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United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. BENMAR TRANSP. & LEASING CORP.(1979) No. 78-1602 Argued: Decided: October 15, 1979 </s> Held: </s> The Court of Appeals erred in vacating the Interstate Commerce Commission's 1977 order granting a contract carrier permit - even though the order was defective for failing to include a finding required by the Interstate Commerce Act - and in refusing to consider instead the Commission's subsequent orders that remedied the defect and that had been entered while the appeal from the 1977 order was still pending. All the interested parties had concurred in the Commission's decision to reopen the administrative proceedings and to hold judicial review of the 1977 order in abeyance, and the Commission's action, which occurred before the Court of Appeals was ready to hear arguments on the merits and before it received the record, did not interfere in any manner with the proceedings in the Court of Appeals. Cf. American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service, 397 U.S. 532 . </s> Certiorari granted; 582 F.2d 246, reversed. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> This case is here on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission authorizing respondent Consolidated Truck Service, Inc., to begin contract carrier service in competition with respondent Benmar Transport & Leasing Corp. The order, issued October 5, 1977, was defective because it lacked the statutorily required finding that it was consistent "`with the public interest and with the national transportation policy,' [ 210] of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 310 [now 49 U.S.C. 10930 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. II)]." Benmar Transport & Leasing Corp. v. ICC, 582 F.2d 246, 248 (1978). </s> The case was argued in the Court of Appeals on July 17, 1978, and decided August 16, 1978. In reaching its decision, [444 U.S. 4, 5] the Court of Appeals refused to consider two subsequent Commission orders that remedied the defect. The first of these orders, issued with the consent of all interested parties almost six months before oral argument in the Court of Appeals, reopened the administrative proceedings and made the finding required by 49 U.S.C. 310. The second, issued on April 18, 1978, denied respondent Benmar's petition for administrative review of the former order. This denial became the Commission's final administrative order and had the effect of reaffirming its earlier decision to grant Consolidated's application for a contract carrier permit. Although the question briefed by the parties in the Court of Appeals was whether the order of April 18, 1978, was supported by the evidence, the Court of Appeals declined to examine the question on the ground that the only order properly before it was the defective order of October 5, 1977. It thus vacated the order and remanded the case for further proceedings. </s> We grant the petition of the United States and the Commission and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. In American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service, 397 U.S. 532 (1970), this Court held that the Commission's broad powers to "reverse, change, or modify" its decisions "are plainly adequate to add to the findings or firm them up as the Commission deems desirable, absent any collision or interference with the District Court." Id., at 541. (The applicable statute then provided for review of orders of the Commission by a three-judge District Court, rather than by the Court of Appeals.) Here the Commission's action did not interfere in any manner with the proceedings in the Court of Appeals, and the Commission acted before that court was ready to hear arguments on the merits and before it received the record. All parties concurred in the Commission's decision to reopen the proceedings and to hold judicial review in abeyance pending the Commission's final disposition of Benmar's petition for administrative review. The position of the [444 U.S. 4, 6] parties - both those who prevailed and those who lost before the Commission - is convincingly demonstrated by the fact that no party has filed a brief in support of the decision reached by the Court of Appeals. </s> As the Court said in American Farm Lines, supra, "[t]he concept `of an indivisible jurisdiction which must be all in one tribunal or all in the other may fit' some statutory schemes, . . . but it does not fit this one." 397 U.S., at 541 . After the abolition of the "forms of action" in the early common law, it was said that "[t]he forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us from their graves." F. Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law 2 (1936). Orderly rules of procedure are necessary in order that appellate review may be had of agency findings, but empty formalities devoid of either substantive or procedural benefit have no place in the normal scheme for administrative review unless Congress chooses to place them there. Here Congress has quite clearly not chosen to impose such virtually meaningless requirements as the Court of Appeals insisted upon. * The judgment of the Court [444 U.S. 4, 7] of Appeals is inconsistent with the spirit which animated American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service, supra, and is therefore </s> Reversed. </s> [Footnote * The dissenting opinion makes the bald statement that "[t]he ICC simply ignored the time limits established by the Court of Appeals and thereby prevented judicial review altogether. The Court of Appeals was not ready to hear argument and had not received the record solely because the ICC did not deign to comply with the scheduling orders of the court." The opinion of the Court of Appeals, Benmar Transport & Leasing Corp. v. ICC, 582 F.2d 246 (1978), lends no support to this statement. Respondent Benmar petitioned the court to set aside the Commission's order but consented along with other interested parties to the reopening of the Commission proceedings before the record had been filed with the Court of Appeals or oral argument heard by that court. After the Commission completed these proceedings, it issued its final order of April 18, 1978 - an order which was reviewable by the Court of Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2341-2349. The Court of Appeals thus was not deprived of its jurisdiction over this dispute. Rather, for no apparent reason other than to insist that the parties comply with an "empty formality," the Court of Appeals stated in its opinion that "when an agency seeks to reconsider its [444 U.S. 4, 7] action, it should move the court to remand or to hold the case in abeyance pending reconsideration by the agency." 582 F.2d, at 248. If such action were necessary in order to avoid genuine interference "in any manner with the proceedings in the Court of Appeals," supra, at 5, we would have a different case. But since we conclude that there was no such interference, the mere fact that application for reopening was not made to the Court of Appeals was not fatal when all interested parties consented to such reopening. See American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service, 397 U.S. 532 (1970). </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting. </s> The Court today summarily reverses the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit setting aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission which concededly lacked a statutorily required finding. The Court takes this action because of two subsequent orders which the Commission issued after the petition for review had been filed with the Court of Appeals without seeking the permission of that court or taking any of the proper procedural steps. I dissent. </s> Since the procedural timetable involved in this case is important to the issue presented, it is necessary to set out more fully the proceedings below. Respondent Benmar Transport & Leasing Corp. filed a petition to review the order of the ICC with the Court of Appeals on January 13, 1978. There were no petitions for reconsideration still pending at that time. Thereafter, counsel for Benmar notified the ICC that the order was patently defective because of the lack of a statutorily required finding. The ICC on its own motion reopened the administrative proceedings on January 27, 1978, and made the necessary statutory finding. The parties then filed a motion in the Court of Appeals for an extension of [444 U.S. 4, 8] time in which to file the record and briefs, and an extension was granted until March 8, 1978. Benmar filed an administrative petition for reconsideration and for reopening the ICC proceedings for receipt of new evidence on February 27, 1978. The reply to this petition was not filed with the ICC by respondent Consolidated Truck Service, Inc., until March 16, 1978 - well after the deadline for filing the record and briefs with the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, on March 7, 1978, the day before the record and briefs were due to be filed with the court, the ICC moved to have further judicial proceedings held in abeyance pending the Commission's disposition of Benmar's petition. Before the Court of Appeals could rule on this motion, the Clerk of that court was informed by Benmar's counsel that as an alternative to the motion to hold the action in abeyance Benmar intended to withdraw the petition for judicial review subject to reinstatement within 30 days after the disposition of the administrative petition. Benmar and the ICC attempted to draft a stipulation to that effect, but no stipulation was ever filed with the court. On April 18, 1978, the ICC denied Benmar's petition for reconsideration, thus making the January 27 order final. Benmar then filed an amended petition for judicial review, and a new schedule for filing the record and briefs had to be established by the court. </s> In light of this procedural history, it is astounding that the majority can assert that "the Commission's action did not interfere in any manner with the proceedings in the Court of Appeals, and the Commission acted before that court was ready to hear arguments on the merits and before it received the record." The ICC simply ignored the time limits established by the Court of Appeals and thereby prevented judicial review altogether. The Court of Appeals was not ready to hear argument and had not received the record solely because the ICC did not deign to comply with the scheduling orders of the court. The Commission did not even bother to move for [444 U.S. 4, 9] a second extension. Such actions by a litigant should not be condoned by this Court. * </s> The case upon which the majority relies so heavily, American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service, 397 U.S. 532 (1970), is not controlling. In that case there was a multi-party proceeding before the ICC. Some carriers filed petitions for reconsideration before the Commission, but while those petitions were pending other carriers filed for judicial review. The District Court temporarily restrained operation of the ICC's original order but did not affect the pending administrative petitions. For those parties whose petitions' were pending before the Commission, there was "no final action" and the ICC retained "jurisdiction to complete the administrative process." Id., at 541 (emphasis added). It was for this reason that "both tribunals have jurisdiction" of the matter. Ibid., quoting Wrather-Alvarez Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 101 U.S. App. D.C. 324, 327, 248 F.2d 646, 649 (1957). This Court stressed, however, that the Commission "did not act inconsistently" with the court but rather had acted "in full harmony with the court's jurisdiction." 397 U.S., at 541 -542. </s> This concurrent-jurisdiction concept is inapplicable in the present case. At the time the petition for judicial review was filed no petitions for reconsideration were pending before the ICC. The administrative proceedings were complete and the [444 U.S. 4, 10] order was final as to all parties. In addition, as already noted, the ICC here did not act in full harmony with the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. Instead, the Commission through its actions simply forced the court to forgo the proper exercise of its jurisdiction until the ICC and the other litigants decided for themselves that they would file the record and briefs. The decision in American Farm Lines was not meant to give the Commission the power to stall judicial review. Contrary to the assertions of the majority, preventing the court from being effectively deprived of jurisdiction through the willful actions of litigants ignoring proper scheduling orders hardly constitutes "empty formalities." Since this Court today encourages the ICC to interfere with the proper exercise of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, I dissent. </s> [Footnote * In light of the conceded facts that after one extension the record and briefs were to be filed with the Court of Appeals by March 8, 1978, and that the ICC did not even render its revised final order until April 18, 1978, much less file the record and briefs, it does not require specific language in the lower court's opinion for this Court to be aware of the necessary conclusion that judicial review was delayed by the actions of the Commission. The majority's repeated assertion that there was no interference with the proceedings in the Court of Appeals simply ignores the procedural history below. The fact that Benmar consented to the ICC's actions does not change the fact that these litigants, like all other litigants, owe an obligation to the court not to delay judicial proceedings. </s> [444 U.S. 4, 11]

United States Supreme Court BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET(1994) No. 93-517 Argued: March 30, 1994Decided: June 27, 1994 </s> [Footnote * Page I Together with No. 93-527, Board of Education of Monroe-Woodbury Central School District v. Grumet et al., and No. 93-539, Attorney General of New York v. Grumet et al., also on certiorari to the same court. </s> The New York Village of Kiryas Joel is a religious enclave of Satmar Hasidim, practitioners of a strict form of Judaism. Its incorporators intentionally drew its boundaries under the State's general village incorporation law to exclude all but Satmars. The village fell within the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District until a special state statute, 1989 N.Y.Laws, ch. 748, carved out a separate district that follows village lines. Although the statute gives a locally elected school board plenary authority over primary and secondary education in the village, the board currently runs only a special education program for handicapped children; other village children attend private religious schools, which do not offer special educational services. Shortly before the new district began operations, respondents and others brought this action claiming, inter alia, that Chapter 748 violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The state trial court granted summary judgment for respondents, and both the intermediate appellate court and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that Chapter 748's primary effect was impermissibly to advance religion. </s> Held: </s> The judgment is affirmed. Page II 81 N.Y. 2d 518, 618 N. E. 2d 94, affirmed. </s> JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts II-B, II-C, and III, concluding that Chapter 748 violates the Establishment Clause. Pp. 14-22. </s> (a) Because the Kiryas Joel Village School District did not receive its new governmental authority simply as one of many communities eligible for equal treatment under a general law, there is no assurance that the next religious community seeking a school district of its own will receive one. The anomalously case-specific creation of this district for a religious community leaves the Court without any way to review such state action for the purpose of safeguarding the principle that government should not prefer one religion to another, or religion to irreligion. Nor can the historical context furnish any reason to suppose that the Satmars are merely one in a series of similarly benefited communities, the special Act in this case being entirely at odds with New York's historical trend. Pp. 14-17. </s> (b) Although the Constitution allows the State to accommodate religious needs by alleviating special burdens, Chapter 748 crosses the line from permissible accommodation to impermissible establishment. There are, however, several alternatives for providing bilingual and bicultural special education to Satmar children that do not implicate the Establishment Clause. The Monroe-Woodbury school district could offer an educationally appropriate program at one of its public schools or at a neutral site near one of the village's parochial schools, and if the state legislature should remain dissatisfied with the local district's responsiveness, it could enact general legislation tightening the mandate to school districts on matters of special education or bilingual and bicultural offerings. Pp. 17-20. </s> JUSTICE SOUTER, joined by JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE STEVENS, and JUSTICE GINSBURG, concluded in Part II-A that, by delegating the State's discretionary authority over public schools to a group defined by its common religion, Chapter 748 brings about an impermissible "fusion" of governmental and religious functions. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126 , 127. That a religious criterion was the defining test is shown by the legislature's undisputed knowledge that the village was exclusively Satmar when the statute was adopted; by the fact that the creation of such a small and specialized school district ran uniquely counter to customary districting practices in the State; and by the district's origin in a special and unusual legislative Act, rather than the State's general laws for school district organization. The result is that the legislature has delegated civic authority on the Page III basis of religious belief, rather than on neutral principles. Pp. 7-14. </s> JUSTICE KENNEDY, agreeing that the Kiryas Joel Village School District violates the Establishment Clause, concluded that the school district's real vice is that New York created it by drawing political boundaries on the basis of religion. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. ___, ___-___. There is more than a fine line between the voluntary association that leads to a political community comprised of people who share a common religious faith, and the forced separation that occurs when the government draws explicit political boundaries on the basis of peoples' faith. In creating the district in question, New York crossed that line. Pp. 8-10. </s> SOUTER, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-B, II-C, and III, in which BLACKMUN, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts II (introduction) and II-A, in which BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring opinion. STEVENS, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BLACKMUN and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and THOMAS, J., joined. </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 1] </s> JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The Village of Kiryas Joel in Orange County, New York, is a religious enclave of Satmar Hasidim, practitioners of a strict form of Judaism. The village fell within the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District until a special state statute passed in 1989 carved out a separate district, following village lines, to serve this distinctive population. 1989 N.Y.Laws, ch. 748. The question is whether the Act creating the separate school district violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, binding on the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Because this unusual act is tantamount to an allocation of political power on a religious </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 2] </s> criterion and neither presupposes nor requires governmental impartiality toward religion, we hold that it violates the prohibition against establishment. </s> I </s> The Satmar Hasidic sect takes its name from the town near the Hungarian and Romanian border where, in the early years of this century, Grand Rebbe Joel Teitelbaum molded the group into a distinct community. After World War II and the destruction of much of European Jewry, the Grand Rebbe and most of his surviving followers moved to the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn, New York. Then, 20 years ago, the Satmars purchased an approved but undeveloped subdivision in the town of Monroe and began assembling the community that has since become the Village of Kiryas Joel. When a zoning dispute arose in the course of settlement, the Satmars presented the Town Board of Monroe with a petition to form a new village within the town, a right that New York's Village Law gives almost any group of residents who satisfy certain procedural niceties. See N.Y. Village Law, Art. 2 (McKinney 1973 and Supp. 1994). Neighbors who did not wish to secede with the Satmars objected strenuously, and, after arduous negotiations, the proposed boundaries of the Village of Kiryas Joel were drawn to include just the 320 acres owned and inhabited entirely by Satmars. The village, incorporated in 1977, has a population of about 8,500 today. Rabbi Aaron Teitelbaum, eldest son of the current Grand Rebbe, serves as the village rov (chief rabbi) and rosh yeshivah (chief authority in the parochial schools). </s> The residents of Kiryas Joel are vigorously religious people who make few concessions to the modern world and go to great lengths to avoid assimilation into it. They interpret the Torah strictly; segregate the sexes outside the home; speak Yiddish as their primary language; eschew television, radio, and English language </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 3] </s> publications; and dress in distinctive ways that include headcoverings and special garments for boys and modest dresses for girls. Children are educated in private religious schools, most boys at the United Talmudic Academy, where they receive a thorough grounding in the Torah and limited exposure to secular subjects, and most girls at Bais Rochel, an affiliated school with a curriculum designed to prepare girls for their roles as wives and mothers. See generally W. Kephart & W. Zellner, Extraordinary Groups (4th ed. 1991); I. Rubin, Satmar, An Island in the City (1972). </s> These schools do not, however, offer any distinctive services to handicapped children, who are entitled under state and federal law to special education services even when enrolled in private schools. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. IV); N.Y.Educ.Law, Art. 89 (McKinney 1981 and Supp. 1994). Starting in 1984 the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District provided such services for the children of Kiryas Joel at an annex to Bais Rochel, but a year later ended that arrangement in response to our decisions in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), and School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985). Children from Kiryas Joel who needed special education (including the deaf, the mentally retarded, and others suffering from a range of physical, mental, or emotional disorders) were then forced to attend public schools outside the village, which their families found highly unsatisfactory. Parents of most of these children withdrew them from the Monroe-Woodbury secular schools, citing "the panic, fear and trauma [the children] suffered in leaving their own community and being with people whose ways were so different," and some sought administrative review of the public school placements. Board of Ed. of Monroe-Woodbury Central School Dist. v. Wieder, 72 N.Y.2d 174, 180-181, 527 N.E.2d 767, 770 (1988). </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 4] </s> Monroe-Woodbury, for its part, sought a declaratory judgment in state court that New York law barred the district from providing special education services outside the district's regular public schools. Id., at 180, 527 N.E.2d at 770. The New York Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that state law left Monroe-Woodbury free to establish a separate school in the village because it gives educational authorities broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate program. Id., at 186-187, 527 N.E.2d at 773. The court added, however, that the Satmars' constitutional right to exercise their religion freely did not require a separate school, since the parents had alleged emotional trauma, not inconsistency with religious practice or doctrine, as the reason for seeking separate treatment. Id., at 189, 527 N.E.2d at 775. </s> By 1989, only one child from Kiryas Joel was attending Monroe-Woodbury's public schools; the village's other handicapped children received privately funded special services or went without. It was then that the New York Legislature passed the statute at issue in this litigation, which provided that the Village of Kiryas Joel "is constituted a separate school district, . . . and shall have and enjoy all the powers and duties of a union free school district. . . ." 1989 N.Y.Laws, ch. 748. 1 The </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 5] </s> statute thus empowered a locally elected board of education to take such action as opening schools and closing them, hiring teachers, prescribing textbooks, establishing disciplinary rules, and raising property taxes to fund operations. N.Y.Educ.Law 1709 (McKinney 1988). In signing the bill into law, Governor Cuomo recognized that the residents of the new school district were "all members of the same religious sect," but said that the bill was "a good faith effort to solve th[e] unique problem" associated with providing special education services to handicapped children in the village. Memorandum filed with Assembly Bill Number 8747 (July 24, 1989), App. 40-41. </s> Although it enjoys plenary legal authority over the elementary and secondary education of all school-aged children in the village, N.Y.Educ.Law 3202 (McKinney 1981 and Supp. 1994), the Kiryas Joel Village School District currently runs only a special education program for handicapped children. The other village children have stayed in their parochial schools, relying on the new school district only for transportation, remedial education, and health and welfare services. If any child without handicap in Kiryas Joel were to seek a public school education, the district would pay tuition to send the child into Monroe-Woodbury or another school district nearby. Under like arrangements, several of the neighboring districts send their handicapped Hasidic children into Kiryas Joel, so that two thirds of the full-time students in the village's public school come from outside. In all, the new district serves just over 40 full-time students, and two or three times that many parochial school students on a part-time basis. </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 6] </s> Several months before the new district began operations, the New York State School Boards Association and respondents Grumet and Hawk brought this action against the State Education Department and various state officials, challenging Chapter 748 under the national and state constitutions as an unconstitutional establishment of religion. 2 The State Supreme Court for Albany County allowed the Kiryas Joel Village School District and the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District to intervene as parties defendant and accepted the parties' stipulation discontinuing the action against the original state defendants, although the Attorney General of New York continued to appear to defend the constitutionality of the statute. See N.Y.Exec.Law 71 (McKinney 1993). On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court ruled for the plaintiffs (respondents here), finding that the statute failed all three prongs of the test in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and was thus unconstitutional under both the National and State Constitutions. Grumet v. New York State Ed. Dept., 151 Misc.2d 60, 579 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1992). </s> A divided Appellate Division affirmed on the ground that Chapter 748 had the primary effect of advancing religion, in violation of both constitutions, 187 App. Div.2d 16, 592 N.Y.S.2d 123 (1992), and the state Court of Appeals affirmed on the federal question, while expressly reserving the state constitutional issue, 81 N.Y.2d 518, 618 N.E.2d 94 (1993). Judge Smith </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 7] </s> wrote for the court in concluding that because both the district's public school population and its school board would be exclusively Hasidic, the statute created a "symbolic union of church and state" that was "likely to be perceived by the Satmarer Hasidim as an endorsement of their religious choices, or by nonadherents as a disapproval" of their own. Id., at 529, 618 N.E.2d at 100. As a result, said the majority, the statute's primary effect was an impermissible advancement of religious belief. In a concurring opinion, Judge Hancock found the effect purposeful, so that the statute violated the first as well as the second prong of Lemon. Id., at 540, 618 N.E.2d at 107. Chief Judge Kaye took a different tack, applying the strict scrutiny we have prescribed for statutes singling out a particular religion for special privileges or burdens; she found Chapter 748 invalid as an unnecessarily broad response to a narrow problem, since it creates a full school district instead of simply prescribing a local school for the village's handicapped children. Id., at 532, 618 N.E.2d at 102 (concurring opinion). In dissent, Judge Bellacosa objected that the new district was created to enable the village's handicapped children to receive a secular, public school education; that this was, indeed, its primary effect; and that any attenuated benefit to religion was a reasonable accommodation of both religious and cultural differences. Id., at 550-551, 618 N.E.2d at 113. </s> We stayed the mandate of the Court of Appeals, 509 U.S. __ (1993), and granted certiorari, 510 U.S. ___ (1993). </s> II </s> "A proper respect for both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses compels the State to pursue a course of `neutrality' toward religion," Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 , </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 8] </s> 792-793 (1973), favoring neither one religion over others nor religious adherents collectively over nonadherents. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). Chapter 748, the statute creating the Kiryas Joel Village School District, departs from this constitutional command by delegating the State's discretionary authority over public schools to a group defined by its character as a religious community, in a legal and historical context that gives no assurance that governmental power has been or will be exercised neutrally. </s> Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982), provides an instructive comparison with the litigation before us. There, the Court was requested to strike down a Massachusetts statute granting religious bodies veto power over applications for liquor licenses. Under the statute, the governing body of any church, synagogue, or school located within 500 feet of an applicant's premises could, simply by submitting written objection, prevent the Alcohol Beverage Control Commission from issuing a license. Id., at 117. In spite of the State's valid interest in protecting churches, schools, and like institutions from "`the hurly-burly' associated with liquor outlets," id., at 123 (internal quotation marks omitted), the Court found that in two respects the statute violated "the wholesome `neutrality' of which this Court's cases speak," School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). The Act brought about a "`fusion of governmental and religious functions'" by delegating "important, discretionary governmental powers" to religious bodies, thus impermissibly entangling government and religion. 459 U.S., at 126 , 127 (quoting Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, supra, at 222); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 613. And it lacked "any `effective means of guaranteeing' that the delegated power `[would] be used exclusively for secular, neutral, and nonideological purposes,'" 459 U.S., at 125 (quoting Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 9] </s> supra, at 780); this, along with the "significant symbolic benefit to religion" associated with "the mere appearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority by Church and State," led the Court to conclude that the statute had a "`primary' and `principal' effect of advancing religion," 459 U.S., at 125 -126; see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612. Comparable constitutional problems inhere in the statute before us. </s> A </s> Larkin presented an example of united civic and religious authority, an establishment rarely found in such straightforward form in modern America, cf. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 263 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part), and a violation of "the core rationale underlying the Establishment Clause," 459 U.S., at 126 . See also Allegheny County v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 590 -591 (1989) (Establishment Clause prevents delegating governmental power to religious group); id., at 660 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (same); Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15 -16 (1947) (Establishment Clause prevents State from "participat[ing] in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa"); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 493 -494 (1961) (same). </s> The Establishment Clause problem presented by Chapter 748 is more subtle, but it resembles the issue raised in Larkin to the extent that the earlier case teaches that a State may not delegate its civic authority to a group chosen according to a religious criterion. Authority over public schools belongs to the State, N.Y. Const., Art. XI, 1 (McKinney 1987), and cannot be delegated to a local school district defined by the State in order to grant political control to a religious group. </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 10] </s> What makes this litigation different from Larkin is the delegation here of civic power to the "qualified voters of the village of Kiryas Joel," 1989 N.Y.Laws, ch. 748, as distinct from a religious leader such as the village rov, or an institution of religious government like the formally constituted parish council in Larkin. In light of the circumstances of this case, however, this distinction turns out to lack constitutional significance. </s> It is, first, not dispositive that the recipients of state power in this case are a group of religious individuals united by common doctrine, not the group's leaders or officers. Although some school district franchise is common to all voters, the State's manipulation of the franchise for this district limited it to Satmars, giving the sect exclusive control of the political subdivision. In the circumstances of this case, the difference between thus vesting state power in the members of a religious group as such instead of the officers of its sectarian organization is one of form, not substance. It is true that religious people (or groups of religious people) cannot be denied the opportunity to exercise the rights of citizens simply because of their religious affiliations or commitments, for such a disability would violate the right to religious free exercise, see McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), which the First Amendment guarantees as certainly as it bars any establishment. But McDaniel, which held that a religious individual could not, because of his religious activities, be denied the right to hold political office, is not in point here. That individuals who happen to be religious may hold public office does not mean that a state may deliberately delegate discretionary power to an individual, institution, or community on the ground of religious identity. If New York were to delegate civic authority to "the Grand Rebbe," Larkin would obviously require invalidation (even though under McDaniel the Grand Rebbe may run for, and serve on his local school board), and the same </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 11] </s> is true if New York delegates political authority by reference to religious belief. Where "fusion" is an issue, the difference lies in the distinction between a government's purposeful delegation on the basis of religion and a delegation on principles neutral to religion, to individuals whose religious identities are incidental to their receipt of civic authority. </s> Of course, Chapter 748 delegates power not by express reference to the religious belief of the Satmar community, but to residents of the "territory of the village of Kiryas Joel." 1989 N.Y.Laws, ch. 748. Thus the second (and arguably more important) distinction between this case and Larkin is the identification here of the group to exercise civil authority in terms not expressly religious. But our analysis does not end with the text of the statute at issue, see Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. ___, ___ (1993) (slip op., at 12); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 -61 (1985); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 -342 (1960), and the context here persuades us that Chapter 748 effectively identifies these recipients of governmental authority by reference to doctrinal adherence, even though it does not do so expressly. We find this to be the better view of the facts because of the way the boundary lines of the school district divide residents according to religious affiliation, under the terms of an unusual and special legislative act. </s> It is undisputed that those who negotiated the village boundaries when applying the general village incorporation statute drew them so as to exclude all but Satmars, and that the New York Legislature was well aware that the village remained exclusively Satmar in 1989 when it adopted Chapter 748. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 93-517, p. 20; Brief for Respondents 11. The significance of this fact to the state legislature is indicated by the further fact that carving out the village school district ran counter to customary districting </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 12] </s> practices in the State. Indeed, the trend in New York is not toward dividing school districts but toward consolidating them. The thousands of small common school districts laid out in the early 19th century have been combined and recombined, first into union free school districts and then into larger central school districts, until only a tenth as many remain today. Univ. of State of N.Y. and State Education Dept., School District Reorganization, Law Pamphlet 14, pp. 8-12 (1962) (hereinafter Law Pamphlet); Woodward, N.Y. State Education Dept., Legal and Organizational History of School District Reorganization in New York State 10-11 (Aug. 1986). Most of these cover several towns, many of them cross county boundaries, and only one remains precisely coterminous with an incorporated village. Law Pamphlet at 24. The object of the State's practice of consolidation is the creation of districts large enough to provide a comprehensive education at affordable cost, which is thought to require at least 500 pupils for a combined junior-senior high school. Univ. of State of N.Y. and State Education Dept., Master Plan for School District Reorganization in New York State 10-11 (rev. ed. 1958). 3 The Kiryas Joel Village School District, in contrast, has only 13 local, full-time students in all (even including out-of-area and part-time students leaves the number under 200), and in offering only special education and remedial programs it makes no pretense to be a full-service district. </s> The origin of the district in a special act of the legislature, rather than the State's general laws governing school district reorganization, 4 is likewise anomalous. </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 13] </s> Although the legislature has established some 20 existing school districts by special act, all but one of these are districts in name only, having been designed to be run by private organizations serving institutionalized children. They have neither tax bases nor student populations of their own but serve children placed by other school districts or public agencies. See N.Y.Educ.Law 3601-a (Statutory Notes), 4001 and 4005 (McKinney Supp. 1994); Law Pamphlet at 18 ("These districts are school districts only by way of a legal fiction"). The one school district petitioners point to that was formed by special act of the legislature to serve a whole community, as this one was, is a district formed for a new town, much larger and more heterogeneous than this village, being built on land that straddled two existing districts. See 1972 N.Y.Laws, ch. 928 (authorizing Gananda School District). Thus the Kiryas Joel Village School District is exceptional to the point of singularity, as the only district coming to our notice that the legislature carved from a single existing district to serve local residents. Clearly this district "cannot be seen as the fulfillment of [a village's] destiny as an independent governmental entity," United States v. Scotland Neck Bd. of Ed., 407 U.S. 484, 492 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring in result). 5 </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 14] </s> Because the district's creation ran uniquely counter to state practice, following the lines of a religious community where the customary and neutral principles would not have dictated the same result, we have good reasons to treat this district as the reflection of a religious criterion for identifying the recipients of civil authority. Not even the special needs of the children in this community can explain the legislature's unusual Act, for the State could have responded to the concerns of the Satmar parents without implicating the Establishment Clause, as we explain in some detail further on. We therefore find the legislature's Act to be substantially equivalent to defining a political subdivision and hence the qualification for its franchise by a religious test, resulting in a purposeful and forbidden "fusion of governmental and religious functions." Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S., at 126 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 6 </s> B </s> The fact that this school district was created by a special and unusual Act of the legislature also gives reason for concern whether the benefit received by the </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 15] </s> Satmar community is one that the legislature will provide equally to other religious (and nonreligious) groups. This is the second malady the Larkin Court identified in the law before it, the absence of an "effective means of guaranteeing" that governmental power will be and has been neutrally employed. Id., at 125 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But whereas, in Larkin, it was religious groups the Court thought might exercise civic power to advance the interests of religion (or religious adherents), here the threat to neutrality occurs at an antecedent stage. </s> The fundamental source of constitutional concern here is that the legislature itself may fail to exercise governmental authority in a religiously neutral way. The anomalously case-specific nature of the legislature's exercise of state authority in creating this district for a religious community leaves the Court without any direct way to review such state action for the purpose of safeguarding a principle at the heart of the Establishment Clause, that government should not prefer one religion to another, or religion to irreligion. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S., at 52 -54; Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S., at 104 ; School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S., at 216 -217. Because the religious community of Kiryas Joel did not receive its new governmental authority simply as one of many communities eligible for equal treatment under a general law, 7 we have no assurance that the next similarly situated group seeking a school district of its own will receive one; unlike an administrative agency's denial of an exemption from a generally applicable law, which "would be entitled to a judicial audience," Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Admin., </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 16] </s> 878 F.2d 1458, 1461 (CADC 1989) (R. B. GINSBURG, J.), a legislature's failure to enact a special law is itself unreviewable. Nor can the historical context in this case furnish us with any reason to suppose that the Satmars are merely one in a series of communities receiving the benefit of special school district laws. Early on in the development of public education in New York, the State rejected highly localized school districts for New York City when they were promoted as a way to allow separate schooling for Roman Catholic children. R. Church & M. Sedlak, Education in the United States 162, 167-169 (1976). And in more recent history, the special Act in this case stands alone. See supra, at 13. </s> The general principle that civil power must be exercised in a manner neutral to religion is one the Larkin Court recognized, although it did not discuss the specific possibility of legislative favoritism along religious lines because the statute before it delegated state authority to any religious group assembled near the premises of an applicant for a liquor license, see 459 U.S., at 120 -121, n. 3, as well as to a further category of institutions not identified by religion. But the principle is well grounded in our case law, as we have frequently relied explicitly on the general availability of any benefit provided religious groups or individuals in turning aside Establishment Clause challenges. In Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970), for example, the Court sustained a property tax exemption for religious properties in part because the State had "not singled out one particular church or religious group or even churches as such," but had exempted "a broad class of property owned by nonprofit, quasi-public corporations." Accord, id., at 696-697 (opinion of Harlan, J.). And Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 608 (1988), upheld a statute enlisting a "wide spectrum of organizations" in addressing adolescent sexuality because the law was "neutral with respect to the grantee's status as a </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 17] </s> sectarian or purely secular institution." 8 See also Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (striking down sales tax exemption exclusively for religious publications); id., at 14-15 (plurality opinion); id., at 27-28 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 711 (1985) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment) (statute impermissibly "singles out Sabbath observers for special . . . protection without according similar accommodation to ethical and religious beliefs and practices of other private employees"); cf. Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services for Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 492 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring). Here the benefit flows only to a single sect, but aiding this single, small religious group causes no less a constitutional problem than would follow from aiding a sect with more members or religion as a whole, see Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 -246 (1982), and we are forced to conclude that the State of New York has violated the Establishment Clause. </s> C </s> In finding that Chapter 748 violates the requirement of governmental neutrality by extending the benefit of a special franchise, we do not deny that the Constitution allows the state to accommodate religious needs by alleviating special burdens. Our cases leave no doubt that in commanding neutrality the Religion Clauses do not require the government to be oblivious to impositions that legitimate exercises of state power may place on religious belief and practice. Rather, there is "ample </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 18] </s> room under the Establishment Clause for "benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference," Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Later-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra, at 673); "government may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and . . . may do so without violating the Establishment Clause." Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144 -145 (1987). The fact that Chapter 748 facilitates the practice of religion is not what renders it an unconstitutional establishment. Cf. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. ___, ___ (1992) (SOUTER, J., concurring) (slip op., at 19) ("That government must remain neutral in matters of religion does not foreclose it from ever taking religion into account"); School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S., at 299 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("[H]ostility, not neutrality, would characterize the refusal to provide chaplains and places of worship for prisoners and soldiers cut off by the State from all civilian opportunities for public communion"). </s> But accommodation is not a principle without limits, and what petitioners seek is an adjustment to the Satmars' religiously grounded preferences 9 that our cases do not countenance. Prior decisions have allowed religious communities and institutions to pursue their own interests free from governmental interference, see Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, supra, at 336-337 (government may allow religious organizations to favor their own adherents in hiring, even for secular </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 19] </s> employment); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (government may allow public schools to release students during the school day to receive off-site religious education), but we have never hinted that an otherwise unconstitutional delegation of political power to a religious group could be saved as a religious accommodation. Petitioners' proposed accommodation singles out a particular religious sect for special treatment, 10 and whatever the limits of permissible legislative accommodations may be, compare Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, supra (striking down law exempting only religious publications from taxation), with Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, supra (upholding law exempting religious employers from Title VII), it is clear that neutrality as among religions must be honored. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. at 244-246. </s> This conclusion does not, however, bring the Satmar parents, the Monroe-Woodbury school district, or the State of New York to the end of the road in seeking ways to respond to the parents' concerns. Just as the Court in Larkin observed that the State's interest in protecting religious meeting places could be "readily accomplished by other means," 459 U.S., at 124 , there are several alternatives here for providing bilingual and bicultural special education to Satmar children. Such services can perfectly well be offered to village children through the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District. Since the Satmars do not claim that separatism is religiously mandated, their children may receive bilingual and bicultural instruction at a public school already run by the Monroe-Woodbury district. Or if the educationally appropriate offering by Monroe-Woodbury should turn out to be a separate program of bilingual and </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 20] </s> bicultural education at a neutral site near one of the village's parochial schools, this Court has already made it clear that no Establishment Clause difficulty would inhere in such a scheme, administered in accordance with neutral principles that would not necessarily confine special treatment to Satmars. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S., at 247 -248. </s> To be sure, the parties disagree on whether the services Monroe-Woodbury actually provided in the late 1980's were appropriately tailored to the needs of Satmar children, but this dispute is of only limited relevance to the question whether such services could have been provided, had adjustments been made. As we understand New York law, parents who are dissatisfied with their handicapped child's program have recourse through administrative review proceedings (a process that appears not to have run its course prior to resort to Chapter 748, see Board of Ed. of Monroe-Woodbury Central School Dist. v. Wieder, 572 N.Y.2d at 180, 527 N.E.2d at 770), and if the New York Legislature should remain dissatisfied with the responsiveness of the local school district, it could certainly enact general legislation tightening the mandate to school districts on matters of special education or bilingual and bicultural offerings. </s> III </s> Justice Cardozo once cast the dissenter as "the gladiator making a last stand against the lions." B. Cardozo, Law and Literature 34 (1931). JUSTICE SCALIA's dissent is certainly the work of a gladiator, but he thrusts at lions of his own imagining. We do not disable a religiously homogeneous group from exercising political power conferred on it without regard to religion. Cf. post, at 5-6. Unlike the states of Utah and New Mexico (which were laid out according to traditional political methodologies taking account of lines of latitude and longitude and topographical features, see F. Van </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 21] </s> Zandt, Boundaries of the United States and the Several States 250-257 (1966)), the reference line chosen for the Kiryas Joel Village School District was one purposely drawn to separate Satmars from non-Satmars. Nor do we impugn the motives of the New York Legislature, cf. post, at 7-10, which no doubt intended to accommodate the Satmar community without violating the Establishment Clause; we simply refuse to ignore that the method it chose is one that aids a particular religious community, as such, see App. 19-20 (Assembly sponsor thrice describes the Act's beneficiaries as the "Hasidic" children or community), rather than all groups similarly interested in separate schooling. The dissent protests it is novel to insist "up front" that a statute not tailor its benefits to apply only to one religious group, post, at 17-19, but, if this were so, Texas Monthly, Inc. would have turned out differently, see 489 U.S., at 14 -15 (plurality opinion); id., at 28 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment), and language in Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, 397 U.S., at 673 , and Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S., at 608 , purporting to rely on the breadth of the statutory schemes would have been mere surplusage. Indeed, under the dissent's theory, if New York were to pass a law providing school buses only for children attending Christian day schools, we would be constrained to uphold the statute against Establishment Clause attack until faced by a request from a non-Christian family for equal treatment under the patently unequal law. Cf. Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U.S., at 17 (upholding school bus service provided all pupils). And to end on the point with which JUSTICE SCALIA begins, the license he takes in suggesting that the Court holds the Satmar sect to be New York's established church, see post, at 1, is only one symptom of his inability to accept the fact that this Court has long held that the First Amendment reaches more than </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 22] </s> classic, 18th century establishments. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S., at 492 -495. </s> Our job, of course would be easier if the dissent's position had prevailed with the Framers and with this Court over the years. An Establishment Clause diminished to the dimensions acceptable to JUSTICE SCALIA could be enforced by a few simple rules, and our docket would never see cases requiring the application of a principle like neutrality toward religion as well as among religious sects. But that would be as blind to history as to precedent, and the difference between JUSTICE SCALIA and the Court accordingly turns on the Court's recognition that the Establishment Clause does comprehend such a principle and obligates courts to exercise the judgment necessary to apply it. </s> In this case, we are clearly constrained to conclude that the statute before us fails the test of neutrality. It delegates a power this Court has said "ranks at the very apex of the function of a State," Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972), to an electorate defined by common religious belief and practice, in a manner that fails to foreclose religious favoritism. It therefore crosses the line from permissible accommodation to impermissible establishment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York is accordingly </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The statute provides in full: "Section 1. The territory of the village of Kiryas Joel in the town of Monroe, Orange county, on the date when this act shall take effect, shall be and hereby is constituted a separate school district, and shall be known as the Kiryas Joel village school district and shall have and enjoy all the powers and duties of a union free school district under the provisions of the education law. </s> 2. Such district shall be under the control of a board of education, which shall be composed of from five to nine members elected by the qualified voters of the village of Kiryas Joel, said members to serve for terms not exceeding five years. </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 5] </s> 3. This act shall take effect on the first day of July next succeeding the date on which it shall have become a law." </s> [Footnote 2 Messrs. Grumet and Hawk sued in both their individual capacities and as officers of the State School Boards Association, but New York's Appellate Division ruled that the Association and its officers lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of Chapter 748. 187 App. Div.2d 16, 19, 592 N.Y.S.2d 123, 126 (1992). Thus, as the case comes to us, respondents are simply citizen taxpayers. See N.Y. State Fin.Law 123 (McKinney 1989). </s> [Footnote 3 The Commissioner of Education updates this Master Plan as school districts consolidate, see N.Y.Educ.Law 314 (McKinney 1988), but has not published a superseding version. </s> [Footnote 4 State law allows consolidation on the initiative of a district superintendent, N.Y.Educ.Law 1504 (McKinney 1988), local </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 13] </s> voters, 1510-1513, 1522-1524, 1902, or the Commissioner of Education, 1526, 1801-1803-a, depending on the circumstances. It also authorizes the district superintendent to "organize a new school district," 1504, which may allow secession from an existing district, but this general law played no part in the creation of the Kiryas Joel Village School District. </s> [Footnote 5 Although not dispositive in this facial challenge, the pattern of interdistrict transfers, proposed and presently occurring, tends to confirm that religion, rather than geography, is the organizing principle for this district. Cf. United States v. Scotland Neck Bd. of Ed., 407 U.S. 484, 490 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring in result). When Chapter 748 was passed, the understanding was that, if a </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 14] </s> non-Hasidic child were to move into the Village, the district would pay tuition to send the child to one of the neighboring school districts, since Kiryas Joel would have no regular education program. Although the need for such a transfer has not yet arisen, there are 20 Hasidic children with handicapping conditions who transfer into Kiryas Joel's school district from the nearby East Ramapo and Monroe-Woodbury school districts. </s> [Footnote 6 Because it is the unusual circumstances of this district's creation that persuade us the State has employed a religious criterion for delegating political power, this conclusion does not imply that any political subdivision that is coterminous with the boundaries of a religiously homogeneous community suffers the same constitutional infirmity. The district in this case is distinguishable from one whose boundaries are derived according to neutral historical and geographic criteria, but whose population happens to comprise coreligionists. </s> [Footnote 7 This contrasts with the process by which the Village of Kiryas Joel itself was created, involving, as it did, the application of a neutral state law designed to give almost any group of residents the right to incorporate. See ante, at 2. </s> [Footnote 8 The Court used "sectarian" to refer to organizations akin to this school district in that they were operated in a secular manner but had a religious affiliation; it recognized that government aid may not flow to an institution "`in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission,'" 487 U.S., at 610 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973)). </s> [Footnote 9 The Board of Education of the Kiryas Joel Village School District explains that the Satmars prefer to live together "to facilitate individual religious observance and maintain social, cultural and religious values," but that it is not "`against their religion' to interact with others." Brief for Petitioner in No. 93-517, p. 4, n. 1. </s> [Footnote 10 In this respect, it goes beyond even Larkin, transferring political authority to a single religious group, rather than to any church or school. </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 1] </s> JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring. </s> For the reasons stated by JUSTICE SOUTER and JUSTICE STEVENS, whose opinions I join, I agree that the New York statute under review violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. I write separately only to note my disagreement with any suggestion that today's decision signals a departure from the principles described in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The opinion of the Court (and of the plurality with respect to Part II-A) relies upon several decisions, including Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982), that explicitly rested on the criteria set forth in Lemon. Indeed, the two principles on which the </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 2] </s> opinion bases its conclusion that the legislative act is constitutionally invalid essentially are the second and third Lemon criteria. See ante, at 8-9; Larkin, 459 U.S., at 126 -127 (finding "a fusion of governmental and religious functions" under Lemon's "entanglement" prong); id., at 125-126 (finding a lack of any "effective means of guaranteeing" that governmental power will be neutrally employed under Lemon's "principal or primary effect" prong). </s> I have no quarrel with the observation of JUSTICE O'CONNOR, post, at 8, that the application of constitutional principles, including those articulated in Lemon, must be sensitive to particular contexts. But I remain convinced of the general validity of the basic principles stated in Lemon, which have guided this Court's Establishment Clause decisions in over 30 cases. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 , ___, n. 4 (1992) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring). </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 1] </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE GINSBURG join, concurring. </s> New York created a special school district for the members of the Satmar religious sect in response to parental concern that children suffered "panic, fear and trauma" when "leaving their own community and being with people whose ways were so different." Ante, at 3. To meet those concerns, the State could have taken steps to alleviate the children's fear by teaching their schoolmates to be tolerant and respectful of Satmar customs. Action of that kind would raise no constitutional concerns and would further the strong public </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 2] </s> interest in promoting diversity and understanding in the public schools. </s> Instead, the State responded with a solution that affirmatively supports a religious sect's interest in segregating itself and preventing its children from associating with their neighbors. The isolation of these children, while it may protect them from "panic, fear and trauma," also unquestionably increased the likelihood that they would remain within the fold, faithful adherents of their parents' religious faith. By creating a school district that is specifically intended to shield children from contact with others who have "different ways," the State provided official support to cement the attachment of young adherents to a particular faith. It is telling, in this regard, that two thirds of the school's full-time students are Hasidic handicapped children from outside the village; the Kiryas Joel school thus serves a population far wider than the village - one defined less by geography than by religion. See ante, at 5, 13-14, n. 5. </s> Affirmative state action in aid of segregation of this character is unlike the evenhanded distribution of a public benefit or service, a "release time" program for public school students involving no public premises or funds, or a decision to grant an exemption from a burdensome general rule. It is, I believe, fairly characterized as establishing, rather than merely accommodating, religion. For this reason, as well as the reasons set out in JUSTICE SOUTER's opinion, I am persuaded that the New York law at issue in these cases violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 1] </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. </s> I </s> The question at the heart of this case is: what may the government do, consistently with the Establishment Clause, to accommodate people's religious beliefs? The history of the Satmars in Orange County is especially instructive on this, because they have been involved in at least three accommodation problems, of which this case is only the most recent. </s> The first problem related to zoning law, and arose shortly after the Satmars moved to the town of Monroe </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 2] </s> in the early 1970's. Though the area in which they lived was zoned for single-family homes, the Satmars subdivided their houses into several apartments, apparently in part because of their traditionally close-knit extended family groups. The Satmars also used basements of some of their buildings as schools and synagogues, which, according to the town, was also a zoning violation. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1976, 1, p. 53, col. 1; App. 10-14. </s> Fortunately for the Satmars, New York state law had a way of accommodating their concerns. New York allows virtually any group of residents to incorporate their own village, with broad powers of self-government. The Satmars followed this course, incorporating their community as the village of Kiryas Joel, and their zoning problems, at least, were solved. Ante, at 2. </s> The Satmars' next need for accommodation arose in the mid-1980's. Satmar education is pervasively religious, and is provided through entirely private schooling. But though the Satmars could afford to educate most of their children, educating the handicapped is a difficult and expensive business. Moreover, it is a business that the government generally funds, with tax moneys that come from the Satmars as well as from everyone else. In 1984, therefore, the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District began providing handicapped education services to the Satmar children at an annex to the Satmar religious school. The curriculum and the environment of the services were entirely secular. They were the same sort of services available to handicapped students at secular public and private schools throughout the country. </s> In 1985, however, we held that publicly funded classes on religious school premises violate the Establishment Clause. School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 ; Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 . Based on these decisions, the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 3] </s> stopped providing services at the Kiryas Joel site, and required the Satmar children to attend public schools outside the village. This, however, was not a satisfactory arrangement for the Satmars, in part because the Satmar children had a hard time dealing with immersion in the non-Satmar world. By 1989, only one handicapped Kiryas Joel child was going to the public school - the others were getting either privately funded services or no special education at all. Though the Satmars tried to reach some other arrangement with the Monroe-Woodbury School District, the problem was not resolved. </s> In response to these difficulties came the third accommodation. In 1989, the New York Legislature passed a statute to create a special school district covering only the village of Kiryas Joel. This school district could, of course, only operate secular schools, and the Satmars therefore wanted to use it only to provide education for the handicapped. But because the district provides this education in the village, Satmar children could take advantage of the district's services without encountering the problems they faced when they were sent out to Monroe-Woodbury schools. It is the constitutionality of the law creating this district that we are now called on to decide. </s> II </s> The three situations outlined above shed light on an important aspect of accommodation under the First Amendment: religious needs can be accommodated through laws that are neutral with regard to religion. The Satmars' living arrangements were accommodated by their right - a right shared with all other communities, religious or not, throughout New York - to incorporate themselves as a village. From 1984 to 1985, the Satmar handicapped children's educational needs were accommodated by special education programs like those </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 4] </s> available to all handicapped children, religious or not. Other examples of such accommodations abound: the Constitution itself, for instance, accommodates the religious desires of those who were opposed to oaths by allowing any officeholder - of any religion, or none - to take either an oath of office or an affirmation. Art. II, 1, cl. 8; Art. VI, cl. 3; see also Amdt. 4. Likewise, the selective service laws provide exemptions for conscientious objectors whether or not the objection is based on religious beliefs. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 356 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result). </s> We have time and again held that the government generally may not treat people differently based on the God or gods they worship, or don't worship. "The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another." Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). "Just as we subject to the most exacting scrutiny laws that make classifications based on race . . . so too we strictly scrutinize governmental classifications based on religion." Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 , n. 3 (1990). "[T]he Establishment Clause prohibits government from abandoning secular purposes . . . to favor the adherents of any sect or religious organization." Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971). "Neither [the State nor the Federal Governments] can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against nonbelievers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs." Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (footnote omitted). See also Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 8 -9 (1989) (plurality opinion); id., at 26, 28-29 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment); Welsh, supra, at 356 (Harlan, J., concurring); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 5] </s> City, 397 U.S. 664, 696 -697 (1970) (opinion of Harlan, J.). </s> This emphasis on equal treatment is, I think, an eminently sound approach. In my view, the Religion Clauses - the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, the Religious Test Clause, Art. VI, cl. 3, and the Equal Protection Clause as applied to religion - all speak with one voice on this point: absent the most unusual circumstances, one's religion ought not affect one's legal rights or duties or benefits. As I have previously noted, "the Establishment Clause is infringed when the government makes adherence to religion relevant to a person's standing in the political community."Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment). </s> That the government is acting to accommodate religion should generally not change this analysis. What makes accommodation permissible, even praiseworthy, is not that the government is making life easier for some particular religious group as such. Rather, it is that the government is accommodating a deeply held belief. Accommodations may thus justify treating those who share this belief differently from those who do not; but they do not justify discriminations based on sect. A state law prohibiting the consumption of alcohol may exempt sacramental wines, but it may not exempt sacramental wine use by Catholics, but not by Jews. A draft law may exempt conscientious objectors, but it may not exempt conscientious objectors whose objections are based on theistic belief (such as Quakers) as opposed to nontheistic belief (such as Buddhists) or atheistic belief. See Welsh, supra, at 356 (Harlan, J., concurring in result); see also id., at 335-344 (reaching this result on statutory interpretation grounds); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (same). The Constitution permits "nondiscriminatory religious practice exemption[s]," Smith, supra, at 890 (emphasis added), not sectarian ones. </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 6] </s> III </s> I join Parts I, II-B, II-C, and III of the Court's opinion because I think this law, rather than being a general accommodation, singles out a particular religious group for favorable treatment. The Court's analysis of the history of this law and of the surrounding statutory scheme, ante, at 11-13, persuades me of this. </s> On its face, this statute benefits one group - the residents of Kiryas Joel. Because this benefit was given to this group based on its religion, it seems proper to treat it as a legislatively drawn religious classification. I realize this is a close question, because the Satmars may be the only group who currently need this particular accommodation. The legislature may well be acting without any favoritism, so that if another group came to ask for a similar district, the group might get it on the same terms as the Satmars. But the nature of the legislative process makes it impossible to be sure of this. A legislature, unlike the judiciary or many administrative decisionmakers, has no obligation to respond to any group's requests. A group petitioning for a law may never get a definite response, or may get a "no" based not on the merits, but on the press of other business or the lack of an influential sponsor. Such a legislative refusal to act would not normally be reviewable by a court. Under these circumstances, it seems dangerous to validate what appears to me a clear religious preference. </s> Our invalidation of this statute in no way means that the Satmars' needs cannot be accommodated. There is nothing improper about a legislative intention to accommodate a religious group, so long as it is implemented through generally applicable legislation. New York may, for instance, allow all villages to operate their own school districts. If it does not want to act so broadly, it may set forth neutral criteria that a village must meet to have a school district of its own; these criteria can then be applied by a state agency, and the decision </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 7] </s> would then be reviewable by the judiciary. A district created under a generally applicable scheme would be acceptable even though it coincides with a village which was consciously created by its voters as an enclave for their religious group. I do not think the Court's opinion holds the contrary. </s> I also think there is one other accommodation that would be entirely permissible: the 1984 scheme, which was discontinued because of our decision in Aguilar. The Religion Clauses prohibit the government from favoring religion, but they provide no warrant for discriminating against religion. All handicapped children are entitled by law to government-funded special education. See, e.g., Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. If the government provides this education on-site at public schools and at nonsectarian private schools, it is only fair that it provide it on-site at sectarian schools as well. </s> I thought this to be true in Aguilar, see 473 U.S., at 421 -431 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting), and I still believe it today. The Establishment Clause does not demand hostility to religion, religious ideas, religious people, or religious schools. Cf. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. ___ (1993). It is the Court's insistence on disfavoring religion in Aguilar that led New York to favor it here. The court should, in a proper case, be prepared to reconsider Aguilar, in order to bring our Establishment Clause jurisprudence back to what I think is the proper track-government impartiality, not animosity, towards religion. </s> IV </s> One aspect of the Court's opinion in this case is worth noting: Like the opinions in two recent cases, Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. ___ (1992); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. ___ (1993), and the case I think is most relevant to this one, Larson v. Valente, </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 8] </s> 456 U.S. 228 (1982), the Court's opinion does not focus on the Establishment Clause test we set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). </s> It is always appealing to look for a single test, a Grand Unified Theory that would resolve all the cases that may arise under a particular clause. There is, after all, only one Establishment Clause, one Free Speech Clause, one Fourth Amendment, one Equal Protection Clause. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (STEVENS, J., concurring). </s> But the same constitutional principle may operate very differently in different contexts. We have, for instance, no one Free Speech Clause test. We have different tests for content-based speech restrictions, for content-neutral speech restrictions, for restrictions imposed by the government acting as employer, for restrictions in nonpublic fora, and so on. This simply reflects the necessary recognition that the interests relevant to the Free Speech Clause inquiry - personal liberty, an informed citizenry, government efficiency, public order, and so on - are present in different degrees in each context. </s> And setting forth a unitary test for a broad set of cases may sometimes do more harm than good. Any test that must deal with widely disparate situations risks being so vague as to be useless. I suppose one can say that the general test for all free speech cases is "a regulation is valid if the interests asserted by the government are stronger than the interests of the speaker and the listeners," but this would hardly be a serviceable formulation. Similarly, Lemon has, with some justification, been criticized on this score. </s> Moreover, shoehorning new problems into a test that does not reflect the special concerns raised by those problems tends to deform the language of the test. Relatively simple phrases like "primary effect . . . that neither advances nor inhibits religion" and "entanglement," Lemon, supra, at 612-613, acquire more and </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 9] </s> more complicated definitions which stray ever further from their literal meaning. Distinctions are drawn between statutes whose effect is to advance religion and statutes whose effect is to allow religious organizations to advance religion. See, e.g., Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336 -337 (1987); id., at 347 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment) (discussing this point). Assertions are made that authorizing churches to veto liquor sales in surrounding areas "can be seen as having a `primary' and `principal' effect of advancing religion." Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125 -126 (1982). "Entanglement" is discovered in public employers monitoring the performance of public employees - surely a proper enough function - on parochial school premises, and in the public employees cooperating with the school on class scheduling and other administrative details. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S., at 413 . Alternatives to Lemon suffer from a similar failing when they lead us to find "coercive pressure" to pray when a school asks listeners - with no threat of legal sanctions - to stand or remain silent during a graduation prayer. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. ___, ___ (1992) (slip op., at 13). Some of the results and perhaps even some of the reasoning in these cases may have been right. I joined two of the cases cited above, Larkin and Lee, and continue to believe they were correctly decided. But I think it is more useful to recognize the relevant concerns in each case on their own terms, rather than trying to squeeze them into language that does not really apply to them. </s> Finally, another danger to keep in mind is that the bad test may drive out the good. Rather than taking the opportunity to derive narrower, more precise tests from the case law, courts tend to continually try to patch up the broad test, making it more and more amorphous </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 10] </s> and distorted. This, I am afraid, has happened with Lemon. </s> Experience proves that the Establishment Clause, like the Free Speech Clause, cannot easily be reduced to a single test. There are different categories of Establishment Clause cases, which may call for different approaches. Some cases, like this one, involve government actions targeted at particular individuals or groups, imposing special duties or giving special benefits. Cases involving government speech on religious topics, See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, supra; Allegheny County v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980), seem to me to fall into a different category, and to require an analysis focusing on whether the speech endorses or disapproves of religion, rather than on whether the government action is neutral with regard to religion. See Allegheny County, supra, at 623-637 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). </s> Another category encompasses cases in which the government must make decisions about matters of religious doctrine and religious law. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (which also did not apply Lemon). These cases, which often arise in the application of otherwise neutral property or contract principles to religious institutions, involve complicated questions not present in other situations. See, e.g., id., at 721 (looking at some aspects of religious law to determine the structure of the church, but refusing to look further into religious law to resolve the ultimate dispute). Government delegations of power to religious bodies may make up yet another category. As Larkin itself suggested, government impartiality towards religion may not be enough in such situations: A law that bars all alcohol sales within some distance of a church, school, or hospital may be valid, but an equally evenhanded </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 11] </s> law that gives each institution discretionary power over the sales may not be. Larkin, supra, at 123-124. Of course, there may well be additional categories, or more opportune places to draw the lines between the categories. </s> As the Court's opinion today shows, the slide away from Lemon's unitary approach is well under way. A return to Lemon, even if possible, would likely be futile, regardless of where one stands on the substantive Establishment Clause questions. I think a less unitary approach provides a better structure for analysis. If each test covers a narrower and more homogeneous area, the tests may be more precise and therefore easier to apply. There may be more opportunity to pay attention to the specific nuances of each area. There might also be, I hope, more consensus on each of the narrow tests than there has been on a broad test. And abandoning the Lemon framework need not mean abandoning some of the insights that the test reflected, nor the insights of the cases that applied it. </s> Perhaps eventually under this structure we may indeed distill a unified, or at least a more unified, Establishment Clause test from the cases. Cf. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 -299 (1984) (uniting two strands of Free Speech Clause doctrine). But it seems to me that the case law will better be able to evolve towards this if it is freed from the Lemon test's rigid influence. The hard questions would, of course, still have to be asked; but they will be asked within a more carefully tailored and less distorted framework. </s> * * * </s> For the reasons stated, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York. </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 1] </s> JUSTICE KENNEDY, concurring in the judgment. </s> The Court's ruling that the Kiryas Joel Village School District violates the Establishment Clause is in my view correct, but my reservations about what the Court's reasoning implies for religious accommodations in general are sufficient to require a separate writing. As the Court recognizes, a legislative accommodation that discriminates among religions may become an establishment of religion. But the Court's opinion can be interpreted to say that an accommodation for a particular religious group is invalid because of the risk that the legislature will not grant the same accommodation to another religious group suffering some similar burden. </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 2] </s> This rationale seems to me without grounding in our precedents and a needless restriction upon the legislature's ability to respond to the unique problems of a particular religious group. The real vice of the school district, in my estimation, is that New York created it by drawing political boundaries on the basis of religion. I would decide the issue we confront upon this narrower theory, though in accord with many of the Court's general observations about the State's actions in this case. </s> I </s> This is not a case in which the government has granted a benefit to a general class of recipients of which religious groups are just one part. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. ___ (1993); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). It is, rather, a case in which the government seeks to alleviate a specific burden on the religious practices of a particular religious group. I agree that a religious accommodation demands careful scrutiny to ensure that it does not so burden nonadherents or discriminate against other religions as to become an establishment. I disagree, however, with the suggestion that the Kiryas Joel Village School District contravenes these basic constitutional commands. But for the forbidden manner in which the New York Legislature sought to go about it, the State's attempt to accommodate the special needs of the handicapped Satmar children would have been valid. </s> "Government policies of accommodation, acknowledgment, and support for religion are an accepted part of our political and cultural heritage." Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989) (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Before the Revolution, colonial </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 3] </s> governments made a frequent practice of exempting religious objectors from general laws. See McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv.L.Rev. 1409, 1466-1473 (1990) (recounting colonial exemptions from oath requirements, compulsory military service, religious assessments, and other general legislation). As early as 1691, for instance, New York allowed Quakers to testify by affirmation, rather than oath, in civil court cases. T. Curry, The First Freedoms: Church and State in America to the Passage of the First Amendment 64 (1986). Later, during the American Revolution, the Continental Congress exempted religious objectors from military conscription. Resolution of July 18, 1775, reprinted in 2 Journals of the Continental Congress 187, 189 (1905) ("As there are some people, who, from religious principles, cannot bear arms in any case, this Congress intend no violence to their consciences . . ."). And since the framing of the Constitution, this Court has approved legislative accommodations for a variety of religious practices. See, e.g., Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389-390 (1918) (military draft exemption for religious objectors); Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (New York City program permitting public school children to leave school for one hour a week for religious observance and instruction); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (military draft exemption for religious objectors); Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (exemption of religious organizations from Title VII's prohibition of religious discrimination); Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (exemption from drug laws for sacramental peyote use) (dicta). </s> New York's object in creating the Kiryas Joel Village School District - to accommodate the religious practices of the handicapped Satmar children - is validated by the </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 4] </s> principles that emerge from these precedents. First, by creating the district, New York sought to alleviate a specific and identifiable burden on the Satmars' religious practice. The Satmars' way of life, which springs out of their strict religious beliefs, conflicts in many respects with mainstream American culture. They do not watch television or listen to radio; they speak Yiddish in their homes and do not read English language publications; and they have a distinctive hairstyle and dress. Attending the Monroe-Woodbury public schools, where they were exposed to much different ways of life, caused the handicapped Satmar children understandable anxiety and distress. New York was entitled to relieve these significant burdens, even though mainstream public schooling does not conflict with any specific tenet of the Satmars' religious faith. The Title VII exemption upheld in Corporation of Presiding Bishop, supra, for example, covers religious groups who may not believe themselves obliged to employ coreligionists in every instance. See also Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970) ("The limits of permissible state accommodation to religion are by no means coextensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause"); accord, Smith, supra, at 890 (legislatures may grant accommodations even when courts may not). </s> Second, by creating the district, New York did not impose or increase any burden on non-Satmars, compared to the burden it lifted from the Satmars, that might disqualify the District as a genuine accommodation. In Gillette, supra, the Court upheld a military draft exemption, even though the burden on those without religious objection to war (the increased chance of being drafted and forced to risk one's life in battle) was substantial. And in Corporation of Presiding Bishop, the Court upheld the Title VII exemption even though it permitted employment discrimination against nonpractitioners of the religious organization's faith. </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 5] </s> There is a point, to be sure at which an accommodation may impose a burden on nonadherents so great that it becomes an establishment. See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709 -710 (1985) (invalidating mandatory Sabbath day off because it provided "no exception when honoring the dictates of Sabbath observers would cause the employer substantial economic burdens or when the employer's compliance would require the imposition of significant burdens on other employees required to work in place of the Sabbath observers"). This case has not been argued, however, on the theory that non-Satmars suffer any special burdens from the existence of the Kiryas Joel Village School District. </s> Third, the creation of the school district to alleviate the special burdens born by the handicapped Satmar children cannot be said, for that reason alone, to favor the Satmar religion to the exclusion of any other. "The clearest command of the Establishment Clause," of course, "is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another." Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982); accord, Smith, supra, 494 U.S., at 886 , n. 3. I disagree, however, with the Court's conclusion that the school district breaches this command. The Court insists that religious favoritism is a danger here, because the "anomalously case-specific nature of the legislature's exercise of state authority in creating this district for a religious community leaves the Court without any direct way to review such state action" to ensure interdenominational neutrality. Ante, at 15. "Because the religious community of Kiryas Joel did not receive its new governmental authority simply as one of many communities eligible for equal treatment under a general law," the Court maintains, "we have no assurance that the next similarly situated group seeking a school district of its own will receive one; . . . a </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 6] </s> legislature's failure to enact a special law is itself unreviewable." Ante, at 15-16 (footnote omitted). </s> This reasoning reverses the usual presumption that a statute is constitutional and, in essence, adjudges the New York Legislature guilty until it proves itself innocent. No party has adduced any evidence that the legislature has denied another religious community like the Satmars its own school district under analogous circumstances. The legislature, like the judiciary, is sworn to uphold the Constitution, and we have no reason to presume that the New York Legislature would not grant the same accommodation in a similar future case. The fact that New York singled out the Satmars for this special treatment indicates nothing other than the uniqueness of the handicapped Satmar children's plight. It is normal for legislatures to respond to problems as they arise - no less so when the issue is religious accommodation. Most accommodations cover particular religious practices. See, e.g., 21 CFR 1307.31 (1993) ("The listing of peyote as a controlled substance . . . does not apply to the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American Church"); 25 CFR 11.87H (1993) ("[I]t shall not be unlawful for any member of the Native American Church to transport into Navajo country, buy, sell, possess, or use peyote in any form in connection with the religious practices, sacraments or services of the Native American Church"); Dept. of Air Force, Reg. 35-10, § 2-28(b)(2) (Apr. 1989) ("Religious head coverings are authorized for wear while in uniform when military headgear is not authorized. . . . Religious head coverings may be worn underneath military headgear if they do not interfere with the proper wearing, functioning, or appearance of the prescribed headgear. . . . For example, Jewish yarmulkes meet this requirement if they do not exceed 6 inches in diameter"); National Prohibition Act, 3, 41 Stat. 308 ("Liquor for nonbeverage </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 7] </s> purposes and wine for sacramental purposes may be manufactured, purchased, sold, bartered, transported, imported, exported, delivered, furnished and possessed"), repealed by Liquor Law Repeal and Enforcement Act, 1, 49 Stat. 872. They do not thereby become invalid. </s> Nor is it true that New York's failure to accommodate another religious community facing similar burdens would be insulated from challenge in the courts. The burdened community could sue the State of New York, contending that New York's discriminatory treatment of the two religious communities violated the Establishment Clause. To resolve this claim, the court would have only to determine whether the community does indeed bear the same burden on its religious practice as did the Satmars in Kiryas Joel. See Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 878 F.2d 1458, 1463-1465 (CADC 1989) (R. B. GINSBURG, J.) (rejecting claim that the members of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church were entitled to an exemption from the marijuana laws on the same terms as the peyote exemption for the Native American Church); Olsen v. Iowa, 808 F.2d 652 (CA8 1986) (same). While a finding of discrimination would then raise a difficult question of relief, compare Olsen, 878 F.2d at 1464 ("Faced with the choice between invalidation and extension of any controlled substances religious exemption, which would the political branches choose? It would take a court bolder than this one to predict . . . that extension, not invalidation, would be the probable choice"), with Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 -93 (1979) (curing gender discrimination in the AFDC program by extending benefits to children of unemployed mothers instead of denying benefits to children of unemployed fathers), the discrimination itself would not be beyond judicial remedy. </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 8] </s> II </s> The Kiryas Joel Village School District thus does not suffer any of the typical infirmities that might invalidate an attempted legislative accommodation. In the ordinary case, the fact that New York has chosen to accommodate the burdens unique to one religious group would raise no constitutional problems. Without further evidence that New York has denied the same accommodation to religious groups bearing similar burdens, we could not presume from the particularity of the accommodation that the New York Legislature acted with discriminatory intent. </s> This particularity takes on a different cast, however, when the accommodation requires the government to draw political or electoral boundaries. "The principle that government may accommodate the free exercise of religion does not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause," Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. ___, ___ (1992) (slip op., at 8), and, in my view, one such fundamental limitation is that government may not use religion as a criterion to draw political or electoral lines. Whether or not the purpose is accommodation and whether or not the government provides similar gerrymanders to people of all religious faiths, the Establishment Clause forbids the government to use religion as a line-drawing criterion. In this respect, the Establishment Clause mirrors the Equal Protection Clause. Just as the government may not segregate people on account of their race, so too it may not segregate on the basis of religion. The danger of stigma and stirred animosities is no less acute for religious line-drawing than for racial. Justice Douglas put it well in a statement this Court quoted with approval just last Term: </s> "When racial or religious lines are drawn by the State, the multiracial, multireligious communities </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 9] </s> that our Constitution seeks to weld together as one become separatist; antagonisms that relate to race or to religion, rather than to political issues, are generated; communities seek not the best representative, but the best racial or religious partisan. Since that system is at war with the democratic ideal, it should find no footing here." Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 67 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoted in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. ___, ___ (1993) (slip op., at 17)). </s> I agree with the Court insofar as it invalidates the school district for being drawn along religious lines. As the plurality observes, ante, at 11, the New York Legislature knew that everyone within the village was Satmar when it drew the school district along the village lines, and it determined who was to be included in the district by imposing, in effect, a religious test. There is no serious question that the legislature configured the school district, with purpose and precision, along a religious line. This explicit religious gerrymandering violates the First Amendment Establishment Clause. </s> It is important to recognize the limits of this principle. We do not confront the constitutionality of the Kiryas Joel Village itself, and the formation of the village appears to differ from the formation of the school district in one critical respect. As the Court notes, ante, at 15, n. 7, the village was formed pursuant to a religion-neutral self-incorporation scheme. Under New York law, a territory with at least 500 residents and not more than five square miles may be incorporated upon petition by at least 20 percent of the voting residents of that territory or by the owners of more than 50 percent of the territory's real property. N.Y. Village Law 2-200, 2-202 (McKinney 1973 and Supp. 1994). Aside from ensuring that the petition complies with certain procedural requirements, the supervisor of the town in which the territory is located has no discretion to reject </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 10] </s> the petition. 2-206; see Decision on Sufficiency of Petition, in App. 8, 14 ("[T]he hollow provisions of the Village Law . . . allow me only to review the procedural niceties of the petition itself"). The residents of the town then vote upon the incorporation petition in a special election. N.Y. Village Law 2-212 (McKinney 1973). By contrast, the Kiryas Joel Village School District was created by state legislation. The State of New York had complete discretion not to enact it. The State thus had a direct hand in accomplishing the religious segregation. </s> As the plurality indicates, the Establishment Clause does not invalidate a town or a state "whose boundaries are derived according to neutral historical and geographic criteria, but whose population happens to comprise coreligionists." Ante, at 14, n. 6. People who share a common religious belief or lifestyle may live together without sacrificing the basic rights of self-governance that all American citizens enjoy, so long as they do not use those rights to establish their religious faith. Religion flourishes in community, and the Establishment Clause must not be construed as some sort of homogenizing solvent that forces unconventional religious groups to choose between assimilating to mainstream American culture or losing their political rights. There is more than a fine line, however, between the voluntary association that leads to a political community comprised of people who share a common religious faith, and the forced separation that occurs when the government draws explicit political boundaries on the basis of peoples' faith. In creating the Kiryas Joel Village School District, New York crossed that line, and so we must hold the district invalid. </s> III </s> This is an unusual case, for it is rare to see a State exert such documented care to carve out territory for </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 11] </s> people of a particular religious faith. It is also unusual in that the problem to which the Kiryas Joel Village School District was addressed is attributable in no small measure to what I believe were unfortunate rulings by this Court. </s> Before 1985, the handicapped Satmar children of Kiryas Joel attended the private religious schools within the village that the other Satmar children attended. Because their handicaps were in some cases acute (ranging from mental retardation and deafness to spina bifida and cerebral palsy), the State of New York provided public funds for special education of these children at annexes to the religious schools. Then came the companion cases of School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), and Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). In Grand Rapids, the Court invalidated a program in which public school teachers would offer supplemental classes at private schools, including religious schools at the end of the regular school day. And in Aguilar, the Court invalidated New York City's use of Title I funding to pay the salaries of public school teachers who taught educationally deprived children of low-income families at parochial schools in the city. After these cases, the Monroe-Woodbury School District suspended its special education program at the Kiryas Joel religious schools, and the Kiryas Joel parents were forced to enroll their handicapped children at the Monroe-Woodbury public schools in order for the children to receive special education. The ensuing difficulties, as the Court recounts, ante, at 2, led to the creation of the Kiryas Joel Village School District. </s> The decisions in Grand Rapids and Aguilar may have been erroneous. In light of the case before us, and in the interest of sound elaboration of constitutional doctrine, it may be necessary for us to reconsider them at a later date. A neutral aid scheme, available to religious and nonreligious alike, is the preferable way to </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 12] </s> address problems such as the Satmar handicapped children have suffered. See Witters, 474 U.S., at 490 -492 (Powell, J., concurring). But for Grand Rapids and Aguilar, the Satmars would have had no need to seek special accommodations or their own school district. Our decisions led them to choose that unfortunate course, with the deficiencies I have described. </s> One misjudgment is no excuse, however, for compounding it with another. We must confront this case as it comes before us, without bending rules to free the Satmars from a predicament into which we put them. The Establishment Clause forbids the government to draw political boundaries on the basis of religious faith. For this reason, I concur in the judgment of the Court. </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 1] </s> JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE THOMAS join, dissenting. </s> The Court today finds that the Powers That Be, up in Albany, have conspired to effect an establishment of the Satmar Hasidim. I do not know who would be more surprised at this discovery: the Founders of our Nation or Grand Rebbe Joel Teitelbaum, founder of the Satmar. The Grand Rebbe would be astounded to learn that, after escaping brutal persecution and coming to America with the modest hope of religious toleration for their ascetic form of Judaism, the Satmar had become so powerful, so closely allied with Mammon, as to have become an "establishment" of the Empire State. And the Founding </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 2] </s> Fathers would be astonished to find that the Establishment Clause - which they designed "to insure that no one powerful sect or combination of sects could use political or governmental power to punish dissenters," Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 319 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) - has been employed to prohibit characteristically and admirably American accommodation of the religious practices (or more precisely, cultural peculiarities) of a tiny minority sect. I, however, am not surprised. Once this Court has abandoned text and history as guides, nothing prevents it from calling religious toleration the establishment of religion. </s> I </s> Unlike most of our Establishment Clause cases involving education, these cases involve no public funding, however slight or indirect, to private religious schools. They do not involve private schools at all. The school under scrutiny is a public school specifically designed to provide a public secular education to handicapped students. The superintendent of the school, who is not Hasidic, is a 20-year veteran of the New York City public school system, with expertise in the area of bilingual, bicultural, special education. The teachers and therapists at the school all live outside the village of Kiryas Joel. While the village's private schools are profoundly religious and strictly segregated by sex, classes at the public school are co-ed and the curriculum secular. The school building has the bland appearance of a public school, unadorned by religious symbols or markings; and the school complies with the laws and regulations governing all other New York State public schools. There is no suggestion, moreover, that this public school has gone too far in making special adjustments to the religious needs of its students. Cf. Zorach v. Clauson, supra, at 312-315 (approving a </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 3] </s> program permitting early release of public school students to attend religious instruction). In sum, these cases involve only public aid to a school that is public as can be. The only thing distinctive about the school is that all the students share the same religion. </s> None of our cases has ever suggested that there is anything wrong with that. In fact, the Court has specifically approved the education of students of a single religion on a neutral site adjacent to a private religious school. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 247 -248 (1977). In that case, the Court rejected the argument that "any program that isolates the sectarian pupils is impermissible," id., at 246, and held that, "[t]he fact that a unit on a neutral site on occasion may serve only sectarian pupils does not provoke [constitutional] concerns," id., at 247. And just last Term, the Court held that the State could permit public employees to assist students in a Catholic school. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. ___, ___ (1993) (slip op., at 11-12) (sign language translator for deaf student). If a State can furnish services to a group of sectarian students on a neutral site adjacent to a private religious school, or even within such a school, how can there be any defect in educating those same students in a public school? As the Court noted in Wolman, the constitutional dangers of establishment arise "from the nature of the institution, not from the nature of the pupils," Wolman, supra, at 248. There is no danger in educating religious students in a public school. </s> For these very good reasons, JUSTICE SOUTER's opinion does not focus upon the school, but rather upon the school district and the New York Legislature that created it. His arguments, though sometimes intermingled, are two: that reposing governmental power in the Kiryas Joel School District is the same as reposing governmental power in a religious group, and that, in enacting the statute creating the district, the New York </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 4] </s> State Legislature was discriminating on the basis of religion, i.e., favoring the Satmar Hasidim over others. I shall discuss these arguments in turn. </s> II </s> For his thesis that New York has unconstitutionally conferred governmental authority upon the Satmar sect, JUSTICE SOUTER relies extensively, and virtually exclusively, upon Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982). JUSTICE SOUTER believes that the present case "resembles" Grendel's Den because that cases "teaches that a state may not delegate its civic authority to a group chosen according to a religious criterion," ante, at 9 (emphasis added). That misdescribes both what that case taught (which is that a state may not delegate its civil authority to a church), and what this case involves (which is a group chosen according to cultural characteristics). The statute at issue there gave churches veto power over the State's authority to grant a liquor license to establishments in the vicinity of the church. The Court had little difficulty finding the statute unconstitutional. "The Framers did not set up a system of government in which important, discretionary governmental powers would be delegated to or shared with religious institutions." Id., at 127. </s> JUSTICE SOUTER concedes that Grendel's Den "presented an example of united civic and religious authority, an establishment rarely found in such straightforward form in modern America." Ante, at 9. The uniqueness of the case stemmed from the grant of governmental power directly to a religious institution, and the Court's opinion focused on that fact, remarking that the transfer of authority was to "churches" (10 times), the "governing body of churches" (twice), "religious institutions" (twice) and "religious bodies" (once). Astonishingly, however, JUSTICE SOUTER dismisses the difference between a </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 5] </s> transfer of government power to citizens who share a common religion as opposed to "the officers of its sectarian organization" - the critical factor that made Grendel's Den unique and "rar[e]" - as being "one of form, not substance." Ante, at 10. </s> JUSTICE SOUTER's steamrolling of the difference between civil authority held by a church, and civil authority held by members of a church, is breathtaking. To accept it, one must believe that large portions of the civil authority exercised during most of our history were unconstitutional, and that much more of it than merely the Kiryas Joel School District is unconstitutional today. The history of the populating of North America is in no small measure the story of groups of people sharing a common religious and cultural heritage striking out to form their own communities. See, e.g., W. Sweet, The Story of Religion in America 9 (1950). It is preposterous to suggest that the civil institutions of these communities, separate from their churches, were constitutionally suspect. And if they were, surely JUSTICE SOUTER cannot mean that the inclusion of one or two nonbelievers in the community would have been enough to eliminate the constitutional vice. If the conferral of governmental power upon a religious institution as such (rather than upon American citizens who belong to the religious institution) is not the test of Grendel's Den invalidity, there is no reason why giving power to a body that is overwhelmingly dominated by the members of one sect would not suffice to invoke the Establishment Clause. That might have made the entire States of Utah and New Mexico unconstitutional at the time of their admission to the Union, 1 and would undoubtedly </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 6] </s> make many units of local government unconstitutional today. 2 </s> JUSTICE SOUTER's position boils down to the quite novel proposition that any group of citizens (say, the residents of Kiryas Joel) can be invested with political power, but not if they all belong to the same religion. Of course such disfavoring of religion is positively antagonistic to the purposes of the Religion Clauses, and we have rejected it before. In McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), we invalidated a state constitutional amendment that would have permitted all persons to participate in political conventions, except ministers. We adopted James Madison's view that the State could not "`punis[h] a religious profession with the privation of a civil right.'" Id., at 626 (opinion of Burger, C.J.), quoting 5 Writings of James Madison 288 (G. Hunt ed. 1904). Or as JUSTICE BRENNAN put it in his opinion concurring in judgment: "Religionists, no less than members of any other group, enjoy the full measure of protection afforded speech, association, and political activity generally." Id., at 641; see also Widmar v. </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 7] </s> Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). I see no reason why it is any less pernicious to deprive a group, rather than an individual, of its rights simply because of its religious beliefs. </s> Perhaps appreciating the startling implications for our constitutional jurisprudence of collapsing the distinction between religious institutions and their members, JUSTICE SOUTER tries to limit his "unconstitutional conferral of civil authority" holding by pointing out several features supposedly unique to the present case: that the "boundary lines of the school district divide residents according to religious affiliation," ante, at 11 (emphasis added); that the school district was created by "a special act of the legislature," ante, at 12; and that the formation of the school district ran counter to the legislature's trend of consolidating districts in recent years, ante, at 11-12. Assuming all these points to be true (and they are not), they would certainly bear upon whether the legislature had an impermissible religious motivation in creating the district (which is JUSTICE SOUTER's next point, in the discussion of which I shall reply to these arguments). But they have nothing to do with whether conferral of power upon a group of citizens can be the conferral of power upon a religious institution. It can not. Or if it can, our Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been transformed. </s> III </s> I turn, next, to JUSTICE SOUTER's second justification for finding an establishment of religion: his facile conclusion that the New York Legislature's creation of the Kiryas Joel School District was religiously motivated. But in the Land of the Free, democratically adopted laws are not so easily impeached by unelected judges. To establish the unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law on the mere basis of its asserted religiously preferential </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 8] </s> (or discriminatory) effects - or at least to establish it in conformity with our precedents - JUSTICE SOUTER "must be able to show the absence of a neutral, secular basis" for the law. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971); see also Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (facially race-neutral laws can be invalidated on the basis of their effects only if "unexplainable on grounds other than race"). </s> There is, of course, no possible doubt of a secular basis here. The New York Legislature faced a unique problem in Kiryas Joel: a community in which all the nonhandicapped children attend private schools, and the physically and mentally disabled children who attend public school suffer the additional handicap of cultural distinctiveness. It would be troublesome enough if these peculiarly dressed, handicapped students were sent to the next town, accompanied by their similarly clad but unimpaired classmates. But all the unimpaired children of Kiryas Joel attend private school. The handicapped children suffered sufficient emotional trauma from their predicament that their parents kept them home from school. Surely the legislature could target this problem, and provide a public education for these students, in the same way it addressed, by a similar law, the unique needs of children institutionalized in a hospital. See e.g., 1970 N.Y.Laws, ch. 843 (authorizing a union free school district for the area owned by Blythedale Children's Hospital). </s> Since the obvious presence of a neutral, secular basis renders the asserted preferential effect of this law inadequate to invalidate it, JUSTICE SOUTER is required to come forward with direct evidence that religious preference was the objective. His case could scarcely be weaker. It consists, briefly, of this: the People of New York created the Kiryas Joel Village School District in order to further the Satmar religion, rather than for any </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 9] </s> proper secular purpose, because (1) they created the district in an extraordinary manner - by special Act of the legislature, rather than under the State's general laws governing school district reorganization; (2) the creation of the district ran counter to a State trend towards consolidation of school districts; and (3) the District includes only adherents of the Satmar religion. On this indictment, no jury would convict. </s> One difficulty with the first point is that it is not true. There was really nothing so "special" about the formation of a school district by an Act of the New York Legislature. The State has created both large school districts, see e.g., 1972 N.Y.Laws, ch. 928 (creating the Gananda School District out of land previously in two other districts), and small specialized school districts for institutionalized children, see e.g., 1972 N.Y.Laws, ch. 559 (creating a union free school district for the area owned by Abbott House), through these special Acts. But, in any event, all that the first point proves, and the second point as well (countering the trend toward consolidation), 3 is that New York regarded Kiryas Joel </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 10] </s> as a special case, requiring special measures. I should think it obvious that it did, and obvious that it should have. But even if the New York Legislature had never before created a school district by special statute (which is not true), and even if it had done nothing but consolidate school districts for over a century (which is not true), how could the departure from those past practices possibly demonstrate that the legislature had religious favoritism in mind? It could not. To be sure, when there is no special treatment, there is no possibility of religious favoritism; but it is not logical to suggest that when there is special treatment, there is proof of religious favoritism. </s> JUSTICE SOUTER's case against the statute comes down to nothing more, therefore, than his third point: the fact that all the residents of the Kiryas Joel Village School District are Satmars. But all its residents also wear unusual dress, have unusual civic customs, and have not much to do with people who are culturally different from them. (The Court recognizes that "the Satmars prefer to live together `to facilitate individual religious observance and maintain social, cultural and religious values,' but that it is not `against their religion' to interact with others." Ante, at 18, n. 9, quoting Brief for Petitioners in No. 93-517, p. 4, n. 1.) On what basis does JUSTICE SOUTER conclude that it is the theological distinctiveness, rather than the cultural distinctiveness, that was the basis for New York State's decision? The normal assumption would be that it was the latter, since it was not theology, but dress, language, and cultural alienation that posed the educational problem for the children. </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 11] </s> JUSTICE SOUTER not only does not adopt the logical assumption, he does not even give the New York Legislature the benefit of the doubt. The following is the level of his analysis: </s> "Not even the special needs of the children in this community can explain the legislature's unusual Act, for the State could have responded to the concerns of the Satmar parents [by other means]." Ante, at 14. </s> In other words, we know the legislature must have been motivated by the desire to favor the Satmar Hasidim religion, because it could have met the needs of these children by a method that did not place the Satmar Hasidim in a separate school district. This is not a rational argument proving religious favoritism; it is rather a novel Establishment Clause principle to the effect that no secular objective may be pursued by a means that might also be used for religious favoritism if some other means is available. </s> I have little doubt that JUSTICE SOUTER would laud this humanitarian legislation if all of the distinctiveness of the students of Kiryas Joel were attributable to the fact that their parents were nonreligious commune dwellers, or American Indians, or gypsies. The creation of a special, one-culture school district for the benefit of those children would pose no problem. The neutrality demanded by the Religion Clauses requires the same indulgence towards cultural characteristics that are accompanied by religious belief. "The Establishment Clause does not license government to treat religion and those who teach or practice it, simply by virtue of their status as such, as . . . subject to unique disabilities." McDaniel v. Paty, supra, at 641 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment). </s> Even if JUSTICE SOUTER could successfully establish that the cultural distinctiveness of the Kiryas Joel </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 12] </s> students (which is the problem the New York Legislature addressed) was an essential part of their religious belief, rather than merely an accompaniment of their religious belief, that would not discharge his heavy burden. In order to invalidate a facially neutral law, JUSTICE SOUTER would have to show not only that legislators were aware that religion caused the problems addressed, but also that the legislature's proposed solution was motivated by a desire to disadvantage or benefit a religious group (i.e. to disadvantage or benefit them because of their religion). For example, if the city of Hialeah, knowing of the potential health problems raised by the Santeria religious practice of animal sacrifice, were to provide by ordinance a special, more frequent, municipal garbage collection for the carcasses of dead animals, we would not strike the ordinance down just because the city council was aware that a religious practice produced the problem the ordinance addressed. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. ___, ___-___ (1993) (slip op., at 15-19). Here, a facially neutral statute extends an educational benefit to the one area where it was not effectively distributed. Whether or not the reason for the ineffective distribution had anything to do with religion, it is a remarkable stretch to say that the Act was motivated by a desire to favor or disfavor a particular religious group. The proper analogy to Chapter 748 is not the Court's hypothetical law providing school buses only to Christian students, see ante, at 21, but a law providing extra buses to rural school districts (which happen to be predominantly Southern Baptist). </s> At various times, JUSTICE SOUTER intimates, though he does not precisely say, that the boundaries of the school district were intentionally drawn on the basis of religion. He refers, for example, to "[t]he State's manipulation of the franchise for this district . . ., giving the sect exclusive control of the political subdivision," ante, at </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 13] </s> 10 - implying that the "giving" of political power to the religious sect was the object of the "manipulation." There is no evidence of that. The special district was created to meet the special educational needs of distinctive handicapped children, and the geographical boundaries selected for that district were (quite logically) those that already existed for the village. It sometimes appears as though the shady "manipulation" JUSTICE SOUTER has in mind is that which occurred when the village was formed, so that the drawing of its boundaries infected the coterminous boundaries of the district. He says, for example, that "[i]t is undisputed that those who negotiated the village boundaries when applying the general village incorporation statute drew them so as to exclude all but Satmars." Ante, at 11. It is indeed. But non-Satmars were excluded, not (as he intimates) because of their religion, but - as JUSTICE O'CONNOR clearly describes, see ante, at 1-2 - because of their lack of desire for the high-density zoning that Satmars favored. It was a classic drawing of lines on the basis of communality of secular governmental desires, not communality of religion. What happened in the creation of the village is, in fact, precisely what happened in the creation of the school district, so that the former cannot possibly infect the latter, as JUSTICE SOUTER tries to suggest. Entirely secular reasons (zoning for the village, cultural alienation of students for the school district) produced a political unit whose members happened to share the same religion. There is no evidence (indeed, no plausible suspicion) of the legislature's desire to favor the Satmar religion, as opposed to meeting distinctive secular needs or desires of citizens who happened to be Satmars. If there were, JUSTICE SOUTER would say so; instead, he must merely insinuate. </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 14] </s> IV </s> But even if Chapter 748 were intended to create a special arrangement for the Satmars because of their religion (not including, as I have shown in Part I, any conferral of governmental power upon a religious entity), it would be a permissible accommodation. "This Court has long recognized that the government may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and that it may do so without violating the Establishment Clause." Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144 -145 (1987). Moreover, "there is ample room for accommodation of religion under the Establishment Clause," Corporation for Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987), and for "play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference," Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y. City, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). Accommodation is permissible, moreover, even when the statute deals specifically with religion, see, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S., at 312 -315, and even when accommodation is not commanded by the Free Exercise Clause, see, e.g., Walz, supra, at 673. </s> When a legislature acts to accommodate religion, particularly a minority sect, "it follows the best of our traditions." Zorach, supra, at 314. The Constitution itself contains an accommodation of sorts. Article VI, cl. 3, prescribes that executive, legislative and judicial officers of the Federal and State Governments shall bind themselves to support the Constitution "by Oath or Affirmation." Although members of the most populous religions found no difficulty in swearing an oath to God, Quakers, Moravians, and Mennonites refused to take oaths based on Matthew 5:34's injunction "swear not at all." The option of affirmation was added to accommodate these minority religions and enable their members </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 15] </s> to serve in government. See 1 A. Stokes, Church and State in The United States 524-527 (1950). Congress, from its earliest sessions, passed laws accommodating religion by refunding duties paid by specific churches upon the importation of plates for the printing of Bibles, see 6 Stat. 116 (1813), vestments, 6 Stat. 346 (1816), and bells, 6 Stat. 675 (1836). Congress also exempted church property from the tax assessments it levied on residents of the District of Columbia; and all 50 States have had similar laws. See Walz, supra, at 676-678. </s> This Court has also long acknowledged the permissibility of legislative accommodation. In one of our early Establishment Clause cases, we upheld New York City's early release program, which allowed students to be released from public school during school hours to attend religious instruction or devotional exercises. See Zorach, supra, at 312-315. We determined that the early release program "accommodates the public service to . . . spiritual needs," and noted that finding it unconstitutional would "show a callous indifference to religious groups." 343 U.S., at 314 . In Walz, supra, we upheld a property tax exemption for religious organizations, observing that it was part of a salutary tradition of "permissible state accommodation to religion." Id., at 672-673. And in Presiding Bishop, supra, we upheld a section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 exempting religious groups from the antidiscrimination provisions of Title VII. We concluded that it was "a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions." Id., at 335. </s> In today's opinion, however, the Court seems uncomfortable with this aspect of our constitutional tradition. Although it acknowledges the concept of accommodation, it quickly points out that it is "not a principle without limits," ante, at 18, and then gives reasons why the </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 16] </s> present case exceeds those limits, reasons which simply do not hold water. "[W]e have never hinted," the Court says, "that an otherwise unconstitutional delegation of political power to a religious group could be saved as a religious accommodation." Ante, at 19. Putting aside the circularity inherent in referring to a delegation as "otherwise unconstitutional" when its constitutionality turns on whether there is an accommodation, if this statement is true, it is only because we have never hinted that delegation of political power to citizens who share a particular religion could be unconstitutional. This is simply a replay of the argument we rejected in Part II, supra. </s> The second and last reason the Court finds accommodation impermissible is, astoundingly, the mere risk that the State will not offer accommodation to a similar group in the future, and that neutrality will therefore not be preserved. Returning to the ill fitted crutch of Grendel's Den, the Court suggests that by acting through this special statute the New York Legislature has eliminated any "`effective means of guaranteeing' that governmental power will be and has been neutrally employed." Ante, at 15, quoting Grendel's Den, 459 U.S., at 125 . How misleading. That language in Grendel's Den was an expression of concern not (as the context in which it is quoted suggests) about the courts' ability to assure the legislature's future neutrality, but about the legislature's ability to assure the neutrality of the churches to which it had transferred legislative power. That concern is inapposite here; there is no doubt about the legislature's capacity to control what transpires in a public school. </s> At bottom, the Court's "no guarantee of neutrality" argument is an assertion of this Court's inability to control the New York Legislature's future denial of comparable accommodation. We have "no assurance," the Court says, "that the next similarly situated group </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 17] </s> seeking a school district of its own will receive one," since "a legislature's failure to enact a special law is . . . unreviewable." Ante, at 16; see also ante, at 6 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 4 That is true only in the technical (and irrelevant) sense that the later group denied an accommodation may need to challenge the grant of the first accommodation in light of the later denial, rather than challenging the denial directly. But one way or another, "even if [an administrative agency is] not empowered or obliged to act, [a litigant] would be entitled to a judicial audience. Ultimately, the courts cannot escape the obligation to address [a] plea that the exemption [sought] is mandated by the first amendment's religion clauses." Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 878 F.2d 1458, 1461 (CADC 1989) (R. B. GINSBURG, J.). </s> The Court's demand for "up front" assurances of a neutral system is at war with both traditional accommodation doctrine and the judicial role. As we have described, supra, at 15, Congress's earliest accommodations exempted duties paid by specific churches on particular items. See, e.g., 6 Stat. 346 (1816) (exempting vestments imported by "bishop of Bardstown"). Moreover, most efforts at accommodation seek to solve a problem that applies to members of only one or a few religions. Not every religion uses wine in its sacraments, but that does not make an exemption from Prohibition for sacramental wine-use impermissible, accord, Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 18] </s> 508 U.S., at ___, n. 2 (slip op., at 3, n.2) (SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment), nor does it require the State granting such an exemption to explain in advance how it will treat every other claim for dispensation from its controlled substances laws. Likewise, not every religion uses peyote in its services, but we have suggested that legislation which exempts the sacramental use of peyote from generally applicable drug laws is not only permissible, but desirable, see Employment Div., Ore. Dept of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990), without any suggestion that some "up front" legislative guarantee of equal treatment for sacramental substances used by other sects must be provided. The record is clear that the necessary guarantee can and will be provided, after the fact, by the courts. See, e.g., Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Admin., supra, (rejecting claim that peyote exemption requires marijuana exemption for Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church); Olsen v. Iowa, 808 F.2d 652 (CA8 1986) (same); Kennedy v. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, 459 F.2d 415 (CA9 1972) (accepting claim that peyote exemption for Native American Church requires peyote exemption for other religions that use that substance in their sacraments). 5 </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 19] </s> Contrary to the Court's suggestion, ante, at 20-22, I do not think that the Establishment Clause prohibits formally established "state" churches and nothing more. I have always believed, and all my opinions are consistent with the view, that the Establishment Clause prohibits the favoring of one religion over others. In this respect, it is the Court that attacks lions of straw. What I attack is the Court's imposition of novel "up front" procedural requirements on state legislatures. Making law (and making exceptions) one case at a time, whether through adjudication or through highly particularized rulemaking or legislation, violates, ex ante no principle of fairness, equal protection, or neutrality, simply because it does not announce in advance how all future cases (and all future exceptions) will be disposed of. If it did, the manner of proceeding of this Court itself would be unconstitutional. It is presumptuous for this Court to impose - out of nowhere - an unheard-of prohibition against proceeding in this manner upon the Legislature of New York State. I never heard of such a principle, nor has anyone else, nor will it ever be heard of again. Unlike what the New York Legislature has done, this is a special rule to govern only the Satmar Hasidim. </s> V </s> A few words in response to the separate concurrences: JUSTICE STEVENS adopts, for these cases, a rationale that is almost without limit. The separate Kiryas Joel school district is problematic in his view because "[t]he isolation of these children, while it may protect them from "panic, fear and trauma," also unquestionably increased the likelihood that they would remain within the fold, faithful adherents of their parents' religious faith." Ante, at 2. So much for family values. If the Constitution forbids any state action that incidentally </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 20] </s> helps parents to raise their children in their own religious faith, it would invalidate a release program permitting public school children to attend the religious instruction program of their parents' choice, of the sort we approved in Zorach, supra; 6 indeed, it would invalidate state laws according parents physical control over their children at least insofar as that is used to take the little fellows to church or synagogue. JUSTICE STEVENS' statement is less a legal analysis than a manifesto of secularism. It surpasses mere rejection of accommodation, and announces a positive hostility to religion - which, unlike all other noncriminal values, the state must not assist parents in transmitting to their offspring. </s> JUSTICE KENNEDY's "political line-drawing" approach founders on its own terms. He concedes that the Constitution does not prevent people who share a faith from forming their own villages and towns, and suggests that the formation of the village of Kiryas Joel was free from defect. Ante, at 9-10. He also notes that States are free to draw political lines on the basis of history and geography. Ante, at 10. I do not see, then, how a school district drawn to mirror the boundaries of an existing village (an existing geographic line), which itself is not infirm, can violate the Constitution. Thus, while JUSTICE KENNEDY purports to share my criticism (Part IV, supra) of the Court's unprecedented insistence that the New York Legislature make its accommodations only by general legislation, see ante, at 1-2, 6, his own approach is little different. He says the village is constitutional because it was formed (albeit by members of a single religious sect) under a general New York law; but he finds the school district unconstitutional because </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 21] </s> it was the product of a specific enactment. In the end, his analysis is no different from the Court's. </s> JUSTICE KENNEDY expresses the view that School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), and Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) - the cases that created the need for the Kiryas Joel legislation by holding unconstitutional state provision of supplemental educational services in sectarian schools - "may have been erroneous," and he suggests that "it may be necessary for us to reconsider them at a later date." Ante, at 11. JUSTICE O'CONNOR goes even further and expresses the view that Aguilar should be overruled. Ante, at 7. I heartily agree that these cases, so hostile to our national tradition of accommodation, should be overruled at the earliest opportunity; but meanwhile, today's opinion causes us to lose still further ground, and in the same anti-accommodationist direction. </s> Finally, JUSTICE O'CONNOR observes that the Court's opinion does not focus on the so-called Lemon test, see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and she urges that that test be abandoned at least as a "unitary approach" to all Establishment Clause claims, ante, at 11. I have previously documented the Court's convenient relationship with Lemon, which it cites only when useful, see Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. ___,___ (1993) (slip op., at 1-5) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment), and I no longer take any comfort in the Court's failure to rely on it in any particular case, as I once mistakenly did, see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. ___, ___ (1992) (SCALIA, J., dissenting). But the Court's snub of Lemon today (it receives only two "see also" citations, in the course of the opinion's description of Grendel's Den) is particularly noteworthy because all three courts below (who are not free to ignore Supreme Court precedent at will) relied on it, and the parties (also bound by our case law) dedicated over 80 pages of briefing to the application and </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 22] </s> continued vitality of the Lemon test. In addition to the other sound reasons for abandoning Lemon, see, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 -640 (1987) (SCALIA, J., dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108 -112 (1985) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting), it seems quite inefficient for this Court, which in reaching its decisions relies heavily on the briefing of the parties and, to a lesser extent, the opinions of lower courts, to mislead lower courts and parties about the relevance of the Lemon test. Compare ante (ignoring Lemon despite lower courts' reliance) with Lamb's Chapel, supra (applying Lemon despite failure of lower court to mention it). </s> Unlike JUSTICE O'CONNOR, however, I would not replace Lemon with nothing, and let the case law "evolve" into a series of situation-specific rules (government speech on religious topics, government benefits to particular groups, etc.) unconstrained by any "rigid influence," ante, at 11. The problem with (and the allure of) Lemon has not been that it is "rigid," but rather that, in many applications, it has been utterly meaningless, validating whatever result the Court would desire. See Lamb's Chapel, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 2-3) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment); Wallace, supra, at 110-111 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). To replace Lemon with nothing is simply to announce that we are now so bold that we no longer feel the need even to pretend that our haphazard course of Establishment Clause decisions is governed by any principle. The foremost principle I would apply is fidelity to the longstanding traditions of our people, which surely provide the diversity of treatment that JUSTICE O'CONNOR seeks, but do not leave us to our own devices. </s> * * * </s> The Court's decision today is astounding. Chapter 748 involves no public aid to private schools, and does not </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 23] </s> mention religion. In order to invalidate it, the Court casts aside, on the flimsiest of evidence, the strong presumption of validity that attaches to facially neutral laws, and invalidates the present accommodation because it does not trust New York to be as accommodating toward other religions (presumably those less powerful than the Satmar Hasidim) in the future. This is unprecedented - except that it continues, and takes to new extremes, a recent tendency in the opinions of this Court to turn the Establishment Clause into a repealer of our Nation's tradition of religious toleration. I dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 A census taken in 1906, 10 years after statehood was granted to Utah, and 6 years before it was granted to New Mexico, showed that, in Utah, 87.7% of all church members were Mormon, and in New Mexico, 88.7% of all church members were Roman Catholic. </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 6] </s> See Bureau of the Census, Special Reports, Religious Bodies, Part I, p. 55 (1910). </s> [Footnote 2 At the county level, the smallest unit for which comprehensive data is available, there are a number of counties in which the overwhelming majority of churchgoers are of a single religion: Rich County, Utah (100% Mormon); Kennedy County, Texas (100% Roman Catholic); Emery County, Utah (99.2% Mormon); Franklin and Madison Counties, Idaho (99% or more Mormon); Graham County, North Carolina (93.7% Southern Baptist); Mora County, New Mexico (92.6% Roman Catholic). M. Bradley, N. Green, D. Jones, M. Lynn, & L. McNeil, Churches and Church Membership in the United States 1990 pp. 46, 112-113, 246, 265, 283, 365, 380, 393 (1992). In all of these counties, the adherents of the indicated religion constitute a substantial majority, in some cases over a 95% majority, of the total population. If data were available for smaller units of government than counties, I have no doubt I could point to hundreds of towns placed in jeopardy by today's opinion. </s> [Footnote 3 The Court says that "[e]arly on in the development of public education in New York, the State rejected highly localized school districts for New York City when they were promoted as a way to allow separate schooling for Roman Catholic children." Ante, at 16. Both the implication that this rejection of localism was general State policy, and the implication that (like the Court's prohibition of localism today) it had the purpose and effect of religious neutrality are simply not faithful to the cited source. The 1841 proposal was not to treat New York City schools differently, in order to favor Roman Catholics; it was "that the state's school code, which promoted a district system structure with local taxing authority, be extended to New York City." R. Church & M. Sedlak, Education in the United States 167 (1976). And the rejection of that proposal was not a triumph for keeping sectarian religion out of some public schools; it was a triumph for keeping the King James version of the Bible in all public schools. The Court's selected source concludes: </s> [ BOARD OF ED. OF KIRYAS JOEL v. GRUMET, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 10] </s> "[T]he Whigs swept the city elections that year 1842. and made Bible reading - the King James version - mandatory in any schools sharing these monies. There was nothing left for the Catholics to do but to build their own parochial system with their own money." Id., at 168-169. </s> [Footnote 4 The Court hints, ante, at 15, that its fears would have been allayed if the New York Legislature had previously created similar school districts for other minority religions. But had it done so, each of them would have been attacked (and invalidated) for the same reason as this one: because it had no antecedents. I am sure the Court has in mind some way around this chicken-and-egg problem. Perhaps the legislature could name the first four school districts in pectore. </s> [Footnote 5 The Court likens its demand for "up front" assurances to the Court's focus on the narrowness of the statute it struck down in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). See ante, at 21. Texas Monthly bears no resemblance to today's opinion, except that it also was wrong and it also misinterpreted Walz, see Id., at 33-40 (SCALIA, J., dissenting). The tax treatment of publishing companies in Texas was governed by an "across the board" rule. There was never any question whether nonreligious publishers would get the tax exemption accorded to religious publishers; by rule they did not, and the Court struck down that rule because it discriminated in favor of religion. By contrast, adjustments to existing school districts in New York are done case by case. No decision, including Texas Monthly, remotely suggests that approaching accommodations in a case-specific manner automatically violates the Establishment Clause. </s> [Footnote 6 JUSTICE STEVENS' bald statement that such a program would be permissible, see ante, at 2 can exclude it from the reach of his opinion, but not from the reach of his logic. Page I

United States Supreme Court EEOC v. ASSOCIATED DRY GOODS CORP.(1981) No. 79-1068 Argued: November 3, 1980Decided: January 26, 1981 </s> Section 706 (b) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that employment discrimination charges "shall not be made public" by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and bars public disclosure of anything "said or done" during informal Commission settlement endeavors. Section 709 (e) makes it a misdemeanor for any EEOC officer or employee "to make public" any information the EEOC obtains through its investigative powers before the institution of any proceeding involving such information. After employment discrimination charges were filed against a department store division (Horne) of respondent, the EEOC requested Horne to provide it with the complaints' employment records and other information relating to Horne's personnel practices. Horne refused to provide the information unless the EEOC agreed not to disclose it to the charging parties. The EEOC refused to give this assurance, explaining its practice, pursuant to regulations and its Compliance Manual, of making limited disclosure to a charging party of information in his and other files when he needs that information in connection with a potential lawsuit. When Horne continued to refuse to provide the requested information, the EEOC subpoenaed the material. Respondent then filed suit in Federal District Court, seeking to have the EEOC's limited disclosure practices declared in violation of Title VII and to enjoin enforcement of the subpoena. The District Court held that such practices violated Title VII, and accordingly enforced the subpoena only on the condition that the EEOC treat charging parties as members of the "public" to whom it cannot disclose any information in its files. The Court of Appeals affirmed. </s> Held: </s> Congress did not include charging parties within the "public" to whom disclosure of confidential information is illegal under 706 (b) and 709 (e). Pp. 598-604. </s> (a) The "public" to whom 706 (b) and 709 (e) forbid disclosure of charges and other information cannot logically include the parties to the agency proceeding, since the charges, of course, cannot be concealed from the charging party or from the respondent upon whom the statute requires notice to be served. A consistent reading of the statute requires that the "public" to whom 709 (e) prohibits disclosure [449 U.S. 590, 591] of information obtained in Commission investigations similarly exclude the parties. P. 598. </s> (b) The legislative history of 706 (b) and 709 (e) supports this reading of the statute. Pp. 598-600. </s> (c) Moreover, such reading of the statute is consistent with the coordinated scheme of administrative and judicial enforcement of Title VII. Limited disclosure to the parties can speed the EEOC's required investigation and enhances its ability to carry out its statutory responsibility to resolve charges through informal conciliation and negotiation. Pp. 600-602. </s> (d) Even if disclosure to charging parties may encourage litigation in some instances, this result is not inconsistent with Title VII's ultimate purposes of permitting a private right of action as an important part of the enforcement scheme. Pp. 602-603. </s> (e) It was error to hold that respondent had a categorical right to refuse to comply with the EEOC subpoena unless the EEOC assured it that the information supplied would be held in absolute secrecy. Respondent was only entitled to assurance that each employee filing a charge against Horne would see information in no file other than his or her own. Pp. 603-604. </s> 607 F.2d 1075, reversed and remanded. </s> STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 604. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 606. POWELL, J., took no part in the decision of the case. REHNQUIST, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. </s> Barry Sullivan argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Leroy D. Clark, Joseph T. Eddins, Lutz Alexander Prager, and Vella M. Fink. </s> Roger S. Kaplan argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Robert Lewis, Joel L. Finger, and Thomas C. Greble. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Leonard Rovins and Alan D. Gallay for the American Retail Federation; and by Robert E. Williams and Douglas S. McDowell for the Equal Employment Advisory Council. [449 U.S. 590, 592] </s> JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 limits the authority of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to make public disclosure of information it has obtained in investigating and attempting to resolve a claim of employment discrimination. 1 We granted certiorari in this case to consider whether the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was correct in holding that a prelitigation disclosure of information in a Commission file to the employee who filed the Title VII claim is a "public" disclosure within the meaning of the statutory restrictions. 445 U.S. 926 . 2 </s> [449 U.S. 590, 593] </s> I </s> This case arose when the Commission sought evidence with respect to discrimination charges filed against the Joseph Horne Co., a division of the respondent, Associated Dry Goods Corp. Horne operates retail department stores in Pennsylvania. Between 1971 and 1973, seven Horne employees filed employment discrimination charges with the Commission, six alleging sex discrimination and one alleging racial discrimination. The Commission began its investigation by requesting Horne to provide the employment records of the complaints, and statistics, documents, and other information relating to Horne's general personnel practices. Horne refused to provide the information unless the Commission agreed beforehand not to disclose any of the requested material to the charging parties. The Commission refused to give this assurance, explaining its practice of making limited disclosure to a charging party of information in his and other files when he needs that information in connection with a potential lawsuit. 3 When Horne continued to refuse [449 U.S. 590, 594] to provide the information without an assurance of absolute secrecy, the Commission subpoenaed the material. After the Commission rejected Horne's petition for revocation of the agency subpoena, the respondent filed this suit, asking the District Court to declare that the Commission's limited disclosure practices violated Title VII, and to enjoin the Commission from enforcing the subpoena. 4 </s> The District Court, concluding that the Commission's disclosure of confidential information to charging parties upsets Title VII's scheme of negotiation and settlement, held that the regulations and the provisions in the Compliance Manual covering special disclosure to charging parties violate Title VII. Accordingly, the court enforced the subpoena only on the condition that the Commission treat charging parties as members of the "public" to whom it cannot disclose any information in its files. 454 F. Supp. 387 (ED Va.). The [449 U.S. 590, 595] Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment. EEOC v. Joseph Horne Co., 607 F.2d 1075. </s> II </s> In enacting Title VII, Congress combined administrative and judicial means of eliminating employment discrimination. A person claiming to be the victim of discrimination must first file a charge with the Commission. The Commission must then serve notice of the charge on the employer, and begin an investigation to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe the charge is true. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (b). If it finds no such reasonable cause, the Commission must dismiss the charge. Ibid. If it does find reasonable cause, it must try to eliminate the alleged discriminatory practice "by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." Ibid. 5 If its attempts at conciliation fail, the Commission may bring a civil action against the employer. 2000e-5 (f) (1). But Title VII also makes private lawsuits by aggrieved employees an important part of its means of enforcement. If the Commission dismisses the charge, the employee may immediately file a private action. Ibid. And regardless of whether the Commission finds reasonable cause, the employee may bring an action 180 days after filing the charge if by that time the Commission has not filed its own lawsuit. Ibid. 6 </s> [449 U.S. 590, 596] </s> Title VII gives the Commission two formal means of obtaining information when it investigates a charge: The Commission may examine and copy evidence in the possession of the respondent employer, 2000e-8 (a), and subpoena evidence and documents, 2000e-9. Congress imposed on the Commission a duty to maintain this information in confidence. Section 706 (b) of Title VII directs that "[c]harges shall not be made public by the Commission." 7 If the Commission attempts informally to resolve a charge for which it has found reasonable cause, it cannot make "public" anything said or done in the course of the negotiations between the Commission and the parties; any Commission employee violating this prohibition faces criminal penalties. Ibid. Section 709 (e) of the statute supplements these prohibitions by making it a misdemeanor for any officer or employee of the Commission "to make public in any manner whatever any information" the Commission obtains through its investigative powers before the institution of any proceeding involving this information. 8 </s> Title VII nowhere defines "public." In its regulation governing disclosure, the Commission has construed the statute's prohibition of "public" release of information to permit prelitigation disclosure of charges and of investigative information to the parties where such disclosure "is deemed necessary for securing appropriate relief." 29 CFR 1601.22 (1979). Specifically, the Commission has also created special disclosure rules permitting release of information in its files to charging parties or their attorneys, aggrieved persons in whose behalf charges have been filed and the persons or organizations who [449 U.S. 590, 597] have filed the charges in their behalf, and respondents and their attorneys, so long as the request for the information is made in connection with contemplated litigation. 9 Though normally a person can see information in the file only for the case in which he is directly involved, the Commission sometimes allows a prospective litigant to see information in files of cases brought by other employees against the same employer where that information is relevant and material to the litigant's case. EEOC Compliance Manual 83.7 (c). 10 Before disclosing any information, however, the Commission expunges the names, identifying characteristics, and statements of any witnesses who have been promised anonymity, as well as the names of any other respondents. 11 Moreover, any person requesting confidential information must execute a written agreement not to disclose the information to any other [449 U.S. 590, 598] person, except as part of the normal course of litigation after a suit is filed. 12 </s> III </s> For the reasons that follow, we have concluded that Congress did not include charging parties within the "public" to whom disclosure of confidential information is illegal under the provisions of Title VII here at issue. Section 706 (b) states that "[c]harges shall not be made public." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (b). The charge, of course, cannot be concealed from the charging party. Nor can it be concealed from the respondent, since the statute also expressly requires the Commission to serve notice of the charge upon the respondent within 10 days of its filing. Ibid. Thus, the "public" to whom the statute forbids disclosure of charges cannot logically include the parties to the agency proceeding. 13 And we must infer that Congress intended the same distinction when it used the word "public" in 709 (e), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-8 (e). The two statutory provisions treat essentially the same subject, and, absent any congressional indication to the contrary, we must assume that "public" means the same thing in the two sections. 14 </s> The very limited legislative history of the disclosure provisions supports this reading. The bill passed by the House contained no restrictions on public disclosure. See H. R. [449 U.S. 590, 599] Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 13 (1963). 15 The disclosure provisions were made part of the substitute bill which Senators Dirksen and Humphrey introduced in the Senate, and which the House later passed without amendment. See 110 Cong. Rec. 12819 (1964). Senator Humphrey, the cosponsor of the bill, explained that the purpose of the disclosure provisions was to prevent wide or unauthorized dissemination of unproved charges, not limited disclosures necessary to carry out the Commission's functions: "[T]his is a ban on publicizing and not on such disclosure as is necessary to the carrying out of the Commission's duties under the statute. . . . The amendment is not intended to hamper Commission investigations or proper cooperation with other State and Federal agencies, but rather is aimed at the making available to the general public of unproven charges." Id., at 12723 (emphasis added). 16 The parties to an agency proceeding are hardly [449 U.S. 590, 600] members of the "general public," especially since, as common sense and the express language of 706 (b) show, see supra, at 598, they always have available to them the charge - proved or unproved - in the case to which they are parties. 17 </s> This reading of the statute, moreover, is consistent with the coordinated scheme of administrative and judicial enforcement which Congress created to enforce Title VII. See supra, at 595. First, limited disclosure to the parties can speed the Commission's required investigation: the Commission can more readily obtain information informally - rather [449 U.S. 590, 601] than through its formal powers under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-9 - if it can present the parties with specific facts for them to corroborate or rebut. Second, limited disclosure enhances the Commission's ability to carry out its statutory responsibility to resolve charges through informal conciliation and negotiation: A party is far more likely to settle when he has enough information to be able to assess the strengths and weaknesses of his opponent's case as well as his own. 18 </s> The respondent argues vigorously that the disclosure of investigative information to charging parties may encourage many lawsuits that would not otherwise be filed, and thus contravene the congressional policy of relying on administrative resolution and settlement. But the effect of limited disclosure may be just the opposite. The employee has little to gain from filing a futile lawsuit, and indeed faces the possibility of an adverse fee award if the suit is frivolous. [449 U.S. 590, 602] Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 . Pointless litigation burdens both the parties and the federal courts, and it is in the interest of all concerned that the charging party have adequate information in assessing the feasibility of litigation. Under the respondent's view of the statute, however, the charging party would be able to obtain that information only after filing a lawsuit. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-8 (e). Thus, a charging party would have to file suit in a hopeless case in order to discover that the case was hopeless. 19 The Commission's disclosure practice may therefore help fulfill the statutory goal of maximum possible reliance upon voluntary conciliation and administrative resolution of claims. </s> In any event, even if disclosure may encourage litigation in some instances, that result is not inconsistent with the ultimate purposes of Title VII. 20 The private right of action remains an important part of Title VII's scheme of enforcement, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 . Congress considered the charging party a "private attorney general," whose role in enforcing the ban on discrimination is parallel to that of the Commission itself. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, supra, at 421. 21 The private litigant [449 U.S. 590, 603] could hardly play that role without access to information needed to assess the feasibility of litigation. </s> IV </s> Nevertheless, though Congress allowed disclosure of investigative information in a charging party's file to that party himself, nothing in the statute or its legislative history reveals any intent to allow the Commission to reveal to that charging party information in the files of other charging parties who have brought claims against the same employer. See EEOC Compliance Manual 83.7 (c). 22 As noted earlier, the charging party cannot logically be a member of the "public" to whom disclosure is forbidden by 706 (b) of Title VII, and, by extension, cannot be a member of the public under 709 (e). See supra, at 598. The reason, however, is that the charging party is obviously aware of the charge he has filed, and so cannot belong to the public to which Congress referred when it directed that "[c]harges shall not be made public." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (b). </s> But there is no reason why the charging party should know the content of any other employee's charge, and he must be considered a member of the public with respect to charges filed by other people. With respect to all files other than his own, he is a stranger. </s> The Commission notes that it often consolidates substantially similar charges for investigation, and in other instances draws upon information generated in an earlier investigation of the same employer. The Commission therefore argues that because information in one party's file may be directly [449 U.S. 590, 604] relevant to another party's charge, it would be burdensome for it to have to reproduce the generally relevant information for each file, and unfair to a charging party to deny him access to generally relevant information that, by chance of timing, appears first and fully in another party's file. </s> But the Commission's argument is merely one of administrative convenience, and such convenience cannot override the prohibitions in the statute. Statistics and other information about an employer's general practices may certainly be relevant to individual charges of discrimination, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 -805, but by including such information, in full or summary form, in each individual charging party's file, the Commission can fully comply with the statute while giving each party the information he needs to weigh the strength of his own case. </s> V </s> The Court of Appeals erred, therefore, in holding that the respondent had a categorical right to refuse to comply with the EEOC subpoena unless the Commission assured it that the information supplied would be held in absolute secrecy. The respondent was entitled only to assurance that each employee filing a charge against Horne would see information in no file other than his or her own. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the decision of this case. </s> JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Section 706 (b) of Title VII, 78 Stat. 259, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (b), provides in relevant part: </s> "Charges shall be made in writing under oath or affirmation and shall contain such information and be in such form as the Commission requires. Charges shall not be made public by the Commission. . . . If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Nothing said or done during and as part of such informal endeavors may be made public by the Commission, its officers or employees, or used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding without the consent of the persons concerned. Any person who makes public information in violation of this subsection shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. . . ." </s> Section 709 (e) of Title VII, 78 Stat. 264, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-8 (e), provides: </s> "It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the Commission to make public in any manner whatever any information obtained by the Commission pursuant to its authority under this section prior to the institution of any proceeding under this title involving such information. Any officer or employee of the Commission who shall make public in any manner whatever any information in violation of this subsection shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year." </s> [Footnote 2 The decision of the Court of Appeals in this case that the Commission lacks the authority to make such a disclosure, EEOC v. Joseph Horne Co., 607 F.2d 1075 (CA4), conflicts with that of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC, 472 F.2d 1147. The [449 U.S. 590, 593] Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits have construed the "public" disclosure provisions of the statute in virtually the same way as did the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the present case, though in the somewhat different context of the Commission's disclosure to individual charging parties of materials emerging from a systemwide investigation of an employer's practices after the Commission itself has brought a charge. Burlington Northern, Inc. v. EEOC, 582 F.2d 1097 (CA7); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. EEOC, 189 U.S. App. D.C. 163, 581 F.2d 941. Since the Commission itself brought no charge in this case, the question of how the disclosure provisions apply in that context is not before the Court. </s> [Footnote 3 The Commission's general policy on disclosure is set out in 29 CFR 1601.22 (1979): </s> "Neither a charge, nor information obtained pursuant to section 709 (a) of Title VII, nor information obtained from records required to be kept or reports required to be filed pursuant to section 709 (c) and (d) of Title VII, shall be made matters of public information by the Commission prior to the institution of any proceedings under this Title involving [449 U.S. 590, 594] such charge or information. This provision does not apply to such earlier disclosures to charging parties, or their attorneys, respondents or their attorneys, or witnesses where disclosure is deemed necessary for securing appropriate relief. This provision also does not apply to such earlier disclosures to representatives of interested Federal, State, and local authorities as may be appropriate or necessary to the carrying out of the Commission's function under Title VII, nor to the publication of data derived from such information in a form which does not reveal the identity of charging parties, respondents, or persons supplying the information." </s> The Commission also has created very specific "special disclosure" rules governing the form and scope of disclosure to those persons whom the Commission treats as being separate from the "public" to whom the statute forbids any disclosure. 29 CFR 1610.17 (d) (1979); EEOC Compliance Manual 83 et seq. </s> [Footnote 4 The complaint also alleged that the EEOC disclosure rules violate the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551, 553, the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. 1905, and the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552. In addition, it alleged that the rules were substantive, rather than procedural, and therefore exceeded the Commission's statutory authority to issue rules of the latter type only. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-12. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals addressed any of these allegations, and the issues they raise are not now before us. </s> [Footnote 5 In most cases, the Commission actually begins its attempt to achieve a negotiated settlement before it makes a reasonable-cause determination. 29 CFR 1601.20 (1979); EEOC Compliance Manual 15. If it does achieve an early settlement, the agreement states that the Commission has made no judgment on the merits of the claim. Ibid. To investigate a charge as quickly as possible and to improve the chances of an early informal resolution, the Commission holds a factfinding conference well before it makes a reasonable-cause decision, with each party presenting its version of the facts. 29 CFR 1601.15 (c) (1979). </s> [Footnote 6 Under Commission regulations, the employee may obtain a right-to-sue letter upon request once 180 days have passed from the filing of the [449 U.S. 590, 596] charge, 29 CFR 1601.28 (a) (1) (1979), but the Commission may issue a right-to-sue letter earlier if it finds that it cannot complete its consideration of a charge within 180 days of filing, 1601.28 (a) (2). The statute gives the employee 90 days from the Commission's notice of right to sue to file a private lawsuit. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (f) (1). </s> [Footnote 7 See n. 1, supra. </s> [Footnote 8 See n. 1, supra. </s> [Footnote 9 A charging party, however, cannot obtain information under these rules until his right to sue has attached, unless he can demonstrate a compelling need for earlier disclosure. EEOC Compliance Manual 83.3 (a). </s> [Footnote 10 The Commission defines "relevant and material" as follows: </s> "Information in other case files is relevant or material when other case files contain charges, investigations or determinations involving the same basis (e. g., sex, religion, national origin, race) with limited exceptions such as when the private litigant's case alleged discrimination in promotion against females and the other case file involved a male's claim that he was not hired because of respondent's policy of not hiring long haired males. Other case files may be relevant or material if they involve a different basis only when the treatment afforded one protected class is probative of treatment afforded the private litigant's class (e. g., systemic discrimination against Spanish Surnamed Americans is often probative as to treatment accorded Blacks and vice versa)." EEOC Compliance Manual 83.7 (c) (2). </s> However, whenever the Commission discloses to a charging party information from other case files, it does not reveal the identity of the other employees who brought charges against the employer. 83.7 (c) (4). </s> [Footnote 11 The Commission also expunges any records of or statements obtained in its informal settlement negotiations, except for information which the Commission can otherwise obtain under its statutory power to copy or subpoena evidence. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-8 (a), 2000e-9. </s> [Footnote 12 "Information in case files may be disclosed only on the condition that the person requesting disclosure agree in writing not to make the information obtained public except in the normal course of a civil action or other proceeding instituted under Title VII." EEOC Compliance Manual 83.3 (b). </s> [Footnote 13 The statute also forbids public disclosure of any matters arising in informal conciliation "without the written consent of the persons concerned." 2000-e (5) (b). This phrase suggests that the parties, the "persons" whose consent would most obviously be necessary, are not members of the "public" to whom disclosure is forbidden. </s> [Footnote 14 The language in 709 (e) forbidding disclosure "in any manner whatever," seems clearly to refer to the means of publication, and not to the persons to whom disclosure is forbidden. </s> [Footnote 15 The House bill, however, did incorporate by reference the provisions of 10 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 723, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 50, which prohibit FTC employees from making "public any information obtained from the Commission without its authority. . . ." See H. R. 7152, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., 710 (a) (1963). Under FTC rules construing 10, the ban on disclosure applies only to unauthorized release of information, and does not prevent disclosure to parties to FTC proceedings. 16 CFR 1.41, 1.133, 1.134 (1964) (current version at 16 CFR 3.36, 4.10 (c) (1980)). Thus, in passing the substitute bill without amendment, the House may well have assumed that the express disclosure provisions in the Senate bill gave the Commission powers of disclosure similar to those under the FTC Act. </s> [Footnote 16 The other cosponsor of the Senate bill, Senator Dirksen, explained 706 (b)'s prohibition of any "public" disclosure of matters revealed during informal conciliation attempts as follows: "The maximum results from the voluntary approach will be achieved if the investigation and conciliation are carried on in privacy. If voluntary compliance with this title is not achieved, the dispute will be fully exposed to public view when a court suit is filed." 110 Cong. Rec. 8193 (1964). Senator Dirksen's explanation strongly suggests that the parties are considered part of the private efforts at conciliation, not members of the general public to whom the dispute will be "fully exposed" after litigation begins. </s> [Footnote 17 The principle that courts should respect an agency's contemporaneous construction of its founding statute, Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 408 , also supports this view of Title VII, since the Commission first issued its rule permitting disclosure to the charging party shortly after Congress created the EEOC in 1965. 30 Fed. Reg. 8407 (1965). Moreover, such a contemporaneous construction deserves special deference when it has remained consistent over a long period of time. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 . The Commission's current regulation permitting such disclosure, 29 CFR 1601.22 (1979), reflects no significant change from the original regulation. The original regulation permitted disclosure to the charging party "as may be appropriate or necessary to the carrying out of the Commission's functions . . . ." 30 Fed. Reg. 8409 (1965). The regulation was changed in 1977 to allow disclosure to the charging party's attorney as well as to the party himself, and to rephrase the controlling condition for disclosure as "where such disclosure is deemed necessary for securing appropriate relief." 42 Fed. Reg. 42024 (1977) (codified at 29 CFR 1601.22 (1979)). In the 15 years during which the Commission has consistently allowed limited disclosure to the charging party, Congress has never expressed its disapproval, and its silence in this regard suggests its consent to the Commission's practice. United States v. Jackson, 280 U.S. 183, 196 -197. In 1972 Congress made major changes in Title VII, but the only change in the disclosure provisions was a very minor one in 706 (b): Congress amended the provision requiring consent before disclosure of conciliation matters by replacing "consent of the parties" with "consent of the persons concerned." Section 706 (b) was also amended to permit charges to be filed "on behalf of" as well as by aggrieved parties, and the new phrase "persons concerned" was probably intended to conform to that change. </s> See 118 Cong. Rec. 4941 (1972). </s> [Footnote 18 When the Commission issues its decision on whether there is probable cause to believe the charge is true, it explains the factual bases for its conclusion. EEOC Compliance Manual 40.7. A positive finding may thereby be a spur to settlement; a negative finding may deter the employee from filing a frivolous lawsuit. If the Commission were not allowed to disclose to the parties essential facts it obtained during its investigation, it would be able to announce no more than its bare conclusion on reasonable cause, and these important benefits of the reasonable-cause determination would be lost. </s> Moreover, a charging party who consents to a settlement negotiated by the Commission waives his right to file a civil action. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (f) (1); see Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 364 . Of course, anyone who settles a case gives up the right to litigate it. But Title VII places employment discrimination claimants in an especially difficult position by forcing them to yield initial control of their potential lawsuits to the Commission, which, in reaching agreement with the employer, might have interests different from those of the employee. It seems unlikely that Congress would force a Title VII charging party, who would have difficulty resisting the opportunity to enter the agreement negotiated by the Commission, to waive his statutory right to litigate when he cannot know the essential facts obtained in the Commission's investigations. </s> [Footnote 19 An impecunious employee would be unlikely to be able to conduct a thorough investigation of his own after he filed a charge, and therefore would be tempted to file a lawsuit so that he could request appointed counsel, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (f) (1), if the statute did not allow the Commission to give him essential investigative information before he filed suit. </s> [Footnote 20 The filing of a private lawsuit may actually encourage settlement. See Young v. International Telephone & Telegraph Co., 438 F.2d 757, 764 (CA3). </s> [Footnote 21 The legislative history of the 1972 amendments to Title VII reflects a strong reaffirmation of the importance of the private right of action in the Title VII enforcement scheme: </s> "The retention of the private right of action . . . is intended to make clear that an individual aggrieved by a violation of Title VII should not be forced to abandon the claim merely because of a decision by the [449 U.S. 590, 603] Commission or the Attorney General as the case may be, that there are insufficient grounds for the Government to file a complaint. . . . </s> "It is hoped that recourse to the private lawsuit will be the exception and not the rule. . . . However, as the individual's rights to redress are paramount under the provisions of Title VII it is necessary that all avenues be left open for quick and effective relief." 118 Cong. Rec. 7565 (1972) (Section-by-Section analysis). </s> [Footnote 22 See n. 10, supra. </s> JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> In my view, the proper standard for evaluating disclosures of information by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [449 U.S. 590, 605] (EEOC) was expressed by Senator Humphrey, the cosponsor of the bill that became Title VII. As the Court notes, ante, at 598-600, Senator Humphrey stated that the prohibitions against public disclosure in 706 (b) and 709 (e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (b) and 2000e-8 (e), do not forbid "such disclosure as is necessary to the carrying out of the Commission's duties under the statute." 110 Cong. Rec. 12723 (1964). I would adhere to this standard and require the Commission to justify any disclosure of its investigative files by demonstrating that the disclosure is "necessary to the carrying out of [its] duties." * Because the Commission must communicate charges to respondents, investigate the charges that have been filed, determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the charges are true, inform the parties of its determination, and attempt to settle charges, see 706 (b), there undoubtedly are many occasions when it must disclose some of its information to the parties and to witnesses. The Court of Appeals erred, therefore, when it held that no disclosure to parties and witnesses is permitted before a suit is filed. </s> The Commission, however, has not pointed to any provision [449 U.S. 590, 606] of Title VII imposing a duty upon it to allow charging parties access to its records "for the purpose of reviewing information in the case file in connection with pending or contemplated litigation." EEOC Compliance Manual 83.3 (a). I do not find it necessary to resolve the disagreement between the Commission and respondent over whether the Commission's prelitigation disclosure rules are a help or a hindrance to the effective enforcement of Title VII. I simply find no provision of the statute authorizing the Commission to assist charging parties who are trying to decide whether to file a suit. </s> The Court of Appeals held that the prelitigation disclosure rules are invalid. I would affirm that part of its judgment. </s> [Footnote * As the Court notes, the agency adopted precisely this standard as a contemporaneous construction of the statute. Its first disclosure rules, issued in 1965, authorized disclosure to the charging party "as may be appropriate or necessary to the carrying out of the Commission's function." 30 Fed. Reg. 8409 (1965). This regulation remained unchanged until 1977, when it was amended to state a broader standard, although the agency disclaimed an intent to do so. See 42 Fed. Reg. 42024 (1977). Disclosure to a charging party, his or her attorney, and certain others is now permitted when it "is deemed necessary for securing appropriate relief." 29 CFR 1601.22 (1979). That this is a departure from the previous standard is clear, since the Commission retained the "necessary to the carrying out of the Commission's function" language for disclosures of information to interested federal, state, or local authorities. Ibid. </s> The Regulations in the EEOC Compliance Manual which set forth the agency's prelitigation disclosure program were first adopted in 1975. They hardly can be called a contemporaneous construction of Title VII. </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. </s> The Court construes a prohibition against public disclosure as an authorization for prelitigation discovery. A principal basis for the Court's unusual construction of rather plain statutory language is that because a charging party must know the contents of a charge, that party cannot be a member of the public to which disclosure is prohibited. In my view, the reason that the statute is not violated by the charging party's knowledge of the contents of a charge is that he is the source of the information contained in the charge; no disclosure occurs when he reads what he has written, regardless of whether he is a member of the public. </s> To encourage prompt and full disclosure of relevant information to a neutral conciliator, Congress assured employees and employers alike that no public disclosure of such information would occur prior to the institution of formal proceedings. To enforce this assurance, the statute imposes criminal penalties on Commission personnel who disclose information to the public. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-8 (e). 1 It seems fanciful to [449 U.S. 590, 607] me to conclude that Congress intended to prohibit direct disclosure while permitting indirect disclosure. That result, however, is the consequence of the Court's view that direct disclosure may be made to a fairly large group of persons who can then pass the information along to others. 2 Although Commission rules do provide that such persons shall agree not to make disclosed information public to others, neither the statutes nor the regulations contain any sanction for the violation of that sort of agreement. 3 If Congress had regarded this group as members of some nonpublic category, I believe that Congress would have expressly prohibited them from making any public disclosure of the confidential information they receive from the Commission. 4 The Court's reading of the statute shows little respect for the drafting ability of Congress. </s> I therefore agree with the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that the statute should be interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning. </s> Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 A violation of the disclosure prohibition contained in 2000e-8 (e) is a misdemeanor punishable by 1-year imprisonment and a $1,000 fine. </s> [Footnote 2 The persons to whom special disclosure is permitted, as described by the Court, include parties or their attorneys, aggrieved persons in whose behalf charges have been filed, and the persons or organizations who have filed the charges in their behalf, and respondents and their attorneys. See ante, at 596-597. </s> [Footnote 3 The consequences of a violation surely do not include the criminal penalties that the statute expressly authorizes when Commission personnel make public disclosure. </s> [Footnote 4 The Commission argues that it could prevent further disclosure by seeking injunctive and compensatory relief for breach of the agreement not to disclose the information to others. Brief for Petitioner 37-38, n. 24. This remedy may ameliorate the practical consequences of the Commission's regulation, but the existence of such a remedy does not answer the question of why Congress provided no express sanction for further disclosure by this nonpublic category. </s> [449 U.S. 590, 608]

United States Supreme Court GARCIA v. UNITED STATES(1984) No. 83-6061 Argued: October 10, 1984Decided: December 10, 1984 </s> For assaulting an undercover Secret Service agent with a loaded pistol, in an attempt to rob him of $1,800 of Government "flash money" that the agent was using to buy counterfeit currency from them, petitioners were convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 2114, which proscribes the assault and robbery of any custodian of "mail matter or of any money or other property of the United States." The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions over petitioners' contention that 2114 is limited to crimes involving the Postal Service. </s> Held: </s> The language "any money or other property of the United States" in 2114 includes the $1,800 belonging to the United States and entrusted to the Secret Service agent as "flash money," and thus by using a pistol in an effort to rob the agent petitioners fell squarely within the prohibitions of the statute. Pp. 73-80. </s> (a) "Mail matter," "money," and "other property" are separated from one another in 2114 by use of the disjunctive "or." This means that the word "money" must be given its ordinary, separate meaning and does not mean "postal money" or "money in the custody of postal employees." P. 73. </s> (b) There is no ambiguity in the language of the statute. But even if there were, the particular language here does not lend itself to application of the ejusdem generis rule so as to require reading the general terms "money" and "other property" following "mail matter" in a specific, restricted postal context. The term "mail matter" is no more a specific term - and is probably less specific - than "money." Pp. 73-75. </s> (c) The legislative history shows no intent by Congress to limit the statute to postal crimes. Pp. 75-78. </s> (d) The fact that the Solicitor General in a prior case presenting the identical issue conceded that 2114 only applied to postal crimes, a concession he now states was unwarranted, does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to interpret Congress' intent in enacting 2114. Pp. 78-79. </s> 718 F.2d 1528, affirmed. </s> REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. [469 U.S. 70, 71] STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 80. </s> Charles G. White argued the cause pro hac vice for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Theodore J. Sakowitz. </s> Jerrold J. Ganzfried argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Trott, Deputy Solicitor General Frey, and John F. De Pue. </s> JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Petitioners assaulted an undercover United States Secret Service agent with a loaded pistol, in an attempt to rob him of $1,800 of Government "flash money" that the agent was using to buy counterfeit currency from them. They were convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 2114, which proscribes the assault and robbery of any custodian of "mail matter or of any money or other property of the United States." The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed petitioners' convictions, over their contention that 2114 is limited to crimes involving the Postal Service. 718 F.2d 1528 (1983). We granted certiorari, 466 U.S. 926 (1984), to resolve a split in the Circuits concerning the reach of 2114, 1 and we affirm. </s> Agent K. David Holmes of the United States Secret Service posed as someone interested in purchasing counterfeit currency. He met petitioners Jose and Francisco Garcia in a park in Miami, Fla. Petitioners agreed to sell Holmes a large quantity of counterfeit currency, and asked that he show them the genuine currency he intended to give in exchange. He "flashed" the $1,800 of money to which he had been entrusted by the United States, and they showed him a sample of their wares - a counterfeit $50 bill. [469 U.S. 70, 72] </s> Wrangling over the terms of the agreement began, and Jose Garcia leapt in front of Holmes brandishing a semiautomatic pistol. He pointed the pistol at Holmes, assumed a combat stance, chambered a round into the pistol, and demanded the money. While Holmes slowly raised his hands over his head, three Secret Service agents who had been watching from afar raced to the scene on foot. Jose Garcia dropped the pistol and surrendered, but Francisco Garcia seized the money belonging to the United States and fled. The agents arrested Jose Garcia on the spot, and pursued and later arrested Francisco Garcia as well. </s> Petitioners were convicted in a jury trial of violating 18 U.S.C. 2114 by assaulting a lawful custodian of Government money, Agent Holmes, with intent to "rob, steal, or purloin" the money. That section states in full: </s> "Whoever assaults any person having lawful charge, control, or custody of any mail matter or of any money or other property of the United States, with intent to rob, steal, or purloin such mail matter, money, or other property of the United States, or robs any such person of mail matter, or of any money, or other property of the United States, shall for the first offense, be imprisoned not more than ten years; and if in effecting or attempting to effect such robbery he wounds the person having custody of such mail, money, or other property of the United States, or puts his life in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon, or for a subsequent offense, shall be imprisoned twenty-five years." </s> Both petitioners were sentenced to the 25-year prison term mandated by 2114 when the assault puts the custodian's life in jeopardy by use of a dangerous weapon. 2 On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgments of conviction. The only issue before us on certiorari is whether the language "any money, or other property of the [469 U.S. 70, 73] United States" in 2114 includes the $1,800 belonging to the United States and entrusted to Agent Holmes as "flash money" in this case. </s> Section 2114 prohibits the assault with intent to rob of "any person having lawful charge, control or custody of any mail matter or of any money or other property of the United States . . . ." (emphasis supplied). Petitioners contend that notwithstanding the reach of this language, Congress intended that only the robbery of "postal" money or property was to be covered by the statute. </s> The enacted language of the statute is contrary to petitioners' argument. The language protects custodians of any mail matter, custodians of any United States money, and, in a catchall phrase, custodians of any other United States property. As in our recent case of Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980), "[n]othing on the face of the statute suggests a congressional intent to limit its coverage to persons [employed by the Postal Service]." Id., at 60. </s> The three classes of property protected by 2114 are each separated by the conjunction "or." Canons of construction indicate that terms connected in the disjunctive in this manner be given separate meanings. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 739 -740 (1978). In Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979), we refused to ignore the statutory meaning which would be presumed from similar disjunctive language, stating that the use of the term "or" indicates an intent to give the nouns their separate, normal meanings. Id., at 339. In our case, Congress separated "mail matter," "money," and "other property" from one another by use of a disjunctive, and we think this means that the word "money" must be given its ordinary, separate meaning; it does not mean "postal money" or "money in the custody of postal employees." </s> Petitioners contend that the language of the statute is ambiguous, and in support of this contention offer what seems to us a rather labyrinthine explanation of the statutory language. Petitioners first claim that the conjunction "or" [469 U.S. 70, 74] cannot properly be read to totally separate the three types of property listed in the prohibition; for if the word "or" indeed strictly separates the three types of property, the statute would proscribe assaults on custodians of any "money," whether or not it was money belonging to the United States, because the term "money" would not be modified or restricted by the term "of the United States" which follows the word "property." Thus Congress would have enacted a law, say petitioners, proscribing assaults on custodians of money by whomever owned, and "Congress would then have enacted a Federal robbery statute without any jurisdictional basis." Reply Brief for Petitioners 3. Because Congress could not have intended this absurd result, petitioners contend, there is an ambiguity in the statutory language. This contention, however, totally ignores the word "other" which follows "money" and shows that the money referred to, like the property referred to, is money belonging to the United States. </s> Petitioners then develop their argument by invoking the principle of ejusdem generis to resolve the ambiguity which their analysis creates. Under that principle, of course, where general words follow an enumeration of specific terms, the general words are read to apply only to other items like those specifically enumerated. See Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 588 (1980). Petitioners thus urge that "mail matter" is a specific term, and therefore the general terms "money" and "other property" which follow it must be read in the specific, restricted postal context. They conclude that "money" was intended to mean "postal money" and "other property of the United States" was intended to mean "other postal property." </s> We said in Harrison that "`"the rule of ejusdem generis, while firmly established, is only an instrumentality for ascertaining the correct meaning of words when there is uncertainty."'" Ibid., quoting United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 91 (1975), in turn quoting Gooch v. United States, [469 U.S. 70, 75] 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936). We are not persuaded that petitioners' analysis of the statutory language creates any ambiguity in the plain meaning of the words, and even if it did we do not think that the particular language here lends itself to the application of the ejusdem generis rule. We have previously noted that the terms in question are made separate and distinct from one another by Congress' use of the disjunctive; in addition, the term "mail matter" is no more specific a term - and is probably less specific - than "money." </s> Notwithstanding petitioners' argument to the contrary, we are satisfied that the statutory language with which we deal has a plain and unambiguous meaning. While we now turn to the legislative history as an additional tool of analysis, we do so with the recognition that only the most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions from those data would justify a limitation on the "plain meaning" of the statutory language. When we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, except in "`rare and exceptional circumstances,'" TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 , n. 33 (1978), quoting Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930). </s> Section 2114 had its genesis as a law to protect mail carriers from assault and robbery of mail matter. The forerunner to 2114 was 18 U.S.C. 320 (1934 ed., Supp. V). It proscribed assault and robbery of "any person having lawful charge, control, or custody of any mail matter." Section 320 had been placed in Chapter 8 of Title 18 of the United States Code. Chapter 8 was entitled "Offenses Against Postal Service." In 1935, however, the 74th Congress amended 320 by appending after the term "mail matter" the clause "or of any money or other property of the United States." Section 320 as amended retained its place in Chapter 8 of Title 18 until 1948, when it was transferred to Chapter 103, which is entitled "Robbery and Burglary" and contains all of the federal statutes covering those crimes. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 797. Section 320 was then renumbered as 2114; with the exception of minor particulars [469 U.S. 70, 76] the text of the statute has remained unchanged since the 1935 amendment. </s> Petitioners contend that the 1935 amendment to 320 was not intended to expand the reach of that statute beyond postal crimes. In support of this they rely on some short colloquies from the House floor which they describe as "snippets." </s> In surveying legislative history we have repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for finding the Legislature's intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill, which "represen[t] the considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation." Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969). We have eschewed reliance on the passing comments of one Member, Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35 (1982), and casual statements from the floor debates. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385 (1968); Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). In O'Brien, supra, at 385, we stated that Committee Reports are "more authoritative" than comments from the floor, and we expressed a similar preference in Zuber, supra, at 187. 3 </s> The Committee Reports on this bill show no intent on the part of the 74th Congress to limit the amended 320 to less than the normal reach of its words. The House Report on the bill to amend 320 is entitled "SAFEGUARDING CUSTODIANS OF GOVERNMENT MONEYS AND PROPERTY" and states that "[t]he purpose of the pending [469 U.S. 70, 77] bill is to bring within the provisions of the Penal Code the crime of robbing or attempting to rob custodians of Government moneys." H. R. Rep. No. 582, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1935). The Senate Report on the 1935 amendment is entitled "PROVIDING FOR PUNISHMENT FOR THE CRIME OF ROBBING OR ATTEMPTING TO ROB CUSTODIANS OF GOVERNMENT MONEYS OR PROPERTY," and the Senate Report states the purpose of the bill exactly like the House Report. S. Rep. No. 1440, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1935). Nowhere do the Committee Reports state that the amended statute required a "postal nexus" or was limited to postal crimes. </s> Petitioners make a good deal of the fact that both Reports contain the letter from the Postmaster General, requesting enactment of the bill. That official's letter, however, says nothing about limiting the broad language of the bill to postal crimes, but instead speaks simply of "custodian[s] of Government funds," not of Government "mail." H. R. Rep. No. 582, supra, at 1; S. Rep. No. 1440, supra, at 1. In two places the Postmaster General's letter states that the bill was designed to punish the crime of "robbing or attempting to rob custodians of Government moneys." Ibid. Thus the Committee Reports show that the Postmaster, and the two Committee responsible for the legislation, gave no evidence of their belief that the statute was limited to postal crimes. </s> Petitioners rely heavily on the statement of Representative Dobbins, whom the dissent identifies as the floor manager, made on the floor of the House of Representatives on May 24, 1935. Representative Dobbins stated: </s> "The only purpose of the pending bill is to extend the protection of the present law to property of the United States in the custody of its postal officials. . . . [L]et me say there are many custodians of postal stations who have a great amount of money in their custody but little mail. . . ." 79 Cong. Rec. 8205 (1935). [469 U.S. 70, 78] </s> We find a number of flaws in petitioners' argument that Representative Dobbins' statement is clear proof of Congress' intent. First, this snippet quotes Representative Dobbins out of context. The above-quoted statement was made in response to an objection from another Member concerning the mandatory 25-year penalty in the proposed statute. As one in favor of the bill, Representative Dobbins' attempt to limit the scope of the statute is best read in light of this objection. See ibid. To permit such colloquies to alter the clear language of the statute undermines the intent of Congress. Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 237 (1984). See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983). Isolated statements such as Representative Dobbins' are "not impressive legislative history." Zuber, supra, at 187. If they were, a statement of Representative Wolcott earlier in the same colloquy to the effect that "[t]his bill is confined to assaults on Federal law-enforcement officers," 79 Cong. Rec., at 8205, would seem to counterbalance the import of Representative Dobbins' statement. Thus petitioners would lose even if we were to adopt some type of reverse parol evidence rule, where oral statements were elevated above enacted language in determining the meaning of the statute. </s> We think probably the strongest argument that may be made for limitation on the coverage of 2114, although petitioners do not themselves make it as such, is that set forth in the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Reid, 517 F.2d 953 (1975), and amplified by our dissenting colleagues today. This argument is certainly not without persuasive power, and it would perhaps be controlling if there were substantial ambiguity in the language Congress had enacted. But there is no such ambiguity. We are not willing to narrow the plain meaning of even a criminal statute on the basis of a gestalt judgment as to what Congress probably intended. </s> As a final argument petitioners assert that they are vindicated by the Solicitor General's earlier stipulation in United [469 U.S. 70, 79] States v. Hanahan, 442 F.2d 649 (CA7 1971), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 807 (1973). In that case we were faced with the identical issue presented here, but we vacated and remanded in light of the Solicitor General's concession that 2114 only applied to postal crimes. 4 The Solicitor General now states that his concession in Hanahan was unwarranted. As we noted in NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 351 (1978), a governmental agency "is not disqualified from changing its mind" concerning the construction of a statute. See also Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 222 (1976). Moreover, private agreements between litigants, especially those disowned, cannot relieve this Court of performance of its judicial function. It is our responsibility to interpret the intent of Congress in enacting 2114, irrespective of petitioners' or respondent's prior or present views. "[T]he proper administration of the criminal law cannot be left merely to the stipulation of [the] parties." Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 259 (1942). We agree that the Solicitor General's prior concession was ill-advised, but it does not control this case. </s> Petitioners seek to clip 2114 despite its plain terms, but "[t]he short answer is that Congress did not write the statute that way." Russello, 464 U.S., at 23 . 5 Instead, Congress [469 U.S. 70, 80] selected language that penalized assaults or robberies of anyone who is a custodian of "any money or other property of the United States." It is beyond question that by using a pistol in an effort to rob Agent Holmes, petitioners fell squarely within the prohibitions of the statute. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 See United States v. Reid, 517 F.2d 953 (CA2 1975); United States v. Rivera, 513 F.2d 519 (CA2), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 948 (1975); United States v. Fernandez, 497 F.2d 730 (CA9 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975). </s> [Footnote 2 Petitioners were also convicted of other crimes. See 718 F.2d 1528 (1983). </s> [Footnote 3 As Justice Jackson stated: </s> "Resort to legislative history is only justified where the face of the Act is inescapably ambiguous, and then I think we should not go beyond Committee reports, which presumably are well considered and carefully prepared. . . . [T]o select casual statements from floor debates, not always distinguished for candor or accuracy, as a basis for making up our minds what law Congress intended to enact is to substitute ourselves for the Congress in one of its important functions." Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 -396 (1951) (concurring). </s> [Footnote 4 Despite the Solicitor General's view, Government prosecutors had relied on 2114 outside of the postal context. See e. g., United States v. O'Neil, 436 F.2d 571 (CA9 1970) (Customs Service employee); United States v. Sherman, 421 F.2d 198 (CA4) (military money custodian), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 914 (1970); Peek v. United States, 321 F.2d 934 (CA9 1963) (same). </s> [Footnote 5 We disagree with petitioners' assertion that 2114 as we have read it does not fit well with other federal statutes, especially 2112. The statutes are related but not duplicitous. Section 2112 prohibits only consummated robberies of any person - whether lawful custodian or not - possessing any type of personal property of the United States. The difference between 2112 and 2114 is that the latter is specifically directed to authorized custodians, and protects them against assaults accompanying both attempted and completed robberies. Thus the statutes complement each other. </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting. </s> When the literal application of a statute would produce a result "demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters," the actual legislative intent must control our disposition. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982). I believe a similar rule should apply to the literal application of a federal criminal statute that is dramatically broader than the coverage that its draftsmen intended. </s> I </s> A fair reading of the entire history of 18 U.S.C. 2114 convinces me that Congress never intended it to apply outside of the postal context. As the Court correctly notes, ante, at 75, 2114 "had its genesis as a law to protect mail carriers from assault and robbery of mail matter." The deterrent purpose of such a law justifies the imposition of especially severe sanctions. For that reason, heavy penalties have always been authorized, and sometimes mandated, for assaults upon mail carriers. </s> The Second Congress, recognizing the importance of the delivery of the mails, enacted the earliest predecessor to 2114 in 1792. That enactment, entitled "An Act to establish the Post-Office and Post Roads within the United States," 1 stated in part that death was the penalty for any [469 U.S. 70, 81] person who robbed "any carrier of the mail of the United States." 2 The penalty for robbery of a carrier of the mail remained the same when the Third Congress passed the Act of May 8, 1794. 3 Almost three years later, Congress made aiding and abetting the robbery of a mail carrier an offense also subject to a penalty of death. 4 </s> Repeatedly in subsequent years Congress enacted special legislation dealing with mail-robbery offenses. Such statutes were enacted in 1799, 5 1810, 6 1825, 7 1872, 8 and [469 U.S. 70, 82] 1909. 9 In the 1909 statute, Congress established a mandatory minimum sentence of incarceration of 25 years for attempted robbery if the mail carrier was wounded or had his life put in danger. As it had done consistently for over a century, Congress thus ensured that the law would provide special protection for a person within the postal setting by making it clear that a crime upon such a person was an unusually serious matter, not only because it was a federal offense, but also because of the severity of the mandated penalty. 10 </s> [469 U.S. 70, 83] </s> The history through the 1909 codification and in the immediate years thereafter unequivocally demonstrates that 2114's predecessors were always intended for postal offenses. This case, of course, involves an interpretation of the amendment of 320 of Title 18 that Congress adopted in 1935. The question is whether Congress intended to abandon the postal nexus that had characterized this legislation throughout its long history. </s> II </s> A review of the circumstances leading to the 1935 amendment persuades me that Congress merely intended to broaden the protection of postal workers. In 1934 two bills containing the amendatory language that was enacted in the following year were introduced in the House of Representatives and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. 11 Neither of those bills was reported out of that Committee which, of course, is the Committee that would normally process a significant change in the general coverage of the Criminal Code. In 1935, the highest postal official, the Postmaster General, wrote a letter to Representative James M. Mead, Chairman of the House Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads, requesting an amendment to cover assaults [469 U.S. 70, 84] on custodians of Government funds. 12 In both the House and the Senate it was the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads that processed the requested legislation. See H. R. Rep. No. 582, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); S. Rep. No. 1440, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). </s> The 1935 amendment that was referred to the House Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads was a noncontroversial measure that Congressman Dobbins, a Member of that Committee, managed on the floor of the House. In response to a query, he stated that "[t]he only purpose of [469 U.S. 70, 85] the pending bill is to extend the protection of the present law to property of the United States in the custody of its postal officials, the same as it now extends that protection to mail matter in the custody of its postal officials." 13 When a [469 U.S. 70, 86] relatively minor piece of legislation of this sort is processed with almost no debate on the floor of either House, the unambiguous comment of a spokesman for the Committee that reported the bill is particularly illuminating. In my opinion it is entitled to greater weight than a general statement in the Committee Reports that is little more than a paraphrase of the statutory language itself. </s> As Judge Friendly succinctly wrote in United States v. Reid, 517 F.2d 953 (CA2 1975): </s> "[T]he 1935 amendment was to a statute which stood in the chapter of the Criminal Code dealing with offenses against the postal service. No Congressman could have supposed that, in passing an amendment to that section proposed by the Postmaster General and recommended by the committees dealing with the postal service, he was creating a new crime with respect to government property generally." Id., at 957, n. 3a. </s> III </s> Even after Congress enacted the 1935 amendment, thus structuring the statute to read 14 in much the same form as it [469 U.S. 70, 87] exists today, the statute remained in the chapter dealing with crimes against the Postal Service until the general revision of the Judicial Code in 1948. No one contends that the 1948 revision changed the meaning of the statute. 15 </s> Apparently it never occurred to any federal prosecutor that this statute had any application outside the postal context until several decades after it was amended. 16 Indeed, in 1973, when the question was first considered at the top executive level of the Department of Justice in United States v. Hanahan, 442 F.2d 649 (CA7 1971), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 807 (1973), Solicitor General Bork carefully examined the question, concluding that it covered only postal crimes. The Solicitor General's explanation of that conclusion merits quotation: </s> "In 1935 Congress added the more encompassing phrase `money or other property of the United States.' On its face the statute covers the crime for which petitioner was convicted, as one involving a `person having lawful charge, control, or custody of any . . . money or other property of the United States . . . . We agree with petitioner, however, that the legislative history plainly shows that the statute was intended to apply only to postal crimes. </s> "The bill amending the statute was designed to remedy the anomalous situation which existed under the old statute. Before the amendments the statute imposed a severe penalty on one who robbed mail matter from the Postal Office but imposed no penalty on one who [469 U.S. 70, 88] robbed money or other valuable property from the Post Office. . . . </s> "The change in the law had been advocated by the Post Office Department and only that Department submitted a report on the bill to the House and Senate Committees on Post Office and Post Roads. . . . We therefore concede that Section 2114, as amended, was designed only to cover robberies of post offices or postal employees." 17 </s> IV </s> Even if I am correct in my appraisal of the actual intent of Congress, it is arguable that the statutory language is sufficiently plain that it should nevertheless be given effect. There are, however, three special concerns that lead me to the contrary conclusion. </s> First is the relationship between this statute and other parts of the Criminal Code. The general statute proscribing thefts of Government property, 18 U.S.C. 2112, carries a lesser penalty even if violence accompanies the theft. 18 The more severe penalty in 2114 is only explicable if we assume that Congress wanted to provide a special deterrent to crimes against an identifiable class of federal employees. Moreover, that special deterrent is consistent with the congressional decision in 1868 that mail carriers should wear special uniforms that the Postmaster General prescribed. See Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 246, 20, 15 Stat. 197. Robbery of a uniformed postal worker fits squarely into the rationale for 2114. The assault in this case, however, was upon an undercover agent not known to have any connection with [469 U.S. 70, 89] the Federal Government. This type of robbery is not appropriately prosecuted under 2114. 19 </s> Second, the severity of the mandatory minimum sentences - 10 years if no actual or threatened violence is involved and 25 years in a case of this kind - is rather plainly disproportionate to the offense if it covers every conceivable theft of Government property - even the attempted robbery of a Government-owned hammer. 20 The Government responds by noting that it is for Congress to decide if a penalty is too harsh. 21 This is quite true. But this response identifies my final - and most important - concern. </s> It is Congress, rather than the Executive, that must define the dimensions of the federal law enforcement program. Law enforcement remains, and should remain, the primary responsibility of the several States. Every increase in the power of the federal prosecutor moves us a step closer to a national police force with its attendant threats to individual liberty. For that reason, I believe we have a special obligation to make sure that Congress intended to authorize a novel assertion of federal criminal jurisdiction. Cf. Bell v. United States, 462 U.S. 356, 363 (1983) (STEVENS, J., dissenting); McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 675 (1982) (STEVENS, J., dissenting); United States v. Altobella, 442 F.2d 310, [469 U.S. 70, 90] 316 (CA7 1971). There is, of course, no doubt that Congress has the authority to enact a law with the meaning the Court finds in 2114 today. I am not, however, convinced that Congress actually intended to do so. I therefore respectfully dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, 1, 1 Stat. 232. </s> [Footnote 2 That section provided in pertinent part: </s> "That if any person or persons shall rob any carrier of the mail of the United States, of such mail, or if any person shall rob the mail, in which letters are sent to be conveyed by post, of any letter or packet, or shall steal such mail, or shall steal and take from or out of the same, or from or out of any post-office, any letter or packet, such offender or offenders shall, on conviction thereof, suffer death." 17, 1 Stat. 237. </s> [Footnote 3 See ch. 23, 17, 1 Stat. 361. </s> [Footnote 4 Act of Mar. 3, 1797, ch. 19, 4, 1 Stat. 511. </s> [Footnote 5 Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 43, 15, 1 Stat. 736-737 (up to 40 lashes and imprisonment not exceeding 10 years for first mail-robbery conviction; death for first mail-robbery conviction, if wounding the carrier or placing his life in danger by the use of a dangerous weapon; death for second mail-robbery conviction; up to 30 lashes or imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, for attempted robbery of the mails). </s> [Footnote 6 Act of Apr. 30, 1810, ch. 37, 19, 2 Stat. 598 (up to three years' imprisonment for attempted robbery of the mails by assaulting, shooting, or threatening the custodian with a dangerous weapon). </s> [Footnote 7 Act of Mar. 3, 1825, ch. 64, 22, 4 Stat. 108-109 (5 to 10 years' imprisonment for first mail-robbery conviction; death for first mail-robbery conviction if the carrier of the mails was wounded or had his life put in danger by a dangerous weapon; death for second mail-robbery conviction). </s> [Footnote 8 In 1872, Congress passed "An Act to revise, consolidate, and amend the Statutes relating to the Post-office Department." Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, 1-327, 17 Stat. 283-330. Section 285 of the revision stated: </s> "That any person who shall rob any carrier, agent, or other person intrusted with the mail, of such mail, or any part thereof, shall, on conviction thereof, be imprisoned at hard labor not less than five nor more than ten years; and if convicted a second time of a like offence, or if, in effecting such robbery the first time, the robber shall wound the person having custody of the mail, or put his life in jeopardy by the use of dangerous weapons, such [469 U.S. 70, 82] offender shall be imprisoned at hard labor for the term of his natural life." 17 Stat. 320. </s> In contrast to the single grouping of offenses related to mail robbery in previous statutes, the revision also contained a separate section for attempting to rob a mail carrier: </s> "That any person who shall attempt to rob the mail by assaulting the person having custody thereof, shooting at him or his horse, or threatening him with dangerous weapons, and shall not effect such robbery, shall, on conviction thereof, be imprisoned at hard labor not less than two nor more than ten years." 287, 17 Stat. 320. </s> The Revised Statutes of 1878 contained the separate mail-robbery-related provisions, as renumbered. Rev. Stat. 5472, 5473. </s> [Footnote 9 In 1909 Congress codified the United States Penal Code, combined the two sections that related to robbery of the mails, and placed the single statute on mail robbery in the section entitled "Offenses Against Postal Service." Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, 197, 35 Stat. 1126. The section provided: </s> "Whoever shall assault any person having lawful charge, control, or custody of any mail matter, with intent to rob, steal, or purloin such mail matter or any part thereof, or shall rob any such person of such mail or any part thereof, shall, for a first offense, be imprisoned not more than ten years; and if in effecting or attempting to effect such robbery, he shall wound the person having custody of the mail, or put his life in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon, or for a subsequent offense, shall be imprisoned for twenty-five years." Ibid. </s> See 18 U.S.C. 320 (1934 ed., Supp. V). </s> [Footnote 10 Congress' attention was particularly called to the consolidation of the previous two sections and the establishment of a single 25-year penalty. The Report on S. 2982, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., stated: [469 U.S. 70, 83] </s> "This section is made up of two sections of the Revised Statutes. Under those sections, one committing robbery of the mails, or attempting to do so, and in doing or attempting to do which makes use of a dangerous weapon, is subject to imprisonment for life. This language has been omitted and the maximum imprisonment which may be imposed has been reduced to twenty-five years." S. Rep. No. 10, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., 21 (1908) (Report of the Special Joint Committee on the Revision of the Laws). </s> Throughout the discussion on the provision, Congress had no doubt that it was concerned with the mails. Id., at 1906 ("The offense intended to be reached by this provision is interfering with a person having custody of the mail") (statement of Mr. Heyburn). </s> [Footnote 11 See H. R. Rep. No. 582, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1935). </s> [Footnote 12 The text of the letter stated: </s> "The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of the 16th instant, requesting a report on H. R. 5360, a bill providing for punishment for the crime of robbing or attempting to rob custodians of Government moneys or property. </s> "Assaults upon custodians of mail matter are punishable under section 197 of the Federal Penal Code (18 U.S.C. 320), which provides a penalty of 25 years' imprisonment if the custodian is wounded or his life is put in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon. If the person assaulted is a custodian of Government funds (not mail) the maximum punishment that can be imposed is imprisonment for not more than 10 years and a fine of not more than $5,000; and no penalty is provided for attempts to commit such crimes. Recent years have witnessed a substantial increase in crimes of the latter type and it is believed that section 197 of the Penal Code should be amended so as to bring within its provisions the crime of robbing or attempting to rob custodians of Government moneys. Legislation to this effect was recommended in the Postmaster General's annual report for 1933 and two bills, H. R. 6546 and H. R. 7214, were introduced and referred to the House Judiciary Committee but neither bill was reported out by the committee. The recommendation for the passage of this legislation is renewed." H. R. Rep. No. 582, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1935). </s> See also Hearings before Subcommittee No. 8 of the House Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads on H. R. 154, 3252, 5049, 5162, 5360, 5370, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 24 (1935) ("What we want to say about this bill is the fact that when a bandit, at the point of a gun, holds up our postal employees and takes mail, we have a 25-year penalty for it, but if he comes into the post office and does the same thing and takes away only cash, we are unable to give him such a sentence") (statement of K. P. Aldrich, Chief Post Office Inspector). </s> [Footnote 13 79 Cong. Rec. 8205 (1935) (emphasis added). The discussion that led to the comment proceeded, in part, as follows: </s> "Mr. DOBBINS. I do not believe that the recommittal of this bill would accomplish anything. It was rather thoroughly considered. It did not merely receive perfunctory consideration. I think the language to which objection was made the previous day when this bill was considered, while it may be unusual language, it has been in the statute a great many years. Since the objection was made the other day I have taken up the matter with the legal advisor and with the inspection force of the Post Office Department. They feel it would be extremely dangerous to change the language of the statute as it is now. As to new language being incorporated in the act, I see no objection to changing it in the manner suggested by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Wolcott] at the last hearing of the Consent Calendar. </s> "Mr. WOLCOTT. I stated at that time that I thought it was a very poorly drafted bill, and I had hoped the committee would redraft it and report it out. I do not insist upon my amendment so far as the penalty is concerned. I think it is a very bad way to leave legislation, making it mandatory upon a judge to give a particular sentence, and no more or no less. If the committee want it that way, however, I have no objection. I think, however, for the purpose of safeguarding the integrity of our work here the language on page 1 should be amended. </s> . . . . . </s> "Mr. DOBBINS. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Ohio objects to the 25-year penalty provision provided in this bill. The penalty clause is not new legislation. If this bill is not passed, the statute will still contain the mandatory 25-year penalty. </s> "The only purpose of the pending bill is to extend the protection of the present law to property of the United States in the custody of its postal officials, the same as it now extends that protection to mail matter in the custody of postal officials. Aside from that it makes no change in the law. It just includes property of the United States in addition to mail matter which is protected; and let me say there are many custodians of postal stations who have a great amount of money in their custody but little mail; for instance in those substations where money orders are sold. If a bandit attacks those employees seeking that money, there is no way to prosecute [469 U.S. 70, 86] the bandit under the present law, but if he is merely after a postal card or a letter he can be prosecuted. </s> "I think this makes a salutory change in the law. It is advocated by the Post Office Department and it seems to me there ought to be no objection to it." Ibid. </s> [Footnote 14 The text of the statute read: </s> "Whoever shall assault any person having lawful charge, control, or custody of any mail matter or of any money or other property of the United States, with intent to rob, steal, or purloin such mail matter, money, or other property of the United States, or any part thereof, or shall rob any such person of such mail matter, or of any money, or other property of the United States, or any part thereof, shall, for the first offense, be imprisoned not more than ten years; and if in effecting or attempting to effect such robbery he shall wound the person having custody of such mail, money, or other property of the United States, or put his life in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon, or for a subsequent offense, shall be [469 U.S. 70, 87] imprisoned twenty-five years." Act of Aug. 26, 1935, ch. 694, 49 Stat. 867. </s> [Footnote 15 The Court, ante, at 75-76, correctly states that 320 was renumbered 2114 and transferred to the section of Title 18 entitled "Robbery and Burglary" in 1948. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 797. </s> [Footnote 16 The earliest appeal using 2114 outside of a postal setting appears to be Peek v. United States, 321 F.2d 934 (CA9 1963); it arose almost three decades after the 1935 amendment. </s> [Footnote 17 Memorandum for United States in Hanahan v. United States, O. T. 1972, No. 72-6454, pp. 2-3 (footnotes omitted). </s> [Footnote 18 That section provides: </s> "Whoever robs another of any kind or description of personal property belonging to the United States, shall be imprisoned not more than fifteen years." </s> [Footnote 19 The Government stated at oral argument that 2114 was activated in this case instead of 2112 because the former section covers attempted robbery. Tr. of Oral Arg. 31. However, in its brief the Government concedes that it was not without statutory relief because 18 U.S.C. 111 prohibits assaults on Government employees or officials listed in 18 U.S.C. 1114, which includes "any officer or employee of the Secret Service." A conviction under 111, if involving a deadly or dangerous weapon, carries a fine of not more than $10,000, or imprisonment of 10 years, or both. Jose Garcia was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 111, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. 718 F.2d 1528, 1530 (1983). </s> [Footnote 20 At oral argument, the Government stated that 2114 covers the robbery of a hammer that is Government property. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. </s> [Footnote 21 Id., at 26. </s> [469 U.S. 70, 91]

United States Supreme Court PATTERSON v. LAMB(1947) No. 229 Argued: January 7, 1946Decided: January 20, 1947 </s> Mr. Frederick Bernays Wiener, of Providence, R.I., for petitioners. [329 U.S. 539, 540] Mr.Roger Robb, of Washington, D.C., for respondent. </s> Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. On October 28, 1944, respondent brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the then Secretary of War and Adjutant General of the Army. 1 He prayed for a judgment declaring that he had served in the United States Army from November 11, 1918 (Armistice Day) until November 14, 1918, and that for this service he was entitled to a certificate of honorable discharge from the Army, instead of the certificate of 'Discharge from the Draft' which had been issued to him. He also prayed for a mandatory injunction to compel issuance to him of a certificate of honorable discharge from the Army. The complainant alleged that on November 9, 1918, he received a communication from his local draft board directing him to report to the board at Davenport, Iowa, for 'immediate military service' at 9 a.m., November 11, 1918, and stating that from that day and hour he would be 'a soldier in the military service of the United States'; that he reported as ordered, and was made the leader of the drafted group there assembled which was to board a train that day for a mobilization camp at Camp Dodge, Iowa; that during the day he was told that because of the Armistice the draft call had been canceled; that he and the other draftees would not go to Camp Dodge, but could return home, still soldiers, and await further orders; that four days later he received a notice from his board that by telegraphic order of the Provost Marshal, acting under instructions of the President, all induction orders through- [329 U.S. 539, 541] out the Nation had been canceled, and all registrants, who, like himself, had been inducted but not entrained, were discharged from the Army; and that cancellation of their induction orders would have the effect of the honorable discharge from the Army. He further alleged that in January, 1919, he received a certificate dated November 14, 1918, entitled 'Discharge from Draft,' accompanying which was a check for four dollars ($ 4.00) bearing the notation 'Final Pay'; that because of the foregoing circumstances he had always assumed that his discharge had the effect of an honorable discharge from the Army; that he had obtained certain tax exemptions from the State of Iowa on the ground that he had such a discharge, but was later authoritatively denied exemptions by reason of a decision of the State supreme court, Lamb v. Kroeger, 233 Iowa 730, 8 N.W. 2d 405; that it was after this decision that he applied for and was denied an honorable discharge by the Secretary and Adjutant General. The District Court sustained petitioner's motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of act on for which relief could be granted. Other grounds of the motion, not passed on by the District Court, were that the alleged cause of action was not justiciable, was barred by laches, and that the type of certificate to be issued draftees under the circumstances alleged was a matter solely within the discretion of the Secretary of War and not a subject for judicial review. The Court of Appeals reversed, rejecting all the grounds set up in the motion to dismiss. 154 F.2d 319. This holding not only decided important questions concerning the power of the War Department, but also upset twenty-five years of important War Department rulings and practices which have affected, and will hereafter affect, the status and claims of thousands of draftees of the First World War. This called for our review, and we granted certiorari, 329 U.S. 695 , 67 S.Ct. 66. [329 U.S. 539, 542] Whether and to what extent the courts have power to review or control the War Department's action in fixing the type of discharge certificates issued to soldiers,2 is a question that we need not here determine; nor need we decide whether the action should have been dismissed because of laches. For we are satisfied that the War Department was within its power in granting a discharge from draft rather than the type of discharge it granted soldiers who performed military service after having become fully and finally absorbed into that service. The only statute which directly bears upon 'certificates of discharge' for enlisted men, Article of War 108, set out below,3 does not particularly prescribe the types or contents of certificates authorized to be granted. But pursuant to authority granted by Congress,4 the War Department many years ago promulgated Army Regulation No. 150 which provided for three types of certificates of discharge: honorable, dishonorable, and unclassified. 5 An honorable discharge was one granted to a soldier whose conduct in service had been such as to warrant his re- [329 U.S. 539, 543] enlistment. This regulation was well suited to fit cases of soldiers who had enlisted under ordinary conditions, had seen service and had been discharged in the course of regular Army routine. On its face, however, it shows how poorly it was adapted to fit the extraordinary circumstances bound to develop in connection with a nation-wide program for passing upon acceptances, rejections, and discharges of draftees in the course of their progress from their homes to their complete and final integration into the Army. So, after the passage of the 1917 Draft Act, 40 Stat. 76, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, 201 et seq., the War Department, on January 12, 1918, issued its Circular No. 651 in which it made provision for men discharged from draft as distinguished from men discharged from the Army. This provision, in effect when respondent reported for induction, had particular, though not necessarily exclusive, reference to draftees rejected for one reason or another at mobilization camps after their induction at their local draft boards. But despite the fact that draftees became subject to military law and duty from the moment of their arrival for entrainment at the local board, Selective Service Regulation 174-176 provided that they nevertheless were not finally accepted for military service, and could be rejected after arrival at camp. 6 And it was not until [329 U.S. 539, 544] they had been finally accepted that they could or would be assigned to full-fledged duty as soldiers. The Discharge from Draft Form No. 638, referred to in Circular No. 651, was originally prepared for draftees rejected at camp after induction 'on account of physical unfitness, dependency, etc.' Form No. 638 had been in use long prior to the respondent's rejection on the ground that the Government did not need his services after the Armistice. Had the Armistice not been declared, had respondent gone on to Camp Dodge, and had he then been rejected for any reason there, he would have received, not an honorable discharge from the Army, but a 'Discharge from Draft.' Yet we are asked to give the regulations and certificates a judicial construction, contrary to the Army's construction, whereby respondent, who got no farther than his local board, would stand in a better status than the tens of thousands of other draftees who came much closer to complete integration into the Army than he ever did. An argument to support this contention is that the telegraphic order issued from Army headquarters on Armistice Day, which canceled entrainment orders for respondent and about 155,000 other draftees then ready for entrainment, provided that all of them were 'discharged from the Army.' But that same order stated that 'The issue of formal papers of discharge will be considered and determined later' and that the purpose of the telegraphic order was 'merely to cancel outstanding calls and stop the entrainment thereunder of men for the Army.' And when 'the issue of formal papers of discharge' was 'later' considered, it resulted in War Department Circular No. 111 of 1918. That circular was the follow-up of the President's Armistice Day draft cancellation order, and as foreshadowed by the Armistice Day order, this circular prescribed with definiteness the type of 'formal papers of discharge' which this respondent and others like him would later receive. It was a 'Discharge from Draft.' [329 U.S. 539, 545] No statute or previous Army Regulation had provided for the extraordinary situation which developed on Armistice Day and which made it necessary for the President to halt the processing of these thousands of men and direct that they return to their homes. When this new situation arose, it was certainly within the province of the War Department to provide for its solution by, among other things, issuing to those returned home an appropriate form of certificate, whether of the honorable discharge variety, a 'discharge from the draft,' or some special form designed specifically for the occasion. Respondent was inducted into the Army and was discharged before he reached a mobilization camp for final processing. His discharge adequately indicates these facts. The law demands no more. Reversed. </s> Footnotes </s> [Footnote 1 The Secretary of War and The Adjutant General against whom the action was originally instituted are no longer in office; their successors have been properly substituted as parties. </s> [Footnote 2 See Denby v. Berry, 51 App.D.C. 335, 279 F. 317; Id., 263 U.S. 29 , 44 S.Ct. 74; Davis v. Woodring, 72 App.D.C. 83, 111 F.2d 523; Palmer v. United States, 72 Ct.Cl. 401; Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206 , 59 S.Ct. 320; cf. 58 Stat. 286, 38 U.S. C.Supp. IV, 693h, 38 U.S.C.A. 693h. [Footnote 3 'No enlisted man, lawfully inducted into the military service of the United States, shall be discharged from said service without a certificate of discharge signed by a field officer of the regiment or oth r organization to which the enlisted man belongs ....' 39 Stat. 619, 668. [Footnote 4 18 Stat. 337, 10 U.S.C. 16, 10 U.S.C.A. 16; see also United States v. Eliason, 16 Pet. 291, 301, 302. [Footnote 5 Paragraph 150 of the Army Regulations of 1913, corrected to April 15, 1917, was as follows: '150. Blank forms for discharge and final statements will be furnished by The Adjutant General's Department and will be retained in the personal custody of company commanders. Discharge certificates will be used in the discharge of enlisted men and for no other purpose, and will be of three classes: For honorable discharge, for discharge, and for dishonorable discharge. </s> 'They will be used as follows: </s> '1. The blank for honorable discharge, when the solider's conduct has been such as to warrant his reenlistment and his service has been honest and faithful. </s> '2. The blank for dishonorable discharge, for dishonorable discharge by sentence of a court martial or a military commission. </s> '3. The blank for discharge when the soldier is discharged except as specified under sections 1 and 2 of this paragraph (C.A.R. Nos. 14 and 34).' </s> [Footnote 6 Cf. Gibson v. United States and Dodez v. United States, 329 U.S. 338 , 67 S.Ct. 301.

United States Supreme Court U.S. v. ANDERSON, CLAYTON & CO.(1955) No. 26 Argued: October 20, 1955Decided: November 7, 1955 </s> Pursuant to a contract entered into without any shown purpose of advantageous investment but solely for the purpose of maintaining the distribution of its common stock among responsible and active members of its organization in a manner designed to reflect their worth to it, a corporation purchased the shares of a deceased officer. These shares were not retired, but were retained as treasury stock. While in the treasury, they could not be voted nor counted for the purpose of establishing a quorum, nor were dividends paid on them. Subsequently, they were resold at a profit to other officers of the corporation, pursuant to the contract. Held: In the circumstances of this case, Treasury Regulations 111, 29.22 (a)-15, does not make the sale of this treasury stock of the corporation a taxable transaction under 22 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Pp. 55-60. </s> (a) On the record in this case, the corporation was not dealing in its shares as it might in the shares of another corporation, within the meaning of the Regulation. Pp. 59-60. </s> (b) A different result is not required by the fact that the shares were not retired and new shares issued. P. 60. </s> 129 Ct. Cl. 295, 122 F. Supp. 837, affirmed. </s> Assistant Attorney General Holland argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, John F. Davis, Ellis N. Slack, Lee A. Jackson and Harry Baum. </s> John C. White argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. </s> MR. JUSTICE MINTON delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Anderson, Clayton & Co., a Delaware corporation, was organized in 1929. Its capital structure consisted of preferred stock and 100,000 shares of common stock, the [350 U.S. 55, 56] capital value of which was fixed at one dollar per share. By April 21, 1930, all of the common stock had been issued, in varying amounts, to the corporation's managing officials, in consideration of their worth and responsibility to the company, which is engaged in the highly technical and skilled business of cotton merchandising. </s> In 1931 a written agreement was entered into between the corporation and the common stockholders, the purpose of which was to restrict the ownership of the common stock to the management group and to adjust the respective interests in the common stock among that group as responsibility changed. Accordingly, the agreement provided that the stock could not be disposed of except by written consent of the owners of 75% of the common stock. Upon the death of any party to the agreement, the corporation agreed to purchase the common stock of the deceased at its book value as of July 31 preceding the stockholder's death. </s> One M. D. Anderson, one of the chief officers of the company, was originally issued 31,000 shares. During the development of the corporation, Mr. Anderson had transferred shares of his stock, pursuant to the agreement, to junior officials as they assumed more duties and responsibilities, until at the time of his death in 1939 he owned 18,574 shares. These shares the corporation purchased at their book value of $50.79 per share. This stock was not retired, but was retained as treasury stock. While in the treasury, it could not be voted nor were dividends paid on it. </s> The company in 1944 sold 6,500 of these shares to junior officials at the then book value of $112.68 per share. The difference between the price paid Anderson's estate and that received from the sale of the shares to the junior officials was $402,285, on which the United States imposed a long-term capital-gains tax of $100,571.25. Respondent paid the tax and sued in the [350 U.S. 55, 57] Court of Claims to recover the amount. The respondent took the position that no long-term capital gain resulted because it was not dealing in its stock "as it might in the shares of another corporation," as contemplated in Treasury Regulations 111, 29.22 (a)-15. 1 The Court of Claims agreed with respondent and entered judgment for recovery of the tax paid, with interest. 129 Ct. Cl. 295, 122 F. Supp. 837. We granted certiorari, 348 U.S. 936 , because of the claim of conflict with decisions of the Courts of Appeals. 2 </s> The sole question therefore is whether, in the circumstances of this case, Treasury Regulations 111, 29.22 (a)-15 makes the sale of this treasury stock of the corporation [350 U.S. 55, 58] a taxable transaction under 22 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. 3 </s> Article 66 of Treasury Regulations 74, promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1928, provided that a corporation which purchases its own stock, holds it as treasury stock, and later sells it "realizes no gain or loss" from such transactions. This Court upheld that regulation as a proper one interpretive of the general terms of 22 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code. Helvering v. Reynolds Co., 306 U.S. 110, 114 . The present regulation was promulgated in 1934. Its effect was to remove the categorical exclusion of taxable gains or losses arising out of the purchase and sale by a corporation of its own stock accorded such transactions by Article 66 of Treasury Regulations 74. The amended regulation specifically excludes from tax consequences a corporation's sale of its stock upon original issue whether sold for more or less than par or stated value. On the other hand, the regulation specifically provides that tax consequences flow from the receipt by the [350 U.S. 55, 59] corporation of its own stock as consideration for sales of its property or in satisfaction of indebtedness to it. With regard to all other dealings by a corporation in its own stock, whether or not tax consequences result depends generally upon the "real nature of the transaction, which is to be ascertained from all its facts and circumstances." The regulation provides further that "if a corporation deals in its own shares as it might in the shares of another corporation," such dealings are considered, for tax purposes, as though the corporation were in fact dealing in the other corporation's stock. Thus, whether the transaction here in question is taxable depends, in the final analysis, on whether respondent corporation dealt with its shares of treasury stock "as it might" have dealt with another corporation's stock. </s> The Court of Claims ruled, after a thorough examination of all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction, that the corporation was not dealing in its shares as it might in the shares of another corporation. This conclusion is abundantly supported by the subsidiary findings, which are all supported by the evidence in this case. </s> We agree with the Court of Claims. Here the purchase and sale were made pursuant to a contract entered into without any shown purpose of advantageous investment. Instead the purpose of the agreement was found to be to maintain the distribution of the stock among responsible and active members of the organization in a manner designed to reflect their worth to the corporation. Indicative of this singleness of purpose is the fact that some of the stock purchased from Mr. Anderson's estate was sold to the corporation's other executives at a price below that for which it was acquired. No consideration was given to the opportune time for purchase or sale. The purchase of Mr. Anderson's stock by the corporation was dictated by the terms of the contract upon the fortuitous [350 U.S. 55, 60] circumstance of his death. Moreover, when purchased, the stock was lodged in the treasury. It could not be taken into account in any payment of dividends, nor voted in shareholder meetings, nor counted for the purpose of establishing a quorum. These unrecognized rights are all incident to the ownership of common stock of other corporations. It is thus clear that respondent was not dealing in its shares as it might in the shares of others. </s> The Government urges that the crucial inquiry as to whether the transaction is taxable under the regulation depends for its answer upon whether the reacquired shares are resold or retired and new shares issued; since the shares were not retired, the resale at a price greater than cost results in a taxable gain under 22 (a) of the Code and the applicable regulation. The Government receives comfort for its position in the language of Commissioner v. Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn, Inc., 171 F.2d 474, 476, and Commissioner v. Landers Corp., 210 F.2d 188, 191. But we do not think formalities should be raised to such an important position. Moreover, the applicable regulation provides that tax consequences depend upon "the real nature of the transaction, which is to be ascertained from all its facts and circumstances," and not upon the sole circumstance that the stock is not retired. When viewed in its entirety, the instant transaction, limited to a wholly intracorporate purpose with no element of speculation or gain envisioned from dealing in its shares, does not constitute dealing by the corporation in its own shares as it might deal in the shares of another corporation within the meaning of the regulation. </s> The judgment is </s> Affirmed. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE BURTON dissent. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 "SEC. 29.22 (a)-15. Acquisition or Disposition by a Corporation of its Own Capital Stock. (a) Whether the acquisition or disposition by a corporation of shares of its own capital stock gives rise to taxable gain or deductible loss depends upon the real nature of the transaction, which is to be ascertained from all its facts and circumstances. The receipt by a corporation of the subscription price of shares of its capital stock upon their original issuance gives rise to neither taxable gain nor deductible loss, whether the subscription or issue price be in excess of, or less than, the par or stated value of such stock. </s> "(b) But if a corporation deals in its own shares as it might in the shares of another corporation, the resulting gain or loss is to be computed in the same manner as though the corporation were dealing in the shares of another. So also if the corporation receives its own stocks as consideration upon the sale of property by it, or in satisfaction of indebtedness to it, the gain or loss resulting is to be computed in the same manner as though the payment had been made in any other property. Any gain derived from such transactions is subject to tax, and any loss sustained is allowable as a deduction where permitted by the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code." </s> [Footnote 2 Commissioner v. Landers Corp., 210 F.2d 188; Commissioner v. H. W. Porter & Co., 187 F.2d 939; Commissioner v. Rollins Burdick Hunter Co., 174 F.2d 698; Commissioner v. Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn, Inc., 171 F.2d 474. </s> [Footnote 3 "SEC. 22. Gross Income. </s> "(a) General Definition. `Gross income' includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service (including personal service as an officer or employee of a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing), of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in such property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever. . . ." </s> For tax years after 1953, transactions such as the one here involved carry no tax consequences by virtue of congressional enactment of 1032 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which provides: "No gain or loss shall be recognized to a corporation on the receipt of money or other property in exchange for stock (including treasury stock) of such corporation." </s> [350 U.S. 55, 61]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. HOPKINS(1976) No. 75-246 Argued: Decided: June 24, 1976 </s> Asserting jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, which provides for suits in the Court of Claims upon any express or implied contract with military exchanges, respondent's decedent brought suit against the United States alleging that his discharge from his position as a civilian employee of the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) breached an employment contract. The Government moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, claiming that the Tucker Act was not applicable to employment contracts and alternatively that AAFES employees do not have a contractual relationship with their employer but serve by "appointment." Denying this motion, the Court of Claims, after determining that AAFES employees could never serve by appointment, held that it had jurisdiction because respondent's decedent's relationship with the AAFES was based upon an implied contract of employment and such contract was covered by the Tucker Act, as amended in 1970. Held: Since the Tucker Act applies, by its terms, to "any express or implied contract," it is applicable to employment contracts as well as those for goods or other services, and hence respondent's decedent's allegations that his discharge constituted a breach of an employment contract was sufficient, under the Act as amended in 1970, to withstand the Government's motion to dismiss. But in determining whether the decedent was employed by virtue of a contract or by appointment, the Court of Claims gave insufficient attention to applicable administrative regulations relating to the status of AAFES employees, and thus erred in its threshold determination that such employees could never serve by appointment. </s> 206 Ct. Cl. 303, 513 F.2d 1360, affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. </s> Robert B. Reich argued the cause pro hac vice for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor [427 U.S. 123, 124] General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Lee, and Ronald R. Glancz. </s> Thomas H. McGrail argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> This case involves a suit by respondent's decedent, 1 a civilian employee of the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES), claiming wrongful discharge from his employment. He asserted jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491, which provides for suits in the Court of Claims upon any express or implied contract with such military exchanges. The Government moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Claims concluded that it had jurisdiction because respondent's decedent's relationship with the AAFES was based upon an implied contract of employment and such a contract is covered, since 1970, by the Tucker Act. 206 Ct. Cl. 303, 513 F.2d 1360. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between this decision and a contrary holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Young v. United States, 498 F.2d 1211 (1974). 423 U.S. 821 . </s> The status of claims against military post exchanges has been in some doubt since the decision of this Court in Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481 (1942). There the Court, in striking down a state tax on the distribution of motor fuel by Army post exchanges, held that such exchanges "are arms of the Government deemed by it essential for the performance of governmental functions. They are integral parts of the War Department . . . ." However, the Court also observed that the "Government assumes none of the financial obligations of the exchange." Id., at 485. [427 U.S. 123, 125] </s> The latter observation was the basis of a series of decisions by the Court of Claims to the effect that it lacked jurisdiction over claims concerning the activities of non-appropriated fund instrumentalities. 2 That court held that it could not entertain suits based on a contract for services with such an entity, because, since the Government had assumed no liability for the entity's financial obligations it could not be said to have consented to a suit designed to vindicate such obligations. Therefore, no "claim against the United States" existed under the Tucker Act which is the source of Court of Claims jurisdiction, Borden v. United States, 126 Ct. Cl. 902, 116 F. Supp. 873 (1953); Pulaski Cab Co. v. United States, 141 Ct. Cl. 160, 157 F. Supp. 955 (1958); Kyer v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 747, 369 F.2d 714 (1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 929 (1967). </s> The Court of Claims, while denying jurisdiction, recognized the harsh consequences of this result since it could leave claimants against the exchanges with no forum in which to seek relief. However, the court recognized that "it is up to Congress to remedy this apparent harsh result . . . . [T]he courts should refrain from legislating by judicial fiat." Keetz v. United States, 168 Ct. Cl. 205, 207 (1964). </s> In 1970 Congress amended the Tucker Act and provided: </s> "For the purpose of this paragraph, an express or implied contract with the Army and Air Force Exchange Service . . . shall be considered an express or implied contract with the United States." Pub. L. 91-350, 84 Stat. 449. [427 U.S. 123, 126] </s> The purpose of this amendment, as the reports of both Houses made clear, was to afford contractors a federal forum in which to sue nonappropriated fund instrumentalities by doing away with the inequitable "loophole" in the Tucker Act. S. Rep. No. 91-268, p. 2 (1969); H. R. Rep. No. 91-933, p. 2 (1970). Borden, supra; Pulaski, supra; Keetz, supra; and Kyer, supra, were cited as examples of the "harsh result" which the amendment would correct. The purpose of the bill was clearly to provide a remedy to "contractors" with non-appropriated fund instrumentalities, e. g., S. Rep. No. 91-268, pp. 4-5, and there is nothing in the legislative history to indicate, as the Government contends, that "contractors" did not include anyone who had formed a contractual employment relationship. Since the statute applies, by its terms, to "any express or implied contract" we hold that it is applicable to employment contracts as well as those for goods or other services. The fact that Congress has dealt specifically with exchange employees when it wanted to bring them within or leave them without the provisions of a law dealing with federal employees generally (e. g., 5 U.S.C. 8171 (b)) is not of controlling weight here. This statute deals with those who have a contractual relationship with military exchanges rather than with different classes of federal employees. If employees of military exchanges are within its general language, they are not removed from its effect by congressional practices in enacting other kinds of statutes. </s> The Government alternatively contends that AAFES employees do not have a contractual relationship with their employer, and that like orthodox federal employees they serve by "appointment" to a particular position. While there is some ambiguity in the opinion of the Court of Claims, that court apparently agreed that plaintiff [427 U.S. 123, 127] and others like him did have a contractual employment relationship with the AAFES. We think it would be both unnecessary and unwise for us to decide the question at this stage of the case, and we think that the Court of Claims gave insufficient attention to applicable administrative regulations when it undertook to decide the question. </s> The exchange services are created and administered pursuant to the general authority granted the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force by 10 U.S.C. 3012 and 8012. The nonappropriated-fund status of the exchanges places them in a position whereby the Federal Government, absent special legislation, does not assume the obligations of those exchanges in the manner that contracts entered into by appropriated fund agencies are assumed. Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S., at 485 . The nonappropriated-fund status of the exchanges, however, does not alter the fact that the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force may engage employees by "appointment," in the same manner as other personnel hired by the Secretaries may be employed. See Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, supra; Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99 (1890); Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402 (1851). </s> The regulations governing the AAFES, state that ordinary employees are deemed employees of an instrumentality of the United States, and hold their positions by appointment. AR 60-21/AFR 147-15, c. 1, I, § 1-7; c. 2, I (Nov. 12, 1974). 3 There is congressional recognition [427 U.S. 123, 128] of the power of the Secretaries to employ exchange employees by appointment. The House and Senate Reports on Pub. L. 91-350 explicitly recognized that employees of nonappropriated-fund activities, when performing their official duties, are employees of the United States. S. Rep. No. 91-268, supra, at 2; H. R. Rep. No. 91-933, supra, at 2. Further, Congress has specifically granted exchange employees certain rights afforded only appointed employees, and, more important, has specifically excluded them from the coverage of certain statutes granting rights to appointed federal employees. See statutes cited in AR 60-21/AFR 147-15, c. 1, I, § 1-8. Of particular import is their exclusion, through the operation of 5 U.S.C. 2105 (c), from the provisions of the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. 5596. The Back Pay Act is the means by which appointed employees subjected to unjustified personnel action are given a cause of action against the United States. The Act is made necessary by the fact that, absent specific command of statute or authorized regulation, an appointed employee subjected to unwarranted personnel action does not have a cause of action against the United States. Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290, 293 -296 (1900); Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 69 -70 (1974); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 405 -407 (1976). Since the Act deals only with appointees, the specific exclusion of AAFES employees from the coverage of the Act would seem to indicate a congressional recognition that they may be appointed, but that appointed AAFES employees should not be allowed to sue under the Act. </s> This is not to say that an exchange may never employ a person pursuant to a contract of employment. The Secretaries have provided, by separate regulation, for a process under which a person may be employed by contract. AR 60-20/AFR 147-14, c. 4, II and III [427 U.S. 123, 129] (Mar. 21, 1974). Such employment is subject to different procedures for negotiation, approval, and administrative remedies from those applicable to employment under AR 60-21/AFR 147-15. The regulation governing contracts defines "service contract" as including contracts both for services performed off a military installation and "direct services such as janitorial and window cleaning service." AR 60-20/AFR 147-14, App. A, § A-6e. Under the regulation in effect at the time of plaintiff's discharge, it was specifically provided that exchanges "will not enter into [a service contract] with military personnel on active duty, civil service employees, or exchange employees." AR 60-20/AFR 147-14, XIX, § 88b (Apr. 14, 1965) (emphasis added). The regulation thus clearly distinguished between employment pursuant to appointment and employment pursuant to contract, a distinction that existed prior to plaintiff's hiring and continues today in the use of separate regulations for "contracting" and "appointment." </s> When Congress enacted Pub. L. 91-350, making contracts entered into by the post exchanges cognizable in the Court of Claims, it did not change in any way the other provisions of the United States Code dealing with exchange employees, nor did it purport to require that the exchanges employ all persons pursuant to contract. </s> The Court of Claims, in reaching its conclusion that plaintiff held his position by virtue of an express or implied contract assumed that once it was determined he was not an appointed federal employee this result followed as a matter of course. It concluded that in such event his employment status was governed by a series of cases from the private sector of the economy holding that the typical employee-employer relationship was contractual in nature. While we do not question the relevance of these cases by way of analogy should plaintiff [427 U.S. 123, 130] be determined not to have been an appointee we hold that the Court of Claims erred in its threshold determination that AAFES employees could never serve by appointment. Rather, the question depends upon an analysis of the statutes and regulations previously described in light of whatever evidence is adduced on remand as to plaintiff's particular status in this case. </s> It is thus apparent that the question of whether plaintiff was employed by virtue of a contract or by appointment is not susceptible of determination at this time. Rather, the issue is one which must receive additional consideration from the Court of Claims after development of a fuller record. </s> Respondent in her brief in this Court advanced a second theory upon which the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims in this case could be sustained. She urged that plaintiff's discharge in violation of executive regulations constituted a claim enforceable under the Tucker Act, and that his discharge without due process constituted a claim founded on the Constitution and therefore enforceable under the Tucker Act. Brief for Respondent 51. At oral argument, counsel conceded that our decision in United States v. Testan, supra, which had been handed down between the time of the filing of his brief and the oral argument, foreclosed such a claim. </s> Plaintiff's allegation that his discharge constituted a breach of a contract of employment was sufficient, under the provisions of Pub. L. 91-350, to withstand the Government's motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction in the Court of Claims, and the judgment of the court so holding is therefore affirmed. That portion of its judgment deciding that plaintiff held his employment position by virtue of an express or implied contract, rather than by appointment, [427 U.S. 123, 131] is vacated and the cause remanded for further proceedings on that question. </s> It is so ordered. </s> MR. JUSTICE POWELL dissents from the opinion of the Court substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Skelton in his dissenting opinion in the Court of Claims. 206 Ct. Cl. 303, 314, 513 F.2d 1360, 1366 (1975). </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The named respondent is the window of the original plaintiff. </s> [Footnote 2 A "nonappropriated fund instrumentality" is one which does not receive its monies by congressional appropriation. See 10 U.S.C. 4779 (c), 9779 (c). </s> [Footnote 3 Except where otherwise noted, the regulations cited are those presently in effect. These differ in some respects from the regulations in effect at the time of respondent's decedent's hiring and at the time of his discharge. On remand it will be necessary for the Court of Claims to determine which regulations are applicable to this case. </s> [427 U.S. 123, 132]

United States Supreme Court UTAH v. UNITED STATES(1971) No. 31 Argued: April 26, 1971Decided: June 7, 1971 </s> In this suit involving conflicting claims between Utah and the United States to the shorelands around the Great Salt Lake the Special Master's report, finding that at the date of Utah's admission to the Union the Lake was navigable and that the lake bed passed to Utah at that time, is supported by adequate evidence and is approved by the Court. The parties are invited to address themselves to the decree submitted with the report with a view to agreeing, if possible, upon the issues that have now been settled. Pp. 9-13. </s> DOUGLAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all members joined except MARSHALL, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. </s> Dallin W. Jensen, Assistant Attorney General of Utah, argued for plaintiff in support of the Report of the Special Master. With him on the briefs were Vernon B. Romney, Attorney General, Robert B. Hansen, Deputy Attorney General, Paul E. Reimann, Assistant Attorney General, and Clifford L. Ashton and Edward W. Clyde, Special Assistant Attorneys General. </s> Peter L. Strauss argued for the United States on exceptions to the Report of the Special Master. On the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Kashiwa, Louis F. Claiborne, and Martin Green. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This suit was initiated by Utah to resolve a dispute between it and the United States as to shorelands around the Great Salt Lake. Utah's claim to the lands is premised on the navigability of the lake at the date of [403 U.S. 9, 10] statehood, viz., January 4, 1896. If indeed the lake were navigable at that time, the claim of Utah would override any claim of the United States, with the possible exception of a claim based on the doctrine of reliction, not now before us. </s> The operation of the "equal footing" principle has accorded newly admitted States the same property interests in submerged lands as was enjoyed by the Thirteen Original States as successors to the British Crown. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 222-223, 228-230. That means that Utah's claim to the original bed of the Great Salt Lake - whether now submerged or exposed - ultimately rests on whether the lake was navigable (Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 410, 416-417) at the time of Utah's admission. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 -28. It was to that issue that we directed the Special Master, Hon. J. Cullen Ganey, to address himself. See Utah v. United States, 394 U.S. 89 . In the present report the Special Master found that at the time in question the Great Salt Lake was navigable. We approve that finding. </s> The question of navigability is a federal question. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 563. Moreover, the fact that the Great Salt Lake is not part of a navigable interstate or international commercial highway in no way interferes with the principle of public ownership of its bed. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 ; United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 . The test of navigability of waters was stated in The Daniel Ball, supra, at 563: </s> "Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. . . ." [403 U.S. 9, 11] </s> While that statement was addressed to the navigability of "rivers" it applies to all water courses. United States v. Oregon, supra, at 14. </s> The United States strongly contests the finding of the Special Master that the Great Salt Lake was navigable. Although the evidence is not extensive, we think it is sufficient to sustain the findings. There were, for example, nine boats used from time to time to haul cattle and sheep from the mainland to one of the islands or from one of the islands to the mainland. The hauling apparently was done by the owners of the livestock, not by a carrier for the purpose of making money. Hence it is suggested that this was not the use of the lake as a navigable highway in the customary sense of the word. That is to say, the business of the boats was ranching and not carrying water-borne freight. We think that is an irrelevant detail. The lake was used as a highway and that is the gist of the federal test. </s> It is suggested that the carriage was also limited in the sense of serving only the few people who performed ranching operations along the shores of the lake. But that again does not detract from the basic finding that the lake served as a highway and it is that feature that distinguishes between navigability and non-navigability. </s> There was, in addition to the boats used by ranchers, one boat used by an outsider who carried sheep to an island for the owners of the sheep. It is said that one sheep boat for hire does not make an artery for commerce; but one sheep boat for hire is in keeping with the theme of actual navigability of the waters of the lake in earlier years. </s> There was, in addition, a boat known as the City of Corinne which was launched in May 1871 for the purpose of carrying passengers and freight; but its life in that capacity apparently lasted less than a year. In 1872 it [403 U.S. 9, 12] was converted into an excursion boat which apparently plied the waters of the lake until 1881. There are other boats that hauled sheep to and from an island in the lake and also hauled ore, and salt, and cedar posts. Still another boat was used to carry salt from various salt works around the lake to a railroad connection. </s> The United States says the trade conducted by these various vessels was sporadic and their careers were short. It is true that most of the traffic which we have mentioned took place in the 1880's, while Utah became a State in 1896. Moreover, it is said that the level of the lake had so changed by 1896 that navigation was not practical. The Master's Report effectively refutes that contention. It says that on January 4, 1896, the lake was 30.2 feet deep. He finds that on that date "the Lake was physically capable of being used in its ordinary condition as a highway for floating and affording passage to water craft in the manner over which trade and travel was or might be conducted in the customary modes of travel on water at that time." He found that the lake on January 4, 1896, "could have floated and afforded passage to large boats, barges and similar craft currently in general use on inland navigable bodies of water in the United States." He found that the areas of the lake that had a depth sufficient for navigation "were several miles wide, extending substantially through the length and width of the Lake." </s> Most of the history of actual water transportation, to be sure, took place on the lake in the 1880's, yet the findings of the Master are that the water conditions which obtained on January 4, 1896, still permitted navigation at that time. </s> In sum, it is clear that Utah is entitled to the decree for which it asks. The Special Master has submitted with his report a proposed decree which we attach as an Appendix to this opinion. We invite the parties to [403 U.S. 9, 13] address themselves to that decree with the view of agreeing, if possible, upon the issues which have now been settled by this litigation. </s> So ordered. </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT </s> IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT: </s> 1. The United States of America, its departments and agencies, are enjoined, subject to any regulations which the Congress may impose in the interest of navigation or pollution control, from asserting against the State of Utah any claim of right, title and interest: </s> (a) to the bed of the Great Salt Lake lying below the meander line of Great Salt Lake as duly surveyed heretofore or in accordance with Section 1 of the Act of June 3, 1966, 80 Stat. 192, with the exception of any lands within the Bear River Migratory Bird Refuge and the Weber Basin federal reclamation project, </s> (b) to the natural resources and living organisms in or beneath the bed of the Great Salt Lake as delineated in (a) above, and </s> (c) to the natural resources and living organisms either within the waters of the Great Salt Lake, or extracted therefrom, lying below the meander line of the Great Salt Lake, as delineated in (a) above, except brine and minerals in solution in the brine or precipitated or extracted therefrom in whatever federal lands there may be below said meander line, together with the right to prospect for, mine, and remove the same, as set forth in Section 3 of the Act of June 3, 1966, 80 Stat. 192. [403 U.S. 9, 14] </s> 2. The State of Utah is not required to pay the United States, through the Secretary of the Interior, for the lands, including any minerals, lying below the meander line of the Great Salt Lake, as delineated in 1 (a), above, of this decree. </s> 3. The prayer of the United States of America in its Answer to the State of Utah's Complaint that this Court "confirm, declare and establish that the United States is the owner of all right, title and interest in all the lands described in Section 2 of the Act of June 3, 1966, 80 Stat. 192, as amended by the Act of August 23, 1966, 80 Stat. 349, and that the State of Utah is without any right, title or interest in such lands, save for the right to have these lands conveyed to it by the United States, and to pay for them, in accordance with the provisions of the Act of June 3, 1966, as amended," is denied. </s> Respectfully submitted, </s> J. CULLEN GANEY, Senior Circuit Judge, Special Master. </s> [403 U.S. 9, 15]

United States Supreme Court GRUMMAN v. UNITED STATES(1962) No. 436 Argued: April 19, 1962Decided: June 18, 1962 </s> Judgment reversed on the authority of Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 . </s> Reported below: 111 U.S. App. D.C. 79, 294 F.2d 708. </s> David Rein argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Joseph Forer. </s> Bruce J. Terris argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Yeagley and Kevin T. Maroney. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The judgment is reversed. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 . </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK and MR. JUSTICE HARLAN dissent for the reasons stated in their dissenting opinions in Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 779 , 781. </s> MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE took no part in the decision of this case. </s> [370 U.S. 288, 289]

United States Supreme Court SIMS v. GEORGIA(1967) No. 678 Argued: Decided: December 18, 1967 </s> In this case, before the Court for the second time, petitioner, a Negro sentenced to death for rape, again contends that the confession used at his trial was coerced through physical abuse and that the juries which indicted and convicted him were discriminatorily selected. This Court, without reaching these claims, previously remanded the case for a hearing on the voluntariness of the confession, 385 U.S. 538 , noting that the State had failed to produce as witnesses police officers who had been present at the time the petitioner claimed he was mistreated and had thus failed to rebut petitioner's testimony regarding physical abuse prior to his confession. Though the facts as to the composition of the juries showed the percentage of Negroes listed on the racially segregated county tax digests from which the jury lists were compiled was far larger than such percentages on the jury lists, the State produced only a jury commissioner's testimony that he did not discriminate in compiling the lists. Following this Court's remand, the judge who had presided at petitioner's trial, without hearing further testimony and solely on the basis of the record previously before this Court, decided that the confession was voluntary, refused to decide other issues, and denied a new trial. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. Held: </s> 1. The State has again not adequately rebutted petitioner's claim that the confession resulted from coercion, and its second failure to produce the police officers as witnesses supports the conclusion that their testimony would not have rebutted petitioner's. </s> 2. The manner in which the juries which indicted and convicted petitioner were selected was unconstitutional. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 . </s> Certiorari granted; 223 Ga. 465, 156 S. E. 2d 65, reversed and remanded. </s> Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Anthony G. Amsterdam and Howard Moore, Jr., for petitioner. [389 U.S. 404, 405] </s> PER CURIAM. </s> This case is before us for the second time. Last Term we granted certiorari to consider five constitutional questions raised by petitioner in challenging his conviction for rape and his accompanying death sentence. 384 U.S. 998 (1966). Because we decided the case on the ground that petitioner had not received the hearing on the voluntariness of a confession introduced against him required by our decision in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), we did not reach the other issues argued by the parties. 385 U.S. 538 (1967). </s> On remand the case was submitted to the judge who had presided at petitioner's original trial on the basis of the printed record previously before this Court. On that record alone the trial judge determined that petitioner's confession had been voluntary and denied a new trial. The trial court specifically refused to pass on any of the other questions previously briefed and argued here, holding that the prior rulings on these issues by the Georgia Supreme Court constituted the law of the case. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, upholding the trial court on all points. </s> In his present application petitioner raises again two of the four issues not reached in our previous decision in this case: the voluntariness of his confession and the composition of the juries by which he was indicted and tried. * In response to the State's previous argument that "there was no evidence to make any issue of voluntariness" and [389 U.S. 404, 406] therefore there was no need to apply Jackson v. Denno, Mr. Justice Clark stated: </s> "We cannot agree. There was a definite, clear-cut issue here. Petitioner testified that Doctor Jackson physically abused him while he was in his office and that he was suffering from that abuse when he made the statement, thereby rendering such confession involuntary and the result of coercion. The doctor admitted that he saw petitioner on the floor of his office; that he helped him disrobe and that he knew that petitioner required hospital treatment because of the laceration over his eye but he denied that petitioner was actually abused in his presence. He was unable to state, however, that the state patrolmen did not commit the alleged offenses against petitioner's person because he was not in the room during the entire time in which the petitioner and the patrolmen were there. In fact, the doctor was quite evasive in his testimony and none of the officers present during the incident were produced as witnesses. Petitioner's claim of mistreatment, therefore, went uncontradicted as to the officers and was in conflict with the testimony of the physician." 385 U.S., at 543 . </s> Thus in remanding the case for a hearing on voluntariness we indicated to the State that as the evidence then stood it had failed adequately to rebut petitioner's testimony that he had been subjected to physical violence prior to his confession. The State had every opportunity to offer the police officers, whose failure to testify had already been commented upon here, to contradict petitioner's version of the events. Its failure to do so when given a second chance lends support to the conclusion that their testimony would not, in fact, have rebutted petitioner's. [389 U.S. 404, 407] </s> It needs no extended citation of cases to show that a confession produced by violence or threats of violence is involuntary and cannot constitutionally be used against the person giving it. Beecher v. Alabama, ante, p. 35. The reliance by the State on subsequent warnings made to petitioner prior to his confessing is misplaced. Petitioner had been in the continuous custody of the police for over eight hours and had not been fed at all during that time. He had not been given access to family, friends, or counsel at any point. He is an illiterate, with only a third grade education, whose mental capacity is decidedly limited. Under such circumstances the fact that the police may have warned petitioner of his right not to speak is of little significance. See Beecher v. Alabama, supra, at 37, n. 4. Compare Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957). </s> Petitioner also contends that he was indicted and tried by juries from which members of his race had been unconstitutionally excluded. The facts reveal that the grand and petit jury lists were drawn from the county tax digests which separately listed taxpayers by race in conformity with then existing Georgia law. Negroes constituted 24.4% of the individual taxpayers in the county. However, they amounted to only 4.7% of the names on the grand jury list and 9.8% of the names on the traverse jury list from which petitioner's grand and petit juries were selected. The State's only response to that showing was to call one of the jury commissioners as a witness; the jury commissioner testified that he or one of the other commissioners knew personally every qualified person in the county and did not discriminate in selecting names for the jury lists. The facts in this case make it virtually indistinguishable from Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967). Accordingly, it is clear that the juries by which petitioner was indicted and tried were selected in a manner [389 U.S. 404, 408] that does not comport with constitutional requirements. See also Jones v. Georgia, ante, p. 24. </s> The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> [Footnote * The State has not filed a response. While ordinarily we would call for a response before deciding a case summarily, the exact issues presented now were briefed and argued fully by the State and petitioner last Term. Since the proceedings below on remand consisted solely of a reconsideration of the printed record previously before us, we see no need for another presentation of the arguments already presented to us by the State. </s> [389 U.S. 404, 409]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION(1970) No. 28 Argued: October 21, 1969Decided: February 2, 1970 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 38, Brundage et al. v. United States et al., No. 43, City of Auburn v. United States et al., and No. 44, Livingston Anti-Merger Committee v. Interstate Commerce Commission et al., on appeal from the same court. </s> In 1967 the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) approved a merger plan filed by the Great Northern Railway Co. (GN) and the Northern Pacific Railway Co. (NP) (collectively the Northern Lines), and three of their subsidiaries, the Pacific Coast Railroad Co., the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. (Burlington), and the Spokane, Portland & Seattle Railway Co. (SP&S). The Northern Lines operate largely west from St. Paul, Minneapolis, and Duluth, across the Northern Tier of States to Spokane, Tacoma, and Portland. NP, with about 6,200 miles of track, runs generally to the south of GN, which operates about 8,200 miles of track. The Northern Lines jointly own and control the Burlington and the SP&S. The Burlington has 8,648 miles of track extending from Chicago to the Twin Cities and southwesterly to Missouri, Kansas, Colorado, and Montana, and by its subsidiaries reaches Houston and Galveston. The SP&S has more than 500 miles of mainline road in Oregon and Washington which provides the most direct route from Spokane to Portland and is of strategic importance to the Northern Lines. Rail competition in the Northern Lines' area is provided by GN and NP (the principal competitors), and the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co. (Milwaukee), which has not been an effective long-haul competitor, never having had adequate access to the Pacific Northwest gateways. Truck competition, present in the area for some time, is growing. GN's and NP's merger efforts span three-quarters of a century. The present merger plan was disapproved by the ICC in 1966 by a vote of 6 to 5, the ICC finding that: although the estimated annual savings would approximate $25 million by the tenth year after merger, a significant source of [396 U.S. 491, 492] the savings would be the elimination of jobs; the merger would eliminate substantial competition between GN and NP; even with protective conditions for the benefit of the Milwaukee, it would remain a weak competitor; and the plan did not afford benefits of such scope and importance as to outweigh the lessening of rail competition in the Northern Tier. The ICC reopened the proceedings in 1967 and considered new evidence on savings to be realized from the merger, and the additional evidence resulting in the changed position of some of the major objectors to the plan. The ICC found that: the savings would be more than $40 million a year by the tenth year; agreements with the employees had removed union objections to the merger and provided that no jobs would be eliminated except by attrition; and the applicants had accepted all protective conditions sought by Milwaukee; and acknowledged that it had failed to give appropriate weight to 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act to facilitate rail mergers "consistent with the public interest." The ICC then re-examined the anticompetitive effects of the merger, weighing them against the savings and benefits to the public, shippers, and the roads, and, emphasizing the strengthened position of the Milwaukee, approved the plan because its benefits outweighed its anticompetitive effects. The three-judge District Court sustained the ICC, holding that the ICC was guided by the applicable legal principles and that its findings were supported by substantial evidence. Four appeals were taken: (1) the United States, through the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, argues that the ICC did not properly apply the standard of 5 in determining that the merger was consistent with the public interest. It contends that when a merger will substantially diminish competition between two financially healthy, competing roads, the anticompetitive effects should preclude approval absent a clear showing that a serious transportation need will be met or important public benefits will be provided beyond the normal savings and efficiencies deriving from a merger; (2) the Northern Pacific Stockholders' Protective Committee challenges the exchange ratios agreed upon by the companies for their stock on the basis that NP's land holdings were insufficiently valued; (3) the City of Auburn, Washington (the western terminus for NP's transcontinental trains whose yard would be closed if the merger were approved), supports the Department of Justice's brief, and contends that the ICC failed to assess adequately the impact of the merger on affected communities; and (4) the Livingston Anti-Merger Committee urges that the ICC had no authority to [396 U.S. 491, 493] approve the merger because the NP, the successor by purchase in 1896 to the Northern Pacific Railroad Co. (Railroad) does not own the franchise and right of way involved in the merger as Congress did not authorize the sale as required by Railroad's charter, and Railroad is not a party to the merger; and that if it is held that NP does own the franchise, no merger can take place without approval of Congress. Held: </s> 1. The ICC's conclusion that the merger, as conditioned, comported with the public interest under the standards of 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by the Transportation Act of 1940, is supported by the findings which the ICC made on the basis of substantial evidence after measuring the competitive consequences of the merger against its resulting benefits. Pp. 506-516. </s> (a) Congress intended by the 1940 amendments "to facilitate merger and consolidation in the national transportation system," and that the industry "proceed toward an integrated transportation system" (County of Marin v. United States, 356 U.S. 412, 416 , 418), and the congressional objective is not to be read as confining mergers to situations where weak carriers are preserved by combining with those that are strong. Pp. 508-511. </s> (b) Congress vested in the ICC the task of "apprais[ing] the effects of the curtailment of competition which will result from [a] proposed consolidation and consider them along with the advantages of improved service, safer operation, lower costs, etc., to determine whether the consolidation will assist in effectuating the over-all transportation policy." McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 87 . Pp. 511-513. </s> (c) The ICC's determination that the conditions agreed to by the applicants, the attrition agreements with the employees, the enhanced savings, and manifold service improvements to shippers and the public, outweighed the loss of competition between the Northern Lines, is supported by substantial evidence. Pp. 513-516. </s> 2. The ICC's determination that the stock exchange ratio applicable to Northern Pacific stockholders and Great Northern stockholders, which was established, after protracted arm's-length negotiations, with the approval of the companies and the large majority of their stockholders, is just and reasonable, is supported by substantial evidence, and the ICC's refusal to reopen the record for evidence to update it was not an abuse of discretion. Pp. 516-522. [396 U.S. 491, 494] </s> 3. The ICC found on the basis of substantial evidence that the merger's long-run effect would benefit the Northern Tier communities, including Auburn, even if that city's yard closed if the merger was approved. Since it now appears that the Auburn yard will remain open, the anticipated principal harm to the city because of the merger has disappeared, and a fortiori the ICC's refusal to take further evidence on the merger's impact on the city was not an abuse of its discretion. Pp. 522-524. </s> 4. The ICC did not err in refusing to disapprove the merger because of the Livingston Anti-Merger Committee's contention that acquisition by NP of its railroad property resulted from invalid foreclosure proceedings, as the ICC could, for purposes of the merger proceeding, properly rely on "existing judicial records supplemented by opinions of two Attorneys General" on the title question which were adverse to the Committee's challenge; nor do the charter provisions of NP's predecessor in interest foreclose the ICC's approval of the merger. Pp. 524-530. </s> 296 F. Supp. 853, affirmed. </s> Assistant Attorney General McLaren argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold, Deputy Solicitor General Springer, and Howard E. Shapiro. Louis B. Dailey argued the cause for appellants in No. 38. With him on the briefs was Harry Tyson Carter. Valentine B. Deale argued the cause and filed briefs for appellant in No. 44. Robert L. Wald and Joel E. Hoffman filed a brief for appellant in No. 43. </s> Fritz R. Kahn argued the cause for appellee Interstate Commerce Commission in all cases. With him on the brief were Robert W. Ginnane and Jerome Nelson. Hugh B. Cox argued the cause for appellees Great Northern Railway Co. et al. in all cases. With him on the briefs were Ray Garrett, D. Robert Thomas, Lee B. McTurnan, Michael Boudin, Anthony Kane, Louis E. Torinus, Earl F. Requa, Frank S. Farrell, Eldon Martin, R. T. Cubbage, and Richard J. Flynn. Fred H. Tolan [396 U.S. 491, 495] argued the cause for appellees Pacific Northwest Shippers in No. 28. With him on the brief was Alan F. Wohlstetter. Raymond K. Merrill argued the cause for appellee Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co. in No. 28. With him on the brief were Edwin O. Schiewe, Warren H. Ploeger, Thomas H. Ploss, and Edward H. Foley. Lee Johnson, Attorney General of Oregon, and Richard W. Sabin, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for appellee Public Utility Commissioner of Oregon in No. 28. </s> MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The Interstate Commerce Commission orders that give rise to these appeals grow out of applications seeking approval of a merger plan filed by the Great Northern Railway Company and the Northern Pacific Railway Company (collectively the Northern Lines), and three of their subsidiaries - the Pacific Coast Railroad Company, the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company, (Burlington), and the Spokane, Portland & Seattle Railway Company (SP&S). The Commission approved the merger and a three-judge Federal District Court for the District of Columbia affirmed the orders of the Commission. 1 We affirm the judgment of the District Court. </s> The factual and historical setting of the merger is important to an understanding of our disposition of these appeals. Great Northern operates some 8,200 miles of road located in 10 States and two Canadian provinces. Northern Pacific has approximately 6,200 miles of track in seven States and one Canadian province. The Northern Lines operate largely in the area west of St. Paul, Minneapolis, and Duluth, running from these points [396 U.S. 491, 496] across the Northern Tier of States (Minnesota, North Dakota, Montana, Idaho, and Washington) to Spokane, Tacoma, and Portland. The Northern Pacific's tracks run generally somewhat to the south of the Great Northern's. The Northern Lines jointly own and control the Burlington and the SP&S, while the Great Northern owns and controls the Pacific Coast Railroad Company. The Burlington's 8,648 miles of track extend from Chicago to the Twin Cities and generally southwesterly to Missouri, Kansas, Colorado, and Montana. By its subsidiaries 2 the Burlington reaches the Gulf of Mexico at Houston and Galveston. The SP&S has 599 miles of road in Oregon and Washington, of which 515 are mainline. This mainline provides the most direct route from Spokane to Portland and is of strategic importance to the Northern Lines because Spokane lies on their main transcontinental routes and Portland is an important West Coast terminal for both roads. The Pacific Coast has 32 miles of track, all in King County, Washington; its rolling stock and motive power are leased from the Great Northern. </s> Rail competition in the areas served by the Northern Lines is principally between three carriers: the Great Northern, the Northern Pacific, and the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company (Milwaukee). Because the Burlington's routes largely complement those of the Northern Lines, there is no substantial competition between the Burlington and its corporate parents. The Great Northern and the Northern Pacific overshadow the Milwaukee and are each the principal competitor of the other. The Northern Lines carry the lion's share of traffic between the Twin Cities [396 U.S. 491, 497] and Duluth and the Pacific Northwest, both roads having good access to the Pacific Northwest through control of certain vital gateways in the area. Although the Milwaukee was designed and constructed to be a competitor of the Northern Lines, it has never accounted for a large percentage of the carriage across the Northern Tier States to the Pacific Northwest; it has never become a ratemaking railroad. The explanation for this is that although possessing superior grades and a shorter route west of the Twin Cities, it has never had adequate access to the gateways of the Pacific Northwest, largely because of the Northern Lines' control of the SP&S. As a result, its role has been that of a short-haul carrier feeding much profitable long-haul traffic to the Northern Lines at St. Paul and Minneapolis. </s> The population of the Northern Tier region traversed by the Northern Lines and the Milwaukee is concentrated largely in its easterly and westerly extremities. The Northern Tier is rich in agricultural and mineral resources, and embraces the country's richest timber reserves. However, the markets for the products of the Northern Tier are limited in number and distant from the region; the major shipments must move east. Thus, transportation capable of carrying its bulk products at a rate low enough to permit participation in those markets is of extreme importance to the region. Rail transportation well serves this need. There has been historically, however, an imbalance between the low-rated agricultural, mineral, and forest produce traffic flowing out of the region, and high-rated manufactured goods flowing into the region. The former is traffic inherently suited to rail transport, but the latter is subject to incursions from other modes of carriage. Although water traffic in the Northern Tier is virtually nonexistent, truck competition has been present for some time and is growing. [396 U.S. 491, 498] </s> Northern Pacific and Great Northern have long sought to merge into a single unified transportation system. In Pearsall v. Great Northern R. Co., 161 U.S. 646 (1896), this Court ruled that an attempt to consolidate the operation of the two roads was contrary to a Minnesota statute prohibiting the consolidation of parallel and competing railroads. The next merger attempt was struck down in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904), as contrary to the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. 1 et seq. 3 Then the declining fortunes of rail carriers led Congress to enact the Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 456, which charged the Interstate Commerce Commission with the affirmative responsibility to formulate plans for simplifying the Nation's rail transport "into a limited number of systems." 41 Stat. 481. This engendered a third effort, under the Commission's auspices, to merge the Northern Lines. 4 However, this effort foundered on the Commission's requirement that the Burlington be excluded from the Northern Lines system, and the Northern Lines were unwilling to consolidate without the Burlington. </s> I </s> The Present Merger </s> In 1955 the Northern Lines began investigating anew the possibility of a merger that would combine five roads - the Burlington, the SP&S, the Pacific Coast, and the Northern Lines - to form a New Company. Extensive negotiations dealing with all phases of the proposed merger were commenced. Five years later, in 1960, an agreement was finally reached. It provided that the Northern Lines, the Burlington, and the Pacific Coast [396 U.S. 491, 499] be merged into New Company, which was to acquire the subsidiaries of the merged companies as well as all their leasehold, trackage, and joint-use rights in other carriers and the terminals incident thereto. New Company would lease the SP&S, thereby acquiring that road's subsidiaries and trackage rights. </s> The merger agreement further provided that Northern Pacific shareholders would receive common stock of New Company on a share-for-share basis. Great Northern stockholders would receive one share of New Company common for each share of Great Northern and, in addition, one-half share of New Company $10 par 5 1/2% preferred for each share of Great Northern held at the date of the merger, this preferred stock to be retired over a 25-year period, beginning at the fifth anniversary of the merger, and to be redeemable at the option of New Company any time after the fifth anniversary of the merger. The Burlington stock held by the Northern Lines, amounting to 97.18% of the total shares outstanding, would be canceled and the remaining shareholders given 3.25 shares of New Company common for each share of Burlington. </s> Commission Proceedings </s> First Report. - As a result of these renewed merger negotiations between 1955 and 1960, applications were filed in 1961 under 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 380, as amended, 49 U.S.C. 5, seeking approval of the merger and authorization for the issuance of stock and securities, the assumption of obligations and other authority necessary to effectuate the merger. 5 Extensive public hearings were held in 1961 and 1962 at [396 U.S. 491, 500] which the Department of Justice, the Department of Agriculture, various railway employee groups, nine States or state regulatory agencies, and the Milwaukee and the Chicago & North Western Railway Company (North Western), inter alia, actively opposed the merger as proposed. Shippers and related interest groups appeared in support of the proposal. The Hearing Examiner submitted a report in 1964 recommending approval of the merger and the related transactions, subject to certain protective conditions. The Commission heard oral argument and in a report dated March 31, 1966 (First Report), rejected the Examiner's recommendation and disapproved the merger by a vote of 6 to 5. 6 </s> The applicants petitioned for a reconsideration, asserting that they were willing to accept all protective conditions sought by the Milwaukee and another affected road, the North Western, that they had entered into attrition agreements with the objecting unions for the protection of the employees, and that the merger would yield dollar savings greater than those estimated in the First Report. While this petition was pending before the Commission, the applicants entered into agreements with the North Western and the Milwaukee which provided that the merger applicants would agree to all the conditions sought by those roads; the Milwaukee and the North Western then agreed to support the merger. 7 Thereafter, these roads withdrew their opposition to the merger and urged the Commission to approve it. Approval was advocated or objections withdrawn by a number of parties who had previously either completely opposed the merger or opposed it absent imposition of [396 U.S. 491, 501] adequate protective conditions. These included the Department of Agriculture, the Public Utility Commissioner of Oregon, and the States of North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Michigan. 8 </s> Second Report. - On January 4, 1967, the Commission granted the application and reopened the proceedings for reconsideration and further hearings. Although the order by its terms reopened the proceedings on all issues, the hearing was limited to taking evidence on the question of the amount of savings the merger would produce in light of the agreement between the applicants and the Milwaukee and the North Western, and the other changes relevant to savings which had occurred after the close of the first hearing. Oral arguments followed. On November 30, 1967, the Commission handed down a report and order (Second Report) approving the proposed merger by a vote of 8 to 2 as consistent with the public interest and imposing certain conditions to protect other carriers. 9 On April 11, 1968, the Commission denied an application for reconsideration. 10 </s> [396 U.S. 491, 502] </s> District Court Proceedings </s> The United States, acting through the Department of Justice, filed a complaint on May 9, 1968, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the Commission order approving the merger. Other parties intervened, some as plaintiffs 11 and some as defendants. 12 After preliminary proceedings had resulted in a stay of the Commission's order pendente lite, the case was submitted on the merits to the three-judge court designated in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 2325 and 2284. The court, in an opinion by Senior Circuit Judge Charles Fahy, unanimously sustained the Commission, holding that in approving the merger and the related transactions the Commission was guided by the applicable legal principles and that its findings were supported by substantial evidence. The court dismissed the complaints, vacated the stay pendente lite, and then stayed its order pending appeal to this Court. Upon the filing of appeals with this Court, we ordered a further stay pending final disposition. </s> II </s> The Appeals Here </s> Four appeals were taken from the District Court's judgment; the Department of Justice (No. 28), the Northern Pacific Stockholders' Protective Committee [396 U.S. 491, 503] (No. 38), the City of Auburn, Washington (No. 43), and the Livingston Anti-Merger Committee (No. 44). </s> Each of the four appellants attacks the approval of the merger on different grounds. Because these challenges cover every aspect of the merger, and because of the rather complex expositions of fact necessary to the disposition of each objection, these appeals will be dealt with seriatim. With the cases in this posture the Court must review the proceedings before the Commission to "determine whether the Commission has proceeded in accordance with law and whether its findings and conclusions accord with the statutory standards and are supported by substantial evidence." Penn-Central Merger and N&W Inclusion Cases, 389 U.S. 486, 499 (1968). It should be emphasized, however, as Mr. Justice Fortas noted, speaking for the Court in a similar context, "[w]ith respect to the merits of the merger . . . our task is limited. We do not inquire whether the merger satisfies our own conception of the public interest. Determination of the factors relevant to the public interest is entrusted by the law primarily to the Commission, subject to the standards of the governing statute." Id., at 498-499. </s> The governing statute here is 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by the Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 905, 49 U.S.C. 5. The Act provides that the Commission is to approve a proposed merger when it is "consistent with the public interest" and the terms of the proposal are "just and reasonable." In determining whether this standard is met, the Commission is to </s> "give weight to the following considerations, among others: (1) The effect of the proposed transaction upon adequate transportation service to the public; (2) the effect upon the public interest of the inclusion, or failure to include other railroads [396 U.S. 491, 504] in the territory involved in the proposed transaction; (3) the total fixed charges resulting from the proposed transaction; and (4) the interest of the carrier employees affected." 49 U.S.C. 5 (2) (c). </s> In addition to the four factors listed above, the Commission must also consider the anticompetitive effects of any merger or consolidation, because under 5 (11) of the Interstate Commerce Act any transaction approved by the Commission is relieved of the operation of the antitrust laws. McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 83 -87 (1944). </s> In its First Report the Commission found that the merger would result in improved service to shippers in areas served by the Northern Lines because it would enable the roads to make more efficient use of their facilities and would permit the use of the shortest and swiftest internal routes available. In addition, the merger was found to afford estimated savings of approximately $25 million per year by the tenth year after merger. However, the Commission also found that as a consequence of the merger more than 5,200 jobs would be eliminated, this being a significant source of the reduced operating costs. The Commission then analyzed the anticompetitive impact of the proposal and found it would eliminate substantial competition between the Northern Lines in the Northern Tier. The Commission reasoned that even with protective conditions attached to the merger for the benefit of the Milwaukee, it would remain a weak carrier in the Northern Tier when compared with New Company. The Commission, by a vote of 6 to 5, as noted earlier, concluded that the proposed merger plan did not afford benefits of such scope and importance as to outweigh the lessening of rail competition in the Northern Tier; the merger was disapproved. </s> When the Commission reopened the proceedings in [396 U.S. 491, 505] 1967, it considered additional evidence including the changed positions of some of the major objectors, and new evidence on the savings to be realized from the merger; the Second Report was then issued. The Commission found that rather than the $25 million previously estimated, in fact more than $40 million per year in savings would be realized by the tenth year after merger. It also noted that agreements entered into by the applicants and their employees had removed objections of various unions to the merger and that no jobs would be eliminated except in the normal course of attrition. Aside from these changes, and the acceptance by the merger applicants of protective conditions sought by the Milwaukee, the record before the Commission was the same as that on which the First Report was based. The Second Report acknowledged that the First Report had failed to give appropriate weight to one of the aims of the national transportation policy and 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, to facilitate rail mergers "consistent with the public interest" in the development of a comprehensive national transport system, and that this had led the Commission to view the merger proposal too stringently. It then went on to re-examine the anticompetitive effects of the merger, weighing them against the savings and benefits to the public, shippers and the roads, and, accentuating the new and strengthened competitive posture of the Milwaukee, it concluded that the merger proposal should be approved because its benefits outweighed its anticompetitive effects in the Northern Tier region. </s> That this was not an easy problem for the Commission is attested by the lengthy history of attempts to merge these lines which dates back three-quarters of a century. The efforts to establish a more unified rail transportation system in the Northern Tier represent a 20th [396 U.S. 491, 506] century phase of the development of the American West; it brackets a period of enormous growth and change, and of new developments in transportation and public needs. Against this background it is not surprising that the members of the Commission were divided 6 to 5 against the merger on the First Report in 1966 and 8 to 2 in favor of the merger on the Second Report in 1967 after changes had been made in the plan to meet many of the objections raised. Nor is it remarkable that two great departments of government, each charged with responsibility to protect the public interest, took opposing positions; vigorous advocacy of divergent views on this difficult problem has narrowed and sharpened the issues and aided the Court in their resolution, ensuring that no factor which ought to be considered would elude our attention. </s> Appellants' Contentions </s> (a) No. 28, Department of Justice. - The United States, through the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, challenges the Commission's approval of the merger primarily on the ground that the Commission in the Second Report did not properly apply the standard of 5 (2) (b) of the Interstate Commerce Act in determining that the merger is consistent with the public interest. The Department contends that under the statute when a proposed merger will result in a substantial diminution of competition between two financially healthy, competing roads, its anticompetitive effects should preclude the approval of the merger absent a clear showing that a serious transportation need will be met or important public benefits will be provided beyond the savings and efficiencies that normally flow from a merger. The Department urges that the instant case presents a merger between two financially healthy carriers, each of which is the prime competitor of the [396 U.S. 491, 507] other in the area served. Admittedly the Commission found in its First Report that the merger would result in a "drastic lessening of competition." The Department argues that because no benefits are shown to flow from the merger beyond the economies and efficiencies normally resulting from unified operations, the Commission has not satisfied the statutory standard and that the District Court erred in refusing to enjoin the merger. </s> The Department maintains that prior to 1920 the antitrust laws and their underlying policies applied with full force to railroads and that the Transportation Act of 1920, which commanded an affirmative development by the Commission of a nationwide plan "for the consolidation of the railway properties of the continental United States into a limited number of systems," 41 Stat. 481, was primarily intended to promote the absorption of financially weak by strong carriers. To the extent that the 1920 Act did not intend to encourage rail mergers producing only the usual or "normal" kinds of merger benefits, the Department contends that the policies of the antitrust laws remain the guiding standard by which these consolidations are to be judged. The Transportation Act of 1940, according to the Department, did not alter this policy, but only eliminated the Commission's duty to formulate a national plan and to confine mergers to the four corners of this plan. The Department suggests that when the Commission is determining whether a merger or consolidation is consistent with the public interest, it must analyze the merger in terms of its anticompetitive impact and, if that impact would be great, then determine whether the merger is required by a serious transportation need or necessary to secure important public benefits. This standard, it urges, is "consistent with both the legislative history of [ 5] and, more generally, with the goal of substantial [396 U.S. 491, 508] simplification of railroad systems that underlay the Transportation Acts of both 1920 and 1940." 13 </s> The Department of Justice is correct in stating that one focal point of concern throughout the legislative consideration of the problems of railroads has been the weak carrier and its preservation through combination with the strong. Congress saw that as one - but only one - means to promote its objectives. The 1920 statute as a whole also embodied concern for economy and efficiency in rail operations. See Railroad Commission of California v. Southern Pacific Co., 264 U.S. 331, 341 (1924); Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R. Co., 270 U.S. 266, 277 (1926); Texas v. United States, 292 U.S. 522, 530 (1934); United States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225, 232 (1939). Thus, a rail merger that furthers the development of a more efficient transportation unit and one that results in the joining of a "sick" with a strong carrier serve equally to promote the long-range objectives of Congress and, upon approval by the Commission, both are immunized from the operation [396 U.S. 491, 509] of the antitrust laws. The policy of the 1920 Act has been consistently interpreted in this way. We find no basis for reading the congressional objective as confining these mergers to combinations by which the strong rescue the halt and the lame. </s> In New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12 (1932), this Court cautioned that </s> "[t]he fact that the carriers' lines are parallel and competing cannot be deemed to affect the validity of the authority conferred upon the Commission. . . . The question whether the acquisition of control in the case of competing carriers will aid in preventing an injurious waste and in securing more efficient transportation service is thus committed to the judgment of the administrative agency upon the facts developed in the particular case." Id., at 25-26. </s> Although this decision was prior to the passage of the Transportation Act of 1940, that Act in no way altered the basic policy 14 underlying the 1920 enactment. We recognized in St. Joe Paper Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 347 U.S. 298, 319 (1954), that Congress adopted the recommendations of the Committee of Six when it passed the 1940 Transportation Act and relieved the Commission of its duty to promulgate a national railroad consolidation plan. That Committee's report recognized economies and efficiencies of operation as well as the elimination of circuitous routing to be benefits that could [396 U.S. 491, 510] flow to the public through consolidations. 15 As recently as County of Marin v. United States, 356 U.S. 412 (1958), this Court observed: </s> "The congressional purpose in the sweeping revision of 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1940 . . . was to facilitate merger and consolidation in the national transportation system. In the Transportation Act of 1920 the Congress had directed the Commission itself to take the initiative in developing a plan `for the consolidation of the railway properties of the continental United States into a limited number of systems,' 41 Stat. 481, but after 20 years of trial the approach appeared inadequate. The Transportation Act of 1940 extended 5 to motor and water carriers, and relieved the Commission of its responsibility to initiate the unifications. `Instead, it authorized approval by the Commission of carrier-initiated, voluntary plans of merger or consolidation if, subject to such terms, conditions and modifications as the Commission might prescribe, the proposed transactions met with certain tests of public interest, justice and reasonableness . . . .' (Emphasis added.) Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U.S. 182, 193 (1948). . . In short, the result of the Act was a change in the means, while the end remained the same. The very language of the amended `unification section' expresses clearly the desire of the Congress that the industry proceed toward an integrated national [396 U.S. 491, 511] transportation system through substantial corporate simplification." Id., at 416-418. (Emphasis in original.) (Footnotes omitted.) </s> We turn now to consider the appropriate weight to be accorded by the Commission to antitrust policy in proceedings for approval of a merger. The role of antitrust policy under 5 was discussed comprehensively and dispositively in McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944), a case dealing with a merger of several large trucking companies. Since this Court has nowhere else dealt so definitively with this issue, the analysis by Mr. Justice Rutledge in the opinion for the Court merits extended quotation: </s> "The history of the development of the special national transportation policy suggests, quite apart from the explicit provision of 5 (11), that the policies of the anti-trust laws determine `the public interest' in railroad regulation only in a qualified way. And the altered emphasis in railroad legislation on achieving an adequate, efficient, and economical system of transportation through close supervision of business operations and practices rather than through heavy reliance on the enforcement of free competition in various phases of the business, cf. New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12 , has its counterpart in motor carrier policy. . . . </s> "[T]here can be little doubt that the Commission is not to measure proposals for all-rail or all-motor consolidations by the standards of the anti-trust laws. Congress authorized such consolidations because it recognized that in some circumstances they were appropriate for effectuation of the national transportation policy. It was informed that this [396 U.S. 491, 512] policy would be furthered by `encouraging the organization of stronger units' in the motor carrier industry. And in authorizing those consolidations it did not import the general policies of the anti-trust laws as a measure of their permissibility. It in terms relieved participants in appropriate mergers from the requirements of those laws. 5 (11). In doing so, it presumably took into account the fact that the business affected is subject to strict regulation and supervision, particularly with respect to rates charged the public - an effective safeguard against the evils attending monopoly, at which the Sherman Act is directed. Against this background, no other inference is possible but that, as a factor in determining the propriety of motor-carrier consolidations the preservation of competition among carriers, although still a value, is significant chiefly as it aids in the attainment of the objectives of the national transportation policy. </s> "Therefore, the Commission is not bound . . . to accede to the policies of the anti-trust laws . . . . </s> "Congress however neither has made the anti-trust laws wholly inapplicable to the transportation industry nor has authorized the Commission in passing on a proposed merger to ignore their policy. . . . Hence, the fact that the carriers participating in a properly authorized consolidation may obtain immunity from prosecution under the anti-trust laws in no sense relieves the Commission of its duty, as an administrative matter, to consider the effect of the merger on competitors and on the general competitive situation in the industry in the light of the objectives of the national transportation policy. </s> "In short, the Commission must estimate the scope and appraise the effects of the curtailment of competition which will result from the proposed [396 U.S. 491, 513] consolidation and consider them along with the advantages of improved service, safer operation, lower costs, etc., to determine whether the consolidation will assist in effectuating the over-all transportation policy. Resolving these considerations is a complex task which requires extensive facilities, expert judgment and considerable knowledge of the transportation industry. Congress left that task to the Commission . . . . `The wisdom and experience of that commission,' not of the courts, must determine whether the proposed consolidation is `consistent with the public interest.' [Citations omitted.] If the Commission did not exceed the statutory limits within which Congress confined its discretion and its findings are adequate and supported by evidence, it is not our function to upset its order." Id., at 83-88. (Footnotes omitted.) </s> Accord, Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. United States, 361 U.S. 173, 186 -188 (1959); Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 382 U.S. 154, 156 -157 (1965); see Florida East Coast R. Co. v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 993 (D.C. M. D. Fla. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 386 U.S. 544 (1967). </s> The Department urges that the Commission failed to give sufficient weight to the diminution of competition between the Northern Lines - in short, that it failed to strike the correct balance between antitrust objectives and the overall transportation needs that concern Congress. This contention tends to isolate individual factors that are to enter into the Commission's decision and view them as the controlling considerations. "Competition is merely one consideration here," Penn-Central Merger and N&W Inclusion Cases, 389 U.S. 486, 500 (1968). And, we might add, it is a consideration that is implied and is in addition to the four specifically mentioned [396 U.S. 491, 514] in 5 (2) (c) of the statute. In our view the Commission, in both reports, exhibited a concern and sensitivity to the difficult task of accommodating the regulatory policy based on competition with the long-range policy of achieving carrier consolidations. Indeed, this led the Commission to disapprove the merger by a margin of one vote in 1966 after five years of study because of specified infirmities in the plan. The Commission reached a different conclusion by a decisive vote in 1967 on a supplemental record which reflected substantial changes in the merger plan. Our review, like that of the District Court, reveals substantial record evidence to support the Commission's determination that the conditions agreed to by the applicants, the attrition agreements with the employees, the enhanced savings found in the Second Report, and the service improvements to shippers and the public found in both the First and Second Reports outweighed the loss of competition between the Northern Lines. Striking the balance is for the Commission and we cannot say that it did so improperly. </s> The benefits to the public from this merger are important and deserve elaboration. The Commission found that substantial service benefits would flow from the merger. Shippers will benefit from improved car supply, wider routing, better loading and unloading privileges, and improved tracing and claims service. New Company will be able to use the shortest and most efficient routes while eliminating yard interchange delays, thus providing shippers with faster service. The Commission found that the economics New Company will realize as a result of consolidating yards, repair facilities, and management, eliminating duplicate train services and pooling of cars and trains will result in lower rates to shippers and receivers. In addition, the opening of strategic gateways to the Milwaukee will remove artificial barriers to [396 U.S. 491, 515] the development of new markets, sources of supply, and services. </s> The Milwaukee objections prior to the First Report were based on the adverse impact of the merger on its competitive position and, in turn, on shippers and the public. Following the First Report the Northern Lines accepted conditions urged by the Milwaukee. Under the new conditions the posture of the Milwaukee, lying largely between the two Northerns and handicapped by limitations at both eastern and western terminals, will be greatly improved. Absent the protective conditions it would continue to be virtually strangled by the unified system; with them the Milwaukee gives prospect of affording substantial competition to the merged lines and will be placed in the position that at its inception it hoped to achieve. Its past failure to become a meaningful competitor came in large part because its lines did not reach into Portland, Oregon, or into the southwest terminal of the Northern Lines in California. In a strictly competitive situation it is understandable that neither of the Northern Lines would interchange traffic with the Milwaukee except on its own terms and this destined that the Milwaukee would fail to become a true transcontinental line even though its western terminus lay within a few miles of Portland with the latter's access to the sea. </s> The Milwaukee north-south traffic on the West Coast was limited to the short run from Seattle to Longview, barely half the distance from the Canadian border to Washington's southern border. Moreover, westbound traffic destined for points on one of the Northern Lines was taken over by one of them at St. Paul or Minneapolis notwithstanding Milwaukee's line from there deep into Washington. In the proceedings prior to 1966 many objecting shippers joined the Milwaukee in pointing out that rates and limitations on Milwaukee's service [396 U.S. 491, 516] precluded full use of the Milwaukee to the disadvantage of both shippers and the carrier. </s> The conditions imposed by the Commission's Second Report will alter that situation and substantially enlarge the Milwaukee's competitive potential between St. Paul and Minneapolis and the West Coast due to enlargement of its long-haul capability. Shippers will be afforded more flexible service. Another condition attached to the Commission's approval will permit the Milwaukee to run lines from its present western terminus into Portland, giving it a link with the Southern Pacific. All this will enable the Milwaukee to compete with the Northern Lines for east-west traffic and some north-south traffic as well as linkage with Canadian carriers to the north, which was previously the exclusive domain of one or both of the Northerns. Other conditions of lesser consequence will buttress the newly designed competitive posture of the Milwaukee. </s> The contention that the Commission failed to project an analysis of the relative position of the Milwaukee vis-a-vis the merged Northerns discounts the difficulty of precise forecasts and tends to overstate the need for such projections. The Commission can deal only in the probabilities that will arise from the Milwaukee's improved posture as a genuine competitor for traffic over a wide area, something it had never been able to achieve. After the merger it will afford shippers a choice of routes and service negating the idea that all rail competition will disappear in the Pacific Northwest. </s> (b) No. 38, The Northern Pacific Stockholders' Protective Committee. - The Northern Pacific Stockholders' Protective Committee 16 has appealed the District Court's affirmance of the Commission's approval of the proposed [396 U.S. 491, 517] merger's stock exchange provisions. To put each of the Committee's contentions in perspective requires that we describe the source of the Committee's concern and how the applicants dealt with it in reaching the present merger terms. </s> The Committee's continuing opposition to the merger relates to Northern Pacific's land holdings. The Northern Pacific Railway Company holds more than two million acres in fee and has mineral rights in another six million acres. These lands are rich in natural resources, including coal, oil, and timber, and are important sources of income. The negotiations between the parties centered to a large extent on these lands. Northern Pacific's financial adviser had suggested that although Great Northern had a better history of earning power and its stock had generally sold at a level above that of Northern Pacific's, the large land holdings of the Northern Pacific with their vast resources were of sufficient worth to justify a share-for-share exchange ratio between the Great Northern and the Northern Pacific. The Great Northern, however, insisted on a 60-40 stock exchange ratio because of its traditional rail strength. After further negotiations the roads realized that the lands were a stumbling block to the merger and considered several modes of segregating them from Northern Pacific's rail properties. One was to create two classes of New Company stock, one being issued to Northern Pacific shareholders and representing the natural resource properties, and another being issued to both Great Northern and Northern Pacific shareholders and representing Northern Pacific's rail properties. The second solution considered was spinning off the natural resource lands into another corporation and using the proceeds from an issuance of its stock as a Northern Pacific contribution to the merger. Neither of these solutions was acceptable to the negotiators, the former because of the problems inherent in [396 U.S. 491, 518] administering a corporation for two classes of stockholders with divergent interests, and the latter because of potential litigation with bondholders and adverse tax consequences to Northern Pacific. The negotiators concluded that the merger plan must include the land holdings of Northern Pacific. </s> Thereafter both roads made concessions, the Great Northern abandoning its claim for a permanently larger share for its stockholders and the Northern Pacific abandoning its claim for immediate equality. The result was an exchange ratio giving immediate recognition to Great Northern's greater earning power and historically higher market price while giving Northern Pacific's shareholders equal participation in the earnings of the enterprise on a long-term basis. The terms of the merger, as worked out by the negotiators over a five-year period, were approved by both roads' financial advisors, their boards of directors and their stockholders. 17 Shortly thereafter the Northern Pacific Stockholders' Protective Committee was formed. </s> When the merger proposal was submitted to the Commission for approval the Stockholders' Committee opposed the exchange ratio, pressing its claim that the natural resource lands were undervalued and that the Commission either should adjust the exchange ratio in accordance with the Committee's estimates of the property's worth or, preferably, should order the lands segregated and placed in a separate corporation, the stock of [396 U.S. 491, 519] which would be available to Northern Pacific shareholders. The Hearing Examiner's report reviewed the extensive negotiations between the parties and the modes by which they reached a valuation of the contribution each road's shareholders were making to New Company, concluding that there had been good-faith arm's-length bargaining and that the result of this bargaining fairly reflected each group of stockholders' contribution to New Company. The Examiner found the Committee's contention on value to be unsupported by record evidence and its spinoff proposal to be unfair to Northern Pacific shareholders. He recommended approval of the terms of the exchange. </s> The Commission's First Report, which disapproved the merger, did not reach the issue of the exchange ratio. When in 1967 the Commission reconsidered its earlier decision, it refused the Committee's request that it reopen the record for the taking of new evidence on the exchange ratio, but did not hear oral argument on the matter. The Committee again pressed its contentions. The Commission's Second Report rejected the Committee's arguments upon basically the same grounds given by the Hearing Examiner in his 1964 Report. </s> The Committee continued its attack on the stock exchange ratio in the District Court and urged that the Commission had abused its discretion in refusing to reopen the record to receive updated evidence on the exchange ratio. The District Court ruled that the Commission's finding that the terms were just and reasonable was supported by substantial evidence. It also held that the evidence the Committee proffered was not of sufficient importance to have affected the ultimate fairness of the Commission's finding. The discretion exercised by the Commission in refusing to reopen the record was, therefore, found free from abuse. </s> The Committee now contends that the record lacks substantial evidence to support the Commission's determination [396 U.S. 491, 520] that the exchange ratios are just and reasonable; that the Commission failed to consider the whole record before it; that the Commission erred, abused its discretion, or denied appellant due process of law in not permitting the record to be updated respecting the 1967 worth of the contributions being made by each group of shareholders, especially respecting Northern Pacific's natural resource properties; that the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the determination of the Commission that the proposed segregation of the natural resource lands is a proposal lacking merit and is unfair to Northern Pacific shareholders; and that the District Court erred in upholding the Commission's action. Our review leads us to reject these contentions. </s> Under 5 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, the Commission is to approve only such merger terms as it finds to be just and reasonable. The Commission, as had the negotiators and the Hearing Examiner, fully considered the proposed segregation of the natural resource properties and concluded that it was neither feasible nor fair to Northern Pacific stockholders. That determination is supported by substantial record evidence. In passing we note that although the Commission in fulfilling its statutory responsibilities is to carefully review all of the terms of a merger proposal and determine whether they are just and reasonable, it is not for the agency, much less the courts, to dictate the terms of the merger agreement once this standard has been met. It can hardly be argued that the bargaining parties were not capable of protecting their own interests. </s> The Commission's unwillingness to reopen the record in 1967 for the taking of new evidence on the exchange ratio was not an abuse of discretion nor did it deny the appellant due process of law. What this Court said in [396 U.S. 491, 521] Interstate Commerce Commission v. Jersey City, 322 U.S. 503 (1944), is applicable here: </s> "Administrative consideration of evidence - particularly where the evidence is taken by an examiner, his report submitted to the parties, and a hearing held on their exceptions to it - always creates a gap between the time the record is closed and the time the administrative decision is promulgated. This is especially true if the issues are difficult, the evidence intricate, and the consideration of the case deliberate and careful. If upon the coming down of the order litigants might demand rehearing, as a matter of law because some new circumstance has arisen, some new trend has been observed, or some new fact discovered, there would be little hope that the administrative process could ever be consummated in an order that would not be subject to reopening. It has been almost a rule of necessity that rehearings were not matters of right, but were pleas to discretion. And likewise it has been considered that the discretion to be invoked was that of the body making the order, and not that of a reviewing body." Id., at 514-515. </s> Moreover, as this Court noted in United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, 327 U.S. 515 (1946), "it has been held consistently that rehearings before administrative bodies are addressed to their own discretion. . . . Only a showing of the clearest abuse of discretion could sustain an exception to that rule." Id., at 535. </s> We find nothing in the Committee's arguments to persuade us that such an abuse occurred when the Commission refused to take further evidence on the question of each group of shareholders' contribution to the merger. Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U.S. 182 (1948), relied upon by the Committee, is not to the contrary. [396 U.S. 491, 522] That decision requires that the value of a stockholder's contribution to a merger be determined in accord with the "current worth" of his equity. That does not mean there must be a repeated updating of the evidence before the agency; in a complex merger such as this that would lead to interminable delay. A determination that the terms of a merger proposal fairly reflect the current worth of each shareholder's contribution meets the standards of Schwabacher if the agency had before it evidence as to the worth of the shareholders' contributions at the time of the submission of the proposal, and there is no showing that subsequent events have materially altered the worth of the various shareholders' contributions to the merger. The evidence the appellant Committee presents to this Court, purporting to show that Northern Pacific's stock is presently worth considerably more, vis-a-vis Great Northern's, than was the case at the time of the initial hearings, does show fluctuations in the worth of the two companies' stock. But we cannot say that those fluctuations, in the context of this merger proposal, are sufficient to show that the worth of the various shareholders' contributions to the merger has been materially altered. We agree with the District Court that the Commission's refusal to reopen the record for further evidence was not an abuse of discretion. </s> (c) No. 43, City of Auburn. - The City of Auburn, Washington, opposes the merger for the reasons set out in the brief of the Department of Justice, and, in addition, contends that the Commission failed to adequately assess the impact of the merger upon affected communities and explain why the benefits of the merger convincingly outweigh its adverse effects on these communities. Auburn also objects to the refusal to open the 1967 hearings for further testimony concerning the impact of the merger upon Auburn. </s> Auburn is a city of 19,000 inhabitants in western Washington, halfway between Seattle and Tacoma, [396 U.S. 491, 523] which serves as the western terminus for the Northern Pacific's transcontinental trains. A substantial part of the city's economy is dependent upon that road's activity there. The record before the Commission indicated that if the merger were approved, the Auburn yard would be closed, and that the town of Everett, on the other side of Seattle, would become the western terminus for all of New Company's transcontinental trains. </s> Insofar as the city challenges the Commission's action on the same grounds as the Department of Justice, our disposition of the appeal in No. 28 applies here. As for the 1967 hearings, the city failed to object to the scope of the Commission's reopened hearings and made no attempt to present evidence at those hearings. Neither did it challenge the Commission's findings concerning the impact of the merger upon Auburn. Only when it came before the District Court did it raise its contentions. This alone might preclude its attack on the merger. But we need not decide that issue because we find that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in refusing to take evidence in 1967 as to the impact of the merger on Auburn. </s> In the record upon which the Second Report is based the Commission had evidence of the impact of the yard's closing on the city. Thus, even assuming the closing, the Commission found that the long-run effect of the merger would be to benefit communities in the Northern Tier, such as Auburn, and that the brief and transitory dislocations the merger would occasion were not sufficient to outweigh the merger's benefits. We find this to be a justifiable conclusion supported by substantial evidence on the record. We can hardly imagine any merger of substantial carriers that would not cause some dislocations to some shippers, some communities, and some employees. </s> The plans for the Auburn yard now seem to be altered; the applicants stated before the District Court and again [396 U.S. 491, 524] before this Court that they now intend to maintain the Auburn yard. As a result, employment in Auburn will be largely unaffected by the merger. Since we conclude that the Commission properly determined that Auburn's hardships and those of communities similarly situated, as posited on the record, did not warrant disapproval of the merger, it is difficult to imagine any basis upon which we might find the Commission to have abused its discretion in not taking further evidence on the merger's impact on Auburn when the principal harm of which the city earlier complained has disappeared. </s> (d) No. 44, Livingston Anti-Merger Committee. - Citizens of Montana, living in and about Livingston, Helena, and Glendive, who appear here as the Livingston, Anti-Merger Committee, attack the merger on several grounds. As a prelude to discussing these contentions, the historical facts upon which the Committee's attack is based should be stated. </s> In 1864 Congress created the Northern Pacific Railroad Company (Railroad) and granted it authority to build a railroad from Lake Superior to Puget Sound. To subsidize this enterprise Congress granted Railroad a right-of-way and alternate sections of land along that right-of-way. According to the terms of Railroad's charter it could not encumber its franchise or right-of-way without congressional approval, and was not authorized to merge with another road, except under limited conditions not relevant here. 18 In 1870 Congress passed a resolution allowing Railroad to issue bonds secured by its property and subject to foreclosure for default. Shortly thereafter a mortgage was pledged, only to be foreclosed in 1875. After the foreclosure proceedings the property was struck off to a committee of bondholders. Later, however, the property was returned to Railroad pursuant to a reorganization plan. Although Congress did not further authorize [396 U.S. 491, 525] mortgaging of the franchise or right-of-way, Railroad again encumbered its property by pledging several mortgages. In 1896, after these mortgages had been defaulted upon and foreclosure proceedings had been commenced, a negotiated settlement was made which resulted in the property of Railroad being sold to the Northern Pacific Railway Company (Railway), which has operated under Railroad's franchise and upon its right-of-way ever since. Railway presently owns 97% of the stock of Railroad, which is no longer an operating company. </s> On the basis of these facts Livingston contends that the Interstate Commerce Commission had no authority to approve the proposed merger because Railway does not own the franchise and right-of-way involved in this merger, and Railroad is not a party to the merger. Livingston argues that the 1896 foreclosure was a sham and it actually was a sale of Railroad property to Railway; because Congress never authorized that sale, it is void. In addition, Livingston contends that the mortgages that led to the 1896 foreclosure were not authorized by Congress; therefore, they could not constitute the basis for a valid foreclosure and liquidation. The claimed consequence is that the title to the franchise and right-of-way remains in Railroad. Livingston argues that even if it should be held that Railway does own the franchise and right-of-way, under the 1864 charter of Railroad, to which Railway succeeded, no merger involving these properties can take place without congressional approval, and such approval has not been procured. Finally, Livingston urges that the Commission and the District Court failed to properly deal with these contentions and make specific findings as to the Commission's jurisdiction. </s> The Commission was presented with these arguments and found them to be without merit. The District Court affirmed the Commission, ruling that it had not erred in refusing to disapprove the merger because of appellant's [396 U.S. 491, 526] claims and had not erred in refusing to litigate their merits. We affirm the District Court. Section 5 (2) (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act provides in pertinent part: </s> "(a) It shall be lawful, with the approval and authorization of the Commission, as provided in subdivision (b) of this paragraph - </s> "(i) for two or more carriers to consolidate or merge their properties or franchises, or any part thereof, into one corporation for the ownership, management, and operation of the properties theretofore in separate ownership . . . ." 49 U.S.C. 5 (2) (a). </s> The premise of Livingston's position is that under this statute before the Commission can assume jurisdiction over a merger application it must determine that the applicants have proper legal title to the rights and property which they seek to bring into the merger. This is an erroneous assumption. The Commission is not required to deal with the subtleties of "good title" before assuming jurisdiction over a 5 matter. Cf. O. C. Wiley & Sons v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 542, 543-545 (D.C. W. D. Va.), aff'd per curiam, 388 U.S. 902 (1949); Walker v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 388, 396 (D.C. W. D. Tex. 1962); Interstate Investors, Inc. v. United States, 287 F. Supp. 374, 392 n. 32 (D.C. S. D. N. Y. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 479 (1969). And because a Commission order under 5 (2) "is permissive, not mandatory." New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 26 -27 (1932), the approval of a merger proposal does not amount to an adjudication of any such questions. These are matters for the courts, not for an agency that has responsibility in the realm of regulating transportation systems. </s> In the instant case there were ample grounds for the Commission's assumption of jurisdiction over the applicants. [396 U.S. 491, 527] Although the validity of Railway's claim that it is Railroad's successor in interest and has good title to all of Railroad's rights and properties has never been judicially determined, this Court has impliedly recognized it several times. In Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913), we held that a creditor of Railroad had an assertable claim against the equity of Railroad's shareholders represented by Railway's assets because the foreclosure amounted to little more than a judicially approved reorganization in which the shareholders of the old company became the shareholders of the new. As against a bona fide creditor of Railroad, we found the judicial sale ineffective to bar his rights. However, we also stated that </s> "[a]s between the parties and the public generally, the sale was valid. . . . [T]he Northern Pacific Railroad was divested of the legal title [to its properties]. . . ." Id., at 506. </s> In United States v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 311 U.S. 317 (1940), we described some of the history of the appellee company as follows: </s> "Pursuant to foreclosure proceedings the Northern Pacific Railway Company acquired title to the railroad, the land grant, and all other property of the original corporation and has since operated the road and obtained patents for millions of acres under the land grants." Id., at 328. </s> In addition, Attorney General Harmon in 1897 advised the Secretary of the Interior that Railway had a right, as successor in interest of Railroad, to patents of land grants made to Railroad. 21 Op. Atty. Gen. 486. The Secretary of the Interior thereafter treated Railway as Railroad's legal successor and patented large amounts of land to Railway. When in 1905 the then Secretary of the Interior asked then Attorney General Moody, later an Associate Justice of this Court, about the right of [396 U.S. 491, 528] Railway to Railroad's land grants, Mr. Moody, after investigating the matter, reaffirmed his predecessor's conclusion that Railway was Railroad's legitimate successor in interest. 25 Op. Atty. Gen. 401. In 1954 a committee of Railroad's minority shareholders sued Railway seeking to have the 1896 foreclosure set aside and all titles and franchises declared to be in Railroad and to obtain an accounting from Railway for all properties and profits received from 1896 through 1954. In an exhaustive opinion Judge Edward A. Tamm of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held the action barred by laches and dismissed the complaint. Landell v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 122 F. Supp. 253 (D.C. D.C. 1954), aff'd, 96 U.S. App. D.C. 24, 223 F.2d 316, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 844 (1955). In this context we think the Commission did not err in assuming jurisdiction over the applicants while refusing to adjudicate the merits of Railway's title. As the District Court stated, "[f]or purposes of merger proceedings it could rely on the existing judicial records . . . supplemented by the opinions of two Attorneys General." 19 </s> We are then faced with the contention of Livingston that Railway is prohibited from participating in the merger and that the Commission is barred from approving it by the terms of Railroad's charter. That charter does not authorize Railroad to merge with the applicant companies and prohibits the mortgaging of its property in the absence of congressional consent. If Railway is Railroad's successor in interest, Livingston contends, it is bound by the provisions of Railroad's charter, and those provisions would be violated by the proposed merger and issuance of securities incident thereto. Livingston argues that because the Act chartering Railroad is a law as much as it is a grant, see Oregon & California R. Co. v. United States, 238 U.S. 393, 427 (1915), it is binding [396 U.S. 491, 529] upon the Commission and makes the Commission's approval of the merger unlawful. Livingston relies upon Union Pacific R. Co. v. Mason City & Fort Dodge R. Co., 199 U.S. 160 (1905), as standing for the proposition that statutory restrictions on a predecessor federal railroad company survive a foreclosure sale and apply to a successor private railroad company operating on the original company's rights and franchise. </s> We do not find the Mason City decision to be controlling, despite its somewhat similar legal and factual context. In 1862 Congress chartered the Union Pacific Railroad Company and authorized it to build a transcontinental railroad. In 1865 Railroad, pursuant to congressional authorization, pledged a mortgage secured by its right-of-way and franchise to gain monies necessary for construction. In 1871 Congress granted Railroad authority to issue bonds for the construction of a bridge over the Missouri River, that grant being conditioned upon the bridge's being open for the use of all roads for a reasonable compensation, to be paid to the owner of the bridge. This condition was one generally inserted by Congress in statutes authorizing bridge construction. Sometime after the bridge was built the 1865 mortgage was foreclosed and the Union Pacific Railroad Company, a Utah corporation, purchased the assets of the federal corporation. It thereafter refused to allow any but its own trains to use the bridge, contending that as purchaser under the foreclosure of the 1865 mortgage, it was not bound by the 1871 statute's conditions. This Court rejected that contention and concluded that the conditions applied to the Utah corporation, reasoning that the purpose of Congress in authorizing the construction of the bridge required that the conditions appended to that authorization attach to the bridge and bind its owner. </s> The instant case is quite different. Here the provisions of the charter of Northern Pacific Railroad Company which are urged to bar this merger were directed only to [396 U.S. 491, 530] the operations of the federal corporation, not to the operation of the railroad. Thus, when the corporation's property was sold to another, the conditions of which Livingston speaks did not follow that property into the hands of the successor corporation. It therefore follows that the statute creating the Northern Pacific Railroad Company did not bar the Interstate Commerce Commission from authorizing a merger involving the Northern Pacific Railway Company, a Wisconsin corporation. 20 We find that the Commission acted within its authority in assuming jurisdiction over the instant merger proposal and that Railway is not barred by the statute from participating in that merger. We have considered Livingston's other contentions and find them to be without merit. </s> Conclusion </s> On the entire record we cannot say that the District Court erred in upholding the order set forth in the Second Report or that the Commission has done other than give effect to the Transportation Act of 1920 as amended in 1940, which vested in the Commission the responsibility of balancing the values of competition against the need for consolidation of rail transportation units. </s> The judgment of the District Court is therefore affirmed and the stay granted by this Court pending the resolution of these appeals is hereby vacated. </s> [Appendixes A and B follow this page.] </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the decision of these cases. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The three-judge court decision is reported as United States v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 853 (D.C. D.C. 1968). </s> [Footnote 2 The Colorado & Southern Railway Company and the Fort Worth & Denver Railway Company are both controlled by the Burlington. </s> [Footnote 3 The vote in this historic case was 5 to 4 with one of the majority, Mr. Justice Brewer, joining on narrower grounds. </s> [Footnote 4 See Great Northern Pacific R. Co. Acquisition, 162 I. C. C. 37 (1930). </s> [Footnote 5 Among the allied transactions were the issuance of certain securities and the assumption of obligations and liability in respect of securities under 20a of the Interstate Commerce Act, and the obtaining of certain extensions and abandonments of railroad lines under 1 (18) to 1 (20), inclusive, of the Act. </s> [Footnote 6 328 I. C. C. 460 (1966). The majority included Commissioners Bush, Tucker, Webb, Tierney, Brown, and Deason. Commissioners Tuggle, Freas, Murphy, Walrath, and Goff dissented. </s> [Footnote 7 The Northern Lines also agreed not to oppose the authorization of a proposed Milwaukee-North Western merger. </s> [Footnote 8 Petitions were also filed by the Northern Pacific Stockholders' Protective Committee seeking further hearings with respect to the justness and reasonableness of the terms of the merger agreement, and the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad seeking an investigation into the agreements entered into by the applicants with the Milwaukee and the North Western. These petitions were denied. </s> [Footnote 9 331 I. C. C. 228 (1967). Commissioners Tuggle, Murphy, Walrath, Bush, Tucker, Deason, Stafford, and Syphers voted to approve the merger, while Commissioners Tierney and Brown dissented. Commissioner Hardin did not participate in the decision. </s> [Footnote 10 In this order the Commission modified one of the conditions placed on the merger by the order of November 30, 1967. On June 17, 1968, a further order was issued, ruling that the Milwaukee must be allowed to bring grain traffic through 11 gateways opened to it by conditions contained in the Second Report. Neither the order of April 11 nor that of June 17 was challenged in the District Court. Hence, they are not before us. </s> [Footnote 11 Attacking the merger were the following: the Northern Pacific Stockholders' Protective Committee; the City of Auburn, Washington; the State of Washington; the Board of Railroad Commissioners of Montana; the Livingston Anti-Merger Committee; and the Public Service Commission of Minnesota. </s> [Footnote 12 The intervening defendants included the applicants, the Milwaukee, the Public Utility Commissioner of Oregon, and 230 Pacific Northwest shippers. </s> [Footnote 13 We might note that the substance of the Department's position with respect to the Commission's power to approve consolidations was presented to this Court by the Secretary of Agriculture in No. 31, O. T. 1943, McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944), Brief for Secretary of Agriculture of the United States 38, 40, and to the three-judge court in the Seaboard-Coast Line merger litigation, Florida East Coast R. Co. v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 993, 1012-1013 (D.C. M. D. Fla. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 386 U.S. 544 (1967). In both of these cases, one decided in 1944 and the other in 1966, the Department's position was rejected. In addition, in 1962 a bill was before the Senate that would have imposed a moratorium on the Commission's approval of large railroad mergers that would otherwise violate 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. 18. The Department actively supported the bill. It was not reported out of committee. See Hearings on S. 3097 before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). </s> [Footnote 14 The Commission apparently had no difficulty in approving a merger of the Northern Lines under a plan similar to that held violative of the Sherman Act in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). The Commission gave as one of the considerations leading it to approve the proposed merger, "the feasibility of making large operating economies." Great Northern Pacific R. Co. Acquisition, 162 I. C. C. 37, 47 (1930). </s> [Footnote 15 Report of Committee appointed September 20, 1938, by the President of the United States, to Submit Recommendations upon the General Transportation Situation, December 23, 1938, in Hearings on H. R. 2531 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 259-308 (1939). </s> [Footnote 16 Appellant Committee represents about 3% of Northern Pacific's stockholders, who hold approximately 5% of the outstanding shares of Northern Pacific. </s> [Footnote 17 Northern Pacific's shareholders approved the merger terms in 1961 by a vote of 73.81% to 6.64%, the remainder of the stock not being voted. In 1968 the shareholders again approved the merger's terms, as conditioned by the ICC's Second Report, 73.2% voting for and 2.57% voting against, the remainder not voting. Prior to both of these votes the members of the appellant Committee vigorously urged the shareholders to reject the merger as being unfair because of the low value given the natural resource properties. </s> [Footnote 18 See Act of July 2, 1864, 3, 13 Stat. 367. </s> [Footnote 19 296 F. Supp. 853, 877 (D.C. D.C. 1968). </s> [Footnote 20 Appellees contend that under 5(11) and 20a (7) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 5 (11), 20a (7), the approval of a consolidation proposal operates to relieve the applicants from any inhibiting state or federal laws, that the charter of Railroad is such a law, and that approval of the instant merger proposal modifies any conflicting provisions in that charter. Since we do not find Railroad's charter to be binding upon Railway, we need not reach that contention. </s> [396 U.S. 491, 531]

United States Supreme Court ILLINOIS C. R. CO. v. NORFOLK & W. R. CO.(1966) No. 15 Argued: October 11, 1966Decided: November 14, 1966 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 17, Calumet Harbor Terminals, Inc., et al. v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. et al. and No. 20, United States et al. v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. et al., also on appeal from the same court. </s> Appellants, seven railroads, applied to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) for authority to provide direct service to the Lake Calumet Harbor Port, which is being developed by the Chicago Regional Port District as a major deep water port facility for traffic via the St. Lawrence Seaway. The Port area is now served directly by only Rock Island, which along with the nearest rail facility, Nickel Plate (later merged into the Norfolk & Western), intervened in opposition to the proposed expansion of rail service. The applications sought approval of trackage extension as well as an unexecuted agreement between appellants and the Port District for operations within the Port area. After a full hearing, the Hearing Examiner recommended approval of appellants' entire project. The ICC adopted the recommendations but ruled that the applicants should file supplemental applications covering Port area operations as provided in the proposed lease with the Port District. The supplemental applications covering the lease were filed, an exclusive operating clause to which the ICC had objected having been eliminated. The ICC, finding that the public convenience and necessity required the additional services applied for by appellants, approved the applications, as supplemented, without a further hearing which the Rock Island and Nickel Plate had requested, the ICC having concluded that the previous hearing record was adequate to support the entire project. A second supplemental application was later filed clarifying the rental provision which in the ICC's view required no further hearing as requested by those railroads. The Rock Island and Nickel Plate sued to enjoin the ICC's orders, which a three-judge [385 U.S. 57, 58] District Court set aside as not supported by sufficient evidence. The District Court also found that due process required that Rock Island and Nickel Plate be granted a hearing on the rental provisions. The court ordered a hearing on all the issues. Held: </s> 1. The ICC's action granting appellant railroads' applications to provide additional service was supported by "substantial evidence" on the record viewed as a whole as to the Port's future potential and the need for providing competitive rail service at the outset of the Port's development. It was not the District Court's function to substitute its own conclusions for those which the ICC had fairly drawn from its findings. Pp. 65-69. </s> 2. During the proceedings before the Hearing Examiner and the ICC, the operations of the appellants within the Port area were fully considered as an integral part of their overall plan, and the District Court had no basis for concluding that due process required a new hearing on the issues. Pp. 70-75. </s> 241 F. Supp. 974, reversed and remanded. </s> William J. O'Brien, Jr., argued the cause for appellants in Nos. 15 and 17. With him on the brief in No. 15 were Robert H. Bierma and Edmund A. Schroer. With him on the brief in No. 17 was Charles B. Myers. </s> Richard A. Posner argued the cause for the United States et al. in No. 20. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Howard E. Shapiro and Robert W. Ginnane. </s> Theodore E. Desch argued the cause for appellees in all cases. With him on the brief were Martin L. Cassell, Don McDevitt, John L. Bordes, Reuben L. Hedlund and Robert A. Deane. </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This is an appeal from the judgment of a three-judge District Court, 241 F. Supp. 974, setting aside orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 307 I. C. C. 493, 312 I. C. C. 277, 317 I. C. C. 502, which granted the [385 U.S. 57, 59] applications of seven railroads 1 to provide additional rail service to the Lake Calumet Harbor Port near the southern limits of Chicago, Illinois. The service was to be provided through the construction of a single line of track into the Chicago Regional Port District for the joint use of the seven railroads. At present the port is served directly by only one railroad, appellee Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Company (Rock Island). Appellee New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Company (Nickel Plate), 2 has facilities on the east side of Lake Calumet which has been reserved for future commercial development, but at present its facilities do not reach the port. The court, with one judge dissenting, rejected as not having "ample support" in the record, the findings of the Commission that the public convenience and necessity required the additional service applied for by the seven roads. It further found, unanimously, that the requirements of due process were violated by the Commission in its refusal to give Rock Island and Nickel Plate a hearing before approving a nonexclusive agreement, subsequently executed between the applicant roads and the Port District, covering the use of the latter's facilities. The court ordered a new hearing on all the issues, one judge concluding that such hearing should be limited to the subsequently executed nonexclusive use agreement. We noted probable jurisdiction, 382 U.S. 913 , and reverse the judgment. [385 U.S. 57, 60] </s> I. </s> BACKGROUND OF LAKE CALUMET HARBOR PORT. </s> Lake Calumet Harbor Port is one of seven facilities within the Port of Chicago available for the handling of water-borne freight. It is a shallow lake approximately two miles in length and covers approximately 1,250 acres. It is accessible by water from Lake Michigan via the Calumet River into the heart of the Chicago switching district, a distance of some six miles. </s> As early as 1880 one of the Pullman companies constructed trackage that first brought rail service to Lake Calumet. Pullman reserved some 300 to 500 acres for the development of a harbor and later donated some acreage to the United States for the development of a turning basin. Comprehensive plans for dredging Lake Calumet harbor and the filling of submerged lands were prepared in 1916 by an engineer for the City of Chicago. In 1917 Pullman waived riparian rights to some four miles of Lake Calumet shoreline to the City of Chicago and in 1935 gave additional land to the United States for the purpose of widening the Calumet River. </s> In 1947 the Illinois Central, an appellant here, attempted to enter the port area. Pullman and two of the seven appellants here. New York Central and the Belt Railway Company of Chicago, opposed the application which was addressed to the Illinois Commerce Commission. In 1949, during the pendency of the proceeding, Rock Island acquired the common stock and certain industrial property of Pullman for $2,200,000. Rock Island then entered the proceedings in opposition to Illinois Central. The application of the latter was approved by the Illinois Commerce Commission but the Circuit Court of Cook County rejected it and the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed in 1953. Chicago, R. I. [385 U.S. 57, 61] & P. R. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission ex rel. Illinois Central R. Co., 414 Ill. 134, 111 N. E. 2d 136. </s> The Interstate Commerce Commission in approving the acquisition of Pullman by Rock Island - over the objections of Illinois Central and the Belt Railway Company, each of which also sought to acquire Pullman or a portion of its trackage on the lake - imposed certain conditions on Rock Island designed to guarantee fair practices, assure nondiscriminatory handling of the traffic of other railroads to and from the lake and guarantee the mutuality of traffic and operating relationships theretofore existing between Pullman and the other roads. Rock Island, however, continued to be the only line providing direct service to the port. </s> The Chicago Regional Port District was created as a municipal corporation by the State of Illinois in 1951. Its purpose was the development of Lake Calumet into a major deep water port facility for both domestic and import-export traffic via the St. Lawrence Seaway. In 1954 the Port District declared by resolution that the public's, as well as the port's, interest required that its trackage be accessible to as many railroads as possible. In 1955 the Port District acquired the lake and some adjoining property from the City of Chicago and began dredging the lake and constructing port facilities at its southern end; it also built 14 miles of railroad yard "hold" tracks in the port, docks, two 6,500,000-bushel grain elevators, three transit sheds occupying 300,000 square feet of space, a back-up warehouse with 200,000 square feet of space, and streets. These facilities cost $24,000,000 and were paid for by the sale of Port District revenue bonds. By contract with the Port District the Rock Island operates over the trackage of the Port District and also serves the Calumet Harbor Terminals, Inc., a private harbor facility. No other railroads reach the port on their own tracks. The Nickel [385 U.S. 57, 62] Plate is the nearest rail facility. As previously noted, it has trackage on the east side of the lake which has been reserved for future development by the Port District. Any railroad wishing to service the port must use the facilities of Rock Island. </s> II. </s> THE APPLICATIONS BEFORE THE COMMISSION. </s> On October 22, 1956, the appellants Illinois Central Railroad Company and the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, requested authority from the Commission under the provisions of 49 U.S.C. 1 (18) to construct 1.431 miles of new track that would connect their lines to the present trackage of an affiliate of Illinois Central that passes near Lake Calumet's southwestern shore. Similar applications were subsequently filed by the Chicago South Shore and South Bend Railroad, the Belt Railway Company of Chicago, the Michigan Central Railroad Company, the New York Central Railroad Company and the Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Company. All of the applicants sought to operate directly to and from the Lake Calumet port, rather than use the facilities of the Rock Island. The latter, as well as the Nickel Plate, requested and was given leave to intervene as were other parties. 3 The Rock Island and Nickel Plate were the only objectors, the remaining intervenors all supporting the applications. </s> The original applications of the seven railroads did not specifically request authority from the Commission to operate over the Port District's tracks. It appears that appellants were under the impression that formal Commission authority was not necessary because of the [385 U.S. 57, 63] fact that Rock Island was currently operating without it. Nevertheless, the applications covered the entire plan of operations proposed by appellants, including activity within the Port District as well as an unexecuted agreement covering the leasing of the Port District facilities which was attached to the application as an exhibit. This lease was before the Hearing Examiner during the 12-day joint hearing he conducted and was the subject of testimony and consideration. The appellants advised, and the Hearing Examiner concluded, that the appellants sought approval to operate within the Port District, as well as authority for the track extension. Accordingly, the Hearing Examiner recommended to the Commission that the entire project of the appellants be approved. </s> On October 5, 1959, the Commission adopted the Hearing Examiner's recommendations but ruled that the applicants should file supplemental applications covering their proposed operations within the Port District, as provided in the proposed lease with the District. The Commission discussed the lease and indicated that it was satisfactory. It did, however, feel that the exclusive right of operation clause should be eliminated. The Commission also ruled that Rock Island's service to Calumet Harbor Terminals, Inc., was not to be disrupted and that every industry located at Lake Calumet Harbor was to have direct rail service, not only from the applicants but the Rock Island and Nickel Plate, if they so elected. </s> In April 1960, the appellants, pursuant to the Commission's requirement, filed supplemental applications for specific authority to operate within the Port District. The proposed lease covered by these applications eliminated the exclusionary provisions to which the Commission had objected. Despite the request of Rock Island and Nickel Plate for a hearing on the new lease the Commission [385 U.S. 57, 64] found that the "technical deficiency" existing in appellants' original applications had been corrected by the filing of their supplemental applications; that the record of the previous hearing was adequate to support approval of the entire proposal of the appellants; and the applications, as supplemented, were approved. </s> In June 1961, however, the appellants and the Port District found it necessary to amend their operating agreement and appellants filed a second supplemental application asking for approval of the same. This agreement modified the one previously approved by the Commission. The old agreement had provided for a 5% annual rental for the use of the Port District's rail facilities based upon the valuation of the latter, but not to exceed $2 per car, loaded or empty, including locomotives. The new agreement provided for a flat charge of $2 for each loaded freight car; it also specifically eliminated industry-owned tracks within the Port District from the agreement; and provided that it did not affect the right of Rock Island to operate in the Port District nor grant any exclusive privilege to the appellants. The Commission, after once again denying appellees' request for a hearing, approved this final agreement on November 26, 1962. The Commission found that the changes merely clarified the rights and responsibilities of the parties. As to the rentals it found that "rentals generally may be considered reasonable where, as here, the facts of record disclose that nonaffiliated parties, after bargaining at arm's length, have entered into an agreement under which increased service will be offered to the public, all parties to the agreement will benefit financially, and the interveners' ability to continue to serve the public will not be impaired." 4 </s> [385 U.S. 57, 65] </s> III. </s> PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT. </s> The Rock Island and Nickel Plate then filed this suit seeking to enjoin the Commission's orders and the three-judge District Court vacated the orders on the grounds we have stated. </s> The court found that it was faced with two basic problems: (1) whether there was "substantial evidence" to support the order of the Commission and (2) whether the refusal of the Commission to have a hearing on the lease agreement between the applicants and the Port District denied Rock Island and Nickel Plate due process of law. </s> With respect to the first problem the court found "substantial support" for some of the "important findings" of the Commission. However, it found that the record did not "offer ample support" for certain of its conclusions. These conclusions appeared to have been drawn by the Commission from the prior findings which the court had found to have "substantial support" in the record. </s> On the supplemental application for authority to operate within the Port District the court held there was insufficient evidence to support the order of approval; that the rental under the final contract was materially different from the provisions of the original plan and bound the Rock Island and Nickel Plate to operate under the same condition without affording them the right of a hearing. By a divided court it ordered a complete rehearing on all issues. We cannot agree with either the findings of the District Court or with its disposition of the case. </s> IV. </s> APPLICABLE STANDARD ON REVIEW. </s> At the outset the Commission and the appellant railroads contend that the court did not apply the correct standards in reviewing the Commission's action. As we [385 U.S. 57, 66] have noted, the court did reject certain "conclusions" of the Commission, as above indicated, with respect to the public convenience and necessity for additional rail service to Lake Calumet port on the ground that they did not have "ample support" in the record. The test on judicial review is, of course, whether the action of the Commission is supported by "substantial evidence" on the record viewed as a whole, 5 U.S.C. 1009 (e) (5). Substantial evidence is "enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury." Labor Board v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939). A careful reading of the opinion leads us to conclude that the court was applying the test of substantiality. Indeed, at four separate places in the opinion it uses the term "substantial evidence" as being the necessary requirement. As unfortunate as it is that the "ample support" language crept into the decision, we do not believe that the court was creating a "novel formulation" but rather inadvertently used the "ample support" terminology merely to meet the same language in the dissent referring to the conclusions of the Commission. </s> We have concluded that the court erred in setting aside the conclusions of the Commission. The Act authorizes the issuance of certificates such as the ones sought here when the Commission finds that the future public convenience and necessity will require additional railroad service. 49 U.S.C. 1 (18). This Court has repeatedly held that if a railroad, voluntarily proposing the extension of its lines, can show that its proposal "either presently or in the reasonably near future will be self-sustaining, or so nearly so as not unduly to burden interstate commerce, the Commission may issue a certificate authorizing the proposed line," Interstate Commerce Commission v. Oregon-Wash. R. & Nav. Co., [385 U.S. 57, 67] 288 U.S. 14, 37 (1933). The Commission, however, "must be convinced that the proposed venture will not drain the railroad's resources and disable it from performing those duties of public service under which it then rested, with consequent detriment to the public in the matter of service and rates." Ibid. Also see Texas & P. R. Co. v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co., 270 U.S. 266, 277 (1926); Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 35, 42 (1931). Rock Island and Nickel Plate contend that the "evidence [of appellants] adduced before the Commission was so totally devoid of factual possibility as to be no evidence at all." As we read it, the evidence as to the future possibilities of the port was somewhat conflicting. The Commission, in keeping with its duty, resolved this conflict. Indeed, the findings of the Commission, which were upheld by the District Court, completely refute the Rock Island and Nickel Plate claims. Among the findings approved by the court 5 are the following: The port was "the major deepwater port facility of the port of Chicago," with "unparalleled access" to barge, rail, lake steamer and motor transportation and "complete access to ocean transportation" in the immediate future, with 71,490,510 tons of water-borne traffic in 1955 and with "material increases" 6 in tonnages predicted for the future from [385 U.S. 57, 68] among an estimated 600 to 900 vessels coming to the Chicago port each season, that "will necessitate a substantially broadened railroad service into and out of the Lake Calumet port"; appellants' combined yard capacity was 61,601 cars, more than 12 times that presently available at the port; appellants' routing would be "more direct," entail less handling, expedite shipments and be less expensive than the present operation of Rock Island; and, finally, it was "imperative . . . that at the very beginning of this new era of development a plan and system for handling the transportation needs of the port be established which will assure the type of service that is expected and will provide for steady progress and expansion." We believe that these findings, in the light of others not overturned by the District Court, are sufficient to sustain the Commission's action in issuing the certificates. </s> Moreover, we believe that the District Court erred in striking down the conclusions of the Commission. These conclusions 7 included: Consideration of the whole record warranted the finding that the applications should be granted; granting them would result in greater rail competition, better service, greater car supply and lower rates for the industries served by the port; appellants would be "on a par" with the Rock Island in solicitation of grain traffic, and by having control of their cars they could return empties in a fast shuttle service to country elevators without interchange with Rock Island; the time has come when additional freight service is required for the future development of the Port District; better service can be given through elimination of delays, by single-line hauls or more direct hauls; a single trunkline railroad [385 U.S. 57, 69] service would be detrimental and a hindrance to the development of the harbor, and, although the port is served by some 100 common carrier trucklines, the Rock Island is the only railroad presently serving the port; the future convenience and necessity must be given "a higher value" than the present convenience and necessity; the proposed construction either presently or in the reasonably near future is necessary to meet a public need and will be reasonably profitable; and, finally, considering the expansion program at the port and the increased rail traffic to be made available the Commission is "of the opinion that the additional service . . . is warranted." As we have said, these conclusions were largely based upon previous Commission findings which the District Court approved. The Commission's function is to draw such reasonable conclusions from its findings as in its discretion are appropriate. As we said in Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966), "the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence." It is not for the court to strike down conclusions that are reasonably drawn from the evidence and findings in the case. Its duty is to determine whether the evidence supporting the Commission's findings is substantial, Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). Having found that there was substantial support in the record for the Commission's findings as to the port's future potential and the necessity of providing competitive rail service at the outset of the port's development, it was not the District Court's function to substitute its own conclusions for those which the Commission had fairly drawn from such findings. Its agreement with the controlling subsidiary findings required the District Court to sustain the Commission's conclusions. [385 U.S. 57, 70] </s> The court also erred, we believe, in ordering a new hearing on the issues. It found that the Commission's order issuing a certificate of public convenience and necessity to operate within the Port District was not supported by sufficient evidence and violated due process in that a hearing was not afforded the appellees thereon. </s> As we view the original applications of the appellants they proposed "to extend their operations to serve the Lake Calumet Harbor District near Chicago, in Cook County, Illinois . . . future industries, elevators, warehouses, docks and piers in the Calumet Harbor Port area." The prayer was that "your Commission issue a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing the construction and operation for which authority is herein sought." 8 The proceeding came on for a hearing before the Hearing Examiner on September 30, 1957, and counsel for the Rock Island stated for the record that his understanding was "the issue in this case is that all applications are for the purpose of handling import and export business only to and from the Port District Harbor of Chicago . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) And counsel for the appellants stated that the plan was "to handle interstate business to and from the area over which the port has jurisdiction. We have no such limitation at all as to import or export trade." Likewise, the "Return to Questionnaire" executed by appellants stated: "The line proposed to be constructed and operated will receive material revenue from freight traffic to be handled to and from industries, elevators, warehouses, docks, and piers presently operating in the Calumet Harbor Port area, in addition to those facilities to be constructed with the [385 U.S. 57, 71] further development of the area." 9 To make it crystal clear paragraph 10 of the same answer to the questionnaire stated: </s> "The Lake Calumet Port District, which the proposed line will serve is currently served by the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Company by virtue of its acquisition of the Pullman Railroad Company, through purchase of capital stock, and lease by the former of the railroad property of the latter approved and authorized by the Commission in Finance Docket No. 16252, Pullman Railroad Company Control, decided November 17, 1949." </s> The other applications had similar allegations and the other appellants' questionnaire returns contained like statements. Moreover, the answers filed on May 16, 1957, by Rock Island and Pullman to the applications, addressed themselves solely to the proposition that "applicant's extension of its line of railroad and operations through trackage rights to serve territory [the Port District] heretofore served exclusively and adequately by petitioners cannot be supported by public convenience and necessity, could mean only a duplication of rail service, and would create unsound and uneconomic conditions in transportation." </s> As we read the record before the Hearing Examiner the case was tried on the theory that the applications included the proposed operations within the Port District. During the presentation of appellants' evidence objection was made to the introduction of the proposed lease between appellants and the Port District on the ground that it was beyond the scope of the application. The Hearing Examiner overruled the objection. The testimony of virtually all of the appellants' witnesses was [385 U.S. 57, 72] directed to some phase of the operations of the Port District. It should also be noted that the appellees sought to rebut this testimony in voluminous detail. For example, 40 pages of the record detail the testimony of Mr. R. C. Davidson, a witness for Rock Island. His testimony is devoted to Rock Island's operation in the United States with specific reference to the Port District. It compares Rock Island's operation in the Port District with that proposed by the appellants and answers in detail the statistics of the appellants as to charges, rates, switching problems, etc., involved in operations within the Port District. Page after page of prepared statistics on the costs, profits, etc., of the proposed operation were included in the testimony, together with forecasts as to the impact of the same, if permitted, on Rock Island's operations. Another witness for Rock Island, Professor Marvin L. Fair, testified for some 15 pages on the potential of the Port District. His research was in great depth and included comparisons with other Great Lakes ports; estimated traffic of the Port District, including iron ore, grain, and general cargo; physical conditions of navigation at the port; the effect of tolls; the capacity of the Welland Canal (in the St. Lawrence Seaway) and its impact on the port; the efficiency of the port facilities; established movement of exports and imports; the effect of political, military, and economic conditions at home and abroad and the adequacy of Rock Island's service. </s> The record establishes beyond a doubt that the appellants were in fact seeking Commission approval of the entire project. Their offering of the unexecuted, proposed contract into evidence is one of many indications of this fact. The Hearing Examiner specifically noted, at the time the contract was received in evidence, that its approval by the Commission was necessary in order for the appellants to serve the Port District as they proposed. It would, indeed, have been a futile act for the appellants [385 U.S. 57, 73] to seek and attain approval to extend their lines to the Port District but not be able to enter it! </s> It is true that appellees objected to the introduction of the proposed agreement because they felt, and rightly so, that the application which the appellants had submitted was not technically broad enough for the authority they sought. The Hearing Examiner overruled them and they were obliged to - and did - offer their evidence on the matter. When the question came before the Commission for decision, it ruled that the applications were technically deficient and permitted the parties to correct the same through the filing of supplemental applications. At no time did the Commission find that the proposal to operate within the Port District had not been adequately explored and examined. Rather, a careful reading of the Commission's entire opinion leads us to the opposite conclusion. At every stage of the proceedings before the Hearing Examiner and also before the Commission, operations of the appellants within the Port District were considered an integral part of the overall plan which they submitted. </s> The ruling of the Commission that the supplemental applications should be considered in "conjunction with the original application," did not, in our view, deprive appellees of due process of law. When appellees requested a full hearing on the supplemental applications the grounds they alleged were that they were adequately serving the port; that they were prepared to spend further sums of money in the construction of facilities to serve it; that they were entitled to retain the traffic of the Port District; that there was no adequate reason for extension of the railroad lines of appellants into territory heretofore served exclusively by appellees; and that the extension of the railroad lines of appellants was not justified by public convenience and necessity. As the Commission itself found, "Examination of the record discloses [385 U.S. 57, 74] that these are the same arguments and contentions that were set forth in protestants' original briefs, exceptions to the examiner's proposed report, in their petitions for reconsideration, and in their oral arguments." Illinois Central R. Co. Construction and Trackage, 312 I. C. C. 277, 280. </s> The changes in the proposed lease agreement which the Commission approved without a further hearing involved the removal of the "exclusive right to operate within the Port" clause, which that document had given the appellants, and the formula for determining the annual rental to be charged by the Port District. As to the former, it can hardly be maintained that this worked a hardship or detriment upon the appellees. The removal of the clause, in fact, made certain that appellees were not precluded from continuing their present operations. As to the rental clause, it will be remembered that the original proposed agreement provided for 5% annual rental based on the value of the land and tracks, but not to exceed $2 per car. This was changed in the first supplemental application to a charge of not to exceed $2 per revenue car or locomotive. The final contract merely provided for a charge of $2 for each revenue car, which was much more favorable to the appellants than either of the former clauses. Moreover, the final charge compared favorably to other per-car rates previously approved by the Commission. In the light of these considerations, as well as the fact that appellees were invited and refused to sit in on the negotiation of the contract; had ample opportunity and did present their evidence as to the reasonableness of the charge for the use of Port District property; were, and are, in nowise bound by the contract; and, finally, in view of the insignificance of the changes in the final agreement compared with the former ones, we are led to conclude that appellees were not entitled to another hearing. [385 U.S. 57, 75] </s> Appellees also insist that a new hearing be held so that evidence of "present conditions" could be presented to the Commission rather than "speculation." It is true that this case has been pending for 10 years but this, rather than being a reason for holding additional hearings, operates to the contrary. We have concluded that the orders of the Commission were proper under the circumstances. We have found substantial support for its actions. Accordingly, it is our view that this matter be concluded. </s> The judgment is therefore reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court with directions to sustain the Commission's orders. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Illinois Central Railroad Company; Pennsylvania Railroad Company; Chicago South Shore and South Bend Railroad; Belt Railway Company of Chicago; the New York Central Railroad Company; and the Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Company. The Michigan Central Railroad Company sought additional trackage approval but had not signed a proposed lease with the Port District as the other appellants had. </s> [Footnote 2 The Nickel Plate has merged into the Norfolk and Western Railway Company since this proceeding began. </s> [Footnote 3 Others included: the Secretary of Agriculture, the Port District, the Chicago Board of Trade, the Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry, and two private companies operating on the lake, Calumet Harbor Terminals, Inc., and North Pier Terminal Company. </s> [Footnote 4 317 I. C. C. 502, 505. </s> [Footnote 5 Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 974, 977. </s> [Footnote 6 The testimony was that rail traffic to and from the port in 1960 would be 27,000 carloads which could easily increase to 76,500 carloads in 1962, 115,000 carloads in 1968 and anywhere from 250,000 to 350,000 carloads a year when both sides of the lake are completed. There was also much testimony as to grain shipments. The seven States of Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska and Colorado in 1956 produced 43% of all the wheat and 51% of the corn grown in the United States. The existing disparity in rates will divert much grain from Atlantic and Gulf ports for movement via Chicago and the St. Lawrence Seaway. Service to the port by [385 U.S. 57, 67] one railroad does not appear adequate since the railroads serving the midwest grain-producing States terminate in Chicago and have extensive switching and classification yards which could be utilized. </s> [Footnote 7 241 F. Supp. 974, 979. </s> [Footnote 8 Application of Illinois Central, Pennsylvania, and Chicago South Shore and South Bend railroads filed October 19, 1956, with the Interstate Commerce Commission. </s> [Footnote 9 Return of Illinois Central, Pennsylvania, and the Chicago South Shore and South Bend, R. 17. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting. </s> The District Court set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission on the ground that the evidence failed to support its findings of fact. I dissent from the Court's reversal of that holding. In Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U.S. 474, 488 , it was said that "Congress has merely made it clear that a reviewing court is not barred from setting aside a Board decision when it cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the Board's view." In the case here the District Court found that it could not conscientiously support the Commission's findings and I would affirm its judgment, adhering to the principles so firmly announced in Universal Camera, supra. </s> [385 U.S. 57, 76]

United States Supreme Court SNOW v. COMMISSIONER(1974) No. 73-641 Argued: April 16, 1974Decided: May 13, 1974 </s> Petitioner Edwin A. Snow, who had advanced part of the capital in a partnership formed in 1966 to develop a special-purpose incinerator and had become a limited partner, was disallowed a deduction under 174 (a) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, on his individual income tax return for that year for his pro rata share of the partnership's operating loss. Though there were no sales in 1966, expectations were high and the inventor-partner was giving about a third of his time to the project, an outside engineering firm doing the shopwork. The Tax Court and the Court of Appeals both upheld disallowance of the deduction, which 174 (a) (1) provides for "experimental expenditures which are paid or incurred by [the taxpayer] during the taxable year in connection with his trade or business as expenses which are not chargeable to capital account." Held: It was error to disallow the deduction, which was "in connection with" petitioner's trade or business, and the disallowance was contrary to the broad legislative objective of the Congress when it enacted 174 to provide an economic incentive, especially for small and growing businesses, to engage in the search for new products and new inventions. Pp. 502-504. </s> 482 F.2d 1029, reversed. </s> DOUGLAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined except STEWART, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. </s> Burgess L. Doan argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners. </s> Stuart A. Smith argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, [416 U.S. 500, 501] Assistant Attorney General Crampton, Bennet N. Hollander, and Jane M. Edmisten. * </s> [Footnote * Charles H. Phillips and Ronald L. Blanc, pro se, filed a brief as amici curiae. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Section 174 (a) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. 174 (a) (1), allows a taxpayer to take as a deduction "experimental expenditures which are paid or incurred by him during the taxable year in connection with his trade or business as expenses which are not chargeable to capital account." Petitioner Edwin A. Snow (hereafter petitioner) was disallowed as a deduction his distributive share of the net operating loss of a partnership, Burns Investment Company, for the taxable year 1966. The United States Tax Court sustained the Commissioner, 58 T. C. 585. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, 482 F.2d 1029 (1973). The case is here on a writ of certiorari because of an apparent conflict between that court and the Fourth Circuit in Cleveland v. Commissioner, 297 F.2d 169 (1961). </s> Petitioner was a limited partner in Burns, having contributed $10,000 for a four-percent interest in Burns. The general partner was one Trott who had previously formed two other limited partnerships, one called Echo, to develop a telephone answering device and the other Courier, to develop an electronic tape recorder. Petitioner had become a limited partner in each of these other partnerships. 1 </s> [416 U.S. 500, 502] </s> Burns was formed to develop "a special purpose incinerator for the consumer and industrial markets." Trott was the inventor and had conceived of this idea in 1964 and between then and 1966 had made a number of prototypes. His patent counsel had told him in 1965 that several features of the burner were in his view patentable but in 1966 advised him that the incinerator as a whole had not been sufficiently "reduced to practice" in order to develop it into a marketable product. At that point Trott formed Burns, petitioner putting up part of the capital. Thereafter various models of the burner were built and tested. </s> During 1966 Burns reported no sales of the incinerator or any other product but expectations were high; and Trott was giving about one-third of his time to the project, an outside engineering firm doing the shopwork. 2 </s> Trott obtained a patent on the incinerator in 1970, and it is currently being produced and marketed under the name Trash-Away. 3 </s> Section 174 was enacted in 1954 to dilute some of the conception of "ordinary and necessary" business expenses under 162 (a) (then 23 (a) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939) adumbrated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion in Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 499 (1940), where he said that [416 U.S. 500, 503] the section in question (old 23 (a)) "involves holding one's self out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or services." The words "trade or business" appear, however, in about 60 different sections of the 1954 Act. 4 Those other sections are not helpful here because Congress wrote into 174 (a) (1) "in connection with," and 162 (a) is more narrowly written than is 174, allowing "a deduction" of "ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred . . . in carrying on any trade or business." That and other sections are not helpful here. </s> The legislative history makes fairly clear the reasons. Established firms with ongoing business had continuous programs of research quite unlike small or pioneering business enterprises. 5 Mr. Reed of New York, Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means, made the point even more explicit when he addressed the House on the bill: 6 </s> "Present law contains no statutory provision dealing expressly with the deduction of these expenses. The result has been confusion and uncertainty. Very often, under present law small businesses which are developing new products and do not have established research departments are not allowed to deduct these expenses despite the fact that their large and well-established competitors can obtain the deduction. . . . This provision will greatly stimulate the search for new products and new inventions upon which the future economic and military strength of our Nation depends. It will be particularly valuable [416 U.S. 500, 504] to small and growing businesses." (Emphasis added.) </s> Congress may at times in its wisdom discriminate tax-wise between various kinds of business, between old and oncoming business and the like. But we would defeat the congressional purpose somewhat to equalize the tax benefits of the ongoing companies and those that are upcoming and about to reach the market by perpetuating the discrimination created below and urged upon us here. </s> We read 174 as did the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Cleveland "to encourage expenditure for research and experimentation." 297 F.2d, at 173. That incentive is embedded in 174 because of "in connection with," making irrelevant whether petitioners were rich or poor. </s> We are invited to explore the treatment of "hobby-losses" under 183. But that is far afield of the present inquiry for it is clear that in this case under 174 the profit motive was the sole drive of the venture. </s> Reversed. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Both Echo and Courier claimed research and development expenses in 1965 and 1966; and they were not challenged by the Commissioner, apparently because their products were in a more [416 U.S. 500, 502] advanced stage of development and were available for sale or licensing. </s> [Footnote 2 Treasury Regulation 1.174-2 (a) (2) provides: "The provisions of this section apply not only to costs paid or incurred by the taxpayer for research or experimentation undertaken directly by him but also to expenditures paid or incurred for research or experimentation carried on in his behalf by another person or organization (such as . . . [an] engineering company, or similar contractor). . . ." </s> [Footnote 3 Prior to 1970 Burns was incorporated and it produces and markets Trash-Away, petitioner being its Chairman of the Board. </s> [Footnote 4 Saunders, "Trade or Business," Its Meaning Under the Internal Revenue Code, U. So. Cal. 12th Inst. on Fed. Tax. 693 (1960). </s> [Footnote 5 Hearings on H. R. 8300 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, p. 105. </s> [Footnote 6 100 Cong. Rec. 3425 (1954). </s> [416 U.S. 500, 505]

United States Supreme Court HUGHES v. UNITED STATES(1952) No. 86 Argued: January 7, 1952Decided: February 4, 1952 </s> A Sherman Act consent decree provided for divorcement of a motion picture company's production-distribution assets from its theater assets. Two new companies were to be formed; their stock was to be distributed to stockholders of the old company; and the latter was to be dissolved. Relative to appellant, who owned 24% of the stock of the old company, the decree provided that he might "either" sell his stock in one or the other of the new companies "or" deposit such stock with a court-designated trustee under a voting trust agreement to remain in force until appellant "shall have sold" his stock in one of the companies. Appellant chose not to sell any stock, and the District Court appointed a trustee and approved the agreed terms of a voting trust. Without evidence or findings of fact, and over appellant's protests, the District Court later amended its order appointing the trustee and ordered that the trusteed stock be sold. Held: </s> 1. The provision of the decree did not require that appellant sell his stock within a reasonable time. Pp. 356-357. </s> 2. Under the powers reserved in the consent decree, the District Court can require the sale of appellant's stock; but that would be a substantial modification of the consent decree, which cannot be made without a hearing that includes evidence and a judicial determination based upon it. Pp. 357-358. </s> Reversed. </s> From an order of a three-judge District Court in a Sherman Act proceeding, compelling appellant to sell certain shares of stock, he appealed directly to this Court under 15 U.S.C. 29. Reversed, p. 358. </s> T. A. Slack argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant. Leonard P. Moore, John H. Dorsey and Francis J. O'Hara, Jr. were of counsel. [342 U.S. 353, 354] </s> Philip Marcus argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Morison, Ralph S. Spritzer and Robert L. Stern. </s> Opinion of the Court by MR. JUSTICE BLACK, announced by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS. </s> A three-judge District Court has construed certain provisions of a Sherman Act consent decree as compelling the sale of certain moving picture stocks owned by the appellant Hughes. This case is properly here on appeal from an order entered to compel the sale. 15 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 29. </s> These anti-trust proceedings were originally brought by the United States against Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corporation and other moving picture producers, distributors, and exhibitors. From the District Court's judgment in the case both the Government and defendants appealed. We affirmed in part and reversed in part. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 . We remanded the case to the District Court leaving it free to consider whether it was necessary to require the production and distribution companies to divest themselves of all ownership and interest in the business of exhibiting pictures. Thereafter a consent decree was entered containing detailed provisions for complete divorcement of R. K. O.'s production-distribution assets from its theater assets. To accomplish this, R. K. O. was to form two new holding companies: one, the "New Picture Company," was to take over all R. K. O. subsidiaries engaged in production and distribution; the other, the "New Theater Company," was to own and control R. K. O. subsidiaries which operated theaters. Upon formation of the new companies, R. K. O. was to be dissolved. Former stockholders were to become the owners of all the capital stock of the two new companies. [342 U.S. 353, 355] </s> A factor considered in connection with this divorcement was that Howard R. Hughes, appellant here, owned 24% of the common stock of R. K. O. No other person or corporation owned as much as 1%. He and government representatives agreed on terms to meet this situation. Their agreement was embodied in the consent decree, becoming section V. This section of the decree, set out below, * is the center of the present controversy. It provides that Hughes may "either" (A) sell his stock in one or the other of the two newly formed companies, "or" (B) deposit such stock with a court-designated trustee [342 U.S. 353, 356] under a voting trust agreement to remain in force until Hughes shall have sold his stock in one of the companies. Hughes chose not to sell any stock, and he and the United States agreed on a trustee and the terms of a voting trust, which agreement was approved by a court order. Later, by motion the United States sought a court order forcing the trustee to sell Hughes' stock. Without evidence or findings of fact, and over Hughes' protests, the District Court amended its order appointing a trustee by providing that "if the stock trusteed shall not have been disposed of by Howard R. Hughes by February 20th, 1953, the trustee shall dispose of such stock within two years thereafter." Appellant Hughes urges that it was error to order his stock sold in so summary a manner. </s> First. The Government argues that section V should be read as compelling Hughes to sell his stock within a reasonable time. We hold that the language of the section imposes no such requirement. A reading of the either/or wording would make most persons believe that Hughes was to have a choice of two different alternatives. Hughes would have no choice if the first "alternative" was to sell the stock and the second "alternative" was also to sell the stock. Moreover, section V provided that, if Hughes did not sell his stock but chose to place it in a voting trust, this trust should remain in force "until Howard R. Hughes shall have sold" his stock. This would ordinarily mean that Hughes, not the Court, could decide whether his stock should be sold. Nor can a different inference be drawn from the language authorizing the court to provide the trust's general "terms or conditions, including compensation to the trustee." This language cannot support an inference that the court was empowered to deprive Hughes of either of his expressly granted alternatives. </s> Arguing on a broader front than the mere language of section V, the Government urges: that section V must [342 U.S. 353, 357] be interpreted so as to achieve the purposes of the entire R. K. O. consent decree; that the basic purpose of that decree was divorcement of production-distribution companies from theater exhibition companies; and that Hughes cannot consistently with this purpose be left with a 24% interest in both types of companies. It may be true as the Government now contends that Hughes' large block of ownership in both types of companies endangers the independence of each. Evidence might show that a sale by Hughes is indispensable if competition is to be preserved. However, in section V the parties and the District Court provided their own detailed plan to neutralize the evils from such ownership. Whatever justification there may be now or hereafter for new terms that require a sale of Hughes' stock, we think there is no fair support for reading that requirement into the language of section V. The District Court's order cannot be supported by reliance on such an interpretation. Consequently the court's command to sell the stock effected a substantial modification of the original decree. </s> Second. The Government finds support for the substantial change in the decree by reference to (1) provisions in the decree reserving jurisdiction to amend, and (2) the inherent equity powers of the court. We entertain no doubt concerning the District Court's power to require sale of Hughes' stock after a proper hearing. When this case was formerly here on other phases, 334 U.S. 131 , we had occasion to point out the District Court's power to require some companies to divest themselves of ownership of other companies where necessary to preserve competition and to prevent monopoly. The guiding principles there set out would also justify compulsory divestment of stocks by an individual. But there has been no adequate hearing of this issue as to Hughes. Neither when the present order was considered nor when the original decree was entered were any findings of fact [342 U.S. 353, 358] made to support an order of compulsory sale of Hughes' stock. As previously pointed out the consent of Hughes did not include consent to make him sell. At every stage Hughes objected to the order forcing sale of his stock without a hearing that included evidence and a judicial determination based on it. </s> In these circumstances we hold that it was error to enter an order forcing Hughes to sell his stock. </s> Reversed. </s> MR. JUSTICE JACKSON and MR. JUSTICE CLARK took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> [Footnote * "V. Howard R. Hughes represents that he now owns approximately 24 percent of the common stock of Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corporation. Within a period of one year from the date hereof, Howard R. Hughes shall either: </s> "A. Dispose of his holdings of the stock of (1) the New Picture Company, or (2) the New Theater Company, as he may elect, to a purchaser or purchasers who is or are not a defendant herein or owned or controlled by or affiliated with a defendant in this cause; or </s> "B. Deposit with a trustee designated by the court all of his shares of the New Picture Company or the New Theater Company, as he may elect, under a voting trust agreement whereby the trustee shall possess and be entitled to exercise all the voting rights of such shares, including the right to execute proxies and consents with respect thereto. Such voting trust agreement shall thereafter remain in force until Howard R. Hughes shall have sold his holdings of stock of the New Picture Company or the New Theater Company to a purchaser or purchasers who is or are not a defendant herein or owned or controlled by or affiliated with a defendant herein, and upon such sale and transfer such voting trust agreement shall automatically terminate. Such trust shall be upon such other terms or conditions, including compensation to the trustee, as shall be prescribed by the Court. During the period of such voting trust, Howard R. Hughes shall be entitled to receive all dividends and other distributions made on account of the trusteed shares, and proceeds from the sale thereof. </s> "For the purpose of evidencing his consent to be bound by the terms of section V of this decree, Howard R. Hughes individually has consented to its entry and it shall be binding upon his agents and employees." </s> [342 U.S. 353, 359]

United States Supreme Court MICHAELS v. UNITED STATES(1964) No. 571 Argued: Decided: March 9, 1964 </s> Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for consideration by the Court of Appeals of the sufficiency of the evidence to support imposition of nonconcurrent sentences, that court having erroneously assumed that petitioners had not made a motion for acquittal at the close of the evidence. </s> Reported below: 321 F.2d 913. </s> Morris A. Shenker and Murry L. Randall for petitioners. </s> Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> Petitioner James A. Michaels, Jr., is president of petitioner Michaels Enterprises, Inc., a corporate retail dealer in alcoholic beverages. Petitioners were convicted by a jury in the Eastern District of Missouri on both counts of a two-count indictment. The first count charged them with failure to "produce" or to "preserve" certain purchase records, in violation of 72 Stat. 1400, 26 U.S.C. 5603 (b) (5). The second count charged them with failure "to keep" certain purchase records or "make required entries therein" in violation of 72 Stat. 1400, 26 U.S.C. 5603 (b) (1). Petitioner James A. Michaels, Jr., was sentenced to imprisonment for one year and fined $1,000 on the first count; * he was fined an additional $1,000 on the second count. Petitioner Michaels Enterprises, Inc., was fined $1,000 on each of the two counts. [376 U.S. 356, 357] </s> The critical issue, as we see it, is whether the record contains sufficient evidence of violations of the two counts to support the imposition of nonconcurrent sentences. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit refused to consider the "question of sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict," on the ground that petitioners "did not move for an acquittal at the close of all the evidence." 321 F.2d 913, 917. The record clearly shows, however, that petitioners did move for "judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence," as well as "at the close of the government's case." </s> The writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded to that court for consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence. </s> It is so ordered. </s> [Footnote * This is the maximum penalty provided by the statute. </s> [376 U.S. 356, 358]

United States Supreme Court DELO v. STOKES(1990) No. A-795 Argued: Decided: May 11, 1990 </s> After respondent Stokes was convicted and sentenced to death in Missouri, he filed three unsuccessful habeas corpus petitions in the federal courts. A few days before his scheduled execution, he filed an application for stay of execution pending consideration of a fourth habeas petition. The District Court found that the imposition of a stay was warranted by the issues raised in his claim that the state courts had selectively applied the rules governing lesser included offense instructions in capital murder cases in violation of his right to equal protection. The Court of Appeals denied the State's motion to vacate the stay. </s> Held: </s> The District Court abused its discretion in granting the stay. A stay of execution pending disposition of a second or successive federal habeas petition can be granted only when there are substantial grounds upon which relief can be granted. Here, there are no such grounds, because Stokes' fourth petition clearly constitutes an abuse of the writ. His claim could have been raised in his first petition for federal habeas, and the principles he asserts are not novel and could have been developed long before this application. </s> Motion granted. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The State of Missouri has issued a warrant for the execution of Winford Stokes, which expires at 11:59 p.m. CDT on May 11, 1990. Stokes was convicted of capital murder in 1979 and sentenced to death. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Missouri Supreme Court. State v. Stokes, 638 S. W. 2d 715 (1982) (en banc). Stokes has since filed three separate petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts, each of which was denied. See Stokes v. Armontrout, 851 F.2d 1085 (CA8 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1019 (1989); Stokes v. Armontrout, 893 F.2d 152 (CA8 1989), stay of execution denied, post, p. 926; Stokes v. Armontrout, No. 89-0133C(6) (ED Mo., Mar. 16, 1990). On [495 U.S. 320, 321] May 10, 1990, this Court denied a stay of execution pending the filing and disposition of a petition for certiorari relating to one of Stokes' first three habeas petitions. Post, p. 926. </s> While his application for stay of execution was pending in this Court, and within a matter of days before the scheduled execution, Stokes filed in the District Court a new application for stay of execution pending consideration of a fourth federal habeas petition. On the afternoon of May 9, the District Court granted a stay of execution, stating that "the issues raised by petitioner's claim that his right to equal protection of the laws was violated by the Missouri state courts' selective application of the rules governing lesser included offense instructions in capital murder cases warrant the imposition of a stay of execution. See Williams v. Armontrout, 891 F.2d 656, 658-59 (8th Cir. 1989), vacated upon grant of rehearing en banc (February 7, 1990)." No. 90-0505C(6) (ED Mo.). On the morning of May 11, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied the State's motion to vacate the stay, one judge dissenting. The State then asked the en banc Court of Appeals to vacate the stay. That motion was also denied. The State has now filed with this Court an application to vacate the stay of execution. </s> A stay of execution pending disposition of a second or successive federal habeas petition should be granted only when there are "substantial grounds upon which relief might be granted." Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 895 (1983). There are no "substantial grounds" present in this case, because respondent's fourth federal habeas petition clearly constitutes an abuse of the writ. See 28 U.S.C. 2254 Rule 9(b); 28 U.S.C. 2244(b). Stokes' claim that he was entitled to a lesser included offense instruction, and that the Missouri Supreme Court has selectively applied its rules relating to that claim, could have been raised in his first petition for federal habeas corpus. The equal protection principles asserted by respondent are not novel and could have been developed [495 U.S. 320, 322] long before this last minute application for stay of execution. Indeed, Stokes himself cites dissenting opinions filed in the Missouri Supreme Court in 1983 to support his contention. See, e. g., State v. Holland, 653 S. W. 2d 670, 679 (en banc) (Welliver, J., dissenting). </s> The fourth federal habeas petition now pending in the District Court "is another example of abuse of the writ." Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377, 378 -380 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring, joined by four other Justices) (vacating stay of execution where claims in a successive petition could, and should, have been raised in a first petition for federal habeas corpus). The District Court abused its discretion in granting a stay of execution. The application to vacate the stay is granted. </s> It is so ordered. </s> JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA join, concurring. </s> I join in the opinion of the Court. The more than 24-hour delay in the Court of Appeals' ruling on the State's motion to vacate the stay granted on this fourth successive petition, one which discloses no substantial ground for relief, makes appropriate some additional comments. </s> In this case, execution was scheduled for 12:01 a.m. CDT on May 11, 1990, under a warrant which expires, as the Court indicates, at 11:59 p.m. CDT on May 11, 1990. The Eighth Circuit found itself unable to rule on a motion to vacate a District Court stay until midafternoon on Friday, May 11. All courts of appeals should consider implementing, and following, procedures, such as those employed by the Eleventh Circuit, see Rule 22-3, Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (1987), to make certain that three active judges are available to act upon emergency stays of this sort and to provide a timely ruling from the panel as a body, so that this Court may also rule upon the case where necessary and appropriate. [495 U.S. 320, 323] </s> If the court of appeals fails to act in a manner sufficiently prompt to preserve the jurisdiction of the court and to protect the parties from the consequences of a stay entered without an adequate basis, an injured party may seek relief in this Court pursuant to our jurisdiction under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651. See Maxwell v. Bishop, 385 U.S. 650 (1967) (common-law petition for writ of certiorari granted where shortness of time available before a scheduled execution made ordinary appeal procedure unavailable). </s> Delay or default by courts in the federal system must not be allowed to deprive parties, including States, of the lawful process to which they are entitled. It is the duty of the courts of appeals to adopt and follow procedures which ensure all parties expeditious determinations with respect to any request for a stay. Prompt review and determination is necessary to enable criminal processes to operate without undue interference from the federal courts, and to assure the proper functioning of the federal habeas procedure. </s> JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins and JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins as to Parts I, II, and III, dissenting. </s> I </s> Today the Court vacates a stay of execution entered by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri and found to be within that court's discretion by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc. Contrary to the majority's intimations, this case does not involve a last minute stay application by a defendant on the eve of his execution. Rather, Winford Stokes raised an equal protection claim in an amendment to a petition for writ of habeas corpus pending in the District Court on April 5, 1990, before the current execution date had been set. * The rush to judgment is instigated here by the [495 U.S. 320, 324] State's insistence on vacating the District Court's grant of a stay to consider Mr. Stokes' claim. </s> "In lifting the stay imposed by the Court of Appeals, the Court has resorted to an exercise of power that is unusual and that should only be resorted to on the rare occasion in which a lower court has flagrantly abused its discretion." Wainwright v. Adams, 466 U.S. 964, 965 (1984). The Court does so on the basis of a rule that quite properly vests considerable discretion in the court most familiar with the facts of the case and its prior history. Title 28 U.S.C. 2254 Rule 9(b) provides that: </s> "A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ." (Emphasis added.) </s> The judge to whom Mr. Stokes applied for a writ of habeas corpus did not choose to dismiss on such grounds. To the contrary, Judge George F. Gunn found that: </s> "Upon thorough consideration of the record before it, the Court concludes that the issues raised by petitioner's claim that his right to equal protection of the laws was violated by the Missouri state courts' selective application of the rules governing lesser included offense instructions in capital murder cases warrant the imposition of a stay of execution." </s> This Court has said repeatedly that the principles governing the disposition of successive writs "are addressed to the sound discretion of the federal trial judges. Theirs is the major responsibility for the just and sound administration of the federal collateral remedies. . . . We are confident that [495 U.S. 320, 325] this power will be soundly applied." Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18 -19 (1963). See also Wainwright v. Booker, 473 U.S. 935, 938 (1985) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) ("[T]he lower court's decision is `deserving of great weight'"). Judge Gunn is particularly well situated to exercise the discretion Congress has entrusted to him. He has heard three of Mr. Stokes' habeas applications, attending to the complex issues and detailed facts of Mr. Stokes' conviction over several years. </s> The Eighth Circuit, also closer to this case than we could hope to be in the few hours we have had to consider the matter, found the District Court's order sound and responsible. The Court of Appeals similarly is due considerable deference. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896 (1983) ("A stay of execution should first be sought from the court of appeals, and this Court generally places considerable weight on the decision reached by the courts of appeals in these circumstances"); O'Connor v. Board of Education of School District 23, 449 U.S. 1301, 1304 (1980) (STEVENS, J., in chambers) ("A Court of Appeals' decision to enter a stay is entitled to great deference"). Nonetheless, this Court has decided that both the District Court and the Court of Appeals have committed such gross abuses of discretion that this Court must intervene. Nothing in the Court's opinion explains adequately why the lower courts have been adjudged so harshly. </s> II </s> The Court vacates the stay granted by the District Court because in this Court's judgment, Mr. Stokes' claim "could have been developed long before this last minute application for stay of execution." Ante, at 321-322. I do not share the Court's confidence in the matter. While the "equal protection principles asserted" by Mr. Stokes are hardly novel, ibid. (emphasis added) - indeed, they date back to 1868 - the nature of Mr. Stokes' claim is a different matter. [495 U.S. 320, 326] </s> To determine whether the claim is novel, we must begin by defining what it is. The lower courts have not ruled on the merits of Mr. Stokes' claim. Rather, they in effect have held his case in abeyance pending resolution of Williams v. Armontrout, 891 F.2d 656 (1989); in this case, the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, is reviewing a panel decision that the selective application by Missouri courts of the decision in State v. Baker, 636 S. W. 2d 902, 904-905 (1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983), "denies similarly situated defendants in capital murder cases equal protection of the law in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution." 891 F.2d, at 659. Given that the Eighth Circuit has not determined definitively the contours of the equal protection claim, it is impossible to say at this time whether the claim constitutes a "novel" one. </s> Even if we could ascertain the precise character of the claim, in order to decide whether it could have been raised in a previous habeas petition we also would have to engage in a comprehensive review of Missouri state cases over the past decade. The Court today does not even purport to do this. In other contexts, the Court has noted that whether a legal claim is a "novel" one depends on an inquiry into existing precedents. Cf. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990) (that claim is "within the `logical compass' of an earlier decision, or indeed that it is `controlled' by a prior decision" does not prevent it from being a "new rule" for purposes of retroactivity). Thus, the mere fact that the Court today can point to an opinion of a dissenting Missouri Supreme Court Justice in 1983 hardly establishes that Mr. Stokes' claim is not "novel." </s> III </s> When a person's life is at stake we cannot tolerate such facile judgments. I would rather rely on the considered wisdom of the courts below, aided by their familiarity with Missouri law, that Mr. Stokes' claim cannot be decided until Williams is resolved. Given the dire consequences of error, [495 U.S. 320, 327] the Court's rush to judgment is unseemly and indefensible. See Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377, 382 -383 (1984) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); id., at 384 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). There is no call to deny a district court the time it needs to consider properly a petitioner's claim. "It is . . . important that before we allow human lives to be snuffed out we be sure - emphatically sure - that we act within the law." Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 321 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting). </s> IV </s> Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), I would deny the application to vacate the stay entered by the District Court. </s> [Footnote * At that time, a stay of execution was in effect pending review by the Eighth Circuit of the District Court's denial of a previous habeas petition. [495 U.S. 320, 324] This stay was dissolved by the Court of Appeals on April 24. On April 27, the Missouri Supreme Court set Stokes' execution date for May 11. </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, dissenting. </s> In my opinion both the District Court and the Court of Appeals - particularly when acting en banc - are in a far better position than this Court to determine whether a successive petition for habeas corpus constitutes an abuse of the writ. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the Court's summary disposition of the application to vacate the stay entered by the District Court and upheld by the Court of Appeals. </s> [495 U.S. 320, 328]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. DEMKO(1966) No. 76 Argued: November 8, 1966Decided: December 5, 1966 </s> Respondent, a federal prisoner, was injured while performing an assigned prison task. He filed claim for compensation benefits under 18 U.S.C. 4126, and received an award which was to be paid monthly upon discharge and to continue while he was disabled. He then filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The Government's defense that the 4126 remedy was exclusive was rejected by the District Court, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: The compensation system provided in 18 U.S.C. 4126 reasonably and fairly covers federal prisoners who are injured in prison employment and is the exclusive remedy to protect that group. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 , distinguished. Pp. 151-154. </s> 350 F.2d 698, reversed. </s> Richard S. Salzman argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Douglas, Robert S. Rifkind and Morton Hollander. </s> Gerald N. Ziskind argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The respondent Demko, a federal prisoner, was seriously injured in 1962 in the performance of an assigned prison task in a federal penitentiary. Shortly afterward he filed a claim for compensation benefits under 18 U.S.C. 4126. That law, first enacted by Congress in 1934, authorized the Federal Prison Industries, Inc., a federal corporation, to use its funds "in paying, under rules and regulations promulgated by the Attorney General, compensation . . . to inmates or their dependents [385 U.S. 149, 150] for injuries suffered in any industry." 1 Under that law and regulations promulgated under it, respondent was awarded $180 per month which was to start on discharge from prison and continue so long as disability continued. 2 After winning this compensation award, respondent brought this action against the United States in the Federal District Court under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 3 alleging that his injury was due to the Government's negligence for which he was entitled to recover additional damages under that Act. The United States defended on the single ground that respondent's right to recover compensation under 18 U.S.C. 4126 was his exclusive remedy against the Government barring him from any suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The District Court, holding that compensation under 18 U.S.C. 4126 was not his exclusive remedy, rejected this defense and accordingly entered a judgment for the respondent against the United States for tort claim damages based on stipulated facts. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. 350 F.2d 698. Subsequently the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Granade v. United States, 356 F.2d 837, reached precisely the opposite result, holding that a prison inmate, injured in prison employment and eligible for compensation under 18 U.S.C. 4126, is precluded from suing under the Federal Tort Claims Act. To resolve this conflict we granted certiorari. 383 U.S. 966 . [385 U.S. 149, 151] </s> Historically, workmen's compensation statutes were the offspring of a desire to give injured workers a quicker and more certain recovery than can be obtained from tort suits based on negligence and subject to common-law defenses to such suits. Thus compensation laws are practically always thought of as substitutes for, not supplements to, common-law tort actions. A series of comparatively recent cases in this Court has recognized this historic truth and ruled accordingly. Johansen v. United States, 343 U.S. 427 , and Patterson v. United States, 359 U.S. 495 , for instance, are typical of the recognition by this Court that the right of recovery granted groups of workers covered by such compensation laws is exclusive. Such rulings of this Court have established as a general rule the exclusivity of remedy under such compensation laws. 4 In Johansen v. United States, supra, at 441, this Court stated that where "the Government has created a comprehensive system to award payments for injuries, it should not be held to have made exceptions to that system without specific legislation to that effect." Later in Patterson v. United States, supra, at 496, this Court emphatically [385 U.S. 149, 152] refused to abandon the Johansen ruling, calling attention to the fact that Congress by specific statute could change the Johansen "policy at any time." Consequently we decide this case on the Johansen principle that, where there is a compensation statute that reasonably and fairly covers a particular group of workers, it presumably is the exclusive remedy to protect that group. </s> There is no indication of any congressional purpose to make the compensation statute in 18 U.S.C. 4126 non-exclusive. It was enacted in 1934, and provided for injured federal prisoners the only chance they had to recover damages of any kind. Its enactment was 12 years prior to the 1946 Federal Tort Claims Act. There is nothing in the legislative history of this latter Act which pointed to any purpose to add tort claim recovery for federal prisoners after they had already been protected by 18 U.S.C. 4126. Indeed to hold that the 1946 Federal Tort Claims Act was designed to have such a supplemental effect would be to hold that injured prisoners are given greater protection than all other government employees who are protected exclusively by the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 a congressional purpose not easy to infer. </s> The court below refused to accept the prison compensation law as an exclusive remedy because it was deemed not comprehensive enough. We disagree. That law, as shown by its regulations, its coverage and the amount of its payments to the injured and their dependents, compares favorably with compensation laws all over the country. 6 While there are differences in the way it protects its beneficiaries, these are due in the main to the differing circumstances of prisoners and nonprisoners. That law, as the Solicitor General points out, offers far [385 U.S. 149, 153] more liberal payments than many of the state compensation laws, and its standard of payments for prisoners rests on the schedules of payment of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act which Congress has provided to take care of practically all government employees. This particular federal compensation law, created to meet, in the accepted fashion of such laws, the special need of a class of prisoners, has now for more than 30 years functioned to the satisfaction of Congress, except as Congress broadened its coverage in 1961. 7 Until Congress decides differently we accept the prison compensation law as an adequate substitute for a system of recovery by common-law torts. </s> The court below was of the opinion that its holding was required by United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 . We think not. Whether a prisoner covered by the prison compensation law could also recover under the Federal Tort Claims Act was neither an issue in nor decided by Muniz. As our opinion in Muniz noted, neither of the two prisoners there was covered by the prison compensation law. What we decided in Muniz was that the two prisoners there involved, who were not protected by the prison compensation law, were not barred from seeking relief under the Federal Tort Claims Act. However, that is not this case. The decision in Muniz could not possibly control our decision here because respondent is protected by the prison compensation law. 8 All [385 U.S. 149, 154] other arguments of respondent have been considered but we find none sufficient to justify recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The judgments of the courts below are reversed with direction to sustain the Government's defense that respondent's recovery under the prison compensation law is exclusive. </s> Reversed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Act of June 23, 1934, c. 736, 4, 48 Stat. 1211. The Federal Prison Industries was established as a District of Columbia corporation and a "governmental body" to expand an industrial training and rehabilitation program for prisoners initiated by the Act of May 27, 1930, c. 340, 46 Stat. 391. </s> [Footnote 2 On August 1, 1966, Federal Prison Industries, Inc., raised respondent's award to $245.31 per month under authority of the Act of July 4, 1966, 80 Stat. 252, amending the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 39 Stat. 742, as amended, 5 U.S.C. 751 et seq. </s> [Footnote 3 28 U.S.C. 1346 (b), 2671 et seq. </s> [Footnote 4 The lower federal courts have held, uniformly, that persons for whom the Government has supplied an administrative compensation remedy are precluded from seeking recovery against the United States for injuries received in the course of their work under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Jones Act, the Suits in Admiralty Act, or the Public Vessels Act. Jarvis v. United States, 342 F.2d 799, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 831 ; Rizzuto v. United States, 298 F.2d 748; Lowe v. United States, 292 F.2d 501; Somma v. United States, 283 F.2d 149; Mills v. Panama Canal Co., 272 F.2d 37, cert. denied, 362 U.S. 961 ; United States v. Forfari, 268 F.2d 29, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 ; Balancio v. United States, 267 F.2d 135, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 875 ; Aubrey v. United States, 103 U.S. App. D.C. 65, 254 F.2d 768; United States v. Firth, 207 F.2d 665; Lewis v. United States, 89 U.S. App. D.C. 21, 190 F.2d 22, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 869 . See also Gradall v. United States, 161 Ct. Cl. 714, 329 F.2d 960, 963; Denenberg v. United States, 158 Ct. Cl. 401, 305 F.2d 378, 379-380. </s> [Footnote 5 39 Stat. 742, as amended, 5 U.S.C. 751 et seq. </s> [Footnote 6 The regulations governing awards of workmen's compensation to federal prisoners appear at 28 CFR 301.1-301.10 (1965 rev.). </s> [Footnote 7 In 1961 Congress expanded the coverage of 18 U.S.C. 4126 to include not only prisoners' injuries suffered in "any industry" but also in "any work activity in connection with the maintenance or operation of the institution where confined." Act of September 26, 1961, 75 Stat. 681, 18 U.S.C. 4126. </s> [Footnote 8 In this case, the Government stipulated that respondent's "right to compensation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. []4126 is not affected by this suit. Regardless of the outcome of this suit [respondent] will have the same right to compensation as if suit had not been instituted." </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE, whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins, dissenting. </s> United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 , held that action under the Federal Tort Claims Act was available to federal prisoners injured by the negligence of government employees. Given that case, the respondent, who was injured by government negligence while a federal prisoner, is entitled to relief unless the compensation available to him under 18 U.S.C. 4126 is his exclusive remedy, a proposition which rests on the intent of Congress to give 4126 that effect. Certainly the section does not in so many words exclude other remedies; and in my view exclusivity should not be inferred, for 4126 is neither comprehensive nor certain and does not meet the tests of Johansen v. United States, 343 U.S. 427 , and of Patterson v. United States, 359 U.S. 495 . Section 4126 permits, but does not require, the application of prison industries income to some form of compensation scheme. The scheme adopted by the Attorney General applies to only a limited class of prisoners - those doing prison industry, maintenance, or similar work. A prisoner injured in prison industry work gets no compensation under the plan until he is released and none then if he has completely recovered. Furthermore, his payments stop if he is reincarcerated. If he dies while in prison, he gets nothing at all. On the other hand, if a prisoner is injured by the negligence of a prison guard and is not covered by the 4126 plan, he may sue and [385 U.S. 149, 155] recover under the Tort Claims Act. Recovery is his and when he gets it, he keeps it whether or not he dies before his prison term expires and whether or not he is released and then again imprisoned. </s> Essentially, I agree with Judge Freedman, who wrote the opinion for the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The following is a passage from his opinion: </s> "Congress in adopting the amendment of 1961 to 4126 gave no express indication that the compensation authorized by it was to be exclusive, and its provisions preclude the imputation of any such intention. The compensation scheme for prisoners is very different from the compensation system for servicemen which was described in [Feres v. United States] as being `simple, certain, and uniform' ( 340 U.S., at 144 . . .) at the time the Federal Tort Claims Act was passed in 1946. It is also vastly different from the right to compensation enjoyed by government employes under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act. It is permissive rather than mandatory. The amount of the award rests entirely within the discretion of the Attorney General, but may not under the statute exceed the amount payable under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act. Compensation is paid only upon the inmate's release from prison and will be denied if full recovery occurs while he is in custody and no significant disability remains after his release. There is no provision for the claimant to have a personal physician present at his physical examination, and there is no opportunity for administrative review. Finally, compensation, even when granted, does not become a vested right, but is to be paid only so long as the claimant conducts himself in a lawful manner and may be immediately suspended upon conviction of any crime, or upon incarceration in a penal institution. [385 U.S. 149, 156] </s> "What emerges on examination, therefore, is a severely restrictive system of compensation permeated at all levels by the very prison control and dominion which was at the origin of the inmate's injury. This discretionary and sketchy system of compensation, which would not even have covered the present plaintiff in 1946, may not be deemed the equivalent of compensation under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act of 1916. Nowhere can there be found any indication that Congress intended that it should serve to exclude prisoners from the broad and sweeping policy embodied in the Federal Tort Claims Act." 350 F.2d 698, 700-701. (Foot-notes omitted.) </s> Nor does respondent claim the right to cumulate his remedies; he concedes that recovery under the compensation scheme must be offset against any negligence award he would otherwise receive. </s> Respectfully, I dissent. </s> [385 U.S. 149, 157]

United States Supreme Court CHRISTOFFEL V. UNITED STATES(1949) No. 528 Argued: April 20, 1949Decided: June 27, 1949 </s> Mr. O. John Rogge, Washington, D.C., for petitioner. Mr. Alexander M. Campbell, Asst. Attorney General, for respondent. [ Christoffel v. United States 338 U.S. 84 (1949) ] </s> [338 U.S. 84 , 85] </s> Mr. Justice MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court. In March of 1947, the committee on Education and Labor was, as it is now, a standing committee of the House of Representatives. 1 During the first session of the 80th Congress it held frequent hearings on proposed amendments to the National Labor Relations Act. On March 1, 1947, petitioner appeared as a witness before the committee, under oath, and in the course of the proceedings was asked a series of questions directed to his political affiliations and associations. In his answers he unequivocally denied that he was a Communist or that he endorsed, supported or participated in Communist programs. As a result of these answers he was indicted for perjury under Title 22, 2501 of the District of Columbia Code,2 and after a trial by jury was convicted. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, 171 F.2d 1004, and we granted certiorari to review its validity. 336 U.S. 934 . No question is raised as to the relevancy or propriety of the questions asked. Petitioner's main contention is that the committee was not a 'competent tribunal' within the meaning of the statute, in that a quorum of </s> [338 U.S. 84 , 86] </s> the committee was not present at the time of the incident on which the indictment was based. As to this, the record reveals the following: the Committee on Education and Labor consists of twenty-five members, of whom thirteen constitute a quorum. At the commencement of the afternoon session on Saturday, March 1, 1947, shortly after two o'clock, a roll call showed that fourteen members were present. Petitioner's testimony started some time after four o'clock. The responses said to constitute offenses were given just prior to five p.m. Evidence was adduced was adduced at the trial from which a jury might have concluded that at the time of the allegedly perjurious answers less than a quorum-as few as six-of the committee were in attendance. Counsel for the petitioner contended vigorously at the trial, on appeal and in this Court that unless a quorum were found to be actually present when the crucial questions were asked, the statutory requirement of a competent tribunal was not met and that absent such a finding a verdict of acquittal should follow. The trial court agreed that the presence of a quorum was an indispensable part of the offense charged, and instructed the jury that to find the defendant guilty they had to find beyond a reasonable doubt 'That the defendant Christoffel appeared before a quorum of at least thirteen members of the said Committee,' and 'that at least that number must have been actually and physically present. * * * If such a Committee so met, that is, if thirteen members did meet at the beginning of the afternoon session of March 1, 1947, and thereafter during the progress of the hearing some of them left temporarily or otherwise and no question was raised as to the lack of a quorum, then the fact that the majority did not remain there would not affect, for the purposes of this case, the existence of that Committee as a competent tribunal provided that before the oath was administered </s> [338 U.S. 84 , 87] </s> and before the testimony of the defendant was given there were present as many as 13 members of that Committee at the beginning of the afternoon session. * * *' This charge is objected to insofar as it allows the jury to find a quorum present simply by finding that thirteen or more members were in attendance when the committee was convened, without reference to subsequent facts. The Constitution of the United States provides that 'Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings,' Art. I, 5, and we find that the subject of competency, both of the House as a whole and of its committees, has been a matter of careful consideration. Rule XI(2)(f) of the House of Representatives reads in part, 'The rules of the House are hereby made the rules of its standing committees so far as applicable. * * *' Rule XV of the House provides for a call of the House if a quorum is not present, and it has been held under this rule that such a call, or a motion to adjourn, is the only business that may be transacted in the absence of a quorum. IV Hind's Precedents 2950; IV id. 2988. See IV id. 2934, 2939; VI Cannon's Precedents 653; VI id. 680. It appears to us plain that even the most highly privileged business must be suspended in the absence of a quorum in the House itself. A similar situation obtains in the committees. 3 The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 812, provides, referring to the standing committees, in 133(d), 'No measure or recommendation shall be reported from any such committee unless a majority of the commit- </s> [338 U.S. 84 , 88] </s> tee were actually present.' The rule embodied in this subsection was effective as long ago as 1918 to keep off the floor of the House a bill from a committee attended by less than a quorum, even though no objection was raised i the committee meeting itself. It appeared that the situation in the committee was much like the one with which we are concerned, with members coming and going during the meeting. No point of no quorum was raised at the committee meeting. When the Chairman proposed in the House to bring up the bill considered in the meeting, the Speaker ruled, on objection being made from the floor, that in spite of the point's not having been raised in committee, the bill could not be reported. The absence of a quorum of the committee, though at the time unobjected to, had made effective action impossible. VIII Cannon's Precedents 2212. Witnesses in committee hearings cannot be required to be familiar with the complications of parliamentary practice. Even if they are, the power to raise a point of no quorum appears to be limited to members of the committee. We have no doubt that if a member of the committee had raised a point of no quorum and a count had revealed the presence of less than a majority, proceedings would have been suspended until the deficiency should be supplied. In a criminal case affecting the rights of one not a member, the occasion of trial is an appropriate one for petitioner to raise the question. Congressional practice in the transaction of ordinary legislative business is of course none of our concern, and by the same token the considerations which may lead Congress as a matter of legislative practice to treat as valid the conduct of its committees do not control the issue before us. The question is neither what rules Congress may establish for its own governance, nor whether presumptions of continuity may protect the validity of its legislative conduct. The question is rather what rules </s> [338 U.S. 84 , 89] </s> the House has established and whether they have been followed. It of course has the power to define what tribunal is competent to exact testimony and the conditions that establish its competency to do so. The heart of this case is that by the charge that was given it the jury was allowed to assume that the conditions of competency were satisfied even though the basis in fact was not established and in face of a possible finding that the facts contradicted the assumption. We are measuring a conviction of crime by the statute which defined it. As a consequence of this conviction, petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of from two to six years. An essential part of a procedure which can be said fairly to inflict such a punishment is that all the element of the crime charged shall be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. An element of the crime charged in the instant indictment is the presence of a competent tribunal, and the trial court properly so instructed the jury. The House insists that to be such a tribunal a committee must consist of a quorum, and we agree with the trial court's charge that to convict, the jury had to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that there were 'actually physically present' a majority of the committee. 4 </s> [338 U.S. 84 , 90] </s> Then to charge, however, that such requirement is satisfied by a finding that there was a majority present two or three hours before the defendant offered his testimony, in the face of evidence indicating the contrary, is to rule as a matter of law that a quorum need not be present when the offense is committed. This not only seems to us contrary to the rules and practice of the Congress but denies petitioner a fundamental right. That right is that he be convicted of crime only on proof of all the elements of the crime charged against him. A tribunal that is not competent is no tribunal, and it is unthinkable that such a body can be the instrument of criminal conviction. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming so much of the instructions to the jury as allowed them to find a quorum present without reference to the facts at the time of the alleged perjurious testimony, and its judgment is reversed. Reversed. </s> Mr. Justice JACKSON, dissenting. THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice REED, Mr. Justice BURTON, and I think the Court is denying to the records of the Congress and its committees the credit and effect to which they are entitled, quite contrary to all recognized parliamentary rules, our previous decisions, and the Constitution itself. No one questions that the competency of a Committee of either House of Congress depends upon the action of the House in constituting the Committee, and in determining the rules governing its procedure. Nor does any one deny that each House has the power to provide expressly that a majority of the entire membership of any of its Committees shall constitute a quorum for certain purposes and that, for other purposes, a different number shall be sufficient. For example, either House may provide expressly that, for the purpose of convening a session of a Com- </s> [338 U.S. 84 , 91] </s> mittee or of approving a report, a majority of the Committee's entire membership shall be necessary and that, for the purpose of taking sworn testimony, one or more Committee members shall be sufficient to constitute a quorum. Similarly, each House may spell out a formal rule that a Committee shall constitute a competent tribunal to take sworn testimony if a majority of its members shall be present at the beginning of the session at which the testimony is taken and that such competency shall continue, although the attendance of Committee members may drop, during the Committee's session, to some smaller number. The reasonableness of such a rule is apparent because the value of the testimony taken by such a Committee is measured not so much by the number of people who hear it spoken at the session as it is by the number and identity of those who read it later. But what Congress may do by express rule it may do also by its custom and practice. There is no requirement, constitutional or otherwise, that its body of parliamentary law must be recorded in order to be authoritative. In the absence of objection raised at the time, and in the absence of any showing of a rule, practice or custom to the contrary, this Court has the duty to presume that the conduct of a Congressional Committee, in its usual course of business, conforms to both the written and unwritten rules of the House which created it. 'Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, * * *.' Art. I, 2, cl. 2. This Court accordingly can neither determine the rules for either House of Congress nor require those rules to be expressed with any degree of explicitness other than that chosen by the respective Houses. The record shows a quorum of this committee present when the session began and neither Christoffel nor anyone else had raised the point of no quorum up to the time he gave false testimony. On trial for perjury he introduced oral testimony tending to show that, at the moment </s> [338 U.S. 84 , 92] </s> he so testified, less than a quorum were actually present. The trial court charged that, in the absence of ch llenge or proof to the contrary, the quorum established at the beginning of the session is presumed to continue and the jury could find Christoffel guilty of perjury if he gave false testimony before such a body. He was found guilty. The Court now holds the charge was erroneous and that if the Government cannot show positively that there was a quorum present when he falsified, the committee was not a 'competent tribunal' within the Perjury Statute of the District and his conviction thereunder is invalid. Thus the issue is not whether a quorum is required in order for the committee to be a competent tribunal, but whether committee rules, practices and records, and congressional rules, practices and records in analogous situations, are subject to attack by later oral testimony and to invalidation by the courts. All the parliamentary authorities, including those cited by the Court, agree that a quorum is required for action, other than adjournment, by any parliamentary body; and they agree that the customary law of such bodies is that, the presence of a quorum having been ascertained and recorded at the beginning of a session, that record stands unless and until the point of no quorum is raised. This is the universal practice. If it were otherwise, repeated useless roll calls would be necessary before every action. In this case, therefore, the record on the subject of quorum was entitled to full credit. Christoffel himself did not, during his testimony, raise the question of no quorum. Whether one not a member of the body would have been permitted to do so and what effect it would have, had he been refused, we need not decide. The fact is, he made no effort to raise the point. To have then even suggested the objection would have given opportunity to the Committee to correct it. And if there were not enough committee members present to make a </s> [338 U.S. 84 , 93] </s> legal body, he would be at liberty, if his objection were overruled, to walk out. Instead, he chose to falsify to the committee and now says that, despite the record, he should be allowed to prove that not enough members were present for his lie to be legal perjury. The Court agrees and holds that the House Rules requiring a quorum for action require this result. Since the constitutional provision governing the House itself also requires a quorum before that body can do business, this raises the question whether the decision now announced will also apply to the House itself. If it does, it could have the effect of invalidating any action taken or legislation passed without a record vote, which represents a large proportion of the business done by both House and Senate. The effect is illustrated by noting that such a rule would make possible the invalidation of not only this conviction for perjury, but the Perjury Act1 itself, as well as the Judicial Code2 which is now the source of this Court's authority to review the conviction. Moreover, this rule is in direct contravention of the Constitution which does not require either House or Senate, much less a committee, to take a record vote except3 'at the Desire of one-fifth of those Present.' Art. I, 5, cl. 3. The Court significantly omits citation of any prior decision in support of its present conclusion. 4 The reason </s> [338 U.S. 84 , 94] </s> is fairly clear-the others are inconsistent with this one. For example, in United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 509 , we held it to be within the competency of the House to prescribe any method reasonably certain to ascertain the </s> [338 U.S. 84 , 95] </s> fact of a quorum; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom or advantages of any such rule-'with the courts the question is only one of power.' The House has adopted the rule and practice that a quorum once established is presumed to continue unless and until a point of no quorum is raised. By this decision, the Court, in effect, invalidates that rule despite the limitations consistently imposed upon courts where such an issue is tendered. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 669 -673, 496-498; United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 , 509; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 143 , 31 S. Ct. 342, 345, 346, Ann.Cas. 1912B, 1312; cf. Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 , 218. And see Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 , 453-456, 981-983, 122 A.L.R. 695 and concurring opinions at 307 U.S. 456 -460, and 460- 470-990. We do not think we should devise a new rule for this particular case to extend aid to one who did not raise his objection when it could be met and who has been prejudiced by absence of a quorum only if we assume that, although he told a falsehood to eleven Congressmen, he would have been honest if two more had been present. But in no event should we put out a doctrine by which every Congressional Act or Committee action, and perhaps every judgment here, can be overturned on oral testimony of interested parties. We should affirm the conviction. Footnotes </s> [Footnote 1 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 812, 822, 121, Rule X, House of Representatives; H.R. Rep. No. 111, adopted Feb. 26, 1947 ( 93 Cong.Rec. 1504). [Footnote 2 'Title 22, Sec. 2501ÄPerjuryÄSubornation of perjury. Every person who, having taken an oath or affirmation before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which the law authorized such oath or affirmation to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed is true, wilfully and contrary to such oath or affirmation states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true, shall be guilty of perjury; and any person convicted of perjury or subornation of perjury shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than two no more than ten years * * *.' 31 Stat. 1329. </s> [Footnote 3 There is some difference between procedure in the full House and in its committees. In the former, business is transacted on the assumption that a quorum is present at all times, unless a roll call or a division indicate the contrary. In committee meetings, however, the presence of a quorum must be affirmatively shown before the committee is deemed to be legally met. VIII Cannon's Precedents 2222. </s> [Footnote 4 In Meyers v. United States, D.C.Cir., 171 F.2d 800, the appellant made contentions similar to those of petitioner. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held the same view expressed here. 'On October 6, 1947, however, only two senators were present at the hearing. Since they were a minority of the subcommittee, they could not legally function except to adjourn. For that reason, the testimony of Lamarre given on that day cannot be considered as perjury nor can appellant be convicted of suborning it.' 171 F.2d at page 811. The conviction was affirmed on the ground that all the perjurious statements alleged in th indictment were made on October 4, when a quorum was present. 171 F.2d at page 812. </s> [Footnote 1 Passed without record vote by the Senate, 34 Cong.Rec., Pt. 4, pp. 3496Ä97, and by the House without a record vote, 34 Cong.Rec., Pt. 4, p. 3586. [Footnote 2 Passed by the Senate without a record vote, 94 Cong.Rec., Pt. 7, p. 7930, and motion to reconsider withdrawn, 94 Cong.Rec., Pt. 7, p. 8297. Passed by the House without a record vote, 94 Cong.Rec., Pt. 7, p. 8501. [Footnote 3 A separate provision requires a record vote on the question of overriding a Presidential veto. Art. I, 7, cl. 2. [Footnote 4 This is not because others have not tried to raise the issue. In Meyers v. United States, D.C.Cir., 171 F.2d 800, certiorari denied 336 U.S. 912 , the petitioner was convicted of subornation of perjury committed before a committee of Congress on two separate daysÄOctober 4 and October 6. The conviction was allowed to stand despite a charge to the jury that the quorum on October 4 was presumed to continue unless and until a committee member raised the point of no quorum, and that false testimony given before the point is raised is perjurious under this same statute. That charge is practically identical with the charge given in this case, of which this Court now says 'The heart of this case is that by the charge that was given it the jury was allowed to assume that the conditions of competency were satisfied even though the basis in fact was not established and in face of a possible finding that the facts contradicted the assumption.' This perfectly describes the Meyers case, considering only the October 4th testimony, on which it is said the conviction rested. Considering only that part of each count, Meyers was convicted and is now imprisoned for suborning perjury given under identical conditions as did Christoffel; and Meyers' guilt was determined by a jury which received the same ruling the Court now holds to be error as applied to Christoffel. Yet the Meyers conviction was affirmed and we denied his plea for review. Such a denial here of course does not imply approval of the law announced below but, on the undisputed facts, Meyers conviction rests on a basis which this Court says is 'unthinkable' as to Christoffel whose conviction is reversed. Moreover, the Meyers jury was permitted to convict partly at least on the basis of testimony given before a Committee on October 6 when the committee records showed, and the Government admits, that no quorum was present at any time. Today's opinion is diametrically opposed to the Meyers conviction based on the October 4th testimony alone, but the Meyers conviction also rests in part on testimony before a body which demonstrably and admittedly never amounted to a quorum, while Christoffel's is reversed merely because the charge permitted the jury to ignore oral testimony 'indicating' that a quorum once admittedly established may have evaporated. I do not see how the Court can justify such discrimination. The court below evidently could not, for it relied on the Meyers case as a precedent for affirming the conviction of Christoffel on this identical issue. 171 F.2d 1004, 1005, n. 1.

United States Supreme Court POLIZZI v. COWLES MAGAZINES(1953) No. 287 Argued: March 10, 1953Decided: June 1, 1953 </s> Respondent, an Iowa corporation which publishes a national magazine, maintains no offices in Florida, but sells the magazine to two independent wholesale companies which distribute it to retailers in Florida. Petitioner, a resident of Florida, sued respondent in a Florida state court for allegedly libelous matter published in the magazine. Respondent removed the action to the federal district court for the district in which the state court was located. The district court dismissed the action for want of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1391 (c). Held: The district court improperly dismissed the action for want of jurisdiction. The cause is remanded to that court to take jurisdiction of the action and determine whether it acquired jurisdiction of respondent by proper service. Pp. 664-667. </s> (a) 28 U.S.C. 1391 (c) is inapplicable to an action which has been removed from a state court to a federal district court, and the question whether respondent was "doing business" in Florida, within the meaning of that section, is irrelevant. Pp. 665-666. </s> (b) The venue of removed actions is governed by 28 U.S.C. 1441 (a). Under that section venue in this case was properly laid. Pp. 665-666. </s> 197 F.2d 74, reversed. </s> In a suit brought by petitioner in a state court, and removed by respondent to a federal district court, the district court dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 197 F.2d 74. This Court granted certiorari. 344 U.S. 853 . Reversed and remanded to the district court, p. 667. </s> A. C. Dressler argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was John D. Marsh. [345 U.S. 663, 664] </s> Manuel Lee Robbins argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was John F. Harding. Robert H. Anderson entered an appearance for respondent. </s> MR. JUSTICE MINTON delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Respondent, an Iowa corporation which publishes Look magazine, maintains no offices in Florida, but sells its magazines to two independent wholesale companies which distribute them to retailers in Florida. Respondent does employ two "circulation road men" whose job is to check retail outlets in a multi-state area which includes Florida. These two road men cover separate and mutually exclusive districts, and neither exercises any supervision over the other. Petitioner, a resident of Florida, brought suit against Respondent in the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, for allegedly libelous matter printed in Look magazine. Respondent moved to dismiss or in lieu thereof to quash the return of service, made on an agent of one of the distributing wholesalers. Before the state court acted on this motion, Respondent removed the action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. See 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1332, 1441, 1446, 1447 (b). That court issued an additional summons which was served on Briardy, one of Respondent's road men, "as a managing agent of [Respondent] transacting business for it in the State of Florida . . . ." See 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1448; Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 4 (d) (3), (7); Fla. Stat. Ann., 1943, 47.17 (5). On Petitioner's motion, the original state court service was quashed. Respondent then moved the court "to dismiss this action or in lieu thereof to quash the return of purported or attempted service of the additional summons . . . ." The District Court, without passing upon the motion to quash the return of service, dismissed the action on the ground that it did "not have jurisdiction [345 U.S. 663, 665] under Section 1391, sub-section C, New Title 28, United States Code" because Respondent "was not, at the time of the service of the summons, doing business in [the Southern District of Florida]." The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed on the same ground, 197 F.2d 74, and we granted certiorari. 344 U.S. 853 . </s> The only question in this case on the record before us is whether the District Court correctly dismissed the action for want of jurisdiction. </s> Both courts below held that the District Court lacked jurisdiction, but they reached that conclusion by deciding that Respondent was not "doing business" in Florida within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1391 (c). Section 1391 is a general venue statute. In a case where it applies, if its requirements are not satisfied, the District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction, although dismissal of the case might be justified if a timely objection to the venue were interposed. 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1406. But even on the question of venue, 1391 has no application to this case because this is a removed action. The venue of removed actions is governed by 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1441 (a), and under that section venue was properly laid in the Southern District of Florida. Lee v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 260 U.S. 653 ; General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 260 U.S. 261, 270 -279; Moss v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 157 F.2d 1005. 1 The pertinent provisions of the two statutes are set forth in the margin. 2 Section 1391 (a) limits the district in which an action may be "brought." Section 1391 (c) [345 U.S. 663, 666] similarly limits the district in which a corporation may be "sued." This action was not "brought" in the District Court, nor was Respondent "sued" there; the action was brought in a state court and removed to the District Court. Section 1441 (a) expressly provides that the proper venue of a removed action is "the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." The Southern District of Florida is the district embracing Dade County, the place where this action was pending. 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 89. </s> Therefore, the question whether Respondent was "doing business" in Florida within the meaning of 1391 (c) is irrelevant, and the discussion of that question is beside the point. The District Court based its holding that it lacked jurisdiction on a statute which has no application to the case, and the Court of Appeals affirmed on the same reasoning. </s> We express no opinion whether Respondent was "doing business" in Florida within the meaning of the due process requirements set out in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , because Respondent has not [345 U.S. 663, 667] contended that the International Shoe test is not met. 3 Nor do we decide whether the District Court acquired jurisdiction of the person of Respondent by proper service, because the lower courts did not pass on the question of service. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the District Court to take jurisdiction of the action and determine whether the District Court acquired jurisdiction of Respondent by proper service. </s> Reversed. </s> MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, not having heard the argument, took no part in the consideration and disposition of this case. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 See also 1 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, 101; Charles W. Bunn, Jurisdiction and Practice of the Courts of the United States (5th ed., Charles Bunn, 1949), 146-148; Moore, Commentary on the United States Judicial Code, 199. </s> [Footnote 2 " 1391. Venue generally. "(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought [345 U.S. 663, 666] only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside. . . . . . "(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes." (Emphasis supplied.) " 1441. Actions removable generally. "(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." (Emphasis supplied.) </s> [Footnote 3 "In the case now before the Court no question of due process is involved." Brief for Respondent in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari, p. 9. "All this has nothing to do with due process . . . ." Brief for Respondent, p. 17. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom MR. JUSTICE JACKSON joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> Polizzi lives in Coral Gables, Florida. He has been in the construction business there for some years. Cowles Magazines, Inc., an Iowa corporation, publishes Look, a magazine circulating nationally. May 23, 1950, Look carried an article branding Polizzi as one of the ringleaders of a national gang of murderous, blackmailing prostitute-pandering criminals. Nearly 50,000 copies covered Florida. Many were displayed and distributed in Polizzi's home town. He at once wrote the publisher that the charges against him were false, demanding both retraction and apology. It did nothing. Polizzi then [345 U.S. 663, 668] brought this libel suit in the state circuit court of his home county. Appearing "specially" in the local United States District Court, the Cowles corporation obtained an order for removal of the case from state to federal court. It asked the District Court to dismiss the case without giving Polizzi a chance to have it tried on the merits. The reasons urged were that Cowles was an Iowa corporation, was not and had not been "doing business" in Florida and consequently could not be sued in the Florida court unless it consented to be sued there. The effect of this contention was that while Polizzi could bring his libel suit in a federal district court in the corporation's home state of Iowa, no such suit could be maintained in a federal court in the state where Polizzi lived and where the criminal charges were likely to do him the most harm. Agreeing with Cowles, the District Court dismissed Polizzi's suit without giving him a chance to try the case on its merits. The Court of Appeals affirmed. For many reasons I think the dismissal was wrong and therefore concur in this Court's reversal of that dismissal. From this point on, however, I part company with the Court. </s> This Court reverses solely because both the District Court and the Court of Appeals in dismissing referred to and relied on the "doing business" provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1391 (c), a venue statute not applicable to removal cases like this but to suits originally filed against corporations in United States District Courts. For this reason, not suggested by Cowles or Polizzi, the Court refuses to pass on the "doing business" contention which Cowles did make and which both courts below decided. 1 </s> [345 U.S. 663, 669] This means the case goes back for reconsideration of the same old "doing business" question that has been hanging fire for three years. It took three years for Polizzi to get here and have the Court by-pass the "doing business" question this time. If he is lucky enough to get that question back here and decided for him in three more years, he may then look forward to the possibility of having a jury try his case sometime along about 1957. </s> I think this Court should here and now reject Cowles' dilatory contentions. There may have been some reason for snarling up lawsuits against foreign corporations a hundred years ago because of newly expanding activities of migratory businesses. But there is no such excuse now. A large part of the business in each and every state is done today by corporations created under the laws of other states. To adjust the practical administration of law to this situation the Court in recent years has refused [345 U.S. 663, 670] to be bound by old rigid concepts 2 about "doing business." Whether cases are to be tried in one locality or another is now to be tested by basic principles of fairness, 3 unless, as seems possible, this case represents a throwback to what I consider less enlightened practices. </s> Under any of the concepts, old or new, I think Cowles was doing business in Florida. It had a regular agent there, paid by the month, whose sole job was to carry on activities for Cowles in order to increase Look's circulation in that state. On this agent, who managed for the publishing corporation all the business it carried on in Florida, process was served. These facts, together with others which I need not labor, show the frivolous nature of the "doing business" question. They show also the lack of merit in the question the Court tells the district judge to pass on: Should the 1950 notice by service on the corporation's regular Florida representative be held sufficient to require it to defend, or should the District Court now after three years' litigation quash that service and require that new notice of the suit the corporation is here defending be served on some other company employee? I venture to suggest that if this question were raised anywhere except in a court, it would be dismissed as ludicrous. </s> But aside from what has been said, there is a new statute which gives an anachronistic flavor, a sort of irrelevance to all of Cowles' dilatory motions and arguments. I refer to 28 U.S.C. 1404 (a), which has codified the doctrine of forum non conveniens. That statute [345 U.S. 663, 671] gives district judges broad powers to transfer civil actions from one district to another "in the interest of justice." 4 And the heart of Cowles' contention is that it would be unfair, inconvenient and unjust to subject it to a suit in the District Court of Florida. But the Iowa corporation has not denied at all that it could be subjected to this libel suit in the federal district court in Iowa or in some other district where the corporation is "doing business." Therefore, the question Cowles has been raising from the beginning is: In what federal district court does the fair administration of justice require that this lawsuit be tried? This poses precisely the problem which the rule of forum non conveniens is designed to meet and solve. In light of that rule I think we should reject Cowles' old dilatory motions and direct the District Court in Florida to try this case at once, unless Cowles can show that court that it would be in the interest of justice to try the case in another district. But the Court refuses to discard old outdated concepts for the new rule of convenience and fairness. Instead Polizzi is sent back to the District Court not to try his case on the merits but to listen a few more years to a debate over whether Cowles has had adequate notice of this suit and whether the corporation is "doing business" in Florida. In the meantime, Polizzi stands convicted in the eyes of his community on the basis of an unproved story. At least since Magna Charta some [345 U.S. 663, 672] people have thought that to delay justice may be to deny justice. I would order that Polizzi be given the trial he seeks. 5 </s> [Footnote 1 The record makes clear that the "doing business" question was the ground on which Cowles made the motion to dismiss, the ground on which the District Court dismissed the lawsuit, the ground on which the Court of Appeals affirmed, and a ground on which Cowles asked us to affirm the dismissal. The corporation's motion to dismiss [345 U.S. 663, 669] asserted that "The defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of Iowa and was not doing or carrying on business in Florida at the time of such purported or attempted service and is not doing and has never done business within the State of Florida so as to be present in Florida . . . ." Evidence of a number of witnesses was heard on this "doing business" question. The District Court dismissed by finding "as a matter of fact that defendant was not, at the time of the service of the summons, doing business in this district . . ." and then related the dismissal to 28 U.S.C. 1391 (c). The Court of Appeals affirmed on the same ground, saying that the company could not "be said to be doing business in the state so as to be subject to suit there." It reached this conclusion because it thought the company's activities were not within "the meaning of doing business" as "discussed in the authorities" to which it referred, namely, International Shoe Company v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , and a number of other cases of this Court cited in footnote 2, 197 F.2d 74, 76. And in this Court the corporation argued specifically that ". . . the conclusion is inevitable that the courts below in holding that respondent was not transacting business in the State of Florida fairly followed the principles laid down in the International Shoe Co. case." </s> [Footnote 2 Cf. von Jhering, In the Heaven of Legal Concepts, translated in Cohen and Cohen, Readings in Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy, 678-689. </s> [Footnote 3 See on this point International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 ; Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 ; United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795 . </s> [Footnote 4 28 U.S.C. 1404 (a) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." A companion statute, 28 U.S.C. 1406 (a), provides: "The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought." </s> [Footnote 5 28 U.S.C. 2106 provides that this Court in reversing judgments may direct the District Court to enter such orders as are "just under the circumstances." </s> MR. JUSTICE BURTON, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> I agree that the District Court and the Court of Appeals erroneously referred to the wrong venue statute in deciding the question of "doing business." Like MR. JUSTICE BLACK I think it unfortunate that this case must be prolonged by a remand to consider again the same "doing business" question under another statute. Unlike MR. JUSTICE BLACK, however, I find nothing in the majority opinion to suggest that the enlightened rationale of our more recent cases such as International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , has been abandoned or impaired. Nor do I find any hint in the majority opinion that anything in the Constitution or other federal law prohibits the trial of this case in a United States District Court in Florida. My objection is that the majority have not ruled on this question at all. </s> [345 U.S. 663, 1]

United States Supreme Court FEDERAL POWER COM'N V. INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS CO.(1949) No. 109 Argued: Decided: April 18, 1949 </s> Natural Gas Co. 336 U.S. 577 (1949) ] </s> [336 U.S. 577 , 579] </s> Mr. Bradford Ross, of Washington, D.C., for Federal Power commission. Mr. John P. Randolph, of St. Joseph, Mo., for Public Service Commission of Missouri. Mr. William C. Wines, of Chicago, Ill., for Illinois Commerce Commission. Mr. John T. Cahill, of New York City, for Memphis Natural Gas Company. Mr. Forney Johnston, of Birmingham, Ala., for Southern Natural Gas Company. Mr. William A. Dougherty, of New York City, for Interstate Natural Gas Company and Mississippi River Fuel Corporation. Mr. Charles C. Crabtree, of Memphis, Tenn., for Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division. </s> Mr. Justice DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. This case, here on certiorari, involves the proper disposition of a fund accumulated under a stay order issued </s> [336 U.S. 577 , 580] </s> by the Court of Appeals pending review of a rate order issued by petitioner. That order reduced the rates for natural gas on sales by Interstate Natural Gas Co. to Mississippi River Fuel Corp , Southern Natural Gas Co., and United Gas Pipe Line Co. for resale to Memphis Natural Gas Co., and on sales by Interstate to Memphis. The Court of Appeals sustained the order, 5 Cir., 156 F.2d 949, and we affirmed its judgment, 331 U.S. 682 . Interstate deposited in the registry of the court pending review the monthly difference between payments under existing rates and those required under the order of the Commission. Interstate has now moved in the Court of Appeals for a distribution of the fund. The pipe-line companies-Mississippi, Southern, United,1 and Memphis-claimed the fund and asked that it be distributed to them. Petitioner and certain state and municipal agencies also intervened, opposing distribution to the pipe-line companies and claiming that it should be made to the ultimate consumers of the gas or to such others as may be equitably entitled to it. The Court of Appeals, relying on Central States Electric Co. v. Muscatine, 324 U.S. 138 , ordered the fund to be paid to those from whom Interstate wrongfully exacted the payments, viz., the pipe-line companies, without prejudice to such rights as others may have to hold those companies accountable for the amounts involved. 5 Cir., 166 F.2d 796. First. Here, unlike Central States Electric Co. v. Muscatine, supra, the distributing companies that seek return of the fund created from their payments of the excessive rates are subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission, since they are natural gas companies engaged in the transportation or sale at wholesale of natural gas in interstate commerce. See Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 314 U.S. 498 . The claims of these pipe- </s> [336 U.S. 577 , 581] </s> line companies to the fund are therefore determinable solely with reference to federal law, since the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 821, 15 U.S. C. 717, 15 U.S.C.A. 717, is designed to regulate the segment of the industry occupied by such distributors. See Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 331 U.S. 682 , 689-690, 1486, 1487; Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 610 , 291. We may not therefore sustain the action of the Court of Appeals unless it is clear as a matter of federal law that the pipe-line companies are entitled to the fund. The basis of the claim stated in their petitions for intervention is that they are entitled to the fund as of right, since it was created by their payments. But we would be unmindful of the purpose of the Act and the responsibility of the federal courts under it, if we so ruled. The aim of the Act was to protect ultimate consumers of natural gas from excessive charges. See Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra, 320 U.S. at pages 610, 612, 64 S.Ct. at pages 291, 292. They were the intended beneficiaries of rate reductions ordered by the federal commission, though state machinery might have to be invoked to obtain lower rates at the consumer level. The rates charged a wholesaler are part of its costs, reflected in its rate base. Reduction of those costs normally will lead in due course to reduction in its resale rates, unless we are to assume that the passage of the Natural Gas Act was an exercise in futility. It is of course conceivable that a wholesaler might be warranted in keeping all or a part of the rate reduction under the standards of reasonableness prescribed by the Act. But a court would not be warranted in assuming that the rates which have been charged are so low as to be unreasonable. No such presumption attends rates which have been fixed pursuant to rate orders of the Commission. Nor can we make any such presumption as respects rates fixed </s> [336 U.S. 577 , 582] </s> by the utilities themselves without the compulsion of a rate order. For experience does not indicate that utilities are wont to charge themselves out of business. The pipe-line companies in their petitions for intervention make no claim that their rates have been so low that they are entitled to these refunds as a matter of law. Were that issue tendered the court would need to resolve it and could call upon the Federal Power Commission for information relevant to it. Moreover, if the pipe-line companies passed on to their customers the rate reductions from the date of the Commission's order (as Mississippi alleges it did), they would be entitled to a return of the payments they made into the fund. They would then have done all that was in their power to effectuate the policy of the Act in this regard. But apart from those exceptions, it is the duty of the court to look beyond those companies for the rightful claimants of the funds. It is the responsibility of the court which distributes the fund accumulated under its stay order 'to correct that which has been wrongfully done by virtue of its process.' United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 197 , 802. That responsibility plainly cannot be discharged by payment of the fund to those who show no loss by reason of the court's action. It is said that the federal court could not bypass the pipe-line companies without undertaking to pass on the reasonableness of the rates which they have charged-a matter beyond its competence except on review or orders of the Commission. But it is not remaking to determine the equity of the claim of the pipe-line companies to the fund. The federal court, through exercise of its power under 19 of the Act, issued the stay order under which the fund was accumulated. When a federal court of equity grants relief by way of injunction it has a responsibility to protect all the interests whom its injunction may affect. Inland Steel Co. v. </s> [336 U.S. 577 , 583] </s> United States, 306 U.S. 153 . It assumes the duty to make disposition of the fund in accord with equitable principles. United States v. Morgan, supra, 307 U.S. at page 191, 59 S.Ct. at page 799. If in a particular case the court reaches the question of reasonableness of rates, it does so only for purposes of distributing the fund for whose creation it alone was responsible. It does not fix or prescribe rates for the past or the future. The reasonableness of rates charged by the companies who claim the fund is wholly ancillary to the problem of determining what claimants are equitably entitled to share in it. See Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301 ; United States v. Morgan, supra. Second. The problem is somewhat more complicated if distribution of the fund is to be made to claimants other than the pipe-line companies. The latter sell gas to at least two types of customers-industrial users over whose rates the Federal Power Commission has no jurisdiction2 and over which state regulatory bodies may or may not, depending on local law; and numerous distributing companies selling to customers in eight states. If the pipe-line companies had passed the rate reductions on to the distributing companies those reductions may or may not have reached the ultimate consumers. We likewise do not know whether the reductions would have reached the industrial users either by terms of the contracts or by virtue of the assertion of regulatory authority. If in this situation local law rpovides a standard for determining which of two or more claimants would have been entitled to the benefits of the rate reduction, the federal court should apply it. If clear and speedy state remedies are available, the federal court might hold the fund until those having the final say on the state law questions have spoken. Cf. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478, 483 , 630, 84 L.Ed 876; Spector Motor Service v. </s> [336 U.S. 577 , 584] </s> McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 . But in absence of uch a showing the federal court in the interest of dispatch should proceed to determine the questions, relying on such sources of local law as may be available, including information from state regulatory agencies. The federal court may in its discretion disburse the funds directly to either the local distributing companies or the ultimate consumers or work out an administrative scheme whereby the distribution is made pursuant to directives of state agencies. In conclusion, the task of the federal court in distributing the fund accumulated by virtue of its stay order is to undo the wrong which its process caused. The basic problem, therefore, is not to fix rates but to determine who suffered a loss as a result of the court's action in granting the stay. What in fact would have happened as a consequence of federal or state law if the stay had not been issued, no one can know for a certainty. But the federal court must make its prognostication, whether an excursion into federal or state law questions is entailed. Distribution of the fund should not involve prolonged litigation. It is an administrative matter involving the exercise of an informed judgment by the federal court and should have the flexibility and dispatch which characterize the administrative process. Reversed. </s> FRANKFURTER, Justice, concurring. While agreeing in substance with Mr. Justice DOUGLAS's opinion, because of the conflict of views to which the case has given rise I deem it desirable to spell out with particularity what I regard as the controlling considerations. 1. The controversy concerns the proper disposition of a fund impounded in the Court of Appeals by virtue of the Court's suspension of a rate reduction order of the </s> [336 U.S. 577 , 585] </s> Federal Power Commission. Interstate paid into the registry of the court the sums collected by it in excess of the rates fixed by the Commission. After the order was finally sustained Interstate moved the court for distribution of the fund to the three companies which, as customers of Interstate, paid the unlawfully exacted amounts. The motion was supported by the three purchasers from Interstate; it was resisted by the Federal Power Commission which asked that distribution be made to the ultimate consumers; it was also resisted by the City of Jackson and by the regulatory commissions of Illinois and Missouri, which likewise urged that distribution be made to the ultimate consumers within their respective territories. One of Interstate's purchasers, United Gas Pipe Line Company, although intervening as a claimant, advised the court that it would pass on its share of the refund to the Memphis Natural Gas Company, to which United had resold the gas purchased from Interstate. 2. The court below thus had before it claims upon the fund by two immediate purchasers from Interstate, which asserted their right to the amounts paid into the fund by them, by a third purchaser from Interstate which made claim upon the fund but merely as a conduct for its passage to a subpurchaser, and by public agencies-national, state and municipal-which urged that the entire fund be distributed to the ultimate consumers. The respondents-Interstate and the three immediate purchasers from it- basically rely on Southern Pacific Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531 , in urging that the fund should go to the immediate depositors from whom it was found to have been wrongfully exacted. They deem that case to be the foundation of our decision in Central States Electric Co. v. City of Muscatine, 324 U.S. 138 . The Government on the other hand asks that the Muscatine case be overruled and that the fund should go to the ultimate consumers. </s> [336 U.S. 577 , 586] </s> In the Muscatine case this Court rejected the notion that as between a utility like Interstate and its immediae purchasers a rate reduction makes the distributors mere conduits of the reduction for the exclusive benefit of the ultimate consumers. In short, the rationale of the M scatine case is that that which is in fact not true in the process of rate- fixing ought not to be erected into a principle of law merely because the effect of a rate-reduction is postponed through an exercise of the right to judicial review afforded by the Congress. 3. It would, therefore, appear to be clear that the judicial duty is to deal fairly with a trust fund held to await the with a trust fund held to await the it may be distributed on the basis of what would have taken place had the Power Commission's order gone into effect at once. The task, then, for the Court of Appeals is to reconstruct, as far as it can possibly be done, what would have happened had no fund accrued. Reasons of equity produced the fund; equitable considerations must determine its distribution. The governing principle is that of unjust enrichment. Since the task of the court is to place the parties in the position in which they would have been had there not been a postponement of the effective date of the rate-reduction, it is now the duty of the court to make that retrospective determination not by unfounded assumptions erected into rigid legal rules, but by an ascertainment of what actually would have happened contemporaneously had purchasers from Interstate obtained their gas at the lower rate. 4. A utility is entitled to charge a reasonable rate. It would be dealing with a fiction and not a fact to hold as a matter of law either that the immediate purchasers from Interstate should keep the benefit of the reduced rate or that it should all go to the ultimate consumers. Whether the three purchasers or the intervening distribu- </s> [336 U.S. 577 , 587] </s> tors are entitled to any part of the reduction depends on the ascertainable condition of the three purchasers from Interstate and the intermediate purchasers from them. A merely compensatory rate below which no rate may be fixed by a regulatory commission may not be a reasonable rate. See Brandeis, J., in Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. 276, 296 , 549, 31 A.L.R. 807. For various reasons a utility may charge, as is well known, less than what as a matter of law it could be compelled to charge. On the other hand, it may charge the maximum of what is reasonable. To distribute the entire fund among the immediate purchasers from Interstate may give them a complete windfall, since they might have been compelled, under their duty to charge only a reasonable rate, to reduce their rates so as to keep none of the Interstate reductions. Since all these purchasers are subject to regulation by the Power Commission, the Power Commission could have ordered such rate reductions in whole or in part. On the other hand to take it all away from them now might work an injustice because they might have been allowed to keep at least part of the reduction. As to the intermediate purchasers that were not subject to the Federal Power Commission, the allowable retention of any part of a reduced rate from a distributor would have turned contemporaneously on state law. To deny both these classes of the intermediate purchasers the right to establish just claim against the fund and to distribute it all among the consumers, moreover, would inevitably leave a sizeable unclaimed amount, and this, of course, would have to go to the depositors as the residuary claimant-it would have to go, that is, to Interstate, the one party least entitled to any of the fund. These arbitrary alternatives-to distribute the whole fund to the immediate purchasers from Interstate or to distribute it all to the ultimate consumers-have at least </s> [336 U.S. 577 , 588] </s> the support of logic though not of justice. A suggested compromise-to go beyond the immediate purchasers and at the same time stop short with those purchasers over whom the Federal Power Commission has authority-is said to be justified by the fact that a federal court cannot engage in rate regulation. This suggestion has the support neither of logic nor of justice. If a federal court is arred from inquiring, because such an inquiry amounts in effect to rate regulation, what would have been the consequences to all those affected had the reduction of Interstate's rate gone into immediate effect, rates administered by the Federal Power Commission should be no more open to such an inquiry than are those beyond the power of the Commission. And if it would be unjust to let an immediate distributee which had passed on the higher rate to its purchasers retain the benefit of the reduction, it would be equally unjust to let any succeeding distributee which had done the same thing enjoy the benefit merely because it was the last distributee subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. At all events, in preventing unjust enrichment a court of equity is not exercising the functions of rate-making; it is neither awarding reparations for the past nor fixing a future schedule as does a rate- regulating body. Granting that a federal court does not have the power to regulate rates, it does not follow that in discharging the duty to distribute a fund of its own creation it is barred from an inquiry which has some aspects-though I believe very minor ones-that would also appear in a rate proceeding. In short, issues that may be pertinent to a rate investigation before a regulatory commission are not therefore beyond the power of judicial inquiry when they arise in a totally different relation. 5. Accordingly, the task for the court below is to determine in 1949 how the Interstate rate reduction would have affected all the intermediate distributors in '43 and </s> [336 U.S. 577 , 589] </s> '44 had it not been suspended by the court's injunction. The Court of Appeals has inherent powers to bring to its aid all effective means to discharge this task. This Court, in Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 40 S. Ct. 543, showed the resources available to our District Courts even in an action at law when due regard must be had for the requirements of the Seventh Amendment. The more clearly available are procedures for doing justice where a court of equity is called upon to distribute a trust fund of its own creation. In the light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals should ask the Federal Power Commission for an advisory report as to what the Commission might have determined had it in the original proceeding for the reduction of the rates of Interstate exercised its power to bring in all the parties. There is nothing novel in this. District Courts may call upon the Federal Trade Commission to help shape decrees in Sherman Law cases. To be sure, the Clayton Act explicitly so provides. But a court of equity has inherent powers to invite such help from a great agency of the Government. While the Federal Power Commission could, if it chose, decline to render that help, it is inconceivable that it would do so. As to the intermediate purchasers, subject not to the Power Commission but to State or city regulation, the local agencies could be similarly resorted to for aid in the ultimate problem before the lower court of distributing a commingled fund as to which none of the interested parties can fairly be said, as a matter of law, to have an obvious, demonstrated claim. Various obstacles are conceived to stand in the way of the lower court's fulfillment of this task. But it is, to say the least, premature to conjure up abstract difficulties which, as a practical matter, may evaporate in the light of the informed advice which these various regulatory agencies may be able to furnish readily on the </s> [336 U.S. 577 , 590] </s> basis of their available records of the financial condition of the utilities subject to them. It will be time enough to distribute the fund by some makeshift rule of thumb if what is concededly a rule of intrinsic fairness should be found judicially unenforceable. Accordingly, I would remand the case to the Court of Appeals to take steps consistent with the foregoing views. By Mr. Justice JACKSON. Mr. Justice BURTON and I view this case in a different light than do any of our brethre but we have joined in the judgment and the opinion of Mr. Justice DOUGLAS because we deem it important that instructions to the court below carry the concurrence of a majority of this Court. We agree with much but not all of that opinion and where our views differ we are closer to that opinion than to other views expressed here. We repeat our concurrence so that there may be no misunderstanding but with also be express for the record our individual views. The way this case appears to us is this: 1. The three pipe-line companies whose excessive payments made up this fund may not, under the terms of the impounding order, have an absolute right to recover it. However, since this Court found that the money was illegally exacted from them, it would seem to make at least a prima facie case for returning it to their possession. The minimum to which they are entitled is a chance to be heard as to whatever claim they may have to it. As these companies are subject to the Federal Natural Gas Act, a federal court might properly weigh their claims under federal law. 2. Assuming, however, what is not improbable, that none of the pipe- line companies establishes a claim to the fund, the next in right to receive it would be their customers, the local distributing companies. The latter </s> [336 U.S. 577 , 591] </s> are under protection of federal law as to the rates which may be exacted from them by the pipe-line companies but are in no respect under federal law as to the rates they may charge customers. If all of the federal power exerted in the Natural Gas Act had been exercised by the Federal Power Commission, it could not reach or control their customer relations. We do not see, therefore, how a federal court in this litigation can derive from the Act any greater power to enter the local field with refunds than the Power Commission had to enter it for rate-making. There are many legal and practical reasons why the court's function should not be expanded beyond the point where Congress ended the functions of the PowerCommission. 3. The manner and amount by which any repayments to distributing companies would be reflected in reduced rates to consumers, and therefore in rebates, is exclusively for state law. Twenty-one of these distributing companies are involved and they operate in eight states, each with its own principles to govern local rate-making and separate authorities to apply them. We solve no problem by saying that computation of this refund is not rate-making. Of course it is not, but it is so like unto it that no one suggests that any body of law except that of rate-making is applicable. Disguise it with what sophistry we will, the disposition of refunds as between operating companies and customers must be generally based on the local law of rate-making or on no law at all. Some of these companies and their customers are located within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; others are in the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits. I know of no legal or practical justification for requiring the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to undertake interpretation and application as an original matter of the laws of eight states, several of them beyond its jurisdiction. </s> [336 U.S. 577 , 592] </s> 4. The application of these funds, if they are held to go to the local distributing companies, present difficult questions of policy which it is the responsibility of the states to resolve in their own ways. The federal court should not undertake to resolve them, even if they were less complex. These problems are not solved or evaded by saying that refunds shall go to consumers rather than to the companies. It oversimplifies these problems to treat consumers in the abstract as a class all alike. And it does not dispose of the problems to declare that refunds should be on 'equitable principles' as if there were a defined and accepted body of principles of equity on this subject. Equity in the historical sense- equity jurisprudence-has no guidance to give beyond maxims, such, for exampl , as 'equality is equity.' But here, what is equality? Of course, what no doubt is meant is that the court should apply a sort of natural justice based on popular notions of right dealing. But this does not answer some of the concrete questions which someone must face in final disposition of these funds. I shall mention but few. At the very outset one is faced with the question as to what is an 'equitable' basis of refund as between industrial and domestic consumers. Direct sales to industrial consumers by the three pipe-line companies amounted to 63% of the total for Mississippi River Fuel Company, 18% in the case of Southern Natural Gas Company, and 11% for United Gas Pipe Line Company. In addition to this, other industrial consumers may be served by local distributing companies. The Federal Power Commission proposal, which this Court seems to think should prevail, is that refunds both to industrial and domestic consumers be calculated by dividing the money in proportion to feet of gas sold to each one. On this basis, the Power Commission's exhibit proposes a refund to direct industrial consumers alone of over a million dollars from this fund. The Commission does </s> [336 U.S. 577 , 593] </s> not tell us the prices paid by various classes of consumers. But it is common knowledge that, for a variety of reasons, industries get a much lower price per m.c.f. than domestic users. If we assume it is 50%, then the refund would repay industrials twice as large a proportion of what they have paid for gas per m.c.f. as it would household users. Is this 'equity'? In my dissent in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co ., 320 U.S. 591 , I pointed out the uneconomic use of gas in industry and the waste and exhaustion of irreplaceable natural resources that it causes, and the great differential that exists between their low contract price and the price paid by domestic users. I have great doubt whether the industrial users have any just basis for participating in this refund; but if they could, and they certainly are entitled to try, their share should not be greater than their proportion of the revenues contributed, rather than of their proportion of the consumption. The latter measures only the benefits they already have derived from exhausting the Nation's supplies, not at all what they have contributed to the fund. This Court refused to consider these equities, as did also the Power Commission, in the Hope case. Why not then leave the states free to solve the issue? Some of the states may have an intelligent policy with reference to the rapid depletion of our gas reserves, vis a vis domestic and industrial consumption, and the relation of price to uneconomic uses. The Federal Government has none. The Power Commission has furnished a tabulation showing the share of each local distributing company under its theory. But it has not provided any of the data which would disclose the magnitude and complexity of the task it is asking us to visit upon the Court of Appeals by directing it to go beyond this and distribute each company's share among its consumers. By reference to Moody's Manual, however, we can learn the </s> [336 U.S. 577 , 594] </s> approximate number of customers served by each company. Then by applying the Power Commission's tabulation of the share of refunds, it would appear that refunds for some companies would be so trivial that a state supervising authority might conclude that to cover this refund into the current revenues of the operating company for whatever effect it might have on its present or future rates would be a more sensible procedure than to spend it in expense of special proceedings to refund to consumers. For instance, Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. serves 142,481 customers in 109 communities. The Power Commission allocates it $20,911, or an average 15 per consumer. The Illinois Power serves 116,000 customers in 56 communities and is allocated $50,065, or about 43 per consumer. Birmingham Gas serves 61,000 consumers in 9 communities and is allocated $ 30, 33, making an average refund of about 49. The foregoing estimate of consumer refunds assumes an equal amount to each consumer. Another permissible basis, and I should think, a fairer one where substantial amounts were involved, would be a refund in ratio to the bills paid for gas. The Power Commission, however, if consistent, would use another method and refund in proportion to the feet of gas purchased by the consumer. Different local conditions precipitate some nice questions in applying any fair method as between consumers. From Moody's Manual, for example, we learn that one of the largest of the distributing companies, the Atlanta Gaslight Co., with serves approximately 133,000 consumers in 28 communities, has a graduated scale of rates, so that consumers pay different rates for gas consumed in different quantity brackets. I should think the practical effect of its schedule would be that a very large consumer would make an average payment much less per thousand feet than would a moderate household consumer. Equality of refund may not be equality of treatment. It will take </s> [336 U.S. 577 , 595] </s> more than equalitarian generalities to get this cash into consumers' hands. Is not the manner of refund under such local conditions one to be worked out by local authorities rather than the federal court of a distant circuit? The problems do not end here. Consumers during what period are entitled to refund? Certainly the rate reduction which caused this fund to accumulate could not in normal course have reached local retail consumers until sometime after reduction in wholesale rates, and the period would differ according to local conditions. The individuals who are entitled to refund, for whatever period may be adopted, must be identified and questions settled as who is entitled to the refund of a deceased consumer, what becomes of the share of one who has removed or is unknown. Disputes between landlord and tenant, husband and wife, and many other questions will arise; all of which are for local authorities. For these reasons it seems to us that the functions of the federal court end when it has granted these refunds to the last purchaser whose purchase price the federal authority can lawfully reduce. This would be the distributing companies. From there on it is a local problem with which neither the Power Commission nor the court has any legitimate concern. The machinery of some of the states may be somewhat inadequate for dealing with the problem, but that does not, in our view, warrant usurpation of their functions. However, for reasons stated at the beginning of this opinion, Mr. Justice BURTON and I have joined the judgment and opinion of the Court. </s> Mr. Justice BLACK, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals, but dissent from the directions given that court for disposition of the impounded funds. In the first </s> [336 U.S. 577 , 596] </s> place I think those directions rest on erroneous legal principles. Secondly, without precise definition of issues or standards, the directions impose an almost impossible task on the Court of Appeals, a task which is bound to dissipate a large part of the funds in diverse, protracted, involved and confused litigation. Furthermore, I see little assurance that the fund's remnant at the end of this litigation could ever reach the consumers who are in my judgment the equitable and legal beneficiaries of the funds. Acting pursuant to the Natural Gas Act,1 the Federal Power Commission ordered the Interstate Natural Gas Company to reduce its rates to certain wholesale pipe-line companies. Challenging this order as illegal, the wholesale companies sought and obtained from a District Court an injunction against enforcement of the rate reduction order. By reason of the injunction the pipe-line companies were compelled to continue to pay the higher gas rates. But the court required the Natural Gas Company to make monthly payment into court of amounts equal to the rate reduction. For more than four years these funds have been collected and paid into court. When this case was submitted, the total amount collected was in excess of two and a half million dollars. The rate reduction order was sustained by this Court2 and consequently Interstate is not entitled to and asserts no claim to the fund. The wholesale pipe-line companies claim it on the ground that but for the injunction they would have obtained the gas at the lower rate. 3 The </s> [336 U.S. 577 , 597] </s> Federal Power Commission and certain state agencies here contend that since the purpose of the Natural Gas Act was to provide benefits to the ultimate consumers the total impounded funds should be distributed to the consumers. First. I agree with the Court that the aim of the Federal Act was to protect ultimate consumers of gas from excessive charges. To protect the ultimate consumer, however, the Act went no further than to fix the interstate rates of producers and wholesalers. Congress intended that these federal rate reductions would lower the costs of gas to local retailers, thus enabling state and local agencies to fix lower consumer rates on the federally fixed lower wholesale rates. Consequently, where courts leave the Act's scheme free to function, ultimate consumers of gas get no benefits from the federally reduced producer rates until and unless state or local authorities fix reduced rates for companies whose sales fall within their respective jurisdictions. Under such circumstances rate relationships and cost consequences as between consumers and dealers under state jurisdiction would raise questions of state law only. But here, the normal consequences of the valid federal rate reduction were not allowed to take place. The injunction placed an insuperable obstacle to state reduction of wholesale or retail rates on the basis of the federal rate reduction order. Thus the court's stay blocked the congressional mechanism intended to produce lower consumer rates. Central States Electric Co. v. Muscatine, 324 U.S. 138, 149 , 570 (dissenting opinion). Furthermore, no practical remedy is available in the state courts or state or federal regulatory agencies to determine retroactively what is a proper distribution of the impounded funds. The judicial stay therefore effectually frustrated the congressional purpose to provide a timely opportunity for state or national </s> [336 U.S. 577 , 598] </s> regulatory agencies to accord consumers the Act's benefits. Consequently, rights in the fund as between ultimate consumers and the pipe-line companies must be determined under the new situation created by the federal court. Second. Different from the Court, I think that distribution of the fund in this new situation is wholly a matter of federal law and that the fund should be distributed without a futile effort to determine the extent consumer rates might have been reduced by state or national regulatory agencies had they been left free to act on the reduced rate cost of gas. It was a federal court acting under authority of federal law that created the fund. And having deprived consumers of an opportunity to get the reduced rates Congress intended them to have as the result of an integrated federal-state course of conduct, it became the duty of the federal court to administer this fund under federal rules that would as nearly as possible afford these congressionally intended benefits to consumers. Nothing short of this will accord with the congressional purpose or with equitable principles by which the court must be governed in administering the fund. Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U.S. 153 ; United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183 . All ga the wholesale price of which was affected by the Commission's order had its ultimate price to the consumer fixed by law or by agreement of parties. 4 In neither event can it be assumed that the price paid failed to give the seller a reasonable value. Under such circumstances, where rates were fixed by law or contract on the basis of the high wholesale rate, neither statutes nor equitable principles require the Court of Appeals to seek standards of reasonableness different from those under which gas merchants voluntarily had already sold their product to </s> [336 U.S. 577 , 599] </s> retailers and consumers. All regulatory statutes permit utilities to complain of unreasonable rates, and the failure of these utilities to prosecute claims for excess rates until this windfall was in sight should bar them from making retroactive claims now. And of course, where the price was fixed by voluntary contracts, the court should not be required to re-examine those contracts on the naive assumption that consumers took an unconscionable advantage of the pipe-line companies. My belief is that under the circumstances here the only way even partially to carry out the purpose of Congress to afford consumer relief is by distributing this fund to the consumers. This itself will impose a tedious, onerous, and perhaps expensive burden on the court and the consumers. Such a burden, however, is one of the prices to be paid for the practice of judicial suspension of rate orders. But the burden in distribution to consumers would be small in comparison to that imposed by requiring the court in 1949 and 1950 to make expensive and extensive explorations to speculate on what rates state administrative agencies would have found reasonable in separate years from 1943 to 1947.5 Neither the procedure I suggest nor that adopted by the Court can achieve with scientific accuracy the result that would have followed had the court not suspended the rate reduction order. But under the Court's plan to require the Court of Appeals to reconstruct hypothetical rate situations in several states a major part of the funds might be dis- </s> [336 U.S. 577 , 600] </s> sipated in a costly but vain search for an unattainable goal. 6 Consumers at least can get a substantial part of the funds under the procedure I suggest. 7 Nor can I see any possible intrusion into state functions by following such a course. Neither state laws nor state courts are responsible for the tangled situation here. I cannot see where it could p ssibly offend the states or encroach on their power for the federal court to distribute these funds to the very state people the federal law was passed to protect. And the state representatives here arguing for the distribution of this fund to the ultimate consumers, citizens of their states, are apparently unable to detect in distribution to these consumers any invasion of state rights by the federal courts. This seems an appropriate time to reverse Central States Electric Co. v. Muscatine, 324 U.S. 138 . I regret to see that holding survive even in part. Mr. Justice MURPHY and Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE join in this opinion. Footnotes </s> [Footnote 1 United claimed an allocable share on behalf of Memphis to which it had resold the gas which it had purchased from Interstate. </s> [Footnote 2 1(b). </s> [Footnote 1 52 Stat. 821, 15 U.S.C. 717, 15 U.S.C.A. 717. [Footnote 2 Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 331 U.S. 682 . [Footnote 3 One pipe-line company claims to have passed on the rate reduction to its customers which if proved would put it in an entirely different category. </s> [Footnote 4 As the Court points out, industrial purchasers' rates may not have been fixed by law but by contracts. </s> [Footnote 5 How is this reasonableness to be determined, on the fair value theory, the reproduction cost theory, or some other theory? And how many more years would it take the Court to complete the several extensive inquiries required to reach its conclusions as to reasonableness of the prices charged by the several companies in the several states where they sold gas? See McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co., 302 U.S. 419 , 428Ä439, 328Ä333 (dissenting opinion). </s> [Footnote 6 It is interesting to note the unchallenged assertion in the Government brief that although in Central States Electric Co. v. Muscatine, 324 U.S. 138 , 'this Court required that the way be left open for the ultimate consumers to utilize the remedies, if any, provided by local law, no such proceeding has been brought.' The illusion that state relief is somehow available to the consumers here seems to persist despite the realities that consumers in the Central States case, similarly situated to the consumers here, have not received a dime from the 'available' state remedies. [Footnote 7 Apprehension is expressed in this Court that the procedure I suggest would result in making the producing company the residuary beneficiary of funds not claimed by consumers. Such an apprehension is not justified since the Court of Appeals can direct any unclaimed consumer funds to be distributed to whatever company might show a superior equity.

United States Supreme Court FCC v. NATIONAL CITIZENS COMM. FOR BROADCASTING(1978) No. 76-1471 Argued: January 16, 1978Decided: June 12, 1978 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 76-1521, Channel Two Television Co. et al. v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting; No. 76-1595, National Association of Broadcasters v. Federal Communications Commission et al.; No. 76-1604, American Newspaper Publishers Assn. v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting et al.; No. 76-1624, Illinois Broadcasting Co., Inc., et al. v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting et al.; and No. 76-1685, Post Co. et al. v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting et al., also on certiorari to the same court. </s> After a lengthy rulemaking proceeding, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted regulations prospectively barring the initial licensing or the transfer of newspaper-broadcast combinations where there is common ownership of a radio or television broadcast station and a daily newspaper located in the same community ("co-located" combinations). Divestiture of existing co-located combinations was not required except in 16 "egregious cases," where the combination involves the sole daily newspaper published in a community and either the sole broadcast station or the sole television station providing that entire community with a clear signal. Absent waiver, divestiture must be accomplished in those 16 cases by January 1, 1980. On petitions for review of the regulations, the Court of Appeals affirmed the FCC's prospective ban but ordered adoption of regulations requiring dissolution of all existing combinations that did not qualify for waivers. The court held that the limited divestiture requirement was arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of 10 (e) of the Administrative Procedure Act. Held: The challenged regulations are valid in their entirety. Pp. 793-815. </s> (a) The regulations, which are designed to promote diversification of the mass media as a whole, are based on public-interest goals that the FCC is authorized to pursue. As long as the regulations are not an unreasonable means for seeking to achieve those goals, they fall within the FCC's general rulemaking authority recognized in United States v. Storer [436 U.S. 775, 776] Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 , and National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 . Pp. 793-796. </s> (b) Although it is contended that the rulemaking record did not conclusively establish that the prospective ban would fulfill the stated purpose, "[d]iversity and its effects are . . . elusive concepts, not easily defined let alone measured without making quality judgments objectionable on both policy and First Amendment grounds," and evidence of specific abuses by common owners is difficult to compile. In light of these considerations, the FCC clearly did not take an irrational view of the public interest when it decided to impose the prospective ban, and was entitled to rely on its judgment, based on experience, that "it is unrealistic to expect true diversity from a commonly owned station-newspaper combination." In view of changed circumstances in the broadcasting industry, moreover, the FCC was warranted in departing from its earlier licensing decisions that allowed co-located combinations. Pp. 796-797. </s> (c) The contention that the First Amendment rights of newspaper owners are violated by the regulations ignores the fundamental proposition that there is no "unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 . In view of the limited broadcast spectrum, allocation and regulation of frequencies are essential. Nothing in the First Amendment prevents such allocation as will promote the "public interest" in diversification of the mass communications media. A newspaper owner need not forfeit his right to publish in order to acquire a station in another community; nor is he "singled out" for more stringent treatment than other owners of mass media under already existing multiple-ownership rules. Far from seeking to limit the flow of information, the FCC has acted "to enhance the diversity of information heard by the public without on-going government surveillance of the content of speech." The regulations are a reasonable means of promoting the public interest in diversified mass communications, and thus they do not violate the First Amendment rights of those who will be denied broadcasting licenses pursuant to them. Pp. 798-802. </s> (d) The limited divestiture requirement reflects a rational weighing of competing policies. The FCC rationally concluded that forced dissolution solution of all existing co-located combinations, though fostering diversity, would disrupt the industry and cause individual hardship and would or might harm the public interest in several respects, specifically identified by the FCC. In the past, the FCC has consistently acted on the theory that preserving continuity of meritorious service furthers the [436 U.S. 775, 777] public interest. And in the instant proceeding the FCC specifically noted that the existing newspaper-broadcast combinations had a "long record of service" in the public interest and concluded that their replacement by new owners would not guarantee the same level of service, would cause serious disruption during the transition period, and would probably result in a decline of local ownership. Pp. 803-809. </s> (e) The function of weighing policies under the public-interest standard has been delegated by Congress to the FCC in the first instance, and there is no basis for a "presumption" that existing newspaper-broadcast combinations "do not serve the public interest." Such a presumption would not comport with the FCC's longstanding and judicially approved practice of giving controlling weight in some circumstances to its goal of achieving "the best practicable service to the public." There is no statutory or other obligation that diversification should be given controlling weight in all circumstances. The FCC has made clear that diversification of ownership is a less significant factor when the renewal of an existing license as compared with an initial licensing application is being considered, and the policy of evaluating existing licensees on a somewhat different basis from new applicants appears to have been approved by Congress. Since the decision to "grandfather" most existing combinations was based on judgments and predictions by the FCC, complete factual support in the record was not required; "a forecast of the direction in which future public interest lies necessarily involves deductions based on the expert knowledge of the agency," FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 29 . Nor was it arbitrary for the FCC to order divestiture in only the 16 "egregious cases," since the FCC made a rational judgment in concluding that the need for diversification was especially great in cases of local monopoly. Pp. 809-815. </s> 181 U.S. App. D.C. 1, 555 F.2d 938, affirmed in part and reversed in part. </s> MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined except BRENNAN, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. </s> Erwin N. Griswold argued the cause for petitioners in Nos. 76-1521, 76-1595, 76-1604, 76-1624, and 76-1685. Ernest W. Jennes and Russell H. Carpenter, Jr., filed briefs for petitioners in No. 76-1521; Lee Loevinger, David B. Lytle, and Walter A. Smith, Jr., filed a brief for petitioner in No. 76-1595; Arthur [436 U.S. 775, 778] B. Hanson, Aloysius B. McCabe, and Michael Yourshaw filed briefs for petitioner in No. 76-1604; John B. Kenkel and William M. Barnard filed a brief for petitioners in No. 76-1624; and John H. Midlen and John H. Midlen, Jr., filed a brief for petitioners in No. 76-1685. </s> Daniel M. Armstrong argued the cause for the Federal Communications Commission, petitioner in No. 76-1471 and a respondent in No. 76-1595. With him on the briefs were Sheldon M. Guttmann and Keith H. Fagan. </s> Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Shenefield, Frank H. Easterbrook, Barry Grossman, Robert B. Nicholson, and Bruce E. Fein. </s> Charles M. Firestone argued the cause for National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, a respondent in No. 76-1471, 76-1521, 76-1604, 76-1624, and 76-1685. With him on the brief were Edward J. Kuhlmann and Nolan A. Bowie. </s> James A. McKenna, Jr., and Thomas N. Frohock filed a brief for American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., a respondent in Nos. 76-1471, 76-1521, 76-1604, 76-1624, and 76-1685. </s> R. Russell Eagan, Robert A. Beizer, John P. Southmayd, Thomas H. Wall, Alan C. Campbell, Richard Hildreth, and James E. Greeley filed a brief for Gray Communications Systems, Inc., et al., respondents in Nos. 76-1471, 76-1521, 76-1595, 76-1604, and 76-1685. </s> Paul Dobin and Ian D. Volner filed a brief in No. 76-1471 for Louisiana Television Broadcasting Corp., as respondent under this Court's Rule 21 (4).Fn </s> Fn [436 U.S. 775, 778] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Mr. Griswold and Victor E. Ferrall, Jr., for Dispatch Printing Co. et al., and by J. Roger Wollenberg, Timothy N. Black, John F. Cooney, and John E. Flick for Times Mirror Co. </s> Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by the National [436 U.S. 775, 779] Emergency Civil Liberties Foundation, and by Earle K. Moore for the Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ et al. [436 U.S. 775, 779] </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> At issue in these cases are Federal Communications Commission regulations governing the permissibility of common ownership of a radio or television broadcast station and a daily newspaper located in the same community. Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, Second Report and Order, 50 F. C. C. 2d 1046 (1975) (hereinafter cited as Order), as amended upon reconsideration, 53 F. C. C. 2d 589 (1975), codified in 47 CFR 73.35, 73.240, 73.636 (1976). The regulations, adopted after a lengthy rulemaking proceeding, prospectively bar formation or transfer of co-located newspaper-broadcast combinations. Existing combinations are generally permitted to continue in operation. However, in communities in which there is common ownership of the only daily newspaper and the only broadcast station, or (where there is more than one broadcast station) of the only daily newspaper and the only television station, divestiture of either the newspaper or the broadcast station is required within five years, unless grounds for waiver are demonstrated. </s> The questions for decision are whether these regulations either exceed the Commission's authority under the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151 et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. V), or violate the First or Fifth Amendment rights of newspaper owners; and whether the lines drawn by the Commission between new and existing newspaper-broadcast combinations, and between existing combinations subject to divestiture and those allowed to continue in operation, are arbitrary or capricious within the meaning of 10 (e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706 (2) (A) (1976 ed.). For the reasons set forth below, we sustain the regulations in their entirety. [436 U.S. 775, 780] </s> I </s> A </s> Under the regulatory scheme established by the Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162, and continued in the Communications Act of 1934, no television or radio broadcast station may operate without a license granted by the Federal Communications Commission. 47 U.S.C. 301. Licensees who wish to continue broadcasting must apply for renewal of their licenses every three years, and the Commission may grant an initial license or a renewal only if it finds that the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served thereby. 307 (a), (d), 308 (a), 309 (a), (d). </s> In setting its licensing policies, the Commission has long acted on the theory that diversification of mass media ownership serves the public interest by promoting diversity of program and service viewpoints, as well as by preventing undue concentration of economic power. See, e. g., Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 45 F. C. C. 1476, 1476-1477 (1964). This perception of the public interest has been implemented over the years by a series of regulations imposing increasingly stringent restrictions on multiple ownership of broadcast stations. In the early 1940's, the Commission promulgated rules prohibiting ownership or control of more than one station in the same broadcast service (AM radio, FM radio, or television) in the same community. 1 </s> [436 U.S. 775, 781] In 1953, limitations were placed on the total number of stations in each service a person or entity may own or control. 2 And in 1970, the Commission adopted regulations prohibiting on a prospective basis, common ownership of a VHF television station and any radio station serving the same market. 3 </s> More generally, "[d]iversification of control of the media of mass communications" has been viewed by the Commission as "a factor of primary significance" in determining who, among competing applicants in a comparative proceeding, should receive the initial license for a particular broadcast facility. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F. C. C. 2d 393, 394-395 (1965) (italics omitted). Thus, prior to adoption of the regulations at issue here, the fact that an applicant for an initial license published a newspaper in the community to be served by the broadcast station was taken into account on a case-by-case basis, and resulted in some instances in awards of licenses to competing applicants. 4 </s> [436 U.S. 775, 782] </s> Diversification of ownership has not been the sole consideration thought relevant to the public interest, however, The Commission's other, and sometimes conflicting, goal has been to ensure "the best practicable service to the public." Id., at 394. To achieve this goal, the Commission has weighed factors such as the anticipated contribution of the owner to station operations, the proposed program service, and the past broadcast record of the applicant - in addition to diversification of ownership - in making initial comparative licensing decisions. See id., at 395-400. Moreover, the Commission has given considerable weight to a policy of avoiding undue disruption of existing service. 5 As a result, newspaper owners [436 U.S. 775, 783] in many instances have been able to acquire broadcast licenses for stations serving the same communities as their newspapers, and the Commission has repeatedly renewed such licenses on findings that continuation of the service offered by the common owner would serve the public interest. See Order, at 1066-1067, 1074-1075. </s> B </s> Against this background, the Commission began the instant rulemaking proceeding in 1970 to consider the need for a more restrictive policy toward newspaper ownership of radio and television broadcast stations. Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Docket No. 18110), 22 F. C. C. 2d 339 (1970). 6 Citing studies showing the dominant role of television stations and daily newspapers as sources of local news and other information, id., at 346; see id., at 344-346, 7 the notice of [436 U.S. 775, 784] rulemaking proposed adoption of regulations that would eliminate all newspaper-broadcast combinations serving the same market, by prospectively banning formation or transfer of such combinations and requiring dissolution of all existing combinations within five years, id., at 346. The Commission suggested that the proposed regulations would serve "the purpose of promoting competition among the mass media involved, and maximizing diversification of service sources and viewpoints." Ibid. At the same time, however, the Commission expressed "substantial concern" about the disruption of service that might result from divestiture of existing combinations. Id., at 348. Comments were invited on all aspects of the proposed rules. </s> The notice of rulemaking generated a considerable response. Nearly 200 parties, including the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, various broadcast and newspaper interests, public interest groups, and academic and research entities, filed comments on the proposed rules. In addition, a number of studies were submitted, dealing with the effects of newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership on competition and station performance, the economic consequences of divestiture, and the degree of diversity present in the mass media. In March 1974, the Commission requested further comments directed primarily to the core problem of newspaper-television station cross-ownership, Memorandum Opinion and Order (Docket No. 18110), 47 F. C. C. 2d 97 (1974), and close to 50 sets of additional comments were filed. In July 1974, the Commission held three days of oral argument, at which all parties who requested time were allowed to speak. </s> The regulations at issue here were promulgated and explained in a lengthy report and order released by the Commission on January 31, 1975. The Commission concluded, first, that it had statutory authority to issue the regulations under the Communications Act, Order, at 1048, citing 47 U.S.C. 2 (a), 4 (i), 4 (j), 301, 303, 309 (a), and that the [436 U.S. 775, 785] regulations were valid under the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution, Order, at 1050-1051. It observed that "[t]he term public interest encompasses many factors including `the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.'" Order, at 1048, quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945), and that "ownership carries with it the power to select, to edit, and to choose the methods, manner and emphasis of presentation," Order, at 1050. The Order further explained that the prospective ban on creation of co-located newspaper-broadcast combinations was grounded primarily in First Amendment concerns, while the divestiture regulations were based on both First Amendment and antitrust policies. Id., at 1049. In addition, the Commission rejected the suggestion that it lacked the power to order divestiture, reasoning that the statutory requirement of license renewal every three years necessarily implied authority to order divestiture over a five-year period. Id., at 1052. </s> After reviewing the comments and studies submitted by the various parties during the course of the proceeding, the Commission then turned to an explanation of the regulations and the justifications for their adoption. The prospective rules, barring formation of new broadcast-newspaper combinations in the same market, as well as transfers of existing combinations to new owners, were adopted without change from the proposal set forth in the notice of rulemaking. 8 While recognizing [436 U.S. 775, 786] the pioneering contributions of newspaper owners to the broadcast industry, the Commission concluded that changed circumstances made it possible, and necessary, for all new licensing of broadcast stations to "be expected to add to local diversity." Id., at 1075. 9 In reaching this conclusion, the Commission did not find that existing co-located newspaper-broadcast combinations had not served the public interest, or that such combinations necessarily "spea[k] with one voice" or are harmful to competition. Id., at 1085, 1089. In the Commission's view, the conflicting studies submitted by the parties concerning the effects of newspaper ownership on competition and station performance were inconclusive, and no pattern of specific abuses by existing cross-owners was demonstrated. See id., at 1072-1073, 1085, 1089. The prospective rules were justified, instead, by reference to the Commission's policy of promoting diversification of ownership: Increases in diversification of ownership would possibly result in enhanced diversity of viewpoints, and, given the absence of persuasive countervailing considerations, "even a small gain in diversity" was "worth pursuing." Id., at 1076, 1080 n. 30. </s> With respect to the proposed across-the-board divestiture requirement, however, the Commission concluded that "a mere hoped-for gain in diversity" was not a sufficient justification. Id., at 1078. Characterizing the divestiture issues as "the most difficult" presented in the proceeding, the Order explained that the proposed rules, while correctly recognizing the central importance of diversity considerations, "may have [436 U.S. 775, 787] given too little weight to the consequences which could be expected to attend a focus on the abstract goal alone." Ibid. Forced dissolution would promote diversity, but it would also cause "disruption for the industry and hardship for individual owners," "resulting in losses or diminution of service to the public." Id., at 1078, 1080. </s> The Commission concluded that in light of these countervailing considerations divestiture was warranted only in "the most egregious cases," which it identified as those in which a newspaper-broadcast combination has an "effective monopoly" in the local "marketplace of ideas as well as economically." Id., at 1080-1081. The Commission recognized that any standards for defining which combinations fell within that category would necessarily be arbitrary to some degree, but "[a] choice had to be made." Id., at 1080. It thus decided to require divestiture only where there was common ownership of the sole daily newspaper published in a community and either (1) the sole broadcast station providing that entire community with a clear signal, or (2) the sole television station encompassing the entire community with a clear signal. Id., at 1080-1084. 10 </s> [436 U.S. 775, 788] </s> The Order identified 8 television-newspaper and 10 radio-newspaper combinations meeting the divestiture criteria. Id., at 1085, 1098. Waivers of the divestiture requirement were granted sua sponte to 1 television and 1 radio combination, leaving a total of 16 stations subject to divestiture. The Commission explained that waiver requests would be entertained in the latter cases, 11 but, absent waiver, either the newspaper or the broadcast station would have to be divested by January 1, 1980. Id., at 1084-1086. 12 </s> [436 U.S. 775, 789] </s> On petitions for reconsideration, the Commission reaffirmed the rules in all material respects. Memorandum Opinion and Order (Docket No. 18110), 53 F. C. C. 2d 589 (1975). </s> C </s> Various parties - including the National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting (NCCB), the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), the American Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA), and several broadcast licensees subject to the divestiture requirement - petitioned for review of the regulations in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 402 (a) and 28 U.S.C. 2342 (1), 2343 (1970 ed. and Supp. V). Numerous other parties intervened, and the United States - represented by the Justice Department - was made a respondent pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2344, 2348. NAB, ANPA, and the broadcast licensees subject to divestiture argued that the regulations went too far in restricting cross-ownership of newspapers and broadcast stations; NCCB and the Justice Department contended that the regulations did not go far enough and that the Commission inadequately justified its decision not to order divestiture on a more widespread basis. </s> Agreeing substantially with NCCB and the Justice Department, the Court of Appeals affirmed the prospective ban on new licensing of co-located newspaper-broadcast combinations, but vacated the limited divestiture rules, and ordered the Commission to adopt regulations requiring dissolution of all existing combinations that did not qualify for a waiver under the procedure outlined in the Order. 181 U.S. App. D.C. 1, 555 F.2d 938 (1977); see n. 11, supra. The court held, first, that the prospective ban was a reasonable means of furthering [436 U.S. 775, 790] "the highly valued goal of diversity" in the mass media, 181 U.S. App. D.C., at 17, 555 F.2d, at 954, and was therefore not without a rational basis. The court concluded further that, since the Commission "explained why it considers diversity to be a factor of exceptional importance," and since the Commission's goal of promoting diversification of mass media ownership was strongly supported by First Amendment and antitrust policies, it was not arbitrary for the prospective rules to be "based on [the diversity] factor to the exclusion of others customarily relied on by the Commission." Id., at 13 n. 33, 555 F.2d, at 950 n. 33; see id., at 11-12, 555 F.2d, at 948-949. </s> The court also held that the prospective rules did not exceed the Commission's authority under the Communications Act. The court reasoned that the public interest standard of the Act permitted, and indeed required, the Commission to consider diversification of mass media ownership in making its licensing decisions, and that the Commission's general rulemaking authority under 47 U.S.C. 303 (r) and 154 (i) allowed the Commission to adopt reasonable license qualifications implementing the public-interest standard. 181 U.S. App. D.C., at 14-15, 555 F.2d, at 951-952. The court concluded, moreover, that since the prospective ban was designed to "increas[e] the number of media voices in the community," and not to restrict or control the content of free speech, the ban would not violate the First Amendment rights of newspaper owners. Id., at 16-17, 555 F.2d, at 953-954. </s> After affirming the prospective rules, the Court of Appeals invalidated the limited divestiture requirement as arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of 10 (e) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706 (2) (A) (1976 ed.). The court's primary holding was that the Commission lacked a rational basis for "grandfathering" most existing combinations while banning all new combinations. The court reasoned that the Commission's own diversification policy, as [436 U.S. 775, 791] reinforced by First Amendment policies and the Commission's statutory obligation to "encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest," 47 U.S.C. 303 (g), required the Commission to adopt a "presumption" that stations owned by co-located newspapers "do not serve the public interest," 181 U.S. App. D.C., at 25-26, 555 F.2d, at 962-963. The court observed that, in the absence of countervailing policies, this "presumption" would have dictated adoption of an across-the-board divestiture requirement, subject only to waiver "in those cases where the evidence clearly discloses that cross-ownership is in the public interest." Id., at 29, 555 F.2d, at 966. The countervailing policies relied on by the Commission in its decision were, in the court's view, "lesser policies" which had not been given as much weight in the past as its diversification policy. Id., at 28, 555 F.2d, at 965. And "the record [did] not disclose the extent to which divestiture would actually threaten these [other policies]." Ibid. The court concluded, therefore, that it was irrational for the Commission not to give controlling weight to its diversification policy and thus to extend the divestiture requirement to all existing combinations. 13 </s> The Court of Appeals held further that, even assuming a difference in treatment between new and existing combinations [436 U.S. 775, 792] was justifiable, the Commission lacked a rational basis for requiring divestiture in the 16 "egregious" cases while allowing the remainder of the existing combinations to continue in operation. The court suggested that "limiting divestiture to small markets of `absolute monopoly' squanders the opportunity where divestiture might do the most good," since "[d]ivestiture . . . may be more useful in the larger markets." Id., at 29, 555 F.2d, at 966. The court further observed that the record "[did] not support the conclusion that divestiture would be more harmful in the grandfathered markets than in the 16 affected markets," nor did it demonstrate that the need for divestiture was stronger in those 16 markets. Ibid. On the latter point, the court noted that, "[a]lthough the affected markets contain fewer voices, the amount of diversity in communities with additional independent voices may in fact be no greater." Ibid. </s> The Commission, NAB, ANPA, and several cross-owners who had been intervenors below, and whose licenses had been grandfathered under the Commission's rules but were subject to divestiture under the Court of Appeals' decision, petitioned this Court for review. 14 We granted certiorari, 434 U.S. 815 (1977), and we now affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it upholds the prospective ban and reverse the judgment insofar as it vacates the limited divestiture requirement. 15 </s> [436 U.S. 775, 793] </s> II </s> Petitioners NAB and ANPA contend that the regulations promulgated by the Commission exceed its statutory rulemaking authority and violate the constitutional rights of newspaper owners. We turn first to the statutory, and then to the constitutional, issues. </s> A </s> (1) </s> Section 303 (r) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 303 (r), provides that "the Commission from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires, shall . . . [m]ake such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of [the Act]." See also 47 U.S.C. 154 (i). As the Court of Appeals recognized, 181 U.S. App. D.C., at 14, 555 F.2d, at 951, it is now well established that this general rulemaking authority supplies a statutory basis for the Commission to issue regulations codifying its view of the public-interest licensing standard, so long as that view is based on consideration of permissible factors and is otherwise reasonable. If a license applicant does not qualify under standards set forth in such regulations, and does not proffer sufficient grounds for waiver or change of those standards, the Commission may deny the application without further inquiry. See United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., [436 U.S. 775, 794] 351 U.S. 192 (1956); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). </s> This Court has specifically upheld this rulemaking authority in the context of regulations based on the Commission's policy of promoting diversification of ownership. In United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., supra, we sustained the portion of the Commission's multiple-ownership rules placing limitations on the total number of stations in each broadcast service a person may own or control. See n. 2, supra. And in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra, we affirmed regulations that, inter alia, prohibited broadcast networks from owning more than one AM radio station in the same community, and from owning "`any standard broadcast station in any locality where the existing standard broadcast stations are so few or of such unequal desirability . . . that competition would be substantially restrained by such licensing.'" See 319 U.S., at 206 -208; n. 1, supra. </s> Petitioner NAB attempts to distinguish these cases on the ground that they involved efforts to increase diversification within the boundaries of the broadcasting industry itself, whereas the instant regulations are concerned with diversification of ownership in the mass communications media as a whole. NAB contends that, since the Act confers jurisdiction on the Commission only to regulate "communication by wire or radio," 47 U.S.C. 152 (a), it is impermissible for the Commission to use its licensing authority with respect to broadcasting to promote diversity in an overall communications market which includes, but is not limited to, the broadcasting industry. </s> This argument undersells the Commission's power to regulate broadcasting in the "public interest." In making initial licensing decisions between competing applicants, the Commission has long given "primary significance" to "diversification of control of the media of mass communications," and has denied licenses to newspaper owners on the basis of this policy [436 U.S. 775, 795] in appropriate cases. See supra, at 781, and n. 4. As we have discussed on several occasions, see, e. g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra, at 210-218; Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 -377, 387-388 (1969), the physical scarcity of broadcast frequencies, as well as problems of interference between broadcast signals, led Congress to delegate broad authority to the Commission to allocate broadcast licenses in the "public interest." And "[t]he avowed aim of the Communications Act of 1934 was to secure the maximum benefits of radio to all the people of the United States." National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra, at 217. It was not inconsistent with the statutory scheme, therefore, for the Commission to conclude that the maximum benefit to the "public interest" would follow from allocation of broadcast licenses so as to promote diversification of the mass media as a whole. </s> Our past decisions have recognized, moreover, that the First Amendment and antitrust values underlying the Commission's diversification policy may properly be considered by the Commission in determining where the public interest lies. "[T]he `public interest' standard necessarily invites reference to First Amendment principles," Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 122 (1973), and, in particular, to the First Amendment goal of achieving "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources," Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S., at 20 . See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 385, 390. See also United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 667 -669, and n. 27 (1972) (plurality opinion). And, while the Commission does not have power to enforce the antitrust laws as such, it is permitted to take antitrust policies into account in making licensing decisions pursuant to the public-interest standard. See, e. g., United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 , [436 U.S. 775, 796] 351 (1959); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra, at 222-224. Indeed we have noted, albeit in dictum: </s> "[I]n a given case the Commission might find that antitrust considerations alone would keep the statutory standard from being met, as when the publisher of the sole newspaper in an area applies for a license for the only available radio and television facilities, which, if granted, would give him a monopoly of that area's major media of mass communication." United States v. Radio Corp. of America, supra, at 351-352. </s> (2) </s> It is thus clear that the regulations at issue are based on permissible public-interest goals and, so long as the regulations are not an unreasonable means for seeking to achieve these goals, they fall within the general rulemaking authority recognized in the Storer Broadcasting and National Broadcasting cases. Petitioner ANPA contends that the prospective rules are unreasonable in two respects: 16 first, the rulemaking record did not conclusively establish that prohibiting common ownership of co-located newspapers and broadcast stations would in fact lead to increases in the diversity of viewpoints among local communications media; and second, the regulations were based on the diversification factor to the exclusion of other service factors considered in the past by the Commission in making initial licensing decisions regarding newspaper owners, see supra, at 782. With respect to the first point, we agree with the Court of Appeals that, notwithstanding the inconclusiveness of the rulemaking record, the Commission acted rationally in finding that diversification of ownership would enhance the possibility of achieving greater diversity of viewpoints. As the Court of Appeals observed, "[d]iversity and its effects are . . . elusive concepts, not easily defined let [436 U.S. 775, 797] alone measured without making qualitative judgments objectionable on both policy and First Amendment grounds." 181 U.S. App. D.C., at 24, 555 F.2d, at 961. Moreover, evidence of specific abuses by common owners is difficult to compile; "the possible benefits of competition do not lend themselves to detailed forecast." FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 96 (1953). In these circumstances, the Commission was entitled to rely on its judgment, based on experience, that "it is unrealistic to expect true diversity from a commonly owned station-newspaper combination. The divergency of their viewpoints cannot be expected to be the same as if they were antagonistically run." Order, at 1079-1080; see 181 U.S. App. D.C., at 25, 555 F.2d, at 962. </s> As to the Commission's decision to give controlling weight to its diversification goal in shaping the prospective rules, the Order makes clear that this change in policy was a reasonable administrative response to changed circumstances in the broadcasting industry. Order, at 1074-1075; see FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 -138 (1940). The Order explained that, although newspaper owners had previously been allowed, and even encouraged, to acquire licenses for co-located broadcast stations because of the shortage of qualified license applicants, a sufficient number of qualified and experienced applicants other than newspaper owners was now available. In addition, the number of channels open for new licensing had diminished substantially. It had thus become both feasible and more urgent for the Commission to take steps to increase diversification of ownership, and a change in the Commission's policy toward new licensing offered the possibility of increasing diversity without causing any disruption of existing service. In light of these considerations, the Commission clearly did not take an irrational view of the public interest when it decided to impose a prospective ban on new licensing of co-located newspaper-broadcast combinations. 17 </s> [436 U.S. 775, 798] </s> B </s> Petitioners NAB and ANPA also argue that the regulations, though designed to further the First Amendment goal of [436 U.S. 775, 799] achieving "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources," Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S., at 20 , nevertheless violate the First Amendment rights of newspaper owners. We cannot agree, for this argument ignores the fundamental proposition that there is no "unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S., at 388 . </s> The physical limitations of the broadcast spectrum are well known. Because of problems of interference between broadcast signals, a finite number of frequencies can be used productively; this number is far exceeded by the number of persons wishing to broadcast to the public. In light of this physical scarcity, Government allocation and regulation of broadcast frequencies are essential, as we have often recognized. Id., at 375-377, 387-388; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S., at 210 -218; Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 282 (1933); see supra, at 795. No one here questions the need for such allocation and regulation, and, given that need, we see nothing in the First Amendment to prevent the Commission from allocating licenses so as to promote the "public interest" in diversification of the mass communications media. </s> NAB and ANPA contend, however, that it is inconsistent with the First Amendment to promote diversification by barring a newspaper owner from owning certain broadcasting stations. In support, they point to our statement in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), to the effect that "government may [not] restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others," id., at 48-49. As Buckley also recognized, however, "`the broadcast media pose unique and special problems not present in the traditional free speech case.'" Id., at 50 n. 55, quoting Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S., [436 U.S. 775, 800] at 101. Thus efforts to "`enhanc[e] the volume and quality of coverage' of public issues" through regulation of broadcasting may be permissible where similar efforts to regulate the print media would not be. 424 U.S., at 50 -51, and n. 55, quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 393; cf. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). Requiring those who wish to obtain a broadcast license to demonstrate that such would serve the "public interest" does not restrict the speech of those who are denied licenses; rather, it preserves the interests of the "people as a whole . . . in free speech." Red Lion Broadcasting Co., supra, at 390. As we stated in Red Lion, "to deny a station license because `the public interest' requires it `is not a denial of free speech.'" 395 U.S., at 389 , quoting National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra, at 227. See also Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., supra. </s> Relying on cases such as Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), and Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), NAB and ANPA also argue that the regulations unconstitutionally condition receipt of a broadcast license upon forfeiture of the right to publish a newspaper. Under the regulations, however, a newspaper owner need not forfeit anything in order to acquire a license for a station located in another community. 18 More importantly, in the cases relied on by those petitioners, unlike the instant case, denial of a benefit had the effect of [436 U.S. 775, 801] abridging freedom of expression, since the denial was based solely on the content of constitutionally protected speech; in Speiser veterans were deprived of a special property-tax exemption if they declined to subscribe to a loyalty oath, while in Elrod certain public employees were discharged or threatened with discharge because of their political affiliation. As we wrote in National Broadcasting, supra, "the issue before us would be wholly different" if "the Commission [were] to choose among applicants upon the basis of their political, economic or social views." 319 U.S., at 226 . Here the regulations are not content related; moreover, their purpose and effect is to promote free speech, not to restrict it. </s> Finally, NAB and ANPA argue that the Commission has unfairly "singled out" newspaper owners for more stringent treatment than other license applicants. 19 But the regulations treat newspaper owners in essentially the same fashion as other owners of the major media of mass communications were already treated under the Commission's multiple-ownership rules, see supra, at 780-781, and nn. 1-3; owners of radio stations, television stations, and newspapers alike are now restricted in their ability to acquire licenses for co-located broadcast stations. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), in which this Court struck down a state tax imposed only on newspapers, is thus distinguishable in the degree to which newspapers were singled out for special treatment. In addition, the effect of the tax in Grosjean was "to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled," id., at 250, an effect inconsistent with the protection conferred on the press by the First Amendment. </s> In the instant case, far from seeking to limit the flow of information, the Commission has acted, in the Court of Appeals' words, "to enhance the diversity of information heard by the public without on-going government surveillance of the [436 U.S. 775, 802] content of speech." 181 U.S. App. D.C., at 17, 555 F.2d, at 954. The regulations are a reasonable means of promoting the public interest in diversified mass communications; thus they do not violate the First Amendment rights of those who will be denied broadcast licenses pursuant to them. 20 Being forced to "choose among applicants for the same facilities," the Commission has chosen on a "sensible basis," one designed to further, rather than contravene, "the system of freedom of expression." T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 663 (1970). </s> III </s> After upholding the prospective aspect of the Commission's regulations, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Commission's decision to limit divestiture to 16 "egregious cases" of "effective monopoly" was arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of 10 (e) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. 706 (2) (A) (1976 ed.). 21 We agree with the Court of Appeals that regulations [436 U.S. 775, 803] promulgated after informal rulemaking, while not subject to review under the "substantial evidence" test of the APA, 5 U.S.C. 706 (2) (E) (1976 ed.) quoted in n. 21, supra, may be invalidated by a reviewing court under the "arbitrary or capricious" standard if they are not rational and based on consideration of the relevant factors. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413 -416 (1971). Although this review "is to be searching and careful," "[t]he court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency." Id., at 416. </s> In the view of the Court of Appeals, the Commission lacked a rational basis, first, for treating existing newspaper-broadcast combinations more leniently than combinations that might seek licenses in the future; and, second, even assuming a distinction between existing and new combinations had been justified, for requiring divestiture in the "egregious cases" while allowing all other existing combinations to continue in operation. We believe that the limited divestiture requirement reflects a rational weighing of competing policies, and we therefore reinstate the portion of the Commission's order that was invalidated by the Court of Appeals. </s> A </s> (1) </s> The Commission was well aware that separating existing newspaper-broadcast combinations would promote diversification of ownership. It concluded, however, that ordering widespread [436 U.S. 775, 804] spread divestiture would not result in "the best practicable service to the American public," Order, at 1074, a goal that the Commission has always taken into account and that has been specifically approved by this Court, FCC v. Sanders Bros Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940); see supra, at 782. In particular, the Commission expressed concern that divestiture would cause "disruption for the industry" and "hardship for individual owners," both of which would result in harm to the public interest. Order, at 1078. Especially in light of the fact that the number of co-located newspaper-broadcast combinations was already on the decline as a result of natural market forces, and would decline further as a result of the prospective rules, the Commission decided that across-the-board divestiture was not warranted. See id., at 1080 n. 29. </s> The Order identified several specific respects in which the public interest would or might be harmed if a sweeping divestiture requirement were imposed: the stability and continuity of meritorious service provided by the newspaper owners as a group would be lost; owners who had provided meritorious service would unfairly be denied the opportunity to continue in operation; "economic dislocations" might prevent new owners from obtaining sufficient working capital to maintain the quality of local programming; 22 and local ownership of broadcast stations would probably decrease. 23 Id., at 1078. [436 U.S. 775, 805] We cannot say that the Commission acted irrationally in concluding that these public-interest harms outweighed the potential gains that would follow from increasing diversification of ownership. </s> In the past, the Commission has consistently acted on the theory that preserving continuity of meritorious service furthers the public interest, both in its direct consequence of bringing proved broadcast service to the public, and in its indirect consequence of rewarding - and avoiding losses to - licensees who have invested the money and effort necessary to produce quality performance. 24 Thus, although a broadcast license must be renewed every three years, and the licensee must satisfy the Commission that renewal will serve the public interest, both the Commission and the courts have recognized that a licensee who has given meritorious service has a "legitimate renewal expectanc[y]" that is "implicit in the structure of the Act" and should not be destroyed absent good cause. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 143 U.S. App. D.C. 383, 396, 444 F.2d 841, 854 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971); see Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 145 U.S. App. D.C. 32, 44, and n. 35, 447 F.2d 1201, 1213, and n. 35 (1971); In re Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Applicant, Stemming From the Comparative Hearing Process, 66 F. C. C. 2d 419, 420 [436 U.S. 775, 806] (1977); n. 5, supra. 25 Accordingly, while diversification of ownership is a relevant factor in the context of license renewal as well as initial licensing, the Commission has long considered the past performance of the incumbent as the most important factor in deciding whether to grant license renewal and thereby to allow the existing owner to continue in operation. Even where an incumbent is challenged by a competing applicant who offers greater potential in terms of diversification, the Commission's general practice has been to go with the "proved product" and grant renewal if the incumbent has rendered meritorious service. See generally In re Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Applicant, Stemming from the Comparative Hearing Process, supra; n. 5, supra. </s> In the instant proceeding, the Commission specifically noted that the existing newspaper-broadcast cross-owners as a group had a "long record of service" in the public interest; many were pioneers in the broadcasting industry and had established and continued "[t]raditions of service" from the outset. Order, at 1078. 26 Notwithstanding the Commission's diversification policy, all were granted initial licenses upon findings that the public interest would be served thereby, and those that had been in existence for more than three years had also had their [436 U.S. 775, 807] licenses renewed on the ground that the public interest would be furthered. The Commission noted, moreover, that its own study of existing co-located newspaper-television combinations showed that in terms of percentage of time devoted to several categories of local programming, these stations had displayed "an undramatic but nonetheless statistically significant superiority" over other television stations. Id., at 1078 n. 26. 27 An across-the-board divestiture requirement would result in loss of the services of these superior licensees, and - whether divestiture caused actual losses to existing owners, or just denial of reasonably anticipated gains - the result would be that future licensees would be discouraged from investing the resources necessary to produce quality service. </s> At the same time, there was no guarantee that the licensees who replaced the existing cross-owners would be able to provide the same level of service or demonstrate the same long-term commitment to broadcasting. And even if the new owners were able in the long run to provide similar or better service, the Commission found that divestiture would cause serious disruption in the transition period. Thus, the Commission observed that new owners "would lack the long knowledge of the community and would have to begin raw," and - because of high interest rates - might not be able to obtain sufficient working capital to maintain the quality of local programming. Id., at 1078; see n. 22, supra. 28 </s> [436 U.S. 775, 808] </s> The Commission's fear that local ownership would decline was grounded in a rational prediction, based on its knowledge of the broadcasting industry and supported by comments in the record, see Order, at 1068-1069, that many of the existing newspaper-broadcast combinations owned by local interests would respond to the divestiture requirement by trading stations with out-of-town owners. It is undisputed that roughly 75% of the existing co-located newspaper-television combinations are locally owned, see 181 U.S. App. D.C., at 26-27, 555 F.2d, at 963-964, and these owners' knowledge of their local communities and concern for local affairs, built over a period of years, would be lost if they were replaced with outside interests. Local ownership in and of itself had been recognized to be a factor of some - if relatively slight - significance even in the context of initial licensing decisions. See Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F. C. C. 2d, at 396. It was not unreasonable, therefore, for the Commission to consider it as one of several factors militating against divestiture of combinations that have been in existence for many years. 29 </s> [436 U.S. 775, 809] </s> In light of these countervailing considerations, we cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that it was arbitrary and capricious for the Commission to "grandfather" most existing combinations, and to leave opponents of these combinations to their remedies in individual renewal proceedings. In the latter connection we note that, while individual renewal proceedings are unlikely to accomplish any "overall restructuring" of the existing ownership patterns, the Order does make clear that existing combinations will be subject to challenge by competing applicants in renewal proceedings, to the same extent as they were prior to the instant rulemaking proceedings. Order, at 1087-1088 (emphasis omitted); see n. 12, supra. That is, diversification of ownership will be a relevant but somewhat secondary factor. And, even in the absence of a competing applicant, license renewal may be denied if, inter alia, a challenger can show that a common owner has engaged in specific economic or programming abuses. See nn. 12 and 13, supra. </s> (2) </s> In concluding that the Commission acted unreasonably in not extending its divestiture requirement across the board, the Court of Appeals apparently placed heavy reliance on a "presumption" that existing newspaper-broadcast combinations "do not serve the public interest". See supra, at 790-791. The court derived this presumption primarily from the Commission's own diversification policy, as "reaffirmed" by adoption of the prospective rules in this proceeding, and secondarily from "[t]he policies of the First Amendment," 181 U.S. App. D.C., at 26, 555 F.2d, at 963, and the Commission's statutory duty to "encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest," 47 U.S.C. 303 (g). As explained [436 U.S. 775, 810] in Part II above, we agree that diversification of ownership furthers statutory and constitutional policies, and, as the Commission recognized, separating existing newspaper-broadcast combinations would promote diversification. But the weighing of policies under the "public interest" standard is a task that Congress has delegated to the Commission in the first instance, and we are unable to find anything in the Communications Act, the First Amendment, or the Commission's past or present practices that would require the Commission to "presume" that its diversification policy should be given controlling weight in all circumstances. 30 </s> Such a "presumption" would seem to be inconsistent with the Commission's longstanding and judicially approved practice of giving controlling weight in some circumstances to its more general goal of achieving "the best practicable service to the public." Certainly, as discussed in Part III-A (1) above, the Commission through its license renewal policy has made clear that it considers diversification of ownership to be a factor of less significance when deciding whether to allow an existing licensee to continue in operation than when evaluating applicants seeking initial licensing. Nothing in the language or the legislative history of 303 (g) indicates that Congress intended to foreclose all differences in treatment between new and existing licensees, and indeed, in amending 307 (d) of the Act in 1952, Congress appears to have lent its approval to the Commission's policy of evaluating existing licensees on a [436 U.S. 775, 811] somewhat different basis from new applicants. 31 Moreover, if enactment of the prospective rules in this proceeding itself were deemed to create a "presumption" in favor of divestiture, the Commission's ability to experiment with new policies would be severely hampered. One of the most significant advantages of the administrative process is its ability to adapt to new circumstances in a flexible manner, see FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S., at 137 -138, and we are unwilling to presume that the Commission acts unreasonably when it decides to try out a change in licensing policy primarily on a prospective basis. </s> The Court of Appeals also relied on its perception that the policies militating against divestiture were "lesser policies" to which the Commission had not given as much weight in the past as its diversification policy. See supra, at 791. This perception is subject to much the same criticism as the "presumption" that existing co-located newspaper-broadcasting combinations do not serve the public interest. The Commission's past concern with avoiding disruption of existing service is amply illustrated by its license renewal policies. In addition, it is worth noting that in the past when the Commission has [436 U.S. 775, 812] changed its multiple-ownership rules it has almost invariably tailored the changes so as to operate wholly or primarily on a prospective basis. For example, the regulations adopted in 1970 prohibiting common ownership of a VHF television station and a radio station serving the same market were made to apply only to new licensing decisions; no divestiture of existing combinations was required. See n. 3 supra. The limits set in 1953 on the total numbers of stations a person could own, upheld by this Court in United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956), were intentionally set at levels that would not require extensive divestiture of existing combinations. See Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 18 F. C. C., at 292. And, while the rules adopted in the early 1940's prohibiting ownership or control of more than one station in the same broadcast service in the same community required divestiture of approximately 20 AM radio combinations, FCC Eleventh Annual Report 12 (1946), the Commission afforded an opportunity for case-by-case review, see Multiple Ownership of Standard Broadcast Stations, 8 Fed. Reg. 16065 (1943). Moreover, television and FM radio had not yet developed, so that application of the rules to these media was wholly prospective. See Rules and Regulations Governing Commercial Television Broadcast Stations, supra, n. 1; Rules Governing Standard and High Frequency Broadcast Stations, supra, n. 1. </s> The Court of Appeals apparently reasoned that the Commission's concerns with respect to disruption of existing service, economic dislocations, and decreases in local ownership necessarily could not be very weighty since the Commission has a practice of routinely approving voluntary transfers and assignments of licenses. See 181 U.S. App. D.C., at 26-28, 555 F.2d. at 963-965. But the question of whether the Commission should compel proved licensees to divest their stations is a different question from whether the public interest is served [436 U.S. 775, 813] by allowing transfers by licensees who no longer wish to continue in the business. As the Commission's brief explains: </s> "[I]f the Commission were to force broadcasters to stay in business against their will, the service provided under such circumstances, albeit continuous, might well not be worth preserving. Thus, the fact that the Commission approves assignments and transfers in no way undermines its decision to place a premium on the continuation of proven past service by those licensees who wish to remain in business." Brief for Petitioner in No. 76-1471, p. 38 (footnote omitted). 32 </s> The Court of Appeals' final basis for concluding that the Commission acted arbitrarily in not giving controlling weight to its divestiture policy was the Court's finding that the rulemaking record did not adequately "disclose the extent to which divestiture would actually threaten" the competing policies relied upon by the Commission. 181 U.S. App. D.C., at 28, 555 F.2d, at 965. However, to the extent that factual determinations were involved in the Commission's decision to "grandfather" most existing combinations, they were primarily of a judgmental or predictive nature - e. g., whether a divestiture requirement would result in trading of stations with out-of-town owners; whether new owners would perform as well as existing crossowners, either in the short run or in the long run; whether losses to existing owners would result from forced sales; whether such losses would discourage future investment in quality programming; and whether new owners would have sufficient working capital to finance local programming. [436 U.S. 775, 814] In such circumstances complete factual support in the record for the Commission's judgment or prediction is not possible or required; "a forecast of the direction in which future public interest lies necessarily involves deductions based on the expert knowledge of the agency," FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 29 (1961); see Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 162 U.S. App. D.C. 331, 338-339, 499 F.2d 467, 474-475 (1974). </s> B </s> We also must conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was arbitrary to order divestiture in the 16 "egregious cases" while allowing other existing combinations to continue in operation. The Commission's decision was based not - as the Court of Appeals may have believed, see supra, at 792 - on a conclusion that divestiture would be more harmful in the "grandfathered" markets than in the 16 affected markets, but rather on a judgment that the need for diversification was especially great in cases of local monopoly. This policy judgment was certainly not irrational, see United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S., at 351 -352, and indeed was founded on the very same assumption that underpinned the diversification policy itself and the prospective rules upheld by the Court of Appeals and now by this Court - that the greater the number of owners in a market, the greater the possibility of achieving diversity of program and service viewpoints. </s> As to the Commission's criteria for determining which existing newspaper-broadcast combinations have an "effective monopoly" in the "local marketplace of ideas as well as economically," we think the standards settled upon by the Commission reflect a rational legislative-type judgment. Some line had to be drawn, and it was hardly unreasonable for the Commission to confine divestiture to communities in which there is common ownership of the only daily newspaper and [436 U.S. 775, 815] either the only television station or the only broadcast station of any kind encompassing the entire community with a clear signal. Cf. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, supra, at 351-352, quoted, supra, at 796. It was not irrational, moreover, for the Commission to disregard media sources other than newspapers and broadcast stations in setting its divestiture standards. The studies cited by the Commission in its notice of rulemaking unanimously concluded that newspapers and television are the two most widely utilized media sources for local news and discussion of public affairs; and, as the Commission noted in its Order, at 1081, "aside from the fact that [magazines and other periodicals] often had only a tiny fraction in the market, they were not given real weight since they often dealt exclusively with regional or national issues and ignored local issues." Moreover, the differences in treatment between radio and television stations, see n. 10, supra, were certainly justified in light of the far greater influence of television than radio as a source for local news. See Order, at 1083. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. </s> It is so ordered. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 See Multiple Ownership of Standard Broadcast Stations (AM radio), 8 Fed. Reg. 16065 (1943); Rules and Regulations Governing Commercial Television Broadcast Stations, 4.226, 6 Fed. Reg. 2284, 2284-2285 (1941); Rules Governing Standard and High Frequency Broadcast Stations (FM radio), 3.228 (a), 5 Fed. Reg. 2382, 2384 (1940). In 1941 the Commission issued "chain broadcasting" regulations that, among other things, prohibited any organization from operating more than one broadcast network and barred any network from owning more than one standard broadcast station in the same community. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 193 , 206-208 (1943). In 1964 the Commission tightened its multiple-ownership regulations so as to prohibit [436 U.S. 775, 781] common ownership of any stations in the same broadcast service that have overlaps in certain service contours. See Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 45 F. C. C. 1476 (1964). </s> [Footnote 2 See Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 18 F. C. C. 288 (1953). The regulations limited each person to a total of seven AM radio stations, seven FM radio stations, and five VHF television stations. In United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956), the regulations were upheld by this Court. </s> [Footnote 3 Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 22 F. C. C. 2d 306 (1970), as modified, 28 F. C. C. 2d 662 (1971). No divestiture of existing television-radio combinations was required. The regulations also provided that license applications involving common ownership of a UHF television station and a radio station serving the same market would be considered on a case-by-case basis and that common ownership of AM and FM radio stations serving the same market would be permitted. </s> [Footnote 4 See, e. g., McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 99 U.S. App. D.C. 195, 239 F.2d 15 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 918 (1957); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 89 U.S. App. D.C. 13, 189 F.2d 677, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 830 (1951). </s> In the early 1940's, the Commission considered adopting rules barring [436 U.S. 775, 782] common ownership of newspapers and radio stations, see Order Nos. 79 and 79-A, 6 Fed. Reg. 1580, 3302 (1941), but, after an extensive rulemaking proceeding, decided to deal with the problem on an ad hoc basis, Newspaper Ownership of Radio Stations, Notice of Dismissal of Proceeding, 9 Fed. Reg. 702 (1944). </s> [Footnote 5 The Commission's policy with respect to license renewals has undergone some evolution, but the general practice has been to place considerable weight on the incumbent's past performance and to grant renewal - even where the incumbent is challenged by a competing applicant - if the incumbent has rendered meritorious service. In 1970 the Commission adopted a policy statement purporting to codify its previous practice as to comparative license renewal hearings. Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Applicants, 22 F. C. C. 2d 424. Citing considerations of predictability and stability, the statement adopted the policy that, where an incumbent's program service "has been substantially attuned to meeting the needs and interests of its area," the incumbent would be granted an automatic preference over any new applicant without consideration of other factors - including diversification of ownership - that are taken into account in initial licensing decisions. Id., at 425. This policy statement was overturned on appeal, Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 145 U.S. App. D.C. 32, 447 F.2d 1201 (1971), on the ground that the Commission was required to hold full hearings at which all relevant public-interest factors would be considered. The court agreed with the Commission, however, that "incumbent licensees should be judged primarily on their records of past performance." Id., at 44, 447 F.2d, at 1213. The court stated further that "superior performance [by an incumbent] should be a plus of major significance in renewal [436 U.S. 775, 783] proceedings." Ibid. (emphasis in original). After the instant regulations were promulgated, the Commission adopted a new policy statement in response to the Citizens Communications decisions, returning to a case-by-case approach in which all factors would be considered, but in which the central factor would still be the past performance of the incumbent. In re Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Applicant, Stemming from the Comparative Hearing Process, 66 F. C. C. 2d 419 (1977), pet. for review pending sub nom. National Black Media Coalition v. FCC, No. 77-1500 (CADC). </s> [Footnote 6 This proceeding was a continuation of the earlier proceeding that had resulted in adoption of regulations barring new licensing of radio-VHF television combinations in the same market, while permitting AM-FM combinations and consigning radio-UHF television combinations to case-by-case treatment. See supra, at 781, and n. 3. In addition to the proposal with respect to common ownership of newspapers and broadcast stations, the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking suggested the possibility of prohibiting AM-FM combinations and requiring divestiture of existing television-radio combinations serving the same market, but these latter proposals were not adopted and they are not at issue here. See Order, at 1052-1055. </s> [Footnote 7 The studies generally showed that radio was the third most important source of news, ranking ahead of magazines and other periodicals. See 22 F. C. C. 2d, at 345. </s> [Footnote 8 The rules prohibit a newspaper owner from acquiring a license for a co-located broadcast station, either by transfer or by original licensing; if a broadcast licensee acquires a daily newspaper in the same market, it must dispose of its license within a year or by the time of its next renewal date, whichever comes later. See Order, at 1074-1076, 1099-1107. Non-commercial educational television stations and college newspapers are not included within the scope of the rules. 47 CFR 73.636, and n. 10 (1976). For purposes of the rules, ownership is defined to include operation or control, 73.636 n. 1; a "daily newspaper" is defined as "one which is published four or more days per week, which is in the English language [436 U.S. 775, 786] and which is circulated generally in the community of publication," 73.636 n. 10; and a broadcast station is considered to serve the same community as a newspaper if a specified service contour of the station - "Grade A" for television, 2 mV/m for AM, and 1 mV/m for FM - encompasses the city in which the newspaper is published, Order, at 1075. </s> [Footnote 9 The Commission did provide, however, for waiver of the prospective ban in exceptional circumstances. See Order, at 1076 n. 24, 1077; Memorandum Opinion and Order (Docket No. 18110), 53 F. C. C. 2d 589, 591, 592 (1975). </s> [Footnote 10 Radio and television stations are treated the same under the regulations to the extent that, if there is only one broadcast station serving a community - regardless of whether it is a radio or television station - common ownership of it and a co-located daily newspaper is barred. On the other hand, radio and television stations are given different weight to the extent that the presence of a radio station does not exempt a newspaper-television combination from divestiture, whereas the presence of a television station does exempt a newspaper-radio combination. The latter difference in treatment was explained on the ground that "[r]ealistically, a radio station cannot be considered the equal of either the paper or the television station in any sense, least of all in terms of being a source for news or for being the medium turned to for discussion of matters of local concern." Order, at 1083. The Commission also explained that the regulations did not take into account the presence of magazines and other periodicals, or out-of-town radio or television stations not encompassing the entire community with a clear signal, since - aside from their often small market share - these [436 U.S. 775, 788] sources could not be depended upon for coverage of local issues. See id., at 1081-1082. </s> [Footnote 11 While noting that the Commission "would not be favorably inclined to grant any request premised on views rejected when the rule was adopted," the Order stated that temporary or permanent waivers might be granted if the common owner were unable to sell his station or could sell it only at an artificially depressed price; if it could be shown that separate ownership of the newspaper and the broadcast station "cannot be supported in the locality"; or, more generally, if the underlying purposes of the divestiture rule "would be better served by continuation of the current ownership pattern." Id., at 1085. </s> [Footnote 12 As to existing newspaper-broadcast combinations not subject to the divestiture requirement, the Commission indicated that, within certain limitations, issues relating to concentration of ownership would continue to be considered on a case-by-case basis in the context of license renewal proceedings. Thus, while making clear the Commission's view that renewal proceedings were not a proper occasion for any "overall restructuring" of the broadcast industry, the Order stated that diversification of ownership would remain a relevant consideration in renewal proceedings in which common owners were challenged by competing applicants. Id., at 1088 (emphasis in original); see id., at 1087-1089; n. 5, supra. The Order suggested, moreover, that where a petition to deny renewal is filed, but no competing applicant steps forward, the renewal application would be set for hearing if a sufficient showing were made of specific abuses by a common owner, or of economic monopolization of the sort that would violate the Sherman Act. Order, at 1080 n. 29, 1088. </s> The Order does not make clear the extent to which hearings will be available on petitions to deny renewal that do not allege specific abuses or economic monopolization. Counsel for the Commission informs us, however, that the Order was intended to "limi[t] such challengers only to the [436 U.S. 775, 789] extent that [the Commission] will not permit them to re-argue in an adjudicatory setting the question already decided in this rulemaking, i. e., in what circumstances is the continued existence of co-located newspaper-broadcast combinations per se undesirable." Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. 76-1471, p. 8; see n. 13, infra. </s> [Footnote 13 The Court of Appeals apparently believed that, under the terms of the Order, future petitions to deny license renewal to existing cross-owners could be set for hearing only if they alleged economic monopolization, and not if they alleged specific programming abuses. See 181 U.S. App. D.C., at 29 n. 108, 555 F.2d, at 966 n. 108. On the basis of this assumption, the court held that the standards for petitions to deny were unreasonable. Since we do not read the Order as foreclosing the possibility of a hearing upon a claim of specific abuses, and since the Commission itself is apparently of the view that the only issue foreclosed in petitions to deny is the question of whether newspaper-broadcast ownership is per se undesirable, see n. 12, supra, we cannot say that the Order itself unreasonably limits the availability of petitions to deny renewal. The reasonableness of the Commission's actions on particular petitions to deny filed subsequent to the Order is, of course, not before us at this time. </s> [Footnote 14 Upon motion of the Commission the Court of Appeals temporarily stayed its mandate - insofar as it overturned the Commission's limited divestiture requirement - pending the filing of a petition for certiorari by the Commission. 181 U.S. App. D.C. 30, 555 F.2d 967 (1977). The Commission filed its petition for certiorari within the time allotted by the Court of Appeals, and thus the stay has remained in effect. See 28 U.S.C. 2101 (f); Fed. Rule App. Proc. 41 (b). </s> [Footnote 15 Several of the petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals exceeded the proper role of a reviewing court by directing the Commission to adopt a rule requiring divestiture of all existing combinations, rather than allowing the Commission to reconsider its decision and formulate its own [436 U.S. 775, 793] approach in light of the legal principles set forth by the court. Petitioners cite well-established authority to the effect that, absent extraordinary circumstances, "the function of the reviewing court ends when an error of law is laid bare. At that point the matter once more goes to the Commission for reconsideration." FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 20 (1952); accord, NLRB v. Food Store Employees, 417 U.S. 1, 9 -10 (1974); South Prairie Constr. Co. v. Operating Engineers, 425 U.S. 800, 805 -806 (1976). In light of our disposition of these cases, we need not decide whether the Court of Appeals was justified in departing from the latter course of action. </s> [Footnote 16 The rationality of the limited divestiture requirement is discussed in Part III, infra. </s> [Footnote 17 NAB and ANPA make one final argument in support of their position that the regulations exceed the Commission's authority. They claim that - [436 U.S. 775, 798] regardless of the otherwise broad scope of the Commission's rulemaking authority - both Congress and the Commission itself have indicated that the Commission lacks authority to promulgate any rules prohibiting newspaper owners from acquiring broadcast licenses. They rely on a legal opinion by the Commission's first General Counsel that was submitted to the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, Memorandum to the Commission; Opinion of the General Counsel, Jan. 25, 1937, reprinted in App. 445-465, and the legislative history of proposed amendments to the Act that were considered in the late 1940's and early 1950's but never passed, S. 1333, 25, Hearings on S. 1333 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); S. 1973, 14, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); S. 658, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952) (House amendment 7 (c)). </s> This argument is wholly unavailing. Apart from any questions as to the weight that should be given to a General Counsel's opinion which was never formally adopted by the Commission, and to legislative statements made subsequent to enactment of the statute being construed, see, e. g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 170 (1968); United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962), the cited materials are simply irrelevant to the issue in this case. The Commission's General Counsel merely concluded that newspaper owners, as a class, could not be absolutely barred from owning broadcast stations; he did not address the much narrower question of whether a newspaper owner may be barred from acquiring a broadcast station located in the same community as the newspaper. See Opinion of the General Counsel, supra, App. 447, 449. Similarly, the proposed amendments to the Act apparently would have only precluded the Commission from adopting a total prohibition on newspaper ownership of broadcast stations. See Hearings on S. 1333, supra, at 44, 69-70; Hearings on S. 1973 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 20-21, 42-44, 103-105 (1949); S. Rep. No. 741, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1949). Congress' rejection of the amendments as unnecessary, see House Conf. Rep. No. 2426, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 18-19 (1952); S. Rep. No. 741, supra, at 2-3 - following the Commission's representation that it lacked such authority even without the amendments, see Hearings on S. 1973, supra, at 103-104 (testimony of FCC Chairman Hyde) - sheds no light on the question at issue here. </s> [Footnote 18 We note also that the regulations are in form quite similar to the prohibitions imposed by the antitrust laws. This court has held that application of the antitrust laws to newspapers is not only consistent with, but is actually supportive of the values underlying, the First Amendment. See, e. g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139 -140 (1969). See also United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 351 -352 (1959). Since the Commission relied primarily on First Amendment rather than antitrust considerations, however, the fact that the antitrust laws are fully applicable to newspapers is not a complete answer to the issues in this case. </s> [Footnote 19 NAB frames this argument in terms of the First Amendment; ANPA advances it as an equal protection claim under the Fifth Amendment. </s> [Footnote 20 The reasonableness of the regulations as a means of achieving diversification is underscored by the fact that waivers are potentially available from both the prospective and the divestiture rules in cases in which a broadcast station and a co-located daily newspaper cannot survive without common ownership. See nn. 9, 11, supra. </s> [Footnote 21 The APA provides in relevant part: </s> "To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall - </s> . . . . . </s> "(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be - </s> "(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; </s> "(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; </s> "(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; </s> "(D) without observance of procedure required by law; </s> "(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections [436 U.S. 775, 803] 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or </s> "(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court. </s> "In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error." 5 U.S.C. 706 (2) (1976 ed.). </s> [Footnote 22 Although the Order is less than entirely clear in this regard, the Commission's theory with respect to "economic dislocations" and programming apparently was that, because of high interest rates, new owners would have to devote a substantial portion of revenues to debt service, and insufficient working capital would remain to finance local programming. See Order, at 1068 (describing comments to this effect). </s> [Footnote 23 In the Order the Commission expressed concern that a sweeping divestiture requirement "could reduce local ownership as well as the involvement of owners in management." Id., at 1078 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals questioned the validity of any reliance on owner involvement in management, because "no evidence was presented that the local owners . . . are actively involved in daily management" and the Order itself had observed that "`[m]ost of the parties state that their [436 U.S. 775, 805] broadcast stations and newspapers have separate management, facilities, and staff . . . .'" 181 U.S. App. D.C., at 27, 555 F.2d, at 964, quoting Order, at 1059. Of course, the fact that newspapers and broadcast stations are separately managed does not foreclose the possibility that the common owner participates in management of the broadcast station and not the newspaper. But in any event, the Commission clearly did not place any significant weight on this factor, and we therefore need not consider it. See 5 U.S.C. 706 (1976 ed.), quoted in part in n. 21, supra (rule of prejudicial error). </s> [Footnote 24 We agree with the Court of Appeals that "[p]rivate losses are a relevant concern under the Communications Act only when shown to have an adverse effect on the provision of broadcasting service to the public." 181 U.S. App. D.C., at 27-28, 555 F.2d, at 964-965, citing FCC v. [436 U.S. 775, 806] Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 -476 (1940), and Carroll Broadcasting v. FCC, 103 U.S. App. D.C. 346, 258 F.2d 440 (1958). Private losses that result in discouragement of investment in quality service have such an effect. </s> [Footnote 25 Section 301 of the Act provides that "no [broadcast] license shall be construed to create any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license." 47 U.S.C. 301. The fact that a licensee does not have any legal or proprietary right to a renewal does not mean, however, that the Commission cannot take into account the incumbent's past performance in deciding whether renewal would serve the public interest. See infra, at 810-811, and n. 31. </s> [Footnote 26 See B. Robbins, A Study of Pioneer AM Radio Stations and Pioneer Television Stations (1971), reprinted in App. 694-712. </s> [Footnote 27 Earlier in the Order, the Commission had noted that this study was the first to be based on the 1973 annual programming reports for television stations, which were not yet available at the time the programming studies submitted by the parties were conducted. Order, at 1073; see id., at 1094. </s> The United States suggests that the Commission could not properly have relied on this study since it was not made available to the parties for comment in advance of the Commission's decision. Brief for United States 46 n. 39. No party petitioned the Commission for reconsideration on this ground, nor was the issue raised in the Court of Appeals or in any of the petitions for certiorari, and it is therefore not before us. </s> [Footnote 28 Commissioner Hooks effectively summarized this complex of factors in [436 U.S. 775, 808] his separate opinion, concurring in the Commission's decision not to order across-the-board divestiture, while dissenting on other grounds: </s> "[A]s I contemplate the superior performance of many newspaper-owned stations . . . and speculate on the performance of some unknown successor, my conditioned response yields `a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush' philosophy. Opponents [of divestiture] ask: Why require divestiture for its own sake of a superior broadcaster, with experience, background and resources, for an unknown licensee whose operation may be inferior? Can we afford, through wide-scale divestiture, to experiment with a dogmatic diversity formula; and, after the churning has ceased, who will profit - the new owners or the public?" Order, at 1109. </s> [Footnote 29 The fact that 75%, but not all, of the existing television-newspaper combinations are locally owned does not mean that it was irrational for the Commission to take into account local ownership as one of several factors justifying a decision to "grandfather" most existing combinations, including those that are not locally owned. The Commission has substantial discretion as to whether to proceed by rulemaking or adjudication, see SEC v. [436 U.S. 775, 809] Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 201 -202 (1947), and - in the context of a rule based on a multifactor weighing process - every consideration need not be equally applicable to each individual case. </s> [Footnote 30 The Order at one point states: "If our democratic society is to function, nothing can be more important than insuring that there is a free flow of information from as many divergent sources as possible." Order, at 1079 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals recognized, however, that "the Commission probably did not intend for this . . . statemen[t] to be read literally," 181 U.S. App. D.C. at 26, 555 F.2d, at 963, and, indeed, it appears from the context that the statement was intended only as an explanation of why the Commission was adopting a First Amendment rather than an antitrust focus. </s> [Footnote 31 Prior to 1952, 307 (d) provided that decisions on renewal applications "shall be limited to and governed by the same considerations and practice which affect the granting of original applications." See Communications Act of 1934, 307 (d), 48 Stat. 1084. In 1952 the section was amended to provide simply that renewal "may be granted . . . if the Commission finds that public interest, convenience, and necessity would be served thereby." Communications Act Amendments, 1952, 5, 66 Stat. 714. The House Report explained that the previous language "is neither realistic nor does it reflect the way in which the Commission actually has handled renewal cases," H. R. Rep. No. 1750, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1952), and the Senate Report specifically stated that the Commission has the "right and duty to consider, in the case of a station which has been in operation and is applying for renewal, the overall performance of that station against the broad standard of public interest, convenience, and necessity," S. Rep. No. 44, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1951). </s> [Footnote 32 The Commission also points out, Brief for Petitioner in No. 76-1471, p. 24, that it has a rule against "trafficking" - i. e., the acquisition and sale of licenses to realize a quick profit - that applies to license transfers or assignments within three years after a licensee commences operations. See 47 CFR 1.597 (1976); Crowder v. FCC, 130 U.S. App. D.C. 198, 201-202, and nn. 22-23, 399 F.2d 569, 572-573, and nn. 22-23, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 962 (1968). </s> [436 U.S. 775, 816]

United States Supreme Court FLINT RIDGE DEV. CO. v. SCENIC RIVERS ASSN.(1976) No. 75-510 Argued: April 27, 1976Decided: June 24, 1976 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 75-545, Hills, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, et al. v. Scenic Rivers Association of Oklahoma et al., also on certiorari to the same court. </s> The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (Disclosure Act), which is designed to prevent false and deceptive practices in the interstate sale of unimproved tracts of land by requiring developers to disclose information needed by potential purchasers, requires a developer to register a subdivision by filing with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) a statement of record containing information concerning title of the land, the terms and conditions for disposing of lots, the conditions of the subdivision, including access, noise, safety, sewage, utilities, proximity to municipalities, the nature of the developer's proposed improvements, various other specified data, and such additional matters as the Secretary of HUD may require as being reasonably necessary or appropriate for the protection of purchasers. Such statement of record becomes effective automatically on the 30th day after filing unless the Secretary determines that it is on its face incomplete or materially inaccurate, in which case the effective date is suspended until 30 days after the developer files the information necessary to complete or correct the statement. After the petitioner developer had filed a statement of record with HUD concerning a certain subdivision, but before the statement became effective, respondent environmental organizations requested HUD to prepare an environmental impact statement on the development before allowing the statement of record to go into effect. Upon HUD's refusal to do so, the organizations brought suit against the Secretary and the Administrator of HUD's Office of Interstate Land Sales Registration, seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction requiring them, prior to registering the developer's statement of record, to conduct an environmental study in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), which requires all federal agencies "to the fullest [426 U.S. 776, 777] extent possible" to include "in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" an environmental impact statement analyzing the consequences of, and alternatives to, the proposed action. The District Court ruled for the organizations, holding that NEPA's requirements applied to HUD and ordering it to prepare an environmental impact statement before approving the developer's statement of record. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: NEPA's environmental impact statement requirement is inapplicable to this case. Even if the Secretary's allowing a disclosure statement to become effective constituted "major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" within the meaning of NEPA so that an environmental impact statement would ordinarily be required, there would be a clear and fundamental conflict of statutory duty, since the Secretary cannot comply with the duty under the Disclosure Act to allow statements of record to go into effect within 30 days of filing, absent inaccurate or incomplete disclosure, and simultaneously prepare impact statements on proposed developments. Pp. 785-793. </s> (a) While NEPA's instruction that all federal agencies comply with the impact statement requirement "to the fullest extent possible" is a deliberate command that the duty NEPA imposes upon the agencies to consider environmental factors not be shunted aside in the bureaucratic shuffle, nevertheless NEPA recognizes that where a clear and unavoidable conflict in statutory authority exists, NEPA must yield. Pp. 787-788. </s> (b) The Disclosure Act does not leave the Secretary discretion to suspend the effective date of the proposed statement of record for such time as is necessary to prepare an impact statement, but rather mandates that the statement of record's effective date shall be the 30th day after filing with the sole exception that the Secretary is empowered to suspend the effective date for inadequate disclosure. Pp. 788-791. </s> 520 F.2d 240, reversed and remanded. </s> MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined except POWELL, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. </s> F. Paul Thieman, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners in No. 75-510. With him on the briefs were Harry A. [426 U.S. 776, 778] Rissetto, Edwin Kronfeld, and Thomas C. Watson. Howard E. Shapiro argued the cause for petitioners in No. 75-545. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Taft, Deputy Solicitor General Randolph, Carl Strass, and K. H. Sauerbrunn. </s> Andrew T. Dalton, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents in both cases.Fn </s> Fn [426 U.S. 776, 778] Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in both cases were filed by Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, and Nicholas C. Yost and C. Foster Knight, Deputy Attorneys General, for the State of California; and by Toney Anaya, Attorney General, and Nicholas R. Gentry, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of New Mexico. </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Today we must decide whether the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) requires the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to prepare an environmental impact statement before it may allow a disclosure statement filed with it by a private real estate developer pursuant to the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (Disclosure Act) to become effective. </s> I </s> The Disclosure Act, 82 Stat. 590, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1701 et seq., is designed to prevent false and deceptive practices in the sale of unimproved tracts of land by requiring developers to disclose information needed by potential buyers. The Act is based on the full disclosure provisions and philosophy of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 77a et seq., which it resembles in many respects. Section 1404 (a) (1) of the Disclosure Act makes it unlawful for the developer [426 U.S. 776, 779] of a covered subdivision "to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce, or of the mails . . . to sell or lease any lot in any subdivision unless a statement of record with respect to such lot is in effect . . . and a printed property report . . . is furnished to the purchaser in advance of the signing of any contract or agreement for sale or lease by the purchaser." 15 U.S.C. 1703 (a) (1). </s> The statement of record and the property report, which is a condensed version of the statement of record, are prepared by the developer. They contain information concerning the title of the land; the terms and conditions for disposing of lots; the conditions of the subdivision, including access, noise, safety, sewage, utilities, proximity to municipalities, and the nature of the developer's proposed improvements; various other specified data; and such additional matters "as the Secretary [of HUD] may require as being reasonably necessary or appropriate for the protection of purchasers." 1406 (12) of the Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. 1705. 1 By regulation, the [426 U.S. 776, 780] property report is a required part of the statement of record. 2 24 CFR 1710.20 (a), (e), 1710.110 (1975). </s> A developer registers a subdivision by filing the statement [426 U.S. 776, 781] of record, including the property report, with HUD. The statement, which is effective only with respect to the lots specified therein, becomes effective automatically on the 30th day after filing, or on such earlier date as the Secretary may determine. 1405, 1407 (a) of the Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. 1704, 1706 (a). If the Secretary determines that the statement of record is on its face incomplete or inaccurate in any material respect, and so notifies the developer within 30 days of filing, the effective date is suspended until 30 days after the developer files the information necessary to complete or correct the report. 1407 (b) of the Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. 1706 (b). 3 If the statement is on its face complete and accurate, however, it must be permitted to go into effect. The Secretary has no power to evaluate the substance of the developer's proposal; and the Disclosure Act expressly provides: "The fact that a statement of record with respect to a subdivision has been filed or is in effect shall not be deemed a finding by the Secretary that the statement of record is true and accurate on its face, or be held to mean the Secretary has in any way [426 U.S. 776, 782] passed upon the merits of, or given approval to, such subdivision." 1417 of the Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. 1716. Moreover, the Act prohibits any person from advertising or representing that the Secretary approves or recommends the subdivision or the sale or lease of lots therein. 1408 (b), 1417 of the Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. 1707 (b), 1716. 4 </s> Petitioner Flint Ridge Development Co. (Flint Ridge) is a private joint venture organized to develop and sell lots in a subdivision located in northeastern Oklahoma adjacent to the Illinois River. In February 1974, the company filed with HUD a statement of record and property report relating to "Flint Ridge No. 1," which consists of approximately 1,000 residential lots on 2,200 acres of company land. The Secretary found the statement to be inaccurate and incomplete on its face, and suspended its effective date. Flint Ridge subsequently filed corrections and the amended statement became effective on May 2, 1974. Sales of lots commenced immediately thereafter. </s> Respondents Scenic Rivers Association of Oklahoma and Illinois River Conservation Council are nonprofit Oklahoma corporations organized for the purpose of protecting the Illinois River, a state-designated "scenic" river, and its undeveloped environs, which some members use for recreation. After Flint Ridge filed its statement of record, but before it became effective, respondents petitioned HUD to prepare an environmental impact statement on the development prior to allowing the statement of record to go into effect. HUD rejected the request [426 U.S. 776, 783] and respondents brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma against the Secretary of HUD and the Administrator of HUD's Office of Interstate Land Sales Registration. 5 Respondents requested a declaratory judgment and an injunction requiring that the defendants "prior to approval and registration of a statement of record and property report, under the Interstate Land Sales Act, conduct an environmental study in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act [83 Stat. 852, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.] . . . ." Record 593. Respondents also sought a preliminary injunction to require the federal defendants to "[w]ithdraw the approval of the Interstate Land Sales filing for the Flint Ridge Development Company . . . ." Id., at 597-598. The District Court permitted Flint Ridge to intervene as a defendant. </s> After a hearing, the District Court ruled for the respondents. It found that the requirements of NEPA applied to HUD and that its action in allowing Flint Ridge's statement of record to go into effect constituted major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment so as to require the preparation and filing of an environmental impact statement under NEPA. The court thereupon suspended Flint Ridge's statement of record, prohibited public sale thereunder, ordered the preparation of an environmental impact statement, and enjoined HUD "from approving the . . . filing of Flint Ridge Development Co. until such time as the environmental impact study has been prepared and a public hearing held thereon . . . ." 382 F. Supp. 69, 76 (1974). </s> On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit [426 U.S. 776, 784] reversed the District Court's holding that a public hearing was necessary on the environmental impact statement, 6 but affirmed the remainder of the District Court's decision. The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that HUD's review of disclosure statements for adequacy constituted major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the meaning of NEPA. The real estate development, the court reasoned, would have "substantial consequences to the environment," 520 F.2d 240, 244 (1975), and those consequences would come about most readily through the interstate sales that federal approval of the disclosure statement would allow. 7 Thus, the court held, this case is similar to those in which federal agencies approve particular projects, license them, or supply funding or financial guarantees. </s> The Court of Appeals deemed it immaterial to its decision that the purpose of the Disclosure Act was only to provide necessary information to potential buyers and that under the Act the Secretary had only the limited discretion to reject statements of record that were incomplete or inaccurate. These limitations were irrelevant, the court concluded, because "the NEPA impact statement requirement applies to virtually all federal agencies and is not limited to those that are concerned with the environment. One of its purposes is to require the giving of attention to environmental problems regardless [426 U.S. 776, 785] of whether the agency has authority to do anything about it." Id., at 245 (footnote omitted). Likewise, the court found, it was of no import that the Disclosure Act provides that statements of record become effective within 30 days unless suspended. Although it would take much longer to prepare an impact statement, the 30-day provision was not inconsistent with the court's holding because "[t]here is nothing in the statute . . . which prohibits the agency from suspending a statement of record pending the preparation and filing of an impact statement." Id., at 244. We granted certiorari, 423 U.S. 1013 (1975), and we now reverse. </s> II </s> Section 102 (2) (C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. 4332 (2) (C), requires all agencies of the United States "to the fullest extent possible" to "include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" an environmental impact statement analyzing the consequences of, and alternatives to, the proposed action. 8 The Secretary and Flint [426 U.S. 776, 786] Ridge offer essentially two theories for exempting HUD from this duty in the administration of the Disclosure Act. </s> First, they claim, allowing a disclosure statement to become effective is not major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the meaning of NEPA. In petitioners' view, NEPA is concerned only with introducing environmental considerations into the decisionmaking processes of agencies that have the ability to react to environmental consequences when taking action. If the agency cannot so act, its action is not "major" and does not fall within the statutory language. Thus, petitioners urge, NEPA should not be read to impose a duty on HUD to prepare an environmental impact statement in this case since the agency, by statute, has no power to take environmental consequences into account in deciding whether to allow a disclosure statement to become effective. To this respondents counter, as did the Court of Appeals, that NEPA's goals are not so narrow and that even if the agency taking action is itself powerless to protect the environment, preparation and circulation of an impact statement serves the valuable function of bringing the environmental consequences of federal actions to the attention of those who are empowered to do something [426 U.S. 776, 787] about them - other federal agencies, Congress, state agencies, or even private parties. </s> Petitioner's second argument is that even if HUD's action in allowing a disclosure statement to become effective constitutes major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the meaning of NEPA, HUD is nonetheless exempt from the duty of preparing an environmental impact statement because compliance with that duty is not possible if HUD is also to comply with the Disclosure Act's requirement that statements of record become effective within 30 days of filing, unless incomplete or inaccurate on their face. In response to this claim, respondents contend that the Secretary has an inherent power to suspend the effective date of a statement of record past the 30-day deadline in order to prepare an impact statement. Because we reject this argument of respondents and find that preparation of an impact statement is inconsistent with the Secretary's mandatory duties under the Disclosure Act, we need not resolve petitioner's first contention. </s> NEPA's instruction that all federal agencies comply with the impact statement requirement - and with all the other requirements of 102 - "to the fullest extent possible," 42 U.S.C. 4332, is neither accidental nor hyperbolic. Rather, the phrase is a deliberate command that the duty NEPA imposes upon the agencies to consider environmental factors not be shunted aside in the bureaucratic shuffle. This conclusion emerges clearly from the statement of the Senate and House conferees, who wrote the "fullest extent possible" language into NEPA: </s> "The purpose of the new language is to make it clear that each agency of the Federal Government shall comply with the directives set out in [ 102 (2)] unless the existing law applicable to such [426 U.S. 776, 788] agency's operations expressly prohibits or makes full compliance with one of the directives impossible . . . . Thus, it is the intent of the conferees that the provision `to the fullest extent possible' shall not be used by any Federal agency as a means of avoiding compliance with the directives set out in section 102. Rather, the language in section 102 is intended to assure that all agencies of the Federal Government shall comply with the directives set out in said section `to the fullest extent possible' under their statutory authorizations and that no agency shall utilize an excessively narrow construction of its existing statutory authorizations to avoid compliance." 115 Cong. Rec. 39703 (1969) (House conferees) (emphasis added). </s> See id., at 40418 (Senate conferees). See also 40 CFR 1500.4 (a) (1975). </s> Section 102 recognizes, however, that where a clear and unavoidable conflict in statutory authority exists, NEPA must give way. As we noted in United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 694 (1973), "NEPA was not intended to repeal by implication any other statute." And so the question we must resolve is whether, assuming an environmental impact statement would otherwise be required in this case, requiring the Secretary to prepare such a statement would create an irreconcilable and fundamental conflict with the Secretary's duties under the Disclosure Act. </s> The Disclosure Act provides that a statement of record becomes effective automatically 30 days after filing unless the Secretary acts affirmatively, within that time, to suspend it for inadequate disclosure. 15 U.S.C. 1706. 9 It is inconceivable that an environmental impact [426 U.S. 776, 789] statement could, in 30 days, be drafted, circulated, commented upon, and then reviewed and revised in light of the comments. 10 Respondents do not contend otherwise. Rather, they take the position, accepted by the Court of Appeals, that the statute does not preclude the Secretary from suspending the effective date of the proposed statement for such time as is necessary to prepare an impact statement. 11 </s> We find, to the contrary, that the Disclosure Act leaves [426 U.S. 776, 790] the Secretary no such discretion. The Act mandates that "[e]xcept as hereinafter provided, the effective date of a statement of record . . . shall be the thirtieth day after the filing thereof . . . ." 1407 (a), 15 U.S.C. 1706 (a) (emphasis added). The only exception to this mandatory command that is "hereinafter provided" is the power granted the Secretary to suspend the effective date of a statement "[i]f it appears to the Secretary that a statement of record . . . is on its face incomplete or inaccurate in any material respect . . . ." 1407 (b), 15 U.S.C. 1706 (b). 12 Thus, while the Secretary may unquestionably suspend an effective date in order to allow the developer to remedy an inadequate disclosure statement, there is no basis in the statute to allow the Secretary to order such a suspension so as to give HUD time to prepare an impact statement. </s> Not only does the Court of Appeals' opinion grant the Secretary a power not conferred by statute, but the exercise [426 U.S. 776, 791] of that power ordered by the court would contravene the purpose of the 30-day provision of the Disclosure Act. The 30-day time limit, as the Court of Appeals recognized, is designed to protect developers from costly delays as a result of the need to register with HUD. Yet, the Court of Appeals' reading of the statute would make such delays commonplace, and render the 30-day provision little more than a nullity. Environmental impact statements, and consequent lengthy suspensions, would be necessary in virtually all cases. 13 </s> In sum, even if the Secretary's action in this case constituted major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment so that an environmental impact statement would ordinarily be required, there would be a clear and fundamental conflict of statutory duty. The Secretary cannot comply with the statutory duty to allow statements of record to go into effect within 30 days of filing, absent inaccurate or incomplete disclosure, and simultaneously prepare impact statements on proposed developments. In these circumstances, we find that NEPA's impact statement requirement is inapplicable. [426 U.S. 776, 792] </s> This is not to say that environmental concerns are irrelevant to the Disclosure Act or that the Secretary has no duties under NEPA. Section 1406 (5) of the Disclosure Act recognizes that disclosure of some of the environmental aspects of a subdivision is necessary to protect prospective purchasers and requires such disclosure in the statement of record and property report. 15 U.S.C. 1705 (5). The developer must provide information on such factors as roads, water, sewage, drainage, soil erosion, climate, nuisances, natural hazards, municipal services, and zoning restrictions. Moreover, 1406 (12) and 1408 (a) confer on the Secretary authority to require "other information" from developers in their statements of record and property reports, both for the "protection of purchasers" and "in the public interest." 14 Therefore, if the Secretary finds it necessary for the protection of purchasers or in the public interest, the Secretary may adopt rules requiring developers to incorporate a wide range of environmental information into property reports to be furnished prospective purchasers; and respondents may request the Secretary to institute a rulemaking proceeding to consider the desirability of ordering such disclosure. 5 U.S.C. 553 (e). </s> Because the courts below erred in ordering the Secretary to prepare an impact statement before allowing [426 U.S. 776, 793] Flint Ridge's statement of record to go into effect, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> MR. JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Section 1406, 15 U.S.C. 1705, provides in full: </s> "The statement of record shall contain the information and be accompanied by the documents specified hereinafter in this section - </s> "(1) the name and address of each person having an interest in the lots in the subdivision to be covered by the statement of record and the extent of such interest; </s> "(2) a legal description of, and a statement of the total area included in, the subdivision and a statement of the topography thereof, together with a map showing the division proposed and the dimensions of the lots to be covered by the statement of record and their relation to existing streets and roads; </s> "(3) a statement of the condition of the title to the land comprising the subdivision, including all encumbrances and deed restrictions and covenants applicable thereto; </s> "(4) a statement of the general terms and conditions, including the range of selling prices or rents at which it is proposed to dispose of the lots in the subdivision; </s> "(5) a statement of the present condition of access to the subdivision, [426 U.S. 776, 780] the existence of any unusual conditions relating to noise or safety which affect the subdivision and are known to the developer, the availability of sewage disposal facilities and other public utilities (including water, electricity, gas, and telephone facilities) in the subdivision, the proximity in miles of the subdivision to nearby municipalities, and the nature of any improvements to be installed by the developer and his estimated schedule for completion; </s> "(6) in the case of any subdivision or portion thereof against which there exists a blanket encumbrance, a statement of the consequences for an individual purchaser of a failure, by the person or persons bound, to fulfill obligations under the instrument or instruments creating such encumbrance and the steps, if any, taken to protect the purchaser in such eventuality; </s> "(7) (A) copy of its articles of incorporation, with all amendments thereto, if the developer is a corporation; (B) copies of all instruments by which the trust is created or declared, if the developer is a trust; (C) copies of its articles of partnership or association and all other papers pertaining to its organization, if the developer is a partnership, unincorporated association, joint stock company, or any other form of organization; and (D) if the purported holder of legal title is a person other than developer, copies of the above documents for such person; </s> "(8) copies of the deed or other instrument establishing title to the subdivision in the developer or other person and copies of any instrument creating a lien or encumbrance upon the title of developer or other person or copies of the opinion or opinions of counsel in respect to the title to the subdivision in the developer or other person or copies of the title insurance policy guaranteeing such title; </s> "(9) copies of all forms of conveyance to be used in selling or leasing lots to purchasers; </s> "(10) copies of instruments creating easements or other restrictions; </s> "(11) such certified and uncertified financial statements of the developer as the Secretary may require; and </s> "(12) such other information and such other documents and [426 U.S. 776, 781] certifications as the Secretary may require as being reasonably necessary or appropriate for the protection of purchasers." </s> [Footnote 2 The information required to be included in a property report is described in 1408 (a) of the Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. 1707 (a): </s> "A property report relating to the lots in a subdivision shall contain such of the information contained in the statement of record, and any amendments thereto, as the Secretary may deem necessary, but need not include the documents referred to in paragraphs (7) to (11), inclusive, of section 1406 [15 U.S.C. 1705]. A property report shall also contain such other information as the Secretary may by rules or regulations require as being necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of purchasers." </s> [Footnote 3 Upon suspension, the developer may request a hearing, which must be held within 20 days. 1407 (b) of the Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. 1706 (b). </s> [Footnote 4 The disclosure requirements of the Act are enforceable by both private and Government civil remedies, 1404 (b), 1410, 1415 of the Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. 1703 (b), 1709, 1714, and by criminal sanctions, 1415, 1418 of the Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. 1714, 1717. </s> [Footnote 5 The District Court dismissed other federal and state agencies named in the complaint as "additional defendants." Record 581, 658. </s> [Footnote 6 Since respondents did not seek certiorari on this ruling, its correctness is not before us. However, because we find that no environmental impact statement was necessary before the Secretary could permit Flint Ridge's statement of record to become effective, a fortiori no hearing on an environmental impact statement was required in this case. </s> [Footnote 7 The court recognized that even absent federal approval the project could go ahead so long as the lots were not sold in interstate commerce. 520 F.2d, at 244. </s> [Footnote 8 In pertinent part, 102, 42 U.S.C. 4332, provides: </s> "The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible . . . (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall . . . </s> "(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on - </s> "(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, </s> "(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, </s> "(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, </s> "(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and </s> "(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources [426 U.S. 776, 786] which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. </s> "Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public as provided by section 552 of Title 5, and shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes . . . ." </s> [Footnote 9 Compare 8 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77h (a), which provides that the registration statement for a [426 U.S. 776, 789] securities offering becomes effective within 20 days after it is filed, in the absence of a delaying amendment by the registrant or a stop order proceeding by the Securities and Exchange Commission. </s> [Footnote 10 Draft environmental impact statements on simple projects prepared by experienced personnel take some three to five months to complete, at least in the Department of the Interior. Complex projects prepared by inexperienced personnel may take up to 18 months to prepare. Sixth Annual Report, Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) 639 (1975). </s> Once a draft statement is prepared, CEQ guidelines provide that "[t]o the maximum extent practicable" no action should be taken sooner than 90 days after a draft environmental impact statement (and 30 days after the final statement) has been made available for comment. 40 CFR 1500.11 (b) (1975). Agencies commenting on a draft statement are to have at least 45 days to make their comments. 40 CFR 1500.9 (f) (1975). </s> [Footnote 11 Respondents also contend that HUD's own guidelines require it to prepare an impact statement before a disclosure statement becomes effective under the Disclosure Act. This claim is spurious. The document on which respondents rely, HUD Handbook 1390.1, the Handbook of Departmental Policies, Responsibilities and Procedures for Protection and Enhancement of Environmental Quality, 38 Fed. Reg. 19182 et seq. (1973), amended 39 Fed. Reg. 38922 (1974), by its own terms does not apply to registrations under the Disclosure Act. Section 1 of the handbook states that its provisions apply to "HUD legislative proposals, policy and guidance documents (including guides, regulations, handbooks, circulars, technical standards, etc.) and individual project approval actions on insurance, loans and grants, subsidies and demonstration projects." 38 Fed. Reg. 19182 (1973). Subdivision registrations do not fall within any of these categories. </s> [Footnote 12 Sections 1407 (c) and (d) grant the Secretary the additional power to suspend already effective statements of record, but do not expand upon the Secretary's limited discretion to extend the time requirements of the Act. </s> Under 1407 (d), the Secretary may suspend an already effective statement, after notice and hearing, only if the Secretary determines that it includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state any material fact necessary to make the statement not misleading. 15 U.S.C. 1706 (d). </s> Under 1407 (c), upon receipt of an amendment to a statement of record, the Secretary may, if the Secretary determines "such action to be necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of purchasers," suspend the statement of record until the amendment becomes effective. 15 U.S.C. 1706 (c). While this provision gives the Secretary greater flexibility in deciding whether to suspend a statement of record, it does not affect the Act's time limits. The amendment must become effective within 30 days unless it is inaccurate or incomplete. 1407 (a) of the Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. 1706 (a). </s> [Footnote 13 It is no answer to suggest, as respondents do, that the limit could be met if the Secretary ordered the developer not to file its statement of record until HUD completed an environmental impact statement. This proposal is no more than a circumvention of the statute's language, and is equally violative of its purpose. </s> The Court of Appeals alternatively suggested that "a developer could give advance notice to HUD of its intent to sell land in interstate commerce, whereby HUD could commence the preparation of its impact statement." 520 F.2d, at 244. This suggestion would still not allow compliance with the 30-day rule. The agency could not fruitfully begin the impact statement until the developer's plans were fully or largely worked out - at which time the developer would be virtually ready to file his disclosure statement and begin sales. </s> [Footnote 14 Section 1406 (12) only gives the Secretary the power to order the inclusion in statements of record of information necessary for "the protection of purchasers." See n. 1, supra. However, 1408 (a) allows the Secretary to order the inclusion in property reports of information necessary for "the protection of purchasers" or "in the public interest." See n. 2, supra. Since, by regulation, the property report must be included in the statement of record, 24 CFR 1710.20 (a), (e), 1710.110 (1975), information necessary "in the public interest" may, in effect, be required in the statement of record as well. </s> [426 U.S. 776, 794]

United States Supreme Court BRAY v. ALEXANDRIA CLINIC(1993) No. 90-985 Argued: October 16, 1991Decided: January 13, 1993 </s> Respondents, abortion clinics and supporting organizations, sued to enjoin petitioners, an association and individuals who organize and coordinate antiabortion demonstrations, from conducting demonstrations at clinics in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. The District Court held that, by conspiring to deprive women seeking abortions of their right to interstate travel, petitioners had violated the first clause of 42 U.S.C. 1985(3), which prohibits conspiracies to deprive, "any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws"; ruled for respondents on their pendent state law claims of trespass and public nuisance; as relief on these three claims, enjoined petitioners from trespassing on, or obstructing access to, specified clinics; and, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988, ordered petitioners to pay respondents attorney's fees and costs on the 1985(3) claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed. </s> Held: </s> 1. The first clause of 1985(3) does not provide a federal cause of action against persons obstructing access to abortion clinics. Pp. 267-278. </s> (a) Respondents have not shown that opposition to abortion qualifies alongside race discrimination as an "otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus [underlying] the conspirators' action," as is required under Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 , in order to prove a private conspiracy in violation of 1985(3)'s first clause. Respondents' claim that petitioners' opposition to abortion reflects an animus against women in general must be rejected. The "animus" requirement demands at least a purpose that focuses upon women by reason of their sex, whereas the record indicates that petitioners' demonstrations are not directed specifically at women, but are intended to protect the victims of abortion, stop its practice, and reverse its legalization. Opposition to abortion cannot reasonably be presumed to reflect a sex-based intent; there are common and respectable reasons for opposing abortion other than a derogatory view of women as a class. This Court's prior decisions indicate that the disfavoring of abortion, although only women [506 U.S. 263, 264] engage in the activity, is not ipso facto invidious discrimination against women as a class. Pp. 268-274. </s> (b) Respondents have also not shown that petitioners "aimed at interfering with rights" that are "protected against private, as well as official, encroachment," a second prerequisite to proving a private conspiracy in violation of 1985(3)'s first clause. Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 . Although the right to interstate travel is constitutionally protected against private interference in at least some contexts, Carpenters makes clear that a 1985(3) private conspiracy must be "aimed at" that right. Ibid. That was not established here. Although respondents showed that substantial numbers of women travel interstate to reach the clinics in question, it was irrelevant to petitioners' opposition whether or not such travel preceded the intended abortions. Moreover, as far as appears from the record, petitioners' proposed demonstrations would erect "actual barriers to . . . movement" only intrastate. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 , n. 6. Respondents have conceded that this intrastate restriction is not applied discriminatorily against interstate travelers, and the right to interstate travel is therefore not implicated. Ibid. Nor can respondents' 1985(3) claim be based on the right to abortion, which is a right protected only against state interference, and therefore cannot be the object of a purely private conspiracy. See Carpenters, supra, at 833. Pp. 274-278. </s> (c) The dissenters err in considering whether respondents have established a violation of 1985(3)'s second, "hindrance" clause, which covers conspiracies "for the purpose of preventing or hindering . . . any State . . . from giving or securing to all persons . . . the equal protection of the laws." A "hindrance" clause claim was not stated in the complaint, was not considered by either of the lower courts, was not contained in the questions presented on certiorari, and was not suggested by either party as a question for argument or decision here. Nor is it readily determinable that respondents have established a "hindrance" clause violation. The language in the first clause of 1985(3) that is the source of the Griffin animus requirement also appears in the "hindrance" clause. Second, respondents' "hindrance" "claim" would fail unless the "hindrance" clause applies to private conspiracies aimed at rights constitutionally protected only against official encroachment. Cf. Carpenters. Finally, the District Court did not find that petitioners' purpose was to prevent or hinder law enforcement. Pp. 279-285. </s> 2. The award of attorney's fees and costs under 1988 must be vacated because respondents were not entitled to relief under 1985(3). However, respondents' 1985(3) claims were not, prior to this decision, "wholly insubstantial and frivolous," Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 -683, so as to deprive the District Court of subject-matter jurisdiction [506 U.S. 263, 265] over the action. Consideration should be given on remand to the question whether the District Court's judgment on the state law claims alone can support the injunction that was entered. P. 285. </s> 914 F.2d 582, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. </s> SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 287. SOUTER, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 288. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 307. O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 345. </s> Jay Alan Sekulow reargued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were James M. Henderson, Sr., Douglas W. Davis, Thomas Patrick Monaghan, Walter M. Weber, and James E. Murphy. </s> Deputy Solicitor General Roberts reargued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Barbara L. Herwig, and Lowell V. Sturgill, Jr. </s> Deborah A. Ellis reargued the ccause for respondents. With her on the brief were Martha F. Davis, Sally F. Goldfarb, John H. Schafer, and Laurence J. Eisenstein. John H. Schafer argued the cause for respondents on the original argument. With him on the brief were William H. Allen, Mr. Eisenstein, Alison Wetherfield, and Helen Neuborne. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for American Victims of Abortion by James Bopp, Jr., and Richard E. Coleson; for Concerned Women for America by Andrew J. Ekonomou and Mark N. Troobnick; for Feminists for Life of America et al. by Christine Smith Torre and Edward R. Grant; for the Free Congress Foundation by Eric A. Daly and Jordan P. Secola, and George J. Mercer; for the Southern Center for Law & Ethics by Albert L. Jordan; for Woman Exploited by Abortion et al. by Samuel Brown Casey, Victor L. Smith, and David L. Llewellyn; for Daniel [506 U.S. 263, 266] Berrigan et al. by Wendall R. Bird and David J. Myers; and for James Joseph Lynch, Jr., pro se. </s> Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Attorney General of New York et al. by Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, pro se, O. Peter Sherwood, Solicitor General, Sanford M. Cohen and Shelley B. Mayer, Assistant Attorneys General, and Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General of Virginia, pro se; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Judith Levin, Steven R. Shapiro, John A. Powell, Burt Neuborne, and Elliot M. Mincberg; for Falls Church, Virginia, by David R. Lasso; for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., by Julius L. Chambers, Charles Stephen Ralston, and Eric Schnapper; for the National Abortion Federation et al. by Elaine Metlin, Roger K. Evans, and Eve W. Paul; and for 20 Organizations Committed to Women's Health and Women's Equality by Dawn Johnsen, Lois Eisner Murphy, and Marcy J. Wilder. </s> Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the National Right to Life Committee, Inc., et al. by James Bopp, Jr., and Barry A. Bostrom; and for George Lucas et al. by Lawrence J. Joyce and Craig H. Greenwood. [506 U.S. 263, 266] </s> JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case presents the question whether the first clause of Rev.Stat. 1980, 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) - the surviving version of 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 - provides a federal cause of action against persons obstructing access to abortion clinics. Respondents are clinics that perform abortions and organizations that support legalized abortion and that have members who may wish to use abortion clinics. Petitioners are Operation Rescue, an unincorporated association whose members oppose abortion, and six individuals. Among its activities, Operation Rescue organizes antiabortion demonstrations in which participants trespass on, and obstruct general access to, the premises of abortion clinics. The individual petitioners organize and coordinate these demonstrations. </s> Respondents sued to enjoin petitioners from conducting demonstrations at abortion clinics in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. Following an expedited trial, the District Court ruled that petitioners had violated 1985(3) by [506 U.S. 263, 267] conspiring to deprive women seeking abortions of their right to interstate travel. The court also ruled for respondents on their pendent state law claims of trespass and public nuisance. As relief on these three claims, the court enjoined petitioners from trespassing on, or obstructing access to, abortion clinics in specified Virginia counties and cities in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F.Supp. 1483 (ED Va. 1989). Based on its 1985(3) ruling and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988, the court also ordered petitioners to pay respondents $27,687.55 in attorney's fees and costs. </s> The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582 (1990), and we granted certiorari, 498 U.S. 1119 (1991). The case was argued in the October 1991 Term, and pursuant to our direction, see 504 U.S. 970 (1992), was reargued in the current Term. </s> I </s> Our precedents establish that, in order to prove a private conspiracy in violation of the first clause of 1985(3), 1 a [506 U.S. 263, 268] plaintiff must show, inter alia, (1) that "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus [lay] behind the conspirators' action," Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971), and (2) that the conspiracy "aimed at interfering with rights" that are "protected against private, as well as official, encroachment," Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983). We think neither showing has been made in the present case. </s> A </s> In Griffin, this Court held, reversing a 20-year-old precedent, see Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951), that 1985(3) reaches not only conspiracies under color of state law, but also purely private conspiracies. In finding that the text required that expanded scope, however, we recognized the "constitutional shoals that would lie in the path of interpreting 1985(3) as a general federal tort law." Griffin, 403 U.S., at 102 . That was to be avoided, we said, "by requiring, as an element of the cause of action, the kind of invidiously discriminatory motivation stressed by the sponsors of the limiting amendment," ibid. - citing specifically Representative Shellabarger's statement that the law was restricted "to the prevention of deprivations which shall attack the equality of rights of American citizens; that any violation of the right, the animus and effect of which is to strike down the citizen, to the end that he may not enjoy equality of rights as contrasted with his and other citizens' rights, shall be within the scope of the remedies. . . .," id., at 100 (emphasis in original), quoting Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 478 (1871). We said that "[t]he language [of 1985(3)] requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously [506 U.S. 263, 269] discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." 403 U.S., at 102 (emphasis in original). </s> We have not yet had occasion to resolve the "perhaps"; only in Griffin itself have we addressed and upheld a claim under 1985(3), and that case involved race discrimination. Respondents assert that there qualifies alongside race discrimination, as an "otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus" covered by the 1871 law, opposition to abortion. Neither common sense nor our precedents support this. </s> To begin with, we reject the apparent conclusion of the District Court (which respondents make no effort to defend) that opposition to abortion constitutes discrimination against the "class" of "women seeking abortion." Whatever may be the precise meaning of a "class" for purposes of Griffin's speculative extension of 1985(3) beyond race, the term unquestionably connotes something more than a group of individuals who share a desire to engage in conduct that the 1985(3) defendant disfavors. Otherwise, innumerable tort plaintiffs would be able to assert causes of action under 1985(3) by simply defining the aggrieved class as those seeking to engage in the activity the defendant has interfered with. This definitional ploy would convert the statute into the "general federal tort law" it was the very purpose of the animus requirement to avoid. Ibid. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN has cogently put it, the class "cannot be defined simply as the group of victims of the tortious action." Carpenters, supra, at 850 (dissenting opinion). "Women seeking abortion" is not a qualifying class. </s> Respondents' contention, however, is that the alleged class-based discrimination is directed not at "women seeking abortion," but at women in general. We find it unnecessary to decide whether that is a qualifying class under 1985(3), since the claim that petitioners' opposition to abortion reflects an animus against women in general must be rejected. We do not think that the "animus" requirement can be met [506 U.S. 263, 270] only by maliciously motivated, as opposed to assertedly benign (though objectively invidious), discrimination against women. It does demand, however, at least a purpose that focuses upon women by reason of their sex - for example (to use an illustration of assertedly benign discrimination), the purpose of "saving" women because they are women from a combative, aggressive profession such as the practice of law. The record in this case does not indicate that petitioners' demonstrations are motivated by a purpose (malevolent or benign) directed specifically at women as a class; to the contrary, the District Court found that petitioners define their "rescues" not with reference to women, but as physical intervention "`between abortionists and the innocent victims,'" and that "all [petitioners] share a deep commitment to the goals of stopping the practice of abortion and reversing its legalization." 726 F.Supp., at 1488. Given this record, respondents' contention that a class-based animus has been established can be true only if one of two suggested propositions is true: (1) that opposition to abortion can reasonably be presumed to reflect a sex-based intent, or (2) that intent is irrelevant, and a class-based animus can be determined solely by effect. Neither proposition is supportable. </s> As to the first: some activities may be such an irrational object of disfavor that, if they are targeted, and if they also happen to be engaged in exclusively or predominantly by a particular class of people, an intent to disfavor that class can readily be presumed. A tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews. But opposition to voluntary abortion cannot possibly be considered such an irrational surrogate for opposition to (or paternalism towards) women. Whatever one thinks of abortion, it cannot be denied that there are common and respectable reasons for opposing it, other than hatred of, or condescension toward (or indeed any view at all concerning), women as a class - as is evident from the fact that men and women are on both sides of the issue, just as men and women are on both sides of petitioners' unlawful demonstrations. [506 U.S. 263, 271] See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992). </s> Respondents' case comes down, then, to the proposition that intent is legally irrelevant; that, since voluntary abortion is an activity engaged in only by women, 2 to disfavor it is ipso facto to discriminate invidiously against women as a class. Our cases do not support that proposition. In Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), we rejected the claim that a state disability insurance system that denied coverage to certain disabilities resulting from pregnancy discriminated on the basis of sex in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "While it is true," we said, "that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification." Id., at 496, n. 20. We reached a similar conclusion in Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), sustaining against an Equal Protection Clause challenge a Massachusetts law giving employment preference to military veterans, a class which, in Massachusetts, was over 98% male, id., at 270. "`Discriminatory purpose,'" we said, "implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It [506 U.S. 263, 272] implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part "because of," not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Id., at 279 (citation omitted). 3 The same principle applies to the "class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus" requirement of 1985(3). 4 Moreover, two of our cases [506 U.S. 263, 273] deal specifically with the disfavoring of abortion, and establish conclusively that it is not ipso facto sex discrimination. In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), and Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), we held that the constitutional test applicable to government abortion funding restrictions is not the heightened scrutiny standard that our cases demand for sex-based discrimination, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 -199 (1976), but the ordinary rationality standard. See Maher, supra, at 470-471, 478; Harris, supra, at 322-324. [506 U.S. 263, 274] </s> The nature of the "invidiously discriminatory animus" Griffin had in mind is suggested both by the language used in that phrase ("invidious . . . [t]ending to excite odium, ill will, or envy; likely to give offense; esp., unjustly and irritatingly discriminating," Webster's Second International Dictionary 1306 (1954)) and by the company in which the phrase is found ("there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus," Griffin, 403 U.S., at 102 (emphasis added)). Whether one agrees or disagrees with the goal of preventing abortion, that goal in itself (apart from the use of unlawful means to achieve it, which is not relevant to our discussion of animus) does not remotely qualify for such harsh description, and for such derogatory association with racism. To the contrary, we have said that "a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion" is proper and reasonable enough to be implemented by the allocation of public funds, see Maher, supra, at 474, and Congress itself has, with our approval, discriminated against abortion in its provision of financial support for medical procedures, see Harris, supra, at 325. This is not the stuff out of which a 1985(3) "invidiously discriminatory animus" is created. </s> B </s> Respondents' federal claim fails for a second, independent reason: A 1985(3) private conspiracy "for the purpose of depriving . . . any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws," requires an intent to deprive persons of a right guaranteed against private impairment. See Carpenters, 463 U.S., at 833 . No intent to deprive of such a right was established here. </s> Respondents, like the courts below, rely upon the right to interstate travel - which we have held to be, in at least some contexts, a right constitutionally protected against private interference. See Griffin, supra, at 105-106. But all that respondents can point to by way of connecting petitioners' [506 U.S. 263, 275] actions with that particular right is the District Court's finding that "[s]ubstantial numbers of women seeking the services of [abortion] clinics in the Washington Metropolitan area travel interstate to reach the clinics." 726 F.Supp., at 1489. That is not enough. As we said in a case involving 18 U.S.C. 241, the criminal counterpart of 1985(3): </s> "[A] conspiracy to rob an interstate traveler would not, of itself, violate 241. But if the predominant purpose of the conspiracy is to impede or prevent the exercise of the right of interstate travel, or to oppress a person because of his exercise of that right, then . . . the conspiracy becomes a proper object of the federal law under which the indictment in this case was brought." United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 760 (1966). 5 </s> Our discussion in Carpenters makes clear that it does not suffice for application of 1985(3) that a protected right be incidentally affected. A conspiracy is not "for the purpose" of denying equal protection simply because it has an effect upon a protected right. The right must be "aimed at," 463 U.S., at 833 (emphasis added); its impairment must be a conscious objective of the enterprise. Just as the "invidiously discriminatory animus" requirement, discussed above, requires that the defendant have taken his action "at least in part `because of,' not merely `in spite of,' its adverse effects [506 U.S. 263, 276] upon an identifiable group," Feeney, 442 U.S., at 279 , so also the "intent to deprive of a right" requirement demands that the defendant do more than merely be aware of a deprivation of right that he causes, and more than merely accept it; he must act at least in part for the very purpose of producing it. 6 That was not shown to be the case here, and is on its face implausible. Petitioners oppose abortion, and it is irrelevant to their opposition whether the abortion is performed after interstate travel. </s> Respondents have failed to show a conspiracy to violate the right of interstate travel for yet another reason: Petitioners' proposed demonstrations would not implicate that right. The federal guarantee of interstate travel does not transform state-law torts into federal offenses when they are intentionally [506 U.S. 263, 277] committed against interstate travelers. Rather, it protects interstate travelers against two sets of burdens: "the erection of actual barriers to interstate movement" and "being treated differently" from intrastate travelers. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 , n. 6 (1982). See Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180 (1869) (Art. IV, 2, "inhibits discriminating legislation against [citizens of other States and] gives them the right of free ingress into other States, and egress from them"); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948) (Art. IV, 2, "insure[s] to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy"). As far as appears from this record, the only "actual barriers to. . . movement" that would have resulted from petitioners' proposed demonstrations would have been in the immediate vicinity of the abortion clinics, restricting movement from one portion of the Commonwealth of Virginia to another. Such a purely intrastate restriction does not implicate the right of interstate travel, even if it is applied intentionally against travelers from other States, unless it is applied discriminatorily against them. That would not be the case here, as respondents conceded at oral argument. 7 </s> The other right alleged by respondents to have been intentionally infringed is the right to abortion. The District Court declined to rule on this contention, relying exclusively upon the right-of-interstate-travel theory; in our view, it also [506 U.S. 263, 278] is an inadequate basis for respondents' 1985(3) claim. Whereas, unlike the right of interstate travel, the asserted right to abortion was assuredly "aimed at" by the petitioners, deprivation of that federal right (whatever its contours) cannot be the object of a purely private conspiracy. In Carpenters, we rejected a claim that an alleged private conspiracy to infringe First Amendment rights violated 1985(3). The statute does not apply, we said, to private conspiracies that are "aimed at a right that is by definition a right only against state interference," but applies only to such conspiracies as are "aimed at interfering with rights . . . protected against private, as well as official, encroachment." 463 U.S., at 833 . There are few such rights (we have hitherto recognized only the Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude, United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988), and, in the same Thirteenth Amendment context, the right of interstate travel, see United States v. Guest, supra, at 759, n. 17). The right to abortion is not among them. It would be most peculiar to accord it that preferred position, since it is much less explicitly protected by the Constitution than, for example, the right of free speech rejected for such status in Carpenters. Moreover, the right to abortion has been described in our opinions as one element of a more general right of privacy, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 -153 (1973), or of Fourteenth Amendment liberty, see Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 505 U.S., at 846 -851, and the other elements of those more general rights are obviously not protected against private infringement. (A burglar does not violate the Fourth Amendment, for example, nor does a mugger violate the Fourteenth.) Respondents' 1985(3) "deprivation" claim must fail, then, because they have identified no right protected against private action that has been the object of the alleged conspiracy. [506 U.S. 263, 279] </s> II </s> Two of the dissenters claim that respondents have established a violation of the second, "hindrance" clause of 1985(3), which covers conspiracies "for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws." 42 U.S.C. 1985(3). </s> This "claim" could hardly be presented in a posture less suitable for our review. As respondents frankly admitted at both argument and reargument, their complaint did not set forth a claim under the "hindrance" clause. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27 ("the complaint did not make a hinder or prevent claim"); Tr. of Reargument 33-34. 8 Not surprisingly, therefore, neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals considered the application of that clause to the current facts. The "hindrance" clause issue is not fairly included within the questions on which petitioners sought certiorari, see Pet. for Cert. i; this Court's Rule 14.1(a), 9 which is alone enough to exclude it from our consideration. 10 Nor is it true [506 U.S. 263, 280] that "[t]he issue was briefed, albeit sparingly, by the parties prior to the first oral argument in this case." Post, at 3 (SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). To the contrary, neither party initiated even the slightest suggestion that the "hindrance" question was an issue to be argued and decided here. 11 That possibility was suggested for the first time by questions from the bench during argument, and was reintroduced, again from the bench, during reargument. (Respondents sought to include a "hindrance"-clause section in their Supplemental Brief on Reargument, but the Court declined to accept that section for filing. See 505 U.S. 1240 (1992).) In sum, the Justices reaching the "hindrance"-clause issue in this case must find in the complaint claims that the respondents themselves have admitted are not there; must resolve a question not presented to, or ruled on by, any lower court; must revise the rule that it is the petition for certiorari (not the brief in opposition and later briefs) that determines the questions presented; and must penalize the parties for not addressing an issue on [506 U.S. 263, 281] which the Court specifically denied supplemental briefing. 12 That is extraordinary. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 -382, n. 3 (1992) (citing cases and treatises); Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 97 , n. 4 (1991); Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 277 , and n. 23 (1989). </s> The dissenters' zeal to reach the question whether there was a "hindrance"-clause violation would be more understandable, perhaps, if the affirmative answer they provided were an easy one. It is far from that. Judging from the statutory text, a cause of action under the "hindrance" clause would seem to require the same "class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus" that the "deprivation" clause requires, and that we have found lacking here. We said in Griffin that the source of the animus requirement is "[t]he language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities," 403 U.S., at 102 (emphasis in original) - and such language appears in the "hindrance" clause as well. 13 At oral argument, respondents conceded applicability of the animus requirement, though they withdrew [506 U.S. 263, 282] this concession on reargument. Without a race- or class-based animus requirement, the "hindrance" clause of this post-Civil War statute would have been an available weapon against the mass "sit-ins" that were conducted for purposes of promoting desegregation in the 1960's - a wildly improbable result. 14 </s> Even, moreover, if the "hindrance"-clause claim did not fail for lack of class-based animus, it would still fail unless the "hindrance" clause applies to a private conspiracy aimed at [506 U.S. 263, 283] rights that are constitutionally protected only against official (as opposed to private) encroachment. JUSTICE STEVENS finds it "clear" that it does, see post, at 34, citing, surprisingly, Carpenters. To the extent that case illuminates this question at all, it is clearly contrary to the dissent's view, holding that the "deprivation" clause, at least, does not cover private conspiracies aimed at rights protected only against state encroachment. JUSTICE O'CONNOR simply asserts without analysis that the "hindrance" clause nonetheless applies to those rights, post, at 355-356 - although the operative language of the two clauses ("equal protection of the laws") is identical. JUSTICE SOUTER disposes of the rights-guaranteed-against-private-encroachment requirement, and the class-based animus requirement as well, only by (1) undertaking a full-dress reconsideration of Griffin and Carpenters, (2) concluding that both those cases were wrongly decided, and (3) limiting the damage of those supposed errors by embracing an interpretation of the statute that concededly gives the same language in two successive clauses completely different meaning. 15 See post, at 292-303. This [506 U.S. 263, 284] formidable task has been undertaken and completed, we reiterate, uninvited by party or amicus, and with respect to a cause of action not presented in the pleadings, not asserted or ruled upon below, and not contained in the questions presented on certiorari. </s> Equally troubling as the dissenters' questionable resolution of a legal issue never presented is their conclusion that the lower court found (or, in the case of JUSTICE SOUTER, can reasonably be thought to have found) the facts necessary to support the (nonexistent) "hindrance" claim. They concede that this requires a finding that the protesters' purpose was to prevent or hinder law enforcement officers; but discern such a finding in the District Court's footnote recitation that "the rescuers outnumbered the . . . police officers" and that "the police were unable to prevent the closing of the clinic for more than six (6) hours." National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F.Supp., at 1489, n. 4. See post, at 339 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); post, at 356 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting); post, at 306 (SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). This renders the distinction between "purpose" and "effect" utterly meaningless. Here again, the dissenters (other than JUSTICE SOUTER) would give respondents more than respondents themselves dared to ask. Respondents frankly admitted at the [506 U.S. 263, 285] original argument, and even at reargument, that the District Court never concluded that impeding law enforcement was the purpose of petitioners' protests, and that the "hindrance" claim, if valid in law, required a remand. They were obviously correct. 16 </s> III </s> Because respondents were not entitled to relief under 1985(3), they were also not entitled to attorney's fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. 1988. We therefore vacate that award. </s> Petitioners seek even more. They contend that respondents' 1985(3) claims were so insubstantial that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action, including the pendent state claims, and that the injunction should therefore be vacated and the entire action dismissed. We do not agree. While respondents' 1985(3) causes of action fail, they were not, prior to our deciding of this case, "wholly insubstantial and frivolous," Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 -683 (1946), so as to deprive the District Court of jurisdiction. </s> It may be, of course, that even though the District Court had jurisdiction over the state-law claims, judgment on those claims alone cannot support the injunction that was entered. We leave that question for consideration on remand. [506 U.S. 263, 286] </s> * * * </s> JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent observes that this is "a case about the exercise of federal power to control an interstate conspiracy to commit illegal acts," post, at 344, and involves "no ordinary trespass," or "picketing of a local retailer," but "the kind of zealous, politically motivated, lawless conduct that led to the enactment of the Ku Klux Act in 1871 and gave it its name," post, at 313. Those are certainly evocative assertions, but, as far as the point of law we have been asked to decide is concerned, they are irrelevant. We construe the statute, not the views of "most members of the citizenry." Post, at 344. By its terms, 1985(3) covers concerted action by as few as two persons, and does not require even interstate (much less nationwide) scope. It applies no more and no less to completely local action by two part-time protesters than to nationwide action by a full-time force of thousands. 17 And, under our precedents, it simply does not apply to the sort of action at issue here. </s> Trespassing upon private property is unlawful in all States, as is, in many States and localities, intentionally obstructing the entrance to private premises. These offenses may be prosecuted criminally under state law, and may also be the basis for state civil damages. They do not, however, give rise to a federal cause of action simply because their objective is to prevent the performance of abortions, any more than they do so (as we have held) when their objective is to stifle free speech. [506 U.S. 263, 287] </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and vacated in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Section 1985(3) provides as follows: </s> "If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the [506 U.S. 263, 268] United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators." 42 U.S.C. 1985(3). </s> [Footnote 2 Petitioners and their amici argue that the intentional destruction of human fetuses, which is the target of their protests, is engaged in not merely by the women who seek and receive abortions, but by the medical and support personnel who provide abortions, and even by the friends and relatives who escort the women to and from the clinics. Many of those in the latter categories, petitioners point out, are men, and petitioners block their entry to the clinics no less than the entry of pregnant women. Respondents reply that the essential object of petitioners' conspiracy is to prevent women from intentionally aborting their fetuses. The fact that the physical obstruction targets some men, they say, does not render it any less "class based" against women - just as a racial conspiracy against blacks does not lose that character when it targets in addition white supporters of black rights, see Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 836 (1983). We need not resolve this dispute, but assume for the sake of argument that respondents' characterization is correct. </s> [Footnote 3 JUSTICE STEVENS asserts that, irrespective of intent or motivation, a classification is sex-based if it has a sexually discriminatory effect. Post, at 326-332. The cases he puts forward to confirm this revisionist reading of Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), in fact confirm the opposite. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977), cited Geduldig only once, in endorsement of Geduldig's ruling that a facially neutral benefit plan is not sex-based unless it is shown that "distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other." 434 U.S., at 145 (quoting Geduldig, supra, at 496-497, n. 20) (internal quotation marks omitted). Satty said that the Court "need not decide" whether "it is necessary to prove intent to establish a prima facie violation of 703(a)(1)," 434 U.S., at 144 , because "[r]espondent failed to prove even a discriminatory effect," id., at 145 (emphasis added). It is clear from this that sex-based discriminatory intent is something beyond sexually discriminatory effect. The Court found liability in Satty "[n]otwithstanding Geduldig," post, at 328, not (as JUSTICE STEVENS suggests) because Geduldig is compatible with the belief that effects alone constitute the requisite intent, but rather because 703(a)(2) of Title VII has no intent requirement. 434 U.S., at 139 -141. In his discussion of the (inapplicable) Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 92 Stat. 2076, JUSTICE STEVENS acknowledges that Congress understood Geduldig as we do, see post, at 330-331, and nn. 29-30. As for the cases JUSTICE STEVENS relegates to footnotes: Turner v. Utah Dept. of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975), was not even a discrimination case; General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 135 (1976), describes the holding of Geduldig precisely as we do; and Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983), casts no doubt on the continuing vitality of Geduldig. </s> [Footnote 4 We think this principle applicable to 1985(3) not because we believe that Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence is automatically incorporated into 1985(3), but rather because it is inherent in the requirement of a class-based animus, i.e., an animus based on class. We do not dispute JUSTICE STEVENS' observation, post, at 326, that Congress "may offer relief from discriminatory effects," without evidence of intent. The question is [506 U.S. 263, 273] whether it has done so, and if we are faithful to our precedents, we must conclude that it has not. </s> JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE O'CONNOR would replace discriminatory purpose with a requirement of intentionally class-specific (or perhaps merely disparate) impact. Post, at 322-332 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); post, at 350-354 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting). It is enough for these dissenters that members of a protected class are "targeted" for unlawful action "by virtue of their class characteristics," post, at 352 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting), see also post, at 354, regardless of what the motivation or animus underlying that unlawful action might be. Accord, post, at 322-323 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). This approach completely eradicates the distinction, apparent in the statute itself, between purpose and effect. Under JUSTICE STEVENS' approach, petitioners' admitted purpose of preserving fetal life (a "legitimate and nondiscriminatory goal," post, at 323 (emphasis added)) becomes the "indirect consequence of petitioners' blockade," while the discriminatory effect on women seeking abortions is now "the conspirators' immediate purpose," ibid. (emphasis added). JUSTICE O'CONNOR acknowledges that petitioners' "target[ing]" is motivated by "opposition to the practice of abortion." Post, at 351. </s> In any event, the characteristic that formed the basis of the targeting here was not womanhood, but the seeking of abortion - so that the class the dissenters identify is the one we have rejected earlier: women seeking abortion. The approach of equating opposition to an activity (abortion) that can be engaged in only by a certain class (women) with opposition to that class leads to absurd conclusions. On that analysis, men and women who regard rape with revulsion harbor an invidious antimale animus. Thus, if state law should provide that convicted rapists must be paroled so long as they attend weekly counseling sessions; and if persons opposed to such lenient treatment should demonstrate their opposition by impeding access to the counseling centers; those protesters would, on the dissenters' approach, be liable under 1985(3) because of their antimale animus. </s> [Footnote 5 JUSTICE STEVENS finds "most significant . . . the dramatic difference between the language of 18 U.S.C. 241" and that of 1985(3), in that the former "includes an unequivocal `intent' requirement." Post, at 335. He has it precisely backwards. The second paragraph of 241 does contain an explicit "intent" requirement, but the first paragraph, which was the only one at issue in Guest, see 383 U.S., at 747 , does not; whereas 1985(3) does explicitly require a "purpose." As for JUSTICE STEVENS' emphasis upon the fact that 1985(3), unlike 241, embraces "a purpose to deprive another of a protected privilege `either directly or indirectly,'" post, at 335: that in no way contradicts a specific intent requirement. The phrase "either directly or indirectly" modifies "depriving," not "purpose." The deprivation, whether direct or indirect, must still have been the purpose of the defendant's action. </s> [Footnote 6 To contradict the plain import of our cases on this point, JUSTICE STEVENS presses into service a footnote in Griffin. Post, at 335-336, n. 33. In addressing "[t]he motivation requirement introduced by the word `equal' into . . . 1985(3)," Griffin said that this was not to be confused with a test of "specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right made definite by decision or other rule of law"; 1985(3) "`contains no specific requirement of "wilfulness,'" and its "motivation aspect . . . focuses not on scienter in relation to deprivation of rights, but on invidiously discriminatory animus." Griffin, 403 U.S., at 102 , n. 10. This is supremely irrelevant to the present discussion, since (1) we are not considering "the motivation requirement introduced by the word `equal,'" but rather the intent requirement introduced by the word "purpose," and (2) we are not asserting that the right in question must have been "made definite by decision or other rule of law," but only that it must have been "aimed at," with or without knowledge that it is a federally protected right, cf. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 103 -107 (1945) - a requirement not of "wilfulness," in other words, but only of "purpose." The requisite "purpose" was of course pleaded in Griffin as we specifically noted. See 403 U.S., at 103 . JUSTICE STEVENS makes no response whatever to the plain language of Carpenters, except to contend that the same irrelevant footnote 10 reaches forward 12 years in time, to prevent Carpenters from meaning what it obviously says ("aimed at"). Although a few lower courts at one time read the Griffin footnote as JUSTICE STEVENS does, see post, at 336-337, those cases were all decided years before this Court's opinion in Carpenters, which we follow. </s> [Footnote 7 JUSTICE STEVENS expresses incredulity at the rule we have described. It is, he says, "unsupported by precedent or reason," post, at 333, both of which show he claims, that the right of interstate travel is violated even by "conduct that evenhandedly disrupts both local and interstate travel," post, at 337. We cite right-to-travel cases for our position; he cites nothing but negative Commerce Clause cases for his. While it is always pleasant to greet such old Commerce Clause warhorses as Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), and Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), cited post, at 337, surely they are irrelevant to the individual right of interstate travel we are here discussing. That right does not derive from the negative Commerce Clause, or else it could be eliminated by Congress. </s> [Footnote 8 These admissions were accurate. The amended complaint alleged, in its two federal causes of action, that petitioners "have conspired to deprive women of their right to travel" and "have conspired . . . for the purpose of denying women seeking abortions . . . their rights to privacy." App. 15-16. These are both "deprivation" claims; neither one makes any allusion to hindrance or prevention of state authorities. </s> [Footnote 9 JUSTICE SOUTER contends, post, at 290-291, that the "hindrance" clause issue was embraced within question four, which asked: "Are respondents' claims under 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) so insubstantial as to deprive the federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction?" Pet. for Cert. i. This argument founders on the hard (and admitted) reality that "respondents' claims" did not include a "hindrance" claim. </s> [Footnote 10 Contrary to JUSTICE SOUTER's suggestion, post, at 290-291, the provision of our Rules giving respondents the right in their brief in opposition, to restate the questions presented Rule 24.2, does not give them the power to expand the questions presented, as the Rule itself makes clear. In any event, neither of the questions set forth in the Brief in Opposition fairly [506 U.S. 263, 280] raises the "hindrance" claim. And there is no support whatever for JUSTICE SOUTER's reliance upon the formulation of the question in respondents' brief on the merits, post, at 290, as the basis for deeming the question properly presented - though on the merits, once again, the question referred to by JUSTICE SOUTER is unhelpful. </s> [Footnote 11 Respondents' brief asserted that, if the Court did not affirm the judgment on the basis of the "deprivation" clause, then a remand would be necessary, so that respondents could "present a number of contentions respecting [their right-to-privacy] claim" which had not been reached below, including the contention that" petitioners, by means of their blockades, had hindered the police in securing to women their right to privacy." Brief for Respondents 43. Petitioners' reply brief responded that the complaint did not contain such a "hindrance" claim, and that there was "no reason to believe" that the "hindrance" clause "would not entail the same statutory requirements of animus and independent rights which respondents have failed to satisfy under the first clause of the statute." Reply Brief for Petitioners 14-15. These were obviously not arguments for resolution of the "hindrance" claim here. </s> [Footnote 12 We are unable to grasp the logic whereby JUSTICE SOUTER, who would have us conclusively resolve the "hindrance" clause legal issue against petitioners (despite their lack of opportunity to address it both here and below) criticizes our opinion, see post, at 291-292, for merely suggesting (without resolving the "hindrance" clause issue) the difficulties that inhere in his approach. </s> [Footnote 13 In straining to argue that the "hindrance" clause does not have the same animus requirement as the first clause of 1985(3), JUSTICE STEVENS makes an argument extrapolating from the reasoning of Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (1983), which held that the animus requirement expounded in Griffin did not apply to a claim under the first clause of 1985(2). Post, at 340-342. But the heart of Kush - what the case itself considered "of greatest importance" - was the fact that Griffin's animus requirement rested on "the `equal protection' language" of 1985(3), which the first clause of 1985(2) did not contain. 460 U.S., at 726 . Since the "hindrance" clause of 1985(3) does contain that language, the straightforward application of Kush to this case is quite the opposite of what JUSTICE STEVENS asserts. </s> [Footnote 14 JUSTICE SOUTER contends the sit-in example is inapposite, because the sit-ins did not "depriv[e] the owners of the segregated lunch counter[s] of any independently protected constitutional right." Post, at 305, n. 10. In the very paragraph to which that footnote is appended, however, JUSTICE SOUTER purports to leave open the question whether the "hindrance" clause would apply when the conspiracy "amount[s] to a denial of police protection to individuals who are not attempting to exercise a constitutional right," post, at 304, n. 9 - such as (presumably) the rights guaranteed by state trespass laws. Certainly the sit-ins violated such state law rights, or else there would have been no convictions. It is not true, in any case, that the sit-ins did not invade constitutional rights, if one uses that term (as JUSTICE SOUTER does) to include rights constitutionally protected only against official (as opposed to private) encroachment. Surely property owners have a constitutional right not to have government physically occupy their property without due process and without just compensation. </s> JUSTICE SOUTER's citation of Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), post, at 305, n. 10, and Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 472 (K.B. 1701), post, at 305, n. 10, requires no response. He cites Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), for the proposition that the 1964 Civil Rights Act's elimination of restaurant owners' right to exclude blacks from their establishments did not violate the Due Process or Takings Clauses. Assuredly not. But government regulation of commercial use through valid legislation is hardly comparable to government action that would have been the equivalent of what those conducting the sit-ins did: physically occupy private property, against the consent of the owner, without legal warrant. JUSTICE SOUTER cites Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), post, at 306, n. 10, to establish (in effect) that there was, even before the Civil Rights Act, legal warrant for the physical occupation. Any argument driven to reliance upon an extension of that volatile case is obviously in serious trouble. </s> [Footnote 15 JUSTICE SOUTER contends that, even without the animus and rights-guaranteed-against-private-encroachment requirements, the "hindrance" clause will still be "significantly limit[ed]" in scope, covering only "conspiracies to act with enough force . . . to overwhelm the capacity of legal authority to act evenhandedly in administering the law," post, at 300 (emphasis added). JUSTICE STEVENS discerns a similar limitation, see post, 341-342. Only JUSTICE SOUTER attempts to find a statutory basis for it. He argues that, since 1985(1) prohibits a conspiracy to prevent "any person" (emphasis added) from "discharging any duties," 1985(3)'s prohibition of a conspiracy directed against "the constituted authorities" (emphasis added) must be speaking of something that affects more than a single official, post, at 300. This seems to us a complete non sequitur. The difference between "any person" and "constituted authorities" would contain such a significant limitation (if at all) only if the remaining language of the two sections was roughly parallel. But it is not. Section 1985(1), for example, speaks of categorically "prevent[ing]" a person's exercise of his duties, whereas 1985(3) speaks of "preventing or hindering" the constituted authorities. (Emphasis added.) Obviously, one can "hinder" the [506 U.S. 263, 284] authorities by "preventing" an individual officer. If these dissenters' interpretation of 1985(3) were adopted, conspiracies to prevent individual state officers from acting would be left entirely uncovered. (Section 1985(1) applies only to officers of the United States - which is, of course, the basic distinction between the two provisions.) </s> Neither dissent explains why the application of enough force to impede law enforcement, though not to "overwhelm" or "supplant" it, does not constitute a "hindering"; or, indeed, why only "force," and not bribery or misdirection, must be the means of hindrance or prevention. Nothing in the text justifies these limitations. JUSTICE SOUTER's faith in the "severely limited" character of the hindrance clause also depends upon his taking no position on whether the clause protects federal statutory rights and state-protected rights, post, at 303-304, n. 9. </s> [Footnote 16 Because of our disposition of this case, we need not address whether the District Court erred by issuing an injunction, despite the language in 1985(3) authorizing only "an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation." It is curious, however, that the dissenters, though quick to reach and resolve the unpresented "hindrance" issue, assume without analysis the propriety of the injunctive relief that they approve - though the contrary was asserted by the United States as amicus in support of petitioners, and the issue was addressed by both parties in supplemental briefs on reargument. See Supplemental Brief for Petitioners on Reargument 4-9; Brief for Respondents on Reargument 9. </s> [Footnote 17 JUSTICE STEVENS chides us for invoking text here, whereas (he says) we rely instead upon "statutory purpose" for our class-based animus requirement - "selectively employ[ing] both approaches to give [ 1985(3)] its narrowest possible construction." Post, at 343, n. 37. That is not so. For our class-based animus requirement we rely, plainly and simply, upon our holding in Griffin, whatever approach Griffin may have used. That holding is (though JUSTICE STEVENS might wish otherwise) an integral part of our jurisprudence extending 1985(3) to purely private conspiracies. </s> JUSTICE KENNEDY, concurring. </s> In joining the opinion of the Court, I make these added observations. </s> The three separate dissenting opinions in this case offer differing interpretations of the statute in question, 42 U.S.C. 1985(3). Given the difficulty of the question, this is understandable, but the dissenters' inability to agree on a single rationale confirms, in my view, the correctness of the Court's opinion. As all recognize, essential considerations of federalism are at stake here. The federal balance is a fragile one, and a false step in interpreting 1985(3) risks making a whole catalog of ordinary state crimes a concurrent violation of a single congressional statute passed more than a century ago. </s> Of course, the wholesale commission of common state-law crimes creates dangers that are far from ordinary. Even in the context of political protest, persistent, organized, premeditated lawlessness menaces in a unique way the capacity of a State to maintain order and preserve the rights of its citizens. Such actions are designed to inflame, not inform. They subvert the civility and mutual respect that are the essential preconditions for the orderly resolution of social conflict in a free society. For this reason, it is important to note that another federal statute offers the possibility of powerful federal assistance for persons who are injured or threatened by organized lawless conduct that falls within the primary jurisdiction of the States and their local governments. </s> Should state officials deem it necessary, law enforcement assistance is authorized upon request by the State to the Attorney General of the United States, pursuant to [506 U.S. 263, 288] 42 U.S.C. 10501. In the event of a law enforcement emergency as to which "State and local resources are inadequate to protect the lives and property of citizens or to enforce the criminal law," 10502(3), the Attorney General is empowered to put the full range of federal law enforcement resources at the disposal of the State, including the resources of the United States Marshals Service, which was presumably the principal practical advantage to respondents of seeking a federal injunction under 1985(3). See 10502(2). </s> If this scheme were to be invoked, the nature and extent of a federal response would be a determination for the Executive. Its authority to act is less circumscribed than our own, but I have little doubt that such extraordinary intervention into local controversies would be ordered only after a careful assessment of the circumstances, including the need to preserve our essential liberties and traditions. Indeed, the statute itself explicitly directs the Attorney General to consider "the need to avoid unnecessary Federal involvement and intervention in matters primarily of State and local concern." 10501(c)(5). </s> I do not suggest that this statute is the only remedy available. It does illustrate, however, that Congress has provided a federal mechanism for ensuring that adequate law enforcement resources are available to protect federally guaranteed rights, and that Congress, too, attaches great significance to the federal decision to intervene. Thus, even if, after proceedings on remand, the ultimate result is dismissal of the action, local authorities retain the right and the ability to request federal assistance, should they deem it warranted. </s> JUSTICE SOUTER, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. </s> I </s> This case turns on the meaning of two clauses of 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) which render certain conspiracies civilly actionable. The first clause (the deprivation clause) covers conspiracies [506 U.S. 263, 289] </s> "for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws"; </s> the second (the prevention clause), conspiracies </s> "for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws. . . ." </s> For liability in either instance, the statute requires an "act in furtherance of the . . . conspiracy, whereby [a person] is injured in his person or property, or deprived of . . . any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. . . ." </s> Prior cases giving the words "equal protection of the laws" in the deprivation clause an authoritative construction have limited liability under that clause by imposing two conditions not found in the terms of the text. An actionable conspiracy must have some racial or perhaps other class-based motivation, Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971), and, if it is "aimed at" the deprivation of a constitutional right, the right must be one secured not only against official infringement, but against private action as well, Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983). The Court follows these cases in applying the deprivation clause today, and to this extent I take no exception to its conclusion. I know of no reason that would exempt us from the counsel of stare decisis in adhering to this settled statutory construction, see Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197 (1991), which Congress is free to change if it should think our prior reading unsound. </s> II </s> The meaning of the prevention clause is not thus settled, however, and starting in Part IV I will give my reasons for reading it without any importation of these extratextual conditions from the deprivation clause. First, however, a word [506 U.S. 263, 290] is in order to show that the prevention clause's construction is properly before us, and to explain why the Court is not in a position to cast doubt on that clause's arguable applicability to the facts indicated by the record, in light of the Court's refusal to allow respondents to address this very issue in the supplemental briefing that was otherwise permitted prior to the reargument of this case. </s> A </s> Respondents' complaint does not limit their theory of liability to the deprivation clause alone, for it alleges simply that petitioners "have conspired with each other and other parties presently unknown for the purpose of denying women seeking abortions at targeted facilities their right to privacy, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1985(3)." App. 16. 1 Evidence presented at a hearing before the District Court addressed the issue of prevention or hindrance, leading that court to note that the demonstrators so far outnumbered local police that "[e]ven though 240 rescuers were arrested the, police were unable to prevent the closing of the clinic for more than six (6) hours." National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F.Supp. 1483, 1489, n. 4 (ED Va. 1989). The applicability of the prevention clause is fairly included within the questions presented, especially as restated by respondents, see Brief for Respondents i (first question presented); 2 Brief in Opposition i; Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267 , n. 12 (1992) (respondent has the right under this Court's Rule 24.2 to [506 U.S. 263, 291] restate the questions presented); see also Pet. for Cert. i (petitioners' fourth question presented). 3 The issue was briefed, albeit sparingly, by the parties prior to the first oral argument in this case, see Brief for Respondents 43-44; Reply Brief for Petitioners 14-15, and during that argument was the subject of a question from the bench. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. </s> B </s> Just as it is therefore proper for me to address the interpretation of the prevention clause and the merits of respondents' position under its terms, it was reasonable for respondents themselves to seek leave to file a supplemental brief addressing that interpretation and those merits prior to the reargument. Their request was nonetheless denied, see 505 U.S. 1240 (1992), though I voted to grant it, and three other Members of the Court dissented on the record from the Court's action to the contrary. Nonetheless, whatever may have been the better decision, denying respondents' request was at least consistent with leaving the consideration of the prevention clause for another day, and in no way barred respondents from pressing a claim under the clause at a later stage of this litigation. A vote to deny the request could, for example, simply have reflected a view that, in the absence of more extensive trial court findings than those quoted above, it was better to leave the prevention clause for further consideration on the remand that I agree is appropriate. Now, however, in expressing skepticism that the prevention clause could be a basis for relief, the Court begins to close the door that the earlier order left open, a move that is unfair to respondents after their request was denied. While the Court's opinion concentrates on the errors of my ways, it would be difficult not to read it as rejecting a construction of the prevention clause under which petitioners might [506 U.S. 263, 292] succeed, and to that extent as barring their claim under a statutory provision on which they were not allowed to comment in the supplemental briefing that was otherwise permitted before reargument. </s> C </s> Because, in my judgment, the applicability of the prevention clause was raised, and because there is neither unfairness to respondents in putting forward the statutory interpretation that does not bar their claim, nor unfairness to petitioners who sought no leave to address the issue further, I turn to my own views on the meaning of the prevention clause's terms. </s> III </s> Because this Court has not previously faced a prevention clause claim, the difficult question that arises on this first occasion is whether to import the two conditions imposed on the deprivation clause as limitations on the scope of the prevention clause as well. If we do not, we will be construing the phrase "equal protection of the laws" differently in neighboring provisions of the same statute, and our interpretation will seemingly be at odds with the "natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same act [were] intended to have the same meaning." Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932). But the presumption is defeasible, and in this instance giving the common phrase an independent reading is exactly what ought to be done. </s> This is so because the two conditions at issue almost certainly run counter to the intention of Congress, and whatever may have been the strength of this Court's reasons for construing the deprivation clause to include them, those reasons have no application to the prevention clause now before us. To extend the conditions to shorten the prevention clause's reach would, moreover, render that clause inoperative against a conspiracy to which its terms in their plain [506 U.S. 263, 293] meaning clearly should apply, a conspiracy whose perpetrators plan to overwhelm available law enforcement officers, to the point of preventing them from providing a class of victims attempting to exercise a liberty guaranteed them by the Constitution with the police protection otherwise extended to all persons going about their lawful business on streets and private premises. Lest we embrace such an unintended and untoward result, we are obliged to reject any limiting constructions that stare decisis does not require. </s> A </s> The amalgam of concepts reflected in 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) witness the statute's evolution, as 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, from a bill that would have criminalized conspiracies "to do any act in violation of the rights, privileges, or immunities of any person . . .," Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 206 (1871) (statement of Rep. Blair), quoting H.R. 320, 2, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (1871), to a statute including a civil cause of action against conspirators and those who "go in disguise" to violate certain constitutional guarantees. See 17 Stat. 13. The amendment of the original bill that concerns us occurred in the House, to calm fears that the statute's breadth would extend it to cover a vast field of traditional state jurisdiction, exceeding what some Members of Congress took to he the scope of congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Comment, A Construction of Section 1985(c) in Light of Its Original Purpose, 46 U.Chi.L.Rev. 402, 417 (1979). The principal curb placed on the statute's scope was the requirement that actionable conspiracies (not otherwise proscribed on the strength of their threats to voting rights, see 1985(3)) be motivated by a purpose to deny equal protection of the laws. The sponsor of the amendment, Representative Shellabarger, put it this way: "The object of the amendment is . . . to confine the authority of this law to the prevention of deprivations which [506 U.S. 263, 294] shall attack the equality of rights of American citizens. . . ." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 478 (1871). </s> The effect of the equal protection requirement in thus limiting the deprivation clause has received the Court's careful attention, first in Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951), then in a series of more recent cases, Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979), and Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983). For present purposes, Griffin and Carpenters stand out. </s> B </s> The Griffin Court sought to honor the restrictive intent of the 42d Congress by reading the "language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities," Griffin, 403 U.S., at 102 (emphasis omitted), as demanding proof of "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." Ibid. And while this treatment did, of course, effectively narrow the scope of the clause, it did so probably to the point of overkill, unsupported by any indication of an understanding on the part of Congress that the animus to deny equality of rights lying at the heart of an equal protection violation as the legislation's sponsors understood it would necessarily be an animus based on race or some like character. See id., at 100; Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 188 (remarks of Rep. Willard); Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., at 478 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger). </s> While the Congress did not explain its understanding of statutory equal protection to any fine degree, I am not aware of (and the Griffin Court did not address) any evidence that, in using the phrase "equal protection" in a statute passed only three years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress intended that phrase to mean anything different from what the identical language meant in the Amendment itself. That is not to say, of course, that all Members of Congress in 1871, or all jurists, would have [506 U.S. 263, 295] agreed on exactly what the phrase did mean, and certainly it is true that the conceptual development of equal protection could hardly have been outlined in advance by the Members of the 42d Congress. But equally is it true that we have no reason to suppose that they meant their statutory equal protection provision to be read any more narrowly than its obvious cognate in the Amendment. Griffin, however, gave it just such a reading. </s> To be sure, there is some resonance between Griffin's animus requirement and those constitutional equal protection cases that deal with classifications calling for strict or heightened scrutiny, as when official discriminations employ such characteristics as race, national origin, alienage, gender, or illegitimacy. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 -441 (1985) (describing the jurisprudence). 4 But these categories of distinctions based on race or on qualities bearing a more or less close analogy to race do not by any means exhaust the scope of constitutional equal protection. All legislative classifications, whether or not they can be described as having "some racial or perhaps otherwise class-based invidiously discriminatory animus," are subject to review under the Equal Protection Clause, which contains no reference to race, and which has been understood to have this comprehensive scope since at least the late 19th century. See, e.g., Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 293 -294 (1898) (citing cases). A routine legislative classification is, of course, subject only to deferential scrutiny, passing constitutional muster if it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate governmental purpose. E.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., supra, (describing the test); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981). [506 U.S. 263, 296] But the point is that Fourteenth Amendment equal protection scrutiny is applied to such classifications, and if the scope of "equal protection" in the statute is to balance its constitutional counterpart, the statute ought to cover discriminations that would be impermissible under rational-basis scrutiny. </s> There is, indeed, even some extratextual evidence of a positive congressional intent to provide just such a statutory reach beyond what Griffin would allow. Some of the legislative history of 2 of the 1871 Act suggests that the omission of any reference to race from the statutory text of equal protection was not the result of inadvertence, and that Congress understood that classifications infringing the statutory notion of equal protection were not to be limited to those based on race or some closely comparable personal quality. The most significant, and often quoted, evidence came from Senator Edmunds, who managed the bill on the Senate floor and remarked that if there were a conspiracy against a person "because he was a Democrat, if you please, or because he was a Catholic, or because he was a Methodist, or because he was a Vermonter . . . then this section could reach it." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., at 567. 5 These are not, of course, all examples of discrimination based on any class comparable to race, and the Senator's list counters any suggestion that the subject matter of statutory equal protection was meant to be so confined. 6 </s> [506 U.S. 263, 297] </s> C </s> Notwithstanding the Griffin Court's decision to read the deprivation clause's equal protection element as more restrictive than Fourteenth Amendment equal protection, the Court recognized that in a different respect the statute remained more expansive than its constitutional counterpart, in being aimed at deprivations of equal protection by purely private conspirators, 403 U.S., at 96 -97. This very conclusion, in fact, prompted the further concern that the deprivation clause might, by its terms, apply to facts beyond Congress' constitutional reach. The Court nonetheless obviated the need to address the scope of congressional power at that time by confining itself to a holding that the statute was constitutional at least insofar as it implemented congressional power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment and the right to travel freely, each of which was "assertable against private as well as governmental interference." Id., at 105. 7 </s> The Court was then only one step away from putting the deprivation clause in its present shape, a step it took in Carpenters. Whereas Griffin had held that requiring a purpose to infringe a federal constitutional right guaranteed against private action was sufficient to allay any fear that the deprivation clause was being applied with unconstitutional breadth, Carpenters turned this sufficient condition into a necessity insofar as conspiracies to deprive any person or class of persons of federal constitutional rights were concerned, by holding that, in the case of such a conspiracy, no cause of action could be stated without alleging such an ultimate object of depriving the plaintiff of a right protected [506 U.S. 263, 298] against private action by the Federal Constitution. 463 U.S., at 833 . </s> It was a most significant step. In going no further than to affirm the deprivation clause's constitutionality insofar as it applied to conspiracies to infringe federal constitutional rights guaranteed against private action, the Griffin Court had arguably acted with prudent reticence in avoiding a needless ruling on Congress' power to outlaw conspiracies aimed at other rights. 8 But in converting this indisputably constitutional object, of giving relief against private conspiracies to violate federal constitutional rights guaranteed against private action, into the exclusive subject matter of the clause with respect to conspiracies to deprive people of federal constitutional rights, the Carpenters Court almost certainly narrowed that clause from the scope Congress had intended. If indeed Congress had meant to confine the statute that narrowly, its application to federal constitutional deprivations in 1871 would not have gone beyond violations of the Thirteenth Amendment, adopted in 1865. (The next clear example of a constitutional guarantee against individual action would not emerge until United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 -760, n. 17 (1966), recognizing a right of interstate travel good against individuals as well as governments.) But if Congress had meant to protect no federal constitutional rights outside those protected by the Thirteenth Amendment, it is hard to see why the drafters would not simply have said so, just as in the third and fourth clauses of 1985(3), they dealt expressly with infringements of voting rights, already guaranteed against abridgment by the Fifteenth Amendment adopted in 1870. </s> The Carpenters Court might have responded to this objection by suggesting that the textual breadth of the deprivation clause reflects its applicability to conspiracies aimed at violating rights guaranteed under state law or rights [506 U.S. 263, 299] guaranteed against individual infringement by federal statutory law, since such possible applications were left open by the Court's opinion. See Carpenters, supra, at 833-834. But this answer would prompt the even more fundamental objection that there is no textual basis in the deprivation clause (or in the portions of subsection (3) common to all clauses) suggesting that any such individual-infringement limitation was intended at all. </s> Whether or not the concerns with constitutionality that prompted both the Griffin and Carpenters holdings were well raised or wisely allayed by those decisions, the solution reached most probably left a lesser deprivation clause than Congress intended. Just as probably, if that solution were imported into the prevention clause, it would work an equally unintended contraction. </s> IV </s> The conclusion that the conditions placed on the deprivation clause narrow its intended scope prompts the question whether the reasons thought to argue in favor of placing such conditions on the deprivation clause apply to the prevention clause. They do not. </s> A </s> We may recall that in holding racial or other class-based animus a necessary element of the requisite purpose to deprive of equal protection, the Griffin Court was mindful of the congressional apprehension that the statute might otherwise turn out to be "a general federal tort law." Griffin, 403 U.S., at 102 . While the Court did not dwell on why it chose a requirement of racial or comparable class-based animus to restrict statutory equal protection, its readiness to read the statutory category more narrowly than its Fourteenth Amendment counterpart is at least understandable when one sees that the scope of conspiracies actionable under the deprivation clause has virtually no textual limit beyond [506 U.S. 263, 300] the need to prove the equal protection element. Without the Griffin Court's self-imposed class-based animus requirement, any private conspiracy to deprive of equal protection would be actionable under 1985(3) so long as the conspirators took some action that produced some harm. </s> The prevention clause carries no such premonition of liability, however. Its most distinctive requirement, to prove a conspiratorial purpose to "preven[t] or hinde[r] the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing . . . the equal protection of the laws," is both an additional element unknown to the deprivation clause and a significantly limiting condition. Private conspiracies to injure according to class or classification are not enough here; they must be conspiracies to act with enough force, of whatever sort, to overwhelm the capacity of legal authority to act evenhandedly in administering the law. </s> The requirement that the very capacity of the law enforcement authorities must be affected is supported by a comparison of the statutory language of the prevention clause, which touches only those conspiracies with a purpose to "preven[t] or hinde[r] the constituted authorities" of any State or territory from giving or securing equal protection, with the text of 1985(1), which (among other things) prohibits conspiracies to prevent "any person" from "discharging any duties" of an office under the United States. The contrast makes clear that the words of the prevention clause are not those that Congress used when it meant to deal with every situation in which a single government official was prevented from discharging his duties. To be sure, in an earlier day of scarce law enforcement personnel, rudimentary communication, and slow transportation, in some situations it might have been possible to overthrow the capacity of government by overthrowing one official alone. But a more ambitious conspiratorial object would be required under normal modern conditions, and in order to satisfy the requirement of affecting the law enforcement system sufficiently, such a [506 U.S. 263, 301] conspiracy would need to envision action capable of countering numbers of officers or injuring their responsive capacity (as by disabling their communication system, for example). </s> The requirement of an object to thwart the capacity of law enforcement authority to provide equal protection of the laws thus narrows the scope of conspiracies actionable under the prevention clause. It does so to such a degree that no reason appears for narrowing it even more by a view of equal protection more restrictive than that of the Fourteenth Amendment. </s> B </s> Equally inapposite to the prevention clause is the second Griffin-Carpenters deprivation clause limitation that where a conspiracy to deny equal protection would interfere with exercise of a federal constitutional right, it be a right "protected against private, as well as official, encroachment," Carpenters, 463 U.S., at 833 . The justification for the Court's initial enquiry concerning rights protected by the Constitution against private action lay in its stated concern about the constitutional limits of congressional power to regulate purely private action. Griffin, supra, at 104. Once again, however, the reason that there is no arguable need to import the extratextual limitation from the deprivation clause into the prevention clause lies in the prevention clause's distinctive requirement that the purpose of a conspiracy actionable under its terms must include a purpose to accomplish its object by preventing or hindering officials in the discharge of their constitutional responsibilities. The conspirators' choice of this means to work their will on their victims would be significant here precisely because the act of frustrating or thwarting state officials in their exercise of the State's police power would amount simply to an extralegal way of determining how that state power would be exercised. It would, in real terms, be the exercise of state power itself. To the degree that private conspirators would arrogate the State's police power to themselves to thwart equal protection by [506 U.S. 263, 302] imposing what amounts to a policy of discrimination in place of the Constitution's mandate, their action would be tantamount to state action, and be subject as such to undoubted congressional authority to penalize any exercise of state police power that would abridge the equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. That is to say, Congress is no less able to legislate against unconstitutional exercises of state authority by conspiratorial usurpation than it is to counter unconstitutional action taken by those formally vested with state authority. </s> This equation of actionable conspiracies with state action is indeed central to the reading given to the prevention clause by the Griffin Court. In reasoning that the deprivation clause contained no state action requirement, the Court contrasted the text of that clause with the language of three other provisions indicating, respectively, "three possible forms for a state action limitation on 1985(3)." Griffin, 403 U.S., at 98 . One such limitation that might have been read into the deprivation clause was "that there must be interference with or influence upon state authorities." Ibid. The Court declined to tack that requirement onto the deprivation clause because its inclusion in the prevention clause indicated that Congress intended it to apply there, and nowhere else. The relevant point here is that the whole basis of the Griffin Court's analysis was that "interference with or influence on state authorities" was state action, and it follows from Griffin's own premises that no guarantee-against-private-encroachment condition would have been needed even then to allay any apprehension that, in reaching the private conspiracies described by the prevention clause, Congress might be exceeding its authority under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. </s> Accordingly, I conclude that the prevention clause may be applied to a conspiracy intended to hobble or overwhelm the capacity of duly constituted state police authorities to secure equal protection of the laws, even when the conspirators' [506 U.S. 263, 303] animus is not based on race or a like class characteristic, and even when the ultimate object of the conspiracy is to violate a constitutional guarantee that applies solely against state action. </s> V </s> Turning now to the application of the prevention clause as I thus read it, I conclude that a conspiracy falls within the terms of the prevention clause when its purpose is to hinder or prevent law enforcement authorities from giving normal police protection to women attempting to exercise the right to abortion recognized in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). My reason for this is not a view that a State's frustration of an individual's choice to obtain an abortion would, without more, violate equal protection, but that a classification necessarily lacks any positive relationship to a legitimate state purpose, and consequently fails rational basis scrutiny, when it withdraws a general public benefit on account of the exercise of a right otherwise guaranteed by the Constitution. See Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (applying the Equal Protection Clause and finding no "appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered" by a discrimination that would independently violate the First Amendment). While such a discrimination, were it wrought by the State, could be treated as a burden on the exercise of a right protected by a substantive due process guarantee, see Casey, supra, and forbidden as such, the denial of generally available civic benefits to one group solely because its members seek what the Constitution guarantees would just as clearly be a classification for a forbidden purpose, which is to say, independently a violation of equal protection. See Mosley, supra; Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980). 9 When private individuals conspire for the [506 U.S. 263, 304] purpose of arrogating and, in effect, exercising the State's power in a way that would thus violate equal protection if so exercised by state officials, the conspiracy becomes actionable when implemented by an act "whereby [a person] is injured in his person or property, or deprived of . . . any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States." 1985(3). 10 </s> [506 U.S. 263, 305] </s> VI </s> The only remaining question is whether respondents have demonstrated, and the District Court has found, a conspiracy [506 U.S. 263, 306] thus actionable under the prevention clause. 11 While I think that all of the requisite findings would be supportable on this record, one such finding has not been expressly made. </s> The District Court found that petitioners conspired to cause respondent clinics to cease operations by trespassing on their property and physically blocking entry into and exit from the clinics, see 726 F.Supp., at 1489, rendering existing and prospective patients, as well as physicians and medical staff, unable to enter the clinic to render or receive medical counseling or advice. Ibid. The District Court found that petitioners' actions were characteristically undertaken without notice and typically overwhelmed local police officials invested with the law enforcement component of the State's police power, rendering them unable for a substantial period to give or secure the police protection otherwise extended to all persons going about their lawful business on the streets and on private premises. Id., at 1489, 1490, and n. 4. The victims were chosen because they would be making choices falling within the scope of recognized substantive due process protection, id., at 1489, choices that may not be made the basis for discriminatory state classifications applied to deny state services routinely made available to all persons. The District Court found that the effects of thus replacing constituted authority with a lawless regime would create a substantial risk of physical harm, ibid., and of damage to respondents' property, id., at 1489-1490, a conclusion amply [506 U.S. 263, 307] supported by the record evidence of personal assaults and tortious restrictions on lawful movement, as well as damage to property, at petitioners' previous demonstrations. See, e.g., Tr. A-25 (Nov. 20, 1989). </s> These facts would support a conclusion that petitioners' conspiracy had a "purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of [Virginia] from giving or securing to all persons within [Virginia] the equal protection of the laws," and it might be fair to read such a finding between the lines of the District Court's express conclusions. But the finding was not express, and the better course is to err on the side of seeking express clarification. Certainly that is true here, when other Members of the Court think it appropriate to remand for further proceedings. I conclude therefore that the decision of the Court of Appeals should be vacated and the case be remanded for consideration of purpose, and for a final determination whether implementation of this conspiracy was actionable under the prevention clause of 42 U.S.C. 1985(3). </s> [Footnote 1 Contrary to the Court's interpretation, see ante, at 279, and n. 8, respondents made this very point at reargument: </s> "Q: And it wasn't - and it wasn't in the complaint, was it? </s> "Ms. Ellis: No, Your Honor. The complaint is [sic] alleged, though, a violation of section 1985(3) generally." Tr. of Reargument 33-34. </s> [Footnote 2 "Whether a conspiracy to blockade medical clinics providing abortions and related services to women, substantial numbers of whom travel from other states, is a basis for a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. 1985(3)." </s> [Footnote 3 "Are respondents' claims under 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) so insubstantial as to deprive the federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction?" </s> [Footnote 4 Cf. Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 835 -839 (1983) (holding that animus against a class based upon its economic views, status, or activities is beyond the reach of the deprivation clause, and reserving the question whether it reaches animus against any class other than "Negroes and those who championed their cause"). </s> [Footnote 5 Carpenters did leave open the question whether the deprivation clause might apply to a conspiracy "aimed at any class or organization on account of its political views or activities. . . ." See Carpenters, supra, at 837. </s> [Footnote 6 Senator Edmunds' quoted language occurred in a discussion of both 2 and 3 of the bill that became the Civil Rights Act of 1871. See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., at 567. That Senator Edmunds was referring to the statutory language at issue here is unmistakable, because he stated that he was describing the conditions required before a conspiracy could be actionable "under the provisions of all this bill." See ibid. </s> [Footnote 7 This prudential step was presumably unnecessary in light of United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 762 (1966) (Clark, J., concurring); id., at 782 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), in which a majority of the Court concluded that 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies, with or without state action, that interfere with exercise of Fourteenth Amendment rights. </s> [Footnote 8 But see n. 7, supra. </s> [Footnote 9 I emphasize the substantive due process guarantee at issue here because my analysis rests on the fact that, treating the conspirators as the State, the imposition of restrictions on abortion more strict than those [506 U.S. 263, 304] permitted under the Constitution is not a legitimate public purpose. I do not reach the question whether and how the equal protection requirement in the prevention clause would be violated by a conspiracy which, if charged to the State, would amount to a denial of police protection to individuals who are not attempting to exercise a constitutional right. </s> [Footnote 10 The scope of this construction of the prevention clause is limited. It certainly would not forbid any conduct, unlike that at issue here, protected by the First Amendment. Nor would it reach even demonstrations that have only the incidental effect of overwhelming local police authorities, for the statute, by its terms, requires a "purpose" to "preven[t] or hinde[r] the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws." Indeed, it would not necessarily reach even most types of civil disobedience that may be intended to overwhelm police by inviting multiple arrests, because the purpose of these is not ordinarily to discriminate against individuals on the basis of their exercise of an independently protected constitutional right. See n. 9, supra. </s> As to the lunch counter sit-in protests of the early 1960's, to which the Court refers, see ante, at 282, and n. 14, if the cases that made it to this Court are representative, these normally were not "mass" demonstrations, but rather led to the arrests of small groups of orderly students who refused to leave segregated establishments when requested to do so. See, e.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 348 (1964) ("two Negro college students"); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 227 (1964) ("12 Negro students"); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964) (an integrated group of 18 blacks and whites); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 147 (1964) ("five Negro college students"); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130, 132 (1964) ("five young Negroes"); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 268 (1963) ("three Negro and one white college students" seeking service at a refreshment counter "designed to accommodate 24 persons"); Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 245 , 247 (1963) (10 "Negro boys and girls" seeking service at a lunch counter that "was designed to accommodate 59 persons"). </s> In any event, under the construction I adopt today, a lunch counter sit-in would not have been actionable even if police had been overwhelmed [506 U.S. 263, 305] because, for example, protesters arrested for trespass were immediately replaced by others who prevented police from barring integration of the lunch counter, leading to mass arrests. This is so because the protesters would not have deprived the owner of the segregated lunch counter of any independently protected constitutional right. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 -622 (1984) (no associational right on the part of individual members to exclude women from the Jaycees); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 -261 (1964) (Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibiting discrimination in places of public accommodation does not work a deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law, nor a taking of property without just compensation). </s> The Court correctly describes the holding of Heart of Atlanta, but then ignores the import of that holding in reaching its conclusion. It argues that government action that "would have been the equivalent of what those conducting the sit-ins did," i.e., government action preventing restaurant owners from discriminating in provision of service against blacks, would have violated the Constitution by "physically occupy[ing the restaurant owners'] property without due process and without just compensation." See ante, at 282, n. 14. Whether the "property" to which the Court refers is the lunch counter itself, or the restaurant owners' "right to exclude blacks from their establishments" on the basis of race, ibid. assuming that could even be described as one of that bundle of rights that made up such a restaurant owner's property (a dubious proposition, see, e.g., Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 472, 484 (K.B. 1701) (common law duty of innkeepers to serve potential patrons equally, without regard to personal preference, so long as they can be accommodated)), the Court does not explain how, if such government action would violate the Constitution, Title II of the Civil Rights Act could provide "legal warrant for the physical occupation," ante, at 282, n. 14, without similarly offending the Takings and Due Process Clauses. </s> There is, additionally, an independent reason apart from the absence of any constitutional right on the restaurant owner's part, that a sit-in demonstration would not be actionable under my construction of the prevention clause. Although the question was left open in the sit-in cases decided by this Court in 1963 and 1964, see Paulsen, The Sit-In Cases of 1964: "But Answer Came There None," 1964 S.Ct.Rev. 137 (1964), and was then largely mooted by the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, [506 U.S. 263, 306] government enforcement of private segregation by use of a state trespass law, rather than "securing to all persons . . . the equal protection of the laws," itself amounted to an unconstitutional act in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). </s> [Footnote 11 As the Court observes, ante, at 285, n. 16, I do not address the propriety of injunctive relief in this case, even though it was addressed by the parties in supplemental briefs on reargument. Unlike the prevention clause question, it is not "fairly included" within the questions upon which certiorari was granted, and therefore its consideration by the Court would be inappropriate. See this Court's Rule 14.1(a). </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, dissenting. </s> After the Civil War, Congress enacted legislation imposing on the Federal Judiciary the responsibility to remedy both abuses of power by persons acting under color of state law and lawless conduct that state courts are neither fully competent, nor always certain, to prevent. 1 The Ku Klux Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, was a response to the massive, organized lawlessness that infected our Southern States during the post-Civil War era. When a question concerning this statute's coverage arises, it is appropriate to consider whether [506 U.S. 263, 308] the controversy has a purely local character or the kind of federal dimension that gave rise to the legislation. </s> Based on detailed, undisputed findings of fact, the District Court concluded that the portion of 2 of the Ku Klux Act now codified at 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) provides a federal remedy for petitioners' violent concerted activities on the public streets and private property of law-abiding citizens. National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F.Supp. 1483 (ED Va. 1989). The Court of Appeals affirmed. National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582 (CA4 1990). The holdings of the courts below are supported by the text and the legislative history of the statute, and are fully consistent with this Court's precedents. Admittedly, important questions concerning the meaning of 1985(3) have been left open in our prior cases, including whether the statute covers gender-based discrimination and whether it provides a remedy for the kind of interference with a woman's right to travel to another State to obtain an abortion revealed by this record. Like the overwhelming majority of federal judges who have spoken to the issue, 2 I am persuaded that traditional principles [506 U.S. 263, 309] of statutory construction readily provide affirmative answers to these questions. </s> It is unfortunate that the Court has analyzed this case as though it presented an abstract question of logical deduction, rather than a question concerning the exercise and allocation of power in our federal system of government. The Court ignores the obvious (and entirely constitutional) congressional intent behind 1985(3) to protect this Nation's citizens from what amounts to the theft of their constitutional rights by organized and violent mobs across the country. </s> The importance of the issue warrants a full statement of the facts found by the District Court before reaching the decisive questions in this case. </s> I </s> Petitioners are dedicated to a cause that they profoundly believe is far more important than mere obedience to the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia or the police power of its cities. To achieve their goals, the individual petitioners "have agreed and combined with one another and with defendant Operation Rescue to organize, coordinate and participate in "rescue" demonstrations at abortion clinics in various parts of the country, including the Washington metropolitan area. The purpose of these "rescue" demonstrations is to disrupt operations at the target clinic, and indeed ultimately to cause the clinic to cease operations entirely." 3 </s> The scope of petitioners' conspiracy is nationwide; it far exceeds the bounds or jurisdiction of any one State. They have blockaded clinics across the country, and their activities have been enjoined in New York, Pennsylvania, Washington, Connecticut, California, Kansas, and Nevada, as well as the [506 U.S. 263, 310] District of Columbia metropolitan area. They have carried out their "rescue" operations in the District of Columbia and Maryland in defiance of federal injunctions. 4 </s> Pursuant to their overall conspiracy, petitioners have repeatedly engaged in "rescue" operations that violate local law and harm innocent women. Petitioners trespass on clinic property and physically block access to the clinic, preventing patients, as well as physicians and medical staff, from entering the clinic to render or receive medical or counseling services. Uncontradicted trial testimony demonstrates that petitioners' conduct created a "substantial risk that existing or prospective patients may suffer physical or mental harm." 5 Petitioners make no claim that their conduct is a legitimate form of protected expression. </s> Petitioners' intent to engage in repeated violations of law is not contested. They trespass on private property, interfere with the ability of patients to obtain medical and counseling [506 U.S. 263, 311] services, and incite others to engage in similar unlawful activity. They also engage in malicious conduct, such as defacing clinic signs, damaging clinic property, and strewing nails in clinic parking lots and on nearby public streets. 6 This unlawful conduct is "vital to [petitioners'] avowed purposes and goals." 7 They show no signs of abandoning their chosen method for advancing their goals. 8 </s> Rescue operations effectively hinder and prevent the constituted authorities of the targeted community from providing local citizens with adequate protection. 9 The lack of advance warning of petitioners' activities, combined with limited police department resources, makes it difficult for the police to prevent petitioners' ambush by "rescue" from closing a clinic for many hours at a time. The trial record is replete with examples of petitioners overwhelming local law enforcement officials by sheer force of numbers. In one "rescue" in Falls Church, Virginia, the demonstrators vastly outnumbered the police department's complement of 30 deputized officers. The police arrested 240 rescuers, but were unable to prevent the blockade from closing the clinic for more than six hours. Because of the large-scale, highly organized nature of petitioners' activities, the local authorities are unable to protect the victims of petitioners' conspiracy. 10 </s> [506 U.S. 263, 312] </s> Petitioners' conspiracy had both the purpose and effect of interfering with interstate travel. The number of patients who cross state lines to obtain an abortion obviously depends, to some extent, on the location of the clinic and the quality of its services. In the Washington metropolitan area, where interstate travel is routine, 20 to 30 percent of the patients at some clinics were from out of State, while at least one clinic obtained over half its patients from other States. The District Court's conclusions in this regard bear repetition: </s> "[Petitioners] engaged in this conspiracy for the purpose, either directly or indirectly, of depriving women seeking abortions and related medical and counseling services, of the right to travel. The right to travel includes the right to unobstructed interstate travel to obtain an abortion and other medical services. . . . Testimony at trial establishes that clinics in Northern Virginia provide medical services to plaintiffs' members and patients who travel from out of state. Defendants' activities interfere with these persons' right to unimpeded interstate travel by blocking their access to [506 U.S. 263, 313] abortion clinics. And the Court is not persuaded that clinic closings affect only intrastate travel, from the street to the doors of the clinics. Were the Court to hold otherwise, interference with the right to travel could occur only at state borders. This conspiracy, therefore, effectively deprives organizational plaintiffs' non-Virginia members of their right to interstate travel." 11 </s> To summarize briefly, the evidence establishes that petitioners engaged in a nationwide conspiracy; to achieve their goal they repeatedly occupied public streets and trespassed on the premises of private citizens in order to prevent or hinder the constituted authorities from protecting access to abortion clinics by women, a substantial number of whom traveled in interstate commerce to reach the destinations blockaded by petitioners. The case involves no ordinary trespass, nor anything remotely resembling the peaceful picketing of a local retailer. It presents a striking contemporary example of the kind of zealous, politically motivated, lawless conduct that led to the enactment of the Ku Klux Act in 1871 and gave it its name. </s> II </s> The text of the statute makes plain the reasons Congress considered a federal remedy for such conspiracies both necessary and appropriate. In relevant part, the statute contains two independent clauses which I separately identify in the following quotation: </s> "If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, [first] for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or [second] for the [506 U.S. 263, 314] purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; . . . in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators." 42 U.S.C. 1985(3). </s> The plain language of the statute is surely broad enough to cover petitioners' conspiracy. Their concerted activities took place on both the public "highway" and the private "premises of another." The women targeted by their blockade fit comfortably within the statutory category described as "any person or class of persons." Petitioners' interference with police protection of women seeking access to abortion clinics "directly or indirectly" deprived them of equal protection of the laws and of their privilege of engaging in lawful travel. Moreover, a literal reading of the second clause of the statute describes petitioners' proven "purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory" from securing "to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws." </s> No one has suggested that there would be any constitutional objection to the application of this statute to petitioners' nationwide conspiracy; it is obvious that any such constitutional claim would be frivolous. Accordingly, if, as it sometimes does, the Court limited its analysis to the statutory text, it would certainly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. For both the first clause and the second clause of 1985(3) plainly describe petitioners' conspiracy. [506 U.S. 263, 315] </s> III </s> The Court bypasses the statute's history, intent, and plain language in its misplaced reliance on prior precedent. Of course, the Court has never before had occasion to construe the second clause of 1985(3). The first clause, however, has been narrowly construed in Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951), Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), and Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983). In the first of these decisions, the Court held that 1985(3) did not apply to wholly private conspiracies. 12 In Griffin, the Court rejected that view, but limited the application of the statute's first clause to conspiracies motivated by discriminatory intent to deprive plaintiffs of rights constitutionally protected against private (and not just governmental) deprivation. Finally, Carpenters reemphasized that the first clause of 1985(3) offers no relief from the violation of rights protected against only state interference. 463 U.S., at 830 -834. To date, the Court has recognized as rights protected against private encroachment (and, hence, by 1985(3)) only the constitutional right of interstate travel and rights granted by the Thirteenth Amendment. </s> For present purposes, it is important to note that, in each of these cases, the Court narrowly construed 1985(3) to avoid what it perceived as serious constitutional problems with the statute itself. Because those problems are not at issue here, it is even more important to note a larger point about our precedent. In the course of applying Civil War era legislation to civil rights issues unforeseeable in 1871, the Court has adopted a flexible approach, interpreting the statute to reach current concerns without exceeding the bounds of its intended purposes or the constitutional powers [506 U.S. 263, 316] of Congress. 13 We need not exceed those bounds to apply the statute to these facts. </s> The facts and decision in Griffin are especially instructive here. In overruling an important part of Collins, the Court found that the conduct the plaintiffs alleged - a Mississippi highway attack on a white man suspected of being a civil rights worker and the two black men who were passengers in his car - was emblematic of the antiabolitionist violence that 1985(3) was intended to prevent. A review of the legislative history demonstrated, on the one hand, that Congress intended the coverage of 1985(3) to reach purely private conspiracies, but on the other hand, that it wanted to avoid the "constitutional shoals" that would lie in the path of a general federal tort law punishing an ordinary assault and battery committed by two or more persons. The racial motivation for the battery committed by the defendants in the case before the Court placed their conduct "close to the core of the coverage intended by Congress." 403 U.S., at 103 . It therefore satisfied the limiting construction that the Court placed on the reference to a deprivation of "equal" privileges and immunities in the first clause of the Act. The Court explained that construction: </s> "The constitutional shoals that would lie in the path of interpreting 1985(3) as a general federal tort law can be avoided by giving full effect to the congressional purpose - by requiring, as an element of the cause of action, the kind of invidiously discriminatory motivation stressed by the sponsors of the limiting amendment. See the remarks of Representatives Willard and Shellabarger, [Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 100 (1871)]. The language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise [506 U.S. 263, 317] class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." Id., at 101-102. </s> A footnote carefully left open the question "whether a conspiracy motivated by invidiously discriminatory intent other than racial bias would be actionable under the portion of 1985(3) before us." Id., at 102, n. 9 (emphasis added). Neither of our two more recent opinions construing 1985(3) has answered the question left open in Griffin or has involved the second clause of the statute. 14 </s> After holding that the statute did apply to such facts, and that requiring a discriminatory intent would prevent its overapplication, the Griffin Court held that 1985(3) would be within the constitutional power of Congress if its coverage were limited to constitutional rights secured against private action. The facts in that case identified two such grounds. [506 U.S. 263, 318] </s> One ground was 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment. The other was the right to travel. The Court explained how the petitioners could show a violation of the latter. As with the class-based animus requirement, the Court was less concerned with the specifics of that showing than with the constitutionality of 1985(3); it emphasized that whatever evidence they presented had to "make it clear that the petitioners had suffered from conduct that Congress may reach under its power to protect the right of interstate travel." Id., at 106. </s> The concerns that persuaded the Court to adopt a narrow reading of the text of 1985(3) in Griffin are not presented in this case. Giving effect to the plain language of 1985(3) to provide a remedy against the violent interference with women exercising their privilege - indeed, their right - to engage in interstate travel to obtain an abortion presents no danger of turning the statute into a general tort law. Nor does anyone suggest that such relief calls into question the constitutional powers of Congress. When the Griffin Court rejected its earlier holding in Collins, it provided both an "authoritative construction" of 1985(3), see ante, at 289 (SOUTER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and a sufficient reason for rejecting the doctrine of stare decisis whenever it would result in an unnecessarily narrow construction of the statute's plain language. The Court wrote: </s> "Whether or not Collins v. Hardyman was correctly decided on its own facts is a question with which we need not here be concerned. But it is clear, in the light of the evolution of decisional law in the years that have passed since that case was decided, that many of the constitutional problems there perceived simply do not exist. Little reason remains, therefore, not to accord to the words of the statute their apparent meaning." 403 U.S., at 95 -96. [506 U.S. 263, 319] </s> Once concerns about the constitutionality of 1985(3) are properly put aside, we can focus more appropriately on giving the statute its intended effect. On the facts disclosed by this record, I am convinced that both the text of the statute and its underlying purpose support the conclusion that petitioners' conspiracy was motivated by a discriminatory animus and violated respondents' protected right to engage in interstate travel. </s> IV </s> The question left open in Griffin - whether the coverage of 1985(3) is limited to cases involving racial bias - is easily answered. The text of the statute provides no basis for excluding from its coverage any cognizable class of persons who are entitled to the equal protection of the laws. This Court has repeatedly and consistently held that gender-based classifications are subject to challenge on constitutional grounds, see, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). A parallel construction of post-Civil War legislation that, in the words of Justice Holmes, "dealt with Federal rights and with all Federal rights, and protected them in the lump," United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 387 (1915), is obviously appropriate. </s> The legislative history of the Act confirms the conclusion that, even though it was primarily motivated by the lawless conduct directed at the recently emancipated citizens, its protection extended to "all the thirty-eight millions of the citizens of this nation." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 484 (1871). Given then prevailing attitudes about the respective roles of males and females in society, it is possible that the enacting legislators did not anticipate protection of women against class-based discrimination. That, however, is not a sufficient reason for refusing to construe the statutory text in accord with its plain meaning, particularly when that construction fulfills the central purpose of the legislation. See Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 155 -156 (1991). [506 U.S. 263, 320] </s> The gloss that Justice Stewart placed on the statute in Griffin, then, did not exclude gender-based discrimination from its coverage. But it does require us to resolve the question whether a conspiracy animated by the desire to deprive women of their right to obtain an abortion is "class based." </s> V </s> The terms "animus" and "invidious" are susceptible to different interpretations. The Court today announces that it could find class-based animus in petitioners' mob violence "only if one of two suggested propositions is true: (1) that opposition to abortion can reasonably be presumed to reflect a sex-based intent, or (2) that intent is irrelevant, and a class-based animus can be determined solely by effect." Ante, at 270. </s> The first proposition appears to describe a malevolent form of hatred or ill will. When such an animus defends itself as opposition to conduct that a given class engages in exclusively or predominantly, we can readily unmask it as the intent to discriminate against the class itself. See ibid. Griffin, for instance, involved behavior animated by the desire to keep African-American citizens from exercising their constitutional rights. The defendants were no less guilty of a class-based animus because they also opposed the cause of desegregation or rights of African-American suffrage, and the Court did not require the plaintiffs in Griffin to prove that their beatings were motivated by hatred for African-Americans. Similarly, a decision disfavoring female lawyers, 15 female owners of liquor [506 U.S. 263, 321] establishments, 16 or pregnant women 17 may appropriately be characterized as "invidiously discriminatory" even if the decisionmakers have goals other than - or in addition to - discrimination against individual women. 18 </s> The second proposition deserves more than the Court's disdain. It plausibly describes an assumption that intent [506 U.S. 263, 322] lies behind the discriminatory effects from which Congress intended 1985(3) to protect American citizens. Congress may obviously offer statutory protections against behavior that the Constitution does not forbid, including forms of discrimination that undermine 1985(3)'s guarantee of equal treatment under the law. Regardless of whether the examples of paternalistic discrimination given above involve a constitutional violation, as a matter of statutory construction, it is entirely appropriate to conclude that each would satisfy the class-based animus requirement, because none of them poses any danger of converting 1985(3) into a general tort law or creating concerns about the constitutionality of the statute. </s> Both forms of class-based animus that the Court proposes are present in this case. </s> Sex-Based Discrimination </s> It should be noted that a finding of class-based animus in this case does not require finding that to disfavor abortion is, "ipso facto," to discriminate invidiously against women. See ante, at 271. Respondents do not take that position, and they do not rely on abstract propositions about "opposition to abortion" per se. See ante, at 269-270. Instead, they call our attention to a factual record showing a particular lawless conspiracy employing force to prevent women from exercising their constitutional rights. Such a conspiracy, in the terms of the Court's first proposition, may "reasonably be presumed to reflect a sex-based intent." See ante, at 270. </s> To satisfy the class-based animus requirement of 1985(3), the conspirators' conduct need not be motivated by hostility toward individual women. As women are unquestionably a protected class, that requirement - as well as the central purpose of the statute - is satisfied if the conspiracy is aimed at conduct that only members of the protected class have the capacity to perform. It is not necessary that the intended effect upon women be the sole purpose of the conspiracy. It [506 U.S. 263, 323] is enough that the conspiracy be motivated "at least in part" by its adverse effects upon women. Cf. Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 -266 (1977). The immediate and intended effect of this conspiracy was to prevent women from obtaining abortions. Even assuming that the ultimate and indirect consequence of petitioners' blockade was the legitimate and nondiscriminatory goal of saving potential life, it is undeniable that the conspirators' immediate purpose was to affect the conduct of women. 19 Moreover, petitioners target women because of their sex, specifically, because of their capacity to become pregnant and to have an abortion. 20 </s> [506 U.S. 263, 324] </s> It is also obvious that petitioners' conduct was motivated "at least in part" by the invidious belief that individual women are not capable of deciding whether to terminate a pregnancy, or that they should not be allowed to act on such a decision. Petitioners' blanket refusal to allow any women access to an abortion clinic overrides the individual class member's choice, no matter whether she is the victim of rape or incest, whether the abortion may be necessary to save her life, 21 or even whether she is merely seeking advice or information about her options. Petitioners' conduct is designed to deny every woman the opportunity to exercise a constitutional right that only women possess. Petitioners' conspiracy, which combines massive defiance of the law with violent obstruction of the constitutional rights of their fellow citizens, represents a paradigm of the kind of conduct that the statute was intended to cover. 22 </s> [506 U.S. 263, 325] </s> The Court recognizes that the requisite animus may "readily be presumed" on the basis of the relationship between the targeted activity and membership in the targeted class. Ante, at 270. But the Court insists that opposition to an act engaged in exclusively by members of a protected class does not involve class-based animus unless the act itself is an "irrational object of disfavor." Ibid. The Court's view requires a subjective judicial interpretation inappropriate in the civil rights context, where what seems rational to an oppressor seems equally irrational to a victim. Opposition to desegregation, and opposition to the voting rights of both African-Americans and women, were certainly at one time considered "rational" propositions. But such propositions were never free of the class-based discrimination from which 1985(3) protects the members of both classes. </s> The activity of traveling to a clinic to obtain an abortion is, of course, exclusively performed by women. Opposition to that activity may not be "irrational," but violent interference with it is unquestionably "aimed at" women. The Court offers no justification for its newly crafted suggestion that deliberately imposing a burden on an activity exclusively performed by women is not class-based discrimination unless opposition to the activity is also irrational. The Court is apparently willing to presume discrimination only when opposition to the targeted activity is - in its eyes - wholly pretextual: that is, when it thinks that no rational person would oppose the activity, except as a means of achieving a separate and distinct goal. 23 The Court's analysis makes sense only if every member of a protected class [506 U.S. 263, 326] exercises all of her constitutional rights, or if no rational excuse remains for otherwise invidious discrimination. Not every member of every protected class chooses to exercise all of his or her constitutional rights; not all of them want to. That many women do not obtain abortions - that many women oppose abortion - does not mean that those who violently prevent the exercise of that right by women who do exercise it are somehow cleansed of their discriminatory intent. In enacting a law such as 1985(3) for federal courts to enforce, Congress asked us to see through the excuses - the "rational" motives - that will always disguise discrimination. Congress asked us to foresee, and speed, the day when such discrimination, no matter how well disguised, would be unmasked. </s> Statutory Relief from Discriminatory Effects </s> As for the second definition of class-based animus, disdainfully proposed by the Court, ibid., there is no reason to insist that a statutory claim under 1985(3) must satisfy the restrictions we impose on constitutional claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. A congressional statute may offer relief from discriminatory effects even if the Fourteenth Amendment prevents only discriminatory intent. </s> The Court attempts to refute the finding of class-based animus by relying on our cases holding that the governmental denial of either disability benefits for pregnant women or abortion funding does not violate the Constitution. That reliance is misplaced for several reasons. Cases involving constitutional challenges to governmental plans denying financial benefits to pregnant women, and cases involving equal protection challenges to facially neutral statutes with discriminatory effects, involve different concerns and reach justifiably different results than a case involving citizens' statutory protection against burdens imposed on their constitutional rights. [506 U.S. 263, 327] </s> In Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), we faced the question whether a State's disability insurance system violated the Fourteenth Amendment by excluding benefits for normal pregnancy. A majority of the Court concluded that the system did not constitute discrimination on the basis of sex prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause. Geduldig, of course, did not purport to establish that, as a matter of logic, a classification based on pregnancy is gender neutral. As an abstract statement, that proposition is simply false; a classification based on pregnancy is a sex-based classification, just as, to use the Court's example, a classification based on the wearing of yarmulkes is a religion-based classification. Nor should Geduldig be understood as holding that, as a matter of law, pregnancy-based classifications never violate the Equal Protection Clause. In fact, as the language of the opinion makes clear, what Geduldig held was that not every legislative classification based on pregnancy was equivalent, for equal protection purposes, to the explicitly gender-based distinctions struck down in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). That Geduldig must be understood in these narrower terms is apparent from the sentence which the Court quotes in part: "While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification like those considered in Reed, supra, and Frontiero, supra." Geduldig, 417 U.S., at 496 , n. 20 (emphasis added). 24 </s> Central to the holding in Geduldig was the Court's belief that the disability insurance system before it was a plan that [506 U.S. 263, 328] conferred benefits evenly on men and women. 25 Later cases confirmed that the holding in Geduldig depended on an analysis of the insurance plan as a benefit program with an overall nondiscriminatory effect. 26 Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977), applied a statute without an intent requirement to an employer's policy denying accumulated seniority to employees returning from pregnancy leave. Notwithstanding Geduldig, the Court found that the policy burdened only women, and therefore constituted discrimination on the basis of sex. The Court stated that "petitioner has not merely refused to extend to women a benefit that men cannot and do not receive, but has imposed on women a substantial burden that men need not suffer. The distinction between benefits and burdens is more than one of semantics." 434 U.S., at 142 . 27 The distinction between [506 U.S. 263, 329] those who oppose abortion and those who physically threaten women and obstruct their access to abortion clinics is also more than semantic. Petitioners in this case form a mob that seeks to impose a burden on women by forcibly preventing the exercise of a right that only women possess. The discriminatory effect of petitioners' conduct is beyond doubt. </s> Geduldig is inapplicable for another reason. The issue of class-based animus in this case arises in a statutory, not a constitutional, context. There are powerful reasons for giving 1985(3) a reading that is broader than the constitutional holdings on which the Court relies. 28 In our constitutional [506 U.S. 263, 330] cases, we apply the intent standard to determine whether a constitutional violation has occurred. In cases under 1985(3), we apply the class-based animus test not to determine whether a constitutional violation has occurred - the violation is independently established - but to determine whether that violation can be remedied. Given the differing roles the intent standard and the class-based animus requirement play in our jurisprudence, there is no justification for applying the same stringent standards in the context of 1985(3) as in our constitutional cases. </s> As a matter of statutory interpretation, I have always believed that rules that place special burdens on pregnant women discriminate on the basis of sex, for the capacity to become pregnant is the inherited and immutable characteristic that "primarily differentiates the female from the male." General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 162 (1976) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). I continue to believe that that view should inform our construction of civil rights legislation. </s> That view was also the one affirmed by Congress in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 92 Stat. 2076, which amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. 29 The Act categorically expressed Congress' view that [506 U.S. 263, 331] "discrimination based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her sex." Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983). Geduldig had held that a pregnancy-based classification did not constitute forbidden sex discrimination if the classification related to benefits and did not have a discriminatory effect. In the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Congress rejected Geduldig's focus on benefits and overall impact, instead insisting that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy necessarily constitutes prohibited sex discrimination. See H.R.Rep. No. 95-948, pp. 2-3 (1978). The statements of the bill's proponents demonstrate their disapproval of the Court's reluctance in Gilbert and Geduldig to recognize that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is always gender-based discrimination. See, e.g., 123 Cong.Rec. 10581 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Hawkins) ("[I]t seems only common sense, that since only women can become pregnant, discrimination against pregnant people is necessarily discrimination against women . . ."). 30 </s> Two Terms ago, in Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991), the Court again faced the question whether a classification based on childbearing capacity violated a statutory ban on discrimination. That case, arising under Title VII, concerned Johnson Controls' "fetal-protection policy," which excluded all women "capable of bearing children" from jobs requiring exposure to lead. Johnson Controls sought to justify the policy on the basis that maternal exposure to lead created health risks for a fetus. The first question the Court addressed was whether the policy was facially discriminatory or, alternatively, facially neutral, with merely a discriminatory effect. The [506 U.S. 263, 332] Court concluded that the policy was facially discriminatory. The policy was not neutral, the Court held, "because it does not apply to the reproductive capacity of the company's male employees in the same way as it applies to that of the females." Id., at 199. Johnson Controls, I had thought, signaled the Court's recognition that classifications based on ability to become pregnant are necessarily discriminatory. </s> VI </s> Respondents' right to engage in interstate travel is inseparable from the right they seek to exercise. That right, unduly burdened and frustrated by petitioners' conspiracy, is protected by the Federal Constitution, as we recently reaffirmed in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Almost two decades ago, the Court squarely held that the right to enter another State for the purpose of seeking abortion services available there is protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, U.S. Const., Art. IV, 2. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973). 31 A woman's right to engage in interstate travel for this purpose is either entitled to special respect because she is exercising a constitutional right or because restrictive rules in her home State may make travel to another State imperative. Federal courts are uniquely situated to protect that right for the same reason they are well suited to protect the privileges and immunities of those who enter other States to ply their trade. See, e.g., Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 248 -256 (1898). [506 U.S. 263, 333] </s> The District Court's conclusion that petitioners intended to interfere with the right to engage in interstate travel is well supported by the record. Interference with a woman's ability to visit another State to obtain an abortion is essential to petitioners' achievement of their ultimate goal - the complete elimination of abortion services throughout the United States. No lesser purpose can explain their multi-state "rescue" operations. </s> Even in a single locality, the effect of petitioners' blockade on interstate travel is substantial. Between 20 and 30 percent of the patients at a targeted clinic in Virginia were from out-of-State, and over half of the patients at one of the Maryland clinics were interstate travelers. 726 F.Supp., at 1489. Making their destination inaccessible to women who have engaged in interstate travel for a single purpose is unquestionably a burden on that travel. That burden was not only a foreseeable and natural consequence of the blockades, but indeed was also one of the intended consequences of petitioners' conspiracy. </s> Today the Court advances two separate reasons for rejecting the District Court's conclusion that petitioners deliberately deprived women seeking abortions of their right to interstate travel. First, relying on an excerpt from our opinion in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 760 (1966), the Court assumes that "`the predominant purpose'" or "the very purpose" of the conspiracy must be to impede interstate travel. Ante, at 275, 276. Second, the Court assumes that even an intentional restriction on out-of-state travel is permissible if it imposes an equal burden on intrastate travel. The first reason reflects a mistaken understanding of Guest and Griffin, and the second is unsupported by precedent or reason. </s> In the Guest case, the Court squarely held that the Federal Constitution protects the right to engage in interstate travel from private interference. Not a word in that opinion suggests that the constitutional protection is limited to [506 U.S. 263, 334] impediments that discriminate against nonresidents. Instead, the Court broadly referred to the federal commerce power that "authorizes Congress to legislate for the protection of individuals from violations of civil rights that impinge on their free movement in interstate commerce." 383 U.S., at 759 . It then held that the right of interstate travel was one of the federal rights protected from private interference by the criminal statute that had been enacted as 6 of the Enforcement Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 141, later codified at 18 U.S.C. 241. That statute had previously been construed to contain a "stringent scienter requirement" to save it from condemnation as a criminal statute failing to provide adequate notice of the proscribed conduct. 383 U.S., at 785 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id., at 753-754. The Guest opinion then explained why this history would limit the coverage of 18 U.S.C. 241: </s> "This does not mean, of course, that every criminal conspiracy affecting an individual's right of free interstate passage is within the sanction of 18 U.S.C. 241. A specific intent to interfere with the federal right must be proved, and, at a trial, the defendants are entitled to a jury instruction phrased in those terms. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 106 -107 1945.. Thus, for example, a conspiracy to rob an interstate traveler would not, of itself, violate 241. But if the predominant purpose of the conspiracy is to impede or prevent the exercise of the right of interstate travel, or to oppress a person because of his exercise of that right, then, whether or not motivated by racial discrimination, the conspiracy becomes a proper object of the federal law under which the indictment in this case was brought." 383 U.S., at 760 . </s> Today the Court assumes that the same sort of scienter requirement should apply to 1985(3) because 18 U.S.C. 241 is its "criminal counterpart." Ante, at 275. [506 U.S. 263, 335] </s> The Court is mistaken. The criminal sanctions that were originally included in 2 of the Ku Klux Act were held unconstitutional over a century ago. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887). The statute now codified at 18 U.S.C. 241 was enacted in 1870, a year earlier than the Ku Klux Act. The texts of the two statutes are materially different. Even if that were not so, it would be inappropriate to assume that a strict scienter requirement in a criminal statute should be glibly incorporated in a civil statute. 32 But what is most significant is the dramatic difference between the language of 18 U.S.C. 241, which includes an unequivocal "intent" requirement, and the language of 1985(3), which broadly describes a purpose to deprive another of a protected privilege "either directly or indirectly." An indirect interference with the right to travel may violate 1985(3) even if it would not violate 241. 33 </s> [506 U.S. 263, 336] </s> The Court interpreted the right to interstate travel more generously in Griffin. It wrote: </s> "Under these allegations, it is open to the petitioners to prove at trial that they had been engaging in interstate travel or intended to do so, that their federal right to travel interstate was one of the rights meant to be [506 U.S. 263, 337] discriminatorily impaired by the conspiracy, that the conspirators intended to drive out-of-state civil rights workers from the State, or that they meant to deter the petitioners from associating with such persons. This and other evidence could make it clear that the petitioners had suffered from conduct that Congress may reach under its power to protect the right of interstate travel." Griffin, 403 U.S., at 106 . </s> In that paragraph, the Court mentions that plaintiffs' federal right to travel may have been "discriminatorily" impaired. The use of that word was appropriate because of the Court's earlier discussion of the importance of class-based discriminatory animus in interpreting the statute, but was entirely unnecessary in order to uphold the constitutionality of the statute as applied to conduct that "Congress may reach under its power to protect the right of interstate travel." Ibid. Moreover, "in the light of the evolution of decisional law," id., at 95-96, in recent years, today no one could possibly question the power of Congress to prohibit private blockades of streets and highways used by interstate travelers, even if the conspirators indiscriminately interdicted both local and out-of-state travelers. </s> The implausibility of the Court's readings of Griffin and Guest is matched by its conclusion that a burden on interstate travel is permissible as long as an equal burden is imposed on local travelers. The Court has long recognized that a burden on interstate commerce may be invalid even if the same burden is imposed on local commerce. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 , n. 4 (1951); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). The fact that an impermissible burden is most readily identified when it discriminates against nonresidents does not justify immunizing conduct that evenhandedly disrupts both local and interstate travel. The defendants in Griffin, for example, [506 U.S. 263, 338] could not have refuted the claim that they interfered with the right to travel by demonstrating that they indiscriminately attacked local civil rights activists as well as nonresidents. </s> In this case, petitioners have deliberately blockaded access to the destinations sought by a class of women including both local and interstate travelers. Even though petitioners may not have known which of the travelers had crossed the state line, petitioners unquestionably knew that many of them had. The conclusion of the District Court that petitioners "engaged in this conspiracy for the purpose, either directly or indirectly, of depriving women seeking abortions and related medical counseling services, of the right to travel," 726 F.Supp., at 1493, is abundantly supported by the record. </s> Discrimination is a necessary element of the class-based animus requirement, not of the abridgment of a woman's right to engage in interstate travel. Perhaps nowhere else in its opinion does the Court reject such obvious assumptions of the authors of 1985(3). The Reconstruction Congress would have been startled, I think, to learn that 1985(3) protected freed slaves and their supporters from Klan violence not covered by the Thirteenth Amendment only if the Klan members spared local African-Americans and abolitionists their wrath. And it would have been shocked to learn that its law offered relief from a Klan lynching of an out-of-state abolitionist only if the plaintiff could show that the Klan specifically intended to prevent his travel between the States. Yet these are the impossible requirements the Court imposes on a 1985(3) plaintiff who has shown that her right to travel has been deliberately and significantly infringed. It is difficult to know whether the Court is waiting until only a few States have abortion clinics before it finds that petitioners' behavior violates the right to travel, or if it believes that petitioners could never violate that right as long as they oppose the abortion a woman seeks to obtain as well as the travel necessary to obtain it. [506 U.S. 263, 339] </s> VII </s> Respondents have unquestionably established a claim under the second clause of 1985(3), the state hindrance provision. 34 The record amply demonstrates petitioners' successful efforts to overpower local law enforcement officers. During the "rescue" operations, the duly constituted authorities are rendered ineffective, and mob violence prevails. 35 A conspiracy that seeks by force of numbers to prevent local officials from protecting the victims' constitutional rights presents exactly the kind of pernicious combination that the second clause of 1985(3) was designed to counteract. As we recognized in Griffin, the second clause of 1985(3) explicitly concerns such interference with state officials, and, for that reason, does not duplicate the coverage of the first clause. Griffin, 403 U.S., at 99 . </s> Petitioners' conspiracy hinders the lawful authorities from protecting women's constitutionally protected right to choose whether to end their pregnancies. Though this may be a right that is protected only against state infringement, it is clear that, by preventing government officials from safeguarding the exercise of that right, petitioners' conspiracy effects a deprivation redressable under 1985(3). See Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S., at, 830; id., at 840, n. 2 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); see also Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. [506 U.S. 263, 340] v. Novotny, 442 U.S., at 384 (STEVENS, J., concurring). A conspiracy that seeks to interfere with law enforcement officers' performance of their duties entails sufficient involvement with the State to implicate the federally protected right to choose an abortion and to give rise to a cause of action under 1985(3). </s> We have not previously considered whether class-based animus is an element of a claim under the second clause of 1985(3). We have, however, confronted the question whether the class-based animus requirement developed in Griffin should extend to another part of the Ku Klux Act, the portion now codified at 1985(2). That provision, which generally proscribes conspiracies to interfere with federal proceedings, was enacted as part of the same paragraph of the Ku Klux Act that also contained what is now 1985(3). 36 For that reason, in Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (1983), the defendants contended that the plaintiffs had the burden of proving that the alleged conspiracy to intimidate witnesses had been motivated by the kind of class-based animus described in Griffin. The Court of Appeals rejected this contention. Its reasoning, which we briefly summarized in Kush, is highly relevant here: "Noting the Federal Government's unquestioned constitutional authority to protect the processes of its own courts, and the absence of any need to limit the first part of 1985(2) to avoid creating a general federal tort law, the Court of Appeals declined to impose the limitation set forth in Griffin v. Breckenridge." 460 U.S., at 723 . </s> Kush suggests that Griffin's strictly construed class-based animus requirement, developed for the first clause of 1985(3), should not limit the very different second clause. We explained: [506 U.S. 263, 341] </s> "Although Griffin itself arose under the first clause of 1985(3), petitioners argue that its reasoning should be applied to the remaining portions of 1985 as well. We cannot accept that argument for three reasons. First, the scope of the Griffin opinion is carefully confined to "the portion of 1985(3) now before us," [Griffin, 403 U.S.,] at 99; see also id., at 102, n. 9. There is no suggestion in the opinion that its reasoning applies to any other portion of 1985. Second, the analysis in the Griffin opinion relied heavily on the fact that the sponsors of the 1871 bill added the "equal protection" language in response to objections that the `enormous sweep of the original language' vastly extended federal authority and displaced state control over private conduct. Id., at 99-100. That legislative background does not apply to the portions of the statute that prohibit interference with federal officers, federal courts, or federal elections. Third, and of greatest importance, the statutory language that provides the textual basis for the "class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus" requirement simply does not appear in the portion of the statute that applies to this case." 460 U.S., at 726 . </s> It is true, of course, that the reference to "equal protection" appears in both the first and the second clauses of 1985(3), but the potentially unlimited scope of the former is avoided by the language in the latter that confines its reach to conspiracies directed at the "constituted authorities of any State or Territory." The deliberate decision in Griffin that "carefully confined" its holding to "the portion of 1985(3) now before us," coupled with the inapplicability of Griffin's rationale to the second clause, makes it entirely appropriate to give that clause a different and more natural construction. Limited to conspiracies that are sufficiently massive to supplant local law enforcement authorities, the second clause requires no further restriction to honor the congressional purpose of creating an effective civil rights remedy without [506 U.S. 263, 342] federalizing all tort law. The justification for a narrow reading of Griffin's judicially crafted requirement of class-based animus simply does not apply to the state hindrance clause. An action under that clause entails both a violation of the victims' constitutional rights and state involvement. This situation is so far removed from the question whether facially neutral legislation constitutes a violation of the Equal Protection Clause that the strict intent standards developed in that area can have no application. </s> In the context of a conspiracy that hinders state officials and violates respondents' constitutional rights, class-based animus can be inferred if the conspirators' conduct burdens an activity engaged in predominantly by members of the class. Indeed, it would be faithful both to Griffin and to the text of the state hindrance clause to hold that the clause proscribes conspiracies to prevent local law enforcement authorities from protecting activities that are performed exclusively by members of a protected class, even if the conspirators' animus were directed at the activity, rather than at the class members. Thus, even if yarmulkes, rather than Jews, were the object of the conspirators' animus, the statute would prohibit a conspiracy to hinder the constituted authorities from protecting access to a synagogue or other place of worship for persons wearing yarmulkes. Like other civil rights legislation, this statute should be broadly construed to provide federal protection against the kind of disorder and anarchy that the States are unable to control effectively. </s> With class-based animus understood as I have suggested, the conduct covered by the state hindrance clause would be as follows: a large-scale conspiracy that violates the victims' constitutional rights by overwhelming the local authorities and that, by its nature, victimizes predominantly members of a particular class. I doubt whether it would be possible to describe conduct closer to the core of 1985(3)'s coverage. This account would perfectly describe the conduct of the Ku Klux Klan, the group whose activities prompted the enactment [506 U.S. 263, 343] of the statute. This description also applies to petitioners, who have conspired to deprive women of their constitutional right to choose an abortion by overwhelming the local police and by blockading clinics with the intended effect of preventing women from exercising a right only they possess. The state hindrance clause thus provides an independent ground for affirmance. 37 </s> VIII </s> In sum, it is irrelevant whether the Court is correct in its assumption that "opposition to abortion" does not necessarily evidence an intent to disfavor women. Many opponents of [506 U.S. 263, 344] abortion respect both the law and the rights of others to make their own decisions on this important matter. Petitioners, however, are not mere opponents of abortion; they are defiant lawbreakers who have engaged in massive concerted conduct that is designed to prevent all women from making up their own minds about not only the issue of abortion in general, but also whether they should (or will) exercise a right that all women - and only women - possess. </s> Indeed, the error that infects the Court's entire opinion is the unstated and mistaken assumption that this is a case about opposition to abortion. It is not. It is a case about the exercise of federal power to control an interstate conspiracy to commit illegal acts. I have no doubt that most opponents of abortion, like most members of the citizenry at large, understand why the existence of federal jurisdiction is appropriate in a case of this kind. </s> The Court concludes its analysis of 1985(3) by suggesting that a contrary interpretation would have condemned the massive "sit-ins" that were conducted to promote desegregation in the 1960's - a "wildly improbable result." See ante, at 282. This suggestion is profoundly misguided. It assumes that we must totally reject the class-based animus requirement to affirm the District Court, when, in fact, we need only construe that requirement to satisfy its purpose. Moreover, the demonstrations in the 1960's were motivated by a desire to extend the equal protection of the laws to all classes - not to impose burdens on any disadvantaged class. Those who engaged in the nonviolent "sit-ins" to which the Court refers were challenging "a political and economic system that had denied them the basic rights of dignity and equality that this country had fought a Civil War to secure." NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 918 (1982). The suggestion that there is an analogy between their struggle to achieve equality and these petitioners' concerted efforts to deny women equal access to a constitutionally protected privilege may have rhetorical appeal, but it is [506 U.S. 263, 345] insupportable on the record before us, and does not justify the majority's parsimonious construction of an important federal statute. 38 </s> I respectfully dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 Thus, for example, the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, was a response to a concern about concentrations of economic power that could not be effectively controlled by state enforcement of common law doctrines of restraint of trade. See W. Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America 77-85 (1980). </s> [Footnote 2 See Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218 (CA6 1991); National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582 (CA4 1990); New York State National Organization for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339 (CA2 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990); Women's Health Care Services v. Operation Rescue National, 773 F.Supp. 258 (Kan. 1991); Planned Parenthood Assn. of San Mateo Cty. v. Holy Angels Catholic Church, 765 F.Supp. 617 (ND Cal. 1991); National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue, 747 F.Supp. 760 (DC 1990); Southwestern Medical Clinics of Nevada, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 744 F.Supp. 230 (Nev. 1989); National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F.Supp. 1483 (ED Va. 1989); Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 712 F.Supp. 165 (Ore. 1988); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F.Supp. 577 (ED Pa. 1989); and New York State National Organization for Women v. Terry, 697 F.Supp. 1324 (SDNY 1988); but see Lucero v. Operation Rescue of Birmingham, 954 F.2d 624 (CA11 1992); National Abortion Federation v. Operation Rescue, 721 [506 U.S. 263, 309] F.Supp. 1168 (CD Cal. 1989); and Lucero v. Operation Rescue of Birmingham, 772 F.Supp. 1193 (ND Ala. 1991). </s> [Footnote 3 National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F.Supp., at 1488. </s> [Footnote 4 Id., at 1490. </s> [Footnote 5 Id., at 1489. The District Court's findings described the risk of serious physical and psychological injuries caused by petitioners' conduct: </s> "For example, for some women who elect to undergo an abortion, clinic medical personnel prescribe and insert a pre-abortion laminaria to achieve cervical dilation. In these instances, timely removal of the laminaria is necessary to avoid infection, bleeding and other potentially serious complications. If a "rescue" demonstration closes a clinic, patients requiring the laminaria removal procedure or other vital medical services must either postpone the required treatment and assume the attendant risks or seek the services elsewhere. Uncontradicted trial testimony established that there were numerous economic and psychological barriers to obtaining these services elsewhere. Hence, a "rescue" demonstration creates a substantial risk that a clinic's patients may suffer physical and mental harm. </s> ". . . Uncontradicted trial testimony by Dickinson-Collins, a trained mental health professional, established that blockading clinics and preventing patient access could cause stress, anxiety and mental harm (i) to women with abortions scheduled for that time, (ii) to women with abortion procedures (i.e., laminaria insertion) already underway and (iii) to women seeking counseling concerning the abortion decision." Ibid. (footnote omitted). </s> [Footnote 6 Ibid. </s> [Footnote 7 Id., at 1495. </s> [Footnote 8 Id., at 1490. </s> [Footnote 9 Presumably this fact, as well as her understanding of the jurisdictional issue, contributed to the decision of the attorney general of Virginia to file a brief amicus curiae supporting federal jurisdiction in this case. The city attorney for Falls Church, Virginia, has also filed an amicus curiae brief supporting respondents. </s> [Footnote 10 See id., at 1489, n. 4. The District Court's findings contain several examples illustrating the character of petitioners' "rescue" operations: "For example, on almost a weekly basis for the last five (5) years, Commonwealth Women's Clinic has been the target of "rescue" demonstrations by Operation Rescue. One of the largest of these occurred on October 29, 1988. That "rescue" succeeded in closing the Clinic from 7:00 a.m. to 1:30 p.m., notwithstanding the efforts of the Falls Church Police Department. [506 U.S. 263, 312] `Rescuers' did more than trespass on to the clinic's property and physically block all entrances and exits. They also defaced clinic signs, damaged fences and blocked ingress into and egress from the Clinic's parking lot by parking a car in the center of the parking lot entrance and deflating its tires. On this and other occasions, rescuers' have strewn nails on the parking lots and public streets abutting the clinics to prevent the passage of any cars. Less than a year later, in April, 1989, a similar "rescue" demonstration closed the Metropolitan Family Planning Institute in the District of Columbia for approximately four (4) hours. </s> ". . . Clinics in Maryland and the District of Columbia were closed as a result of "rescues" on November 10, 11 and 12, 1989. The following weekend, on November 18, 1989, the Hillcrest Women's Surgi-Center in the District of Columbia was closed for eleven (11) hours as a result of a "rescue" demonstration. Five (5) women who had earlier commenced the abortion process at the clinic by having laminaria inserted were prevented by "rescuers" from entering the clinic to undergo timely laminaria removal."Id., at 1489-1490 (footnote omitted). </s> [Footnote 11 Id., at 1493. </s> [Footnote 12 The Court subsequently noted that the constitutional concerns that had supported the limiting construction adopted in Collins would not apply to "a private conspiracy so massive and effective that it supplants [state] authorities, and thus satisfies the state action requirement." Griffin, 403 U.S., at 98 , and n. 5. </s> [Footnote 13 The Court's caution in this regard echoes the recorded debates of the enacting Congress itself. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, id., 99-102. </s> [Footnote 14 In Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979), we held that 1985(3) does not provide a remedy for a retaliatory discharge that violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. We had no occasion to agree or to disagree with the Court of Appeals' holding that conspiracies motivated by an invidious animus against women fall within 1985(3), because we concluded that the deprivation of the subsequently created Title VII statutory right could not form the basis for a 1985(3) claim. </s> Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983), arose out of a labor dispute in which union organizers had assaulted two nonunion employees and vandalized equipment owned by the employer. We held that 1985(3) did not provide a remedy for two reasons. First, the alleged violation of the First Amendment was insufficient, because there was no claim that the State was involved in the conspiracy, or that the aim of the conspiracy was to influence state action. Second, we concluded that group action resting on economic or commercial animus, such as animus in favor of or against unionization, did not constitute the kind of class-based discrimination discussed in our opinion in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971). As the introductory paragraph to the opinion made clear, the case involved only the scope of the remedy made available by the first clause of 1985(3). See 463 U.S., at 827 . </s> [Footnote 15 See Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130 (1873). The reasoning of the concurring Justices surely evidenced invidious animus, even though it rested on traditional views about a woman's place in society, rather than on overt hostility toward women. These Justices wrote: </s> "[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and [506 U.S. 263, 320] proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of interests and views which belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her husband. So firmly fixed was this sentiment in the founders of the common law that it became a maxim of that system of jurisprudence that a woman had no legal existence separate from her husband, who was regarded as her head and representative in the social state; and, notwithstanding some recent modifications of this civil status, many of the special rules of law flowing from and dependent upon this cardinal principle still exist in full force in most States. One of these is that a married woman is incapable, without her husband's consent, of making contracts which shall be binding on her or him. . . . </s> ". . . The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator." Id., at 141 (Bradley, J., joined by Swayne and Field, JJ., concurring in judgment). </s> The Justices who subscribed to those views were certainly not misogynists, but their basic attitude - or animus - toward women is appropriately characterized as "invidiously discriminatory." </s> [Footnote 16 See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). In a prescient dissenting opinion written in 1948 that accords with our current understanding of the idea of equality, Justice Rutledge appropriately selected the word "invidious" to characterize a statutory discrimination between male and female owners of liquor establishments. Id., at 468. </s> [Footnote 17 See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977). </s> [Footnote 18 Last Term, in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992), we found that Michigan had discriminated against interstate commerce in garbage - even though its statutory scheme discriminated against most of the landfill operators in Michigan as well as those located in other States. </s> [Footnote 19 In Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), we inquired whether the challenged conduct was undertaken "at least in part `because of,' not merely `in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Id., at 279. It would be nonsensical to say that petitioners blockaded clinics "in spite of" the effect of the blockades on women. </s> [Footnote 20 The Court mischaracterizes this analysis by ignoring the distinction between a classification that is sex based and a classification that constitutes sexual discrimination prohibited by the Constitution or by statute. See ante, at 272, n. 3. A classification is sex based if it classifies on the basis of sex. As the capacity to become pregnant is a characteristic necessarily associated with one sex, a classification based on the capacity to become pregnant is a classification based on sex. </s> See Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 Colum.L.Rev. 1, 32-33 (1992) (footnotes omitted): </s> "The first point is that restrictions on abortion should be seen as a form of sex discrimination. The proper analogy here is to a law that is targeted solely at women, and thus contains a de jure distinction on the basis of sex. A statute that is explicitly addressed to women is, of course, a form of sex discrimination. A statute that involves a defining characteristic or a biological correlate of being female should be treated in precisely the same way. If a law said that "no woman" may obtain an abortion, it should readily be seen as a sex-based classification. A law saying that "no person" may obtain an abortion has the same meaning. </s> "The fact that some men may also be punished by abortion laws - for example, male doctors - does not mean that restrictions on abortion [506 U.S. 263, 324] are sex-neutral. Laws calling for racial segregation make it impermissible for whites as well as blacks to desegregate, and this does not make such laws race-neutral. Nor would it be correct to say that restrictions on abortion merely have a discriminatory impact on women, and that they should therefore be treated in the same way as neutral weight and height requirements having disproportionate effects on women. With such requirements, men and women are on both sides of the legal line; but abortion restrictions exclusively target women. A law that prohibited pregnant women, or pregnant people, from appearing on the streets during daylight would readily be seen as a form of de jure sex discrimination. A restriction on abortion has the same sex-based features. </s> [Footnote 21 The Court refers to petitioners' opposition to "voluntary" abortion. Ante, at 270. It is not clear what the Court means by "voluntary" in this context, but petitioners' opposition is certainly not limited to "elective" abortions. Petitioners' conduct evidences a belief that it is better for a woman to die than for the fetus she carries to be aborted. See nn. 5, 10, supra. </s> [Footnote 22 The Court's discussion of the record suggests that the District Court made a finding that petitioners were not motivated by a purpose directed at women as a class. See ibid. The District Court made no such finding, and such a finding would be inconsistent with the District Court's conclusion that petitioners' gender-based animus satisfied the class-based animus requirement of 1985(3), see 726 F.Supp., at 1492. </s> [Footnote 23 The limitations of this analysis are apparent from the example the Court invokes: "A tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews." Ante, at 270. The yarmulke tax would not become less of a tax on Jews if the taxing authorities really did wish to burden the wearing of yarmulkes. And the fact that many Jews do not wear yarmulkes - like the fact that many women do not seek abortions - would not prevent a finding that the tax - like petitioners' blockade - targeted a particular class. </s> [Footnote 24 To his argument quoted in n. 19, supra, Professor Sunstein adds: "It is by no means clear that Geduldig would be extended to a case in which pregnant people were (for example) forced to stay indoors in certain periods, or subjected to some other unique criminal or civil disability." 92 Colum.L.Rev., at 32, n. 122. </s> [Footnote 25 The court emphasized that nothing in the record suggested that the actuarial value of the insurance package was greater for men than for women. See 417 U.S., at 496 . Indeed, even the exclusion of coverage for pregnancy-related disability benefited both men and women. The Court noted that dual distribution of benefits in the now-famous lines: "The program divides potential recipients into two groups - pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. . . . The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the program thus accrue to members of both sexes." Id., at 497, n. 20. </s> [Footnote 26 See, e.g., Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 677 , n. 12 (1983) (after quoting the footnote in Geduldig which includes the language on which the Court relies today, we stated: "The principal emphasis in the text of the Geduldig opinion, unlike the quoted footnote, was on the reasonableness of the State's cost justifications for the classification in its insurance program"); Turner v. Utah Dept. of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44, 45 , n. (1975) (per curiam) (observing that the opinion below "ma[de] no mention of coverage limitations or insurance principles central to [Geduldig v.] Aiello"); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 137 (1976) (relying on the reasoning of Geduldig, the Court again emphasized that, notwithstanding a pregnancy exclusion, the plan had not been shown to provide women, as a group, with a lower level of health benefits). </s> [Footnote 27 The abortion funding cases cited by the Court similarly turn on the distinction between the denial of monetary benefits and the imposition of a burden. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475 (1977) ("There is a basic [506 U.S. 263, 329] difference between direct state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy"); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 313 -318 (1980). In Harris and Maher, the "suspect classification" that the Court considered was indigency. Relying on San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), the Court rejected the argument that "financial need alone identifies a suspect class." Maher, 432 U.S., at 471 ; Harris, 448 U.S., at 323 (citing Maher, 432 U.S., at 471 ). </s> [Footnote 28 A failure to meet the intent standard imposed on the Fourteenth Amendment does not preclude a finding of class-based animus here. Much of this Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence concerns the permissibility of particular legislative distinctions. The case law that has evolved focuses on how impermissible discrimination may be inferred in the face of arguably "neutral" legislation or policy. See Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S., at 274 ; Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 -266 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). We have recognized that, even in constitutional cases, disproportionate impact may provide powerful evidence of discrimination. See Feeney, 442 U.S., at 279 , n. 25; Arlington Heights, 429 U.S., at 265 -266; Davis, 426 U.S., at 242 . In developing the intent standard, though, we expressed reluctance to subject facially neutral legislation to judicial invalidation based on effect alone. The question here is not whether a law, "neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue," Davis, 426 U.S., at 242 , violates the Equal Protection Clause. It is indisputable that a governmental body would violate the Constitution if, for the purpose of burdening abortion, it infringed a person's federally protected right to travel. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973). This governmental conduct would be actionable [506 U.S. 263, 330] under 1 of the Ku Klux Act, now 42 U.S.C. 1983. If private parties jointly participated in the conduct, they, too, would be liable under 1983. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). The class-based animus requirement determines whether a private conspiracy to violate the federal right to travel - a right protected against private interference - similarly gives rise to a federal cause of action. </s> [Footnote 29 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act was passed in reaction to the Court's decision in Gilbert, which relied on Geduldig to uphold a pregnancy exclusion in a private employer's disability insurance plan, challenged under Title VII. In enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Congress directly repudiated the logic and the result of Gilbert. See Newport News, 462 U.S., at 678 ("When Congress amended Title VII in 1978, it unambiguously expressed its disapproval of both the holding and the reasoning of the Court in the Gilbert decision"). </s> [Footnote 30 The House and Senate Reports both state that the Act adopts the position, held by the Justices who dissented in Gilbert, that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is discrimination on account of sex. H.R.Rep No. 95-948, p. 2 (1978); S.Rep. No. 95-331, pp. 2-3 (1977); see Newport News, 462 U.S., at 678 -679. </s> [Footnote 31 Although two Justices dissented from other portions of the decision in Doe v. Bolton, see 410 U.S., at 221 -223, no Member of the Court expressed disagreement with this proposition. Moreover, even if the view of the two Justices who dissented in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 171 (1973), were the law, a woman's right to enter another State to obtain an abortion would deserve strong protection. For under the position espoused by those dissenters, the diversity among the States in their regulation of abortion procedures would magnify the importance of unimpeded access to out-of-state facilities. </s> [Footnote 32 See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 , and n. 13 (1978) (distinguishing intent requirement for civil and criminal violations of the Sherman Act). </s> [Footnote 33 The Court's confusion of the intent element of 1985(3) with the intent required in criminal civil rights statutes is particularly surprising in that Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), anticipated this mistake and explicitly warned against it. Indeed, Griffin expressly rejected the idea that 1985(3) contained a specific intent requirement. In finding specific intent necessary for a violation of 18 U.S.C. 241, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), relied on Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 106 -107 (1945), which also construed a criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. 241, to require specific intent. See Guest, 383 U.S., at 760 . Griffin unmistakably distinguished that kind of specific intent requirement from the mental element required for a claim under 1985(3). In Griffin, the Court stated that the "motivation requirement" of 1985(3) "must not be confused with the test of "specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right made definite by decision or other rule of law" articulated by the plurality opinion in Screws v. United States. . . ." 403 U.S., at 102 , n. 10. The language could hardly be more clear. Griffin took care to differentiate between "invidiously discriminatory animus," which 1985(3) did require, and specific intent to violate a right, which 1985(3) did not. Further, while distinguishing Screws, Griffin cited Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), which declined [506 U.S. 263, 336] to find a specific intent requirement for actions under 42 U.S.C. 1983. See Monroe, 365 U.S., at 187 ; see also id., at 206-207 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Section 1983, like 1985(3), was enacted as part of the Ku Klux Act of 1871, and provides for civil enforcement of federal rights. The pattern is clear: The criminal statutes, 18 U.S.C. 241 and 18 U.S.C. 242, require specific intent to violate a right; the civil statutes, 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 1985(3), do not. </s> The Court's repeated invocation of the word "aim" simply does not support its attempt to manufacture a specific intent requirement out of whole cloth. As the Court observes, Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983), uses the expression "aimed at," id., at 833. Carpenters does not relate this phrase to a specific intent requirement, nor does it in any other way suggest that an action under 1985(3) requires proof of specific intent. Griffin also uses the phrase "aim at;" there, the Court states: "the conspiracy, in other words, must aim at a deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all." 403 U.S., at 102 (emphasis added). Unlike Carpenters, Griffin does discuss whether 1985(3) requires specific intent. In the footnote appended to the very sentence that contains the phrase "aim at," the Court explains: "The motivation aspect of 1985(3) focuses not on scienter in relation to deprivation of rights, but on invidiously discriminatory animus." 403 U.S., at 102 , n. 10. Today, in insisting that 1985(3) requires specific intent to violate a right, the Court contradicts Griffin and finds that one of the mental elements of 1985(3) does relate to "scienter in relation to deprivation of rights." In seeking to justify this departure from precedent, the Court describes the passage in Griffin that includes this Court's only discussion of specific intent in relation to 1985(3) as "supremely" irrelevant, ante, at 276, n. 6. I gather this means that only the Supreme Court could find it irrelevant; lower courts have been more reluctant to ignore Griffin's plain language, see Fisher v. Shamburg, 624 F.2d 156, 158, n. 2 (CA10 1980); Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608, 610 (CA6 1973); Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382, 1385-1386 (CA6 1972); Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F.Supp. 717, 723 (R.I.), aff'd, 588 F.2d 818 (CA1 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979). </s> [Footnote 34 "If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another . . . for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; . . . in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators." 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 35 See 726 F.Supp., at 1489-1490, and n. 4. </s> [Footnote 36 The full text of 2 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, 17 Stat. 13, is quoted in the appendix to the Court's opinion in Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 727 -729 (1983). </s> [Footnote 37 As part of its crabbed interpretation of the statute, the Court asserts that the scope of the conspiracy is irrelevant in determining whether its activities can be reached by 1985(3). See ante, at 283-284. This suggestion is contradicted by our prior cases, which have recognized that the magnitude of the conspiratorial undertaking may indeed be relevant in ascertaining whether conduct is actionable under 1985(3). See Griffin, 403 U.S., at 98 ; Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 661 -662 (1951). </s> More generally, the Court's comments evidence a renunciation of the effort to construe this civil rights statute in accordance with its intended purpose. In Griffin, Novotny, and Carpenters, our construction of the statute was guided by our understanding of Congress' goals in enacting the Ku Klux Act. Today, the Court departs from this practice and construes 1985(3) without reference to the "purpose, history, and common understanding of this Civil War Era statute," Novotny, 442 U.S., at 381 (Powell, J., concurring). This represents a sad and unjustified abandonment of a valuable interpretive tradition. </s> Of course, the Court does not completely reject resort to statutory purpose: the Court does rely on legislative intent in limiting the reach of the statute. The requirement of class-based animus, for example, owes as much to Griffin's analysis of congressional purpose as to the text of 1985(3). Two Terms ago, I noted: "In recent years, the Court has vacillated between a purely literal approach to the task of statutory interpretation and an approach that seeks guidance from historical context, legislative history, and prior cases identifying the purpose that motivated the legislation." West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 112 (1991) dissenting opinion. Today, the Court selectively employs both approaches to give the statute its narrowest possible construction. </s> [Footnote 38 JUSTICE KENNEDY's reminder that the Court's denial of any relief to individual respondents does not prevent their States from calling on the United States, through its Attorney General, for help, ante, at 2, is both puzzling and ironic, given the role this Administration has played in this and related cases in support of Operation Rescue. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Women's Health Care Services v. Operation Rescue-National, 773 F.Supp., at 269-270; compare Memorandum for United States as Amicus Curiae in Griffin v. Breckenridge, O.T. 1970, No. 144. </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, dissenting. </s> Petitioners act in organized groups to overwhelm local police forces and physically blockade the entrances to respondents' clinics with the purpose of preventing women from exercising their legal rights. Title 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) provides a federal remedy against private conspiracies aimed at depriving any person or class of persons of the "equal protection of the laws," or of "equal privileges and immunities under the laws." In my view, respondents' injuries and petitioners' activities fall squarely within the ambit of this statute. </s> I </s> The Reconstruction Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871, also known as the Ku Klux Act (Act), 17 Stat. 13, to combat the chaos that paralyzed the post-War South. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 -279 (1985); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 336 -339 (1983). Section 2 of the Act extended the protection of federal courts to those who effectively were prevented from exercising their civil rights by the threat of mob violence. Although the immediate purpose of 1985(3) was to combat animosity against blacks [506 U.S. 263, 346] and their supporters, Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 836 (1983), the language of the Act, like that of many Reconstruction statutes, is more expansive than the historical circumstances that inspired it. The civil remedy component of 2, codified at 42 U.S.C. 1985(3), speaks in general terms, and provides a federal cause of action to any person injured or deprived of a legal right by </s> "two or more persons in any State or Territory [who] conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, [first] for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or [second] for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws. . . ." </s> The Court's approach to Reconstruction Era civil rights statutes has been to "accord [them] a sweep as broad as [their] language." United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966); accord, Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968). Today, the Court does just the opposite, precluding application of the statute to a situation that its language clearly covers. There is no dispute that petitioners have "conspired" through their concerted and unlawful activities. The record shows that petitioners' "purpose" is "directly" to "depriv[e]" women of their ability to obtain the clinics' services, see National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F.Supp., 1483, 1488 (ED Va. 1989), as well as "indirectly" to infringe on their constitutional privilege to travel interstate in seeking those services, id., at 1489. The record also shows that petitioners accomplish their goals by purposefully "preventing or hindering" local law enforcement authorities from maintaining open access to the clinics. [506 U.S. 263, 347] See ibid. and n. 4. In sum, petitioners' activities fit precisely within the language of both clauses of 1985(3). </s> Yet the Court holds otherwise, and it does so primarily on the basis of an "element" of the 1985(3) cause of action that does not appear on the face of the statute. Adhering adamantly to our choice of words in Griffin v. Breckenridge, supra, the Court holds that petitioners did not exhibit a "class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus" against the clinics or the women they serve. I would not parse Griffin so finely as to focus on that phrase to the exclusion of our reasons for adopting it as an element of a 1985(3) civil action. </s> A </s> As the Court explained in Griffin, 1985(3)'s "class-based animus" requirement is derived from the statute's legislative history. That case recounted that 2 of the original Civil Rights bill had proposed criminal punishment for private individuals who conspired "with intent `to do any act in violation of the rights, privileges, or immunities of another person.'" 403 U.S., at 99 -100 (quoting Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68 (1871)). The bill was amended to placate those who believed the proposed language was too sweeping. 403 U.S., at 100 . Accordingly, the amendment narrowed the criminal provision to reach only conspiracies that deprived "any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws. . . ." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., at 477 (emphasis supplied). The amendment also added a civil remedy for those harmed by such conspiracies, which is now codified at 1985(3). Looking to the "congressional purpose" the statute's legislative history exhibited, the Court concluded that "there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action. The conspiracy, in other words, must aim at a deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all." Griffin, 403 U.S., at 102 (footnotes omitted). [506 U.S. 263, 348] </s> Griffin's narrowing construction of 1985(3) was a rational effort to honor the language of the statute without providing a federal cause of action for "all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others." Id., at 101. The "class-based animus" requirement avoids the constitutional difficulties of federalizing every crime or tort committed by two or more persons, while giving effect to the enacting Congress' condemnation of private action against individuals on account of their group affiliation. Perhaps the clearest expression of this intent is found in the statement of Senator Edmunds, who managed the bill on the floor of the Senate, when he explained to his colleagues that Congress did not "undertake in this bill to interfere with what might be called a private conspiracy growing out of a neighborhood feud . . . [but, if] it should appear that this conspiracy was formed against this man because he was a Democrat, if you please, or because he was a Catholic, or because he was a Methodist, or because he was a Vermonter, . . . then this section could reach it." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., at 567. Indeed, Senator Edmunds' comment on the scope of 2 of the Act is illustrative of a more general concern in the 42d Congress for extending federal protection to diverse classes nationwide. See, e.g., id., at App. 153-154 (Rep. Garfield) (legislation protects "particular classes of citizens" and "certain classes of individuals"); id., at App. 267 (Rep. Barry) ("white or black, native or adopted citizens"); id., at App. 376 (Rep. Lowe) ("all classes in all States; to persons of every complexion and of whatever politics"); id., at App. 190 (Rep. Buckley) ("yes, even women"). </s> Griffin's requirement of class-based animus is a reasonable shorthand description of the type of actions the 42d Congress was attempting to address. Beginning with Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983), however, that shorthand description began to take on a life of its own. In that case, a majority of the Court held that conspiracies motivated by bias toward others on account of their economic views or activities [506 U.S. 263, 349] did not constitute class-based discrimination within the reach of the statute. Id., at 837-839. I agreed with the dissent, however, that, "[i]nstead of contemplating a list of actionable class traits, . . . Congress had in mind a functional definition of the scope of [ 1985(3)]," and intended to "provide a federal remedy for all classes that seek to exercise their legal rights in unprotected circumstances similar to those of the victims of Klan violence." Id., at 851 (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.) (emphasis deleted). Accordingly, I would have found that 1985(3) provided a remedy to nonunion employees injured by mob violence in a "self-professed union town" whose residents resented nonunion activities. Id., at 854. </s> For the same reason, I would find in this case that the statute covers petitioners' conspiracy against the clinics and their clients. Like the Klan conspiracies Congress tried to reach in enacting 1985(3), "[p]etitioners intended to hinder a particular group in the exercise of their legal rights because of their membership in a specific class." Ibid. The controversy associated with the exercise of those rights, although legitimate, makes the clinics and the women they serve especially vulnerable to the threat of mob violence. The women seeking the clinics' services are not simply "the group of victims of the tortious action," id., at 850; as was the case in Carpenters, petitioners' intended targets are clearly identifiable - by virtue of their affiliation and activities - before any tortious action occurs. </s> B </s> Even if I had not dissented in Carpenters, I would still find in today's case that 1985(3) reaches conspiracies targeted at a gender-based class, and that petitioners' actions fall within that category. I agree with JUSTICE STEVENS that "[t]he text of the statute provides no basis for excluding from its coverage any cognizable class of persons who are entitled to the equal protection of the laws." Ante, at 319 (dissenting [506 U.S. 263, 350] opinion). At the very least, the classes protected by 1985(3) must encompass those classifications that we have determined merit a heightened scrutiny of state action under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Classifications based on gender fall within that narrow category of protected classes. E.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 -726 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Not surprisingly, the seven Federal Courts of Appeals to have addressed the question have all reached the conclusion that the class of "women" falls within the protection of the statute. Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15, 20 (CA1 1984); New York State National Organization for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1359 (CA2 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990); Novotny v. Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 584 F.2d 1235, 1244 (CA3 1978) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979); National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582, 585 (CA4 1990); Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1434 (CA7 1988); Conroy v. Conroy, 575 F.2d 175, 177 (CA8 1978); Life Ins. Co. of North America v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 505 (CA9 1979). As JUSTICE WHITE has observed: "[I]t is clear that sex discrimination may be sufficiently invidious to come within the prohibition of 1985(3)." Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 389 , n. 6 (1979) (dissenting opinion). </s> If women are a protected class under 1985(3), and I think they are, then the statute must reach conspiracies whose motivation is directly related to characteristics unique to that class. The victims of petitioners' tortious actions are linked by their ability to become pregnant and by their ability to terminate their pregnancies, characteristics unique to the class of women. Petitioners' activities are directly related to those class characteristics, and therefore, I believe, are appropriately described as class based within the meaning of our holding in Griffin. [506 U.S. 263, 351] </s> Petitioners assert that, even if their activities are class based, they are not motivated by any discriminatory animus, but only by their profound opposition to the practice of abortion. I do not doubt the sincerity of that opposition. But in assessing the motivation behind petitioners' actions, the sincerity of their opposition cannot surmount the manner in which they have chosen to express it. Petitioners are free to express their views in a variety of ways, including lobbying, counseling, and disseminating information. Instead, they have chosen to target women seeking abortions, and to prevent them from exercising their equal rights under law. Even without relying on the federally protected right to abortion, petitioners' activities infringe on a number of state-protected interests, including the state laws that make abortion legal, Va.Code Ann. 18.2-72, 18.2-73 (1988), and the state laws that protect against force, intimidation, and violence, e.g., Va.Code Ann. 18.2-119 (Supp. 1992) (trespassing), 18.2-120 (1988) (instigating trespass to prevent the rendering of services to persons lawfully on the premises), 18.2-404 (obstructing free passage of others), 18.2-499 (conspiring to injure another in his business or profession). It is undeniably petitioners' purpose to target a protected class, on account of their class characteristics, and to prevent them from the equal enjoyment of these personal and property rights under law. The element of class-based discrimination that Griffin read into 1985(3) should require no further showing. </s> I cannot agree with the Court that the use of unlawful means to achieve one's goal "is not relevant to [the] discussion of animus." Ante, at 274. To the contrary, the deliberate decision to isolate members of a vulnerable group and physically prevent them from conducting legitimate activities cannot be irrelevant in assessing motivation. Cf. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475 (1977) (noting the "basic difference," in constitutional equal protection analysis, between "direct . . . interference with a protected activity" and "encouragement [506 U.S. 263, 352] of an alternative activity"). The clinics at issue are lawful operations; the women who seek their services do so lawfully. In my opinion, petitioners' unlawful conspiracy to prevent the clinics from serving those women, who are targeted by petitioners by virtue of their class characteristics, is a group-based, private deprivation of the "equal protection of the laws" within the reach of 1985(3). </s> The Court finds an absence of discriminatory animus by reference to our decisions construing the scope of the Equal Protection Clause, and reinforces its conclusion by recourse to the dictionary definition of the word "invidious." See ante, at 271-274. The first step would be fitting if respondents were challenging state action; they do not. The second would be proper if the word "invidious" appeared in the statute we are construing; it does not. As noted above, Griffin's requirement of "class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus" was a shorthand description of the congressional purpose behind the legislation that became 1985(3). Microscopic examination of the language we chose in Griffin should not now substitute for giving effect to Congress' intent in enacting the relevant legislative language, i.e., that "any violation of the right, the animus and effect of which is to strike down the citizen, to the end that he [or she] may not enjoy equality of rights as contrasted with . . . other citizens' rights, shall be within the scope of the remedies of this section." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., at 478 (Rep. Shellabarger). </s> Because 1985(3) is a statute that was designed to address deprivations caused by private actors, the Court's invocation of our cases construing the reach of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is misplaced. The Court relies on Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), in which we maintained that, for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, "not . . . every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification." Id., at 496, n. 20. But that case construed a constitutional provision [506 U.S. 263, 353] governing state action, which is far different than determining the scope of a statute aimed at rectifying harms inflicted by private actors. In fact, in stark contrast to our constitutional holding in Geduldig, Congress has declared that, for purposes of interpreting a more recent antidiscrimination statute, a classification based on pregnancy is considered a classification "on the basis of sex." See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 92 Stat. 2076, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k); Newport News Shipbuilding Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678 (1983). Similarly, although we have determined that a successful constitutional challenge to a regulation that disproportionately affects women must show that the legislature "selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part "because of," not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an identifiable group," Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979), Congress recently has made clear its position that showing subjective intent to discriminate is not always necessary to prove statutory discrimination, see Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105(a), 105 Stat. 1074. </s> In today's case, I see no reason to hold a 1985(3) plaintiff to the constitutional standard of invidious discrimination that we have employed in our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. To be sure, the language of that Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and 1985(3) are similar, and "[a] century of Fourteenth Amendment adjudication has . . . made it understandably difficult to conceive of what might constitute a deprivation of the equal protection of the laws by private persons." Griffin, 403 U.S., at 97 . The Court resolves that difficulty by construing the two provisions in tandem, although there surely is no requirement that we do so. Cf. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 378 -379 (1959) (explaining that statutory grant of "arising under" jurisdiction need not mirror the reach of Art. III "arising under" jurisdiction). [506 U.S. 263, 354] </s> I would focus not on the similarities of the two provisions, but on their differences. The Equal Protection Clause guarantees that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const., Amdt. 14, 1 (emphasis added). In my view, 1985(3) does not simply repeat that guarantee, but provides a complement to it: No private actor may conspire with the purpose of "depriving . . . any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws." (Emphasis added.) Unlike "deny," which connotes a withholding, the word "deprive" indicates an intent to prevent private actors from taking away what the State has seen fit to bestow. </s> The distinction in choice of words is significant in light of the interrelated objectives of the two provisions. The Fourteenth Amendment protects against state action, but it "erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). Section 1985(3), by contrast, was "meant to reach private action." Griffin, supra, at 101. Given that difference in focus, I would not interpret "discriminatory animus" under the statute to establish the same high threshold that must be met before this Court will find that a State has engaged in invidious discrimination in violation of the Constitution. As the 42d Congress well appreciated, private actors acting in groups can be as devastating to the exercise of civil rights as hostile state actors, and they pose an even greater danger, because they operate in an unregulated realm divorced from the responsibilities and checking functions of government. In recognition of that danger, I would hold that Griffin's element of class-based discrimination is met whenever private conspirators target their actions at members of a protected class, by virtue of their class characteristics, and deprive them of their equal enjoyment of the rights accorded them under law. [506 U.S. 263, 11] </s> This case is not about abortion. It most assuredly is not about "the disfavoring of abortions" by state legislatures. [506 U.S. 263, 355] Ante, at 273 (discussing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)). Rather, this case is about whether a private conspiracy to deprive members of a protected class of legally protected interests gives rise to a federal cause of action. In my view, it does, because that is precisely the sort of conduct that the 42d Congress sought to address in the legislation now codified at 1985(3). Our precedents construing the scope of gender discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment should not distract us from properly interpreting the scope of the statutory remedy. </s> II </s> The second reason the majority offers for reversing the decision below is that petitioners' activities did not intentionally deprive the clinics and their clients of a right guaranteed against private impairment, a requirement that the Court previously has grafted onto the first clause of 1985(3). See Carpenters, 463 U.S., at 833 . I find it unnecessary to address the merits of this argument, however, as I am content to rest my analysis solely on the basis that respondents are entitled to invoke the protections of a federal court under the second clause of 1985(3). Whereas the first clause of the statute speaks of conspiracies whose purpose is to "depriv[e], either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws," the second clause addresses conspiracies aimed at "preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws." </s> Respondents attempted to brief the issue for the Court in a supplemental brief on reargument, but the effort was rejected by a majority of the Court. See 505 U.S. 1240 (1992). Although the issue is open to be decided on remand, I agree with JUSTICE STEVENS that "[r]espondents have unquestionably established a claim under the second clause of 1985(3), [506 U.S. 263, 356] the state hindrance provision." Ante, at 339 (dissenting opinion). We have not previously had occasion to consider the scope of the statute's "prevention or hindrance" provision, but it is clear that the second clause does not require that actionable conspiracies be "aimed at interfering with rights" that are "protected against private, as well as official, encroachment." Carpenters, supra, at 833. Rather, it covers conspiracies aimed at obstructing local law enforcement. See Griffin, 403 U.S., at 98 -99 (second clause of 1985(3) prohibits "interference with state officials"); Great American ed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Novotny, 442 U.S., at 384 (STEVENS, J., concurring). Like JUSTICE STEVENS, I am satisfied by my review of the record that the District Court made findings that adequately support a conclusion that petitioners' activities are class-based and intentionally designed to impede local law enforcement from securing "the equal protection of the laws" to the clinics and the women they serve. See 726 F.Supp., at 1489, and n. 4, and 1496. </s> III </s> In Griffin, this Court "resurrect[ed]" 1985(3) "from its interment under Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951)," to hold that the statute provided a federal remedy for those injured by purely private conspiracies. Novotny, supra, at 395, n. 19 (WHITE, J., dissenting). That resurrection proved a false hope indeed. The statute was intended to provide a federal means of redress to the targets of private conspiracies seeking to accomplish their political and social goals through unlawful means. Today the Court takes yet another step in restricting the scope of the statute, to the point where it now cannot be applied to a modern-day paradigm of the situation the statute was meant to address. I respectfully dissent. </s> [506 U.S. 263, 357]

United States Supreme Court JOHANNS, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, et al. v. LIVESTOCK MARKETING ASSOCIATION et al.(2005) No. 03-1164 Argued: December 8, 2004Decided: May 23, 2005 </s> The Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985 (Beef Act) establishes a federal policy of promoting and marketing beef and beef products. The Secretary of Agriculture has implemented the Act through a Beef Promotion and Research Order (Order), which creates a Cattlemen's Beef Promotion and Research Board (Beef Board) and an Operating Committee, and imposes an assessment, or "checkoff," on all sales and importation of cattle. The assessment funds, among other things, beef promotional campaigns approved by the Operating Committee and the Secretary. Respondents, associations whose members pay the checkoff and individuals whose cattle are subject to the checkoff, challenged the program on First Amendment grounds, relying on United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, in which this Court invalidated a mandatory checkoff that funded mushroom advertising. The District Court found that the Beef Act and Order unconstitutionally compel respondents to subsidize speech to which they object. Affirming, the Eighth Circuit held that compelled funding of speech may violate the First Amendment even when it is the government's speech. Held:Because the beef checkoff funds the Government's own speech, it is not susceptible to a First Amendment compelled-subsidy challenge. Pp.5-15. (a)This Court has sustained First Amendment challenges in "compelled-subsidy" cases, in which the government requires an individual to subsidize a private message he disagrees with. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1; Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209. Keller and Abood led the Court to sustain a compelled-subsidy challenge to an assessment whose only purpose was to fund mushroom advertising. United Foods, supra, at 413, 415-416. However, the speech in United Foods, Keller, and Abood was found, or presumed, to be private. The compelled-subsidy cases have consistently respected the principle that compelled support of private speech differs from compelled support of government speech. The Court has generally assumed, though not squarely held, that such funding of government speech does not alone raise First Amendment concerns. Pp.5-8. </s> (b)Respondents argue that the speech here is not government speech because it is controlled by nongovernmental entities, i.e., the Beef Board and Operating Committee. In fact, the message is effectively controlled by the Federal Government. Congress and the Secretary have set out the overarching message and some of the campaign's elements, and have left the development of the remaining details to the Operating Committee, half of whose members are appointed by the Secretary and all of whom are subject to removal by the Secretary. The Secretary also has final approval authority over every word in every promotional campaign, and his subordinates attend and participate in meetings at which proposals are developed. By contrast, in Keller the compelled subsidy funded communicative activities that were not prescribed by law or developed under official government supervision. Nor does the Order's funding mechanism affect the compelled-subsidy analysis. That citizens have no First Amendment right not to fund government speech is no less true when, as here, the funding is achieved through targeted assessments devoted to a program to which some assessed citizens object, rather than through general taxes. The Court need not address respondents' argument that the advertisements, most of which are credited to "America's Beef Producers," give the impression that respondents endorse their message. Neither the Beef Act nor the Order requires attribution of the ads to "America's Beef Producers" or to anyone else, so neither can be facially invalid on this theory, and the record contains no evidence from which to conclude that the ads' message would be associated with respondents. Pp.8-15. </s> (c)Respondents may proceed with their other challenges to the Beef Act and Order, which the District Court did not reach. P.15. 335 F.3d 711, vacated and remanded. Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., and Breyer, J., filed concurring opinions. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens and Kennedy, JJ., joined. </s> MIKE JOHANNS, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, etal., PETITIONERS </s> 03-1164v. </s> LIVESTOCK MARKETING ASSOCIATION etal. </s> NEBRASKA CATTLEMEN, INC., etal., PETITIONERS </s> 03-1165v. </s> LIVESTOCK MARKETING ASSOCIATION etal. on writs of certiorari to the united states court ofappeals for the eighth circuit [May 23, 2005] </s> Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> For the third time in eight years, we consider whether a federal program that finances generic advertising to promote an agricultural product violates the First Amendment. In these cases, unlike the previous two, the dispositive question is whether the generic advertising at issue is the Government's own speech and therefore is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny. I A </s> The Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985 (Beef Act or Act), 99 Stat. 1597, announces a federal policy of promoting the marketing and consumption of "beef and beef products," using funds raised by an assessment on cattle sales and importation. 7 U.S.C. §2901(b). The statute directs the Secretary of Agriculture to implement this policy by issuing a Beef Promotion and Research Order (Beef Order or Order), §2903, and specifies four key terms it must contain: The Secretary is to appoint a Cattlemen's Beef Promotion and Research Board (Beef Board or Board), whose members are to be a geographically representative group of beef producers and importers, nominated by trade associations. §2904(1). The Beef Board is to convene an Operating Committee, composed of 10 Beef Board members and 10 representatives named by a federation of state beef councils. §2904(4)(A). The Secretary is to impose a $1-per-head assessment (or "checkoff") on all sales or importation of cattle and a comparable assessment on imported beef products. §2904(8). And the assessment is to be used to fund beef-related projects, including promotional campaigns, designed by the Operating Committee and approved by the Secretary. §§2904(4)(B), (C). The Secretary promulgated the Beef Order with the specified terms. The assessment is collected primarily by state beef councils, which then forward the proceeds to the Beef Board. 7 CFR §1260.172(a)(5) (2004).1 The Operating Committee proposes projects to be funded by the checkoff, including promotion and research. §1260.167(a). The Secretary or his designee (see §§2.22(a)(1)(viii)(X), 2.79(a)(8)(xxxii)) approves each project and, in the case of promotional materials, the content of each communication. §§1260.168(e), 1260.169; App. 114, 143. </s> The Beef Order was promulgated in 1986 on a temporary basis, subject to a referendum among beef producers on whether to make it permanent. 7 U.S.C. §§2903, 2906(a). In May 1988, a large majority voted to continue it. Since that time, more than $1 billion has been collected through the checkoff, 132 F.Supp. 2d 817, 820 (SD 2001), and a large fraction of that sum has been spent on promotional projects authorized by the Beef Act--many using the familiar trademarked slogan "Beef. It's What's for Dinner." App. 50. In fiscal year 2000, for example, the Beef Board collected over $48 million in assessments and spent over $29 million on domestic promotion. The Board also funds overseas marketing efforts; market and food-science research, such as evaluations of the nutritional value of beef; and informational campaigns for both consumers and beef producers. See 7 U.S.C. §§2902(6), (9), (15), 2904(4)(B). </s> Many promotional messages funded by the checkoff (though not all, see App. 52-53) bear the attribution "Funded by America's Beef Producers." E.g., id., at 50-51. Most print and television messages also bear a Beef Board logo, usually a check-mark with the word "BEEF." E.g., id., at 50-52. B </s> Respondents are two associations whose members collect and pay the checkoff, and several individuals who raise and sell cattle subject to the checkoff. Id., at 17-19. They sued the Secretary, the Department of Agriculture, and the Board in Federal District Court on a number of constitutional and statutory grounds not before us--in particular, that the Board impermissibly used checkoff funds to send communications supportive of the beef program to beef producers. 132 F.Supp. 2d, at 823. Petitioners in No. 03-1165, a state beef producers' association and two individual producers, intervened as defendants to argue in support of the program. The District Court granted a limited preliminary injunction, which forbade the continued use of checkoff funds to laud the beef program or to lobby for governmental action relating to the checkoff. Id., at 832. While the litigation was pending, we held in United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001), that a mandatory checkoff for generic mushroom advertising violated the First Amendment. Noting that the mushroom program closely resembles the beef program,2 respondents amended their complaint to assert a First Amendment challenge to the use of the beef checkoff for promotional activity. 207 F.Supp. 2d 992, 996 (SD 2002); App. 30-32. Respondents noted that the advertising promotes beef as a generic commodity, which, they contended, impedes their efforts to promote the superiority of, inter alia, American beef, grain-fed beef, or certified Angus or Hereford beef. </s> After a bench trial, the District Court ruled for respondents on their First Amendment claim. It declared that the Beef Act and Beef Order unconstitutionally compel respondents to subsidize speech to which they object, and rejected the Government's contention that the checkoff survives First Amendment scrutiny because it funds only government speech. 207 F.Supp. 2d, at 1002-1007. The court entered a permanent injunction barring any further collection of the beef checkoff, even from producers willing to pay (allowing continued collection of voluntary checkoffs, the court thought, would require "rewrit[ing]" the Beef Act). Id., at 1007-1008. Believing that the cost of calculating the share of the checkoff attributable to the compelled subsidy would be too great, the court also declined to order a refund of checkoff funds already collected. Ibid. Finally, the court made permanent its earlier injunction against "producer communications" praising the beef program or seeking to influence governmental policy. Id., at 1008. The court did not rule on respondents' other claims, but certified its resolution of the First Amendment claim as final pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). 207 F.Supp. 2d, at 1008. </s> The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 335 F.3d 711 (2003). Unlike the District Court, the Court of Appeals did not dispute that the challenged advertising is government speech; instead, it held that government speech status is relevant only to First Amendment challenges to the speech's content, not to challenges to its compelled funding. See id., at 720-721. Compelled funding of speech, it held, may violate the First Amendment even if the speech in question is the government's. Ibid. </s> We granted certiorari. 541 U.S. 1062 (2004). II </s> We have sustained First Amendment challenges to allegedly compelled expression in two categories of cases: true "compelled speech" cases, in which an individual is obliged personally to express a message he disagrees with, imposed by the government; and "compelled subsidy" cases, in which an individual is required by the government to subsidize a message he disagrees with, expressed by a private entity. We have not heretofore considered the First Amendment consequences of government-compelled subsidy of the government's own speech. We first invalidated an outright compulsion of speech in West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The State required every schoolchild to recite the Pledge of Allegiance while saluting the American flag, on pain of expulsion from the public schools. We held that the First Amendment does not "le[ave] it open to public authorities to compel [a person] to utter" a message with which he does not agree. Id., at 634. Likewise, in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), we held that requiring a New Hampshire couple to bear the State's motto, "Live Free or Die," on their cars' license plates was an impermissible compulsion of expression. Obliging people to "use their private property as a 'mobile billboard' for the State's ideological message" amounted to impermissible compelled expression. Id., at 715. </s> The reasoning of these compelled-speech cases has been carried over to certain instances in which individuals are compelled not to speak, but to subsidize a private message with which they disagree. Thus, although we have upheld state-imposed requirements that lawyers be members of the state bar and pay its annual dues, and that public-school teachers either join the labor union representing their "shop" or pay "service fees" equal to the union dues, we have invalidated the use of the compulsory fees to fund speech on political matters. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). Bar or union speech with such content, we held, was not germane to the regulatory interests that justified compelled membership, and accordingly, making those who disagreed with it pay for it violated the First Amendment. See Keller, supra, at 15-16; Abood, supra, at 234-235. </s> These latter cases led us to sustain a compelled-subsidy challenge to an assessment very similar to the beef checkoff, imposed to fund mushroom advertising. United Foods, supra; see 335 F.3d, at 717 ("[W]e agree with the district court that '[t]he beef checkoff is, in all material respects, identical to the mushroom checkoff'" at issue in United Foods). Deciding the case on the assumption that the advertising was private speech, not government speech, see 533 U.S., at 416-417,3 we concluded that Abood and Keller were controlling. As in those cases, mushroom producers were obliged by "law or necessity" to pay the checkoff; although Abood and Keller would permit the mandatory fee if it were "germane" to a "broader regulatory scheme," in United Foods the only regulatory purpose was the funding of the advertising. 533 U.S., at 413, 415-416. </s> In all of the cases invalidating exactions to subsidize speech, the speech was, or was presumed to be, that of an entity other than the government itself. See Keller, supra, at 11, 15-16; Abood, supra, at 212-213; United Foods, supra, at 416-417; see also Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229, 230 (2000) (because "[t]he University ha[s] disclaimed that the speech is its own," Abood and Keller "provide the beginning point for our analysis"); cf. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 851-852 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (university's Student Activities Fund likely does not unconstitutionally compel speech because it "represents not government resources ... but a fund that simply belongs to the students"). Our compelled-subsidy cases have consistently respected the principle that "[c]ompelled support of a private association is fundamentally different from compelled support of government." Abood, supra, at 259, n.13 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). "Compelled support of government"--even those programs of government one does not approve--is of course perfectly constitutional, as every taxpayer must attest. And some government programs involve, or entirely consist of, advocating a position. "The government, as a general rule, may support valid programs and policies by taxes or other exactions binding on protesting parties. Within this broader principle it seems inevitable that funds raised by the government will be spent for speech and other expression to advocate and defend its own policies." Southworth, 529 U.S., at 229. We have generally assumed, though not yet squarely held, that compelled funding of government speech does not alone raise First Amendment concerns. See ibid.; Keller, supra, at 12-13; Rosenberger, supra, at 833; see also Wooley, supra, at 721 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). III </s> Respondents do not seriously dispute these principles, nor do they contend that, as a general matter, their First Amendment challenge requires them to show only that their checkoff dollars pay for speech with which they disagree. Rather, they assert that the challenged promotional campaigns differ dispositively from the type of government speech that, our cases suggest, is not susceptible to First Amendment challenge. They point to the role of the Beef Board and its Operating Committee in designing the promotional campaigns, and to the use of a mandatory assessment on beef producers to fund the advertising. We consider each in turn. A </s> The Secretary of Agriculture does not write ad copy himself. Rather, the Beef Board's promotional campaigns are designed by the Beef Board's Operating Committee, only half of whose members are Beef Board members appointed by the Secretary. (All members of the Operating Committee are subject to removal by the Secretary. 7 CFR §1260.213 (2004).) Respondents contend that speech whose content is effectively controlled by a nongovernmental entity--the Operating Committee--cannot be considered "government speech." We need not address this contention, because we reject its premise: The message of the promotional campaigns is effectively controlled by the Federal Government itself.4 The message set out in the beef promotions is from beginning to end the message established by the Federal Government.5 Congress has directed the implementation of a "coordinated program" of promotion, "including paid advertising, to advance the image and desirability of beef and beef products." 7 U.S.C. §§2901(b), 2902(13). Congress and the Secretary have also specified, in general terms, what the promotional campaigns shall contain, see, e.g., §2904(4)(B)(i) (campaigns "shall ... take into account" different types of beef products), and what they shall not, see, e.g., 7 CFR §1260.169(d) (2004) (campaigns shall not, without prior approval, refer "to a brand or trade name of any beef product"). Thus, Congress and the Secretary have set out the overarching message and some of its elements, and they have left the development of the remaining details to an entity whose members are answerable to the Secretary (and in some cases appointed by him as well). </s> Moreover, the record demonstrates that the Secretary exercises final approval authority over every word used in every promotional campaign. All proposed promotional messages are reviewed by Department officials both for substance and for wording, and some proposals are rejected or rewritten by the Department. App. 114, 118-121, 274-275. Nor is the Secretary's role limited to final approval or rejection: officials of the Department also attend and participate in the open meetings at which proposals are developed. Id., at 111-112. </s> This degree of governmental control over the message funded by the checkoff distinguishes these cases from Keller. There the state bar's communicative activities to which the plaintiffs objected were not prescribed by law in their general outline and not developed under official government supervision. Indeed, many of them consisted of lobbying the state legislature on various issues. See 496 U.S., at 5, and n.2. When, as here, the government sets the overall message to be communicated and approves every word that is disseminated, it is not precluded from relying on the government-speech doctrine merely because it solicits assistance from nongovernmental sources in developing specific messages. B </s> Respondents also contend that the beef program does not qualify as "government speech" because it is funded by a targeted assessment on beef producers, rather than by general revenues. This funding mechanism, they argue, has two relevant effects: it gives control over the beef program not to politically accountable legislators, but to a narrow interest group that will pay no heed to respondents' dissenting views, and it creates the perception that the advertisements speak for beef producers such as respondents. We reject the first point. The compelled-subsidy analysis is altogether unaffected by whether the funds for the promotions are raised by general taxes or through a targeted assessment. Citizens may challenge compelled support of private speech, but have no First Amendment right not to fund government speech. And that is no less true when the funding is achieved through targeted assessments devoted exclusively to the program to which the assessed citizens object. Cf. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982) ("There is no principled way ... to distinguish between general taxes and those imposed under the Social Security Act" in evaluating the burden on the right to free exercise of religion). The First Amendment does not confer a right to pay one's taxes into the general fund, because the injury of compelled funding (as opposed to the injury of compelled speech) does not stem from the Government's mode of accounting. Cf. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 700 (1986) ("The Free Exercise Clause ... does not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government's internal procedures"); id., at 716-717 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in result). </s> Some of our cases have justified compelled funding of government speech by pointing out that government speech is subject to democratic accountability. See, e.g., Abood, 431 U.S., at 259, n.13 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment); Southworth, 529 U. S., at 235. But our references to "traditional political controls," id., at 229, do not signify that the First Amendment duplicates the Appropriations Clause, U.S. Const., Art.I, §9, cl.7, or that every instance of government speech must be funded by a line item in an appropriations bill. Here, the beef advertisements are subject to political safeguards more than adequate to set them apart from private messages. The program is authorized and the basic message prescribed by federal statute, and specific requirements for the promotions' content are imposed by federal regulations promulgated after notice and comment. The Secretary of Agriculture, a politically accountable official, oversees the program, appoints and dismisses the key personnel, and retains absolute veto power over the advertisements' content, right down to the wording.6 And Congress, of course, retains oversight authority, not to mention the ability to reform the program at any time. No more is required.7 </s> As to the second point, respondents' argument proceeds as follows: They contend that crediting the advertising to "America's Beef Producers" impermissibly uses not only their money but also their seeming endorsement to promote a message with which they do not agree. Communications cannot be "government speech," they argue, if they are attributed to someone other than the government; and the person to whom they are attributed, when he is, by compulsory funding, made the unwilling instrument of communication, may raise a First Amendment objection. </s> We need not determine the validity of this argument--which relates to compelled speech rather than compelled subsidy8--with regard to respondents' facial challenge. Since neither the Beef Act nor the Beef Order requires attribution, neither can be the cause of any possible First Amendment harm. The District Court's order enjoining the enforcement of the Act and the Order thus cannot be sustained on this theory. </s> On some set of facts, this second theory might (again, we express no view on the point) form the basis for an as-applied challenge--if it were established, that is, that individual beef advertisements were attributed to respondents. The record, however, includes only a stipulated sampling of these promotional materials, see App. 47, and none of the exemplars provides any support for this attribution theory except for the tagline identifying the funding. Respondents apparently presented no other evidence of attribution at trial, and the District Court made no factual findings on the point. Indeed, in the only trial testimony on the subject that any party has identified, an employee of one of the respondent associations said he did not think the beef promotions would be attributed to his group.9 Whether the individual respondents who are beef producers would be associated with speech labeled as coming from "America's Beef Producers" is a question on which the trial record is altogether silent. We have only the funding tagline itself, a trademarked term10 that, standing alone, is not sufficiently specific to convince a reasonable factfinder that any particular beef producer, or all beef producers, would be tarred with the content of each trademarked ad.11 We therefore conclude that on the record before us an as-applied First Amendment challenge to the individual advertisements affords no basis on which to sustain the Eighth Circuit's judgment, even in part. *** Respondents' complaint asserted a number of other grounds for declaring the Beef Act, the Beef Order, or both invalid in their entirety. The District Court, having enjoined the Act and the Order on the basis of the First Amendment, had no occasion to address these other grounds. Respondents may now proceed on these other claims. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. </s> MIKE JOHANNS, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, etal., PETITIONERS </s> 03-1164v. </s> LIVESTOCK MARKETING ASSOCIATION etal. </s> NEBRASKA CATTLEMEN, INC., etal., PETITIONERS </s> 03-1165v. </s> LIVESTOCK MARKETING ASSOCIATION etal. on writs of certiorari to the united states court ofappeals for the eighth circuit [May 23, 2005] </s> Justice Thomas, concurring. </s> I join the Court's opinion. I continue to believe that "[a]ny regulation that compels the funding of advertising must be subjected to the most stringent First Amendment scrutiny." United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 419 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 504-506 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting). At the same time, I recognize that this principle must be qualified where the regulation compels the funding of speech that is the government's own. It cannot be that all taxpayers have a First Amendment objection to taxpayer-funded government speech, even if the funded speech is not "germane" to some broader regulatory program. See ante, at 7-8. Like the Court, I see no analytical distinction between "pure" government speech funded from general tax revenues and from speech funded from targeted exactions, ante, at 10-12; the practice of using targeted taxes to fund government operations, such as excise taxes, dates from the founding, see The Federalist No. 12, p. 75 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). </s> Still, if the advertisements associated their generic pro-beef message with either the individual or organization respondents, then respondents would have a valid as-applied First Amendment challenge. The government may not, consistent with the First Amendment, associate individuals or organizations involuntarily with speech by attributing an unwanted message to them, whether or not those individuals fund the speech, and whether or not the message is under the government's control. This principle follows not only from our cases establishing that the government may not compel individuals to convey messages with which they disagree, see, e.g., West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-634 (1943); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713-717 (1977), but also from our expressive-association cases, which prohibit the government from coercively associating individuals or groups with unwanted messages, see, e.g., Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000) (government cannot "force [an] organization to send a message" with which it disagrees); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 576-577 (1995). If West Virginia had compelled Mr. Barnette to take out an advertisement reciting the Pledge of Allegiance and purporting to be "A Message from the Barnette Children," for example, that would have been compelled speech (if a less intrusive form of it), just like the mandatory flag salute invalidated in Barnette. The present record, however, does not show that the advertisements objectively associate their message with any individual respondent. Ante, at 13-15, and n. 11.** The targeted nature of the funding is also too attenuated a link. </s> Moreover, these are not cases like Barnette; the government has not forced respondents to bear a government-imposed message. Cf. ante, at 13, n.8; post, at 10, n.9 (Souter,J., dissenting). The payment of taxes to the government for purposes of supporting government speech is not nearly as intrusive as being forced to "utter what is not in [one's] mind," Barnette, supra, at 634, or to carry an unwanted message on one's property. </s> With these observations, I join the Court's opinion. </s> MIKE JOHANNS, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, etal., PETITIONERS </s> 03-1164v. </s> LIVESTOCK MARKETING ASSOCIATION etal. </s> NEBRASKA CATTLEMEN, INC., etal., PETITIONERS </s> 03-1165v. </s> LIVESTOCK MARKETING ASSOCIATION etal. on writs of certiorari to the united states court ofappeals for the eighth circuit [May 23, 2005] </s> Justice Breyer, concurring. </s> The beef checkoff program in these cases is virtually identical to the mushroom checkoff program in United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001), which the Court struck down on First Amendment grounds. The "government speech" theory the Court adopts today was not before us in United Foods, and we declined to consider it when it was raised at the eleventh hour. See id., at 416-417. I dissented in United Foods, based on my view that the challenged assessments involved a form of economic regulation, not speech. See id., at 428. And I explained that, were I to classify the program as involving "commercial speech," I would still vote to uphold it. See id., at 429. </s> I remain of the view that the assessments in these cases are best described as a form of economic regulation. However, I recognize that a majority of the Court does not share that view. Now that we have had an opportunity to consider the "government speech" theory, I accept it as a solution to the problem presented by these cases. With the caveat that I continue to believe that my dissent in United Foods offers a preferable approach, I join the Court's opinion. </s> MIKE JOHANNS, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, etal., PETITIONERS </s> 03-1164v. </s> LIVESTOCK MARKETING ASSOCIATION etal. </s> NEBRASKA CATTLEMEN, INC., etal., PETITIONERS </s> 03-1165v. </s> LIVESTOCK MARKETING ASSOCIATION etal. on writs of certiorari to the united states court ofappeals for the eighth circuit [May 23, 2005] </s> Justice Ginsburg, concurring in the judgment. </s> I resist ranking the promotional messages funded under the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985, 7 U.S.C. §2901 et seq., but not attributed to the Government,as government speech, given the message the Govern-ment conveys in its own name. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services and U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Dietary Guidelines for Americans 2005, pp. 69, 30, available at http://www.healthierus.gov/dietaryguidelines/dga2005/document (as visited May 18, 2005, and available in Clerk of Court's case file) (noting that "[t]rans fatty acids ... are present in foods that come from ruminant animals (e.g., cattle and sheep)" and recommending that Americans "[l]imit intake of fats and oils high in saturated and/or trans fatty acids"); post, at 9, n. 7 (Souter, J., dissenting). I remain persuaded, however, that the assessments in these cases, as in United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001), and Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997), qualify as permissible economic regulation. See United Foods, 533 U. S., at 425 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For that reason, I concur in the judgment. </s> MIKE JOHANNS, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, etal., PETITIONERS </s> 03-1164v. </s> LIVESTOCK MARKETING ASSOCIATION etal. </s> NEBRASKA CATTLEMEN, INC., etal., PETITIONERS </s> 03-1165v. </s> LIVESTOCK MARKETING ASSOCIATION etal. on writs of certiorari to the united states court ofappeals for the eighth circuit [May 23, 2005] </s> Justice Kennedy, dissenting. </s> I join Justice Souter's dissenting opinion, which demonstrates with persuasive analysis why the speech at issue here cannot meaningfully be considered government speech at all. I would reserve for another day the difficult First Amendment questions that would arise if the government were to target a discrete group of citizens to pay even for speech that the government does "embrace as publicly as it speaks," post, at 11. </s> MIKE JOHANNS, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, etal., PETITIONERS </s> 03-1164v. </s> LIVESTOCK MARKETING ASSOCIATION etal. </s> NEBRASKA CATTLEMEN, INC., etal., PETITIONERS </s> 03-1165v. </s> LIVESTOCK MARKETING ASSOCIATION etal. on writs of certiorari to the united states court ofappeals for the eighth circuit [May 23, 2005] </s> Justice Souter, with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy join, dissenting. </s> The Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985, known as the Beef Act, taxes cattle sold in or imported into the United States at one dollar a head. 7 U.S.C. §2904(8). Much of the revenue is spent urging people to eat beef, as in advertisements with the slogan, "Beef. It's What's for Dinner." App. 50. Respondent taxpayers, "South Dakota and Montana ranchers and organizations representing their interests," Brief for Respondents 1, object to the tax because they disagree with the advertisements' content, which they see as a generic message that "beef is good." This message, the ranchers say, ignores the fact that not all beef is the same; the ads fail to distinguish, for example, the American ranchers' grain-fed beef from the grass-fed beef predominant in the imports, which the Americans consider inferior. </s> The ranchers' complaint is on all fours with the objection of the mushroom growers in United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001), where a similar statutory exaction was struck down as a compelled subsidy of speech prohibited by the First Amendment absent a comprehensive regulatory scheme to which the speech was incidental. The defense of the Government's actions in these cases, however, differs from the position of the United States in United Foods. There we left open the possibility that a compelled subsidy would be justifiable not only as one element of an otherwise valid regulatory scheme, but also as speech of the Government itself, which the Government may pay for with revenue (usually from taxes) exacted from those who dissent from the message as well as from those who agree with it or do not care about it. Not surprisingly, the Government argues here that the beef advertising is its own speech, exempting it from the First Amendment bar against extracting special subsidies from those unwilling to underwrite an objectionable message. </s> The Court accepts the defense unwisely. The error is not that government speech can never justify compelling a subsidy, but that a compelled subsidy should not be justifiable by speech unless the government must put that speech forward as its own. Otherwise there is no check whatever on government's power to compel special speech subsidies, and the rule of United Foods is a dead letter. I take the view that if government relies on the government-speech doctrine to compel specific groups to fund speech with targeted taxes, it must make itself politically accountable by indicating that the content actually is a government message, not just the statement of one self-interested group the government is currently willing to invest with power. Sometimes, as in these very cases, government can make an effective disclosure only by explicitly labeling the speech as its own. Because the Beef Act fails to require the Government to show its hand, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding the Act unconstitutional, and I respectfully dissent from the Court's decision to condone this compelled subsidy.1 *** </s> In 1779 Jefferson wrote that "to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical." 5 The Founders' Constitution, §37, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, p. 77 (1987), codified in 1786 at Va. Code Ann. §57-1 (Lexis 2003). Although he was not thinking about compelled advertising of farm produce, we echoed Jefferson's view four years ago in United Foods, where we said that "First Amendment values are at serious risk if the government can compel a particular citizen, or a discrete group of citizens, to pay special subsidies for speech on the side that it favors ...." 533 U.S., at 411. United Foods addressed a scheme of enforced exaction virtually identical to the one here, except that the product involved was mushrooms, not beef. There, as here, a federal statute forced a targeted group (mushroom growers) to pay a tax that funded ads promoting its members' produce at a generic level objectionable to some of them. We held that the mushroom statute violated the growers' First Amendment right to refuse to pay for expression when they object to its content.2 As the Court says, ante, at 5-6, United Foods was a descendent of two lines of precedent. The first, exemplified by WestVirginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), and Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), stands for the principle that government may not force individuals to utter or convey messages they disagree with or, indeed, to say anything at all. The second, comprising Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990), and Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), is authority for the related proposition that, absent substantial justification, government may not force targeted individuals to pay for others to speak. </s> Four years before United Foods we held that one such ground was present where enforced contribution to objectionable speech is incidental to a "broader collective enterprise in which th[e] freedom to act independently is already constrained by the regulatory scheme." Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 469 (1997). As noted, United Foods left open the possibility of another justification, that the objectionable message is "government speech," which our case law suggests is immune to many types of First Amendment challenge. See ante, at 7-8. </s> Although we declined to address the pertinence of a government-speech justification in United Foods, it is crucial to the defense of the statute here because, as the District Court and the Court of Appeals observed (and as the Court appears to agree), these cases are factually on all fours with United Foods. See 335 F.3d 711, 717 (CA8 2003) ("[W]e agree with the district court that '[t]he beef checkoff is, in all material respects, identical to the mushroom checkoff'" program challenged in United Foods (quoting 207 F.Supp. 2d 992, 1002 (SD 2002))), quoted ante, at 6. Unless, then, the doctrine of government speech is defined in such a way as to justify the targeted compulsion here, the enforced subsidy for beef ads must fail along with the mushroom subsidy. In my judgment the beef subvention should fail, for I, unlike the Court, do not believe that the beef ads qualify for treatment as speech by the Government. </s> The government-speech doctrine is relatively new, and correspondingly imprecise. In fact, the few cases in which we have addressed the doctrine have for the most part not gone much beyond such broad observations as "[t]he government, as a general rule, may support valid programs and policies by taxes or other exactions binding on protesting parties. Within this broader principle it seems inevitable that funds raised by the government will be spent for speech and other expression to advocate and defend its own policies." Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000). Even at this somewhat early stage of development, however, two points about the doctrine are clear. </s> The first point of certainty is the need to recognize the legitimacy of government's power to speak despite objections by dissenters whose taxes or other exactions necessarily go in some measure to putting the offensive message forward to be heard. To govern, government has to say something, and a First Amendment heckler's veto of any forced contribution to raising the government's voice in the "marketplace of ideas"3 would be out of the question. See Keller, supra, at 12-13 ("If every citizen were to have a right to insist that no one paid by public funds express a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of great concern to the public would be limited to those in the private sector, and the process of government as we know it radically transformed"). </s> The second fixed point of government-speech doctrine is that the First Amendment interest in avoiding forced subsidies is served, though not necessarily satisfied, by the political process as a check on what government chooses to say. "When the government speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy." Southworth, supra, at 235; see also Abood, supra, at 259, n.13 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) ("[T]he reason for permitting the government to compel the payment of taxes and to spend money on controversial projects is that the government is representative of the people"). Democracy, in other words, ensures that government is not untouchable when its speech rubs against the First Amendment interests of those who object to supporting it; if enough voters disagree with what government says, the next election will cancel the message. </s> The adequacy of the democratic process to render the subsidization of government speech tolerable is, naturally, tied to the character of the subsidy. For when government funds its speech with general tax revenue, as it usually does, no individual taxpayer or group of taxpayers can lay claim to a special, or even a particularly strong, connection to the money spent (and hence to the speech funded). See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486-487 (1923). Outrage is likely to be rare, and disagreement tends to stay temperate. But the relative palatability of a remote subsidy shared by every taxpayer is not to be found when the speech is funded with targeted taxes. For then, as here, the particular interests of those singled out to pay the tax are closely linked with the expression, and taxpayers who disagree with it suffer a more acute limitation on their presumptive autonomy as speakers to decide what to say and what to pay for others to say. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) ("[T]he fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment [is] that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message").4 </s> When a targeted assessment thus makes the First Amendment affront more galling, it does, or should, follow that greater care is required to assure that the political process can practically respond to limit the compulsion Jefferson inveighed against. Whereas it would simply be unrealistic to think that every speech subsidy from general revenue could or should be scrutinized for its amenability to effective political response, the less-common targeted speech subsidies can be reviewed specifically for their susceptibility to response by the voters, and the intensity of the provocation experienced by the targeted group justifies just such scrutiny. </s> In these cases, the requirement of effective public accountability means the ranchers ought to prevail, it being clear that the Beef Act does not establish an advertising scheme subject to effective democratic checks. The reason for this is simple: the ads are not required to show any sign of being speech by the Government, and experience under the Act demonstrates how effectively the Government has masked its role in producing the ads.5 Most obviously, many of them include the tag line, "[f]unded by America's Beef Producers," App. 50-51, which all but ensures that no one reading them will suspect that the message comes from the National Government.6 But the tag line just underscores the point that would be true without it, that readers would most naturally think that ads urging people to have beef for dinner were placed and paid for by the beef producers who stand to profit when beef is on the table. No one hearing a commercial for Pepsi or Levi's thinks Uncle Sam is the man talking behind the curtain. Why would a person reading a beef ad think Uncle Sam was trying to make him eat more steak?7 Given the circumstances, it is hard to see why anyone would suspect the Government was behind the message unless the message came out and said so. </s> The Court takes the view that because Congress authorized this scheme and the Government controls (or at least has a veto on) the content of the beef ads, the need for democratic accountability has been satisfied. See ante, at 11-12. But the Court has it backwards. It means nothing that Government officials control the message if that fact is never required to be made apparent to those who get the message, let alone if it is affirmatively concealed from them. The political accountability of the officials with control is insufficient, in other words, just because those officials are allowed to use their control (and in fact are deliberately using it) to conceal their role from the voters with the power to hold them accountable.8 Unless the putative government speech appears to be coming from the government, its governmental origin cannot possibly justify the burden on the First Amendment interests of the dissenters targeted to pay for it.9 </s> Nor is it any answer that resourceful taxpayers could discover the Government behind the beef ads by doing research on the implementation of the Beef Act. Of course a taxpayer could discover the facts by looking hard enough, but what would tip off the taxpayer to look? And even if a few taxpayers did unearth the truth it would not matter, for the First Amendment harm cannot be mitigated by the possibility that a few cognoscenti may actually understand how the scheme works. If the judiciary is justified in keeping hands off special assessments on dissenters from government speech, it is because there is a practical opportunity for political response; esoteric knowledge on the part of a few will not do. </s> In sum, the First Amendment cannot be implemented by sanctioning government deception by omission (or by misleading statement) of the sort the Court today condones, and expression that is not ostensibly governmental, which government is not required to embrace as publicly as it speaks, cannot constitute government speech sufficient to justify enforcement of a targeted subsidy to broadcast it. The Court of Appeals thus correctly held that United Foods renders the Beef Act's mandatory-assessment provisions unconstitutional.10 </s> FOOTNOTESFootnote *Together with No. 03-1165, Nebraska Cattlemen, Inc., et al. v. Livestock Marketing Association et al., also on certiorari to the same court. FOOTNOTESFootnote 1In most cases, only 50 cents per head is remitted to the Beef Board, because the Beef Act and Beef Order allow domestic producers to deduct from their $1 assessment up to 50 cents in voluntary contributions to their state beef councils. 7 U.S.C. §2904(8)(C); 7 CFR §1260.172(a)(3) (2004). Footnote 2The Department of Agriculture oversees similar programs of promotional advertising, funded by checkoffs, for a number of other agricultural commodities. See 7 CFR §1205.10 et seq. (2004) (cotton); §1207.301 et seq. (potatoes); §1210.301 et seq. (watermelons); §1215.1 et seq. (popcorn); §1216.1 et seq. (peanuts); §1218.1 et seq. (blueberries); §1219.1 et seq. (Hass avocados); §1220.101 et seq. (soybeans); §1230.1 et seq. (pork); §1240.1 et seq. (honey); §1250.301 et seq. (eggs); §1280.101 et seq. (lamb). Footnote 3In United Foods, the Court distinguished (and the dissent relied on) Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997), which upheld the use of mandatory assessments to fund generic advertising promoting California tree fruit. In Glickman, as in United Foods, the Government did not argue that the advertising was permissible government speech. See 521 U.S., at 482, n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the Government had waived any such argument). Rather, the Government contended, and we agreed, that compelled support for generic advertising was legitimately part of the Government's "collectivist" centralization of the market for tree fruit. Id., at 475 (opinion of the Court). Here, as in United Foods, "there is no broader regulatory system in place" that collectivizes aspects of the beef market unrelated to speech, so Glickman is not controlling. 533 U.S., at 415. Footnote 4We therefore need not label the Operating Committee as "governmental" or "nongovernmental." The entity to which assessments are remitted is the Beef Board, all of whose members are appointed by the Secretary pursuant to law. The Operating Committee's only relevant involvement is ancillary--it designs the promotional campaigns, which the Secretary supervises and approves--and its status as a state actor thus is not directly at issue. Footnote 5The principal dissent suggests that if this is so, then the Government has adopted at best a mixed message, because it also promulgates dietary guidelines that, if followed, would discourage excessive consumption of beef. Post, at 8, n.5 (opinion of Souter, J.); see also post, at 1 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment). Even if we agreed that the protection of the government-speech doctrine must be forfeited whenever there is inconsistency in the message, we would nonetheless accord the protection here. The beef promotions are perfectly compatible with the guidelines' message of moderate consumption--the ads do not insist that beef is also What's for Breakfast, Lunch, and Midnight Snack. Footnote 6Congress also required a referendum among producers before permanently implementing the checkoff, and allowed the Secretary to call another referendum upon demand of a "representative group" comprising 10 percent of cattle producers. 7 U.S.C. §§2906(a)-(b). Even before they amended their complaint to challenge the checkoff as compelled speech, respondents were seeking in this litigation to force such a referendum. See 207 F.Supp. 2d 992, 995 (SD 2002). Footnote 7The principal dissent finds some "First Amendment affront" in all compelled funding of government speech--and when, it says, "a targeted assessment . . . makes the First Amendment affront more galling, ... greater care is required to assure that the political process can practically respond to limit the compulsion." Post, at 7. That greater care consists, the dissent says, of a requirement that government speech funded by a targeted assessment must identify government as the speaker. Post, at 8-9. The dissent cites no prior practice, no precedent, and no authority for this highly refined elaboration--not even anyone who has ever before thought of it. It is more than we think can be found within "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." Of course, nothing in the Beef Act or Beef Order prevents the government from identifying itself as sponsor of the ads--much less requires concealment of the ads' provenance--so even if it were correct, this theory would not sustain the judgment below, which altogether enjoined the Act and the Order. But the correct focus is not on whether the ads' audience realizes the government is speaking, but on the compelled assessment's purported interference with respondents' First Amendment rights. As we hold today, respondents enjoy no right not to fund government speech--whether by broad-based taxes or targeted assessments, and whether or not the reasonable viewer would identify the speech as the government's. If a viewer would identify the speech as respondents', however, the analysis would be different. See infra, at 13-14, and n. 8. Footnote 8The principal dissent conflates the two concepts into something it describes as citizens' "presumptive autonomy as speakers to decide what to say and what to pay for others to say." Post, at 7. As we discuss in the text, there might be a valid objection if "those singled out to pay the tax are closely linked with the expression" (post, at 7) in a way that makes them appear to endorse the government message. But this compelled-speech argument (like the Wooley and Barnette opinions on which it draws) differs substantively from the compelled-subsidy analysis. The latter invalidates an exaction not because being forced to pay for speech that is unattributed violates personal autonomy, but because being forced to fund someone else's private speech unconnected to any legitimate government purpose violates personal autonomy. Supra, at 6 (discussing Keller and Abood). Such a violation does not occur when the exaction funds government speech. Apportioning the burden of funding government operations (including speech) through taxes and other levies does not violate autonomy simply because individual taxpayers feel "singled out" or find the exaction "galling," post, at 7, and n.4. Footnote 9An employee of respondent Western Organization of Resource Councils (WORC) testified as follows: </s> "QWhen someone would see an ad that says, 'Beef, it's what's for dinner,' do you believe anyone looks at that ad and says that message is coming from WORC? </s> "AI don't think so. </s> "Q... [D]o you have any basis to actually believe that any of these messages promoted by the Cattlemen's Beef Board are attributed to WORC as an organization? ..... </s> "ANo, I don't think so." Tr. 46-47. </s> Footnote 10The phrase "America's Beef Producers" has apparently beentrademarked by the Board since 1999, see http://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/tarr?regser=registration&entry=2352917 (as visited May 20, 2005, and available in Clerk of Court's case file), and some promotional materials are attributed to "America's Beef ProducersSM." Other promotional materials in the record, however, bear other attributions (such as a notice identifying the Beef Board as the copyright holder, or the apparently untrademarked phrase "Funded by America's Veal Producers through the Beef Checkoff"). App. 52. Footnote 11"America's Beef Producers" might be thought more plausibly to refer to a particular organization of beef producers, and such an organization might have a valid First Amendment objection if the ads' message were incorrectly attributed to it. Cf. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 572-573 (1995). But neither of the respondent groups claims that it would be mistaken for "America's Beef Producers," see n. 9, supra, and none of the individual respondents claims to be injured because of his membership in an organization. Rather, respondents claim that "America's Beef Producers" is precise enough to identify the speech as coming from Robert Thullner, John Smith, Ernie Mertz, and the other respondents who are American beef producers. FOOTNOTESFootnote **I note that on remand respondents may be able to amend their complaint to assert an attribution claim. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15. FOOTNOTESFootnote 1The Government's petition for certiorari also presented a question as to whether more limited relief might be available, but the Court denied certiorari on that question and hence it is not before us. Footnote 2We also noted that while the mushroom growers' disagreement with the ads' message "could be seen as minor ... , there is no apparent principle which distinguishes out of hand minor debates about whether a branded mushroom is better than just any mushroom." United Foods, 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) ("There is necessarily, and within suitably defined areas, a [First Amendment] freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect"). Footnote 3See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas--th[e] ... best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market ..."). Footnote 4The Court asserts that in fact there is no difference between a taxpayer's challenge to speech funded with general revenues, which our precedents foreclose, and a challenge to speech funded with targeted taxes. But the Court's lone authority for that position, our statement in United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), that "[t]here is no principled way ... to distinguish between general taxes and those imposed under the Social Security Act," id., at 260, quoted ante, at 11, is unavailing. Lee involved a religious objection to paying Social Security taxes, and the Court's statement in that case was grounded in the recognition that if the Government were required to accommodate the objection, there would be nothing to stop others from raising a similar religious objection to paying "general taxes." Here there is no comparable danger because of the commonsense notion that individuals feel a closer connection to speech that they are singled out to fund with targeted taxes than they do to expression paid for with general revenues. We recognized this in Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), where we noted that the individual taxpayer's "interest in the moneys of the Treasury--partly realized from taxation and partly from other sources--is shared with millions of others [and] is comparatively minute and indeterminable." Id., at 487. This commonsense notion, then, provides a "principled way" to distinguish in this context between targeted and general taxes. The Court in Lee seemed to recognize that its reasoning might be limited in this way, as the unredacted version of its statement reads: "[t]here is no principled way, however, for purposes of this case, to distinguish between general taxes and those imposed under the Social Security Act." 455 U.S., at 260. Footnote 5 The Court thinks it is enough that the Government is not required to mislead in this way. Ante, at 12, n.7. This view that the statute is saved because it might be applied without misleading readers apparently reflects the Court's position that these cases involve a facial challenge. Ante, at 13. But the challenge here is to the application of the statute through actual, misleading ads, as shown by a record replete with examples. Footnote 6Disputing this, petitioners Nebraska Cattlemen, Inc., etal., suggest that any danger of confusion is eliminated by the inclusion in the beef ads of a red check mark with the word "beef" atop it, because this "distinctive checkoff logo is a direct sign that the ads are disseminated pursuant to the federal checkoff program." Reply Brief for Petitioners in No. 03-1165, at 15-16. It seems to me quite implausible that most (or even some) Americans associate a red check mark underneath the word "beef" with the Federal Government. Indeed, it strikes me that even someone generally familiar with the Beef Act and its taxation mandate might not recognize the checkoff logo as signifying Government involvement. Footnote 7Moreover, anyone who did draw such an unlikely connection would also have to believe that Uncle Sam was having a hard time making his mind up, for other, expressly governmental messages take a different view of how much beef Americans should be eating. Dietary Guidelines for Americans 2005, a publication of the Departments of Agriculture and of Health and Human Services, discusses beef in a chapter entitled "Fats." Http://www.health.gov/dietaryguidelines/dga2005/document (as visited May 16, 2006, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). The message of that chapter is that most Americans need to reduce their consumption of fats, and should get most of the fats they do eat from sources other than beef, namely fish, nuts, and vegetable oils. See id., at 29-31. That the report, which the Secretaries of Agriculture and of Health and Human Services say "is intended to be a primary source of dietary health information," id., at i, does not encourage the consumption of beef (as the beef ads do) is clear from the fact that a different chapter, which discusses fruits, vegetables, whole grains, and fat-free dairy products, is entitled "Food Groups to Encourage." Id., at 23. Footnote 8Notably, the Court nowhere addresses how, or even whether, the benefits of allowing government to mislead taxpayers by concealing its sponsorship of expression outweigh the additional imposition on First Amendment rights that results from it. Indeed, the Court describes no benefits from its approach and gives no reason to think First Amendment doctrine should accommodate the Government's subterfuge. The Court merely observes that no precedent requires the Government to show its hand when it seeks to defend a targeted assessment by claiming government speech. Ante, at 12, n.7. That is of course to be expected, since the government-speech doctrine is so new that the Government has never before enjoyed the opportunity to invoke it in this Court when attempting to justify the type of compelled subsidy struck down in United Foods. Since the Court now says the Government need never show its hand in cases like this one, ante, at 12-13, there is no chance for an effective political check on forced funding for speech, however objectionable. Footnote 9That said, I do not mean to suggest that explicitly labeling speech as that of government would suffice when individuals must personally convey government's message, as in WestVirginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), and Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). The infringement on the speaker's autonomy in those situations is greater than in cases like the ones before us today, so great that it cannot be saved by allowing speakers to inform listeners that they (the speakers) are simply communicating a government message or that they disagree with the message. The Court apparently took the same view in Wooley, as it was unmoved by the dissent's observation in that case that New Hampshire drivers were free to "place on their bumper a conspicuous bumper sticker explaining in no uncertain terms that they do not profess the motto 'Live Free or Die.'" Id., at 722 (opinion of Rehnquist, J.). Footnote 10Petitioners also defend the Beef Act by pointing to Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980), where we subjected restrictions on commercial speech to a less rigorous level of review than that applied to restrictions on most other types of speech. But the Court strongly suggested in Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 469 (1997), and in United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001), both that Central Hudson scrutiny is not appropriate in a case involving compelled speech rather than restrictions on speech, and that even if some relaxed standard of review analogous to Central Hudson were employed the Beef Act would not survive it. See Glickman, supra, at 474, n.18 ("The Court of Appeals fails to explain why the Central Hudson test, which involved a restriction on commercial speech, should govern a case involving the compelled funding of speech"); United Foods, supra, at 410 ("[E]ven viewing commercial speech as entitled to lesser protection, we find no basis under either Glickman or our other precedents to sustain the compelled assessments sought in this case"). Petitioners do not explain why we should depart from these intimations that restrictions on speech are not judged by the same standard as compelled speech.

United States Supreme Court McKEIVER v. PENNSYLVANIA(1971) No. 322 Argued: December 10, 1970Decided: June 21, 1971 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 128, In re Burrus et al., on certiorari to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, argued December 9-10, 1970. </s> The requests of appellants in No. 322 for a jury trial were denied, and they were adjudged juvenile delinquents under Pennsylvania law. The State Supreme Court, while recognizing the applicability to juveniles of certain due process procedural safeguards, held that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in juvenile court. Appellants argue for a right to a jury trial because they were tried in proceedings "substantially similar to a criminal trial," and note that the press is generally present at the trial and that members of the public also enter the courtroom. Petitioners in No. 128 were adjudged juvenile delinquents in North Carolina, where their jury trial requests were denied and in proceedings where the general public was excluded. Held: A trial by jury is not constitutionally required in the adjudicative phase of a state juvenile court delinquency proceeding. Pp. 540-551, 553-556. </s> No. 322, 438 Pa. 339, 265 A. 2d 350, and No. 128, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S. E. 2d 879, affirmed. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, and MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concluded that: </s> 1. The applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings is fundamental fairness, as developed by In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 , and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , which emphasized factfinding procedures, but in our legal system the jury is not a necessary component of accurate factfinding. P. 543. </s> 2. Despite disappointments, failures, and shortcomings in the juvenile court procedure, a jury trial is not constitutionally required in a juvenile court's adjudicative stage. Pp. 545-550. </s> (a) The Court has not heretofore ruled that all rights constitutionally assured to an adult accused are to be imposed in a juvenile proceeding. P. 545. </s> (b) Compelling a jury trial might remake the proceeding into a fully adversary process and effectively end the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding. P. 545. </s> (c) Imposing a jury trial on the juvenile court system would not remedy the system's defects and would not greatly strengthen the factfinding function. P. 547. [403 U.S. 528, 529] </s> (d) The States should be free to experiment to achieve the high promise of the juvenile court concept, and they may install a jury system; or a juvenile court judge may use an advisory jury in a particular case. P. 547. </s> (e) Many States by statute or judicial decision deny a juvenile a right to jury trial, and the great majority that have faced that issue since Gault, supra, and Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 , have concluded that the considerations involved in those cases do not compel trial by jury in juvenile court. Pp. 548-549. </s> (f) Jury trial would entail delay, formality, and clamor of the adversary system, and possibly a public trial. P. 550. </s> (g) Equating the adjudicative phase of the juvenile proceeding with a criminal trial ignores the aspects of fairness, concern, sympathy, and paternal attention inherent in the juvenile court system. P. 550. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN concluded that: </s> Due process in juvenile delinquency proceedings, which are not "criminal prosecutions," does not require the States to provide jury trials on demand so long as some other aspect of the process adequately protects the interests that Sixth Amendment jury trials are intended to serve. In the juvenile context, those interests may be adequately protected by allowing accused individuals to bring the community's attention to bear upon their trials. Since Pennsylvania has no statutory bar to public juvenile trials, and since no claim is made that members of the public were excluded over appellants' objections, the judgment in No. 322 should be affirmed. Pp. 553-556. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concurred in the judgments in these cases on the ground that criminal jury trials are not constitutionally required of the States, either by the Sixth Amendment or by due process. P. 557. </s> BLACKMUN, J., announced the Court's judgments and delivered an opinion in which BURGER, C. J., and STEWART and WHITE, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 551. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in No. 322 and dissenting in No. 128, post, p. 553. HARLAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgments, post, p. 557. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACK and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 557. </s> Daniel E. Farmer argued the cause for appellants in No. 322. With him on the brief were John S. Roberts, [403 U.S. 528, 530] Jr., Peter W. Brown, Harvey N. Schmidt, and James O. Freedman. </s> Michael Meltsner argued the cause for petitioners in No. 128. With him on the briefs were Jack Greenberg, Julius L. Chambers, James E. Ferguson II, and Anthony Amsterdam. </s> Arlen Specter argued the cause for appellee in No. 322. With him on the brief was James D. Crawford. </s> Robert Morgan, Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent, the State of North Carolina, in No. 128. With him on the brief were Ralph Moody, Deputy Attorney General, and Andrew A. Vanore, Jr., Assistant Attorney General. </s> Alfred L. Scanlan argued the cause for the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges as amicus curiae urging affirmance in No. 128. With him on the brief was Martin J. Flynn. </s> Briefs of amici curiae in No. 128 were filed by John J. Droney for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; by Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Albert W. Harris, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, and Derald E. Granberg and Gloria F. DeHart, Deputy Attorneys General, for the State of California; and by Norman Lefstein for the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia et al. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN announced the judgments of the Court and an opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, and MR. JUSTICE WHITE join. </s> These cases present the narrow but precise issue whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment assures the right to trial by jury in the adjudicative phase of a state juvenile court delinquency proceeding. [403 U.S. 528, 531] </s> I </s> The issue arises understandably, for the Court in a series of cases already has emphasized due process factors protective of the juvenile: </s> 1. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948), concerned the admissibility of a confession taken from a 15-year-old boy on trial for first-degree murder. It was held that, upon the facts there developed, the Due Process Clause barred the use of the confession. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, in an opinion in which three other Justices joined, said, "Neither man nor child can be allowed to stand condemned by methods which flout constitutional requirements of due process of law." 332 U.S., at 601 . </s> 2. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962), where a 14-year-old was on trial, is to the same effect. </s> 3. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), concerned a 16-year-old charged with housebreaking, robbery and rape in the District of Columbia. The issue was the propriety of the juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction "after full investigation," as permitted by the applicable statute. It was emphasized that the latitude the court possessed within which to determine whether it should retain or waive jurisdiction "assumes procedural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due process and fairness, as well as compliance with the statutory requirement of a `full investigation.'" 383 U.S., at 553 . </s> 4. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), concerned a 15-year-old, already on probation, committed in Arizona as a delinquent after being apprehended upon a complaint of lewd remarks by telephone. Mr. Justice Fortas, in writing for the Court, reviewed the cases just cited and observed, </s> "Accordingly, while these cases relate only to restricted aspects of the subject, of the subject, they unmistakably [403 U.S. 528, 532] indicate that, whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone." 387 U.S., at 13 . </s> The Court focused on "the proceedings by which a determination is made as to whether a juvenile is a `delinquent' as a result of alleged misconduct on his part, with the consequence that he may be committed to a state institution" and, as to this, said that "there appears to be little current dissent from the proposition that the Due Process Clause has a role to play." Ibid. Kent was adhered to: "We reiterate this view, here in connection with a juvenile court adjudication of `delinquency,' as a requirement which is part of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of our Constitution." Id., at 30-31. Due process, in that proceeding, was held to embrace adequate written notice; advice as to the right to counsel, retained or appointed; confrontation; and cross-examination. The privilege against self-incrimination was also held available to the juvenile. The Court refrained from deciding whether a State must provide appellate review in juvenile cases or a transcript or recording of the hearings. </s> 5. DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28 (1969), presented, by state habeas corpus, a challenge to a Nebraska statute providing that juvenile court hearings "shall be conducted by the judge without a jury in an informal manner." However, because that appellant's hearing had antedated the decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), and Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968), and because Duncan and Bloom had been given only prospective application by DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968), DeBacker's case was deemed an inappropriate one for resolution of the jury trial issue. His appeal was therefore dismissed. MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, in separate dissents, took the position that a juvenile is entitled to a jury trial at [403 U.S. 528, 533] the adjudicative stage. MR. JUSTICE BLACK described this as "a right which is surely one of the fundamental aspects of criminal justice in the English-speaking world," 396 U.S., at 34 , and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS described it as a right required by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments "where the delinquency charged is an offense that, if the person were an adult, would be a crime triable by jury." 396 U.S., at 35 . </s> 6. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), concerned a 12-year-old charged with delinquency for having taken money from a woman's purse. The Court held that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged," 397 U.S., at 364 , and then went on to hold, at 368, that this standard was applicable, too, "during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding." </s> From these six cases - Haley, Gallegos, Kent, Gault, DeBacker, and Winship - it is apparent that: </s> 1. Some of the constitutional requirements attendant upon the state criminal trial have equal application to that part of the state juvenile proceeding that is adjudicative in nature. Among these are the rights to appropriate notice, to counsel, to confrontation and to cross-examination, and the privilege against self-incrimination. Included, also, is the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. </s> 2. The Court, however, has not yet said that all rights constitutionally assured to an adult accused of crime also are to be enforced or made available to the juvenile in his delinquency proceeding. Indeed, the Court specifically has refrained from going that far: </s> "We do not mean by this to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative [403 U.S. 528, 534] hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment." Kent, 383 U.S., at 562 ; Gault, 387 U.S., at 30 . </s> 3. The Court, although recognizing the high hopes and aspirations of Judge Julian Mack, the leaders of the Jane Addams School 1 and the other supporters of the juvenile court concept, has also noted the disappointments of the system's performance and experience and the resulting widespread disaffection. Kent, 383 U.S., at 555 -556; Gault, 387 U.S., at 17 -19. There have been, at one and the same time, both an appreciation for the juvenile court judge who is devoted, sympathetic, and conscientious, and a disturbed concern about the judge who is untrained and less than fully imbued with an understanding approach to the complex problems of childhood and adolescence. There has been praise for the system and its purposes, and there has been alarm over its defects. </s> 4. The Court has insisted that these successive decisions do not spell the doom of the juvenile court system or even deprive it of its "informality, flexibility, or speed." Winship, 397 U.S., at 366 . On the other hand, a concern precisely to the opposite effect was expressed by two dissenters in Winship. Id., at 375-376. </s> II </s> With this substantial background already developed, we turn to the facts of the present cases: </s> No. 322. Joseph McKeiver, then age 16, in May 1968 was charged with robbery, larceny, and receiving stolen goods (felonies under Pennsylvania law, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, 4704, 4807, and 4817 (1963)) as acts of juvenile [403 U.S. 528, 535] delinquency. At the time of the adjudication hearing he was represented by counsel. 2 His request for a jury trial was denied and his case was heard by Judge Theodore S. Gutowicz of the Court of Common Pleas, Family Division, Juvenile Branch, of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania. McKeiver was adjudged a delinquent upon findings that he had violated a law of the Commonwealth. Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 11, 243 (4) (a) (1965). He was placed on probation. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed without opinion. In re McKeiver, 215 Pa. Super. 760, 255 A. 2d 921 (1969). </s> Edward Terry, then age 15, in January 1969 was charged with assault and battery on a police officer and conspiracy (misdemeanors under Pennsylvania law, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, 4708 and 4302 (1963)) as acts of juvenile delinquency. His counsel's request for a jury trial was denied and his case was heard by Judge Joseph C. Bruno of the same Juvenile Branch of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. Terry was adjudged a delinquent on the charges. This followed an adjudication and commitment in the preceding week for an assault on a teacher. He was committed, as he had been on the earlier charge, to the Youth Development Center at Cornwells Heights. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed without opinion. In re Terry, 215 Pa. Super. 762, 255 A. 2d 922 (1969). </s> The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted leave to appeal in both cases and consolidated them. The single question considered, as phrased by the court, was "whether there is a constitutional right to a jury trial in juvenile court." The answer, one justice dissenting, was [403 U.S. 528, 536] in the negative. In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 265 A. 2d 350 (1970). We noted probable jurisdiction. 399 U.S. 925 (1970). </s> The details of the McKeiver and Terry offenses are set forth in Justice Roberts' opinion for the Pennsylvania court, 438 Pa., at 341-342, nn. 1 and 2, 265 A. 2d, at 351 nn. 1 and 2, and need not be repeated at any length here. It suffices to say that McKeiver's offense was his participating with 20 or 30 youths who pursued three young teenagers and took 25 cents from them; that McKeiver never before had been arrested and had a record of gainful employment; that the testimony of two of the victims was described by the court as somewhat inconsistent and as "weak"; and that Terry's offense consisted of hitting a police officer with his fists and with a stick when the officer broke up a boys' fight Terry and others were watching. </s> No. 128. Barbara Burrus and approximately 45 other black children, ranging in age from 11 to 15 years, 3 were the subjects of juvenile court summonses issued in Hyde County, North Carolina, in January 1969. </s> The charges arose out of a series of demonstrations in the county in late 1968 by black adults and children protesting school assignments and a school consolidation plan. Petitions were filed by North Carolina state highway patrolmen. Except for one relating to James Lambert Howard, the petitions charged the respective juveniles with wilfully impeding traffic. The charge against Howard was that he wilfully made riotous noise and was disorderly in the O. A. Peay School in Swan Quarter; interrupted and disturbed the school during its regular sessions; and defaced school furniture. The acts so [403 U.S. 528, 537] charged are misdemeanors under North Carolina law. N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-174.1 (1965 and Supp. 1969), 14-132 (a), 14-273 (1969). </s> The several cases were consolidated into groups for hearing before District Judge Hallett S. Ward, sitting as a juvenile court. The same lawyer appeared for all the juveniles. Over counsel's objection, made in all except two of the cases, the general public was excluded. A request for a jury trial in each case was denied. </s> The evidence as to the juveniles other than Howard consisted solely of testimony of highway patrolmen. No juvenile took the stand or offered any witness. The testimony was to the effect that on various occasions the juveniles and adults were observed walking along Highway 64 singing, shouting, clapping, and playing basketball. As a result, there was interference with traffic. The marchers were asked to leave the paved portion of the highway and they were warned that they were committing a statutory offense. They either refused or left the roadway and immediately returned. The juveniles and participating adults were taken into custody. Juvenile petitions were then filed with respect to those under the age of 16. </s> The evidence as to Howard was that on the morning of December 5, he was in the office of the principal of the O. A. Peay School with 15 other persons while school was in session and was moving furniture around; that the office was in disarray; that as a result the school closed before noon; and that neither he nor any of the others was a student at the school or authorized to enter the principal's office. </s> In each case the court found that the juvenile had committed "an act for which an adult may be punished by law." A custody order was entered declaring the juvenile a delinquent "in need of more suitable guardianship" and committing him to the custody of the County [403 U.S. 528, 538] Department of Public Welfare for placement in a suitable institution "until such time as the Board of Juvenile Correction or the Superintendent of said institution may determine, not inconsistent with the laws of this State." The court, however, suspended these commitments and placed each juvenile on probation for either one or two years conditioned upon his violating none of the State's laws, upon his reporting monthly to the County Department of Welfare, upon his being home by 11 p. m. each evening, and upon his attending a school approved by the Welfare Director. None of the juveniles has been confined on these charges. </s> On appeal, the cases were consolidated into two groups. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed. In re Burrus, 4 N.C. App. 523, 167 S. E. 2d 454 (1969); In re Shelton, 5 N.C. App. 487, 168 S. E. 2d 695 (1969). In its turn the Supreme Court of North Carolina deleted that portion of the order in each case relating to commitment, but otherwise affirmed. In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S. E. 2d 879 (1969). Two justices dissented without opinion. We granted certiorari. 397 U.S. 1036 (1970). </s> III </s> It is instructive to review, as an illustration, the substance of Justice Roberts' opinion for the Pennsylvania court. He observes, 438 Pa., at 343, 265 A. 2d at 352, that "[f]or over sixty-five years the Supreme Court gave no consideration at all to the constitutional problems involved in the juvenile court area"; that Gault "is somewhat of a paradox, being both broad and narrow at the same time"; that it "is broad in that it evidences a fundamental and far-reaching disillusionment with the anticipated benefits of the juvenile court system"; that it is narrow because the court enumerated four due process rights which it held applicable in juvenile proceedings, but declined to rule on two other claimed rights, id., at [403 U.S. 528, 539] 344-345, 265 A. 2d, at 353; that as a consequence the Pennsylvania court was "confronted with a sweeping rationale and a carefully tailored holding," id., at 345, 265 A. 2d, at 353; that the procedural safeguards "Gault specifically made applicable to juvenile courts have already caused a significant `constitutional domestication' of juvenile court proceedings," id., at 346, 265 A. 2d, at 354; that those safeguards and other rights, including the reasonable-doubt standard established by Winship, "insure that the juvenile court will operate in an atmosphere which is orderly enough to impress the juvenile with the gravity of the situation and the impartiality of the tribunal and at the same time informal enough to permit the benefits of the juvenile system to operate" (footnote omitted), id., at 347, 265 A. 2d, at 354; that the "proper inquiry, then, is whether the right to a trial by jury is `fundamental' within the meaning of Duncan, in the context of a juvenile court which operates with all of the above constitutional safeguards," id., at 348, 265 A. 2d, at 354; and that his court's inquiry turned "upon whether there are elements in the juvenile process which render the right to a trial by jury less essential to the protection of an accused's rights in the juvenile system than in the normal criminal process." Ibid. </s> Justice Roberts then concluded that such factors do inhere in the Pennsylvania juvenile system: (1) Although realizing that "faith in the quality of the juvenile bench is not an entirely satisfactory substitute for due process," id., at 348, 265 A. 2d, at 355, the judges in the juvenile courts "do take a different view of their role than that taken by their counterparts in the criminal courts." Id., at 348, 265 A. 2d, at 354-355. (2) While one regrets its inadequacies, "the juvenile system has available and utilizes much more fully various diagnostic and rehabilitative services" that are "far superior to those available in the regular criminal process." Id., at 348-349, [403 U.S. 528, 540] 265 A. 2d, at 355. (3) Although conceding that the post-adjudication process "has in many respects fallen far short of its goals, and its reality is far harsher than its theory," the end result of a declaration of delinquency "is significantly different from and less onerous than a finding of criminal guilt" and "we are not yet convinced that the current practices do not contain the seeds from which a truly appropriate system can be brought forth." (4) Finally, "of all the possible due process rights which could be applied in the juvenile courts, the right to trial by jury is the one which would most likely be disruptive of the unique nature of the juvenile process." It is the jury trial that "would probably require substantial alteration of the traditional practices." The other procedural rights held applicable to the juvenile process "will give the juveniles sufficient protection" and the addition of the trial by jury "might well destroy the traditional character of juvenile proceedings." Id., at 349-350, 265 A. 2d, at 355. </s> The court concluded, id., at 350, 265 A. 2d, at 356, that it was confident "that a properly structured and fairly administered juvenile court system can serve our present societal needs without infringing on individual freedoms." </s> IV </s> The right to an impartial jury "[i]n all criminal prosecutions" under federal law is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Through the Fourteenth Amendment that requirement has now been imposed upon the States "in all criminal cases which - were they to be tried in a federal court - would come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee." This is because the Court has said it believes "that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 210 -211 (1968). [403 U.S. 528, 541] </s> This, of course, does not automatically provide the answer to the present jury trial issue, if for no other reason than that the juvenile court proceeding has not yet been held to be a "criminal prosecution," within the meaning and reach of the Sixth Amendment, and also has not yet been regarded as devoid of criminal aspects merely because it usually has been given the civil label. Kent, 383 U.S., at 554 ; Gault, 387 U.S., at 17 , 49-50; Winship, 397 U.S., at 365 -366. </s> Little, indeed, is to be gained by any attempt simplistically to call the juvenile court proceeding either "civil" or "criminal." The Court carefully has avoided this wooden approach. Before Gault was decided in 1967, the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against self-incrimination had been imposed upon the state criminal trial. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). So, too, had the Sixth Amendment's rights of confrontation and cross-examination. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), and Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). Yet the Court did not automatically and peremptorily apply those rights to the juvenile proceeding. A reading of Gault reveals the opposite. And the same separate approach to the standard-of-proof issue is evident from the carefully separated application of the standard, first to the criminal trial, and then to the juvenile proceeding, displayed in Winship. 397 U.S., at 361 and 365. </s> Thus, accepting "the proposition that the Due Process Clause has a role to play," Gault, 387 U.S., at 13 , our task here with respect to trial by jury, as it was in Gault with respect to other claimed rights, "is to ascertain the precise impact of the due process requirement." Id., at 13-14. </s> V </s> The Pennsylvania juveniles' basic argument is that they were tried in proceedings "substantially similar to a criminal trial." They say that a delinquency proceeding [403 U.S. 528, 542] in their State is initiated by a petition charging a penal code violation in the conclusory language of an indictment; that a juvenile detained prior to trial is held in a building substantially similar to an adult prison; that in Philadelphia juveniles over 16 are, in fact, held in the cells of a prison; that counsel and the prosecution engage in plea bargaining; that motions to suppress are routinely heard and decided; that the usual rules of evidence are applied; that the customary common-law defenses are available; that the press is generally admitted in the Philadelphia juvenile courtrooms; that members of the public enter the room; that arrest and prior record may be reported by the press (from police sources, however, rather than from the juvenile court records); that, once adjudged delinquent, a juvenile may be confined until his majority in what amounts to a prison (see In re Bethea, 215 Pa. Super. 75, 76, 257 A. 2d 368, 369 (1969), describing the state correctional institution at Camp Hill as a "maximum security prison for adjudged delinquents and youthful criminal offenders"); and that the stigma attached upon delinquency adjudication approximates that resulting from conviction in an adult criminal proceeding. </s> The North Carolina juveniles particularly urge that the requirement of a jury trial would not operate to deny the supposed benefits of the juvenile court system; that the system's primary benefits are its discretionary intake procedure permitting disposition short of adjudication, and its flexible sentencing permitting emphasis on rehabilitation; that realization of these benefits does not depend upon dispensing with the jury; that adjudication of factual issues on the one hand and disposition of the case on the other are very different matters with very different purposes; that the purpose of the former is indistinguishable from that of the criminal trial; that the jury trial provides an independent protective factor; that [403 U.S. 528, 543] experience has shown that jury trials in juvenile courts are manageable; that no reason exists why protection traditionally accorded in criminal proceedings should be denied young people subject to involuntary incarceration for lengthy periods; and that the juvenile courts deserve healthy public scrutiny. </s> VI </s> All the litigants here agree that the applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings, as developed by Gault and Winship, is fundamental fairness. As that standard was applied in those two cases, we have an emphasis on factfinding procedures. The requirements of notice, counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and standard of proof naturally flowed from this emphasis. But one cannot say that in our legal system the jury is a necessary component of accurate factfinding. There is much to be said for it, to be sure, but we have been content to pursue other ways for determining facts. Juries are not required, and have not been, for example, in equity cases, in workmen's compensation, in probate, or in deportation cases. Neither have they been generally used in military trials. In Duncan the Court stated, "We would not assert, however, that every criminal trial - or any particular trial - held before a judge alone is unfair or that a defendant may never be as fairly treated by a judge as he would be by a jury." 391 U.S., at 158 . In DeStefano, for this reason and others, the Court refrained from retrospective application of Duncan, an action it surely would have not taken had it felt that the integrity of the result was seriously at issue. And in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), the Court saw no particular magic in a 12-man jury for a criminal case, thus revealing that even jury concepts themselves are not inflexible. </s> We must recognize, as the Court has recognized before, that the fond and idealistic hopes of the juvenile court [403 U.S. 528, 544] proponents and early reformers of three generations ago have not been realized. The devastating commentary upon the system's failures as a whole, contained in the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime 7-9 (1967), reveals the depth of disappointment in what has been accomplished. Too often the juvenile court judge falls far short of that stalwart, protective, and communicating figure the system envisaged. 4 The community's unwillingness to provide people and facilities and to be concerned, the insufficiency of time devoted, the scarcity of professional help, the inadequacy of dispositional alternatives, and our general lack of knowledge all contribute to dissatisfaction with the experiment. 5 </s> [403 U.S. 528, 545] </s> The Task Force Report, however, also said, id., at 7, "To say that juvenile courts have failed to achieve their goals is to say no more than what is true of criminal courts in the United States. But failure is most striking when hopes are highest." </s> Despite all these disappointments, all these failures, and all these shortcomings, we conclude that trial by jury in the juvenile court's adjudicative stage is not a constitutional requirement. We so conclude for a number of reasons: </s> 1. The Court has refrained, in the cases heretofore decided, from taking the easy way with a flat holding that all rights constitutionally assured for the adult accused are to be imposed upon the state juvenile proceeding. What was done in Gault and in Winship is aptly described in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa. Super. 62, 74, 234 A. 2d 9, 15 (1967): </s> "It is clear to us that the Supreme Court has properly attempted to strike a judicious balance by injecting procedural orderliness into the juvenile court system. It is seeking to reverse the trend [pointed out in Kent, 383 U.S., at 556 whereby `the child receives the worst of both worlds. . . .'" </s> 2. There is a possibility, at least, that the jury trial, if required as a matter of constitutional precept, will remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process and will put an effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding. </s> 3. The Task Force Report, although concededly pre-Gault, is notable for its not making any recommendation [403 U.S. 528, 546] that the jury trial be imposed upon the juvenile court system. This is so despite its vivid description of the system's deficiencies and disappointments. Had the Commission deemed this vital to the integrity of the juvenile process, or to the handling of juveniles, surely a recommendation or suggestion to this effect would have appeared. The intimations, instead, are quite the other way. Task Force Report 38. Further, it expressly recommends against abandonment of the system and against the return of the juvenile to the criminal courts. 6 </s> [403 U.S. 528, 547] </s> 4. The Court specifically has recognized by dictum that a jury is not a necessary part even of every criminal process that is fair and equitable. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S., at 149 -150, n. 14, and 158. </s> 5. The imposition of the jury trial on the juvenile court system would not strengthen greatly, if at all, the factfinding function, and would, contrarily, provide an attrition of the juvenile court's assumed ability to function in a unique manner. It would not remedy the defects of the system. Meager as has been the hoped-for advance in the juvenile field, the alternative would be regressive, would lose what has been gained, and would tend once again to place the juvenile squarely in the routine of the criminal process. </s> 6. The juvenile concept held high promise. We are reluctant to say that, despite disappointments of grave dimensions, it still does not hold promise, and we are particularly reluctant to say, as do the Pennsylvania appellants here, that the system cannot accomplish its rehabilitative goals. So much depends on the availability of resources, on the interest and commitment of the public, on willingness to learn, and on understanding as to cause and effect and cure. In this field, as in so many others, one perhaps learns best by doing. We are reluctant to disallow the States to experiment further and to seek in new and different ways the elusive answers to the problems of the young, and we feel that we would be impeding that experimentation by imposing the jury trial. The States, indeed, must go forward. If, in its wisdom, any State feels the jury trial is desirable in all cases, or in certain kinds, there appears to be no impediment to its installing a system embracing that feature. That, however, is the State's privilege and not its obligation. </s> 7. Of course there have been abuses. The Task Force Report has noted them. We refrain from saying at this [403 U.S. 528, 548] point that those abuses are of constitutional dimension. They relate to the lack of resources and of dedication rather than to inherent unfairness. </s> 8. There is, of course, nothing to prevent a juvenile court judge, in a particular case where he feels the need, or when the need is demonstrated, from using an advisory jury. </s> 9. "The fact that a practice is followed by a large number of states is not conclusive in a decision as to whether that practice accords with due process, but it is plainly worth considering in determining whether the practice `offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)." Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952). It therefore is of more than passing interest that at least 29 States and the District of Columbia by statute deny the juvenile a right to a jury trial in cases such as these. 7 The same result is achieved in other [403 U.S. 528, 549] States by judicial decision. 8 In 10 States statutes provide for a jury trial under certain circumstances. 9 </s> 10. Since Gault and since Duncan the great majority of States, in addition to Pennsylvania and North Carolina, that have faced the issue have concluded that the considerations that led to the result in those two cases do not compel trial by jury in the juvenile court. In re Fucini, 44 Ill. 2d 305, 255 N. E. 2d 380 (1970); Bible v. State, ____ Ind. ____, 254 N. E. 2d 319 (1970); Dryden v. Commonwealth, 435 S. W. 2d 457 (Ky. 1968); In re Johnson, 254 Md. 517, 255 A. 2d 419 (1969); Hopkins v. Youth Court, 227 So.2d 282 (Miss. 1969); In re J. W., 106 N. J. Super. 129, 254 A. 2d 334 (1969); In re D., 27 N. Y. 2d 90, 261 N. E. 2d 627 (1970); In re Agler, 19 Ohio St. 2d 70, 249 N. E. 2d 808 (1969); State v. Turner, 253 Ore. 235, 453 P.2d 910 (1969). See In re Estes v. Hopp, 73 Wash. 2d 263, 438 P.2d 205 (1968); McMullen v. Geiger, 184 Neb. 581, 169 N. W. 2d 431 (1969). To the contrary are Peyton v. Nord, 78 N. M. 717, 437 P.2d 716 (1968), and, semble, Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 994 (SDNY 1968). </s> 11. Stopping short of proposing the jury trial for juvenile proceedings are the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, 24 (a), approved in July 1968 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws: [403 U.S. 528, 550] the Standard Juvenile Court Act, Art. V, 19, proposed by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (see W. Sheridan, Standards for Juvenile and Family Courts 73, Dept. of H. E. W., Children's Bureau Pub. No. 437-1966); and the Legislative Guide for Drafting Family and Juvenile Court Acts 29 (a) (Dept. of H. E. W., Children's Bureau Pub. No. 472-1969). </s> 12. If the jury trial were to be injected into the juvenile court system as a matter of right, it would bring with it into that system the traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the adversary system and, possibly, the public trial. It is of interest that these very factors were stressed by the District Committee of the Senate when, through Senator Tydings, it recommended, and Congress then approved, as a provision in the District of Columbia Crime Bill, the abolition of the jury trial in the juvenile court. S. Rep. No. 91-620, pp. 13-14 (1969). </s> 13. Finally, the arguments advanced by the juveniles here are, of course, the identical arguments that underlie the demand for the jury trial for criminal proceedings. The arguments necessarily equate the juvenile proceeding - or at least the adjudicative phase of it - with the criminal trial. Whether they should be so equated is our issue. Concern about the inapplicability of exclusionary and other rules of evidence, about the juvenile court judge's possible awareness of the juvenile's prior record and of the contents of the social file; about repeated appearances of the same familiar witnesses in the persons of juvenile and probation officers and social workers - all to the effect that this will create the likelihood of pre-judgment - chooses to ignore, it seems to us, every aspect of fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and of paternal attention that the juvenile court system contemplates. [403 U.S. 528, 551] </s> If the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process are to be superimposed upon the juvenile court system, there is little need for its separate existence. Perhaps that ultimate disillusionment will come one day, but for the moment we are disinclined to give impetus to it. </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 See Mr. Justice Fortas' article, Equal Rights - For Whom?, 42 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 401, 406 (1967). </s> [Footnote 2 At McKeiver's hearing his counsel advised the court that he had never seen McKeiver before and "was just in the middle of interviewing" him. The court allowed him five minutes for the interview. Counsel's office, Community Legal Services, however, had been appointed to represent McKeiver five months earlier. App. 2. </s> [Footnote 3 In North Carolina juvenile court procedures are provided only for persons under the age of 16. N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-277 and 7A-278 (1) (1969). </s> [Footnote 4 "A recent study of juvenile court judges . . . revealed that half had not received undergraduate degrees; a fifth had received no college education at all; a fifth were not members of the bar." Task Force Report 7. </s> [Footnote 5 "What emerges, then, is this: In theory the juvenile court was to be helpful and rehabilitative rather than punitive. In fact the distinction often disappears, not only because of the absence of facilities and personnel but also because of the limits of knowledge and technique. In theory the court's action was to affix no stigmatizing label. In fact a delinquent is generally viewed by employers, schools, the armed services - by society generally - as a criminal. In theory the court was to treat children guilty of criminal acts in noncriminal ways. In fact it labels truants and runaways as junior criminals. </s> "In theory the court's operations could justifiably be informal, its findings and decisions made without observing ordinary procedural safeguards, because it would act only in the best interest of the child. In fact it frequently does nothing more nor less than deprive a child of liberty without due process of law - knowing not what else to do and needing, whether admittedly or not, to act in the community's interest even more imperatively than the child's. In theory it was to exercise its protective powers to bring an errant child back into the fold. In fact there is increasing reason to believe that its intervention reinforces the juvenile's unlawful impulses. In theory it [403 U.S. 528, 545] was to concentrate on each case the best of current social science learning. In fact it has often become a vested interest in its turn, loathe to cooperate with innovative programs or avail itself of forward-looking methods." Task Force Report 9. </s> [Footnote 6 "Nevertheless, study of the juvenile courts does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the time has come to jettison the experiment and remand the disposition of children charged with crime to the criminal courts of the country. As trying as are the problems of the juvenile courts, the problems of the criminal courts, particularly those of the lower courts, which would fall heir to much of the juvenile court jurisdiction, are even graver; and the ideal of separate treatment of children is still worth pursuing. What is required is rather a revised philosophy of the juvenile court based on the recognition that in the past our reach exceeded our grasp. The spirit that animated the juvenile court movement was fed in part by a humanitarian compassion for offenders who were children. That willingness to understand and treat people who threaten public safety and security should be nurtured, not turned aside as hopeless sentimentality, both because it is civilized and because social protection itself demands constant search for alternatives to the crude and limited expedient of condemnation and punishment. But neither should it be allowed to outrun reality. The juvenile court is a court of law, charged like other agencies of criminal justice with protecting the community against threatening conduct. Rehabilitating offenders through individualized handling is one way of providing protection, and appropriately the primary way in dealing with children. But the guiding consideration for a court of law that deals with threatening conduct is nonetheless protection of the community. The juvenile court, like other courts, is therefore obliged to employ all the means at hand, not excluding incapacitation, for achieving that protection. What should distinguish the juvenile from the criminal courts is greater emphasis on rehabilitation, not exclusive preoccupation with it." Task Force Report 9. </s> [Footnote 7 Ala. Code, Tit. 13, 369 (1958); Alaska Stat. 47.10.070 (Supp. 1970); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 8-229 (1956), see Ariz. Laws, c. 223 (May 19, 1970); Ark. Stat. Ann. 45-206 (1964); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 10, 1175 (Supp. 1970); Fla. Stat. 39.09 (2) (1965); Ga. Code Ann. 24-2420 (Supp. 1970); Hawaii Rev. Stat. 571-41 (1968); Idaho Code 16-1813 (Supp. 1969); Ind. Ann. Stat. 9-3215 (Supp. 1970); Iowa Code 232.27 (1971); Ky. Rev. Stat. 208.060 (1962); La Rev. Stat. 13:1579 (Supp. 1962); Minn. Stat. 260.155 subd. 1 (1969); Miss. Code Ann. 7185-08 (1942); Mo. Rev. Stat. 211.171 (6) (1969) (equity practice controls); Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-206.03 (2) (1968); Nev. Rev. Stat. 62.190 (3) (1968); N. J. Stat. Ann. 2A:4-35 (1952); N. Y. Family Court Act 164 and 165 and Civ. Prac. Law and Rules 4101; N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-285 (1969); N. D. Cent. Code 27-16-18 (1960); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2151.35 (Supp. 1970); Ore. Rev. Stat. 419.498 (1) (1968); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 11, 247 (1965); S. C. Code Ann. 15-1095.19 (Supp. 1970); Utah Code Ann. 55-10-94 (Supp. 1969); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 33, 651 (a) (Supp. 1970); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 13.04.030; D.C. Code 16-2316 (a) (Supp. 1971). </s> [Footnote 8 In re Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 228 P. 467 (1924); Cinque v. Boyd 99 Conn. 70, 121 A. 678 (1923); In re Fletcher, 251 Md. 520, 248 A. 2d 364 (1968); Commonwealth v. Page, 339 Mass. 313, 316, 159 N. E. 2d 82, 85 (1959); In re Perham, 104 N. H. 276, 184 A. 2d 449 (1962). </s> [Footnote 9 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 37-19-24 (Supp. 1965); Kan. Stat. Ann. 38-808 (Supp. 1969); Mich. Comp. Laws 712A.17 (1948); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. 10-604.1 (Supp. 1969); Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 10. 1110 (Supp. 1970); S. D. Comp. Laws 26-8-31 (1967); Tex. Civ. Stat., Art. 2338-1, 13 (b) (Supp. 1970); W. Va. Code Ann. 49-5-6 (1966); Wis. Stat. Ann. 48.25 (2) (Supp. 1971): Wyo Stat. Ann. 14-115.24 (Supp. 1971). </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring. </s> Although the function of the jury is to find facts, that body is not necessarily or even probably better at the job than the conscientious judge. Nevertheless, the consequences of criminal guilt are so severe that the Constitution mandates a jury to prevent abuses of official power by insuring, where demanded, community participation in imposing serious deprivations of liberty and to provide a hedge against corrupt, biased, or political justice. We have not, however, considered the juvenile case a criminal proceeding within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment and hence automatically subject to all of the restrictions normally applicable in criminal cases. The question here is one of due process of law and I join the plurality opinion concluding that the States are not required by that clause to afford jury trials in juvenile courts where juveniles are charged with improper acts. </s> The criminal law proceeds on the theory that defendants have a will and are responsible for their actions. A finding of guilt establishes that they have chosen to engage in conduct so reprehensible and injurious to others that they must be punished to deter them and others from crime. Guilty defendants are considered blame-worthy; they are branded and treated as such, however much the State also pursues rehabilitative ends in the criminal justice system. </s> For the most part, the juvenile justice system rests on more deterministic assumptions. Reprehensible acts by [403 U.S. 528, 552] juveniles are not deemed the consequence of mature and malevolent choice but of environmental pressures (or lack of them) or of other forces beyond their control. Hence the state legislative judgment not to stigmatize the juvenile delinquent by branding him a criminal; his conduct is not deemed so blameworthy that punishment is required to deter him or others. Coercive measures, where employed, are considered neither retribution nor punishment. Supervision or confinement is aimed at rehabilitation, not at convincing the juvenile of his error simply by imposing pains and penalties. Nor is the purpose to make the juvenile delinquent an object lesson for others, whatever his own merits or demerits may be. A typical disposition in the juvenile court where delinquency is established may authorize confinement until age 21, but it will last no longer and within that period will last only so long as his behavior demonstrates that he remains an unacceptable risk if returned to his family. Nor is the authorization for custody until 21 any measure of the seriousness of the particular act that the juvenile has performed. </s> Against this background and in light of the distinctive purpose of requiring juries in criminal cases, I am satisfied with the Court's holding. To the extent that the jury is a buffer to the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor in the criminal law system, the distinctive intake policies and procedures of the juvenile court system to a great extent obviate this important function of the jury. As for the necessity to guard against judicial bias, a system eschewing blameworthiness and punishment for evil choice is itself an operative force against prejudice and short-tempered justice. Nor where juveniles are involved is there the same opportunity for corruption to the juvenile's detriment or the same temptation to use the courts for political ends. [403 U.S. 528, 553] </s> Not only are those risks that mandate juries in criminal cases of lesser magnitude in juvenile court adjudications, but the consequences of adjudication are less severe than those flowing from verdicts of criminal guilt. This is plainly so in theory, and in practice there remains a substantial gulf between criminal guilt and delinquency, whatever the failings of the juvenile court in practice may be. Moreover, to the extent that current unhappiness with juvenile court performance rests on dissatisfaction with the vague and overbroad grounds for delinquency adjudications, with faulty judicial choice as to disposition after adjudication, or with the record of rehabilitative custody, whether institutional or probationary, these shortcomings are in no way mitigated by providing a jury at the adjudicative stage. </s> For me there remain differences of substance between criminal and juvenile courts. They are quite enough for me to hold that a jury is not required in the latter. Of course, there are strong arguments that juries are desirable when dealing with the young, and States are free to use juries if they choose. They are also free, if they extend criminal court safeguards to juvenile court adjudications, frankly to embrace condemnation, punishment, and deterrence as permissible and desirable attributes of the juvenile justice system. But the Due Process Clause neither compels nor invites them to do so. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the judgment in No. 322 and dissenting in No. 128. </s> I agree with the plurality opinion's conclusion that the proceedings below in these cases were not "criminal prosecutions" within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. For me, therefore, the question in these cases is whether jury trial is among the "essentials of due process and fair treatment," In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967), required during the adjudication of a charge of delinquency based [403 U.S. 528, 554] upon acts that would constitute a crime if engaged in by an adult. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359 and n. 1 (1970). This does not, however, mean that the interests protected by the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of jury trial in all "criminal prosecutions" are of no importance in the context of these cases. The Sixth Amendment, where applicable, commands that these interests be protected by a particular procedure, that is, trial by jury. The Due Process Clause commands, not a particular procedure, but only a result: in my Brother BLACKMUN'S words, "fundamental fairness . . . [in] factfinding." In the context of these and similar juvenile delinquency proceedings, what this means is that the States are not bound to provide jury trials on demand so long as some other aspect of the process adequately protects the interests that Sixth Amendment jury trials are intended to serve. 1 </s> In my view, therefore, the due process question cannot be decided upon the basis of general characteristics of juvenile proceedings, but only in terms of the adequacy of a particular state procedure to "protect the [juvenile] from oppression by the Government," Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965), and to protect him against "the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). </s> Examined in this light, I find no defect in the Pennsylvania cases before us. The availability of trial by jury allows an accused to protect himself against possible oppression by what is in essence an appeal to the community conscience, as embodied in the jury that hears [403 U.S. 528, 555] his case. To some extent, however, a similar protection may be obtained when an accused may in essence appeal to the community at large, by focusing public attention upon the facts of his trial, exposing improper judicial behavior to public view, and obtaining, if necessary, executive redress through the medium of public indignation. Of course, the Constitution, in the context of adult criminal trials, has rejected the notion that public trial is an adequate substitute for trial by jury in serious cases. But in the context of juvenile delinquency proceedings, I cannot say that it is beyond the competence of a State to conclude that juveniles who fear that delinquency proceedings will mask judicial oppression may obtain adequate protection by focusing community attention upon the trial of their cases. For, however much the juvenile system may have failed in practice, its very existence as an ostensibly beneficent and noncriminal process for the care and guidance of young persons demonstrates the existence of the community's sympathy and concern for the young. Juveniles able to bring the community's attention to bear upon their trials may therefore draw upon a reservoir of public concern unavailable to the adult criminal defendant. In the Pennsylvania cases before us, there appears to be no statutory ban upon admission of the public to juvenile trials. 2 Appellants themselves, without contradiction, assert that "the press is generally admitted" to juvenile delinquency proceedings in Philadelphia. 3 Most important, the record in these [403 U.S. 528, 556] cases is bare of any indication that any person whom appellants sought to have admitted to the courtroom was excluded. In these circumstances, I agree that the judgment in No. 322 must be affirmed. </s> The North Carolina cases, however, present a different situation. North Carolina law either permits or requires exclusion of the general public from juvenile trials. 4 In the cases before us, the trial judge "ordered the general public excluded from the hearing room and stated that only officers of the court, the juveniles, their parents or guardians, their attorney and witnesses would be present for the hearing," In re Burrus, 4 N.C. App. 523, 525, 167 S. E. 2d 454, 456 (1969), notwithstanding petitioners' repeated demand for a public hearing. The cases themselves, which arise out of a series of demonstrations by black adults and juveniles who believed that the Hyde County, North Carolina, school system unlawfully discriminated against black school children, present a paradigm of the circumstances in which there may be a substantial "temptation to use the courts for political ends." Opinion of MR. JUSTICE WHITE, ante, at 552. And finally, neither the opinions supporting the judgment nor the respondent in No. 128 has pointed to any feature of North Carolina's juvenile proceedings that could substitute for public or jury trial in protecting the petitioners against misuse of the judicial process. Cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 188 , 193 (1968) (HARLAN, J., dissenting) (availability of resort to "the political process" [403 U.S. 528, 557] is an alternative permitting States to dispense with jury trials). Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment in No. 128. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring in the judgments. </s> If I felt myself constrained to follow Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), which extended the Sixth Amendment right of jury trial to the States, I would have great difficulty, upon the premise seemingly accepted in my Brother BLACKMUN'S opinion, in holding that the jury trial right does not extend to state juvenile proceedings. That premise is that juvenile delinquency proceedings have in practice actually become in many, if not all, respects criminal trials. But see my concurring and dissenting opinion in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 65 (1967). If that premise be correct, then I do not see why, given Duncan, juveniles as well as adults would not be constitutionally entitled to jury trials, so long as juvenile delinquency systems are not restructured to fit their original purpose. When that time comes I would have no difficulty in agreeing with my Brother BLACKMUN, and indeed with my Brother WHITE, the author of Duncan, that juvenile delinquency proceedings are beyond the pale of Duncan. </s> I concur in the judgments in these cases, however, on the ground that criminal jury trials are not constitutionally required of the States, either as a matter of Sixth Amendment law or due process. See my concurring and dissenting opinion in Duncan and my separate opinion in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 118 -119 (1970). </s> [Footnote 1 "A criminal process which was fair and equitable but used no juries is easy to imagine. It would make use of alternative guarantees and protections which would serve the purposes that the jury serves in the English and American systems." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n. 14 (1968). This conclusion is, of course, inescapable in light of our decisions that petty criminal offenses may be tried without a jury notwithstanding the defendant's request. E. g., District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937). </s> [Footnote 2 The generally applicable statute, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 11, 245 (1965), merely provides that juvenile proceedings shall be "separate" from regular court business. Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 11, 269-402 (1965), requiring exclusion of the general public from juvenile hearings, applies only to Allegheny County. Both of the instant cases were tried in Philadelphia County. </s> [Footnote 3 "The judges of the Philadelphia Juvenile Court exercise varying degrees of control over admission to the courtroom, but the press is generally admitted . . . ." Brief for Appellants 9 n. 9. </s> [Footnote 4 N.C. Gen. Stat. 110-24 (1966), in force at the time of these trials, appears on its face to permit but not require such exclusion, as does identical language in the present statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-285 (1969). The North Carolina Supreme Court in the present cases has read these statutes as a legislative determination "that a public hearing is [not] in the best interest of the youthful offender." In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 530, 169 S. E. 2d 879, 887 (1969). </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL concur, dissenting. </s> These cases from Pennsylvania and North Carolina present the issue of the right to a jury trial for offenders charged in juvenile court and facing a possible incarceration [403 U.S. 528, 558] until they reach their majority. I believe the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, require a jury trial. </s> In the Pennsylvania cases one of the appellants was charged with robbery (Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, 4704 (1963)), larceny (Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, 4807), and receiving stolen goods (Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, 4817) as acts of juvenile delinquency. Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 11, 246 (1965). He was found a delinquent and placed on probation. The other appellant was charged with assault and battery on a police officer (Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, 4708) and conspiracy (Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, 4302) as acts of juvenile delinquency. On a finding of delinquency he was committed to a youth center. Despite the fact that the two appellants, aged 15 and 16, would face potential incarceration until their majority, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 11, 250, they were denied a jury trial. </s> In the North Carolina cases petitioners are students, from 11 to 15 years of age, who were charged under one of three criminal statutes: (1) "disorderly conduct" in a public building, N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-132 (1969); (2) "wilful" interruption or disturbance of a public or private school. N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-273; or (3) obstructing the flow of traffic on a highway or street, N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-174.1 (1965 and Supp. 1969). </s> Conviction of each of these crimes would subject a person, whether juvenile or adult, to imprisonment in a state institution. In the case of these students the possible term was six to 10 years; it would be computed for the period until an individual reached the age of 21. Each asked for a jury trial which was denied. The trial judge stated that the hearings were juvenile hearings, not criminal trials. But the issue in each case was whether [403 U.S. 528, 559] they had violated a state criminal law. The trial judge found in each case that the juvenile had committed "an act for which an adult may be punished by law" and held in each case that the acts of the juvenile violated one of the criminal statutes cited above. The trial judge thereupon ordered each juvenile to be committed to the state institution for the care of delinquents and then placed each on probation for terms from 12 to 24 months. </s> We held in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 , that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone." As we noted in that case, the Juvenile Court movement was designed to avoid procedures to ascertain whether the child was "guilty" or "innocent" but to bring to bear on these problems a "clinical" approach. Id., at 15, 16. It is, of course, not our task to determine as a matter of policy whether a "clinical" or "punitive" approach to these problems should be taken by the States. But where a State uses its juvenile court proceedings to prosecute a juvenile for a criminal act and to order "confinement" until the child reaches 21 years of age or where the child at the threshold of the proceedings faces that prospect, then he is entitled to the same procedural protection as an adult. As MR. JUSTICE BLACK said in In re Gault, supra, at 61 (concurring): </s> "Where a person, infant or adult, can be seized by the State, charged, and convicted for violating a state criminal law, and then ordered by the State to be confined for six years, I think the Constitution requires that he be tried in accordance with the guarantees of all the provisions of the Bill of Rights made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Undoubtedly this would be true of an adult defendant, and it would be a plain denial of equal protection of the laws - an invidious discrimination [403 U.S. 528, 560] - to hold that others subject to heavier punishments could, because they are children, be denied these same constitutional safeguards." </s> Just as courts have sometimes confused delinquency with crime, so have law enforcement officials treated juveniles not as delinquents but as criminals. As noted in the President's Crime Commission Report: </s> "In 1965, over 100,000 juveniles were confined in adult institutions. Presumably most of them were there because no separate juvenile detention facilities existed. Nonetheless, it is clearly undesirable that juveniles be confined with adults." President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 179 (1967). </s> Even when juveniles are not incarcerated with adults the situation may be no better. One Pennsylvania correctional institution for juveniles is a brick building with barred windows, locked steel doors, a cyclone fence topped with barbed wire, and guard towers. A former juvenile judge described it as "a maximum security prison for adjudged delinquents." In re Bethea, 215 Pa. Super. 75, 76. 257 A. 2d 368, 369. </s> In the present cases imprisonment or confinement up to 10 years was possible for one child and each faced at least a possible five-year incarceration. No adult could be denied a jury trial in those circumstances. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 . The Fourteenth Amendment, which makes trial by jury provided in the Sixth Amendment applicable to the States, speaks of denial of rights to "any person", not denial of rights to "any adult person"; and we have held indeed that where a juvenile is charged with an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, he is entitled to be tried under a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 . [403 U.S. 528, 561] </s> In DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28, 33 , 35, MR. JUSTICE BLACK and I dissented from a refusal to grant a juvenile, who was charged with forgery, a jury trial merely because the case was tried before Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 , was decided. MR. JUSTICE BLACK, after noting that a juvenile being charged with a criminal act was entitled to certain constitutional safeguards, viz., notice of the issues, benefit of counsel, protection against compulsory self-incrimination, and confrontation of the witnesses against him, added: </s> "I can see no basis whatsoever in the language of the Constitution for allowing persons like appellant the benefit of those rights and yet denying them a jury trial, a right which is surely one of the fundamental aspects of criminal justice in the English-speaking world." 396 U.S., at 34 . </s> I added that by reason of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments the juvenile is entitled to a jury trial </s> "as a matter of right where the delinquency charged is an offense that, if the person were an adult, would be a crime triable by jury. Such is this case, for behind the facade of delinquency is the crime of forgery." Id., at 35. </s> Practical aspects of these problems are urged against allowing a jury trial in these cases. * They have been [403 U.S. 528, 562] answered by Judge De Ciantis of the Family Court of Providence, Rhode Island, in a case entitled In the Matter of McCloud, decided January 15, 1971. A juvenile was charged with the rape of a 17-year-old female and Judge De Ciantis granted a motion for a jury trial in an opinion, a part of which I have attached as an appendix to this dissent. He there concludes that "the real traumatic" experience of incarceration without due process is "the feeling of being deprived of basic rights." He adds: </s> "The child who feels that he has been dealt with fairly and not merely expediently or as speedily as possible will be a better prospect for rehabilitation. Many of the children who come before the court come from broken homes, from the ghettos; they often suffer from low self-esteem; and their behavior is frequently a symptom of their own feelings of inadequacy. Traumatic experiences of denial of basic rights only accentuate the past deprivation and contribute to the problem. Thus, a general societal attitude of acceptance of the juvenile as a person entitled to the same protection as an adult may be the true beginning of the rehabilitative process." [403 U.S. 528, 563] </s> Judge De Ciantis goes on to say that "[t]rial by jury will provide the child with a safeguard against being prejudged" by a judge who may well be prejudiced by reports already submitted to him by the police or case-workers in the case. Indeed the child, the same as the adult, is in the category of those described in the Magna Carta: </s> "No freeman may be . . . imprisoned . . . except by the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land." </s> These cases should be remanded for trial by jury on the criminal charges filed against these youngsters. </s> APPENDIX TO OPINION OF DOUGLAS, J., DISSENTING </s> De Ciantis, J.: The defendant, who will hereinafter be referred to as a juvenile, on the sixth day of September, 1969, was charged with Rape upon a female child, seventeen years old, in violation of Title 11, Chapter 37, Section 1, of the General Laws of 1956. </s> . . . . . </s> TRAUMA </s> The fact is that the procedures which are now followed in juvenile cases are far more traumatic than the potential experience of a jury trial. Who can say that a boy who is arrested and handcuffed, placed in a lineup, transported in vehicles designed to convey dangerous criminals, placed in the same kind of a cell as an adult, deprived of his freedom by lodging him in an institution where he is subject to be transferred to the state's prison and in the "hole" has not undergone a traumatic experience? </s> The experience of a trial with or without a jury is meant to be impressive and meaningful. The fact that a juvenile realizes that his case will be decided by twelve [403 U.S. 528, 564] objective citizens would allow the court to retain its meaningfulness without causing any more trauma than a trial before a judge who perhaps has heard other cases involving the same juvenile in the past and may be influenced by those prior contacts. To agree that a jury trial would expose a juvenile to a traumatic experience is to lose sight of the real traumatic experience of incarceration without due process. The real traumatic experience is the feeling of being deprived of basic rights. [In] In the matter of Reis, 1 this Court indicated the inadequacies of the procedure under which our court operates. A judge who receives facts of a case from the police and approves the filing of a petition based upon those facts may be placed in the untenable position of hearing a charge which he has approved. His duty is to adjudicate on the evidence introduced at the hearing and not be involved in any pre-adjudicatory investigation. </s> It is contrary to the fundamental principles of due process for the court to be compelled, as it is in this state, to act as a one-man grand jury, then sit in judgment on its own determination arising out of the facts and proceedings which he conducted. This responsibility belongs with a jury. </s> BACKLOG </s> An argument has been made that to allow jury trials would cause a great backlog of cases and, ultimately, would impair the functioning of the juvenile court. The fact however is that there is no meaningful evidence that granting the right to jury trials will impair the function of the court. Some states permit jury trials in all juvenile court cases; few juries have been demanded, and there is no suggestion from these courts that jury trials have impeded the system of juvenile justice. [403 U.S. 528, 565] </s> In Colorado, where jury trials have been permitted by statute, Judge Theodore Rubin of the Denver Juvenile Court has indicated that jury trials are an important safeguard and that they have not impaired the functioning of the Denver Juvenile Courts. For example, during the first seven months of 1970, the two divisions of the Denver Juvenile Court have had fewer than two dozen jury trials, in both delinquency and dependency-neglect cases. In Michigan, where juveniles are also entitled to a jury trial, Judge Lincoln of the Detroit Juvenile Court indicates that his court has had less than five jury trials in the year 1969 to 1970. </s> The recent Supreme Court decision of Williams vs Florida, [399 U.S. 78 (June 22, 1970), which held that the constitutional right to trial by jury in criminal cases does not require a twelve-member jury, could be implemented to facilitate the transition to jury trials. A jury of less than twelve members would be less cumbersome, less "formal," and less expensive than the regular twelve-member jury, and yet would provide the accused with objective fact-finders. </s> In fact the very argument of expediency, suggesting "supermarket" or "assembly-line" justice is one of the most forceful arguments in favor of granting jury trials. By granting the juvenile the right to a jury trial, we would, in fact, be protecting the accused from the judge who is under pressure to move the cases, the judge with too many cases and not enough time. It will provide a safeguard against the judge who may be prejudiced against a minority group or who may be prejudiced against the juvenile brought before him because of some past occurrence which was heard by the same judge. </s> There have been criticisms that juvenile court judges, because of their hearing caseload, do not carefully weigh the evidence in the adjudicatory phase of the proceedings. [403 U.S. 528, 566] It is during this phase that the judge must determine whether in fact the evidence has been established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed the acts alleged in the petition. Regardless of the merit of these criticisms, they have impaired the belief of the juveniles, of the bar and of the public as to the opportunity for justice in the juvenile court. Granting the juvenile the right to demand that the facts be determined by a jury will strengthen the faith of all concerned parties in the juvenile system. </s> . . . . . </s> It is important to note, at this time, a definite side benefit of granting jury trials, i. e., an aid to rehabilitation. The child who feels that he has been dealt with fairly and not merely expediently or as speedily as possible will be a better prospect for rehabilitation. Many of the children who come before the court come from broken homes, from the ghettos; they often suffer from low self-esteem; and their behavior is frequently a symptom of their own feelings of inadequacy. Traumatic experiences of denial of basic rights only accentuate the past deprivation and contribute to the problem. Thus, a general societal attitude of acceptance of the juvenile as a person entitled to the same protection as an adult may be the true beginning of the rehabilitative process. </s> PUBLIC TRIAL </s> Public trial in the judgment of this Court does not affect the juvenile court philosophy. </s> [In] In re Oliver 2 Mr. Justice Black reviews the history of the public trial. Its origins are obscure, but it seems to have evolved along with the jury trial guarantee in English common law and was then adopted as a provision [403 U.S. 528, 567] of the Federal Constitution as well as by most state constitutions. Among the benefits of a public trial are the following: </s> 1. "Public trials come to the attention of key witnesses unknown to the parties. These witnesses may then voluntarily come forward and give important testimony." </s> 2. "The spectators learn about their government and acquire confidence in their judicial remedies." </s> 3. "The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the [forum] of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power." (P. 270.) </s> Justice Black has nothing to say on the question of whether a public trial acts as a deterrent to crime, but it is clear that he believes publicity to improve the quality of criminal justice, both theoretically and practically. </s> As for the juvenile trial issue, he writes: </s> "Whatever may be the classification of juvenile court proceedings, they are often conducted without admitting all the public. But it has never been the practice to wholly exclude parents, relatives, and friends, or to refuse juveniles the benefit of counsel." (P. 266.) </s> In fact, the juvenile proceedings as presently conducted are far from secret. Witnesses for the prosecution and for the defense, social workers, court reporters, students, police trainees, probation counselors, and sheriffs are present in the courtroom. Police, the Armed Forces, the Federal Bureau of Investigation obtain information and have access to the police files. There seems no more reason to believe that a jury trial would destroy confidentiality than would witnesses summoned to testify. [403 U.S. 528, 568] </s> The Court also notes the report of the PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION O[N] LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 75 (1967), wherein it is stated: </s> "A juvenile's adjudication record is required by the law of most jurisdictions to be private and confidential; in practice the confidentiality of those reports is often violated." Furthermore, "[s]tatutory restrictions almost invariably apply only to court records, and even as to those the evidence is that many courts routinely furnish information to the FBI and the military, and on request to government agencies and even to private employers." </s> JUDGE'S EXPERTISE </s> The Court is also aware of the argument that the juvenile court was created to develop judges who were experts in sifting out the real problems behind a juvenile's breaking the law; therefore, to place the child's fate in the hands of a jury would defeat that purpose. This will, however, continue to leave the final decision of disposition solely with the judge. The role of the jury will be only to ascertain whether the facts, which give the court jurisdiction, have been established beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury will not be concerned with social and psychological factors. These factors, along with prior record, family and educational background, will be considered by the judge during the dispositional phase. </s> Taking into consideration the social background and other facts, the judge, during the dispositional phase, will determine what disposition is in the best interests of the child and society. It is at this stage that a judge's expertise is most important, and the granting of a jury trial [403 U.S. 528, 569] will not prevent the judge from carrying out the basic philosophy of the juvenile court. </s> Trial by jury will provide the child with a safeguard against being prejudged. The jury clearly will have no business in learning of the social report or any of the other extraneous matter unless properly introduced under the rules of evidence. Due process demands that the trier of facts should not be acquainted with any of the facts of the case or have knowledge of any of the circumstances, whether through officials in his own department or records in his possession. If the accused believes that the judge has read an account of the facts submitted by the police or any other report prior to the adjudicatory hearing and that this may prove prejudicial, he can demand a jury and insure against such knowledge on the part of the trier of the facts. </s> WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL </s> Counsel also questions whether a child can waive his right to a jury trial or, in fact, whether a parent or counsel may waive. </s> When the waiver comes up for hearing, the Court could, at its discretion, either grant or refuse the juvenile's waiver of a jury trial, and/or appoint a guardian or legal counsel to advise the child. </s> My experience has shown that the greatest percentage of juveniles who appear before the court in felony cases have lived appalling lives due to parental neglect and brutality, lack of normal living conditions, and poverty. This has produced in them a maturity which is normally acquired much later in life. They are generally well aware of their rights in a court of law. However, in those cases where a child clearly needs guidance, the court-appointed guardian or attorney could explain to him the implications of a waiver. The juvenile's rights and interests would thus be protected every bit as stringently [403 U.S. 528, 570] as they are today before he is allowed to plead guilty or not guilty to a complaint. A guilty plea is, after all, a waiver of the right to trial altogether. </s> Counsel is placed with the responsibility of explaining to the juvenile the significance of guilty and nolo contendere pleas, of instructing the juvenile on the prerogative to take the witness stand, and is expected to advise his client in the same manner as he would an adult about to stand trial. And now counsel suggests to the Court that counsel is not capable of explaining and waiving the right to a jury trial. The Court fails to see the distinction between this waiver and the absolute waiver, to wit, a guilty plea. Counsel should act in the best interest of his client, even if this may be in conflict with the parents. On a number of occasions this Court has appointed counsel for a juvenile whose parents could not afford to retain private counsel, and where the parents' interests were in conflict with those of the child. This procedure will be continued and the Court will continue to rely on the good judgment of the bar. </s> The Court could easily require that a waiver of a jury trial be made in person by the juvenile in writing, in open court, with the consent and approval of the Court and the attorney representing both the juvenile and the state. The judge could ascertain as to whether the juvenile can intelligently waive his right and, if necessary, appoint counsel to advise the youth as to the implications connected with the waiver. This could be accomplished without any difficulty through means presently available to the Court. </s> JURY OF PEERS </s> One of the most interesting questions raised is that concerning the right of a juvenile to a trial by his peers. Counsel has suggested that a jury of a juvenile's peers [403 U.S. 528, 571] would be composed of other juveniles, that is, a "teenage jury." Webster's Dictionary, Second Edition, 1966, defines a peer as an equal, one of the same rank, quality, value. The word "peers" means nothing more than citizens, In re Grilli, 179 N. Y. S. 795, 797. The phrase "judgment of his peers" means at common law, a trial by a jury of twelve men, State vs Simons, 61 Kan. 752. "Judgment of his peers" is a term expressly borrowed from the Magna Charta, and it means a trial by jury, Ex parte Wagner, 58 Okl. Cr. 161. The Declaration of Independence also speaks of the equality of all men. Are we now to say that a juvenile is a second-class citizen, not equal to an adult? The Constitution has never been construed to say women must be tried by their peers, to wit, by all-female juries, or Negroes by all-Negro juries. </s> The only restriction on the makeup of the jury is that there can be no systematic exclusion of those who meet local and federal requirements, in particular, voting qualifications. </s> The Court notes that presently in some states 18-year-olds can vote. Presumably, if they can vote, they may also serve on juries. Our own legislature has given first passage to an amendment to the Constitution to permit 18-year-olds to vote. Thus, it is quite possible that we will have teenage jurors sitting in judgment of their so-called "peers." </s> CRIMINAL PROCEEDING </s> The argument that the adjudication of delinquency is not the equivalent of criminal process is spurious. This Court has discussed the futility of making distinctions on the basis of labels in prior decisions. Because the legislature dictates that a child who commits a felony shall be called a delinquent does not change the nature of the crime. Murder is murder; robbery is robbery - they are [403 U.S. 528, 572] both criminal offenses, not civil, regardless and independent of the age of the doer. </s> . . . . . </s> It is noteworthy that in our statute there is not an express statutory provision indicating that the proceedings are civil. Trial by jury in Rhode Island is guaranteed to all persons, whether in criminal cases or in civil cases. That right existed prior to the adoption of the Constitution; and certainly whether one is involved in a civil or criminal proceeding of the Family Court in which his "liberty" is to be "taken" "imprisoned" "outlawed" and "banished" he is entitled to a trial by jury. (Henry vs Cherry & Webb, 30 R. I. 13, at 30). </s> This Court believes that although the juvenile court was initially created as a social experiment, it has not ceased to be part of the judicial system. In view of the potential loss of liberty at stake in the proceeding, this Court is compelled to accord due process to all the litigants who come before it; and, therefore, all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, including trial by jury, must prevail. </s> The Court concludes that the framers of our Constitution never intended to place the power in any one man or official, and take away the "protection of the law from the rights of an individual." It meant "to secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and posterity." The Constitution was written with the philosophy based upon a composite of all of the most liberal ideas which came down through the centuries; The Magna Charta, the Petition of Rights, the Bill of Rights and the Rules of Common Law; and the keystone is the preservation of individual liberty. All these ideas were carefully inserted in our Constitution. </s> The juvenile is constitutionally entitled to a jury trial. </s> [Footnote * The Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia and the Neighborhood Legal Services Program of Washington, D.C., have filed a brief amicus in which the results of a survey of jury trials in delinquency cases in the 10 States requiring jury trials plus the District of Columbia are set forth. The cities selected were mostly large metropolitan areas. Thirty juvenile courts processing about 75,000 juvenile cases a year were canvassed: </s> "[W]e discovered that during the past five and a half years, in 22 out of 26 courts surveyed, cumulative requests for jury trials totaled 15 or less. In the remaining five courts in our sample, statistics were unavailable. During the same period, in 26 out of 29 [403 U.S. 528, 562] courts the cumulative number of jury trials actually held numbered 15 or less, with statistics unavailable for two courts in our sample. For example, in Tulsa, Oklahoma, counsel is present in 100% of delinquency cases, but only one jury trial has been requested and held during the past five and one-half years. In the Juvenile Court of Fort Worth, Texas, counsel is also present in 100% of the cases, and only two jury trials have been requested since 1967. The Juvenile Court in Detroit, Michigan, reports that counsel is appointed in 70-80% of its delinquency cases, but thus far in 1970, it has had only four requests for a jury. Between 1965 and 1969 requests for juries were reported as `very few.' </s> "In only four juvenile courts in our sample has there clearly been a total during the past five and one-half years of more than 15 jury trial requests and/or more than 15 such trials held." </s> The four courts showing more than 15 requests for jury trials were Denver, Houston, Milwaukee, and Washington, D.C. </s> [Footnote 1 Reis, 7 CrL 2151 (1970). </s> [Footnote 2 333 U.S. 257 . </s> [403 U.S. 528, 573]

United States Supreme Court MURPHY v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.(1999) No. 97-1992 Argued: April 27, 1999Decided: June 22, 1999 </s> Respondent United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), hired petitioner as a mechanic, a position that required him to drive commercial vehicles. To drive, he had to satisfy certain Department of Transportation (DOT) health certification requirements, including having "no current clinical diagnosis of high blood pressure likely to interfere with his/her ability to operate a commercial vehicle safely." 49 CFR §391.41(b)(6). Despite petitioner's high blood pressure, he was erroneously granted certification and commenced work. After the error was discovered, respondent fired him on the belief that his blood pressure exceeded the DOT's requirements. Petitioner brought suit under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), the District Court granted respondent summary judgment, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Citing its decision in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F. 3d 893, 902, aff'd, ante, p. ___, that an individual claiming a disability under the ADA should be assessed with regard to any mitigating or corrective measures employed, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner's hypertension is not a disability because his doctor testified that when medicated, petitioner functions normally in everyday activities. The court also affirmed the District Court's determi-nation that petitioner is not "regarded as" disabled under the ADA, explaining that respondent did not terminate him on an unsubstantiated fear that he would suffer a heart attack or stroke, but because his blood pressure exceeded the DOT's requirements for commercial vehicle drivers. </s> Held: </s> 1. Under the ADA, the determination whether petitioner's impairment "substantially limits" one or more major life activities is made with reference to the mitigating measures he employs. Sutton, ante, p. ___. The Tenth Circuit concluded that, when medicated, petitioner's high blood pressure does not substantially limit him in any major life activity. Because the question whether petitioner is disabled when taking medication is not before this Court, there is no occasion here to consider whether he is "disabled" due to limitations that persist despite his medication or the negative side effects of his medication. P. 4. </s> 2. Petitioner is not "regarded as" disabled because of his high blood pressure. Under Sutton, ante , at ___, a person is "regarded as" disabled within the ADA's meaning if, among other things, a covered entity mistakenly believes that the person's actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. Here, respondent argues that it does not regard petitioner as substantially limited in the major life activity of working, but, rather, regards him as unqualified to work as a UPS mechanic because he is unable to obtain DOT health certification. When referring to the major life activity of working, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) defines "substantially limits" as "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities." 29 CFR §1630(j)(3)(i). Thus, one must be regarded as precluded from more than a particular job. Assuming without deciding that the EEOC regulations are valid, the Court concludes that the evidence that petitioner is regarded as unable to meet the DOT regulations is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he is regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs utilizing his skills. At most, petitioner has shown that he is regarded as unable to perform the job of mechanic only when that job requires driving a commercial motor vehicle--a specific type of vehicle used on a highway in interstate commerce. He has put forward no evidence that he is regarded as unable to perform any mechanic job that does not call for driving a commercial motor vehicle and thus does not require DOT certification. Indeed, it is undisputed that he is generally employable as a mechanic, and there is uncontroverted evidence that he could perform a number of mechanic jobs. Consequently, petitioner has failed to show that he is regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs. Rather, the undisputed record evidence demonstrates that petitioner is, at most, regarded as unable to perform only a particular job. This is insufficient, as a matter of law, to prove that petitioner is regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working. Pp. 4-8. </s> 141 F. 3d 1185, affirmed. </s> O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer, J., joined. </s> VAUGHN L. MURPHY, PETITIONER v. </s> UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC. </s> on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the tenth circuit </s> [June 22, 1999] </s> Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Respondent United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), dismissed petitioner Vaughn L. Murphy from his job as a UPS mechanic because of his high blood pressure. Petitioner filed suit under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act), 104 Stat. 328, 42 U.S.C. §12101 et seq ., in Federal District Court. The District Court granted summary judgment to respondent, and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. We must decide whether the Court of Appeals correctly considered petitioner in his medicated state when it held that petitioner's impairment does not "substantially limi[t]" one or more of his major life activities and whether it correctly determined that petitioner is not "regarded as disabled." See §12102(2). In light of our decision in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. , ante , p. ____, we conclude that the Court of Appeals' resolution of both issues was correct. </s> I </s> Petitioner was first diagnosed with hypertension (high blood pressure) when he was 10 years old. Unmedicated, his blood pressure is approximately 250/160. With medication, however, petitioner's "hypertension does not significantly restrict his activities and . . . in general he can function normally and can engage in activities that other persons normally do." 946 F.Supp. 872, 875 (Kan. 1996) (discussing testimony of petitioner's physician). </s> In August 1994, respondent hired petitioner as a mechanic, a position that required petitioner to drive commercial motor vehicles. Petitioner does not challenge the District Court's conclusion that driving a commercial motor vehicle is an essential function of the mechanic's job at UPS. 946 F.Supp., at 882-883. To drive such vehicles, however, petitioner had to satisfy certain health requirements imposed by the Department of Transportation (DOT). 49 CFR §391.41(a) (1998) ("A person shall not drive a commercial motor vehicle unless he/she is physically qualified to do so and . . . has on his/her person . . . a medical examiner's certificate that he/she is physically qualified to drive a commercial motor vehicle"). One such requirement is that the driver of a commercial motor vehicle in interstate commerce have "no current clinical diagnosis of high blood pressure likely to interfere with his/her ability to operate a commercial vehicle safely." §391.41(b)(6). </s> At the time respondent hired him, petitioner's blood pressure was so high, measuring at 186/124, that he was not qualified for DOT health certification, see App. 98a-102a (Department of Transportation, Medical Regulatory Criteria for Evaluation Under Section 391.41(b)(6), attached as exhibit to Affidavit and Testimony of John R. McMahon) (hereinafter Medical Regulatory Criteria). Nonetheless, petitioner was erroneously granted certification, and he commenced work. In September 1994, a UPS Medical Supervisor who was reviewing petitioner's medical files discovered the error and requested that petitioner have his blood pressure retested. Upon retesting, petitioner's blood pressure was measured at 160/102 and 164/104. See App. 48a (testimony of Vaughn Murphy). On October 5, 1994, respondent fired petitioner on the belief that his blood pressure exceeded the DOT's requirements for drivers of commercial motor vehicles. </s> Petitioner brought suit under Title I of the ADA in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. The court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment. It held that, to determine whether petitioner is disabled under the ADA, his "impairment should be evaluated in its medicated state." 946 F.Supp., at 881. Noting that when petitioner is medicated he is inhibited only in lifting heavy objects but otherwise functions normally, the court held that petitioner is not "disabled" under the ADA. Id., at 881-882. The court also rejected petitioner's claim that he was "regarded as" disabled, holding that respondent "did not regard Murphy as disabled, only that he was not certifiable under DOT regulations." Id ., at 882. </s> The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment. 141 F.3d 1185 (CA10 1999) (judgt. order). Citing its decision in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc ., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (CA10 1997), aff'd, ___ U.S. ___ (1999), that an individual claiming a disability under the ADA should be assessed with regard to any mitigating or corrective measures employed, the court held that petitioner's hypertension is not a disability because his doctor had testified that when petitioner is medicated, he "`functions normally doing everyday activity that an everyday person does.'" App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a. The court also affirmed the District Court's determination that petitioner is not "regarded as" disabled under the ADA. It explained that respondent did not terminate petitioner "on an unsubstantiated fear that he would suffer a heart attack or stroke," but "because his blood pressure exceeded the DOT's requirements for drivers of commercial vehicles." Id., at 5a. We granted certiorari, 525 U.S. ____ (1999), and we now affirm. </s> II </s> The first question presented in this case is whether the determination of petitioner's disability is made with reference to the mitigating measures he employs. We have answered that question in Sutton in the affirmative. Given that holding, the result in this case is clear. The Court of Appeals concluded that, when medicated, petitioner's high blood pressure does not substantially limit him in any major life activity. Petitioner did not seek, and we did not grant, certiorari on whether this conclusion was correct. Because the question whether petitioner is disabled when taking medication is not before us, we have no occasion here to consider whether petitioner is "disabled" due to limitations that persist despite his medication or the negative side effects of his medication. Instead, the question granted was limited to whether, under the ADA, the determination of whether an individual's impairment "substantially limits" one or more major life activities should be made without consideration of mitigating measures. Consequently, we conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the grant of summary judgment in respondent's favor on the claim that petitioner is substantially limited in one or more major life activities and thus disabled under the ADA. </s> III </s> The second issue presented is also largely resolved by our opinion in Sutton . Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that he is not "regarded as" disabled because of his high blood pressure. As we held in Sutton , ante , p. 15, a person is "regarded as" disabled within the meaning of the ADA if a covered entity mistakenly believes that the person's actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. Here, petitioner alleges that his hypertension is regarded as substantially limiting him in the major life activity of working, when in fact it does not. To support this claim, he points to testimony from respondent's resource manager that respondent fired petitioner due to his hypertension, which he claims evidences respondent's belief that petitioner's hypertension--and consequent inability to obtain DOT certification--substantially limits his ability to work. In response, respondent argues that it does not regard petitioner as substantially limited in the major life activity of working but, rather, regards him as unqualified to work as a UPS mechanic because he is unable to obtain DOT health certification. </s> As a preliminary matter, we note that there remains some dispute as to whether petitioner meets the requirements for DOT certification. As discussed above, petitioner was incorrectly granted DOT certification at his first examination when he should have instead been found unqualified. See supra , at 2. Upon retesting, although petitioner's blood pressure was not low enough to qualify him for the one-year certification that he had incorrectly been issued, it was sufficient to qualify him for optional temporary DOT health certification. App. 98a-102a (Medical Regulatory Criteria). Had a physician examined petitioner and, in light of his medical history, declined to issue a temporary DOT certification, we would not second-guess that decision. Here, however, it appears that UPS determined that petitioner could not meet the DOT standards and did not allow him to attempt to obtain the optional temporary certification. Id., at 84a-86a (testimony of Monica Sloan, UPS's company nurse); id., at 54a-55a (testimony and affidavit of Vaughn Murphy). We need not resolve the question of whether petitioner could meet the standards for DOT health certification, however, as it goes only to whether petitioner is qualified and whether respondent has a defense based on the DOT regulations, see Albertsons v. Kirkingburg , post , p. ____--issues not addressed by the court below or raised in the petition for certiorari. </s> The only issue remaining is whether the evidence that petitioner is regarded as unable to obtain DOT certification (regardless of whether he can, in fact, obtain optional temporary certification) is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether petitioner is regarded as substantially limited in one or more major life activities. As in Sutton, ante, at 18-19, we assume, arguendo , that the EEOC regulations regarding the disability determination are valid. When referring to the major life activity of working, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) defines "substantially limits" as: "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities." 29 CFR §1630(j)(3)(i) (1998). The EEOC further identifies several factors that courts should consider when determining whether an individual is substantially limited in the major life activity of working, including "the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within [the] geographical area [reasonably accessible to the individual], from which the individual is also disqualified." §1630(j)(3)(ii)(B). Thus, to be regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working, one must be regarded as precluded from more than a particular job. See §1630(j)(3)(i) ("The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working"). </s> Again, assuming without deciding that these regulations are valid, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he is regarded as disabled. Petitioner was fired from the position of UPS mechanic because he has a physical impairment--hypertension--that is regarded as preventing him from obtaining DOT health certification. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a (UPS terminated Murphy because "his blood pressure exceeded the DOT's requirements for drivers of commercial vehicles"); 946 F.Supp., at 882 ("[T]he court concludes UPS did not regard Murphy as disabled, only that he was not certifiable under DOT regulations"); App. 125a, ¶ ;18 (Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment) ("UPS considers driving commercial motor vehicles an essential function of plaintiff's job as mechanic"); App. 103a (testimony of John R. McMahon) (stating that the reason why petitioner was fired was that he "did not meet the requirements of the Department of Transportation"). </s> The evidence that petitioner is regarded as unable to meet the DOT regulations is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether petitioner is regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs utilizing his skills. At most, petitioner has shown that he is regarded as unable to perform the job of mechanic only when that job requires driving a commercial motor vehicle--a specific type of vehicle used on a highway in interstate commerce. 49 CFR §390.5 (defining "commercial motor vehicle" as a vehicle weighing over 10,000 pounds, designed to carry 16 or more passengers, or used in the transportation of hazardous materials). Petitioner has put forward no evidence that he is regarded as unable to perform any mechanic job that does not call for driving a commercial motor vehicle and thus does not require DOT certification. Indeed, it is undisputed that petitioner is generally employable as a mechanic. Petitioner has "performed mechanic jobs that did not require DOT certification" for "over 22 years," and he secured another job as a mechanic shortly after leaving UPS. 946 F.Supp., at 875, 876. Moreover, respondent presented uncontroverted evidence that petitioner could perform jobs such as diesel mechanic, automotive mechanic, gas-engine repairer, and gas-welding equipment mechanic, all of which utilize petitioner's mechanical skills. See App. 115a (report of Lewis Vierling). </s> Consequently, in light of petitioner's skills and the array of jobs available to petitioner utilizing those skills, petitioner has failed to show that he is regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs. Rather, the undisputed record evidence demonstrates that petitioner is, at most, regarded as unable to perform only a particular job. This is insufficient, as a matter of law, to prove that petitioner is regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working. See Sutton, ante, at 19-20. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly granted summary judgment in favor of respondent on petitioner's claim that he is regarded as disabled. For the reasons stated, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. </s> It is so ordered. </s> VAUGHN L. MURPHY, PETITIONER v. </s> UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC. </s> on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the tenth circuit </s> [June 22, 1999] </s> Justice Stevens , with whom Justice Breyer joins, dissenting. </s> For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., ante, p.___, I respectfully dissent. I believe that petitioner has a "disability" within the meaning of the ADA because, assuming petitioner's uncontested evidence to be true, his very severe hypertension--in its unmedicated state--"substantially limits" his ability to perform several major life activities. Without medication, petitioner would likely be hospitalized. See App. 81. Indeed, unlike Sutton, this case scarcely requires us to speculate whether Congress intended the Act to cover individuals with this impairment. Severe hypertension, in my view, easily falls within the ADA's nucleus of covered impairments. See Sutton, ante, at 3-9 ( Stevens, J., dissenting). </s> Because the Court of Appeals did not address whether petitioner was qualified or whether he could perform the essential job functions, App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a, I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.

United States Supreme Court NEW YORK v. UNITED STATES(1992) No. 91-543 Argued: March 30, 1992Decided: June 19, 1992 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 91-558, County of Allegany, New York v. United States et al., and No. 91-563, County of Cortland, New York v. United States et al., also on certiorari to the same court. </s> Faced with a looming shortage of disposal sites for low level radioactive waste in 31 States, Congress enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, which, among other things, imposes upon States, either alone or in "regional compacts" with other States, the obligation to provide for the disposal of waste generated within their borders, and contains three provisions setting forth "incentives" to States to comply with that obligation. The first set of incentives - the monetary incentives - works in three steps: (1) States with disposal sites are authorized to impose a surcharge on radioactive waste received from other States; (2) the Secretary of Energy collects a portion of this surcharge and places it in an escrow account; and (3) States achieving a series of milestones in developing sites receive portions of this fund. The second set of incentives - the access incentives - authorizes sited States and regional compacts gradually to increase the cost of access to their sites, and then to deny access altogether, to waste generated in States that do not meet federal deadlines. The so-called third "incentive" - the take-title provision - specifies that a State or regional compact that fails to provide for the disposal of all internally generated waste by a particular date must, upon the request of the waste's generator or owner, take title to and possession of the waste and become liable for all damages suffered by the generator or owner as a result of the State's failure to promptly take possession. Petitioners, New York State and two of its counties, filed this suit against the United States, seeking a declaratory judgment that, inter alia, the three incentives provisions are inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment - which declares that "powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States" - and with the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, 4 - which directs the United States to "guarantee to every State . . . a Republican Form of Government." The District Court dismissed the complaint, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. [505 U.S. 144, 145] </s> Held: </s> 1. The Act's monetary incentives and access incentives provisions are consistent with the Constitution's allocation of power between the Federal and State Governments, but the take-title provision is not. Pp. 155-183. </s> (a) In ascertaining whether any of the challenged provisions oversteps the boundary between federal and state power, the Court must determine whether it is authorized by the affirmative grants to Congress contained in Article I's Commerce and Spending Clauses or whether it invades the province of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment. Pp. 155-159. </s> (b) Although regulation of the interstate market in the disposal of low level radioactive waste is well within Congress' Commerce Clause authority, cf. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621 -623, and Congress could, if it wished, pre-empt entirely state regulation in this area, a review of this Court's decisions, see, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 , and the history of the Constitutional Convention, demonstrates that Congress may not commandeer the States' legislative processes by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program, but must exercise legislative authority directly upon individuals. Pp. 159-166. </s> (c) Nevertheless, there are a variety of methods, short of outright coercion, by which Congress may urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests. As relevant here, Congress may, under its spending power, attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds, so long as such conditions meet four requirements. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 -208, and n. 3. Moreover, where Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, it may, as part of a program of "cooperative federalism," offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation. See, e.g., Hodel, supra, 452 U.S. at 288, 289. Pp. 166-169. </s> (d) This Court declines petitioners' invitation to construe the Act's provision obligating the States to dispose of their radioactive wastes as a separate mandate to regulate according to Congress' instructions. That would upset the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers, whereas the constitutional problem is avoided by construing the Act as a whole to comprise three sets of incentives to the States. Pp. 169-170. </s> (e) The Act's monetary incentives are well within Congress' Commerce and Spending Clause authority, and thus are not inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment. The authorization to sited States to impose surcharges is an unexceptionable exercise of Congress' power to enable [505 U.S. 144, 146] the States to burden interstate commerce. The Secretary's collection of a percentage of the surcharge is no more than a federal tax on interstate commerce, which petitioners do not claim to be an invalid exercise of either Congress' commerce or taxing power. Finally, in conditioning the States' receipt of federal funds upon their achieving specified milestones, Congress has not exceeded its Spending Clause authority in any of the four respects identified by this Court in Dole, supra, at 207-208. Petitioners' objection to the form of the expenditures as nonfederal is unavailing, since the Spending Clause has never been construed to deprive Congress of the power to collect money in a segregated trust fund and spend it for a particular purpose, and since the States' ability largely to control whether they will pay into the escrow account or receive a share was expressly provided by Congress as a method of encouraging them to regulate according to the federal plan. Pp. 171-173. </s> (f) The Act's access incentives constitute a conditional exercise of Congress' commerce power along the lines of that approved in Hodel, supra, at 288, and thus do not intrude on the States' Tenth Amendment sovereignty. These incentives present nonsited States with the choice either of regulating waste disposal according to federal standards or having their waste-producing residents denied access to disposal sites. They are not compelled to regulate, expend any funds, or participate in any federal program, and they may continue to regulate waste in their own way if they do not accede to federal direction. Pp. 173-174. </s> (g) Because the Act's take-title provision offers the States a "choice" between the two unconstitutionally coercive alternatives - either accepting ownership of waste or regulating according to Congress' instructions - the provision lies outside Congress' enumerated powers, and is inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment. On the one hand, either forcing the transfer of waste from generators to the States or requiring the States to become liable for the generators' damages would "commandeer" States into the service of federal regulatory purposes. On the other hand, requiring the States to regulate pursuant to Congress' direction would present a simple unconstitutional command to implement legislation enacted by Congress. Thus, the States' "choice" is no choice at all. Pp. 174-177. </s> (h) The United States' alternative arguments purporting to find limited circumstances in which congressional compulsion of state regulation is constitutionally permissible - that such compulsion is justified where the federal interest is sufficiently important; that the Constitution does, in some circumstances, permit federal directives to state governments; and that the Constitution endows Congress with the power [505 U.S. 144, 147] to arbitrate disputes between States in interstate commerce - are rejected. Pp. 177-180. </s> (i) Also rejected is the sited state respondents' argument that the Act cannot be ruled an unconstitutional infringement of New York sovereignty because officials of that State lent their support, and consented, to the Act's passage. A departure from the Constitution's plan for the intergovernmental allocation of authority cannot be ratified by the "consent" of state officials, since the Constitution protects state sovereignty for the benefit of individuals, not States or their governments, and since the officials' interests may not coincide with the Constitution's allocation. Nor does New York's prior support estop it from asserting the Act's unconstitutionality. Pp. 180-183. </s> (j) Even assuming that the Guarantee Clause provides a basis upon which a State or its subdivisions may sue to enjoin the enforcement of a federal statute, petitioners have not made out a claim that the Act's money incentives and access incentives provisions are inconsistent with that Clause. Neither the threat of loss of federal funds nor the possibility that the State's waste producers may find themselves excluded from other States' disposal sites can reasonably be said to deny New York a republican form of government. Pp. 183-186. </s> 2. The take-title provision is severable from the rest of the Act, since severance will not prevent the operation of the rest of the Act or defeat its purpose of encouraging the States to attain local or regional self-sufficiency in low level radioactive waste disposal; since the Act still includes two incentives to encourage States along this road; since a State whose waste generators are unable to gain access to out-of-state disposal sites may encounter considerable internal pressure to provide for disposal, even without the prospect of taking title; and since any burden caused by New York's failure to secure a site will not be borne by other States' residents because the sited regional compacts need not accept New York's waste after the final transition period. Pp. 186-187. </s> 942 F.2d 114 (CA5 1991), affirmed in part and reversed in part. </s> O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and THOMAS, JJ., joined, and in Parts III-A and III-B of which WHITE, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which BLACKMUN and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 188. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 210. [505 U.S. 144, 148] </s> Peter H. Schiff, Deputy Solicitor General of New York, argued the cause for petitioners in all cases. With him on the briefs for petitioner in No. 91-543 were Robert Abrams, Attorney General, Jerry Boone, Solicitor General, and John McConnell, Assistant Attorney General. Edward F. Premo II filed briefs for petitioner in No. 91-558. Michael B. Gerrard, Deborah Goldberg, and Patrick M. Snyder filed briefs for petitioner in No. 91- 563. </s> Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the federal respondents in all cases. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Acting Assistant Attorney General Hartman, Ronald J. Mann, Anne S. Almy, Louise F. Milkman, and Jeffrey P. Kehne. William B. Collins, Senior Assistant Attorney General of Washington, argued the cause for the state respondents in Nos. 91-543 and 91-563. On the brief were Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Attorney General of Washington, T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina, and James Patrick Hudson, Deputy Attorney General, Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, and Allen T. Miller, Jr., Assistant Attorney General. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal filed for the State of Ohio et al. by Lee Fisher, Attorney General of Ohio, and James O. Payne, Jr., Mary Kay Smith, and Patricia A. Delaney, Assistant Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Grant Woods of Arizona, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Daniel E. Lungren of California, Elizabeth Barrett-Anderson of Guam, Roland W. Burris of Illinois, Linley E. Pearson of Indiana, Chris Gorman of Kentucky, Michael E. Carpenter of Maine, Scott Harshbarger of Massachusetts, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Robert J. Del Tufo of Mew Jersey, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., of Pennsylvania, James E. O'Neil of Rhode Island, Mark W. Barnett of South Dakota, Dan Morales of Texas, Mario Palumbo of West Virginia, and James E. Doyle of Wisconsin; and for the Council of State Government by Stewart Abercrombie Baker. </s> Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American College of Nuclear Physicians et al. by Harold F. Reis; for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Robert M. Weinberg, David Silberman, and Laurence Gold; and for the Rocky [505 U.S. 144, 149] Mountain Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact et al. by Rex E. Lee, Carter G. Phillips, Richard D. Berstein, and David K. Rees. </s> Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the State of Connecticut by Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, and Aaron S. Bayer, Deputy Attorney General; for the State of Michigan by Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Gay Secor Hardy, Solicitor General and Thomas L. Casey, A. Michael Leffler, and John C. Scherbarth, Assistant Attorneys General; and for US Ecology, Inc., by Irwin Goldbloom. [505 U.S. 144, 149] </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case implicates one of our Nation's newest problems of public policy, and perhaps our oldest question of constitutional law. The public policy issue involves the disposal of radioactive waste: in this case, we address the constitutionality of three provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub.L. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842, 42 U.S.C. 2021b et seq. The constitutional question is as old as the Constitution: it consists of discerning the proper division of authority between the Federal Government and the States. We conclude that, while Congress has substantial power under the Constitution to encourage the States to provide for the disposal of the radioactive waste generated within their borders, the Constitution does not confer upon Congress the ability simply to compel the States to do so. We therefore find that only two of the Act's three provisions at issue are consistent with the Constitution's allocation of power to the Federal Government. </s> I </s> We live in a world full of low level radioactive waste. Radioactive material is present in luminous watch dials, smoke alarms, measurement devices, medical fluids, research materials, and the protective gear and construction materials used by workers at nuclear power plants. Low level radioactive waste is generated by the Government, by hospitals, by research institutions, and by various industries. The waste must be isolated from humans for long periods of time, [505 U.S. 144, 150] often for hundreds of years. Millions of cubic feet of low level radioactive waste must be disposed of each year. See App. 110a-111a; Berkovitz, Waste Wars: Did Congress "Nuke" State Sovereignty in the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985?, 11 Harv. Envtl.L.Rev. 437, 439-440 (1987). </s> Our Nation's first site for the land disposal of commercial low level radioactive waste opened in 1962 in Beatty, Nevada. Five more sites opened in the following decade: Maxey Flats, Kentucky (1963), West Valley, New York (1963), Hanford, Washington (1965), Sheffield, Illinois (1967), and Barnwell, South Carolina (1971). Between 1975 and 1978, the Illinois site closed because it was full, and water management problems caused the closure of the sites in Kentucky and New York. As a result, since 1979, only three disposal sites - those in Nevada, Washington, and South Carolina - have been in operation. Waste generated in the rest of the country must be shipped to one of these three sites for disposal. See Low-Level Radioactive Waste Regulation 39-40 (M. Burns ed. 1988). </s> In 1979, both the Washington and Nevada sites were forced to shut down temporarily, leaving South Carolina to shoulder the responsibility of storing low level radioactive waste produced in every part of the country. The Governor of South Carolina, understandably perturbed, ordered a 50% reduction in the quantity of waste accepted at the Barnwell site. The Governors of Washington and Nevada announced plans to shut their sites permanently. App. 142a, 152a. </s> Faced with the possibility that the Nation would be left with no disposal sites for low level radioactive waste, Congress responded by enacting the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, Pub.L. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347. Relying largely on a report submitted by the National Governors' Association, see App. 105a-141a, Congress declared a federal policy of holding each State "responsible for providing for the availability of capacity either within or outside the State [505 U.S. 144, 151] for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated within its borders," and found that such waste could be disposed of "most safely and efficiently . . . on a regional basis." 4(a)(1), 94 Stat. 3348. The 1980 Act authorized States to enter into regional compacts that, once ratified by Congress, would have the authority, beginning in 1986, to restrict the use of their disposal facilities to waste generated within member States. 4(a)(2)(B), 94 Stat. 3348. The 1980 Act included no penalties for States that failed to participate in this plan. </s> By 1985, only three approved regional compacts had operational disposal facilities; not surprisingly, these were the compacts formed around South Carolina, Nevada, and Washington, the three sited States. The following year, the 1980 Act would have given these three compacts the ability to exclude waste from nonmembers, and the remaining 31 States would have had no assured outlet for their low level radioactive waste. With this prospect looming, Congress once again took up the issue of waste disposal. The result was the legislation challenged here, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985. </s> The 1985 Act was again based largely on a proposal submitted by the National Governors' Association. In broad outline, the Act embodies a compromise among the sited and unsited States. The sited States agreed to extend for seven years the period in which they would accept low level radioactive waste from other States. In exchange, the unsited States agreed to end their reliance on the sited States by 1992. </s> The mechanics of this compromise are intricate. The Act directs: Each State shall be responsible for providing, either by itself or in cooperation with other States, for the disposal of . . . low-level radioactive waste generated within the State," 42 U.S.C. 2021c(a)(1)(A), with the exception of certain waste generated by the Federal Government, 2021c(a)(1)(B), 2021c(b). The Act authorizes States to [505 U.S. 144, 152] "enter into such [interstate] compacts as may be necessary to provide for the establishment and operation of regional disposal facilities for low-level radioactive waste." 2021d(a)(2). For an additional seven years beyond the period contemplated by the 1980 Act, from the beginning of 1986 through the end of 1992, the three existing disposal sites "shall make disposal capacity available for low-level radioactive waste generated by any source," with certain exceptions not relevant here. 2021e(a)(2). But the three States in which the disposal sites are located are permitted to exact a graduated surcharge for waste arriving from outside the regional compact - in 1986-1987, $10 per cubic foot; in 1988-1989, $20 per cubic foot; and in 1990-1992, $40 per cubic foot. 2021e(d)(1). After the 7-year transition period expires, approved regional compacts may exclude radioactive waste generated outside the region. 2021d(c). </s> The Act provides three types of incentives to encourage the States to comply with their statutory obligation to provide for the disposal of waste generated within their borders. </s> 1. Monetary incentives. One quarter of the surcharges collected by the sited States must be transferred to an escrow account held by the Secretary of Energy. 2021e(d)(2)(A). The Secretary then makes payments from this account to each State that has complied with a series of deadlines. By July 1, 1986, each State was to have ratified legislation either joining a regional compact or indicating an intent to develop a disposal facility within the State. 2021e(e)(1)(A), 2021e(d)(2)(B)(i). By January 1, 1988, each unsited compact was to have identified the State in which its facility would be located, and each compact or stand-alone State was to have developed a siting plan and taken other identified steps. 2021e(e)(1)(B), 2021e(d)(2)(B)(ii). By January 1, 1990, each State or compact was to have filed a complete application for a license to operate a disposal facility, or the Governor of any State that had not filed an application was to have certified that the State would be capable of disposing [505 U.S. 144, 153] of all waste generated in the State after 1992. 2021e(e)(1)(C), 2021e(d)(2)(B)(iii). The rest of the account is to be paid out to those States or compacts able to dispose of all low level radioactive waste generated within their borders by January 1, 1993. 2021e(d)(2)(B)(iv). Each State that has not met the 1993 deadline must either take title to the waste generated within its borders or forfeit to the waste generators the incentive payments it has received. 2021e(d)(2)(C). </s> 2. Access incentives. The second type of incentive involves the denial of access to disposal sites. States that fail to meet the July, 1986, deadline may be charged twice the ordinary surcharge for the remainder of 1986, and may be denied access to disposal facilities thereafter. 2021e(e)(2)(A). States that fail to meet the 1988 deadline may be charged double surcharges for the first half of 1988 and quadruple surcharges for the second half of 1988, and may be denied access thereafter. 2021e(e)(2)(B). States that fail to meet the 1990 deadline may be denied access. 2021e(e)(2)(C). Finally, States that have not filed complete applications by January 1, 1992, for a license to operate a disposal facility, or States belonging to compacts that have not filed such applications, may be charged triple surcharges. 2021e(e)(1)(D), 2021e(e)(2)(D). </s> 3. The take-title provision. The third type of incentive is the most severe. The Act provides: </s> "If a State (or, where applicable, a compact region) in which low-level radioactive waste is generated is unable to provide for the disposal of all such waste generated within such State or compact region by January 1, 1996, each State in which such waste is generated, upon the request of the generator or owner of the waste, shall take title to the waste, be obligated to take possession of the waste, and shall be liable for all damages directly or indirectly incurred by such generator or owner as a consequence of the failure of the State to take possession [505 U.S. 144, 154] of the waste as soon after January 1, 1996, as the generator or owner notifies the State that the waste is available for shipment." 2021e(d)(2)(C). </s> These three incentives are the focus of petitioners' constitutional challenge. </s> In the seven years since the Act took effect, Congress has approved nine regional compacts, encompassing 42 of the States. All six unsited compacts and four of the unaffiliated States have met the first three statutory milestones. Brief for United States 10, n. 19; id. at 13, n. 25. </s> New York, a State whose residents generate a relatively large share of the Nation's low level radioactive waste, did not join a regional compact. Instead, the State complied with the Act's requirements by enacting legislation providing for the siting and financing of a disposal facility in New York. The State has identified five potential sites, three in Allegany County and two in Cortland County. Residents of the two counties oppose the State's choice of location. App. 29a-30a, 66a-68a. </s> Petitioners - the State of New York and the two counties - filed this suit against the United States in 1990. They sought a declaratory judgment that the Act is inconsistent with the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments to the Constitution, with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and with the Guarantee Clause of Article IV of the Constitution. The States of Washington, Nevada, and South Carolina intervened as defendants. The District Court dismissed the complaint. 757 F.Supp. 10 (NDNY 1990). The Court of Appeals affirmed. 942 F.2d 114 (CA2 1991). Petitioners have abandoned their due process and Eleventh Amendment claims on their way up the appellate ladder; as the case stands before us, petitioners claim only that the Act is inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause. [505 U.S. 144, 155] </s> II </s> A </s> In 1788, in the course of explaining to the citizens of New York why the recently drafted Constitution provided for federal courts, Alexander Hamilton observed: "The erection of a new government, whatever care or wisdom may distinguish the work, cannot fail to originate questions of intricacy and nicety; and these may, in a particular manner, be expected to flow from the the establishment of a constitution founded upon the total or partial incorporation of a number of distinct sovereignties." The Federalist No. 82, p. 491 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Hamilton's prediction has proved quite accurate. While no one disputes the proposition that "[t]he Constitution created a Federal Government of limited powers," Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991); and while the Tenth Amendment makes explicit that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people," the task of ascertaining the constitutional line between federal and state power has given rise to many of the Court's most difficult and celebrated cases. At least as far back as Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 324 (1816), the Court has resolved questions "of great importance and delicacy" in determining whether particular sovereign powers have been granted by the Constitution to the Federal Government or have been retained by the States. </s> These questions can be viewed in either of two ways. In some cases, the Court has inquired whether an Act of Congress is authorized by one of the powers delegated to Congress in Article I of the Constitution. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). In other cases, the Court has sought to determine whether an Act of Congress invades the province of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, [505 U.S. 144, 156] 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71 (1869). In a case like this one, involving the division of authority between federal and state governments, the two inquiries are mirror images of each other. If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress. See United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 649 (1961); Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 102 (1946); Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534 (1941). </s> It is in this sense that the Tenth Amendment "states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered." United State v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). As Justice Story put it, "[t]his amendment is a mere affirmation of what, upon any just reasoning, is a necessary rule of interpreting the constitution. Being an instrument of limited and enumerated powers, it follows irresistibly that what is not conferred is withheld, and belongs to the state authorities." 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 752 (1833). This has been the Court's consistent understanding: "The States unquestionably do retai[n] a significant measure of sovereign authority . . . to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their original powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government." Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, supra, at 549 (internal quotation marks omitted). </s> Congress exercises its conferred powers subject to the limitations contained in the Constitution. Thus, for example, under the Commerce Clause, Congress may regulate publishers engaged in interstate commerce, but Congress is constrained in the exercise of that power by the First Amendment. The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which, as we have discussed, [505 U.S. 144, 157] is essentially a tautology. Instead, the Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States. The Tenth Amendment thus directs us to determine, as in this case, whether an incident of state sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article I power. </s> The benefits of this federal structure have been extensively catalogued elsewhere, see, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, supra, at 457-460; Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 Colum.L.Rev. 1, 3-10 (1988); McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. Chi. L.Rev. 1484, 1491-1511 (1987), but they need not concern us here. Our task would be the same even if one could prove that federalism secured no advantages to anyone. It consists not of devising our preferred system of government, but of understanding and applying the framework set forth in the Constitution. "The question is not what power the Federal Government ought to have, but what powers in fact have been given by the people." United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63 (1936). </s> This framework has been sufficiently flexible over the past two centuries to allow for enormous changes in the nature of government. The Federal Government undertakes activities today that would have been unimaginable to the Framers in two senses; first, because the Framers would not have conceived that any government would conduct such activities; and second, because the Framers would not have believed that the Federal Government, rather than the States, would assume such responsibilities. Yet the powers conferred upon the Federal Government by the Constitution were phrased in language broad enough to allow for the expansion of the Federal Government's role. Among the provisions of the Constitution that have been particularly important in this regard, three concern us here. </s> First, the Constitution allocates to Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States." [505 U.S. 144, 158] Art. I, 8, cl. 3. Interstate commerce was an established feature of life in the late 18th century. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 42, p. 267 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("The defect of power in the existing Confederacy to regulate the commerce between its several members [has] been clearly pointed out by experience"). The volume of interstate commerce and the range of commonly accepted objects of government regulation have, however, expanded considerably in the last 200 years, and the regulatory authority of Congress has expanded along with them. As interstate commerce has become ubiquitous, activities once considered purely local have come to have effects on the national economy, and have accordingly come within the scope of Congress' commerce power. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). </s> Second, the Constitution authorizes Congress "to pay the Debts and provide for the . . . general Welfare of the United States." Art. I, 8, cl. 1. As conventional notions of the proper objects of government spending have changed over the years, so has the ability of Congress to "fix the terms on which it shall disburse federal money to the States." Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). Compare, e.g., United States v. Butler, supra, at 72-75 (spending power does not authorize Congress to subsidize farmers), with South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (spending power permits Congress to condition highway funds on States' adoption of minimum drinking age). While the spending power is "subject to several general restrictions articulated in our cases," id. at 207, these restrictions have not been so severe as to prevent the regulatory authority of Congress from generally keeping up with the growth of the federal budget. </s> The Court's broad construction of Congress' power under the Commerce and Spending Clauses has of course been guided, as it has with respect to Congress' power generally, by the Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause, which [505 U.S. 144, 159] authorizes Congress "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers." U.S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 18. See, e.g., Legal Tender Case 110 U.S. 421, 449 -450 (1884); McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. at 411-421. </s> Finally, the Constitution provides that "the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. As the Federal Government's willingness to exercise power within the confines of the Constitution has grown, the authority of the States has correspondingly diminished to the extent that federal and state policies have conflicted. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983). We have observed that the Supremacy Clause gives the Federal Government "a decided advantage in th[e] delicate balance" the Constitution strikes between state and federal power. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 460. </s> The actual scope of the Federal Government's authority with respect to the States has changed over the years, therefore, but the constitutional structure underlying and limiting that authority has not. In the end, just as a cup may be half empty or half full, it makes no difference whether one views the question at issue in this case as one of ascertaining the limits of the power delegated to the Federal Government under the affirmative provisions of the Constitution or one of discerning the core of sovereignty retained by the States under the Tenth Amendment. Either way, we must determine whether any of the three challenged provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 oversteps the boundary between federal and state authority. </s> B </s> Petitioners do not contend that Congress lacks the power to regulate the disposal of low level radioactive waste. Space in radioactive waste disposal sites is frequently sold [505 U.S. 144, 160] by residents of one State to residents of another. Regulation of the resulting interstate market in waste disposal is therefore well within Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause. Cf. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621 -623 (1978); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 359 (1992). Petitioners likewise do not dispute that, under the Supremacy Clause, Congress could, if it wished, pre-empt state radioactive waste regulation. Petitioners contend only that the Tenth Amendment limits the power of Congress to regulate in the way it has chosen. Rather than addressing the problem of waste disposal by directly regulating the generators and disposers of waste, petitioners argue, Congress has impermissibly directed the States to regulate in this field. </s> Most of our recent cases interpreting the Tenth Amendment have concerned the authority of Congress to subject state governments to generally applicable laws. The Court's jurisprudence in this area has traveled an unsteady path. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (state schools and hospitals are subject to Fair Labor Standards Act); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (overruling Wirtz) (state employers are not subject to Fair Labor Standards Act); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities) (state employers are once again subject to Fair Labor Standards Act). See also New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975); Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988); Gregory v. Ashcroft, supra. This case presents no occasion to apply or revisit the holdings of any of these cases, as this is not a case in which Congress has subjected a State to the same legislation applicable to private parties. Cf. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 758 -759 (1982). [505 U.S. 144, 161] </s> This case instead concerns the circumstances under which Congress may use the States as implements of regulation; that is, whether Congress may direct or otherwise motivate the States to regulate in a particular field or a particular way. Our cases have established a few principles that guide our resolution of the issue. </s> 1 </s> As an initial matter, Congress may not simply "commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program." Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981). In Hodel, the Court upheld the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 precisely because it did not "commandeer" the States into regulating mining. The Court found that "the States are not compelled to enforce the steep-slope standards, to expend any state funds, or to participate in the federal regulatory program in any manner whatsoever. If a State does not wish to submit a proposed permanent program that complies with the Act and implementing regulations, the full regulatory burden will be borne by the Federal Government. Ibid. </s> The Court reached the same conclusion the following year in FERC v. Mississippi, supra. At issue in FERC was the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, a federal statute encouraging the States in various ways to develop programs to combat the Nation's energy crisis. We observed that "this Court never has sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations." Id., at 761-762. As in Hodel, the Court upheld the statute at issue because it did not view the statute as such a command. The Court emphasized: "Titles I and III of [the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA)] require only consideration of federal standards. And if a State has no utilities commission, or simply stops regulating in the field, it need not even entertain the [505 U.S. 144, 162] federal proposals." 456 U.S., at 764 (emphasis in original). Because "[t]here [wa]s nothing in PURPA `directly compelling' the States to enact a legislative program," the statute was not inconsistent with the Constitution's division of authority between the Federal Government and the States. Id., at 765 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., supra, at 288). See also South Carolina v. Baker, supra, at 513 (noting "the possibility that the Tenth Amendment might set some limits on Congress' power to compel States to regulate on behalf of federal interests"); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, supra, at 556 (same). </s> These statements in FERC and Hodel were not innovations. While Congress has substantial powers to govern the Nation directly, including in areas of intimate concern to the States, the Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress' instructions. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911). The Court has been explicit about this distinction. "Both the States and the United States existed before the Constitution. The people, through that instrument, established a more perfect union by substituting a national government, acting, with ample power, directly upon the citizens, instead of the Confederate government, which acted with powers, greatly restricted, only upon the States." Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall., at 76 (emphasis added). The Court has made the same point with more rhetorical flourish, although perhaps with less precision, on a number of occasions. In Chief Justice Chase's much-quoted words, "the preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National government. The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States." Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725 (1869). See also Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, [505 U.S. 144, 163] 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926) ("[N]either government may destroy the other nor curtail in any substantial manner the exercise of its powers"); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) ("[U]nder our federal system, the States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government"); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S., at 461 ("[T]he States retain substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme, powers with which Congress does not readily interfere"). </s> Indeed, the question whether the Constitution should permit Congress to employ state governments as regulatory agencies was a topic of lively debate among the Framers. Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress lacked the authority in most respects to govern the people directly. In practice, Congress "could not directly tax or legislate upon individuals; it had no explicit "legislative" or "governmental" power to make binding "law" enforceable as such." Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1447 (1987). </s> The inadequacy of this governmental structure was responsible in part for the Constitutional Convention. Alexander Hamilton observed: "The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as contra-distinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of whom they consist." The Federalist No. 16, p. 108 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). As Hamilton saw it, "we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those ingredients which may be considered as forming the characteristic difference between a league and a government; we must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens - the only proper objects of government." Id., at 109. The new National Government must carry its agency to the persons of the citizens. It must stand in need of no intermediate legislations. . . . The government of the Union, like that of each State, must be able to address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of individuals." Id. No. 16, at 116. [505 U.S. 144, 164] </s> The Convention generated a great number of proposals for the structure of the new Government, but two quickly took center stage. Under the Virginia Plan, as first introduced by Edmund Randolph, Congress would exercise legislative authority directly upon individuals, without employing the States as intermediaries. 1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 21 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). Under the New Jersey Plan, as first introduced by William Paterson, Congress would continue to require the approval of the States before legislating, as it had under the Articles of Confederation. 1 id., at 243-244. These two plans underwent various revisions as the Convention progressed, but they remained the two primary options discussed by the delegates. One frequently expressed objection to the New Jersey Plan was that it might require the Federal Government to coerce the States into implementing legislation. As Randolph explained the distinction, "[t]he true question is whether we shall adhere to the federal plan [i.e., the New Jersey Plan], or introduce the national plan. The insufficiency of the former has been fully displayed. . . . There are but two modes by which the end of a Gen[eral] Gov[ernment] can be attained: the 1st is by coercion as proposed by Mr. P[aterson's] plan[, the 2nd] by real legislation as prop[osed] by the other plan. Coercion [is] impracticable, expensive, cruel to individuals. . . . We must resort therefore to a national Legislation over individuals." 1 id., at 255-256 (emphasis in original). Madison echoed this view: "The practicability of making laws, with coercive sanctions, for the States as political bodies, had been exploded on all hands." 2 id., at 9. </s> Under one preliminary draft of what would become the New Jersey Plan, state governments would occupy a position relative to Congress similar to that contemplated by the Act at issue in this case: "[T]he laws of the United States ought, as far as may be consistent with the common interests of the Union, to be carried into execution by the judiciary and executive officers of the respective states, wherein the [505 U.S. 144, 165] execution thereof is required." 3 id., at 616. This idea apparently never even progressed so far as to be debated by the delegates, as contemporary accounts of the Convention do not mention any such discussion. The delegates' many descriptions of the Virginia and New Jersey Plans speak only in general terms about whether Congress was to derive its authority from the people or from the States, and whether it was to issue directives to individuals or to States. See 1 id., at 260-280. </s> In the end, the Convention opted for a Constitution in which Congress would exercise its legislative authority directly over individuals, rather than over States; for a variety of reasons, it rejected the New Jersey Plan in favor of the Virginia Plan. 1 id., at 313. This choice was made clear to the subsequent state ratifying conventions. Oliver Ellsworth, a member of the Connecticut delegation in Philadelphia, explained the distinction to his State's convention: "This Constitution does not attempt to coerce sovereign bodies, states, in their political capacity. . . . But this legal coercion singles out the . . . individual." 2 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 197 (2d ed. 1863). Charles Pinckney, another delegate at the Constitutional Convention, emphasized to the South Carolina House of Representatives that, in Philadelphia, "the necessity of having a government which should at once operate upon the people, and not upon the states, was conceived to be indispensable by every delegation present." 4 id., at 256. Rufus King, one of Massachusetts' delegates, returned home to support ratification by recalling the Commonwealth's unhappy experience under the Articles of Confederation and arguing: "Laws, to be effective, therefore, must not be laid on states, but upon individuals." 2 id., at 56. At New York's convention, Hamilton (another delegate in Philadelphia) exclaimed: "But can we believe that one state will ever suffer itself to be used as an instrument of coercion? The thing is a dream; it is impossible. Then we are brought to this dilemma - either a federal [505 U.S. 144, 166] standing army is to enforce the requisitions, or the federal treasury is left without supplies, and the government without support. What, sir, is the cure for this great evil? Nothing but to enable the national laws to operate on individuals, in the same manner as those of the states do." 2 id., at 233. At North Carolina's convention, Samuel Spencer recognized that "all the laws of the Confederation were binding on the states in their political capacities, . . . but now the thing is entirely different. The laws of Congress will be binding on individuals." 4 id., at 153. </s> In providing for a stronger central government, therefore, the Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States. As we have seen, the Court has consistently respected this choice. We have always understood that, even where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts. E.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S., at 762 -766; Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S., at 288 -289; Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall., at 76. The allocation of power contained in the Commerce Clause, for example, authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments' regulation of interstate commerce. </s> 2 </s> This is not to say that Congress lacks the ability to encourage a State to regulate in a particular way, or that Congress may not hold out incentives to the States as a method of influencing a State's policy choices. Our cases have identified a variety of methods, short of outright coercion, by which Congress may urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests. Two of these methods are of particular relevance here. [505 U.S. 144, 167] </s> First, under Congress' spending power, "Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds." South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S., at 206 . Such conditions must (among other requirements) bear some relationship to the purpose of the federal spending, id., at 207-208, and n. 3; otherwise, of course, the spending power could render academic the Constitution's other grants and limits of federal authority. Where the recipient of federal funds is a State, as is not unusual today, the conditions attached to the funds by Congress may influence a State's legislative choices. See Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 Colum.L.Rev. 847, 874-881 (1979). Dole was one such case: the Court found no constitutional flaw in a federal statute directing the Secretary of Transportation to withhold federal highway funds from States failing to adopt Congress' choice of a minimum drinking age. Similar examples abound. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 478 -480 (1980); Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 -462 (1978); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 -569 (1974); Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 142 -144 (1947). </s> Second, where Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress' power to offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., supra, at 288. See also FERC v. Mississippi, supra, at 764-765. This arrangement, which has been termed "a program of cooperative federalism," Hodel, supra, at 289, is replicated in numerous federal statutory schemes. These include the Clean Water Act, 86 Stat. 816, as amended, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq., see Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992) (Clean Water Act "anticipates a partnership between the States and the Federal Government, animated by a shared objective"); the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, [505 U.S. 144, 168] 84 Stat. 1590, 29 U.S.C. 651 et seq., see Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., ante, at 97; the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2796, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq., see Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 611 -612 (1992); and the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 94 Stat. 2374, 16 U.S.C. 3101 et seq., see Kenaitze Indian Tribe v. Alaska, 860 F.2d 312, 314 (CA9 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989). </s> By either of these two methods, as by any other permissible method of encouraging a State to conform to federal policy choices, the residents of the State retain the ultimate decision as to whether or not the State will comply. If a State's citizens view federal policy as sufficiently contrary to local interests, they may elect to decline a federal grant. If state residents would prefer their government to devote its attention and resources to problems other than those deemed important by Congress, they may choose to have the Federal Government, rather than the State, bear the expense of a federally mandated regulatory program, and they may continue to supplement that program to the extent state law is not pre-empted. Where Congress encourages state regulation, rather than compelling it, state governments remain responsive to the local electorate's preferences; state officials remain accountable to the people. </s> By contrast, where the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished. If the citizens of New York, for example, do not consider that making provision for the disposal of radioactive waste is in their best interest, they may elect state officials who share their view. That view can always be pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause if it is contrary to the national view, but, in such a case, it is the Federal Government that makes the decision in full view of the public, and it will be federal officials that suffer the consequences if the decision turns out to be detrimental or unpopular. [505 U.S. 144, 169] But where the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision. Accountability is thus diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the local electorate in matters not preempted by federal regulation. See Merritt, 88 Colum. L. Rev., at 61-62; La Pierre, Political Accountability in the National Political Process - The Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 577, 639-665 (1985). </s> With these principles in mind, we turn to the three challenged provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985. </s> III </s> The parties in this case advance two quite different views of the Act. As petitioners see it, the Act imposes a requirement directly upon the States that they regulate in the field of radioactive waste disposal in order to meet Congress' mandate that "[e]ach State shall be responsible for providing . . . for the disposal of . . . low-level radioactive waste." 42 U.S.C. 2021c(a)(1)(A). Petitioners understand this provision as a direct command from Congress, enforceable independent of the three sets of incentives provided by the Act. Respondents, on the other hand, read this provision together with the incentives, and see the Act as affording the States three sets of choices. According to respondents, the Act permits a State to choose first between regulating pursuant to federal standards and losing the right to a share of the Secretary of Energy's escrow account; to choose second between regulating pursuant to federal standards and progressively losing access to disposal sites in other States; and to choose third between regulating pursuant to federal standards and taking title to the waste generated within the State. [505 U.S. 144, 170] Respondents thus interpret 2021c(a)(1)(A), despite the statute's use of the word "shall," to provide no more than an option which a State may elect or eschew. </s> The Act could plausibly be understood either as a mandate to regulate or as a series of incentives. Under petitioners' view, however, 2021c(a)(1)(A) of the Act would clearly "commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program." Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S., at 288 . We must reject this interpretation of the provision for two reasons. First, such an outcome would, to say the least, "upset the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S., at 460 . "[I]t is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain of Congress' intent before finding that federal law overrides this balance," ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted), but the Act's amenability to an equally plausible alternative construction prevents us from possessing such certainty. Second, "where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). This rule of statutory construction pushes us away from petitioners' understanding of 2021c(a)(1)(A) of the Act, under which it compels the States to regulate according to Congress' instructions. </s> We therefore decline petitioners' invitation to construe 2021c(a)(1)(A), alone and in isolation, as a command to the States independent of the remainder of the Act. Construed as a whole, the Act comprises three sets of "incentives" for the States to provide for the disposal of low level radioactive waste generated within their borders. We consider each in turn. [505 U.S. 144, 171] </s> A </s> The first set of incentives works in three steps. First, Congress has authorized States with disposal sites to impose a surcharge on radioactive waste received from other States. Second, the Secretary of Energy collects a portion of this surcharge and places the money in an escrow account. Third, States achieving a series of milestones receive portions of this fund. </s> The first of these steps is an unexceptionable exercise of Congress' power to authorize the States to burden interstate commerce. While the Commerce Clause has long been understood to limit the States' ability to discriminate against interstate commerce, see, e.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 -455 (1992); Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia ex rel. Society for Relief of Distressed Pilots, 12 How. 299 (1852), that limit may be lifted, as it has been here, by an expression of the "unambiguous intent" of Congress. Wyoming, supra, at 458; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 427 -431 (1946). Whether or not the States would be permitted to burden the interstate transport of low level radioactive waste in the absence of Congress' approval, the States can clearly do so with Congress' approval, which is what the Act gives them. </s> The second step, the Secretary's collection of a percentage of the surcharge, is no more than a federal tax on interstate commerce, which petitioners do not claim to be an invalid exercise of either Congress' commerce or taxing power. Cf. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 -45 (1950); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 581 -583 (1937). </s> The third step is a conditional exercise of Congress' authority under the Spending Clause: Congress has placed conditions - the achievement of the milestones - on the receipt of federal funds. Petitioners do not contend that Congress has exceeded its authority in any of the four respects our cases have identified. See generally South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S., at 207 -208. The expenditure is for the general [505 U.S. 144, 172] welfare, Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 -641 (1937); the States are required to use the money they receive for the purpose of assuring the safe disposal of radioactive waste. 42 U.S.C. 2021e(d)(2)(E). The conditions imposed are unambiguous, Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S., at 17 ; the Act informs the States exactly what they must do and by when they must do it in order to obtain a share of the escrow account. The conditions imposed are reasonably related to the purpose of the expenditure, Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S., at 461 ; both the conditions and the payments embody Congress' efforts to address the pressing problem of radioactive waste disposal. Finally, petitioners do not claim that the conditions imposed by the Act violate any independent constitutional prohibition. Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist. No 40-1, 469 U.S. 256, 269 -270 (1985). </s> Petitioners contend nevertheless that the form of these expenditures removes them from the scope of Congress' spending power. Petitioners emphasize the Act's instruction to the Secretary of Energy to "deposit all funds received in a special escrow account. The funds so deposited shall not be the property of the United States." 42 U.S.C. 2021e(d)(2)(A). Petitioners argue that, because the money collected and redisbursed to the States is kept in an account separate from the general treasury, because the Secretary holds the funds only as a trustee, and because the States themselves are largely able to control whether they will pay into the escrow account or receive a share, the Act "in no manner calls for the spending of federal funds." Reply Brief for Petitioner State of New York 6. </s> The Constitution's grant to Congress of the authority to "pay the Debts and provide for the . . . general Welfare" has never, however, been thought to mandate a particular form of accounting. A great deal of federal spending comes from segregated trust funds collected and spent for a particular purpose. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. 118 (Highway Trust Fund); [505 U.S. 144, 173] 42 U.S.C. 401(a) (Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund); 42 U.S.C. 401(b) (Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund); 42 U.S.C. 1395t (Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund). The Spending Clause has never been construed to deprive Congress of the power to structure federal spending in this manner. Petitioners' argument regarding the States' ability to determine the escrow account's income and disbursements ignores the fact that Congress specifically provided the States with this ability as a method of encouraging the States to regulate according to the federal plan. That the States are able to choose whether they will receive federal funds does not make the resulting expenditures any less federal; indeed, the location of such choice in the States is an inherent element in any conditional exercise of Congress' spending power. </s> The Act's first set of incentives, in which Congress has conditioned grants to the States upon the States' attainment of a series of milestones, is thus well within the authority of Congress under the Commerce and Spending Clauses. Because the first set of incentives is supported by affirmative constitutional grants of power to Congress, it is not inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment. </s> B </s> In the second set of incentives, Congress has authorized States and regional compacts with disposal sites gradually to increase the cost of access to the sites, and then to deny access altogether, to radioactive waste generated in States that do not meet federal deadlines. As a simple regulation, this provision would be within the power of Congress to authorize the States to discriminate against interstate commerce. See Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, FRS, 472 U.S. 159, 174 -175 (1985). Where federal regulation of private activity is within the scope of the Commerce Clause, we have recognized the ability of Congress to offer states the choice of regulating that activity according to federal [505 U.S. 144, 174] standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn, Inc., 452 U.S., at 288 ; FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S., at 764 -765. </s> This is the choice presented to nonsited States by the Act's second set of incentives: States may either regulate the disposal of radioactive waste according to federal standards by attaining local or regional self-sufficiency, or their residents who produce radioactive waste will be subject to federal regulation authorizing sited States and regions to deny access to their disposal sites. The affected States are not compelled by Congress to regulate, because any burden caused by a State's refusal to regulate will fall on those who generate waste and find no outlet for its disposal, rather than on the State as a sovereign. A State whose citizens do not wish it to attain the Act's milestones may devote its attention and its resources to issues its citizens deem more worthy; the choice remains at all times with the residents of the State, not with Congress. The State need not expend any funds, or participate in any federal program, if local residents do not view such expenditures or participation as worthwhile. Cf. Hodel, supra, at 288. Nor must the State abandon the field if it does not accede to federal direction; the State may continue to regulate the generation and disposal of radioactive waste in any manner its citizens see fit. </s> The Act's second set of incentives thus represents a conditional exercise of Congress' commerce power, along the lines of those we have held to be within Congress' authority. As a result, the second set of incentives does not intrude on the sovereignty reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment. </s> C </s> The take-title provision is of a different character. This third so-called "incentive" offers States, as an alternative to regulating pursuant to Congress' direction, the option of taking title to and possession of the low level radioactive waste [505 U.S. 144, 175] generated within their borders and becoming liable for all damages waste generators suffer as a result of the States' failure to do so promptly. In this provision, Congress has crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion. </s> We must initially reject respondents' suggestion that, because the take-title provision will not take effect until January 1, 1996, petitioners' challenge thereto is unripe. It takes many years to develop a new disposal site. All parties agree that New York must take action now in order to avoid the take-title provision's consequences, and no party suggests that the State's waste generators will have ceased producing waste by 1996. The issue is thus ripe for review. Cf. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 201 (1983); Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 144 -145 (1974). </s> The take-title provision offers state governments a "choice" of either accepting ownership of waste or regulating according to the instructions of Congress. Respondents do not claim that the Constitution would authorize Congress to impose either option as a freestanding requirement. On one hand, the Constitution would not permit Congress simply to transfer radioactive waste from generators to state governments. Such a forced transfer, standing alone, would in principle be no different than a congressionally compelled subsidy from state governments to radioactive waste producers. The same is true of the provision requiring the States to become liable for the generators' damages. Standing alone, this provision would be indistinguishable from an Act of Congress directing the States to assume the liabilities of certain state residents. Either type of federal action would "commandeer" state governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes, and would, for this reason, be inconsistent with the Constitution's division of authority between federal and state governments. On the other hand, the second alternative held out to state governments - regulating pursuant [505 U.S. 144, 176] to Congress' direction - would, standing alone, present a simple command to state governments to implement legislation enacted by Congress. As we have seen, the Constitution does not empower Congress to subject state governments to this type of instruction. </s> Because an instruction to state governments to take title to waste, standing alone, would be beyond the authority of Congress, and because a direct order to regulate, standing alone, would also be beyond the authority of Congress, it follows that Congress lacks the power to offer the States a choice between the two. Unlike the first two sets of incentives, the take-title incentive does not represent the conditional exercise of any congressional power enumerated in the Constitution. In this provision, Congress has not held out the threat of exercising its spending power or its commerce power; it has instead held out the threat, should the States not regulate according to one federal instruction, of simply forcing the States to submit to another federal instruction. A choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at all. Either way, "the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program," Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S., at 288 , an outcome that has never been understood to lie within the authority conferred upon Congress by the Constitution. </s> Respondents emphasize the latitude given to the States to implement Congress' plan. The Act enables the States to regulate pursuant to Congress' instructions in any number of different ways. States may avoid taking title by contracting with sited regional compacts, by building a disposal site alone or as part of a compact, or by permitting private parties to build a disposal site. States that host sites may employ a wide range of designs and disposal methods, subject only to broad federal regulatory limits. This line of reasoning, however, only underscores the critical alternative a [505 U.S. 144, 177] State lacks: a State may not decline to administer the federal program. No matter which path the State chooses, it must follow the direction of Congress. </s> The take title provision appears to be unique. No other federal statute has been cited which offers a state government no option other than that of implementing legislation enacted by Congress. Whether one views the take-title provision as lying outside Congress' enumerated powers or as infringing upon the core of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, the provision is inconsistent with the federal structure of our Government established by the Constitution. </s> IV </s> Respondents raise a number of objections to this understanding of the limits of Congress' power. </s> A </s> The United States proposes three alternative views of the constitutional line separating state and federal authority. While each view concedes that Congress generally may not compel state governments to regulate pursuant to federal direction, each purports to find a limited domain in which such coercion is permitted by the Constitution. </s> First, the United States argues that the Constitution's prohibition of congressional directives to state governments can be overcome where the federal interest is sufficiently important to justify state submission. This argument contains a kernel of truth: in determining whether the Tenth Amendment limits the ability of Congress to subject state governments to generally applicable laws, the Court has, in some cases, stated that it will evaluate the strength of federal interests in light of the degree to which such laws would prevent the State from functioning as a sovereign; that is, the extent to which such generally applicable laws would impede a state government's responsibility to represent and be accountable to the citizens of the State. See, e.g., EEOC v. [505 U.S. 144, 178] Wyoming, 460 U.S., at 242 , n. 17; Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U.S., at 684 , n. 9; National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S., at 853 . The Court has more recently departed from this approach. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S., at 512 -513; Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S., at 556 -557. But whether or not a particularly strong federal interest enables Congress to bring state governments within the orbit of generally applicable federal regulation, no Member of the Court has ever suggested that such a federal interest would enable Congress to command a state government to enact state regulation. No matter how powerful the federal interest involved, the Constitution simply does not give Congress the authority to require the States to regulate. The Constitution instead gives Congress the authority to regulate matters directly, and to pre-empt contrary state regulation. Where a federal interest is sufficiently strong to cause Congress to legislate, it must do so directly; it may not conscript state governments as its agents. </s> Second, the United States argues that the Constitution does, in some circumstances, permit federal directives to state governments. Various cases are cited for this proposition, but none support it. Some of these cases discuss the well established power of Congress to pass laws enforceable in state courts. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 402 (1973); see also Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 -137 (1876). These cases involve no more than an application of the Supremacy Clause's provision that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land," enforceable in every State. More to the point, all involve congressional regulation of individuals, not congressional requirements that States regulate. Federal statutes enforceable in state courts do, in a sense, direct state judges to enforce them, but this sort of federal "direction" of state judges is mandated by the text of the Supremacy [505 U.S. 144, 179] Clause. No comparable constitutional provision authorizes Congress to command state legislatures to legislate. </s> Additional cases cited by the United States discuss the power of federal courts to order state officials to comply with federal law. See Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 228 (1987); Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U.S. 658, 695 (1979); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 106 -108 (1972); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 -19 (1958); Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155 -156 (1908). Again, however, the text of the Constitution plainly confers this authority on the federal courts, the "judicial Power" of which "shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, [and] the Laws of the United States . . .; [and] to Controversies between two or more States; [and] between a State and Citizens of another State." U.S. Const., Art. III, 2. The Constitution contains no analogous grant of authority to Congress. Moreover, the Supremacy Clause makes federal law paramount over the contrary positions of state officials; the power of federal courts to enforce federal law thus presupposes some authority to order state officials to comply. See Puerto Rico v. Branstad, supra, at 227-228 (overruling Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (1861)). </s> In sum, the cases relied upon by the United States hold only that federal law is enforceable in state courts, and that federal courts may, in proper circumstances, order state officials to comply with federal law, propositions that by no means imply any authority on the part of Congress to mandate state regulation. </s> Third, the United States, supported by the three sited regional compacts as amici, argues that the Constitution envisions a role for Congress as an arbiter of interstate disputes. The United States observes that federal courts, and this Court in particular, have frequently resolved conflicts among States. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 </s> [505 U.S. 144, 180] (1992); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992). Many of these disputes have involved the allocation of shared resources among the States, a category perhaps broad enough to encompass the allocation of scarce disposal space for radioactive waste. See, e.g., Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). The United States suggests that, if the Court may resolve such interstate disputes, Congress can surely do the same under the Commerce Clause. The regional compacts support this argument with a series of quotations from The Federalist and other contemporaneous documents, which the compacts contend demonstrate that the Framers established a strong National Legislature for the purpose of resolving trade disputes among the States. Brief for Rocky Mountain Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact et al. as Amici Curiae 17, and n. 16. </s> While the Framers no doubt endowed Congress with the power to regulate interstate commerce in order to avoid further instances of the interstate trade disputes that were common under the Articles of Confederation, the Framers did not intend that Congress should exercise that power through the mechanism of mandating state regulation. The Constitution established Congress as "a superintending authority over the reciprocal trade" among the States, The Federalist No. 42, p. 268 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961), by empowering Congress to regulate that trade directly, not by authorizing Congress to issue trade-related orders to state governments. As Madison and Hamilton explained, "a sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over governments, a legislation for communities, as contradistinguished from individuals, as it is a solecism in theory, so in practice it is subversive of the order and ends of civil polity." Id., No. 20, at 138. </s> B </s> The sited state respondents focus their attention on the process by which the Act was formulated. They correctly [505 U.S. 144, 181] observe that public officials representing the State of New York lent their support to the Act's enactment. A Deputy Commissioner of the State's Energy Office testified in favor of the Act. See Low-Level Waste Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 862, H.R. 1046, H.R. 1083, and H.R. 1267 before the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 97-98, 190-199 (1985) (testimony of Charles Guinn). Senator Moynihan of New York spoke in support of the Act on the floor of the Senate. 131 Cong.Rec. 38423 (1985). Respondents note that the Act embodies a bargain among the sited and unsited States, a compromise to which New York was a willing participant, and from which New York has reaped much benefit. Respondents then pose what appears at first to be a troubling question: how can a federal statute be found an unconstitutional infringement of state sovereignty when state officials consented to the statute's enactment? </s> The answer follows from an understanding of the fundamental purpose served by our Government's federal structure. The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials governing the States. To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals. State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: "Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). "Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front." Gregory v. [505 U.S. 144, 182] Ashcroft, 501 U.S., at 458 . See The Federalist No. 51, p. 323. (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). </s> Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States, therefore, the departure from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the "consent" of state officials. An analogy to the separation of powers among the branches of the Federal Government clarifies this point. The Constitution's division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118 -137 (1976), for instance, the Court held that Congress had infringed the President's appointment power, despite the fact that the President himself had manifested his consent to the statute that caused the infringement by signing it into law. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S., at 842 , n. 12. In INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 -959 (1983), we held that the legislative veto violated the constitutional requirement that legislation be presented to the President, despite Presidents' approval of hundreds of statutes containing a legislative veto provision. See id., at 944-945. The constitutional authority of Congress cannot be expanded by the "consent" of the governmental unit whose domain is thereby narrowed, whether that unit is the Executive Branch or the States. </s> State officials thus cannot consent to the enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond those enumerated in the Constitution. Indeed, the facts of this case raise the possibility that powerful incentives might lead both federal and state officials to view departures from the federal structure to be in their personal interests. Most citizens recognize the need for radioactive waste disposal sites, but few want sites near their homes. As a result, while it would be well within the authority of either federal or state officials to choose where the disposal sites will be, it is likely to be in the political interest of each individual official to avoid being held accountable to the voters for the choice of location. If [505 U.S. 144, 183] a federal official is faced with the alternatives of choosing a location or directing the States to do it, the official may well prefer the latter, as a means of shifting responsibility for the eventual decision. If a state official is faced with the same set of alternatives - choosing a location or having Congress direct the choice of a location - the state official may also prefer the latter, as it may permit the avoidance of personal responsibility. The interests of public officials thus may not coincide with the Constitution's intergovernmental allocation of authority. Where state officials purport to submit to the direction of Congress in this manner, federalism is hardly being advanced. </s> Nor does the State's prior support for the Act estop it from asserting the Act's unconstitutionality. While New York has received the benefit of the Act in the form of a few more years of access to disposal sites in other States, New York has never joined a regional radioactive waste compact. Any estoppel implications that might flow from membership in a compact, see West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 35 -36 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring), thus do not concern us here. The fact that the Act, like much federal legislation, embodies a compromise among the States does not elevate the Act (or the antecedent discussions among representatives of the States) to the status of an interstate agreement requiring Congress' approval under the Compact Clause. Cf. Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540, 572 (1840) (plurality opinion). That a party collaborated with others in seeking legislation has never been understood to estop the party from challenging that legislation in subsequent litigation. </s> V </s> Petitioners also contend that the Act is inconsistent with the Constitution's Guarantee Clause, which directs the United States to "guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government." U.S. Const., Art. IV, 4. Because we have found the take-title provision of the Act [505 U.S. 144, 184] irreconcilable with the powers delegated to Congress by the Constitution, and hence with the Tenth Amendment's reservation to the States of those powers not delegated to the Federal Government, we need only address the applicability of the Guarantee Clause to the Act's other two challenged provisions. </s> We approach the issue with some trepidation, because the Guarantee Clause has been an infrequent basis for litigation throughout our history. In most of the cases in which the Court has been asked to apply the Clause, the Court has found the claims presented to be nonjusticiable under the "political question" doctrine. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 182 , n. 17 (1980) (challenge to the preclearance requirements of the Voting Rights Act); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 218 -229 (1962) (challenge to apportionment of state legislative districts); Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 140 -151 (1912) (challenge to initiative and referendum provisions of state constitution). </s> The view that the Guarantee Clause implicates only nonjusticiable political questions has its origin in Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (1849), in which the Court was asked to decide, in the wake of Dorr's Rebellion, which of two rival governments was the legitimate government of Rhode Island. The Court held that "it rests with Congress," not the judiciary, "to decide what government is the established one in a State." Id., at 42. Over the following century, this limited holding metamorphosed into the sweeping assertion that "[v]iolation of the great guaranty of a republican form of government in States cannot be challenged in the courts." Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (plurality opinion). </s> This view has not always been accepted. In a group of cases decided before the holding of Luther was elevated into a general rule of nonjusticiability, the Court addressed the merits of claims founded on the Guarantee Clause without any suggestion that the claims were not justiciable. See [505 U.S. 144, 185] Attorney General of Michigan ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233, 239 (1905); Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 519 (1897); In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461 -462 (1891); Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 175-176 (1875). See also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 563 -564 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (racial segregation "inconsistent with the guarantee given by the Constitution to each State of a republican form of government"). </s> More recently, the Court has suggested that perhaps not all claims under the Guarantee Clause present nonjusticiable political questions. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582 (1964) ("[S]ome questions raised under the Guarantee Clause are nonjusticiable"). Contemporary commentators have likewise suggested that courts should address the merits of such claims, at least in some circumstances. See, e.g., L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 398 (2d ed. 1988); J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 118, n., and 122-123 (1980); W. Wiecek, The Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution 287-289, 300 (1972); Merritt, 88 Colum. L. Rev., at 70-78; Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 Minn.L.Rev. 513, 560-565 (1962). </s> We need not resolve this difficult question today. Even if we assume that petitioners' claim is justiciable, neither the monetary incentives provided by the Act nor the possibility that a State's waste producers may find themselves excluded from the disposal sites of another State can reasonably be said to deny any State a republican form of government. As we have seen, these two incentives represent permissible conditional exercises of Congress' authority under the Spending and Commerce Clauses respectively, in forms that have now grown commonplace. Under each, Congress offers the States a legitimate choice, rather than issuing an unavoidable command. The States thereby retain the ability to set their legislative agendas; state government officials remain accountable to the local electorate. The twin threats [505 U.S. 144, 186] imposed by the first two challenged provisions of the Act - that New York may miss out on a share of federal spending or that those generating radioactive waste within New York may lose out-of-state disposal outlets - do not pose any realistic risk of altering the form or the method of functioning of New York's government. Thus, even indulging the assumption that the Guarantee Clause provides a basis upon which a State or its subdivisions may sue to enjoin the enforcement of a federal statute, petitioners have not made out such a claim in this case. </s> VI </s> Having determined that the take-title provision exceeds the powers of Congress, we must consider whether it is severable from the rest of the Act. </s> "The standard for determining the severability of an unconstitutional provision is well established: unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law." Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). While the Act itself contains no statement of whether its provisions are severable, "[i]n the absence of a severability clause, . . . Congress' silence is just that - silence - and does not raise a presumption against severability." Id., at 686. Common sense suggests that where Congress has enacted a statutory scheme for an obvious purpose, and where Congress has included a series of provisions operating as incentives to achieve that purpose, the invalidation of one of the incentives should not ordinarily cause Congress' overall intent to be frustrated. As the Court has observed, "it is not to be presumed that the legislature was legislating for the mere sake of imposing penalties, but the penalties . . . were simply in aid of the main purpose of the statute. They may fail, and still the great body of the statute have operative force, and the force contemplated by the legislature in its [505 U.S. 144, 187] enactment." Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 396 (1894). See also United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 -586 (1968). </s> It is apparent in light of these principles that the take title provision may be severed without doing violence to the rest of the Act. The Act is still operative, and it still serves Congress' objective of encouraging the States to attain local or regional self-sufficiency in the disposal of low level radioactive waste. It still includes two incentives that coax the States along this road. A State whose radioactive waste generators are unable to gain access to disposal sites in other States may encounter considerable internal pressure to provide for the disposal of waste, even without the prospect of taking title. The sited regional compacts need not accept New York's waste after the 7-year transition period expires, so any burden caused by New York's failure to secure a disposal site will not be borne by the residents of other States. The purpose of the Act is not defeated by the invalidation of the take-title provision, so we may leave the remainder of the Act in force. </s> VII </s> Some truths are so basic that, like the air around us, they are easily overlooked. Much of the Constitution is concerned with setting forth the form of our government, and the courts have traditionally invalidated measures deviating from that form. The result may appear "formalistic" in a given case to partisans of the measure at issue, because such measures are typically the product of the era's perceived necessity. But the Constitution protects us from our own best intentions: it divides power among sovereigns and among branches of government precisely so that we may resist the temptation to concentrate power in one location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the day. The shortage of disposal sites for radioactive waste is a pressing national problem, but a judiciary that licensed extraconstitutional [505 U.S. 144, 188] government with each issue of comparable gravity would, in the long run, be far worse. </s> States are not mere political subdivisions of the United States. State governments are neither regional offices nor administrative agencies of the Federal Government. The positions occupied by state officials appear nowhere on the Federal Government's most detailed organizational chart. The Constitution instead "leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty," The Federalist No. 39, p. 246 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961), reserved explicitly to the States by the Tenth Amendment. </s> Whatever the outer limits of that sovereignty may be, one thing is clear: the Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program. The Constitution permits both the Federal Government and the States to enact legislation regarding the disposal of low level radioactive waste. The Constitution enables the Federal Government to pre-empt state regulation contrary to federal interests, and it permits the Federal Government to hold out incentives to the States as a means of encouraging them to adopt suggested regulatory schemes. It does not, however, authorize Congress simply to direct the States to provide for the disposal of the radioactive waste generated within their borders. While there may be many constitutional methods of achieving regional self-sufficiency in radioactive waste disposal, the method Congress has chosen is not one of them. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly </s> Affirmed in part and reversed in part. </s> JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> The Court today affirms the constitutionality of two facets of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (1985 Act), Pub.L. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842, 42 U.S.C. 2021b et seq. These provisions include the monetary [505 U.S. 144, 189] incentives from surcharges collected by States with low-level radioactive waste storage sites and rebated by the Secretary of Energy to States in compliance with the 1985 Act's deadlines for achieving regional or in-state disposal, see 2021e(d)(2)(A) and 2021e(d)(2)(B)(iv), and the "access incentives," which deny access to disposal sites for States that fail to meet certain deadlines for low-level radioactive waste disposal management 2021e(e)(2). The Court strikes down and severs a third component of the 1985 Act, the "take title" provision, which requires a noncomplying State to take title to or to assume liability for its low-level radioactive waste if it fails to provide for the disposal of such waste by January 1, 1996. 2021e(d)(2)(C). The Court deems this last provision unconstitutional under principles of federalism. Because I believe the Court has mischaracterized the essential inquiry, misanalyzed the inquiry it has chosen to undertake, and undervalued the effect the seriousness of this public policy problem should have on the constitutionality of the take-title provision, I can only join Parts III-A and III-B, and I respectfully dissent from the rest of its opinion and the judgment reversing in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals. </s> I </s> My disagreement with the Court's analysis begins at the basic descriptive level of how the legislation at issue in this case came to be enacted. The Court goes some way toward setting out the bare facts, but its omissions cast the statutory context of the take-title provision in the wrong light. To read the Court's version of events, see ante, at 150-151, one would think that Congress was the sole proponent of a solution to the Nation's low-level radioactive waste problem. Not so. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980 (1980 Act), Pub.L. 96-673, 94 Stat. 3347, and its amendatory 1985 Act, resulted from the efforts of state leaders to achieve a state-based set of remedies to the waste problem. They sought not federal pre-emption or intervention, but [505 U.S. 144, 190] rather congressional sanction of interstate compromises they had reached. </s> The two signal events in 1979 that precipitated movement toward legislation were the temporary closing of the Nevada disposal site in July, 1979, after several serious transportation-related incidents, and the temporary shutting of the Washington disposal site because of similar transportation and packaging problems in October, 1979. At that time, the facility in Barnwell, South Carolina, received approximately three-quarters of the Nation's low-level radioactive waste, and the Governor ordered a 50 percent reduction in the amount his State's plant would accept for disposal. National Governors' Association Task Force on Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal, Low-Level Waste: A Program for Action 3 (Nov. 1980) (lodged with the Clerk of this Court) (hereinafter A Program for Action). The Governor of Washington threatened to shut down the Hanford, Washington, facility entirely by 1982 unless "some meaningful progress occurs toward" development of regional solutions to the waste disposal problem. Id., at 4, n. Only three sites existed in the country for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste, and the "sited" States confronted the undesirable alternatives either of continuing to be the dumping grounds for the entire Nation's low-level waste or of eliminating or reducing in a constitutional manner the amount of waste accepted for disposal. </s> The imminence of a crisis in low-level radioactive waste management cannot be overstated. In December, 1979, the National Governors' Association convened an eight-member task force to coordinate policy proposals on behalf of the States. See Status of Interstate Compacts for the Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive Waste: Hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1983). In May, 1980, the State Planning Council on Radioactive Waste Management submitted the following unanimous recommendation to President Carter: [505 U.S. 144, 191] </s> "The national policy of the United States on low-level radioactive waste shall be that every State is responsible for the disposal of the low-level radioactive waste generated by nondefense related activities within its boundaries, and that States are authorized to enter into interstate compacts, as necessary, for the purpose of carrying out this responsibility." 126 Cong.Rec. 20135 (1980). </s> This recommendation was adopted by the National Governors' Association a few months later. See A Program for Action 6-7; H. R. Rep. No. 99-314, pt. 2, p. 18 (1985). The Governors recognized that the Federal Government could assert its preeminence in achieving a solution to this problem, but requested instead that Congress oversee state-developed regional solutions. Accordingly, the Governors' Task Force urged that "each state should accept primary responsibility for the safe disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated within its borders," and that "the states should pursue a regional approach to the low-level waste disposal problem." A Program for Action 6. </s> The Governors went further, however, in recommending that "Congress should authorize the states to enter into interstate compacts to establish regional disposal sites" and that "[s]uch authorization should include the power to exclude waste generated outside the region from the regional disposal site." Id., at 7. The Governors had an obvious incentive in urging Congress not to add more coercive measures to the legislation should the States fail to comply, but they nevertheless anticipated that Congress might eventually have to take stronger steps to ensure compliance with long-range planning deadlines for low-level radioactive waste management. Accordingly, the Governors' Task Force </s> "recommend[ed] that Congress defer consideration of sanctions to compel the establishment of new disposal sites until at least two years after the enactment of compact [505 U.S. 144, 192] consent legislation. States are already confronting the diminishing capacity of present sites and an unequivocal political warning from those states' Governors. If at the end of the two-year period, states have not responded effectively, or if problems still exist, stronger federal action may be necessary. But until that time, Congress should confine its role to removing obstacles and allow the states a reasonable chance to solve the problem themselves." Id., at 8-9. </s> Such concerns would have been mooted had Congress enacted a "federal" solution, which the Senate considered in July, 1980. See S. 2189, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); S.Rep. No. 96-548 (1980) (detailing legislation calling for federal study, oversight, and management of radioactive waste). This "federal" solution, however, was opposed by one of the sited State's Senators, who introduced an amendment to adopt and implement the recommendations of the State Planning Council on Radioactive Waste Management. See 126 Cong.Rec. 20136 (1980) (statement of Sen. Thurmond). The "state-based" solution carried the day, and, as enacted, the 1980 Act announced the "policy of the Federal Government that . . . each State is responsible for providing for the availability of capacity either within or outside the State for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated within its borders." Pub.L. 96-573, 4(a)(1), 94 Stat. 3348. The Act further authorized States to enter into such compacts as may be necessary to provide for the establishment and operation of regional disposal facilities for low-level radioactive waste," 4(a)(2)(A), compacts to which Congress would have to give its consent. 4(a)(2)(B). The 1980 Act also provided that, beginning on January 1, 1986, an approved compact could reserve access to its disposal facilities for those States which had joined that particular regional compact. Ibid. </s> As well described by one of the amici, the attempts by States to enter into compacts and to gain congressional [505 U.S. 144, 193] approval sparked a new round of political squabbling between elected officials from unsited States, who generally opposed ratification of the compacts that were being formed, and their counterparts from the sited States, who insisted that the promises made in the 1980 Act be honored. See Brief for American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as Amicus Curiae 12-14. In its effort to keep the States at the forefront of the policy amendment process, the National Governors' Association organized more than a dozen meetings to achieve a state consensus. See H. Brown, The Low-Level Waste Handbook: A User's Guide to the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, p. iv (Nov. 1986) (describing "the states' desire to influence any revisions of the 1980 Act"). </s> These discussions were not merely academic. The sited States grew increasingly and justifiably frustrated by the seeming inaction of unsited States in meeting the projected actions called for in the 1980 Act. Thus, as the end of 1985 approached, the sited States viewed the January 1, 1986, deadline established in the 1980 Act as a "drop-dead" date, on which the regional compacts could begin excluding the entry of out-of-region waste. See 131 Cong.Rec. 35203 (1985). Since, by this time, the three disposal facilities operating in 1980 were still the only such plants accepting low-level radioactive waste, the unsited States perceived a very serious danger if the three existing facilities actually carried out their threat to restrict access to the waste generated solely within their respective compact regions. </s> A movement thus arose to achieve a compromise between the sited and the unsited States, in which the sited States agreed to continue accepting waste in exchange for the imposition of stronger measures to guarantee compliance with the unsited States' assurances that they would develop alternative disposal facilities. As Representative Derrick explained, the compromise 1985 legislation "gives nonsited [505 U.S. 144, 194] States more time to develop disposal sites, but also establishes a very firm timetable and sanctions for failure to live up [to] the agreement." Id., at 35207. Representative Markey added that "[t]his compromise became the basis for our amendments to the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980. In the process of drafting such amendments, various concessions have been made by all sides in an effort to arrive at a bill which all parties could accept." Id., at 35205. The bill that in large measure became the 1985 Act "represent[ed] the diligent negotiating undertaken by" the National Governors' Association and "embodied" the "fundamentals of their settlement." Id., at 35204 (statement of Rep. Udall). In sum, the 1985 Act was very much the product of cooperative federalism, in which the States bargained among themselves to achieve compromises for Congress to sanction. </s> There is no need to resummarize the essentials of the 1985 legislation, which the Court does ante, at 4-6. It does, however, seem critical to emphasize what is accurately described in one amicus brief as the assumption by Congress of "the role of arbiter of disputes among the several States." Brief for Rocky Mountain Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact et al. as Amici Curiae 9. Unlike legislation that directs action from the Federal Government to the States, the 1980 and 1985 Acts reflected hard-fought agreements among States as refereed by Congress. The distinction is key, and the Court's failure properly to characterize this legislation ultimately affects its analysis of the take-title provision's constitutionality. </s> II </s> To justify its holding that the take-title provision contravenes the Constitution, the Court posits that, "[i]n this provision, Congress has crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion." Ante, at 27. Without attempting to understand properly the take-title provision's place in the [505 U.S. 144, 195] interstate bargaining process, the Court isolates the measure analytically and proceeds to dissect it in a syllogistic fashion. The Court candidly begins with an argument respondents do not make: that "the Constitution would not permit Congress simply to transfer radioactive waste from generators to state governments." Ibid. "Such a forced transfer," it continues, "standing alone, would in principle be no different than a congressionally compelled subsidy from state governments to radioactive waste producers." Ibid. Since this is not an argument respondents make, one naturally wonders why the Court builds its analysis that the take title provision is unconstitutional around this opening premise. But having carefully built its straw man, the Court proceeds impressively to knock him down. "As we have seen," the Court teaches, "the Constitution does not empower Congress to subject state governments to this type of instruction." Ante, at 176. </s> Curiously absent from the Court's analysis is any effort to place the take-title provision within the overall context of the legislation. As the discussion in Part I of this opinion suggests, the 1980 and 1985 statutes were enacted against a backdrop of national concern over the availability of additional low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities. Congress could have pre-empted the field by directly regulating the disposal of this waste pursuant to its powers under the Commerce and Spending Clauses, but instead it unanimously assented to the States' request for congressional ratification of agreements to which they had acceded. See 131 Cong.Rec. 35252 (1985); id., at 38425. As the floor statements of Members of Congress reveal, see supra, at 193-194, the States wished to take the lead in achieving a solution to this problem and agreed among themselves to the various incentives and penalties implemented by Congress to ensure [505 U.S. 144, 196] adherence to the various deadlines and goals. 1 The chief executives of the States proposed this approach, and I am unmoved by the Court's vehemence in taking away Congress' authority to sanction a recalcitrant unsited State now that New York has reaped the benefits of the sited States' concessions. </s> A </s> In my view, New York's actions subsequent to enactment of the 1980 and 1986 Acts fairly indicate its approval of the interstate agreement process embodied in those laws within the meaning of Art. I, 10, cl. 3, of the Constitution, which provides that "[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State." First, the States - including New York - worked through their Governors to petition Congress for the 1980 and 1985 Acts. As I have attempted to demonstrate, these statutes are best understood as the products of collective state action, rather than as impositions placed on States by the Federal Government. Second, New York acted in compliance with the requisites of both statutes in key respects, thus signifying its assent to the agreement achieved among the States as codified in these laws. After enactment of the 1980 Act and pursuant to its provision in 4(a)(2), 94 Stat. 3348, New York entered into compact negotiations with several other northeastern States before withdrawing from them to "go it alone." Indeed, in 1985, as the January 1, 1986, deadline crisis approached and Congress considered the 1985 legislation that is the subject of this lawsuit, the Deputy Commissioner for Policy and Planning of the New [505 U.S. 144, 197] York State Energy Office testified before Congress that "New York State supports the efforts of Mr. Udall and the members of this Subcommittee to resolve the current impasse over Congressional consent to the proposed LLRW compacts and provide interim access for states and regions without sites. New York State has been participating with the National Governors' Association and the other large states and compact commissions in an effort to further refine the recommended approach in HR 1083 and reach a consensus between all groups." See Low-Level Waste Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 862, H.R. 1046, H.R. 1083, and H.R. 1267 before the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 197 (1985) (testimony of Charles Guinn) (emphasis added). </s> Based on the assumption that "other states will [not] continue indefinitely to provide access to facilities adequate for the permanent disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated in New York," 1986 N. Y. Laws, ch. 673, 2, the state legislature enacted a law providing for a waste disposal facility to be sited in the State. Ibid. This measure comported with the 1985 Act's proviso that States which did not join a regional compact by July 1, 1986, would have to establish an in-state waste disposal facility. See 42 U.S.C. 2021e(e)(1)(A). New York also complied with another provision of the 1985 Act, 2021e(e)(1)(B), which provided that, by January 1, 1988, each compact or independent State would identify a facility location and develop a siting plan, or contract with a sited compact for access to that region's facility. By 1988, New York had identified five potential sites in Cortland and Allegany Counties, but public opposition there caused the State to reconsider where to locate its waste disposal facility. See Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, U.S. Dept. of Energy, Report to Congress in Response to Public Law 99-240: 1990 Annual Report on Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Progress 32-35 [505 U.S. 144, 198] (1991) (lodged with the Clerk of this Court). As it was undertaking these initial steps to honor the interstate compromise embodied in the 1985 Act, New York continued to take full advantage of the import concession made by the sited States, by exporting its low-level radioactive waste for the full 7-year extension period provided in the 1985 Act. By gaining these benefits and complying with certain of the 1985 Act's deadlines, therefore, New York fairly evidenced its acceptance of the federal-state arrangement - including the take title provision. </s> Although, unlike the 42 States that compose the nine existing and approved regional compacts, see Brief for United States 10, n. 19, New York has never formalized its assent to the 1980 and 1985 statutes, our cases support the view that New York's actions signify assent to a constitutional interstate "agreement" for purposes of Art. I, 10, cl. 3. In Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540 (1840), Chief Justice Taney stated that "[t]he word "agreement" does not necessarily import any direct and express stipulation; nor is it necessary that it should be in writing. If there is a verbal understanding to which both parties have assented, and upon which both are acting, it is an "agreement." And the use of all of these terms, "treaty," "agreement," "compact," show that it was the intention of the framers of the Constitution to use the broadest and most comprehensive terms; . . . and we shall fail to execute that evident intention, unless we give to the word "agreement" its most extended signification; and so apply it as to prohibit every agreement, written or verbal, formal or informal, positive or implied, by the mutual understanding of the parties." Id., at 572. (emphasis added). In my view, New York acted in a manner to signify its assent to the 1985 Act's take title provision as part of the elaborate compromise reached among the States. </s> The State should be estopped from asserting the unconstitutionality of a provision that seeks merely to ensure that, after deriving substantial advantages from the 1985 Act, [505 U.S. 144, 199] New York in fact must live up to its bargain by establishing an in-state low-level radioactive waste facility or assuming liability for its failure to act. Cf. West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 35 -36 (1951), Jackson, J., concurring: "West Virginia officials induced sister States to contract with her and Congress to consent to the Compact. She now attempts to read herself out of this interstate Compact . . . . Estoppel is not often to be invoked against a government. But West Virginia assumed a contractual obligation with equals by permission of another government that is sovereign in the field. After Congress and sister States had been induced to alter their positions and bind themselves to terms of a covenant, West Virginia should be estopped from repudiating her act." (Emphasis added.) </s> B </s> Even were New York not to be estopped from challenging the take-title provision's constitutionality, I am convinced that, seen as a term of an agreement entered into between the several States, this measure proves to be less constitutionally odious than the Court opines. First, the practical effect of New York's position is that, because it is unwilling to honor its obligations to provide in-state storage facilities for its low-level radioactive waste, other States with such plants must accept New York's waste, whether they wish to or not. Otherwise, the many economically and socially beneficial producers of such waste in the State would have to cease their operations. The Court's refusal to force New York to accept responsibility for its own problem inevitably means that some other State's sovereignty will be impinged by it being forced, for public health reasons, to accept New York's low-level radioactive waste. I do not understand the principle of federalism to impede the National Government from acting as referee among the States to prohibit one from bullying another. [505 U.S. 144, 200] </s> Moreover, it is utterly reasonable that, in crafting a delicate compromise between the three overburdened States that provided low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities and the rest of the States, Congress would have to ratify some punitive measure as the ultimate sanction for noncompliance. The take title provision, though surely onerous, does not take effect if the generator of the waste does not request such action, or if the State lives up to its bargain of providing a waste disposal facility either within the State or in another State pursuant to a regional compact arrangement or a separate contract. See 42 U.S.C. 2021e(d)(2)(C). </s> Finally, to say, as the Court does, that the incursion on state sovereignty "cannot be ratified by the `consent' of state officials," ante, at 34, is flatly wrong. In a case involving a congressional ratification statute to an interstate compact, the Court upheld a provision that Tennessee and Missouri had waived their immunity from suit. Over their objection, the Court held that "[t]he States who are parties to the compact by accepting it and acting under it assume the conditions that Congress under the Constitution attached." Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 281 -282 (1959) (emphasis added). In so holding, the Court determined that a State may be found to have waived a fundamental aspect of its sovereignty - the right to be immune from suit - in the formation of an interstate compact even when, in subsequent litigation, it expressly denied its waiver. I fail to understand the reasoning behind the Court's selective distinctions among the various aspects of sovereignty that may and may not be waived, and do not believe these distinctions will survive close analysis in future cases. Hard public policy choices sometimes require strong measures, and the Court's holding, while not irremediable, essentially misunderstands that the 1985 take title provision was part of a complex interstate agreement about which New York should not now be permitted to complain. [505 U.S. 144, 201] </s> III </s> The Court announces that it has no occasion to revisit such decisions as Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983); and National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); see ante, at 13, because "this is not a case in which Congress has subjected a State to the same legislation applicable to private parties." Ibid. Although this statement sends the welcome signal that the Court does not intend to cut a wide swath through our recent Tenth Amendment precedents, it nevertheless is unpersuasive. I have several difficulties with the Court's analysis in this respect: It builds its rule around an insupportable and illogical distinction in the types of alleged incursions on state sovereignty; it derives its rule from cases that do not support its analysis; it failsto apply the appropriate tests from the cases on which it purports to base its rule; and it omits any discussion of the most recent and pertinent test for determining the take-title provision's constitutionality. </s> The Court's distinction between a federal statute's regulation of States and private parties for general purposes, as opposed to a regulation solely on the activities of States, is unsupported by our recent Tenth Amendment cases. In no case has the Court rested its holding on such a distinction. Moreover, the Court makes no effort to explain why this purported distinction should affect the analysis of Congress' power under general principles of federalism and the Tenth Amendment. The distinction, facilely thrown out, is not based on any defensible theory. Certainly one would be hard pressed to read the spirited exchanges between the Court and dissenting Justices in National League of Cities, supra, and in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, supra, as having been based on the distinction now drawn by the Court. An incursion on state sovereignty [505 U.S. 144, 202] hardly seems more constitutionally acceptable if the federal statute that "commands" specific action also applies to private parties. The alleged diminution in state authority over its own affairs is not any less because the federal mandate restricts the activities of private parties. </s> Even were such a distinction to be logically sound, the Court's "anticommandeering" principle cannot persuasively be read as springing from the two cases cited for the proposition, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981), and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761 -762 (1982). The Court purports to draw support for its rule against Congress "commandeer[ing]" state legislative processes from a solitary statement in dictum in Hodel. See ante, at 161: "As an initial matter, Congress may not simply `commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.'" (quoting Hodel, supra,, at 288). That statement was not necessary to the decision in Hodel, which involved the question whether the Tenth Amendment interfered with Congress' authority to pre-empt a field of activity that could also be subject to state regulation, and not whether a federal statute could dictate certain actions by States; the language about "commandeer[ing]" States was classic dicta. In holding that a federal statute regulating the activities of private coal mine operators was constitutional, the Court observed that "[i]t would . . . be a radical departure from long-established precedent for this Court to hold that the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from displacing state police power laws regulating private activity." 452 U.S., at 292 . </s> The Court also claims support for its rule from our decision in FERC, and quotes a passage from that case in which we stated that "`this Court never has sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations.'" Ante, at 161 (quoting 456 U.S., at [505 U.S. 144, 203] 761-762). In so reciting, the Court extracts from the relevant passage in a manner that subtly alters the Court's meaning. In full, the passage reads: "While this Court never has sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations, cf. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977), there are instances where the Court has upheld federal statutory structures that in effect directed state decisionmakers to take or to refrain from taking certain actions." Ibid. (citing Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975)) (emphasis added)). 2 The phrase highlighted by the Court merely means that we have not had the occasion to address whether Congress may "command" the States to enact a certain law, and, as I have argued in Parts I and II of this opinion, this case does not raise that issue. Moreover, it should go without saying that the absence of any on-point precedent from this Court has no bearing on the question whether Congress has properly exercised its constitutional authority under Article I. Silence by this Court on a subject is not authority for anything. </s> The Court can scarcely rest on a distinction between federal laws of general applicability and those ostensibly directed solely at the activities of States, therefore, when the decisions from which it derives the rule not only made no such distinction, but validated federal statutes that constricted state sovereignty in ways greater than or similar to [505 U.S. 144, 204] the take title provision at issue in this case. As Fry, Hodel, and FERC make clear, our precedents prior to Garcia upheld provisions in federal statutes that directed States to undertake certain actions. "[I]t cannot be constitutionally determinative that the federal regulation is likely to move the States to act in a given way," we stated in FERC, "or even to `coerc[e] the States' into assuming a regulatory role by affecting their `freedom to make decisions in areas of "integral governmental functions."'" 456 U.S., at 766 . I thus am unconvinced that either Hodel or FERC supports the rule announced by the Court. </s> And if those cases do stand for the proposition that, in certain circumstances, Congress may not dictate that the States take specific actions, it would seem appropriate to apply the test stated in FERC for determining those circumstances. The crucial threshold inquiry in that case was whether the subject matter was pre-emptible by Congress. See 456 U.S., at 765 . "If Congress can require a state administrative body to consider proposed regulations as a condition to its continued involvement in a pre-emptible field - and we hold today that it can - there is nothing unconstitutional about Congress' requiring certain procedural minima as that body goes about undertaking its tasks." Id., at 771 (emphasis added). The FERC Court went on to explain that, if Congress is legislating in a pre-emptible field - as the Court concedes it was doing here, see ante, at 173-174 - the proper test before our decision in Garcia was to assess whether the alleged intrusions on state sovereignty "do not threaten the States' `separate and independent existence,' Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76 (1869); Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911), and do not impair the ability of the States "to function effectively in a federal system." Fry v. United States, 421 U.S., at 547 , n. 7; National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S., at 852 ." FERC, supra, at 765-766. [505 U.S. 144, 205] On neither score does the take title provision raise constitutional problems. It certainly does not threaten New York's independent existence, nor impair its ability to function effectively in the system, all the more so since the provision was enacted pursuant to compromises reached among state leaders and then ratified by Congress. </s> It is clear, therefore, that, even under the precedents selectively chosen by the Court, its analysis of the take-title provision's constitutionality in this case falls far short of being persuasive. I would also submit, in this connection, that the Court's attempt to carve out a doctrinal distinction for statutes that purport solely to regulate state activities is especially unpersuasive after Garcia. It is true that, in that case, we considered whether a federal statute of general applicability - the Fair Labor Standards Act - applied to state transportation entities, but our most recent statements have explained the appropriate analysis in a more general manner. Just last Term, for instance, JUSTICE O'CONNOR wrote for the Court that "[w]e are constrained in our ability to consider the limits that the state-federal balance places on Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (declining to review limitations placed on Congress' Commerce Clause powers by our federal system)." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S., at 464 . Indeed, her opinion went on to state that "this Court in Garcia has left primarily to the political process the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress' Commerce Clause powers." Ibid. (emphasis added). </s> Rather than seek guidance from FERC and Hodel, therefore, the more appropriate analysis should flow from Garcia, even if this case does not involve a congressional law generally applicable to both States and private parties. In Garcia, we stated the proper inquiry: "[W]e are convinced that [505 U.S. 144, 206] the fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the `States as States' is one of process, rather than one of result. Any substantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must find its justification in the procedural nature of this basic limitation, and it must be tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national political process, rather than to dictate a "sacred province of state autonomy.'" 469 U.S., at 554 (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S., at 236 ). Where it addresses this aspect of respondents' argument, see ante, at 180-183, the Court tacitly concedes that a failing of the political process cannot be shown in this case, because it refuses to rebut the unassailable arguments that the States were well able to look after themselves in the legislative process that culminated in the 1985 Act's passage. Indeed, New York acknowledges that its "congressional delegation participated in the drafting and enactment of both the 1980 and the 1985 Acts." Pet. for Cert. in No. 91-543, p. 7. The Court rejects this process-based argument by resorting to generalities and platitudes about the purpose of federalism being to protect individual rights. </s> Ultimately, I suppose, the entire structure of our federal constitutional government can be traced to an interest in establishing checks and balances to prevent the exercise of tyranny against individuals. But these fears seem extremely far distant to me in a situation such as this. We face a crisis of national proportions in the disposal of low-level radioactive waste, and Congress has acceded to the wishes of the States by permitting local decisionmaking, rather than imposing a solution from Washington. New York itself participated and supported passage of this legislation at both the gubernatorial and federal representative levels, and then enacted state laws specifically to comply with the deadlines and timetables agreed upon by the States in the 1985 Act. For [505 U.S. 144, 207] me, the Court's civics lecture has a decidedly hollow ring at a time when action, rather than rhetoric, is needed to solve a national problem. 3 </s> [505 U.S. 144, 208] </s> IV </s> Though I disagree with the Court's conclusion that the take title provision is unconstitutional, I do not read its opinion to preclude Congress from adopting a similar measure through its powers under the Spending or Commerce Clauses. The Court makes clear that its objection is to the alleged "commandeer[ing]" quality of the take title provision. See ante, at 175. As its discussion of the surcharge and rebate incentives reveals, see ante, at 171-172, the spending power offers a means of enacting a take title provision under the Court's standards. Congress could, in other words, condition the payment of funds on the State's willingness to take title if it has not already provided a waste disposal facility. Under the scheme upheld in this case, for example, moneys collected in the surcharge provision might be withheld or disbursed depending on a State's willingness to take title to or otherwise accept responsibility for the low-level radioactive waste generated in state after the statutory deadline for establishing its own waste disposal facility has passed. See ibid.; South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 -209 (1987); Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978). </s> Similarly, should a State fail to establish a waste disposal facility by the appointed deadline (under the statute as presently drafted, January 1, 1996, 2021e(d)(2)(C)), Congress has the power pursuant to the Commerce Clause to regulate directly the producers of the waste. See ante, at 174. Thus, as I read it, Congress could amend the statute to say that, if a State fails to meet the January 1, 1996, deadline for [505 U.S. 144, 209] achieving a means of waste disposal, and has not taken title to the waste, no low-level radioactive waste may be shipped out of the State of New York. See, e.g., Hodel, 452 U.S., at 288 . As the legislative history of the 1980 and 1985 Acts indicates, faced with the choice of federal pre-emptive regulation and self-regulation pursuant to interstate agreement with congressional consent and ratification, the States decisively chose the latter. This background suggests that the threat of federal pre-emption may suffice to induce States to accept responsibility for failing to meet critical time deadlines for solving their low-level radioactive waste disposal problems, especially if that federal intervention also would strip state and local authorities of any input in locating sites for low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities. And of course, should Congress amend the statute to meet the Court's objection and a State refuse to act, the National Legislature will have ensured at least a federal solution to the waste management problem. </s> Finally, our precedents leave open the possibility that Congress may create federal rights of action in the generators of low-level radioactive waste against persons acting under color of state law for their failure to meet certain functions designated in federal-state programs. Thus, we have upheld 1983 suits to enforce certain rights created by statutes enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause, see, e.g., Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., 496 U.S. 498 (1990); Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418 (1987), although Congress must be cautious in spelling out the federal right clearly and distinctly, see, e.g., Suter v. Artist M, 503 U.S. 347 (1992) (not permitting a 1983 suit under a Spending Clause statute when the ostensible federal right created was too vague and amorphous). In addition to compensating injured parties for the State's failure to act, the exposure to liability established by such suits also potentially serves as an inducement to compliance with the program mandate. [505 U.S. 144, 210] </s> V </s> The ultimate irony of the decision today is that, in its formalistically rigid obeisance to "federalism," the Court gives Congress fewer incentives to defer to the wishes of state officials in achieving local solutions to local problems. This legislation was a classic example of Congress acting as arbiter among the States in their attempts to accept responsibility for managing a problem of grave import. The States urged the National Legislature not to impose from Washington a solution to the country's low-level radioactive waste management problems. Instead, they sought a reasonable level of local and regional autonomy consistent with Art. I, 10, cl. 3, of the Constitution. By invalidating the measure designed to ensure compliance for recalcitrant States, such as New York, the Court upsets the delicate compromise achieved among the States, and forces Congress to erect several additional formalistic hurdles to clear before achieving exactly the same objective. Because the Court's justifications for undertaking this step are unpersuasive to me, I respectfully dissent. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 As Senator McClure pointed out: "[T]he actions taken in the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources met the objections and the objectives of the States point by point; and I want to underscore what the Senator from Louisiana has indicated - that it is important that we have real milestones. It is important to note that the discussions between staffs and principals have produced a[n] agreement that does have some real teeth in it at some points." 131 Cong.Rec. 38415 (1985). </s> [Footnote 2 It is true, that under the majority's approach, Fry is distinguishable, because it involved a statute generally applicable to both state governments and private parties. The law at issue in that case was the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, which imposed wage and salary limitations on private and state workers alike. In Fry, the Court upheld this statute's application to the States over a Tenth Amendment challenge. In my view, Fry perfectly captures the weakness of the majority's majority's distinction, because the law upheld in that case involved a far more pervasive intrusion on state sovereignty - the authority of state governments to pay salaries and wages to its employees below the federal minimum - than the take-title provision at issue here. </s> [Footnote 3 With selective quotations from the era in which the Constitution was adopted, the majority attempts to bolster its holding that the take title provision is tantamount to federal "commandeering" of the States. In view of the many Tenth Amendment cases decided over the past two decades in which resort to the kind of historical analysis generated in the majority opinion was not deemed necessary, I do not read the majority's many invocations of history to be anything other than elaborate window dressing. Certainly nowhere does the majority announce that its rule is compelled by an understanding of what the Framers may have thought about statutes of the type at issue here. Moreover, I would observe that, while its quotations add a certain flavor to the opinion, the majority's historical analysis has a distinctly wooden quality. One would not know from reading the majority's account, for instance, that the nature of federal-state relations changed fundamentally after the Civil War. That conflict produced in its wake a tremendous expansion in the scope of the Federal Government's lawmaking authority, so much so that the persons who helped to found the Republic would scarcely have recognized the many added roles the National Government assumed for itself. Moreover, the majority fails to mention the New Deal era, in which the Court recognized the enormous growth in Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. See generally F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 56-59 (1927); H. Hyman, A More Perfect Union: The Impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on the Constitution (1973); Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 Va.L.Rev. 1 (1950); Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 1863-1875, 13 Am.J. Legal Hist. 333 (1969); Scheiber, State Law and "Industrial Policy" in American Development, 1790-1987, 75 Calif.L.Rev. 415 (1987); Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 Yale L.J. 453 (1989). While I believe we should not be blind to history, neither should we read it so selectively as to restrict the proper scope of Congress' powers under Article 1, especially when the history not mentioned by the majority fully supports a more expansive understanding of the legislature's authority than may have existed in the late 18th century. </s> Given the scanty textual support for the majority's position, it would be far more sensible to defer to a coordinate branch of government in its decision to devise a solution to a national problem of this kind. Certainly in other contexts, principles of federalism have not insulated States from mandates by the National Government. The Court has upheld congressional [505 U.S. 144, 208] statutes that impose clear directives on state officials, including those enacted pursuant to the Extradition Clause, see, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 227 -228 (1987), the post-Civil War Amendments, see, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 319 -320 (1966), as well as congressional statutes that require state courts to hear certain actions, see, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392 -394, (1947). </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> Under the Articles of Confederation, the Federal Government had the power to issue commands to the States. See Arts. VIII, IX. Because that indirect exercise of federal power proved ineffective, the Framers of the Constitution empowered the Federal Government to exercise legislative authority directly over individuals within the States, even though that direct authority constituted a greater intrusion on state sovereignty. Nothing in that history suggests that the Federal Government may not also impose its will upon the several States as it did under the Articles. The Constitution enhanced, rather than diminished, the power of the Federal Government. [505 U.S. 144, 211] </s> The notion that Congress does not have the power to issue "a simple command to state governments to implement legislation enacted by Congress," ante, at 28, is incorrect and unsound. There is no such limitation in the Constitution. The Tenth Amendment 1 surely does not impose any limit on Congress' exercise of the powers delegated to it by Article I. 2 Nor does the structure of the constitutional order or the values of federalism mandate such a formal rule. To the contrary, the Federal Government directs state governments in many realms. The Government regulates state-operated railroads, state school systems, state prisons, state elections, and a host of other state functions. Similarly, there can be no doubt that, in time of war, Congress could either draft soldiers itself or command the States to supply their quotas of troops. I see no reason why Congress may not also command the States to enforce federal water and air quality standards or federal standards for the disposition of low-level radioactive wastes. </s> The Constitution gives this Court the power to resolve controversies between the States. Long before Congress [505 U.S. 144, 212] enacted pollution control legislation, this Court crafted a body of "`interstate common law,'" Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 106 (1972), to govern disputes between States involving interstate waters. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 98 -99 (1992). In such contexts, we have not hesitated to direct States to undertake specific actions. For example, we have "impose[d] on States an affirmative duty to take reasonable steps to conserve and augment the water supply of an interstate stream." Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 185 (1982) (citing Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922)). Thus, we unquestionably have the power to command an upstate stream that is polluting the waters of a downstream State to adopt appropriate regulations to implement a federal statutory command. </s> With respect to the problem presented by the case at hand, if litigation should develop between States that have joined a compact, we would surely have the power to grant relief in the form of specific enforcement of the take-title provision. 3 Indeed, even if the statute had never been passed, if one State's radioactive waste created a nuisance that harmed its neighbors, it seems clear that we would have had the power [505 U.S. 144, 213] to command the offending State to take remedial action. Cf. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, supra. If this Court has such authority, surely Congress has similar authority. </s> For these reasons, as well as those set forth by JUSTICE WHITE, I respectfully dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." </s> [Footnote 2 In United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), we explained: "The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between the national and state governments as it had been established by the Constitution before the amendment, or that its purpose was other than to allay fears that the new national government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers. See e.g., II Elliot's Debates, 123, 131, III id. 450, 464, 600; IV id. 140, 149; I Annals of Congress, 432, 761, 767-768; Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, 1907-1908. </s> "From the beginning and for many years, the amendment has been construed as not depriving the national government of authority to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end." Id., at 124; see also ante, at 155-157. </s> [Footnote 3 Even if 2021e(d)(2)(C) is "invalidated" insofar as it applies to the State of New York, it remains enforceable against the 44 States that have joined interstate compacts approved by Congress, because the compacting States have, in their agreements, embraced that provision, and given it independent effect. Congress' consent to the compacts was "granted subject to the provisions of the [Act] . . . and only for so long as the [entities] established in the compact comply with all the provisions of [the] Act." Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact Consent Act, Pub. L. 100-319, 102 Stat. 471. Thus, the compacts incorporated the provisions of the Act, including the take title provision. These compacts, the product of voluntary interstate cooperation, unquestionably survive the "invalidation" of 2021e(d)(2)(C) as it applies to New York. Congress did not "direc[t]" the States to enter into these compacts, and the decision of each compacting State to enter into a compact was not influenced by the existence of the take title provision: whether a State went its own way or joined a compact, it was still subject to the take-title provision. </s> [505 U.S. 144, 214]

United States Supreme Court KEITH LANCE ET AL. v. MIKE COFFMAN, COLORADO SECRETARY OF STATE(2007) No. 06-641 Argued: Decided: March 5, 2007 </s> Per Curiam. </s> The Elections Clause of the United States Constitution provides that the "Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators." Art. I, §4, cl.1 (emphasis added). When Colorado legislators were unable to redraw congressional districts after the 2000 census to accommodate an additional Representative, a state court did it for them. See Beauprez v. Avalos, 42 P.3d 642 (Colo. 2002) (en banc). The legislature was able to pass a redistricting plan in 2003, which Colorado's Governor signed into law. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §2-1-101. </s> Colorado's attorney general, however, filed an original action in the Colorado Supreme Court to enjoin Colorado's secretary of state from implementing this new plan, noting that Article V, §44, of the Colorado Constitution limits redistricting to once per census. The Colorado General Assembly intervened in the action to defend its plan. The Colorado Supreme Court granted the injunction, holding that "judicially-created districts are just as binding and permanent as districts created by the General Assembly," and that the court-drawn plan must remain in effect until the next decennial census. People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1231 (2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1093 (2004). The court further held that this result did not offend the Elections Clause of the United States Constitution. 79 P.3d, at 1232. </s> Immediately after Salazar was decided, four Colorado citizens--none of whom had participated in Salazar--filed the instant action in Federal District Court. They argued that Article V, §44, of the Colorado Constitution, as interpreted by the Colorado Supreme Court, violates their rights under the Elections Clause. </s> The District Court initially determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the suit in light of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, but we vacated and remanded for further proceedings. Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006) (per curiam). On remand, the District Court held that the citizen-plaintiffs had standing to bring their Elections Clause challenge. Lance v. Dennis, 444 F.Supp. 2d 1149, 1154-1155 (2006). The court went on, however, to hold that the suit was barred by issue preclusion because the plaintiffs "stand in privity with the Secretary of State and the General Assembly," who were on the losing side in the Salazar litigation. 444 F.Supp. 2d, at 1161. The concurring judge concluded that appellants lacked standing to sue in the first place. Id., at 1162 (Porfilio, J., concurring in result). Plaintiffs appeal once again. </s> Federal courts must determine that they have jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits. Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998).** Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to "Cases" and "Controversies." One component of the case-or-controversy requirement is standing, which requires a plaintiff to demonstrate the now-familiar elements of injury in fact, causation, and redressability. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992). "We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government--claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large--does not state an Article III case or controversy." Id., at 573-574. See also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. ___, ___ (2006) (slip op., at 8) (refusing to create an exception to the general prohibition on taxpayer standing for challenges to state tax or spending decisions, and observing that taxpayer standing has been rejected "because the alleged injury is not 'concrete and particularized,' but instead a grievance the taxpayer 'suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally'" (citation omitted)). </s> Our refusal to serve as a forum for generalized grievances has a lengthy pedigree. In Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922), for example, a citizen sued the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to challenge the procedures by which the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified. We dismissed the suit because it was "not a case within the meaning of ... Article III." Id., at 129. The plaintiff sought to assert "only the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government be administered according to law and that the public moneys be not wasted." Ibid. "Obviously," we held, "this general right does not entitle a private citizen to institute [a suit] in the federal courts." Id., at 129-130. </s> Similarly, in Ex parte Lévitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam), we dismissed a citizen suit claiming that Justice Black's appointment to this Court contravened the Constitution's Ineligibility Clause, Art.I, §6, cl.2. We found that the petitioner had no interest in the suit "other than that of a citizen and a member of the bar of this Court." 302 U.S., at 634. That was not enough. To have standing, we observed, a plaintiff must have more than "a general interest common to all members of the public." Ibid. See also Frothingham v. Mellon, decided with Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (taxpayer standing cannot be predicated upon an injury the plaintiff "suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally"). Cf. Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405, 406 (1900) ("[E]ven in a proceeding which he prosecutes for the benefit of the public ... [the plaintiff] must generally aver an injury peculiar to himself, as distinguished from the great body of his fellow citizens"). </s> A pair of more recent cases further illustrates the point. In United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974), a federal taxpayer challenged the Government's failure to disclose certain CIA expenditures as a violation of the Constitution's Accounts Clause, which requires that "a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time." Art.I, §9, cl.7. Relying on Lévitt, this Court dismissed the claim as a "generalized grievance" that is "plainly undifferentiated and 'common to all members of the public.'" Richardson, 418 U.S., at 176-177. See also id., at 191 (Powell, J., concurring) ("The power recognized in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), is a potent one. Its prudent use seems to me incompatible with unlimited notions of taxpayer and citizen standing"). </s> The same day, in Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), we addressed standing to bring a challenge under the Constitution's Incompatibility Clause, which provides that "no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office." Art.I, §6, cl.2. Citizen-taxpayers brought a lawsuit contending that Members of Congress who were also members of the military Reserves violated the Incompatibility Clause. This Court dismissed for lack of standing. It "reaffirm[ed] Lévitt in holding that standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interest of the kind alleged here which is held in common by all members of the public, because of the necessarily abstract nature of the injury all citizens share." 418 U.S., at 220. Refusing to entertain generalized grievances ensures that "there is a real need to exercise the power of judicial review" in a particular case, and it helps guarantee that courts fashion remedies "no broader than required by the precise facts to which the court's ruling would be applied." Id., at 221-222. In short, it ensures that courts exercise power that is judicial in nature. </s> The instant case parallels Fairchild, Lévitt, and their progeny. The plaintiffs here are four Colorado voters. Three days after the Colorado Supreme Court issued its decision in Salazar, they filed a complaint alleging that "Article V, §44 of the Colorado Constitution, as interpreted in Salazar, violated [the Elections Clause] of the U.S. Constitution by depriving the state legislature of its responsibility to draw congressional districts." Lance v. Davidson, 379 F.Supp. 2d 1117, 1122 (2005). In light of the discussion above, the problem with this allegation should be obvious: The only injury plaintiffs allege is that the law--specifically the Elections Clause--has not been followed. This injury is precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the conduct of government that we have refused to countenance in the past. It is quite different from the sorts of injuries alleged by plaintiffs in voting rights cases where we have found standing. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207-208 (1962). Because plaintiffs assert no particularized stake in the litigation, we hold that they lack standing to bring their Elections Clause claim. </s> Our two decisions construing the term "Legislature" in the Elections Clause do not contradict this holding. Each of these cases was filed by a relator on behalf of the State rather than private citizens acting on their own behalf, as is the case here. See State ex rel. Smiley v. Holm, 184 Min. 647, 238 N.W. 792 (1931) (per curiam), rev'd subnom. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932); Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916). In neither case did we address whether a private citizen had alleged a "concrete and particularized" injury sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article III. </s> The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado is therefore vacated in part, and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss the Elections Clause claim for lack of standing. We affirm the District Court's dismissal of the Petition Clause claim. It is so ordered. </s> FOOTNOTESFootnote **Our prior decision in this case did not violate this principle because Rooker-Feldman concerns a district court's subject-matter jurisdiction, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005), and "there is no unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy," Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 578 (1999).

United States Supreme Court RICHARDS v. UNITED STATES(1962) No. 59 Argued: November 15, 1961Decided: February 26, 1962 </s> Petitioners are the personal representatives of passengers killed when a commercial airplane crashed in Missouri while en route from Oklahoma to New York. The maximum amount recoverable under the Missouri Wrongful Death Act had either been paid or tendered to them by the airline; but they sued in a Federal District Court in Oklahoma to recover from the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act additional amounts which they claimed to be due them under the Oklahoma Wrongful Death Act, which contains no limitation on the amount a single person may recover from a tortfeasor. They claimed that the Government, through the Federal Aviation Agency, had negligently failed to enforce the terms of the Civil Aeronautics Act and regulations thereunder which prohibited the practices then being used by the airline in its overhaul depot in Oklahoma. The District Court dismissed the complaint and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: The judgment is affirmed. Pp. 2-16. </s> (a) In the Tort Claims Act, Congress has enacted a rule which requires federal courts, in multistate tort actions, to look in the first instance to the law of the State where the acts of negligence took place. Pp. 6-10. </s> (b) A reading of the statute as a whole, with due regard to its purpose, requires application of the whole law of the State where [369 U.S. 1, 2] the act or omission occurred, including its choice-of-laws rules. Pp. 10-15. </s> (c) Both the Federal District Court in Oklahoma and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit have interpreted the pertinent Oklahoma decisions as declaring that an action for wrongful death is based on the statute of the place where the injury occurred that caused the death; that determination of the question of state law is accepted by this Court and is controlling here; the Missouri statute, therefore, controls this case; and petitioners have failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted. Pp. 15-16. </s> 285 F.2d 521, affirmed. </s> Truman B. Rucker argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Edward M. O'Brien. </s> Richard J. Medalie argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Orrick, Alan S. Rosenthal and Sherman L. Cohn. </s> W. B. Patterson argued the cause for American Airlines, Inc., respondent. With him on the briefs was Fred M. Mock. </s> MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The question to be decided in this case is what law a Federal District Court should apply in an action brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act 1 where an act of negligence occurs in one State and results in an injury and death in another State. The basic provision of the Tort Claims Act states that the Government shall be liable for tortious conduct committed by its employees acting within the scope of their employment "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the [369 U.S. 1, 3] law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 2 The parties urge that the alternatives in selecting the law to determine liability under this statute are: (1) the internal law of the place where the negligence occurred, or (2) the whole law (including choice-of-law rules) of the place where the negligence occurred, or (3) the internal law of the place where the operative effect of the negligence took place. </s> Although the particular facts of this case are relatively unimportant in deciding the question before us, a brief recitation of them is necessary to set the context for our decision. The petitioners are the personal representatives of passengers killed when an airplane, owned by the respondent American Airlines, crashed in Missouri while en route from Tulsa, Oklahoma, to New York City. Suit was brought by the petitioners against the United States in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, on the theory that the Government, through the Federal Aviation Agency, had "negligently failed to enforce the terms of the Civil Aeronautics Act and the regulations thereunder which prohibited the practices then being used by American Airlines, Inc., in the overhaul depot of Tulsa, Oklahoma." 3 The petitioners in each case either had already received a $15,000 settlement from the Airlines, the maximum amount recoverable under the Missouri Wrongful Death Act, 4 or had been tendered that amount. They sought additional amounts from the United States under the Oklahoma Wrongful [369 U.S. 1, 4] Death Act 5 which contains no limitation on the amount a single person may recover from a tortfeasor. The Government filed a third-party complaint against American Airlines, seeking reimbursement for any amount that the petitioners might recover against the United States. </s> After a pretrial hearing, the District Court ruled that the complaints failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted under the Oklahoma Act since that statute could not be applied extraterritorially "where an act or omission occurring in Oklahoma results in injury and death in the State of Missouri." 6 Alternatively, the court noted that if Oklahoma law was applicable under the Federal Tort Claims Act, "then the general law of Oklahoma, including its conflicts of law rule, is applicable thereunder," thus precluding further recovery since the Oklahoma conflicts rule would refer the court to the law of Missouri, the place where the negligence had its operative effect. 7 In dismissing the petitioners' complaints against the United States, the court found it unnecessary to pass upon the third-party complaint asserted by the Government against American. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment by a divided vote, 8 the majority agreeing with the lower court that the complaints failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be based under either the Oklahoma or the Missouri Wrongful Death Act. In dissent, the chief judge, believing that Congress intended the internal law of the place where the act or omission occurred to control the rights and liabilities of the parties, stated that he thought it was error to apply the Oklahoma [369 U.S. 1, 5] conflict-of-laws rule, and would have remanded the case for a determination of liability under the Oklahoma Act. </s> That the question confronting us is an important one and of a recurring nature is made apparent by the conflicting views expressed in its solution by the lower federal courts. In the five circuits in which it has arisen, resolution of the question has been reached by adoption of one or another of the alternatives urged upon us by the parties to this suit. The petitioners' contention, that the reference in Section 1346 (b) to the "place where the act or omission occurred" directs application of only the internal law of that State - here, Oklahoma - is supported by the Seventh Circuit's decision in Voytas v. United States, 256 F.2d 786, and by the District of Columbia Circuit in Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 95 U.S. App. D.C. 189, 221 F.2d 62, as well as by the dissenting judge of the Tenth Circuit in the instant case. The Government's interpretation of the Act, that in order also to give effect to Section 2674, 9 providing that the United States shall be liable in the same manner as a private individual, a court must refer to the whole law of the State where the act or omission occurred, was adhered to by the Second Circuit in Landon v. United States, 197 F.2d 128, as well as by the Tenth Circuit in the case at bar. American Airlines, although willing to abide by the interpretation advanced by the Government, suggests, as an alternative, that the internal law of the place where the negligence had its operative effect - here, Missouri - should control. This construction of the Act is supported by the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Marshall, 230 F.2d 183, and by the dissenting opinion in the Union Trust case, supra. It was to resolve the threefold conflict and to enunciate a rule that can be applied uniformly in Tort Claims Act cases that we granted certiorari. 366 U.S. 916 . [369 U.S. 1, 6] </s> I. </s> The principal provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act, originally enacted as Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 10 is Section 1346 (b), reading in pertinent part: </s> ". . . the district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." </s> Section 2674, also relevant to our decision, provides: </s> "The United States shall be liable, respecting . . . tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages." </s> The Tort Claims Act was designed primarily to remove the sovereign immunity of the United States from suits in tort and, with certain specific exceptions, to render the Government liable in tort as a private individual would be under like circumstances. 11 It is evident that the Act was not patterned to operate with complete independence [369 U.S. 1, 7] from the principles of law developed in the common law and refined by statute and judicial decision in the various States. Rather, it was designed to build upon the legal relationships formulated and characterized by the States, and, to that extent, the statutory scheme is exemplary of the generally interstitial character of federal law. If Congress had meant to alter or supplant the legal relationships developed by the States, it could specifically have done so to further the limited objectives of the Tort Claims Act. That is, notwithstanding the generally interstitial character of the law, Congress, in waiving the immunity of the Government for tortious conduct of its employees, could have imposed restrictions and conditions on the extent and substance of its liability. 12 We must determine whether, and to what extent, Congress exercised this power in selecting a rule for the choice of laws to be applied in suits brought under the Act. And, because the issue of the applicable law is controlled by a formal expression of the will of Congress, we need not pause to consider the question whether the conflict-of-laws rule applied in suits where federal jurisdiction rests upon diversity of citizenship shall be extended to a case such as this, in which jurisdiction is based upon a federal statute. 13 In addition, and even though Congress has left to judicial implication the task of giving content to its will in selecting the controlling law, because of the formal expression found in the Act itself, we are presented with a situation wholly distinguishable from those cases in which our initial inquiry has been whether the appropriate rule should be the simple adoption of state [369 U.S. 1, 8] law. 14 Here, we must decide, first, to which State the words "where the act or omission occurred" direct us, and, second, whether application of the internal law or the whole law of that State would be most consistent with the legislative purpose in enacting the Tort Claims Act. </s> II. </s> The legislative history of the Act, although generally extensive, 15 is not, except in a negative way, helpful in solving the problem of the law to be applied in a multi-state tort action such as is presented by the facts of this case. It has been repeatedly observed that Congress did not consider choice-of-law problems during the long period that the legislation was being prepared for enactment. 16 The concern of Congress, as illustrated by the legislative history, 17 was the problem of a person injured by an employee operating a government vehicle or otherwise acting within the scope of his employment, situations [369 U.S. 1, 9] rarely involving a conflict-of-laws question. 18 In these instances, where the negligence and the injury normally occur simultaneously and in a single jurisdiction, the law to be applied is clear, and no solution to the meaning of the words "the law of the place where the act or omission occurred" is required. Here, however, we are faced with events touching more than one "place" - a problem which Congress apparently did not explicitly consider - and, thus, we are compelled to give content to those critical words. </s> In the Tort Claims Act Congress has expressly stated that the Government's liability is to be determined by the application of a particular law, the law of the place where the act or omission occurred, 19 and we must, of course, start with the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used. We believe that it would be difficult to conceive of any more precise language Congress could have used to command application of the law of the place where the negligence occurred than the words it did employ in the Tort Claims Act. Thus we first reject the alternative urged by American Airlines. The legislative materials cited to us by American 20 not only lack probative force [369 U.S. 1, 10] in a judicial sense, but they are completely unpersuasive to support the argument that Congress intended the words "act or omission" to refer to the place where the negligence had its operative effect. The ease of application inherent in the rule urged by American lends a certain attractiveness, but we are bound to operate within the framework of the words chosen by Congress and not to question the wisdom of the latter in the process of construction. We conclude that Congress has, in the Tort Claims Act, enacted a rule which requires federal courts, in multistate tort actions, to look in the first instance to the law of the place where the acts of negligence took place. </s> III. </s> However, our task is not completed. Having rejected the third alternative stated initially as inconsistent with the express terminology of the Act, we must now determine the reach of the words "law of the place." Do they embrace the whole law of the place where the negligence occurred, or only the internal law of that place? This problem, unlike the initial question discussed under II, supra, has not been dealt with by any formal expression of Congress and we must therefore establish the rule to be applied uniformly by lower federal courts, with due regard to the variant interests and policies expressed by the Tort Claims Act legislation. [369 U.S. 1, 11] </s> We believe it fundamental that a section of a statute should not be read in isolation from the context of the whole Act, 21 and that in fulfilling our responsibility in interpreting legislation, "we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but [should] look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy." 22 We should not assume that Congress intended to set the courts completely adrift from state law with regard to questions for which it has not provided a specific and definite answer in an act such as the one before us which, as we have indicated, is so intimately related to state law. Thus, we conclude that a reading of the statute as a whole, with due regard to its purpose, requires application of the whole law of the State where the act or omission occurred. </s> We are led to our conclusion by other persuasive factors notwithstanding the fact that the very conflict among the lower federal courts that we must here resolve illustrates the also reasonable alternative view expressed by the petitioners. First, our interpretation enables the federal courts to treat the United States as a "private individual under like circumstances," and thus is consistent with the Act considered as a whole. 23 The general conflict-of-laws rule, followed by a vast majority of the States, 24 is to apply the law of the place of injury to the [369 U.S. 1, 12] substantive rights of the parties. Therefore, where the forum State is the same as the one in which the act or omission occurred, our interpretation will enable the federal courts to treat the United States as an individual would be treated under like circumstances. 25 Moreover, this interpretation of the Act provides a degree of flexibility to the law to be applied in federal courts that would not be possible under the view advanced either by the petitioners or by American. Recently there has been a tendency on the part of some States to depart from the general conflicts rule in order to take into account the interests of the State having significant contact with the parties to the litigation. 26 We can see no compelling reason to saddle the Act with an interpretation that would [369 U.S. 1, 13] prevent the federal courts from implementing this policy in choice-of-law rules where the State in which the negligence occurred has adopted it. Should the States continue this rejection of the older rule in those situations where its application might appear inappropriate or inequitable, 27 the flexibility inherent in our interpretation will also be more in step with that judicial approach, as well as with the character of the legislation and with the purpose of the Act considered as a whole. </s> In the absence of persuasive evidence to the contrary, we do not believe that Congress intended to adopt the inflexible rule urged upon us by the petitioners. Despite the power of Congress to enact for litigation of this type a federal conflict-of-laws rule independent of the States' development of such rules, we should not, particularly in the type of interstitial legislation involved here, assume that it has done so. Nor are we persuaded to require such an independent federal rule by the petitioners' argument that there are other instances, specifically set forth in the Act, 28 where the liability of the United States is not co-extensive [369 U.S. 1, 14] with that of a private person under state law. It seems sufficient to note that Congress has been specific in those instances where it intended the federal courts to depart completely from state law and, also, that this list of exceptions contains no direct or indirect modification of the principles controlling application of choice-of-law rules. Certainly there is nothing in the legislative history that even remotely supports the argument that Congress did not intend state conflict rules to apply to multistate tort actions brought against the Government. 29 </s> [369 U.S. 1, 15] </s> Under our interpretation of the Act we find it unnecessary to judge the effect of the Oklahoma courts' pronouncements that the Oklahoma Wrongful Death Act cannot be given extraterritorial effect. 30 </s> IV. </s> Our view of a State's power to adopt an appropriate conflict-of-laws doctrine in a situation touching more than one place has been indicated by our discussion in Part III of this opinion. 31 Where more than one State has sufficiently substantial contact with the activity in question, the forum State, by analysis of the interests possessed by the States involved, could constitutionally apply to the decision of the case the law of one or another state having such an interest in the multistate activity. 32 Thus, an Oklahoma state court would be free to apply either its own law, the law of the place where the negligence occurred, or the law of Missouri, the law of the place where the injury occurred, to an action brought in its courts and involving this factual situation. 33 Both the [369 U.S. 1, 16] Federal District Court sitting in Oklahoma, and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, have interpreted the pertinent Oklahoma decisions, 34 which we have held are controlling, to declare that an action for wrongful death is based on the statute of the place where the injury occurred that caused the death. 35 Therefore, Missouri's statute controls the case at bar. It is conceded that each petitioner has received $15,000, the maximum amount recoverable under the Missouri Act, and the petitioners thus have received full compensation for their claims. Accordingly, the courts below were correct in holding that, in accordance with Oklahoma law, petitioners had failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted. The judgment is </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The provisions of the Tort Claims Act are now found in 28 U.S.C. 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, and 2671-2680. </s> [Footnote 2 28 U.S.C. 1346 (b). </s> [Footnote 3 Under 72 Stat. 778, 49 U.S.C. 1425, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency is charged with the responsibility of enforcing rules and regulations controlling inspection, maintenance, overhaul and repair of all equipment used in air transportation. </s> [Footnote 4 Mo. Rev. Stat., 1949, 537.090. Subsequent to the origination of these actions the Missouri Code was amended to provide for maximum damages of $25,000. Mo. Rev. Stat., 1959, 537.090. </s> [Footnote 5 Okla. Stat., 1951, Tit. 12, 1051-1054. </s> [Footnote 6 The opinion of the District Court is not reported. </s> [Footnote 7 Gochenour v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 205 Okla. 594, 239 P.2d 769. </s> [Footnote 8 285 F.2d 521. </s> [Footnote 9 28 U.S.C. 2674. </s> [Footnote 10 60 Stat. 842 (1946). </s> [Footnote 11 See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 , for a detailed analysis of the purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act in the context of its legislative history. </s> [Footnote 12 Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270 ; United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 . </s> [Footnote 13 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 . See Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 ; McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365 ; D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447 . </s> [Footnote 14 See, e. g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 ; Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 ; D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447 ; Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289 ; Board of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 . See also discussion in Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System, 679 et seq. </s> [Footnote 15 Hearings before House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 5373 and H. R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.; S. Rep. No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.; H. R. Rep. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.; No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. </s> [Footnote 16 See, e. g., 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1455 (1955); 45 Iowa L. Rev. 125 (1959); 6 N. Y. L. F. 484, 488-490 (1960). </s> [Footnote 17 See H. R. Rep. No. 2428, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 3; Hearings on H. R. 5373 and H. R. 6463, note 15, supra, 39, 66; Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 7236, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 7, 16; Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2690, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 9; 69 Cong. Rec. 2192, 2193, 3118; 86 Cong. Rec. 12024. </s> [Footnote 18 See, e. g., Knecht v. United States, 242 F.2d 929; Irish v. United States, 225 F.2d 3; United States v. Praylou, 208 F.2d 291; Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631; D'Anna v. United States, 181 F.2d 335; Olson v. United States, 175 F.2d 510; Modla v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 198; Irvin v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 25. </s> [Footnote 19 28 U.S.C. 1346 (b). </s> [Footnote 20 Hearings before House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 5373 and H. R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 30. American suggests that support for its argument is found in the testimony of Mr. Francis Shea, then Assistant Attorney General of the United States, before the House Committee on the Judiciary, who stated, when asked where a claimant might bring suit under the Act, that the venue [369 U.S. 1, 10] provision allowed suit to be brought either where the claimant resides or where the injury took place. Because the venue provision of the Act also contains the words "wherein the act or omission complained of occurred" (28 U.S.C. 1402 (b)), American contends that the reference to the place where the injury occurred should control the meaning of the "act or omission" language in Section 1346 (b). In addition to the fact that this testimony bears no relation to the choice-of-laws problems, and that considerations underlying the problem of venue are substantially different from those determining applicable law, we are not persuaded to allow an isolated piece of legislative history to detract from the Act the words Congress expressly employed. </s> [Footnote 21 Labor Board v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 288 ; Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76, 89 ; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 439 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). </s> [Footnote 22 Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor Board, 350 U.S. 270, 285 , quoting from United States v. Boisdore's Heirs, 8 How. 113, 122. </s> [Footnote 23 28 U.S.C. 2674, quoted in the text, supra, as well as 28 U.S.C. 1346 (b), provides that the United States should be treated as an individual defendant would be under like circumstances. </s> [Footnote 24 Restatement, Conflict of Laws, 377, 378 and 391. This rule has been repeated so frequently that a citation of cases here would serve no purpose. For a collection of cases, see Goodrich, Conflict [369 U.S. 1, 12] of Laws, 263-264; Stumberg, Conflict of Laws, 182-187; 25 C. J. S. Death 28, nn. 27-30. </s> [Footnote 25 For example, had the petitioners in the instant case brought suit against American as well as the United States, the petitioners' interpretation of the Act would have the District Court determine American's liability by the law of Missouri and the United States' by the law of Oklahoma. Under our construction of the Act, however, both defendants' liability would be determined by the law of Missouri. However, because of the venue provision in the statute, allowing suit to be brought where all the plaintiffs reside as well as where the act or omission occurred (28 U.S.C. 1402 (b); see Knecht v. United States, 242 F.2d 929; Olson v. United States, 175 F.2d 510), a situation may arise where a District Court could not determine the Government's and a private individual's liability in exactly the same manner. </s> [Footnote 26 Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944; Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N. W. 2d 365; Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N. W. 2d 814. See Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 Stan. L. Rev. 205 (1958). Cf. Vrooman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 183 F.2d 479; Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163; Caldwell v. Gore, 175 La. 501, 143 So. 387; Burkett v. Globe Indemnity Co., 182 Miss. 423, 181 So. 316. </s> [Footnote 27 In addition to the cases cited in note 26, supra, see the opinion by MR. JUSTICE BLACK in Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161 -162, where it is stated in context to a different but analogous problem: </s> "In determining which contact is the most significant in a particular transaction, courts can seldom find a complete solution in the mechanical formulae of the conflicts of law. Determination requires the exercise of an informed judgment in the balancing of all the interests of the states with the most significant contacts in order best to accommodate the equities among the parties to the policies of those states." </s> [Footnote 28 The Act permits claimants to sue only in the federal courts, and not in the state courts which are available in actions against a private individual, 1346 (b); the Act prescribes its own period of limitations which may be shorter or longer than that of the State, 2401 (b); the claimant cannot obtain a trial by jury under the Act, although he could against a private individual, 2402; the claimant cannot obtain interest prior to judgment in suits under the [369 U.S. 1, 14] Act regardless of the state rule governing private individuals, 2674; the claimant cannot obtain punitive damages under the Act, even though state law may provide for it as against a private defendant, 2674; the claimant cannot recover any damages against the United States on any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights, whereas he could recover such damages against a private individual, 2680 (h); the claimant cannot obtain any recovery against the United States on a claim arising in a foreign country, although he could against a private individual, 2680 (k); and the Act exempts the Government from liability for claims based on various types of activities, although a private individual would be liable in the same circumstances, 2680. </s> [Footnote 29 In fact, despite the ambiguity that exists in the history due to the fact that Congress did not specifically consider the choice-of-laws problem, the legislative material indicates that Congress thought in terms of state law being applicable. The term "law of the place where the act or omission occurred" was particularized as (1) the law of the situs of the wrongful act or omission. Hearings before House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 5373 and H. R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 35; (2) local law, id., at 26, 27, 30, 59 and 61; S. Rep. No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 6; H. R. Rep. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 9; H. R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 4; S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 32; (3) local tort law. Hearings before House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 5373 and H. R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 30; (4) the law of the situs of the alleged tort. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on [369 U.S. 1, 15] the Judiciary on S. 2690, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 44; and (5) the locale of the injury or damage. Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 5373 and H. R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 9. </s> [Footnote 30 Gochenour v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 205 Okla. 594, 239 P.2d 769. See Fenton v. Sinclair Refining Co., 206 Okla. 19, 240 P.2d 748. </s> [Footnote 31 Supra, pp. 12-13 and cases cited. See also Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 ; Watson v. Employers Liability Corp., 348 U.S. 66 ; Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 . Cf. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 ; Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 . </s> [Footnote 32 See, e. g., the cases cited in note 26, supra. </s> [Footnote 33 Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803; Otey v. Midland Valley R. Co., 108 Kan. 755, 197 P. 203; Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Central R. Co., 78 N. H. 553, 103 A. 263; El Paso & N. W. R. Co. v. McComus, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 170, 81 S. W. 760 (holding that the law of the place of injury controls) and [369 U.S. 1, 16] Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N. W. 2d 365 (holding that the law of the place of negligence controls). See also Hunter v. Derby Foods, 110 F.2d 970; 35 Col. L. Rev. 202. </s> [Footnote 34 Gochenour v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 205 Okla. 594, 239 P.2d 769; Miller v. Tennis, 140 Okla. 185, 282 P. 345. See Fenton v. Sinclair Refining Co., 206 Okla. 19, 240 P.2d 748. </s> [Footnote 35 We are aware that in the Oklahoma cases cited in note 34, supra, both the injury and negligence occurred in the same sister State, and that the two courts below relied largely on dictum in those cases to conclude that Oklahoma would follow the general rule that the law of the place of injury would control even had the negligence that caused the injury taken place in Oklahoma. The petitioners here do not contend that this was an erroneous interpretation of state law. We ordinarily accept the determinations of Courts of Appeals on questions of state law and do so here under the circumstances presented. General Box Co. v. United States, 351 U.S. 159, 165 ; Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701, 707 -708; Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 237 . </s> [369 U.S. 1, 17]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. PRICE(1960) No. 48 Argued: December 9, 1959Decided: January 18, 1960 </s> Under 272 (a) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as amended, failure of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to send to a taxpayer a 90-day notice of a deficiency in his income tax return does not bar an action by the United States to collect such deficiency and statutory interest thereon when the taxpayer had executed and filed, under 272 (d), a waiver of the restrictions of 272 (a) on the assessment and collection of deficiencies, since 272 (d) authorizes the filing of such a waiver "at any time" and not only after the issuance of a 90-day notice of a deficiency. Pp. 304-313. </s> 263 F.2d 382, reversed. </s> Howard A. Heffron argued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Rice, A. F. Prescott and George F. Lynch. </s> W. Lee McLane, Jr. argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The United States brought this action against the respondent taxpayer for the collection of a deficiency in taxes for the year 1946, and statutory interest thereon. The respondent defended on the ground that the action could not be maintained because the Commissioner of Internal Revenue had never issued to the taxpayer a notice of deficiency (commonly known as a "90-day letter") for the amount in question. This defense was based on 272 (a) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 53 [361 U.S. 304, 305] Stat. 82, as amended, providing in pertinent part as follows: </s> "If in the case of any taxpayer, the Commissioner determines that there is a deficiency in respect of the tax imposed by this chapter, the Commissioner is authorized to send notice of such deficiency to the taxpayer by registered mail. Within ninety days after such notice is mailed . . . the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court of the United States for a redetermination of the deficiency. No assessment of a deficiency in respect of the tax imposed by this chapter and no distraint or proceeding in court for its collection shall be made, begun, or prosecuted until such notice has been mailed to the taxpayer, nor until the expiration of such ninety-day period, nor, if a petition has been filed with the Tax Court, until the decision of the Tax Court has become final. . . ." </s> The Government relied on the admitted fact that respondent had executed a Treasury Department form waiving the restrictions on assessment and collection of the deficiency sued for, 1 and on 272 (d) of the 1939 Code, 53 Stat. 83, said to authorize such a waiver, which provides: </s> "The taxpayer shall at any time have the right, by a signed notice in writing filed with the Commissioner, [361 U.S. 304, 306] to waive the restrictions provided in subsection (a) of this section on the assessment and collection of the whole or any part of the deficiency." </s> The District Court held that the waiver was not effective because a 90-day letter had not been issued, and that 272 (a) therefore barred the action. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 263 F.2d 382, and in view of contrary decisions in the First and Sixth Circuits, 2 we granted certiorari. 359 U.S. 988 . For reasons hereafter stated we think the court below was in error. </s> We start with the language of 272 (d). By its terms, the right of waiver is to be available "at any time," and is applicable to "the restrictions" contained in 272 (a). Those restrictions include the prohibitions on assessment and collection of a deficiency prior to the mailing of a 90-day letter, no less than the same prohibitions relating to the period following the issuance of such a letter during which a petition for a redetermination of a deficiency may be filed or is awaiting decision of the Tax Court. </s> Respondent seeks to support the view that these provisions should be read as applying only to the period following the issuance of the 90-day letter by noting that 272 (d) is limited to waivers of restrictions on the assessment and collection of "the deficiency," and asserting that "the deficiency" does not come into existence, as it were, until a 90-day letter has been mailed. This reading of the statute is said to follow from the first sentence of 272 (a) (1): </s> "If in the case of any taxpayer, the Commissioner determines that there is a deficiency in respect of the [361 U.S. 304, 307] tax imposed by this chapter, the Commissioner is authorized to send notice of such deficiency to the taxpayer by registered mail." </s> A deficiency, it is argued, is not "determined" until the statutory notice has been issued. We cannot accept any such fine-spun refinements. The plain sense of this provision contemplates, first, a determination, and then the sending of a notice. No persuasive reason appears for artificially engrafting upon the statutory terms excessively formal conditions. 3 Nor do we find any force in the argument that because a determination and assessment of additional deficiencies may follow upon one already made, "the deficiency" referred to in 272 (d) must be taken as limited to one previously determined. </s> Section 272 (d) does not on its face therefore support the view that a waiver of the restrictions on assessment and collection of a tax is effective only if filed after the issuance of a 90-day letter. We think a similar conclusion follows from an examination of the legislative history of the relevant statutory enactments. </s> In creating the Tax Court (originally known as the Board of Tax Appeals), Congress provided a forum in which taxpayers could obtain an "independent review of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue's determination of additional income . . . taxes by the Board in advance of their paying the tax found by the Commissioner to be due." Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 721 . Section 274 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 297, and the Revenue Act of 1926, 274 (a), 44 Stat. 55 (the predecessors of 272 (a) of the 1939 Code), disabled the Commissioner from assessing or collecting any deficiency until a notice of such deficiency had been [361 U.S. 304, 308] issued, and for 60 (later amended to 90) days thereafter, or, in the event that a taxpayer took an appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals within such period, until that body had rendered a final decision. However, even though a taxpayer did not wish to contest the Commissioner's determination of a deficiency before the Board, interest on such deficiency continued to accrue from the original due date of the tax until the time for seeking Board review had run, such interest being thereafter collectible upon assessment of the tax. Revenue Act of 1924, 274 (f), 43 Stat. 297. </s> To meet this situation, the 1926 Revenue Act added, in 274 (d), 44 Stat. 56, the waiver provisions re-enacted as 272 (d) of the 1939 Code. At the same time, Congress provided, in 274 (j) (the predecessor of 292 of the 1939 Code), that the filing of a waiver as provided for by subsection (d) should stop the running of interest on the deficiency upon the expiration of 30 days from such filing or upon the assessment of such deficiency, whichever the earlier. 4 The relation between the two sections of the 1926 Act, and between the comparable sections of the 1939 Code as well, is clear: (1) a waiver is provided for in 274 (d) [1939 Code, 272 (d)] "[i]n order to permit the taxpayer to pay the tax and stop the running of interest," S. Rep. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 27; (2) the Commissioner is thereupon permitted to assess [361 U.S. 304, 309] and collect the tax free of the restrictions contained in 274 (a) [1939 Code, 272 (a)]; and (3) the taxpayer is protected against the continued running of interest, due to delay in assessment, by the 30-day cutoff provided for by 274 (j) [1939 Code, 292]. </s> We can find in this history and the purpose it discloses no warrant for inferring that it was intended that a taxpayer should be without power to stop the running of interest against him until a formal notice of deficiency has been issued. 5 Yet, as will appear, such is the necessary effect of respondent's position. Major reliance is placed on a passage in the Senate Committee Report on the 1926 Act: </s> "In order to permit the taxpayer to pay the tax and stop the running of interest, the committee recommends in section 274 (d) of the bill that the taxpayer at any time be permitted to waive in writing the restrictions on the commissioner against assessing and collecting the tax, but without taking away the right of the taxpayer to take the case to the board." S. Rep. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 27. </s> Respondent claims that the last clause of this passage should be taken as indicating that 274 (d), reenacted as 272 (d) of the 1939 Code, does not sanction waivers prior to the issuance of a 90-day letter, because it is that event which brought the Board's, and now brings the Tax Court's, jurisdiction to review deficiencies into play. To read the passage - the obscurity of which has previously been judicially noted 6 - so as to apply the clause in question to waivers executed before the issuance of a notice of [361 U.S. 304, 310] deficiency would require a holding that, despite a waiver, the issuance by the Commissioner of a notice of deficiency remains a prerequisite to assessment and collection. But since, as the taxpayer acknowledges, it is inconceivable that a waiver would be effective to stop the running of interest, and at the same time be ineffective to permit the Government immediately to assess and collect the deficiency to which the waiver referred, the necessary result of respondent's reading of the Senate Committee Report would be to infer that a taxpayer was to be without power to stop the running of interest until a formal notice of deficiency had issued, often involving not inconsiderable periods of delay. Such an inference does not jibe either with the "right" the statute gives a taxpayer to file a waiver "at any time," or with the purposes of the waiver provisions. Moreover, had Congress desired to require the issuance of a notice of deficiency prior to assessment and collection in all circumstances, it more likely would have accomplished that result directly, as it did in the instance of jeopardy assessments. See Revenue Act of 1926, 279 (b), 44 Stat. 59 (now 6861 (b) of the 1954 Code). </s> Nor do we think that subsequent legislative developments change the view we have of the statute. Several years after the enactment of the 1926 statute, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit expressed views similar to those which formed the basis for the decision below. Mutual Lumber Co. v. Poe, 66 F.2d 904; McCarthy Co. v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 618. In 1938, Congress considered various suggested revisions in the revenue statutes, and a House of Representatives Subcommittee recommended an express repudiation of those decisions. This recommendation was not adopted, and from the failure to act, respondent would have us infer an acceptance by Congress of the Ninth Circuit's position. Such non-action by Congress affords the most dubious foundation [361 U.S. 304, 311] for drawing positive inferences. Moreover, the Subcommittee's discussion, which is set out in full in the margin, 7 does not support the meaning sought to be derived from it. While certain isolated passages can be so read, taken [361 U.S. 304, 312] as a whole what the Subcommittee said appears to us to espouse the position that the Commissioner's long-standing interpretation of the statute was correct, and that clarification was called for only because of the doubts caused by the Ninth Circuit's decisions, which this Court had declined to review. 290 U.S. 706, 298 U.S. 655. Whether Congress thought the proposal unwise, as respondent argues, or unnecessary, we cannot tell; accordingly, no inference can properly be drawn from the failure of the Congress to act. </s> Finally, we are similarly unable to find support for respondent's position in the history of the 1954 Code. While the recodification settled (for taxable years covered by that Act) the question before us by expressly authorizing a waiver prior to the issuance of a 90-day letter, 8 the reports contain no clear statement as to Congress' view of then existing law. What light there is, [361 U.S. 304, 313] however, tends to favor the Government's contentions. The new statute amended another subsection of the section containing the waiver provision, and the reports refer to that amendment as the "only material change from existing law." 9 Respondent argues that the change regarding waiver was probably thought not "material." Inferences from legislative history cannot rest on so slender a reed. Moreover, the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 282 . </s> The legislative history, then, does not call for a result contrary to that indicated by the language of the Act. We hold that a waiver given pursuant to 272 (d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 or its predecessor sections, although executed prior to the issuance of a notice of deficiency, is a fully effective instrument. </s> Reversed and remanded. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The waiver was executed on United States Treasury Form 870, entitled "Waiver of Restrictions on Assessment and Collection of Deficiency in Tax," and read, in relevant part, as follows: "Pursuant to the provisions of Section 272 (d) of the Internal Revenue Code, and/or the corresponding provisions of prior internal revenue laws, the restrictions provided in Section 272 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code, and/or the corresponding provisions of prior internal revenue laws, are hereby waived and consent is given to the assessment and collection of the following deficiency or deficiencies in tax:" </s> [Footnote 2 Associated Mutuals v. Delaney, 176 F.2d 179, 182-184; Moore v. Cleveland R. Co., 108 F.2d 656, 658-660. See also Roos v. United States, 90 Ct. Cl. 482, 31 F. Supp. 144. </s> [Footnote 3 See Moore v. Cleveland R. Co., supra, at 659, analyzing 271 (a) of the Code, 53 Stat, 82, defining a "deficiency." </s> [Footnote 4 Section 292 of the 1939 Code, 53 Stat. 88, which is in all respects material here identical with its 1926 counterpart, provided, in pertinent part: "Interest upon the amount determined as a deficiency shall be assessed at the same time as the deficiency, shall be paid upon notice and demand from the collector, and shall be collected as a part of the tax, at the rate of 6 per centum per annum from the date prescribed for the payment of the tax . . . to the date the deficiency is assessed, or, in the case of a waiver under section 272 (d), to the thirtieth day after the filing of such waiver or to the date the deficiency is assessed whichever is the earlier." </s> [Footnote 5 See Moore v. Cleveland R. Co., supra, at 659-660. </s> [Footnote 6 Associated Mutuals v. Delaney, supra, at 183. Even respondent's interpretation of the passage would not, however, give literal effect to its language, for a taxpayer would not "at any time be permitted to waive" the restrictions on assessment and collection of a deficiency, but could do so only after the issuance of a notice of deficiency. </s> [Footnote 7 "In order to enable the Government to collect admitted deficiencies in an orderly and expeditious manner without the delay necessarily involved in the issuance of a formal notice of deficiency, and also to enable taxpayers to curtail the interest period on such deficiencies by permitting the Government to make an earlier assessment of the tax than otherwise would be possible, the Bureau of Internal Revenue has entered into cooperative agreements with taxpayers. "It has been a practice of long standing in the Bureau to endeavor to secure the signed agreement of a taxpayer to additional taxes proposed by an internal-revenue agent as the result of a field investigation, and also to taxes proposed in letters from the Commissioner mailed as preliminaries to the issuance of the formal notice of deficiency authorized in section 272 (a), Revenue Act of 1936, and corresponding provisions of prior acts. It has further been the practice to regard such a signed agreement as a valid waiver under section 272 (d), Revenue Act of 1936, and corresponding provisions of prior acts, for the purpose of computing interest on the deficiencies agreed to in accordance with section 292, Revenue Act of 1936, and corresponding provisions of prior acts. That is, interest on a deficiency so agreed to would be computed to the date of assessment or to the thirtieth day after the filing of such agreement, whichever was the earlier. In the great majority of such cases the assessment is made within 30 days after the agreement is procured, thereby making collection of such deficiencies more nearly concurrent with their discovery than would be the case if formal notice were required to be given. "As a result of two decisions of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Mutual Lumber Co. v. Poe, 66 F.2d 906, certiorari denied Jan. 6, 1936; McCarthy Co. v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 618, certiorari denied Apr. 6, 1936), a valid waiver cannot be given by a taxpayer prior to the formal determination by the Commissioner, as evidenced by a 60- or 90-day letter, that there is a deficiency in tax. "Your subcommittee while feeling that the language of the statute is already sufficiently clear, feels compelled, in view of the action of the Supreme Court in denying certiorari, to recommend (Recommendation No. 47) that an amendment be inserted to insure the validity of waivers given before the mailing of the deficiency letter, such amendment to provide that the taxpayer shall have the right [361 U.S. 304, 312] at any time after a deficiency is proposed in any manner that the Commissioner may direct, whether before or after the sending of the notice of deficiency as provided in subsection (a) of that section, to waive by a signed notice in writing, any and all restrictions or conditions, however imposed, on the immediate assessment and collection of the whole or any part of the deficiency so proposed. "It is believed that the proposed amendment will furnish a clear and unquestionable statutory basis for a long-established and satisfactorily functioning departmental procedure. It will be conducive to the early settlement of controverted issues without necessity for litigation, while at the same time retaining for the taxpayer his present privilege of paying deficiencies under appeal and thereby terminating the running of deficiency interest." Report of a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways and Means, on Proposed Revision of the Revenue Laws, 1938, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess., pp. 53-54. </s> [Footnote 8 Section 6213 (d) of the 1954 Code reads as follows: "The taxpayer shall at any time (whether or not a notice of deficiency has been issued) have the right, by a signed notice in writing filed with the Secretary or his delegate, to waive the restrictions provided in subsection (a) on the assessment and collection of the whole or any part of the deficiency." </s> [Footnote 9 H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. A405: "Section 6213. Restrictions applicable to deficiencies; petition to Tax Court. "The only material change from existing law is made in subsection (b) (3) of this section, which contains a new provision providing that any amount paid as a tax, or in respect of a tax, may be assessed upon the receipt of such payment notwithstanding the restrictions on assessment contained in subsection (a)." See also, to the same effect, S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 573. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART joins, dissenting. </s> Mutual Lumber Co. v. Poe, 66 F.2d 904, decided in 1933, states in my view the correct rule - one that was early criticized and challenged, yet one that Congress did not undertake to change. I would therefore affirm this judgment. </s> [361 U.S. 304, 314]

United States Supreme Court SORIANO v. UNITED STATES(1957) No. 49 Argued: December 5, 1956Decided: January 14, 1957 </s> Petitioner, a resident of the Philippines, sued in the Court of Claims to recover just compensation for the requisitioning by Philippine guerrilla forces of certain equipment and supplies during the Japanese occupation of the Philippine Islands. The suit was filed more than six years after the last alleged requisition. Held: The suit was barred by the six-year statute of limitations. Pp. 270-277. </s> (a) The period of limitation applicable to petitioner's case in the Court of Claims was not affected by his having filed a claim with the Army Claims Service. Pp. 273-275. </s> (b) The existence of hostilities during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines did not toll the statute of limitations in petitioner's case. Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532, distinguished. Pp. 275-276. </s> (c) Limitations and conditions upon which the Government consents to be sued must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied. P. 276. </s> (d) Petitioner's suit was not filed within three years after the cessation of hostilities, and would be barred even if the three-year limitation of the statute were applicable. Pp. 276-277. </s> 133 Ct. Cl. 971, affirmed on other grounds. </s> Prew Savoy and George W. Foley argued the cause for petitioner. On the brief were Mr. Savoy and Jay Pfotenhauer. </s> Roger D. Fisher argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Doub, Melvin Richter and William W. Ross. </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This suit was filed in the Court of Claims by petitioner, a resident of the Philippines, to recover just compensation for the requisitioning by Philippine guerrilla forces [352 U.S. 270, 271] of certain foodstuffs, supplies, equipment, and merchandise during the Japanese occupation of the Philippine Islands. While decision on the merits would require a determination of the status of Philippine guerrillas as a unit operating in the service of the United States, we do not reach that question. We have determined that the Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction because the claim was not filed within the period provided by the statute, 62 Stat. 976, 28 U.S.C. 2501. 1 </s> On July 26, 1941, pursuant to the Philippine Independence Act, 2 President Roosevelt ordered the Philippine Army into the service of the armed forces of the United States. 3 After the fall of Bataan and Corregidor in 1942, elements of this Philippine Army fled to the hills [352 U.S. 270, 272] and continued military resistance against the Japanese as guerrilla units. These units, from time to time, requisitioned and commandeered supplies from Philippine civilians. Petitioner contends that these units were part of the United States Army having implied authority to bind the United States to pay for such supplies. He alleges that from September 1942 until the last requisition in January 1945 he delivered supplies to these guerrilla units of the value of $119,765.75. He filed a claim for this amount with the United States Army Claims Service on March 30, 1948. This claim was denied on June 21, 1948. </s> Thereafter on April 26, 1951, more than six years after the last alleged requisition, this action was filed in the United States Court of Claims. The Government moved to dismiss on several grounds, including (1) that the statutory limitation period had run, and (2) that the units were part of the Philippine forces for which the United States was in no manner responsible. In a per curiam order, 133 Ct. Cl. 971, after issue was drawn on the pleadings, the Court of Claims dismissed the suit on the authority of Logronio v. United States, 132 Ct. Cl. 596, 133 F. Supp. 395 (1955). In effect, this reaffirmed its earlier holdings that members of the guerrilla units of the Philippine Army were not part of the Army of the United States. 4 The limitation question was not passed upon. </s> We granted certiorari, 351 U.S. 917 , to determine the validity of the claims of the petitioner and others in like position. After issuance of the writ in this case, the Court of Claims in Compania Maritima v. United States, 136 Ct. Cl. ___, 145 F. Supp. 935 (1956), held that a Philippine resident seeking redress against the United States was under a legal disability while hostilities [352 U.S. 270, 273] between Japan and the United States continued. The court further held that the claim of such a person must be filed within three years "after the disability ceases," i. e., by September 2, 1948. Apprehensive that this rule might be applied to his case, petitioner requested and we granted permission to argue the limitation question which, as we have said, had been raised but not considered at the time of the dismissal by the Court of Claims. </s> Petitioner urges that his suit was timely filed because he was first required to present his claim to the Army Claims Service before he could prosecute the action in the Court of Claims. This administrative procedure, he points out, was not exhausted until June 21, 1948, and this suit was filed on April 26, 1951, less than three years thereafter. But, if he should fail with this contention, he argues that the war suspended the running of the statute and it was, therefore, tolled until September 2, 1945, when hostilities ceased with Japan. We cannot agree with either contention. </s> It has been settled since Kendall v. United States, 107 U.S. 123 (1883), that the Congress in creating the Court of Claims restricted that court's jurisdiction. In Kendall this Court held that the Congress in the Act creating the Court of Claims gave the Government's consent to be sued therein only in certain classes of claims and that no others might be asserted against it, including "claims which are declared barred if not asserted within the time limited by the statute." Id., at 125. As to the latter cases, jurisdiction was given only over those filed "within six years after such claim first accrues," unless the claimant was "under legal disability or beyond the seas at the time the claim accrues," in which event suit must "be filed within three years after the disability ceases." 62 Stat. 976, 28 U.S.C. 2501. As was said in Kendall, supra, "The court cannot superadd to those enumerated . . .," it having "no more authority to engraft [another] disability [352 U.S. 270, 274] upon the statute than a disability arising from sickness, surprise, or inevitable accident, which might prevent a claimant from suing within the time prescribed." Id., at 125. </s> Petitioner asserts that his action did not accrue until the denial of the claim by the Army Claims Service. At the same time, he admits that the claim filed there was based on the alleged delivery of supplies, etc., on the promise of future payment. The claim, if allowed, was against the Philippine Government, not the United States. 5 The claim asserted in this proceeding, on the contrary, is against the United States and based on the alleged taking of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Petitioner would have us hold that this just compensation case could not be filed until after an administrative denial of his claim filed with the Army Claims Service. But, even if the claims were laid on the same theory and each was directed against the United States, Congress has made no such requirement. It has not so restricted the jurisdiction of [352 U.S. 270, 275] the Court of Claims. 6 Under the circumstances, for us to say that the exhaustion of administrative remedies in such case is a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims would but "engraft [another] disability upon the statute" and thus frustrate the purpose of Congress. Furthermore, it would be a limitless extension of the period of limitation that Congress expressly provided for the prosecution of claims against the Government in the Court of Claims. This we cannot do. </s> We now reach petitioner's second contention. The cause of action as alleged by petitioner was for just compensation for supplies, etc., taken from him by guerrillas during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. He alleges in his complaint that the action, if any he has, accrued at the time of the taking and could only be maintained within six years thereafter but for the existence of the hostilities which he claims tolled the statute. He depends on Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532 (1868), to support this position. Such reliance is misplaced. That case involved private citizens, not the Government. It has no applicability to claims against the sovereign. See Haycraft v. United States, 22 Wall. 81 (1875). </s> To permit the application of the doctrine urged by petitioner would impose the tolling of the statute in every time-limit-consent Act passed by the Congress. For example, statutes permitting suits for tax refunds, tort actions, alien property litigation, patent cases, and other claims against the Government would all be affected. Strangely enough, Congress would be required to provide expressly in each statute that the period of limitation was [352 U.S. 270, 276] not to be extended by war. But Congress was entitled to assume that the limitation period it prescribed meant just that period and no more. With this intent in mind, Congress has passed specific legislation each time it has seen fit to toll such statutes of limitations because of war. 7 And this Court has long decided that limitations and conditions upon which the Government consents to be sued must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590 -591 (1941), and cases there cited. Furthermore, even if hostilities prevented petitioner from filing his claim and this condition could be regarded as creating a "disability," the claim would nonetheless be barred by the express terms of this statute because not filed within three years after the cessation of hostilities, to wit, before September 2, 1948. Likewise, if petitioner claimed such a disability under the Trading with the Enemy Act, 8 he would not better his position, for timely action was necessary by the [352 U.S. 270, 277] same date. The same is true of any claim under the disability specifically provided for "persons beyond the seas," 9 even if this provision were applicable to petitioner. Such applicability has not been urged and we do not pass upon it. </s> We are not unmindful that the enforcement of this rule might result in hardship in some cases, and perhaps frustrate the expectations of some Philippine citizens who in good faith supplied recognized guerrilla units. Such considerations are not for us, as this Court can enforce relief against the sovereign only within the limits established by Congress. Petitioner here had six years within which to act. He filed no claim whatever until after the expiration of three years from the date he alleges the last taking occurred. This claim was filed with the Army Claims Service on the basis of an alleged contract. That claim was denied within less than three months after it was filed. This left petitioner over two and a half years additional time to pursue his just compensation remedy. Still he did nothing for almost three years, when he filed this suit in the Court of Claims. By that time his claim, on any theory, was barred by statute. The judgment is therefore. </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 62 Stat. 976, 28 U.S.C. 2501, the pertinent part of which reads: </s> "Every claim of which the Court of Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed, or the claim is referred by the Senate or House of Representatives, or by the head of an executive department within six years after such claim first accrues. </s> . . . . . </s> "A petition on the claim of a person under legal disability or beyond the seas at the time the claim accrues may be filed within three years after the disability ceases." </s> [Footnote 2 The Philippine Independence Act of March 24, 1934, 48 Stat. 456 et seq., provides in pertinent part: </s> "(12) The Philippine Islands recognizes the right of the United States to expropriate property for public uses, to maintain military and other reservations and armed forces in the Philippines, and, upon order of the President, to call into the service of such armed forces all military forces organized by the Philippine government." Id., at 457. </s> [Footnote 3 Military Order of President Roosevelt, dated July 26, 1941, 6 Fed. Reg. 3825, which provides in pertinent part: </s> ". . . I hereby call and order into the service of the armed forces of the United States for the period of the existing emergency, and place under the command of a General Officer, United States Army, to be designated by the Secretary of War from time to time, all of the organized military forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines . . . ." </s> [Footnote 4 Victorio v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 748 (1950), vacated, 122 Ct. Cl. 708, 106 F. Supp. 182 (1952); Logronio v. United States, 132 Ct. Cl. 596, 133 F. Supp. 395 (1955), overruling the second Victorio opinion, supra. </s> [Footnote 5 On August 6, 1945, the functions of the Army Claims Service, which had been established in April 1945, were extended to include consideration of certain types of guerrilla claims, such as claims of civilians for compensation for supplies delivered to the guerrillas during the Japanese occupation, provided "there was a clear understanding at the time the supplies and equipment or services were purchased or contracted for that payment would eventually be made." See the order of General MacArthur to the Commanding General, U.S. Armed Forces, Western Pacific, dated August 6, 1945. Such claims were actually asserted against the Philippine Government and, if and when approved by the Claims Service, were paid by that Government. In 1946, Congress advanced $200,000,000 for the expenses of the Army of the Philippines, 60 Stat. 14, and at various other times during the war similar special appropriations were made. From such appropriations the Philippine Government paid whatever claims were found valid. For further discussion of the operation of the Army Claims Service in the Philippines, see Victorio v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 748 (1950). </s> [Footnote 6 While the Court of Claims held in Dino v. United States, 119 Ct. Cl. 307 (1951), that a claim similar to the one here involved should first be asserted in the appropriate administrative agency, this rule has now been abandoned by that court. See, e. g., the discussion in Tan v. United States, 122 Ct. Cl. 662, 102 F. Supp. 552 (1952), and the cases there cited. </s> [Footnote 7 Congress specifically tolled the statute of limitations for some actions against the Government during the Second World War, e. g., Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, 54 Stat. 1181, 50 U.S.C. App. 525, providing for suspension of limitations in suits by or against servicemen; and 34 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 60 Stat. 925-926, 50 U.S.C. App. 34 (a), suspending limitations in suits against the Alien Property Custodian respecting vested property. However, the statute of limitations has not been enlarged by Congress for claims such as petitioner's. </s> [Footnote 8 40 Stat. 411, 50 U.S.C. App. 2: </s> "That the word `enemy,' as used herein, shall be deemed to mean, for the purposes of such trading and of this Act - </s> "(a) Any individual, partnership, or other body of individuals, of any nationality, resident within the territory (including that occupied by the military and naval forces) of any nation with which the United States is at war, or resident outside the United States and doing business within such territory, and any corporation incorporated within such territory of any nation with which the United States is at war or incorporated within any country other than the United States and doing business within such territory." </s> [Footnote 9 The present saving clause (see note 1, supra) was enacted in 1948. However, the pre-1948 statute, 36 Stat. 1139, 28 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) 262, also had a saving clause which contained as a specific disability "persons beyond the seas at the time the claim accrued." The 1948 amendment merely substituted the general saving clause for the prior clause which specifically set forth various disabilities. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER concur, dissenting. </s> If petitioner had sued in the Court of Claims without first presenting his claim to the Army Claims Service, I [352 U.S. 270, 278] think the Court of Claims would have been warranted in dismissing it. The Army Claims Service was established April 7, 1945, by General Douglas MacArthur to process claims such as this one. The Army Claims Service questioned whether expenses incurred by guerrilla organizations could be paid out of the appropriated funds. On August 6, 1945, General MacArthur advised the Army Claims Service that it could authorize the payment of claims such as this one. That directive stated: </s> ". . . The United States Army will assume the responsibility for paying certain claims arising out of activities of guerrilla forces in the Philippines. That responsibility will be limited to claims for the value of goods or services essential for carrying on operations against the enemy. </s> ". . . No payments will be made on claims arising out of activities of other than recognized guerrilla forces. </s> . . . . . </s> ". . . Such claims will be paid from the appropriation, `Expenses, Army of the Philippines'. </s> ". . . Payment will be made only on claims where there was a clear understanding at the time the supplies and equipment or services were purchased or contracted for that payment would eventually be made. There must have been a clear intention on the part of the guerrilla commander and of the vendor or employee that an obligation was being created. It must be definitely shown that the provision of such supplies, equipment or services was not intended as a patriotic donation to the common cause against the enemy. It must also be definitely shown that the supplies, equipment or services were essential for the operation of the guerrilla forces." [352 U.S. 270, 279] </s> That directive was issued in accordance with the Act of July 3, 1945, 59 Stat. 401-402, which appropriated money for "all expenses necessary for the mobilization, operation, and maintenance of the Army of the Philippines." The expenditure and accounting were to be in the manner prescribed by the President. Id., at 402. And the moneys were to be available to the Philippine Government "as authorized by the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East." Id., at 402. The Government's brief advises us that nearly $300,000,000 was appropriated by the Congress for that purpose through July 3, 1945. And on February 18, 1946, $200,000,000 more was added to that appropriation. 60 Stat. 14. </s> The statutory scheme for payment of the expenses of the guerrilla forces, therefore, demonstrates that this claim, if it can be sustained on the merits, runs against the United States. The fact that approved claims were paid by the Philippine Government is a mere administrative detail. For it acted in this respect only as a disbursing agency for the United States. </s> Hence petitioner properly first presented his claim to the Army Claims Service, which rejected it June 21, 1948. The six-year statute should be held to run from that date. For it is the general rule that, where a claim must first be processed by an administrative agency, it does not accrue until the agency refuses payment. See United States v. Taylor, 104 U.S. 216, 222 . Cf. United States v. Clark, 96 U.S. 37, 43 -44. </s> That was the view of the Court of Claims in an earlier case involving such a problem. See Dino v. United States, 119 Ct. Cl. 307. I think the Court of Claims position in the Dino case is the correct one. </s> [352 U.S. 270, 280]

United States Supreme Court CORBITT v. NEW JERSEY(1978) No. 77-5903 Argued: October 3, 1978Decided: December 11, 1978 </s> Under the New Jersey homicide statutes, life imprisonment is the mandatory punishment for defendants convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, while a term of not more than 30 years is the punishment for second-degree murder. Trials to the court and guilty pleas are not allowed in murder cases, but a plea of non vult is allowed. If such a plea is accepted, the judge need not decide whether the murder is first or second degree, but the punishment is either life imprisonment or the same punishment as is imposed for second-degree murder. Appellant, after pleading not guilty to a murder indictment, was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and accordingly sentenced to life imprisonment. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting appellant's contention that the possibility of a sentence of less than life upon the plea of non vult, combined with the absence of a similar possibility when found guilty of first-degree murder by a jury, was an unconstitutional burden on his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments and also violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Held: </s> 1. The New Jersey sentencing scheme does not impose an unconstitutional burden on appellant's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp. 216-225. </s> (a) Although the mandatory punishment when a jury finds a defendant guilty of first-degree murder is life imprisonment, the risk of that punishment is not completely avoided by pleading non vult because the judge accepting the plea has authority to impose a life term. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 , distinguished. Pp. 216-217. </s> (b) Not every burden on the exercise of a constitutional right, and not every pressure or encouragement to waive such a right, is invalid; specifically, there is no per se rule against encouraging guilty pleas. Here, the probability or certainty of leniency in return for a non vult plea did not invalidate the mandatory life sentence, there having been no assurances that a plea would have been accepted and if it had been that a lesser sentence would have been imposed. Cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 . Pp. 218-222. </s> (c) If appellant had tendered a plea and if it had been accepted and a term of years less than life had been imposed, this would simply [439 U.S. 212, 213] have recognized that there had been a plea and that in sentencing it is constitutionally permissible to take that fact into account. Absent the abolition of guilty pleas and plea bargaining, it is not forbidden under the Constitution to extend a proper degree of leniency in return for guilty pleas, and New Jersey has done no more than that. Pp. 222-223. </s> (d) There was no element of retaliation or vindictiveness against appellant for going to trial, where it does not appear that he was subjected to unwarranted charges or was being punished for exercising a constitutional right. While defendants pleading non vult may be treated more leniently than those who go to trial, withholding the possibility of leniency from the latter cannot be equated with impermissible punishment as long as plea bargaining is held to be a proper procedure. Pp. 223-224. </s> (e) The New Jersey sentencing scheme does not exert such a powerful influence to coerce inaccurate pleas non vult as to be deemed constitutionally suspect. Here, the State did not trespass on appellant's rights so long as he was free to accept or refuse the choice presented to him by the State, i. e., to go to trial and face the risk of life imprisonment or to seek acceptance of a non vult plea and imposition of the lesser penalty. P. 225. </s> 2. Nor does the sentencing scheme infringe appellant's right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, since all New Jersey defendants are given the same choice as to whether to go to trial or plead non vult. Defendants found guilty by a jury are not penalized for exercising their right to a jury trial any more than defendants who plead guilty are penalized for giving up the chance of acquittal at trial. Equal protection does not free those who made a bad assessment of risks or a bad choice from the consequences of their decision. Pp. 225-226. </s> 74 N. J. 379, 378 A. 2d 235, affirmed. </s> WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 226. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 228. </s> James K. Smith, Jr., argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Stanley C. Van Ness. </s> John DeCicco, Deputy Attorney General of New Jersey, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were [439 U.S. 212, 214] John J. Degnan, Attorney General, David S. Baime, Assistant Attorney General, and Anthony J. Parrillo, Deputy Attorney General. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Under the New Jersey homicide statutes, 1 some murders are of the first degree; the rest are of the second degree. Juries [439 U.S. 212, 215] rendering guilty murder verdicts are to designate whether the murder was a first- or second-degree crime. The mandatory punishment, to be imposed by the judge, for those convicted by a jury of first-degree murder is life imprisonment; 2 second-degree murder is punished by a term of not more than 30 years. Trials to the court in murder cases are not permitted, and guilty pleas to murder indictments are forbidden. Pleas of non vult or nolo contendere, however, are allowed. "If such plea be accepted," the punishment "shall be either imprisonment for life or the same as that imposed upon a conviction of murder in the second degree." 3 The judge [439 U.S. 212, 216] entertaining the plea determines that there is a factual basis for conviction but need not decide whether the murder is first or second degree. </s> Appellant Corbitt, after pleading not guilty to a murder indictment, was convicted of committing murder in the course of an arson - a felony murder and one of the first-degree homicides. 4 He was sentenced to the mandatory punishment of life imprisonment. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the New Jersey appellate courts. The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected his contention that because defendants pleading non vult could be sentenced to a lesser term, the mandatory life sentence following a first-degree murder verdict was an unconstitutional burden upon his right to a jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and upon his right against compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as a violation of his right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. 74 N. J. 379, 378 A. 2d 235 (1977). We noted probable jurisdiction. 434 U.S. 1060 (1978). </s> Appellant's principal reliance is upon United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). There, this Court held that the death sentence provided by the Federal Kidnaping Act was invalid because it could be imposed only upon the recommendation of a jury accompanying a guilty verdict, whereas the maximum penalty for those tried to the court after waiving a jury and for those pleading guilty was life [439 U.S. 212, 217] imprisonment. Only those insisting on a jury trial faced the possibility of a death penalty. These provisions were held to be a needless encouragement to plead guilty or to waive a jury trial, and the death penalty was consequently declared unconstitutional. </s> We agree with the New Jersey Supreme Court that there are substantial differences between this case and Jackson, and that Jackson does not require a reversal of Corbitt's conviction. The principal difference is that the pressures to forgo trial and to plead to the charge in this case are not what they were in Jackson. First, the death penalty, which is "unique in its severity and irrevocability," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976), is not involved here. Although we need not agree with the New Jersey court that the Jackson rationale is limited to those cases where a plea avoids any possibility of the death penalty's being imposed, it is a material fact that under the New Jersey law the maximum penalty for murder is life imprisonment, not death. Furthermore, in Jackson, any risk of suffering the maximum penalty could be avoided by pleading guilty. Here, although the punishment when a jury finds a defendant guilty of first-degree murder is life imprisonment, 5 the risk of that punishment is not completely avoided by pleading non vult because the judge accepting the plea has the authority to impose a life term. New Jersey does not reserve the maximum punishment for murder for those who insist on a jury trial. </s> It is nevertheless true that while life imprisonment is the [439 U.S. 212, 218] mandatory punishment for a defendant against whom a jury has returned a first-degree murder verdict, a judge accepting a non vult plea does not classify the murder 6 and may impose either life imprisonment or a term of up to 30 years. The defendant who wishes to avoid the certainty of life imprisonment if he is tried and found guilty by the jury of first-degree murder, may seek to do so by tendering a non vult plea. Although there is no assurance that he will be so favored, the judge does have the power to accept the plea and to sentence him to a lesser term. 7 It is Corbitt's submission that the possibility of a sentence of less than life upon the plea of non vult, combined with the absence of a similar possibility when found guilty by a jury, is an unconstitutional burden on his federal rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. </s> As did the New Jersey Supreme Court, we disagree. The cases in this Court since Jackson have clearly established that not every burden on the exercise of a constitutional right, and not every pressure or encouragement to waive such a right, is invalid. 8 Specifically, there is no per se rule against encouraging [439 U.S. 212, 219] guilty pleas. We have squarely held that a State may encourage a guilty plea by offering substantial benefits in return for the plea. 9 The plea may obtain for the defendant [439 U.S. 212, 220] "the possibility or certainty . . . [not only of] a lesser penalty than the sentence that could be imposed after a trial and a verdict of guilty . . .," Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970), but also of a lesser penalty than that required to be imposed after a guilty verdict by a jury. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), the defendant went to trial on an indictment charging him as a habitual criminal, for which the mandatory punishment was life imprisonment. The prosecutor, however, had been willing to accept a plea of guilty to a lesser charge carrying a shorter sentence. The defendant chose to go to trial, was convicted, and was sentenced to life. We affirmed the conviction, holding that the State, through the prosecutor, had not violated the Constitution since it "no more than openly presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecution." Id., at 365. Relying upon and quoting from Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973), we also said: </s> "While confronting a defendant with the risk of more severe punishment clearly may have a `discouraging effect on the defendant's assertion of his trial rights, the imposition of these difficult choices [is] an inevitable' - and permissible - `attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas.' Chaffin [439 U.S. 212, 221] v. Stynchcombe, supra, at 31. It follows that, by tolerating and encouraging the negotiation of pleas, this Court has necessarily accepted as constitutionally legitimate the simple reality that the prosecutor's interest at the bargaining table is to persuade the defendant to forgo his right to plead not guilty." 434 U.S., at 364 . </s> There is no difference of constitutional significance between Bordenkircher and this case. 10 There, as here, the defendant went to trial on an indictment that included a count carrying a mandatory life term under the applicable state statutes. There, as here, the defendant could have sought to counter the mandatory penalty by tendering a plea. In Bordenkircher, as permitted by state law, the prosecutor was willing to forgo the habitual criminal count if there was a plea, in which event the mandatory sentence would have been avoided. Here, the state law empowered the judge to impose a lesser term either in connection with a plea bargain or otherwise. In both cases, the defendant gave up the possibility of leniency if he went to trial and was convicted on the count carrying the mandatory penalty. In Bordenkircher, the probability or certainty of leniency in return for a plea did not invalidate the mandatory penalty imposed after a jury trial. It should not do so here, where there was no assurance that a plea would be accepted if tendered and, if it had been, no assurance that a sentence less than life would be imposed. Those matters rested ultimately in the discretion of the judge, [439 U.S. 212, 222] perhaps substantially influenced by the prosecutor and the plea-bargaining process permitted by New Jersey law. 11 </s> Bordenkircher, like other cases here, unequivocally recognized the State's legitimate interest in encouraging the entry of guilty pleas and in facilitating plea bargaining, a process mutually beneficial to both the defendant and the State. 12 In pursuit of this interest, New Jersey has provided that the judge may, but need not, accept pleas of non vult and that he may impose life or the specified term of years. This not only provides for discretion in the trial judge but also sets the limits within which plea bargaining on punishment may take place. The New Jersey Supreme Court observed that the [439 U.S. 212, 223] "encouragement of guilty defendants not to contest their guilt is at the very heart of an effective plea negotiation program." 74 N. J., at 396, 378 A. 2d, at 243-244. Its conclusion was that in this light there were substantial benefits to the State in providing the opportunity for lesser punishment and that the statutory pattern could not be deemed a needless or arbitrary burden on the defendant's constitutional rights within the meaning of United States v. Jackson. </s> We are in essential agreement with the New Jersey Supreme Court. Had Corbitt tendered a plea and had it been accepted and a term of years less than life imposed, this would simply have recognized the fact that there had been a plea and that in sentencing it is constitutionally permissible to take that fact into account. The States and the Federal Government are free to abolish guilty pleas and plea bargaining; but absent such action, as the Constitution has been construed in our cases, it is not forbidden to extend a proper degree of leniency in return for guilty pleas. New Jersey has done no more than that. </s> We discern no element of retaliation or vindictiveness against Corbitt for going to trial. There is no suggestion that he was subjected to unwarranted charges. Nor does this record indicate that he was being punished for exercising a constitutional right. 13 Indeed, insofar as this record reveals, Corbitt may have tendered a plea and it was refused. There is no doubt that those homicide defendants who are willing to plead non vult may be treated more leniently than those who go to trial, but withholding the possibility of leniency from the latter cannot be equated with impermissible punishment as long as our cases sustaining plea bargaining remain undisturbed. [439 U.S. 212, 224] Those cases, as we have said, unequivocally recognize the constitutional propriety of extending leniency in exchange for a plea of guilty and of not extending leniency to those who have not demonstrated those attributes on which leniency is based. 14 </s> [439 U.S. 212, 225] </s> Finally, we are unconvinced that the New Jersey statutory pattern exerts such a powerful influence to coerce inaccurate pleas non vult that it should be deemed constitutionally suspect. There is no suggestion here that Corbitt was not well counseled or that he misunderstood the choices that were placed before him. Here, as in Bordenkircher, the State did not trespass on the defendant's rights "so long as the accused [was] free to accept or reject" the choice presented to him by the State, 434 U.S., at 363 , that is, to go to trial and face the risk of life imprisonment or to seek acceptance of a non vult plea and the imposition of the lesser penalty authorized by law. 15 </s> Appellant also argues that the sentencing scheme infringes his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because it penalizes the exercise of a "fundamental right." We rejected a similar argument in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), noting that "[t]o fit the problem . . . into an equal protection framework is a task too Procrustean to be rationally accomplished." Id., at 723. All New Jersey defendants are given the same choice. Those electing to contest their guilt face a certainty of life imprisonment if convicted of first-degree murder; but they may be acquitted instead or, in a proper case, may be convicted of a lesser degree of homicide and receive a sentence of less than life. Furthermore, a plea of non vult may itself result in a life sentence. The result, therefore, </s> "may depend upon a particular combination of infinite variables peculiar to each individual trial. It simply cannot [439 U.S. 212, 226] be said that a state has invidiously `classified' . . . ." Id., at 722. </s> It cannot be said that defendants found guilty by a jury are "penalized" for exercising the right to a jury trial any more than defendants who plead guilty are penalized because they give up the chance of acquittal at trial. In each instance, the defendant faces a multitude of possible outcomes and freely makes his choice. Equal protection does not free those who made a bad assessment of risks or a bad choice from the consequences of their decision. The judgment of the Supreme Court of New Jersey is affirmed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The relevant statutes are N. J. Stat. Ann 2A:113-1 to 2A:113-4 (West 1969 and Supp. 1978-1979): </s> "2A:113-1. Murder </s> "If any person, in committing or attempting to commit arson, burglary, kidnapping, rape, robbery, sodomy or any unlawful act against the peace of this state, of which the probable consequences may be bloodshed, kills another, or if the death of anyone ensues from the committing or attempting to commit any such crime or act; or if any person kills a judge, magistrate, sheriff, constable or other officer of justice, either civil or criminal, of this State, or a marshal or other officer of justice, either civil or criminal, of the United States, in the execution of his office or duty, or kills any of his assistants, whether specially called to his aid or not, endeavoring to preserve the peace or apprehend a criminal, knowing the authority of such assistant, or kills a private person endeavoring to suppress an affray, or to apprehend a criminal, knowing the intention with which such private person interposes, then such person so killing is guilty of murder. </s> "2A:113-2. Degrees of murder; designation in verdict </s> "Murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which is committed in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate arson, burglary, kidnapping, rape, robbery or sodomy, or which is perpetrated in the course or for the purpose of resisting, avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, or of effecting or assisting an escape or rescue from legal custody, or murder of a police or other law enforcement officer acting in the execution of his duty or of a person assisting any such officer so acting, is murder in the first degree. Any other kind of murder is murder in the second degree. A jury finding a person guilty of murder shall designate by their verdict whether it be murder in the first degree or in the second degree." </s> "2A:113-3. Murder; plea of guilty not to be received; plea of non vult or nolo contendere and sentence thereon </s> "In no case shall the plea of guilty be received upon any indictment for [439 U.S. 212, 215] murder, and if, upon arraignment, such plea is offered, it shall be disregarded, and the plea of not guilty entered, and a jury, duly impaneled, shall try the case. </s> "Nothing herein contained shall prevent the accused from pleading non vult or nolo contendere to the indictment; the sentence to be imposed, if such plea be accepted, shall be either imprisonment for life or the same as that imposed upon a conviction of murder in the second degree. </s> "2A:113-4. Murder; punishment </s> "Every person convicted of murder in the first degree, [his] aiders, abettors, counselors and procurers, shall suffer death unless the jury shall by its verdict, and as a part thereof, upon and after the consideration of all the evidence, recommend life imprisonment, in which case this and no greater punishment shall be imposed. </s> "Every person convicted of murder in the second degree shall suffer imprisonment for not more than 30 years." </s> Manslaughter is separately defined in 2A:113-5 (West 1969). </s> [Footnote 2 The provision for the death penalty in 2A:113-4 was invalidated in Funicello v. New Jersey, 403 U.S. 948 (1971). On remand, the New Jersey Supreme Court held the death penalty provision severable from the statute and ruled that life imprisonment was to be imposed upon all defendants convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, State v. Funicello, 60 N. J. 60, 286 A. 2d 55, cert. denied sub nom. New Jersey v. Presha, 408 U.S. 942 (1972). </s> [Footnote 3 N. J. Stat. Ann. 2A:113-3 (West 1969). As the statute suggests, the trial judge has complete discretion to refuse to accept the plea. See State v. Sullivan, 43 N. J. 209, 246, 203 A. 2d 117, 196 (1964). He may not, however, accept a plea if the defendant maintains his innocence, [439 U.S. 212, 216] stands mute, or refuses to admit facts that establish guilt. State v. Reali, 26 N. J. 222, 139 A. 2d 300 (1958); State v. Sands, 138 N. J. Super. 103, 109-112, 350 A. 2d 274, 277-279 (App. Div. 1975); State v. Rhein, 117 N. J. Super. 112, 283 A. 2d 759 (App. Div. 1971). </s> [Footnote 4 Corbitt was indicted on two counts of arson and one count of murder. The State presented its case on a felony-murder basis. He was found guilty on one count of arson and on the murder count. Sentences of life imprisonment for felony murder and a concurrent term for arson were imposed. Because the arson conviction was deemed merged into the murder conviction, the separate sentence for arson was set aside on appeal. </s> [Footnote 5 New Jersey Stat. Ann. 2A:113-2 (West 1969) directs a jury finding a defendant guilty of murder to "designate by their verdict whether it be murder in the first degree or in the second degree." It thus appears that in appropriate cases the jury would be instructed on both first-and second-degree murder. In this case, however, the State proceeded on a felony-murder basis; the judge considered it to be a first-degree felony-murder case; and there were no instructions on second-degree murder or manslaughter. As far as the record before us reveals, Corbitt did not request or object to the absence of instructions on lesser crimes. </s> [Footnote 6 Under New Jersey law, the plea is to be directed to the indictment, which may charge murder generally. The trial court accepting a plea does not hold a hearing for the purpose of determining the degree of guilt or make any such determination. State v. Williams, 39 N. J. 471, 479, 189 A. 2d 193, 197 (1963); State v. Walker, 33 N. J. 580, 588-589, 166 A. 2d 567, 571-572 (1960). </s> [Footnote 7 If the plea is accepted, the sentencing judge would appear to have discretion not only to impose up to 30 years on facts that might have warranted a first-degree murder verdict by a jury but also to impose a life term where the facts indicate a second-degree murder verdict. </s> [Footnote 8 For example, in Crampton v. Ohio, decided with McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), we upheld Ohio's procedure whereby the jury determines both guilt and punishment in a single trial and in a single verdict. Crampton argued that the unitary procedure impaired his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination because he could remain silent on the issue of guilt only at the cost of [439 U.S. 212, 219] surrendering any chance to plead his case on the issue of punishment. As we stated there, in rejecting his argument: </s> "The criminal process, like the rest of the legal system, is replete with situations requiring `the making of difficult judgments' as to which course to follow. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S., at 769 . Although a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him to choose." Id., at 213. </s> See also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970). </s> In United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975), we held that a District Court could condition the admissibility of impeachment testimony by a defense witness upon production of an investigative report prepared by the witness, rejecting Nobles' contention that to do so would violate his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process and cross-examination. </s> [Footnote 9 The Court intimated as much in Jackson itself: "[T]he evil in the federal statute is not that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury waivers but simply that it needlessly encourages them." 390 U.S., at 583 . Decisions after Jackson sustained practices that, although encouraging guilty pleas, were not "needless." In the first of these cases, Brady v. United States, supra, the petitioner had pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 50 years' imprisonment after being indicted under the same statute, the Federal Kidnaping Act, at issue in Jackson. Brady claimed that his guilty plea had been involuntary, relying on our holding in Jackson that the death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnaping Act served to encourage guilty pleas needlessly. In effect, Brady argued that Jackson required the invalidation of every guilty plea entered under the Federal Kidnaping Act prior to Jackson. We concluded that he had "read far too much into the Jackson opinion." 397 U.S., at 746 . Jackson had in no way altered the test of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969), that guilty pleas are valid if knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. </s> Subsequent decisions reaffirmed the permissibility of plea bargaining even though "every such circumstance has a discouraging effect on the defendant's assertion of his trial rights," because the "imposition of these difficult choices [is the] inevitable attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas." Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 (1973). See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); [439 U.S. 212, 220] North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). </s> In Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (1976), the appellant challenged the Massachusetts system for disposition of certain state crimes in which the defendant is first tried without a jury. If convicted, he may appeal and obtain a jury trial de novo. Although the range of penalties was the same at each tier, Ludwig suffered a harsher sentence when he appealed and was found guilty by a jury. Recognizing the interest of the State in efficient criminal procedure, we rejected a claim based on Jackson that the system discouraged the assertion of the right to a jury trial by imposing harsher sentences upon those that exercised that right. 427 U.S., at 627 -628, n. 4. </s> [Footnote 10 In Bordenkircher, the original indictment did not include the habitual criminal count, which was added when the defendant was reindicted following his refusal to plead. This escalation of the charges after the failure of plea bargaining, which to the dissenters in this Court demonstrated impermissible vindictiveness, is not present here; and we need not rely on this aspect of the Bordenkircher decision. The rationale of that case would a fortiori govern a case where the original indictment contains a habitual criminal count and conviction on that count follows the defendant's decision not to plead to a lesser charge. </s> [Footnote 11 New Jersey expressly authorizes plea bargaining. N. J. Court Rule 3:9-3 (a). Any agreement reached is "placed on the record in open court at the time the plea is entered." Rule 3:9-3 (b). The New Jersey Rules also permit disclosure of the tentative agreement to the judge to secure advance approval. Rule 3:9-3 (c). In any event, if the judge "determines that the interest of justice would not be served by effectuating the agreement," he must permit the defendant to withdraw the plea. Rule 3:9-3 (e). </s> [Footnote 12 The Court has several times recognized the benefits of plea bargaining to the defendant as well as to the State. In Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977), we said: </s> "Whatever might be the situation in an ideal world, the fact is that the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are important components of this country's criminal justice system. Properly administered, they can benefit all concerned. The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties of a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in realizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources. The public is protected from the risks posed by those charged with criminal offenses who are at large on bail while awaiting completion of criminal proceedings." (Footnote omitted.) </s> See also Santobello v. New York, supra, at 260-261; Brady v. United States, 397 U.S., at 751 -752. There is thus much more to be derived from plea bargaining than simply conserving scarce prosecutorial resources, and those benefits accrue equally where the plea bargaining occurs within a statutory framework. </s> [Footnote 13 The dissent's suggestion, post, at 229-230, that New Jersey concedes that its statutes have both the purpose and effect of penalizing the assertion of the right not to plead guilty is untenable, see Brief for Appellee 28-31, and seems inconsistent with the later description of the State's position, post, at 230. </s> [Footnote 14] The dissent appears to question any system that subjects the defendant who stands trial to a substantial risk of greater punishment than the defendant who pleads guilty. But in the next breath, the dissent appears to embrace plea bargaining, although the plea-bargaining systems operating in a majority of the jurisdictions throughout the country inherently extend to defendants who plead guilty the probability or the certainty of leniency that will not be available if they go to trial. </s> The dissent asserts that the attack here is on the statutory scheme rather than upon the system of plea bargaining, which is said to individualize defendants and does not mandate a different standard of punishment depending solely on whether or not a plea is entered. The distinction is without substance for the purposes of this case. In the first place, plea bargaining by state prosecutors operates by virtue of state law, here by virtue of the formal rules of the Supreme Court of New Jersey. That system permits a proper amount of leniency in return for pleas, leniency that is denied if one goes to trial. In this sense, the standard of punishment is necessarily different for those who plead and for those who go to trial. For those who plead, that fact itself is a consideration in sentencing, a consideration that is not present when one is found guilty by a jury. Second, under the New Jersey statutes, pleas may be rejected even if tendered; there must, for example, be a factual basis for the plea. Even if a plea is accepted, there is discretion to impose life imprisonment. The statute leaves much to the judge and to the prosecutor and does not mandate lesser punishment for those pleading non vult than is imposed on those who go to trial. It is also true that under normal circumstances, juries in New Jersey may find a defendant guilty of second-degree murder rather than first. </s> Third, we cannot hold that a prosecutor may charge a person with a crime carrying a mandatory punishment and secure a valid conviction, despite his power to offer leniency to those who plead - including dismissal of the mandatory count in return for a plea - and yet hold that the legislature may not openly provide for the possibility of leniency in return for a plea. This is particularly true where it is contemplated that plea bargaining will in any event go forward within the limits set by the legislature. </s> [Footnote 15 We do not suggest that every conceivable statutory sentencing structure, plea-bargaining system, or particular plea bargain would be constitutional. We hold only that a State may make due allowance for pleas in its sentencing decisions and that New Jersey has not exceeded its powers in this respect by its statutory provision extending the possibility of leniency to those who plead non vult in homicide cases. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring in the judgment. </s> I agree with the Court that United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 , is not controlling in this case. In the Jackson case, a convicted defendant could be sentenced to death if he had requested a jury trial but could be sentenced to no more than a life sentence if he either had pleaded guilty or had pleaded not guilty and waived a jury trial. Under these circumstances, the Court held that this part of the federal statute was unconstitutional because it "impose[d] an impermissible burden upon the exercise of a constitutional right." Id., at 572. </s> Under the New Jersey statutory scheme, by contrast, no such impermissible burden is present. Unlike the statute at issue in the Jackson case, the death penalty is not involved here, and a convicted defendant can be sentenced to the maximum penalty of life imprisonment whether he pleads non vult or goes to trial. Moreover, although in New Jersey a defendant pleads non vult to a general indictment of murder, he can be sentenced to the maximum sentence even though the underlying facts would have supported no more than a second-degree murder conviction if the defendant had gone to trial and been found guilty by a jury. Since the latter offense cannot [439 U.S. 212, 227] be punished by life imprisonment, a defendant who is guilty of second-degree murder is subject to a greater penalty if he pleads non vult than if he pleads not guilty and is convicted of that offense after a jury trial. Finally, a defendant who pleads not guilty and goes to trial can be convicted of a lesser included offense or acquitted even though in fact he is guilty of first-or second-degree murder or manslaughter. It is, therefore, impossible to state with any confidence that the New Jersey statute does in fact penalize a defendant's decision to plead not guilty. * </s> I cannot agree with the statement of the Court, however, that "[t]here is no difference of constitutional significance between Bordenkircher and this case." Ante, at 221. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 , involved plea negotiations between the attorney for the prosecution and the attorney for the defense in the context of an adversary system of criminal justice. It seems to me that there is a vast difference between the settlement of litigation through negotiation between counsel for the parties, and a state statute such as is involved in the present case. While a prosecuting attorney, acting as an advocate, necessarily must be able to settle an adversary criminal lawsuit through plea bargaining with his adversary, a state legislature has a quite different function to perform. Could a state legislature provide that the penalty for every criminal offense to which a defendant pleads guilty is to be one-half the penalty to be imposed upon a defendant convicted of the same offense after a not-guilty plea? I would suppose that such legislation would be clearly unconstitutional under United States v. Jackson. Since the reasoning of part [439 U.S. 212, 228] of the Court's opinion suggests otherwise, I concur only in the judgment. </s> [Footnote * Indeed, despite the appellant's claim that the statute coerces or encourages guilty pleas, the appellant himself pleaded not guilty, went to trial and was convicted. The petitioner in United States v. Jackson, by contrast, brought a facial attack on the constitutionality of the statute by way of a motion to dismiss the indictment. See 390 U.S., at 571 . </s> MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting. </s> The concept of a "false" not-guilty plea has no place in our jurisprudence. 1 A defendant has a constitutional right to require the State to support its accusation with evidence. 2 He is therefore given an unqualified right - before trial when he retains the presumption of innocence - to plead not guilty. 3 </s> [439 U.S. 212, 229] Because the entry of such a plea cannot at once be criminally punishable and constitutionally protected, a statute that has no other purpose or effect than to penalize assertion of the right not to plead guilty is "patently unconstitutional." The Court so held in United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 , and that holding is dispositive of this case. 4 </s> Today, however, the Court decides that a defendant who has been convicted after a full trial may be punished not only for the crime charged in the indictment but additionally for entering a "false" plea of not guilty. The holding in Jackson, though not specifically overruled, has been divorced from the rationale on which it rested. </s> New Jersey does not seriously contend that 2A:113-3 has any purpose or effect other than to penalize assertion of the right not to plead guilty. Its argument that the statute is justified by a valid state interest in conserving scarce prosecutorial [439 U.S. 212, 230] resources is simply a restatement of the obvious purpose of the law to motivate defendants to plead guilty instead of exercising their expensive right to trial. If appellee is correct in its assertion that the statute has been effective as a money-saving inducement to guilty pleas, that success is necessarily attributable to the deterrent effect of the penalty imposed on those who resist the inducement. </s> In its attempt to distinguish Jackson, the State argues that its statute imposes no penalty for "falsely" pleading not guilty because it provides the same maximum punishment regardless of the plea. That argument is beside the point because the statute provides a significantly more severe standard of punishment for the defendant who exercises his constitutional rights than for the one who submits without trial. For the former, a mandatory life sentence is prescribed whereas for the latter, life is "only the maximum in a discretionary spectrum of length" that extends downward anywhere from a term of 30 years to no term at all. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 300 . Whether viewed in light of the legislative purpose in enacting the statute or in light of its impact on the defendant's choice of how to plead, this difference in punitive standards has the same "onerous" effect as if the maximum, as well as the minimum, penalty differed. 5 Just as in Jackson, the [439 U.S. 212, 231] statute subjects the defendant who stands trial to a substantial risk of greater punishment than the defendant who pleads guilty. 6 </s> Nor is this statutory scheme the equivalent of a plea bargain negotiated between defense counsel and the prosecutor. While such bargains serve a state interest in common with 2A:113-3, they do so without penalizing the defendant's assertion of his legal rights. In the bargaining process, individual [439 U.S. 212, 232] factors relevant to the particular case may be considered by the prosecutor in charging and by the trial judge in sentencing, regardless of the defendant's plea; 7 the process does not mandate a different standard of punishment depending solely on whether or not a plea is entered. 8 </s> Of even greater importance is the fact that a defendant who refuses a plea bargain will not be punished for his constitutionally protected recalcitrance; whatever punishment he receives will be for his conduct in committing the offense or offenses the State has proved at trial. 9 In contrast, a defendant who faces a more severe range of statutory penalties simply because he has insisted on a trial, is subjected to punishment not only for the crime the State has proved but also for the "offense" of entering a "false" not-guilty plea. </s> Because the legislature, the voice of the community in identifying [439 U.S. 212, 233] crimes and penalties, 10 has inflexibly engraved the different standard of punishment in the statute itself, New Jersey may not disavow or disparage its policy of imposing a special punishment simply because a person has done what the law plainly allows him to do. As the Court reiterated last Term, the implementation of such a policy inevitably produces a due process violation of the most basic sort. 11 </s> The right of the defendant to stand absolutely mute before the bar of justice and to force the government to make its case without his aid has been accepted since the earliest days of the Republic. 12 That silence, and its formal invocation by entry of a not-guilty plea, cannot retain the protection of the Fifth Amendment and be simultaneously a punishable offense. The same act cannot be both lawful and unlawful. That is the essence of the Court's holding in Jackson. I respectfully dissent from its repudiation. </s> [Footnote 1 "[T]he plea is not evidence. Nor is it testimonial. It is not under oath. Nor is it subject to cross-examination. When it is `not guilty,' it has no effect as testimony or evidence . . . . The function of that plea is to put the Government to its proof and to preserve the right to defend. . . . </s> "If the plea were testimonial or evidentiary, the court would have no power to demand it. . . . But if, having used its power to extract the plea for its proper purpose, it can go further and over the defendant's objection convert or pervert it into evidence, in substance if not in form it compels the defendant to testify in his own case. That it has no power to do." Wood v. United States, 75 U.S. App. D.C. 274, 282-283, 128 F.2d 265, 273-274 (1942) (Rutledge, J.). </s> See also Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (not-guilty plea is not inconsistent with entrapment defense even though latter implies admission that the offense was committed); State v. Valentina, 71 N. J. L. 552, 556, 60 A. 177, 179 (1905) (not-guilty plea and confession of guilt are not inconsistent). </s> [Footnote 2 Among the implications of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is that "[g]overnments, state and federal, [may be] constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured, and may not by coercion prove a charge against an accused out of his own mouth." Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 -8. As expressed by Dean Wigmore, the Fifth Amendment gives the individual the right to "requir[e] the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load." 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence 2251, p. 317 (McNaughten rev. ed. 1961), quoted in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 . </s> [Footnote 3 "Upon that plea the accused may stand, shielded by the presumption of his innocence, until it appears that he is guilty." Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 485 -486. See Byrd v. United States, 119 U.S. App. D.C. [439 U.S. 212, 229] 360, 362, 342 F.2d 939, 941 (1965); United States v. Mayfield, 59 F. 118, 119 (ED La. 1893). </s> Long before the incorporation of the Fifth Amendment into the Fourteenth, the States had firmly enforced these principles: </s> "[A] plea of not guilty, to a criminal charge, at once calls to the defense of defendant the presumption of innocence, denies the credibility of evidence for the State, and casts upon the State the burden of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . These words are not mere formalities, but express vital principles of our criminal jurisprudence and criminal procedure. These principles ought not to be readily abandoned, or worn away by invasion." State v. Hardy, 189 N.C. 799, 804-805, 128 S. E. 152, 155 (1925). </s> [Footnote 4 "Our problem is to decide whether the Constitution permits the establishment of such a death penalty, applicable only to those defendants who assert the right to contest their guilt before a jury. The inevitable effect of any such provision is, of course, to discourage assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial. If the provision had no other purpose or effect than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it would be patently unconstitutional." United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S., at 581 (footnote omitted). </s> [Footnote 5 This conclusion was the predicate for the Court's holding in Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 . In that case the Court held that a change in statutory sentencing provisions for burglary could not be applied retroactively even though the new provisions did not increase the 15-year maximum sentence, but only made it mandatory: </s> "The effect of the new statute is to make mandatory what was before only the maximum sentence. . . . </s> "Removal of the possibility of a sentence of less than fifteen years . . . operates to [defendants'] detriment in the sense that the standard of punishment adopted by the new statute is more onerous than that of the old." Id., at 400-401. </s> Accord, Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 300 ("[O]ne is not barred from challenging a change in the penal code on ex post facto grounds simply because the sentence he received under the new law was not more onerous [439 U.S. 212, 231] than that which he might have received under the old"). See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 619 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment) (A statutory sentencing scheme under which "a defendant can plead not guilty only by enduring a semimandatory [death-penalty provision], rather than [the] purely discretionary, capital-sentencing provision" applicable to defendants who plead guilty creates a "disparity between a defendant's prospects under the two sentencing alternatives [that] is . . . too great to survive under Jackson"). </s> Mr. Justice Stone's opinion for the unanimous Court in Lindsey also disposes of appellee's argument that the statute here is distinguishable from the one in Jackson because it does not make death the consequence of a "false" not-guilty plea: When "a punishment for murder of life imprisonment or death [is] changed to death alone," it is "only a more striking instance of the detriment which ensues from the revision of a statute providing for a maximum and a minimum punishment by making the maximum compulsory." 301 U.S., at 401 . In either case, "[i]t is plainly to the substantial disadvantage of petitioners to be deprived of all opportunity to receive" less than the maximum. Id., at 402-403. See also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 -752, holding that a defendant who pleads guilty to avoid the death penalty is entitled to no different treatment from one who pleads guilty to avoid any other "maximum sentence authorized by law." </s> [Footnote 6 In one important respect, the statute invalidated in Jackson was less onerous than the New Jersey statute involved in this case. The Jackson defendant could avoid the more severe penalty by merely forgoing his Sixth Amendment right to a jury and trying the case to the court alone. Here, however, the price of avoiding the statutory penalty for an incorrect plea of not guilty is the waiver not only of the right to a jury but also the right to put the government to its proof, to confront one's accusers, and to present a defense. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 . </s> [Footnote 7 See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723 . Whenever this flexibility and individualization has given way to prosecutorial or judicial vindictiveness against those who assert their rights, the Court has condemned the practice. Id., at 725. The message of Pearce, as well as Jackson; Brady v. United States, supra; Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 ; and Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 , is that where the legislature, prosecutor, judge, or all three "deliberately employ their charging and sentencing powers to induce [a] defendant to tender a plea of guilty," Brady, supra, at 751 n. 8, and where they do so with the "objective [of] penaliz[ing] a person's reliance on his legal rights, [such action] is `patently unconstitutional.'" Bordenkircher, supra, at 363, quoting Chaffin, supra, at 32-33, n. 20. </s> [Footnote 8 This point was made most forcefully in Brady v. United States. In that case, the Court upheld a conviction under the same statute challenged in Jackson. However, petitioner in Brady, unlike respondent in Jackson, had not received a higher sentence as "the price of a jury trial." 397 U.S., at 746 . Instead, he had knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty and brought himself within the lower range of penalties provided for those who did not insist upon trial. The Court affirmed the conviction because the plea-bargaining process, even when buttressed by the invalid statute, was not "inherently coercive of guilty pleas." Ibid. </s> [Footnote 9 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, supra, at 364. </s> [Footnote 10 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 594 . Cf. United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 7 Cranch 32. </s> [Footnote 11 "To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, supra, at 363. </s> [Footnote 12 United States v. Hare, 26 F. Cas. 148 (No. 15,304) (CC Md. 1818); United States v. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. 1287 (No. 15,204) (CC Mass. 1834) (Story, J.). The days have long since passed when a refusal to plead qualified as an admission of guilt or an invitation for the extraction of a plea through torture or piene forte et dure. See McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372, 386 -387 (Douglas, J., dissenting); In re Smith, 13 F. 25 (CC Mass. 1882). Today, it is universally accepted that silence at arraignment is equivalent to a plea of not guilty. See United States v. Beadon, 49 F.2d 164 (CA2 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 625 . </s> [439 U.S. 212, 234]

United States Supreme Court COMMISSIONER OF INT. REV. V. SOUTH TEXAS LUMBER CO.(1948) No. 384 Argued: January 14, 1948Decided: March 29, 1948 </s> Rehearing Denied May 3, 1948. Mr. Lee A. Jackson, of Washington, D.C., for petitioner. Mr. Charles C. MacLean, Jr., of New York City, for respondent. [ Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. South Texas Lumber Co. 333 U.S. 496 (1948) ] </s> [333 U.S. 496 , 497] </s> Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. This case raises a question as to respondent's liability for the taxable year 1943 under the Excess Profits Tax of 1940, as amended. 54 Stat. 975, 26 U.S.C. 710 et seq., 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code, 710 et seq. The law was passed to tax abnormally high profits due to large governmental expenditures about to be made from appropriations for national defense. 1 The excess profits tax was a graduated surtax upon a portion of corporate income, and was imposed in addition to the regular income tax. It applied to all corporate profits and gains over and above what Congress deemed to be a fair and normal return for the corporate business taxed. Under the controlling 1943 law the amount of income subject to this excess profits tax is computed by subtracting from the net income subject to regular income tax the amount of earnings Congress deemed to be a taxpayer's normal and fair return. 2 This deductible amount, called the excess profits credit, was to be computed in one of two ways, whichever resulted in the lesser tax. 712. The first, not used here, permits a deduction of an amount equal to the company's average net income for the taxable years 1936 to 1939 inclusive. 713. The second, used here, permits a deduction of an amount equal to 8 per centum of the taxpayer's invested capital for the taxable year. 3 714. An includable element of the 'invested capital' is the 'accumulated earnings and profits as of the beginning of such taxable year.' 718. It thus appears that by this method Congress intended, with minor exceptions not here relevant, to impose the excess profits tax on all annual net income in excess of 8% of a </s> [333 U.S. 496 , 498] </s> corporation's working capital, including its accumulated profits. The controversy here is over the taxpayer's claim that in computing its 1943 tax the statute allows it to include in this 8% deduction its 'accumulated profits' from certain installment sales, which profits the tapayer, in accordance with an option conferred upon him, had elected not to report as a part of its taxable income in prior years. Beginning in 1937 and extending over a four-year period, respondent sold parcels of real estate, gave deeds, and took installment notes, which were secured by mortgages and vendors liens. It kept its books generally on a calendar year accrual basis of accounting, a basis under which all obligations of a company applicable to a year are listed as expenditures, whether paid that year or not, and all obligations to it incurred by others applicable to the year are set up as income on the same basis. Under 26 U.S.C. 41, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code, 41, an income taxpayer may report income and expenditures either on an accrual basis, or on a cash basis-under which latter method annual net income is measured by the difference between actual cash received and paid out within the taxable year. In any event, the basis used must, in the language of 41, 'clearly reflect the income.' Respondent did not report the value of its land installment notes as income on the accrual basis as it could have done under 41. Instead, from 1937 up to and including 1943, it has consistently reported its annual income from the installment sales on a third, or 'installment' basis, expressly authorized for certain types of installment sales by 26 U. S.C. 44, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code, 44. That section permits a taxpayer to return as taxable income for a given year only 'that proportion of the installment payments actually received in that year which the gross profit realized or to be realized when payment is completed, bears to the total contract price.' Thus respondent's install- </s> [333 U.S. 496 , 499] </s> ment income has actually been reported for taxes all along substantially on a modified cash receipts basis, and the taxpayer's net income, which is subjected both to the normal income tax and to the excess profits tax, has not in any of these years reflected the unpaid balances on the installment notes, or any part of them. On the contrary, these balances were listed on respondent's tax returns during these years as 'Unrealized Profit Installment Sales.' On its 1943 excess profits tax return respondent nevertheless reported as 'accumulated earnings and profits' the amount of 'Unrealized Profit Installment Sales' shown on its books at the end of 1942,4 and included this amount in 'invested capital.' It thus sought to deduct 8% of its theretofore designated 'unrealized profit' in computing its excess profits tax. The Commissioner redetermined the tax for 1943 after eliminating this item from 'invested capital.' The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner's redetermination, 7 T.C. 669, relying on its opinion in Kimbrell's Home Furnishings, Inc., v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 339.5 The Circuit Court of Appeals, 5 Cir., 162 F.2d 866, with one justice dissenting, reversed on the authority of its decision in Commissioner v. Shenandoah Co., 5 Cir., 138 F.2d 792. The Government's petition for certiorari alleged that the result reached by the Circuit Court of Appeals was counter to the Commissioner's regulations and to longstanding tax practices recognized by statutes and judicial opinions, under which practices a taxpayer normally cannot report taxable income on one accounting basis and adjustments of that income on another. The </s> [333 U.S. 496 , 500] </s> questions thereby raised are of importance in tax administration and we granted certiorari to consider them. A Treasury regulation, set out in part below,6 applicable to both the normal income tax and the excess profits tax,7 specifically prv ides that 'a corporation computing income on the installment basis as provided in section 44 shall, with respect to the installment transactions, compute earnings and profits on such basis.'8 Since respondent computed its taxable income from installment sales on the installment or modified cash receipts basis, but computed its earnings and profits from these same sales on another basis, the accrual, it contends that the regulation is invalid because inconsistent with the governing code provisions. Validity of the regulation is therefore the crucial question. </s> [333 U.S. 496 , 501] </s> This Court has many times declared that Treasury regulations must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes and that they constitute contemporaneous constructions by those charged with administration of these statutes which should not be overruled except for weighty reasons. See, e.g., Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375, 378 , 145. This regulation is in harmony with the long-established congressional policy that a taxpayer generally cannot compute income taxes by reporting annual income on a cash basis and deductions on an accrual basis. Such a practice has been uniformly held inadmissible because it results in a distorted picture which makes a tax return fail truly to reflect net income. This has been the construction given income, estate, and previous excess profits tax laws by administrative officials, the Board of Tax Appeals, and the courts. 9 </s> The regulation's reasonableness and consistency with the statutes which impose the excess profits tax on incomes, is also supported by prior legislative and administrative history. The present 'invested capital' deduction is patterned after a similar provision in 326(a) of the Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1057, 1088, 1092. That section imposed a 'War-Profits and Excess-Profits Tax.' Invested capital there included 'paid in or earned surplus and undivided profits.' Undert hat law the administration, the Board of Tax Appeals, and the courts have uniformly held that a taxpayer, having elected to </s> [333 U.S. 496 , 502] </s> adopt the installment basis of accounting, could not thereafter distort his true excess profits tax income by including uncollected installment obligations in his 'invested capital' deduction base. 10 A taxpayer, having chosen to report his taxable income from installment sales on the installment cash receipts plan, thereby spreading its gross earnings and profits from such sales over a number of years and avoiding high tax rates, was not permitted to obtain a further reduction by shifting to an accrual plan and treating uncollected balances on these installment sales as though they had actually been received in the year of the sale. The history of the congressional adoption of the optional installment basis also supports the power of the Commissioner to adopt the regulation here involved. Prior to 1926 the right of a taxpayer to report on the installment plan rested only on Treasury regulations. 11 In 1925, the Board of Tax Appeals held these regulations were without statutory support. 12 Congress promptly, in 212(d) of the 1926 Revenue Act, 26 U.S.C.A.Int.Rev. Acts, page 162, adopted the present statutory authority for an elective installment basis for reporting income, the Senate committee report on the measure designating it as a 'third basis, the installment </s> [333 U.S. 496 , 503] </s> basis.'13 This new statutory provision was strikingly similar to the Treasury regulations previously held unauthorized by the Board of Tax Appeals. That the Commissioner was particularly intended by Congress to have broad rule-making power under the regulation was manifested by the first words in the new installment basis section which only permitted taxpayers to take advantage of it 'Under regulations prescribed by the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary * * *.' The clause is still contained in 44 of the code. This gives added reasons why interpretations of the Act and regulations under it should not be overruled by the courts unless clearly contrary to the will of Congress. See Burnet v. S. & L. Bldg. Corporation, 288 U.S. 406, 415 , 430. The installment basis of reporting was enacted, as shown by its history, to relieve taxpayers who adopted it from having to pay an income tax in the year of sale based on the full amount of anticipated profits when in fact they had received in cash only a small portion of the sales price. Another reason was the difficult and time-consuming effort of appraising the uncertain market value of installment obligations. 14 There is no indication in any of the congressional history, however, that by passage of this law Congress contemplated that those taxpayers, who elected to adopt this accounting method for their own advantage could by this means obtain a further tax advantage denied all other taxpayers, whereby they could, as to the same taxb le transaction, report in part on a cash receipts basis and in part on an accrual basis. We find nothing unreasonable in the regulations here. See Commissioner v. Wheeler, 324 U.S. 542 . </s> [333 U.S. 496 , 504] </s> It is argued that notwithstanding what has been said, Congress by enacting 501 of the 1940 Second Revenue Act, 54 Stat. 974, 1004, 26 U.S. C. 115(l) 26 U.S.C.A.Int.Rev.Code, 115(l), had provided a definition of 'earnings and profits' which includes these unpaid installment obligations and that the regulation here conflicts with 115(l),15 which is applicable alike to both the income and the excess profits taxes. There are at least two reasons why we cannot accept this argument. In the first place, neither 115(l) nor any other purports to alter the Commission's power to promulgate reasonable regulations which require taxpayers who adopt the installment basis of accounting to use an accounting method that reflects true income. The hybrid method here urged would not accomplish that result. In the second place, we cannot accept the respondent's interpretation of 115(l). He argues that 'earnings and profits' derived from a sale of property are defined in 115(l) considered in the light of 111, 112, and 113; that these sections together define such earnings and profits as all gain 'realized' in the year of sale and 'recognized' under the law applicable to the year of sale; that all the anticipated profits from these installment sales were 'realized' when the sales were made because the installment obligations of the purchasers were received by respondent in the year of sale and they must be assumed to have been worth their face value; that they </s> [333 U.S. 496 , 505] </s> were 'recognized' as taxable by 111(c), the law applicable to the year of sale; and that consequently, the Commissioner was compelled to accept these lawfully 'realized' and 'recognized' accumulated profits as 'invested capital' for excess profits tax purposes, even though not previously reported as taxable income for either income tax or excess profits tax purposes. Finally respondent contends that 44 merely conferred upon it a privilege to defer payment of income tax on its tax- 'recognized' profits realized from installment sales until the unpaid installment obligations were collected. The congressional reports on 115(l) do not provide support for the idea that gains not included in taxable income under the taxpayer's method of accounting may nevertheless be considered 'realized' and 'recognized' for computing tax adjustments or deductions so long as they might have entered into such computations under a different method of accounting. 16 Furthermore, neither 111, 112, nor 113, require a 'recognition' of the full face value of installment paper. It is true that 111(b) does provide that gain or loss 'realized' from the sale of property shall be measured by the 'sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the property (other than money) received' and 111(c) provides that the extent of gain or loss shall be 'recognized' as determined 'under the provisions of section 112.' But 111(d) </s> [333 U.S. 496 , 506] </s> provides that nothing in 111 'shal be construed to prevent (in the case of property sold under contract providing for payment in installments) the taxation of that portion of any installment payment representing gain or profit in the year in which such payment is received.' This means that where a taxpayer has validly reported its income from installment sales on the installment basis provided by 44, that section, not 111, 112, and 113 prescribes the extent to which receipts from such sales are 'recognized' as taxable and the year in which such receipts are 'recognized' in computing taxable income. Section 44 provides for the return as income 'in any taxable year that proportion of the installment payments actually received in that year which the gross profit realized or to be realized when payment is completed, bears to the total contract price.' Unlike 111, 44 does not recognize as subject to income tax liability the 'market value' of deferred installment obligations. They may never be recognized by a taxpayer on the installment basis for tax purposes under 44 or any other section, for they may never be paid, or may be paid only in part. The anticipated profits from these deferred obligations are recognized and taxable under 44 only if the obligations are paid and when they are paid, unless they are sold or transferred before payment. Thus whatever meaning is given to the words 'realized' and 'recognized' the regulation here considered is not in conflict with 115( l), 111, 112, and 113. The regulation is valid. The respondent can include in its equity invested capital only that portion of its profits from installment payments which it has actually received and on which it has already paid income taxes in the years of receipt. Reversed. Mr. Justice DOUGLAS and Mr. Justice BURTON dissent. Footnotes </s> [Footnote 1 H.R. No. 2894, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 1Ä2. [Footnote 2 Other adjustments not here material are provided, but the chief deduction or 'aj ustment' is the one noted above. [Footnote 3 The straight 8% figure of 1940 was modified in several respects not here material in 1941 and subsequent years. 55 Stat. 699, 56 Stat. 911, 58 Stat. 55. </s> [Footnote 4 In its 1943 return respondent also reported the amount of such unrealized profits shown on its books as of the end of the two preceding years for purposes of calculating the excess profits credit carryover authorized by 710(c). [Footnote 5 The Kimbrell case was subsequently reversed but not on the contention here urged. 4 Cir., 159 F.2d 608. </s> [Footnote 6 Section 29.115Ä3 of Regulations 111: 'Earnings or Profits.ÄIn determining the amount of earnings or profits (whether of the taxable year, or accumulated prior to March 1, 1913) due consideration must be given to the facts, and, while mere bookkeeping entries increasing or decreasing surplus will not be conclusive, the amount of the earnings or profits in any case will be dependent upon the method of accounting properly employed in computing net income. For instance, a corporation keeping its books and filing its income tax return under sections 41, 42, and 43 on the cash receipts and disbursements basis may not use the accrual basis in determining earnings and profits; a corporation computing income on the installment basis as provided in section 44 shall, with respect to the installment transactions, compute earnings and profits on such basis; * * *. ' [Footnote 7 The meaning of all terms used in the subchapter dealing with the income tax was expressly made applicable to terms used in the excess profits subchapter. 728. Treasury Regulations 112 provided: '* * * In general, the concept of 'accumulated earnings and profits' for the purpose of the excess profits tax is the same as for the purpose of the income tax.' 35.718Ä2. See also H.R.No.2894, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 41. [Footnote 8 This part of the regulation was added as an amendment to Reg. 103, 19.115Ä3, now 29.115Ä3 of Reg. 111, after adoption of the 1940 Excess Profits Tax Law. T.D. 5059, July 8, 1941. </s> [Footnote 9 G.C.M. 2951, VIIÄI Cum. Bull. 160 (1928); I.T. 3253, 1939Ä1 Cum. Bull. 178; Appeal of Consolidated Asphalt Co., 1 B.T.A. 79, 82; Appeal of Henry Reubel, Executor, 1 B.T.A. 676, 678Ä680; Appeal of B. B. Todd, Inc., 1 B.T.A. 762, 766; Appeal of Bank of Hartsville, 1 B.T.A. 920, 921; Appeal of Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 2 B.T.A. 892, 894, 895; United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 440 , 134; Jacob Bros. Co. v. Com'r, 2 Cir., 50 F.2d 394, 396; Jenkins v. Bitgood, D.C., 22 F. Supp. 16, 17, 18, affirmed, 2 Cir., 101 F.2d 17. </s> [Footnote 10 Schmoller & Mueller Piano Co. v. United States, 67 Ct.Cl. 428; John M. Brant Co. v. United States, 40 F.2d 126, 69 Ct.Cl. 516; Standard Computing Scale Co. v. United States, 52 F.2d 1018, 72 Ct.Cl. 619; Jacob Bros. v. Com'r, 2 Cir., 50 F.2d 394; Tull & Gibbs v. United States, 9 Cir., 48 F.2d 148; Appeal of Blum's, Inc., 7 B.T.A. 737, 771; New England Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Com'r, 9 B.T.A. 334; Green Furniture Co. v. Com'r, 14 B.T.A. 508; S. Davidson & Bros., Inc., v. Com'r, 21 B.T.A. 638, 644; Federal Street & Pleasant Valley Passenger R. Co. v. Com'r, 24 B.T.A. 262, 266. [Footnote 11 Article 117 of Regulations 33 (Revised) promulgated Jan. 2, 1918, and Article 42 of Regulations 45, promulgated April 17, 1919. [Footnote 12 Appeal of B. B. Todd, Inc., 1 B.T.A. 762; Appeal of H. B. Graves Co., Inc., 1 B.T.A. 859; Appeal of Hoover Bond Co., 1 B.T.A. 929; Appeal of Six Hundred and Fifty West End Avenue Co., 2 B.T.A. 958. </s> [Footnote 13 S.Rep.No.52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 19, the Senate Finance Committee's report on Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 9, 23. [Footnote 14 S.Rep.No.52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 19; Willcuts v. Gradwohl, 8 Cir ., 58 F.2d 587, 589, 590. </s> [Footnote 15 Section 115(l) provides: 'The gain or loss realized from the sale or other disposition * * * of property by a corporationÄ* * * '(2) for the purpose of the computation of earnings and profits of the corporation for any period beginning after February 28, 1913, shall be determined by using as the adjusted basis the adjusted basis (under the law applicable to the year in which the sale or other disposition was made) for determining gain. </s> 'Gain or loss so realized shall increase or decrease the earnings and profits to, but not beyond, the extent to which such a realized gain or loss was recognized in computing net income under the law applicable to the year in which such sale or disposition was made.' </s> [Footnote 16 The Conference Committee report on the Second Revenue Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 974, said with reference to 115(l): 'The provisions in the House and Senate bills, that gain or loss so realized shall increase or decrease the earnings and profits to, but not beyond, the extent recognized in computing net income under the law applicable to the year in which such sale or disposition was made, are retained. As used in this subsection the term 'recognized' relates to a realized gain or loss which is recognized pursuant to the provisions of law, for example, see section 112 of the Internal Revenue Code. It does not relate to lossess disallowed or not taken into account.' Conf.Rep.No.3002, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 60.

United States Supreme Court WYRICK v. FIELDS(1982) No. 82-158 Argued: Decided: November 29, 1982 </s> Respondent, a soldier stationed in Missouri, after being arrested on a charge of rape and after consulting with private counsel and with an attorney provided him by the Army, requested a polygraph examination. Immediately prior to the examination, which was conducted by an agent of the Army's Criminal Investigation Division (CID), respondent signed a consent document that included information of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 ; the CID agent read to respondent a detailed statement that also explained his rights, including the right to stop answering questions at any time or to speak to a lawyer before answering further, even if he signed a waiver certificate; and respondent, in response to a question, stated that he did not want a lawyer present. At the conclusion of the polygraph examination, the CID agent told respondent that there had been some deceit, and asked him if having intercourse with the victim, but said that it had been consensual; the agent asked whether respondent wished to discuss the matter further with another CID agent and with the local Police Chief; and respondent said that he did. The Police Chief read respondent his Miranda warnings once again before questioning him, and respondent repeated that his sexual contact with the victim had been consensual. Respondent was convicted after trial in a Missouri state court, which denied his motion to suppress the testimony of the two CID agents and the Police Chief as to his "confessions" to voluntary intercourse, holding that he had waived his rights. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Federal District Court denied respondent's subsequent petition for habeas corpus relief. However, the Federal Court of Appeals reversed, holding that although respondent had waived his Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present while the polygraph examination itself was being conducted, the State failed to prove that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to the presence of counsel at the examining CID agent's "post-test interrogation." The court suggested that there would have been no violation if the agent merely had paused at the end of the polygraph examination to remind respondent of his rights. [459 U.S. 42, 43] </s> Held: </s> The Court of Appeals misconstrued Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , which establishes that where an accused, after invoking his right to counsel, initiates subsequent dialogue with the authorities, the question whether there was a valid waiver of the right to counsel as to any interrogation that occurs during such dialogue is controlled by the "totality of the circumstances," including the fact that the accused initiated the dialogue. Here, respondent initiated not just a meeting with the authorities, but interrogation, by requesting the polygraph examination. Respondent validly waived his right to have counsel present at "post-test" questioning, unless the circumstances changed so seriously that his answers no longer were voluntary, or unless he no longer was waiving his rights knowingly and voluntarily. To require new warnings merely because the examination had been discontinued and respondent was asked if he could explain the test's unfavorable results, would be unreasonable. The questions put to respondent after the examination would not have caused him to forget the rights of which he had been advised and which he had understood moments before. </s> Certiorari granted; 682 F.2d 154, reversed and remanded. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, over a dissent by Judge Ross, directed that respondent Edward Fields' petition for a writ of habeas corpus be granted; it did so on the ground that Fields had been convicted with evidence obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present at an interrogation. 682 F.2d 154 (1982). We have concluded that the Court of Appeals' majority misconstrued this Court's recent decision in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and imposed a new and unjustified limit on police questioning of a suspect who voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waives his right to have counsel present. </s> I </s> Respondent, a soldier then stationed at Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., was charged with raping an 81-year-old woman on September 21, 1974. After his arrest on September 25, Fields was released on his own recognizance. He retained [459 U.S. 42, 44] private defense counsel. After discussing the matter with his counsel and with a military attorney provided him by the Army, Fields requested a polygraph examination. This request was granted and the examination was conducted on December 4 by an agent of the Army's Criminal Investigation Division (CID) at the fort. </s> Prior to undergoing the polygraph examination, Fields was given a written consent document, which he signed, informing him of his rights, as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and of his rights under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Eighth Amendment. In addition, the CID agent read to Fields the following detailed statement: </s> "Before I ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You do not have to answer my questions or say anything. Anything you say or do can be used against you in a criminal trial. You have a right to talk to a lawyer before questioning or have a lawyer present with you during the questioning. This lawyer can be a civilian lawyer of your own choice, or a military lawyer, detailed for you at no expense to you. Also, you may ask for a military lawyer of your choice by name and he will be detailed for you if superiors determine he's reasonably available. If you are now going to discuss the offense under investigation, which is rape, with or without a lawyer present, you have a right to stop answering questions at any time or speak to a lawyer before answering further, even if you sign a waiver certificate. Do you want a lawyer at this time?" See State v. Fields, 538 S. W. 2d 348, 350, n. 1 (Mo. App. 1976) (emphasis added). </s> Fields answered: "No." </s> At the conclusion of the polygraph examination, which took less than two hours, the CID agent told Fields that there had been some deceit, and asked him if he could explain why his answers were bothering him. Fields then admitted having [459 U.S. 42, 45] intercourse with the victim on September 21, but said that she had instigated and consented to it. The agent asked Fields if he wished to discuss the matter further with another CID agent and with the Waynesville, Mo., Chief of Police. Fields said that he did. Then, in his turn, the Police Chief read Fields his Miranda warnings once again before questioning him. Fields repeated that he had had sexual contact with the victim, but that it had been consensual. </s> Respondent was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court, Pulaski County, Mo. He sought to suppress the testimony of the two CID agents and the Police Chief regarding his "confessions" to voluntary intercourse. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that Fields had waived his rights. The testimony was admitted. Fields was convicted, and was sentenced to 25 years in prison. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment on the ground that Fields "had been repeatedly and amply advised of his rights and . . . voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his rights." 538 S. W. 2d, at 350. </s> Eventually, Fields sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The District Court, agreeing with the Missouri Court of Appeals that Fields had voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to counsel, denied respondent's petition. On appeal, however, the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the case with directions to order the State either to release Fields or to afford him a new trial. 682 F.2d, at 162. </s> II </s> The Court of Appeals found that the police conduct in question contravened the "clear import" of this Court's decision in Edwards v. Arizona: "a defendant's right to have counsel present at custodial interrogations must be zealously guarded." 682 F.2d, at 158. In Edwards, this Court had held that once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, he may not be subjected to further interrogation until counsel is provided [459 U.S. 42, 46] unless the suspect himself initiates dialogue with the authorities. 451 U.S., at 484 -487. The Eighth Circuit recognized that what it called the "per se rule" of Edwards "does not resolve the issue present here." 682 F.2d, at 158. Fields and his counsel had agreed that Fields should take the polygraph examination, and Fields appeared voluntarily and stated that he did not want counsel present during the interrogation. Thus, the Court of Appeals conceded that "Fields thereby `initiated' further dialogue with the authorities after his right to counsel had been invoked." Ibid. </s> When the suspect has initiated the dialogue, Edwards makes clear that the right to have a lawyer present can be waived: </s> "If, as frequently would occur in the course of a meeting initiated by the accused, the conversation is not wholly one-sided, it is likely that the officers will say or do something that clearly would be `interrogation.' In that event, the question would be whether a valid waiver of the right to counsel and the right to silence had occurred, that is, whether the purported waiver was knowing and intelligent and found to be so under the totality of the circumstances, including the necessary fact that the accused, not the police, reopened the dialogue with the authorities." 451 U.S., at 486 , n. 9. </s> Citing this language, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged - as it had to - that "[t]here is no question that Fields waived his right to have counsel present while the [polygraph] examination itself was being conducted." 682 F.2d, at 160. Yet that court found that the State had failed to satisfy its burden of proving that "Fields knowingly and intelligently waived his right to have counsel present at the post-test interrogation." Ibid. The court suggested that had the CID agent merely "paus[ed] to remind the defendant" of his rights, thus [459 U.S. 42, 47] providing "meaningfully timed Miranda warnings" (emphasis in original), there would have been no violation. Ibid. </s> III </s> In reaching this result, the Court of Appeals did not examine the "totality of the circumstances," as Edwards requires. Fields did not merely initiate a "meeting." By requesting a polygraph examination, he initiated interrogation. That is, Fields waived not only his right to be free of contact with the authorities in the absence of an attorney, but also his right to be free of interrogation about the crime of which he was suspected. Fields validly waived his right to have counsel present at "post-test" questioning, unless the circumstances changed so seriously that his answers no longer were voluntary, or unless he no longer was making a "knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment" of his rights. 451 U.S., at 482 . </s> The Court of Appeals relied on two facts indicating the need for a new set of warnings: the polygraph examination had been discontinued, and Fields was asked if he could explain the test's unfavorable results. To require new warnings because of these two facts is unreasonable. Disconnecting the polygraph equipment effectuated no significant change in the character of the interrogation. The CID agent could have informed Fields during the examination that his answers indicated deceit; asking Fields, after the equipment was disconnected, why the answers were bothering him was not any more coercive. The Court of Appeals stated that there was no indication that Fields or his lawyer anticipated that Fields would be asked questions after the examination. But it would have been unreasonable for Fields and his attorneys to assume that Fields would not be informed of the polygraph readings and asked to explain any unfavorable result. Moreover, Fields had been informed that he could stop the questioning at any time, and could request at any time that [459 U.S. 42, 48] his lawyer join him. Merely disconnecting the polygraph equipment could not remove this knowledge from Fields' mind. * </s> The only plausible explanation for the court's holding is that, encouraged by what it regarded as a per se rule established in Edwards, it fashioned another rule of its own: that, notwithstanding a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of the right to have counsel present at a polygraph examination, and notwithstanding clear evidence that the suspect understood that right and was aware of his power to stop questioning at any time or to speak to an attorney at any time, the police again must advise the suspect of his rights before questioning him at the same interrogation about the results of the polygraph. The court indicated that this rule was needed because it thought that the use of polygraph "results" in questioning, although it does not necessarily render a response involuntary, is inherently coercive. But Courts of Appeals, including a different panel of the Eighth Circuit itself, and state courts, have rejected such a rule. See, e. g., United States v. Little Bear, 583 F.2d 411, 414 (CA8 1978); Keiper v. Cupp, 509 F.2d 238, 241-242 (CA9 1975); People v. Barreto, 256 Cal. App. 2d 392, 64 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1967); State v. Henry, 352 So.2d 643 (La. 1977). Cf. Henry v. Dees, 658 F.2d 406 (CA5 1981) (waiver not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent in the total circumstances of the case, including mental retardation of suspect). The Eighth Circuit's rule certainly finds no support in Edwards, which emphasizes that the totality of the circumstances, including the fact that the suspect initiated the questioning, is controlling. Nor is the [459 U.S. 42, 49] rule logical; the questions put to Fields after the examination would not have caused him to forget the rights of which he had been advised and which he had understood moments before. The rule is simply an unjustifiable restriction on reasonable police questioning. </s> IV </s> According to the dissent, a substantial question as to the admissibility of Fields' statements may be raised under the Sixth Amendment. Post, at 52-55. The Sixth Amendment issues raised by the dissent, however, are not before us. The Court of Appeals rested its judgment exclusively on the Fifth Amendment "right to have counsel present during a custodial interrogation" and on its interpretation of this Court's decision in Edwards. 682 F.2d, at 158. That interpretation was flawed and the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We express no view as to whether any constitutional safeguards not mentioned by the Court of Appeals bear on this case. </s> Because the Court of Appeals misapplied Edwards and created an unjustified per se rule, the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and that court's judgment is reversed and the case is remanded. </s> It is so ordered. </s> [Footnote * The dissent suggests that, because the results of polygraph examinations are inadmissible in Missouri, Fields might reasonably have expected that he would not be subjected "to additional questioning that can produce admissible evidence." Post, at 51, n. 2. Although the results of the polygraph examination might not have been admissible evidence, the statements Fields made in response to questioning during the course of the polygraph examination surely would have been. </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring. </s> There is much force to what JUSTICE MARSHALL has written in dissent. I share his concern about the Court's practice of deciding cases summarily, partly because there is a special risk of error in summary dispositions and partly because the practice represents an unwise use of the Court's scarce resources. I do not, however, agree with JUSTICE MARSHALL's suggestion that we should invite the parties to submit briefs on the merits before a case is summarily decided. I fear that the institution of such a practice would tend to regularize and expand the number of our summary dispositions. [459 U.S. 42, 50] </s> In this case I believe the correct procedure for the Court to have followed would have been simply to deny the petition for a writ of certiorari. No conflict has yet developed on the precise question presented and, as JUSTICE MARSHALL demonstrates, the Court of Appeals' conclusion is not without reasoned support. The Court, however, has granted the petition. Although I voted against that action, I am now persuaded that the Court's resolution of the merits is correct and therefore join its disposition. </s> JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting. </s> A summary reversal is an exceptional disposition. It should be reserved for situations in which the applicable law is settled and stable, the facts are not disputed, and the decision below is clearly in error. 1 Because I do not believe that this is such a case, I dissent. </s> I </s> I do not agree that respondent's consent to the polygraph examination necessarily constituted a waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights with respect to the postexamination interrogation. In my view, this case is not controlled by the footnote in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 486 , n. 9 (1981), on which the Court relies. That footnote dealt with the hypothetical case, not before the Court in Edwards, of a suspect who initiates a meeting with the police. The Court indicated that, even if the police said or did something in the meeting that constituted interrogation, incriminating statements thereby elicited would be admissible if a knowing and intelligent waiver of the suspect's Fifth Amendment rights could be inferred in light of "the totality of the circumstances, including the necessary fact that the accused, not the police, reopened the dialogue with the authorities." Ibid. (Emphasis supplied.) [459 U.S. 42, 51] </s> In this case, "the totality of the circumstances" includes the undisputed facts that respondent agreed only to submit to a polygraph examination, and that he was never told he would be subjected to a postexamination interrogation. Moreover, an agreement to submit to a polygraph examination differs in an important respect from the initiation of an ordinary conversation with the authorities. When a suspect commences a conversation with a policeman, he has reason to expect that, as in any conversation, there will be a give-and-take extending beyond the subject matter of his original remarks. It may therefore be appropriate to conclude that the suspect's waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights extends to the entire conversation. By contrast, a polygraph examination is a discrete test. It has a readily identifiable beginning and end. An individual who submits to such an examination does not necessarily have any reason whatsoever to expect that he will be subjected to a postexamination interrogation. 2 While in some cases the prosecution may be able to prove that a suspect knew there would be questioning after the test, here there is "no evidence that Fields or his lawyer anticipated that the CID officer would attempt to elicit incriminating statements from Fields after the examination was run." 682 F.2d 154, 160 (CA8 1982). </s> In any event, I do not believe that this substantial constitutional question should be disposed of summarily. I recognize, [459 U.S. 42, 52] of course, that this Court's expanding docket has increased the pressure to accelerate the disposition process. I cannot agree, however, that summary reversal is proper in a case that involves a significant issue not settled by our prior decisions. If the Court concludes that there are "special and important reasons," this Court's Rule 17.1, for granting certiorari but also concludes that this case should not be set for oral argument, the Court should at least give the parties notice that it is considering a summary disposition, so that they may have an opportunity to submit briefs on the merits. See Brown, Foreword: Process of Law, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 77, 94-95 (1958). </s> II </s> Today's decision holds only that the postexamination interrogation did not violate respondent's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Court's ruling does not preclude the Court of Appeals from considering on remand whether the interrogation nevertheless violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 3 See Massiah v. United [459 U.S. 42, 53] States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). Because "the policies underlying the two constitutional protections are quite distinct," Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 , n. 4 (1980), a suspect may waive his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent without waiving his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. </s> Where only the Fifth Amendment applies, the ultimate question is whether the conduct alleged to constitute a waiver demonstrates that, despite "the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966), the suspect's statements were given voluntarily. To make the Fifth Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination effective, this Court has held that a suspect has a right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation. Id., at 469-472. Once a suspect in custody asks to speak to a lawyer, he "is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S., at 484 -485. When a suspect has indicated that he needs legal advice before deciding whether to talk further, any subsequent statements made at the authorities' insistence without counsel being present are unlikely to be voluntary. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 110 , n. 2 (1975) (WHITE, J., concurring in result). If, on the other hand, the subsequent statements are made in a conversation initiated by the accused, they may well be voluntary. See Edwards v. Arizona, supra, at 486, n. 9. Since the underlying purpose of the privilege against self-incrimination is to prevent the State from coercing an individual to give evidence against himself, it makes sense to find [459 U.S. 42, 54] a waiver of the privilege where a suspect's conduct provides assurance that his statements were made voluntarily. </s> The determination of whether there has been a valid waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has a different focus, for the values underlying that right are different. The purpose of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is to provide the defendant with legal assistance during the critical stages of the criminal process. See, e. g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932). To give effect to this protection, this Court has insisted that the State deal with a defendant through his attorney. Once the State has commenced adversary criminal proceedings against an individual, as Missouri did in this case more than two months before the polygraph examination was held, the Sixth Amendment forbids all efforts to elicit information from him in the absence of counsel, regardless of whether he is in custody, see United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 273 -274, n. 11 (1980); Massiah v. United States, supra, and regardless of whether the technique used to extract information is in any way coercive, see McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U.S. 356 (1965). </s> To establish a waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, it is therefore not enough for the State to point to conduct - such as the initiation of a conversation - that demonstrates that the defendant's statements were made voluntarily. Since a Sixth Amendment violation does not depend upon coercion, the protection of the Sixth Amendment is not waived by conduct that shows only that a defendant's statements were not coerced. The State must show that the defendant intelligently and knowingly relinquished his right not to be questioned in the absence of counsel. The State can establish a waiver only by proving "`an intentional relinquishment or abandonment'" of the right to have counsel present. Brewer v. Williams, supra, at 404, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 4 </s> [459 U.S. 42, 55] </s> Given the different policies underlying the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, it is not surprising that a number of courts have held that "`[w]arnings by law enforcement officers and subsequent action by the accused that might suffice to comply with Fifth Amendment strictures against testimonial compulsion [do] not necessarily meet . . . the higher standard with respect to waiver of the right to counsel that applies when the Sixth Amendment [right to counsel] has attached.'" United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1147 (CA2 1980), quoting United States v. Massimo, 432 F.2d 324, 327 (CA2 1970) (Friendly, J., dissenting) (majority did not reach the issue), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1022 (1971). 5 Today's decision therefore does not foreclose the Court of Appeals from considering on remand whether the postexamination interrogation violated the Sixth Amendment. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 See generally Brown, Foreword: Process of Law, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 77 (1958). </s> [Footnote 2 Certainly no one would argue that a suspect who consented to a blood test, a lineup, or fingerprinting thereby consented to be questioned about the results of those procedures. </s> In this case, it is particularly inappropriate to assume that Fields must have realized that the CID agent would conduct a postexamination interrogation. The results of polygraph examinations are inadmissible in Missouri. See State v. Biddle, 599 S. W. 2d 182, 191 (Mo. 1980) (en banc); State v. Weindorf, 361 S. W. 2d 806, 811 (Mo. 1962). When a defendant, after consultation with his attorney, agrees to submit to an examination the results of which are inadmissible, the authorities have no justification for inferring that the defendant has also agreed to submit to additional questioning that can produce admissible evidence. </s> [Footnote 3 I do not share the majority's certainty that the Court of Appeals relied "exclusively on the Fifth Amendment." Ante, at 49. Although the opinion below does discuss Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), at considerable length, the court phrased its holding in terms of the "right to counsel" without referring specifically to the Fifth Amendment or the Sixth Amendment. See 682 F.2d 154, 157 (CA8 1982) ("we conclude that Fields did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to have counsel present at the interrogation"); id., at 161 ("The government has simply introduced no evidence from which we can conclude that when Fields was confronted with the accusatory statement that the `lie-detector' showed he was lying, he waived his right to the protection of counsel in this coercive situation"). See also id., at 161, n. 12 (relying on Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), a Sixth Amendment case). It is noteworthy that the Magistrate, whose report the District Court adopted, pointed to the Sixth Amendment problem by observing that it is "a somewhat empty gesture to appoint an attorney for an accused . . . and then pursue [an] interrogation . . . without his attorney." In addition, the petition for certiorari asserts that the decision below "expands the rights guaranteed an accused during [459 U.S. 42, 53] interrogation under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments." Pet. for Cert. 7 (emphasis supplied). </s> In any event, since the Court today construes the Court of Appeals' opinion as resting solely on the Fifth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment issue remains open on remand. </s> [Footnote 4 Edwards v. Arizona, supra, addressed only the standard governing waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. [459 U.S. 42, 55] Since the Court concluded that Edwards had been interrogated in violation of the Fifth Amendment, it had no occasion to consider whether the Sixth Amendment applied or whether, if so, Edwards had waived its protection. See id., at 480, n. 7. </s> [Footnote 5 See United States ex rel. O'Connor v. New Jersey, 405 F.2d 632, 636 (CA3), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 923 (1969); Hancock v. White, 378 F.2d 479, 482 (CA1 1967). See also United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344, 1354-1355 (CA7) (Stevens, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 873 (1972); People v. Arthur, 22 N. Y. 2d 325, 330, 239 N. E. 2d 537, 539 (1968). See generally Note, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 363 (1982). </s> [459 U.S. 42, 56]

United States Supreme Court ARLAN'S DEPT. STORE v. KENTUCKY(1962) No. 503 Argued: Decided: December 17, 1962 </s> The owners of three retail stores in Kentucky were fined for employing persons in their businesses on Sunday in violation of a Kentucky statute, and the convictions were sustained against their claim that the statute violated the First Amendment, applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment. Held: An appeal to this Court is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. </s> Reported below: 357 S. W. 2d 708. </s> James E. Thornberry and Edward M. Post for appellants. </s> John B. Breckinridge, Attorney General of Kentucky, Holland N. McTyeire, Assistant Attorney General, and Chas. E. Keller for appellee. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting. </s> This is a criminal prosecution of the owners of three retail stores for employing persons in their businesses on Sunday. 1 Each was fined $20 and costs and the convictions [371 U.S. 218, 219] were sustained (357 S. W. 2d 708) against the claim that the laws violated the First Amendment, applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case differs from Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 , and Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Market, 366 U.S. 617 , in that those who actually observe the Sabbath on a day of the week other than Sunday are exempt from the penal provisions. 2 But as I indicated in my dissent in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 561 , the unconstitutionality of Sunday laws strikes much deeper. By what authority can government compel one person not to work on Sunday because the majority of the populace deems Sunday to be a holy day? Moslems may someday control a state legislature. Could they make criminal the opening of a shop on Friday? Would not we Christians fervently believe, if that came to pass, that government had no authority to make us bow to the scruples of the Moslem majority? </s> I said in my dissent in the McGowan case: </s> ". . . it is a strange Bill of Rights that makes it possible for the dominant religious group to bring the minority to heel because the minority, in the doing of acts which intrinsically are wholesome and not antisocial, does not defer to the majority's religious beliefs. Some have religious scruples against eating pork. Those scruples, no matter how bizarre [371 U.S. 218, 220] they might seem to some, are within the ambit of the First Amendment. . . . Is it possible that a majority of a state legislature having those religious scruples could make it criminal for the nonbeliever to sell pork? Some have religious scruples against slaughtering cattle. Could a state legislature, dominated by that group, make it criminal to run an abattoir? . . . A legislature of Christians can no more make minorities conform to their weekly regime than a legislature of Moslems, or a legislature of Hindus. The religious regime of every group must be respected - unless it crosses the line of criminal conduct. But no one can be forced to come to a halt before it, or refrain from doing things that would offend it. That is my reading of the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause." 366 U.S., at 575 . </s> The religious nature of this state regulation is emphasized by the fact that it exempts "members of a religious society" who actually observe the Sabbath on a day other than Sunday. The law is thus plainly an aid to all organized religions, bringing to heel anyone who violates the religious scruples of the majority by seeking his salvation not through organized religion but on his own. </s> I see no possible way by which this law can be sustained under the First Amendment. </s> ". . . if a religious leaven is to be worked into the affairs of our people, it is to be done by individuals and groups, not by the Government. This necessarily means, first, that the dogma, creed, scruples, or practices of no religious group or sect are to be preferred over those of any others; second, that no one shall be interfered with by government for practicing the religion of his choice; third, that the State may not require anyone to practice a religion or even any [371 U.S. 218, 221] religion; and fourth, that the State cannot compel one so to conduct himself as not to offend the religious scruples of another. The idea, as I understand it, was to limit the power of government to act in religious matters . . . not to limit the freedom of religious men to act religiously nor to restrict the freedom of atheists or agnostics." 366 U.S., at 563 -564. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Kentucky Rev. Stat. 436.160 reads in relevant part as follows: "(1) Any person who works on Sunday at his own or at any other occupation or employs any other person, in labor or other business, whether for profit or amusement, unless his work or the employment of others is in the course of ordinary household duties, work of necessity or charity or work required in the maintenance or operation of a public service or public utility plant or system, shall be fined not less than two dollars nor more than fifty dollars. The employment [371 U.S. 218, 219] of every person employed in violation of this subsection shall be deemed a separate offense. "(2) Persons who are members of a religious society which observes as a Sabbath any other day in the week than Sunday shall not be liable to the penalty prescribed in subsection (1) of this section, if they observe as a Sabbath one day in each seven. "(3) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to amateur sports, athletic games, operation of moving picture shows, chautauquas, filling stations or opera." </s> [Footnote 2 Id., subsection (2). </s> [371 U.S. 218, 222]

United States Supreme Court ZUBER v. ALLEN(1969) No. 25 Argued: October 16, 1969Decided: December 9, 1969 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 52, Hardin, Secretary of Agriculture v. Allen et al., also on certiorari to the same court. </s> Respondent Vermont dairy farmers ("country" milk producers) brought this action to invalidate the so-called farm location differential provided for by order of the Secretary of Agriculture as contrary to the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937. The effect of the order is to require milk distributors to pay milk producers situated close to milk marketing areas ("nearby" farmers) higher prices than are paid to producers located at greater distances from such areas. In the 1920's, prior to federal regulation, nearby farmers received higher prices for their milk in the Boston area than farmers at more distant points. The 1935 amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act, carried forward into 8 (c) of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, provides, in part, for the payment to all producers "delivering milk to all handlers of uniform prices for all milk . . . subject only to adjustments for (a) volume, market, and production differential customarily applied by the handlers subject to such order, (b) the grade or quality of the milk delivered, (c) the locations at which delivery of such milk is made." The Department of Agriculture regulations provide a price differential for "nearby" farmers, and a lesser differential for intermediate nearby zones. The District Court granted an injunction against further payments of the differentials, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: </s> 1. The statutory scheme, which was to provide uniform prices to all producers in the marketing area, subject only to specifically enumerated adjustments, contemplated that "market differentials . . . customarily applied" would be based on cost adjustments. Pp. 179-187. [396 U.S. 168, 169] </s> (a) The particularity and specificity of the enumerated differentials negate the conclusion that Congress was thinking only in terms of historical considerations. P. 183. </s> (b) The other statutory differentials, for "volume," "grade or quality," "location," and "production," all compensate the producer for providing an economic service benefiting the milk handler. Pp. 183-184. </s> (c) In a statute whose purpose was to avoid the infirmity of the overbroad delegation of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, it would have been simple to include "nearby" payments in the list of enumerated differentials, or at least to allude to them in the draftsmen's report. P. 185. </s> 2. The "nearby" differentials do not fall into the category of the permissible adjustments, which are limited to compensation for rendering an economic service, and neither the Secretary of Agriculture nor the "nearby" farmer petitioners have advanced any economic justifications for them that have substantial record support. Pp. 188-191. </s> 3. This holding does not depart from the Court's precedents. United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533 , distinguished. To the extent that Green Valley Creamery v. United States, 108 F.2d 342, contravenes this holding, it is disapproved. Pp. 191-192. </s> 4. While according great weight to a department's contemporaneous construction of its own enabling legislation, the Court cannot abdicate its ultimate responsibility to construe the statutory language. Pp. 192-194. </s> 5. Although the Secretary's orders have been specifically approved by the farmers concerned in accordance with 9 (B) (i) of the Act, such approval does not legitimize the regulation which is not authorized by statute. Pp. 195-196. </s> 6. A reversal for trial on the merits is not warranted since the Department of Agriculture acted on a formal record, and a remand to the Secretary is inappropriate in the absence of a request by the Government, which has advanced no new theory for sustaining the regulation. Pp. 196-197. </s> 7. The Court of Appeals' award to "nearby" farmer petitioners of the escrowed differential payments collected before the District Court entered final judgment will not be disturbed. P. 197. </s> 131 U.S. App. D.C. 109, 402 F.2d 660, affirmed. [396 U.S. 168, 170] </s> Lawrence D. Hollman argued the cause for petitioners in No. 25. With him on the briefs was Carlyle C. Ring, Jr. Daniel M. Friedman argued the cause for petitioner in No. 52. On the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Ruckelshaus, Peter L. Strauss, Alan S. Rosenthal, and Walter H. Fleischer. </s> Charles Patrick Ryan argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief was Edward J. Ryan. </s> Edwin H. Amidon, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for the State of Vermont as amicus curiae urging affirmance in both cases. With him on the brief was James M. Jeffords, Attorney General. </s> Robert H. Quinn, Attorney General of Massachusetts, pro se, Walter H. Mayo III, Assistant Attorney General, Herbert F. DeSimone, Attorney General of Rhode Island, pro se, Charles G. Edwards, Assistant Attorney General, Robert K. Killian, Attorney General of Connecticut, pro se, and Michael J. Scanlon, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the Attorneys General of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut as amici curiae urging reversal in both cases. </s> C. Wayne Smyth filed a brief for Lorton Blair et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance in both cases. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This action was brought by respondent Vermont dairy farmers, "country" milk producers, seeking a judgment invalidating as contrary to the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, as amended, 50 Stat. 246, 7 U.S.C. 601 et seq. (1964 ed. and Supp. IV), the so-called farm location differential provided for by order [396 U.S. 168, 171] of the Secretary of Agriculture. 1 The effect of that order is to require milk distributors to pay to milk producers situated at certain distances from milk marketing areas, "nearby" farmers, higher prices than are paid to producers located at greater distances from such areas. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction on January 16, 1967, against further payments and on respondents' motion for summary judgment transformed its decree into a permanent injunction on June 15, 1967. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. 131 U.S. App. D.C. 109, 402 F.2d 660 (1968). We granted certiorari to resolve the important issue of statutory construction involved in this aspect of the administration of the federal milk regulation program. 394 U.S. 958 (1969). [396 U.S. 168, 172] </s> I </s> BACKGROUND </s> Once again this Court must traverse the labyrinth of the federal milk marketing regulation provisions. 2 While previous decisions have outlined the operation of the statute and the pertinent regulations, a brief odyssey through the economic and regulatory background is essential perspective for focusing the issue now before the Court. </s> A. THE ECONOMICS OF THE MILK INDUSTRY </s> The two distinctive and essential phenomena of the milk industry are a basic two-price structure that permits a higher return for the same product, depending on its ultimate use, and the cyclical characteristic of production. </s> Milk has essentially two end uses: as a fluid staple of daily consumer diet, and as an ingredient in manufactured dairy products such as butter and cheese. Milk used in the consumer market has traditionally commanded a premium price, even though it is of no higher quality than milk used for manufacture. While cost differences account for part of the discrepancy in price, they do not explain the entire gap. At the same time the milk industry is characterized by periods of seasonal overproduction. The winter months are low in yield and [396 U.S. 168, 173] conversely the summer months are fertile. In order to meet fluid demand which is relatively constant, sufficiently large herds must be maintained to supply winter needs. The result is oversupply in the more fruitful months. The historical tendency prior to regulation was for milk distributors, "handlers," to take advantage of this surplus to obtain bargains during glut periods. Milk can be obtained from distant sources and handlers can afford to absorb transportation costs and still pay more to outlying farmers whose traditional outlet is the manufacturing market. 3 To maintain income farmers increase production and the disequilibrium snowballs. </s> To protect against market vicissitudes, farmers in the early 1920's formed cooperatives. These cooperatives were effective in eliminating the self-defeating overproduction by pooling the milk supply and refusing to deal with handlers except on a collective basis. 4 During [396 U.S. 168, 174] the 1920's era of relative market stability the nearby farmers enjoyed premium prices for their product. These favorable prices were apparently attributable to reduced transportation costs and also the nearby farmer's historic position as a fluid supplier. 5 </s> B. THE FIRST FEDERAL PROGRAM </s> The drop in commodity prices during the depression years destroyed the equilibrium of the 1920's and utter chaos ensued. Congress, in an effort to restore order to the market and boost the purchasing power of farmers, enacted the licensing provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 48 Stat. 31, 35. Under 8 (3) the Secretary of Agriculture was empowered </s> "[t]o issue licenses permitting processors, associations of producers, and others to engage in the handling, in the current of interstate or foreign commerce, of any agricultural commodity or product thereof, or any competing commodity or product thereof. Such licenses shall be subject to such terms and conditions, not in conflict with existing Acts of [396 U.S. 168, 175] Congress or regulations pursuant thereto, as may be necessary to eliminate unfair practices or charges that prevent or tend to prevent the effectuation of the declared policy and the restoration of normal economic conditions in the marketing of such commodities or products and the financing thereof. The Secretary of Agriculture may suspend or revoke any such license, after due notice and opportunity for hearing, for violations of the terms or conditions thereof. . . ." </s> Under the licensing system base-rating plans not unlike the private arrangements that obtained in the 1920's were adopted. 6 Producers were assigned bases which fixed the percent of their output that they would be permitted to sell at the Class I price that was paid for fluid milk. 7 The viability of the licensing scheme was jeopardized, however, by judicial decisions disapproving a similarly broad delegation of power under the National Industrial Recovery Act provisions, 48 Stat. 195. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). With its agricultural marketing program resting on quicksand, Congress moved swiftly to eliminate the defect of overbroad delegation and to shore up the void in the agricultural marketing provisions. Section 8 (3) of the 1933 Act was amended in 1935 and the pertinent language has been carried forward without significant [396 U.S. 168, 176] change into 8c of the present Act. Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 246, as amended, 7 U.S.C. 608c (1964 ed. and Supp. IV). 8 </s> [396 U.S. 168, 177] </s> C. THE PRESENT REGULATORY SCHEME </s> The present system, which differs little in substance from the scheme conceived in 1937 for regulating the Boston market, 9 provides for a uniform market price payable to all producers by all handlers. 10 Prices are established for Class I and Class II uses. The total volume of milk channeled into the market in each category is multiplied by the appropriate coefficient price and the two results are totaled and then divided by the total number of pounds sold. The result represents the average value of milk sold in the marketing area and is the basic "uniform" price. Were all producers to receive this price they would share on an equal basis [396 U.S. 168, 178] the profits of Class I marketing and assume equally the costs of disposing of the economic surplus in the Class II market. The actual price to the producer is, however, the "blended" price which is computed by adding and subtracting certain special differentials provided for by statute and order. See 7 CFR 1001.64 (1969). The deduction for differential payments withheld for the benefit of nearby producers reduces the uniform "blended" price to those producers ineligible to collect this particular adjustment. 11 The provision is contained in 1001.72 of the order and provides: </s> "In making the payments to producers . . . each handler shall add any applicable farm location differential specified in this section. </s> "(a) With respect to milk received from a producer whose farm is located within any of the places specified in this paragraph, the differential shall be 46 cents per hundredweight, unless the addition of 46 cents gives a result greater than the Class I price determined under 1001.60, 1001.62, and 1001.63 which is effective at the plant at which the milk is received. In that event there shall be added a rate which will produce that price." </s> A differential of 23 is provided for deliveries from farms in intermediate nearby zones. 1001.72 (b). </s> The foregoing provisions appear in the so-called 1964 Massachusetts-Rhode Island Order, which consolidated into one region the four sub-markets which were previously [396 U.S. 168, 179] regulated separately under the so-called four "New England" orders: the 1951 Boston order which carried forward the order adopted for the Boston area in 1937; the Springfield order promulgated in 1949; and the Southeastern New England order of 1958. Each order included a provision for a nearby differential payment to farmers within a stated radius of a designated market center. For example the differential under the Boston order was payable to farmers located within a 40-mile radius of the State House in Boston; a slightly lower differential was paid to farmers within an 80-mile radius. Under the 1964 order there is no central point for the computation of the radius for payment of the differential; the Secretary has retained the differential provisions as they appeared in the previous four orders. Farmers who would have been entitled to the differential under any one of the previous four marketing regulations continue to receive those payments under the present order. These nearby farmers are eligible for the differential on any shipments within the New England marketing area, even though their milk may actually be used outside the radius of their particular nearby zone. </s> II </s> THE STATUTORY SCHEME </s> The foundation of the statutory scheme is to provide uniform prices to all producers in the marketing area, subject only to specifically enumerated adjustments. The question before the Court, stated most simply, is whether payment of farm location differentials, set forth above, is a permissible adjustment under 8c (5) (B) to the general requirement of uniformity of price. 12 </s> [396 U.S. 168, 180] </s> The Secretary has in the past labeled the "nearby" differential a "location" differential and defended its inclusion in his orders on that ground. The justification and argument are now, however, pitched in a different key. The Government has apparently abandoned all but one of the numerous theories advanced below, and pressed most vigorously in the Blair v. Freeman litigation (125 U.S. App. D.C. 207, 370 F.2d 229 (1966)), and it now stresses the provision in 8c (5) (B) for "volume, market, and production differentials customarily applied by the handlers subject to such order." </s> While the proper resolution of the issue is by no means self-evident, we are persuaded that "market . . . differentials customarily applied" contemplates cost adjustments. The plain thrust of the federal statute was to remove ruinous and self-defeating competition among [396 U.S. 168, 181] the producers and permit all farmers to share the benefits of fluid milk profits according to the value of goods produced and services rendered. The Government's proposed reading of the Act, bottomed, as it is, on the historical payment of a premium to nearby farmers during the monopolistic era of the cooperative pools, would come to perpetuate economic distortion and freeze the milk industry into the competitive structure that prevailed during the 1920's. </s> Without the benefit of government muscle to eliminate crippling price warfare in the summer months, neither nearby nor country producers could share in the monopoly-type profits that accrue from fluid milk sales. Absent regulation only the handlers, if anyone, would stand to benefit from the "fluid" monopoly. While we cannot project what would be the case today if a free market prevailed, we might well anticipate that the nearby producers' winter advantages would be negligible in view of reduced transportation costs and more reliable refrigeration. Thus even in winter handlers might be free to play nearby and outlying farmers against each other since handlers would be free of the leverage exercised by the nearby cooperatives during the 1920's. Nearby producers now seek the best of both worlds. Having achieved the security that comes with regulation, they seek under a regulatory umbrella to appropriate monopoly profits that were never secure in the unregulated market. </s> We are reluctant to attribute such intent to Congress and, simply in the name of administrative expertise, to follow a path not marked by the language of the statute. Indeed, such signposts as may be discerned from the legislative history point in a very different direction. The legislative history strongly suggests that "market differentials," as well as all the other differentials, contemplated particular understood economic adjustments. The House Report, in discussing the allowable adjustments [396 U.S. 168, 182] characterizes the market differential as a payment over and above the transportation costs, i. e., a location differential, for delivery to the primary market. 13 Thus farmers would share with handlers the savings from bypassing country-station processing and handling the milk only at the city plant. </s> The significance of the legislative history emerges upon study of the subsequent administrative practice. The original Boston order obscures the market differential payment by providing in place of a labeled adjustment a two-price structure which allowed an additional 18 per cwt. for city-delivered milk over and above the costs of transporting the milk from the country plant. However, the testimony of Mr. Aplin for the Market Administrator erases any doubt that those responsible for administering the Act fully understood the meaning of the Committee's explanation of market differential. 14 </s> [396 U.S. 168, 183] </s> Subsequent orders have combined the country station handling adjustment, properly the market differential, and the location-transportation differential into the so-called zone differential. 15 </s> The statute before us does not contain a mandate phrased in broad and permissive terms. Congress has spoken with particularity and provided specifically enumerated differentials, which negatives the conclusion that it was thinking only in terms of historical considerations. The prefatory discussion in the House Report emphasizes the congressional purpose to confine the boundaries of the Secretary's delegated authority. 16 In these circumstances an administrator does not have "broad dispensing power." See Addison v. Holly Hill Co., 322 U.S. 607, 617 (1944). The congressional purpose is further illumined by the character of the other statutory differentials for "volume," [396 U.S. 168, 184] "grade or quality," "location," and "production," 17 all of which compensate or reward the producer for providing an economic service of benefit to the handler. 18 </s> The general language of the committee report indicating that Congress intended to carry forward the basic regulatory approach adopted under the 1933 Act, following the precedent of the 1920's, is stressed by the dissent to this opinion. This committee language, it is argued, reinforces the continuity connotations of the "customarily applied" language, a thrust that is not blunted [396 U.S. 168, 185] by any specific language indicating a legislative purpose to treat all farmers equally. </s> Legislative silence is a poor beacon to follow in discerning the proper statutory route. For here the light illumines two different roads. If nearby payments had the notoriety and significance in the milk distribution industry attributed to them by the dissent, Congress could have given its blessing by carving out another specific exception to the uniform price requirement. In an Act whose very purpose was to avoid the infirmity of overbroad delegation and to set forth with particularity the details for a comprehensive regulatory scheme, it would have been a simple matter to include in a list of enumerated differentials, "nearby" payments, or at least allude to them in the report of the draftsmen. It is clear that Congress was not conferring untrammeled discretion on the Secretary and authorizing him to proceed in a vacuum. This was the very evil condemned by the courts that the 1935 amendments sought to eradicate. 19 It would be perverse to assume that congressional drafters, in eliminating ambiguity from the old Act, 20 were careless in listing their exceptions and selecting the illustrations from the committee report from which their words would ultimately derive content. 21 </s> [396 U.S. 168, 186] </s> We consider our conclusions in no way undermined by the colloquy on the floor between Senator Copeland and Senator Murphy upon which the dissent places such emphasis. A committee report represents the considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation. Floor debates reflect at best the understanding of individual Congressmen. It would take extensive and thoughtful debate to detract from the plain thrust of a committee report in this instance. There is no indication, however, that the question of nearby differentials and the meaning of "market . . . differentials customarily applied" were precisely considered in the floor dialogue. The exchange is not only brief but also inconclusive as to meaning. 22 Indeed, Senator Murphy apparently acquiesced [396 U.S. 168, 187] in Senator Copeland's implied criticism of the statute for providing uniform prices for distant and nearby producers within the marketing region. When Senator Copeland pursued his inquiry, asking whether the Act recognized the higher cost for taxes on nearby lands, Senator Murphy merely recited the differential provisions of the Act and suggested that they "adopt the present practice of business," but conspicuously lacking is an affirmative statement that any specific differential covered these costs. This is not impressive legislative history especially in light of Senator Murphy's earlier agreement with Senator Copeland's statement that "[t]he provisions of the equalization . . . provide that a producer who is producing his milk on farms near to cities would receive the same price for his product as a farmer who produces his milk, say, 40 or 50 miles away from the same community," and the specific business illustrations of the House Report. [396 U.S. 168, 188] </s> III </s> SCOPE OF MARKET DIFFERENTIAL </s> While market differentials customarily applied need not be restricted to the sole illustration in the House Report, that illustration, taken in conjunction with the discussion of all the statutory differentials, suggests that the permissible adjustments are limited to compensation for rendering an economic service. 23 The challenged nearby differentials do not fall into this category. 24 </s> Nor has the Secretary advanced any economic justification for these differential payments. It is plain from the administrative record that the nearby differential was included in the original Boston order as a recognition of the favored position of nearby producers in the fluid market and as an inducement to nearby farmers to approve the Secretary's order. (J. A. 237. 25 ) The only sense [396 U.S. 168, 189] in which the handler may be said to gain economically is by virtue of the elimination of the nearby producer as a potential competitor. While this factor is mentioned in the findings accompanying the 1937 order, it has not [396 U.S. 168, 190] been emphasized in the 1964 findings and the testimony at the 1963 hearings suggests that support in the record is indeed scant. That entry of the nearbys into the distribution market would bring unwanted competition, is irrelevant if it does not jeopardize market stability. We think the analysis of the court below was correct: if there is any economic benefit here, producers should receive their compensation directly from the handlers and not out of the marketwide pool. 131 U.S. App. D.C., at 114, 402 F.2d, at 665. </s> While petitioner nearby farmers do not concede so readily the absence of economic foundation for the differential, no justifications are advanced that find any substantial support in the record. The allusion to the evenness of production on nearby farms would not justify the exclusive payment of this differential to nearby farmers. If the Secretary intended a production differential, all producers who qualify would be eligible. Some amici and petitioners point to higher taxes on nearby lands and opportunity costs as reason for retaining the differential. These are, admittedly, additional costs of nearby production, but they are of no concern to handlers who seek only to obtain reliably milk at the cheapest price. See Kessel, Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of Milk Markets, 10 J. Law & Econ. 51 (1967). This Court has been slow to attribute to Congress an intent to compensate for inefficient allocation of economic resources. Cf. West Ohio Gas Co. v. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63, 72 (1935). While petitioners argue that the differential is a necessary inducement to keep the nearby farmers in business, the record does not reveal that the Secretary acted out of concern that the nearby farmers would quit the market, nor is there any evidence demonstrating the present necessity for nearby producers. In an era where efficient transportation is [396 U.S. 168, 191] available this may be of nominal concern. At most this may have been an unspoken consideration in 1937. 26 </s> Since the Secretary made no findings to that effect, the Court need not consider whether they would justify payment of the nearby differential in view of the legislative history indicating that the statute contemplates adjustments primarily for economic costs to handlers that are absorbed or reduced by the producers. Further if the representations of respondents are correct - and they are not without support in the record - it appears that the elimination of the 40-mile zone nearby differential payments of 46, even with the suspension of the intermediate differential payments of 23, would result in a higher uniform price to those farmers now receiving the 23 differential. 27 </s> IV </s> PRIOR DECISIONS </s> Our holding does not represent a departure from this Court's precedents. No opinion of this Court has ever explicitly approved the nearby differential. Reliance on United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533 (1939), is misplaced. This Court's refusal to invalidate the payment of a nearby differential to farmers in certain counties named in the New York order must be taken in the context of that action which was initiated by the Government against handlers who refused to obey the regulations. That decision did not repudiate the District Court's finding that the provision was "discriminatory as between producers." Id., at 567. The narrow reach of our Rock Royal holding was recognized in Stark v. [396 U.S. 168, 192] Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944), where we noted that Rock Royal held the handlers without standing "to object to the operation of the producer settlement fund," id., at 308, except as it affected handlers. The Court in Rock Royal went on to reject Rock Royal's contention that the payments placed those handlers without customers in the nearby counties at a competitive disadvantage. </s> Our attention is also drawn to the First Circuit's decision in Green Valley Creamery v. United States, 108 F.2d 342 (1939). As in Rock Royal, supra, the parties did not have standing to raise the invalidity of the nearby differential. To the extent the First Circuit's view is contrary to our present holding, we disapprove it. </s> V </s> SIGNIFICANCE OF DEPARTMENTAL CONSTRUCTION </s> While this Court has announced that it will accord great weight to a departmental construction of its own enabling legislation, especially a contemporaneous construction, see Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961); it is only one input in the interpretational equation. Its impact carries most weight when the administrators participated in drafting and directly made known their views to Congress in committee hearings. See Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, supra; United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U.S. 534, 539 (1940). In such circumstances, absent any indication that Congress differed with the responsible department, a court should resolve any ambiguity in favor of the administrative construction, if such construction enhances the general purposes and policies underlying the legislation. [396 U.S. 168, 193] See American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 112 -114 (1946). </s> The Court may not, however, abdicate its ultimate responsibility to construe the language employed by Congress. Those props that serve to support a disputable administrative construction are absent here. There is no suggestion in the findings, nor have the parties explained, how the present differential contributes to the broad, general purpose of eliminating crippling competition. Nor in the present case has the Court's attention been drawn to any hearings that suggest that Congress acted with the particular administrative construction before it in either 1935 or 1937. And if those administrators who participated in drafting the 1935 Act understood market differentials to encompass the farm location differential, they obviously failed to communicate their understanding to the drafters of the committee report. It is also evident that the 1937 re-enactment of the 1935 amendments was routine and did not follow a comprehensive review of the issues that had been explored in detail by the 1935 draftsmen who wrote the committee reports. 28 </s> It is true that a report from the Federal Trade Commission set forth the computations employed under the 1936 Boston order which apparently provided for a [396 U.S. 168, 194] nearby differential. 29 But the stark figures, set forth in the appendix to the report without explication, can hardly be said to have given the administrative construction the "notoriety" that this Court found persuasive in Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S., at 18 . In Udall the Court was impressed by the fact that the Secretary's interpretation had "been a matter of public record and discussion." Id., at 17. Even despite active congressional involvement in reviewing certain administrative action in connection with particular leases, the Court noted that it would not attribute ratification to Congress. Udall v. Tallman, supra. Nor can petitioners put flesh on this argument by citing 4 of the 1937 re-enactment, 50 Stat. 249, 30 and the committee report, H. R. Rep. No. 468, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1937), which merely states in the language of the Act that 4 purports to ratify, legalize, and confirm all action taken pursuant to the agreement and order provisions under the 1935 statute. 31 </s> [396 U.S. 168, 195] </s> VI </s> RELEVANCE OF PRODUCER APPROVAL </s> Petitioners allude to the fact that the orders in question have been specifically approved by the farmers concerned as required by 8c (9) (B) (i) and (ii) of the Act. 32 While the contention is adumbrated, the argument appears to run as follows: since provision is made for approval of orders by the regulated subjects, the Secretary's discretion should be generously interpreted. [396 U.S. 168, 196] If provision for such approval could ever legitimize a regulation not authorized by statute, the provision has no significance in the case before us, in light of the considerations already discussed. It is the Secretary, not the farmers, who is responsible for administering the statute and initiating orders. 33 </s> VII </s> PROPRIETY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT </s> Although the Secretary does not press the point, the private petitioners argue that this Court should at the very least reverse for a trial on the merits or alternatively reverse with instructions to remand to the Secretary for further consideration. </s> This is not a case where a department has acted without a formal record. In such instances a trial might be appropriate to afford the department an opportunity to develop those facts which underpin its action. When action is taken on a record the department cannot then present testimony in court to remedy the gaps in the record, any more than arguments of counsel on review can substitute for an agency's failure to make findings or give reasons. A remand to the Secretary is inappropriate in the absence of a request by the Government. Counsel for the Department has advanced no new theory for sustaining the order. Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 92 (1943). </s> Unlike Addison v. Holly Hill Co., 322 U.S. 607 (1944), we do not have before us a definition in a regulation that is necessary to give meaning and content to the administrative [396 U.S. 168, 197] scheme. Nor does our decision have the effect of engrafting a definition on a particular statutory term, a function that should, in the first instance, be left to the appropriate administrative body. The 1964 order, moreover, expressly provides for severance of any provision that is found invalid. See 7 CFR 1001.96. </s> VIII </s> DISPOSITION OF THE ESCROW FUND </s> Petitioner farmers' last line of retreat is their contention that they are entitled to escrow monies that have been accruing since the District Court's entry of the order granting the respondent's motion for a preliminary injunction. The court below struck an equitable balance in awarding to petitioners, nearby farmers, all escrow monies collected prior to the entry of final judgment by the District Court. This is a fair solution, and one this Court will not disturb. Petitioners have been on notice since Blair v. Freeman, 125 U.S. App. D.C. 207, 370 F.2d 229 (1966), that nearby differentials were bottomed on a shaky statutory premise. Lest losing parties be encouraged to prolong litigation by frivolous appeals in order to reap a windfall, we think respondents deserve the fruits of their victory as of the date of final judgment at trial. </s> The judgment below is </s> Affirmed. </s> THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The Secretary has promulgated comprehensive regulations to govern the marketing of milk, 7 CFR 1002.1 et seq. (1969), pursuant to the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act. The provisions relevant to this cause are set forth in Part I of this opinion, at 178, infra. The action was originally brought against the Secretary only. Petitioners Zuber et al., nearby farmers, unsuccessfully sought leave to intervene before the District Court in support of the Secretary's regulations. When judgment was rendered against the Secretary, petitioners sought leave to intervene for the purposes of appeal. Leave was granted and the Secretary also decided to take an appeal. The parties have devoted a good deal of energy to disputing what constitutes the record in this litigation. Petitioners at various times have referred us to the testimony and record compiled in an action brought in the Northern District of New York, Cranston v. Freeman, 290 F. Supp. 785 (1968). Respondents have objected, noting that the record in Cranston is not formally before this Court, and have included in the appendix various materials that were not of record below. The Court need not pause over the controversy since none of the materials in respondents' appendix is decisive of the action before us. As for the references to the Cranston record, they too are not decisive of the dispute. </s> [Footnote 2 See, e. g., Lehigh Valley Cooperative v. United States, 370 U.S. 76 (1962); Brannan v. Stark, 342 U.S. 451 (1952); Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944); United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533 (1939); H. P. Hood & Sons v. United States, 307 U.S. 588 (1939). The lower courts have also been plagued by the milk problem. See especially Judge Frank's lament, Queensboro Farm Prods. v. Wickard, 137 F.2d 969 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1943); see also Blair v. Freeman, 125 U.S. App. D.C. 207, 370 F.2d 229 (1966); Green Valley Creamery v. United States, 108 F.2d 342 (C. A. 1st Cir. 1939). </s> [Footnote 3 For fluid use, milk must be transported in its natural state and as such is a bulky and highly perishable commodity. Thus cost of shipment to a consumer market is greater than transporting an equal supply to a manufacturing plant. These factors, combined with more rigid sanitary requirements for plants distributing the fluid product, see Agricultural Adjustment Administration Report, May 1933-Feb. 1934, p. 154, explain part of the disparity between the price for Class I (fluid milk) and Class II (other uses) milk. Nearby producers, given equilibrium of supply and demand, are logical fluid suppliers to the urban areas. See generally J. Cassels, A Study of Fluid Milk Prices (1937). </s> [Footnote 4 The cooperative system amounted to a pooling arrangement wherein participating producers would bargain collectively with the handlers and threaten to withhold their milk if the handlers refused to agree to purchase a certain minimum percentage of their Class I fluid milk from the pool. Without this supply the handlers would be unable to meet their winter requirements. Essential to this arrangement of course was a sufficiently wide membership to insure no alternative source of supply to recalcitrant handlers. The second aspect of the arrangement was the division of the profits among the producer members of the cooperative. Frequently [396 U.S. 168, 174] employed was a base-rating plan whereby each producer would be assigned a percentage of his milk for which he could claim payment at the Class I fluid price. For the remaining production he would be paid at the Class II rate. Apparently bases were assigned according to the anticipated participation of the producer in the fluid market. As a result, nearby producers received more favorable bases in view of their historical role as fluid suppliers in an equilibrium market. For descriptions of the cooperative systems see Cassels, supra, n. 3, at 56-70; J. Black, The Dairy Industry and the AAA 49-51 (1935). </s> [Footnote 5 Because they were historically fluid suppliers the nearby producers apparently maintained at all times production sufficient to service the consumer fluid market. In addition their close proximity enabled them to deliver to small retailers. As such they were potential competitors. </s> [Footnote 6 See Agricultural Adjustment Administration Report, supra, n. 3, at 159-161; G. Barnhart, The Development of the Licenses and Order Regulating the Handling of Milk in the Greater Boston, Massachusetts, Marketing Area, Nov. 3, 1933-June 1, 1946 (unpublished dissertation on file with Department of Agriculture and Harvard University). </s> [Footnote 7 License 38 for the Boston area provided more favorable bases for the nearby producers. See Barnhart, supra, n. 6. at 95-96. </s> [Footnote 8 "(5) Milk and its products; terms and conditions of orders. "In the case of milk and its products, orders issued pursuant to this section shall contain one or more of the following terms and conditions, and (except as provided in subsection (7) of this section) no others: "(A) Classifying milk in accordance with the form in which or the purpose for which it is used, and fixing, or providing a method for fixing, minimum prices for each such use classification which all handlers shall pay, and the time when payments shall be made, for milk purchased from producers or associations of producers. Such prices shall be uniform as to all handlers, subject only to adjustments for (1) volume, market, and production differentials customarily applied by the handlers subject to such order, (2) the grade or quality of the milk purchased, and (3) the locations at which delivery of such milk, or any use classification thereof, is made to such handlers: "(B) Providing: "(i) for the payment to all producers and associations of producers delivering milk to the same handler of uniform prices for all milk delivered by them: Provided, That except in the case of orders covering milk products only, such provision is approved or favored by at least three-fourths of the producers who, during a representative period determined by the Secretary of Agriculture, have been engaged in the production for market of milk covered in such order or by producers who, during such representative period, have produced at least three-fourths of the volume of such milk produced for market during such period; the approval required hereunder shall be separate and apart from any other approval or disapproval provided for by this section; or "(ii) for the payment to all producers and associations of producers delivering milk to all handlers of uniform prices for all milk so delivered, irrespective of the uses made of such milk by the individual handler to whom it is delivered; "subject, in either case, only to adjustments for (a) volume, market, and production differentials customarily applied by the handlers subject to such order, (b) the grade or quality of the milk delivered, (c) the locations at which delivery of such milk is made, and (d) a further adjustment, equitably to apportion the total value of the [396 U.S. 168, 177] milk purchased by any handler, or by all handlers, among producers and associations of producers, on the basis of their marketings of milk, which may be adjusted to reflect sales of such milk by any handler or by all handlers in any use classification or classifications, during a representative period of time which need not be limited to one year." </s> [Footnote 9 The Boston order of 1937, 2 Fed. Reg. 1331, established uniform prices for all producers at $3.19 and $3.01 per cwt. of milk, depending on the place of delivery, with a further adjustment for transportation to the handler's plant in the marketing area. Article VIII, 4 (1) also provided for an adjustment based on the cost of transporting milk from outlying plants to the primary Boston market. The present regulations calculate price with reference to the purchasing power of milk based on the 1958 cost-of-living index. No transportation adjustment is provided for in calculation of the uniform price under 1001.62 of the order. Differentials to compensate for zone of delivery are retained as separate adjustments. See infra. </s> [Footnote 10 The Secretary has three alternative modes of proceeding under the Act. He may establish "use" prices which all handlers must pay to all producers according to the actual amount of milk used in each category, 8c (5) (A); individual handler pools where all producers or cooperatives selling to an individual handler shall be paid a uniform price for milk delivered to that handler; or a marketwide pool where all handlers must pay all producers a uniform price for all milk delivered irrespective of end use. </s> [Footnote 11 Also included is an adjustment for delivery to a nearby plant. The location of handler plants is classified by zones. 7 CFR 1001.62. Delivery to a plant located nearby the consumer market is, of course, advantageous to the handler and the producer is compensated for this service. The handler also saves the cost of handling and processing at his country plant in addition to saving transportation cost. Conversely, depositing milk at handlers' plants in outlying districts results in a negative adjustment. </s> [Footnote 12 Section 8c (5) (B) (ii) requires all uniform prices to be paid "irrespective of the uses made of such milk by the individual handler to whom it is delivered." Respondents contend that the nearby differential [396 U.S. 168, 180] is merely a disguised payment for the nearby suppliers' greater share of fluid milk sales. Such was apparently the case in the New Jersey order invalidated by the Court of Appeals in Blair v. Freeman, supra, where the payment of the differential was explicitly linked to the percentage of nearby milk actually supplied to the fluid market. We share respondents' skepticism and our doubts are reinforced by the explicit connection of differential payments with the share of fluid milk supplied in the 1936 Boston order. Further cause for skepticism is found in the present zone differential structure which undercompensates the handlers for transportation from outlying districts and thus encourages them to buy from nearby farmers. See Kessel, Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of Milk Markets, 10 J. Law & Econ. 51, 64-65 (1967). Here, however, unlike the situation in Blair v. Freeman, supra, the producer receives the differential irrespective of the use to which his milk is ultimately put. Since the nearby differential in the present order is not directly tied to the percentage of fluid milk sales, although the order limits differential payments to 46 or the Class I price, whichever is higher, we accept the Government's contention that, as a matter of strict logic, the payment of differentials based on the historical position of nearby producers as fluid suppliers, is not inconsistent with the irrespective-of-end-use requirement. </s> [Footnote 13 "The market differential is a differential which is given to the producer to compensate him for delivering his milk to a city market instead of to a country plant. These differentials vary with the markets and cannot be qualified as a `location' differential, because of the fact that location is usually determined on the distance from a primary market whereas market differentials are usually paid in secondary markets." H. R. Rep. No. 1241, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1935). </s> [Footnote 14 The relevant excerpts from the hearing are included in the Joint Appendix and appear at 258-259: "Section 4 . . . provides for location differentials. . . . Now, the price which is arrived at from the calculation of the pool is a blended price for all milk f. o. b. the market with country station allowances deducted. Now, Paragraph 1 [of 4] here provides that there shall be deducted from that blended price in the case of milk delivered to a plant more than 40 miles from the State House an amount equal to the carlot freight rate from that plant to Boston, so that that deduction would be different for each freight zone, and the price would be smaller by the amount of difference in freight from each zone as we go out from the market. Now, Paragraph 2 [of 4] provides that in the case of milk delivered from a producer [396 U.S. 168, 183] to a plant located within forty miles of the State House there should be added 18 cents per hundredweight. That is added for the reason that in the case of country stations there is allowed the dealers on Class I milk 20 cents a hundredweight as a country station charge, and we are allowing for containers in which to ship the milk three cents in the case of milk received at city plants, instead of having a 20 cent and a three cent deduction, which would be 23 cents. There is a receiving station allowance of only five cents. The difference is 18 cents per hundredweight. We add back in here 18 cents to the producer whose milk does not pass through a country station." (Emphasis added.) </s> [Footnote 15 See Barnhart, supra, n. 6, at 620. </s> [Footnote 16 "To eliminate questions of improper delegation of legislative authority raised by the decisions in Schechter et al. v. United States, the provisions relating to orders enumerate the commodities to which orders issued by the Secretary of Agriculture may be applicable, prescribe fully the administrative procedure to be followed by the Secretary in issuing, enforcing, and terminating orders, and specify the terms which may be included in orders dealing with the enumerated commodities." H. R. Rep. No. 1241, supra, at 8. See Brannan v. Stark, 342 U.S. 451, 465 (1952). </s> [Footnote 17 In this connection it should be noted that the production differential authorized for maintaining an adequate supply for fluid use during the lean winter months is not, strictly speaking, a handler cost but a general cost of the market. It is, however, an essential cost that cannot be eliminated by looking to an alternative supplier. Viewed in this context, it is of course a cost to the handler; for in a nonregulated equilibrium market, a handler would be forced to pay a premium during the winter months when supply is limited and demand constant. </s> [Footnote 18 "The volume differential is a differential which is paid when the operations of several country plants are consolidated into one plant. The inconvenience which is caused to producers by closing up plants to which they have been delivering and requiring that all of their milk be handled by one plant, is compensated by an additional payment to the producers. The production differential is the differential which is paid to a producer, compensating him for keeping his farm and milk qualified for a city market even though his milk may actually be going into manufactured use. . . . The production differential is a payment to the farmer for performing this function in the market." (Emphasis supplied.) H. R. Rep. No. 1241, supra, at 9-10. In Brannan v. Stark, supra, this Court invalidated regulations providing certain payments to cooperatives that had the effect of reducing the blended price to nonmember producers. The premise underlying our holding was that these payments would have to represent compensation for rendering of economic services of benefit to all producers. Even the dissenters took as a point of departure the proposition that the payments could be sustained only if justified in terms of services rendered. </s> [Footnote 19 See Brannan v. Stark, supra. </s> [Footnote 20 "The proposed amendments, insofar as they relate to marketing agreements and orders, are primarily intended to implement and spell out in more detail and with greater freedom from ambiguity the powers which were provided for in the original act. The present language of the statute is, unfortunately, subject to serious misconstruction. This has given rise to obstacles in connection with the enforcement of the marketing agreements and licenses which have seriously endangered their successful operation." H. R. Rep. No. 1241, supra, at 7. </s> [Footnote 21 The verdict of quiescent years cannot be invoked to baptize a statutory gloss that is otherwise impermissible. This Court has many times reconsidered statutory constructions that have been passively abided by Congress. Congressional inaction frequently [396 U.S. 168, 186] betokens unawareness, preoccupation, or paralysis. "It is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law." Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946). Its significance is greatest when the area is one of traditional year-by-year supervision, like tax, where watchdog committees are considering and revising the statutory scheme. Even less deference is due silence in the wake of unsuccessful attempts to eliminate an offending interpretation by amendment. See, e. g., Girouard v. United States, supra. Where, as in the case before us, there is no indication that a subsequent Congress has addressed itself to the particular problem, we are unpersuaded that silence is tantamount to acquiescence, let alone the approval discerned by the dissent. </s> [Footnote 22 The floor exchange is reported at 79 Cong. Rec. 11139-11140. "Mr. COPELAND. What has the Senator to say to the suggestion that in a number of communities in up-State New York there is not a sufficient supply of milk surrounding the market to take care of the demand; therefore, milk must be brought into the market from more distant points? The provisions of the equalization which we are now discussing provide that a producer who is producing his milk on farms near to cities would receive the same price for his product as a farmer who produces his milk, say, 40 or 50 miles away from the same community. "Mr. MURPHY. If they were embraced in the same marketing area, that would be true. Let us keep in mind what the situation is. There is a deficiency of consumer demand. There is a surplus of [396 U.S. 168, 187] milk. The price is greatly depressed, and has been for 5 years. The only way in which one can determine how each one of the producers included in the plan provided here shall bear his share of the cost of effecting a higher price is to divide the milk by classification uses. . . . . . "Mr. COPELAND. I do not think the Senator has quite stated all the conditions. He does not take into consideration the difference in the cost of production. Taxes and values of property near the city are very much higher than in the case of property farther away from the city. The transportation differential does not compensate for the difference in cost, as I see it. "Mr. MURPHY. If the Senator will refer to page 12, line 13, he will see that there is this qualification: "`Such prices shall be uniform as to all handlers, subject only to adjustments for (1) volume, market, and production differentials customarily applied by the handlers subject to such order - ' "They adopt the present practice of business - "`(2) the grade or quality of the milk purchased, and (3) the locations at which delivery of such milk, or any use classification thereof, is made to such handlers.'" </s> [Footnote 23 The market differential does not, strictly speaking, compensate the producer for absorbing a cost to the handler for it may be no additional cost to the producer to deliver to a city plant. A nearby farmer, for example, would not incur additional costs by delivering to a preferred city plant as opposed to a country station. The savings to the handler are nevertheless plain and the market differential should properly be viewed as an adjustment that permits the producer to share in the handler's profits resulting from reduced costs. </s> [Footnote 24 See Kessel, supra, n. 12, at 65-66 (1967). After criticizing the present undercompensation for transportation costs from faraway zones as a disguised subsidy to nearby producers, resulting in an inefficient allocation of economic resources, the author draws a comparison with the nearby differential lamenting, "However weak the case for zone differentials that fail to depict transportation costs, it is infinitely stronger than the case for location differentials." </s> [Footnote 25 The Secretary's 1964 findings include the following: "The farm location differential provisions under the present New England orders should be continued under the Massachusetts-Rhode Island order and the Connecticut order. "A group of nine cooperative associations, which represents principally producers whose farms are located outside any of the specified [396 U.S. 168, 189] farm location differential areas, proposed that farm location differentials be eliminated under the New England orders. Three other cooperative associations proposed that a producer whose farm is located within New England and who is presently eligible to receive a farm location differential . . . under any New England order be eligible to receive the same differential irrespective of the New England order under which his milk is pooled. Another cooperative association proposed that the farm location differentials be increased . . . . . . . . . ". . . [F]arm location differentials have been in effect under the several New England orders since the inception of the orders. The differentials were adopted to reflect in the pricing structure of the orders historical price relationships by location which prevailed in these markets. It was found that customarily somewhat higher values, above those which normally reflected transportation costs, attached to milk produced near the principal consumption centers as compared to the market value of milk produced in the more distant areas of the milkshed. "While considerable testimony in support of removal of the provisions was received, it was not established that the farm location differential provisions are resulting in unstable or disruptive marketing conditions which warrant their deletion from the orders at this time. Although certain marketing problems in the nearby and intermediate market areas were referred to in the testimony, these problems are not the result of production increases on farms in these areas which logically might be attributable to the higher returns to producers in these areas. Such increases have not been significantly different from those on farms not eligible for the farm location differentials." (J. A. 349-351). There is no reason to dispute the Secretary's finding that the differentials have no disruptive effect on the market. The issue, however, is whether the provisions are authorized by statute. The Secretary's order is devoid of any economic justification and relies solely on the historical factor of the nearby producer's favorable share of the fluid use market. See also Report to the Secretary of Agriculture by the Federal Milk Order Study Committee 74-75 (1962). </s> [Footnote 26 See Report to the Secretary of Agriculture by the Federal Milk Order Study Committee, supra, n. 25, at 75. </s> [Footnote 27 See J. A. 455 reporting excerpts from the Secretary's decision of October 21, 1958, accompanying the order for the Southeastern New England marketing area. </s> [Footnote 28 Judge Frank expressed the view in Queensboro Farm Prods. v. Wickard, 137 F.2d 969 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1943), that Congress intended to adopt the intervening administrative interpretation of the "use" language of 8c (5) (A) by its 1937 re-enactment. The construction of the "use" provision may well have caused more concern than the interpretation of the 8c (5) (B) differentials. In any event, Judge Frank's assumption that Congress gave "careful consideration . . . in connection with a re-enactment," 137 F.2d, at 977, is not supported by citation to specific legislative history that would indicate that Congress had in mind specific problems in connection with the administration of the marketing provisions. </s> [Footnote 29 The 1936 order provided for payment of a uniform price subject to adjustments and with a special exception for "any producer, whose farm is located within forty (40) miles of the State House in Boston and who delivers milk to such handler at a plant located within forty (40) miles of the State House in Boston, at $3.30 per hundredweight for that quantity of milk delivered by such producer not in excess of the base of such producer." (Emphasis supplied.) Art. VIII, 1 (2). </s> [Footnote 30 Section 4 of the Act provided: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed as invalidating any marketing agreement, license, or order, or any regulation relating to, or any provision of, or any act of the Secretary of Agriculture in connection with, any such agreement, license, or order which has been executed, issued, approved, or done under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, or any amendment thereof, but such marketing agreements, licenses, orders, regulations, provisions, and acts are hereby expressly ratified, legalized, and confirmed." </s> [Footnote 31 To the extent that Congress could be said to have acted against the background of the 1936 order, the Court must reject petitioners' argument. The 1936 order was superseded by the 1937 order which differed in approach. The provision for nearby differentials in the [396 U.S. 168, 195] 1936 order was obscured by allowing a more favorable total price to nearby producers. See n. 29, supra. The 21 differential incorporated in the 1937 order for the benefit of intermediate nearby zones was not included in the 1936 order. The 21 differential provided in Art. VIII, 4 (2), of the 1936 order could have been viewed as a true market differential since its payment depended on delivery to a handler within a 40-mile zone from a producer beyond a 40-mile zone. Further, as noted by the court below, 4 is typical of statutory boilerplate traditionally included in legislative re-enactments, to avoid breaks in regulatory continuity. 131 U.S. App. D.C., at 119, 402 F.2d, at 670. </s> [Footnote 32 Section 8c (9) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. 608c (9), provides that no order shall become effective until the Secretary determines: "(B) That the issuance of such order is the only practical means of advancing the interests of the producers of such commodity pursuant to the declared policy, and is approved or favored: "(i) By at least two-thirds of the producers . . . who, during a representative period determined by the Secretary, have been engaged, within the production area specified in such marketing agreement or order, in the production for market of the commodity specified therein, or who, during such representative period, have been engaged in the production of such commodity for sale in the marketing area specified in such marketing agreement, or order, or "(ii) By producers who, during such representative period, have produced for market at least two-thirds of the volume of such commodity produced for market within the production area specified in such marketing agreement or order, or who, during such representative period, have produced at least two-thirds of the volume of such commodity sold within the marketing area specified in such marketing agreement or order." </s> [Footnote 33 Lower courts have, in some circumstances, permitted an agency to rely on the approval of those affected by an action as evidence that the action is in the "public interest." Compare Citizens for Allegan County v. FPC, 134 U.S. App. D.C. 229, 414 F.2d 1125 (1969). with Marine Space Enclosures v. FMC, 137 U.S. App. D.C. 9. 420 F.2d 577 (1969). We need not consider what scope, if any, may be given to these principles. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK; with whom MR. JUSTICE WHITE joins, dissenting. </s> The central question in this cause is whether a provision in the Secretary of Agriculture's Boston milk market regulation which provides that farmers close to Boston [396 U.S. 168, 198] will receive a higher price for their milk than farmers farther away is valid under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, as amended, 50 Stat. 246, 7 U.S.C. 601 et seq. (1964 ed. and Supp. IV). The majority concludes that this higher payment can be sustained only if it represents "compensation for rendering an economic service," ante, at 188, and then holds that since the Secretary has not provided such an economic justification for this payment, it is invalid. The effect of affirming the judgment below is that challenged payments which have been placed in a special fund since June 1967 and now amount to over $8,000,000 will be distributed to all farmers selling milk in the Boston market instead of only those located near Boston. This represents a drastic change in the distribution of the income from the sale of milk since only the nearby farmers have received these additional payments for at least 30 years. My study of the legislative history convinces me beyond any doubt that this result is wrong and in direct conflict with the intent of Congress as expressed in the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act and its predecessors. In my opinion Congress intended to permit the Secretary to regulate the milk industry in accordance with the practices that had developed in that industry prior to the first federal regulation in 1933 and did not intend to eliminate the economic advantages that specific groups had enjoyed in the past. Since it is clear beyond a doubt that farmers near Boston received more for their milk than did other farmers prior to federal regulation, I would reverse the judgment below and hold this provision of the Boston milk order valid. </s> In order to understand the purpose of the 1937 Act, it is necessary to go back to the 1920's at a time prior to any federal regulation. As the majority correctly points out, the economics of the milk industry at that [396 U.S. 168, 199] time often led to destructive competition and chaos. Milk producers therefore formed cooperatives for their own protection and sold milk on a collective basis. All the parties in this case agree, and the record conclusively shows, that under the cooperatives at that time farmers close to marketing centers received more for their milk than did farmers farther away. This higher price resulted from many factors, including the greater proportion of milk from nearby farms that was used for fluid purposes, the possibility that those farmers would compete with handlers by selling directly to customers, smaller seasonal variation in the volume of milk produced, and higher costs - such as taxes and land values - incurred in farming close to the cities. 1 As long as economic conditions remained generally stable, the cooperatives succeeded in protecting all farmers from the dangers of overproduction and excessive competition. Then the depression set in and milk farmers, like so many other Americans, were unable to maintain stable prices by self-regulation. Congress reacted to this situation by passing the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (A. A. A.), 48 Stat. 31, under which the Secretary of Agriculture was given broad powers to regulate the farm economy through licensing. Id., 8 (3), 48 Stat. 35. Very few details or standards describing the Secretary's powers were provided in the 1933 Act, and there was no attention given to specific problems of [396 U.S. 168, 200] nearby farmers in the milk industry. Under the provisions of that Act the Secretary issued a license for the Boston market in 1933 and this first license included provisions that effectively maintained the historical price advantage of producers close to Boston. 2 In 1935 bills were introduced in Congress to amend the A. A. A. 3 and hearings were held on those bills in February and March of that year. 4 In May 1935 this Court held in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 , that provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. 195, were unconstitutional, in part because that Act delegated powers to an administrative agency without providing adequate standards and guidelines. The congressional committees considering the amendments immediately recognized that the Schechter decision cast considerable doubt on the validity of the A. A. A. and they therefore reported out a completely amended bill which set forth detailed descriptions of the powers and standards that the Secretary was to employ. 5 As reported and passed by Congress, that bill contained specific provisions concerning the milk industry, and it is those provisions that are involved in the present case. 6 The committee reports accompanying that bill make it abundantly clear that a primary purpose [396 U.S. 168, 201] of the bill was to "eliminate questions of improper delegation of legislative authority raised by the decision in Schechter . . . ." 7 There is no indication that when Congress passed those amendments it intended to cut back on or limit the authority the Secretary had actually exercised in regulating milk under the 1933 Act, but rather the purpose was to avoid judicial invalidation resulting from the absence of constitutionally sufficient standards. History and the legislative record make it quite clear that Congress in 1935 was concerned, not about limiting an excessively aggressive Secretary, but about overcoming the limitations imposed by a Court that was frustrating the congressional purpose by holding laws unconstitutional. Pursuant to the 1935 Act, the Secretary issued a new order in 1936 for the Boston market which, like the 1933 order, contained provisions for additional payments to nearby farmers. In issuing this order he explicitly relied on the historical, economic factors which justified these additional payments. (J. A. 224.) The effectiveness of the 1935 amendments was also jeopardized by court decisions, 8 and Congress again acted by passing a new law, the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 246. This statute re-enacted the milk marketing provisions of the 1935 Act in substantially the same form and further provided that all market orders issued under that Act were "expressly ratified, legalized, and confirmed." 50 Stat. 249. Proceeding under the new Act the Secretary reinstated the 1936 Boston order including the additional [396 U.S. 168, 202] payments to farmers located nearer the city, and that order and the 1937 Act have remained in substantially the same form until this time. With this general historical picture in mind, it is easier to answer the central legal question in this case which is whether the 1937 Act authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to provide that nearby farmers will receive more for their milk than farmers farther away. </s> The Act provides that the Secretary shall establish by order certain basic prices for milk delivered by producers and allows him to adjust that basic price to reflect "volume, market, and production differentials customarily applied by the handlers subject to such order . . . ." 7 U.S.C. 608c (5) (B), cl. (a) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). 9 The Secretary here argues that the payment of additional sums to farmers close to Boston is an authorized "market differential." The argument cannot be settled simply on the basis of the statutory language since there is no definition of the term "market." However the legislative history makes it clear beyond any doubt that this provision was designed to allow the Secretary broad leeway in regulating the milk industry in accordance with prior practices and differentials in the unregulated market. The committee reports in both Houses said that the milk order provisions in the Act were designed to "follow the methods employed by cooperative associations of producers prior to the enactment of the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the provisions of [396 U.S. 168, 203] licenses issued pursuant to the present section 8 (3) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act." 10 The only discussion of these provisions during the congressional floor debates fully supports this statement. Senator Copeland, a former commissioner of health in New York City and a man well acquainted with the milk industry in New England, asked Senator Murphy, the floor manager for the bill, about the possibility that farmers near the cities would receive the same price for milk as farmers farther away. Senator Murphy's initial answer indicated this would be so, but when Senator Copeland pressed the inquiry further, stating that not all factors had been considered, Senator Murphy indicated that the provisions for specific differentials "adopt the present practice of business." 11 To me that reply indicates that nearby differentials would be permissible, if they were part of the business practice - as they were. The majority diminishes the importance of this discussion by saying that it represents the views of only two men, not those of the committee, but anyone acquainted with the realities of the United States Senate knows that the remarks of the floor manager are taken by other Senators as reflecting the views of the committee itself. This history makes it clear that Congress did not intend to limit the authorized differentials to any specific payments, but rather intended to permit the Secretary to employ whatever practices, consistent with the history of the unregulated [396 U.S. 168, 204] market, he found necessary to achieve stability in the milk industry. </s> Applying these considerations it becomes plain that the additional payments to nearby farmers are authorized as a "differential customarily applied." Nearby farmers had always obtained a higher price for their milk than farmers farther away and the Secretary's regulations in 1933 and 1936 reflected this historical fact. Reinstatement of the nearby differentials after passage of the 1937 Act merely continued this prior administrative practice, based on the earlier economic realities, of paying more for milk produced on farms close to Boston. Had Congress intended to eliminate this feature of the prior practice, it would have been easy to say so, but there is absolutely nothing in the statute or in the legislative history that demonstrates a desire to alter the advantage nearby farmers had always enjoyed. </s> My conclusion that this differential is authorized is buttressed by the actions of Congress and the Secretary since 1937. There has always been a healthy controversy among farmers about this differential, and extensive hearings in 1963 brought forth strong arguments against continuing it. (J. A. 360-599.) Yet Congress, even though it amended the statute in 1965, 79 Stat. 1187, still has not in any way indicated that the nearby differential was unauthorized by the 1937 Act or that it should be eliminated at this time. Similarly the Secretary has continually reviewed this provision and refused to eliminate it, the most recent time being 1964. (J. A. 346, 349.) Since Congress, in my view, intended in 1933, 1935, and 1937 to authorize payments like the nearby differential and since it has not altered this authorization in the past 32 years, I cannot agree that this Court should or properly can eliminate the payment, ostensibly through a process of statutory interpretation. [396 U.S. 168, 205] </s> This interpretation is not based on a theory of legislative silence as the majority seems to imply. To me the legislative history speaks clearly in saying that Congress intended the Secretary to regulate the industry in accordance with prior practices, and the statutory language, statements in committee reports, and floor debates do not "illumine two different roads," ante, at 185. I see only one path that is marked by the legislative record, and the only silence I perceive is the striking absence of any statements in the statute or the legislative history that support the majority's interpretation. </s> My conclusion that the location differential is authorized by the Act finds support in other judicial decisions. In United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533 (1939), certain milk handlers made a broadside attack on the New York order issued under the 1937 Act. This Court rejected that challenge. One part of the argument was that the nearby differential provision of that order was invalid. This Court noted that "[t]he Act authorizes such an arrangement," citing the provision for market differentials customarily applied. Id., at 567. Although that provision was promulgated under 8c (5) (A) of the Act, the identical language supporting that conclusion is found in 8c (5) (B), and it is that latter section which is involved in the present case. The majority attempts to distinguish that case by noting that it was a suit brought by the Government against handlers, but it is difficult to see what difference that makes. It does not matter who sues, if the Court decides an issue of statutory interpretation that decision should remain the same even if the litigants change. 12 </s> [396 U.S. 168, 206] </s> The nearby differential of the Boston order involved here was also approved by the First Circuit in Green Valley Creamery v. United States, 108 F.2d 342 (1939). The majority's dismissal of that case on the conclusion the handlers did not have standing to raise this issue is irrelevant. The First Circuit there found the differential valid and then stated that "[f]urthermore" the handlers lacked standing. Id., at 346. It does not matter to me whether the decision on the validity of the location differential is classified as dictum or a holding. The point remains that the First Circuit considered these payments and found them expressly provided for by the language of 8c (5) (B). Ibid. </s> The majority disagrees with the interpretation of the statute set forth above and instead finds that the foundation of the portion of 1937 Act involved here was to provide uniform prices to all producers, with adjustments to that uniform price only as "compensation for rendering an economic service." Ante, at 188. This interpretation, as I understand it, would require the Secretary to disregard the historical price advantage nearby producers had in the sale of their milk, and to consider only whether there is a present economic justification for particular payments. I respectfully submit that this interpretation cannot be supported by the language of the Act considered as a whole or by the relevant expressions of congressional intent found in the legislative history. The theory of this Act adopted by the majority is clearly not that of Congress, but one created by the Court itself. </s> The conclusion that each of the differentials specified in the Act represents only "compensation for rendering an economic service" finds no support whatsoever in the language of the Act or the legislative history. None of the adjustments described in the Act is defined in terms of any "economic service." The majority does not refer [396 U.S. 168, 207] to any legislative history that indicates such a definition was intended. It may well be possible for an analyst to fit the language of the Act, the committee reports, and the floor debates into a coherent pattern of economic services, but had Congress desired to require this as a touchstone for the authorized differentials, it would have been easy for it to have said so. Congress did not choose to do so in 1933, 1935, or 1937, and it has not done so in the intervening 32 years. Moreover, if there is any pattern into which all the differentials clearly fit that is fully supported by express legislative history, it is the clear pattern of allowing the Secretary to incorporate provisions reflecting the customary practices of the milk industry itself. 13 </s> Even if the majority's statutory interpretation were correct, I do not understand why it would lead to the conclusion that the judgment below should be affirmed and the challenged payments distributed at this time to all farmers. Until this Court's decision the Secretary had [396 U.S. 168, 208] no reason to know that he had to justify the provisions of this order as "compensation for rendering an economic service," and his failure to have provided such a defense does not necessarily mean it is unavailable. Indeed the Court apparently would approve this same provision were the Secretary to issue it again, but only if it were then accompanied by an economic study that this Court - composed of lawyers, not economic or agricultural experts - finds acceptable. If such a justification is present, the differential is in fact lawful at this time, and it would not seem to matter that the Secretary has not yet incanted the proper magic words. </s> I do not see what harm would follow if this Court were simply to vacate the judgment below, remand the cases to the Secretary for appropriate study, and continue to place the payments in the special fund pending ultimate resolution of the controversy. If the Secretary cannot make the proper economic justification, the only result would be to postpone the day when the accumulating funds, which now amount to over $8,000,000, would be distributed. If, on the other hand, he is able to show that these payments compensate for an economic service, then the Court would not have unnecessarily given the accumulated millions to farmers who are not legally entitled to receive them. </s> My conviction that the Act was designed to permit the Secretary to include adjustments that reflected the prior practice of the milk industry does not mean that he can act with unlimited abandon and approve a payment simply because historically it was provided for prior to federal regulation. The statute requires that the Secretary issue orders which "will tend to effectuate the declared policy of [the Act] . . . ." 7 U.S.C. 608c (4). Those policies are specifically set forth, 7 U.S.C. 602, and in general provide that orders should establish and maintain orderly marketing conditions [396 U.S. 168, 209] and parity prices for milk producers. In his latest promulgation of the Boston order the Secretary specifically refused to eliminate the nearby differentials (J. A. 349-357) and found that the order "will tend to effectuate the declared policy of the Act." 29 Fed. Reg. 12236. That finding cannot be disturbed, nor the nearby differential invalidated, unless it is shown that the order is not supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record considered in its entirety. Cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). In this action the Court of Appeals did not make a specific finding on the substantiality of the evidence, and the respondents argue that it is insubstantial, but a review of the entire record in light of the appropriate legal standards indicates that the nearby differential in the Boston order is fully supported by substantial evidence. </s> In reaching this conclusion, it must be remembered that the Secretary is required to find only two things. First, that the proposed provision represents a payment customarily applied in the milk market, and second, that inclusion of the proposed provision will further the policies of the Act. The first of these questions is essentially a factual one, and there is no real argument in this action that the Secretary was wrong in finding as a matter of historical fact that nearby farmers received additional payments which are reflected in the location differential. The respondents do not really deny the historical existence of this higher price, but rather attack its legality under the Act. The Court of Appeals, moreover, specifically recognized the historical fact that such differentials existed, but accepted the respondents' argument that they were illegal. 131 U.S. App. D.C., at 112-114, 118, 402 F.2d, at 663-665, 669. An independent review of the record confirms the conclusion that such differentials had been customary in the market. It is thus easy to conclude that the factual finding [396 U.S. 168, 210] required by the Act has been supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record. </s> The second required finding, that the provision will further the policies of the Act, is a mixed question of fact and administrative policy. The Secretary has held extensive hearings in the past on the provisions of the Boston milk order (J. A. 233-247, 257-302, 305-330, 360-651), and he has repeatedly found that the nearby location differential furthers the policies of the Act. Since this is essentially a question of administrative discretion and will be set aside only on a strong showing by the parties that the finding is without support in the basic facts on which the Secretary has relied, it is proper to say on this record that this second finding is adequately supported. Nothing in the respondents' arguments indicates that the nearby differential does not further the policies of the Act, but rather they argue only that elimination of the differential would better serve those policies. But this question is one for the Secretary, not for the parties or for this Court, to decide. </s> What is involved here is simply a question of interpreting and following the will of Congress. Over 30 years ago Congress decided that milk producers needed governmental assistance in stabilizing their income, but it also decided that this stabilization should be accomplished with a minimal amount of change in the industry's prior practices. Congress therefore authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to regulate the industry and left most of the details to him. For over 30 years he has used his authority to regulate the Boston milk market, and has consistently found it desirable to provide higher prices for milk produced on farms close to Boston. It may well be that this decision is not the best or the most economically sound one that he could make in light of changed economic conditions in 1969, but that decision is one Congress has committed to the Secretary alone. In my view [396 U.S. 168, 211] this Court and the Court of Appeals in this litigation effectively substitute their will for the will of Congress and their views of economics and wise administration for those of the Secretary whom Congress selected to carry out its will. The Court indicates that its decision will avoid a "windfall." Ante, at 197. In fact the Court itself creates a windfall of over $8,000,000 which is siphoned out of the pockets of farmers close to Boston and bestowed like a Christmas present on those farther away. This the Court does contrary to the informed judgment of the Secretary who, faithful to the Act, has declared for years that distant farmers are not eligible for such a bonus. I am unable to agree that this is a proper function for the Court to perform and I therefore dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 The majority implies, ante, at 181, that this higher price in the 1920's was an economic "distortion." There has been no such finding by the Secretary or any of the courts below, nor was any evidence taken that was directed at this issue. This Court is poorly equipped to pass judgment on the economic validity or invalidity of this higher price, surely not as well equipped as the Secretary and the economists who advise him. It is the Secretary, not this Court, to whom Congress has delegated the task of fixing the prices producers will be paid for their milk and of making the underlying economic judgments. </s> [Footnote 2 This license adopted a somewhat complicated base-rating plan similar to that used by the milk cooperatives. See n. 4, ante, at 173-174. There is general agreement among the parties that these licenses effectively resulted in higher milk prices to nearby farmers, and the Court of Appeals recognized this fact. 131 U.S. App. D.C. 109, 113-114, 402 F.2d 660, 664-665. </s> [Footnote 3 H. R. 5585, S. 1807, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. </s> [Footnote 4 Hearing on H. R. 5585 before the House Committee on Agriculture, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.; Hearings on S. 1807 before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. </s> [Footnote 5 H. R. 8492, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. </s> [Footnote 6 These provisions of the 1935 amendments have been carried forward, virtually without change, into the present statute. </s> [Footnote 7 S. Rep. No. 1011, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 8; H. R. Rep. No. 1241, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 8. </s> [Footnote 8 In United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), this Court declared the processing tax provisions of the A. A. A. invalid, and some district courts then held that the entire Act was invalid. E. g., United States v. David Buttrick Co., 15 F. Supp. 655 (D.C. Mass. 1936), rev'd, 91 F.2d 66 (C. A. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 737 (1937). </s> [Footnote 9 This language was first enacted in the 1935 amendments to the A. A. A., but was re-enacted in the 1937 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act without change. There is no relevant legislative history for the 1937 Act, but the parties all agree that the history of the 1935 amendments also applies to the 1937 Act. The discussion of legislative history in the text is based on the 1935 legislative record. The complete text of the relevant portions of the present statute is set forth in n. 8, ante, at 176-177. </s> [Footnote 10 S. Rep. No. 1011, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 9; H. R. Rep. No. 1241, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 9. This basic purpose is reflected in the fact that Congress provided the Secretary with three different schemes of regulation, each of which followed a variety of regulations used by the milk cooperatives. See n. 10, ante, at 177. In 1965 Congress followed this same basic purpose when it amended the Act to make explicit the Secretary's power to employ base-rating plans, described in n. 4, ante, at 173-174. See 79 Stat. 1187, U.S.C. 608c (5) (B), cl. (d) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). </s> [Footnote 11 The full discussion is set out in n. 22, ante, at 186-187. </s> [Footnote 12 The majority also seems to imply, ante, at 191-192, that Rock Royal did not decide this issue since the handlers did not have standing to raise it. It seems to me that the Court there did decide that the handlers, who argued that the nearby differential reduced their own profits, could raise this issue. </s> [Footnote 13 In a footnote, n. 18, ante, at 184, the majority implies that there is support for this novel interpretation in our prior decision in Brannan v. Stark, 342 U.S. 451 (1952), which held invalid a provision in the Boston milk order that distributed certain sums to producer cooperatives. That case specifically held that such payments were not authorized by the catchall provision in the Act permitting provisions in milk orders "[i]ncidental to, and not inconsistent with, the terms and conditions specified in [other sections] and necessary to effectuate the other provisions of such order." 7 U.S.C. 608c (7) (D); Brannan, at 457-458. It is true that the majority there did decide that the challenged payments did not represent compensation for an economic benefit received by all producers, but regardless of the validity of that decision, it is irrelevant to the decision in this case. It may be that payments that are sought to be justified solely on the basis of the "necessary provisions" section require independent economic justification, but that certainly does not mean that where the Secretary relies on a specific adjustment set forth in the Act, as he does here, he must also defend it on economic grounds. </s> [396 U.S. 168, 212]

United States Supreme Court NURSING HOME PENSION FUND v. DEMISAY(1993) No. 91-610 Argued: January 11, 1993Decided: June 14, 1993 </s> For several years, respondent employers had made contributions to two trust funds (collectively, Greater Funds) on behalf of their employees. In 1984, however, the employers ended their participation in the Greater Funds and agreed, in collective bargaining agreements with the relevant union, to establish a new set of trust funds (collectively, Southern Funds). To help finance the change between the funds, the employers and other respondents brought an action to compel petitioners, the Greater Funds and their trustees, to transfer to the Southern Funds that portion of the Greater Funds' reserves attributable to respondents' past contributions. Respondents asserted a right to relief under, inter alia, 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, which prohibits payments from employers to union representatives, 302(a) and (b), but affords an exception under 302(c)(5) for payments to an employee trust fund if certain conditions are met, including that the trust fund be "established . . . for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees," and that the payments be "held in trust for the purpose of paying" employee benefits. Respondents' theory was that, unless the reserves attributable to the employers' past contributions were transferred, the Greater Funds would fail to meet 302(c)(5)'s conditions, and would thus suffer from a "structural defect" which could be remedied by the federal courts pursuant to the power conferred by 302(e) to "restrain violations of this section." The District Court granted petitioners' motion for summary judgment, finding no such "structural defect" in the Greater Funds, but the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for the District Court to shape an appropriate remedy. </s> Held: </s> A federal court does not have authority under 302(e) to issue injunctions against a trust fund or its trustees requiring the trust funds to be administered in the manner described in 302(c)(5). Section 302(e) provides district courts with jurisdiction "to restrain violations of this section," and a violation of 302 occurs when payments prohibited by 302(a) and (b) are made. The exception to violation set forth in 302(c)(5) describes the character of the trust to which payments are allowed, leaving it originally to state trust law, and now to federal trust law under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, to [508 U.S. 581, 582] determine when breaches of that trust have occurred and how they may be remedied. Language in Arroyo v. United State, 359 U.S. 419, 426 -427, and NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 331 , that is perhaps susceptible of a contrary reading is pure dicta. Pp. 587-593. </s> 935 F.2d 528, (CA2 1991), reversed and remanded. </s> SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which WHITE and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 593. </s> Henry Rose argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Linda E. Rosenzweig. </s> Ronald E. Richman argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Mark E. Brossman and Eileen M. Fields. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Starr, Christopher J. Wright, Ronald J. Mann, Allen H. Feldman, Mark S. Flynn, Carol Connor Flowe, and Jeffrey B. Cohen; for the Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare and Pension Funds by Thomas C. Nyhan and Terence G. Craig; for the National Coordinating Committee for Multiemployer Plans by Gerald M. Feder and David R. Levin; and for the Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund by Robert M. Westberg and Kirke M. Hasson. </s> JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case presents the question whether a federal district court may issue an injunction pursuant to 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 61 Stat. 157, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 186 (1988 ed. and Supp. III), requiring the trustees of a multiemployer trust fund to transfer assets from that fund to a new multiemployer trust fund established by employers who broke away from the first fund. </s> I </s> Respondents include a group of employers that, until 1981, were members of a multiemployer bargaining association, the Greater New York Health Care Facilities Association, Inc. (Greater Employer Association). Two trust funds [508 U.S. 581, 583] - the Local 144 Nursing Home Pension Fund and the New York City Nursing Home - Local 144 Welfare Fund (collectively, Greater Funds) - were established pursuant to collective bargaining agreements between the Greater Employer Association and the relevant union, Local 144 of the Hotel, Hospital, Nursing Home and Allied Services Employees Union, Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO (Local 144). Prior to 1981, the respondent employers made contributions to the Greater Funds on behalf of their employees in accordance with the terms of collective bargaining agreements negotiated between the Greater Employer Association and Local 144. </s> In 1981, the respondent employers broke away from the Greater Employer Association and executed independent collective bargaining agreements with Local 144. The initial agreements required continuing employer contributions to the Greater Funds, but those concluded in 1984 provided for establishment of a new set of trust funds, the Local 144 Southern New York Residential Health Care Facilities Association Pension Fund, and the Local 144 Southern New York Residential Health Care Facilities Association Welfare Fund (Southern Funds). At approximately the same time, the respondent employers ended their participation in the Greater Funds. </s> In negotiating the transfer from the Greater Funds to the Southern Funds, the "primary concern" of Local 144 was to make sure that the shift would not cause its members to lose benefits. 935 F.2d 528, 530 (CA2 1991). To address that concern, the respondent employers guaranteed in their collective bargaining agreements that the Southern Funds would recognize all credited service time earned under the Greater Funds and, more generally, that employees would not lose any benefits as a result of the withdrawal from the Greater Funds. See 710 F.Supp. 58, 60-61 (SDNY 1989). That guarantee obviously created some peculiar liabilities for the Southern Funds. For example, an employee who had earned nine years credited service time under the [508 U.S. 581, 584] Greater Funds would, after just one more year, of service, acquire vested rights to pension benefits pursuant to the 10-year vesting requirement of the Southern Funds - even though the Southern Funds had received only one year of employer contributions for that employee. See id., at 61, n. 4. The Southern Funds' assumption of these liabilities, however, did not alter the obligations of the Greater Funds, which were not parties to the collective bargaining agreements: they remained liable to the departing employees for all vested benefits. See id., at 61, and n. 5, 65; 935 F.2d, at 530-531. </s> To help cover the Southern Funds' liabilities and in general to help finance the change from the Greater Funds to the Southern Funds, the respondent employers - joined by several of their employees and the trustees of the Southern Funds - brought this action to compel petitioners, the Greater Funds and the Greater Funds' trustees, to transfer an appropriate fractional share of the Greater Funds' assets to the Southern Funds. They asserted right to relief under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. III), and under 302 of the LMRA; only the latter claim is at issue here. </s> The relevant portions of 302 are set forth in the margin. 1 To describe respondents' claim, it is necessary to sketch the [508 U.S. 581, 585] structure of that provision. Subsection (a) prohibits an employer (or an association of employers, such as the Greater Employer Association) from, inter alia, making payments to any representative of its employees, including the employees' union and union officials. Paragraph (b)(1) is the "reciprocal" of subsection (a), Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 423 (1959), making it unlawful for employee representatives to receive the payments prohibited by subsection (a). The prohibitions of subsection (a) and paragraph (b)(1) are drawn broadly, and would prevent payments to union employee health and welfare funds such as those at issue here. See generally United States v. Ryan, 350 U.S. 299, 304 -305 (1956); Goetz, Employee Benefit Trusts under Section [508 U.S. 581, 586] 302 of Labor Management Relations Act, 59 Nw.U. L.Rev. 719, 723-731 (1965). Subsection 302(c), however, provides exceptions to the prohibitions. Most significantly for our purposes, paragraph (c)(5) excepts payments to an employee trust fund so long as certain conditions are met, including that the trust fund be "established . . . for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees," and that the payments be "held in trust for the purpose of paying" employee benefits. </s> Respondents' theory is that the Greater Funds cannot meet those last quoted conditions unless they transfer to the Southern Funds the portion of their reserves that is attributable to the respondents' past contributions. If they fail to do so, according to respondents, they will suffer from a "structural defect" which can be remedied by federal courts pursuant to the power conferred by 302(e) to "restrain violations of this section." </s> The District Court granted petitioners' motion for summary judgment. Though it agreed with respondents that it had power to "review a challenge that the Greater Funds are structurally deficient under [ 302(c)(5)'s] `sole and exclusive' benefit standard," 710 F.Supp., at 61, 62, it found no "structural defect," since there was no allegation of corruption in the Greater Funds and since the transfer of assets would not further any collective bargaining policies. Id., at 64. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Greater Funds "would suffer from a `structural defect'" unless the funds transferred a portion of their assets to the Southern Funds. 935 F.2d, at 534. It remanded for the District Court "to shape an appropriate remedy guided by the principle that a fair portion of the reserves reflecting contributions made to the Greater Funds on behalf of the [respondents' employees] should be reallocated to the Southern Funds." Ibid. We granted certiorari, 505 U.S. 1203 (1992). [508 U.S. 581, 587] </s> II </s> Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals relied on the Second Circuit's earlier decision in Local 50, Bakery and Confectionery Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. Local 3, Bakery and Confectionery Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 733 F.2d 229 (1984), which held that federal courts have "`jurisdiction under [ 302(e)] to enforce a trust fund's compliance with the statutory standards set forth in subsection (c)(5) by eliminating those offensive features in the structure or operation of the trust that would cause it to fail to qualify for a (c)(5) exception." Id., at 234 (quoting Associated Contractors of Essex Cty., Inc. v. Laborers Int'l Union of North America, 559 F.2d 222, 225 (CA3 1977)). Local 50 and the decision below are among a large body of conflicting cases bearing upon federal courts' powers under 302(e) to supervise the administration of 302(c)(5) trust funds. A number of courts have held that 302(e) confers broad supervisory powers. See, e.g., Ponce v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California, 628 F.2d 537, 541-542 (CA9 1980); Lewis v. Mill Ridge Coals, Inc., 298 F.2d 552, 558 (CA6 1962). Others have held that it confers no supervisory powers at all. See, e.g., Ader v. Hughes, 570 F.2d 303, 306 (CA10 1978); Bowers v. Ulpiano Casal, Inc., 393 F.2d 421 (CA1 1968); Moses v. Ammond, 162 F.Supp. 866, 871-872 (SDNY 1958). Still others have acknowledged supervisory powers limited in various respects. See Riley v. MEBA Pension Trust, 570 F.2d 406, 412-413 (CA2 1977); Knauss v. Gorman, 583 F.2d 82, 86 87 (CA3 1978). Our most recent case in this area expressly reserved the question. See Mine Workers Health and Retirement Funds v. Robinson, 455 U.S. 562, 573 , n. 12 (1982). </s> We hold today that 302(e) does not provide authority for a federal court to issue injunctions against a trust fund or its trustees requiring the trust funds to be administered in the manner described in 302(c)(5). By its unmistakable [508 U.S. 581, 588] language, 302(e) provides district courts with jurisdiction "to restrain violations of this section." A "violation" of 302 occurs when the substantive restrictions in 302(a) and (b) are disobeyed, which happens, not when funds are administered by the trust fund, but when they are "pa[id], len[t], or deliver[ed]" to the trust fund, 302(a), or when they are "receive[d], or accept[ed]" by the trust fund, or "request[ed], [or] demand[ed]" for the trust fund, 302(b)(1). And the exception to violation set forth in paragraph (c)(5) relates, not to the purpose for which the trust fund is in fact used (an unrestricted fund that happens to be used "for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees" does not qualify); but rather to the purpose for which the trust fund is "established," 302(c)(5), and for which the payments are "held in trust," 302(c)(5)(A). 2 The trustees' failure to [508 U.S. 581, 589] comply with these latter purposes may be a breach of their contractual or fiduciary obligations and may subject them to suit for such breach; but it is no violation of 302. 3 </s> A few courts and some academic commentators have drawn an analogy between 301 and 302 of the LMRA, and have suggested that, as 301 has been held to create a federal common law governing labor contracts, see Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957), so too should 302 be viewed as authorizing the development of "a specialized body of federal common law of trust administration." Goetz, Developing Federal Labor Law of Welfare and Pension Plans, 55 Cornell L.Rev. 911, 930 (1970). One [508 U.S. 581, 590] court has said, quoting Lincoln Mills, supra, at 457, that "jurisdiction in a case of this kind can be found within the `penumbra of express statutory mandate' of Section 302." Lugo v. Employees Retirement Fund of Illumination Products Industry, 366 F.Supp. 99, 103 (EDNY 1973), quoted approvingly in Alvares v. Erickson, 514 F.2d 156, 166 (CA9) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975). See also Nedd v. United Mine Workers of America, 556 F.2d 190, 203 (CA3 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). A comparison of 302(e) with 301(a) shows that the analogy to Lincoln Mills is inapt. The latter provides a federal cause of action for any "violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization." Subsection 302(e), by contrast, provides no cause of action for a "violation of the fiduciary duties imposed pursuant to an employee benefit trust fund"; rather, it allows federal courts to "restrain violations" of 302, which, as we have explained, occur when payments to a nonqualifying trust are made or received. </s> The text of 302 requires that, if payments are to be exempt from its prohibition, they must be "held in trust for the purpose of paying" employee benefits, and the trust must be "established" for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees. There is nothing to suggest that this had the ambitious purpose of [establishing an entire body of federal trust law], rather than merely describing the character of the trust to which payments are allowed, leaving it to state law to determine when breaches of that trust have occurred and how they may be remedied. As observed by the court in Moses v. Ammond, 162 F. Supp., at 872, n. 14, 302(c)(5) is akin to a provision such as 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 401(a) (1988 ed. and Supp. III), which (in connection with 26 U.S.C. 501 (1988 ed. and Supp. III)) provides a tax exemption for employer-created pension trust funds so long as, inter alia, they are "created . . . for the exclusive benefit of [the employer's] employees or their beneficiaries." No one would contend that that provision confers [508 U.S. 581, 591] upon the federal courts authority to govern and enforce the trusts, and there is no more reason to reach such a conclusion here. </s> Respondents point to our statement in Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S., at 426 -427, that "[c]ontinuing compliance with [the standards of 302(c)(5)] in the administration of welfare funds was made explicitly enforceable in federal district courts by civil proceedings under 302(e)." See also Robinson, 455 U.S., at 573 , n. 12 (referring to this passage). The statement is perhaps susceptible of the reading that "compliance" was "made . . . enforceable" by authorizing district courts to prohibit further payments to an entity that was not established, or does not hold its funds in trust, for the requisite purposes. But in any case, Arroyo was a criminal prosecution brought under 302(d), and the statement was therefore pure dictum. 4 Also dictum was our statement in NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 331 (1981), later quoted in Robinson, 455 U.S., at 570 , that "the `sole purpose' of 302(c)(5) is to ensure that employee benefit trust funds "are legitimate trust funds, used actually for the specified benefits to the employees of the employers who contribute to them. . . .'" (Emphasis added.) This obiter quotation of a line from the floor debate on the LMRA cannot convert (1) a [508 U.S. 581, 592] statutory statement of trust obligations that must exist to obtain an exemption into (2) a statutory authorization to enforce trust obligations. 5 </s> Consistently with the text of 302(c)(5) and the structure of 302 in general, we view the "sole and exclusive benefit" and "held in trust" provisions of that paragraph as neither creating nor imposing a federal trust law standard, but rather as simply requiring a trust obligation for the specified purposes, defined and enforced originally under state law, see Restatement (Second) of Trusts 170(1) (1959), and now under ERISA. 6 Cf. Amax Coal, supra, at 329-330. Respondents do not deny that the Greater Funds are held subject to such a trust obligation. The fiduciaries of the Greater Funds are subject to the fiduciary obligations of ERISA, including the so-called exclusive benefit requirement of 29 U.S.C. 1104(a)(1)(i), and are liable under 29 U.S.C. 1109(a) to legal and equitable remedies for failure in those obligations. Since the Greater Funds are entities that qualify under 302(c)(5), equitable relief under 302(e) restraining future payments to them would not be appropriate. [508 U.S. 581, 593] </s> In addition to the 302 claim, respondents' complaint asserted two ERISA claims, one based on ERISA's asset transfer rules, 29 U.S.C. 1414, and the other on ERISA's above-mentioned fiduciary duty provision, 1104. The District Court ruled against respondents on both claims but, because of its ruling on 302, the Court of Appeals did not reach them. Neither do we and, on remand, the Court of Appeals will be free to consider them. </s> * * * * </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Section 302, 29 U.S.C. 186 (1988 ed. and Supp. III), provides in part: </s> "(a) . . . It shall be unlawful for any employer or association of employers . . . to pay, lend, or deliver . . . any money or other thing of value - </s> "(1) to any representative of any of his employees who are employed in an industry affecting commerce; or </s> "(2) to any labor organization, or any officer or employee thereof, which represents, seeks to represent, or would admit to membership, any of the employees of such employer . . .; </s> * * * * </s> "(b) . . .(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to request, demand, receive, or accept, or agree to receive or accept, any payment, loan, or [508 U.S. 581, 585] delivery of any money or other thing of value prohibited by subsection (a) of this section. </s> * * * * </s> "(c) . . . The provisions of this section shall not be applicable . . . (5) with respect to money or other thing of value paid to a trust fund established by [the representative of the employees], for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of such employer, and their families and dependents (or of such employees, families and dependents jointly with the employees of other employers making similar payments, and their families and dependents): Provided, That (A) such payments are held in trust for the purpose of paying . . . for the benefit of employees, their families and dependents, for medical or hospital care, pensions on retirement or death of employees, . . . (B) the detailed basis on which such payments are to be made is specified in a written agreement with the employer . . .; and (C) such payments as are intended to be used for the purpose of providing pensions or annuities for employees are made to a separate trust which provides that the funds held therein cannot be used for any purpose other than paying such pensions or annuities; . . . </s> * * * * </s> "(e) The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of the Territories and possessions shall have jurisdiction, for cause shown, and subject to the provisions of section 381 of title 28 (relating to notice to opposite party) to restrain violations of this section, without regard to the provisions of section 17 of title 15 and section 52 of this title, and the provisions of chapter 6 of this title." </s> [Footnote 2 JUSTICE STEVENS asserts that our holding is "uninvited," post, at 601, was "quite unanticipated by the submissions of the parties" post, at 595, and has been reached "[w]ithout the benefit of argument . . . by either litigant," That is not so. The Summary of Argument in petitioners' brief began with the assertion that 302(c)(5) was only "a narrow exception to a broad criminal prohibition." Brief for Petitioners 7. The first subdivision of the Argument elaborated on that point, arguing that the provision conferred no authority "to oversee the administration of employee benefit plans." Id., at 8. And the next subdivision, entitled "Lower Federal Courts Have Misconstrued Section 302(c)(5) in Asserting Broad Jurisdiction over the Regulation of Employee Benefit Plans," systematically criticized the lower court jurisprudence permitting regulation of benefit plans, including cases from almost every Circuit. Id., at 11-18. The subdivision concluded: "[T]he federal courts simply do not have the power, by reason of Section 302(c)(5), to restructure and regulate employee benefit plans." Id., at 18 (footnote omitted). By [attacking the basic authority of federal courts to regulate 302(c)(5) trust funds,] petitioners raised the issue we decide here, and amply discussed the considerations bearing upon it. Respondents evidently understood the import of petitioners' argument. They devoted an entire subdivision of their brief to the topic "Federal Courts Have Authority To Remedy Violations Of Section 302(c)(5) In Civil Cases." See Brief for Respondents 17-19. In response to our point here, JUSTICE STEVENS quotes a passage from a [508 U.S. 581, 589] different section of petitioners' brief and claims that it is "disingenuous" to characterize that argument as a broad attack on a federal court's power. Post, at 6, n. 4. We do not do so. </s> [Footnote 3 JUSTICE STEVENS concludes that "it is perfectly clear that funds are no longer "held in trust for the purpose" of benefiting employees if, immediately after deposit into a legitimate trust fund, they are diverted for some improper purpose." Post, at 597-598, n. 3. It is true that funds are "no longer" held in trust if they are misappropriated (just as it is true that funds are "no longer" held in trust when they are paid out in the form of pensions), but it is also irrelevant. If the payments, when received by the relevant employee representative, "are held in trust" and that trust satisfies the other requirements of 302(c)(5) (including that it have been "established" for the proper purposes), the exception in 302(c)(5) applies and the payments do not violate 302. This was our precise holding in Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419 (1959). The union official in that case, immediately upon receiving the employer's contributions to the trust fund, had begun diverting the funds to improper purposes. See id., at 422. Indeed, "the evidence could properly support an inference that the [union official's] purpose from the outset was to appropriate the [contributions to the fund] for his own use." Id., at 423 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, we held that the employer's payments were "within the precise language of 302(c)." Ibid. We deemed the payments to have been "held in trust for the purpose" of benefiting employees since they were made to a trust fund established for that purpose. See id., at 421, 423. JUSTICE STEVENS criticizes us for relying on this "half" of Arroyo while disregarding the other "half," see post, at 3, n. 1, but the "half" to which we adhere is holding, and the "half" we disregard, dictum. </s> [Footnote 4 While JUSTICE STEVENS does not dispute that this statement was dictum, he argues that "the reasoning that led us to [that] conclusion . . . is not so easily dismissed." Post, at 4 (emphasis added). We disagree. As one will see by reading the relevant passage from Arroyo (set forth in the concurrence, post, at 596-597), the "reasoning" consisted of [leaping] from the correct premise, that Congress limited the purposes for which exempt trust funds could be used, to the [entirely unsupported conclusion], that 302(e), rather than state trust law, was to be the means by which that limitation was enforced. It is an ipse dixit, rather than a reasoned conclusion - and, to boot, an ipse dixit contradicted by the very holding of the case in which it was pronounced. Arroyo held that malfeasance in the administration of trust funds did not create federal criminal liability under 302, and there is no basis in either text or reason why it should nonetheless create federal civil liability. </s> [Footnote 5 JUSTICE STEVENS' concluding words are that our action today is "a radical departure from the doctrine of judicial restraint." Post, at 601. We have already refuted his claim that our ruling is reached uninvited and without benefit of argument. See supra, at 588-589, n. 2. His lack-of-restraint criticism seems principally directed, however, at our "departure from [the] understanding" of 302(c)(5), post, at 601, reflected in the dicta of earlier cases - such as the excerpt that he quotes from Mine Workers Health and Retirement Funds v. Robinson, 455 U.S. 562, 573 , n. 12 (1982) (STEVENS, J.), see post, at 600. This seems to us a topsy-turvy version of judicial restraint. It was, if anything, those [dicta] themselves - uninvited, unargued, and unnecessary to the Court's holdings - which insulted that virtue; and we would add injury to insult by according them precedential effect. </s> [Footnote 6 Title 29 U.S.C. 1104(a)(1) (1988 ed. and Supp. III) provides: "[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and - (A) for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan." </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE WHITE and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, concurring in the judgment. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed because petitioners' failure to transfer assets to respondents' Southern Funds did not violate 302(c)(5) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 186(c)(5) (1988 ed., Supp. III). Because the Court unnecessarily decides that 302(e) of the LMRA would not authorize injunctive relief even had petitioners violated the specific standards of 302(c)(5), I do not join its opinion. </s> As the Court explains, see ante, at 582-584, this case arose when respondent employers withdrew from the Greater Funds, a multiemployer trust fund, and negotiated an independent union agreement establishing the Southern Funds. Respondents then sought a transfer to the Southern Funds of that portion of the Greater Funds' assets representing respondents' past contributions on behalf of their employees. 935 F.2d 528, 531 (CA2 1991). The Court of Appeals agreed that a transfer was necessary, reasoning that retention by the Greater Funds of the assets contributed by respondents would violate the "sole and exclusive benefit" provision [508 U.S. 581, 594] of 302(c)(5). Id., at 533-534; see ante, at 586. We granted certiorari to review that holding. See Pet. for Cert. i. </s> I would decide this case on the narrow ground presented: that the refusal to make the transfer at issue did not violate 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. 186(c)(5) (1988 ed., Supp. III). That provision allows payments into trusts not only "for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of [the contributing] employer," but also for the benefit of "such employees, families, and dependents jointly with the employees of other employers making similar payments, and their families and dependents." To the extent respondents' previous contributions to the Greater Funds have not been used already to benefit respondents' own employees, they now will be used for the benefit of "employees of other employers making similar payments, and their families and dependents." Ibid. Hence, the Greater Funds continue to operate within the constraints of 302(c)(5), and no transfer is required. </s> That some portion of respondents' contributions will go to benefit the employees of other contributors is, of course, in the nature of a multiemployer plan. Such plans operate precisely as suggested by the language of 302(c)(5), by pooling employer contributions for the joint benefit of all participating employees. Segregation of funds by an employer is neither feasible nor contemplated. "An employer's contributions are not solely for the benefit of its employees or employees who have worked for it alone." Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 U.S. 638 (1993). See also Stinson v. Ironworkers Dist. Council of Southern Ohio and Vicinity Benefit Trust, 869 F.2d 1014, 1021-1022 (CA7 1989) (use of employer's contributions for benefit of other than own employees does not violate "sole and exclusive benefit" requirement); British Motor Car Distributors, Ltd. v. San Francisco Automotive Industries Welfare Fund, 882 F.2d 371, 377-378 (CA9 1989) (same). [508 U.S. 581, 595] </s> In short, I agree with the United States, appearing as amicus curiae, that petitioners did not violate 302(c)(5) when they refused to transfer some proportional share of assets to the Southern Funds. The Court eschews this straightforward rule of decision, however, in favor of a far broader approach, [quite unanticipated by the submissions of the parties.] [Without the benefit of argument on the point by either litigant], the Court reaches out to overrule decades of case law by deciding that 302(e) does not authorize a civil remedy for violations of 302(c)(5). In my view, this reinvention of 302 of the LMRA is as unwise as it is uninvited. </s> Section 302(c)(5) performs two distinct functions in the statutory scheme. First, as an exception to the criminal prohibitions of 302(a) and (b), 302(c)(5) provides a "safe harbor" for contributions to legitimate pension funds. See ante, at 586. Second, 302(c)(5) sets forth certain standards that must be observed in the ongoing administration of such funds. The importance of both these functions is illustrated by our decision in Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419 , (1959), which involved a contribution lawful when made and thereafter diverted to an unlawful use. Because the payment was to a legitimate trust fund, we held, the transaction fell within 302(c)(5)'s exception, so that receipt of the payment was not a criminal violation of 302(b). Id., at 423-424. At the same time, however, 302(e) was available to provide a civil remedy for the violation of 302(c)(5) that occurred when the funds subsequently were diverted. Id., at 426-427. 1 </s> [508 U.S. 581, 596] </s> The majority repudiates this understanding of 302(c)(5)'s operation, reflected also in NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 331 (1981), and Mine Workers Health and Retirement Funds v. Robinson, 455 U.S. 562, 570 -572 (1982), as "pure dictum." Ante, at 591. But [the reasoning that led us to our conclusion in Arroyo is not so easily dismissed.] As we explained in that case, 302(c)(5) was enacted not merely to exempt specified conduct from the prohibitions of 302(a) and (b), but also to ensure that union trust funds, once established, would continue to benefit the designated employees. 359 U.S., at 424 -427. </s> "Congress believed that, if welfare funds were established which did not define with specificity the benefits payable thereunder, a substantial danger existed that such funds might be employed to perpetuate control of union officers, for political purposes, or even for personal gain. See 92 Cong.Rec. 4892-4894, 4899, 5181, 5345-5346; S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., at 52; 93 Cong.Rec. 4678, 4746-4747. To remove these dangers, specific standards were established to assure that welfare funds would be established only for purposes which Congress considered proper and expended only for the purposes for which they were established. See Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, [61 Harv.L.Rev. 274, 290 (1947)]. Continuing compliance with these standards in the administration of welfare funds was made explicitly enforceable in federal district courts by civil proceedings under 302(e). The legislative history is devoid of any suggestion that defalcating trustees were to be held accountable under federal law, except by way of the injunctive [508 U.S. 581, 597] remedy provided in that subsection." Id., at 426-427 (footnote omitted). 2 </s> We made the same point in Robinson, stating that "the sole purpose of 302(c)(5) is to ensure that employee benefit trust funds are legitimate trust funds, used actually for the specified benefits to the employees of the employers who contribute to them. . . ." 455 U.S., at 570 (quoting Amax Coal, 453 U.S., at 331 internal quotation marks omitted). Our view that 302(c)(5) imposed continuing obligations on the actual use of trust funds, we found, was "amply supported by the legislative history," 455 U.S., at 571 , which reflected a concern that "funds contributed by their employers for the benefit of the employees and their families might be diverted to other union purposes or even to the private benefit of faithless union leaders," id., at 572. See also id., at 570-572, and nn. 8-10, and sources cited therein. To prevent trust funds once legitimate from turning into vehicles for kickbacks and racketeering, 302(c)(5) requires not only that trust funds be "established" for proper purposes, but also that "employer contributions be administered for the sole and exclusive benefit of employees." Id., at 572 (emphasis added). 3 </s> [508 U.S. 581, 598] </s> The proposition that 302(c)(5)'s specific statutory standards are enforceable on a continuing basis has never been questioned before today, by this Court or by any court of appeals. It is true, as the majority notes, ante, at 587, that the precise scope of the civil remedy authorized by 302(e) has been the subject of controversy. Some courts have read 302(e) quite broadly to authorize relief in cases of "unreasonable" or "arbitrary and capricious" trust administration. See, e.g., Phillips v. Alaska Hotel and Restaurant Employees Pension Fund, 944 F.2d 509, 515 (CA9 1991); Stinson v. Ironworkers District Council of Southern Ohio and Vicinity Benefit Trust, 869 F.2d, at 1019. 4 Others have read 302(e) more narrowly, as limited to remedying "violations of basic structure, as determined by the Congress, not violations of fiduciary obligations or standards of prudence in the administration of the trust fund." Bowers v. Ulpiano Casal, Inc., 393 F.2d 421, 424 (CA1 1968). For [508 U.S. 581, 599] present purposes, however, the important point is that every Court of Appeals has assumed that the federal courts may, at a minimum, enforce compliance with 302(c)(5)'s express commands. 5 </s> Our unanimous opinion in Robinson is consistent with this well-established body of case law. In Robinson, we considered and rejected one of the broader views of 302(c)(5), holding that the provision does not empower the federal courts to impose a nonstatutory "reasonableness" requirement on trust fund eligibility criteria established by collective bargaining agreement. 455 U.S., at 574 . We also left open the question whether 302(e) authorizes enforcement of the traditional fiduciary duties of trustees. Id., at 573, n. 12. 6 The question with which we had no difficulty, [508 U.S. 581, 600] however, is the one that the Court reaches out to answer today. We unequivocally stated: </s> "It is, of course, clear that compliance with the specific standards of 302(c)(5) in the administration of welfare funds is enforceable in federal district courts under 302(e) of the LMRA." Ibid. 7 </s> The Court now seems to assume that it is confronted with a choice between "establishing an entire body of federal trust law," ante, at 9, on the one hand, and limiting the scope of 302(e) to injunctions against the making or acceptance of prohibited payments, on the other. As Robinson makes clear, however, there is no need to go so far in either direction; our understanding that 302(e) provides a remedy for violations of 302(c)(5)'s specific standards is independent of any view as to whether 302(e) makes general fiduciary duties enforceable in federal court. [508 U.S. 581, 601] </s> In my view, if a trust fund is not complying with the standards of 302(c)(5) - if, for instance, it is making annual contributions to the Red Cross - then a federal court is authorized by 302(e) to enjoin the improper diversion of funds. There is no sensible reason why the court should instead be restricted to enjoining future payments to the fund, or receipt of those payments, as violations of 302(a) and (b). Congress intended 302(c)(5) to operate as a guarantee against diversion of trust funds, and this purpose is effectuated by the reading we have always before given 302. Today's [departure from this understanding] seriously undermines the functioning of the statute. The Court's action is not only [uninvited] and unnecessary; it is [a radical departure from the doctrine of judicial restraint.] </s> [Footnote 1 The majority relies heavily on one [half] of Arroyo while disregarding the other. See ante, at 589, n. 3. I note here only that the Court in Arroyo never determined that funds diverted after establishment of a trust are "held in trust for the purpose" of benefiting employees, ibid.; to the contrary, its reliance on 302(e) to remedy such abuses supports quite the opposite conclusion. In any event, what Arroyo held is that payment and [508 U.S. 581, 596] receipt of trust funds do not violate 302(a) and (b) if the funds are later diverted, not that the later diversion does not violate 302(c)(5). </s> [Footnote 2 When the Court characterizes this passage as "leaping" to an "entirely unsupported conclusion," see ante, at 591, n. 4, it ignores the abundant support for that conclusion in the legislative history cited in Justice Stewart's opinion. </s> [Footnote 3 Though we did not belabor the point in Robinson, as it was then (as until today) undisputed, it should be noted that the relevant statutory text supports the conclusion that 302(c)(5) creates ongoing obligations for trustees. According to the majority, 302(c)(5)'s requirements of a trust "established" for the benefit of employees and funds "held in trust for the purpose" of paying employees relate to the purpose for which a trust is first established; hence, they are fulfilled entirely, if ever, at the time of establishment. See ante, at 588, 592. Even on this narrow question, I depart from the majority; in my view, [it is perfectly clear that funds are no longer "held in trust for the purpose" of benefiting employees if, immediately [508 U.S. 581, 598] after deposit into a legitimate trust fund, they are diverted for some improper purpose.] </s> More important, however, is the fact that other provisions of 302(c)(5) clearly set forth standards for the continuing administration of trust funds. By their very terms, these standards demand compliance on an ongoing basis. See 302(c)(5)(B) (employees and employers must be equally represented in fund administration); 302(c)(5)(C) (payments to be used for pensions or annuities must be made to a separate trust). The obvious purpose of 302(e) - a subsection largely overlooked by the majority - is to provide a vehicle for enforcing 302(c)(5)'s ongoing obligations, among them the requirement that funds be held in trust for the benefit of employees. </s> [Footnote 4 As the majority notes, petitioners argue that 302(c)(5) does not authorize such broad jurisdiction to "restructure and regulate employee benefit plans." See ante, at 588, n. 2. More precisely, the position with which respondents take issue in the cited pages of their brief, see is that "a collectively bargained term of an employee benefit plan is not subject to federal court review for reasonableness under Section 302 of LMRA." Brief for Petitioners 19; see Brief for Respondents 18. It is [disingenuous], to say the least, to characterize petitioners' argument as one "attacking the basic authority of federal courts to regulate 302(c)(5) trust funds." Ante, at 588, n. 2. See n. 6, infra </s> [Footnote 5 See, e.g., Bowers v. Ulpiano Casal, Inc., 393 F.2d 421, 424, 11 4 (CA1 1968); Lugo v Employees Retirement Fund of Illumination Products Industry, 529 F.2d 251, 254-256 (CA2 1976); Sheet Metal Workers' Local 28 of New Jersey Welfare Fund v. Gallagher, 960 F.2d 1195, 1210 (CA3 1992); Seafarers Pension Plan v. Sturgis, 630 F.2d 218, 220-221 (CA4 1980); Johnson v. Franco, 727 F.2d 442, 446-447 (CA5 1984); Sellers v. O'Connell, 701 F.2d 575, 577 (CA6 1983); Stinson v. Ironworkers District Council of Southern Ohio and Vicinity Pension Trust, 869 F.2d 1014, 1019 (CA7 1989); Holcomb v. United Automotive Assn. of St. Louis, Inc., 852 F.2d 330, 332-335 (CA8 1988); Ponce v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California, 628 F.2d 537, 541-542 (CA9 1980); Ader v. Hughes, 570 F.2d 303, 306 308 (CA10 1978); Central Florida Sheet Metal Contractors Assn., Inc. v. NLRB, 664 F.2d 489, 498 (CA5 1981); Central Tool Co. v. International Assn. of Machinists Nat. Pension Fund, 258 U.S. App. D.C. 309, 322, n. 77, 811 F.2d 651, 664, n. 77 (1987). </s> [Footnote 6 The Court seems to assume that the question reserved in Robinson was the very different one it answers today. See ante, at 587. </s> Petitioners, on the other hand, share our understanding of what was decided in Robinson and what remained open for decision. Notwithstanding the protestations of the majority, see ante, at 588-589, n. 2, petitioners' argument on this point was limited to the proposition that 302(c)(5) does not "establish federal fiduciary standards for trustees of employee benefit plans," Brief for Petitioners 10. Petitioners never argue that 302(e) does not provide a remedy when the specific standards of 302(c)(5) are violated; to the contrary, petitioners cite with approval the holding from [508 U.S. 581, 600] Bowers, supra, that the only violations "within the federal courts' authority involved the failure to meet the specific requirements of Section 302(c)(5)." Brief for Petitioners 12 (emphasis in original). Nor do petitioners ever argue that 302(c)(5)'s "exclusive benefit" obligation is satisfied finally at the time of trust establishment; rather, petitioners understand 302(c)(5) to require that a trust "(1) use employer contributions only for specified types of benefits; (2) use those assets only for benefits for employees and families of the contributing employer and the employees and families of other contributing employers. . . ." Id., at 8 (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 7 Had this basic proposition been challenged in Robinson - and had the Court as then constituted found any merit in the challenge - then it would have been unnecessary to go on to decide whether the discrimination in that case violated 302(c)(5) as "unreasonable." In other words, this proposition provided the framework for all of the reasoning in Robinson, just as it provided the framework for all of our post-Arroyo cases under this statute. Whether or not the label "dicta," see ante, at 592, n. 5, is appropriately applied to such a proposition, our statement in Robinson represented an interpretation of an important federal statute that had been accepted uniformly by the bar, the judiciary, and the Congress for over three decades, since Arroyo was decided in 1959. The Court today simply ignores the interest in adhering to settled rules of law that undergirds the doctrines of stare decisis and judicial restraint. </s> [508 U.S. 581, 602]

United States Supreme Court DEWSNUP v. TIMM(1992) No. 90-741 Argued: October 15, 1991Decided: January 15, 1992 </s> Petitioner Dewsnup, the debtor in a case under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, filed an adversary proceeding, contending that the debt of approximately $120,000 that she owed to respondents exceeded the fair market value of the land securing the debt, and that, therefore, the Bankruptcy Court should reduce respondents' lien on the land to the land's fair market value pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 506(d), which provides that a lien is void "[t]o the extent that [it] secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim." Dewsnup reasoned that respondents would have such an "allowed secured claim" only to the extent of the judicially determined value of their collateral, since, under 506(a), "[a]n allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property." The court determined that the then value of the land in question was $39,000, but refused to grant the requested relief and entered a judgment of dismissal with prejudice. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed. </s> Held: </s> Section 506(d) does not allow Dewsnup to "strip down" respondents' lien to the judicially determined value of the collateral, because respondents' claim is secured by a lien, and has been fully allowed pursuant to 502, and, therefore, cannot be classified as "not an allowed secured claim" for purposes of the lien-voiding provision of 506(d). Pp. 414-420. </s> (a) The contrasting positions of the parties and their amici demonstrate that 506(d) and its relationship to other Code provisions are ambiguous. Pp. 414-416. </s> (b) Although not without its difficulty, the position espoused by respondents and the United States as amicus curiae - that the words "allowed secured claim" in 506(d) need not be read as an indivisible term of art defined by reference to 506(a), but should be read term-by-term to refer to any claim that is, first, allowed, and, second, secured - generally is the better of the several approaches argued in this case. Were this Court writing on a clean slate, it might be inclined to agree with Dewsnup that the quoted words must take the same meaning in 506(d) as in 506(a). However, the practical effect of Dewsnup's argument is to freeze the creditor's secured interest at the judicially determined [502 U.S. 410, 411] valuation in contravention of the pre-Code rule that liens on real property pass through bankruptcy unaffected. Congress must have enacted the Code with a full understanding of the latter rule, and, given the statutory ambiguity here, to attribute to Congress the intention to grant a debtor the broad new remedy against allowed claims to the extent that they become "unsecured" for purposes of 506(a) without mentioning the new remedy somewhere in the Code or in the legislative history is implausible, and contrary to basic bankruptcy principles. Pp. 6-10. </s> 908 F.2d 588, affirmed. </s> BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER, J., joined. THOMAS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. </s> Timothy B. Dyk argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Patricia A. Dunn. </s> Richard G. Taranto argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were H. Bartow Farr III and Michael Z. Hayes. </s> Ronald G. Taranto argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Deputy Solicitor General Roberts, and Alan Charles Raul. * </s> [Footnote * Michael Fox Mivasair and Henry J. Sommer filed a brief for the Consumers Education and Protective Association, Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal. </s> JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> We are confronted in this case with an issue concerning 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 506(d). 1 May [502 U.S. 410, 412] a debtor "strip down" a creditor's lien on real property to the value of the collateral, as judicially determined, when that value is less than the amount of the claim secured by the lien? </s> I </s> On June 1, 1978, respondents loaned $119,000 to petitioner Aletha Dewsnup and her husband, T. LaMar Dewsnup, since deceased. The loan was accompanied by a Deed of Trust granting a lien on two parcels of Utah farmland owned by the Dewsnups. </s> Petitioner defaulted the following year. Under the terms of the Deed of Trust, respondents at that point could have proceeded against the real property collateral by accelerating the maturity of the loan, issuing a notice of default, and selling the land at a public foreclosure sale to satisfy the debt. See also Utah Code Ann. 57-1-20 to 57-1-37 (1990 and Supp. 1991). [502 U.S. 410, 413] </s> Respondents did issue a notice of default in 1981. Before the foreclosure sale took place, however, petitioner sought reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. That bankruptcy petition was dismissed, as was a subsequent Chapter 11 petition. In June, 1984, petitioner filed a petition seeking liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Code, 11 U.S.C. 701 et seq. Because of the pendency of these bankruptcy proceedings, respondents were not able to proceed to the foreclosure sale. See 11 U.S.C. 362. </s> In 1987, petitioner filed the present adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah seeking, pursuant to 506, to "avoid" a portion of respondents' lien. App. 3. Petitioner represented that the debt of approximately $120,000 then owed to respondents exceeded the fair market value of the land, and that, therefore, the Bankruptcy Court should reduce the lien to that value. According to petitioner, this was compelled by the interrelationship of the security-reducing provision of 506(a) and the lien-voiding provision of 506(d). Under 506(a) ("An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest. . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property"), respondents would have an "allowed secured claim" only to the extent of the judicially determined value of their collateral. And under 506(d) ("To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void"), the court would be required to void the lien as to the remaining portion of respondents' claim, because the remaining portion was not an "allowed secured claim" within the meaning of 506(a). </s> The Bankruptcy Court refused to grant this relief. In re Dewsnup, 87 B.R. 676 (1988). After a trial, it determined that the then value of the land subject to the Deed of Trust was $39,000. It indulged in the assumption that the property had been abandoned by the trustee pursuant to 554, [502 U.S. 410, 414] and reasoned that, once property was abandoned, it no longer fell within the reach of 506(a), which applies only to "property in which the estate has an interest," and therefore was not covered by 506(d). </s> The United States District Court, without a supporting opinion, summarily affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's judgment of dismissal with prejudice. App. to Pet. for Cert. 12a. </s> The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in its turn, also affirmed. In re Dewsnup, 908 F.2d 588 (1990). Starting from the "fundamental premise" of 506(a) that a claim is subject to reduction in security only when the estate has an interest in the property, the court reasoned that, because the estate had no interest in abandoned property, 506(a) did not apply (nor, by implication, did 506(d)). Id., at 590-591. The court then noted that a contrary result would be inconsistent with 722, under which a debtor has a limited right to redeem certain personal property. Id., at 592. </s> Because the result reached by the Court of Appeals was at odds with that reached by the Third Circuit in Gaglia v. First Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 889 F.2d 1304, 1306-1311 (1989), and was expressly recognized by the Tenth Circuit as being in conflict, see 908 F.2d, at 591, we granted certiorari. 498 U.S. 1081 (1991). </s> II </s> As we read their several submissions, the parties and their amici are not in agreement in their respective approaches to the problem of statutory interpretation that confronts us. Petitioner-debtor takes the position that 506(a) and 506(d) are complementary, and to be read together. Because, under 506(a), a claim is secured only to the extent of the judicially determined value of the real property on which the lien is fixed, a debtor can void a lien on the property pursuant to 506(d) to the extent the claim is no longer secured, and thus is not "an allowed secured claim." In other words, 506(a) bifurcates classes of claims allowed under 502 into secured [502 U.S. 410, 415] claims and unsecured claims; any portion of an allowed claim deemed to be unsecured under 506(a) is not an "allowed secured claim" within the lien-voiding scope of 506(d). Petitioner argues that there is no exception for unsecured property abandoned by the trustee. </s> Petitioner's amicus argues that the plain language of 506(d) dictates that the proper portion of an undersecured lien on property in a Chapter 7 case is void, whether or not the property is abandoned by the trustee. It further argues that the rationale of the Court of Appeals would lead to evisceration of the debtor's right of redemption and the elimination of an undersecured creditor's ability to participate in the distribution of the estate's assets. </s> Respondents primarily assert that 506(d) is not, as petitioner would have it, "rigidly tied" to 506(a), Brief for Respondents 7. They argue that 506(a) performs the function of classifying claims by true secured status at the time of distribution of the estate to ensure fairness to unsecured claimants. In contrast, the lien-voiding 506(d) is directed to the time at which foreclosure is to take place, and, where the trustee has abandoned the property, no bankruptcy distributional purpose is served by voiding the lien. </s> In the alternative, respondents, joined by the United States as amicus curiae, argue more broadly that the words "allowed secured claim" in 506(d) need not be read as an indivisible term of art defined by reference to 506(a), which, by its terms, is not a definitional provision. Rather, the words should be read, term-by-term, to refer to any claim that is, first, allowed, and, second, secured. Because there is no question that the claim at issue here has been "allowed" pursuant to 502 of the Code and is secured by a lien with recourse to the underlying collateral, it does not come within the scope of 506(d), which voids only liens corresponding to claims that have not been allowed and secured. This reading of 506(d), according to respondents and the United States, gives the provision the simple and sensible function [502 U.S. 410, 416] of voiding a lien whenever a claim secured by the lien itself has not been allowed. It ensures that the Code's determination not to allow the underlying claim against the debtor personally is given full effect by preventing its assertion against the debtor's property. 2 </s> Respondents point out that pre-Code bankruptcy law preserved liens like respondents', and that there is nothing in the Code's legislative history that reflects any intent to alter that law. Moreover, according to respondents, the "fresh-start" policy cannot justify an impairment of respondents' property rights, for the fresh start does not extend to an in rem claim against property, but is limited to a discharge of personal liability. </s> III </s> The foregoing recital of the contrasting positions of the respective parties and their amici demonstrates that 506 of the Bankruptcy Code and its relationship to other provisions of that Code do embrace some ambiguities. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, ch. 506, and, in particular, 506.07 (15th ed. 1990). Hypothetical applications that come to mind and those advanced at oral argument illustrate the difficulty of interpreting the statute in a single opinion that would apply to all possible fact situations. We therefore focus upon the [502 U.S. 410, 417] case before us, and allow other facts to await their legal resolution on another day. </s> We conclude that respondents' alternative position, espoused also by the United States, although not without its difficulty, generally is the better of the several approaches. Therefore, we hold that 506(d) does not allow petitioner to "strip down" respondents' lien, because respondents' claim is secured by a lien and has been fully allowed pursuant to 502. Were we writing on a clean slate, we might be inclined to agree with petitioner that the words "allowed secured claim" must take the same meaning in 506(d) as in 506(a). 3 But, given the ambiguity in the text, we are not convinced that Congress intended to depart from the pre-Code rule that liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected. </s> 1. The practical effect of petitioner's argument is to freeze the creditor's secured interest at the judicially determined valuation. By this approach, the creditor would lose the benefit of any increase in the value of the property by the time of the foreclosure sale. The increase would accrue to the benefit of the debtor, a result some of the parties describe as a "windfall." </s> We think, however, that the creditor's lien stays with the real property until the foreclosure. That is what was bargained for by the mortgagor and the mortgagee. The voidness language sensibly applies only to the security aspect of the lien, and then only to the real deficiency in the security. Any increase over the judicially determined valuation during bankruptcy rightly accrues to the benefit of the creditor, not to the benefit of the debtor and not to the benefit of other unsecured creditors whose claims have been allowed and who had nothing to do with the mortgagor-mortgagee bargain. </s> Such surely would be the result had the lienholder stayed aloof from the bankruptcy proceeding (subject, of course, to [502 U.S. 410, 418] the power of other persons or entities to pull him into the proceeding pursuant to 501), and we see no reason why his acquiescence in that proceeding should cause him to experience a forfeiture of the kind the debtor proposes. It is true that his participation in the bankruptcy results in his having the benefit of an allowed unsecured claim as well as his allowed secured claim, but that does not strike us as proper recompense for what petitioner proposes by way of the elimination of the remainder of the lien. </s> 2. This result appears to have been clearly established before the passage of the 1978 Act. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, a lien on real property passed through bankruptcy unaffected. This Court recently acknowledged that this was so. See Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291 (1991) (slip op. 6) ("Ordinarily, liens and other secured interests survive bankruptcy"); Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84 (1991) ("Rather, a bankruptcy discharge extinguishes only one mode of enforcing a claim - namely, an action against the debtor in personam - while leaving intact another - namely, an action against the debtor in rem."). 4 </s> 3. Apart from reorganization proceedings, see 11 U.S.C. 616(1) and (10) (1976 ed.), no provision of the pre-Code [502 U.S. 410, 419] statute permitted involuntary reduction of the amount of a creditor's lien for any reason other than payment on the debt. Our cases reveal the Court's concern about this. In Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617, 620 -621 (1886), the Court held that a discharge in bankruptcy does not release real estate of the debtor from the lien of a mortgage created by him before the bankruptcy. And in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935), the Court considered additions to the Bankruptcy Act effected by the Frazier-Lemke Act, 48 Stat. 1289 (1934). There the Court noted that the latter Act's "avowed object is to take from the mortgagee rights in the specific property held as security; and to that end "to scale down the indebtedness" to the present value of the property." 295 U.S., at 594 . The Court invalidated that statute under the Takings Clause. It further observed: "No instance has been found, except under the Frazier-Lemke Act, of either a statute or decision compelling the mortgagee to relinquish the property to the mortgagor free of the lien unless the debt was paid in full. Id., at 579. </s> Congress must have enacted the Code with a full understanding of this practice. See H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, p. 357 (1977), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1978, pp. 5787, 6313 ("Subsection (d) permits liens to pass through the bankruptcy case unaffected"). </s> 4. When Congress amends the bankruptcy laws, it does not write "on a clean slate." See Emil v. Hanley, 318 U.S. 515, 521 (1943). Furthermore, this Court has been reluctant to accept arguments that would interpret the Code, however vague the particular language under consideration might be, to effect a major change in pre-Code practice that is not the subject of at least some discussion in the legislative history. See United Savings Assn. of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 380 (1988). See also Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 563 (1990) (slip op. 9); United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 244 -245 (1989). Of course, where the language is unambiguous, silence in the legislative history cannot [502 U.S. 410, 420] be controlling. But, given the ambiguity here, to attribute to Congress the intention to grant a debtor the broad new remedy against allowed claims to the extent that they become "unsecured" for purposes of 506(a) without the new remedy's being mentioned somewhere in the Code itself or in the annals of Congress is not plausible, in our view, and is contrary to basic bankruptcy principles. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. </s> It is so ordered </s> JUSTICE THOMAS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Section 506 provides in full: </s> "(a) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553 of this title, is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property, or to the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest or the amount [502 U.S. 410, 412] so subject to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's interest. </s> "(b) To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the value of which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section, is greater than the amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agreement under which such claim arose. </s> "(c) The trustee may recover from property securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such property to the extent of any benefit to the holder of such claim. </s> "(d) To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void, unless - </s> "(1) such claim was disallowed only under section 502(b)(5) or 502(e) of this title; or </s> "(2) such claim is not an allowed secured claim due only to the failure of any entity to file a proof of such claim under section 501 of this title. </s> [Footnote 2 Respondents expressly stated in their brief and twice again at oral argument that they adopted, as an alternative position, the United States' interpretation of 506(d). Brief for Respondents 40, n. 33; Tr. of Oral Arg. 14, 20. In dissent, however, Justice SCALIA contends that respondents have not taken the same position as the United States on this issue. According to the dissent, the United States has taken the position that "a lien only "secures" the claim in question up to the value of the security that is the object of the lien - and only up to that value is the lien subject to avoidance under 506(d)." Post, at 424. In fact, the United States says: "Under [petitioner's] reading, Section 506(d) would operate to reduce the creditor's lien to the value of the allowed secured claim described in Section 506(a). In our view, this reading makes no sense." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 5. </s> [Footnote 3 Accordingly, we express no opinion as to whether the words "allowed secured claim" have different meaning in other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. </s> [Footnote 4 Section 67 d of the 1898 Act, 30 Stat. 544, 564, made this explicit: </s> "Liens given or accepted in good faith and not in contemplation of or in fraud upon this Act, and for a present consideration, which have been recorded according to law, if record thereof was necessary in order to impart notice, shall not be affected by this Act." </s> The Court, with respect to this statute, has said: "Section 67 d. . . . declares that liens given or accepted in good faith and not in contemplation of or in fraud upon this Act, shall not be affected by it." City of Richmond v. Bird, 249 U.S. 174, 177 (1919). </s> This precise statutory language did not appear in a reorganization of the section in the Chandler Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 840. A respected bankruptcy authority convincingly explained that this was done not to remove the rule of validity, but because "the draftsmen of the 1938 Act desired generally to specify only what should be invalid." 4B Collier on Bankruptcy § 70.70, p. 771 (14th ed. 1979) (emphasis in original). The alteration had no substantive effect. Oppenheimer v. Oldham, 178 F.2d 386, 389 (CA2 1949). </s> JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER joins, dissenting. </s> With exceptions not pertinent here, 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code provides: "To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void. . . ." Read naturally and in accordance with other provisions of the statute, this automatically voids a lien to the extent the claim it secures is not both an "allowed claim" and a "secured claim" under the Code. In holding otherwise, the Court replaces what Congress said with what it thinks Congress ought to have said - and in the process disregards, and hence impairs for future use, well-established principles of statutory construction. I respectfully dissent. </s> I </s> This case turns solely on the meaning of a single phrase found throughout the Bankruptcy Code: "allowed secured claim." Section 506(d) unambiguously provides that, to the extent a lien does not secure such a claim, it is (with certain exceptions) rendered void. See 11 U.S.C. 506(d). Congress did not leave the meaning of "allowed secured claim" to speculation. Section 506(a) says that an "allowed claim" [502 U.S. 410, 421] (the meaning of which is obvious) is also a "secured claim" "to the extent of the value of [the] creditor's interest in the estate's interest in [the securing] property." (This means, generally speaking, that an allowed claim "is secured only to the extent of the value of the property on which the lien is fixed; the remainder of that claim is considered unsecured." United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 239 (1989).) When 506(d) refers to an "allowed secured claim," it can only be referring to that allowed "secured claim" so carefully described two brief subsections earlier. </s> The phrase obviously bears the meaning set forth in 506(a) when it is used in the subsections of 506 other than 506(d) - for example, in 506(b), which addresses "allowed secured claim[s]" that are oversecured. Indeed, as respondents apparently concede, see Brief for Respondents 40; Tr. of Oral Arg. 29-30, even when the phrase appears outside of 506, it invariably means what 506(a) describes: the portion of a creditor's allowed claim that is secured after the calculations required by that provision have been performed. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. 722 (permitting a Chapter 7 debtor to redeem certain tangible personal property from certain liens "by paying the holder of such lien the amount of the allowed secured claim of such holder that is secured by such lien"); 1225(a)(5) (prescribing treatment of "allowed secured claim[s]" in family farmer's reorganization plan); 1325(a)(5) (same with respect to "allowed secured claim[s]" in individual reorganizations) (emphases added). The statute is similarly consistent in its use of the companion phrase "allowed unsecured claim" to describe (with respect to a claim supported by a lien) that portion of the claim that is treated as "unsecured" under 506(a). See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. 507(a)(7) (fixing priority of "allowed unsecured claims of governmental units"); 726(a)(2) (providing for payment of "allowed unsecured claim[s]" in Chapter 7 liquidation); 1225(a)(4) (setting standard for treatment of "allowed unsecured claim[s]" in Chapter 12 plan); 1325(a)(4) (setting standard for treatment [502 U.S. 410, 422] of "allowed unsecured claim[s]" in Chapter 13 plan) (emphases added). When, on the other hand, the Bankruptcy Code means to refer to a secured party's entire allowed claim, i.e., to both the "secured" and "unsecured" portions under 506(a), it uses the term "allowed claim" - as in 11 U.S.C. 363(k), which refers to "a lien that secures an allowed claim." Given this clear and unmistakable pattern of usage, it seems to me impossible to hold, as the Court does, that "the words `allowed secured claim' in 506(d) need not be read as an indivisible term of art defined by reference to 506(a)." Ante, at 415; see ante, at 416-417. We have often invoked the "`normal rule of statutory construction that `"identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.'"'" Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990) (quoting Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986) (quoting Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 87 (1934)) (quoting Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932)))). That rule must surely apply, a fortiori, to use of identical words in the same section of the same enactment. </s> The Court makes no attempt to establish a textual or structural basis for overriding the plain meaning of 506(d), but rests its decision upon policy intuitions of a legislative character, 1 and upon the principle that a text which is "ambiguous" [502 U.S. 410, 423] (a status apparently achieved by being the subject of disagreement between self-interested litigants) cannot change pre-Code law without the imprimatur of "legislative history." Thus abandoning the normal and sensible principle that a term (and especially an artfully defined term such as "allowed secured claim") bears the same meaning throughout the statute, the Court adopts instead what might be called the one-subsection-at-a-time approach to statutory exegesis. "[W]e express no opinion," the Court amazingly says, "as to whether the words `allowed secured claim' have different meaning in other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code." Ante, at 417, n. 3. "We . . . focus upon the case before us, and allow other facts to await their legal resolution on another day." Ante, at 416-417. </s> II </s> As to the meaning of this single subsection (considered, of course, in a vacuum), the Court claims to be embracing "respondents' alternative position," ante, at 417, which is "that the words `allowed secured claim' in 506(d) need not be read as an indivisible term of art defined by reference to 506(a)," ante, at 415, and that "secured claim" (for [502 U.S. 410, 424] purposes of 506(d) alone) simply connotes an allowed claim that is "secured" in the ordinary sense, i.e., that is backed up by a security interest in property, whether or not the value of the property suffices to cover the claim. The Court attributes this position to the United States as well, ante, at 415-416, but the Government's position is in fact different - and significantly so, since it does (as proper statutory interpretation ought to do) give the phrase "allowed secured claim" a uniform meaning. I must describe the Government's theory, and explain why it does not work. </s> The distinctive feature of the United States' approach is that it seeks to avoid invalidation of the so-called "underwater" portion of the lien by focusing, not upon the phrase "allowed secured claim" in 506(d), but upon the prior phrase "secures a claim." ("To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void" (Emphasis added.)) Under the Government's textual theory, this phrase can be read to refer not merely to the object of the security, but to its adequacy. That is to say, a lien only "secures" the claim in question up to the value of the security that is the object of the lien - and only up to that value is the lien subject to avoidance under 506(d). 2 This interpretation succeeds in giving the [502 U.S. 410, 425] phrase "allowed secured claim," which appears later in 506(d), a meaning compatible with that compelled by 506(a). But that is its only virtue. </s> To begin with, the interpretation renders some of the language in 506(d) surplusage. If the phrase "[t]o the extent that a lien secures a claim" describes only that portion of a claim that is secured by actual economic value, then the later phrase "is not an allowed secured claim" should instead have read simply "is not allowed." For the phrase "allowed secured claim" itself describes a claim that is actually secured in light of 506(a)'s calculations. Another reading of 506(d)'s opening passage is available, one that does not assume such clumsy draftsmanship - and that employs, to boot, a much more natural reading of the phrase "lien secures a claim." The latter ordinarily describes the relationship between a lien and a claim, not the relationship between the value of the property subject to the lien and the amount of the claim. One would say that a "mortgage secures the claim" for the purchase price of a house, even if the value of the house was inadequate to satisfy the full amount of the claim. In other words, "[t]o the extent that a lien secures a claim" means in 506(d) what it ordinarily means: "to the extent a lien provides its holder with a right to retain property in full or partial satisfaction of a claim." It means that [502 U.S. 410, 426] in 506(d) just as it means that in 506(a), see 11 U.S.C. 506(a) ("An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien . . . is a secured claim to the extent . . .") (emphasis added), and just as it means that elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code, see, e.g., 362(a)(5) ("to the extent that such lien secures a claim"); 11 U.S.C. 363(k) ("lien that secures an allowed claim"). An unnatural meaning should be disfavored at any time, but particularly when it produces a redundancy. See Montclair v. Ransdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883). </s> Of course, respondents' interpretation also creates a redundancy in 506(d). If a "secured claim" means only a claim for which a lien has been given as security (whether or not the security is adequate), then the prologue of 506(d) can be reformulated as follows: "To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed claim secured by a lien, such lien is void. . . ." Quite obviously, the phrase "secured by a lien" in that reformulation is utterly redundant and absurd - as is (on respondents' interpretation) the word "secured," which bears the same meaning. In other words, both the United States' interpretation and respondents' interpretation create a redundancy: the former by making both parts of the 506(d) prologue refer to adequate security, and the latter by making both parts refer to security plain-and-simple. Only when one gives the words in the first part of the prologue ("[t]o the extent that a lien secures a claim") their natural meaning (as the Government does not) and gives the words in the second part of the prologue ("allowed secured claim") their previously established statutory meaning (as the respondents do not) does the provision make a point, instead of a redundancy. </s> Moreover, the practical consequences of the United States' interpretation would be absurd. A secured creditor holding a lien on property that is completely worthless would not face lien avoidance under 506(d), even if the claim secured by that lien were disallowed entirely. The same would be true of a lien on property that has some value, but is obviously [502 U.S. 410, 427] inadequate to cover all of the disallowed claim: the lien would be voided only to the extent of the property's value at the time of the bankruptcy court's evaluation, and could be asserted against any increase in the value of the property that might later occur, in order to satisfy the disallowed claim. Unavoided liens (or, more accurately, potentials of unavoided liens, since no one knows whether or when future evaluations of the relevant property will exceed that of the bankruptcy court) would impede the trustee's management and settlement of the estate. It would be difficult, for example, to sell overencumbered property subject to outstanding liens pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 363(b) or (c), since any post-sale appreciation in the property could be levied upon by holders of disallowed secured claims. And in a sale of debtor property "free and clear" of the liens attached to it, see 11 U.S.C. 363(f)(3), the undisturbed portion of the disallowed claimant's lien might attach to the proceeds of that sale to the extent of the collateral's post-petition appreciation, preventing the trustee from distributing some or all of the sale proceeds to creditors holding allowed claims. If possible, we should avoid construing the statute in a way that produces such absurd results. </s> III </s> Although the Court makes no effort to explain why petitioner's straightforward reading of 506(d) is textually or structurally incompatible with other portions of the statute, respondents and the United States do so. They point out, to begin with, that the two exceptions to 506(d)'s nullifying effect both pertain to the disallowance of claims, and not to the inadequacy of security, see 11 U.S.C. 506(d)(1) and (2) - from which they conclude that the applicability of 506(d) turns only on the allowability of the underlying claim, and not on the extent to which the claim is a "secured claim" within the meaning of 506(a). But the fact that the statute makes no exceptions to invalidation by reason of inadequate security in no way establishes that such (plainly [502 U.S. 410, 428] expressed) invalidation does not exist. The premise of the argument - that, if a statute qualifies a noun with two adjectives ("allowed" and "secured"), and provides exceptions with respect to only one of the adjectives, then the other can be disregarded - is simply false. The most that can be said is that the two exceptions in 506(d) do not contradict the United States' and respondents' interpretation; but they in no way suggest or support it. </s> Respondents and the United States also identify supposed inconsistencies between petitioner's construction of 506(d) and other sections of the Bankruptcy Code; they are largely illusory. The principal source of concern is 722, which enables a Chapter 7 debtor to "redeem" narrow classes of exempt or abandoned personal property from "a lien securing a dischargeable consumer debt." The price of redemption is fixed as "the amount of the allowed secured claim of [the lienholder] that is secured by such lien" (emphasis added). This provision, we are told, would be largely superfluous if 506(d) automatically stripped liens securing undersecured claims to the value of the collateral, i.e., to the value of the allowed secured claims. </s> This argument is greatly overstated. Section 722 is necessary, and not superfluous, because 506(d) is not a redemption provision. It reduces the value of a lienholder's equitable interest in a debtor's property to the property's liquidation value, but it does not insure the debtor an opportunity to "redeem" the property at that price, i.e., to "free [the] property . . . from [the] mortgage or pledge by paying the debt for which it stood as security." Black's Law Dictionary 1278 (6th ed. 1990). Congress had good reason to be solicitous of the debtor's right to redeem personal property (the exclusive subject of 722), since state redemption laws are typically less generous for personalty than for real property. Compare, e.g., Utah Code Ann. 57-1-31 (1990) with Uniform Commercial Code 9-506, 3A U.L.A. 370 (1981). The most that can be said regarding 722 is that petitioner's [502 U.S. 410, 429] construction of 506(d) would permit a more concise formulation: instead of describing the redemption price as "the amount of the allowed secured claim . . . that is secured by such lien" it would have been possible to say simply "the amount of the claim . . . that is secured by such lien" - since 506(d) would automatically have cut back the lien to the amount of the allowed secured claim. I would hardly call the more expansive formulation a redundancy - not when it is so far removed from the section that did the "cutting back" that the reader has likely forgotten it. </s> Respondents and their amicus also make much of the need to avoid giving Chapter 7 debtors a better deal than they can receive under the other Chapters of the Bankruptcy Code. They assert that, by enabling a Chapter 7 debtor to strip down a secured creditor's liens and pocket any post-petition appreciation in the property, petitioner's construction of 506(d) will discourage debtors from using the preferred mechanisms of reorganization under Chapters 11, 12, and 13. This evaluation of the "finely reticulated" incentives affecting a debtor's behavior rests upon critical - and perhaps erroneous - assumptions about the meaning of provisions in the reorganization chapters. Respondents assume, for example, that a debtor in Chapter 13 cannot strip down a mortgage placed on the debtor's home; but that assumption may beg the very question the Court answers today. True, 1322(b)(2) provides that Chapter 13 filers may not "modify the rights of holders of secured claims" that are "secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence," 11 U.S.C. 1322(b)(2) (emphasis added). But this can be (and has been) read, in light of 506(a), to prohibit modification of the mortgagee's rights only with respect to the portion of his claim that is deemed secured under the Code, see, e.g., In re Hart, 923 F.2d 1410, 1415 (CA10 1991); Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 127 (CA3 1990). If petitioner's construction of 506(d) were applied consistently in this fashion to the Code's various chapters, [502 U.S. 410, 430] see 11 U.S.C. 103(a) (providing that "chapters 1, 3, and 5 . . . [shall] apply in a case under chapter 7, 11, 12, or 13"), Chapter 7 would not appear unduly attractive. In any event, reorganization contains other enticements to lure a debtor away from Chapter 7. It not only permits him to maintain control over his personal and business assets, but affords a broader discharge from prepetition in personam liabilities. Compare, e.g., 11 U.S.C. 523 (listing numerous exceptions to Chapter 7 discharge) with 11 U.S.C. 1328(a) (listing two exceptions to Chapter 13 discharge). Compare, e.g., Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 50 (1986) (restitution obligations imposed in criminal judgments nondischargeable in Chapter 7) with Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 563 -564 (1990) (such restitution obligations dischargeable in Chapter 13). </s> Finally, respondents and the United States find it incongruous that Congress would so carefully protect secured creditors in the context of reorganization while allowing them to be fleeced in a Chapter 7 liquidation by operation of 506(d). This view mistakes the generosity of treatment that creditors can count upon in reorganization. There, no more than under Chapter 7, can they demand the benefit of post-evaluation increases in the value of property given as security. See 11 U.S.C. 1129(b)(2)(A) and 1325(a)(5) (permitting "cram-down" of reorganization plan over objections of secured creditors if creditors are to receive payments equal in present value to the cash value of the collateral, and if creditors retain liens securing such payments). 3 </s> [502 U.S. 410, 431] </s> IV </s> I must also address the Tenth Circuit's basis for the decision affirmed today (alluded to by the Court, ante, at 414, but not discussed), that 506 does not apply to property abandoned by the bankruptcy trustee under 554, see 11 U.S.C. 554. Respondents' principal argument before us was a modified (and less logical) version of the same basic point - viz., that, although 506(a) applies to abandoned property, 506(d) does not. I can address the point briefly, since the plain language obstacles to its validity are even more pronounced than those raised by the Court's approach. </s> The Court of Appeals' reasoning was as follows: 506(d) effects lien-stripping only with respect to property subject to 506(a); but by its terms, 506(a) applies only to property "in which the estate has an interest," since "[t]he estate has no interest in, and does not administer, abandoned property," 506(a), and hence 506(d), does not apply to it. In re Dewsnup, 908 F.2d 588, 590-591 (CA10 1990). The fallacy in this is the assumption that the application of 506(a) (and hence 506(d)) can be undone if and when the estate ceases to "have an interest" in property in which it "had an interest" at the outset of the bankruptcy proceeding. The text does not read that way. Section 506 automatically operates upon all property in which the estate has an interest at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed. 4 Once 506(a)'s grant of secured creditor rights and 506(d)'s elimination of the right to "underwater" liens and liens securing unallowed claims have occurred, they cannot be undone by later abandonment of the property. Nothing in the statute expressly permits such an unraveling, and it would be absurd to imagine it. If, upon the collateral's abandonment, the claim bifurcation [502 U.S. 410, 432] accomplished by 506(a) were nullified, the status of the creditor's allowed claim - i.e., whether (and to what extent) it is "secured" or "unsecured" for purposes of the bankruptcy distribution - would be impossible to determine. Instead, the claim would have to be treated as either completely "secured" or completely "unsecured," neither of which disposition would accord with the Code's distribution principles. The former would deprive the secured claimant of a share in the distribution to general creditors altogether. See 11 U.S.C. 726 (providing for distribution of property of the estate to unsecured claimants). The latter (treating the claim as completely unsecured) would permit the lienholder to share in the pro rata distribution to general creditors to the full amount of his allowed claim (rather than simply to the amount of 506(a)-defined "unsecured claim") while reserving his in rem claim against the security. Respondents' variation on the Tenth Circuit's holding avoids these alternative absurdities only by embracing yet another textual irrationality - asserting that, even though the language that is the basis for the "abandonment" theory (the phrase "in which the estate has an interest") is contained in 506(a), and only applies to 506(d) through 506(a), nonetheless only the effects of 506(d), and not the effects of 506(a), are undone by abandonment. This hardly deserves the name of a theory. </s> V </s> As I have said, the Court does not trouble to make or evaluate the foregoing arguments. Rather, in Part II of its opinion, it merely describes (uncritically) "the contrasting positions of the respective parties and their amici" concerning the meaning of 506(d), ante, at 417, and concludes, because the positions are contrasting, that there is "ambiguity in the text," ante, at 417. (This mode of analysis makes every litigated statute ambiguous.) Having thus established "ambiguity," the Court is able to summon down its deus ex machina: "the pre-Code rule that liens pass through bankruptcy [502 U.S. 410, 433] unaffected" - which cannot be eliminated by an ambiguous provision, at least where the "legislative history" does not mention its demise. Ante, at 417, 418. </s> We have, of course, often consulted pre-Code behavior in the course of interpreting gaps in the express coverage of the Code, or genuinely ambiguous provisions. And we have often said in such cases that, absent a textual footing, we will not presume a departure from longstanding pre-Code practice. See, e.g., Midlantic Natl. Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 46 -47 (1986). But we have never held pre-Code practice to be determinative in the face of what we have here: contradictory statutory text. To the contrary, where "the statutory language plainly reveals Congress' intent" to alter pre-Code regimes, Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, supra, 495 U.S., at 563 , we have simply enforced the new Code according to its terms, without insisting upon "at least some discussion [of the change from prior law] in the legislative history," ante, at 419. </s> For an illustration of just how plainly today's opinion is at odds with our jurisprudence, one need only examine our most recent bankruptcy decision, Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151 (1991). There also, the parties took "contrasting positions" as to the meaning of the statutory text, but we did not shrink from finding, on the basis of our own analysis, that no ambiguity existed. There also it was urged upon us that the interpretation we adopted would overturn pre-Code practice with "no evidence in the legislative history that Congress intended to to make" such change. Ante, at 157. We found it unnecessary to "dispute the accuracy of [that] description of the legislative history . . . in order to reject [the] conclusion" that no change had been effected. "The fact," we said, "that Congress may not have foreseen all of the consequences of a statutory enactment is not a sufficient reason for refusing to give effect to its plain meaning." [502 U.S. 410, 434] Ante, at 157, 158. And "the fact that Congress carefully reexamined and entirely rewrote the preference provision in 1978 supports the conclusion that the text of 547(c)(2) as enacted reflects the deliberate choice of Congress." Ante, at 160. What was true of the preference provision in Wolas is also true of the secured claims provisions at issue in the present case: Congress's careful reexamination and entire rewriting of those provisions supports the conclusion that, regardless of whether pre-Code practice is retained or abandoned, the text means precisely what it says. Indeed, the rewriting here is so complete that, no matter how deeply one admires and venerates "pre-Code law," it is impossible to interpret 506(d) in a manner that entirely preserves it - and the Court itself, for all its protestation of fealty, does not do so. No provision of the former Bankruptcy Act, nor any pre-Code doctrine, purported to invalidate - across the board - liens securing claims disallowed in bankruptcy, see 11 U.S.C. 107 (1976 ed.); see also 4 Collier on Bankruptcy 67 (14th ed. 1978), yet that is precisely what 506(d), as interpreted by the Court today, accomplishes. </s> It is even more instructive to compare today's opinion with our decision a few years ago in United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989), which involved another subsection of 506 itself. The issue was whether 506(b) made post-petition interest available even to those oversecured creditors whose liens were nonconsensual. The Court of Appeals had held that it did not, because such a disposition would alter the pre-Code rule and there was no "legislative history" to support the change. We disagreed. The opinion for the Court began "where all such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself." Id., at 241. We did not recite the contentions of the parties and declare "ambiguity," but entered into our own careful consideration of "[t]he natural reading of the [relevant] phrase," the "grammatical structure of the statute," and the "terminology used throughout the Code." Id., at 241 and 242, n. 5. Having [502 U.S. 410, 435] found a "natural interpretation of the statutory language [that] does not conflict with any significant state or federal interest, nor with any other aspect of the Code," id., at 245, we deemed the pre-Code practice to be irrelevant. And whereas today's opinion announces the policy judgment that "[a]ny increase over the judicially determined valuation during bankruptcy rightly accrues to the benefit of the creditor," ante, at 417, in Ron Pair, we were undeterred by the fact that our result was "arguably somewhat in tension with the desirability of paying all creditors as uniformly as practicable," 489 U.S., at 245 -246. "Congress," we said, "expressly chose to create that alleged tension." Id., at 246. Almost point for point, today's opinion is the methodological antithesis of Ron Pair - and I have the greatest sympathy for the Courts of Appeals who must predict which manner of statutory construction we shall use for the next Bankruptcy Code case. </s> * * * </s> The principal harm caused by today's decision is not the misinterpretation of 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code. The disposition that misinterpretation produces brings the Code closer to prior practice and is, as the Court irrelevantly observes, probably fairer from the standpoint of natural justice. (I say irrelevantly, because a bankruptcy law has little to do with natural justice.) The greater and more enduring damage of today's opinion consists in its destruction of predictability, in the Bankruptcy Code and elsewhere. By disregarding well-established and oft-repeated principles of statutory construction, it renders those principles less secure, and the certainty they are designed to achieve less attainable. When a seemingly clear provision can be pronounced "ambiguous" sans textual and structural analysis, and when the assumption of uniform meaning is replaced by "one-subsection-at-a-time" interpretation, innumerable statutory texts become worth litigating. In the bankruptcy field [502 U.S. 410, 436] alone, for example, unfortunate future litigants will have to pay the price for our expressed neutrality "as to whether the words `allowed secured claim' have different meaning in other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code." Ante, at 417, n. 3. Having taken this case to resolve uncertainty regarding one provision, we end by spawning confusion regarding scores of others. I respectfully dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 For example: "That is what was bargained for by the mortgagor and the mortgagee. . . . Any increase over the judicially determined valuation during bankruptcy rightly accrues to the benefit of the creditor. . . . [W]e see no reason why [the lienholder's] acquiescence in [the bankruptcy] proceeding should cause him to experience a forfeiture of the kind the debtor proposes. . . . [T]he benefit of an allowed [unsecured claim] does not strike us as proper recompense for what petitioner proposes by way of the elimination of the remainder of the lien. Ante, at 417-418. </s> Apart from the fact that these policy judgments are inappropriate, it is not at all clear that evisceration of 506(d) is even necessary to effectuate them. The feared "windfall" to the debtor may be prevented by [502 U.S. 410, 424] 11 U.S.C. 551, which preserves liens avoided under 506(d) and other provisions of the Code "for the benefit of the estate," i.e., for the benefit of the general unsecured creditors. See Note, An Individual Debtor's Right to Avoid Liens Under Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, 12 Cardozo L.Rev. 263, 280-281 (1990). See also In re Ward, 42 B.R. 946, 952-953 (Bankr.Ct. MD Tenn. 1984). And the creditor whose lien has been stripped may even prevail over the other unsecured creditors by reason of 11 U.S.C. 363(k), which permits such an undersecured creditor to apply the entire amount of his allowed claim (secured and unsecured) against the purchase price of the collateral at the trustee's foreclosure sale. This appears to enable the lien-stripped creditor (at least in the context of a trustee-managed foreclosure sale) to use his "unsecured claim" to capture any post-evaluation appreciation in the collateral. See Carlson, Undersecured Claims Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 506(a) and 1111(b): Second Looks at Judicial Valuations of Collateral, 6 Bankr.Devs.J. 253, 272-279 (1989). I would leave these questions for resolution on remand. </s> [Footnote 2 The Court's insistence that the positions put forward by respondents and the United States are one and the same, see ante, at 417, n. 3, is simply mistaken. The following excerpts from the Government's brief, among others, are compatible only with the theory (which is not respondents') that the phrase "lien secures a claim" in 506(d) means "lien is adequate security for a claim": </s> "On its face, [ 506(d)] appears to take one set of circumstances - where "a lien secures a claim" - and carve out of it a lesser and included set of circumstances - where that secured claim "is not an allowed secured claim." Liens in the carved-out set are void. . . . </s> "According to petitioner, what the provision means is that a lien securing an unsecured claim is void. But the provision is triggered only "[t]o the extent that a lien secures a claim," [502 U.S. 410, 425] and if a lien secures a claim the claim is not, at least in common parlance, unsecured. . . . [I]t is inconsistent to say - as petitioner urges - that the prime situation at which the provision is directed is one where, because the collateral is worth less than the amount of the claim, the lien in fact fails to secure the claim. Under petitioner's reading, a provision that applies "[t]o the extent that a lien secures a claim" actually applies only to the extent that the lien does not secure the claim. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). </s> It is of little consequence, however, whether the Government espoused this position or not. In either event, it is a possible interpretation (more plausible, I think, than the one the Court adopts) that merits consideration by those concerned with text. </s> [Footnote 3 The election available to a secured creditor under 1111(b)(2) to treat his undersecured claims as fully secured in a Chapter 11 reorganization notwithstanding 506(a) does not affect this analysis, for an electing creditor is guaranteed under the reorganization plan only "property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is not less than the value of such holder's interest in the estate's interest in the property that secures such claims. 11 U.S.C. 1129(a)(7)(B). In other words, "the present value of such payments [to the 1111(b)(2) elector] need only equal the value of the secured creditor's interest in its collateral. 5 Collier on Bankruptcy § 1111.02, pp. 1111-25 - 1111-26, n. 23 (15th ed. 1990). </s> [Footnote 4 The estate "has an interest," of course, even in its overencumbered property. See 11 U.S.C. 541(d) (providing that property for which the debtor holds legal title alone is "property of the estate" to the extent of that legal title). See also 541(a)(1) (defining the bankruptcy estate to include "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case"). </s> [502 U.S. 410, 437]

United States Supreme Court NIXON v. ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES(1977) No. 75-1605 Argued: April 20, 1977Decided: June 28, 1977 </s> After appellant had resigned as President of the United States, he executed a depository agreement with the Administrator of General Services that provided for the storage near appellant's California home of Presidential materials (an estimated 42 million pages of documents and 880 tape recordings) accumulated during appellant's terms of office. Under this agreement, neither appellant nor the General Services Administration (GSA) could gain access to the materials without the other's consent. Appellant was not to withdraw any original writing for three years, although he could make and withdraw copies. After the initial three-year period he could withdraw any of the materials except tape recordings. With respect to the tape recordings, appellant agreed not to withdraw the originals for five years and to make reproductions only by mutual agreement. Following this five-year period the Administrator would destroy such tapes as appellant directed, and all of the tapes were to be destroyed at appellant's death or after the expiration of 10 years, whichever occurred first. Shortly after the public announcement of this agreement, a bill was introduced in Congress designed to abrogate it, and about three months later this bill was enacted as the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (Act) and was signed into law by President Ford. The Act directs the Administrator of GSA to take custody of appellant's Presidential materials and have them screened by Government archivists in order to return to appellant those personal and private in nature and to preserve those having historical value and to make the materials available for use in judicial proceedings subject to "any rights, defenses or privileges which the Federal Government or any person may invoke." The Administrator is also directed to promulgate regulations to govern eventual public access to some of the materials. These regulations must take into account seven guidelines specified by 104 (a) of the Act, including, inter alia, the need to protect any person's opportunity to assert any legally or constitutionally based right or privilege and the need to return to appellant or his family materials that are personal and private in nature. No such public-access regulations have yet become effective. The day after [433 U.S. 425, 426] the Act was signed into law, appellant filed an action in District Court challenging the Act's constitutionality on the grounds, inter alia, that on its face it violates (1) the principle of separation of powers; (2) the Presidential privilege; (3) appellant's privacy interests; (4) his First Amendment associational rights; and (5) the Bill of Attainder Clause, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the Act. Concluding that since no public-access regulations had yet taken effect it could consider only the injury to appellant's constitutionally protected interests allegedly caused by the taking of the Presidential materials into custody and their screening by Government archivists, the District Court held that appellant's constitutional challenges were without merit and dismissed the complaint. Held: </s> 1. The Act does not on its face violate the principle of separation of powers. Pp. 441-446. </s> (a) The Act's regulation of the Executive Branch's function in the control of the disposition of Presidential materials does not in itself violate such principle, since the Executive Branch became a party to the Act's regulation when President Ford signed the Act into law and President Carter's administration, acting through the Solicitor General, urged affirmance of the District Court's judgment. Moreover, the function remains in the Executive Branch in the person of the GSA Administrator and the Government archivists, employees of that branch. P. 441. </s> (b) The separate powers were not intended to operate with absolute independence, but in determining whether the Act violates the separation-of-powers principle the proper inquiry requires analysis of the extent to which the Act prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions, and only where the potential for disruption is present must it then be determined whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within Congress' constitutional authority. Pp. 441-443. </s> (c) There is nothing in the Act rendering it unduly disruptive of the Executive Branch, since that branch remains in full control of the Presidential materials, the Act being facially designed to ensure that the materials can be released only when release is not barred by privileges inhering in that branch. Pp. 443-446. </s> 2. Neither does the Act on its face violate the Presidential privilege of confidentiality. Pp. 446-455. </s> (a) In view of the specific directions to the GSA Administrator in 104 (a) of the Act to take into account, in determining public access to the materials, "the need to protect any party's opportunity to assert any constitutionally based right or privilege," and the need to return to [433 U.S. 425, 427] appellant his purely private materials, there is no reason to believe that the restrictions on public access ultimately established by regulation will not be adequate to preserve executive confidentiality. Pp. 449-451. </s> (b) The mere screening of the materials by Government archivists, who have previously performed the identical task for other former Presidents without any suggestion that such activity in any way interfered with executive confidentiality, will not impermissibly interfere with candid communication of views by Presidential advisers and will be no more of an intrusion into Presidential confidentiality than the in camera inspection by the District Court approved in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 . Pp. 451-452. </s> (c) Given the safeguards built into the Act to prevent disclosure of materials that implicate Presidential confidentiality, the requirement that appellant's personal and private materials be returned to him, and the minimal nature of the intrusion into the confidentiality of the Presidency resulting from the archivists' viewing such materials in the course of their screening process, the claims of Presidential privilege must yield to the important congressional purposes of preserving appellant's Presidential materials and maintaining access to them for lawful governmental and historical purposes. Pp. 452-454. </s> 3. The Act does not unconstitutionally invade appellant's right of privacy. While he has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his personal communications, the constitutionality of the Act must be viewed in the context of the limited intrusion of the screening process, of appellant's status as a public figure, his lack of expectation of privacy in the overwhelming majority of the materials (he having conceded that he saw no more than 200,000 items), and the virtual impossibility of segregating the apparently small quantity of private materials without comprehensive screening. When this is combined with the Act's sensitivity to appellant's legitimate privacy interests, the unblemished record of the archivists for discretion, and the likelihood that the public-access regulations to be promulgated will further moot appellant's fears that his materials will be reviewed by "a host of persons," it is apparent that appellant's privacy claim has no merit. Pp. 455-465. </s> 4. The Act does not significantly interfere with or chill appellant's First Amendment associational rights. His First Amendment claim is clearly outweighed by the compelling governmental interests promoted by the Act in preserving the materials. Since archival screening is the least restrictive means of identifying the materials to be returned to appellant, the burden of that screening is the measure of the First Amendment claim, and any such burden is speculative in light of the Act's provisions protecting appellant from improper public disclosures [433 U.S. 425, 428] and guaranteeing him full judicial review before any public access is permitted. Pp. 465-468. </s> 5. The Act does not violate the Bill of Attainder Clause. Pp. 468-484. </s> (a) However expansive is the prohibition against bills of attainder, it was not intended to serve as a variant of the Equal Protection Clause, invalidating every Act by Congress or the States that burdens some persons or groups but not all other plausible individuals. While the Bill of Attainder Clause serves as an important bulwark against tyranny, it does not do so by limiting Congress to the choice of legislating for the universe, or legislating only benefits, or not legislating at all. Pp. 468-471. </s> (b) The Act's specificity in referring to appellant by name does not automatically offend the Bill of Attainder Clause. Since at the time of the Act's passage Congress was only concerned with the preservation of appellant's materials, the papers of former Presidents already being housed in libraries, appellant constituted a legitimate class of one, and this alone can justify Congress' decision to proceed with dispatch with respect to his materials while accepting the status of his predecessors' papers and ordering in the Public Documents Act the further consideration of generalized standards to govern his successors. Pp. 471-472. </s> (c) Congress, by lodging appellant's materials in the GSA's custody pending their screening by Government archivists and the promulgation of further regulations, did not "inflict punishment" within the historical meaning of bills of attainder. Pp. 473-475. </s> (d) Evaluated in terms of Congress' asserted proper purposes of the Act to preserve the availability of judicial evidence and historically relevant materials, the Act is one of nonpunitive legislative policymaking, and there is no evidence in the legislative history or in the provisions of the Act showing a congressional intent to punish appellant. Pp. 475-484. </s> 408 F. Supp. 321, affirmed. </s> BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEWART, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined; in all but Part VII of which WHITE, J., joined; in all but Parts IV and V of which POWELL, J., joined; and in Part VII of which BLACKMUN, J., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 484. WHITE, J., post, p. 487, BLACKMUN, J., post, p. 491, and POWELL, J., post, p. 492, filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. BURGER, C. J., post, p. 504, and REHNQUIST, J., post, p. 545, filed dissenting opinions. </s> Herbert J. Miller, Jr., and Nathan Lewin argued the cause [433 U.S. 425, 429] for appellant. With them on the briefs were R. Stan Mortenson, Raymond G. Larroca, Martin D. Minsker, and William H. Jeffress, Jr. </s> Solicitor General McCree argued the cause for the federal appellees. On the brief were former Acting Solicitor General Friedman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Babcock, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Goldbloom, Robert E. Kopp, and Anthony J. Steinmeyer. Robert E. Herzstein argued the cause for appellees Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. With him on the brief were Andrew S. Krulwich, Mark J. Spooner, Peter T. Grossi, Jr., and Leonard B. Simon. Leon Friedman, John H. F. Shattuck, and Joel M. Gora filed a brief for appellees Hellman et al. William A. Dobrovir and Andra N. Oakes filed a brief for appellee Anderson. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Title I of Pub. L. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695, note following 44 U.S.C. 2107 (1970 ed., Supp. V), the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (hereafter Act), directs the Administrator of General Services, an official of the Executive Branch, to take custody of the Presidential papers and tape recordings of appellant, former President Richard M. Nixon, and promulgate regulations that (1) provide for the orderly processing and screening by Executive Branch archivists of such materials for the purpose of returning to appellant those that are personal and private in nature, and (2) determine the terms and conditions upon which public access may eventually be had to those materials that are retained. The question for decision is whether Title I is unconstitutional on its face as a violation of (1) the separation of powers; (2) Presidential privilege doctrines; (3) appellant's privacy interests; (4) appellant's First Amendment associational rights; or (5) the Bill of Attainder Clause. </s> On December 19, 1974, four months after appellant resigned as President of the United States, his successor, President Gerald R. Ford, signed Pub. L. 93-526 into law. The next [433 U.S. 425, 430] day, December 20, 1974, appellant filed this action in the District Court for the District of Columbia, which under 105 (a) of the Act has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain complaints challenging the Act's legal or constitutional validity, or that of any regulation promulgated by the Administrator. Appellant's complaint challenged the Act's constitutionality on a number of grounds and sought declaratory and injunctive relief against its enforcement. A three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2282, 2284. 1 Because regulations required by 104 of the Act governing public access to the materials were not yet effective, the District Court held that questions going to the possibility of future public release under regulations yet to be published were not ripe for review. It found that there was "no need and no justification for this court now to reach constitutional claims directed at the regulations . . . the promulgation of [which] might eliminate, limit, or cast [the constitutional claims] in a different light." 408 F. Supp. 321, 336 (1976). Accordingly, the District Court limited review "to consideration of the propriety of injunctive relief against the alleged facial unconstitutionality of the statute," id., at 335, and held that the challenges to the facial constitutionality of the Act were without merit. It therefore dismissed the complaint. Id., at 374-375. We noted probable jurisdiction, 429 U.S. 976 (1976). We affirm. </s> I </s> The Background </s> The materials at issue consist of some 42 million pages of documents and some 880 tape recordings of conversations. Upon his resignation, appellant directed Government archivists to pack and ship the materials to him in California. This [433 U.S. 425, 431] shipment was delayed when the Watergate Special Prosecutor advised President Ford of his continuing need for the materials. At the same time, President Ford requested that the Attorney General give his opinion respecting ownership of the materials. The Attorney General advised that the historical practice of former Presidents and the absence of any governing statute to the contrary supported ownership in the appellant, with a possible limited exception. 2 43 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 1 (1974), App. 220-230. The Attorney General's opinion emphasized, however: </s> "Historically, there has been consistent acknowledgement that Presidential materials are peculiarly affected by a public interest which may justify subjecting the absolute ownership rights of the ex-President to certain limitations directly related to the character of the documents as records of government activity." Id., at 226. </s> On September 8, 1974, after issuance of the Attorney General's opinion, the Administrator of General Services, Arthur F. Sampson, announced that he had signed a depository agreement with appellant under the authority of 44 U.S.C. 2107. 10 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 1104 (1974). We shall also refer to the agreement as the Nixon-Sampson agreement. See Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107, 160-162 (DC 1975) (App. A). The agreement recited that appellant retained "all legal and equitable title to the Materials, including all literary property rights," and that the materials accordingly were to be "deposited temporarily" near appellant's California home in an "existing facility belonging to the United States." Id., at 160. The agreement stated further that appellant's purpose was "to donate" the materials to the United States "with appropriate [433 U.S. 425, 432] restrictions." Ibid. It was provided that all of the materials "shall be placed within secure storage areas to which access can be gained only by use of two keys," one in appellant's possession and the other in the possession of the Archivist of the United States or members of his staff. With exceptions not material here, appellant agreed "not to withdraw from deposit any originals of the materials" for a period of three years, but reserved the right to "make reproductions" and to authorize other persons to have access on conditions prescribed by him. After three years, appellant might exercise the "right to withdraw from deposit without formality any or all of the Materials . . . and to retain . . . [them] for any purpose . . ." determined by him. Id., at 161. </s> The Nixon-Sampson agreement treated the tape recordings separately. They were donated to the United States "effective September 1, 1979," and meanwhile "shall remain on deposit." It was provided however that "[s]ubsequent to September 1, 1979 the Administrator shall destroy such tapes as [Mr. Nixon] may direct" and in any event the tapes "shall be destroyed at the time of [his] death or on September 1, 1984, whichever event shall first occur." Ibid. Otherwise the tapes were not to be withdrawn, and reproductions would be made only by "mutual agreement." Id., at 162. Access until September 1, 1979, was expressly reserved to appellant, except as he might authorize access by others on terms prescribed by him. </s> Public announcement of the agreement was followed 10 days later, September 18, by the introduction of S. 4016 by 13 Senators in the United States Senate. The bill, which became Pub. L. 93-526 and was designed, inter alia, to abrogate the Nixon-Sampson agreement, passed the Senate on October 4, 1974. It was awaiting action in the House of Representatives when on October 17, 1974, appellant filed suit in the District Court seeking specific enforcement of the Nixon-Sampson agreement. That action was consolidated with other suits seeking access to Presidential materials pursuant [433 U.S. 425, 433] to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552 (1970 ed. and Supp. V), and also seeking injunctive relief against enforcement of the agreement. Nixon v. Sampson, supra. 3 The House passed its version of the Senate bill on December 3, 1974. The final version of S. 4016 was passed on December 9, 1974, and President Ford signed it into law on December 19. </s> II </s> The Act </s> Public Law 93-526 has two Titles. Title I, the challenged Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, consists of 101 through 106. Title II, the Public Documents Act, amends Chapter 33 of Title 44, United States Code, to add 3315 through 3324 thereto, and establish the National Study Commission on Records and Documents of Federal Officials. </s> Section 101 (a) of Title I directs that the Administrator of General Services, notwithstanding any other law or agreement or understanding (e. g., the Nixon-Sampson agreement), "shall receive, obtain, or retain, complete possession and control of all original tape recordings of conversations which were recorded or caused to be recorded by any officer or employee of the Federal Government and which - </s> "(1) involve former President Richard M. Nixon or other individuals who, at the time of the conversation, were employed by the Federal Government; [433 U.S. 425, 434] </s> "(2) were recorded in the White House or in the office of the President in the Executive Office Buildings located in Washington, District of Columbia; Camp David, Maryland; Key Biscayne, Florida; or San Clemente, California; and </s> "(3) were recorded during the period beginning January 20, 1969, and ending August 9, 1974." </s> Section 101 (b) provides that notwithstanding any such agreement or understanding, the Administrator also "shall receive, retain, or make reasonable efforts to obtain, complete possession and control of all papers, documents, memorandums, transcripts, and other objects and materials which constitute the Presidential historical materials [as defined by 44 U.S.C. 2101] of Richard M. Nixon, covering the period beginning January 20, 1969, and ending August 9, 1974." </s> Section 102 (a) prohibits destruction of the tapes or materials except as may be provided by law, and 102 (b) makes them available (giving priority of access to the Office of the Watergate Special Prosecutor) in response to court subpoena or other legal process, or for use in judicial proceedings. This was made subject, however, "to any rights, defenses, or privileges which the Federal Government or any person may invoke . . . ." Section 102 (c) affords appellant, or any person designated by him in writing, access to the recordings and materials for any purpose consistent with the Act "subsequent and subject to the regulations" issued by the Administrator under 103. See n. 46, infra. Section 102 (d) provides for access according to 103 regulations by any agency or department in the Executive Branch for lawful Government use. Section 103 requires custody of the tape recordings and materials to be maintained in Washington except as may otherwise be necessary to carry out the Act, and directs that the Administrator promulgate regulations necessary to assure their protection from loss or destruction and to prevent access to them by unauthorized persons. [433 U.S. 425, 435] </s> Section 104, in pertinent part, directs the Administrator to promulgate regulations governing public access to the tape recordings and materials. Section 104 (a) requires submission of proposed regulations to each House of Congress, the regulations to take effect under 104 (b) (1) at the end of 90 legislative days unless either the House or the Senate adopts a resolution disapproving them. The regulations must take into account seven factors specified in 104 (a), namely: </s> "(1) the need to provide the public with the full truth, at the earliest reasonable date, of the abuses of governmental power popularly identified under the generic term `Watergate'; </s> "(2) the need to make such recordings and materials available for use in judicial proceedings; </s> "(3) the need to prevent general access, except in accordance with appropriate procedures established for use in judicial proceedings to information relating to the Nation's security; </s> "(4) the need to protect every individual's right to a fair and impartial trial; </s> "(5) the need to protect any party's opportunity to assert any legally or constitutionally based right or privilege which would prevent or otherwise limit access to such recordings and materials; </s> "(6) the need to provide public access to those materials which have general historical significance, and which are not likely to be related to the need described in paragraph (1); and </s> "(7) the need to give to Richard M. Nixon, or his heirs, for his sole custody and use, tape recordings and other materials which are not likely to be related to the need described in paragraph (1) and are not otherwise of general historical significance." </s> Section 105 (a) vests the District Court for the District of Columbia with exclusive jurisdiction not only to hear [433 U.S. 425, 436] constitutional challenges to the Act, but also to hear challenges to the validity of any regulation, and to decide actions involving questions of title, ownership, custody, possession, or control of any tape or materials, or involving payment of any award of just compensation required by 105 (c) when a decision of that court holds that any individual has been deprived by the Act of private property without just compensation. Section 105 (b) is a severability provision providing that any decision invalidating a provision of the Act or a regulation shall not affect the validity or enforcement of any other provision or regulation. Section 106 authorizes appropriation of such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of the Title. </s> III </s> The Scope of the Inquiry </s> The District Court correctly focused on the Act's requirement that the Administrator of General Services administer the tape recordings and materials placed in his custody only under regulations promulgated by him providing for the orderly processing of such materials for the purpose of returning to appellant such of them as are personal and private in nature, and of determining the terms and conditions upon which public access may eventually be had to those remaining in the Government's possession. The District Court also noted that in designing the regulations, the Administrator must consider the need to protect the constitutional rights of appellant and other individuals against infringement by the processing itself or, ultimately, by public access to the materials retained. 408 F. Supp., at 334-340. This construction is plainly required by the wording of 103 and 104. 4 </s> [433 U.S. 425, 437] </s> Regulations implementing 102 and 103, which did not require submission to Congress, and which regulate access and screening by Government archivists, have been promulgated, 41 CFR 105-63 (1976). Public-access regulations that must be submitted to Congress under 104 (a) have not, however, become effective. The initial set proposed by the Administrator was disapproved pursuant to 104 (b) (1) by Senate Resolution. S. Res. 244, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); 121 Cong. Rec. 28609-28614 (1975). The Senate also disapproved seven provisions of a proposed second set, although that set had been withdrawn. S. Res. 428, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); 122 Cong. Rec. 10159-10160 (1976). The House disapproved six provisions of a third set. H. R. Res. 1505, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). The Administrator is of the view that regulations cannot become effective except as a package and consequently is preparing a fourth set for submission to Congress. Brief for Federal Appellees 8-9, n. 4. [433 U.S. 425, 438] </s> The District Court therefore concluded that as no regulations under 104 had yet taken effect, and as such regulations once effective were explicitly made subject to judicial review under 105, the court could consider only the injury to appellant's constitutionally protected interests allegedly worked by the taking of his Presidential materials into custody for screening by Government archivists. 408 F. Supp., at 339-340. Judge McGowan, writing for the District Court, quoted the following from Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941): </s> "No one can foresee the varying applications of these separate provisions which conceivably might be made. A law which is constitutional as applied in one manner may still contravene the Constitution as applied in another. Since all contingencies of attempted enforcement cannot be envisioned in advance of those applications, courts have in the main found it wiser to delay passing upon the constitutionality of all the separate phases of a comprehensive statute until faced with cases involving particular provisions as specifically applied to persons who claim to be injured. Passing upon the possible significance of the manifold provisions of a broad statute in advance of efforts to apply the separate provisions in analogous to rendering an advisory opinion upon a statute or a declaratory judgment upon a hypothetical case." 408 F. Supp., at 336. </s> Only this Term we applied this principle in an analogous situation in declining to adjudicate the constitutionality of regulations of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency that were in process of revision, stating: "For [the Court] to review regulations not yet promulgated, the final form of which has been only hinted at, would be wholly novel." EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99, 104 (1977). See also Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268, 283 -284 (1969); Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 451 (1963); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20 -22 (1960); Harmon v. Brucker, [433 U.S. 425, 439] 355 U.S. 579 (1958). We too, therefore, limit our consideration of the merits of appellant's several constitutional claims to those addressing the facial validity of the provisions of the Act requiring the Administrator to take the recordings and materials into the Government's custody subject to screening by Government archivists. </s> The constitutional questions to be decided are, of course, of considerable importance. They touch the relationship between two of the three coordinate branches of the Federal Government, the Executive and the Legislative, and the relationship of appellant to his Government. They arise in a context unique in the history of the Presidency and present issues that this Court has had no occasion heretofore to address. Judge McGowan, speaking for the District Court, comprehensively canvassed all the claims, and in a thorough opinion, concluded that none had merit. Our independent examination of the issues brings us to the same conclusion, although our analysis differs somewhat on some questions. </s> IV </s> Claims Concerning the Autonomy of the Executive Branch </s> The Act was the product of joint action by the Congress and President Ford, who signed the bill into law. It is therefore urged by intervenor-appellees that, in this circumstance, the case does not truly present a controversy concerning the separation of powers, or a controversy concerning the Presidential privilege of confidentiality, because, it is argued, such claims may be asserted only by incumbents who are presently responsible to the American people for their action. We reject the argument that only an incumbent President may assert such claims and hold that appellant, as a former President, may also be heard to assert them. We further hold, however, that neither his separation-of-powers claim nor his claim of breach of constitutional privilege has merit. </s> Appellant argues broadly that the Act encroaches upon the [433 U.S. 425, 440] Presidential prerogative to control internal operations of the Presidential office and therefore offends the autonomy of the Executive Branch. The argument is divided into separate but interrelated parts. </s> First, appellant contends that Congress is without power to delegate to a subordinate officer of the Executive Branch the decision whether to disclose Presidential materials and to prescribe the terms that govern any disclosure. To do so, appellant contends, constitutes, without more, an impermissible interference by the Legislative Branch into matters inherently the business solely of the Executive Branch. </s> Second, appellant contends, somewhat more narrowly, that by authorizing the Administrator to take custody of all Presidential materials in a "broad, undifferentiated" manner, and authorizing future publication except where a privilege is affirmatively established, the Act offends the presumptive confidentiality of Presidential communications recognized in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). He argues that the District Court erred in two respects in rejecting this contention. Initially, he contends that the District Court erred in distinguishing incumbent from former Presidents in evaluating appellant's claim of confidentiality. Appellant asserts that, unlike the very specific privilege protecting against disclosure of state secrets and sensitive information concerning military or diplomatic matters, which appellant concedes may be asserted only by an incumbent President, a more generalized Presidential privilege survives the termination of the President-adviser relationship much as the attorney-client privilege survives the relationship that creates it. Appellant further argues that the District Court erred in applying a balancing test to his claim of Presidential privilege and in concluding that, notwithstanding the fact that some of the materials might legitimately be included within a claim of Presidential confidentiality, substantial public interests outweighed and justified the limited [433 U.S. 425, 441] inroads on Presidential confidentiality necessitated by the Act's provision for Government custody and screening of the materials. Finally, appellant contends that the Act's authorization of the process of screening the materials itself violates the privilege and will chill the future exercise of constitutionally protected executive functions, thereby impairing the ability of future Presidents to obtain the candid advice necessary to the conduct of their constitutionally imposed duties. </s> A </s> Separation of Powers </s> We reject at the outset appellant's argument that the Act's regulation of the disposition of Presidential materials within the Executive Branch constitutes, without more, a violation of the principle of separation of powers. Neither President Ford nor President Carter supports this claim. The Executive Branch became a party to the Act's regulation when President Ford signed the Act into law, and the administration of President Carter, acting through the Solicitor General, vigorously supports affirmance of the District Court's judgment sustaining its constitutionality. Moreover, the control over the materials remains in the Executive Branch. The Administrator of General Services, who must promulgate and administer the regulations that are the keystone of the statutory scheme, is himself an official of the Executive Branch, appointed by the President. The career archivists appointed to do the initial screening for the purpose of selecting out and returning to appellant his private and personal papers similarly are Executive Branch employees. </s> Appellant's argument is in any event based on an interpretation of the separation-of-powers doctrine inconsistent with the origins of that doctrine, recent decisions of the Court, and the contemporary realities of our political system. True, it has been said that "each of the three general departments of government [must remain] entirely free from the control or [433 U.S. 425, 442] coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others . . .," Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935), and that "[t]he sound application of a principle that makes one master in his own house precludes him from imposing his control in the house of another who is master there." Id., at 630. See also O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933); Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201 (1928). </s> But the more pragmatic, flexible approach of Madison in the Federalist Papers and later of Mr. Justice Story 5 was expressly affirmed by this Court only three years ago in United States v. Nixon, supra. There the same broad argument concerning the separation of powers was made by appellant in the context of opposition to a subpoena duces tecum of the Watergate Special Prosecutor for certain Presidential tapes and documents of value to a pending criminal investigation. Although acknowledging that each branch of the Government has the duty initially to interpret the Constitution for itself, and that its interpretation of its powers is due [433 U.S. 425, 443] great respect from the other branches, 418 U.S., at 703 , the Court squarely rejected the argument that the Constitution contemplates a complete division of authority between the three branches. Rather, the unanimous Court essentially embraced Mr. Justice Jackson's view, expressed in his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952). </s> "In designing the structure of our Government and dividing and allocating the sovereign power among three co-equal branches, the Framers of the Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system, but the separate powers were not intended to operate with absolute independence." 418 U.S., at 707 (emphasis supplied). </s> Like the District Court, we therefore find that appellant's argument rests upon an "archaic view of the separation of powers as requiring three airtight departments of government," 408 F. Supp., at 342. 6 Rather, in determining whether the Act disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S., at 711 -712. Only where the potential for disruption is present must we then determine whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress. Ibid. </s> It is therefore highly relevant that the Act provides for custody of the materials in officials of the Executive Branch and that employees of that branch have access to the materials only "for lawful Government use, subject to the [Administrator's] [433 U.S. 425, 444] regulations." 102 (d); 41 CFR 105-63.205, 105-63.206, and 105-63.302 (1976). For it is clearly less intrusive to place custody and screening of the materials within the Executive Branch itself than to have Congress or some outside agency perform the screening function. While the materials may also be made available for use in judicial proceedings, this provision is expressly qualified by any rights, defense, or privileges that any person may invoke including, of course, a valid claim of executive privilege. United States v. Nixon, supra. Similarly, although some of the materials may eventually be made available for public access, the Act expressly recognizes the need both "to protect any party's opportunity to assert any legally or constitutionally based right or privilege," 104 (a) (5), and to return purely private materials to appellant, 104 (a) (7). These provisions plainly guard against disclosures barred by any defenses or privileges available to appellant or the Executive Branch. 7 And appellant himself concedes that the Act "does not make the presidential materials available to the Congress - except insofar as Congressmen are members of the public and entitled to access when the public has it." Brief for Appellant 119. The Executive Branch remains in full control of the Presidential materials, and the Act facially is designed to ensure that the materials can be released only when release is not barred by some applicable privilege inherent in that branch. </s> Thus, whatever are the future possibilities for constitutional [433 U.S. 425, 445] conflict in the promulgation of regulations respecting public access to particular documents, nothing contained in the Act renders it unduly disruptive of the Executive Branch and, therefore, unconstitutional on its face. And, of course, there is abundant statutory precedent for the regulation and mandatory disclosure of documents in the possession of the Executive Branch. See, e. g., the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552 (1970 ed. and Supp. V); the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552 (a) (1970 ed., Supp. V); the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. 552b (1976 ed.); the Federal Records Act, 44 U.S.C. 2101 et seq.; and a variety of other statutes, e. g., 13 U.S.C. 8-9 (census data); 26 U.S.C. 6103 (tax returns). Such regulation of material generated in the Executive Branch has never been considered invalid as an invasion of its autonomy. Cf. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 83 (1973); FAA Administrator v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975). 8 Similar congressional power [433 U.S. 425, 446] to regulate Executive Branch documents exists in this instance, a power that is augmented by the important interests that the Act seeks to attain. See infra, at 452-454. </s> B </s> Presidential Privilege </s> Having concluded that the separation-of-powers principle is not necessarily violated by the Administrator's taking custody of and screening appellant's papers, we next consider appellant's more narrowly defined claim that the Presidential privilege shields these records from archival scrutiny. We start with what was established in United States v. Nixon, supra - that the privilege is a qualified one. 9 Appellant had argued in that case that in camera inspection by the District Court of Presidential documents and materials subpoenaed by the Special Prosecutor would itself violate the privilege without regard to whether the documents were protected from public disclosure. The Court disagreed, stating that "neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege . . . ." 10 </s> [433 U.S. 425, 447] 418 U.S., at 706 . The Court recognized that the privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications derives from the supremacy of the Executive Branch within its assigned area of constitutional responsibilities, 11 but distinguished a President's "broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the confidentiality of such [communications]" from the more particularized and less qualified privilege relating to the need "to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets . . . ." Ibid. The Court held that in the case of the general privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications, its importance must be balanced against the inroads of the privilege upon the effective functioning of the Judicial Branch. This balance was struck against the claim of privilege in that case because the Court determined that the intrusion into the confidentiality of Presidential communications resulting from in camera inspection by the District Court, "with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide," would be minimal and therefore that the claim was outweighed by "[t]he impediment that an absolute, unqualified privilege would place in the way of the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch . . . ." Id., at 706-707. </s> Unlike United States v. Nixon, in which appellant asserted a claim of absolute Presidential privilege against inquiry by the coordinate Judicial Branch, this case initially involves appellant's assertion of a privilege against the very [433 U.S. 425, 448] Executive Branch in whose name the privilege is invoked. The nonfederal appellees rely on this apparent anomaly to contend that only an incumbent President can assert the privilege of the Presidency. Acceptance of that proposition would, of course, end this inquiry. The contention draws on United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 -8 (1953), where it was said that the privilege "belongs to the Government and must be asserted by it: it can neither be claimed nor waived by a private party." The District Court believed that this statement was strong support for the contention, but found resolution of the issue unnecessary. 408 F. Supp., at 343-345. It sufficed, said the District Court, that the privilege, if available to a former President, was at least one that "carries much less weight than a claim asserted by the incumbent himself." Id., at 345. </s> It is true that only the incumbent is charged with performance of the executive duty under the Constitution. And an incumbent may be inhibited in disclosing confidences of a predecessor when he believes that the effect may be to discourage candid presentation of views by his contemporary advisers. Moreover, to the extent that the privilege serves as a shield for executive officials against burdensome requests for information which might interfere with the proper performance of their duties, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S., at 714 ; cf. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501 -503 (1975); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 84 -85 (1967) (per curiam), a former President is in less need of it than an incumbent. In addition, there are obvious political checks against an incumbent's abuse of the privilege. </s> Nevertheless, we think that the Solicitor General states the sounder view, and we adopt it: </s> "This Court held in United States v. Nixon . . . that the privilege is necessary to provide the confidentiality required for the President's conduct of office. Unless he [433 U.S. 425, 449] can give his advisers some assurance of confidentiality, a President could not expect to receive the full and frank submissions of facts and opinions upon which effective discharge of his duties depends. The confidentiality necessary to this exchange cannot be measured by the few months or years between the submission of the information and the end of the President's tenure; the privilege is not for the benefit of the President as an individual, but for the benefit of the Republic. Therefore the privilege survives the individual President's tenure." Brief for Federal Appellees 33. </s> At the same time, however, the fact that neither President Ford nor President Carter supports appellant's claim detracts from the weight of his contention that the Act impermissibly intrudes into the executive function and the needs of the Executive Branch. This necessarily follows, for it must be presumed that the incumbent President is vitally concerned with and in the best position to assess the present and future needs of the Executive Branch, and to support invocation of the privilege accordingly. </s> The appellant may legitimately assert the Presidential privilege, of course, only as to those materials whose contents fall within the scope of the privilege recognized in United States v. Nixon, supra. In that case the Court held that the privilege is limited to communications "in performance of [a President's] responsibilities," 418 U.S., at 711 , "of his office," id., at 713, and made "in the process of shaping policies and making decisions," id., at 708. Of the estimated 42 million pages of documents and 880 tape recordings whose custody is at stake, the District Court concluded that the appellant's claim of Presidential privilege could apply at most to the 200,000 items with which the appellant was personally familiar. </s> The appellant bases his claim of Presidential privilege in this case on the assertion that the potential disclosure of [433 U.S. 425, 450] communications given to the appellant in confidence would adversely affect the ability of future Presidents to obtain the candid advice necessary for effective decisionmaking. We are called upon to adjudicate that claim, however, only with respect to the process by which the materials will be screened and catalogued by professional archivists. For any eventual public access will be governed by the guidelines of 104, which direct the Administrator to take into account "the need to protect any party's opportunity to assert any . . . constitutionally based right or privilege," 104 (a) (5), and the need to return purely private materials to the appellant, 104 (a) (7). </s> In view of these specific directions, there is no reason to believe that the restriction on public access ultimately established by regulation will not be adequate to preserve executive confidentiality. An absolute barrier to all outside disclosure is not practically or constitutionally necessary. As the careful research by the District Court clearly demonstrates, there has never been an expectation that the confidences of the Executive Office are absolute and unyielding. All former Presidents from President Hoover to President Johnson have deposited their papers in Presidential libraries (an example appellant has said he intended to follow) for governmental preservation and eventual disclosure. 12 The [433 U.S. 425, 451] screening processes for sorting materials for lodgment in these libraries also involved comprehensive review by archivists, often involving materials upon which access restrictions ultimately have been imposed. 408 F. Supp., at 347. The expectation of the confidentiality of executive communications thus has always been limited and subject to erosion over time after an administration leaves office. </s> We are thus left with the bare claim that the mere screening of the materials by the archivists will impermissibly interfere with candid communication of views by Presidential advisers. 13 We agree with the District Court that, thus framed, the question is readily resolved. The screening constitutes a very limited intrusion by personnel in the Executive Branch sensitive to executive concerns. These very personnel have performed the identical task in each of the Presidential [433 U.S. 425, 452] libraries without any suggestion that such activity has in any way interfered with executive confidentiality. Indeed, in light of this consistent historical practice, past and present executive officials must be well aware of the possibility that, at some time in the future, their communications may be reviewed on a confidential basis by professional archivists. Appellant has suggested no reason why review under the instant Act, rather than the Presidential Libraries Act, is significantly more likely to impair confidentiality, nor has he called into question the District Court's finding that the archivists' "record for discretion in handling confidential material is unblemished." 408 F. Supp., at 347. </s> Moreover, adequate justifications are shown for this limited intrusion into executive confidentiality comparable to those held to justify the in camera inspection of the District Court sustained in United States v. Nixon, supra. Congress' purposes in enacting the Act are exhaustively treated in the opinion of the District Court. The legislative history of the Act clearly reveals that, among other purposes, Congress acted to establish regular procedures to deal with the perceived need to preserve the materials for legitimate historical and governmental purposes. 14 An incumbent President should not be dependent on happenstance or the whim of a prior President when he seeks access to records of past decisions that define or channel current governmental obligations. 15 Nor should the American people's ability to reconstruct [433 U.S. 425, 453] and come to terms with their history be truncated by an analysis of Presidential privilege that focuses only on the needs of the present. 16 Congress can legitimately act to rectify the hit-or-miss approach that has characterized past attempts to protect these substantial interests by entrusting the materials to expert handling by trusted and disinterested professionals. </s> Other substantial public interests that led Congress to seek to preserve appellant's materials were the desire to restore public confidence in our political processes by preserving the materials as a source for facilitating a full airing of the events leading to appellant's resignation, and Congress' need to understand how those political processes had in fact operated in order to gauge the necessity for remedial legislation. Thus by preserving these materials, the Act may be thought to aid the legislative process and thus to be within the scope of Congress' broad investigative power, see, e. g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975). And, of course, the Congress repeatedly referred to the importance of the materials to the Judiciary in the event that they shed light upon issues in civil or criminal litigation, a social [433 U.S. 425, 454] interest that cannot be doubted. See United States v. Nixon, supra. 17 </s> In light of these objectives, the scheme adopted by Congress for preservation of the appellant's Presidential materials cannot be said to be overbroad. It is true that among the voluminous materials to be screened by archivists are some materials that bear no relationship to any of these objectives (and whose prompt return to appellant is therefore mandated by 104 (a) (7)). But these materials are commingled with other materials whose preservation the Act requires, for the appellant, like his predecessors, made no systematic attempt to segregate official, personal, and private materials. 408 F. Supp., at 355. Even individual documents and tapes often intermingle communications relating to governmental duties, and of great interest to historians or future policymakers, with private and confidential communications. Ibid. </s> Thus, as in the Presidential libraries, the intermingled state of the materials requires the comprehensive review and classification contemplated by the Act if Congress' important objectives are to be furthered. In the course of that process, the archivists will be required to view the small fraction of the materials that implicate Presidential confidentiality, as well as personal and private materials to be returned to appellant. But given the safeguards built into the Act to prevent disclosure of such materials and the minimal nature of the intrusion into the confidentiality of the Presidency, we believe that the claims of Presidential privilege clearly must yield to the important congressional purposes of preserving the materials and maintaining access to them for lawful governmental and historical purposes. [433 U.S. 425, 455] </s> In short, we conclude that the screening process contemplated by the Act will not constitute a more severe intrusion into Presidential confidentiality than the in camera inspection by the District Court approved in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S., at 706 . We must, of course, presume that the Administrator and the career archivists concerned will carry out the duties assigned to them by the Act. Thus, there is no basis for appellant's claim that the Act "reverses" the presumption in favor of confidentiality of Presidential papers recognized in United States v. Nixon. Appellant's right to assert the privilege is specifically preserved by the Act. The guideline provisions on their face are as broad as the privilege itself. If the broadly written protections of the Act should nevertheless prove inadequate to safeguard appellant's rights or to prevent usurpation of executive powers, there will be time enough to consider that problem in a specific factual context. For the present, we hold, in agreement with the District Court, that the Act on its face does not violate the Presidential privilege. </s> V </s> Privacy </s> Appellant concedes that when he entered public life he voluntarily surrendered the privacy secured by law for those who elect not to place themselves in the public spotlight. See, e. g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). He argues, however, that he was not thereby stripped of all legal protection of his privacy, and contends that the Act violates fundamental rights of expression and privacy guaranteed to him by the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. 18 </s> [433 U.S. 425, 456] </s> The District Court treated appellant's argument as addressed only to the process by which the screening of the materials will be performed. "Since any claim by [appellant] that his privacy will be invaded by public access to private materials must be considered premature when it must actually be directed to the regulations once they become effective, we need not consider how the materials will be treated after they are reviewed." 408 F. Supp., at 358. Although denominating the privacy claim "[t]he most troublesome challenge that plaintiff raises . . .," id., at 357, the District Court concluded that the claim was without merit. The court reasoned that the proportion of the 42 million pages of documents and 880 tape recordings implicating appellant's privacy interests was quite small since the great bulk of the materials related to appellant's conduct of his duties as President, and were therefore materials to which great public interest attached. The touchstone of the legality of the archival processing, in the District Court's view, was its reasonableness. Balancing the public interest in preserving the materials touching appellant's performance of his official duties against the invasion of appellant's privacy that archival screening necessarily entails, the District Court concluded that the Act was not unreasonable and hence not facially unconstitutional: </s> "Here, we have a processing scheme without which national interests of overriding importance cannot be served . . . ." Id., at 364. </s> Thus, the Act "is a reasonable response to the difficult problem caused by the mingling of personal and private documents and conversations in the midst of a vastly greater number of nonprivate documents and materials related to government objectives. The processing contemplated by the Act - at least as narrowed by carefully tailored regulations - represents the least intrusive manner in which to provide an adequate level of promotion of government interests of overriding [433 U.S. 425, 457] importance." Id., at 367. We agree with the District Court that the Act does not unconstitutionally invade appellant's right of privacy. </s> One element of privacy has been characterized as "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters . . . ." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977). We may agree with appellant that, at least when Government intervention is at stake, public officials, including the President, are not wholly without constitutionally protected privacy rights in matters of personal life unrelated to any acts done by them in their public capacity. Presidents who have established Presidential libraries have usually withheld matters concerned with family or personal finances, or have deposited such materials with restrictions on their screening. 408 F. Supp., at 360. 19 We may assume with the District [433 U.S. 425, 458] Court, for the purposes of this case, that this pattern of de facto Presidential control and congressional acquiescence gives rise to appellant's legitimate expectation of privacy in such materials. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 -353 (1967). 20 This expectation is independent of the question of ownership of the materials, an issue we do not reach. See n. 8, supra. But the merit of appellant's claim of invasion of his privacy cannot be considered in the abstract; rather, the claim must be considered in light of the specific provisions of the Act, and any intrusion must be weighed against the public interest in subjecting the Presidential materials of appellant's administration to archival screening. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 -539 (1967); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). 21 Under this test, the privacy interest asserted by appellant is weaker than that found wanting in the recent decision of Whalen v. Roe, supra. Emphasizing the precautions utilized by New York State to prevent the unwarranted disclosure of private medical information retained in a state computer bank system, Whalen rejected a constitutional objection to New York's program on privacy grounds. Not only does the Act challenged here mandate regulations similarly aimed at preventing undue dissemination of private materials but, unlike Whalen, the Government will not even retain long-term control over [433 U.S. 425, 459] such private information; rather, purely private papers and recordings will be returned to appellant under 104 (a) (7) of the Act. </s> The overwhelming bulk of the 42 million pages of documents and the 880 tape recordings pertain, not to appellant's private communications, but to the official conduct of his Presidency. Most of the 42 million pages were prepared and seen by others and were widely circulated within the Government. Appellant concedes that he saw no more than 200,000 items, and we do not understand him to suggest that his privacy claim extends to items he never saw. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). Further, it is logical to assume that the tape recordings made in the Presidential offices primarily relate to the conduct and business of the Presidency. And, of course, appellant cannot assert any privacy claim as to the documents and tape recordings that he has already disclosed to the public. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973); Katz v. United States, supra, at 351. Therefore, appellant's privacy claim embracing, for example, "extremely private communications between him and, among others, his wife, his daughters, his physician, lawyer, and clergyman, and his close friends, as well as personal diary dictabelts and his wife's personal files," 408 F. Supp., at 359, relates only to a very small fraction of the massive volume of official materials with which they are presently commingled. 22 </s> [433 U.S. 425, 460] </s> The fact that appellant may assert his privacy claim as to only a small fraction of the materials of his Presidency is plainly relevant in judging the reasonableness of the screening process contemplated by the Act, but this of course does not, without more, require rejection of his privacy argument. Id., at 359. Although the Act requires that the regulations promulgated by the Administrator under 104 (a) take into account appellant's legally and constitutionally based rights and privileges, presumably including his privacy rights, 104 (a) (5), and also take into account the need to return to appellant his private materials, 104 (a) (7), 23 the identity and separation of these purely private matters can be achieved, as all parties concede, only by screening all of the materials. </s> Appellant contends that the Act therefore is tantamount to a general warrant authorizing search and seizure of all of his Presidential "papers and effects." Such "blanket authority," appellant contends, is precisely the kind of abuse that the Fourth Amendment was intended to prevent, for "`the real evil aimed at by the Fourth Amendment is the search itself, that invasion of a man's privacy which consists [in] rummaging about among his effects to secure evidence against him.'" Brief for Appellant 148, quoting United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (CA2 1930). Thus, his brief continues, at 150-151: </s> "[Appellant's] most private thoughts and communications, both written and spoken, will be exposed to and reviewed by a host of persons whom he does not know and [433 U.S. 425, 461] did not select, and in whom he has no reason to place his confidence. This group will decide what is personal, to be returned to [him], and what is historical, to be opened for public review." 24 </s> Appellant principally relies on Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965), but that reliance is misplaced. Stanford invalidated a search aimed at obtaining evidence that an individual had violated a "sweeping and many-faceted law which, among other things, outlaws the Communist Party and creates various individual criminal offenses, each punishable by imprisonment for up to 20 years." Id., at 477. The search warrant authorized a search of his private home for books, records, and other materials concerning illegal Communist activities. After spending more than four hours in Stanford's house, police officers seized half of his books which included works by Sartre, Marx, Pope John XXIII, Mr. Justice Hugo Black, Theodore Draper, and Earl Browder, as well as private documents including a marriage certificate, insurance policies, household bills and receipts, and personal correspondence. Id., at 479-480. Stanford held this to be an unconstitutional general search. </s> The District Court concluded that the Act's provisions for [433 U.S. 425, 462] custody and screening could not be analogized to a general search and that Stanford, therefore, did not require the Act's invalidation. 408 F. Supp., at 366-367, n. 63. We agree. Only a few documents among the vast quantity of materials seized in Stanford were even remotely related to any legitimate government interest. This case presents precisely the opposite situation: the vast proportion of appellant's Presidential materials are official documents or records in which appellant concedes the public has a recognized interest. Moreover, the Act provides procedures and orders the promulgation of regulations expressly for the purpose of minimizing the intrusion into appellant's private and personal materials. Finally, the search in Stanford was an intrusion into an individual's home to search and seize personal papers in furtherance of a criminal investigation and designed for exposure in a criminal trial. In contrast, any intrusion by archivists into appellant's private papers and effects is undertaken with the sole purpose of separating private materials to be returned to appellant from nonprivate materials to be retained and preserved by the Government as a record of appellant's Presidency. </s> Moreover, the screening will be undertaken by Government archivists with, as the District Court noted, "an unblemished record for discretion," 408 F. Supp., at 365. That review can hardly differ materially from that contemplated by appellant's intention to establish a Presidential library, for Presidents who have established such libraries have found that screening by professional archivists was essential. Although the District Court recognized that this contemplation of archival review would not defeat appellant's expectation of privacy, the court held that it does indicate that "in the special situation of documents accumulated by a President during his tenure and reviewed by professional government personnel, pursuant to a process employed by past Presidents, any intrusion into privacy interests is less substantial than it might appear at first." Ibid. (citation omitted). [433 U.S. 425, 463] </s> The District Court analogized the screening process contemplated by the Act to electronic surveillance conducted pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 2510 et seq. 408 F. Supp., at 363. We think the analogy is apt. There are obvious similarities between the two procedures. Both involve the problem of separating intermingled communications, (1) some of which are expected to be related to legitimate Government objectives, (2) some of which are not, and (3) for which there is no means to segregate the one from the other except by reviewing them all. Thus the screening process under the Act, like electronic surveillance, requires some intrusion into private communications unconnected with any legitimate governmental objectives. Yet this fact has not been thought to render surveillance under the Omnibus Act unconstitutional. Cf., e. g., United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (1977); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). See also 408 F. Supp., at 363-364. </s> Appellant argues that this analogy is inappropriate because the electronic surveillance procedure was carefully designed to meet the constitutional requirements enumerated in Berger v. New York, supra, including (1) prior judicial authorization, (2) specification of particular offenses said to justify the intrusion, (3) specification "with particularity" of the conversations sought to be seized, (4) minimization of the duration of the wiretap, (5) termination once the conversation sought is seized, and (6) a showing of exigent circumstances justifying use of the wiretap procedure. Brief for Appellant 157. Although the parallel is far from perfect, we agree with the District Court that many considerations supporting the constitutionality of the Omnibus Act also argue for the constitutionality of this Act's materials screening process. For example, the Omnibus Act permits electronic surveillance only to investigate designated crimes that are serious in nature, 18 U.S.C. 2516, and only when normal investigative techniques have failed or are likely to do so, 2518 (3) (c). Similarly, [433 U.S. 425, 464] the archival review procedure involved here is designed to serve important national interests asserted by Congress, and the unavailability of less restrictive means necessarily follows from the commingling of the documents. 25 Similarly, just as the Omnibus Act expressly requires that interception of nonrelevant communications be minimized, 2518 (5), the Act's screening process is designed to minimize any privacy intrusions, a goal that is further reinforced by regulations which must take those interests into account. 26 The fact that apparently only a minute portion of the materials implicates appellant's privacy interests 27 also negates any conclusion that [433 U.S. 425, 465] the screening process is an unreasonable solution to the problem of separating commingled communications. </s> In sum, appellant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his personal communications. But the constitutionality of the Act must be viewed in the context of the limited intrusion of the screening process, of appellant's status as a public figure, of his lack of any expectation of privacy in the overwhelming majority of the materials, of the important public interest in preservation of the materials, and of the virtual impossibility of segregating the small quantity of private materials without comprehensive screening. When this is combined with the Act's sensitivity to appellant's legitimate privacy interests, see 104 (a) (7), the unblemished record of the archivists for discretion, and the likelihood that the regulations to be promulgated by the Administrator will further moot appellant's fears that his materials will be reviewed by "a host of persons," 28 Brief for Appellant 150, we are compelled to agree with the District Court that appellant's privacy claim is without merit. </s> VI </s> First Amendment </s> During his Presidency appellant served also as head of his national political party and spent a substantial portion of [433 U.S. 425, 466] his working time on partisan political matters. Records arising from his political activities, like his private and personal records, are not segregated from the great mass of materials. He argues that the Act's archival screening process therefore necessarily entails invasion of his constitutionally protected rights of associational privacy and political speech. As summarized by the District Court: "It is alleged that the Act invades the private formulation of political thought critical to free speech and association, imposing sanctions upon past expressive activity, and more significantly, limiting that of the future because individuals who learn the substance of certain private communications by [appellant] - especially those critical of themselves - will refuse to associate with him. The Act is furthermore said to chill [his] expression because he will be `saddled' with prior positions communicated in private, leaving him unable to take inconsistent positions in the future." 408 F. Supp., at 367-368. </s> The District Court, viewing these arguments as in essence a claim that disclosure of the materials violated appellant's associational privacy, and therefore as not significantly different in structure from appellant's privacy claim, again treated the arguments as limited to the constitutionality of the Act's screening process. Id., at 368. As was true with respect to the more general privacy challenge, only a fraction of the materials can be said to raise a First Amendment claim. Nevertheless, the District Court acknowledged that appellant would "appear . . . to have a legitimate expectation that he would have an opportunity to remove some of the sensitive political documents before any government screening took place." Ibid. The District Court concluded, however, that there was no reason to believe that the mandated regulations when promulgated would not adequately protect against public access to materials implicating appellant's privacy in political association, and that "any burden arising solely from review by professional and discreet archivists is not significant." The court therefore held that the Act does not significantly [433 U.S. 425, 467] interfere with or chill appellant's First Amendment rights. Id., at 369. We agree with the District Court's conclusion. </s> It is, of course, true that involvement in partisan politics is closely protected by the First Amendment, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), and that "compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment." Id., at 64. But a compelling public need that cannot be met in a less restrictive way will override those interests, Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58 -59 (1973); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 -377 (1968); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960), "particularly when the `free functioning of our national institutions' is involved." Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 66. Since no less restrictive way than archival screening has been suggested as a means for identification of materials to be returned to appellant, the burden of that screening is presently the measure of his First Amendment claim. Id., at 84. The extent of any such burden, however, is speculative in light of the Act's terms protecting appellant from improper public disclosures and guaranteeing him full judicial review before any public access is permitted. 104 (a) (5), 104 (a) (7), 105 (a). 29 As the District Court concluded, the First Amendment [433 U.S. 425, 468] claim is clearly outweighed by the important governmental interests promoted by the Act. </s> For the same reasons, we find no merit in appellant's argument that the Act's scheme for custody and archival screening of the materials "necessarily inhibits [the] freedom of political activity [of future Presidents] and thereby reduces the `quantity and diversity' of the political speech and association that the Nation will be receiving from its leaders." Brief for Appellant 168. It is significant, moreover, that this concern has not deterred President Ford from signing the Act into law, or President Carter from urging this Court's affirmance of the judgment of the District Court. </s> VII </s> Bill of Attainder Clause </s> A </s> Finally, we address appellant's argument that the Act constitutes a bill of attainder proscribed by Art. I, 9, of the Constitution. 30 His argument is that Congress acted on the premise that he had engaged in "`misconduct,'" was an "`unreliable custodian'" of his own documents, and generally was deserving of a "legislative judgment of blameworthiness," Brief for Appellant 132-133. Thus, he argues, the Act is pervaded with the key features of a bill of attainder: a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial. See United States v. Brown, [433 U.S. 425, 469] 381 U.S. 437, 445 , 447 (1965); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 -316 (1946); Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 377 (1867); Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 323 (1867). </s> Appellant's argument relies almost entirely upon United States v. Brown, supra, the Court's most recent decision addressing the scope of the Bill of Attainder Clause. It is instructive, therefore, to sketch the broad outline of that case. Brown invalidated 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. 504, that made it a crime for a Communist Party member to serve as an officer of a labor union. After detailing the infamous history of bills of attainder, the Court found that the Bill of Attainder Clause was an important ingredient of the doctrine of "separation of powers," one of the organizing principles of our system of government. 381 U.S., at 442 -443. Just as Art. III confines the Judiciary to the task of adjudicating concrete "cases or controversies," so too the Bill of Attainder Clause was found to "reflect . . . the Framers' belief that the Legislative Branch is not so well suited as politically independent judges and juries to the task of ruling upon the blameworthiness of, and levying appropriate punishment upon, specific persons." 381 U.S., at 445 . Brown thus held that 504 worked a bill of attainder by focusing upon easily identifiable members of a class - members of the Communist Party - and imposing on them the sanction of mandatory forfeiture of a job or office, long deemed to be punishment within the contemplation of the Bill of Attainder Clause. See, e. g., United States v. Lovett, supra, at 316; Cummings v. Missouri, supra, at 320. </s> Brown, Lovett, and earlier cases unquestionably gave broad and generous meaning to the constitutional protection against bills of attainder. But appellant's proposed reading is far broader still. In essence, he argues that Brown establishes that the Constitution is offended whenever a law imposes undesired consequences on an individual or on a class [433 U.S. 425, 470] that is not defined at a proper level of generality. The Act in question therefore is faulted for singling out appellant, as opposed to all other Presidents or members of the Government, for disfavored treatment. </s> Appellant's characterization of the meaning of a bill of attainder obviously proves far too much. By arguing that an individual or defined group is attainted whenever he or it is compelled to bear burdens which the individual or group dislikes, appellant removes the anchor that ties the bill of attainder guarantee to realistic conceptions of classification and punishment. His view would cripple the very process of legislating, for any individual or group that is made the subject of adverse legislation can complain that the lawmakers could and should have defined the relevant affected class at a greater level of generality. 31 Furthermore, every person or group made subject to legislation which he or it finds burdensome may subjectively feel, and can complain, that he or it is being subjected to unwarranted punishment. United States v. Lovett, supra, at 324 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 32 </s> [433 U.S. 425, 471] However expansive the prohibition against bills of attainder, it surely was not intended to serve as a variant of the equal protection doctrine, 33 invalidating every Act of Congress or the States that legislatively burdens some persons or groups but not all other plausible individuals. 34 In short, while the Bill of Attainder Clause serves as an important "bulwark against tyranny," United States v. Brown, 381 U.S., at 443 , it does not do so by limiting Congress to the choice of legislating for the universe, or legislating only benefits, or not legislating at all. </s> Thus, in the present case, the Act's specificity - the fact that [433 U.S. 425, 472] it refers to appellant by name - does not automatically offend the Bill of Attainder Clause. Indeed, viewed in context, the focus of the enactment can be fairly and rationally understood. It is true that Title I deals exclusively with appellant's papers. But Title II casts a wider net by establishing a special commission to study and recommend appropriate legislation regarding the preservation of the records of future Presidents and all other federal officials. In this light, Congress' action to preserve only appellant's records is easily explained by the fact that at the time of the Act's passage, only his materials demanded immediate attention. The Presidential papers of all former Presidents from Hoover to Johnson were already housed in functioning Presidential libraries. Congress had reason for concern solely with the preservation of appellant's materials, for he alone had entered into a depository agreement, the Nixon-Sampson agreement, which by its terms called for the destruction of certain of the materials. Indeed, as the federal appellees argue, "appellant's depository agreement . . . created an imminent danger that the tape recordings would be destroyed if appellant, who had contracted phlebitis, were to die." Brief for Federal Appellees 41. In short, appellant constituted a legitimate class of one, and this provides a basis for Congress' decision to proceed with dispatch with respect to his materials while accepting the status of his predecessors' papers and ordering the further consideration of generalized standards to govern his successors. </s> Moreover, even if the specificity element were deemed to be satisfied here, the Bill of Attainder Clause would not automatically be implicated. Forbidden legislative punishment is not involved merely because the Act imposes burdensome consequences. Rather, we must inquire further whether Congress, by lodging appellant's materials in the custody of the General Services Administration pending their screening by Government archivists and the promulgation of further regulations, "inflict[ed] punishment" within the constitutional [433 U.S. 425, 473] proscription against bills of attainder. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S., at 315 ; see also United States v. Brown, supra, at 456-460; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall., at 320. </s> B </s> 1 </s> The infamous history of bills of attainder is a useful starting point in the inquiry whether the Act fairly can be characterized as a form of punishment leveled against appellant. For the substantial experience of both England and the United States with such abuses of parliamentary and legislative power offers a ready checklist of deprivations and disabilities so disproportionately severe and so inappropriate to nonpunitive ends that they unquestionably have been held to fall within the proscription of Art. I, 9. A statutory enactment that imposes any of those sanctions on named or identifiable individuals would be immediately constitutionally suspect. </s> In England a bill of attainder originally connoted a parliamentary Act sentencing a named individual or identifiable members of a group to death. 35 Article I, 9, however, also [433 U.S. 425, 474] proscribes enactments originally characterized as bills of pains and penalties, that is, legislative Acts inflicting punishment other than execution. United States v. Lovett, supra, at 323-324 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Cummings v. Missouri, supra, at 323; Z. Chafee, Jr., Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787, p. 97 (1956). Generally addressed to persons considered disloyal to the Crown or State, "pains and penalties" historically consisted of a wide array of punishments: commonly included were imprisonment, 36 banishment, 37 and the punitive confiscation of property by the sovereign. 38 Our country's own experience with bills of attainder resulted in the addition of another sanction to the list of impermissible legislative punishments: a legislative enactment barring designated individuals or groups from participation in specified employments or vocations, a mode of punishment commonly employed against those legislatively branded as disloyal. See, e. g., Cummings v. Missouri, supra (barring [433 U.S. 425, 475] clergymen from ministry in the absence of subscribing to a loyalty oath); United States v. Lovett, supra (barring named individuals from Government employment); United States v. Brown, supra (barring Communist Party members from offices in labor unions). </s> Needless to say, appellant cannot claim to have suffered any of these forbidden deprivations at the hands of the Congress. While it is true that Congress ordered the General Services Administration to retain control over records that appellant claims as his property, 39 105 of the Act makes provision for an award by the District Court of "just compensation." This undercuts even a colorable contention that the Government has punitively confiscated appellant's property, for the "owner [thereby] is to be put in the same position monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been taken." United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970); accord, United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943). Thus, no feature of the challenged Act falls within the historical meaning of legislative punishment. </s> 2 </s> But our inquiry is not ended by the determination that the Act imposes no punishment traditionally judged to be prohibited by the Bill of Attainder Clause. Our treatment of the scope of the Clause has never precluded the possibility that new burdens and deprivations might be legislatively fashioned that are inconsistent with the bill of attainder guarantee. The Court, therefore, often has looked beyond mere historical experience and has applied a functional test of the existence of punishment, analyzing whether the law under challenge, viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive [433 U.S. 425, 476] legislative purposes. 40 Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall., at 319-320; Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 193 -194 (1898); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 -97 (1958) (plurality opinion); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 -169 (1963). Where such legitimate legislative purposes do not appear, it is reasonable to conclude that punishment of individuals disadvantaged by the enactment was the purpose of the decisionmakers. </s> Application of the functional approach to this case leads to rejection of appellant's argument that the Act rests upon a congressional determination of his blameworthiness and a desire to punish him. For, as noted previously, see supra, at 452-454, legitimate justifications for passage of the Act are readily apparent. First, in the face of the Nixon-Sampson agreement which expressly contemplated the destruction of some of appellant's materials, Congress stressed the need to preserve "[i]nformation included in the materials of former President Nixon [that] is needed to complete the prosecutions [433 U.S. 425, 477] of Watergate-related crimes." H. R. Rep. No. 93-1507, p. 2 (1974). Second, again referring to the Nixon-Sampson agreement, Congress expressed its desire to safeguard the "public interest in gaining appropriate access to materials of the Nixon Presidency which are of general historical significance. The information in these materials will be of great value to the political health and vitality of the United States." Ibid. 41 Indeed, these same objectives are stated in the text of the Act itself, 104 (a), note following 44 U.S.C. 2107 (1970 ed., Supp. V), where Congress instructs the General Services Administration to promulgate regulations that further these ends and at the same time protect the constitutional and legal rights of any individual adversely affected by the Administrator's retention of appellant's materials. </s> Evaluated in terms of these asserted purposes, the law plainly must be held to be an act of nonpunitive legislative policymaking. Legislation designed to guarantee the availability of evidence for use at criminal trials is a fair exercise of Congress' responsibility to the "due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice," United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S., at 713 , and to the functioning of our adversary legal system which depends upon the availability of relevant evidence in carrying out its commitments both to fair play and to the discovery of truth within the bounds set by law. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919). Similarly, Congress' interest [433 U.S. 425, 478] in and expansive authority to act in preservation of monuments and records of historical value to our national heritage are fully established. United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896); Roe v. Kansas, 278 U.S. 191 (1929). 42 A legislature thus acts responsibly in seeking to accomplish either of these objectives. Neither supports an implication of a legislative policy designed to inflict punishment on an individual. </s> 3 </s> A third recognized test of punishment is strictly a motivational one: inquiring whether the legislative record evinces a congressional intent to punish. See, e. g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S., at 308 -314; Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, supra, at 169-170. The District Court unequivocally found: "There is no evidence presented to us, nor is there any to be found in the legislative record, to indicate that Congress' design was to impose a penalty upon Mr. Nixon . . . as punishment for alleged past wrongdoings. . . . The legislative history leads to only one conclusion, namely, that the Act before us is regulatory and not punitive in character." 408 F. Supp., at 373 (emphasis omitted). We find no cogent reason for disagreeing with this conclusion. </s> First, both Senate and House Committee Reports, in formally explaining their reasons for urging passage of the Act, expressed no interest in punishing or penalizing appellant. Rather, the Reports justified the Act by reference to objectives that fairly and properly lie within Congress' legislative competence: preserving the availability of judicial evidence and [433 U.S. 425, 479] of historically relevant materials. Supra, at 476-478. More specifically, it seems clear that the actions of both Houses of Congress were predominantly precipitated by a resolve to undo the recently negotiated Nixon-Sampson agreement, the terms of which departed from the practice of former Presidents in that they expressly contemplated the destruction of certain Presidential materials. 43 Along these lines, H. R. Rep. No. 93-1507, supra, at 2, stated: "Despite the overriding public interest in preserving these materials . . . [the] Administrator of General Services entered into an agreement . . . which, if implemented, could seriously limit access to these records and . . . result in the destruction of a substantial portion of them." See also S. Rep. No. 93-1181, p. 4 (1974). The relevant Committee Reports thus cast no aspersions on appellant's personal conduct and contain no condemnation of his behavior as meriting the infliction of punishment. Rather, they focus almost exclusively on the meaning and effect of an agreement recently announced by the General Services Administration which most Members of Congress perceived to be inconsistent with the public interest. </s> Nor do the floor debates on the measure suggest that Congress was intent on encroaching on the judicial function of punishing an individual for blameworthy offenses. When one of the opponents of the legislation, mischaracterizing the safeguards embodied in the bill, 44 stated that it is "one which partakes of the characteristics of a bill of attainder . . .," 120 [433 U.S. 425, 480] Cong. Rec. 33872 (1974) (Sen. Hruska), a key sponsor of the measure responded by expressly denying any intention of determining appellant's blameworthiness or imposing punitive sanctions: </s> "This bill does not contain a word to the effect that Mr. Nixon is guilty of any violation of the law. It does not inflict any punishment on him. So it has no more relation to a bill of attainder . . . . than my style of pulchritude is to be compared to that of the Queen of Sheba." Id., at 33959-33960 (Sen. Ervin). </s> In this respect, the Act stands in marked contrast to that invalidated in United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S., at 312 , where a House Report expressly characterized individuals as "subversive . . . and . . . unfit . . . to continue in Government employment." H. R. Rep. No. 448, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1943). We, of course, do not suggest that such a formal legislative announcement of moral blameworthiness or punishment is necessary to an unlawful bill of attainder. United States v. Lovett, supra, at 316. But the decided absence from the legislative history of any congressional sentiments expressive of this purpose is probative of nonpunitive intentions and largely undercuts a major concern that prompted the bill of attainder prohibition: the fear that the legislature, in seeking to pander to an inflamed popular constituency, will find it expedient openly to assume the mantle of judge - or, worse still, lynch mob. Cf. Z. Chafee, supra, at 161. 45 No such legislative overreaching is involved here. [433 U.S. 425, 481] </s> We also agree with the District Court that "specific aspects of the Act . . . just do not square with the claim that the Act was a punitive measure." 408 F. Supp., at 373. Whereas appellant complains that the Act has for some two years deprived him of control over the materials in question, Brief for Appellant 140, the Congress placed the materials under the auspices of the General Services Administration, 101, note following 44 U.S.C. 2107 (1970 ed., Supp. V), the same agency designated in the Nixon-Sampson agreement as depository of the documents for a minimum three-year period, App. 40. Whereas appellant complains that the Act deprives him of "ready access" to the materials, Brief for Appellant 140, the Act provides that "Richard M. Nixon, or any person whom he may designate in writing, shall at all times have access to the tape recordings and other materials . . .," 102 (c). 46 The District Court correctly construed this as safeguarding appellant's right to inspect, copy, and use the materials in issue, 408 F. Supp., at 375, paralleling the right to "make reproductions" contained in the Nixon-Sampson agreement, App. 40. And even if we assume that there is merit in appellant's complaint that his property has been confiscated, Brief for Appellant 140, the Act expressly provides for the payment of just compensation under 105 (c); see supra, at 475. </s> Other features of the Act further belie any punitive interpretation. In promulgating regulations under the Act, the General Services Administration is expressly directed by Congress to protect appellant's or "any party's opportunity to assert any legally or constitutionally based right or privilege . . . ." 104 (a) (5). More importantly, the Act preserves for appellant all of the protections that inhere in a judicial proceeding, for 105 (a) not only assures district [433 U.S. 425, 482] court jurisdiction and judicial review over all his legal claims, but commands that any such challenge asserted by appellant "shall have priority on the docket of such court over other cases." A leading sponsor of the bill emphasized that this expedited treatment is expressly designed "to protect Mr. Nixon's property, or other legal rights . . . ." 120 Cong. Rec. 33854 (1974) (Sen. Ervin). Finally, the Congress has ordered the General Services Administration to establish regulations that recognize "the need to give to Richard M. Nixon, or his heirs, for his sole custody and use, tape recordings and other materials which are not likely to be related to" the articulated objectives of the Act, 104 (a) (7). While appellant obviously is not set at ease by these precautions and safeguards, they confirm the soundness of the opinion given the Senate by the law division of the Congressional Research Service: "[B]ecause the proposed bill does not impose criminal penalties or other punishment, it would not appear to violate the Bill of Attainder Clause." 120 Cong. Rec. 33853 (1974). 47 </s> One final consideration should be mentioned in light of the unique posture of this controversy. In determining whether a legislature sought to inflict punishment on an individual, it is often useful to inquire into the existence of less burdensome alternatives by which that legislature (here Congress) could have achieved its legitimate nonpunitive objectives. Today, in framing his challenge to the Act, appellant contends that such an alternative was readily available: </s> "If Congress had provided that the Attorney General or the Administrator of General Services could institute a civil suit in an appropriate federal court to enjoin disposition [433 U.S. 425, 483] . . . of presidential historical materials . . . by any person who could be shown to be an `unreliable custodian' or who had `engaged in misconduct' or who `would violate a criminal prohibition,' the statute would have left to judicial determination, after a fair proceeding, the factual allegations regarding Mr. Nixon's blameworthiness." Brief for Appellant 137. </s> We have no doubt that Congress might have selected this course. It very well may be, however, that Congress chose not to do so on the view that a full-fledged judicial inquiry into appellant's conduct and reliability would be no less punitive and intrusive than the solution actually adopted. For Congress doubtless was well aware that just three months earlier, appellant had resisted efforts to subject himself and his records to the scrutiny of the Judicial Branch, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), a position apparently maintained to this day. 48 A rational and fairminded Congress, therefore, might well have decided that the carefully tailored law that it enacted would be less objectionable to appellant than the alternative that he today appears to endorse. To be sure, if the record were unambiguously to demonstrate that the Act represents the infliction of legislative punishment, the fact that the judicial alternative poses its own difficulties would be of no constitutional significance. But the record suggests the contrary, and the unique choice that Congress faced buttresses our conclusion that the Act cannot fairly be read to inflict legislative punishment as forbidden by the Constitution. </s> We, of course, are not blind to appellant's plea that we [433 U.S. 425, 484] recognize the social and political realities of 1974. It was a period of political turbulence unprecedented in our history. But this Court is not free to invalidate Acts of Congress based upon inferences that we may be asked to draw from our personalized reading of the contemporary scene or recent history. In judging the constitutionality of the Act, we may only look to its terms, to the intent expressed by Members of Congress who voted its passage, and to the existence or nonexistence of legitimate explanations for its apparent effect. We are persuaded that none of these factors is suggestive that the Act is a punitive bill of attainder, or otherwise facially unconstitutional. The judgment of the District Court is </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 For proceedings prior to convention of the three-judge court, see Nixon v. Richey, 168 U.S. App. D.C. 169, 513 F.2d 427, on reconsideration, 168 U.S. App. D.C. 172, 513 F.2d 430 (1975). See also Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107 (DC 1975). </s> [Footnote 2 No opinion was given respecting ownership of certain permanent files retained by the Chief Executive Clerk of the White House from administration to administration. The Attorney General was unable definitively to determine their status on the basis of then-available information. 43 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 1 (1974), App. 228. </s> [Footnote 3 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stayed any order effectuating the decision in Nixon v. Sampson pending decision of the three-judge court whether under 105 (a) the instant case was to "have priority on the docket of [the District] court over other cases," Nixon v. Richey, 168 U.S. App. D.C., at 173, 177, 188-190, 513 F.2d, at 431, 435, 446-448. The three-judge court was of the view that "the central purpose of Congress, in relation to all pending litigation, is to have an early and prior determination of the Act's constitutionality" and therefore did not request dissolution of the stay until entry of judgment. 408 F. Supp., at 333-334, n. 10. </s> [Footnote 4 This interpretation has abundant support in the legislative history of the Act. Senator Javits, one of the sponsors of S. 4016, stated: </s> "[The criteria of 104 (a)] endeavor to protect due process for individuals [433 U.S. 425, 437] who may be named in the papers as well as any privilege which may be involved in the papers, and of course the necessary access of the former President himself. </s> "In short, the argument that the bill authorizes absolute unrestricted public access does not stand up in the face of the criteria and the requirement for the regulations which we have inserted in the bill today." 120 Cong. Rec. 33860 (1974). </s> Senator Nelson, the bill's draftsman, agreed that the primary purpose to provide for the American people a historical record of the Watergate events "should not override all regard for the rights of the individual to privacy and a fair trial." Id., at 33851. Senator Ervin, also a sponsor and floor manager of the bill, stated: </s> "Nobody's right is affected by this bill, because it provides, as far as privacy is concerned, that the regulations of the Administrator shall take into account . . . [the] opportunity to assert any legally or constitutionally based right which would prevent or otherwise limit access to the tape recordings and other materials." Id., at 33969. </s> See also id., at 33960 (remarks of Sen. Ervin); id., at 37902-37903 (remarks of Rep. Brademas). </s> [Footnote 5 Madison in The Federalist No. 47, reviewing the origin of the separation-of-powers doctrine, remarked that Montesquieu, the "oracle" always consulted on the subject, </s> "did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other. His meaning, as his own words import . . . can amount to no more than this, that where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution, are subverted." The Federalist No. 47, pp. 325-326 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in original). </s> Similarly, Mr. Justice Story wrote: </s> "[W]hen we speak of a separation of the three great departments of government, and maintain that that separation is indispensable to public liberty, we are to understand this maxim in a limited sense. It is not meant to affirm that they must be kept wholly and entirely separate and distinct, and have no common link of connection or dependence, the one upon the other, in the slightest degree." 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 525 (M. Bigelow, 5th ed. 1905). </s> [Footnote 6 See also, e. g., 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 1.09 (1958); G. Gunther, Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law 400 (9th ed. 1975); L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 28-30 (1965); Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1383, 1387-1391 (1974); Ratner, Executive Privilege, Self Incrimination, and the Separation of Powers Illusion, 22 UCLA L. Rev. 92-93 (1974). </s> [Footnote 7 The District Court correctly interpreted the Act to require meaningful notice to appellant of archival decisions that might bring into play rights secured by 104 (a) (5). 408 F. Supp., at 340 n. 23. Such notice is required by the Administrator's regulations, 41 CFR 105-63.205 (1976), which provide: "The Administrator of General Services or his designated agent will provide former President Nixon or his designated attorney or agent prior notice of, and allow him to be present during, each authorized access." </s> [Footnote 8 We see no reason to engage in the debate whether appellant has legal title to the materials. See Brief for Appellant 90. Such an inquiry is irrelevant for present purposes because 105 (c) assures appellant of just compensation if his economic interests are invaded, and, even if legal title is his, the materials are not thereby immune from regulation. It has been accepted at least since Mr. Justice Story's opinion in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 347 (No. 4,901) (CC Mass. 1841), that regardless of where legal title lies, "from the nature of the public service, or the character of the documents, embracing historical, military, or diplomatic information, it may be the right, and even the duty, of the government, to give them publicity, even against the will of the writers." Appellant's suggestion that the Folsom principle does not go beyond materials concerning national security and current Government business is negated by Mr. Justice Story's emphasis that is also extended to materials "embracing historical . . . information." Ibid. (Emphasis added.) Significantly, no such limitation was suggested in the Attorney General's opinion to President Ford. Although indicating a view that the materials belonged to appellant, the opinion acknowledged that "Presidential materials" without qualification "are peculiarly affected by a public interest" which may justify subjecting "the absolute ownership rights" to certain [433 U.S. 425, 446] "limitations directly related to the character of the documents as records of government activity." 43 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 1 (1974), App. 220-230. </s> On the other hand, even if legal title rests in the Government, appellant is not thereby foreclosed from asserting under 105 (a) a claim for return of private materials retained by the Administrator in contravention of appellant's rights and privileges as specified in 104 (a) (5). </s> [Footnote 9 Like the District Court, we do not distinguish between the qualified "executive" privilege recognized in United States v. Nixon and the "Presidential" privilege to which appellant refers, except to note that appellant does not argue that the privilege he claims extends beyond the privilege recognized in that case. See 408 F. Supp., at 343 n. 24. </s> [Footnote 10 United States v. Nixon recognized that there is a legitimate governmental interest in the confidentiality of communications between high Government officials, e. g., those who advise the President, and that "[h]uman experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination [433 U.S. 425, 447] of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process." 418 U.S., at 705 . </s> [Footnote 11 Indeed, the opinion noted, id., at 705 n. 15, that Government confidentiality has been a concern from the time of the Constitutional Convention in 1787, the meetings of which were conducted in private, 1 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. xi-xxv (1911), and the records of which were sealed for more than 30 years after the Convention. See 3 Stat. 475, 15th Cong., 1st Sess., Res. 8 (1818). See generally C. Warren, The Making of the Constitution 134-139 (1937). </s> [Footnote 12 The District Court found that in the Hoover Library there are no restrictions on Presidential papers, although some restrictions exist with respect to personal and private materials, and in the Roosevelt Library, less than 0.5% of the materials is restricted. There is no evidence in the record as to the percentage of materials currently under restriction in the Truman or Eisenhower Libraries, but in the Kennedy Library, 85% of the materials has been processed, and of the processed materials, only 0.6% is under donor (as distinguished from security-related) restriction. In the Johnson Library, review of nonclassified materials is virtually complete, and more than 99% of all nonsecurity classified materials is unrestricted. In each of the Presidential libraries, provision has been made for the removal of the restrictions with the passage of time. 408 F. Supp., at 346 n. 31. </s> [Footnote 13 Aside from the public access eventually to be provided under 104, the Act mandates two other access routes to the materials. First, under 102 (b), access is available in accordance with lawful process served upon the Administrator. As we have noted, see n. 7, supra, the appellant is to be advised prior to any access to the materials, and he is thereafter free to review the specific materials at issue, see 102 (c); 41 CFR 105-63.301 (1976), in order to determine whether to assert any rights, privileges, or defenses. Section 102 (b) expressly conditions ultimate access by way of lawful process upon the right of appellant to invoke any rights, defenses, or privileges. </s> Second, 102 (d) of the Act states: "Any agency or department in the executive branch of the Federal Government shall at all times have access to the tape recordings and other materials . . . for lawful Government use . . . ." The District Court eschewed a broad reading of that section as permitting wholesale access by any executive official for any conceivable executive purpose. Instead, it construed 102 (d) in light of Congress' presumed intent that the Act operate within constitutional bounds - an intent manifested throughout the statute, see 408 F. Supp., at 337 n. 15. The District Court thus interpreted 102 (d), and in particular the phrase "lawful use," as requiring that once appellant is notified of requested access by an executive official, see n. 7, supra, he be allowed to assert any constitutional right or privilege that in his view would bar access. See 408 F. Supp., at 338 n. 18. We agree with that interpretation. </s> [Footnote 14 From its exhaustive survey of the legislative history, the District Court concluded that the public interests served by the Act could be merged under "the rubric of preservation of an accurate and complete historical record." Id., at 348-349. </s> [Footnote 15 S. Rep. No. 93-1181, pp. 3-5 (1974); H. R. Rep. No. 93-1507, p. 3 (1974); 120 Cong. Rec. 37904 (remarks of Rep. Abzug). See also 102 (d) of the Act. </s> Presidents in the past have had to apply to the Presidential libraries of their predecessors for permission to examine records of past governmental [433 U.S. 425, 453] actions relating to current governmental problems. See 408 F. Supp., at 351-352. Although it appears that most such requests have been granted, Congress could legitimately conclude that the situation was unstable and ripe for change. It is clear from the face of the Act that making the materials available for the ongoing conduct of Presidential policy was at least one of the objectives of the Act. See 102 (d). </s> [Footnote 16 S. Rep. No. 93-1181, pp. 1, 3 (1974); H. R. Rep. No. 93-1507, pp. 2-3, 8 (1974); Hearing on GSA Regulations Implementing Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act before the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 256 (1975); 120 Cong. Rec. 31549-31550 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Nelson); id., at 33850-33851; id., at 33863 (remarks of Sen. Ervin); id., at 33874-33875 (remarks of Sen. Huddleston); id., at 33875-33876 (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff); id., at 33876 (remarks of Sen. Muskie); id., at 33964-33965 (remarks of Sen. Nelson); id., at 37900-37901 (remarks of Rep. Brademas). See also 101 (b) (1), 104 (a) (7) of the Act. </s> [Footnote 17 As to these several objectives of the legislature, see S. Rep. No. 93-1181, pp. 1, 3-4, 6 (1974); H. R. Rep. No. 93-1507, pp. 2-3, 8 (1974); 120 Cong. Rec. 31549-31550 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Nelson); id., at 33849-33851; id., at 37900-37901 (remarks of Rep. Brademas); id., at 37905 (remarks of Rep. McKinney). See also 102 (b), 104 (a) of the Act. </s> [Footnote 18 Insofar as appellant argues a privacy claim based upon the First Amendment, see Part VI, infra. In joining this part of the opinion, MR. JUSTICE STEWART adheres to his views on privacy as expressed in his concurring opinion in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607 (1977). </s> [Footnote 19 The District Court, 408 F. Supp., at 360 n. 54, surveyed evidence in the record respecting depository restrictions for all Presidents since President Hoover. It is unclear whether President Hoover actually excluded any of his personal and private materials from the scope of his gift, although his offer to deposit materials in a Presidential library reserved the right to do so. President Franklin D. Roosevelt also indicated his intention to select certain materials from his papers to be retained by his family. Because of his death, this function was performed by designated individuals and by his secretary. Again the record is unclear as to how many materials were removed. A number of personal documents deemed to be personal family correspondence were turned over to the Roosevelt family library in 1948, later returned to the official library in 1954-1955, and have been on loan to the family since then. It is unclear to what extent these materials were reviewed by the library personnel. </s> President Truman withheld from deposit the personal file maintained in the White House by his personal secretary. This file was deposited with the library upon his death in 1974, although the terms of his will excluded a small number of items determined by the executors of his will to pertain to personal or business affairs of the Truman family. President Eisenhower's offer to deposit his Presidential materials excluded materials determined by him or his representative to be personal or private. President Kennedy's materials deposited with GSA did not include certain [433 U.S. 425, 458] materials relating to his private affairs, and some recordings of meetings involving President Kennedy, although physically stored in the Kennedy Library, have not yet been turned over to the library or reviewed by Government archivists. President Johnson's offer to deposit materials excluded items which he determined to be of special or private interest pertaining to personal or family affairs. </s> [Footnote 20 Even if prior Presidents had declined to assert their privacy interests in such materials, their failure to do so would not necessarily bind appellant, for privacy interests are not solely dependent for their constitutional protection upon established practice of governmental toleration. </s> [Footnote 21 We agree with the District Court that the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement is not involved. 408 F. Supp., at 361-362. </s> [Footnote 22 Some materials are still in appellant's possession, as the Administrator has not yet attempted to act on his authority under 101 (b) (1) to take custody of them. See Brief for Federal Appellees 4 n. 1. Moreover, the Solicitor General conceded at oral argument that there are certain purely private materials which "should be returned to [appellant] once . . . identified." Tr. of Oral Arg. 58-59. The District Court enjoined the Government from "processing, disclosing, inspecting, transferring, or otherwise disposing of any materials . . . which might fall within the coverage of . . . the . . . Act. . . ." 408 F. Supp., at 375. As the District Court's stay is no longer in effect, the Government should now promptly disclaim any interest in materials conceded to be appellant's purely private communications and deliver them to him. </s> [Footnote 23 The Solicitor General implied at oral argument that the requirement of the guidelines directing the Administrator to consider the need to return to appellant "for his sole custody and use . . . materials which are not [Watergate related] . . . and are not otherwise of general historical significance," 104 (a) (7), is further qualified by the requirement under 102 (b) and 104 (a) (5), that the regulations promulgated by the Administrator take into account the need to protect appellant's rights. defenses, or privileges. Tr. of Oral Arg. 37-38. </s> [Footnote 24 Appellant argues that screening under the Act contrasts with the screening procedures followed by earlier Presidents who, "in donating materials to Presidential libraries, have been able . . . to participate in the selection of persons who would review the materials for classification purposes." Brief for Appellant 151 n. 68. We are unable to say that the record substantiates this assertion. The record is most complete with respect to President Johnson, who appears to have recommended the individual who was later selected as Director of the Johnson Library, but seems not to have played any role in the selection of the archivists actually performing the day-to-day processing. 408 F. Supp., at 365 n. 60. Moreover, we agree with the District Court that it is difficult to see how professional archivists performing a screening task under proper standards would be meaningfully affected in the performance of their duties by loyalty to individuals or institutions. Ibid. </s> [Footnote 25 Appellant argues that, unlike electronic surveillance, where success depends upon the subject's ignorance of its existence, appellant could have been allowed to separate his personal from official materials. But Congress enacted the Act in part to displace the Nixon-Sampson agreement that expressly provided for automatic destruction of the tape recordings in the event of appellant's death and that allowed appellant complete discretion in the destruction of materials after the initial three-year storage period. </s> Moreover, appellant's view of what constitutes official as distinguished from personal and private materials might differ from the view of Congress, the Executive Branch, or a reviewing court. Not only may the use of disinterested archivists lead to application of uniform standards in separating private from nonprivate communications, but the Act provides for judicial review of their determinations. This would not be the case as to appellant's determinations. </s> [Footnote 26 The District Court found, 408 F. Supp., at 364 n. 58, and we agree, that it is irrelevant that Title III, unlike this Act, requires adherence to a detailed warrant requirement, 18 U.S.C. 2518. That requirement is inapplicable to this Act, since we deal not with standards governing a generalized right to search by law enforcement officials or other Government personnel but with a particularized legislative judgment, supplemented by judicial review, similar to condemnation under the power of eminent domain, that certain materials are of value to the public. </s> [Footnote 27 The fact that the overwhelming majority of the materials is relevant to Congress' lawful objectives is in contrast to the experience under the Omnibus Crime Control Act. A recent report on surveillance conducted under the Omnibus Act indicates that for the calendar year 1976 more than one-half of all wire intercepts authorized by judicial order [433 U.S. 425, 465] yielded only nonincriminating communications. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Report on Applications for Orders Authorizing or Approving the Interception of Wire or Oral Communications, Jan. 1, 1976, to Dec. 31, 1976, p. XII (Table 4). </s> [Footnote 28 Throughout this litigation appellant has claimed that his privacy will necessarily be unconstitutionally invaded because the screening requires a staff of "over one hundred archivists, accompanied by lawyers, technicians and secretaries [who] will have a right to review word-by-word five and one-half years of a man's life . . . ." Tr. of Oral Arg. 16. The size of the staff is, of course, necessarily a function of the enormous quantity of materials involved. But clearly not all engaged in the screening will examine each document. The Administrator initially proposed that only one archivist examine most documents. See 408 F. Supp., at 365 n. 59. </s> [Footnote 29 Appellant argues that Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150 -151 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 319 -321 (1958); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 538 -541 (1945); and Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 -453 (1938), support his contention that "[a] statute which vests such broad authority [with respect to First Amendment rights] is unconstitutional on its face, and the party subjected to it may treat it as a nullity even if its actual implementation would not harm him." Brief for Appellant 169. The argument is without merit. Those cases involved regulations that permitted public officials in their arbitrary discretion to impose prior restraints on expressional or associational activities. In contrast, the Act is concerned only with materials that record past activities and with a screening process guided by longstanding archival screening standards. </s> [Footnote 30 Article I, 9, applicable to Congress, provides that "[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed," and Art. I, 10, applicable to the States, provides that "[n]o State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law . . . ." The linking of bills of attainder and ex post facto laws is explained by the fact that a legislative denunciation and condemnation of an individual often acted to impose retroactive punishment. See Z. Chafee, Jr., Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787, pp. 92-93 (1956). </s> [Footnote 31 In this case, for example, appellant faults the Act for taking custody of his papers but not those of other Presidents. Brief for Appellant 130. But even a congressional definition of the class consisting of all Presidents would have been vulnerable to the claim of being overly specific, since the definition might more generally include all members of the Executive Branch, or all members of the Government, or all in possession of Presidential papers, or all in possession of Government papers. This does not dispose of appellant's contention that the Act focuses upon him with the requisite degree of specificity for a bill of attainder, see infra, at 471-472, but it demonstrates that simple reference to the breadth of the Act's focus cannot be determinative of the reach of the Bill of Attainder Clause as a limitation upon legislative action that disadvantages a person or group. See, e. g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 474 -475 (1965) (WHITE, J., dissenting); n. 34, infra. </s> [Footnote 32 "The fact that harm is inflicted by governmental authority does not make it punishment. Figuratively speaking all discomforting action may be deemed punishment because it deprives of what otherwise would be enjoyed. But there may be reasons other than punitive for such deprivation." </s> [Footnote 33 We observe that appellant originally argued that "for similar reasons" the Act violates both the Bill of Attainder Clause and equal protection of the laws. Jurisdictional Statement 27-28. He has since abandoned reliance upon the equal protection argument, apparently recognizing that mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657 (1966), even if the law disadvantages an individual or identifiable members of a group, see, e. g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (opticians); Daniel v. Family Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949) (insurance agents). "For similar reasons" the mere specificity of a law does not call into play the Bill of Attainder Clause. Cf. Comment, The Supreme Court's Bill of Attainder Doctrine: A Need for Clarification, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 212, 234-236 (1966); but see Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 Yale L. J. 330 (1962). </s> [Footnote 34 Brown recognized this by making clear that conflict-of-interest laws, which inevitably prohibit conduct on the part of designated individuals or classes of individuals, do not contravene the bill of attainder guarantee. Brown specifically noted the validity of 32 of the Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. 78, which disqualified identifiable members of a group - officers and employees of underwriting organizations - from serving as officers of Federal Reserve banks, 381 U.S., at 453 . Other valid federal conflict-of-interest statutes which also single out identifiable members of groups to bear burdens or disqualifications are collected, id., at 467-468, n. 2 (WHITE, J., dissenting). See also Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974) (upholding transfer of rail properties of eight railroad companies to Government-organized corporation). </s> [Footnote 35 See, for example, the 1685 attainder of James, Duke of Monmouth, for high treason: "WHEREAS James duke of Monmouth has in an hostile manner invaded this kingdom, and is now in open rebellion, levying war against the king, contrary to the duty of his allegiance; Be it enacted by the King's most excellent majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons in this parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, That the said James duke of Monmouth stand and be convicted and attainted of high treason, and that he suffer pains of death, and incur all forfeitures as a traitor convicted and attainted of high treason." 1 Jac. 2, c. 2 (1685) (emphasis omitted). </s> The attainder of death was usually accompanied by a forfeiture of the condemned person's property to the King and the corruption of his blood, whereby his heirs were denied the right to inherit his estate. Blackstone traced the practice of "corruption of blood" to the Norman conquest. He considered the practice an "oppressive mark of feudal [433 U.S. 425, 474] tenure" and hoped that it "may in process of time be abolished by act of parliament." 4 W. Blackstone Commentaries *388. The Framers of the United States Constitution responded to this recommendation. Art. III, 3. </s> [Footnote 36 See, e. g., 10 & 11 Will. 3, c. 13 (1701): "An Act for continuing the Imprisonment of Counter and others, for the late horrid Conspiracy to assassinate the Person of his sacred Majesty." </s> [Footnote 37 See, e. g., Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 14 (1800) ("`all and every the persons, named and included in the said act [declaring persons guilty of treason] are banished from the said state [Georgia]'"); 2 R. Wooddeson, A Systematical View of the Laws of England 638-639 (1792) (banishment of Lord Clarendon and the Bishop Atterbury). See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 , n. 23 (1963). </s> [Footnote 38 Following the Revolutionary War, States often seized the property of alleged Tory sympathizers. See, e. g., James's Claim, 1 Dall. 47 (1780) ("John Parrock was attained of High Treason, and his estate seized and advertised for sale"); Respublica v. Gordon, 1 Dall. 233 (1788) ("attainted of treason for adhering to the king of Great Britain, in consequence of which his estate was confiscated to the use of the commonwealth . . ."). </s> [Footnote 39 In fact, it remains unsettled whether the materials in question are the property of appellant or of the Government. See n. 8, supra. </s> [Footnote 40 In determining whether punitive or nonpunitive objectives underlie a law, United States v. Brown established that punishment is not restricted purely to retribution for past events, but may include inflicting deprivations on some blameworthy or tainted individual in order to prevent his future misconduct. 381 U.S., at 458 -459. This view is consistent with the traditional purposes of criminal punishment, which also include a preventive aspect. See, e. g., H. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 48-61 (1968). In Brown the element of punishment was found in the fact that "the purpose of the statute before us is to purge the governing boards of labor unions of those whom Congress regards as guilty of subversive acts and associations and therefore unfit to fill [union] positions . . . ." 381 U.S., at 460 . Thus, Brown left undisturbed the requirement that one who complains of being attainted must establish that the legislature's action constituted punishment and not merely the legitimate regulation of conduct. Indeed, just three Terms later, United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 n. 30 (1968), which, like Brown, was also written by Mr. Chief Justice Warren, reconfirmed the need to examine the purposes served by a purported bill of attainder in determining whether it in fact represents a punitive law. </s> [Footnote 41 The Senate pointed to these same objectives in nullifying the Nixon-Sampson agreement: "1. To begin with, prosecutors, defendants, and the courts probably would be deprived of crucial evidence bearing on the defendants' innocence or guilt of the Watergate crimes for which they stand accused. 2. Moreover, the American people would be denied full access to all facts about the Watergate affair, and the efforts of Congress, the executive branch, and others to take measures to prevent a recurrence of the Watergate affair may be inhibited." S. Rep. No. 93-1181, p. 4 (1974). </s> [Footnote 42 These cases upheld exercises of the power of eminent domain in preserving historical monuments and like facilities for public use. The power of eminent domain, however, is not restricted to tangible property or realty but extends both to intangibles and to personal effects as involved here. See Cincinnati v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 223 U.S. 390, 400 (1912); Porter v. United States, 473 F.2d 1329 (CA5 1973). </s> [Footnote 43 Particularly troublesome was the provision of the agreement requiring the automatic destruction of tape recordings upon appellant's death. </s> [Footnote 44 In condemning the enactment as a bill of attainder, Senator Hruska argued that the bill seizes appellant's papers and distributes them to litigants without affording appellant the opportunity judicially "to assert a defense or privilege to the production of the papers." 120 Cong. Rec. 33871 (1974). In fact, the Act expressly recognizes appellant's right to present all such defenses and privileges through an expedited judicial proceeding. See infra, at 481-482. </s> [Footnote 45 The Court in United States v. Brown, 381 U.S., at 444 , referred to Alexander Hamilton's concern that legislatures might cater to the "momentary passions" of a "`free people, in times of heat and violence . . . .'" In this case, it is obvious that the supporters of this Act steadfastly avoided inflaming or appealing to any "passions" in the community. Indeed, rather than seek expediently to impose punishment and to circumvent the courts, Congress expressly provided for access to the Judiciary for resolution of any constitutional and legal rights appellant might assert. S. Rep. No. 93-1181, pp. 2-6 (1974). </s> [Footnote 46 Regulations guaranteeing appellant's unrestricted access to the materials have been promulgated by the Administrator and have not been challenged. See 41 CFR 105-63.3 (1976). </s> [Footnote 47 In brief, the legislative history of the Act offers a paradigm of a Congress aware of constitutional constraints on its power and carefully seeking to act within those limitations. See generally Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 585 (1975). </s> [Footnote 48 For example, in his deposition taken in this case, appellant refused to answer questions pertaining to the accuracy and reliability of his prior public statements as President concerning the contents of the tape recordings and other materials in issue. He invoked a claim of privilege and asserted that the questions were irrelevant to the judicial inquiry. See, e. g., App. 586-590. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring. </s> The statute before the Court does not apply to all Presidents or former Presidents. It singles out one, by name, for special treatment. Unlike all other former Presidents in our history, he is denied custody of his own Presidential papers; he is subjected to the burden of prolonged litigation over the administration of the statute; and his most private papers and conversations are to be scrutinized by Government archivists. The statute implicitly condemns him as an unreliable custodian of his papers. Legislation which subjects a named individual to this humiliating treatment must raise serious questions under the Bill of Attainder Clause. </s> Bills of attainder were typically directed at once powerful leaders of government. By special legislative Acts, Parliament deprived one statesman after another of his reputation, his property, and his potential for future leadership. The motivation for such bills was as much political as it was punitive - and often the victims were those who had been the most relentless in attacking their political enemies at the height of [433 U.S. 425, 485] their own power. 1 In light of this history, legislation like that before us must be scrutinized with great care. </s> Our cases "stand for the proposition that legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial are bills of attainder prohibited by the Constitution." United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 -316. The concept of punishment involves not only the character of the deprivation, but also the manner in which that deprivation is imposed. It has been held permissible for Congress to deprive Communist deportees, as a group, of their social security benefits, Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 , but it would surely be a bill of attainder for Congress to deprive a single, named individual of the same benefit. Cf. id., at 614. The very [433 U.S. 425, 486] specificity of the statute would mark it as punishment, for there is rarely any valid reason for such narrow legislation; and normally the Constitution requires Congress to proceed by general rulemaking rather than by deciding individual cases. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 -446. </s> Like the Court, however, I am persuaded that "appellant constituted a legitimate class of one . . . ." Ante, at 472. The opinion of the Court leaves unmentioned the two facts which I consider decisive in this regard. Appellant resigned his office under unique circumstances and accepted a pardon 2 for any offenses committed while in office. By so doing, he placed himself in a different class from all other Presidents. Cf. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 90 -91. Even though unmentioned, it would be unrealistic to assume that historic facts of this consequence did not affect the legislative decision. 3 </s> Since these facts provide a legitimate justification for the specificity of the statute, they also avoid the conclusion that this otherwise nonpunitive statute is made punitive by its specificity. If I did not consider it appropriate to take judicial notice of those facts, I would be unwilling to uphold the power of Congress to enact special legislation directed only at one former President at a time when his popularity was at its nadir. For even when it deals with Presidents or former Presidents, the legislative focus should be upon "the calling" rather than "the person." Cf. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 320. In short, in my view, this case will not be a precedent for future legislation which relates, not to the Office of President, but just to one of its occupants. [433 U.S. 425, 487] </s> Without imputing a similar reservation to the Court, I join its opinion with the qualification that these unmentioned facts have had a critical influence on my vote to affirm. </s> [Footnote 1 At the debate on the impeachment of the Earl of Danby, the Earl of Carnarvon recounted this history: </s> "My Lords, I understand but little of Latin, but a good deal of English, and not a little of the English history, from which I have learnt the mischiefs of such kind of prosecutions as these, and the ill fate of the prosecutors. I shall go no farther back than the latter end of Queen Elizabeth's reign: At which time the Earl of Essex was run down by Sir Walter Raleigh, and your Lordships very well know what became of Sir Walter Raleigh. My Lord Bacon, he ran down Sir Walter Raleigh, and your Lordships know what became of my Lord Bacon. The Duke of Buckingham, he ran down my Lord Bacon, and your Lordships know what happened to the Duke of Buckingham. Sir Thomas Wentworth, afterwards Earl of Strafford, ran down the Duke of Buckingham, and you all know what became of him. Sir Harry Vane, he ran down the Earl of Strafford, and your Lordships know what became of Sir Harry Vane. Chancellor Hyde, he ran down Sir Harry Vane, and your Lordships know what became of the Chancellor. Sir Thomas Osborne, now Earl of Danby, ran down Chancellor Hyde; but what will become of the Earl of Danby, your Lordships best can tell. But let me see that man that dare run the Earl of Danby down, and we shall soon see what will become of him." (Footnote omitted.) As quoted in Z. Chafee, Jr., Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787, p. 127 (1956). </s> [Footnote 2 See Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 94 . </s> [Footnote 3 Cf. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390: </s> "That Charles 1st. king of England, was beheaded; that Oliver Cromwell was Protector of England; that Louis 16th, late King of France, was guillotined; are all facts, that have happened; but it would be nonsense to suppose, that the States were prohibited from making any law after either of those events, and with reference thereto." </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. </s> I concur in the judgment and, except for Part VII, in the Court's opinion. With respect to the bill of attainder issue, I concur in the result reached in Part VII; the statute does not impose "punishment" and is not, therefore, a bill of attainder. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 462 (1965) (WHITE, J., dissenting). I also append the following observations with respect to one of the many issues in this case. </s> It is conceded by all concerned that a very small portion of the vast collection of Presidential materials now in possession of the Administrator consists of purely private materials, such as diaries, recordings of family conversations, private correspondence - "personal property of any kind not involving the actual transaction of government business." Tr. of Oral Arg. 55. It is also conceded by the federal and other appellees that these private materials, once identified, must be returned to Mr. Nixon. Id., at 38-40, 57-59. The Court now declares that "the Government [without awaiting a court order] should now promptly disclaim any interest in materials conceded to be appellant's purely private communications and deliver them to him." Ante, at 459 n. 22. I agree that the separation and return of these materials should proceed without delay. Furthermore, even if under the Act this process can occur only after the issuance of regulations under 104 that are subject to congressional approval, surely regulations covering this narrow subject matter need not take long to effectuate. </s> Also, 104 (a) (7) suggests that the private materials to be returned to Mr. Nixon are limited to those that "are not otherwise of general historical significance." But, as I see it, the validity of the Act would be questionable if mere historical [433 U.S. 425, 488] significance sufficed to withhold purely private letters or diaries; and in view of the other provisions of the Act, particularly 104 (a) (5), it need not be so construed. Purely private materials, whether or not of historical interest, are to be delivered to Mr. Nixon. The federal and other appellees conceded as much at oral argument. * </s> [433 U.S. 425, 489] </s> Similarly, although the Court relies to some extent on the statutory recognition of the constitutional right to compensation in the even it is determined that the Government has [433 U.S. 425, 490] confiscated Mr. Nixon's property, I would question whether a mere historical interest in purely private communications would be a sufficient predicate for taking them for public use. Historical considerations are normally sufficient grounds for condemning property, United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896); Roe v. Kansas, 278 U.S. 191 </s> [433 U.S. 425, 491] (1929); but whatever may be true of the great bulk of the materials in the event they are declared to be Mr. Nixon's property, I doubt that the Government is entitled to his purely private communications merely because it wants to preserve them and offers compensation. </s> [Footnote * "QUESTION: Well now, suppose Mr. Nixon has prepared a diary every day and put down what, exactly what he did, and let's suppose that someone thought that was a purely personal account. Now, I can just imagine that someone might think that it nevertheless is of general historical significance. </s> "MR. McCREE: May I refer the Court to need No. 5? `The need to protect any party's opportunity to assert any legally or constitutionally based right or privilege which would prevent or otherwise limit access to such recordings and materials.' </s> "And I submit that this Act affords Richard M. Nixon the opportunity to assert the contention that this diary of his is personal and has not the kind of general historical significance that will permit his deprivation; and that would then have to be adjudicated in a court. </s> "QUESTION: Well, do - </s> "MR. McCREE: And ultimately this Court will answer that question. </s> "QUESTION: Well, how do you - so you would agree, then, that 104 must be construed - must be construed to sooner or later return to Mr. Nixon what we might call purely private papers? </s> "MR. McCREE: Indeed I do. </s> "QUESTION: Can you imagine any diary - thinking of Mr. Truman's diary, which, it is reported, was a result of being dictated every evening, after the day's work - can you conceive of any such material that would not be of general historical interest? </s> "MR. McCREE: I must concede, being acquainted with some historians, that it's difficult to conceive of anything that might not be of historical interest. But - </s> "[Laughter.] </s> "QUESTION: Yes. Archivists and historians, like journalists, - </s> "MR. McCREE: Indeed they are. </s> "QUESTION: - think that everything is. </s> "[Laughter.] </s> "MR. McCREE: But this legislation recognizes that a claim of privacy, [433 U.S. 425, 489] a claim of privilege must be protected, and if the regulations are insufficient to do that, again a court will have an opportunity to address itself to a particular item such as the diary before it can be turned over. </s> "And for that reason, we suggest that the attack at this time is premature because the statute, in recognizing the right of privacy, is facially adequate. And the attack that was made the day after it became effective brought to this Court a marvelous opportunity to speculate about what might happen, but the regulations haven't even been promulgated and acquiesced in so that they have become effective." Tr. of Oral Arg. 38-40. </s> "[Mr. HERZSTEIN, for the private appellees:] </s> "But there's just no question about the return of personal diaries, Dictabelts, so long as they are not the materials involved in the transaction of government business. </s> "Now, the statute, I agree, could have been drafted a little more clearly, but we think there are several points which make it quite clear that his personal materials are to be returned to him. </s> "One is the fact that statute refers to the presidential historical materials of Richard Nixon, not to the person[al] or private materials. </s> "The second is that, as Judge McCree mentioned, criterion 7 calls for a return of materials to him, and if you read those two in conjunction with the legislative history, there are statements on the Floor of the Senate, on the Floor of the House, and in the Committee Reports, indicating the expectation that Nixon's personal records would be returned to him. </s> "QUESTION: Could you give us a capsule summary of the difference between what you have just referred to as Nixon's personal records, which will be returned, and the matter which will not be returned? </s> "MR. HERZSTEIN: Well, yes. Certainly any personal letters, among his family or friends, certainly a diary made at the end of the day, as it were, after the event - </s> "QUESTION: Even though the Dictabelt was paid for out of White House appropriations? </s> "MR. HERZSTEIN: That's right. That doesn't bother us. I think it's incidental now. But we do have a different view on the tapes, which actually recorded the transaction of government business by government [433 U.S. 425, 490] employees on government time and so on. The normal tapes that we've heard so much about. </s> "The Dictabelts, Mr. Nixon has said, are his personal diary. Instead of writing it down, in other words, he dictated it at the end of the day. And we think that's - </s> "QUESTION: I want to be sure about that concession, because this certainly is of historical interest. </s> "MR. HERZSTEIN: That's right, it is, but we do not feel it's covered by the statute. We have acknowledged that from the start. </s> "QUESTION: Is this concession shared by the Solicitor General, do you think? </s> "MR. HERZSTEIN: We believe it is. </s> "QUESTION: What about that? </s> "MR. McCREE: About the fact that the paper belongs to the government and so forth, we don't believe that makes a document a government documen[t]. We certainly agree with that. </s> "Beyond that, if the Court please - </s> "QUESTION: What about the Dictabelts representing his daily diary? </s> "MR. McCREE: I would think that's a personal matter that would be - should be returned to him once it was identified. </s> "QUESTION: Well, is there any problem about, right this very minute, of picking those up and giving them back to Mr. Nixon? </s> "MR. McCREE: I know of no problem. Whether it would have to await the adoption of the regulation, which has been stymied by Mr. Nixon's lawsuit, which has been delayed for three years, - </s> "QUESTION: How has that stymied the issuance of regulations, Mr. Solicitor General? </s> "MR. McCREE: One of the dispositions of the district court was to stay the effectiveness of regulations. Now, I think it held up principally the regulations for public access. The other regulations are not part of this record, and I cannot speak to the Court with any knowledge about them." Id., at 57-59. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. </s> My posture in this case is essentially that of MR. JUSTICE POWELL, post, p. 492. I refrain from joining his opinion, however, because I fall somewhat short of sharing his view, post, at 498 and 501-502, that the incumbent President's submission, made through the Solicitor General, that the Act serves rather than hinders the Chief Executive's Art. II functions, is dispositive of the separation-of-powers issue. I would be willing to agree that it is significant and that it is entitled to serious consideration, but I am not convinced that it is dispositive. The fact that President Ford signed the Act does not mean that he necessarily approved of its every detail. Political realities often guide a President to a decision not to veto. </s> One must remind oneself that our Nation's history reveals a number of instances where Presidential transition has not been particularly friendly or easy. On occasion it has been openly hostile. It is my hope and anticipation - as it obviously is of the others who have written in this case - that this Act, concerned as it is with what the Court describes, ante, at 472, as "a legitimate class of one," will not become a model for the disposition of the papers of each President who leaves office at a time when his successor or the Congress is not of his political persuasion. </s> I agree fully with my Brother POWELL when he observes, post, at 503, that the "difficult constitutional questions lie ahead" for resolution in the future. Reserving judgment on [433 U.S. 425, 492] those issues for a more appropriate time - certainly not now - I, too, join the judgment of the Court and agree with much of its opinion. I specifically join Part VII of the Court's opinion. </s> MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. </s> I join the judgment of the Court and all but Parts IV and V of its opinion. For substantially the reasons stated by the Court, I agree that the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (Act) on its face does not violate appellant's rights under the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments and the Bill of Attainder Clause. 1 For reasons quite different from those stated by the Court, I also would hold that the Act is consistent on its face with the principle of separation of powers. </s> I </s> The Court begins its analysis of the issues by limiting its inquiry to those constitutional claims that are addressed to "the facial validity of the provisions of the Act requiring the Administrator to take the recordings and materials into the Government's custody subject to screening by Government archivists." Ante, at 439. I agree that the inquiry must be limited in this manner, but I would add two qualifications that in my view further restrict the reach of today's decision. </s> First, Title I of Pub. L. 93-526 (the Act) does not purport to be a generalized provision addressed to the complex problem of disposition of the accumulated papers of Presidents or other federal officers. Unlike Title II of Pub. L. 93-526 (the Public Documents Act), which authorizes a study of that problem, [433 U.S. 425, 493] Title I is addressed specifically and narrowly to the need to preserve the papers of former President Nixon after his resignation under threat of impeachment. It is legislation, as the Court properly observes, directed against "a legitimate class of one." Ante, at 472. </s> President Nixon resigned on August 9, 1974. Less than two weeks earlier, the House Judiciary Committee had voted to recommend his impeachment, H. R. Rep. No. 93-1305, pp. 10-11 (1974), including among the charges of impeachable offenses allegations that the President had obstructed investigation of the Watergate break-in and had engaged in other unlawful activities during his administration. Id., at 1-4. One month after President Nixon's resignation, on September 8, 1974, President Ford granted him a general pardon for all offenses against the United States that he might have committed in his term of office. </s> On the same day, the Nixon-Sampson agreement was made public. The agreement provided for the materials to be deposited temporarily with the General Services Administration in a California facility, but gave the former President the right to withdraw or direct the destruction of any materials after an initial period of three years or, in the case of tape recordings, five years. During this initial period access would be limited to President Nixon and persons authorized by him, subject only to legal process ordering materials to be produced. Upon President Nixon's death, the tapes were to be destroyed immediately. 10 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 1104-1105 (1974). </s> Those who drafted and sponsored Title I in Congress uniformly viewed its provisions as emergency legislation, necessitated by the extraordinary events that led to the resignation and pardon and to the former President's arrangement for the disposition of his papers. Senator Nelson, for example, referred to the bill as "an emergency measure" whose principal [433 U.S. 425, 494] purpose was to assure "protective custody" of the materials. 120 Cong. Rec. 33848, 33850-33851 (1974). </s> "[T]here is an urgency in the situation now before us. Under the existing agreement between the GSA and Mr. Nixon, if Mr. Nixon died tomorrow, those tapes - if I read the agreement correctly - are to be destroyed immediately; it is also possible that the Nixon papers could be destroyed by 1977. This would be a catastroph[e] from an historical standpoint." Id., at 33857. </s> Senator Ervin similarly remarked: </s> "This bill really deals with an emergency situation, because some of these documents are needed in the courts and by the general public in order that they might know the full story of what is known collectively as the Watergate affair." Id., at 33855. </s> Efforts to apply the legislation more generally to all Presidents or to other federal officers were resisted on the Senate floor. Thus, speaking again of the unique needs created by the Nixon-Sampson agreement and the Watergate scandals, Senator Javits stressed that "we seek to deal in this particular legislation, only with this particular set of papers of this particular ex-President." Id., at 33860. See generally S. Rep. No. 93-1181 (1974). </s> It is essential in addressing the constitutional issues before us not to lose sight of the limited justification for and objectives of this legislation. The extraordinary events that led to the resignation and pardon, and the agreement providing that the record of those events might be destroyed by President Nixon, created an impetus for congressional action that may - without overstatement - be termed unique. I therefore do not share my Brother REHNQUIST'S foreboding that this Act "will daily stand as a veritable sword of Damocles over every succeeding President and his advisers." Post, at 545. If the study authorized by Title II should lead to [433 U.S. 425, 495] more general legislation, there will be time enough to consider its validity if a proper case comes before us. </s> My second reservation follows from the first. Because Congress acted in what it perceived to be an emergency, it concentrated on the immediate problem of establishing governmental custody for the purpose of safeguarding the materials. It deliberately left to the rulemaking process, and to subsequent judicial review, the difficult and sensitive task of reconciling the long-range interests of President Nixon, his advisors, the three branches of Government, and the American public, once custody was established. As the District Court observed: </s> "The Act in terms merely directs GSA to take custody of the materials that fall within the scope of section 101, and to promulgate regulations after taking into consideration the seven factors listed in section 104 (a). Those factors provide broad latitude to the Administrator in establishing the processes and standards under which the materials will be reviewed and public access to them afforded. . . ." 408 F. Supp. 321, 335 (1976) (footnote omitted). </s> In view of the latitude that the Act gives to GSA in framing regulations, I agree with the District Court that the question to be resolved in this case is a narrow one: "Is the regulatory scheme enacted by Congress unconstitutional without reference to the content of any conceivable set of regulations falling within the scope of the Administrator's authority under section 104 (a)?" Id., at 334-335. </s> No regulations have yet taken effect under 104 (a). Ante, at 437. In these circumstances, I believe it is appropriate to address appellant's constitutional claims, as did the District Court, with an eye toward the kind of regulations and screening practices that would be consistent with the Act and yet that would afford protection to the important [433 U.S. 425, 496] constitutional interests asserted. Section 104 (a) (5) of the Act directs the Administrator to take into account </s> "the need to protect any party's opportunity to assert any legally or constitutionally based right or privilege which would prevent or otherwise limit access to such recordings and materials." </s> The District Court observed that in considering this factor, the Administrator might well provide for meaningful participation by appellant in the screening process and in the selection of the archivists who would review the materials. The court also observed that procedures might be adopted that would minimize any intrusion into private materials and that would permit appellant an opportunity to obtain administrative and judicial review of all proposed classifications of the materials. 408 F. Supp., at 339-340. 2 Finally, [433 U.S. 425, 497] the court noted that substantive restrictions on access might be adopted, consistent with traditional restrictions placed on access to Presidential papers, and that such restrictions could forbid public disclosure of any confidential communications between appellant and his advisors "for a fixed period of years, or until the death of Mr. Nixon and others participating in or the subject of communications." Id., at 338. 3 </s> I have no doubt that procedural safeguards and substantive restrictions such as these are within the authority of the Administrator to adopt under the broad mandate of 104 (a). While there can be no positive assurance that such protections will in fact be afforded, we nonetheless may assume, in reviewing the facial validity of the Act, that all constitutional and legal rights will be given full protection. Indeed, that assumption is the basis on which I join today's judgment [433 U.S. 425, 498] upholding the facial validity of the Act. As the Court makes clear in its opinion, the Act plainly requires the Administrator, in designing the regulations, to "consider the need to protect the constitutional rights of appellant and other individuals against infringement by the processing itself or, ultimately, by public access to the materials retained." Ante, at 436. </s> II </s> I agree that the Act cannot be held unconstitutional on its face as a violation of the principle of separation of powers or of the Presidential privilege that derives from that principle. This is not a case in which the Legislative Branch has exceeded its enumerated powers by assuming a function reserved to the Executive under Art. II. E. g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). The question of governmental power in this case is whether the Act, by mandating seizure and eventual public access to the papers of the Nixon Presidency, impermissibly interferes with the President's power to carry out his Art. II obligations. In concluding that the Act is not facially invalid on this ground, I consider it dispositive in the circumstances of this case that the incumbent President has represented to this Court, through the Solicitor General, that the Act serves rather than hinders the Art. II functions of the Chief Executive. </s> I would begin by asking whether, putting to one side other limiting provisions of the Constitution, Congress has acted beyond the scope of its enumerated powers. Cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 70 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring). Apart from the legislative concerns mentioned by the Court, ante, at 476-478, I believe that Congress unquestionably has acted within the ambit of its broad authority to investigate, to inform the public, and, ultimately, to legislate against suspected corruption and abuse of power in the Executive Branch. [433 U.S. 425, 499] </s> This Court has recognized inherent power in Congress to pass appropriate legislation to "preserve the departments and institutions of the general government from impairment or destruction, whether threatened by force or by corruption." Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934). Congress has the power, for example, to restrict the political activities of civil servants, e. g., CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); to punish bribery and conflicts of interest, e. g., Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906); to punish obstructions of lawful governmental functions, Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462 (1910); and - with important exceptions - to make executive documents available to the public, EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973). The Court also has recognized that in aid of such legislation Congress has a broad power "to inquire into and publicize corruption, maladministration or inefficiency in agencies of the Government." Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 n. 33 (1957). See also Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 137-138; Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975). </s> The legislation before us rationally serves these investigative and informative powers. Congress legitimately could conclude that the Nixon-Sampson agreement, following the recommendation of impeachment and the resignation of President Nixon, might lead to destruction of those of the former President's papers that would be most likely to assure public understanding of the unprecedented events that led to the premature termination of the Nixon administration. Congress similarly could conclude that preservation of the papers was important to its own eventual understanding of whether that administration had been characterized by deficiencies susceptible of legislative correction. Providing for retention of the materials by the Administrator and for the selection of appropriate materials for eventual disclosure to the public was a rational means of serving these legitimate congressional objectives. [433 U.S. 425, 500] </s> Congress still might be said to have exceeded its enumerated powers, however, if the Act could be viewed as an assumption by the Legislative Branch of functions reserved exclusively to the Executive by Art. II. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), for example, the Court buttressed its conclusion that the President had acted beyond his power under Art. II by characterizing his seizure of the steel mills as an exercise of a "legislative" function reserved exclusively to Congress by Art. I. 343 U.S., at 588 -589. And last Term we reaffirmed the fundamental principle that the appointment of executive officers is an "Executive" function that Congress is without power to vest in itself. Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 124-141. But the Act before us presumptively avoids these difficulties by entrusting the task of ensuring that its provisions are faithfully executed to an officer of the Executive Branch. 4 </s> I therefore conclude that the Act cannot be held invalid on the ground that Congress has exceeded its affirmative grant of power under the Constitution. But it is further argued that Congress nonetheless has contravened the limitations on legislative power implicitly imposed by the creation of a coequal Executive Branch in Art. II. It is said that by opening up the operations of a past administration to eventual public scrutiny, the Act impairs the ability of present and future Presidents to obtain unfettered information and candid advice and thereby limits executive power in contravention of Art. II and the principle of separation of powers. I see no material distinction between such an argument and the collateral claim that the Act violates the Presidential privilege in confidential communications. </s> In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (Nixon I), [433 U.S. 425, 501] we recognized a presumptive, yet qualified, privilege for confidential communications between the President and his advisors. Observing that "those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process," id., at 705, we recognized that a President's generalized interest in confidentiality is "constitutionally based" to the extent that it relates to "the effective discharge of a President's powers." Id., at 711. We held nonetheless that "[t]he generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specified need for evidence in a pending criminal trial." Id., at 713. </s> Appellant understandably relies on Nixon I. Comparing the narrow scope of the judicial subpoenas considered there with the comprehensive reach of this Act - encompassing all of the communications of his administration - appellant argues that there is no "demonstrated, specific need" here that can outweigh the extraordinary intrusion worked by this legislation. On the ground that the result will be to destroy "the effective discharge of the President's powers," appellant urges that the Act be held unconstitutional on its face. </s> These arguments undoubtedly have considerable force, but I do not think they can support a decision invalidating this Act on its face. Section 1 of Art. II vests all of the executive power in the sitting President and limits his term of office to four years. It is his sole responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Art. II, 3. Here, as previously noted, President Carter has represented to this Court through the Solicitor General that the Act is consistent with "the effective discharge of the President's powers": </s> "Far from constituting a breach of executive autonomy, the Act . . . is an appropriate means of ensuring that the Executive Branch will have access to the materials necessary to the performance of its duties." Brief for Federal Appellees 29. [433 U.S. 425, 502] </s> This representation is similar to one made earlier on behalf of President Ford, who signed the Act. Motion of Federal Appellees to Affirm 15. I would hold that these representations must be given precedence over appellant's claim of Presidential privilege. Since the incumbent President views this Act as furthering rather than hindering effective execution of the laws, I do not believe it is within the province of this Court to hold otherwise. </s> This is not to say that a former President lacks standing to assert a claim of Presidential privilege. I agree with the Court that the former President may raise such a claim, whether before a court or a congressional committee. In some circumstances the intervention of the incumbent President will be impractical or his views unknown, and in such a case I assume that the former President's views on the effective operation of the Executive Branch would be entitled to the greatest deference. It is uncontroverted, I believe, that the privilege in confidential Presidential communications survives a change in administrations. I would only hold that in the circumstances here presented the incumbent, having made clear in the appropriate forum his opposition to the former President's claim, alone can speak for the Executive Branch. 5 </s> [433 U.S. 425, 503] </s> I am not unmindful that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). As we reiterated in Nixon I: </s> "`Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government . . . is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.'" 418 U.S., at 704 , quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). </s> My position is simply that a decision to waive the privileges inhering in the Office of the President with respect to an otherwise valid Act of Congress is the President's alone to make under the Constitution. 6 </s> III </s> The difficult constitutional questions lie ahead. The President no doubt will see to it that the interests in confidentiality so forcefully urged by THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST in their dissenting opinions are taken into account in the final regulations that are promulgated under [433 U.S. 425, 504] 104 (a). While the incumbent President has supported the constitutionality of the Act as it is written, there is no indication that he will oppose appellant's assertions of Presidential privilege as they relate to the rules that will govern the screening process and the timing of disclosure, and particularly the restrictions that may be placed on certain documents and recordings. I emphasize that the validity of such assertions of Presidential privilege is not properly before us at this time. </s> Similarly, difficult and important questions concerning individual rights remain to be resolved. At stake are not only the rights of appellant but also those of other individuals whose First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment interests may be implicated by disclosure of communications as to which a legitimate expectation of privacy existed. I agree with the Court that even in the councils of Government an individual "has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his personal communications," ante, at 465, and also that compelled disclosure of an individual's political associations, in and out of Government, can be justified only by "a compelling public need that cannot be met in a less restrictive way," ante, at 467. Today's decision is limited to the facial validity of the Act's provisions for retention and screening of the materials. The Court's discussion of the interests served by those provisions should not foreclose in any way the search that must yet be undertaken for means of assuring eventual access to important historical records without infringing individual rights protected by the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. </s> [Footnote 1 Although I agree with much of Parts IV and V, I am unable to join those parts of the Court's opinion because of my uncertainty as to the reach of its extended discussion of the competing constitutional interests implicated by the Act. </s> [Footnote 2 By way of illustration, the District Court observed that the following archival practices might be adopted to limit invasion of appellant's constitutionally protected interests: </s> "1. A practice of requiring archivists to make the minimal intrusion necessary to classify material. Identification by signature, the file within which material is found, general nature (as with diaries, or dictabelts serving the same function), a cursory glance at the contents, or other means could significantly limit infringement of plaintiff's interests without undermining the effectiveness of screening by governmental personnel. Participation by Mr. Nixon in preliminary identification of material that might be processed without word-by-word review would facilitate such a procedure. </s> "2. A practice of giving Mr. Nixon some voice in the designation of the personnel who will review the materials, perhaps by selecting from a body of archivists approved by the government. </s> "3. A practice of giving Mr. Nixon notice of all proposed classifications of materials and an opportunity to obtain administrative and judicial review of them, on constitutional or other grounds, before they are effectuated." 408 F. Supp., at 339-340 (footnotes omitted). </s> I agree with the views expressed by MR. JUSTICE WHITE, ante, at 487-491, on the need to return private materials to appellant. </s> [Footnote 3 The District Court noted the existence of: </s> "a basic set of donor-imposed access restrictions that was first formulated by Herbert Hoover [and] followed by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. Under this scheme the following materials would be restricted: </s> "1) materials that are security-classified; </s> "2) materials whose disclosure would be prejudicial to foreign affairs; </s> "3) materials containing statements made by or to a President in confidence; </s> "4) materials relating to the President's family, personal, or business affairs or to such affairs of individuals corresponding with the President; </s> "5) materials containing statements about individuals that might be used to embarrass or harass them or members of their families; </s> "6) such other materials as the President or his representative might designate as appropriate for restriction. </s> "President Franklin Roosevelt imposed restrictions very similar to numbers 1, 2, 4, and 5, and in addition restricted (a) investigative reports on individuals, (b) applications and recommendations for positions, and (c) documents containing derogatory remarks about an individual. President Truman's restrictions were like those of Hoover, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, except that he made no provision, like number 6 above, for restriction merely at his own instance." 408 F. Supp., at 338-339 n. 19 (citations omitted). </s> [Footnote 4 The validity of the provision of 104 (b) for possible disapproval of the Administrator's regulations by either House of Congress is not before us at this time. See 408 F. Supp., at 338 n. 17; Brief for Federal Appellees 26, and n. 11. </s> [Footnote 5 There is at least some risk that political, and even personal, antagonisms could motivate Congress and the President to join in a legislative seizure and public exposure of a former President's papers without due regard to the long-range implications of such action for the Art. II functions of the Chief Executive. Even if such legislation did not violate the principle of separation of powers, it might well infringe individual liberties protected by the Bill of Attainder Clause or the Bill of Rights. But this is not the case before us. In passing this legislation, Congress acted to further legitimate objectives in circumstances that were wholly unique in the history of our country. The legislation was approved by President Ford, personally chosen by President Nixon as his successor, and is now also supported by President Carter. In view of the circumstances leading to its passage and the protection it provides for "`any . . . [433 U.S. 425, 503] constitutionally based right or privilege,'" supra, at 496, this Act on its face does not violate the personal constitutional rights asserted by appellant. </s> [Footnote 6 Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 -637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring): </s> "When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for its includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power. . . ." (Footnote omitted.) See also Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Co., 13 Pet. 415, 420 (1839): </s> "[T]his Court ha[s] laid down the rule, that the action of the political branches of the government in a matter that belongs to them, is conclusive." </s> MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting. </s> In my view, the Court's holding is a grave repudiation of nearly 200 years of judicial precedent and historical practice. That repudiation arises out of an Act of Congress passed in the aftermath of a great national crisis which culminated in the resignation of a President. The Act (Title I of Pub. L. 93-526) violates firmly established constitutional principles in several respects. [433 U.S. 425, 505] </s> I find it very disturbing that fundamental principles of constitutional law are subordinated to what seem the needs of a particular situation. That moments of great national distress give rise to passions reminds us why the three branches of Government were created as separate and coequal, each intended as a check, in turn, on possible excesses by one or both of the others. The Court, however, has now joined a Congress, in haste to "do something," and has invaded historic, fundamental principles of the separate powers of coequal branches of Government. To "punish" one person, Congress - and now the Court - tears into the fabric of our constitutional framework. </s> Any case in this Court calling upon principles of separation of powers, rights of privacy, and the prohibitions against bills of attainder, whether urged by a former President - or any citizen - is inevitably a major constitutional holding. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking of the tendency of "[g]reat cases like hard cases [to make] bad law," went on to observe the dangers inherent when </s> "some accident of immediate overwhelming interest . . . appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will bend." Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 -401 (1904) (dissenting opinion). </s> Well-settled principles of law are bent today by the Court under that kind of "hydraulic pressure." </s> I </s> Separation of Powers </s> Appellant urges that Title I is an unconstitutional intrusion by Congress into the internal workings of the Office of the President, in violation of the constitutional principles of separation of powers. Three reasons support that conclusion. [433 U.S. 425, 506] The well-established principles of separation of powers, as developed in the decisions of this Court, are violated if Congress compels or coerces the President, in matters relating to the operation and conduct of his office. 1 Next, the Act is an exercise of executive - not legislative - power by the Legislative Branch. Finally, Title I works a sweeping modification of the constitutional privilege and historical practice of confidentiality of every Chief Executive since 1789. </s> A </s> As a threshold matter, we should first establish the standard of constitutional review by which Title I is to be judged. In the usual case, of course, legislation challenged in this Court benefits from a presumption of constitutionality. To survive judicial scrutiny a statutory enactment need only have a reasonable relationship to the promotion of an objective which the Constitution does not independently forbid, unless the legislation trenches on fundamental constitutional rights. </s> But where challenged legislation implicates fundamental constitutional guarantees, a far more demanding scrutiny is required. For example, this Court has held that the presumption of constitutionality does not apply with equal force where the very legitimacy of the composition of representative institutions is at stake. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Similarly, the presumption of constitutionality is lessened when the Court reviews legislation endangering fundamental constitutional rights, such as freedom of speech, or denying persons governmental rights or benefits because of race. Legislation touching substantially on these areas comes here bearing a heavy burden which its proponents must carry. </s> Long ago, this Court found the ordinary presumption of constitutionality inappropriate in measuring legislation directly impinging on the basic tripartite structure of our Government. [433 U.S. 425, 507] In Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 192 (1881), Mr. Justice Miller observed for the Court that encroachments by Congress posed the greatest threat to the continued independence of the other branches. 2 Accordingly, he cautioned that the exercise of power by one branch directly affecting the potential independence of another "should be watched with vigilance, and when called in question before any other tribunal . . . should receive the most careful scrutiny." Ibid. (Emphasis supplied.) See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). </s> Our role in reviewing legislation which touches on the fundamental structure of our Government is therefore akin to that which obtains when reviewing legislation touching on other fundamental constitutional guarantees. Because separation of powers is the base framework of our governmental system and the means by which all our liberties depend, Title I can be upheld only if it is necessary to secure some overriding governmental objective, and if there is no reasonable alternative which will trench less heavily on separation-of-powers principles. </s> B </s> Separation of powers is in no sense a formalism. It is the characteristic that distinguished our system from all others conceived up to the time of our Constitution. With federalism, separation of powers is "one of the two great structural principles of the American constitutional system . . ." E. Corwin, The President 9 (1957). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). [433 U.S. 425, 508] </s> In pursuit of that principle, executive power was vested in the President; no other offices in the Executive Branch, other than the Presidency and Vice Presidency, were mandated by the Constitution. Only two Executive Branch offices, therefore, are creatures of the Constitution; all other departments and agencies, from the State Department to the General Services Administration, are creatures of the Congress and owe their very existence to the Legislative Branch. 3 </s> The Presidency, in contrast, stands on a very different footing. Unlike the vast array of departments which the President oversees, the Presidency is in no sense a creature of the Legislature. The President's powers originate not from statute, but from the constitutional command to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . ." These independent, constitutional origins of the Presidency have an important bearing on determining the appropriate extent of congressional power over the Chief Executive or his records and workpapers. For, although the branches of Government are obviously not divided into "watertight compartments," Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 211 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting), the office of the Presidency, as a constitutional equal of Congress, must as a general proposition be free from Congress' coercive powers. 4 This is not simply an abstract proposition [433 U.S. 425, 509] of political philosophy; it is a fundamental prohibition plainly established by the decisions of this Court. </s> A unanimous Court, including Mr. Chief Justice Taft, Mr. Justice Holmes, and Mr. Justice Brandeis stated: </s> "The general rule is that neither department [of Government] may . . . control, direct or restrain the action of the other." Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923). </s> Similarly, in O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933), the Court emphasized the need for each branch of Government to be free from the coercive influence of the other branches: </s> "[E]ach department should be kept completely independent of the others - independent not in the sense that they shall not cooperate to the common end of carrying into effect the purposes of the Constitution, but in the sense that the acts of each shall never be controlled by, or subjected, directly or indirectly, to, the coercive influence of either of the other departments." </s> In Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 -630 (1935), the Court again held: </s> "The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general departments of government entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others, has often been stressed and is hardly open to serious question. So much is implied in the very fact of the separation of the powers . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) </s> Consistent with the principle of noncoercion, the unbroken practice since George Washington with respect to congressional demands for White House papers has been, in Mr. Chief Justice Taft's words, that "while either house [of Congress] [433 U.S. 425, 510] may request information, it cannot compel it . . . ." W. Taft, The Presidency 110 (1916). President Washington established the tradition by declining to produce papers requested by the House of Representatives relating to matters of foreign policy: </s> "To admit, then, a right in the House of Representatives to demand and to have as a matter of course all the papers respecting a negotiation with a foreign power would be to establish a dangerous precedent." 1 Messages and Papers of the Presidents 195 (J. Richardson comp., 1899). </s> In noting the first President's practice, this Court stated in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936), that Washington's historic precedent was "a refusal the wisdom of which was recognized by the House itself and has never since been doubted." 5 </s> Part of our constitutional fabric, then, from the beginning has been the President's freedom from control or coercion by Congress, including attempts to procure documents that, though clearly pertaining to matters of important governmental interests, belong and pertain to the President. This freedom from Congress' coercive influence, in the words of Humphrey's Executor, "is implied in the very fact of the separation of the powers . . . ." 295 U.S., at 629 -630. Moreover, it is not constitutionally significant that Congress has not directed that the papers be turned over to it for examination or retention, rather than to GSA. Separation of powers is fully implicated simply by Congress' mandating what disposition is to be made of the papers of another branch. </s> This independence of the three branches of Government, including control over the papers of each, lies at the heart of [433 U.S. 425, 511] this Court's broad holdings concerning the immunity of congressional papers from outside scrutiny. The Constitution, of course, expressly grants immunity to Members of Congress as to any "Speech or Debate in either House . . ."; yet the Court has refused to confine that Clause literally "to words spoken in debate." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 502 (1969). Congressional papers, including congressional reports, have been held protected by the Clause in order "`to prevent intimidation [of legislators] by the executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary.'" Ibid. In a word, to preserve the constitutionally rooted independence of each branch of Government, each branch must be able to control its own papers. </s> Title I is an unprecedented departure from the constitutional tradition of noncompulsion. The statute commands the head of a legislatively created department to take and maintain custody of appellant's Presidential papers, including many purely personal papers wholly unrelated to any operations of the Government. Title I does not concern itself in any way with materials belonging to departments of the Executive Branch created and controlled by Congress. </s> The Court brushes aside the fundamental principle of noncompulsion, abandoning outright the careful, previously unchallenged holdings of this Court in Mellon, O'Donoghue and Humphrey's Executor. In place of this firmly established doctrine, 6 the Court substitutes, without analysis, an ill-defined [433 U.S. 425, 512] "pragmatic, flexible approach." Ante, at 442. Recasting, for the immediate purposes of this case, our narrow holding in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), see infra, at 515-516, the Court distills separation-of-powers principles into a simplistic rule which requires a "potential for disruption" or an "unduly disruptive" intrusion, before a measure will be held to trench on Presidential powers. 7 </s> The Court's approach patently ignores Buckley v. Valeo, where, only one year ago, we unanimously found a separation-of-powers violation without any allegation, much less a showing, of "undue disruption." There, we held that Congress could not impinge, even to the modest extent of six appointments to the Federal Election Commission, on the appointing powers of the President. We reached this conclusion in the face of the fact that President Ford had signed the bill into law. 8 </s> [433 U.S. 425, 513] </s> But even taking the "undue disruption" test as postulated, the Court engages in a facile analysis, as MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST so well demonstrates. We are told, under the Court's view, that no "undue disruption" arises because GSA officials have taken custody of appellant's Presidential papers, and since, for the time being, only GSA and other Executive Branch officials will have access to them. Ante, at 443-444. </s> This analysis is superficial in the extreme. Separation-of-powers principles are no less eroded simply because Congress goes through a "minuet" of directing Executive Department employees, rather than the Secretary of the Senate or the Doorkeeper of the House, to possess and control Presidential papers. Whether there has been a violation of separation-of-powers principles depends, not on the identity of the custodians, but upon which branch has commanded the custodians to act. Here, Congress has given the command. </s> If separation-of-powers principles can be so easily evaded, then the constitutional separation is a sham. </s> Congress' power to regulate Executive Department documents, as contrasted with Presidential papers, under such measures as the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552 (1970 ed. and Supp. V), does not bear on the question. No one challenges Congress' power to provide for access to records of the Executive Departments which Congress itself created. But the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act of 1974, and similar measures never contemplated mandatory production of Presidential papers. What is instructive, by contrast, is the nonmandatory, noncoercive manner in which Congress has previously legislated with respect to Presidential papers, by providing for Presidential libraries at the option of every [433 U.S. 425, 514] former President. Title I, however, breaches the nonmandatory tradition that has long been a vital incident of separation of powers. </s> C </s> The statute, therefore, violates separation-of-powers principles because it exercises a coercive influence by another branch over the Presidency. The legislation is also invalid on another ground pertaining to separation of powers; it is an attempt by Congress to exercise powers vested exclusively in the President - the power to control files, records, and papers of the office, which are comparable to the internal workpapers of Members of the House and Senate. </s> The general principle as to this aspect of separation of powers was stated in Kilbourn v. Thompson: </s> "[E]ach [branch] shall by the law of its creation be limited to the exercise of the powers appropriate to its own department and no other. </s> . . . . . </s> "[A]s a general rule . . . the powers confided by the Constitution to one of these departments cannot be exercised by another." 103 U.S., at 191 . </s> Madison also expressed this: </s> "For this reason that Convention which passed the ordinance of government, laid its foundation on this basis, that the legislative, executive and judiciary departments should be separate and distinct, so that no person should exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time." The Federalist No. 48, p. 335 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (quoting Jefferson). </s> In the 1975 Term, in the face of a holding by a Court of Appeals that the separation-of-powers challenge was meritless, we unanimously invalidated an attempt by Congress to exercise appointing powers constitutionally vested in the Chief Executive. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S., at 109 -143. [433 U.S. 425, 515] </s> The Constitution does not speak of Presidential papers, just as it does not speak of workpapers of Members of Congress or of judges. 9 But there can be no room for doubt that, up to now, it has been the implied prerogative of the President - as of Members of Congress and of judges - to memorialize matters, establish filing systems, and provide unilaterally for disposition of his workpapers. Control of Presidential papers is, obviously, a natural and necessary incident of the broad discretion vested in the President in order for him to discharge his duties. 10 </s> To be sure, we recognized a narrowly limited exception to Presidential control of Presidential papers in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). But that case permits compulsory judicial intrusions only when a vital constitutional function, i. e., the conduct of criminal proceedings, would be impaired and when the President makes no more "than a generalized claim of . . . public interest . . .," id., at 707, in maintaining complete control of papers and in preserving confidentiality. That case, in short, was essentially a conflict between the Judicial Branch and the President, where the effective functioning of both branches demanded an accommodation and where the prosecutorial and judicial demands upon the President were very narrowly restricted with great [433 U.S. 425, 516] specificity "to a limited number of conversations. . . ." Moreover, the request for production there was limited to materials that might themselves contain evidence of criminal activity of persons then under investigation or indictment. Finally, the intrusion was carefully limited to an in camera examination, under strict limits, by a single United States District Judge. That case does not stand for the proposition that the Judiciary is at liberty to order all papers of a President into custody of United States Marshals. 11 </s> United States v. Nixon, therefore, provides no authority for Congress' mandatory regulation of Presidential papers simply "to promote the general Welfare" which, of course, is a generalized purpose. No showing has been made, nor could it, that Congress' functions will be impaired by the former President's being allowed to control his own Presidential papers. 12 Without any threat whatever to its own functions, Congress has by this statute, as in Buckley v. Valeo, exercised authority entrusted to the Executive Branch. 13 </s> [433 U.S. 425, 517] </s> D </s> Finally, in my view, the Act violates principles of separation of powers by intruding into the confidentiality of Presidential communications protected by the constitutionally based doctrine of Presidential privilege. A unanimous Court in United States v. Nixon could not have been clearer in holding that the privilege guaranteeing confidentiality of such communications derives from the Constitution, subject to compelled disclosure only in narrowly limited circumstances: </s> "A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution." 418 U.S., at 708 . </s> President Lyndon Johnson expressed the historic view of Presidential confidentiality in even stronger terms in a letter to the GSA Administrator: "[S]ince the President . . . is the recipient of many confidences from others, and since the inviolability of such confidence is essential to the functioning of the constitutional office of the Presidency, it will be necessary to withhold from public scrutiny certain papers and [433 U.S. 425, 518] classes of papers for varying periods of time. Therefore . . . I hereby reserve the right to restrict the use and availability of any materials . . . for such time as I, in my sole discretion, may . . . specify . . . ." Hearing before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, on H. J. Res. 632, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 17 (1965). </s> As a constitutionally based prerogative, Presidential privilege inures to the President himself; it is personal in the same sense as the privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Presidential privilege would therefore be largely illusory unless it could be interposed by the President against the countless thousands of persons in the Executive Branch, and most certainly if the executive officials are acting, as this statute contemplates, at the command of a different branch of Government. 14 </s> This statute requires that persons not designated or approved by the former President will review all Presidential papers. Even if the Government agents, in culling through the materials, follow the "advisory" suggestions offered by the District Court, the fact remains that their function abrogates the Presidential privilege. Congress has, in essence, commanded them to review and catalog thousands of papers and recordings that are undoubtedly privileged. Given that fact, it is clear that the Presidential privilege of one occupant of that office will have been rendered a nullity. 15 </s> [433 U.S. 425, 519] </s> E </s> There remains another inquiry under the issue of separation of powers. Does the fact that the Act applies only to a former President, described as "a legitimate class of one," ante, at 472, after he has left office, justify what would otherwise be unconstitutional if applicable to an incumbent President? </s> On the face of it, congressional regulation of the papers of a former President obviously will have less disruptive impact on the operations of an incumbent President than an effort at regulation or control over the same papers of an incumbent President. But this "remoteness" does not eliminate the separation-of-powers defects. First, the principle that a President must be free from coercion should apply to a former President, so long as Congress is inquiring or acting with respect to operations of the Government while the former President was in office. 16 </s> To the extent Congress is empowered to coerce a former President, every future President is at risk of denial of a large measure of the autonomy and independence contemplated by the Constitution and of the confidentiality attending it. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). Indeed, the President, if he is to have autonomy while in office, needs the assurance that Congress will not immediately be free to coerce him to open all his files and records and give an account of Presidential actions at the instant his successor is sworn in. 17 Absent the validity of the expectation of [433 U.S. 425, 520] privacy of such papers (save for a subpoena under United States v. Nixon), future Presidents and those they consult will be well advised to take into account the possibility that their most confidential correspondence, workpapers, and diaries may well be open to congressionally mandated review, with no time limit, should some political issue give rise to an interbranch conflict. </s> The Need for Confidentiality </s> The consequences of this development on what a President expresses to others in writing and orally are incalculable; perhaps even more crucial is the inhibiting impact on those to whom the President turns for information and for counsel, whether they are officials in the Government, business or labor leaders, or foreign diplomats and statesmen. I have little doubt that Title I - and the Court's opinion - will be the subject of careful scrutiny and analysis in the foreign offices of other countries whose representatives speak to a President on matters they prefer not to put in writing, but which may be memorialized by a President or an aide. Similarly, Title I may well be a "ghost" at future White House conferences, with conferees choosing their words more cautiously because of the enlarged prospect of compelled disclosure to others. A unanimous Court carefully took this into account in United States v. Nixon: </s> "The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decisionmaking." 418 U.S., at 708 . [433 U.S. 425, 521] </s> In this same vein, MR. JUSTICE POWELL argues that President Carter's representation to the Court through the Solicitor General that Title I enhances the efficiency of the Executive Branch is dispositive of appellant's separation-of-powers claim. This deference to the views of one administration, expressed approximately 100 days after its inception, as to the permanent structure of our Government is not supported by precedent and conflicts with 188 years of history. First, there is no principled basis for limiting this unique deference. If and when the one-House veto issue, for example, comes before us, are we to accept the opinion of the Department of Justice as to the effects of that legislative device on the Executive Branch's operations? Second, if Title I is thus efficacious, why did the President who signed this bill into law decide to establish a Presidential library in Ann Arbor, Mich., rather than turn all of his Presidential materials over to GSA for screening and retention in Washington, D.C., where the materials would be readily accessible to officials of the Executive Branch? And why, suddenly, is Congress' acquiescence in President Ford's actions consistent with the supposed foundation of Title I? </s> Third, as pointed out by MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, ante, at 491: "Political realities often guide a President to a decision not to veto" or, indeed, a decision not to challenge in court the actions of Congress. See n. 18, infra. Finally, it is perhaps not inappropriate to note that, on occasion, Presidents disagree with their predecessors on issues of policy. Some have believed in "Congressional Government"; others adhered to expansive notions of Presidential power. It is, I respectfully submit, a unique idea that this Court accept as controlling the representations of any administration on a constitutional question going to the permanent structure of Government. </s> Title I is also objectionable on separation-of-powers grounds, despite its applicability only to a former President, because compelling the disposition of all of a former President's papers [433 U.S. 425, 522] is a legislative exercise of what have historically been regarded as executive powers. Presidential papers do not, after all, instantly lose their nature quadrennially at high noon on January 20. Moreover, under Title I it is now the Congress, not the incumbent President, 18 that has decided what to do with all the papers of one entire administration. </s> Finally, the federal appellees concede that Presidential privilege, a vital incident of our separation-of-powers system, does not terminate instantly upon a President's departure from office. They candidly acknowledge that "the privilege survives the individual President's tenure," Brief for Federal Appellees 33, because of the vital public interests underlying the privilege. This principle, as all parties concede, finds explicit support in history; former President Truman in 1953 refused to provide information to the Congress on matters occurring during his administration, advising Congress: </s> "It must be obvious to you that if the doctrine of separation of powers and the independence of the Presidency is to have any validity at all, it must be equally applicable to a President after his term of office has expired when he is sought to be examined with respect to any acts occurring while he [was] President." 120 Cong. Rec. 33419 (1974). (Emphasis supplied.) 19 </s> [433 U.S. 425, 523] </s> To ensure institutional integrity and confidentiality, Presidents and their advisers must have assurance, as do judges and Members of Congress, that their internal communications will not become subject to retroactive legislation mandating intrusions into matters as to which there was a well-founded expectation of privacy when the communications took place. Just as Mr. Truman rejected congressional efforts to inquire of him, after he left office, as to his activities while President, this Court has always assumed that the immunity conferred by the Speech or Debate Clause is available to a Member of Congress after he leaves office. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972). It would therefore be illogical to conclude that the President loses all immunity from legislative coercion as to his Presidential papers from the moment he leaves office. </s> The Court correctly concedes that a former President retains the Presidential privilege after leaving office, ante, at 448-449; but it then concludes that several considerations cut against recognition of the privilege as to one former President. First, the Court places great emphasis on the fact that neither President Ford nor President Carter "supports appellant's claim . . . ." Ante, at 449. The relevance of that fact is not immediately clear. The validity of one person's constitutional privilege does not depend on whether some other holder of the same privilege supports his claim. 20 The fact that an incumbent President has signed or supports a particular measure cannot defeat a former President's claim of privilege. If the Court is correct today, it was wrong one year ago in Buckley v. Valeo, when we unanimously held that Presidential approval of the Federal Election Campaign [433 U.S. 425, 524] Act could not validate an unconstitutional invasion of Presidential appointing authority. </s> Second, the Court suggests that many of the papers are unprivileged. Of the great volume of pages, appellant estimated that he saw only about 200,000 items while he was President. Several points are relevant in this regard. We do not know how many pages the 200,000 items represent; the critical factor is that all papers are presumptively privileged. Regardless of the number of pages, the fact remains that the 200,000 items that the President personally reviewed or prepared while in office obviously have greater historical value than the mass of routine papers coming to the White House. Mountains of Government reports tucked away in Presidential files will not likely engage the interest of archivists or historians, since most such reports are not historically important and are, in any event, available elsewhere. Rather, archivists and historians will want to find and preserve the materials that reflect the President's internal decisionmaking processes. Those are precisely the papers which will be subjected to the most intensive review and which have always been afforded absolute protection. The Court's analytically void invocation of sheer numbers cannot mask the fact that the targets of the review are privileged papers, diaries, and conversations. </s> I agree that, under United States v. Nixon, the Presidential privilege is qualified. From that premise, however, the Court leaps to the conclusion that future regulations governing public access to the materials are sufficient to protect that qualified privilege. The Act does indeed provide for a number of safeguards before the public at large obtains access to the materials. See 104 (a). But the Court cannot have it both ways. The opinion expressly recognizes again and again that public access is not now the issue. The constitutionality of a statute cannot rest on the presumed validity of regulations not yet issued; moreover, no regulations governing public access can remedy the statute's basic flaw of [433 U.S. 425, 525] permitting Congress to seize the confidential papers of a President. </s> F </s> In concluding that Title I on its face violates the principle of separation of powers, I do not address the issue whether some circumstances might justify legislation for the disposition of Presidential papers without the President's consent. Here, nothing remotely like the particularized need we found in United States v. Nixon has been shown with respect to these Presidential papers. No one has suggested that Congress will find its own "core" functioning impaired by lack of the impounded papers, as we expressly found the judicial function would be impaired by lack of the material subpoenaed in United States v. Nixon. </s> I leave to another day the question whether, under exigent circumstances, a narrowly defined congressional demand for Presidential materials might be justified. But Title I fails to satisfy either the required narrowness demanded by United States v. Nixon or the requirement that the coequal powers of the Presidency not be injured by congressional legislation. </s> II </s> Privacy </s> The discussion of separation of powers concerns, of course, the structure of government, not the rights of the sole individual ostensibly affected by this legislation. But Title I touches not only upon the independence of a coordinate branch of government, it also affects, in the most direct way, the basic rights of one named individual. The statute provides, as we have seen, for governmental custody over - and review of - all of the former President's written and recorded materials at the time he left office, including diary recordings and conversations in his private residences outside Washington, D.C. 101 (a) (2). </s> The District Court was deeply troubled by this admittedly [433 U.S. 425, 526] unprecedented intrusion. Its opinion candidly acknowledged that the personal-privacy claim was the "most troublesome" point raised by this unique statute. 21 In addition to communications and memoranda reflecting the President's confidential deliberations, the District Court admitted that the materials subject to GSA review included highly personal communications. </s> "Among all of the papers and tape recordings falling within the Act, however, are some papers and materials containing extremely private communications between [Mr. Nixon] and, among others, his wife, his daughters, his physician, lawyer, and clergyman, and his close friends, as well as personal diary dictabelts and his wife's personal files. . . . Segregating those that are private from those that are not private requires rather comprehensive screening, and archivists entrusted with that duty will be required to read or listen to private communications." 408 F. Supp. 321, 359 (DC 1976). </s> A </s> Given this admitted intrusion, the legislation before us must be subjected to the most searching kind of judicial scrutiny. 22 Statutes that trench on fundamental liberties, like [433 U.S. 425, 527] those affecting significantly the structure of our government, are not entitled to the same presumption of constitutionality we normally accord legislation. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977). The burden of justification is reversed; the burden rests upon government, not on the individual whose liberties are affected, to justify the measure. Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 263 -264 (1977) (POWELL, J., concurring in judgment). We recently reaffirmed the standard of review in such cases as one of "exacting scrutiny." </s> "We long have recognized that significant encroachments on First Amendment rights of the sort that compelled disclosure imposes cannot be justified by a mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest . . . . [W]e have required that the subordinating interests of the State must survive exacting scrutiny." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S., at 64 . </s> B </s> Constitutional analysis must, of course, take fully into account the nature of the Government's interests underlying challenged legislation. Once those interests are identified, we must then focus on the nature of the individual interests affected by the statute. Id., at 14-15. Finally, we must decide whether the Government's interests are of sufficient weight to subordinate the individual's interests, and, if so, whether the Government has nonetheless employed unnecessarily broad means for achieving its purposes. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 310 (1965) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). </s> Two governmental interests are asserted as the justification for this statute: to ensure the general efficiency of the Executive [433 U.S. 425, 528] Branch's operations 23 and to preserve historically significant papers and tape recordings for posterity. 24 Both these purposes are legitimate and important. Yet, there was no serious suggestion by Congress that the operations of the Executive Branch would actually be impaired unless, contrary to nearly 200 years' past practice, all Presidential papers of the one named incumbent were required by law to be impounded in the sole control of Government agents. The statute on its face, moreover, does not purport to address a particularized need, such as the need to secure Presidential papers concerning the Middle East, the SALT talks, or problems in Panama. 25 Indeed, the congressionally perceived "need" is a [433 U.S. 425, 529] far more "generalized need" than that rejected in United States v. Nixon by a unanimous Court. </s> As to the interest in preserving historical materials, there is nothing whatever in our national experience to suggest that existing mechanisms, such as the 20-year-old Presidential Libraries Act, were insufficient to achieve that purpose. 26 In any event, the interest in preserving "historical materials" cannot justify seizing, without notice or hearing, private papers preliminary to a line-by-line examination by Government agents. </s> In contrast to Congress' purposes underlying the statute, this Act intrudes significantly on two areas of traditional privacy interests of Presidents. One embraces Presidential papers relating to his decisions, development of policies, appointments, and communications in his role as leader of a political party; the other encompasses purely private matters of family, property, investments, diaries, and intimate conversations. Both interests are of the highest order, with perhaps some primacy for family papers. 27 Cf. Moore v. East Cleveland, supra, at 499. </s> Title I thus touches directly on what MR. JUSTICE POWELL once referred to as the "intimate areas of an individual's personal affairs," California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 , [433 U.S. 425, 530] 78 (1974) (concurring opinion). The papers in both of these areas - family and political decisionmaking - are of the most private nature, enjoying the highest status under our law. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN recently put it this way: "Personal letters constitute an integral aspect of a person's private enclave." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 427 (1976) (concurring in judgment). An individual's papers, he said, are "an extension of his person." Id., at 420. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL made the same point: "Diaries and personal letters that record only their author's personal thoughts lie at the heart of our sense of privacy." Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 350 (1973) (dissenting opinion). In discussing private papers, he referred even more emphatically to the "deeply held belief on the part of the Members of this Court throughout its history that there are certain documents no person ought to be compelled to produce at the Government's request." Fisher v. United States, supra, at 431-432 (emphasis supplied) (concurring in judgment). This echoes Lord Camden's oft-quoted description of personal papers as a man's "dearest property." Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 628 (1886). </s> One point emerges clearly: The papers here involve the most fundamental First and Fourth Amendment interests. Since the Act asserts exclusive Government custody over all papers of a former President, the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is surely implicated. 28 Indeed, where papers or books are the subject [433 U.S. 425, 531] of a government intrusion, our cases uniformly hold that the Fourth Amendment prohibition against a general search requires that warrants contain descriptions reflecting "the most scrupulous exactitude . . .," Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965). Those cases proscribe general language in a warrant - or a statute - of "indiscriminate sweep . . . ." Id., at 486. Title I, commanding seizure followed by permanent control of all materials having "historical or commemorative value," evidences the "indiscriminate sweep" we have long denounced. This "broad broom" statute provides virtually no standard at all to guide the Government agents combing through the papers; the agents are left to roam at large through confidential materials, something to which no other President and no Member of Congress or of the Judicial Branch has been subjected. </s> The Court, while recognizing that Government agents will necessarily be reviewing the most private kinds of communications covering a period of five and one-half years, tells us that Stanford is inapposite. Several reasons are given. The Court suggests that, unlike the instant case, the seizure in Stanford included vast quantities of materials unrelated to any legitimate government objective; in addition, the Stanford intrusion constituted an invasion of the home in connection with a criminal investigation. That last consideration relied on by the Court can be disposed of quickly, for by its terms, just as in Stanford, Title I commands seizure and review of papers from appellant's private residences within and outside Washington, D.C., 101 (a), for the purpose, among others, of criminal proceedings brought by the Special Prosecutor, 102 (b), and to make the materials available more broadly "for use in judicial proceedings." 104 (a) (2). Title I is not needed for this purpose, since a narrowly defined subpoena can accomplish those purposes under United States v. Nixon. Title I is in effect a "legislative warrant" reminiscent of the odious general warrants of the colonial era. [433 U.S. 425, 532] </s> As to the Court's first consideration, its "quantity" test is fallacious. The intrusion in Stanford was unlawful not because the State had an interest in only part of many items in Stanford's home, but rather because the warrant failed to describe the objects of seizure with the "most scrupulous exactitude." Stanford is not a "numbers" test, the protection of which vanishes if unprotected materials outnumber protected materials; it is, rather, a test designed to ensure that protected materials are not seized at all. Title I on its face commands that protected materials be seized wherever found - including the private residences mentioned - reviewed, and returned only if the Government agents decide that certain protected materials lack historical significance. The Act plainly accomplishes exactly what Stanford expressly forbids. </s> In addition to Fourth Amendment considerations, highly important First Amendment interests pervade all Presidential papers, since they include expressions of privately held views about politics, diplomacy, or people of all walks of life, within and outside this country. Appellant's freedom of association is also implicated, since his recordings and papers will likely reveal much about his relationships with both individuals and organizations. In NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958), the Court said: </s> "This Court has recognized the vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations." </s> Accordingly, in passing on a statute compelling disclosure of political contributions, the Court, in Buckley v. Valeo, imposed the strict standard of "exacting scrutiny" because of the significant impact on First Amendment rights. </s> The fact that the former President was an important national and world political figure obviously does not diminish the traditional privacy interest in his papers. Forced disclosure of private information, even to Government officials, is by no means sanctioned by this Court's decisions, except for [433 U.S. 425, 533] the most compelling reasons. Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). I do not think, for example, that this Court would readily sustain, as a condition to holding public office, a requirement that a candidate reveal publicly membership in every organization whether religious, social, or political. After all, our decision in NAACP v. Alabama, supra, was presumably intended to protect from compelled disclosure members of the organization who were actively involved in public affairs or who held public office in Alabama. </s> The Court's reliance on Whalen v. Roe, supra, in rejecting appellant's privacy claim is surprising. That case dealt with the State's undoubted police power to regulate dispensing of dangerous drugs, the very use or possession of which the State could forbid. 429 U.S., at 603 , and 597 n. 20. Hence, we had no difficulty whatever in reaching a unanimous holding that the public interest in regulating dangerous drugs outweighed any privacy interest in reporting to the State all prescriptions, those reports being made confidential by statute. No personal, private business, or political confidences were involved. </s> C </s> In short, a former President up to now has had essentially the same expectation of privacy with respect to his papers and records as every other person. This expectation is soundly based on two factors: first, under our constitutional traditions, Presidential papers have been, for more than 180 years, deemed by the Congress to belong to the President. Congress ratified this tradition by specific Acts: (a) congressional appropriations following authorization to purchase Presidential papers; (b) congressional enactment of a nonmandatory system of Presidential libraries; and (c) statutes permitting, until 1969, a charitable-contribution deduction for papers of Presidents donated to the United States or to nonprofit institutions. [433 U.S. 425, 534] </s> Second, in the absence of any legislation to the contrary, there was no reason whatever for a President to take time from his official duties to ensure that there was no "commingling" of "public" and "private" papers. Indeed, the fact that the former President commingled Presidential and private family papers, absent any then-existing laws to the contrary, points strongly to the conclusion that he did in fact have an expectation of privacy with respect to both categories of papers. </s> On the basis of this Court's holdings, I cannot understand why the former President's privacy interests do not outweigh the generalized, undifferentiated goals sought to be achieved by Title I. Without a more carefully defined focus, these legislative goals do not represent "paramount Government interests," nor is this particular piece of legislation needed to achieve those goals, even if we assume, arguendo, that they are of a "compelling" or "overriding" nature. But even if other Members of the Court strike the balance differently, the Government has nonetheless failed to choose narrowly tailored means of carrying out its purposes so as not unnecessarily to invade important First and Fourth Amendment liberties. The Court demanded no less in Buckley v. Valeo, and nothing less will do here. Cf. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976). </s> The federal appellees point to two factors as mitigating the effects of this admitted intrusion: first, in their view, most of the President's papers and conversations relate to the business of Government, rather than to personal, family, or political matters; second, it is said that the intrusion is limited as much as possible, since the review will be carried out by specially trained Government agents. </s> Even accepting the Government's interest in identifying and preserving governmentally related papers in order to preserve them for historical purposes, that interest cannot justify a seizure and search of all the papers taken here. [433 U.S. 425, 535] Since compulsory review of personal and family papers and tape recordings is an admittedly improper invasion of privacy, no constitutional principle justifies an intrusion into indisputably protected areas in order to carry out the "generalized" statutory objectives. </s> Second, the intrusion cannot be saved by the credentials, however impeccable, of the Government agents. The initial problem with this justification is that no one knows whether these agents are, as the federal appellees contend, uniformly discreet. Despite the lip service paid by the District Court and appellees to the record of archivists generally, there is nothing before us to justify the conclusion that each of the more than 100 persons who apparently will have access to, and will monitor and examine, the materials is indeed reliably discreet. </s> The Act, furthermore, provides GSA with no meaningful standards to minimize the extent of intrusions upon appellant's privacy. We are thus faced with precisely the same standardless discretion vested in governmental officials which this Court has unhesitatingly struck down in other First Amendment areas. See, e. g., Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, supra. In the absence of any meaningful statutory standards, which might help secure the privacy interests at stake, I question whether we can assume, as a matter of law, that Government agents will be able to formulate for themselves constitutionally valid standards of review in examining, segregating, and cataloging the papers of the former President. </s> Nor does the possibility that, had Title I not been passed, appellant would perhaps use Government specialists to help classify and catalog his papers eliminate the objections to this intrusion. Had appellant, like all his recent predecessors, been permitted to deposit his papers in a Presidential library, Government archivists would have been working directly under appellant's guidance and direction, not solely that of Congress or GSA. He, not Congress, would have established standards [433 U.S. 425, 536] for preservation, to ensure that his privacy would be protected. Similarly, he would have been able to participate personally in the reviewing process and could thus assure that any governmental review of purely personal papers was minimized or entirely eliminated. He, not Congress, would have controlled the selection of which experts, if any, would have access to his papers. Finally, and most important, the "intrusion" would have been consented to, eliminating any constitutional question. But the possibility of a consent intrusion cannot, under our law, justify a nonconsensual invasion. Actual consent is required, cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), not the mere possibility of consent under drastically different circumstances. </s> Finally, even if the Government agents are completely discreet, they are still Government officials charged with reviewing highly private papers and tape recordings. Unless we are to say that a police seizure and examination of private papers is justified by the "impeccable" record of a discreet police officer, I have considerable difficulty understanding how a compulsory review of admittedly private papers, in which there is no conceivable governmental interest, by Government agents is constitutionally permissible. </s> III </s> Bill of Attainder </s> A </s> Under Art. I, 9, cl. 3, as construed and applied by this Court since the time of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, Title I violates the Bill of Attainder Clause. In contrast to Title II of Pub. L. 93-526, the Public Documents Act, which establishes a National Study Commission to study questions concerning the preservation of records of all federal officials, Title I commands the Administrator to seize all tape recordings "involv[ing] former President Richard M. Nixon" and all "Presidential historical materials of Richard M. Nixon . . . ." [433 U.S. 425, 537] 101 (a) (1), (b) (1). By contrast with Title II, which is general legislation, Title I is special legislation singling out one individual as the target. </s> Although the prohibition against bills of attainder has been addressed only infrequently by this Court, it is now settled beyond dispute that a bill of attainder, within the meaning of Art. I, is by no means the same as a bill of attainder at common law. The definition departed from the common-law concept very early in our history, in a most fundamental way. At common law, the bill was a death sentence imposed by legislative Act. Anything less than death was not a bill of attainder, but was, rather, "a bill of pains and penalties." This restrictive definition was recognized tangentially in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 179 (1803), 29 but the Court soon thereafter rejected conclusively any notion that only a legislative death sentence or even incarceration imposed on named individuals fell within the prohibition. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall firmly settled the matter in 1810, holding that legislative punishment in the form of a deprivation of property was prohibited by the Bill of Attainder Clause: </s> "A bill of attainder may affect the life of an individual, or may confiscate his property, or may do both." Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 138. (Emphasis supplied.) </s> The same point was made 17 years later in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 286, where the Court stated: </s> "By classing bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts together, the [433 U.S. 425, 538] general intent becomes very apparent; it is a general provision against arbitrary and tyrannical legislation over existing rights, whether of person or property." (Emphasis supplied.) </s> More than 100 years ago this Court struck down statutes which had the effect of preventing defined categories of persons from practicing their professions. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (1867) (a priest); Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (1867) (a lawyer). Those two cases established more broadly that "punishment" for purposes of bills of attainder is not limited to criminal sanctions; rather, "[t]he deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed, may be punishment . . . ." Cummings, supra, at 320. </s> Mr. Chief Justice Warren pointed out that the Constitution, in prohibiting bills of attainder, did not envision "a narrow, technical (and therefore soon to be outmoded) prohibition . . . ." United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965). To the contrary, the evil was a legislatively imposed deprivation of existing rights, including property rights, directed at named individuals. Mr. Justice Black, in United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 -316 (1946), stated: </s> "[The cases] stand for the proposition that legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial are bills of attainder prohibited by the Constitution." (Emphasis supplied.) </s> The only "punishment" in Lovett, in fact, was the deprivation of Lovett's salary as a Government employee - an indirect punishment for his "bad" associations. </s> Under our cases, therefore, bills of attainder require two elements: first, a specific designation of persons or groups as subjects of the legislation, and, second, a Garland-Cummings-Lovett-Brown-type arbitrary [433 U.S. 425, 539] deprivation, including deprivation of property rights, without notice, trial, or other hearing. 30 No one disputes that Title I suffers from the first infirmity, since it applies only to one former President. The issue that remains is whether there has been a legislatively mandated deprivation of an existing right. </s> B </s> Since George Washington's Presidency, our constitutional tradition, without a single exception, has treated Presidential papers as the President's personal property. This view has been congressionally and judicially ratified, both as to the ownership of Presidential papers, Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (CC Mass. 1841) (Story, J., sitting as Circuit Justice), and, by the practice of Justices as to ownership of their judicial papers. </s> Congress itself has consistently legislated on this assumption. I have noted earlier that appropriation legislation has been enacted on various occasions providing for Congress' purchase of Presidential papers. See Hearing before a Special Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations on H. J. Res. 330, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 28 (1955). Those hearings led Congress to establish a nonmandatory system [433 U.S. 425, 540] of Presidential libraries, again explicitly recognizing that Presidential papers were the personal property of the Chief Executive. In the floor debate on that measure, Congressman John Moss, a supporter of the legislation, stated: "Finally, it should be remembered that Presidential papers belong to the President . . . ." 101 Cong. Rec. 9935 (1955). Indeed, in 1955 in testimony pertaining to this proposed legislation, the Archivist of the United States confirmed: </s> "The papers of the Presidents have always been considered to be their personal property, both during their incumbency and afterward. This has the sanction of law and custom and has never been authoritatively challenged." Hearing on H. J. Res. 330, supra, at 32. </s> Similarly, the GSA Administrator testified: </s> "As a matter of ordinary practice, the President has removed his papers from the White House at the end of his term. This has been in keeping with the tradition and the fact that the papers are the personal property of the retiring Presidents." Id., at 14. (Emphasis supplied.) </s> In keeping with this background, it was not surprising that the Attorney General stated in an opinion in September 1974: </s> "To conclude that such materials are not the property of former President Nixon would be to reverse what has apparently been the almost unvaried understanding of all three branches of the Government since the beginning of the Republic, and to call into question the practices of our Presidents since the earliest times." 43 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 1, pp. 1-2 (1974). </s> I see no escape, therefore, from the conclusion that, on the basis of more than 180 years' history, the appellant has been deprived of a property right enjoyed by all other Presidents [433 U.S. 425, 541] after leaving office, namely, the control of his Presidential papers. </s> Even more starkly, Title I deprives only one former President of the right vested by statute in other former Presidents by the 1955 Act - the right to have a Presidential library at a facility of his own choosing for the deposit of such Presidential papers as he unilaterally selects. Title I did not purport to repeal the Presidential Libraries Act; that statute remains in effect, available to present and future Presidents, and has already been availed of by former President Ford. The operative effect of Title I, therefore, is to exclude, by name, one former President and deprive him of what his predecessors - and his successor - have already been allowed. This invokes what Mr. Justice Black said in Lovett, could not be constitutionally done: </s> "Those who wrote our Constitution well knew the danger inherent in special legislative acts which take away the life, liberty, or property of particular named persons because the legislature thinks them guilty of conduct which deserves punishment. They intended to safeguard the people of this country from punishment without trial by duly constituted courts." 328 U.S., at 317 . (Emphasis supplied.) </s> But apart from Presidential papers generally, Title I on its face contemplates that even the former President's purely family and personal papers and tape recordings are likewise to be taken into custody for whatever period of time is required for review. Some items, such as the originals of tape recordings of the former President's conversations, will never be returned to him under the Act. </s> I need not, and do not, inquire into the motives of Congress in imposing this deprivation on only one named person. Our cases plainly hold that retribution and vindictiveness are not requisite elements of a bill of attainder. The Court [433 U.S. 425, 542] appears to overlook that Mr. Chief Justice Warren in United States v. Brown, supra, concluded that retributive motives on the part of Congress were irrelevant to bill-of-attainder analysis. To the contrary, he said flatly: "It would be archaic to limit the definition of punishment to `retribution.'" Indeed, he expressly noted that bills of attainder had historically been enacted for regulatory or preventive purposes: </s> "Historical considerations by no means compel restriction of the bill of attainder ban to instances of retribution. A number of English bills of attainder were enacted for preventive purposes - that is, the legislature made a judgment, undoubtedly based largely on past acts and associations . . . that a given person or group was likely to cause trouble . . . and therefore inflicted deprivations upon that person or group in order to keep it from bringing about the feared event." 381 U.S., at 458 -459. </s> Under the long line of our decisions, therefore, the Court has the heavy burden of demonstrating that legislation which singles out one named individual for deprivation - without any procedural safeguards - of what had for nearly 200 years been treated by all three branches of Government as private property, can survive the prohibition of the Bill of Attainder Clause. In deciding this case, the Court provides the basis for a future Congress to enact yet another Title I, directed at some future former President, or a Member of the House or the Senate because the individual has incurred public disfavor and that of the Congress. Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). As in United States v. Brown, Title I, in contrast to Title II, does "not set forth a generally applicable rule," 381 U.S., at 450 ; it is beyond doubt special legislation doing precisely the evil against which the prohibitions of the "bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts . . ." were aimed. Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat., at 286. [433 U.S. 425, 543] </s> The concurring opinions make explicit what is implicit throughout the Court's opinion, i. e., (a) that Title I would be unconstitutional under separation-of-powers principles if it applied to any other President; (b) that the Court's holding rests on appellant's being a "legitimate class of one," ante, at 472; and (c) that the Court's holding "will not be a precedent." Ante, at 486. </s> Nothing in our cases supports the analysis of MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, ibid. Under his view, appellant's resignation and subsequent acceptance of a pardon set him apart as a "`legitimate class of one.'" The two events upon which he relies, however, are beside the point. Correct analysis under the Bill of Attainder Clause focuses solely upon the nature of the measure adopted by Congress, not upon the actions of the target of the legislation. Even if this approach were analytically sound, the two events singled out are relevant only to two possible theories: first, that appellant is culpably deserving of punishment by virtue of his resignation and pardon; or second, that appellant's actions were so unique as to justify legislation confiscating his Presidential materials but not those of any other President. The first point can be disposed of quickly, since the Bill of Attainder Clause was, of course, intended to prevent legislatively imposed deprivations of rights upon persons whom the Legislature thought to be culpably deserving of punishment. </s> The remaining question, then, is whether appellant's "uniqueness" permits individualized legislation of the sort passed here. It does not. The point is not that Congress is powerless to act as to exigencies arising during or in the immediate aftermath of a particular administration; rather, the point is that Congress cannot punish a particular individual on account of his "uniqueness." If Congress had declared forfeited appellant's retirement pay to which he otherwise would be entitled, instead of confiscating his Presidential materials, it would not avoid the bill-of-attainder prohibition to say that appellant was guilty of unprecedented actions [433 U.S. 425, 544] setting him apart from his predecessors in office. In short, appellant's uniqueness does not justify serious deprivations of existing rights, including the statutory right abrogated by Title I to establish a Presidential library. </s> The novel arguments advanced in the several concurring opinions serve to emphasize how clearly Title I violates the Bill of Attainder Clause; MR. JUSTICE STEVENS although finding no violation of the Clause, admirably states the case which, for me, demonstrates the unconstitutionality of Title I: </s> "The statute before the Court does not apply to all Presidents or former Presidents. It singles out one, by name, for special treatment. Unlike all former Presidents in our history, he is denied custody of his own Presidential papers; he is subjected to the burden of prolonged litigation over the administration of the statute; and his most private papers and conversations are to be scrutinized by Government archivists. The statute implicitly condemns him as an unreliable custodian of his papers. Legislation which subjects a named individual to this humiliating treatment must raise serious questions under the Bill of Attainder Clause." Ante, at 484. </s> IV </s> The immediate consequences of the Court's holding may be discounted by some on the ground it is justified by the uniqueness of the circumstances - in short, that the end justifies the means - and that, after all, the Court's holding is really not to be regarded as precedent. Yet the reported decisions of this Court reflect other instances in which unique situations confronted the Judicial Branch - for example, the alleged treason of one of the Founding Fathers. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (No. 14,694) (CC Va. 1807). Burr may or may not have been blameless; Father Cummings and Lawyer Garland, in common with hundreds of thousands of others, may have been technically guilty of "carrying on [433 U.S. 425, 545] rebellion" against the United States. But this Court did not weigh the culpability of Cummings, Garland, or of Lovett or Brown in according to each of them the full measure of the protection guaranteed by the literal language of the Constitution. For nearly 200 years this Court has not viewed either a "class" or a "class of one" as "legitimate" under the Bill of Attainder Clause. </s> It may be, as three Justices intimate in their concurring opinions, that today's holding will be confined to this particular "class of one"; if so, it may not do great harm to our constitutional jurisprudence but neither will it enhance the Court's credit in terms of adherence to stare decisis. Only with future analysis, in perspective, and free from the "hydraulic pressure" Holmes spoke of, will we be able to render judgment on whether the Court has today enforced the Constitution or eroded it. </s> [Footnote 1 Later, I will discuss the importance of the legislation's applicability to only one ex-President. </s> [Footnote 2 In this, Mr. Justice Miller was but expressing the earlier opinion of Madison, who declared in The Federalist No. 48, p. 334 (J. Cooke ed., 1961): </s> "The legislative department derives a superiority in our governments from other circumstances. Its constitutional powers being at once more extensive and less susceptible of precise limits, it can with the greater facility, mask under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on the co-ordinate departments." </s> [Footnote 3 Statutes relating to departments or agencies created by Congress frequently are phrased in mandatory terms. For example, in the 1949 legislation creating the General Services Administration, Congress provided as follows: </s> "The Administrator is authorized and directed to coordinate and provide for the . . . efficient purchase, lease and maintenance of . . . equipment by Federal agencies." 40 U.S.C. 759 (a). </s> Even with respect to international relations, Congress has affirmatively imposed certain requirements on the Secretary of State: </s> "The Secretary of State shall furnish to the Public Printer a correct copy of every treaty between the United States and any foreign government . . . ." 22 U.S.C. 2660. </s> [Footnote 4 Cf. MR. JUSTICE WHITE'S discussion in United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 558 (1972) (dissenting opinion), where he spoke of the [433 U.S. 425, 509] "evil" of "executive control of legislative behavior . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) </s> [Footnote 5 This Presidential prerogative has not been limited to foreign affairs, where, of course, secrecy and confidentiality may be of the utmost importance. See A. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 79 (1975); W. Taft, The Presidency 110 (1916). </s> [Footnote 6 The Court's references to the historical understanding of separation-of-powers principles omit a crucial part of that history. Madison's statements in The Federalist No. 47 as to one department's exercising the "whole power" of another department do not purport to be his total treatment of the subject. The Federalist No. 48, two days later, states the central theme of Madison's view: </s> "It is equally evident, that neither [department] ought to possess directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others in the administration of their respective powers." The Federalist No. 48, p. 332 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). (Emphasis supplied.) </s> Indeed, Madison expressly warned at length in No. 48 of the inevitable [433 U.S. 425, 512] dangers of "encroachments" by the Legislative Branch upon the coordinate departments of Government. </s> But aside from the Court's highly selective discussion of the Framers' understanding, the Court cannot obscure the fact that this Court has never required, in order to show a separation-of-powers violation, that Congress usurped the whole of executive power. Any such requirement was rejected by the Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). There, we held that Congress could not constitutionally exercise the President's appointing powers, even though under that statute the President had the power to appoint one-fourth of the Federal Election Commission members, and even though the President had "approved" the statute when he signed the bill into law. </s> [Footnote 7 Nowhere is the standard clarified in the majority's opinion. We are left to guess whether only a "potential for disruption" is required or whether "undue disruption," whatever that may be, is required. </s> [Footnote 8 The federal parties filed three briefs in Buckley. The main brief, styled the "Brief for the Attorney General as Appellee and for the United States as Amicus Curiae," explicitly stated that the method of appointment of four of the members of the Commission was unconstitutional. See pp. 6-7, 110-120. The Attorney General signed this portion of the brief as a party (see pp. 2, 103 n. 65). The Executive Branch therefore made it clear that, in its view, the statute was unconstitutional to the extent it reposed appointing powers in Congress. The second brief, styled the "Brief for [433 U.S. 425, 513] the Attorney General and the Federal Election Commission," generally defended the Act but took no position concerning the method of appointing the Commission. See p. 1 n. 1. The third brief was filed by the Commission on its own behalf only; it defended the appointment procedures, but it was not joined by the Attorney General and did not express the view of the President or of any other portion of the Executive Branch. </s> [Footnote 9 As to congressional papers, see supra, at 510-511. Despite the Constitution's silence as to the papers of the Legislative Branch, this Court had no difficulty holding those papers to be protected from control by other branches. See also MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S dissenting opinion in United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 532 -533 (1972), where he quotes approvingly from Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881), and Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1 (1808). In both of those cases, written materials by legislators were deemed to be protected by legislative immunity from intrusion or seizure. </s> [Footnote 10 This discretion was exercised, as we have seen, by President Washington in the face of a congressional demand for production of his workpapers. </s> Obviously, official documents fall into an entirely different category and are not involved in this case. </s> [Footnote 11 Appellees, of course, would view that sort of intrusion as an intrabranch confrontation, since United States Marshals are officials of the Executive Branch, at least so long as the District Judge simply ordered the Marshals to take custody of and to review the documents without turning them over to the court. This is, of course, sheer sophistry. </s> [Footnote 12 Of course, United States v. Nixon pertained only to the setting of Judicial-Executive conflict. Nothing in our holding suggests that, even if Congress needed Presidential documents in connection with its legislative functions, the constitutional tradition of Presidential control over Presidential documents in the face of legislative demands could be abrogated. We expressly stated in Nixon that "[w]e are not here concerned with the balance between . . . the confidentiality interest and congressional demands for information . . . ." 418 U.S. at 712 n. 19. </s> [Footnote 13 In his concurring opinion, MR. JUSTICE POWELL concludes that Title I was addressed essentially to an "emergency" situation in the wake of appellant's resignation. But his opinion does not present any analysis as to whether this particular legislation, not some other legislation, is necessary to achieve that end. Since Title I commands confiscation of [433 U.S. 425, 517] all materials of an entire Presidential administration, Title I was simply not drafted to meet the specific emergency it purports to address. Besides omitting any discussion justifying the need for Title I, MR. JUSTICE POWELL'S opinion relies entirely on the possibly limiting regulations to be promulgated at some future point by the GSA Administrator, which will protect "all constitutional and legal rights . . . ." Ante, at 497. This conclusion, of course, begs the precise question before us, which is whether the act of congressionally mandated seizure of all Presidential materials of one President violates the Constitution. </s> [Footnote 14 Civil service statutes aside, we know now that an executive official cannot replace all of his underlings on the basis of a patronage system. Thus, as a matter of constitutional law, a Chief Executive would not be at liberty to replace all Executive Branch officials with persons who, for political reasons, enjoy the President's trust and confidence. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). </s> [Footnote 15 I cannot accept the argument pressed by appellees that review is rendered harmless by the fact that many of the documents may not be protected by Presidential privilege. How "harmless" review justifies manifestly "harmful" review escapes me. </s> [Footnote 16 President Truman, for one, objected to Congress' efforts to coerce him after he was no longer in office in connection with matters pertaining to his administration. See infra, at 522. </s> [Footnote 17 It would be the height of impertinence, after all, to serve a legislative subpoena on an outgoing President as he is departing from the inauguration of his successor. So too, the people would rightly be offended, and more important, so would the Constitution, by a congressional resolution, designed to ensure the smooth functioning of the Executive Branch, requiring a former President, upon leaving office, to remain in [433 U.S. 425, 520] Washington, D.C., in order to be available for consultations with his successor for a prescribed period of time. </s> [Footnote 18 The fact that the President signs a bill into law, and thereafter defends it, without more, does not mean, of course, that the policy embodied in the legislation is that of the President, nor does it even mean that the President personally approves of the measure. When signing a bill into law, numerous Presidents have actually expressed disagreement with the legislation but felt constrained for a variety of reasons to permit the bill to become law. President Franklin D. Roosevelt repudiated the "Lovett Rider" later struck down by this Court in United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 325 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). President Ford did not request this legislation in order to assure the effective functioning of the Executive Branch. </s> [Footnote 19 Since by definition the concern is with former Presidents, I see no distinction in Congress' seeking to compel the appearance and testimony [433 U.S. 425, 523] of a former President and in, alternatively, seeking to compel the production of Presidential papers over the former President's objection. </s> [Footnote 20 Clients asserting the attorney-client privilege have not, up to now, been foreclosed from interposing the privilege unless a similarly situated client is willing to support the particular claim. </s> [Footnote 21 The District Court concluded its discussion of the privacy challenge as follows: "We would be less than candid were we to state that we find it as easy to dispose of Mr. Nixon's privacy claims as his claim of presidential privilege." 408 F. Supp., at 367. </s> [Footnote 22 Although the District Court expressly concluded that the former President had a "legitimate expectation" that his Presidential materials would not be subject to "comprehensive review by government personnel without his consent," id., at 361, the Court nonetheless deemed the compulsory intrusion permissible given the constitutionality of the federal wiretap statute, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2520, which of course permits substantial governmental intrusions into the privacy of individuals. Not only is this analogy imperfect, as the District Court itself admitted, 408 F. Supp., at 364, but this analysis fails to apply the "exacting scrutiny" called for by our decisions. Above all, the present statute fails to provide any of the [433 U.S. 425, 527] stringent safeguards, including a warrant, mandated by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Indeed, the District Court flatly admitted as much. Ibid. </s> [Footnote 23 Administrative efficiency is obviously a highly desirable goal. See, e. g., Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 114 (1977); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 -349 (1976). However, I am constrained to recall that "administrative efficiency" has not uniformly been regarded as of "overriding importance." Indeed, claims of administrative efficiency have been swiftly dismissed at times as mere "bald assertion[s]." Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208, 223 (1972) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). Numerous other opinions have held that individual interests, including the right to welfare payments, "clearly outweigh" government interests in promoting "administrative efficiency," Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). And, MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969), stated that when "fundamental" rights are at stake, such as the "right to travel," government must demonstrate a "compelling" interest, not merely a "rational relationship between [the underlying statute] and [the] . . . admittedly permissible state objectives . . . ." </s> [Footnote 24 The initial interest in preserving the materials for judicial purposes has diminished substantially. Since the Special Prosecutor has disclaimed any further interest in the materials for purposes of possible criminal investigations, the only conceivably remaining judicial need is to preserve the materials for possible use in civil litigation between private parties. The admittedly important interests in the enforcement of the criminal law, recognized in United States v. Nixon, are no longer pressed by the Government. </s> [Footnote 25 If there were a particularized need, the statute suffers from greater overbreadth than others we have invalidated. </s> [Footnote 26 At the time Title I was passed, appellant had made tentative arrangements with the University of Southern California in Los Angeles for the establishment of a Presidential library, under the terms of the Presidential Libraries Act. App. 167-168. That has now ripened into a formal agreement so that in the event Title I is invalidated, appellant's historical materials will be housed in a facility on the USC campus under terms applicable to other Presidential libraries of past Presidents. </s> [Footnote 27 The Court's refusal to afford constitutional protection to such commercial matters as bank records, California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), or drug prescription records, Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), only serves to emphasize the importance of truly private papers or communications, such as a personal diary or family correspondence. These private papers lie at the core of First and Fourth Amendment interests. </s> [Footnote 28 The fact that GSA initially secured possession of the Presidential papers through the agreement with the former President does not change the fact that the agency was commanded by Congress to take exclusive custody of and retain all Presidential historical materials. Moreover, everyone admits that the Act contemplates a careful screening process by Government agents. The fact that the governmental intrusion is noncriminal in nature does not, of course, render the Fourth Amendment's prohibitions inapplicable. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). </s> [Footnote 29 "The constitution declares that `no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.' </s> "If, however, such a bill should be passed and a person should be prosecuted under it; must the court condemn to death those victims whom the constitution endeavors to preserve?" Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, at 179. </s> [Footnote 30 Title I fails to provide any procedural due process safeguards, either before or after seizure of the Presidential materials. There is no provision whatever permitting appellant to be heard in the decisionmaking process by which GSA employees will determine, with no statutory standards to guide them, whether particular materials have "general historical value." No time restraints are placed upon GSA's decisionmaking process, even though this Court has consistently recognized that, when dealing with First Amendment interests, the timing of governmental decisionmaking is crucial. E. g, Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961) Under those holdings, any statute which separates an individual, against his will, from First Amendment protected materials must be strictly limited within a time frame. Title I, in contrast, places no limits with respect to GSA's retention of custody over appellant's papers; three years have already elapsed since seizure of the papers in question. </s> MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. </s> Appellant resigned the Office of the Presidency nearly three years ago, and if the issue here were limited to the right of Congress to dispose of his particular Presidential papers, this case would not be of major constitutional significance. Unfortunately, however, today's decision countenances the power of any future Congress to seize the official papers of an outgoing President as he leaves the inaugural stand. In so doing, it poses a real threat to the ability of future Presidents to receive candid advice and to give candid instructions. This result, so at odds with our previous case law on the separation of powers, will daily stand as a veritable sword of Damocles over every succeeding President and his advisers. Believing as I do that the Act is a clear violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers, I need not address the other issues considered by the Court. 1 </s> [433 U.S. 425, 546] </s> My conclusion that the Act violates the principle of separation of powers is based upon three fundamental propositions. First, candid and open discourse among the President, his [433 U.S. 425, 547] advisers, foreign heads of state and ambassadors, Members of Congress, and the others who deal with the White House on a sensitive basis is an absolute prerequisite to the effective discharge of the duties of that high office. Second, the effect of the Act, and of this Court's decision upholding its constitutionality, will undoubtedly restrain the necessary free flow of information to and from the present President and future Presidents. Third, any substantial intrusion upon the effective discharge of the duties of the President is sufficient to violate the principle of separation of powers, and our prior cases do not permit the sustaining of an Act such as this by "balancing" an intrusion of substantial magnitude against the interests assertedly fostered by the Act. [433 U.S. 425, 548] </s> With respect to the second point, it is of course true that the Act is directed solely at the papers of former President Nixon. 2 Although the terms of the Act, therefore, have no direct application to the present occupant or future occupants of the Office, the effect upon candid communication to and from these future Presidents depends, in the long run, not upon the limited nature of the present Act, but upon the precedential effect of today's decision. Unless the authority of Congress to seize the papers of this appellant is limited only to him in some principled way, future Presidents and their advisers will be wary of a similar Act directed at their papers out of pure political hostility. </s> We are dealing with a privilege, albeit a qualified one, that both the Court and the Solicitor General concede may be asserted by an ex-President. It is a privilege which has been relied upon by Chief Executives since the time of George Washington. See, e. g., the dissenting opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, ante, at 509-510. Unfortunately, the Court's opinion upholding the constitutionality of this Act is obscure, to say the least, as to the circumstances that will justify Congress in seizing the papers of an ex-President. 3 A potpourri of reasons is advanced as to why the Act is not an unconstitutional [433 U.S. 425, 549] infringement upon the principle of separation of powers, 4 but the weight to be attached to any of the factors is left wholly unclear. </s> The Court speaks of the need to establish procedures to preserve Presidential materials, to allow a successor President access to the papers of the prior President, to grant the American public historical access, and to rectify the present "hit-or-miss" approach by entrusting the materials to the expert handling of the archivists. Ante, at 452-453. These justifications are equally applicable to each and every future President, and other than one cryptic paragraph, ante, at 453-454, the Court's treatment contains no suggestion that Congress might not permissibly seize the papers of any outgoing future President. The unclear scope of today's opinion will cause future Presidents and their advisers to be uneasy over [433 U.S. 425, 550] the confidentiality of their communications, thereby restraining those communications. </s> The position of my Brothers POWELL and BLACKMUN is that today's opinion will not result in an impediment to future Presidential communications since this case is "unique" 5 - appellant resigned in disgrace from the Presidency during events unique in the history of our Nation. MR. JUSTICE POWELL recognizes that this position is quite different from that of the Court. Ante, at 492-498. Unfortunately his concurring view that the authority of Congress is limited to the situation he describes does not itself change the expansive scope of the Court's opinion, and will serve as scant consolation to future Presidential advisers. For so long as the Court's opinion represents a threat to confidential communications, the concurrences of MR. JUSTICE POWELL and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, I fear, are based on no more than wishful thinking. </s> Were the Court to advance a principled justification for affirming the judgment solely on the facts surrounding appellant's fall from office, the effect of its decision upon future Presidential communications would be far less serious. But the Court does not advance any such justification. </s> A </s> It would require far more of a discourse than could profitably be included in an opinion such as this to fully describe the pre-eminent position that the President of the United States occupies with respect to our Republic. Suffice it to say that the President is made the sole repository of the executive powers of the United States, and the powers entrusted to him as well as the duties imposed upon him [433 U.S. 425, 551] are awesome indeed. 6 Given the vast spectrum of the decisions that confront him - domestic affairs, relationships with foreign powers, direction of the military as Commander in [433 U.S. 425, 552] Chief - it is by no means an overstatement to conclude that current, accurate, and absolutely candid information is essential to the proper performance of his office. Nor is it an overstatement to conclude that the President must be free to give frank and candid instructions to his subordinates. It cannot be denied that one of the principal determinants of the quality of the information furnished to the President will be the degree of trust placed in him by those who confide in him. The Court itself, ante, at 448-449, cites approvingly the following language of the Solicitor General: </s> "`Unless he can give his advisers some assurance of confidentiality, a President could not expect to receive the full and frank submission of facts and opinions upon which effective discharge of his duties depends.'" See Brief for Federal Appellees 33. </s> The public papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had the advantage of discharging executive responsibilities first as the Commander in Chief of the United States forces in Europe during the Second World War and then as President of the United States for two terms, attest to the critical importance of this trust in the President's discretion: </s> "And if any commander is going to get the free, unprejudiced opinions of his subordinates, he had better protect what they have to say to him on a confidential basis." Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955, p. 674 (1959). </s> The effect of a contrary course likewise impressed President Eisenhower: </s> "But when it comes to the conversations that take place [433 U.S. 425, 553] between any responsible official and his advisers or exchange of little, mere slips of this or that, expressing personal opinions on the most confidential basis, those are not subject to investigation by anybody; and if they are, will wreck the Government." Ibid. (Emphasis added.) </s> There simply can be no doubt that it is of the utmost importance for sensitive communications to the President to be viewed as confidential, and generally unreachable without the President's consent. </s> B </s> In order to fully understand the impact of this Act upon the confidential communications in the White House, it must be understood that the Act will affect not merely former President Nixon, but the present President and future Presidents. As discussed above, while this Act itself addresses only the papers of former President Nixon, today's decision upholding its constitutionality renders uncertain the constitutionality of future congressional action directed at any ex-President. Thus Presidential confidants will assume, correctly, that any records of communications to the President could be subject to "appropriation" in much the same manner as the present Act seized the records of confidential communications to and from President Nixon. When advice is sought by future Presidents, no one will be unmindful of the fact that, as a result of the uncertainty engendered by today's decision, all confidential communications of any ex-President could be subject to seizure over his objection, as he leaves the inaugural stand on January 20. </s> And Presidential communications will undoubtedly be impeded by the recognition that there is a substantial probability of public disclosure of material seized under this Act, which, by today's decision, is a constitutional blueprint for future Acts. First, the Act on its face requires that 100-odd Government archivists study and review Presidential papers, [433 U.S. 425, 554] heretofore accessible only with the specific consent of the President. Second, the Act requires that public access is to be granted by future regulations consistent with "the need to provide public access to those materials which have general historical significance . . . ." 104 (a) (6). Either of these provisions is sufficient to detract markedly from the candor of communications to and from the President. </s> In brushing aside the fact that the archivists are empowered to review the papers, the Court concludes that the archivists will be discreet. Ante, at 451-452. But there is no foundation for the Court's assumption that there will be no leaks. Any reviews that the archivists have made of Presidential papers in the past have been done only after authorization by the President, and after the President has had an opportunity to cull the most sensitive documents. It strikes me as extremely naive, and I daresay that this view will be shared by a large number of potential confidants of future Presidents, to suppose that each and every one of the archivists who might participate in a similar screening by virtue of a future Act would remain completely silent with respect to those portions of the Presidential papers which are extremely newsworthy. The Solicitor General, supporting the constitutionality of the Act, candidly conceded as much in oral argument: </s> "Question: . . . I now ask you a question that may sound frivolous, but do you think if a hundred people know anything of great interest in the City of Washington, it will remain a secret? </s> "[Laughter.] </s> "Mr. McCree: MR. JUSTICE POWELL, I have heard that if two people have heard it, it will not." Tr. of Oral Arg. 46. </s> It borders on the absurd for the Court to cite our recent decision in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), as a precedent for the proposition that Government officials will invariably [433 U.S. 425, 555] honor provisions in a law dedicated to the preservation of privacy. It is quite doubtful, at least to my mind, that columnists or investigative reporters will be avidly searching for what doctor prescribed what drug for what patient in the State of New York, which was the information required to be furnished in Whalen v. Roe. But with respect to the advice received by a President, or the instructions given by him, on highly sensitive matters of great historical significance, the case is quite the opposite. Hence, at the minimum, today's decision upholding the constitutionality of this Act, mandating review by archivists, will engender the expectation that future confidential communications to the President may be subject to leaks or public disclosure without his consent. </s> In addition to this review by archivists, Presidential papers may now be seized and shown to the public if they are of "general historical significance." The Court attempts to avoid this problem with the wishful expectation that the regulations regarding public access, when promulgated, will be narrowly drawn. However, this assumes that a Presidential adviser will speak candidly based upon this same wishful assumption that the regulations, when ultimately issued and interpreted, will protect his confidences. But the current Act is over two and one-half years old and no binding regulations have yet been promulgated. And it is anyone's guess as to how long it will take before such ambiguous terms as "historical significance" are definitively interpreted, and as to whether some future Administrator as yet unknown might issue a broader definition. Thus, the public access required by this Act will at the very least engender substantial uncertainty regarding whether future confidential communications will, in fact, remain confidential. </s> The critical factor in all of this is not that confidential material might be disclosed, since the President himself might choose to "go public" with it. The critical factor is that the determination as to whether to disclose is wrested by the [433 U.S. 425, 556] Act from the President. When one speaks in confidence to a President, he necessarily relies upon the President's discretion not to disclose the sensitive. The President similarly relies on the discretion of a subordinate when instructing him. Thus it is no answer to suggest, as does the Court, ante, at 450-451, that the expectation of confidentiality has always been limited because Presidential papers have in the past been turned over to Presidential libraries or otherwise subsequently disclosed. In those cases, ultimate reliance was upon the discretion of the President to cull the sensitive ones before disclosure. But when, as is the case under this Act, the decision whether to disclose no longer resides in the President, communication will inevitably be restrained. </s> The Court, as does MR. JUSTICE POWELL, seeks to diminish the impact of this Act on the Office of the President by virtue of the fact that neither President Ford nor President Carter supports appellant's claim. Ante, at 441, 502 n. 5. It is quite true that President Ford signed the Act into law, and that the Solicitor General, representing President Carter, supports its constitutionality. While we must give due regard to the fact that these Presidents have not opposed the Act, we must also give due regard to the unusual political forces that have contributed to making this situation "unique." Ante, at 494 (POWELL, J., concurring). MR. JUSTICE POWELL refers to the stance of the current Executive as "dispositive," ante, at 498, and the Court places great emphasis upon it. I think this analysis is mistaken. </s> The current occupant of the Presidency cannot by signing into law a bill passed by Congress waive the claim of a successor President that the Act violates the principle of separation of powers. We so held in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). And only last Term we unanimously held in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), that persons with no connection with the Executive Branch of the Government may attack the constitutionality of a law signed by the President on the [433 U.S. 425, 557] ground that it invaded authority reserved for the Executive Branch under the principle of separation of powers. This principle, perhaps the most fundamental in our constitutional framework, may not be signed away by the temporary incumbent of the office which it was designed to protect. </s> MR. JUSTICE POWELL'S view that the incumbent President must join the challenge of the ex-President places Presidential communications in limbo, since advisers, at the time of the communication, cannot know who the successor will be or what his stance will be regarding seizure by Congress of his predecessor's papers. Since the advisers cannot be sure that the President to whom they are communicating can protect their confidences, communication will be inhibited. MR. JUSTICE POWELL'S view, requiring an ex-President to depend upon his successor, blinks at political and historical reality. The tripartite system of Government established by the Constitution has on more than one occasion bred political hostility not merely between Congress and a lameduck President, but between the latter and his successor. To substantiate this view one need only recall the relationship at the time of the transfer to the reins of power from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, from James Buchanan to Abraham Lincoln, from Herbert Hoover to Franklin Roosevelt, and from Harry Truman to Dwight Eisenhower. Thus while the Court's decision is an invitation for a hostile Congress to legislate against an unpopular lameduck President, MR. JUSTICE POWELL's position places the ultimate disposition of a challenge to such legislation in the hands of what history has shown may be a hostile incoming President. I cannot believe that the Constitution countenances this result. One may ascribe no such motives to Congress and the successor Presidents in this case, without nevertheless harboring a fear that they may play a part in some succeeding case. </s> The shadow that today's decision casts upon the daily operation of the Office of the President during his entire [433 U.S. 425, 558] four-year term sharply differentiates it from our previous separation-of-powers decisions, which have dealt with much more specific and limited intrusions. These cases have focused upon unique aspects of the operation of a particular branch of Government, rather than upon an intrusion, such as the present one, that permeates the entire decisionmaking process of the Office of the President. For example, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Steel Seizure Cases), this Court held that the President could not by Executive Order seize steel mills in order to prevent a work stoppage when Congress had provided other methods for dealing with such an eventuality. In Myers v. United States, supra, the Court struck down an 1876 statute which had attempted to restrict the President's power to remove postmasters without congressional approval. In Buckley v. Valeo, supra, the Court struck down Congress' attempt to vest the power to appoint members of the Federal Election Commission in persons other than the President. </s> To say that these cases dealt with discrete instances of governmental action is by no means to disparage their importance in the development of our constitutional law. But it does contrast them quite sharply with the issue involved in the present case. To uphold the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act is not simply to sustain or invalidate a particular instance of the exercise of governmental power by Congress or by the President; it has the much more far-reaching effect of significantly hampering the President, during his entire term of office, in his ability to gather the necessary information to perform the countless discrete acts which are the prerogative of his office under Art. II of the Constitution. </s> C </s> It thus appears to me indisputable that this Act is a significant intrusion into the operations of the Presidency. I do not think that this severe dampening of free communication [433 U.S. 425, 559] to and from the President may be discounted by the Court's adoption of a novel "balancing" test for determining whether it is constitutional. 7 I agree with the Court that the three branches of Government need not be airtight, ante, at 443, and that the separate branches are not intended to operate [433 U.S. 425, 560] with absolute independence, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974). But I find no support in the Constitution or in our cases for the Court's pronouncement that the operations of the Office of the President may be severely impeded by Congress simply because Congress had a good reason for doing so. </s> Surely if ever there were a case for "balancing," and giving weight to the asserted "national interest" to sustain governmental action, it was in the Steel Seizure Cases, supra. There the challenged Presidential Executive Order recited, without contradiction by its challengers, that "American fighting men and fighting men of other nations of the United Nations are now engaged in deadly combat with the forces of aggression in Korea"; that "the weapons and other materials needed by our armed forces and by those joined with us in the defense of the free world are produced to a great extent in this country, and steel is an indispensable component of substantially all of such weapons and materials"; and that a work stoppage in the steel industry "would immediately jeopardize and imperil our national defense and the defense of those joined with us in resisting aggression, and would add to the continuing danger of our soldiers, sailors, and airmen engaged in combat in the field." 343 U.S., at 590 -591 (App. to opinion). Although the "legislative" actions by the President could have been quickly overridden by an Act of Congress, id., at 677 (Vinson, C. J., dissenting), this Court struck down the Executive Order as violative of the separation-of-powers principle with nary a mention of the national interest to be fostered by what could have been characterized as a relatively minimal and temporary intrusion upon the role of Congress. The analysis was simple and straightforward: Congress had exclusive authority to legislate; the President's Executive Order was an exercise of legislative power that impinged upon that authority of Congress, and was therefore unconstitutional. Id., at 588-589. See also Buckley v. Valeo. 8 </s> [433 U.S. 425, 561] </s> I think that not only the Executive Branch of the Federal Government, but the Legislative and Judicial Branches as well, will come to regret this day when the Court has upheld an Act of Congress that trenches so significantly on the functioning of the Office of the President. I dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 While the entire substance of this dissent is devoted to the constitutional principle of separation of powers, and not to the other issues that [433 U.S. 425, 546] the Court addresses separately, it seems to me that the Court is too facile in separating appellant's "privacy" claims from his "separation of powers" claims, as if they were two separate and wholly unrelated attacks on the statute. The concept of "privacy" can be a coat of many colors, and quite differing kinds of rights to "privacy" have been recognized in the law. Property may be "private," in the sense that the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Government from seizing it without paying just compensation. A dictabelt tape or diary may be "private" in that sense, but may also be "private" in the sense that the Fourth Amendment would prohibit an unreasonable seizure of it even though in making such a seizure the Government agreed to pay for the fair value of the diary so as not to run afoul of the Eminent Domain Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Many states have recognized a common-law "right of privacy" first publicized in the famous Warren and Brandeis article, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). Privileges, such as the executive privilege embodied in the Constitution as a result of the separation of powers, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), and the attorney-client privilege, recognized under case and statutory law in most jurisdictions, protect still a different form of privacy. The invocation of such privileges has the effect of protecting the privacy of a communication made confidentially to the President or by a client to an attorney; the purpose of the privilege, in each case, is to assure free communication on the part of the confidant and of the client, respectively. </s> The Court states, ante, at 459, that "it is logical to assume that the tape recordings made in the Presidential offices primarily relate to the conduct and business of the Presidency." Whatever the merits of this argument may be against a claim based on other types of privacy, it makes crystal clear that the Act is a serious intrusion upon the type of "privacy" that is protected by the principle of executive privilege. The Court's complete separation of its discussion of the executive-privilege claim from the privacy claim thus enables it to take inconsistent positions in the different sections of its opinion. </s> The Court's position with respect to the appellant's individual privacy heightens my concern regarding the privacy interest served by executive privilege. In attempting to minimize the Act's impact upon appellant's privacy, the Court concludes that "purely private papers and recordings will be returned to appellant under 104 (a) (7) of the Act." Ibid. However, [433 U.S. 425, 547] this conclusion raises more questions than answers. Under 104 (a) (7), the return of papers to the appellant is conditioned on their being "not otherwise of general historical significance." Given the expansive nature of this phrase, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 39, it is quite conceivable that virtually none of the papers will be returned, and the Court's representation is an empty gesture. See also 104 (a) (6). What is meant by "purely private papers"? Is a personal letter to or from the President, but concerning the duties of the President considered "private," or is a document replete with personal communications, but containing some reference to the affairs of state, "purely private"? The dictabelts of the President's personal recollections, dictated in diary form at the end of each day, are assumedly private, and are to be returned. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 59. But the dictabelt dictation is also recorded on the voice-activated White House taping system, and those tapes will be retained and reviewed. Hence, appellant's privacy interest will not be served by the return of the dictabelts, and the retention of the tapes will seriously erode Presidential communications, as discussed infra, at 553-558. By approaching these issues in compartmentalized fashion the Court obscures the fallacy of its result. </s> I fully subscribe to most of what is said respecting the separation of powers in the dissent of THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Indeed, it is because I so thoroughly agree with his observation that the Court's holding today is a "grave repudiation of nearly 200 years of judicial precedent and historical practice" that I take this opportunity to write separately on the subject, thinking that its importance justifies such an opinion. </s> [Footnote 2 I am not unmindful of the excesses of Watergate, and of the impetus it gave to this legislation. However, the Court's opinion does not set forth a principled distinction that would limit the constitutionality of an Act such as this to President Nixon's papers. Absent such a distinction: </s> "The emotional aspects of the case make it difficult to decide dispassionately, but do not qualify our obligation to apply the law with an eye to the future as well as with concern for the result in the particular case before us." Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 415 (1977) (STEVENS, J., concurring). </s> [Footnote 3 Indeed, there is nothing in the Court's logic which would invalidate such an Act if it applied to an incumbent President during his term of office. It is of course not likely that an incumbent would sign such a measure, but a sufficiently determined Congress could pass it over his veto nonetheless. </s> [Footnote 4 In my view, the Court's decision itself, by not offering any principled basis for distinguishing appellant's case from that of any future President, has a present and future impact on the functioning of the Office of the Presidency. Hence the validity of the reasons asserted by the Court for upholding this particular Act is a subject which I find it unnecessary to address in detail. I feel bound to observe, however, that the Court, in emphasizing, e. g., ante, at 443-444, the fact that the seized papers are to be lodged with the General Services Administration, an agency created by Congress but housed in the Executive Branch of the Government, relies upon a thin reed indeed. </s> Control and management of an agency such as the General Services Administration is shared between the incumbent President, by virtue of his authority to nominate its officials, and Congress, by virtue of its authority to enact substantive legislation defining the functions of the agency. But the physical placement of the seized Presidential papers with such an agency does not solve the separation-of-powers problem. The principle of separation of powers is infringed when, by Act of Congress, Presidential communications are impeded because the President no longer has exclusive control over the release of his confidential papers. The fact that this Act places physical custody in the hands of the General Services Administration, rather than a congressional committee, makes little difference so far as divestiture of Presidential control is concerned. </s> [Footnote 5 My Brother STEVENS, ante, at 486-487, seeks to attribute a similar uniqueness to the precedential value of this case, but his observations are directed to appellant's bill-of-attainder claim, rather than to the separation-of-powers claim. </s> [Footnote 6 Article II empowers him "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate" to make treaties, to appoint numerous other high officials of the Federal Government, to receive ambassadors and other public ministers, and to commission all the officers of the United States. That Article enjoins him to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," and authorizes him to "give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient." It is difficult to imagine a public office whose occupant would be more dependent upon the confidentiality of the advice which he received, and the confidentiality of the instructions which he gave, for the successful execution of his duties. This is particularly true in the area of foreign affairs and international relations; in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936), this Court stated: </s> "Not only, as we have shown, is the federal power over external affairs in origin and essential character different from that over internal affairs, but participation in the exercise of the power is significantly limited. In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. As Marshall said in his great argument of March 7, 1800, in the House of Representatives, `The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.' Annals, 6th Cong., col. 613. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at a very early day in our history (February 15, 1816), reported to the Senate, among other things, as follows: </s> "`The President is the constitutional representative of the United States with regard to foreign nations. He manages our concerns with foreign nations and must necessarily be most competent to determine when, how, and upon what subjects negotiation may be urged with the greatest prospect of success. For his conduct he is responsible to the Constitution. The committee consider this responsibility the surest pledge for the faithful discharge of his duty. They think the interference of the Senate in the direction of foreign negotiations calculated to diminish that responsibility [433 U.S. 425, 552] and thereby to impair the best security for the national safety. The nature of transactions with foreign nations, moreover, requires caution and unity of design, and their success frequently depends on secrecy and dispatch.' U.S. Senate, Reports, Committee on Foreign Relations, vol. 8, p. 24." </s> [Footnote 7 As a matter of original inquiry, it might plausibly be claimed that the concerns expressed by the Framers of the Constitution during their debates, and similar expressions found in the Federalist Papers, by no means require the conclusion that the Judicial Branch is the ultimate arbiter of whether one branch has transgressed upon powers constitutionally reserved to another. It could have been plausibly maintained that the Framers thought that the Constitution itself had armed each branch with sufficient political weapons to fend off intrusions by another which would violate the principle of separation of powers, and that therefore there was neither warrant nor necessity for judicial invalidation of such intrusion. But that is not the way the law has developed in this Court. </s> Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), not only established the authority of this Court to hold an Act of Congress unconstitutional, but the particular constitutional question which it decided was essentially a "separation of powers" issue: whether Congress was empowered under the Constitution to expand the original jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by Art. III of the Constitution. </s> Any argument that Marbury is limited to cases involving the powers of the Judicial Branch and that the Court had no power to intervene in any dispute relating to separation of powers between the other two branches has been rejected in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In so doing, these cases are entirely consistent with the following language from United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974): </s> "In the performance of assigned constitutional duties each branch of the Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great respect from the others. The President's counsel, as we have noted, reads the Constitution as providing an absolute privilege of confidentiality for all Presidential communications. Many decisions of this Court, however, have unequivocally reaffirmed the holding of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), that `[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.' Id., at 177." Id., at 703. </s> [Footnote 8 For the reasons set forth by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, ante, at 512, it is [433 U.S. 425, 561] clear that the circumstances in United States v. Nixon, involving a narrow request for specified documents in connection with a criminal prosecution, provide no support for the Court's use of a balancing test in a case such as this where the seizure is a broad and undifferentiated intrusion into the daily operations of the Office of the President. </s> [433 U.S. 425, 562]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. POWELL(1964) No. 54 Argued: Decided: November 23, 1964 </s> On the ground that the respondent corporate taxpayer's returns had been examined for certain years and that, absent fraud, the statute of limitations barred assessment of additional deficiencies, respondent the taxpayer's president refused to produce records summoned by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) unless it disclosed its basis for believing that fraud had been committed. The Government brought an enforcement proceeding under 7604 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code in the District Court, which held that the agent be allowed to re-examine the records. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that 7605 (b) barred "unnecessary examination" unless the IRS could show reasonable grounds or probable cause to suspect fraud, a condition not satisfied by the agent's affidavit filed with the enforcement petition that he suspected that the taxpayer had fraudulently overstated expenses. Held: </s> 1. Section 7604 (b) does not apply to a non-contumacious refusal like the individual respondent's to comply with a summons; but recommencement of the proceeding will not be required, since the Government sought no prehearing sanctions of arrest and attachment under that statute, which is otherwise similar to 7402 (b) and 7604 (a). The proceeding is therefore considered under those almost identical sections, which give general power to enforce summonses "by appropriate process." Pp. 51-52. </s> 2. In order to enforce a summons for records the Commissioner, either before or after the limitations period has expired, need not show probable cause to suspect fraud. Unless the taxpayer raises a substantial question that judicial enforcement of the summons would abuse the court's process, the Commissioner must only show that the investigation is pursuant and relevant to a legitimate purpose; that the information is not already in the Commissioner's possession; that the Secretary or his delegate has determined that the further examination is necessary, and that the other administrative steps required by the Code have been followed. Pp. 52-58. </s> 325 F.2d 914, reversed and remanded. </s> Bruce J. Terris argued the cause for the United States et al. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, [379 U.S. 48, 49] Assistant Attorney General Oberdorfer, Joseph M. Howard, Meyer Rothwacks and Norman Sepenuk. </s> Bernard G. Segal argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Samuel D. Slade. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In March 1963, the Internal Revenue Service, pursuant to powers afforded the Commissioner by 7602 (2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, summoned respondent Powell to appear before Special Agent Tiberino to give testimony and produce records relating to the 1958 and 1959 returns of the William Penn Laundry (the taxpayer), of which Powell was president. Powell appeared before the agent but refused to produce the records. Because the taxpayer's returns had been once previously examined, and because the three-year statute of limitations barred assessment of additional deficiencies for those years 1 except in cases of fraud (the asserted basis for this summons), 2 Powell contended that before he could be forced to produce the records the Service had to indicate some grounds for its belief that a fraud had been committed. The agent declined to give any such indication and the meeting terminated. </s> Thereafter the Service petitioned the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for enforcement of the administrative summons. With this petition the agent filed an affidavit stating that he had been investigating the taxpayer's returns for 1958 and 1959; that based on this investigation the Regional Commissioner [379 U.S. 48, 50] of the Service had determined an additional examination of the taxpayer's records for those years to be necessary and had sent Powell a letter to that effect; and that the agent had reason to suspect that the taxpayer had fraudulently falsified its 1958 and 1959 returns by overstating expenses. At the court hearing Powell again stated his objections to producing the records and asked the Service to show some basis for its suspicion of fraud. The Service chose to stand on the petition and the agent's affidavit, and, after argument, the District Court ruled that the agent be given one hour in which to re-examine the records. 3 </s> The Court of Appeals reversed, 325 F.2d 914. It reasoned that since the returns in question could only be reopened for fraud, re-examination of the taxpayer's records must be barred by the prohibition of 7605 (b) of the Code 4 against "unnecessary examination" unless the Service possessed information "which might cause a reasonable man to suspect that there has been fraud in the return for the otherwise closed year"; 5 and whether this standard has been met is to be decided "on the basis of the showing made in the normal course of an adversary proceeding . . . ." 6 The court concluded that the affidavit in itself was not sufficient to satisfy its test of probable cause. 7 Consequently, enforcement of the summons was withheld. </s> Because of the differing views in the circuits on the standards the Internal Revenue Service must meet to [379 U.S. 48, 51] obtain judicial enforcement of its orders, 8 we granted certiorari, 377 U.S. 929 . </s> We reverse, and hold that the Government need make no showing of probable cause to suspect fraud unless the taxpayer raises a substantial question that judicial enforcement of the administrative summons would be an abusive use of the court's process, predicated on more than the fact of re-examination and the running of the statute of limitations on ordinary tax liability. </s> I. </s> This enforcement proceeding was brought by the Government pursuant to 7604 (b) of the Code. 9 In Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 , decided last Term subsequent to the rendering of the decision below, this Court [379 U.S. 48, 52] stated that 7604 (b) "was intended only to cover persons who were summoned and wholly made default or contumaciously refused to comply." 375 U.S., at 448 . There was no contumacious refusal in this case. Thus the Government's conceded error in bringing its enforcement proceeding under 7604 (b) instead of 7402 (b) or 7604 (a), 10 each of which grants courts the general power to enforce the Commissioner's summonses "by appropriate process," raises a threshold question whether we must dismiss this case and force the Government to recommence enforcement proceedings under the appropriate sections. Since the Government did not apply for the prehearing sanctions of attachment and arrest peculiar to 7604 (b), and since these constitute the major substantive differences between the sections, we think it would be holding too strictly to the forms of pleading to require the suit to be recommenced, and therefore treat the enforcement proceeding as having been brought under 7402 (b) and 7604 (a). </s> II. </s> Respondent primarily relies on 7605 (b) to show that the Government must establish probable cause for suspecting fraud, and that the existence of probable cause is subject to challenge by the taxpayer at the hearing. 11 That section provides: </s> "No taxpayer shall be subjected to unnecessary examination or investigations, and only one inspection [379 U.S. 48, 53] of a taxpayer's books of account shall be made for each taxable year unless the taxpayer requests otherwise or unless the Secretary or his delegate, after investigation, notifies the taxpayer in writing that an additional inspection is necessary." </s> We do not equate necessity as contemplated by this provision with probable cause or any like notion. If a taxpayer has filed fraudulent returns, a tax liability exists without regard to any period of limitations. Section 7602 authorizes the Commissioner to investigate any such liability. 12 If, in order to determine the existence or nonexistence of fraud in the taxpayer's returns, information in the taxpayer's records is needed which is not already in the Commissioner's possession, we think the examination is not "unnecessary" within the meaning of 7605 (b). Although a more stringent interpretation is possible, one which would require some showing of cause for suspecting fraud, we reject such an interpretation [379 U.S. 48, 54] because it might seriously hamper the Commissioner in carrying out investigations he thinks warranted, forcing him to litigate and prosecute appeals on the very subject which he desires to investigate, and because the legislative history of 7605 (b) indicates that no severe restriction was intended. </s> Section 7605 (b) first appeared as 1309 of the Revenue Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 310. Its purpose and operation were explained by the manager of the bill, Senator Penrose, on the Senate floor: </s> "Mr. PENROSE. Mr. President, the provision is entirely in the interest of the taxpayer and for his relief from unnecessary annoyance. Since these income taxes and direct taxes have been in force very general complaint has been made, especially in the large centers of wealth and accumulation of money, at the repeated visits of tax examiners, who perhaps are overzealous or do not use the best of judgment in the exercise of their functions. I know that from many of the cities of the country very bitter complaints have reached me and have reached the department of unnecessary visits and inquisitions after a thorough examination is supposed to have been had. This section is purely in the interest of quieting all this trouble and in the interest of the peace of mind of the honest taxpayer. </s> "Mr. WALSH. . . . So that up to the present time an inspector could visit the office of an individual or corporation and inspect the books as many times as he chose? </s> "Mr. PENROSE. And he often did so. </s> "Mr. WALSH. . . . And this provision of the Senate committee seeks to limit the inspection to one visit unless the commissioner indicates that there is necessity for further examination? </s> "Mr. PENROSE. That is the purpose of the amendment. [379 U.S. 48, 55] </s> "Mr. WALSH. . . . I heartily agree with the beneficial results that the amendment will produce to the taxpayer. </s> "Mr. PENROSE. I knew the Senator would agree to the amendment, and it will go a long way toward relieving petty annoyances on the part of honest taxpayers." 61 Cong. Rec. 5855 (Sept. 28, 1921). 13 </s> Congress recognized a need for a curb on the investigating powers of low-echelon revenue agents, and considered [379 U.S. 48, 56] that it met this need simply and fully by requiring such agents to clear any repetitive examination with a superior. For us to import a probable cause standard to be enforced by the courts would substantially overshoot the goal which the legislators sought to attain. There is no intimation in the legislative history that Congress intended the courts to oversee the Commissioner's determinations to investigate. No mention was made of the statute of limitations 14 and the exception for fraud. </s> We are asked to read 7605 (b) together with the limitations sections in such a way as to impose a probable cause standard upon the Commissioner from the expiration date of the ordinary limitations period forward. Without some solid indication in the legislative history that such a gloss was intended, we find it unacceptable. 15 Our reading of the statute is said to render the first clause of 7605 (b) surplusage to a large extent, for, as interpreted, the clause adds little beyond the relevance and materiality requirements of 7602. That clause does appear to require that the information sought is not already within the Commissioner's possession, but we think its primary purpose was no more than to emphasize the responsibility of agents to exercise prudent judgment in wielding the extensive powers granted to them by the Internal Revenue Code. 16 </s> [379 U.S. 48, 57] </s> This view of the statute is reinforced by the general rejection of probable cause requirements in like circumstances involving other agencies. In Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 216 , in reference to the Administrator's subpoena power under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Court said "his investigative function, in searching out violations with a view to securing enforcement of the Act, is essentially the same as the grand jury's, or the court's in issuing other pretrial orders for the discovery of evidence, and is governed by the same limitations," and accordingly applied the view that inquiry must not be "`limited . . . by forecasts of the probable result of the investigation.'" In United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 -643, the Court said of the Federal Trade Commission, "It has a power of inquisition, if one chooses to call it that, which is not derived from the judicial function. It is more analogous to the Grand Jury, which does not depend on a case or controversy for power to get evidence but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not." While the power of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue derives from a different body of statutes, we do not think the analogies to other agency situations are without force when the scope of the Commissioner's power is called in question. 17 </s> III. </s> Reading the statutes as we do, the Commissioner need not meet any standard of probable cause to obtain enforcement of his summons, either before or after the three-year statute of limitations on ordinary tax liabilities has expired. He must show that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, that the [379 U.S. 48, 58] information sought is not already within the Commissioner's possession, and that the administrative steps required by the Code have been followed - in particular, that the "Secretary or his delegate," after investigation, has determined the further examination to be necessary and has notified the taxpayer in writing to that effect. This does not make meaningless the adversary hearing to which the taxpayer is entitled before enforcement is ordered. 18 At the hearing he "may challenge the summons on any appropriate ground," Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 , at 449. 19 Nor does our reading of the statutes mean that under no circumstances may the court inquire into the underlying reasons for the examination. It is the court's process which is invoked to enforce the administrative summons and a court may not permit its process to be abused. 20 Such an abuse would take place if the summons had been issued for an improper purpose, such as to harass the taxpayer or to put pressure on him to settle a collateral dispute, or for any other purpose reflecting on the good faith of the particular investigation. The burden of showing an abuse of the court's process is on the taxpayer, and it is not met by a mere showing, as was made in this case, that the statute of limitations for ordinary deficiencies has run or that the records in question have already been once examined. [379 U.S. 48, 59] </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 I. R. C., 6501 (a). </s> [Footnote 2 I. R. C., 6501 (c) (1), which in relevant part provides: "In the case of a false or fraudulent return with the intent to evade tax, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time." </s> [Footnote 3 The parties subsequently agreed that if the Government was upheld in its claim of right to examine without showing probable cause, the one-hour time limitation would be removed. </s> [Footnote 4 See page 52, infra. </s> [Footnote 5 325 F.2d 914, 915-916. </s> [Footnote 6 Id., at 916. </s> [Footnote 7 "Probable cause" as used in this opinion is meant to include the full range of formulations offered by lower courts. </s> [Footnote 8 Compare Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1959); United States v. Ryan, 320 F.2d 500 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1963), affirmed today, post, p. 61, with O'Connor v. O'Connell, 253 F.2d 365 (C. A. 1st Cir. 1958), followed in Lash v. Nighosian, 273 F.2d 185 (C. A. 1st Cir. 1959); Globe Construction Co. v. Humphrey, 229 F.2d 148 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1956); De Masters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1963). </s> [Footnote 9 Section 7604 (b) provides: </s> "Whenever any person summoned under section 6420 (e) (2), 6421 (f) (2), or 7602 neglects or refuses to obey such summons, or to produce books, papers, records, or other data, or to give testimony, as required, the Secretary or his delegate may apply to the judge of the district court or to a United States commissioner for the district within which the person so summoned resides or is found for an attachment against him as for a contempt. It shall be the duty of the judge or commissioner to hear the application, and, if satisfactory proof is made, to issue an attachment, directed to some proper officer, for the arrest of such person, and upon his being brought before him to proceed to a hearing of the case; and upon such hearing the judge or the United States commissioner shall have power to make such order as he shall deem proper, not inconsistent with the law for the punishment of contempts, to enforce obedience to the requirements of the summons and to punish such person for his default or disobedience." </s> [Footnote 10 The two sections are virtually identical. Section 7402 (b) provides: </s> "If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, or other data, the district court of the United States for the district in which such person resides or may be found shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers, or other data." </s> [Footnote 11 See n. 18, infra. </s> [Footnote 12 Section 7602 provides: </s> "For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized - </s> "(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or material to such inquiry; </s> "(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and </s> "(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry." </s> [Footnote 13 Other relevant legislative history to like effect may be found in H. R. Rep. No. 350 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 16 (1921); S. Rep. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 31 (1921); 61 Cong. Rec. 5202 (Aug. 18, 1921), remarks of Mr. Hawley. The provision was re-enacted in 1926. In the Senate, a substitute measure was adopted which would have limited the Commissioner to two examinations appertaining to returns of any one year. Senator Reed's objection to the original provision was: "By merely claiming fraud the Government at any time can make examination after examination, subject only to one limitation, that it must give notice that it is going to make the examination. That, in ordinary course, is done by the mere writing of a letter," 67 Cong. Rec. 3856 (Feb. 12, 1926). There is no indication in the discussion that the courts were thought to play any significant limiting role. The Senate substitute was ultimately deleted by the Conference Committee and the original provision resubstituted. H. R. Rep. No. 356, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 55. The section was re-enacted in 1939 and 1954 without substantial change and without further elaboration of the congressional intent. Respondent contends that in re-enacting the provision, Congress must have been aware of, and acquiesced in, decisions of lower courts that a showing of probable cause is required. In re Andrews' Tax Liability, 18 F. Supp. 804 (1937); Zimmermann v. Wilson, 105 F.2d 583 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1939); In re Brooklyn Pawnbrokers, 39 F. Supp. 304 (1941); Martin v. Chandis Securities Co., 128 F.2d 731 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1942). These cases represent neither a settled judicial construction, see In re Keegan, 18 F. Supp. 746 (1937), nor one which we would be justified in presuming Congress, by its silence, impliedly approved. Compare Shapiro v. United States, 355 U.S. 1 . </s> [Footnote 14 Revenue Act of 1921, 250 (d), 42 Stat. 265, provided a four-year period of limitation on ordinary tax liability. </s> [Footnote 15 The contrary view derives no support from the characterization of the limitations provision as a "statute of repose." The present three-year limitation on assessment of ordinary deficiencies relieves the taxpayer of concern for further assessments of that type, but it by no means follows that it limits the right of the Government to investigate with respect to deficiencies for which no statute of limitations is imposed. </s> [Footnote 16 The Court of Appeals appears to have been led astray by the fact that the Government argued its case on the premise that 7604 (b) was the governing statute. </s> [Footnote 17 See 1 Davis, Administrative Law, 3.12 (1958). </s> [Footnote 18 Because 7604 (a) contains no provision specifying the procedure to be followed in invoking the court's jurisdiction, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply, Martin v. Chandis Securities Co., 128 F.2d 731. The proceedings are instituted by filing a complaint, followed by answer and hearing. If the taxpayer has contumaciously refused to comply with the administrative summons and the Service fears he may flee the jurisdiction, application for the sanctions available under 7604 (b) might be made simultaneously with the filing of the complaint. </s> [Footnote 19 See 1 Davis, Administrative Law, 3.12 (1958). </s> [Footnote 20 See Jaffe, The Judicial Enforcement of Administrative Orders, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 865 (1963). </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG concur, dissenting. </s> Congress, by the three-year statute of limitations that bars assessments of tax deficiencies except (so far as relevant here) in case of fraud, 26 U.S.C. 6501 (a) and (c), has brought into being a "statute of repose" 1 that I would respect more highly than my Brethren. I would respect it by requiring the District Court to be satisfied that the Service is not acting capriciously in reopening the closed tax period. Since the agency must go to the court for process to compel the production of the records for the closed tax period, I would insist that the District Court act in a judicial capacity, free to disagree with the administrative decision unless that minimum standard is met. 2 </s> Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 , does not seem to me to be relevant. It dealt with the usual investigative powers of administrative agencies; and as the Court said in that case, Congress set no standards for administrative action which the judiciary first had to weigh and appraise. 3 Id., 215-216. Here [379 U.S. 48, 60] we have a congressional "statute of repose" embodied in the three-year statute of limitations. I would make it meaningful by protecting it from invasion by mere administrative fiat. Where the limitations period has expired, an examination is presumptively "unnecessary" within the meaning of 7605 (b) - a presumption the Service must overcome. That is to say, a re-examination of the taxpayer's records after the three-year period is "unnecessary" within the meaning of 7605 (b), unless the District Court is shown something more than mere caprice for believing fraud was practiced on the revenue. Without that minimum safeguard the statutory status of repose becomes rather meaningless. </s> [Footnote 1 See the remarks of Senators Smith, Ashurst, and Reed in 67 Cong. Rec. 3852-3853. </s> [Footnote 2 The First Circuit requires the Commissioner to show that "a reasonable basis exists for a suspicion of fraud," O'Connor v. O'Connell, 253 F.2d 365, 370; the Ninth Circuit requires that the decision to investigate for fraud appear as "a matter of rational judgment based on the circumstances of the particular case," De Masters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79, 90; the Third Circuit requires that the agent's suspicion of fraud be "reasonable" in the eyes of the District Court. 325 F.2d 914, 916. </s> [Footnote 3 The case is more like United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 , where, as respects the power of the Federal Trade Commission [379 U.S. 48, 60] to require issuance of "special" reports, the Court reserved the right to prevent the "arbitrary" exercise of that administrative power. Id., at 654. </s> [379 U.S. 48, 61]

United States Supreme Court McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, et al. v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION et al.(2003) No. 02-1674 Argued: September 8, 2003Decided: December 10, 2003 </s> The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), which amended the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), the Communications Act of 1934, and other portions of the United States Code, is the most recent of nearly a century of federal enactments designed "to purge national politics of what [is] conceived to be the pernicious influence of 'big money' campaign contributions." United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 572. In enacting BCRA, Congress sought to address three important developments in the years since this Court's landmark decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (per curiam):the increased importance of "soft money," the proliferation of "issue ads," and the disturbing findings of a Senate investigation into campaign practices related to the 1996 federal elections. </s> With regard to the first development, prior to BCRA, FECA's disclosure requirements and source and amount limitations extended only to so-called "hard money" contributions made for the purpose of influencing an election for federal office. Political parties and candidates were able to circumvent FECA's limitations by contributing "soft money"--money as yet unregulated under FECA--to be used for activities intended to influence state or local elections; for mixed-purpose activities such as get-out-the-vote (GOTV) drives and generic party advertising; and for legislative advocacy advertisements, even if they mentioned a federal candidate's name, so long as the ads did not expressly advocate the candidate's election or defeat. With regard to the second development, parties and candidates circumvented FECA by using "issue ads" that were specifically intended to affect election results, but did not contain "magic words," such as "Vote Against Jane Doe," which would have subjected the ads to FECA's restrictions. Those developments were detailed in a 1998 Senate Committee Report summarizing an investigation into the 1996 federal elections, which concluded that the soft-money loophole had led to a meltdown of the campaign finance system; and discussed potential reforms, including a soft-money ban and restrictions on sham issue advocacy by nonparty groups. </s> Congress enacted many of the committee's proposals in BCRA: Title I regulates the use of soft money by political parties, officeholders, and candidates; Title II primarily prohibits corporations and unions from using general treasury funds for communications that are intended to, or have the effect of, influencing federal election outcomes; and Titles III, IV, and V set out other requirements. Eleven actions challenging BCRA's constitutionality were filed. A three-judge District Court held some parts of BCRA unconstitutional and upheld others. The parties challenging the law are referred to here as plaintiffs, and those who intervened in support of the law are intervenor-defendants. Held:The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. 251 F.Supp. 2d 176, 251 F.Supp. 2d 948, affirmed in part and reversed in part. Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor delivered the Court's opinion with respect to BCRA Titles I and II, concluding that the statute's two principal, complementary features--Congress' effort to plug the soft-money loophole and its regulation of electioneering communications--must be upheld in the main. Pp. 23-118. </s> 1.New FECA §323 survives plaintiffs' facial First Amendment challenge. Pp. 23-77. </s> (a)In evaluating §323, the Court applies the less rigorous standard of review applicable to campaign contribution limits under Buckley and its progeny. Such limits are subject only to "closely drawn" scrutiny, see 459 U.S. 197, 208. The less rigorous review standard shows proper deference to Congress' ability to weigh competing constitutional interests in an area in which it enjoys particular expertise, and provides it with sufficient room to anticipate and respond to concerns about circumvention of regulations designed to protect the political process' integrity. Finally, because Congress, in its lengthy deliberations leading to BCRA's enactment, properly relied on Buckley and its progeny, stare decisis considerations, buttressed by the respect that the Legislative and Judicial Branches owe one another, provide additional powerful reasons for adhering to the analysis of contribution limits the Court has consistently followed since Buckley. The Court rejects plaintiffs' argument that the type of speech and associational burdens that §323 imposes are fundamentally different from the burdens that accompanied Buckley's contribution limits. Pp. 24-32. </s> (b)New FECA §323(a)--which forbids national party committees and their agents to "solicit, receive, ... direct ... , or spend any funds ... that are not subject to [FECA's] limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements," 2 U.S.C.A. §§441i(a)(1), (2)--does not violate the First Amendment. Pp. 32-52. </s> (1)The governmental interest underlying §323(a)--preventing the actual or apparent corruption of federal candidates and officeholders--constitutes a sufficiently important interest to justify contribution limits. That interest is not limited to the elimination of quid pro quo, cash-for-votes exchanges, see Buckley, supra, at 28, but extends also to "undue influence on an officeholder's judgment, and the appearance of such influence," Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 (Colorado II). These interests are sufficient to justify not only contribution limits themselves, but also laws preventing the circumvention of such limits. Id., at 456. While the quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments varies with the novelty or plausibility of the justification raised, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391, the idea that large contributions to a national party can corrupt or create the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders is neither novel nor implausible, see, e.g., Buckley, supra, at 38. There is substantial evidence in these cases to support Congress' determination that such contributions of soft money give rise to corruption and the appearance of corruption. For instance, the record is replete with examples of national party committees' peddling access to federal candidates and officeholders in exchange for large soft-money donations. Pp. 32-45. </s> (2)Section §323(a) is not impermissibly overbroad because it subjects all funds raised and spent by national parties to FECA's hard-money source and amount limits, including, e.g., funds spent on purely state and local elections in which no federal office is at stake. The record demonstrates that the close relationship between federal officeholders and the national parties, as well as the means by which parties have traded on that relationship, have made all large soft-money contributions to national parties suspect, regardless of how those funds are ultimately used. The Government's strong interests in preventing corruption, and particularly its appearance, are thus sufficient to justify subjecting all donations to national parties to FECA's source, amount, and disclosure limitations. Pp. 45-47. </s> (3)Nor is §323(a)'s prohibition on national parties' soliciting or directing soft-money contributions substantially overbroad. That prohibition's reach is limited, in that it bars only soft-money solicitations by national party committees and party officers acting in their official capacities; the committees themselves remain free to solicit hard money on their own behalf or that of state committees and state and local candidates and to contribute hard money to state committees and candidates. Plaintiffs argue unpersuasively that the solicitation ban's overbreadth is demonstrated by §323(e), which allows federal candidates and officeholders to solicit limited amounts of soft money from individual donors under certain circumstances. The differences between §§323(a) and 323(e) are without constitutional significance, see National Right to Work, 459 U.S., at 210, reflecting Congress' reasonable and expert judgments about national committees' functions and their interactions with officeholders. Pp. 47-48. </s> (4)Section 323(a) is not substantially overbroad with respect to the speech and associational rights of minor parties, even though the latter may have slim prospects for electoral success. It is reasonable to require that all parties and candidates follow the same rules designed to protect the electoral process's integrity. Buckley, 424 U.S., at 34-35. A nascent or struggling minor party can bring an as-applied challenge if §323(a) prevents it from amassing the resources necessary to engage in effective advocacy. Id., at 21. Pp. 48-51. </s> (5)Plaintiffs' argument that §323(a) unconstitutionally interferes with the ability of national committees to associate with state and local committees is unpersuasive because it hinges on an unnaturally broad reading of the statutory terms "spend," "receive," "direct," and "solicit." Nothing on §323(a)'s face prohibits national party officers from sitting down with state and local party committees or candidates to plan and advise how to raise and spend soft money, so long as the national officers do not personally spend, receive, direct, or solicit soft money. Pp. 51-52. </s> (c)On its face, new FECA §323(b)--which prohibits state and local party committees from using soft money for activities affecting federal elections, 2 U.S.C.A. §442i(b)--is closely drawn to match the important governmental interest of preventing corruption and its appearance. Pp. 52-66. </s> (1)Recognizing that the close ties between federal candidates and state party committees would soon render §323(a)'s anticorruption measures ineffective if state and local committees remained available as a conduit for soft-money donations, Congress designed §323(b) to prevent donors from contributing nonfederal funds to such committees to help finance "Federal election activity," which is defined to encompass (1) voter registration activity during the 120 days before a federal election; (2) voter identification, GOTV, and generic campaign activity "conducted in connection with an election in which a [federal] candidate ... appears on the ballot"; (3) any "public communication" that "refers to a clearly identified [federal] candidate" and "promotes," "supports," "attacks," or "opposes" such a candidate; and (4) the services of a state committee employee who dedicates more than 25% of his or her compensated time to "activities in connection with a Federal election," 2 U.S.C.A. §§431(20)(A)(i-iv). All activities that fall within this definition must be funded with hard money. §441i(b)(1). The Levin Amendment carves out an exception to this general rule, allowing state and local party committees to pay for certain federal election activities--namely, activities falling within categories (1) and (2) above that either do not refer to "a clearly identified candidate for Federal office," or, if they involve broadcast communications, refer "solely to a clearly identified candidate for State or local office," §§441i(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii)--with an allocated ratio of hard money and so-called "Levin funds." Levin funds are subject only to state regulation, but for two additional restrictions. First, no contributor can donate more than $10,000 per year to a single committee's Levin account. §441i(b)(2)(B)(iii). Second, both Levin funds and the allocated portion of hard money to pay for such activities must be raised by the state or local committee that spends them, though the committee can team up with other national, state, or local committees to solicit the hard-money portion. §§441i(b)(2)(B)(iv), 441i(b)(2)(C). Pp. 52-55. </s> (2)In addressing soft-money contributions to state committees, Congress both drew a conclusion and made a prediction. It concluded from the record that soft money's corrupting influence insinuates itself into the political process not only through national party committees, but also through state committees, which function as an alternate avenue for precisely the same corrupting forces. Indeed, the evidence shows that both candidates and parties already ask donors who have reached their direct contribution limit to donate to state committees. Congress' reasonable prediction, based on the history of campaign finance regulation, was that donors would react to §323(a) by directing soft-money contributions to state committees for the purpose of influencing federal candidates and elections, and that federal candidates would be just as indebted to these contributors as they had been to those who had formerly contributed to the national parties. Preventing corrupting activity from shifting wholesale to state committees and thereby eviscerating FECA clearly qualifies as an important governmental interest. Pp. 55-57. </s> (3)Plaintiffs argue unpersuasively that, even if §323(b) serves a legitimate interest, its restrictions are so unjustifiably burdensome and overbroad that they cannot be considered "closely drawn" to match the Government's objectives. Pp. 57-66. </s> (i)Section 323(b) is not substantially overbroad. Although §323(b) captures some activities that affect state campaigns for nonfederal offices, these are the same activities that were covered by the FEC's pre-BCRA allocation rules, and so had to be funded in part by hard money because they affected both federal and state elections. As a practical matter, BCRA merely codifies the FEC's allocation regime principles while justifiably adjusting the applicable formulas in order to restore the efficacy of FECA's longstanding restriction on contributions to state and local committees for the purpose of influencing federal elections. By limiting its reach to "Federal election activities," §323(b) is narrowly focused on regulating contributions that directly benefit federal candidates and thus pose the greatest risk of corruption or its appearance. The first two categories of "Federal election activity"--voter registration efforts and voter identification, GOTV, and generic campaign activities conducted in connection with a federal election--clearly capture activities that confer a substantial benefit on federal candidates by getting like-minded voters to the polls. If a voter registration drive does not specifically mention a federal candidate, state committees can take advantage of the Levin Amendment's higher contribution limits and relaxed source restrictions. Moreover, because the record demonstrates abundantly that the third category of "Federal election activity," "public communication[s]" that promote or attack a federal candidate, directly affects the election in which that candidate is participating, application of §323(b)'s contribution caps to such communications is closely drawn to the anticorruption interest it is intended to address. Finally, Congress' interest in preventing circumvention of §323(b)'s other restrictions justifies the requirement of the fourth category of "Federal election activity" that federal funds be used to pay any state or local party employee who spends more than 25% of his or her compensated time on activities connected with a federal election. Pp. 58-63. </s> (ii)The Levin Amendment does not unjustifiably burden association among party committees by forbidding transfers of Levin funds among state parties, transfers of hard money to fund the allocable federal portion of Levin expenditures, and joint fundraising of Levin funds by state parties. While preserving parties' associational freedom is important, not every minor restriction on parties' otherwise unrestrained ability to associate is of constitutional dimension. See Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 450, n. 11. Given the delicate and interconnected regulatory scheme at issue here, any associational burdens imposed by the Levin Amendment restrictions are far outweighed by the need to prevent circumvention of the entire scheme. Pp. 63-65. </s> (iii)The evidence supporting the argument that the Levin Amendment prevents parties from amassing the resources needed to engage in effective advocacy is speculative. The history of campaign finance regulation proves that political parties are extraordinarily flexible in adapting to new restrictions on their fundraising abilities. Moreover, the mere fact that §323(b) may reduce the money available to state and local parties to fund federal election activities is largely inconsequential. The question is not whether the amount available over previous election cycles is reduced, but whether the reduction is so radical as to drive the sound of the recipient's voice below the level of notice. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S., at 397. If state or local parties can make such a showing, as-applied challenges remain available. Pp. 65-66. </s> (d)New FECA §323(d)--which forbids national, state, and local party committees and their agents to "solicit any funds for, or make or direct any donations" to §501(c) tax exempt organizations that make expenditures in connection with a federal election, and to §527 political organizations "other than a political committee, a State, district, or local committee of a political party, or the authorized campaign committee of a candidate for State or local office," 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(d)--is not facially invalid. Pp. 66-73. </s> (1)Section 323(d)'s restriction on solicitations is a valid anti-circumvention measure. Absent this provision, national, state, and local party committees would have significant incentives to mobilize their formidable fundraising apparatuses, including the peddling of access to federal officeholders, into the service of like-minded tax-exempt organizations that conduct activities benefiting their candidates. All of the corruption and the appearance of corruption attendant on the operation of those fundraising apparatuses would follow. Plaintiffs' argument that §323(d)'s solicitations ban cannot be squared with §323(e), which allows federal candidates and officeholders to solicit limited soft-money donations to tax-exempt organizations engaged in federal election activities, is not persuasive. If §323(d)'s solicitation restriction is otherwise valid, it is not rendered unconstitutional by the mere fact that Congress chose not to regulate the activities of another group as stringently as it might have. See National Right to Work, 459 U.S., at 210. Furthermore, the difference between the two provisions is explained by the fact that national party officers, unlike federal candidates and officeholders, remain free to solicit soft money on behalf of nonprofit organizations in their individual capacities. Given §323(e)'s tight content, source, and amount restrictions on soft-money solicitations by federal candidates and officeholders, as well as the less rigorous standard of review, §323(e)'s greater solicitation allowances do not render §323(d)'s solicitation restriction facially invalid. Pp. 67-71. </s> (2)Section 323(d)'s restriction on donations to qualifying §501(c) or §527 organizations is a valid anticircumvention measure insofar as it prohibits donations of funds not already raised in compliance with FECA. Absent such a restriction, state and local party committees could accomplish directly what the antisolicitation restrictions prevent them from doing indirectly--raising large sums of soft money to launder through tax-exempt organizations engaging in federal election activities. Although the ban raises overbreadth concerns if read to restrict donations from a party's federal account--i.e., funds already raised in compliance with FECA's source, amount, and disclosure limitations--these concerns do not require that the facial challenge be sustained, given this Court's obligation to construe a statute, if possible, in such a way as to avoid constitutional questions, see, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62. Because the record does not compel the conclusion that Congress intended "donations" to include donations from a party's hard-money account, and because of the constitutional infirmities such an interpretation would raise, the Court narrowly construes §323(d)'s ban to apply only to donations of funds not raised in compliance with FECA. Pp. 71-73. </s> (e)New FECA §323(e)--which, with many exceptions, forbids federal candidates and officeholders to "solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend" soft money in connection with federal elections, 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(e)(1)(A), and limits their ability to do so for state and local elections, §441i(e)(1)(B)--does not violate the First Amendment. No party seriously questions the constitutionality of the general ban on soft-money donations directly to federal candidates and officeholders and their agents. By severing the most direct link to the soft-money donor, the ban is closely drawn to prevent the corruption or the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders. The solicitation restrictions are valid anticircumvention measures. Even before BCRA's passage, federal candidates and officeholders solicited donations to state and local parties, as well as tax-exempt organizations, in order to help their own, as well as their party's, electoral cause. See Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 458. The incentives to do so will only increase with Title I's restrictions on the raising and spending of soft money by national, state, and local parties. Section 323(e) addresses these concerns while accommodating the individual speech and associational rights of federal candidates and officeholders. Pp. 74-77. </s> (f)New FECA §323(f)--which forbids state and local candidates or officeholders to raise and spend soft money to fund ads and other "public communications" that promote or attack federal candidates, 2 U.S.C. §442i(f)--is a valid anticircumvention provision. The section places no cap on the funds that such candidates can spend on any activity, but, rather, limits only the source and amount of contributions that they can draw on to fund expenditures that directly impact federal elections. And, by regulating only contributions used to fund "public communications," the section focuses narrowly on those soft-money donations with the greatest potential to corrupt or give rise to the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders. Plaintiffs' principal arguments against the section--(1) that the definition of "public communications" as communications that support or attack a clearly identified federal candidate is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; and (2) that soft-money contributions to state and local candidates for "public communications" do not corrupt or appear to corrupt federal candidates--are rejected. Pp. 77-78. </s> 2.Several plaintiffs argue unpersuasively that BCRA Title I exceeds Congress' Election Clause authority to "make or alter" rules governing federal elections, U.S. Const., Art. I, §4, and violates constitutional federalism principles by impairing the States' authority to regulate their own elections. In examining federal Acts for Tenth Amendment infirmity, the Court focuses on whether States and state officials are commandeered to carry out federal regulatory schemes. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898. By contrast, Title I only regulates private parties' conduct, imposing no requirements upon States or state officials. And, because it does not expressly pre-empt state legislation, Title I leaves States free to enforce their own restrictions on state electoral campaign financing. Moreover, while this Court has policed the absolute boundaries of Congress' Article I power, see, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, plaintiffs offer no reason to believe that Congress has overstepped its Elections Clause power in enacting BCRA. Indeed, as already found, Title I is closely drawn to match Congress' important interest in preventing the corruption or the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders. That interest is sufficient to ground Congress' exercise of its Elections Clause power. Pp. 79-80. </s> 3.Also rejected is the argument that BCRA Title I violates equal protection by discriminating against political parties in favor of special interest groups, which remain free to raise soft money to fund voter registration, GOTV activities, mailings, and broadcast advertising (other than electioneering communications). First, BCRA actually favors political parties in many ways, e.g., by allowing party committees to receive individual contributions substantially exceeding FECA limits on contributions to nonparty political committees. More importantly, Congress is fully entitled to consider the salient, real-world differences between parties and interest groups when crafting a campaign finance regulation system, see National Right to Work, 459 U.S., at 210, including the fact that parties have influence and power in the legislature vastly exceeding any interest group's. Taken seriously, plaintiffs' equal protection arguments would call into question not just BCRA Title I, but much of FECA's pre-existing structure. Pp. 82-85. </s> 4.Accordingly, the judgment below is affirmed insofar as it upheld §§323(e) and 323(f) and reversed insofar as it invalidated §§323(a), 323(b), and 323(d). P. 82. </s> 5.The District Court's judgment is affirmed to the extent that it upheld the disclosure requirements in amended FECA §304 and rejected the facial attack on the provisions relating to donors of $1,000 or more, but reversed to the extent that it invalidated FECA §304(f)(5). Pp. 82-95. </s> (a)BCRA §201 comprehensively amends FECA §304, which requires political committees to file detailed periodic financial reports with the FEC. The narrowing construction adopted in Buckley limited FECA's disclosure requirement to communications expressly advocating the election or defeat of particular candidates. BCRA adopts a new term, "electioneering communication," which encompasses any "broadcast, cable, or satellite communication" that clearly identifies a candidate for federal office, airs within a specific time period (e.g., within 60 days of a general election and 30 days of a primary), and is targeted to the relevant electorate. 2 U.S.C.A. §434(f)(3)(A)(i). BCRA also amends §304 to provide disclosure requirements for persons who fund electioneering communications (and BCRA §203 amends FECA §316(b)(2) to extend those requirements to corporations and labor unions). </s> Plaintiffs challenge the new term's constitutionality as it applies to both disclosures and expenditures, arguing primarily that Buckley drew a constitutionally mandated line between express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy, and that speakers have an inviolable First Amendment right to engage in the latter category of speech. However, a plain reading of Buckley and Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (MCFL), shows that the express advocacy restriction is a product of statutory interpretation, not a constitutional command. Both the concept of express advocacy and the class of magic words were born of an effort to avoid constitutional problems of vagueness and overbreadth in the statute before the Buckley Court. Consistent with the principle that a constitutional rule should never be formulated more broadly than required by the facts to which it is to be applied, Buckley and MCFL were specific to the statutory language before the Court and in no way drew a constitutional boundary that forever fixed the permissible scope of provisions regulating campaign-related speech. The notion that the First Amendment erects a rigid barrier between express and issue advocacy also cannot be squared with this Court's longstanding recognition that the presence or absence of magic words cannot meaningfully distinguish electioneering speech from a true issue ad. Buckley's express advocacy line has not aided the legislative effort to combat real or apparent corruption, and Congress enacted BCRA to correct the flaws it found. Finally, because the components of new FECA §304(f)(3)'s definition of "electioneering communication" are both easily understood and objectively determinable, the vagueness objection that persuaded the Buckley Court to limit FECA's reach to express advocacy is inapposite here. Pp. 82-88. </s> (b)With regard to plaintiffs' other concerns about the use of the phrase "electioneering communication," the District Court correctly rejected their submission that new FECA §304 unnecessarily requires disclosure of the names of persons who contributed $1,000 or more to the individual or group paying for the communication, but erred in finding §304(f)(5) invalid because it mandates disclosure of executory contracts for communications that have not yet aired. Because the important state interests identified in Buckley--providing the electorate with information, deterring actual corruption and avoiding its appearance, and gathering data necessary to enforce more substantive electioneering restrictions--apply in full to BCRA, Buckley amply supports application of FECA §304's disclosure requirements to the entire range of "electioneering communications." Buckley also forecloses a facial attack on the new §304 provision that requires disclosure of the names of persons who contribute $1,000 or more to segregated funds or spend more than $10,000 in a calendar year on electioneering communications. Under Buckley's standard of proof, the evidence here did not establish the requisite reasonable probability of harm to any plaintiff group or its members resulting from compelled disclosure. However, the rejection of this facial challenge does not foreclose possible future challenges to particular applications of that disclosure requirement. </s> This Court is also unpersuaded by plaintiffs' challenge to new FECA §304(f)(5)'s requirement regarding the disclosure of executory contracts. The new provision mandates disclosure only when a person makes disbursements totaling more than $10,000 in any calendar year to pay for electioneering communications. Given the relatively short time frames in which such communications are made, the interest in assuring that disclosures are made in time to provide relevant information to voters is significant. Yet fixing the deadline for filing disclosure statements based on the date when aggregate disbursements exceed $10,000 would open a significant loophole without the advance disclosure requirement, for political supporters could avoid preelection disclosures about ads slated to run during a campaign's final weeks simply by making a preelection downpayment of less than $10,000, with the balance payable after the election. The record contains little evidence of any harm that might flow from the requirement's enforcement, and the District Court's speculation about such harm cannot outweigh the public interest in ensuring full disclosure before an election actually takes place. Pp. 88-95. </s> 6.The District Court's judgment is affirmed insofar as it held that plaintiffs advanced no basis for finding unconstitutional BCRA §202, which amends FECA §315(a)(7)(C) to provide that disbursements for electioneering communications that are coordinated with a candidate or party will be treated as contributions to, and expenditures by, that candidate or party, 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(a)(7)(C). That provision clarifies the scope of §315(a)(7)(B), which provides that expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of a candidate or party constitute contributions. BCRA pre-empts a possible claim that the term "expenditure" in §315(a)(7)(B) is limited to spending for express advocacy. Because Buckley's narrow interpretation of that term was only a statutory limitation on Congress' power to regulate federal elections, there is no reason why Congress may not treat coordinated disbursements for electioneering communications in the same way it treats other coordinated expenditures. Pp. 96-97. </s> 7.The District Court's judgment is affirmed to the extent that it upheld the constitutionality of new FECA §316(b)(2), and reversed to the extent that it invalidated any part of that section. BCRA §203 extends to all "electioneering communications" FECA §316(b)(2)'s restrictions on the use of corporate and union general treasury funds. 2 U.S.C.A. §441b(b)(2). Because those entities may still organize and administer segregated funds, or PACs, for such communications, the provision is a regulation of, not a ban on, expression. Beaumont, 539 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 15). This Court's consideration of plaintiffs' claim that the expanded regulation is both overinclusive and underinclusive is informed by the conclusion that the distinction between express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy is not constitutionally compelled. Thus, the Court examines the degree to which BCRA burdens First Amendment expression and evaluates whether a compelling governmental interest justifies that burden. Plaintiffs have not carried their burden of proving that new FECA §316(b)(2) is overbroad. They argue that the justifications that adequately support regulation of express advocacy do not apply to significant quantities of speech encompassed by the electioneering communications definition. That argument fails to the extent that issue ads broadcast during the 30- and 60-day periods preceding federal primary and general elections are the functional equivalent of express advocacy. The justifications for regulating express advocacy apply equally to those ads if they have an electioneering purpose, which the vast majority do. Also rejected is plaintiffs' argument that new FECA §316(b)(2)'s segregated-fund requirement is underinclusive because it does not apply to print or Internet advertising. The record here reflects that corporations and unions used soft money to finance a virtual torrent of televised election-related ads during the relevant period. Congress justifiably concluded that remedial legislation was needed to stanch that flow of money. Finally, §304(f)(3)(B)(i), which excludes news items and commentary from the electioneering communications definition, is wholly consistent with First Amendment principles as applied to the media. Pp. 97-103. </s> 8.The District Court's judgment is affirmed to the extent that it upheld new FECA §316(c)(6), as limited to nonprofit entities that are not so-called MCFL organizations. BCRA §204, which adds §316(c)(6), 2 U.S.C.A. §441b(c)(2), extends to nonprofit corporations the prohibition on the use of general treasury funds to pay for electioneering communications. This Court upheld a similar restriction in Beaumont, supra, except as it applied to organizations that are formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideas, have no shareholders, are not established by a business corporation or labor union, and do not accept contributions from those entities, MCFL, 479 U.S., at 264. The same constitutional objection to applying the pre-BCRA restrictions to such organizations necessarily applies with equal force to FECA §316(c)(6). That §316(c)(6) does not, on its face, exempt MCFL organizations is not a sufficient reason to invalidate it. This Court presumes that the legislators were fully aware that the provision could not apply to MCFL-type entities, and the Government concedes that it does not. As so construed, the provision is plainly valid. Pp. 103-106. </s> 9.Because this Court has already found BCRA §201's executory contract disclosure requirement constitutional, plaintiffs' challenge to a similar disclosure requirement in BCRA §212, which added FECA §304(g), 2 U.S.C.A. §434, is essentially moot. Pp. 106-107. </s> 10.The District Court's judgment is affirmed to the extent that it invalidated BCRA §213, which amends FECA §315(d)(4) to require political parties to choose between coordinated and independent expenditures during the postnomination, preelection period. 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(d)(4). That provision places an unconstitutional burden on the parties' right to make unlimited independent expenditures. Although the category of burdened speech is limited to independent expenditures for express advocacy--and therefore is relatively small--it plainly is entitled to First Amendment protection. The governmental interest in requiring parties to avoid using magic words is not sufficient to support the burden imposed by §315(d)(4). The fact that the provision is cast as a choice rather than an outright prohibition on independent expenditures does not make it constitutional. Pp. 107-114. </s> 11.The District Court's judgment is affirmed to the extent that it rejected plaintiffs' challenges to BCRA §214, which adds FECA §315(a)(7)(B)(ii), 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(a)(7)(b)(ii). FECA §315(a)(7)(B)(i) long has provided that expenditures that are controlled by or coordinated with a candidate will be treated as contributions to the candidate. BCRA §214(a) extends that rule to expenditures coordinated with political parties; and §§214 (b) and (c) direct the FEC to promulgate new regulations that do not "require agreement or formal collaboration to establish coordination," 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(a) note. FECA §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) is not overbroad simply because it permits a finding of coordination in the absence of a pre-existing agreement. Congress has always treated expenditures made after a wink or nod as coordinated. Nor does the absence of an agreement requirement render §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) unconstitutionally vague. An agreement has never been required under §315(a)(7)(B)(i), which uses precisely the same language as the new provision to address coordination with candidates, and which has survived without constitutional challenge for almost three decades. Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that that the definition has chilled political speech, and have made no attempt to explain how an agreement requirement would prevent the FEC from engaging in what they fear will be intrusive and politically motivated investigations. Finally, in this facial challenge to BCRA, plaintiffs' challenge to §§214(b) and (c) is not ripe to the extent that they allege constitutional infirmities in the FEC's new regulations rather than the statute. Pp. 114-119. </s> The Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to miscellaneous BCRA Title III and IV provisions, concluding that the District Court's judgment with respect to these provisions must be affirmed. Pp.2-11. </s> 1.The plaintiffs' challenges to BCRA §305, §307, and the millionaire provisions are nonjusticiable. Pp.2-8. </s> (a)The McConnell plaintiffs lack standing to challenge BCRA §305, which amends the federal Communications Act of 1934 requirement that, 45 days before a primary or 60 days before a general election, broadcast stations sell air time to a qualified candidate at their "lowest unit charge," 47 U.S.C. §315(b). Section 305's amendment, in turn, denies a candidate the benefit of that charge in specified circumstances. 47 U.S.C.A. §§315(b)(2)(A), (C). Senator McConnell's testimony that he plans to run ads critical of his opponents and had run them in the past is too remote temporally to satisfy the Article III standing requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate an "injury in fact" that is "actual or imminent," Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 158, given that the lowest unit charge requirement is not available until 45 days before a primary, that Senator McConnell's current term does not expire until 2009, and that, therefore, the earliest day he could be affected by §305 is 45 days before the 2008 Republican primary election. Pp.2-4. </s> (b)The Adams and Paul plaintiffs lack standing to challenge BCRA §307, which amends FECA §315(a)(1) to increase and index for inflation certain contribution limits. Neither injury alleged by the Adams plaintiffs, a group of voters, voter organizations, and candidates, is sufficient to confer standing. First, their assertion that §307 deprives them of an equal ability to participate in the election process based on their economic status does not satisfy the standing requirement that a plaintiff's alleged injury be an invasion of a concrete and particularized legally protected interest, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, since political "free trade" does not necessarily require that all who participate in the political marketplace do so with exactly equal resources, e.g., MCFL, 529 U.S. 765, 771, since, even if the Court were to strike down BCRA §307's increases and indexes, as they ask, both FECA's contribution limits and an exemption for institutional news media would remain unchanged. Pp.4-8. </s> (c)The Adams plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the so-called "millionaire provisions," BCRA §§304, 315, and 316, which provide for a series of staggered increases in otherwise applicable contribution-to-candidate limits if the candidate's opponent spends a triggering amount of his personal funds, and eliminate the coordinated expenditure limits in certain circumstances. Because these plaintiffs allege the same injuries that they alleged with regard to BCRA §307, they fail to state a cognizable injury that is fairly traceable to BCRA. Additionally, none of them is a candidate in an election affected by the millionaire provisions, and it would be purely conjectural to assume that any of them ever will be. P.8. </s> 2.The District Court's decision upholding BCRA §311's expansion of FECA §318(a) to include mandatory electioneering-communications-disbursements disclosure is affirmed because such inclusion bears a sufficient relationship to the important governmental interest of "shed[ding] the light of publicity" on campaign financing, Buckley, 424 U.S., at 81. Assuming, as the Court must, that FECA §318 is valid both to begin with and as amended by BCRA §311's amendments other than the electioneering-communications inclusion, the latter inclusion is not itself unconstitutional. P.9. </s> 3.BCRA §318--which forbids individuals "17 years old or younger" to make contributions to candidates and political parties, 2 U.S.C.A. §441k--violates the First Amendment rights of minors, see, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511-513. Because limitations on an individual's political contributions impinge on the freedoms of expression and association, see Buckley, 424 U.S., at 20-22, the Court applies heightened scrutiny to such a limitation, asking whether it is justified by a "sufficiently important interest" and "closely drawn" to avoid unnecessary abridgment of the First Amendment, see e.g., post, at 25-26 (joint opinion of Stevens and O'Connor, JJ.). The Government offers scant evidence for its assertion that §318 protects against corruption by conduit--i.e., donations by parents through their minor children to circumvent contribution limits applicable to the parents. Absent a more convincing case of the claimed evil, this interest is simply too attenuated for §318 to withstand heightened scrutiny. See Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S., at 391. Even assuming, arguendo, the Government advances an important interest, the provision is overinclusive, as shown by the States' adoption of more tailored approaches. Pp.9-11. </s> 4.Because the FEC clearly has standing, the Court need not address whether the intervenor-defendants, whose position here is identical to the FEC's, were properly granted intervention pursuant to, inter alia, BCRA §403(b). See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 431-432, n.19. P.11. </s> Justice Breyer delivered the Court's opinion with respect to BCRA Title V--§504 of which amends the Communications Act of 1934 to require broadcasters to keep publicly available records of politically related broadcasting requests, 47 U.S.C.A. §315(e)--concluding that the portion of the judgment below invalidating §504 as facially violative of the First Amendment must be reversed. Pp.2-15. </s> 1.Section 504's "candidate request" requirements--which call for broadcasters to keep records of broadcast requests "made by or on behalf of any ... candidate," 47 U.S.C.A. §315(e)(1)(A)--are upheld. They are virtually identical to those contained in a longstanding FCC regulation. The McConnell plaintiffs' argument that the requirements are intolerably burdensome and invasive is rejected. The FCC has consistently estimated that its regulation imposes upon a licensee a comparatively small additional administrative burden. Moreover, the §504 requirement is supported by significant governmental interests in verifying that licensees comply with their obligations to allow political candidates "equal time," 47 U.S.C. §315(a), and to sell such time at the "lowest unit charge," §315(b); in evaluating whether they are processing candidate requests in an evenhanded fashion to help assure broadcasting fairness, §315(a); in making the public aware of how much candidates spend on broadcast messages; 2 U.S.C.A. §434; and in providing an independently compiled set of data for verifying candidates' compliance with BCRA's and FECA's disclosure requirements and source limitations, ibid. Because the Court cannot, on the present record, find the longstanding FCC regulation unconstitutional, it cannot strike down BCRA §504's "candidate request" provision, which simply embodies the regulation in a statute, thereby blocking any agency attempt to repeal it. Pp.3-7. </s> 2.Because §504's "candidate request" requirements are constitutional, its "election message" requirements--which serve similar governmental interests and impose only a small incremental burden in requiring broadcasters to keep records of requests (made by anyone) to broadcast "message[s]" that refer either to a "legally qualified candidate" or to "any election to Federal office," 47 U.S.C.A. §§315(e)(1)(B)(i), (ii)--must be constitutional as well. Pp.8-9. </s> 3.BCRA §504's "issue request" requirements--which call for broadcasters to keep records of requests (made by anyone) to broadcast "message[s]" related to a "national legislative issue of public importance," 47 U.S.C.A. §315(e)(1)(B)(iii), or a "political matter of national importance," §315(e)(1)(B)--survive the McConnell plaintiffs' facial challenge. These recordkeeping requirements seem likely to help determine whether broadcasters are fulfilling their obligations under the FCC's regulations to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on important public issues or whether they too heavily favor entertainment, discriminating against public affairs broadcasts. The plaintiffs' claim that the above-quoted statutory language is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad is unpersuasive, given that it is no more general than language Congress has used to impose other obligations upon broadcasters and is roughly comparable to other BCRA language upheld in this litigation. Whether the "issue request" requirements impose disproportionate administrative burdens will depend on how the FCC interprets and applies them. The parties remain free to challenge the provisions, as interpreted by the FCC's regulations, or as otherwise applied. Without the greater information any such challenge will likely provide, the Court cannot say that the provisions' administrative burdens are so great, or their justifications so minimal, as to warrant finding them facially unconstitutional. Similarly, the argument that the "issue request" requirement will force the purchasers to disclose information revealing their political strategies to opponents does not show that BCRA §504 is facially unconstitutional, but the plaintiffs remain free to raise this argument when §504 is applied. Pp.9-12. Stevens and O'Connor, JJ., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to BCRA Titles I and II, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, in which O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined, in which Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined except with respect to BCRA §305, and in which Thomas, J., joined with respect to BCRA §§304, 305, 307, 316, 319, and 403(b). Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to BCRA Title V, in which Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I and V, and concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Title II. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, except for BCRA §§311 and 318, concurring in the result with respect to BCRA §318, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Title II, and dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I, V, and §311, in which opinion Scalia, J., joined as to Parts I, II-A, and II-B. Kennedy, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Titles I and II, in which Rehnquist, C.J., joined, in which Scalia, J., joined except to the extent the opinion upholds new FECA §323(e) and BCRA §202, and in which Thomas, J., joined with respect to BCRA §213. Rehnquist, C.J., filed an opinion dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I and V, in which Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion dissenting with respect to BCRA §305, in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1674v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1675v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1676v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> JOHN McCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1702v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1727v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC., etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1733v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPELLANTS </s> 02-1734v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1740v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> RON PAUL, UNITED STATES CONGRESSMAN, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1747v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1753v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1755v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1756v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal. on appeals from the united states district court for the district of columbia [December 10, 2003] </s> Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to BCRA Titles I and II.** </s> The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), 116 Stat. 81, contains a series of amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), 86 Stat. 11, as amended, 2 U.S.C.A. §431 et seq. (main ed. and Supp. 2003), the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1088, as amended, 47 U.S.C.A. §315, and other portions of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C.A. §607 (Supp. 2003), 36 U.S.C.A. §§510-511, that are challenged in these cases.1 In this opinion we discuss Titles I and II of BCRA. The opinion of the Court delivered by The Chief Justice, post, p.___, discusses Titles III and IV, and the opinion of the Court delivered by Justice Breyer, post, p. ___, discusses Title V. I </s> More than a century ago the "sober-minded Elihu Root" advocated legislation that would prohibit political contributions by corporations in order to prevent "'the great aggregations of wealth, from using their corporate funds, directly or indirectly,'" to elect legislators who would "'vote for their protection and the advancement of their interests as against those of the public.'" United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 571 (1957) (quoting E. Root, Addresses on Government and Citizenship 143 (R. Bacon & J. Scott eds. 1916)). In Root's opinion, such legislation would "'strik[e] at a constantly growing evil which has done more to shake the confidence of the plain people of small means of this country in our political institutions than any other practice which has ever obtained since the foundation of our Government.'" 352 U.S., at 571. The Congress of the United States has repeatedly enacted legislation endorsing Root's judgment. BCRA is the most recent federal enactment designed "to purge national politics of what was conceived to be the pernicious influence of 'big money' campaign contributions." Id., at 572. As Justice Frankfurter explained in his opinion for the Court in Automobile Workers, the first such enactment responded to President Theodore Roosevelt's call for legislation forbidding all contributions by corporations "'to any political committee or for any political purpose.'" Ibid. (quoting 40 Cong. Rec. 96 (1906)). In his annual message to Congress in December 1905, President Roosevelt stated that "'directors should not be permitted to use stockholders' money'" for political purposes, and he recommended that "'a prohibition'" on corporate political contributions "'would be, as far as it went, an effective method of stopping the evils aimed at in corrupt practices acts.'" 352 U.S., at 352. The resulting 1907 statute completely banned corporate contributions of "money ... in connection with" any federal election. Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864. Congress soon amended the statute to require the public disclosure of certain contributions and expenditures and to place "maximum limits on the amounts that congressional candidates could spend in seeking nomination and election." Automobile Workers, supra, at 575-576. </s> In 1925 Congress extended the prohibition of "contributions" "to include 'anything of value,' and made acceptance of a corporate contribution as well as the giving of such a contribution a crime." Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209 (1982) (citing Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1925, §§301, 313, 43 Stat. 1070, 1074). During the debates preceding that amendment, a leading Senator characterized "'the apparent hold on political parties which business interests and certain organizations seek and sometimes obtain by reason of liberal campaign contributions'" as "'one of the great political evils of the time.'" Automobile Workers, supra, at 576 (quoting 65 Cong. Rec. 9507-9508 (1924)). We upheld the amended statute against a constitutional challenge, observing that "[t]he power of Congress to protect the election of President and Vice President from corruption being clear, the choice of means to that end presents a question primarily addressed to the judgment of Congress." Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547 (1934). </s> Congress' historical concern with the "political potentialities of wealth" and their "untoward consequences for the democratic process," Automobile Workers, supra, at 577-578, has long reached beyond corporate money. During and shortly after World War II, Congress reacted to the "enormous financial outlays" made by some unions in connection with national elections. 352 U.S., at 579. Congress first restricted union contributions in the Hatch Act, 18 U.S.C. §610,2 and it later prohibited "union contributions in connection with federal elections ... altogether." National Right to Work, supra, at 209 (citing War Labor Disputes Act (Smith-Connally Anti-Strike Act), ch. 144, §9, 57 Stat. 167). Congress subsequently extended that prohibition to cover unions' election-related expenditures as well as contributions, and it broadened the coverage of federal campaigns to include both primary and general elections. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136. See Automobile Workers, supra, at 578-584. During the consideration of those measures, legislators repeatedly voiced their concerns regarding the pernicious influence of large campaign contributions. See 93 Cong. Rec. 3428, 3522 (1947); H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); S.Rep. No. 1, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1947); H.R. Rep. No. 2093, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1945). As we noted in a unanimous opinion recalling this history, Congress' "careful legislative adjustment of the federal election laws, in a 'cautious advance, step by step,' to account for the particular legal and economic attributes of corporations and labor organizations warrants considerable deference." National Right to Work, 352 U.S., at 209 (citations omitted). </s> In early 1972 Congress continued its steady improvement of the national election laws by enacting FECA, 86 Stat. 3. As first enacted, that statute required disclosure of all contributions exceeding $100 and of expenditures by candidates and political committees that spent more than $1,000 per year. Id., at 11-19. It also prohibited contributions made in the name of another person, id., at 19, and by Government contractors, id., at 10. The law ratified the earlier prohibition on the use of corporate and union general treasury funds for political contributions and expenditures, but it expressly permitted corporations and unions to establish and administer separate segregated funds (commonly known as political action committees, or PACs) for election-related contributions and expenditures. Id., at 12-13.3 See Pipefitters v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 409-410 (1972). </s> As the 1972 presidential elections made clear, however, FECA's passage did not deter unseemly fundraising and campaign practices. Evidence of those practices persuaded Congress to enact the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 1263. Reviewing a constitutional challenge to the amendments, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit described them as "by far the most comprehensive ... reform legislation [ever] passed by Congress concerning the election of the President, Vice-President and members of Congress." Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 831 (1975) (en banc) (per curiam). </s> The 1974 amendments closed the loophole that had allowed candidates to use an unlimited number of political committees for fundraising purposes and thereby to circumvent the limits on individual committees' receipts and disbursements. They also limited individual political contributions to any single candidate to $1,000 per election, with an overall annual limitation of $25,000 by any contributor; imposed ceilings on spending by candidates and political parties for national conventions; required reporting and public disclosure of contributions and expenditures exceeding certain limits; and established the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to administer and enforce the legislation. Id., at 831-834. </s> The Court of Appeals upheld the 1974 amendments almost in their entirety.4 It concluded that the clear and compelling interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process provided a sufficient basis for sustaining the substantive provisions of the Act. Id., at 841. The court's opinion relied heavily on findings that large contributions facilitated access to public officials5 and described methods of evading the contribution limits that had enabled contributors of massive sums to avoid disclosure. Id., at 837-841.6 </s> The Court of Appeals upheld the provisions establishing contribution and expenditure limitations on the theory that they should be viewed as regulations of conduct rather than speech. Id., at 840-841 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-377 (1968)). This Court, however, concluded that each set of limitations raised serious--though different--concerns under the First Amendment. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-23 (1976) (per curiam). We treated the limitations on candidate and individual expenditures as direct restraints on speech, but we observed that the contribution limitations, in contrast, imposed only "a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication." Id., at 20-21. Considering the "deeply disturbing examples" of corruption related to candidate contributions discussed in the Court of Appeals' opinion, we determined that limiting contributions served an interest in protecting "the integrity of our system of representative democracy." Id., at 26-27. In the end, the Act's primary purpose--"to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions"--provided "a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000 contribution limitation." Id., at 26. </s> We prefaced our analysis of the $1,000 limitation on expenditures by observing that it broadly encompassed every expenditure "'relative to a clearly identified candidate.'" Id., at 39 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §608(e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV)). To avoid vagueness concerns we construed that phrase to apply only to "communications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office." 424 U.S., at 42-44. We concluded, however, that as so narrowed, the provision would not provide effective protection against the dangers of quid pro quo arrangements, because persons and groups could eschew expenditures that expressly advocated the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate while remaining "free to spend as much as they want to promote the candidate and his views." Id., at 45. We also rejected the argument that the expenditure limits were necessary to prevent attempts to circumvent the Act's contribution limits, because FECA already treated expenditures controlled by or coordinated with the candidate as contributions, and we were not persuaded that independent expenditures posed the same risk of real or apparent corruption as coordinated expenditures. Id., at 46-47. We therefore held that Congress' interest in preventing real or apparent corruption was inadequate to justify the heavy burdens on the freedoms of expression and association that the expenditure limits imposed. </s> We upheld all of the disclosure and reporting requirements in the Act that were challenged on appeal to this Court after finding that they vindicated three important interests: providing the electorate with relevant information about the candidates and their supporters; deterring actual corruption and discouraging the use of money for improper purposes; and facilitating enforcement of the prohibitions in the Act. Id., at 66-68. In order to avoid an overbreadth problem, however, we placed the same narrowing construction on the term "expenditure" in the disclosure context that we had adopted in the context of the expenditure limitations. Thus, we construed the reporting requirement for persons making expenditures of more than $100 in a year "to reach only funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate." Id., at 80 (footnote omitted). </s> Our opinion in Buckley addressed issues that primarily related to contributions and expenditures by individuals, since none of the parties challenged the prohibition on contributions by corporations and labor unions. We noted, however, that the statute authorized the use of corporate and union resources to form and administer segregated funds that could be used for political purposes. Id., at 28-29, n.31; see also n.3, supra. </s> Three important developments in the years after our decision in Buckley persuaded Congress that further legislation was necessary to regulate the role that corporations, unions, and wealthy contributors play in the electoral process. As a preface to our discussion of the specific provisions of BCRA, we comment briefly on the increased importance of "soft money," the proliferation of "issue ads," and the disturbing findings of a Senate investigation into campaign practices related to the 1996 federal elections. Soft Money </s> Under FECA, "contributions" must be made with funds that are subject to the Act's disclosure requirements and source and amount limitations. Such funds are known as "federal" or "hard" money. FECA defines the term "contribution," however, to include only the gift or advance of anything of value "made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office." 2 U.S.C. §431(8)(A)(i) (emphasis added). Donations made solely for the purpose of influencing state or local elections are therefore unaffected by FECA's requirements and prohibitions. As a result, prior to the enactment of BCRA, federal law permitted corporations and unions, as well as individuals who had already made the maximum permissible contributions to federal candidates, to contribute "nonfederal money"--also known as "soft money"--to political parties for activities intended to influence state or local elections. Shortly after Buckley was decided, questions arose concerning the treatment of contributions intended to influence both federal and state elections. Although a literal reading of FECA's definition of "contribution" would have required such activities to be funded with hard money, the FEC ruled that political parties could fund mixed-purpose activities--including get-out-the-vote drives and generic party advertising--in part with soft money.7 In 1995 the FEC concluded that the parties could also use soft money to defray the costs of "legislative advocacy media advertisements," even if the ads mentioned the name of a federal candidate, so long as they did not expressly advocate the candidate's election or defeat. FEC Advisory Op. 1995-25. </s> As the permissible uses of soft money expanded, the amount of soft money raised and spent by the national political parties increased exponentially. Of the two major parties' total spending, soft money accounted for 5% ($21.6 million) in 1984, 11% ($45 million) in 1988, 16% ($80 million) in 1992, 30% ($272 million) in 1996, and 42% ($498 million) in 2000.8 The national parties transferred large amounts of their soft money to the state parties, which were allowed to use a larger percentage of soft money to finance mixed-purpose activities under FEC rules.9 In the year 2000, for example, the national parties diverted $280 million--more than half of their soft money--to state parties. </s> Many contributions of soft money were dramatically larger than the contributions of hard money permitted by FECA. For example, in 1996 the top five corporate soft-money donors gave, in total, more than $9 million in nonfederal funds to the two national party committees.10 In the most recent election cycle the political parties raised almost $300 million--60% of their total soft-money fundraising--from just 800 donors, each of which contributed a minimum of $120,000.11 Moreover, the largest corporate donors often made substantial contributions to both parties.12 Such practices corroborate evidence indicating that many corporate contributions were motivated by a desire for access to candidates and a fear of being placed at a disadvantage in the legislative process relative to other contributors, rather than by ideological support for the candidates and parties.13 </s> Not only were such soft-money contributions often designed to gain access to federal candidates, but they were in many cases solicited by the candidates themselves. Candidates often directed potential donors to party committees and tax-exempt organizations that could legally accept soft money. For example, a federal legislator running for reelection solicited soft money from a supporter by advising him that even though he had already "contributed the legal maximum" to the campaign committee, he could still make an additional contribution to a joint program supporting federal, state, and local candidates of his party.14 Such solicitations were not uncommon.15 </s> The solicitation, transfer, and use of soft money thus enabled parties and candidates to circumvent FECA's limitations on the source and amount of contributions in connection with federal elections. Issue Advertising </s> In Buckley we construed FECA's disclosure and reporting requirements, as well as its expenditure limitations, "to reach only funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate." 424 U.S., at 80 (footnote omitted). As a result of that strict reading of the statute, the use or omission of "magic words" such as "Elect John Smith" or "Vote Against Jane Doe" marked a bright statutory line separating "express advocacy" from "issue advocacy." See id., at 44, n. 52. Express advocacy was subject to FECA's limitations and could be financed only using hard money. The political parties, in other words, could not use soft money to sponsor ads that used any magic words, and corporations and unions could not fund such ads out of their general treasuries. So-called issue ads, on the other hand, not only could be financed with soft money, but could be aired without disclosing the identity of, or any other information about, their sponsors. While the distinction between "issue" and express advocacy seemed neat in theory, the two categories of advertisements proved functionally identical in important respects. Both were used to advocate the election or defeat of clearly identified federal candidates, even though the so-called issue ads eschewed the use of magic words.16 Little difference existed, for example, between an ad that urged viewers to "vote against Jane Doe" and one that condemned Jane Doe's record on a particular issue before exhorting viewers to "call Jane Doe and tell her what you think."17 Indeed, campaign professionals testified that the most effective campaign ads, like the most effective commercials for products such as Coca-Cola, should, and did, avoid the use of the magic words.18 Moreover, the conclusion that such ads were specifically intended to affect election results was confirmed by the fact that almost all of them aired in the 60 days immediately preceding a federal election.19 Corporations and unions spent hundreds of millions of dollars of their general funds to pay for these ads,20 and those expenditures, like soft-money donations to the political parties, were unregulated under FECA. Indeed, the ads were attractive to organizations and candidates precisely because they were beyond FECA's reach, enabling candidates and their parties to work closely with friendly interest groups to sponsor so-called issue ads when the candidates themselves were running out of money.21 </s> Because FECA's disclosure requirements did not apply to so-called issue ads, sponsors of such ads often used misleading names to conceal their identity. "Citizens for Better Medicare," for instance, was not a grassroots organization of citizens, as its name might suggest, but was instead a platform for an association of drug manufacturers.22 And "Republicans for Clean Air," which ran ads in the 2000 Republican Presidential primary, was actually an organization consisting of just two individuals--brothers who together spent $25 million on ads supporting their favored candidate.23 </s> While the public may not have been fully informed about the sponsorship of so-called issue ads, the record indicates that candidates and officeholders often were. A former Senator confirmed that candidates and officials knew who their friends were and "sometimes suggest[ed] that corporations or individuals make donations to interest groups that run 'issue ads.'"24 As with soft-money contributions, political parties and candidates used the availability of so-called issue ads to circumvent FECA's limitations, asking donors who contributed their permitted quota of hard money to give money to nonprofit corporations to spend on "issue" advocacy.25 Senate Committee Investigation </s> In 1998 the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs issued a six-volume report summarizing the results of an extensive investigation into the campaign practices in the 1996 federal elections. The report gave particular attention to the effect of soft money on the American political system, including elected officials' practice of granting special access in return for political contributions. The committee's principal findings relating to Democratic Party fundraising were set forth in the majority's report, while the minority report primarily described Republican practices. The two reports reached consensus, however, on certain central propositions. They agreed that the "soft money loophole" had led to a "meltdown" of the campaign finance system that had been intended "to keep corporate, union and large individual contributions from influencing the electoral process."26 One Senator stated that "the hearings provided overwhelming evi-dence that the twin loopholes of soft money and bogus issue advertising have virtually destroyed our campaign finance laws, leaving us with little more than a pile of legal rubble."27 </s> The report was critical of both parties' methods of raising soft money, as well as their use of those funds. It concluded that both parties promised and provided special access to candidates and senior Government officials in exchange for large soft-money contributions. The Committee majority described the White House coffees that rewarded major donors with access to President Clinton,28 and the courtesies extended to an international businessman named Roger Tamraz, who candidly acknowledged that his donations of about $300,000 to the DNC and to state parties were motivated by his interest in gaining the Federal Government's support for an oil-line project in the Caucasus.29 The minority described the promotional materials used by the RNC's two principal donor programs, "Team 100" and the "Republican Eagles," which promised "special access to high-ranking Republican elected officials, including governors, senators, and representatives."30 One fundraising letter recited that the chairman of the RNC had personally escorted a donor on appointments that "'turned out to be very significant in legislation affecting public utility holding companies'" and made the donor "'a hero in his industry.'"31 </s> In 1996 both parties began to use large amounts of soft money to pay for issue advertising designed to influence federal elections. The Committee found such ads highly problematic for two reasons. Since they accomplished the same purposes as express advocacy (which could lawfully be funded only with hard money), the ads enabled unions, corporations, and wealthy contributors to circumvent protections that FECA was intended to provide. Moreover, though ostensibly independent of the candidates, the ads were often actually coordinated with, and controlled by, the campaigns.32 The ads thus provided a means for evading FECA's candidate contribution limits. </s> The report also emphasized the role of state and local parties. While the FEC's allocation regime permitted national parties to use soft money to pay for up to 40% of the costs of both generic voter activities and issue advertising, they allowed state and local parties to use larger percentages of soft money for those purposes.33 For that reason, national parties often made substantial transfers of soft money to "state and local political parties for 'generic voter activities' that in fact ultimately benefit[ed] federal candidates because the funds for all practical purposes remain[ed] under the control of the national committees." The report concluded that "[t]he use of such soft money thus allow[ed] more corporate, union treasury, and large contributions from wealthy individuals into the system."34 </s> The report discussed potential reforms, including a ban on soft money at the national and state party levels and restrictions on sham issue advocacy by nonparty groups.35 The majority expressed the view that a ban on the raising of soft money by national party committees would effectively address the use of union and corporate general treasury funds in the federal political process only if it required that candidate-specific ads be funded with hard money.36 The minority similarly recommended the elimination of soft-money contributions to political parties from individuals, corporations, and unions, as well as "reforms addressing candidate advertisements masquerading as issue ads."37 II </s> In BCRA, Congress enacted many of the committee's proposed reforms. BCRA's central provisions are designed to address Congress' concerns about the increasing use of soft money and issue advertising to influence federal elections. Title I regulates the use of soft money by political parties, officeholders, and candidates. Title II primarily prohibits corporations and labor unions from using general treasury funds for communications that are intended to, or have the effect of, influencing the outcome of federal elections. Section 403 of BCRA provides special rules for actions challenging the constitutionality of any of the Act's provisions. 2 U.S.C. A. §437h note (Supp. 2003). Eleven such actions were filed promptly after the statute went into effect in March 2002. As required by §403, those actions were filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia and heard by a three-judge court. Section 403 directed the District Court to advance the cases on the docket and to expedite their disposition "to the greatest possible extent." The court received a voluminous record compiled by the parties and ultimately delivered a decision embodied in a two-judge per curiam opinion and three separate, lengthy opinions, each of which contained extensive commentary on the facts and a careful analysis of the legal issues. 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (2003). The three judges reached unanimity on certain issues but differed on many. Their judgment, entered on May 1, 2003, held some parts of BCRA unconstitutional and upheld others. 251 F.Supp. 2d 948. </s> As authorized by §403, all of the losing parties filed direct appeals to this Court within 10 days. 2 U.S.C.A. §437h note. On June 5, 2003, we noted probable jurisdiction and ordered the parties to comply with an expedited briefing schedule and present their oral arguments at a special hearing on September 8, 2003. 539 U.S. ___. To simplify the presentation, we directed the parties challenging provisions of BCRA to proceed first on all issues, whether or not they prevailed on any issue in the District Court. Ibid. Mindful of §403's instruction that we expedite our disposition of these appeals to the greatest extent possible, we also consider each of the issues in order. Accordingly, we first turn our attention to Title I of BCRA. III </s> Title I is Congress' effort to plug the soft-money loophole. The cornerstone of Title I is new FECA §323(a), which prohibits national party committees and their agents from soliciting, receiving, directing, or spending any soft money. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(a) (Supp. 2003).38 In short, §323(a) takes national parties out of the soft-money business. The remaining provisions of new FECA §323 largely reinforce the restrictions in §323(a). New FECA §323(b) prevents the wholesale shift of soft-money influence from national to state party committees by prohibiting state and local party committees from using such funds for activities that affect federal elections. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(b). These "Federal election activit[ies]," defined in new FECA §301(20)(A), are almost identical to the mixed-purpose activities that have long been regulated under the FEC's pre-BCRA allocation regime. 2 U.S.C.A. §431(20)(A). New FECA §323(d) reinforces these soft-money restrictions by prohibiting political parties from soliciting and donating funds to tax-exempt organizations that engage in electioneering activities. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(d). New FECA §323(e) restricts federal candidates and officeholders from receiving, spending, or soliciting soft money in connection with federal elections and limits their ability to do so in connection with state and local elections. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(e). Finally, new FECA §323(f) prevents circumvention of the restrictions on national, state, and local party committees by prohibiting state and local candidates from raising and spending soft money to fund advertisements and other public communications that promote or attack federal candidates. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(f). </s> Plaintiffs mount a facial First Amendment challenge to new FECA §323, as well as challenges based on the Elections Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, §4, principles of federalism, and the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause. We address these challenges in turn. A </s> In Buckley and subsequent cases, we have subjected restrictions on campaign expenditures to closer scrutiny than limits on campaign contributions. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. ___, ___ (2003) (slip op., at 14); see also Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-388 (2000); Buckley, 424 U.S., at 19. In these cases we have recognized that contribution limits, unlike limits on expenditures, "entai[l] only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication." Id., at 20; see also, e.g., Beaumont, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 14); Shrink Missouri, supra, at 386-388. In Buckley we said that: "A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support. The quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of the contribution, since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing. At most, the size of the contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of the contributor's support for the candidate. A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or campaign organization thus involves little direct restraint on his political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues. While contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor." 424 U.S., at 21 (footnote omitted). </s> Because the communicative value of large contributions inheres mainly in their ability to facilitate the speech of their recipients, we have said that contribution limits impose serious burdens on free speech only if they are so low as to "preven[t] candidates and political committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy." Ibid. </s> We have recognized that contribution limits may bear "more heavily on the associational right than on freedom to speak," Shrink Missouri, supra, at 388, since contributions serve "to affiliate a person with a candidate" and "enabl[e] like-minded persons to pool their resources," Buckley, 424 U.S., at 22. Unlike expenditure limits, however, which "preclud[e] most associations from effectively amplifying the voice of their adherents," contribution limits both "leave the contributor free to become a member of any political association and to assist personally in the association's efforts on behalf of candidates," and allow associations "to aggregate large sums of money to promote effective advocacy." Ibid. The "overall effect" of dollar limits on contributions is "merely to require candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons." Id., at 21-22. Thus, a contribution limit involving even "'significant interference'" with associational rights is nevertheless valid if it satisfies the "lesser demand" of being "'closely drawn'" to match a "'sufficiently important interest.'" Beaumont, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 15) (quoting Shrink Missouri, supra, at 387-388).39 </s> Our treatment of contribution restrictions reflects more than the limited burdens they impose on First Amendment freedoms. It also reflects the importance of the interests that underlie contribution limits--interests in preventing "both the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of public confidence in the electoral process through the appearance of corruption." National Right to Work, 533 U.S. 431, 440-441 (2001) (Colorado II). We have said that these interests directly implicate "'the integrity of our electoral process, and, not less, the responsibility of the individual citizen for the successful functioning of that process.'" National Right to Work, supra, at 208 (quoting Automobile Workers, 352 U.S., at 570). Because the electoral process is the very "means through which a free society democratically translates political speech into concrete governmental action," Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S., at 401 (Breyer, J., concurring), contribution limits, like other measures aimed at protecting the integrity of the process, tangibly benefit public participation in political debate. For that reason, when reviewing Congress' decision to enact contribution limits, "there is no place for a strong presumption against constitutionality, of the sort often thought to accompany the words 'strict scrutiny.'" Id., at 400 (Breyer, J., concurring). The less rigorous standard of review we have applied to contribution limits (Buckley's "closely drawn" scrutiny) shows proper deference to Congress' ability to weigh competing constitutional interests in an area in which it enjoys particular expertise. It also provides Congress with sufficient room to anticipate and respond to concerns about circumvention of regulations designed to protect the integrity of the political process. </s> Our application of this less rigorous degree of scrutiny has given rise to significant criticism in the past from our dissenting colleagues. See, e.g., Shrink Missouri, 518 U.S. 604, 635-644 (1996) (Colorado I) (Thomas, J., dissenting). We have rejected such criticism in previous cases for the reasons identified above. We are also mindful of the fact that in its lengthy deliberations leading to the enactment of BCRA, Congress properly relied on the recognition of its authority contained in Buckley and its progeny. Considerations of stare decisis, buttressed by the respect that the Legislative and Judicial Branches owe to one another, provide additional powerful reasons for adhering to the analysis of contribution limits that the Court has consistently followed since Buckley was decided. See Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991).40 </s> Like the contribution limits we upheld in Buckley, §323's restrictions have only a marginal impact on the ability of contributors, candidates, officeholders, and parties to engage in effective political speech. Beaumont, 539 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 14). Complex as its provisions may be, §323, in the main, does little more than regulate the ability of wealthy individuals, corporations, and unions to contribute large sums of money to influence federal elections, federal candidates, and federal officeholders. </s> Plaintiffs contend that we must apply strict scrutiny to §323 because many of its provisions restrict not only contributions but also the spending and solicitation of funds raised outside of FECA's contribution limits. But for purposes of determining the level of scrutiny, it is irrelevant that Congress chose in §323 to regulate contributions on the demand rather than the supply side. See, e.g., National Right to Work, supra, at 206-211 (upholding a provision restricting PACs' ability to solicit funds). The relevant inquiry is whether the mechanism adopted to implement the contribution limit, or to prevent circumvention of that limit, burdens speech in a way that a direct restriction on the contribution itself would not. That is not the case here. </s> For example, while §323(a) prohibits national parties from receiving or spending nonfederal money, and §323(b) prohibits state party committees from spending nonfederal money on federal election activities, neither provision in any way limits the total amount of money parties can spend. 2 U.S.C.A. §§441i(a), (b) (Supp. 2003). Rather, they simply limit the source and individual amount of donations. That they do so by prohibiting the spending of soft money does not render them expenditure limitations.41 </s> Similarly, the solicitation provisions of §323(a) and §323(e), which restrict the ability of national party committees, federal candidates, and federal officeholders to solicit nonfederal funds, leave open ample opportunities for soliciting federal funds on behalf of entities subject to FECA's source and amount restrictions. Even §323(d), which on its face enacts a blanket ban on party solicitations of funds to certain tax-exempt organizations, nevertheless allows parties to solicit funds to the organizations' federal PACs. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(d). As for those organizations that cannot or do not administer PACs, parties remain free to donate federal funds directly to such organizations, and may solicit funds expressly for that purpose. See infra, at 72-73 (construing §323(d)'s restriction on donations by parties to apply only to donations from a party committee's nonfederal or soft-money account). And as with §323(a), §323(d) places no limits on other means of endorsing tax-exempt organizations or any restrictions on solicitations by party officers acting in their individual capacities. 2 U.S.C.A. §§441i(a), (d). </s> Section 323 thus shows "due regard for the reality that solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for particular views." Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980). The fact that party committees and federal candidates and officeholders must now ask only for limited dollar amounts or request that a corporation or union contribute money through its PAC in no way alters or impairs the political message "intertwined" with the solicitation. Cf. Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988) (treating solicitation restriction that required fundraisers to disclose particular information as a content-based regulation subject to strict scrutiny because it "necessarily alter[ed] the content of the speech"). And rather than chill such solicitations, as was the case in Schaumburg, the restriction here tends to increase the dissemination of information by forcing parties, candidates, and officeholders to solicit from a wider array of potential donors. As with direct limits on contributions, therefore, §323's spending and solicitation restrictions have only a marginal impact on political speech.42 </s> Finally, plaintiffs contend that the type of associational burdens that §323 imposes are fundamentally different from the burdens that accompanied Buckley's contribution limits, and merit the type of strict scrutiny we have applied to attempts to regulate the internal processes of political parties. E.g., California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 573-574 (2000). In making this argument, plaintiffs greatly exaggerate the effect of §323, contending that it precludes any collaboration among national, state, and local committees of the same party in fundraising and electioneering activities. We do not read the provisions in that way. See infra, at 51-52. Section 323 merely subjects a greater percentage of contributions to parties and candidates to FECA's source and amount limitations. Buckley has already acknowledged that such limitations "leave the contributor free to become a member of any political association and to assist personally in the association's efforts on behalf of candidates." 424 U.S., at 22. The modest impact that §323 has on the ability of committees within a party to associate with each other does not independently occasion strict scrutiny. None of this is to suggest that the alleged associational burdens imposed on parties by §323 have no place in the First Amendment analysis; it is only that we account for them in the application, rather than the choice, of the appropriate level of scrutiny.43 </s> With these principles in mind, we apply the less rigorous scrutiny applicable to contribution limits to evaluate the constitutionality of new FECA §323. Because the five challenged provisions of §323 implicate different First Amendment concerns, we discuss them separately. We are mindful, however, that Congress enacted §323 as an integrated whole to vindicate the Government's important interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption. New FECA §323(a)'s Restrictions on National Party Committees </s> The core of Title I is new FECA §323(a), which provides that "national committee[s] of a political party ... may not solicit, receive, or direct to another person a contribution, donation, or transfer of funds or any other thing of value, or spend any funds, that are not subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act." 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(a)(1) (Supp. 2003). The prohibition extends to "any officer or agent acting on behalf of such a national committee, and any entity that is directly or indirectly established, financed, or maintained, or controlled by such a national committee." §441(a)(2). The main goal of §323(a) is modest. In large part, it simply effects a return to the scheme that was approved in Buckley and that was subverted by the creation of the FEC's allocation regime, which permitted the political parties to fund federal electioneering efforts with a combination of hard and soft money. See supra, at 11-13, and n.7. Under that allocation regime, national parties were able to use vast amounts of soft money in their efforts to elect federal candidates. Consequently, as long as they directed the money to the political parties, donors could contribute large amounts of soft money for use in activities designed to influence federal elections.44 New §323(a) is designed to put a stop to that practice. 1.Governmental Interests Underlying New FECA§323(a) </s> The Government defends §323(a)'s ban on national parties' involvement with soft money as necessary to prevent the actual and apparent corruption of federal candidates and officeholders. Our cases have made clear that the prevention of corruption or its appearance constitutes a sufficiently important interest to justify political contribution limits. We have not limited that interest to the elimination of cash-for-votes exchanges. In Buckley, we expressly rejected the argument that antibribery laws provided a less restrictive alternative to FECA's contribution limits, noting that such laws "deal[t] with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence government action." 424 U.S., at 28. Thus, "[i]n speaking of 'improper influence' and 'opportunities for abuse' in addition to 'quid pro quo arrangements,' we [have] recognized a concern not confined to bribery of public officials, but extending to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors." Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S., at 389; see also Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 441 (acknowledging that corruption extends beyond explicit cash-for-votes agreements to "undue influence on an officeholder's judgment"). Of "almost equal" importance has been the Government's interest in combating the appearance or perception of corruption engendered by large campaign contributions. Buckley, supra, at 27; see also Shrink Missouri, supra, at 390; Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-497 (1985). Take away Congress' authority to regulate the appearance of undue influence and "the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance." Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S., at 390; see also id., at 401 (Breyer, J., concurring). And because the First Amendment does not require Congress to ignore the fact that "candidates, donors, and parties test the limits of the current law," Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 457, these interests have been sufficient to justify not only contribution limits themselves, but laws preventing the circumvention of such limits, id., at 456 ("[A]ll Members of the Court agree that circumvention is a valid theory of corruption"). </s> "The quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty or the plausibility of the justification raised." Shrink Missouri, supra, at 391. The idea that large contributions to a national party can corrupt or, at the very least, create the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders is neither novel nor implausible. For nearly 30 years, FECA has placed strict dollar limits and source restrictions on contributions that individuals and other entities can give to national, state, and local party committees for the purpose of influencing a federal election. The premise behind these restrictions has been, and continues to be, that contributions to a federal candidate's party in aid of that candidate's campaign threaten to create--no less than would a direct contribution to the candidate--a sense of obligation. See Buckley, supra, at 38 (upholding FECA's $25,000 limit on aggregate yearly contributions to a candidate, political committee, and political party committee as a "quite modest restraint ... to prevent evasion of the $1,000 contribution limitation" by, among other things, "huge contributions to the candidate's political party"). This is particularly true of contributions to national parties, with which federal candidates and officeholders enjoy a special relationship and unity of interest. This close affiliation has placed national parties in a unique position, "whether they like it or not," to serve as "agents for spending on behalf of those who seek to produce obligated officeholders." Colorado II, supra, at 452; see also Shrink Missouri, supra, at 406 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[Respondent] asks us to evaluate his speech claim in the context of a system which favors candidates and officeholders whose campaigns are supported by soft money, usually funneled through political parties" (emphasis added)). As discussed below, rather than resist that role, the national parties have actively embraced it. </s> The question for present purposes is whether large soft-money contributions to national party committees have a corrupting influence or give rise to the appearance of corruption. Both common sense and the ample record in these cases confirm Congress' belief that they do. As set forth above, supra, at 11-13, and n.7, the FEC's allocation regime has invited widespread circumvention of FECA's limits on contributions to parties for the purpose of influencing federal elections. Under this system, corporate, union, and wealthy individual donors have been free to contribute substantial sums of soft money to the national parties, which the parties can spend for the specific purpose of influencing a particular candidate's federal election. It is not only plausible, but likely, that candidates would feel grateful for such donations and that donors would seek to exploit that gratitude.45 </s> The evidence in the record shows that candidates and donors alike have in fact exploited the soft-money loophole, the former to increase their prospects of election and the latter to create debt on the part of officeholders, with the national parties serving as willing intermediaries. Thus, despite FECA's hard-money limits on direct contributions to candidates, federal officeholders have commonly asked donors to make soft-money donations to national and state committees "solely in order to assist federal campaigns," including the officeholder's own. 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 472 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration of Wade Randlett, CEO, Dashboard Technology ¶ ;¶ ;6-9 (hereinafter Randlett Decl.), App. 713-714); see also 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 471-473, 478-479 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 842-843 (Leon, J.). Parties kept tallies of the amounts of soft money raised by each officeholder, and "the amount of money a Member of Congress raise[d] for the national political committees often affect[ed] the amount the committees g[a]ve to assist the Member's campaign." Id., at 474-475 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Donors often asked that their contributions be credited to particular candidates, and the parties obliged, irrespective of whether the funds were hard or soft. Id., at 477-478 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 824, 847 (Leon, J.). National party committees often teamed with individual candidates' campaign committees to create joint fundraising committees, which enabled the candidates to take advantage of the party's higher contribution limits while still allowing donors to give to their preferred candidate. Id., at 478 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 847-848 (Leon, J.); see also App. 1286 (Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report (characterizing the joint fundraising committee as one "in which Senate candidates in effect rais[e] soft money for use in their own races")). Even when not participating directly in the fundraising, federal officeholders were well aware of the identities of the donors: National party committees would distribute lists of potential or actual donors, or donors themselves would report their generosity to officeholders. 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 487-488 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) ("[F]or a Member not to know the identities of these donors, he or she must actively avoid such knowledge, as it is provided by the national political parties and the donors themselves"); id., at 853-855 (Leon, J.). </s> For their part, lobbyists, CEOs, and wealthy individuals alike all have candidly admitted donating substantial sums of soft money to national committees not on ideological grounds, but for the express purpose of securing influence over federal officials. For example, a former lobbyist and partner at a lobbying firm in Washington, D.C., stated in his declaration: "'You are doing a favor for somebody by making a large [soft-money] donation and they appreciate it. Ordinarily, people feel inclined to reciprocate favors. Do a bigger favor for someone--that is, write a larger check--and they feel even more compelled to reciprocate. In my experience, overt words are rarely exchanged about contributions, but people do have understandings.'" Id., at 493 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration of Robert Rozen, partner, Ernst & Young ¶ ;14; see 8-R Defs. Exhs., Tab 33).46 </s> Particularly telling is the fact that, in 1996 and 2000, more than half of the top 50 soft-money donors gave substantial sums to both major national parties, leaving room for no other conclusion but that these donors were seeking influence, or avoiding retaliation, rather than promoting any particular ideology. See, e.g., 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 508-510 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (citing Mann Expert Report Tbls. 5-6); 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 509 ("'Giving soft money to both parties, the Republicans and the Democrats, makes no sense at all unless the donor feels that he or she is buying access.'" (quoting declaration of former Sen. Dale Bumpers ¶ ;15, App. 175)).47 </s> The evidence from the federal officeholders' perspective is similar. For example, one former Senator described the influence purchased by nonfederal donations as follows: "'Too often, Members' first thought is not what is right or what they believe, but how it will affect fundraising. Who, after all, can seriously contend that a $100,000 donation does not alter the way one thinks about--and quite possibly votes on--an issue?... When you don't pay the piper that finances your campaigns, you will never get any more money from that piper. Since money is the mother's milk of politics, you never want to be in that situation.'" 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 481 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration of former Sen. Alan Simpson ¶ ;10 (hereinafter Simpson Decl.), App. 811); 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 851 (Leon, J.) (same). </s> See also id., at 489 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) ("'The majority of those who contribute to political parties do so for business reasons, to gain access to influential Members of Congress and to get to know new Members." (quoting Hickmott Decl., Exh. A, ¶ ;46)). By bringing soft-money donors and federal candidates and officeholders together, "[p]arties are thus necessarily the instruments of some contributors whose object is not to support the party's message or to elect party candidates across the board, but rather to support a specific candidate for the sake of a position on one narrow issue, or even to support any candidate who will be obliged to the contributors." Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 451-452. </s> Plaintiffs argue that without concrete evidence of an instance in which a federal officeholder has actually switched a vote (or, presumably, evidence of a specific instance where the public believes a vote was switched), Congress has not shown that there exists real or apparent corruption. But the record is to the contrary. The evidence connects soft money to manipulations of the legislative calendar, leading to Congress' failure to enact, among other things, generic drug legislation, tort reform, and tobacco legislation. See, e.g., 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 482 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 852 (Leon, J.); App. 390-394 (declaration of Sen. John McCain ¶ ;¶ ;5, 8-11 (hereinafter McCain Decl.)); App. 811 (Simpson Decl. ¶ ;10) ("Donations from the tobacco industry to Republicans scuttled tobacco legislation, just as contributions from the trial lawyers to Democrats stopped tort reform"); App. 805 (declaration of former Sen. Paul Simon ¶ ;¶ ;13-14). To claim that such actions do not change legislative outcomes surely misunderstands the legislative process. </s> More importantly, plaintiffs conceive of corruption too narrowly. Our cases have firmly established that Congress' legitimate interest extends beyond preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption to curbing "undue influence on an officeholder's judgment, and the appearance of such influence." Colorado II, supra, at 441. Many of the "deeply disturbing examples" of corruption cited by this Court in Buckley, 424 U.S., at 27, to justify FECA's contribution limits were not episodes of vote buying, but evidence that various corporate interests had given substantial donations to gain access to high-level government officials. See Buckley, 519 F.2d, at 821, 839-840, n.36; nn. 5-6, supra. Even if that access did not secure actual influence, it certainly gave the "appearance of such influence." Colorado II, supra, at 441; see also 519 F. 2d, at 838. </s> The record in the present case is replete with similar examples of national party committees peddling access to federal candidates and officeholders in exchange for large soft-money donations. See 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 492-506 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). As one former Senator put it: "'Special interests who give large amounts of soft money to political parties do in fact achieve their objectives. They do get special access. Sitting Senators and House Members have limited amounts of time, but they make time available in their schedules to meet with representatives of business and unions and wealthy individuals who gave large sums to their parties. These are not idle chit-chats about the philosophy of democracy.... Senators are pressed by their benefactors to introduce legislation, to amend legislation, to block legislation, and to vote on legislation in a certain way.'" Id., at 496 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration of former Sen. Warren Rudman ¶ ;7 (hereinafter Rudman Decl.), App. 742); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 858 (Leon, J.) (same). </s> So pervasive is this practice that the six national party committees actually furnish their own menus of opportunities for access to would-be soft-money donors, with increased prices reflecting an increased level of access. For example, the DCCC offers a range of donor options, starting with the $10,000-per-year Business Forum program, and going up to the $100,000-per-year National Finance Board program. The latter entitles the donor to bimonthly conference calls with the Democratic House leadership and chair of the DCCC, complimentary invitations to all DCCC fundraising events, two private dinners with the Democratic House leadership and ranking members, and two retreats with the Democratic House leader and DCCC chair in Telluride, Colorado, and Hyannisport, Massachusetts. Id., at 504-505 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); see also id., at 506 (describing records indicating that DNC offered meetings with President in return for large donations); id., at 502-503 (describing RNC's various donor programs); id., at 503-504 (same for NRSC); id., at 500-503 (same for DSCC); id., at 504 (same for NRCC). Similarly, "the RNC's donor programs offer greater access to federal office holders as the donations grow larger, with the highest level and most personal access offered to the largest soft money donors." Id., at 500-503 (finding, further, that the RNC holds out the prospect of access to officeholders to attract soft-money donations and encourages officeholders to meet with large soft-money donors); accord, id., at 860-861 (Leon, J.). </s> Despite this evidence and the close ties that candidates and officeholders have with their parties, Justice Kennedy would limit Congress' regulatory interest only to the prevention of the actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption "inherent in" contributions made directly to, contributions made at the express behest of, and expenditures made in coordination with, a federal officeholder or candidate. Post, at 8-10, 15. Regulation of any other donation or expenditure--regardless of its size, the recipient's relationship to the candidate or officeholder, its potential impact on a candidate's election, its value to the candidate, or its unabashed and explicit intent to purchase influence--would, according to Justice Kennedy, simply be out of bounds. This crabbed view of corruption, and particularly of the appearance of corruption, ignores precedent, common sense, and the realities of political fundraising exposed by the record in this litigation.48 </s> Justice Kennedy's interpretation of the First Amendment would render Congress powerless to address more subtle but equally dispiriting forms of corruption. Just as troubling to a functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo corruption is the danger that officeholders will decide issues not on the merits or the desires of their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who have made large financial contributions valued by the officeholder. Even if it occurs only occasionally, the potential for such undue influence is manifest. And unlike straight cash-for-votes transactions, such corruption is neither easily detected nor practical to criminalize. The best means of prevention is to identify and to remove the temptation. The evidence set forth above, which is but a sampling of the reams of disquieting evidence contained in the record, convincingly demonstrates that soft-money contributions to political parties carry with them just such temptation. </s> Justice Kennedy likewise takes too narrow a view of the appearance of corruption. He asserts that only those transactions with "inherent corruption potential," which he again limits to contributions directly to candidates, justify the inference "that regulating the conduct will stem the appearance of real corruption." Post, at 14.49 In our view, however, Congress is not required to ignore historical evidence regarding a particular practice or to view conduct in isolation from its context. To be sure, mere political favoritism or opportunity for influence alone is insufficient to justify regulation. Post, at 12-14. As the record demonstrates, it is the manner in which parties have sold access to federal candidates and officeholders that has given rise to the appearance of undue influence. Implicit (and, as the record shows, sometimes explicit) in the sale of access is the suggestion that money buys influence. It is no surprise then that purchasers of such access unabashedly admit that they are seeking to purchase just such influence. It was not unwarranted for Congress to conclude that the selling of access gives rise to the appearance of corruption. </s> In sum, there is substantial evidence to support Congress' determination that large soft-money contributions to national political parties give rise to corruption and the appearance of corruption. 2.New FECA §323(a)'s Restriction on Spending and Receiving Soft Money </s> Plaintiffs and The Chief Justice contend that §323(a) is impermissibly overbroad because it subjects all funds raised and spent by national parties to FECA's hard-money source and amount limits, including, for example, funds spent on purely state and local elections in which no federal office is at stake.50 Post, 2-5 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Such activities, The Chief Justice asserts, pose "little or no potential to corrupt ... federal candidates or officeholders." Post, at 5 (dissenting opinion). This observation is beside the point. Section 323(a), like the remainder of §323, regulates contributions, not activities. As the record demonstrates, it is the close relationship between federal officeholders and the national parties, as well as the means by which parties have traded on that relationship, that have made all large soft-money contributions to national parties suspect. As one expert noted, "'[t]here is no meaningful distinction between the national party committees and the public officials who control them.'" 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 468-469 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Mann Expert Report 29). The national committees of the two major parties are both run by, and largely composed of, federal officeholders and candidates. Indeed, of the six national committees of the two major parties, four are composed entirely of federal officeholders. Ibid. The nexus between national parties and federal officeholders prompted one of Title I's framers to conclude: "Because the national parties operate at the national level, and are inextricably intertwined with federal officeholders and candidates, who raise the money for the national party committees, there is a close connection between the funding of the national parties and the corrupting dangers of soft money on the federal political process. The only effective way to address this [soft-money] problem of corruption is to ban entirely all raising and spending of soft money by the national parties." 148 Cong. Rec. H409 (Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Rep. Shays). </s> Given this close connection and alignment of interests, large soft-money contributions to national parties are likely to create actual or apparent indebtedness on the part of federal officeholders, regardless of how those funds are ultimately used. </s> This close affiliation has also placed national parties in a position to sell access to federal officeholders in exchange for soft-money contributions that the party can then use for its own purposes. Access to federal officeholders is the most valuable favor the national party committees are able to give in exchange for large donations. The fact that officeholders comply by donating their valuable time indicates either that officeholders place substantial value on the soft-money contribution themselves, without regard to their end use, or that national committees are able to exert considerable control over federal officeholders. See, e.g., App. 1196-1198 (Expert Report of Donald P. Green, Yale University) ("Once elected to legislative office, public officials enter an environment in which political parties-in-government control the resources crucial to subsequent electoral success and legislative power. Political parties organize the legislative caucuses that make committee assignments"); App. 1298 (Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report) (indicating that officeholders' re-election prospects are significantly influenced by attitudes of party leadership). Either way, large soft-money donations to national party committees are likely to buy donors preferential access to federal officeholders no matter the ends to which their contributions are eventually put. As discussed above, Congress had sufficient grounds to regulate the appearance of undue influence associated with this practice. The Government's strong interests in preventing corruption, and in particular the appearance of corruption, are thus sufficient to justify subjecting all donations to national parties to the source, amount, and disclosure limitations of FECA.51 3.New FECA §323(a)'s Restriction on Soliciting or Directing Soft Money </s> Plaintiffs also contend that §323(a)'s prohibition on national parties' soliciting or directing soft-money contributions is substantially overbroad. The reach of the solicitation prohibition, however, is limited. It bars only solicitations of soft money by national party committees and by party officers in their official capacities. The committees remain free to solicit hard money on their own behalf, as well as to solicit hard money on behalf of state committees and state and local candidates.52 They also can contribute hard money to state committees and to candidates. In accordance with FEC regulations, furthermore, officers of national parties are free to solicit soft money in their individual capacities, or, if they are also officials of state parties, in that capacity. See 67 Fed. Reg. 49083 (2002). This limited restriction on solicitation follows sensibly from the prohibition on national committees' receiving soft money. The same observations that led us to approve the latter compel us to reach the same conclusion regarding the former. A national committee is likely to respond favorably to a donation made at its request regardless of whether the recipient is the committee itself or another entity. This principle accords with common sense and appears elsewhere in federal laws. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §201(b)(2) (prohibition on public officials "demand[ing] [or] seek[ing] ... anything of value personally or for any other person or entity ..." (emphasis added)); 5 CFR §2635.203(f)(2) (2003) (restriction on gifts to federal employees encompasses gifts "[g]iven to any other person, including any charitable organization, on the basis of designation, recommendation, or other specification by the employee"). </s> Plaintiffs argue that BCRA itself demonstrates the overbreadth of §323(a)'s solicitation ban. They point in particular to §323(e), which allows federal candidates and officeholders to solicit limited amounts of soft money from individual donors under certain circumstances. Compare 2 U.S.C.A §441i(a) with §441i(e) (Supp. 2003). The differences between §§323(a) and 323(e), however, are without constitutional significance. We have recognized that "the 'differing structures and purposes' of different entities 'may require different forms of regulation in order to protect the integrity of the electoral process,'" National Right to Work, 479 U.S. 238, 258, n.11 (1986) (MCFL); Buckley, 424 U.S., at 105. The differences between the two provisions reflect Congress' reasonable judgments about the function played by national committees and the interactions between committees and officeholders, subjects about which Members of Congress have vastly superior knowledge. 4.New FECA §323(a)'s Application to Minor Parties </s> The McConnell and political party plaintiffs contend that §323(a) is substantially overbroad and must be stricken on its face because it impermissibly infringes the speech and associational rights of minor parties such as the Libertarian National Committee, which, owing to their slim prospects for electoral success and the fact that they receive few large soft-money contributions from corporate sources, pose no threat of corruption comparable to that posed by the RNC and DNC. In Buckley, we rejected a similar argument concerning limits on contributions to minor-party candidates, noting that "any attempt to exclude minor parties and independents en masse from the Act's contribution limitations overlooks the fact that minor-party candidates may win elective office or have a substantial impact on the outcome of an election." 424 U.S., at 34-35. We have thus recognized that the relevance of the interest in avoiding actual or apparent corruption is not a function of the number of legislators a given party manages to elect. It applies as much to a minor party that manages to elect only one of its members to federal office as it does to a major party whose members make up a majority of Congress. It is therefore reasonable to require that all parties and all candidates follow the same set of rules designed to protect the integrity of the electoral process. We add that nothing in §323(a) prevents individuals from pooling resources to start a new national party. Post, at 5 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Only when an organization has gained official status, which carries with it significant benefits for its members, will the proscriptions of §323(a) apply. Even then, a nascent or struggling minor party can bring an as-applied challenge if §323(a) prevents it from "amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy." Buckley, supra, at 21. 5.New FECA §323(a)'s Associational Burdens </s> Finally, plaintiffs assert that §323(a) is unconstitutional because it impermissibly interferes with the ability of national committees to associate with state and local committees. By way of example, plaintiffs point to the Republican Victory Plans, whereby the RNC acts in concert with the state and local committees of a given State to plan and implement joint, full-ticket fundraising and electioneering programs. See App. 693, 694-697 (declaration of John Peschong, RNC Western Reg. Political Dir. (describing the Republican Victory Plans)). The political parties assert that §323(a) outlaws any participation in Victory Plans by RNC officers, including merely sitting down at a table and engaging in collective decisionmaking about how soft money will be solicited, received, and spent. Such associational burdens, they argue, are too great for the First Amendment to bear. We are not persuaded by this argument because it hinges on an unnaturally broad reading of the terms "spend," "receive," "direct," and "solicit." 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(a) (Supp. 2003). Nothing on the face of §323(a) prohibits national party officers, whether acting in their official or individual capacities, from sitting down with state and local party committees or candidates to plan and advise how to raise and spend soft money. As long as the national party officer does not personally spend, receive, direct, or solicit soft money, §323(a) permits a wide range of joint planning and electioneering activity. Intervenor-defendants, the principal drafters and proponents of the legislation, concede as much. Brief for Intervenor-Defendants Sen. John McCain etal. in No. 02-1674 etal., p.22 ("BCRA leaves parties and candidates free to coordinate campaign plans and activities, political messages, and fundraising goals with one another"). The FEC's current definitions of §323(a)'s terms are consistent with that view. See, e.g., 11 CFR §300.2(m) (2002) (defining "solicit" as "to ask ... another person" (emphasis added)); §300.2(n) (defining "direct" as "to ask a person who has expressed an intent to make a contribution . . . to make that contribution ... including through a conduit or intermediary" (emphasis added)); §300.2(c) (laying out the factors that determine whether an entity will be considered to be controlled by a national committee). </s> Given the straightforward meaning of this provision, Justice Kennedy is incorrect that "[a] national party's mere involvement in the strategic planning of fundraising for a state ballot initiative" or its assistance in developing a state party's Levin-money fundraising efforts risks a finding that the officers are in "'indirect control'" of the state party and subject to criminal penalties. Post, at 5-6. Moreover, §323(a) leaves national party committee officers entirely free to participate, in their official capacities, with state and local parties and candidates in soliciting and spending hard money; party officials may also solicit soft money in their unofficial capacities. </s> Accordingly, we reject the plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge to new FECA §323(a). New FECA §323(b)'s Restrictions on State and Local Party Committees </s> In constructing a coherent scheme of campaign finance regulation, Congress recognized that, given the close ties between federal candidates and state party committees, BCRA's restrictions on national committee activity would rapidly become ineffective if state and local committees remained available as a conduit for soft-money donations.53 Section 323(b) is designed to foreclose wholesale evasion of §323(a)'s anticorruption measures by sharply curbing state committees' ability to use large soft-money contributions to influence federal elections. The core of §323(b) is a straightforward contribution regulation: It prevents donors from contributing nonfederal funds to state and local party committees to help finance "Federal election activity." 2 U.S.CA. §441i(b)(1) (Supp. 2003). The term "Federal election activity" encompasses four distinct categories of electioneering: (1) voter registration activity during the 120 days preceding a regularly scheduled federal election; (2) voter identification, get-out-the-vote (GOTV), and generic campaign activity54 that is "conducted in connection with an election in which a candidate for Federal office appears on the ballot"; (3) any "public communication"55 that "refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office" and "promotes," "supports," "attacks," or "opposes" a candidate for that office; and (4) the services provided by a state committee employee who dedicates more than 25% of his or her time to "activities in connection with a Federal election." §§431(20)(A)(i)-(iv). The Act explicitly excludes several categories of activity from this definition: public communications that refer solely to nonfederal candidates;56 contributions to nonfederal candidates;57 state and local political conventions; and the cost of grassroots campaign materials like bumper stickers that refer only to state candidates. §431(20)(B). All activities that fall within the statutory definition must be funded with hard money. §441i(b)(1). Section 323(b)(2), the so-called Levin Amendment, carves out an exception to this general rule. A refinement on the pre-BCRA regime that permitted parties to pay for certain activities with a mix of federal and nonfederal funds, the Levin Amendment allows state and local party committees to pay for certain types of federal election activity with an allocated ratio of hard money and "Levin funds"--that is, funds raised within an annual limit of $10,000 per person. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(b)(2). Except for the $10,000 cap and certain related restrictions to prevent circumvention of that limit, §323(b)(2) leaves regulation of such contributions to the States.58 </s> The scope of the Levin Amendment is limited in two ways. First, state and local parties can use Levin money to fund only activities that fall within categories (1) and (2) of the statute's definition of federal election activity--namely, voter registration activity, voter identification drives, GOTV drives, and generic campaign activities. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(b)(2)(A). And not all of these activities qualify: Levin funds cannot be used to pay for any activities that refer to "a clearly identified candidate for Federal office"; they likewise cannot be used to fund broadcast communications unless they refer "solely to a clearly identified candidate for State or local office." §§441i(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). </s> Second, both the Levin funds and the allocated portion of hard money used to pay for such activities must be raised entirely by the state or local committee that spends them. §441i(b)(2)(B)(iv). This means that a state party committee cannot use Levin funds transferred from other party committees to cover the Levin funds portion of a Levin Amendment expenditure. It also means that a state party committee cannot use hard money transferred from other party committees to cover the hard-money portion of a Levin Amendment expenditure. Furthermore, national committees, federal candidates, and federal officeholders generally may not solicit Levin funds on behalf ofstate committees, and state committees may not team up to raise Levin funds. §441i(b)(2)(C). They can, however, jointly raise the hard money used to make Levin expenditures. 1.Governmental Interests Underlying New FECA§323(b) </s> We begin by noting that, in addressing the problem of soft-money contributions to state committees, Congress both drew a conclusion and made a prediction. Its conclusion, based on the evidence before it, was that the corrupting influence of soft money does not insinuate itself into the political process solely through national party committees. Rather, state committees function as an alternate avenue for precisely the same corrupting forces.59 Indeed, both candidates and parties already ask donors who have reached the limit on their direct contributions to donate to state committees.60 There is at least as much evidence as there was in Buckley that such donations have been made with the intent--and in at least some cases the effect--of gaining influence over federal officeholders.61 Section 323(b) thus promotes an important governmental interest by confronting the corrupting influence that soft-money donations to political parties already have. Congress also made a prediction. Having been taught the hard lesson of circumvention by the entire history of campaign finance regulation, Congress knew that soft-money donors would react to §323(a) by scrambling to find another way to purchase influence. It was "neither novel nor implausible," Shrink Missouri, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994), particularly when, as here, those predictions are so firmly rooted in relevant history and common sense. Preventing corrupting activity from shifting wholesale to state committees and thereby eviscerating FECA clearly qualifies as an important governmental interest. 2.New FECA §323(b)'s Tailoring </s> Plaintiffs argue that even if some legitimate interest might be served by §323(b), the provision's restrictions are unjustifiably burdensome and therefore cannot be considered "closely drawn" to match the Government's objectives. They advance three main contentions in support of this proposition. First, they argue that the provision is substantially overbroad because it federalizes activities that pose no conceivable risk of corrupting or appearing to corrupt federal officeholders. Second, they argue that the Levin Amendment imposes an unconstitutional burden on the associational rights of political parties. Finally, they argue that the provision prevents them from amassing the resources they need to engage in effective advocacy. We address these points in turn. a.§323(b)'s Application to Federal Election Activity </s> Plaintiffs assert that §323(b) represents a new brand of pervasive federal regulation of state-focused electioneering activities that cannot possibly corrupt or appear to corrupt federal officeholders and thus goes well beyond Congress' concerns about the corruption of the federal electoral process. We disagree. It is true that §323(b) captures some activities that affect state campaigns for nonfederal offices. But these are the same sorts of activities that already were covered by the FEC's pre-BCRA allocation rules, and thus had to be funded in part by hard money, because they affect federal as well as state elections. See 11 CFR §106.5 (2002). As a practical matter, BCRA merely codifies the principles of the FEC's allocation regime while at the same time justifiably adjusting the formulas applicable to these activities in order to restore the efficacy of FECA's longtime statutory restriction--approved by the Court and eroded by the FEC's allocation regime--on contributions to state and local party committees for the purpose of influencing federal elections. See 2 U.S.C. §§431(8)(A), 441a(a)(1)(C); see also Buckley, 453 U.S. 182 (1981) (upholding FECA's $5,000 limit on contributions to multicandidate political committees). </s> Like the rest of Title I, §323(b) is premised on Congress' judgment that if a large donation is capable of putting a federal candidate in the debt of the contributor, it poses a threat of corruption or the appearance of corruption. As we explain below, §323(b) is narrowly focused on regulating contributions that pose the greatest risk of this kind of corruption: those contributions to state and local parties that can be used to benefit federal candidates directly. Further, these regulations all are reasonably tailored, with various temporal and substantive limitations designed to focus the regulations on the important anti-corruption interests to be served. We conclude that §323(b) is a closely-drawn means of countering both corruption and the appearance of corruption. </s> The first two categories of "Federal election activity," voter registration efforts, §301(20)(A)(i), and voter identification, GOTV, and generic campaign activities conducted in connection with a federal election, §301(20)(A)(ii), clearly capture activity that benefits federal candidates. Common sense dictates, and it was "undisputed" below, that a party's efforts to register voters sympathetic to that party directly assist the party's candidates for federal office. 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 460 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). It is equally clear that federal candidates reap substantial rewards from any efforts that increase the number of like-minded registered voters who actually go to the polls.62 See, e.g., id., at 459 ("'[The evidence] shows quite clearly that a campaign that mobilizes residents of a highly Republican precinct will produce a harvest of votes for Republican candidates for both state and federal offices. A campaign need not mention federal candidates to have a direct effect on voting for such a candidate.... [G]eneric campaign activity has a direct effect on federal elections'" (quoting Green Expert Report 14)). Representatives of the four major congressional campaign committees confirmed that they "'transfe[r] federal and nonfederal money to state and/or local party committees for'" both voter registration and get-out-the-vote activities, and that "'[t]hese efforts have a significant effect on the election of federal candidates.'" 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 459, 461 (citationsomitted). </s> The record also makes quite clear that federal officeholders are grateful for contributions to state and local parties that can be converted into GOTV-type efforts. See id., at 459 (quoting a letter thanking a California Democratic Party donor and noting that CDP's voter registration and GOTV efforts would help "'increase the number of Californian Democrats in the United States Congress'" and "'deliver California's 54 electoral votes'" to the Democratic presidential candidate). </s> Because voter registration, voter identification, GOTV, and generic campaign activity all confer substantial benefits on federal candidates, the funding of such activities creates a significant risk of actual and apparent corruption. Section 323(b) is a reasonable response to that risk. Its contribution limitations are focused on the subset of voter registration activity that is most likely to affect the election prospects of federal candidates: activity that occurs within 120 days before a federal election. And if the voter registration drive does not specificallymention a federal candidate, state committees can take advantage of the Levin Amendment's higher contribution limits and relaxed source restrictions. 2 U.S.C.A. §§441i(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (Supp. 2003). Similarly, the contribution limits applicable to §301(20)(A)(ii) activities target only those voter identification, GOTV, and generic campaign efforts that occur "in connection with an election in which a candidate for a Federal office appears on the ballot." 2 U.S.C.A. §431(20)(A)(ii). Appropriately, in implementing this subsection, the FEC has categorically excluded all activity that takes place during the run-up to elections when no federal office is at stake.63 Furthermore, state committees can take advantage of the Levin Amendment's higher contribution limits to fund any §301(A)(20)(i) and §301(A)(20)(ii) activities that do not specifically mention a federal candidate. 2 U.S.C.A. §§441i(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). The prohibition on the use of soft money in connection with these activities is therefore closely drawn to meet the sufficiently important governmental interests of avoiding corruption and its appearance. </s> "Public communications" that promote or attack a candidate for federal office--the third category of "Federal election activity," §301(20)(A)(iii)--also undoubtedly have a dramatic effect on federal elections. Such ads were a prime motivating force behind BCRA's passage. See 3 1998 Senate Report 4535 (additional views of Sen. Collins) ("[T]he hearings provided overwhelming evidence that the twin loopholes of soft money and bogus issue advertising have virtually destroyed our campaign finance laws, leaving us with little more than a pile of legal rubble"). As explained below, any public communication that promotes or attacks a clearly identified federal candidate directly affects the election in which he is participating. The record on this score could scarcely be more abundant. Given the overwhelming tendency of public communications, as carefully defined in §301(20)(A)(iii), to benefit directly federal candidates, we hold that application of §323(b)'s contribution caps to such communications is also closely drawn to the anticorruption interest it is intended to address.64 </s> As for the final category of "Federal election activity," §301(20)(A)(iv), we find that Congress' interest in preventing circumvention of §323(b)'s other restrictions justifies the requirement that state and local parties spend federal funds to pay the salary of any employee spending more than 25% of his or her compensated time on activities in connection with a federal election. In the absence of this provision, a party might use soft money to pay for the equivalent of a full-time employee engaged in federal electioneering, by the simple expedient of dividing the federal workload among multiple employees. Plaintiffs have suggested no reason for us to strike down this provision. Accordingly, we give "deference to [the] congressional determination of the need for [this] prophylactic rule." National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S., at 500. b.Associational Burdens Imposed by the LevinAmendment </s> Plaintiffs also contend that §323(b) is unconstitutional because the Levin Amendment unjustifiably burdens association among party committees by forbidding transfers of Levin funds among state parties, transfers of hard money to fund the allocable federal portion of Levin expenditures, and joint fundraising of Levin funds by state parties. We recognize, as we have in the past, the importance of preserving the associational freedom of parties. See, e.g., California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989). But not every minor restriction on parties' otherwise unrestrained ability to associate is of constitutional dimension. See Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 450, n. 11. As an initial matter, we note that state and local parties can avoid these associational burdens altogether by forgoing the Levin Amendment option and electing to pay for federal election activities entirely with hard money. But in any event, the restrictions on the use, transfer, and raising of Levin funds are justifiable anticircumvention measures. Without the ban on transfers of Levin funds among state committees, donors could readily circumvent the $10,000 limit on contributions to a committee's Levin account by making multiple $10,000 donations to various committees that could then transfer the donations to the committee of choice.65 The same anticircumvention goal undergirds the ban on joint solicitation of Levin funds. Without this restriction, state and local committees could organize "all hands" fundraisers at which individual, corporate, or union donors could make large soft-money donations to be divided between the committees. In that case, the purpose, if not the letter, of §323(b)(2)'s $10,000 limit would be thwarted: Donors could make large, visible contributions at fundraisers, which would provide ready means for corrupting federal officeholders. Given the delicate and interconnected regulatory scheme at issue here, any associational burdens imposed by the Levin Amendment restrictions are far outweighed by the need to prevent circumvention of the entire scheme. </s> Section 323(b)(2)(B)(iv)'s apparent prohibition on the transfer of hard money by a national, state, or local committee to help fund the allocable hard-money portion of a separate state or local committee's Levin expenditures presents a closer question. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(b)(2)(B)(iv) (Supp. 2003). The Government defends the restriction as necessary to prevent the donor committee, particularly a national committee, from leveraging the transfer of federal money to wrest control over the spending of the recipient committee's Levin funds. This purported interest is weak, particularly given the fact that §323(a) already polices attempts by national parties to engage in such behavior. See 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(a)(2) (extending §323(a)'s restrictions to entities controlled by national party committees). However, the associational burdens posed by the hard-money transfer restriction are so insubstantial as to be de minimis. Party committees, including national party committees, remain free to transfer unlimited hard money so long as it is not used to fund Levin expenditures. State and local party committees can thus dedicate all "homegrown" hard money to their Levin activities while relying on outside transfers to defray the costs of other hard-money expenditures. Given the strong anticircumvention interest vindicated by §323(b)(2)(B)(iv)'s restriction on the transfer of Levin funds, we will not strike down the entire provision based upon such an attenuated claim of associational infringement. c.New FECA §323(b)'s Impact on Parties' Abilityto Engage in Effective Advocacy </s> Finally, plaintiffs contend that §323(b) is unconstitutional because its restrictions on soft-money contributions to state and local party committees will prevent them from engaging in effective advocacy. As Judge Kollar-Kotelly noted, the political parties' evidence regarding the impact of BCRA on their revenues is "speculative and not based on any analysis." 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 524. If the history of campaign finance regulation discussed above proves anything, it is that political parties are extraordinarily flexible in adapting to new restrictions on their fundraising abilities. Moreover, the mere fact that §323(b) may reduce the relative amount of money available to state and local parties to fund federal election activities is largely inconsequential. The question is not whether §323(b) reduces the amount of funds available over previous election cycles, but whether it is "so radical in effect as to ... drive the sound of [the recipient's] voice below the level of notice." Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S., at 397. If indeed state or local parties can make such a showing, as-applied challenges remain available. We accordingly conclude that §323(b), on its face, is closely drawn to match the important governmental interests of preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption. New FECA §323(d)'s Restrictions on Parties' Solicitations for, and Donations to, Tax-Exempt Organizations </s> Section 323(d) prohibits national, state, and local party committees, and their agents or subsidiaries, from "solicit[ing] any funds for, or mak[ing] or direct[ing] any donations" to, any organization established under §501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code66 that makes expenditures in connection with an election for federal office, and any political organizations established under §527 "other than a political committee, a State, district, or local committee of a political party, or the authorized campaign committee of a candidate for State or local office."67 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(d) (Supp. 2003). The District Court struck down the provision on its face. We reverse and uphold §323(d), narrowly construing the section's ban on donations to apply only to the donation of funds not raised in compliance with FECA. 1.New FECA §323(d)'s Regulation of Solicitations </s> The Government defends §323(d)'s ban on solicitations to tax-exempt organizations engaged in political activity as preventing circumvention of Title I's limits on contributions of soft money to national, state, and local party committees. That justification is entirely reasonable. The history of Congress' efforts at campaign finance reform well demonstrates that "candidates, donors, and parties test the limits of the current law." Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 457. Absent the solicitation provision, national, state, and local party committees would have significant incentives to mobilize their formidable fundraising apparatuses, including the peddling of access to federal officeholders, into the service of like-minded tax-exempt organizations that conduct activities benefiting their candidates.68 All of the corruption and appearance of corruption attendant on the operation of those fundraising apparatuses would follow. Donations made at the behest of party committees would almost certainly be regarded by party officials, donors, and federal officeholders alike as benefiting the party as well as its candidates. Yet, by soliciting the donations to third-party organizations, the parties would avoid FECA's source-and-amount limitations, as well as its disclosure restrictions. See 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 348 (Henderson, J.) (citing various declarations demonstrating that, prior to BCRA, most tax-exempt organizations did not disclose the source or amount of contributions); id., at 521 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (same). Experience under the current law demonstrates that Congress' concerns about circumvention are not merely hypothetical. Even without the added incentives created by Title I, national, state, and local parties already solicit unregulated soft-money donations to tax-exempt organizations for the purpose of supporting federal electioneering activity. See, e.g., 3 1998 Senate Report 4013 ("In addition to direct contributions from the RNC to nonprofit groups, the senior leadership of the RNC helped to raise funds for many of the coalition's nonprofit organizations"); id., at 5983 (minority views) ("Tax-exempt 'issue advocacy' groups and other conduits were systematically used to circumvent federal campaign finance laws"); 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 517 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 848 (Leon, J.). Parties and candidates have also begun to take advantage of so-called "politician 527s," which are little more than soft-money fronts for the promotion of particular federal officeholders and their interests. See id., at 519 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) ("'Virtually every member of Congress in a formal leadership position has his or her own 527 group.... In all, Public Citizen found 63 current members of Congress who have their own 527s'" (quoting Public Citizen Congress Watch, Congressional Leaders' Soft Money Accounts Show Need for Campaign Finance Reform Bills, Feb. 26, 2002, p. 6)); 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 849-850 (Leon, J.). These 527s have been quite successful at raising substantial sums of soft money from corporate interests, as well as from the national parties themselves. See id., at 519-520 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (finding that 27 industries had each donated over $100,000 in a single year to the top 25 politician 527 groups and that the DNC was the single largest contributor to politician 527 groups (citing Public Citizen Congress Watch, supra, at 10-11)); 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 850 (Leon, J.) (same). Given BCRA's tighter restrictions on the raising and spending of soft money, the incentives for parties to exploit such organizations will only increase. </s> Section 323(d)'s solicitation restriction is closely drawn to prevent political parties from using tax-exempt organizations as soft-money surrogates. Though phrased as an absolute prohibition, the restriction does nothing more than subject contributions solicited by parties to FECA's regulatory regime, leaving open substantial opportunities for solicitation and other expressive activity in support of these organizations. First, and most obviously, §323(d) restricts solicitations only to those §501(c) groups "mak[ing] expenditures or disbursements in connection with an election for Federal office," 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(d)(1) (Supp. 2003), and to §527 organizations, which by definition engage in partisan political activity, §441i(d)(2); 26 U.S.C. §527(e). Second, parties remain free to solicit hard-money contributions to a §501(c)'s federal PAC, as well as to §527 organizations that already qualify as federal PACs.69 Third, §323(d) allows parties to endorse qualifying organizations in ways other than direct solicitations of unregulated donations. For example, with respect to §501(c) organizations that are prohibited from administering PACs, parties can solicit hard-money donations to themselves for the express purpose of donating to these organizations. See supra, at 72-73. Finally, as with §323(a), §323(d) in no way restricts solicitations by party officers acting in their individual capacities. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(d) (extending restrictions to solicitations and donations made by "an officer or agent acting on behalf of any such party committee" (emphasis added)). </s> In challenging §323(d)'s ban on solicitations, plaintiffs renew the argument they made with respect to §323(a)'s solicitation restrictions: that it cannot be squared with §323(e), which allows federal candidates and officeholders to solicit limited donations of soft money to tax-exempt organizations that engage in federal election activities. Compare 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(d) with §441i(e)(4). But if §323(d)'s restrictions on solicitations are otherwise valid, they are not rendered unconstitutional by the mere fact that Congress chose not to regulate the activities of another group as stringently as it might have. See National Right to Work, 384 U.S. 641, 656-657 (1966). In any event, the difference between the two provisions is fully explained by the fact that national party officers, unlike federal candidates and officeholders, are able to solicit soft money on behalf of nonprofit organizations in their individual capacities. Section 323(e), which is designed to accommodate the individual associational and speech interests of candidates and officeholders in lending personal support to nonprofit organizations, also places tight content, source, and amount restrictions on solicitations of soft money by federal candidates and officeholders. Given those limits, as well as the less rigorous standard of review, the greater allowances of §323(e) do not render §323(d)'s solicitation restriction facially invalid. 2.New FECA §323(d)'s Regulation of Donations </s> Section 323(d) also prohibits national, state, and local party committees from making or directing "any donatio[n]" to qualifying §501(c) or §527 organizations. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(d) (Supp. 2003). The Government again defends the restriction as an anticircumvention measure. We agree insofar as it prohibits the donation of soft money. Absent such a restriction, state and local party committees could accomplish directly what the antisolicitation restrictions prevent them from doing indirectly--namely, raising large sums of soft money to launder through tax-exempt organizations engaging in federal election activities. Because the party itself would be raising and collecting the funds, the potential for corruption would be that much greater. We will not disturb Congress' reasonable decision to close that loophole, particularly given a record demonstrating an already robust practice of parties' making such donations. See 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 517-518 (Kollar-Kotelly); id., at 848-849 (Leon, J.). The prohibition does raise overbreadth concerns if read to restrict donations from a party's federal account--i.e., funds that have already been raised in compliance with FECA's source, amount, and disclosure limitations. Parties have many valid reasons for giving to tax-exempt organizations, not the least of which is to associate themselves with certain causes and, in so doing, to demonstrate the values espoused by the party. A complete ban on donations prevents parties from making even the "general expression of support" that a contribution represents. Buckley, 424 U.S., at 21. At the same time, prohibiting parties from donating funds already raised in compliance with FECA does little to further Congress' goal of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders. </s> The Government asserts that the restriction is necessary to prevent parties from leveraging their hard money to gain control over a tax-exempt group's soft money. Even if we accepted that rationale, it would at most justify a dollar limit, not a flat ban. Moreover, any legitimate concerns over capture are diminished by the fact that the restrictions set forth in §§323(a) and (b) apply not only to party committees, but to entities under their control. See 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(a)(2) (extending prohibitions on national party committees to "any entity that is directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained, or controlled by such a national committee" (emphasis added)); §441i(b)(1) (same for state and local party committees). </s> These observations do not, however, require us to sustain plaintiffs' facial challenge to §323(d)'s donation restriction. "When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and ... a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided." Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 331 (1988); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769, n. 24 (1982). Given our obligation to avoid constitutional problems, we narrowly construe §323(d)'s ban to apply only to donations of funds not raised in compliance with FECA. This construction is consistent with the concerns animating Title I, whose purpose is to plug the soft-money loophole. Though there is little legislative history regarding BCRA generally, and almost nothing on §323(d) specifically, the abuses identified in the 1998 Senate report regarding campaign finance practices involve the use of nonprofit organizations as conduits for large soft-money donations. See, e.g., 3 1998 Senate Report 4565 ("The evidence indicates that the soft-money loophole is fueling many of the campaign abuses investigated by the Committee.... Soft money also supplied the funds parties used to make contributions to tax-exempt groups, which in turn used the funds to pay for election-related activities"); id., at 4568-4569 (describing as an "egregious exampl[e]" of misuse a $4.6 million donation of nonfederal funds by the RNC to Americans for Tax Reform, which the organization spent on "direct mail and phone bank operations to counter anti-Republican advertising"). We have found no evidence that Congress was concerned about, much less that it intended to prohibit, donations of money already fully regulated by FECA. Given Title I's exclusive focus on abuses related to soft money, we would expect that if Congress meant §323(d)'s restriction to have this dramatic and constitutionally questionable effect, it would say so explicitly. Because there is nothing that compels us to conclude that Congress intended "donations" to include transfers of federal money, and because of the constitutional infirmities such an interpretation would raise, we decline to read §323(d) in that way. Thus, political parties remain free to make or direct donations of money to any tax-exempt organization that has otherwise been raised in compliance with FECA. New FECA §323(e)'s Restrictions on Federal Candidates and Officeholders </s> New FECA §323(e) regulates the raising and soliciting of soft money by federal candidates and officeholders. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(e) (Supp. 2003). It prohibits federal candidates and officeholders from "solicit[ing], receiv[ing], direct[ing], transfer[ing], or spend[ing]" any soft money in connection with federal elections. §441i(e)(1)(A). It also limits the ability of federal candidates and officeholders to solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend soft money in connection with state and local elections. §441i(e)(1)(B).70 Section 323(e)'s general prohibition on solicitations admits of a number of exceptions. For instance, federal candidates and officeholders are permitted to "attend, speak, or be a featured guest" at a state or local party fundraising event. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(e)(3). Section 323(e) specifically provides that federal candidates and officeholders may make solicitations of soft money to §501(c) organizations whose primary purpose is not to engage in "Federal election activit[ies]" as long as the solicitation does not specify how the funds will be spent, 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(e)(4)(A); to §501(c) organizations whose primary purpose is to engage in "Federal election activit[ies]" as long as the solicitations are limited to individuals and the amount solicited does not exceed $20,000 per year per individual, 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(e)(4)(B); and to §501(c) organizations for the express purpose of carrying out such activities, again so long as the amount solicited does not exceed $20,000 per year per individual, 2 U.S.C.A. §441(e)(4)(B). </s> No party seriously questions the constitutionality of §323(e)'s general ban on donations of soft money made directly to federal candidates and officeholders, their agents, or entities established or controlled by them. Even on the narrowest reading of Buckley, a regulation restricting donations to a federal candidate, regardless of the ends to which those funds are ultimately put, qualifies as a contribution limit subject to less rigorous scrutiny. Such donations have only marginal speech and associational value, but at the same time pose a substantial threat of corruption. By severing the most direct link between the soft-money donor and the federal candidate, §323(e)'s ban on donations of soft money is closely drawn to prevent the corruption or the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders. </s> Section 323(e)'s restrictions on solicitations are justified as valid anticircumvention measures. Large soft-money donations at a candidate's or officeholder's behest give rise to all of the same corruption concerns posed by contributions made directly to the candidate or officeholder. Though the candidate may not ultimately control how the funds are spent, the value of the donation to the candidate or officeholder is evident from the fact of the solicitation itself. Without some restriction on solicitations, federal candidates and officeholders could easily avoid FECA's contribution limits by soliciting funds from large donors and restricted sources to like-minded organizations engaging in federal election activities. As the record demonstrates, even before the passage of BCRA, federal candidates and officeholders had already begun soliciting donations to state and local parties, as well as tax-exempt organizations, in order to help their own, as well as their party's, electoral cause. See Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 458 (quoting fundraising letter from a Congressman explaining to contributor that "'you are at the limit of what you can directly contribute to my campaign,' but 'you can further help my campaign by assisting the Colorado Republican Party'"); 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 479-480 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (surveying evidence of federal officeholders' soliciting funds to state and local parties); id., at 848 (Leon, J.) (same); id., at 518 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (surveying evidence of federal officeholders' soliciting funds for nonprofits for electioneering purposes); id., at 849 (Leon, J.) (same). The incentives to do so, at least with respect to solicitations to tax-exempt organizations, will only increase with Title I's restrictions on the raising and spending of soft money by national, state, and local parties. </s> Section 323(e) addresses these concerns while accommodating the individual speech and associational rights of federal candidates and officeholders. Rather than place an outright ban on solicitations to tax-exempt organizations, §323(e)(4) permits limited solicitations of soft money. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(e)(4). This allowance accommodates individuals who have long served as active members of nonprofit organizations in both their official and individual capacities. Similarly, §§323(e)(1)(B) and 323(e)(3) preserve the traditional fundraising role of federal officeholders by providing limited opportunities for federal candidates and officeholders to associate with their state and local colleagues through joint fundraising activities. 2 U.S.C.A. §§441i(e)(1)(B), 441i(e)(3). Given these many exceptions, as well as the substantial threat of corruption or its appearance posed by donations to or at the behest of federal candidates and officeholders, §323(e) is clearly constitutional. We accordingly uphold §323(e) against plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge. New FECA §323(f)'s Restrictions on State Candidates and Officeholders </s> The final provision of Title I is new FECA §323(f). 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(f) (Supp. 2003). Section 323(f) generally prohibits candidates for state or local office, or state or local officeholders, from spending soft money to fund "public communications" as defined in §301(20)(A)(iii)--i.e., a communication that "refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office ... and that promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that office." 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(f)(1); §431(20)(A)(iii). Exempted from this restriction are communications made in connection with an election for state or local office which refer only to the state or local candidate or officeholder making the expenditure or to any other candidate for the same state or local office. §441i(f)(2). Section 323(f) places no cap on the amount of money that state or local candidates can spend on any activity. Rather, like §§323(a) and 323(b), it limits only the source and amount of contributions that state and local candidates can draw on to fund expenditures that directly impact federal elections. And, by regulating only contributions used to fund "public communications," §323(f) focuses narrowly on those soft-money donations with the greatest potential to corrupt or give rise to the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders. </s> Plaintiffs advance two principal arguments against §323(f). We have already rejected the first argument, that the definition of "public communications" in new FECA §301(20)(A)(iii) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. See supra, 62, n.64. We add only that, plaintiffs' and Justice Kennedy's contrary reading notwithstanding, post, at 34, this provision does not prohibit a state or local candidate from advertising that he has received a federal officeholder's endorsement.71 </s> The second argument, that soft-money contributions to state and local candidates for "public communications" do not corrupt or appear to corrupt federal candidates, ignores both the record in this litigation and Congress' strong interest in preventing circumvention of otherwise valid contribution limits. The proliferation of sham issue ads has driven the soft-money explosion. Parties have sought out every possible way to fund and produce these ads with soft money: They have labored to bring them under the FEC's allocation regime; they have raised and transferred soft money from national to state party committees to take advantage of favorable allocation ratios; and they have transferred and solicited funds to tax-exempt organizations for production of such ads. We will not upset Congress' eminently reasonable prediction that, with these other avenues no longer available, state and local candidates and officeholders will become the next conduits for the soft-money funding of sham issue advertising. We therefore uphold §323(f) against plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge.72 B </s> Several plaintiffs contend that Title I exceeds Congress' Election Clause authority to "make or alter" rules governing federal elections, U.S. Const., Art. I, §4, and, by impairing the authority of the States to regulate their own elections, violates constitutional principles of federalism. In examining congressional enactments for infirmity under the Tenth Amendment, this Court has focused its attention on laws that commandeer the States and state officials in carrying out federal regulatory schemes. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). By contrast, Title I of BCRA only regulates the conduct of private parties. It imposes no requirements whatsoever upon States or state officials, and, because it does not expressly pre-empt state legislation, it leaves the States free to enforce their own restrictions on the financing of state electoral campaigns. It is true that Title I, as amended, prohibits some fundraising tactics that would otherwise be permitted under the laws of various States, and that it may therefore have an indirect effect on the financing of state electoral campaigns. But these indirect effects do not render BCRA unconstitutional. It is not uncommon for federal law to prohibit private conduct that is legal in some States. See, e.g., United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483 (2001). Indeed, such conflict is inevitable in areas of law that involve both state and federal concerns. It is not in and of itself a marker of constitutional infirmity. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 392 (1879). Of course, in maintaining the federal system envisioned by the Founders, this Court has done more than just prevent Congress from commandeering the States. We have also policed the absolute boundaries of congressional power under Article I. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). But plaintiffs offer no reason to believe that Congress has overstepped its Elections Clause power in enacting BCRA. Congress has a fully legitimate interest in maintaining the integrity of federal officeholders and preventing corruption of federal electoral processes through the means it has chosen. Indeed, our above analysis turns on our finding that those interests are sufficient to satisfy First Amendment scrutiny. Given that finding, we cannot conclude that those interests are insufficient to ground Congress' exercise of its Elections Clause power. See Morrison, supra, at 607 (respect owed to coordinate branches "demands that we invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds"). C </s> Finally, plaintiffs argue that Title I violates the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it discriminates against political parties in favor of special interest groups such as the National Rifle Association (NRA), American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and Sierra Club. As explained earlier, BCRA imposes numerous restrictions on the fundraising abilities of political parties, of which the soft-money ban is only the most prominent. Interest groups, however, remain free to raise soft money to fund voter registration, GOTV activities, mailings, and broadcast advertising (other than electioneering communications). We conclude that this disparate treatment does not offend the Constitution. As an initial matter, we note that BCRA actually favors political parties in many ways. Most obviously, party committees are entitled to receive individual contributions that substantially exceed FECA's limits on contributions to nonparty political committees; individuals can give $25,000 to political party committees whereas they can give a maximum of $5,000 to nonparty political committees. In addition, party committees are entitled in effect to contribute to candidates by making coordinated expenditures, and those expenditures may greatly exceed the contribution limits that apply to other donors. See 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(d) (Supp. 2003). </s> More importantly, however, Congress is fully entitled to consider the real-world differences between political parties and interest groups when crafting a system of campaign finance regulation. See National Right to Work, 459 U.S., at 210. Interest groups do not select slates of candidates for elections. Interest groups do not determine who will serve on legislative committees, elect congressional leadership, or organize legislative caucuses. Political parties have influence and power in the legislature that vastly exceeds that of any interest group. As a result, it is hardly surprising that party affiliation is the primary way by which voters identify candidates, or that parties in turn have special access to and relationships with federal officeholders. Congress' efforts at campaign finance regulation may account for these salient differences. Taken seriously, appellants' equal protection arguments would call into question not just Title I of BCRA, but much of the pre-existing structure of FECA as well. We therefore reject those arguments. </s> Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court insofar as it upheld §§323(e) and 323(f). We reverse the judgment of the District Court insofar as it invalidated §§323(a), 323(b), and 323(d). IV </s> Title II of BCRA, entitled "Noncandidate Campaign Expenditures," is divided into two subtitles: "Electioneering Communications" and "Independent and Coordinated Expenditures." We consider each challenged section of these subtitles in turn. BCRA §201's Definition of "Electioneering Communication" </s> The first section of Title II, §201, comprehensively amends FECA §304, which requires political committees to file detailed periodic financial reports with the FEC. The amendment coins a new term, "electioneering communication," to replace the narrowing construction of FECA's disclosure provisions adopted by this Court in Buckley. As discussed further below, that construction limited the coverage of FECA's disclosure requirement to communications expressly advocating the election or defeat of particular candidates. By contrast, the term "electioneering communication" is not so limited, but is defined to encompass any "broadcast, cable, or satellite communication" that "(I) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; </s> "(II) is made within-- </s> "(aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election for the office sought by the candidate; or </s> "(bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a convention or caucus of a political party that has authority to nominate a candidate, for the office sought by the candidate; and </s> "(III) in the case of a communication which refers to a candidate other than President or Vice President, is targeted to the relevant electorate." 2 U.S.C.A. §434(f)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. 2003).73 </s> New FECA §304(f)(3)(C) further provides that a communication is "'targeted to the relevant electorate'" if it "can be received by 50,000 or more persons" in the district or State the candidate seeks to represent. 2 U.S.C.A. §434(f)(3)(C). </s> In addition to setting forth this definition, BCRA's amendments to FECA §304 specify significant disclosure requirements for persons who fund electioneering communications. BCRA's use of this new term is not, however, limited to the disclosure context: A later section of the Act (BCRA §203, which amends FECA §316(b)(2)) restricts corporations' and labor unions' funding of electioneering communications. Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the new term as it applies in both the disclosure and the expenditure contexts. </s> The major premise of plaintiffs' challenge to BCRA's use of the term "electioneering communication" is that Buckley drew a constitutionally mandated line between express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy, and that speakers possess an inviolable First Amendment right to engage in the latter category of speech. Thus, plaintiffs maintain, Congress cannot constitutionally require disclosure of, or regulate expenditures for, "electioneering communications" without making an exception for those "communications" that do not meet Buckley's definition of express advocacy. </s> That position misapprehends our prior decisions, for the express advocacy restriction was an endpoint of statutory interpretation, not a first principle of constitutional law. In Buckley we began by examining then-18 U.S.C. §608(e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), which restricted expenditures "'relative to a clearly identified candidate,'" and we found that the phrase "'relative to'" was impermissibly vague. 424 U.S., at 40-42. We concluded that the vagueness deficiencies could "be avoided only by reading §608(e)(1) as limited to communications that include explicit words of advocacy of election or defeat of a candidate."74 Id., at 43. We provided examples of words of express advocacy, such as "'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' ... 'defeat,' [and] 'reject,'" id., at 44, n. 52, and those examples eventually gave rise to what is now known as the "magic words" requirement. </s> We then considered FECA's disclosure provisions, including 2 U.S.C. §431(f) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), which defined "'expenditur[e]'" to include the use of money or other assets "'for the purpose of ... influencing'" a federal election. Buckley, 424 U.S., at 77. Finding that the "ambiguity of this phrase" posed "constitutional problems," ibid., we noted our "obligation to construe the statute, if that can be done consistent with the legislature's purpose, to avoid the shoals of vagueness," id., at 77-78 (citations omitted). "To insure that the reach" of the disclosure requirement was "not impermissibly broad, we construe[d] 'expenditure' for purposes of that section in the same way we construed the terms of §608(e)--to reach only funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate." Id., at 80 (footnote omitted). </s> Thus, a plain reading of Buckley makes clear that the express advocacy limitation, in both the expenditure and the disclosure contexts, was the product of statutory interpretation rather than a constitutional command.75 In narrowly reading the FECA provisions in Buckley to avoid problems of vagueness and overbreadth, we nowhere suggested that a statute that was neither vague nor overbroad would be required to toe the same express advocacy line. Nor did we suggest as much in MCFL, 479 U.S. 238 (1986), in which we addressed the scope of another FECA expenditure limitation and confirmed the understanding that Buckley's express advocacy category was a product of statutory construction.76 </s> In short, the concept of express advocacy and the concomitant class of magic words were born of an effort to avoid constitutional infirmities. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979) (citing Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804)). We have long "rigidly adhered" to the tenet "'never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied,'" United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960) (citation omitted), for "[t]he nature of judicial review constrains us to consider the case that is actually before us," James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 547 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Consistent with that principle, our decisions in Buckley and MCFL were specific to the statutory language before us; they in no way drew a constitutional boundary that forever fixed the permissible scope of provisions regulating campaign-related speech. </s> Nor are we persuaded, independent of our precedents, that the First Amendment erects a rigid barrier between express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy. That notion cannot be squared with our longstanding recognition that the presence or absence of magic words cannot meaningfully distinguish electioneering speech from a true issue ad. See Buckley, supra, at 45. Indeed, the unmistakable lesson from the record in this litigation, as all three judges on the District Court agreed, is that Buckley's magic-words requirement is functionally meaningless. 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 303-304 (Henderson, J.); id., at 534 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 875-879 (Leon, J.). Not only can advertisers easily evade the line by eschewing the use of magic words, but they would seldom choose to use such words even if permitted.77 And although the resulting advertisements do not urge the viewer to vote for or against a candidate in so many words, they are no less clearly intended to influence the election.78 Buckley's express advocacy line, in short, has not aided the legislative effort to combat real or apparent corruption, and Congress enacted BCRA to correct the flaws it found in the existing system. </s> Finally we observe that new FECA §304(f)(3)'s definition of "electioneering communication" raises none of the vagueness concerns that drove our analysis in Buckley. The term "electioneering communication" applies only (1) to a broadcast (2) clearly identifying a candidate for federal office, (3) aired within a specific time period, and (4) targeted to an identified audience of at least 50,000 viewers or listeners. These components are both easily understood and objectively determinable. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-114 (1972). Thus, the constitutional objection that persuaded the Court in Buckley to limit FECA's reach to express advocacy is simply inapposite here. BCRA §201's Disclosure Requirements </s> Having rejected the notion that the First Amendment requires Congress to treat so-called issue advocacy differently from express advocacy, we turn to plaintiffs' other concerns about the use of the term "electioneering communication" in amended FECA §304's disclosure provisions. Under those provisions, whenever any person makes disbursements totaling more than $10,000 during any calendar year for the direct costs of producing and airing electioneering communications, he must file a statement with the FEC identifying the pertinent elections and all persons sharing the costs of the disbursements. 2 U.S.C.A. §§434(f)(2)(A), (B), and (D) (Supp. 2003). If the disbursements are made from a corporation's or labor union's segregated account,79 or by a single individual who has collected contributions from others, the statement must identify all persons who contributed $1,000 or more to the account or the individual during the calendar year. §§434(f)(2)(E), (F). The statement must be filed within 24 hours of each "disclosure date"--a term defined to include the first date and all subsequent dates on which a person's aggregate undisclosed expenses for electioneering communications exceed $10,000 for that calendar year. §§434(f)(1), (2) and (4). Another subsection further provides that the execution of a contract to make a disbursement is itself treated as a disbursement for purposes of FECA's disclosure requirements. §434(f)(5). In addition to the failed argument that BCRA's amendments to FECA §304 improperly extend to both express and issue advocacy, plaintiffs challenge amended FECA §304's disclosure requirements as unnecessarily (1) requiring disclosure of the names of persons who contributed $1,000 or more to the individual or group that paid for a communication, and (2) mandating disclosure of executory contracts for communications that have not yet aired. The District Court rejected the former submission but accepted the latter, finding invalid new FECA §304(f)(5), which governs executory contracts. Relying on BCRA's severability provision,80 the court held that invalidation of the executory contracts subsection did not render the balance of BCRA's amendments to FECA §304 unconstitutional. 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 242 (per curiam). </s> We agree with the District Court that the important state interests that prompted the Buckley Court to uphold FECA's disclosure requirements--providing the electorate with information, deterring actual corruption and avoiding any appearance thereof, and gathering the data necessary to enforce more substantive electioneering restrictions--apply in full to BCRA.81 Accordingly, Buckley amply supports application of FECA §304's disclosure requirements to the entire range of "electioneering communications." As the authors of the District Court's per curiam opinion concluded after reviewing evidence concerning the use of purported "issue ads" to influence federal elections: "The factual record demonstrates that the abuse of the present law not only permits corporations and labor unions to fund broadcast advertisements designed to influence federal elections, but permits them to do so while concealing their identities from the public. BCRA's disclosure provisions require these organizations to reveal their identities so that the public is able to identify the source of the funding behind broadcast advertisements influencing certain elections. Plaintiffs' disdain for BCRA's disclosure pro-visions is nothing short of surprising. Plaintiffs chal-lenge BCRA's restrictions on electioneering communications on the premise that they should be permitted to spend corporate and labor union general treasury funds in the sixty days before the federal elections on broadcast advertisements, which refer to federal candidates, because speech needs to be 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.' McConnell Br. at 44 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). Curiously, Plaintiffs want to preserve the ability to run these advertisements while hiding behind dubious and misleading names like: 'The Coalition-Americans Working for Real Change' (funded by business organizations opposed to organized labor), 'Citizens for Better Medicare' (funded by the pharmaceutical industry), 'Republicans for Clean Air' (funded by brothers Charles and Sam Wyly). Findings ¶ ;¶ ;44, 51, 52. Given these tactics, Plaintiffs never satisfactorily answer the question of how 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' speech can occur when organizations hide themselves from the scrutiny of the voting public. McConnell Br. at 44. Plaintiffs' argument for striking down BCRA's disclosure provisions does not reinforce the precious First Amendment values that Plaintiffs argue are trampled by BCRA, but ignores the competing First Amendment interests of individual citizens seeking to make informed choices in the political marketplace." 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 237. </s> The District Court was also correct that Buckley forecloses a facial attack on the new provision in §304 that requires disclosure of the names of persons contributing $1,000 or more to segregated funds or individuals that spend more than $10,000 in a calendar year on electioneering communications. Like our earlier decision in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958),82 Buckley recognized that compelled disclosures may impose an unconstitutional burden on the freedom to associate in support of a particular cause. Nevertheless, Buckley rejected the contention that FECA's disclosure requirements could not constitutionally be applied to minor parties and independent candidates because the Government's interest in obtaining information from such parties was minimal and the danger of infringing their rights substantial. In Buckley, unlike NAACP, we found no evidence that any party had been exposed to economic reprisals or physical threats as a result of the compelled disclosures. Buckley, 424 U.S., at 69-70. We acknowledged that such a case might arise in the future, however, and addressed the standard of proof that would then apply: "We recognize that unduly strict requirements of proof could impose a heavy burden, but it does not follow that a blanket exemption for minor parties is necessary. Minor parties must be allowed sufficient flexibility in the proof of injury to assure a fair consideration of their claim. The evidence offered need show only a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a party's contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties." Id., at 74. </s> A few years later we used that standard to resolve a minor party's challenge to the constitutionality of the State of Ohio's disclosure requirements. We held that the First Amendment prohibits States from compelling disclosures that would subject identified persons to "threats, harassment, and reprisals," and that the District Court's findings had established a "reasonable probability" of such a result.83 Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 100 (1982). </s> In this litigation the District Court applied Buckley's evidentiary standard and found--consistent with our conclusion in Buckley, and in contrast to that in Brown--that the evidence did not establish the requisite "reasonable probability" of harm to any plaintiff group or its members. The District Court noted that some parties had expressed such concerns, but it found a "lack of specific evidence about the basis for these concerns." 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 247 (per curiam). We agree, but we note that, like our refusal to recognize a blanket exception for minor parties in Buckley, our rejection of plaintiffs' facial challenge to the requirement to disclose individual donors does not foreclose possible future challenges to particular applications of that requirement. </s> We also are unpersuaded by plaintiffs' challenge to new FECA §304(f)(5), which requires disclosure of executory contracts for electioneering communications: "Contracts to disburse </s> "For purposes of this subsection, a person shall be treated as having made a disbursement if the person has executed a contract to make the disbursement." 2 U.S.C.A. §434(f)(5) (Supp. 2003). </s> In our view, this provision serves an important purpose the District Court did not advance. BCRA's amendments to FECA §304 mandate disclosure only if and when a person makes disbursements totaling more than $10,000 in any calendar year to pay for electioneering communications. Plaintiffs do not take issue with the use of a dollar amount, rather than the number or dates of the ads, to identify the time when a person paying for electioneering communications must make disclosures to the FEC. Nor do they question the need to make the contents of parties' disclosure statements available to curious voters in advance of elections. Given the relatively short time frames in which electioneering communications are made, the interest in assuring that disclosures are made promptly and in time to provide relevant information to voters is unquestionably significant. Yet fixing the deadline for filing disclosure statements based on the date when aggregate disbursements exceed $10,000 would open a significant loophole if advertisers were not required to disclose executory contracts. In the absence of that requirement, political supporters could avoid preelection disclosures concerning ads slated to run during the final week of a campaign simply by making a preelection downpayment of less than $10,000, with the balance payable after the election. Indeed, if the advertiser waited to pay that balance until the next calendar year then, as long as the balance did not itself exceed $10,000, the advertiser might avoid the disclosure requirements completely. </s> The record contains little evidence identifying any harm that might flow from the enforcement of §304(f)(5)'s "advance" disclosure requirement. The District Court speculated that disclosing information about contracts "that have not been performed, and may never be performed, may lead to confusion and an unclear record upon which the public will evaluate the forces operating in the political marketplace." 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 241 (per curiam). Without evidence relating to the frequency of nonperformance of executed contracts, such speculation cannot outweigh the public interest in ensuring full disclosure before an election actually takes place. It is no doubt true that §304(f)(5) will sometimes require the filing of disclosure statements in advance of the actual broadcast of an advertisement.84 But the same would be true in the absence of an advance disclosure requirement, if a television station insisted on advance payment for all of the ads covered by a contract. Thus, the possibility that amended §304 may sometimes require disclosures prior to the airing of an ad is as much a function of the use of disbursements (rather than the date of an ad) to trigger the disclosure requirement as it is a function of §304(f)(5)'s treatment of executory contracts. </s> As the District Court observed, amended FECA §304's disclosure requirements are constitutional because they "'d[o] not prevent anyone from speaking.'" Ibid. (quoting Brief for FEC in Opposition in No. 02-582 etal. (DC), p.112). Moreover, the required disclosures "'would not have to reveal the specific content of the advertisements, yet they would perform an important function in informing the public about various candidates' supporters before election day.'" 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 241 (quoting Brief for FEC in Opposition, supra, at 112) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court insofar as it upheld the disclosure requirements in amended FECA §304 and rejected the facial attack on the provisions relating to donors of $1,000 or more, and reverse that judgment insofar as it invalidated FECA §304(f)(5). BCRA §202's Treatment of "Coordinated Communications" as Contributions </s> Section 202 of BCRA amends FECA §315(a)(7)(C) to provide that disbursements for "electioneering communication[s]" that are coordinated with a candidate or party will be treated as contributions to, and expenditures by, that candidate or party. 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(a)(7)(C) (Supp. 2003).85 The amendment clarifies the scope of the preceding subsection, §315(a)(7)(B), which states more generally that "expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of" a candidate or party will constitute contributions. 2 U.S.C. §§441a(a)(7)(B)(i)-(ii). In Buckley we construed the statutory term "expenditure" to reach only spending for express advocacy. 424 U.S., at 40-43, and n. 52 (addressing 18 U.S.C. §608(e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), which placed a $1,000 cap on expenditures "'relative to a clearly identified candidate'"). BCRA §202 pre-empts a possible claim that §315(a)(7)(B) is similarly limited, such that coordinated expenditures for communications that avoid express advocacy cannot be counted as contributions. As we explained above, see supra, at 83-86, Buckley's narrow interpretation of the term "expenditure" was not a constitutional limitation on Congress' power to regulate federal elections. Accordingly, there is no reason why Congress may not treat coordinated disbursements for electioneering communications in the same way it treats all other coordinated expenditures. We affirm the judgment of the District Court insofar as it held that plaintiffs had advanced "no basis for finding Section 202 unconstitutional." 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 250. BCRA §203's Prohibition of Corporate and Labor Disbursements for Electioneering Communications </s> Since our decision in Buckley, Congress' power to prohibit corporations and unions from using funds in their treasuries to finance advertisements expressly advocating the election or defeat of candidates in federal elections has been firmly embedded in our law. The ability to form and administer separate segregated funds authorized by FECA §316, 2 U.S.C.A. §441b (main ed. and Supp. 2003), has provided corporations and unions with a constitutionally sufficient opportunity to engage in express advocacy. That has been this Court's unanimous view,86 and it is not challenged in this litigation. Section 203 of BCRA amends FECA §316(b)(2) to extend this rule, which previously applied only to express advocacy, to all "electioneering communications" covered by the definition of that term in amended FECA §304(f)(3), discussed above. 2 U.S.C.A. §441b(b)(2) (Supp. 2003).87 Thus, under BCRA, corporations and unions may not use their general treasury funds to finance electioneering communications, but they remain free to organize and administer segregated funds, or PACs, for that purpose. Because corporations can still fund electioneering communications with PAC money, it is "simply wrong" to view the provision as a "complete ban" on expression rather than a regulation. Beaumont, 539 U.S., at ___, ___ (slip op., at 15). As we explained in Beaumont: "The PAC option allows corporate political participation without the temptation to use corporate funds for political influence, quite possibly at odds with the sentiments of some shareholders or members, and it lets the government regulate campaign activity through registration and disclosure, see [2 U.S.C.] §§432-434, without jeopardizing the associational rights of advocacy organizations' members." Id., at ___ (slip op., at 16) (citation omitted). </s> See also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658 (1990). </s> Rather than arguing that the prohibition on the use of general treasury funds is a complete ban that operates as a prior restraint, plaintiffs instead challenge the expanded regulation on the grounds that it is both overbroad and underinclusive. Our consideration of plaintiffs' challenge is informed by our earlier conclusion that the distinction between express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy is not constitutionally compelled. In that light, we must examine the degree to which BCRA burdens First Amendment expression and evaluate whether a compelling governmental interest justifies that burden. Id., at 657. The latter question--whether the state interest is compelling--is easily answered by our prior decisions regarding campaign finance regulation, which "represent respect for the 'legislative judgment that the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation.'" Beaumont, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 8) (quoting National Right to Work, 459 U.S., at 209-210). We have repeatedly sustained legislation aimed at "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas." Austin, supra, at 660; see Beaumont, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 7-8); National Right to Work, supra, at 209-210. Moreover, recent cases have recognized that certain restrictions on corporate electoral involvement permissibly hedge against "'circumvention of [valid] contribution limits.'" Beaumont, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 7) (quoting Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 456, and n.18.) </s> In light of our precedents, plaintiffs do not contest that the Government has a compelling interest in regulating advertisements that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate for federal office. Nor do they contend that the speech involved in so-called issue advocacy is any more core political speech than are words of express advocacy. After all, "the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office," Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971), and "[a]dvocacy of the election or defeat of candidates for federal office is no less entitled to protection under the First Amendment than the discussion of political policy generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation." Buckley, 424 U.S., at 48. Rather, plaintiffs argue that the justifications that adequately support the regulation of express advocacy do not apply to significant quantities of speech encompassed by the definition of electioneering communications. </s> This argument fails to the extent that the issue ads broadcast during the 30- and 60-day periods preceding federal primary and general elections are the functional equivalent of express advocacy. The justifications for the regulation of express advocacy apply equally to ads aired during those periods if the ads are intended to influence the voters' decisions and have that effect. The precise percentage of issue ads that clearly identified a candidate and were aired during those relatively brief preelection time spans but had no electioneering purpose is a matter of dispute between the parties and among the judges on the District Court. See 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 307-312 (Henderson, J.); id., at 583-587 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 796-798 (Leon, J.). Nevertheless, the vast majority of ads clearly had such a purpose. Annenberg Report 13-14; App. 1330-1348 (Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report); 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 573-578 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 826-827 (Leon, J.). Moreover, whatever the precise percentage may have been in the past, in the future corporations and unions may finance genuine issue ads during those time frames by simply avoiding any specific reference to federal candidates, or in doubtful cases by paying for the ad from a segregated fund.88 </s> We are therefore not persuaded that plaintiffs have carried their heavy burden of proving that amended FECA §316(b)(2) is overbroad. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). Even if we assumed that BCRA will inhibit some constitutionally protected corporate and union speech, that assumption would not "justify prohibiting all enforcement" of the law unless its application to protected speech is substantial, "not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the scope of the law's plainly legitimate applications." Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. ___, ___ (2003) (slip op., at 5-6). Far from establishing that BCRA's application to pure issue ads is substantial, either in an absolute sense or relative to its application to election-related advertising, the record strongly supports the contrary conclusion. </s> Plaintiffs also argue that FECA §316(b)(2)'s segregated-fund requirement for electioneering communications is underinclusive because it does not apply to advertising in the print media or on the Internet. 2 U.S.C.A. §434(f)(3)(A) (Supp. 2003). The records developed in this litigation and by the Senate Committee adequately explain the reasons for this legislative choice. Congress found that corporations and unions used soft money to finance a virtual torrent of televised election-related ads during the periods immediately preceding federal elections, and that remedial legislation was needed to stanch that flow of money. 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 569-573 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 799 (Leon, J.); 3 1998 Senate Report 4465, 4474-4481; 5 id., at 7521-7525. As we held in Buckley, "reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind." 424 U.S., at 105 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). One might just as well argue that the electioneering communication definition is underinclusive because it leaves advertising 61 days in advance of an election entirely unregulated. The record amply justifies Congress' line drawing. </s> In addition to arguing that §316(b)(2)'s segregated-fund requirement is underinclusive, some plaintiffs contend that it unconstitutionally discriminates in favor of media companies. FECA §304(f)(3)(B)(i) excludes from the definition of electioneering communications any "communication appearing in a news story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any political party, political committee, or candidate." 2 U.S.C.A. §434(f)(3)(B)(i) (Supp. 2003). Plaintiffs argue this provision gives free rein to media companies to engage in speech without resort to PAC money. Section 304(f)(3)(B)(i)'s effect, however, is much narrower than plaintiffs suggest. The provision excepts news items and commentary only; it does not afford carte blanche to media companies generally to ignore FECA's provisions. The statute's narrow exception is wholly consistent with First Amendment principles. "A valid distinction ... exists between corporations that are part of the media industry and other corporations that are not involved in the regular business of imparting news to the public." Austin, 494 U.S., at 668. Numerous federal statutes have drawn this distinction to ensure that the law "does not hinder or prevent the institutional press from reporting on, and publishing editorials about, newsworthy events." Ibid. (citations omitted); see, e.g., 2 U.S.C. §431(9)(B)(i) (exempting news stories, commentaries, and editorials from FECA's definition of "expenditure"); 15 U.S.C. §§1801-1804 (providing a limited antitrust exemption for newspapers); 47 U.S.C. §315(a) (excepting newscasts, news interviews, and news documentaries from the requirement that broadcasters provide equal time to candidates for public office).89 </s> We affirm the District Court's judgment to the extent that it upheld the constitutionality of FECA §316(b)(2); to the extent that it invalidated any part of §316(b)(2), we reverse the judgment. BCRA §204's Application to Nonprofit Corporations </s> Section 204 of BCRA, which adds FECA §316(c)(6), applies the prohibition on the use of general treasury funds to pay for electioneering communications to not-for-profit corporations.90 Prior to the enactment of BCRA, FECA required such corporations, like business corporations, to pay for their express advocacy from segregated funds rather than from their general treasuries. Our recent decision in Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. ___ (2003), confirmed that the requirement was valid except insofar as it applied to a sub-category of corporations described as "MCFL organizations," as defined by our decision in MCFL, 479 U.S. 238 (1986).91 The constitutional objection to applying FECA's segregated-fund requirement to so-called MCFL organizations necessarily applies with equal force to FECA §316(c)(6). Our decision in MCFL related to a carefully defined category of entities. We identified three features of the organization at issue in that case that were central to our holding: "First, it was formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideas, and cannot engage in business activities. If political fundraising events are expressly denominated as requests for contributions that will be used for political purposes, including direct expenditures, these events cannot be considered business activities. This ensures that political resources reflect political support. Second, it has no shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to have a claim on its assets or earnings. This ensures that persons connected with the organization will have no economic disincentive for disassociating with it if they disagree with its political activity. Third, MCFL was not established by a business corporation or a labor union, and it is its policy not to accept contributions from such entities. This prevents such corporations from serving as conduits for the type of direct spending that creates a threat to the political marketplace." Id., at 264. </s> That FECA §316(c)(6) does not, on its face, exempt MCFL organizations from its prohibition is not a sufficient reason to invalidate the entire section. If a reasonable limiting construction "has been or could be placed on the challenged statute" to avoid constitutional concerns, we should embrace it. Broadrick, 487 U.S. 879, 896 (1988); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-697 (1979). Indeed, the Government itself concedes that §316(c)(6) does not apply to MCFL organizations. As so construed, the provision is plainly valid. See Austin, 494 U.S., at 661-665 (holding that a segregated-fund requirement that did not explicitly carve out an MCFL exception could apply to a nonprofit corporation that did not qualify for MCFL status). </s> Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court upholding §316(c)(6) as so limited is affirmed. BCRA §212's Reporting Requirement for $1,000 Expenditures </s> Section 212 of BCRA amends FECA §304 to add a new disclosure requirement, FECA §304(g), which applies to persons making independent expenditures of $1,000 or more during the 20-day period immediately preceding an election. Like FECA §304(f)(5), discussed above, new §304(g) treats the execution of a contract to make a disbursement as the functional equivalent of a payment for the goods or services covered by the contract.92 In challenging this provision, plaintiffs renew the argument we rejected in the context of §304(f)(5): that they have a constitutional right to postpone any disclosure until after the performance of the services purchased by their expenditure. The District Court held that the challenge to FECA §304(g) was not ripe because the FEC has issued regulations "provid[ing] Plaintiffs with the exact remedy they seek"--that is, specifically declining to "require disclosure of independent express advocacy expenditures prior to their 'publi[c] disseminat[ion].'" 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 251, and n.85 (per curiam) (citing 68 Fed. Reg. 404, 452 (2003) (codified at 11 CFR §§109.10(c), (d) (2003))). We are not certain that a regulation purporting to limit the range of circumstances in which a speech-burdening statute will be enforced can render nonjusticiable a facial challenge to the (concededly broader) underlying statute. Nevertheless, we need not separately address the constitutionality of §304(g), for our ruling as to BCRA §201, see supra, at 82-89, renders the issue essentially moot. BCRA §213's Requirement that Political Parties Choose Between Coordinated and Independent Expenditures After Nominating a Candidate </s> Section 213 of BCRA amends FECA §315(d)(4) to impose certain limits on party spending during the postnomination, preelection period.93 At first blush, the text of §315(d)(4)(A) appears to require political parties to make a straightforward choice between using limited coordinated expenditures or unlimited independent expenditures to support their nominees. All three judges on the District Court concluded that the provision placed an unconstitutional burden on the parties' right to make unlimited independent expenditures. 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 388 (Henderson, J.); id., at 650-651 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.), id., at 805-808 (Leon, J.). In the end, we agree with that conclusion but believe it important to identify certain complexities in the text of §315(d)(4) that affect our analysis of the issue. Section 315 of FECA sets forth various limitations on contributions and expenditures by individuals, political parties, and other groups. Section 315(a)(2) restricts "contributions" by parties to $5,000 per candidate. 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(a)(2). Because §315(a)(7) treats expenditures that are coordinated with a candidate as contributions to that candidate, 2 U.S.C.A. §441(a)(7) (Supp. 2003), the $5,000 limit also operates as a cap on parties' coordinated expenditures. Section 315(d), however, provides that, "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law with respect to limitations on expenditures or limitations on contributions," political parties may make "expenditures" in support of their candidates under a formula keyed to the voting-age population of the candidate's home State or, in the case of a candidate for President, the voting-age population of the United States. 2 U.S.C.A. §§441a(d)(1)-(3) (main ed. and Supp. 2003).94 In the year 2000, that formula permitted expenditures ranging from $33,780 to $67,650 for House of Representatives races, and from $67,650 to $1.6 million for Senate races. Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 439, n.3. We held in Colorado I that parties have a constitutional right to make unlimited independent expenditures, and we invalidated §315(d) to the extent that it restricted such expenditures. As a result of that decision, §315(d) applies only to coordinated expenditures, replacing the $5,000 cap on contributions set out in §315(a)(2) with the more generous limitations prescribed by §§315(d)(1)-(3). We sustained that limited application in Colorado II, supra. </s> Section 213 of BCRA amends §315(d) by adding a new paragraph (4). New §315(d)(4)(A) provides that, after a party nominates a candidate for federal office, it must choose between two spending options. Under the first option, a party that "makes any independent expenditure (as defined in section [301(17)])" is thereby barred from making "any coordinated expenditure under this subsection." 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(d)(4)(A)(i) (Supp. 2003). The phrase "this subsection" is a reference to subsection (d) of §315. Thus, the consequence of making an independent expenditure is not a complete prohibition of any coordinated expenditure: Although the party cannot take advantage of the increased spending limits under §§315(d)(1)-(3), it still may make up to $5,000 in coordinated expenditures under §315(a)(2). As the difference between $5,000 and $1.6 million demonstrates, however, that is a significant cost to impose on the exercise of a constitutional right. </s> The second option is the converse of the first. It provides that a party that makes any coordinated expenditure "under this subsection" (i.e., one that exceeds the ordinary $5,000 limit) cannot make "any independent expenditure (as defined in section [301(17)]) with respect to the candidate." 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(d)(4)(A)(ii). Section 301(17) defines "'independent expenditure'" to mean a non-coordinated expenditure "expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate." 2 U.S.C.A. §431(17)(A).95 Therefore, as was true of the first option, the party's choice is not as stark as it initially appears: The consequence of the larger coordinated expenditure is not a complete prohibition of any independent expenditure, but the forfeiture of the right to make independent expenditures for express advocacy. As we explained in our discussion of the provisions relating to electioneering communications, supra, at 83-87, express advocacy represents only a tiny fraction of the political communications made for the purpose of electing or defeating candidates during a campaign. Regardless of which option parties choose, they remain free to make independent expenditures for the vast majority of campaign ads that avoid the use of a few magic words. </s> In sum, the coverage of new FECA §315(d)(4) is much more limited than it initially appears. A party that wishes to spend more than $5,000 in coordination with its nominee is forced to forgo only the narrow category of independent expenditures that make use of magic words. But while the category of burdened speech is relatively small, it plainly is entitled to First Amendment protection. See Buckley, 424 U.S., at 44-45, 48. Under §315(d)(4), a political party's exercise of its constitutionally protected right to engage in "core First Amendment expression," id., at 48, results in the loss of a valuable statutory benefit that has been available to parties for many years. To survive constitutional scrutiny, a provision that has such consequences must be supported by a meaningful governmental interest. </s> The interest in requiring political parties to avoid the use of magic words is not such an interest. We held in Buckley that a $1,000 cap on expenditures that applied only to express advocacy could not be justified as a means of avoiding circumvention of contribution limits or preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption because its restrictions could easily be evaded: "So long as persons and groups eschew expenditures that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, they are free to spend as much as they want to promote the candidate and his views." Id., at 45. The same is true in this litigation. Any claim that a restriction on independent express advocacy serves a strong Government interest is belied by the overwhelming evidence that the line between express advocacy and other types of election-influencing expression is, for Congress' purposes, functionally meaningless. Indeed, Congress enacted the new "electioneering communication[s]" provisions precisely because it recognized that the express advocacy test was woefully inadequate at capturing communications designed to influence candidate elections. In light of that recognition, we are hard pressed to conclude that any meaningful purpose is served by §315(d)(4)'s burden on a party's right to engage independently in express advocacy. </s> The Government argues that §315(d)(4) nevertheless is constitutional because it is not an outright ban (or cap) on independent expenditures, but rather offers parties a voluntary choice between a constitutional right and a statutory benefit. Whatever merit that argument might have in the abstract, it fails to account for new §315(d)(4)(B), which provides: "For purposes of this paragraph, all political committees established and maintained by a national political party (including all congressional campaign committees) and all political committees established and maintained by a State political party (including any subordinate committee of a State committee) shall be considered to be a single political committee." 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(d)(4)(B) (Supp. 2003). </s> Given that provision, it simply is not the case that each party committee can make a voluntary and independent choice between exercising its right to engage in independent advocacy and taking advantage of the increased limits on coordinated spending under §§315(d)(1)-(3). Instead, the decision resides solely in the hands of the first mover, such that a local party committee can bind both the state and national parties to its chosen spending option.96 It is one thing to say that Congress may require a party committee to give up its right to make independent expenditures if it believes that it can accomplish more with coordinated expenditures. It is quite another thing, however, to say that the RNC must limit itself to $5,000 in coordinated expenditures in support of its presidential nominee if any state or local committee first makes an independent expenditure for an ad that uses magic words. That odd result undermines any claim that new §315(d)(4) can withstand constitutional scrutiny simply because it is cast as a voluntary choice rather than an outright prohibition on independent expenditures. </s> The portion of the judgment of the District Court invalidating BCRA §213 is affirmed. BCRA §214's Changes in FECA's Provisions Covering Coordinated Expenditures </s> Ever since our decision in Buckley, it has been settled that expenditures by a noncandidate that are "controlled by or coordinated with the candidate and his campaign" may be treated as indirect contributions subject to FECA's source and amount limitations. 424 U.S., at 46. Thus, FECA §315(a)(7)(B)(i) long has provided that "expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents, shall be considered to be a contribution to such candidate." 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (Supp. 2003). Section 214(a) of BCRA creates a new FECA §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) that applies the same rule to expenditures coordinated with "a national, State, or local committee of a political party." 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(a)(7)(B)(ii).97 Sections 214(b) and (c) direct the FEC to repeal its current regulations98 and to promulgate new regulations dealing with "coordinated communications" paid for by persons other than candidates or their parties. Subsection (c) provides that the new "regulations shall not require agreement or formal collaboration to establish coordination." 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(a) note. Plaintiffs do not dispute that Congress may apply the same coordination rules to parties as to candidates. They argue instead that new FECA §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) and its implementing regulations are overbroad and unconstitutionally vague because they permit a finding of coordination even in the absence of an agreement. Plaintiffs point out that political supporters may be subjected to criminal liability if they exceed the contribution limits with expenditures that ultimately are deemed coordinated. Thus, they stress the importance of a clear definition of "coordination" and argue any definition that does not hinge on the presence of an agreement cannot provide the "precise guidance" that the First Amendment demands. Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States etal., Appellant in No. 02-1756, p. 48. As plaintiffs readily admit, that argument reaches beyond BCRA, calling into question FECA's pre-existing provisions governing expenditures coordinated with candidates. </s> We are not persuaded that the presence of an agreement marks the dividing line between expenditures that are coordinated--and therefore may be regulated as indirect contributions--and expenditures that truly are independent. We repeatedly have struck down limitations on expenditures "made totally independently of the candidate and his campaign," Buckley, 424 U.S., at 47, on the ground that such limitations "impose far greater restraints on the freedom of speech and association" than do limits on contributions and coordinated expenditures, id., at 44, while "fail[ing] to serve any substantial governmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in the electoral process," id., at 47-48. See also Colorado I, 518 U.S., at 613-614 (striking down limit on expenditure made by party officials prior to nomination of candidates and without any consultation with potential nominees). We explained in Buckley: "Unlike contributions, ... independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate." 424 U.S., at 47. </s> Thus, the rationale for affording special protection to wholly independent expenditures has nothing to do with the absence of an agreement and everything to do with the functional consequences of different types of expenditures. Independent expenditures "are poor sources of leverage for a spender because they might be duplicative or counterproductive from a candidate's point of view." Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 446. By contrast, expenditures made after a "wink or nod" often will be "as useful to the candidate as cash." Id., at 442, 446. For that reason, Congress has always treated expenditures made "at the request or suggestion of" a candidate as coordinated.99 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (Supp. 2003). A supporter easily could comply with a candidate's request or suggestion without first agreeing to do so, and the resulting expenditure would be "'virtually indistinguishable from [a] simple contributio[n],'" Colorado II, supra, at 444-445. Therefore, we cannot agree with the submission that new FECA §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) is overbroad because it permits a finding of coordination or cooperation notwithstanding the absence of a pre-existing agreement. </s> Nor are we persuaded that the absence of an agreement requirement renders §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) unconstitutionally vague. An agreement has never been required to support a finding of coordination with a candidate under §315(a)(7)(B)(i), which refers to expenditures made "in cooperation, consultation, or concer[t] with, or at the request or suggestion of" a candidate. Congress used precisely the same language in new §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) to address expenditures coordinated with parties. FECA's longstanding definition of coordination "delineates its reach in words of common understanding." Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 616 (1968). Not surprisingly, therefore, the relevant statutory language has survived without constitutional challenge for almost three decades. Although that fact does not insulate the definition from constitutional scrutiny, it does undermine plaintiffs' claim that the language of §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) is intolerably vague. Plaintiffs do not present any evidence that the definition has chilled political speech, whether between candidates and their supporters or by the supporters to the general public. See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (noting risk that vague statutes may chill protected expression). And, although plaintiffs speculate that the FEC could engage in intrusive and politically motivated investigations into alleged coordination, they do not even attempt to explain why an agreement requirement would solve that problem. Moreover, the only evidence plaintiffs have adduced regarding the enforcement of the coordination provision during its 27-year history concerns three investigations in the late 1990's into groups on different sides of the political aisle. Such meager evidence does not support the claim that §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) will "foster 'arbitrary and discriminatory application.'" Buckley, supra, at 41, n. 48 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 339 U.S. 382, 412 (1950), and is not unconstitutionally vague. </s> Finally, portions of plaintiffs' challenge to BCRA §214 focus on the regulations the FEC has promulgated under §214(c). 11 CFR §109.21 (2003). As the District Court explained, issues concerning the regulations are not appropriately raised in this facial challenge to BCRA, but must be pursued in a separate proceeding. Thus, we agree with the District Court that plaintiffs' challenge to §§214(b) and (c) is not ripe to the extent that the alleged constitutional infirmities are found in the implementing regulations rather than the statute itself. </s> The portions of the District Court judgment rejecting plaintiffs' challenges to BCRA §214 are affirmed. V </s> Many years ago we observed that "[t]o say that Congress is without power to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard ... an election from the improper use of money to influence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power of self protection." Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S., at 545. We abide by that conviction in considering Congress' most recent effort to confine the ill effects of aggregated wealth on our political system. We are under no illusion that BCRA will be the last congressional statement on the matter. Money, like water, will always find an outlet. What problems will arise, and how Congress will respond, are concerns for another day. In the main we uphold BCRA's two principal, complementary features: the control of soft money and the regulation of electioneering communications. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the District Court's judgment with respect to Titles I and II. It is so ordered. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1674v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1675v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1676v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> JOHN McCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1702v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1727v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC., etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1733v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPELLANTS </s> 02-1734v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1740v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> RON PAUL, UNITED STATES CONGRESSMAN, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1747v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1753v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1755v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1756v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal. on appeals from the united states district court for the district of columbia [December 10, 2003] </s> Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV.** </s> This opinion addresses issues involving miscellaneous Title III and IV provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), 116 Stat. 81. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the District Court with respect to these provisions. BCRA §305 </s> BCRA §305 amends the federal Communications Act of 1934 (Communications Act) §315(b), 48 Stat. 1088, as amended, 86 Stat. 4, which requires that, 45 days before a primary or 60 days before a general election, broadcast stations must sell a qualified candidate the "lowest unit charge of the station for the same class and amount of time for the same period," 47 U.S.C. §315(b). Section 305's amendment, in turn, denies a candidate the benefit of that lowest unit charge unless the candidate "provides written certification to the broadcast station that the candidate (and any authorized committee of the candidate) shall not make any direct reference to another candidate for the same office," or the candidate, in the manner prescribed in BCRA §305(a)(3), clearly identifies herself at the end of the broadcast and states that she approves of the broadcast. 47 U.S.C.A. §§315(b)(2)(A), (C) (Supp. 2003). The McConnell plaintiffs challenge §305. They argue that Senator McConnell's testimony that he plans to run advertisements critical of his opponents in the future and that he had run them in the past is sufficient to establish standing. We think not. </s> Article III of the Constitution limits the "judicial power" to the resolution of "cases" and "controversies." One element of the "bedrock" case-or-controversy requirement is that plaintiffs must establish that they have standing to sue. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997). On many occasions, we have reiterated the three requirements that constitute the "'irreducible constitutional minimum'" of standing. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000). First, a plaintiff must demonstrate an "injury in fact," which is "concrete," "distinct and palpable," and "actual or imminent." Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, a plaintiff must establish "a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of--the injury has to be 'fairly trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] some third party not before the court.'" Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)). Third, a plaintiff must show the "'substantial likelihood' that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact." Stevens, supra, at 771. </s> As noted above, §305 amended the Communication Act's requirements with respect to the lowest unit charge for broadcasting time. But this price is not available to qualified candidates until 45 days before a primary election or 60 days before a general election. Because Senator McConnell's current term does not expire until 2009, the earliest day he could be affected by §305 is 45 days before the Republican primary election in 2008. This alleged injury in fact is too remote temporally to satisfy Article III standing. See Whitmore, supra, at 158 ("A threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must show he is "'immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury' as [a] result" of the challenged conduct). Because we hold that the McConnell plaintiffs lack standing to challenge §305, we affirm the District Court's dismissal of the challenge to BCRA §305. BCRA §307 </s> BCRA §307, which amends §315(a)(1) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), 86 Stat. 3, as added, 90 Stat. 487, increases and indexes for inflation certain FECA contribution limits. The Adams and Paul plaintiffs challenge §307 in this Court. Both groups contend that they have standing to sue. Again, we disagree. The Adams plaintiffs, a group consisting of voters, organizations representing voters, and candidates, allege two injuries, and argue each is legally cognizable, "as established by case law outlawing electoral discrimination based on economic status ... and upholding the right to an equally meaningful vote ...." Brief for Appellants Adams et al. in No. 02-1740, p.31. </s> First, they assert that the increases in hard money limits enacted by §307 deprive them of an equal ability to participate in the election process based on their economic status. But, to satisfy our standing requirements, a plaintiff's alleged injury must be an invasion of a concrete and particularized legally protected interest. Lujan, supra, at 560. We have noted that "[a]lthough standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff's contention that particular conduct is illegal, ... it often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We have never recognized a legal right comparable to the broad and diffuse injury asserted by the Adams plaintiffs. Their reliance on this Court's voting rights cases is misplaced. They rely on cases requiring nondiscriminatory access to the ballot and a single, equal vote for each voter. See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974) (invalidating a statute requiring a ballot-access fee fixed at a percentage of the salary for the office sought because it unconstitutionally burdened the right to vote); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666-668 (1966) (invalidating a state poll tax because it effectively denied the right to vote). </s> None of these plaintiffs claims a denial of equal access to the ballot or the right to vote. Instead, the plaintiffs allege a curtailment of the scope of their participation in the electoral process. But we have noted that "[p]olitical 'free trade' does not necessarily require that all who participate in the political marketplace do so with exactly equal resources." Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (per curiam) (rejecting the asserted government interest of "equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections" to justify the burden on speech presented by expenditure limits). This claim of injury by the Adams plaintiffs is, therefore, not to a legally cognizable right. </s> Second, the Adams plaintiffs-candidates contend that they have suffered a competitive injury. Their candidates "do not wish to solicit or accept large campaign contributions as permitted by BCRA" because "[t]hey believe such contributions create the appearance of unequal access and influence." Adams Complaint ¶ ;53. As a result, they claim that BCRA §307 puts them at a "fundraising disadvantage," making it more difficult for them to compete in elections. See id., ¶ ;56. </s> The second claimed injury is based on the same premise as the first: BCRA §307's increased hard money limits allow plaintiffs-candidates' opponents to raise more money, and, consequently, the plaintiffs-candidates' ability to compete or participate in the electoral process is diminished. But they cannot show that their alleged injury is "fairly traceable" to BCRA §307. See Lujan, supra, at 562. Their alleged inability to compete stems not from the operation of §307, but from their own personal "wish" not to solicit or accept large contributions, i.e., their personal choice. Accordingly, the Adams plaintiffs fail here to allege an injury in fact that is "fairly traceable" to BCRA. </s> The Paul plaintiffs maintain that BCRA §307 violates the Freedom of Press Clause of the First Amendment. They contend that their political campaigns and public interest advocacy involve traditional press activities and that, therefore, they are protected by the First Amendment's guarantee of the freedom of press. The Paul plaintiffs argue that the contribution limits imposed by BCRA §307, together with the individual and political action committee contribution limitations of FECA §315, impose unconstitutional editorial control upon candidates and their campaigns. The Paul plaintiffs argue that by imposing economic burdens upon them, but not upon the institutional media, see 2 U.S.C. §431(9)(B)(i) (exempting "any news story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any political party, political committee, or candidate" from the definition of expenditure), BCRA §307 and FECA §315 violate the freedom of the press. </s> The Paul plaintiffs cannot show the "'substantial likelihood' that the requested relief will remedy [their] alleged injury in fact," Stevens, 523 U.S. 83, 105-110 (1998). </s> For the reasons above, we affirm the District Court's dismissal of the Adams and Paul plaintiffs' challenges to BCRA §307 for lack of standing. BCRA §§304, 316, and 319 </s> BCRA §§304 and 316, which amend FECA §315, and BCRA §319, which adds FECA §315A, collectively known as the "millionaire provisions," provide for a series of staggered increases in otherwise applicable contribution-to-candidate limits if the candidate's opponent spends a triggering amount of his personal funds.1 The provisions also eliminate the coordinated expenditure limits in certain circumstances.2 In their challenge to the millionaire provisions, the Adams plaintiffs allege the same injuries that they alleged with regard to BCRA §307. For the reasons discussed above, they fail to allege a cognizable injury that is "fairly traceable" to BCRA. Additionally, as the District Court noted, "none of the Adams plaintiffs is a candidate in an election affected by the millionaire provisions--i.e., one in which an opponent chooses to spend the triggering amount in his own funds--and it would be purely 'conjectural' for the court to assume that any plaintiff ever will be." 251 F.Supp. 2d 176, 431 (DC 2003) (case below) (Henderson, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S., at 560). We affirm the District Court's dismissal of the Adams plaintiffs' challenge to the millionaire provisions for lack of standing. BCRA §311 </s> FECA §318 requires that certain communications "authorized" by a candidate or his political committee clearly identify the candidate or committee or, if not so authorized, identify the payor and announce the lack of authorization. 2 U.S.C.A. §441d (main ed. and Supp. 2003). BCRA §311 makes several amendments to FECA §318, among them the expansion of this identification regime to include disbursements for "electioneering communications" as defined in BCRA §201. The McConnell and Chamber of Commerce plaintiffs challenge BCRA §311 by simply noting that §311, along with all of the "electioneering communications" provisions of BCRA, is unconstitutional. We disagree. We think BCRA §311's inclusion of electioneering communications in the FECA §318 disclosure regime bears a sufficient relationship to the important governmental interest of "shed[ding] the light of publicity" on campaign financing. Buckley, 424 U.S., at 81. Assuming as we must that FECA §318 is valid to begin with, and that FECA §318 is valid as amended by BCRA §311's amendments other than the inclusion of electioneering communications, the challenged inclusion of electioneering communications is not itself unconstitutional. We affirm the District Court's decision upholding §311's expansion of FECA §318(a) to include disclosure of disbursements for electioneering communications. BCRA §318 </s> BCRA §318, which adds FECA §324, prohibits individuals "17 years old or younger" from making contributions to candidates and contributions or donations to political parties. 2 U.S.C.A. §441k (Supp. 2003). The McConnell and Echols plaintiffs challenge the provision; they argue that §318 violates the First Amendment rights of minors. We agree. Minors enjoy the protection of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511-513 (1969). Limitations on the amount that an individual may contribute to a candidate or political committee impinge on the protected freedoms of expression and association. See Buckley, supra, at 20-22. When the Government burdens the right to contribute, we apply heightened scrutiny. See ante, at 25-26 (joint opinion of Stevens and O'Connor, JJ.) ("[A] contribution limit involving even 'significant interference' with associational rights is nevertheless valid if it satisfies the 'lesser demand' of being 'closely drawn' to match a 'sufficiently important interest.'" (quoting Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. ___, ___ (2003) (slip op., at 15)). We ask whether there is a "sufficiently important interest" and whether the statute is "closely drawn" to avoid unnecessary abridgment of First Amendment freedoms. Ante, at 25-26; Buckley, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000) ("The quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised"). </s> Even assuming, arguendo, the Government advances an important interest, the provision is overinclusive. The States have adopted a variety of more tailored approaches--e.g., counting contributions by minors against the total permitted for a parent or family unit, imposing a lower cap on contributions by minors, and prohibiting contributions by very young children. Without deciding whether any of these alternatives is sufficiently tailored, we hold that the provision here sweeps too broadly. We therefore affirm the District Court's decision striking down §318 as unconstitutional. BCRA §403(b) </s> The National Right to Life plaintiffs argue that the District Court's grant of intervention to the intervenor-defendants, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) and BCRA §403(b), must be reversed because the intervenor-defendants lack Article III standing. It is clear, however, that the Federal Election Commission (FEC) has standing, and therefore we need not address the standing of the intervenor-defendants, whose position here is identical to the FEC's. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 431-432, n.19 (1998); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986). Cf. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68-69, n.21 (1986) (reserving the question for another day). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court's judgment finding the plaintiffs' challenges to BCRA §305, §307, and the millionaire provisions nonjusticiable, striking down as unconstitutional BCRA §318, and upholding BCRA §311. The judgment of the District Court is Affirmed. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1674v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1675v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1676v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> JOHN McCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1702v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1727v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC., etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1733v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPELLANTS </s> 02-1734v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1740v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> RON PAUL, UNITED STATES CONGRESSMAN, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1747v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1753v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1755v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1756v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal. on appeals from the united states district court for the district of columbia [December 10, 2003] </s> Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to BCRA Title V.** </s> We consider here the constitutionality of §504 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), amending the Communications Act of 1934. That section requires broadcasters to keep publicly available records of politically related broadcasting requests. 47 U.S.C.A. §315(e) (Supp. 2003). The McConnell plaintiffs, who include the National Association of Broadcasters, argue that §504 imposes onerous administrative burdens, lacks any offsetting justification, and consequently violates the First Amendment. For similar reasons, the three judges on the District Court found BCRA §504 unconstitutional on its face. 251 F.Supp. 2d 176, 186 (DC 2003) (per curiam) (case below). We disagree, and we reverse that determination. I </s> BCRA §504's key requirements are the following: (1) A "candidate request" requirement calls for broadcasters to keep records of broadcast requests "made by or on behalf of" any "legally qualified candidate for public office." 47 U.S.C.A. §315(e)(1)(A) (Supp. 2003). </s> (2) An "election message request" requirement calls for broadcasters to keep records of requests (made by anyone) to broadcast "message[s]" that refer either to a "legally qualified candidate" or to "any election to Federal office." §§315(e)(1)(B)(i), (ii). </s> (3) An "issue request" requirement calls for broadcasters to keep records of requests (made by anyone) to broadcast "message[s]" related to a "national legislative issueof public importance," §315(e)(1)(B)(iii), or otherwise relating to a "political matter of national importance," §315(e)(1)(B). </s> We shall consider each provision in turn. II </s> BCRA §504's "candidate request" requirements are virtually identical to those contained in a regulation that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) promulgated as early as 1938 and which with slight modifications the FCC has maintained in effect ever since. 47 CFR §73.1943 (2002); compare 3 Fed. Reg. 1692 (1938) (47 CFR §36a4); 13 Fed. Reg. 7486 (1948) (47 CFR §§3.190(d), 3.290(d), 3.690(d)); 17 Fed. Reg. 4711 (1952) (47 CFR §3.590(d)); 19 Fed. Reg. 5949 (1954); 23 Fed. Reg. 7817 (1958); 28 Fed. Reg. 13593 (1963) (47 CFR §73.120(d)); 43 Fed. Reg. 32795 (1978) (47 CFR §73.1940(d)); 57 Fed. Reg. 210 (1992) (47 CFR §73.1943). See generally Brief in Opposition to Motion of Appellee National Association of Broadcasters for Summary Affirmance in No. 02-1676, pp.9-10 (hereinafter Brief Opposing Summary Affirmance). In its current form the FCC regulation requires broadcast licensees to "keep" a publicly available file "of all requests for broadcast time made by or on behalf of a candidate for public office," along with a notation showing whether the request was granted, and (if granted) a history that includes "classes of time," "rates charged," and when the "spots actually aired." 47 CFR §73.1943(a) (2002); §76.1701(a) (same for cable systems). These regulation-imposed requirements mirror the statutory requirements imposed by BCRA §504 with minor differences which no one here challenges. Compare 47 CFR §73.1943 with 47 U.S.C.A. §315(e)(2) (see Appendix, infra). </s> The McConnell plaintiffs argue that these requirements are "intolerabl[y]" "burdensome and invasive." Brief for Appellants/Cross-Appellees Senator Mitch McConnell etal. in No. 02-1674 etal., p. 74 (hereinafter Brief for McConnell Plaintiffs). But we do not see how that could be so. The FCC has consistently estimated that its "candidate request" regulation imposes upon each licensee an additional administrative burden of six to seven hours of work per year. See 66 Fed. Reg. 37468 (2001); id., at 18090; 63 Fed. Reg. 26593 (1998); id., at 10379; 57 Fed. Reg. 18492 (1992); see also 66 Fed. Reg. 29963 (2001) (total annual burden of one hour per cable system). That burden means annual costs of a few hundred dollars at most, a microscopic amount compared to the many millions of dollars of revenue broadcasters receive from candidates who wish to advertise. </s> Perhaps for this reason, broadcasters in the past did not strongly oppose the regulation or its extension. Cf., e.g., 17 Fed. Reg. 4711 (1952) ("No comments adverse to the adoption of the proposed rule have been received"); 43 Fed. Reg. 32794 (1978) (no adverse comments). Indeed in 1992, "CBS" itself "suggest[ed]" that the candidate file "include a record of all requests for time." 57 Fed. Reg. 206 (1992); cf. 63 Fed. Reg. 49493 (1998) (FCC "not persuaded that the current retention period [two years] is overly burdensome to licensees"). </s> In any event, as the FCC wrote in an analogous context, broadcaster recordkeeping requirements "'simply run with the territory.'" 40 Fed. Reg. 18398 (1975). Broadcasters must keep and make publicly available numerous records. See 47 CFR §73.3526 (2002) (general description of select recordkeeping requirements for commercial stations); see also §§73.1202, 73.3526(e)(9)(i) (retention of all "written comments and suggestions [including letters and e-mail] received from the public regarding operation of the station" for three years); §73.1212(e) (sponsorship identification records, including the identification of a sponsoring entity's executive officers and board-level members when sponsoring "political matter or matter involving the discussion of a controversial issue of public importance"); §73.1840 (retention of station logs); §73.1942 (candidate broadcast records); §73.2080 (equal employment oppor-tunities records); §§73.3526(e)(11)(i), (e)(12) ("list of programs that have provided the station's most significant treatment of community issues during the preceding three month period," including "brief narrative describing [the issues, and] time, date, duration, and title"); §§73.3526(e)(11)(ii), (iii) (reports of children's program, and retention of records sufficient to substantiate "compliance with the commercial limits on children's programming"); §73.3613(a) (network affiliation contracts); §§73.3613(b), 73.3615, 73.3526(e)(5) (ownership-related reports); §73.3613(c) ("[m]anagement consultant agreements"); §73.3613(d) ("[t]ime brokerage agreements"). Compared to these longstanding recordkeeping requirements, an additional six to seven hours is a small drop in a very large bucket. The McConnell plaintiffs also claim that the "candidate requests" requirement fails significantly to further any important governmental interest. Brief for McConnell Plaintiffs 74. But, again, we cannot agree. The FCC has pointed out that "[t]hese records are necessary to permit political candidates and others to verify that licensees have complied with their obligations relating to use of their facilities by candidates for political office" pursuant to the "equal time" provision of 47 U.S.C. §315(a). 63 Fed. Reg. 49493 (1998). They also help the FCC determine whether broadcasters have violated their obligation to sell candidates time at the "lowest unit charge." 47 U.S.C. §315(b). As reinforced by BCRA, the "candidate request" requirements will help the FCC, the Federal Election Commission, and "the public to evaluate whether broadcasters are processing [candidate] requests in an evenhanded fashion," Brief Opposing Summary Affirmance 9, thereby helping to assure broadcasting fairness. 47 U.S.C. §315(a); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). They will help make the public aware of how much money candidates may be prepared to spend on broadcast messages. 2 U.S.C.A. §434 (main ed. and Supp. 2003); see ante, at 87-93 (joint opinion of Stevens and O'Connor, JJ.) (hereinafter joint opinion). And they will provide an independently compiled set of data for purposes of verifying candidates' compliance with the disclosure requirements and source limitations of BCRA and the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. 2 U.S.C.A. §434; cf. Adventure Communications, Inc. v. Kentucky Registry of Election Finance, 191 F.3d 429, 433 (CA4 1999) (candidate compliance verification); 63 Fed. Reg. 49493 (1998) (FCC finding record retention provision provides public with "necessary and adequate access"). We note, too, that the FCC's regulatory authority is broad. Red Lion, supra, at 380 ("broad" mandate to assure broadcasters operate in public interest); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943) (same). And we have previously found broad governmental authority for agency information demands from regulated entities. Compare United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-643 (1950); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946); Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 414-415 (1984). </s> The Chief Justice suggests that the Government has not made these particular claims. But it has--though succinctly--for it has cross-referenced the relevant regulatory rules. Compare post, at 12-13 (opinion of Rehnquist, C. J.), with Brief Opposing Summary Affirmance; Brief for McConnell Plaintiffs 73-74; Brief for FEC etal. in No. 02-1674 etal., pp. 132-133. And succinctness through cross-reference was necessary given our procedural requirement that the Government set forth in a 140-page brief all its arguments concerning each of the 20 BCRA provisions here under contest. 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 186-188. </s> In sum, given the Government's reference to the 65-year-old FCC regulation and the related considerations we have mentioned, we cannot accept the argument that the constitutionality of the "candidate request" provision lacks evidentiary support. The challengers have made no attempt to explain away the FCC's own contrary conclusions and the mass of evidence in related FCC records and proceedings. E.g., 57 Fed. Reg. 189 (1992); cf. supra, at 4-5; ante, at 117-118 (joint opinion) (upholding BCRA's coordination provision based, in part, on prior experience under similar provision). Because we cannot, on the present record, find the longstanding FCC regulation unconstitutional, we likewise cannot strike down the "candidate request" provision in BCRA §504; for the latter simply embodies the regulation in a statute, thereby blocking any agency attempt to repeal it. III </s> BCRA §504's "election message request" requirements call for broadcasters to keep records of requests (made by any member of the public) to broadcast a "message" about "a legally qualified candidate" or "any election to Federal office." 47 U.S.C.A. §§315(e)(1)(B)(i), (ii) (Supp. 2003). Although these requirements are somewhat broader than the "candidate request" requirement, they serve much the same purposes. A candidate's supporters or opponents account for many of the requests to broadcast "message[s]" about a "candidate." Requests to broadcast messages about an "election" may include messages that favor one candidate or another, along with other messages that may be more neutral. Given the nature of many of the messages, recordkeeping can help both the regulatory agencies and the public evaluate broadcasting fairness, and determine the amount of money that individuals or groups, supporters or opponents, intend to spend to help elect a particular candidate. Cf. ante, at 100-101 (joint opinion) (upholding stringent restrictions on all election-time advertising that refers to a candidate because such advertising will often convey message of support or opposition). Insofar as the request is to broadcast neutral material about a candidate or election, the disclosure can help the FCC carry out other statutory functions, for example, determining whether a broadcasting station is fulfilling its licensing obligation to broadcast material important to the community and the public. 47 U.S.C. §315(a) ("obligation ... to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance"); 47 CFR §73.1910 (2002); §§73.3526(e)(11)(i), (e)(12) (recordkeeping requirements for issues important to the community). </s> For reasons previously discussed, supra, at 4-5, and on the basis of the material presented, we cannot say that these requirements will impose disproportionate administrative burdens. They ask the broadcaster to keep information about the disposition of the request, and information identifying the individual or company requesting the broadcast time (name, address, contact information, or, if the requester is not an individual, the names of company officials). 47 U.S.C.A. §315(e)(2) (Supp. 2003). Insofar as the "request" is made by a candidate's "supporters," the "candidate request" regulation apparently already requires broadcasters to keep such records. 43 Fed. Reg. 32794 (1978). Regardless, the information should prove readily available, for the individual requesting a broadcast must provide it to the broadcaster should the broadcaster accept the request. 47 CFR §73.1212(e) (2002). And as we have previously pointed out, the recordkeeping requirements do not reach significantly beyond other FCCrecordkeeping rules, for example, those requiring broadcasting licensees to keep material showing com-pliance with their license-related promises to broad-cast material on issues of public importance. See, e.g., §§73.3526(e)(11)(i), (e)(12) (recordkeeping requirements for issues important to the community); supra, at 4-5 (collecting regulations); Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 1421-1422 (CADC 1983) (describing FCC rules, in force during 1960-1981, that required nonentertainment programming in 14 specific areas and mandated publicly available records detailing date, time, source, and description to substantiate compliance). If, as we have held, the "candidate request" requirements are constitutional, supra, at 7, the "election message" requirements, which serve similar governmental interests and impose only a small incremental burden, must be constitutional as well. IV </s> The "issue request" requirements call for broadcasters to keep records of requests (made by any member of the public) to broadcast "message[s]" about "a national legislative issue of public importance" or "any political matter of national importance." 47 U.S.C.A. §§315(e)(1)(B), (e)(1)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2003). These recordkeeping requirements seem likely to help the FCC determine whether broadcasters are carrying out their "obligations to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance," 47 CFR §73.1910 (2002), and whether broadcasters are too heavily favoring entertainment, and discriminating against broadcasts devoted to public affairs, see ibid.; 47 U.S.C §315(a); Red Lion, 395 U.S., at 380. The McConnell plaintiffs claim that the statutory language--"political matter of national importance" or "national legislative issue of public importance"--is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Brief for McConnell Plaintiffs 74-75. But that language is no more general than the language that Congress has used to impose other obligations upon broadcasters. Compare 47 U.S.C.A. §315(e)(1)(B) (Supp. 2003) ("political matter of national importance") and §315(e)(1)(B)(iii) ("national legislative issue of public importance") (both added by BCRA §504), with 47 U.S.C. §315(a) ("obligation ... to operate in the public interest" and to afford reasonable opportunity for discussion of "issues of public importance"); §317(a)(2) (FCC disclosure requirements relating to any "political program" or "discussion of any controversial issue"); cf. 47 CFR §73.1212(e) (2002) ("political matter or ... a controversial issue of public importance"); and 9 Fed. Reg. 14734 (1944) ("public controversial issues"); ante, at 117-118 (joint opinion) (noting that the experience under longstanding regulations undermines claims of chilling effect). And that language is also roughly comparable to other language in BCRA that we uphold today. E.g., ante, at 61-62, and n.64 (joint opinion) (upholding 2 U.S.C.A. §431(20)(A)(iii) (Supp. 2003) ("public communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office ... and that promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that office")), ante, at 117-118 (upholding 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(a)(7)(B)(ii) (Supp. 2003) (counting as coordinated disbursements that are made "in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of [a political party]") against challenge and noting that an "agreement" is not necessary for precision). </s> Whether these requirements impose disproportionate administrative burdens is more difficult to say. On the one hand, the burdens are likely less heavy than many that other FCC regulations have imposed, for example, the burden of keeping and disclosing "[a]ll written comments and suggestions" received from the public, including every e-mail. 47 CFR §§73.1202, 73.3526(e)(9) (2002); see also supra, at 4-5. On the other hand, the burdens are likely heavier than those imposed by BCRA §504's other provisions, previously discussed. </s> The regulatory burden, in practice, will depend on how the FCC interprets and applies this provision. The FCC has adequate legal authority to write regulations that may limit, and make more specific, the provision's potential linguistic reach. 47 U.S.C. §315(d). It has often ameliorated regulatory burdens by interpretation in the past, and there is no reason to believe it will not do so here. See 14 FCC Rcd. 4653, ¶ ;25 (1999) (relaxing the recordkeeping requirements in respect to cable systems that serve fewer than 5,000 subscribers); 14 FCC Rcd. 11121, ¶ ;¶ ;20-22 (1999) (requiring candidates to inspect the political file at a station rather than requiring licensees to send out photocopies of the files to candidates upon telephone request). The parties remain free to challenge the provisions, as interpreted by the FCC in regulations, or as otherwise applied. Any such challenge will likely provide greater information about the provisions' justifications and administrative burdens. Without that additional information, we cannot now say that the burdens are so great, or the justifications so minimal, as to warrant finding the provisions unconstitutional on their face. </s> The McConnell plaintiffs and The Chief Justice make one final claim. They say that the "issue request" requirement will force them to disclose information that will reveal their political strategies to opponents, perhaps prior to a broadcast. See post, at 14-15 (dissenting opinion). We are willing to assume that the Constitution includes some form of protection against premature disclosure of campaign strategy--though, given the First Amendment interest in free and open discussion of campaign issues, we make this assumption purely for argument's sake. Nonetheless, even on that assumption we do not see how BCRA §504 can be unconstitutional on its face. </s> For one thing, the statute requires disclosure of names, addresses, and the fact of a request; it does not require disclosure of substantive campaign content. See 47 U.S.C.A. §315(e)(2) (Supp. 2003). For another, the statutory words "as soon as possible," §315(e)(3), would seem to permit FCC disclosure-timing rules that would avoid any premature disclosure that the Constitution itself would forbid. Further, the plaintiffs do not point to--and our own research cannot find--any specific indication of such a "strategy-disclosure" problem arising during the past 65 years in respect to the existing FCC "candidate request" requirement, where the strategic problem might be expected to be more acute. Finally, we today reject an analogous facial attack--premised on speculations of "advance disclosure"--on a similar BCRA provision. See ante, at 94 (joint opinion). Thus, the "strategy disclosure" argument does not show that BCRA §504 is unconstitutional on its face, but the plaintiffs remain free to raise this argument when §504 is applied. V </s> The Chief Justice makes two important arguments in response to those we have set forth. First, he says that we "approac[h] §504 almost exclusively from the perspective of the broadcast licensees, ignoring the interests of candidates and other purchasers, whose speech and association rights are affected." Post, at 11 (dissenting opinion). The Chief Justice is certainly correct in emphasizing the importance of the speech interests of candidates and other potential speakers, but we have not ignored their First Amendment "perspective." To the contrary, we have discussed the speakers' interests together with the broadcasters' interests because the two sets of interests substantially overlap. For example, the speakers' vagueness argument is no different from the broadcasters', and it fails for the same reasons, e.g., the fact that BCRA §504's language is just as definite and precise as other language that we today uphold. See supra, at 10. </s> We have separately discussed the one and only speech-related claim advanced on behalf of candidates (or other speakers) that differs from the claims set forth by the broadcasters. See supra, at 11-12. This is the claim that the statute's disclosure requirements will require candidates to reveal their political strategies to opponents. We just said, and we now repeat, that BCRA §504 can be applied, in a significant number of cases, without requiring any such political-strategy disclosure--either because disclosure in many cases will not create any such risk or because the FCC may promulgate rules requiring disclosure only after any such risk disappears, or both. </s> Moreover, candidates (or other speakers) whom §504 affects adversely in this way (or in other ways) remain free to challenge the lawfulness of FCC implementing regulations and to challenge the constitutionality of §504 as applied. To find that the speech-related interests of candidates and others may be vindicated in an as-applied challenge is not to "ignor[e]" those interests. </s> Second, The Chief Justice says that "the Government, in its brief, proffers no interest whatever to support §504 as a whole," adding that the existence of "pre-existing unchallenged agency regulations imposing similar disclosure requirements" cannot "compel the conclusion that §504 is constitutional," nor somehow "relieve the Government of its burden of advancing a constitutionally sufficient justification for §504." Post, at 12-13 (dissenting opinion). </s> Again The Chief Justice is correct in saying that the mere existence of similar FCC regulation-imposed requirements--even if unchallenged for at least 65 years--cannot prove that those requirements are constitutional. But the existence of those regulations means that we must read beyond the briefs in this case before holding those requirements unconstitutional. Before evaluating the relevant burdens and justifications, we must at least become acquainted with the FCC's own view of the matter. We must follow the Government's regulation-related references to the relevant regulatory records, related FCC regulatory conclusions, and the FCC's enforcement experience. We must take into account, for example, the likelihood that the reason there is "nothing in the record that indicates licensees have treated purchasers unfairly," post, at 13 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), is that for many decades similar FCC regulations have made that unfair treatment unlawful. And, if we are to avoid disrupting related agency law, we must evaluate what we find in agency records and related experience before holding this similar statutory provision unconstitutional on its face. </s> Even a superficial examination of those relevant agency materials reveals strong supporting justifications, and a lack of significant administrative burdens. And any additional burden that the statute, viewed facially, imposes upon interests protected by the First Amendment seems slight compared to the strong enforcement-related interests that it serves. Given the FCC regulations and their history, the statutory requirements must survive a facial attack under any potentially applicable First Amendment standard, including that of heightened scrutiny. </s> That is why the regulations are relevant. That is why the brevity of the Government's discussion here cannot be determinative. That is why we fear that The Chief Justice's contrary view would lead us into an unfortunate--and at present unjustified--revolution in communications law. And that is why we disagree with his dissent. </s> The portion of the judgment of the District Court invalidating BCRA §504 is reversed. </s> It is so ordered. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT </s> Title 47 U.S.C.A. §315(e) (Supp. 2003), as amended by BCRA §504, provides: "Political record "(1) In general </s> "A licensee shall maintain, and make available for public inspection, a complete record of a request to purchase broadcast time that-- </s> "(A) is made by or on behalf of a legally qualified candidate for public office; or </s> "(B) communicates a message relating to any political matter of national importance, including-- </s> "(i) a legally qualified candidate; </s> "(ii) any election to Federal office; or </s> "(iii) a national legislative issue of public importance. </s> "(2) Contents of record </s> "A record maintained under paragraph (1) shall contain information regarding-- </s> "(A) whether the request to purchase broadcast time is accepted or rejected by the licensee; </s> "(B) the rate charged for the broadcast time; </s> "(C) the date and time on which the communication is aired; </s> "(D) the class of time that is purchased; </s> "(E) the name of the candidate to which the communication refers and the office to which the candidate is seeking election, the election to which the communication refers, or the issue to which the communication refers (as applicable); </s> "(F) in the case of a request made by, or on behalf of, a candidate, the name of the candidate, the authorized committee of the candidate, and the treasurer of such committee; and </s> "(G) in the case of any other request, the name of the person purchasing the time, the name, address, and phone number of a contact person for such person, and a list of the chief executive officers or members of the executive committee or of the board of directors of such person. </s> "(3) Time to maintain file </s> "The information required under this subsection shall be placed in a political file as soon as possible and shall be retained by the licensee for a period of not less than 2 years." </s> Title 47 CFR §73.1943 (2002) provides: "Political file. </s> "(a) Every licensee shall keep and permit public inspection of a complete and orderly record (political file) of all requests for broadcast time made by or on behalf of a candidate for public office, together with an appropriate notation showing the disposition made by the licensee of such requests, and the charges made, if any, if the request is granted. The 'disposition' includes the schedule of time purchased, when spots actually aired, the rates charged, and the classes of time purchased. </s> "(b) When free time is provided for use by or on behalf of candidates, a record of the free time provided shall be placed in the political file. </s> "(c) All records required by this paragraph shall be placed in the political file as soon as possible andshall be retained for a period of two years. As soonas possible means immediately absent unusualcircumstances." </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1674v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1675v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1676v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> JOHN McCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1702v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1727v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC., etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1733v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPELLANTS </s> 02-1734v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1740v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> RON PAUL, UNITED STATES CONGRESSMAN, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1747v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1753v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1755v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1756v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal. on appeals from the united states district court for the district of columbia [December 10, 2003] </s> Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I and V.** </s> Although I join Justice Kennedy's opinion in full, I write separately to highlight my disagreement with the Court on Title I of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), 116 Stat. 81, and to dissent from the Court's opinion upholding §504 of Title V. I </s> The issue presented by Title I is not, as the Court implies, whether Congress can permissibly regulate campaign contributions to candidates, de facto or otherwise, or seek to eliminate corruption in the political process. Rather, the issue is whether Congress can permissibly regulate much speech that has no plausible connection to candidate contributions or corruption to achieve those goals. Under our precedent, restrictions on political contributions implicate important First Amendment values and are constitutional only if they are "closely drawn" to reduce the corruption of federal candidates or the appearance of corruption. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976) (per curiam). Yet, the Court glosses over the breadth of the restrictions, characterizing Title I of BCRA as "do[ing] little more that regulat[ing] the ability of wealthy individuals, corporations, and unions to contribute large sums of money to influence federal elections, federal candidates, and federal officeholders." Ante, at 28 (joint opinion of Stevens and O'Connor, JJ.). Because, in reality, Title I is much broader than the Court allows, regulating a good deal of speech that does not have the potential to corrupt federal candidates and officeholders, I dissent. The lynchpin of Title I, new FECA §323(a), prohibits national political party committees from "solicit[ing]," "receiv[ing]," "direct[ing] to another person," and "spend[ing]" any funds not subject to federal regulation, even if those funds are used for nonelection related activities. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(a)(1) (Supp. 2003). The Court concludes that such a restriction is justified because under FECA, "donors have been free to contribute substantial sums of soft money to the national parties, which the parties can spend for the specific purpose of influencing a particular candidate's federal election." Ante, at 36. Accordingly, "[i]t is not only plausible, but likely, that candidates would feel grateful for such donations and that donors would seek to exploit that gratitude." Ibid. But the Court misses the point. Certainly "infusions of money into [candidates'] campaigns," Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985), can be regulated, but §323(a) does not regulate only donations given to influence a particular federal election; it regulates all donations to national political committees, no matter the use to which the funds are put. </s> The Court attempts to sidestep the unprecedented breadth of this regulation by stating that the "close relationship between federal officeholders and the national parties" makes all donations to the national parties "suspect." Ante, at 45. But a close association with others, especially in the realm of political speech, is not a surrogate for corruption; it is one of our most treasured First Amendment rights. See California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 225 (1989); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986). The Court's willingness to impute corruption on the basis of a relationship greatly infringes associational rights and expands Congress' ability to regulate political speech. And there is nothing in the Court's analysis that limits congressional regulation to national political parties. In fact, the Court relies in part on this closeness rationale to regulate nonprofit organizations. Ante, at 47-48, n.51. Who knows what association will be deemed too close to federal officeholders next. When a donation to an organization has no potential to corrupt a federal officeholder, the relationship between the officeholder and the organization is simply irrelevant. </s> The Court fails to recognize that the national political parties are exemplars of political speech at all levels of government, in addition to effective fundraisers for federal candidates and officeholders. For sure, national political party committees exist in large part to elect federal candidates, but as a majority of the District Court found, they also promote coordinated political messages and participate in public policy debates unrelated to federal elections, promote, even in off-year elections, state and local candidates and seek to influence policy at those levels, and increase public participation in the electoral process. See 251 F.Supp. 2d 176, 334-337 (DC 2003) (per curiam) (Henderson, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); id., at 820-821 (Leon, J.). Indeed, some national political parties exist primarily for the purpose of expressing ideas and generating debate. App. 185-186 (declaration of Stephen L. Dasbach et al. ¶ ;11 (describing Libertarian Party)). </s> As these activities illustrate, political parties often foster speech crucial to a healthy democracy, 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 820 (Leon, J.), and fulfill the need for like-minded individuals to ban together and promote a political philosophy, see Jones, supra, at 574; Eu, supra, at 225. When political parties engage in pure political speech that has little or no potential to corrupt their federal candidates and officeholders, the government cannot constitutionally burden their speech any more than it could burden the speech of individuals engaging in these same activities. E.g., National Conservative Political Action Comm., supra, at 496-497; Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 297-298 (1981); Buckley, 424 U.S., at 27. Notwithstanding the Court's citation to the numerous abuses of FECA, under any definition of "exacting scrutiny," the means chosen by Congress, restricting all donations to national parties no matter the purpose for which they are given or are used, are not "closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms," id., at 25. </s> BCRA's overinclusiveness is not limited to national political parties. To prevent the circumvention of the ban on the national parties' use of nonfederal funds, BCRA extensively regulates state parties, primarily state elections, and state candidates. For example, new FECA §323(b), by reference to new FECA §§301(20)(A)(i)-(ii), prohibits state parties from using nonfederal funds1 for general partybuilding activities such as voter registration, voter identification, and get out the vote for state candidates even if federal candidates are not mentioned. See 2 U.S.C.A. §§441i(b), 431(20)(A)(i)-(ii) (Supp. 2003). New FECA §323(d) prohibits state and local political party committees, like their national counterparts, from soliciting and donating "any funds" to nonprofit organizations such as the National Rifle Association or the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). See 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(d). And, new FECA §323(f) requires a state gubernatorial candidate to abide by federal funding restrictions when airing a television ad that tells voters that, if elected, he would oppose the President's policy of increased oil and gas exploration within the State because it would harm the environment. See 2 U.S.C.A. §§441i(f), 431(20)(A)(iii) (regulating "public communication[s] that refe[r] to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office (regardless of whether a candidate for State or local office is also mentioned or identified) and that ... attacks or opposes a candidate for that office"). </s> Although these provisions are more focused on activities that may affect federal elections, there is scant evidence in the record to indicate that federal candidates or officeholders are corrupted or would appear corrupted by donations for these activities. See 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 403, 407, 416, 422 (Henderson, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); id., at 779-780, 791 (Leon, J.); see also Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 616 (1996) (plurality opinion) (noting that "the opportunity for corruption posed by [nonfederal contributions for state elections, get-out-the-vote, and voter registration activities] is, at best, attenuated"). Nonetheless, the Court concludes that because these activities benefit federal candidates and officeholders, see ante, at 59 or prevent the circumvention of pre-existing or contemporaneously enacted restrictions,2 see ante, at 57, 67, 71, 78, it must defer to the "'predictive judgments of Congress,'" ante, at 57 (quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994)). </s> Yet the Court cannot truly mean what it says. Newspaper editorials and political talk shows benefit federal candidates and officeholders every bit as much as a generic voter registration drive conducted by a state party; there is little doubt that the endorsement of a major newspaper affects federal elections, and federal candidates and officeholders are surely "grateful," ante, at 60, for positive media coverage. I doubt, however, the Court would seriously contend that we must defer to Congress' judgment if it chose to reduce the influence of political endorsements in federal elections.3 See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 247, 250 (1974) (holding unconstitutional a state law that required newspapers to provide "right to reply" to any candidate who was personally or professionally assailed in order to eliminate the "abuses of bias and manipulative reportage" by the press). </s> It is also true that any circumvention rationale ultimately must rest on the circumvention itself leading to the corruption of federal candidates and officeholders. See Buckley, 424 U.S., at 38 (upholding restrictions on funds donated to national political parties "for the purpose of influencing any election for a Federal office" because they were prophylactic measures designed "to prevent evasion" of the contribution limit on candidates). All political speech that is not sifted through federal regulation circumvents the regulatory scheme to some degree or another, and thus by the Court's standard would be a "loophole" in the current system.4 Unless the Court would uphold federal regulation of all funding of political speech, a rationale dependent on circumvention alone will not do. By untethering its inquiry from corruption or the appearance of corruption, the Court has removed the touchstone of our campaign finance precedent and has failed to replace it with any logical limiting principle. </s> But such an untethering is necessary to the Court's analysis. Only by using amorphous language to conclude a federal interest, however vaguely defined, exists can the Court avoid the obvious fact that new FECA §§323(a), (b), (d), and (f) are vastly overinclusive. Any campaign finance law aimed at reducing corruption will almost surely affect federal elections or prohibit the circumvention of federal law, and if broad enough, most laws will generally reduce some appearance of corruption. Indeed, it is precisely because broad laws are likely to nominally further a legitimate interest that we require Congress to tailor its restrictions; requiring all federal candidates to self-finance their campaigns would surely reduce the appearance of donor corruption, but it would hardly be constitutional. In allowing Congress to rely on general principles such as affecting a federal election or prohibiting the circumvention of existing law, the Court all but eliminates the "closely drawn" tailoring requirement and meaningful judicial review. </s> No doubt Congress was convinced by the many abuses of the current system that something in this area must be done. Its response, however, was too blunt. Many of the abuses described by the Court involve donations that were made for the "purpose of influencing a federal election," and thus are already regulated. See Buckley, supra. Congress could have sought to have the existing restrictions enforced or to enact other restrictions that are "closely drawn" to its legitimate concerns. But it should not be able to broadly restrict political speech in the fashion it has chosen. Today's decision, by not requiring tailored restrictions, has significantly reduced the protection for political speech having little or nothing to do with corruption or the appearance of corruption. II </s> BCRA §504 amends §315 of the Communications Act to require broadcast licensees to maintain and disclose records of any request to purchase broadcast time that "is made by or on behalf of a legally qualified candidate for public office" or that "communicates a message relating to any political matter of national importance," including communications relating to "a legally qualified candidate," "any election to Federal office," and "a national legislative issue of public importance." BCRA §504; 47 U.S.C.A. §315(e)(1) (Supp. 2003).5 This section differs from other BCRA disclosure sections because it requires broadcast licensees to disclose requests to purchase broadcast time rather than requiring purchasers to disclose their disbursements for broadcast time. See, e.g., BCRA §201. The Court concludes that §504 "must survive a facial attack under any potentially applicable First Amendment standard, including that of heightened scrutiny." Ante, at 15 (opinion of Breyer, J.). I disagree. This section is deficient because of the absence of a sufficient governmental interest to justify disclosure of mere requests to purchase broadcast time, as well as purchases themselves. The Court approaches §504 almost exclusively from the perspective of the broadcast licensees, ignoring the interests of candidates and other purchasers, whose speech and association rights are affected by §504. See, e.g., ante, at 5 (noting that broadcasters are subject to numerous recordkeeping requirements); ante, at 7 (opining that this Court has recognized "broad governmental authority for agency information demands from regulated entities"); ante, at 8-9 ("[W]e cannot say that these requirements will impose disproportionate administrative burdens"). An approach that simply focuses on whether the administrative burden is justifiable is untenable. Because §504 impinges on core First Amendment rights, it is subject to a more demanding test than mere rational-basis review. The Court applies the latter by asking essentially whether there is any conceivable reason to support §504. See ante, at 8 (discussing the ways in which the disclosure "can help" the FCC and the public); ante, at 10 (noting that the "recordkeeping requirements seem likely to help the FCC" enforce the fairness doctrine). </s> Required disclosure provisions that deter constitutionally protected association and speech rights are subject to heightened scrutiny. See Buckley, 424 U.S., at 64. When applying heightened scrutiny, we first ask whether the Government has asserted an interest sufficient to justify the disclosure of requests to purchase broadcast time. Ibid.; see ante, at 89 (joint opinion of Stevens and O'Connor, JJ.) (concluding that the important state interests the Buckley Court held justified FECA's disclosure requirements apply to BCRA §201's disclosure requirement). But the Government, in its brief, proffers no interest whatever to support §504 as a whole. </s> Contrary to the Court's suggestion, ante, at 7 (opinion of Breyer, J.), the Government's brief does not succinctly present interests sufficient to support §504. The two paragraphs that the Court relies on provide the following: "As explained in the government's brief in opposition to the motion for summary affirmance on this issue filed by plaintiff National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), longstanding FCC regulations impose disclosure requirements with respect to the sponsorship of broadcast matter 'involving the discussion of a controversial issue of public importance.' 47 C.F.R. 73.1212(d) and (e) (2002); see 47 C.F.R. 76.1701(d) (2002) (same standard used in disclosure regulation governing cablecasting). By enabling viewers and listeners to identify the persons actually responsible for communications aimed at a mass audience, those regulations assist the public in evaluating the message transmitted. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792 n.32 ('Identification of the source of advertising may be required ... so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected.'). </s> "The range of information required to be disclosed under BCRA §504 is comparable to the disclosures mandated by pre-existing FCC rules. Compare 47 U.S.C. 315(e)(2)(G) (added by BCRA §504), with 47 C.F.R. 73.1212(e) and 76.1701(d) (2002). Plaintiffs do not attempt to show that BCRA §504's requirements are more onerous than the FCC's longstanding rules, nor do they contend that the pre-existing agency regulations are themselves unconstitutional. See generally 02-1676 Gov't Br. in Opp. to Mot. of NAB for Summ. Aff. 4-9. Because BCRA §504 is essentially a codification of established and unchallenged regulatory requirements, plaintiffs' First Amendment claim should be rejected." Brief for FEC etal. in No. 02-1674 etal., pp.132-133; ante, at 7. </s> While these paragraphs attempt to set forth a justification for the new Communications Act §315(e)(1)(B), discussed below, I fail to see any justification for BCRA §504 in its entirety. Nor do I find persuasive the Court's and the Government's argument that pre-existing unchallenged agency regulations imposing similar disclosure requirements compel the conclusion that §504 is constitutional and somehow relieve the Government of its burden of advancing a constitutionally sufficient justification for §504. </s> At oral argument, the Government counsel indicated that one of the interests supporting §504 in its entirety stems from the fairness doctrine, Tr. of Oral Arg. 192, which in general imposes an obligation on licensees to devote a "reasonable percentage" of broadcast time to issues of public importance in a way that reflects opposing views. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Assuming, arguendo, this latter-day assertion should be considered, I think the District Court correctly noted that there is nothing in the record that indicates licensees have treated purchasers unfairly. 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 812 (Leon, J.). In addition, this interest seems wholly unconnected to the central purpose of BCRA, and it is not at all similar to the governmental interestsin Buckley that we found to be "sufficiently importantto outweigh the possibility of infringement," 424 U.S., at 66. </s> As to the disclosure requirements involving "any political matter of national importance" under the new Communications Act §315(e)(1)(B), the Government suggests that the disclosure enables viewers to evaluate the message transmitted.6 First, insofar as BCRA §504 requires reporting of "request[s for] broadcast time" as well as actual broadcasts, it is not supported by this goal. Requests that do not mature into actual purchases will have no viewers, but the information may allow competitors or adversaries to obtain information regarding organizational or political strategies of purchasers. Second, even as to broadcasts themselves, in this noncandidate-related context, this goal is a far cry from the Government interests endorsed in Buckley, which were limited to evaluating and preventing corruption of federal candidates. Ibid.; see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 354 (1995). </s> As to disclosure requirements with respect to candidates under the new Communications Act §315(e)(1)(A), BCRA §504 significantly overlaps with §201, which is today also upheld by this Court, ante, at 87-95 (joint opinion of Stevens and O'Connor, JJ.), and requires purchasers of "electioneering communications" to disclose a wide array of information, including the amount of each disbursement and the elections to which electioneering communications pertain. While I recognize that there is this overlap, §504 imposes a different burden on the purchaser's First Amendment rights: as noted above, §201 is limited to purchasers' disclosure of disbursements for electioneering communications, whereas §504 requires broadcast licensees' disclosure of requests for broadcast time by purchasers. Not only are the purchasers' requests, which may never result in an actual advertisement, subject to the disclosure requirements, but §504 will undoubtedly result in increased costs of communication because the licensees will shift the costs of the onerous disclosure and recordkeeping requirements to purchasers. The Government fails to offer a reason for the separate burden and apparent overlap. </s> The Government cannot justify, and for that matter, has not attempted to justify, its requirement that "request[s for] broadcast" time be publicized. On the record before this Court, I cannot even speculate as to a governmental interest that would allow me to conclude that the disclosure of "requests" should be upheld. Such disclosure risks, inter alia, allowing candidates and political groups the opportunity to ferret out a purchaser's political strategy and, ultimately, unduly burdens the First Amendment freedoms of purchasers. </s> Absent some showing of a Government interest served by §504 and in light of the breadth of disclosure of "requests," I must conclude that §504 fails to satisfy First Amendment scrutiny. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1674v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1675v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1676v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> JOHN McCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1702v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1727v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC., etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1733v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPELLANTS </s> 02-1734v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1740v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> RON PAUL, UNITED STATES CONGRESSMAN, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1747v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1753v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1755v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1756v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal. on appeals from the united states district court for the district of columbia [December 10, 2003] </s> Justice Stevens, dissenting with respect to §305.** </s> The Chief Justice, writing for the Court, concludes that the McConnell plaintiffs lack standing to challenge §305 of BCRA because Senator McConnell cannot be affected by the provision until "45 days before the Republican primary election in 2008." Ante, at 4. I am not persuaded that Article III's case-or-controversy requirement imposes such a strict temporal limit on our jurisdiction. By asserting that he has run attack ads in the past, that he plans to run such ads in his next campaign, and that §305 will adversely affect his campaign strategy, Senator McConnell has identified a "concrete," "'distinct,'" and "'actual'" injury, Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990). That the injury is distant in time does not make it illusory. The second prong of the standing inquiry--whether the alleged injury is fairly traceable to the defendants' challenged action and not the result of a third party's independent choices†--poses a closer question. Section 305 does not require broadcast stations to charge a candidate higher rates for unsigned ads that mention the candidate's opponent. Rather, the provision simply permits stations to charge their normal rates for such ads. Some stations may take advantage of this regulatory gap and adopt pricing schemes that discriminate between the kind of ads that Senator McConnell has run in the past and those that strictly comply with §305. It is also possible, however, that instead of incurring the transaction costs of policing candidates' compliance with §305, stations will continue to charge the same rates for attack ads as for all other campaign ads. In the absence of any record evidence that stations will uniformly choose to charge Senator McConnell higher rates for the attack ads he proposes to run in 2008, it is at least arguable that his alleged injury is not traceable to BCRA §305. Nevertheless, I would entertain plaintiffs' challenge to §305 on the merits and uphold the section. Like BCRA §§201, 212, and 311, §305 serves an important--and constitutionally sufficient--informational purpose. Moreover, §305's disclosure requirements largely overlap those of §311, and plaintiffs identify no reason why any candidate already in compliance with §311 will be harmed by the marginal additional burden of complying with §305. Indeed, I am convinced that "the important governmental interest of 'shed[ding] the light of publicity' on campaign financing," invoked above in connection with §311, ante, at 9 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.), would suffice to support a legislative provision expressly requiring all sponsors of attack ads to identify themselves in their ads. That §305 seeks to achieve the same purpose indirectly, by withdrawing a statutory benefit, does not render the provision any less sound. </s> Finally, I do not regard §305 as a constitutionally suspect "viewpoint-based regulation." Brief for Appellants/Cross-Appellees Senator Mitch McConnell etal. in No. 02-1674 etal., p. 67. Like BCRA's other disclosure requirements, §305 evenhandedly regulates speech based on its electioneering content. Although the section reaches only ads that mention opposing candidates, it applies equally to all such ads. Disagreement with one's opponent obviously expresses a "viewpoint," but §305 treats that expression exactly like the opponent's response. </s> In sum, I would uphold §305. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1674v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1675v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1676v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> JOHN McCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1702v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1727v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC., etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1733v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPELLANTS </s> 02-1734v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1740v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> RON PAUL, UNITED STATES CONGRESSMAN, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1747v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1753v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1755v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1756v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal. on appeals from the united states district court for the district of columbia [December 10, 2003] </s> Justice Scalia, concurring with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I and V, and concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Title II. </s> With respect to Titles I, II, and V: I join in full the dissent of The Chief Justice; I join the opinion of Justice Kennedy, except to the extent it upholds new §323(e) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) and §202 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) in part; and because I continue to believe that Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), was wrongly decided, I also join Parts I, II-A, and II-B of the opinion of Justice Thomas. With respect to Titles III and IV, I join The Chief Justice's opinion for the Court. Because these cases are of such extraordinary importance, I cannot avoid adding to the many writings a few words of my own. </s> This is a sad day for the freedom of speech. Who could have imagined that the same Court which, within the past four years, has sternly disapproved of restrictions upon such inconsequential forms of expression as virtual child pornography, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002), tobacco advertising, Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001), dissemination of illegally intercepted communications, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), and sexually explicit cable programming, United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000), would smile with favor upon a law that cuts to the heart of what the First Amendment is meant to protect: the right to criticize the government. For that is what the most offensive provisions of this legislation are all about. We are governed by Congress, and this legislation prohibits the criticism of Members of Congress by those entities most capable of giving such criticism loud voice: national political parties and corporations, both of the commercial and the not-for-profit sort. It forbids pre-election criticism of incumbents by corporations, even not-for-profit corporations, by use of their general funds; and forbids national-party use of "soft" money to fund "issue ads" that incumbents find so offensive. </s> To be sure, the legislation is evenhanded: It similarly prohibits criticism of the candidates who oppose Members of Congress in their reelection bids. But as everyone knows, this is an area in which evenhandedness is not fairness. If all electioneering were evenhandedly prohibited, incumbents would have an enormous advantage. Likewise, if incumbents and challengers are limited to the same quantity of electioneering, incumbents are favored. In other words, any restriction upon a type of campaign speech that is equally available to challengers and incumbents tends to favor incumbents. </s> Beyond that, however, the present legislation targets for prohibition certain categories of campaign speech that are particularly harmful to incumbents. Is it accidental, do you think, that incumbents raise about three times as much "hard money"--the sort of funding generally not restricted by this legislation--as do their challengers? See FEC, 1999-2000 Financial Activity of All Senateand House Campaigns (Jan. 1, 1999-Dec. 31, 2000) (last modified on May 15, 2001), http://www.fec.gov/press/ 051501congfinact/tables/allcong2000.xls (all Internet ma-terials as visited Dec. 4, 2003, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). Or that lobbyists (who seek the favor of incumbents) give 92 percent of their money in "hard" contributions? See U.S. Public Interest Research Group (PIRG), The Lobbyist's Last Laugh: How K Street Lob-byists Would Benefit from the McCain-Feingold Cam-paign Finance Bill 3 (July 5, 2001), http://www.pirg.org/democracy/democracy.asp?id2=5068. Is it an oversight, do you suppose, that the so-called "millionaire provisions" raise the contribution limit for a candidate running against an individual who devotes to the campaign (as challengers often do) great personal wealth, but do not raise the limit for a candidate running against an individual who devotes to the campaign (as incumbents often do) a massive election "war chest"? See BCRA §§304, 316, and 319. And is it mere happenstance, do you estimate, that national-party funding, which is severely limited by the Act, is more likely to assist cash-strapped challengers than flush-with-hard-money incumbents? See A. Gierzynski & D.Breaux, The Financing Role of Parties, in Campaign Finance in State Legislative Elections 195-200 (J. Thompson & S.Moncrief eds. 1998). Was it unintended, by any chance, that incumbents are free personally to receive some soft money and even to solicit it for other organizations, while national parties are not? See new FECA §§323(a) and (e). </s> I wish to address three fallacious propositions that might be thought to justify some or all of the provisions of this legislation--only the last of which is explicitly embraced by the principal opinion for the Court, but all of which underlie, I think, its approach to these cases. (a) Money is Not Speech </s> It was said by congressional proponents of this legislation, see 143 Cong. Rec. 20746 (1997) (remarks of Sen. Boxer), 145 Cong. Rec. S12612 (Oct. 14, 1999) (remarks of Sen. Cleland), 147 Cong. Rec. S2436 (Mar. 19, 2001) (remarks of Sen. Dodd), with support from the law reviews, see, e.g., Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 Yale L.J. 1001 (1976), that since this legislation regulates nothing but the expenditure of money for speech, as opposed to speech itself, the burden it imposes is not subject to full First Amendment scrutiny; the government may regulate the raising and spending of campaign funds just as it regulates other forms of conduct, such as burning draft cards, see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), or camping out on the National Mall, see Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). That proposition has been endorsed by one of the two authors of today's principal opinion: "The right to use one's own money to hire gladiators, [and] to fund 'speech by proxy,' ... [are] property rights . . . not entitled to the same protection as the right to say what one pleases." Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 399 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring). Until today, however, that view has been categorically rejected by our jurisprudence. As we said in Buckley, 424 U.S., at 16, "this Court has never suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment." Our traditional view was correct, and today's cavalier attitude toward regulating the financing of speech (the "exacting scrutiny" test of Buckley, see ibid., is not uttered in any majority opinion, and is not observed in the ones from which I dissent) frustrates the fundamental purpose of the First Amendment. In any economy operated on even the most rudimentary principles of division of labor, effective public communication requires the speaker to make use of the services of others. An author may write a novel, but he will seldom publish and distribute it himself. A freelance reporter may write a story, but he will rarely edit, print, and deliver it to subscribers. To a government bent on suppressing speech, this mode of organization presents opportunities: Control any cog in the machine, and you can halt the whole apparatus. License printers, and it matters little whether authors are still free to write. Restrict the sale of books, and it matters little who prints them. Predictably, repressive regimes have exploited these principles by attacking all levels of the production and dissemination of ideas. See, e.g., Printing Act of 1662, 14 Car. II, c. 33, §§1, 4, 7 (punishing printers, importers, and booksellers); Printing Act of 1649, 2 Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum 245, 246, 250 (punishing authors, printers, booksellers, importers, and buyers). In response to this threat, we have interpreted the First Amendment broadly. See, e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 65, n.6 (1963) ("The constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press embraces the circulation of books as well as their publication..."). </s> Division of labor requires a means of mediating exchange, and in a commercial society, that means is supplied by money. The publisher pays the author for the right to sell his book; it pays its staff who print and assemble the book; it demands payments from booksellers who bring the book to market. This, too, presents opportunities for repression: Instead of regulating the various parties to the enterprise individually, the government can suppress their ability to coordinate by regulating their use of money. What good is the right to print books without a right to buy works from authors? Or the right to publish newspapers without the right to pay deliverymen? The right to speak would be largely ineffective if it did not include the right to engage in financial transactions that are the incidents of its exercise. </s> This is not to say that any regulation of money is a regulation of speech. The government may apply general commercial regulations to those who use money for speech if it applies them evenhandedly to those who use money for other purposes. But where the government singles out money used to fund speech as its legislative object, it is acting against speech as such, no less than if it had targeted the paper on which a book was printed or the trucks that deliver it to the bookstore. </s> History and jurisprudence bear this out. The best early examples derive from the British efforts to tax the press after the lapse of licensing statutes by which the press was first regulated. The Stamp Act of 1712 imposed levies on all newspapers, including an additional tax for each advertisement. 10 Anne, c. 18, §113. It was a response to unfavorable war coverage, "obvious[ly] ... designed to check the publication of those newspapers and pamphlets which depended for their sale on their cheapness and sensationalism." F.Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England, 1476-1776, pp.309-310 (1952). It succeeded in killing off approximately half the newspapers in England in its first year. Id., at 312. In 1765, Parliament applied a similar Act to the Colonies. 5 Geo. III, c. 12, §1. The colonial Act likewise placed exactions on sales and advertising revenue, the latter at 2s. per advertisement, which was "by any standard . . . excessive, since the publisher himself received only from 3 to 5s. and still less for repeated insertions." A. Schlesinger, Prelude to Independence: The Newspaper War on Britain, 1764-1776, p.68 (1958). The founding generation saw these taxes as grievous incursions on the freedom of the press. See, e.g., 1 D.Ramsay, History of the American Revolution 61-62 (L. Cohen ed. 1990); J.Adams, A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law (1765), reprinted in 3 Life and Works of John Adams 445, 464 (C.Adams ed. 1851). See generally Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245-249 (1936); Schlesinger, supra, at 67-84. </s> We have kept faith with the Founders' tradition by prohibiting the selective taxation of the press. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983) (ink and paper tax); Grosjean, supra (advertisement tax). And we have done so whether the tax was the product of illicit motive or not. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., supra, at 592. These press-taxation cases belie the claim that regulation of money used to fund speech is not regulation of speech itself. A tax on a newspaper's advertising revenue does not prohibit anyone from saying anything; it merely appropriates part of the revenue that a speaker would otherwise obtain. That is even a step short of totally prohibiting advertising revenue--which would be analogous to the total prohibition of certain campaign-speech contributions in the presentcases. Yet it is unquestionably a violation of the First Amendment. </s> Many other cases exemplify the same principle that an attack upon the funding of speech is an attack upon speech itself. In Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980), we struck down an ordinance limiting the amount charities could pay their solicitors. In Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991), we held unconstitutional a state statute that appropriated the proceeds of criminals' biographies for payment to the victims. And in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995), we held unconstitutional a university's discrimination in the disbursement of funds to speakers on the basis of viewpoint. Most notable, perhaps, is our famous opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), holding that paid advertisements in a newspaper were entitled to full First Amendment protection: "Any other conclusion would discourage newspapers from carrying 'editorial advertisements' of this type, and so might shut off an important outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas by persons who do not themselves have access to publishing facilities--who wish to exercise their freedom of speech even though they are not members of the press. The effect would be to shackle the First Amendment in its attempt to secure 'the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.'" Id., at 266 (citations omitted). </s> This passage was relied on in Buckley for the point that restrictions on the expenditure of money for speech are equivalent to restrictions on speech itself. 424 U.S., at 16-17. That reliance was appropriate. If denying protection to paid-for speech would "shackle the First Amendment," so also does forbidding or limiting the right to pay for speech. </s> It should be obvious, then, that a law limiting the amount a person can spend to broadcast his political views is a direct restriction on speech. That is no different from a law limiting the amount a newspaper can pay its editorial staff or the amount a charity can pay its leafletters. It is equally clear that a limit on the amount a candidate can raise from any one individual for the purpose of speaking is also a direct limitation on speech. That is no different from a law limiting the amount a publisher can accept from any one shareholder or lender, or the amount a newspaper can charge any one advertiser or customer. (b) Pooling Money is Not Speech </s> Another proposition which could explain at least some of the results of today's opinion is that the First Amendment right to spend money for speech does not include the right to combine with others in spending money for speech. Such a proposition fits uncomfortably with the concluding words of our Declaration of Independence: "And for the support of this Declaration, . . . we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor." (Emphasis added.) The freedom to associate with others for the dissemination of ideas--not just by singing or speaking in unison, but by pooling financial resources for expressive purposes--is part of the freedom of speech. "Our form of government is built on the premise that every citizen shall have the right to engage in political expression and association. This right was enshrined in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights. Exercise of these basic freedoms in America has traditionally been through the media of political associations. Any interference with the freedom of a party is simultaneously an interference with the freedom of its adherents." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963) (internal quotation marks omitted). </s> "The First Amendment protects political association as well as political expression. The constitutional right of association explicated in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958), stemmed from the Court's recognition that '[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association.' Subsequent decisions have made clear that the First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee '"freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas,"' ...." Buckley, supra, at 15. </s> We have said that "implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment" is "a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984). That "right to associate . . . in pursuit" includes the right to pool financial resources. </s> If it were otherwise, Congress would be empowered to enact legislation requiring newspapers to be sole proprietorships, banning their use of partnership or corporate form. That sort of restriction would be an obvious violation of the First Amendment, and it is incomprehensible why the conclusion should change when what is at issue is the pooling of funds for the most important (and most perennially threatened) category of speech: electoral speech. The principle that such financial association does not enjoy full First Amendment protection threatens the existence of all political parties. (c) Speech by Corporations Can Be Abridged </s> The last proposition that might explain at least some of today's casual abridgment of free-speech rights is this: that the particular form of association known as a corporation does not enjoy full First Amendment protection. Of course the text of the First Amendment does not limit its application in this fashion, even though "[b]y the end of the eighteenth century the corporation was a familiar figure in American economic life." C. Cooke, Corporation, Trust and Company 92 (1951). Nor is there any basis in reason why First Amendment rights should not attach to corporate associations--and we have said so. In First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), we held unconstitutional a state prohibition of corporate speech designed to influence the vote on referendum proposals. We said: "[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that the State could silence their proposed speech. It is the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an individual. The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual." Id., at 776-777 (internal quotation marks, footnotes, and citations omitted). </s> In NAACP v. Button, supra, at 428-429, 431, we held that the NAACP could assert First Amendment rights "on its own behalf, . . . though a corporation," and that the activities of the corporation were "modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments." In Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986), we held unconstitutional a state effort to compel corporate speech. "The identity of the speaker," we said, "is not decisive in determining whether speech is protected. Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the 'discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas' that the First Amendment seeks to foster." And in Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, we held unconstitutional FECA's limitation upon independent corporate expenditures. </s> The Court changed course in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), upholding a state prohibition of an independent corporate expenditure in support of a candidate for state office. I dissented in that case, see id., at 679, and remain of the view that it was error. In the modern world, giving the government power to exclude corporations from the political debate enables it effectively to muffle the voices that best represent the most significant segments of the economy and the most passionately held social and political views. People who associate--who pool their financial resources--for purposes of economic enterprise overwhelmingly do so in the corporate form; and with increasing frequency, incorporation is chosen by those who associate to defend and promote particular ideas--such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Rifle Association, parties to these cases. Imagine, then, a government that wished to suppress nuclear power--or oil and gas exploration, or automobile manufacturing, or gun ownership, or civil liberties--and that had the power to prohibit corporate advertising against its proposals. To be sure, the individuals involved in, or benefited by, those industries, or interested in those causes, could (given enough time) form political action committees or other associations to make their case. But the organizational form in which those enterprises already exist, and in which they can most quickly and most effectively get their message across, is the corporate form. The First Amendment does not in my view permit the restriction of that political speech. And the same holds true for corporate electoral speech: A candidate should not be insulated from the most effective speech that the major participants in the economy and major incorporated interest groups can generate. </s> But what about the danger to the political system posed by "amassed wealth"? The most direct threat from that source comes in the form of undisclosed favors and payoffs to elected officials--which have already been criminalized, and will be rendered no more discoverable by the legislation at issue here. The use of corporate wealth (like individual wealth) to speak to the electorate is unlikely to "distort" elections--especially if disclosure requirements tell the people where the speech is coming from. The premise of the First Amendment is that the American people are neither sheep nor fools, and hence fully capable of considering both the substance of the speech presented to them and its proximate and ultimate source. If that premise is wrong, our democracy has a much greater problem to overcome than merely the influence of amassed wealth. Given the premises of democracy, there is no such thing as too much speech. </s> But, it is argued, quite apart from its effect upon the electorate, corporate speech in the form of contributions to the candidate's campaign, or even in the form of independent expenditures supporting the candidate, engenders an obligation which is later paid in the form of greater access to the officeholder, or indeed in the form of votes on particular bills. Any quid-pro-quo agreement for votes would of course violate criminal law, see 18 U.S.C. §201, and actual payoff votes have not even been claimed by those favoring the restrictions on corporate speech. It cannot be denied, however, that corporate (like noncorporate) allies will have greater access to the officeholder, and that he will tend to favor the same causes as those who support him (which is usually why they supported him). That is the nature of politics--if not indeed human nature--and how this can properly be considered "corruption" (or "the appearance of corruption") with regard to corporate allies and not with regard to other allies is beyond me. If the Bill of Rights had intended an exception to the freedom of speech in order to combat this malign proclivity of the officeholder to agree with those who agree with him, and to speak more with his supporters than his opponents, it would surely have said so. It did not do so, I think, because the juice is not worth the squeeze. Evil corporate (and private affluent) influences are well enough checked (so long as adequate campaign-expenditure disclosure rules exist) by the politician's fear of being portrayed as "in the pocket" of so-called moneyed interests. The incremental benefit obtained by muzzling corporate speech is more than offset by loss of the information and persuasion that corporate speech can contain. That, at least, is the assumption of a constitutional guarantee which prescribes that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech. </s> But let us not be deceived. While the Government's briefs and arguments before this Court focused on the horrible "appearance of corruption," the most passionate floor statements during the debates on this legislation pertained to so-called attack ads, which the Constitution surely protects, but which Members of Congress analogized to "crack cocaine," 144 Cong. Rec. S868 (Feb. 24, 1998) (remarks of Sen. Daschle), "drive-by shooting[s]," id., at S879 (remarks of Sen. Durbin), and "air pollution," 143 Cong. Rec. 20505 (1997) (remarks of Sen. Dorgan). There is good reason to believe that the ending of negative campaign ads was the principal attraction of the legislation. A Senate sponsor said, "I hope that we will not allow our attention to be distracted from the real issues at hand--how to raise the tenor of the debate in our elections and give people real choices. No one benefits from negative ads. They don't aid our Nation's political dialog." Id., at 20521-20522 (remarks of Sen. McCain). He assured the body that "[y]ou cut off the soft money, you are going to see a lot less of that [attack ads]. Prohibit unions and corporations, and you will see a lot less of that. If you demand full disclosure for those who pay for those ads, you are going to see a lot less of that . . . ." 147 Cong. Rec. S3116 (Mar. 29, 2001) (remarks of Sen. McCain). See also, e.g., 148 Cong. Rec. S2117 (Mar. 20, 2002) (remarks of Sen. Cantwell) ("This bill is about slowing the ad war. . . . It is about slowing political advertising and making sure the flow of negative ads by outside interest groups does not continue to permeate the airwaves"); 143 Cong. Rec. 20746 (1997) (remarks of Sen. Boxer) ("These so-called issues ads are not regulated at all and mention candidates by name. They directly attack candidates without any accountability. It is brutal.... We have an opportunity in the McCain-Feingold bill to stop that . . ."); 145 Cong. Rec. S12606-S12607 (Oct. 14, 1999) (remarks of Sen. Wellstone) ("I think these issue advocacy ads are a nightmare. I think all of us should hate them.... [By passing the legislation], [w]e could get some of this poison politics off television"). </s> Another theme prominent in the legislative debates was the notion that there is too much money spent on elections. The first principle of "reform" was that "there should be less money in politics." 147 Cong. Rec. S3236 (Apr. 2, 2001) (remarks of Sen. Murray). "The enormous amounts of special interest money that flood our political system have become a cancer in our democracy." 148 Cong. Rec. S2151 (Mar. 20, 2002) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). "[L]arge sums of money drown out the voice of the average voter." 148 Cong. Rec. H373 (Feb. 13, 2002) (remarks of Rep. Langevin). The system of campaign finance is "drowning in money." Id., at H404 (remarks of Rep. Menendez). And most expansively: "Despite the ever-increasing sums spent on campaigns, we have not seen an improvement in campaign discourse, issue discussion or voter education. More money does not mean more ideas, more substance or more depth. Instead, it means more of what voters complain about most. More 30-second spots, more negativity and an increasingly longer campaign period." 148 Cong. Rec. S2150 (Mar. 20, 2002) (remarks of Sen. Kerry). </s> Perhaps voters do detest these 30-second spots--though I suspect they detest even more hour-long campaign-debate interruptions of their favorite entertainment programming. Evidently, however, these ads do persuade voters, or else they would not be so routinely used by sophisticated politicians of all parties. The point, in any event, is that it is not the proper role of those who govern us to judge which campaign speech has "substance" and "depth" (do you think it might be that which is least damaging to incumbents?) and to abridge the rest. </s> And what exactly are these outrageous sums frittered away in determining who will govern us? A report prepared for Congress concluded that the total amount, in hard and soft money, spent on the 2000 federal elections was between $2.4 and $2.5 billion. J. Cantor, CRS Report for Congress, Campaign Finance in the 2000 Federal Elections: Overview and Estimates of the Flow of Money (2001). All campaign spending in the United States, including state elections, ballot initiatives, and judicial elections, has been estimated at $3.9 billion for 2000, Nelson, Spending in the 2000 Elections, in Financing the 2000 Election 24, Tbl. 2-1 (D. Magleby ed. 2002), which was a year that "shattered spending and contribution records," id., at 22. Even taking this last, larger figure as the benchmark, it means that Americans spent about half as much electing all their Nation's officials, state and federal, as they spent on movie tickets ($7.8 billion); about a fifth as much as they spent on cosmetics and perfume ($18.8 billion); and about a sixth as much as they spenton pork (the nongovernmental sort) ($22.8 billion). See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Tbl. 2.6U (Col. AS; Rows 356, 214, and 139), http:// www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/206u.csv. If our democracy is drowning from this much spending, it cannot swim. * * * Which brings me back to where I began: This litigation is about preventing criticism of the government. I cannot say for certain that many, or some, or even any, of the Members of Congress who voted for this legislation did so not to produce "fairer" campaigns, but to mute criticism of their records and facilitate reelection. Indeed, I will stipulate that all those who voted for the Act believed they were acting for the good of the country. There remains the problem of the Charlie Wilson Phenomenon, named after Charles Wilson, former president of General Motors, who is supposed to have said during the Senate hearing on his nomination as Secretary of Defense that "what's good for General Motors is good for the country."** Those in power, even giving them the benefit of the greatest good will, are inclined to believe that what is good for them is good for the country. Whether in prescient recognition of the Charlie Wilson Phenomenon, or out of fear of good old-fashioned, malicious, self-interested manipulation, "[t]he fundamental approach of the First Amendment . . . was to assume the worst, and to rule the regulation of political speech 'for fairness' sake' simply out of bounds." Austin, 494 U.S., at 693 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Having abandoned that approach to a limited extent in Buckley, we abandon it much further today. </s> We will unquestionably be called upon to abandon it further still in the future. The most frightening passage in the lengthy floor debates on this legislation is the following assurance given by one of the cosponsoring Senators to his colleagues: "This is a modest step, it is a first step, it is an essential step, but it does not even begin to address, in some ways, the fundamental problems that exist with the hard money aspect of the system." 148 Cong. Rec. S2101 (Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Feingold). </s> The system indeed. The first instinct of power is the retention of power, and, under a Constitution that requires periodic elections, that is best achieved by the suppression of election-time speech. We have witnessed merely the second scene of Act I of what promises to be a lengthy tragedy. In scene 3 the Court, having abandoned most of the First Amendment weaponry that Buckley left intact, will be even less equipped to resist the incumbents' writing of the rules of political debate. The federal election campaign laws, which are already (as today's opinions show) so voluminous, so detailed, so complex, that no ordinary citizen dare run for office, or even contribute a significant sum, without hiring an expert advisor in the field, can be expected to grow more voluminous, more detailed, and more complex in the years to come--and always, always, with the objective of reducing the excessive amount of speech. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1674v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1675v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1676v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> JOHN McCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1702v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1727v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC., etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1733v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPELLANTS </s> 02-1734v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1740v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> RON PAUL, UNITED STATES CONGRESSMAN, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1747v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1753v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1755v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1756v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal. on appeals from the united states district court for the district of columbia [December 10, 2003] </s> Justice Thomas, concurring with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, except for BCRA §§311 and 318, concurring in the result with respect to BCRA §318, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Title II, and dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I, V, and §311.** </s> The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." Nevertheless, the Court today upholds what can only be described as the most significant abridgment of the freedoms of speech and association since the Civil War. With breathtaking scope, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), directly targets and constricts core political speech, the "primary object of First Amendment protection." Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 410-411 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Because "the First Amendment 'has its fullest and most urgent application' to speech uttered during a campaign for political office," Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)), our duty is to approach these restrictions "with the utmost skepticism" and subject them to the "strictest scrutiny." Shrink Missouri, supra, at 412 (Thomas, J., dissenting). </s> In response to this assault on the free exchange of ideas and with only the slightest consideration of the appropriate standard of review or of the Court's traditional role of protecting First Amendment freedoms, the Court has placed its imprimatur on these unprecedented restrictions. The very "purpose of the First Amendment [is] to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). Yet today the fundamental principle that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market," Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), is cast aside in the purported service of preventing "corruption," or the mere "appearance of corruption." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976) (per curiam). Apparently, the marketplace of ideas is to be fully open only to defamers, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); nude dancers, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (plurality opinion); pornographers, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002); flag burners, United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); and cross burners, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. ___ (2003). </s> Because I cannot agree with the treatment given by Justice Stevens' and Justice O'Connor's opinion (hereinafter joint opinion) to speech that is "indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society," Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103 (1940), I respectfully dissent. I also dissent from Justice Breyer's opinion upholding BCRA §504. I join The Chief Justice's opinion in regards to BCRA §§304, 305, 307, 316, 319, and 403(b); concur in the result as to §318; and dissent from the opinion as to §311. I also fully agree with Justice Kennedy's discussion of §213 and join that portion of his opinion. Post, at 37-38. I A </s> "[C]ampaign finance laws are subject to strict scrutiny," Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. ___, ___ (2003) (slip op., at 1) (Thomas, J., dissenting), and thus Title I must satisfy that demanding standard even if it were (incorrectly) conceived of as nothing more than a contribution limitation. The defendants do not even attempt to defend Title I under this standard, and for good reason: The various restrictions imposed by Title I are much less narrowly tailored to target only corrupting or problematic donations than even the contribution limits in Shrink Missouri. See 518 U.S. 604, 641-644 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Colorado I). And, as I have previously noted, it is unclear why "[b]ribery laws [that] bar precisely the quid pro quo arrangements that are targeted here" and "disclosure laws" are not "less restrictive means of addressing [the Government's] interest in curtailing corruption." Shrink Missouri, supra, at 428. The joint opinion not only continues the errors of Buckley v. Valeo, by applying a low level of scrutiny to contribution ceilings, but also builds upon these errors by expanding the anticircumvention rationale beyond reason. Admittedly, exploitation of an anticircumvention concept has a long pedigree, going back at least to Buckley itself. Buckley upheld a $1,000 contribution ceiling as a way to combat both the "actuality and appearance of corruption." 424 U.S., at 26. The challengers in Buckley contended both that bribery laws represented "a less restrictive means of dealing with 'proven and suspected quid pro quo arrangements,'" id., at 27, and that the $1,000 contribution ceiling was overbroad as "most large contributors do not seek improper influence over a candidate's position or an officeholder's action," id., at 29. The Court rejected the first argument on the grounds that "laws making criminal the giving and taking of bribes deal with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence governmental action," id., at 27-28, and rejected the second on the grounds that "it [is] difficult to isolate suspect contributions," id., at 30.1 But a broadly drawn bribery law2 would cover even subtle and general attempts to influence government officials corruptly, eliminating the Court's first concern. And, an effective bribery law would deter actual quid pro quos and would, in all likelihood, eliminate any appearance of corruption in the system. </s> Hence, at root, the Buckley Court was concerned that bribery laws could not be effectively enforced to prevent quid pro quos between donors and officeholders, and the only rational reading of Buckley is that it approved the $1,000 contribution ceiling on this ground. The Court then, however, having at least in part concluded that individual contribution ceilings were necessary to prevent easy evasion of bribery laws, proceeded to uphold a separate contribution limitation, using, as the only justification, the "prevent[ion] [of] evasion of the $1,000 contribution limitation." Id., at 38. The need to prevent circumvention of a limitation that was itself an anticircumvention measure led to the upholding of another significant restriction on individuals' freedom of speech. </s> The joint opinion now repeats this process. New Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) §323(a), 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(a) (Supp. 2003), is intended to prevent easy circumvention of the (now) $2,000 contribution ceiling. The joint opinion even recognizes this, relying heavily on evidence that, for instance, "candidates and donors alike have in fact exploited the soft-money loophole, the former to increase their prospects of election and the latter to create debt on the part of officeholders, with the national parties serving as willing intermediaries." Ante, at 36. The joint opinion upholds §323(a), in part, on the grounds that it had become too easy to circumvent the $2,000 cap by using the national parties as go-betweens. </s> And the remaining provisions of new FECA §323 are upheld mostly as measures preventing circumvention of other contribution limits, including §323(a), ante, at 55-57 (§323(b)); ante, at 66-69 (§323(d)); ante, at 75 (§323(e)); ante, at 77-78 (§323(f)), which, as I have already explained, is a second-order anticircumvention measure. The joint opinion's handling of §323(f) is perhaps most telling, as it upholds §323(f) only because of "Congress' eminently reasonable prediction that ... state and local candidates and officeholders will become the next conduits for the soft-money funding of sham issue advertising." Ante, at 78 (emphasis added). That is, this Court upholds a third-order anticircumvention measure based on Congress' anticipation of circumvention of these second-order anticircumvention measures that might possibly, at some point in the future, pose some problem. </s> It is not difficult to see where this leads. Every law has limits, and there will always be behavior not covered by the law but at its edges; behavior easily characterized as "circumventing" the law's prohibition. Hence, speech regulation will again expand to cover new forms of "circumvention," only to spur supposed circumvention of the new regulations, and so forth. Rather than permit this never-ending and self-justifying process, I would require that the Government explain why proposed speech restrictions are needed in light of actual Government interests, and, in particular, why the bribery laws are not sufficient. B </s> But Title I falls even on the joint opinion's terms. This Court has held that "[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised." Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S., at 391. And three Members of today's majority have observed that "the opportunity for corruption" presented by "[u]nregulated 'soft money' contributions" is "at best, attenuated." Colorado I, 518 U.S., at 616 (opinion of Breyer, J., joined by O'Connor and Souter, JJ.). Such an observation is quite clearly correct. A donation to a political party is a clumsy method by which to influence a candidate, as the party is free to spend the donation however it sees fit, and could easily spend the money as to provide no help to the candidate. And, a soft-money donation to a party will be of even less benefit to a candidate, "because of legal restrictions on how the money may be spent." Brief for FEC etal. in No. 02-1674 etal., p.43. It follows that the defendants bear an especially heavy empirical burden in justifying Title I. The evidence cited by the joint opinion does not meet this standard and would barely suffice for anything more than rational-basis review. The first category of the joint opinion's evidence is evidence that "federal officeholders have commonly asked donors to make soft-money donations to national and state committees solely in order to assist federal campaigns, including the officeholder's own." Ante, at 36 (internal quotation marks omitted). But to the extent that donors and federal officeholders have collaborated so that donors could give donations to a national party committee "for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office," the alleged soft-money donation is in actuality a regular "contribution" as already defined and regulated by FECA. See 2 U.S.C. §431(8)(A)(i). Neither the joint opinion nor the defendants present evidence that enforcement of pre-BCRA law has proved to be impossible, ineffective, or even particularly difficult. </s> The second category is evidence that "lobbyists, CEOs, and wealthy individuals" have "donat[ed] substantial sums of soft money to national committees not on ideological grounds, but for the express purpose of securing influence over federal officials." Ante, at 37. Even if true (and the cited evidence consists of nothing more than vague allegations of wrongdoing), it is unclear why existing bribery laws could not address this problem. Again, neither the joint opinion nor the defendants point to evidence that the enforcement of bribery laws has been or would be ineffective. If the problem has been clear and widespread, as the joint opinion suggests, I would expect that convictions, or at least prosecutions, would be more frequent. </s> The third category is evidence characterized by the joint opinion as "connect[ing] soft money to manipulations of the legislative calendar, leading to Congress' failure to enact, among other things, generic drug legislation, tort reform, and tobacco legislation." Ante, at 40. But the evidence for this is no stronger than the evidence that there has been actual vote buying or vote switching for soft money. The joint opinion's citations to the record do not stand for the propositions that they claim. For instance, the McCain declaration does not provide any evidence of any exchange of legislative action for donations of any kind (hard or soft).3 Neither do the Simpson or Simon declarations, with perhaps one exception effectively addressed by Justice Kennedy's opinion.4 See post, at 18-19. In fact, the findings by two of the District Court's judges confirm that the evidence of any quid pro quo corruption is exceedingly weak, if not nonexistent. See 251 F.Supp. 2d 176, 349-352 (DC 2003) (Henderson, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); id., at 851-853 (Leon, J.). The evidence cited by the joint opinion is properly described as "at best, [the Members of Congress'] personal conjecture regarding the impact of soft money donations on the voting practices of their present and former colleagues." Id., at 852 (Leon, J.). </s> The joint opinion also places a substantial amount of weight on the fact that "in 1996 and 2000, more than half of the top 50 soft-money donors gave substantial sums to both major national parties," and suggests that this fact "leav[es] room for no other conclusion but that these donors were seeking influence, or avoiding retaliation, rather than promoting any particular ideology." Ante, at 38 (emphasis in original). But that is not necessarily the case. The two major parties are not perfect ideological opposites, and supporters or opponents of certain policies or ideas might find substantial overlap between the two parties. If donors feel that both major parties are in general agreement over an issue of importance to them, it is unremarkable that such donors show support for both parties. This commonsense explanation surely belies the joint opinion's too-hasty conclusion drawn from a relatively innocent fact. </s> The Court today finds such sparse evidence sufficient. This cannot be held to satisfy even the "relatively complaisant review" of Beaumont, 539 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 14), unless, as it appears, the Court intends to abdicate entirely its role.5 II </s> The Court is not content with "balanc[ing] away First Amendment freedoms," Shrink Missouri, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)). Today's holding continues a disturbing trend: the steady decrease in the level of scrutiny applied to restrictions on core political speech. See Buckley, supra, at 16 (First Amendment requires "exacting scrutiny"); Shrink Missouri, supra, at 387 (applying "Buckley's standard of scrutiny"); Beaumont, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 14) (referencing "relatively complaisant review").6 Although this trend is most obvious in the review of contribution limits, it has now reached what even this Court today would presumably recognize as a direct restriction on core political speech: limitations on independent expenditures. A </s> Of course, by accepting Congress' expansion of what constitutes "coordination" for purposes of treating expenditures as limitations, the Court can pretend that it is, in fact, still only restricting primarily "contributions." I need not say much about this illusion. I have already discussed how the language used in new FECA §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) is, even under Buckley's framework, overly broad and restricts fully protected speech. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 467-468 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Colorado II). The particular language used, "expenditures made by any person ... in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a national, State, or local committee of a political party," BCRA §214(a)(2), captures expenditures with "no constitutional difference" from "a purely independent one." Id., at 468 (Thomas, J., dissenting).7 And new FECA §315(a)(7)(C), although using the neutral term "coordinated," certainly has the purpose of "clarif[ying] the scope of the preceding subsection, §315(a)(7)(B)," ante, at 95 (joint opinion), and thus should be read to be as expansive as the overly broad language in §315(a)(7)(B). Hence, it too is unconstitutional. B </s> As for §§203 and 204, the Court rests its decision on another vast expansion of the First Amendment framework described in Buckley, this time of the Court's, rather than Congress', own making. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-660 (1990), the Court recognized a "different type of corruption" from the "'financial quid pro quo'": the "corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas." The only effect, however, that the "immense aggregations" of wealth will have (in the context of independent expenditures) on an election is that they might be used to fund communications to convince voters to select certain candidates over others. In other words, the "corrosive and distorting effects" described in Austin are that corporations, on behalf of their shareholders, will be able to convince voters of the correctness of their ideas. Apparently, winning in the marketplace of ideas is no longer a sign that "the ultimate good" has been "reached by free trade in ideas," or that the speaker has survived "the best test of truth" by having "the thought ... get itself accepted in the competition of the market." Abrams, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978) ("[T]he fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it"); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N. Y., 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959) ("[I]n the realm of ideas [the Constitution] protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing"). Because Austin's definition of "corruption" is incompatible with the First Amendment, I would overturn Austin and hold that the potential for corporations and unions to influence voters, via independent expenditures aimed at convincing these voters to adopt particular views, is not a form of corruption justifying any state regulation or suppression. Without Austin's peculiar variation of "corruption," §§203 and 204 are supported by no compelling government interest. The joint opinion does not even argue that these provisions address quid pro quo corruption.8 And the shareholder protection rationale is equally unavailing. The "shareholder invests in a corporation of his own volition and is free to withdraw his investment at any time and for any reason," Bellotti, supra, at 794, n.34. Hence, no compelling interest can be found in protecting minority shareholders from the corporation's use of its general treasury, especially where, in other contexts, "equally important and controversial corporate decisions are made by management or by a predetermined percentage of the shareholders." Ibid. C </s> I must now address an issue on which I differ from all of my colleagues: the disclosure provisions in BCRA §201, now contained in new FECA §304(f). The "historical evidence indicates that Founding-era Americans opposed attempts to require that anonymous authors reveal their identities on the ground that forced disclosure violated the 'freedom of the press.'" McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 361 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).9 Indeed, this Court has explicitly recognized that "the interest in having anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition of entry," and thus that "an author's decision to remain anonymous ... is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment." Id., at 342. The Court now backs away from this principle, allowing the established right to anonymous speech to be stripped away based on the flimsiest of justifications. The only plausible interest asserted by the defendants to justify the disclosure provisions is the interest in providing "information" about the speaker to the public. But we have already held that "[t]he simple interest in providing voters with additional relevant information does not justify a state requirement that a writer make statements or disclosures she would otherwise omit." Id., at 348. Of course, Buckley upheld the disclosure requirement on expenditures for communications using words of express advocacy based on this informational interest. 424 U.S., at 81. And admittedly, McIntyre purported to distinguish Buckley. McIntyre, supra, at 355-356. But the two ways McIntyre distinguished Buckley--one, that the disclosure of "an expenditure and its use, without more, reveals far less information [than a forced identification of the author of a pamphlet,]" 514 U.S., at 355; and two, that in candidate elections, the "Government can identify a compelling state interest in avoiding the corruption that might result from campaign expenditures," id., at 356--are inherently implausible. The first is simply wrong. The revelation of one's political expenditures for independent communications about candidates can be just as revealing as the revelation of one's name on a pamphlet for a noncandidate election. See also id., at 384 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The second was outright rejected in Buckley itself, where the Court concluded that independent expenditures did not create any substantial risk of real or apparent corruption. 424 U.S., at 47. Hence, the only reading of McIntyre that remains consistent with the principles it contains is that it overturned Buckley to the extent that Buckley upheld a disclosure requirement solely based on the governmental interest in providing information to the voters. </s> The right to anonymous speech cannot be abridged based on the interests asserted by the defendants. I would thus hold that the disclosure requirements of BCRA §201 are unconstitutional. Because of this conclusion, the so-called advance disclosure requirement of §201 necessarily falls as well.10 D </s> I have long maintained that Buckley was incorrectly decided and should be overturned. See Colorado II, 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (MCFL), it is, or at least was, clear that any regulation of political speech beyond communications using words of express advocacy is unconstitutional. Hence, even under the joint opinion's framework, most of Title II is unconstitutional, as both the "primary definition" and "backup definition" of "electioneering communications" cover a significant number of communications that do not use words of express advocacy. 2 U.S.C.A. §434(f)(3)(A) (Supp. 2003).11 In Buckley, the Court was presented with the ambiguous language "'any expenditure ... relative to a clearly identified candidate.'" 424 U.S., at 41. The Court noted that the "use of so indefinite a phrase as 'relative to' a candidate fails to clearly mark the boundary between permissible and impermissible speech." Ibid. Hence, the Court read the phrase to mean "advocating the election or defeat of a candidate." Id., at 42 (internal quotation marks omitted). But this construction did not complete the vagueness inquiry. As the Court observed: "[T]he distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application. Candidates, especially incumbents, are intimately tied to public issues involving legislative proposals and governmental actions. Not only do candidates campaign on the basis of their positions on various public issues, but campaigns themselves generate issues of public interest." Ibid. </s> The Court then recognized that the constitutional issues raised by the provision "can be avoided only by reading §608(e)(1) as limited to communications that include explicit words of advocacy of election or defeat of a candidate." Id., at 43. </s> The joint opinion argues that Buckley adopted this narrow reading only to avoid addressing a constitutional question. "[T]he concept of express advocacy and the concomitant class of magic words were born of an effort to avoid constitutional infirmities," concludes the joint opinion after examining the language of Buckley. Ante, at 85. This ignores the fact that the Court then struck down the expenditure limitation precisely because it was too narrow: "The exacting interpretation of the statutory language necessary to avoid unconstitutional vagueness thus undermines the limitation's effectiveness as a loophole-closing provision by facilitating circumvention by those seeking to exert improper influence upon a candidate or officeholder. It would naively underestimate the ingenuity and resourcefulness of persons and groups desiring to buy influence to believe that they would have much difficulty devising expenditures that skirted the restriction on express advocacy of election or defeat but nevertheless benefited the candidate's campaign. Yet no substantial societal interest would be served by a loophole-closing provision designed to check corruption that permitted unscrupulous persons and organizations to expend unlimited sums of money in order to obtain improper influence over candidates for elective office." 424 U.S., at 45. </s> Far from saving the provision from constitutional doubt, the Court read the provision in such a way as to guarantee its unconstitutionality. If there were some possibility that regulation of communications without words of express advocacy were constitutional, the provision would have to have been read to include these communications, and the constitutional question addressed head on.12 Indeed, the exceedingly narrow reading of the relevant language in Buckley is far from mandated by the text; it is, in fact, a highly strained reading. "'[A]ny expenditure ... relative to a clearly identified candidate,'" id., at 41, would be better read to cover, for instance, any expenditure for an advertisement aired close to an election that is "intended to influence the voters' decisions and ha[s] that effect," a standard apparently endorsed by the joint opinion as being sufficiently "equivalent" to express advocacy to justify its regulation. Ante, at 99-100. By deliberately adopting a strained and narrow reading of the statutory text and then striking down the provision in question for being too narrow, the Court made clear that regulation of nonexpress advocacy was strictly forbidden. </s> This reading is confirmed by other portions of Buckley and by other cases. For instance, in limiting FECA's disclosure provisions to expenditures involving express advocacy, the Court noted that it gave such a narrowing interpretation "[t]o insure that the reach of [the disclosure provision] is not impermissibly broad." 424 U.S., at 80 (emphasis added). If overbreadth were a concern in limiting the scope of a disclosure provision, it surely was equally a concern in the limitation of an actual cap on expenditures. And, in MCFL, the Court arguably eliminated any ambiguity remaining in Buckley when it explicitly stated that the narrowing interpretations taken in Buckley were necessary "in order to avoid problems of overbreadth." MCFL, 479 U.S., at 248. The joint opinion's attempt to explain away MCFL's uncomfortable language is unpersuasive. The joint opinion emphasizes that the MCFL Court "held that a 'similar construction' must apply to the expenditure limitation," as if that somehow proved its point. Ante, at 85, n.76 (emphasis in original). The fact that the MCFL Court said this does not establish anything, of course; adopting a narrow construction of a statute "in order to avoid problems of overbreadth," 479 U.S., at 248, is perfectly consistent with a holding that, lacking the narrowing construction, the statute would be overly broad, i.e., unconstitutional. </s> The defendants' principal argument in response is that "it would be bizarre to conclude that the Constitution permits Congress to prohibit the use of corporate or union general treasury funds for electioneering advertisements, but that the only standard that it can constitutionally use (express advocacy) is one that misses the vast majority (88.6 percent) of advertisements that candidates themselves use for electioneering." Brief for FEC etal. in No. 02-1674 etal., p.103 (emphasis in original). </s> The joint opinion echoes this, stating that the express advocacy line "cannot be squared with our longstanding recognition that the presence or absence of magic words cannot meaningfully distinguish electioneering speech from a true issue ad." Ante, at 86. First, the presence of the "magic words" does differentiate in a meaningful way between categories of speech. Speech containing the "magic words" is "unambiguously campaign related," Buckley, supra, at 81, while speech without these words is not. Second, it is far from bizarre to suggest that (potentially regulable) speech that is in practice impossible to differentiate from fully protected speech must be fully protected. It is, rather, part and parcel of First Amendment first principles. See, e.g., Free Speech Coalition, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (rejecting suggestion that "the constitutional protection for a free press applies only to the exposition of ideas" as the "line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right," noting that "[w]hat is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine"). This principle clearly played a significant role in Buckley itself, see 424 U.S., at 42 (after noting that "the distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application," holding that the "express advocacy" standard must be adopted as the interpretation of the relevant language in FECA). The express-advocacy line was drawn to ensure the protection of the "discussion of issues and candidates," not out of some strange obsession of the Court to create meaningless lines. And the joint opinion misses the point when it notes that "Buckley's express advocacy line, in short, has not aided the legislative effort to combat real or apparent corruption." Ante, at 86-87. Buckley did not draw this line solely to aid in combating real or apparent corruption, but rather also to ensure the protection of speech unrelated to election campaigns.13 </s> Nor is this to say that speech with words of express advocacy is somehow less protected, as the joint opinion claims. Ante, at 99. The Court in Buckley recognized an informational interest that justified the imposition of a disclosure requirement on campaign-related speech. See 424 U.S., at 81. This interest is not implicated with regard to speech that is unrelated to an election campaign. Hence, it would be unconstitutional to impose such a disclosure requirement on non-election-related speech. And, as "the distinction between discussion of issues and candidates ... may often dissolve in practical application," id., at 42, the only way to prevent the unjustified burdening of nonelection speech is to impose the regulation only on speech that is "unambiguously campaign related," id., at 81, i.e., speech using words of express advocacy. Hence, speech that uses words of express advocacy is protected under the same standard, strict scrutiny, as all other forms of speech. The only difference is that, under Buckley, there is a governmental interest supporting some regulation of those using words of express advocacy not present in other forms of speech. * * * </s> The chilling endpoint of the Court's reasoning is not difficult to foresee: outright regulation of the press. None of the rationales offered by the defendants, and none of the reasoning employed by the Court, exempts the press. "This is so because of the difficulty, and perhaps impossibility, of distinguishing, either as a matter of fact or constitutional law, media corporations from [nonmedia] corporations." Bellotti, 435 U.S., at 796 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Media companies can run procandidate editorials as easily as nonmedia corporations can pay for advertisements. Candidates can be just as grateful to media companies as they can be to corporations and unions. In terms of "the corrosive and distorting effects" of wealth accumulated by corporations that has "little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas," Austin, 494 U.S., at 660, there is no distinction between a media corporation and a nonmedia corporation.14 Media corporations are influential. There is little doubt that the editorials and commentary they run can affect elections. Nor is there any doubt that media companies often wish to influence elections. One would think that the New York Times fervently hopes that its endorsement of Presidential candidates will actually influence people. What is to stop a future Congress from determining that the press is "too influential," and that the "appearance of corruption" is significant when media organizations endorse candidates or run "slanted" or "biased" news stories in favor of candidates or parties? Or, even easier, what is to stop a future Congress from concluding that the availability of unregulated media corporations creates a loophole that allows for easy "circumvention" of the limitations of the current campaign finance laws?15 Indeed, I believe that longstanding and heretofore unchallenged opinions such as Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), are in peril. There, the Court noted that "[c]hains of newspapers, national newspapers, national wire and news services, and one-newspaper towns, are the dominant features of a press that has become noncompetitive and enormously powerful and influential in its capacity to manipulate popular opinion and change the course of events." Id., at 249. Despite expressing some sympathy for those arguing for a legally created "right of access" to encourage diversity in viewpoints in the media, the Court struck down such laws, noting that these laws acted both to suppress speech and to "intru[de] into the function of editors" by interfering with "the exercise of editorial control and judgment." Id., at 257-258. Now, supporters of such laws need only argue that the press' "capacity to manipulate popular opinion" gives rise to an "appearance of corruption," especially when this capacity is used to promote a particular candidate or party. After drumming up some evidence,16 laws regulating media outlets in their issuance of editorials would be upheld under the joint opinion's reasoning (a result considered so beyond the pale in Miami Herald Publishing that the Court there used it as a reductio ad absurdum against the right-of-access law being addressed, see id., at 256). Nor is there anything in the joint opinion that would prevent Congress from imposing the Fairness Doctrine, not just on radio and television broadcasters, but on the entire media. See Red Lion Broadcasting, 395 U.S., at 369 (defining the "fairness doctrine" as a "requirement that discussion of public issues be presented ... and that each side of those issues must be given fair coverage"). </s> Hence, "the freedom of the press," described as "one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty," 1 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 335 (___ ed. 1876) (declaration of Rhode Island upon the ratification of the Constitution),17 could be next on the chopping block. Although today's opinion does not expressly strip the press of First Amendment protection, there is no principle of law or logic that would prevent the application of the Court's reasoning in that setting. The press now operates at the whim of Congress. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1674v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1675v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1676v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> JOHN McCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1702v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1727v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC., etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1733v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPELLANTS </s> 02-1734v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1740v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> RON PAUL, UNITED STATES CONGRESSMAN, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1747v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1753v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1755v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1756v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal. on appeals from the united states district court for the district of columbia [December 10, 2003] </s> Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Titles I and II.** </s> The First Amendment guarantees our citizens the right to judge for themselves the most effective means for the expression of political views and to decide for themselves which entities to trust as reliable speakers. Significant portions of Titles I and II of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA or Act) constrain that freedom. These new laws force speakers to abandon their own preference for speaking through parties and organizations. And they provide safe harbor to the mainstream press, suggesting that the corporate media alone suffice to alleviate the burdens the Act places on the rights and freedoms of ordinary citizens. </s> Today's decision upholding these laws purports simply to follow Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), and to abide by stare decisis, see ante, at 27 (joint opinion of Stevens and O'Connor, JJ. (hereinafter Court or majority)); but the majority, to make its decision work, must abridge free speech where Buckley did not. Buckley did not authorize Congress to decide what shapes and forms the national political dialogue is to take. To reach today's decision, the Court surpasses Buckley's limits and expands Congress' regulatory power. In so doing, it replaces discrete and respected First Amendment principles with new, amorphous, and unsound rules, rules which dismantle basic protections for speech. </s> A few examples show how BCRA reorders speech rights and codifies the Government's own preferences for certain speakers. BCRA would have imposed felony punishment on Ross Perot's 1996 efforts to build the Reform Party. Compare Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) §§309(d)(1)(A), 315(a)(1)(B), and 323(a)(1) (prohibiting, by up to five years' imprisonment, any individual from giving over $25,000 annually to a national party), with Spending By Perot, The Houston Chronicle, Dec. 13, 1996, p.43 (reporting Perot's $8 million founding contribution to the Reform Party). BCRA makes it a felony for an environmental group to broadcast an ad, within 60 days of an election, exhorting the public to protest a Congressman's impending vote to permit logging in national forests. See BCRA §203. BCRA escalates Congress' discrimination in favor of the speech rights of giant media corporations and against the speech rights of other corporations, both profit and nonprofit. Compare BCRA §203, with Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-660 (1990) (first sanctioning this type of discrimination). </s> To the majority, all this is not only valid under the First Amendment but also is part of Congress' "steady improvement of the national election laws." Ante, at 6. We should make no mistake. It is neither. It is the codification of an assumption that the mainstream media alone can protect freedom of speech. It is an effort by Congress to ensure that civic discourse takes place only through the modes of its choosing. And BCRA is only the beginning, as its congressional proponents freely admit: "This is a modest step, it is a first step, it is an essential step, but it does not even begin to address, in some ways, the fundamental problems that exist with the hard money aspect of the system." 148 Cong. Rec. S2101 (Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Feingold). </s> Id., at S2097 (statement of Sen. Wellstone) ("[P]assing this legislation ... will whet people's appetite for more"); id.,at S2101 (statement of Sen. Boxer) ("[T]his bill is notthe be-all or the end-all, but it is a strong start"); id., at S2152 (statement of Sen. Corzine) ("[T]his should not and will not be the last time campaign finance reform is debated on the Senate floor. We have many more important campaign finance issues to explore"); id., at S2157 (statement of Sen. Torricelli) ("Make [BCRA] the beginning of a reform, not the end of reform"); id., at H442 (Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Rep. Doggett) ("Mr. Chairman, if [BCRA] has any defect, it is that it does too little, not too much"). </s> Our precedents teach, above all, that Government cannot be trusted to moderate its own rules for suppression of speech. The dangers posed by speech regulations have led the Court to insist upon principled constitutional lines and a rigorous standard of review. The majority now abandons these distinctions and limitations. </s> With respect, I dissent from the majority opinion upholding BCRA Titles I and II. I concur in the judgment as to BCRA §213 and new FECA §323(e) and concur in the judgment in part and dissent in part as to BCRA §§201, 202, and 214. I. TITLE I AND COORDINATION PROVISIONS </s> Title I principally bans the solicitation, receipt, transfer and spending of soft money by the national parties (new FECA §323(a), 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(a) (Supp. 2003)). It also bans certain uses of soft money by state parties (new FECA §323(b)); the transfer of soft money from national parties to nonprofit groups (new FECA §323(d)); the solicitation, receipt, transfer, and spending of soft money by federal candidates and officeholders (new FECA §323(e)); and certain uses of soft money by state candidates (new FECA §323(f)). These provisions, and the other provisions with which this opinion is principally concerned, are set out in full, see Appendix, infra. Even a cursory review of the speech and association burdens these laws create makes their First Amendment infirmities obvious: Title I bars individuals with shared beliefs from pooling their money above limits set by Congress to form a new third party. See new FECA §323(a). </s> Title I bars national party officials from soliciting or directing soft money to state parties for use on a state ballot initiative. This is true even if no federal office appears on the same ballot as the state initiative. See new FECA §323(a). </s> A national party's mere involvement in the strategic planning of fundraising for a state ballot initiative risks a determination that the national party is exercising "indirect control" of the state party. If that determination is made, the state party must abide by federal regulations. And this is so even if the federal candidate on the ballot, if there is one, runs unopposed or is so certain of election that the only voter interest is in the state and local campaigns. See new FECA §323(a). </s> Title I compels speech. Party officials who want to engage in activity such as fundraising must now speak magic words to ensure the solicitation cannot be interpreted as anything other than a solicitation for hard, not soft, money. See ibid. </s> Title I prohibits the national parties from giving any sort of funds to nonprofit entities, even federally regulated hard money, and even if the party hoped to sponsor the interest group's exploration of a particular issue in advance of the party's addition of it to their platform. See new FECA §323(d). </s> By express terms, Title I imposes multiple different forms of spending caps on parties, candidates, and their agents. See new FECA §§323(a), (e), and (f). </s> Title I allows state parties to raise quasi-soft money Levin funds for use in activities that might affect a federal election; but the Act prohibits national parties from assisting state parties in developing and executing these fundraising plans, even when the parties seek only to advance state election interests. See new FECA §323(b). </s> Until today's consolidated cases, the Court has accepted but two principles to use in determining the validity of campaign finance restrictions. First is the anticorruption rationale. The principal concern, of course, is the agreement for a quid pro quo between officeholders (or candidates) and those who would seek to influence them. The Court has said the interest in preventing corruption allows limitations on receipt of the quid by a candidate or officeholder, regardless of who gives it or of the intent of the donor or officeholder. See Buckley, 459 U.S. 197, 201-211 (1982). </s> The majority today opens with rhetoric that suggests a conflation of the anticorruption rationale with the corporate speech rationale. See ante, at 3-6 (hearkening back to, among others, Elihu Root and his advocacy against the use of corporate funds in political campaigning). The conflation appears designed to cast the speech regulated here as unseemly corporate speech. The effort, however, is unwarranted, and not just because money is not per se the evil the majority thinks. Most of the regulations at issue, notably all of the Title I soft money bans and the Title II coordination provisions, do not draw distinctions based on corporate or union status. Referring to the corporate speech rationale as if it were the linchpin of the case, when corporate speech is not primarily at issue, adds no force to the Court's analysis. Instead, the focus must be on Buckley's anticorruption rationale and the First Amendment rights of individual citizens. A. Constitutionally Sufficient Interest </s> In Buckley, the Court held that one, and only one, interest justified the significant burden on the right of association involved there: eliminating, or preventing, actual corruption or the appearance of corruption stemming from contributions to candidates. "It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary purpose--to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions--in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000 contribution limitation." 424 U.S., at 26. </s> See also ibid. (concluding this corruption interest was sufficiently "significant" to sustain "closely drawn" interference with protected First Amendment rights). </s> In parallel, Buckley concluded the expenditure limitations in question were invalid because they did not advance that same interest. See id., at 47-48 ("[T]he independent expenditure ceiling thus fails to serve any substantial governmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in the electoral process"); see also id., at 45, 46. </s> Thus, though Buckley subjected expenditure limits to strict scrutiny and contribution limits to less exacting review, it held neither could withstand constitutional challenge unless it was shown to advance the anticorruption interest. In these consolidated cases, unless Buckley is to be repudiated, we must conclude that the regulations further that interest before considering whether they are closely drawn or narrowly tailored. If the interest is not advanced, the regulations cannot comport with the Constitution, quite apart from the standard of review. </s> Buckley made clear, by its express language and its context, that the corruption interest only justifies regulating candidates' and officeholders' receipt of what we can call the "quids" in the quid pro quo formulation. The Court rested its decision on the principle that campaign finance regulation that restricts speech without requiring proof of particular corrupt action withstands constitutional challenge only if it regulates conduct posing a demonstrable quid pro quo danger: "To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined." Id., at 26-27. </s> See also id., at 45 ("[A]ssuming, arguendo, that large independent expenditures pose the same dangers of actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements as do large contributions ..."). That Buckley rested its decision on this quid pro quo standard is not a novel observation. We have held this was the case: "The exception [of contribution limits being justified under the First Amendment] relates to the perception of undue influence of large contributions to a candidate: 'To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined.'" Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 297 (1981) (quoting Buckley, supra, at 26-27). See also Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. ___ (2003) (furthering this anticorruption rationaleby upholding limits on contributions given directly to candidates); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (same). </s> Despite the Court's attempt to rely on language from cases like Shrink Missouri to establish that the standard defining corruption is broader than conduct that presents a quid pro quo danger, see ante, at 43, n. 48, in those cases the Court in fact upheld limits on conduct possessing quid pro quo dangers, and nothing more. See also infra, 12. For example, the Shrink Missouri Court's distinguishing of what was at issue there and quid pro quo, in fact, shows only that it used the term quid pro quo to refer to actual corrupt, vote-buying exchanges, as opposed to interactions that possessed quid pro quo potential even if innocently undertaken. Thus, the Court said: "[W]e spoke in Buckley of the perception of corruption 'inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions' to candidates for public office . . . as a source of concern "almost equal" to quid pro quo improbity." 528 U.S., at 390 (citations omitted). </s> Thus, the perception of corruption that the majority now asserts is somehow different from the quid pro quo potential discussed in this opinion, was created by an exchange featuring quid pro quo potential--contributions directly to a candidate. </s> In determining whether conduct poses a quid pro quo danger the analysis is functional. In Buckley, the Court confronted an expenditure limitation provision that capped the amount of money individuals could spend on any activity intended to influence a federal election (i.e., it reached to both independent and coordinated expenditures). See 424 U.S., at 46-47. The Court concluded that though the limitation reached both coordinated and independent expenditures, there were other valid FECA provisions that barred coordinated expenditures. Hence, the limit at issue only added regulation to independent expenditures. On that basis it concluded the provision was unsupported by any valid corruption interest. The conduct to which it added regulation (independent expenditures) posed no quid pro quo danger. See ibid. </s> Placing Buckley's anticorruption rationale in the context of the federal legislative power yields the following rule: Congress' interest in preventing corruption provides a basis for regulating federal candidates' and officeholders' receipt of quids, whether or not the candidate or officeholder corruptly received them. Conversely, the rule requires the Court to strike down campaign finance regulations when they do not add regulation to "actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements." Id., at 45. </s> The Court ignores these constitutional bounds and in effect interprets the anticorruption rationale to allow regulation not just of "actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements," ibid., but of any conduct that wins goodwill from or influences a Member of Congress. It is not that there is any quarrel between this opinion and the majority that the inquiry since Buckley has been whether certain conduct creates "undue influence." See ante, at 40-41. On that we agree. The very aim of Buckley's standard, however, was to define undue influence by reference to the presence of quid pro quo involving the officeholder. The Court, in contrast, concludes that access, without more, proves influence is undue. Access, in the Court's view, has the same legal ramifications as actual or apparent corruption of officeholders. This new definition of corruption sweeps away all protections for speech that lie in its path. </s> The majority says it is not abandoning our cases in this way, but its reasoning shows otherwise: "More importantly, plaintiffs conceive of corruption too narrowly. Our cases have firmly established that Congress' legitimate interest extends beyond preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption to curbing 'undue influence on an officeholder's judgment, or the appearance of such influence.' [Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001) (Colorado II)]. Many of the 'deeply disturbing examples' of corruption cited by this Court in Buckley to justify FECA's contribution limits were not episodes of vote buying, but evidence that various corporate interests had given substantial donations to gain access to high-level government officials. Even if that access did not secure actual influence, it certainly gave the 'appearance of such influence.' Colorado II, supra, at 441; see also [Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 838 (CADC 1975)]. </s> "The record in the present case is replete with similar examples of national party committees peddling access to federal candidates and officeholdersin exchange for large soft-money donations. See [251 F.Supp. 2d 176, 492-506 (DC 2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.)]." Ante, at 40-41. </s> The majority notes that access flowed from the regulated conduct at issue in Buckley and its progeny, then uses that fact as the basis for concluding that access peddling by the parties equals corruption by the candidates. That conclusion, however, is tenable only by a quick and subtle shift, and one that breaks new ground: The majority ignores the quid pro quo nature of the regulated conduct central to our earlier decisions. It relies instead solely on the fact that access flowed from the conduct. </s> To ignore the fact that in Buckley the money at issue was given to candidates, creating an obvious quid pro quo danger as much as it led to the candidates also providing access to the donors, is to ignore the Court's comments in Buckley that show quid pro quo was of central importance to the analysis. See 424 U.S., at 26-27, 45. The majority also ignores that in Buckley, and ever since, those party contributions that have been subject to congressional limit were not general party-building contributions but were only contributions used to influence particular elections. That is, they were contributions that flowed to a particular candidate's benefit, again posing a quid pro quo danger. And it ignores that in Colorado II, the party spending was that which was coordinated with a particular candidate, thereby implicating quid pro quo dangers. In all of these ways the majority breaks the necessary tether between quid and access and assumes that access, all by itself, demonstrates corruption and so can support regulation. See also ante, at 47 ("[L]arge soft-money donations to national party committees are likely to buy donors preferential access to federal officeholders no matter the ends to which their contributions are eventually put"). </s> Access in itself, however, shows only that in a general sense an officeholder favors someone or that someone has influence on the officeholder. There is no basis, in law or in fact, to say favoritism or influence in general is the same as corrupt favoritism or influence in particular. By equating vague and generic claims of favoritism or influence with actual or apparent corruption, the Court adopts a definition of corruption that dismantles basic First Amendment rules, permits Congress to suppress speech in the absence of a quid pro quo threat, and moves beyond the rationale that is Buckley's very foundation. </s> The generic favoritism or influence theory articulated by the Court is at odds with standard First Amendment analyses because it is unbounded and susceptible to no limiting principle. Any given action might be favored by any given person, so by the Court's reasoning political loyalty of the purest sort can be prohibited. There is no remaining principled method for inquiring whether a campaign finance regulation does in fact regulate corruption in a serious and meaningful way. We are left to defer to a congressional conclusion that certain conduct creates favoritism or influence. </s> Though the majority cites common sense as the foundation for its definition of corruption, see ante, at 35, 43, in the context of the real world only a single definition of corruption has been found to identify political corruption successfully and to distinguish good political responsiveness from bad--that is quid pro quo. Favoritism and influence are not, as the Government's theory suggests, avoidable in representative politics. It is in the nature of an elected representative to favor certain policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor the voters and contributors who support those policies. It is well understood that a substantial and legitimate reason, if not the only reason, to cast a vote for, or to make a contribution to, one candidate over another is that the candidate will respond by producing those political outcomes the supporter favors. Democracy is premised on responsiveness. Quid pro quo corruption has been, until now, the only agreed upon conduct that represents the bad form of responsiveness and presents a justiciable standard with a relatively clear limiting principle: Bad responsiveness may be demonstrated by pointing to a relationship between an official and a quid. </s> The majority attempts to mask its extension of Buckley under claims that BCRA prevents the appearance of corruption, even if it does not prevent actual corruption, since some assert that any donation of money to a political party is suspect. See ante, at 40-42. Under Buckley's holding that Congress has a valid "interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption," 424 U.S., at 47-48, however, the inquiry does not turn on whether some persons assert that an appearance of corruption exists. Rather, the inquiry turns on whether the Legislature has established that the regulated conduct has inherent corruption potential, thus justifying the inference that regulating the conduct will stem the appearance of real corruption. Buckley was guided and constrained by this analysis. In striking down expenditure limits the Court in Buckley did not ask whether people thought large election expenditures corrupt, because clearly at that time many persons, including a majority of Congress and the President, did. See id., at 25 ("According to the parties and amici, the primary interest served . . . by the Act as a whole, is the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption"). Instead, the Court asked whether the Government had proved that the regulated conduct, the expenditures, posed inherent quid pro quo corruption potential. See id., at 46. </s> The Buckley decision made this analysis even clearer in upholding contribution limitations. It stated that even if actual corrupt contribution practices had not been proved, Congress had an interest in regulating the appearance of corruption that is "inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions." Id., at 27 (discussing contributions to candidates). See also id., at 28, 30. The quid pro quo nature of candidate contributions justified the conclusion that the contributions pose inherent corruption potential; and this in turn justified the conclusion that their regulation would stem the appearance of real corruption. </s> From that it follows that the Court today should not ask, as it does, whether some persons, even Members of Congress, conclusorily assert that the regulated conduct appears corrupt to them. Following Buckley, it should instead inquire whether the conduct now prohibited inherently poses a real or substantive quid pro quo danger, so that its regulation will stem the appearance of quid pro quo corruption. 1. New FECA §§323(a), (b), (d), and (f) </s> Sections 323(a), (b), (d), and (f), 2 U.S.C.A. §§441i(a), (b), (d), and (f) (Supp. 2003), cannot stand because they do not add regulation to conduct that poses a demonstrable quid pro quo danger. They do not further Buckley's corruption interest. The majority, with a broad brush, paints §323(a) as aimed at limiting contributions possessing federal officeholder corruption potential. From there it would justify §323's remaining provisions as necessary complements to ensure the national parties cannot circumvent §323(a)'s prohibitions. The broad brush approach fails, however, when the provisions are reviewed under Buckley's proper definition of corruption potential. </s> On its face §323(a) does not regulate federal candidates' or officeholders' receipt of quids because it does not regulate contributions to, or conduct by, candidates or officeholders. See BCRA §101(a) (setting out new FECA §323(a): National parties may not "solicit, receive, or direct to another person ... or spend any [soft money]"). </s> The realities that underlie the statute, furthermore, do not support the majority's interpretation. Before BCRA's enactment, parties could only use soft money for a candidate's "benefit" (e.g., through issue ads, which all parties now admit may influence elections) independent of that candidate. And, as discussed later, §323(e) validly prohibits federal candidate and officeholder solicitation of soft money party donations. See infra, at 31. Section 323(a), therefore, only adds regulation to soft money party donations not solicited by, or spent in coordination with, a candidate or officeholder. </s> These donations (noncandidate or officeholder solicited soft money party donations that are independently spent) do not pose the quid pro quo dangers that provide the basis for restricting protected speech. Though the government argues §323(a) does regulate federal candidates' and officeholders' receipt of quids, it bases its argument on this flawed reasoning: (1) "[F]ederal elected officeholders are inextricably linked to their political parties," Brief for Appellees/Cross Appellants FEC etal. in No. 02-1674 etal., p.21; cf. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 626 (1996) (Colorado I) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). </s> (2) All party receipts must be connected to, and must create, corrupt donor favoritism among theseofficeholders. </s> (3) Therefore, regulation of party receipts equals regulation of quids to the party's officeholders. </s> The reasoning is flawed because the Government's reliance on reasoning parallel to the Colorado I concurrence only establishes the first step in its chain of logic: that a party is a proxy for its candidates generally. It does not establish the second step: that as a proxy for its candidates generally, all moneys the party receives (not just candidate solicited-soft money donations, or donations used in coordinated activity) represent quids for all the party's candidates and officeholders. The Government's analysis is inconsistent with what a majority of the Justices, in different opinions, have said. </s> Justice Thomas' dissent in Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 476-477, taken together with Justice Breyer's opinion announcing the judgment of the Court in Colorado I, rebuts the second step of the Government's argument. Justice Thomas demonstrated that a general party-candidate corruption linkage does not exist. As he pointed out: "The dearth of evidence [of such corruption] is unsurprising in light of the unique relationship between a political party and its candidates: 'The very aim of a political party is to influence its candidate's stance on issues and, if the candidate takes office or is reelected, his votes.' If coordinated expenditures help achieve this aim, the achievement 'does not ... constitute "a subversion of the political process."'" Colorado II,supra, at 476-477 (citations omitted). </s> Justice Breyer reached the same conclusion about the corrupting effect general party receipts could have on particular candidates, though on narrower grounds. He concluded that independent party conduct lacks quid pro quo corruption potential. See Colorado I, 518 U.S., at 617-618; id., at 617 ("If anything, an independent [party] expenditure made possible by a $20,000 donation, but controlled and directed by a party rather than the donor, would seem less likely to corrupt than the same (or a much larger) independent expenditure made directly by that donor"); id., at 616 ("[T]he opportunity for corruption posed by [soft money] contributions is, at best, attenuated" because they may not be used for the purposes of influencing a federal election under FECA). </s> These opinions establish that independent party activity, which by definition includes independent receipt and spending of soft money, lacks a possibility for quid pro quo corruption of federal officeholders. This must be all the more true of a party's independent receipt and spending of soft money donations neither directed to nor solicited by a candidate. </s> The Government's premise is also unsupported by the record before us. The record confirms that soft money party contributions, without more, do not create quid pro quo corruption potential. As a conceptual matter, generic party contributions may engender good will from a can-didate or officeholder because, as the Government says: "[A]Member of Congress can be expected to feel a natural temptation to favor those persons who have helped the 'team,'" Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants FEC etal. in No. 02-1674 etal., p.33. Still, no Member of Congress testified this favoritism changed voting behavior. </s> The piece of record evidence the Government puts forward on this score comes by way of deposition testimony from former Senator Simon and Senator Feingold. See 251 F.Supp. 2d 176, 482 (DC 2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Senator Simon reported an unidentified colleague indicated frustration with Simon's opposition to legislation that would benefit a party contributor on the grounds that "'we've got to pay attention to who is buttering our bread'" and testified he did not think there was any question "'this'" (i.e., "donors getting their way") was why the legislation passed. See App. 805. Senator Feingold, too, testified an unidentified colleague suggested he support the legislation because "'they [i.e., the donor] just gave us [i.e., the party] $100,000.'" 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 482 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). </s> That evidence in fact works against the Government. These two testifying Senators expressed disgust toward the favoring of a soft money giver, and not the good will one would have expected under the Government's theory. That necessarily undercuts the inference of corruption the Government would have us draw from the evidence. </s> Even more damaging to the Government's argument from the testimony is the absence of testimony that the Senator who allegedly succumbed to corrupt influence had himself solicited soft money from the donor in question. Equally, there is no indication he simply favored the company with his vote because it had, without any involvement from him, given funds to the party to which he belonged. This fact is crucial. If the Senator himself had been the solicitor of the soft money funds in question, the incident does nothing more than confirm that Congress' efforts at campaign finance reform ought to be directed to conduct that implicates quid pro quo relationships. Only if there was some evidence that the officeholder had not solicited funds from the donor could the Court extrapolate from this episode that general party contributions function as quids, inspiring corrupt favoritism among party members. The episode is the single one of its type reported in the record and does not seem sufficient basis for major incursions into settled practice. Given the Government's claim that the corrupt favoritism problem is widespread, its inability to produce more than a single instance purporting to illustrate the point demonstrates the Government has not fairly characterized the general attitudes of Members towards soft money donors from whom they have not solicited. </s> Other aspects of the record confirm the Government has not produced evidence that Members corruptly favor soft money donors to their party as a per se matter. Most testimony from which the Government would have the Court infer corruption is testimony that Members are rewarded by their parties for soliciting soft money. See id., at 438-521 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). This says nothing about how Members feel about a party's soft money donors from whom they have not solicited. Indeed, record evidence on this point again cuts against the Government: "'As a Member of the Senate Finance Committee, I experienced the pressure first hand. On several occasions when we were debating important tax bills, I needed a police escort to get into the Finance Committee hearing room because so many lobbyists were crowding the halls, trying to get one last chance to make their pitch to each Senator. Senators generally knew which lobbyist represented the interests of which large donor. I was often glad that I limited the amount of soft money fundraising I did and did not take PAC contributions, because it would be extremely difficult not to feel beholden to these donors otherwise.'" Id., at 482 (testimony of former Senator Boren; see 6-R Defs. Exhs., Tab 8, ¶ ;8). </s> Thus, one of the handful of Senators on whom the Government relies to make its case candidly admits the pressure of appeasing soft money donors derives from the Members' solicitation of donors, not from those donors' otherwise giving to their party. </s> In light of all this, §323(a) has no valid anticorruption interest. The anticircumvention interests the Government offers in defense of §§323(b), (d), and (f) must also fall with the interests asserted to justify §323(a). Any anticircumvention interest can be only as compelling as the interest justifying the underlying regulation. </s> None of these other sections has an independent justifying interest. Section 323(b), for example, adds regulation only to activity undertaken by a state party. In the District Court two of the three judges found as fact that particular state and local parties exist primarily to participate in state and local elections, that they spend the majority of their resources on those elections, and that their voter registration and Get Out The Vote (GOTV) activities, in particular, are directed primarily at state and local elections. See 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 301-302 (Henderson, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); id., at 837-840 (Leon, J.). These findings, taken together with BCRA's other, valid prohibitions barring coordination with federal candidates or officeholders and their soft money solicitation, demonstrate that §323(b) does not add regulation to conduct that poses a danger of a federal candidate's or officeholder's receipt of quids. </s> Even §323(b)'s narrowest regulation, which bans state party soft money funded ads that (1) refer to a clearly identified federal candidate, and (2) either support or attack any candidate for the office of the clearly mentioned federal candidate, see new FECA §301(20)(A)(iii), fails the constitutional test. The ban on conduct that by the statute's own definition may serve the interest of a federal candidate suggests to the majority that it is conduct that poses quid pro quo danger for federal candidates or officeholders. Yet, even this effect--considered after excising the coordination and candidate-solicited funding aspects elsewhere prohibited by BCRA §§202 and 214(a) and new FECA §323(a)--poses no danger of a federal candidate's or officeholder's receipt of a quid. That conduct is no different from an individual's independent expenditure referring to and supporting a clearly identified candidate--and this poses no regulable danger. </s> Section 323(d), which governs relationships between the national parties and nonprofit groups, fails for similar reasons. It is worth noting that neither the record nor our own experience tells us how significant these funds transfers are at this time. It is plain, however, that the First Amendment ought not to be manipulated to permit Congress to forbid a political party from aiding other speakers whom the party deems more effective in addressing discrete issues. One of the central flaws in BCRA is that Congress is determining what future course the creation of ideas and the expression of views must follow. Its attempt to foreclose new and creative partnerships for speech, as illustrated here, is consistent with neither the traditions nor principles of our Free Speech guarantee, which insists that the people, and not the Congress, decide what modes of expression are the most legitimate and effective. </s> The majority's upholding §323(d) is all the more unsettling because of the way it ignores the Act as Congress wrote it. Congress said national parties "shall not solicit any funds for, or make or direct any donations to" §501(c) nonprofit organizations that engage in federal election activity or to §527 political committees. The Court, however, reads out the word "any" and construes the words "funds" and "donations" to mean "soft money funds" and "soft money donations." See ante, at 72 ("This construction is consistent with the concerns animating Title I, whose purpose is to plug the soft-money loophole"). The Court's statutory amendment may be consistent with its anti-soft-money rationale; it is not, however, consistent with the plain and unavoidable statutory text Congress has given us. Even as construed by the Court, moreover, it is invalid. </s> The majority strains to save the provision from what must seem to it an unduly harsh First Amendment. It does so by making a legislative determination Congress chose not to make: to prefer hard money to soft money within the construct of national party relationships with nonprofit groups. Congress gave no indication of a preference to regulate either hard money or soft in this context. Rather, it simply proscribed all transfers of money between the two organizations and all efforts by the national parties to raise any money on the nonprofit groups' behalf. The question the Court faces is not which part of a text to sever and strike, but whether Congress can prohibit such transfers altogether. The answer, as the majority recognizes, is no. See ante, at 71 ("[P]rohibiting parties from donating funds already raised in compliance with FECA does little to further Congress' goal of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders"). </s> Though §323(f) in effect imposes limits on candidate contributions, it does not address federal candidate and officeholder contributions. Yet it is the possibility of federal officeholder quid pro quo corruption potential that animates Buckley's rule as it relates to Acts of Congress (as opposed to Acts of state legislatures). See 424 U.S., at 13 ("The constitutional power of Congress to regulate federal elections is well established"). </s> When one recognizes that §§323(a), (b), (d), and (f) do not serve the interest the anticorruption rationale contemplates, Title I's entirety begins to look very much like an incumbency protection plan. See J. Miller, Monopoly Politics 84-101 (1999) (concluding that regulations limiting election fundraising and spending constrain challengers more than incumbents). That impression is worsened by the fact that Congress exempted its officeholders from the more stringent prohibitions imposed on party officials. Compare new FECA §323(a) with new FECA §323(e). Section 323(a) raises an inflexible bar against soft money solicitation, in any way, by parties or party officials. Section 323(e), in contrast, enacts exceptions to the rule for federal officeholders (the very centerpiece of possible corruption), and allows them to solicit soft money for various uses and organizations. </s> The law in some respects even weakens the regulation of federal candidates and officeholders. Under former law, officeholders were understood to be limited to receipt of hard money by their campaign committees. See 2 U.S.C. §§431, 441a (setting out the pre-BCRA FECA regime). BCRA, however, now allows them and their campaign committees to receive soft money that fits the hard money source and amount restrictions, so long as the officeholders direct that money on to other nonfederal candidates. See new FECA §323(e)(1)(B). The majority's characterization of this weakening of the regime as "tightly constrain[ing]" candidates, ante, at 73, n.70, is a prime example of its unwillingness to confront Congress' own interest or the persisting fact that the regulations violate First Amendment freedoms. The more lenient treatment accorded to incumbency-driven politicians than to party officials who represent broad national constituencies must render all the more suspect Congress' claim that the Act's sole purpose is to stop corruption. The majority answers this charge by stating the obvious, that "§323(e) applies to both officeholders and candidates." Ante, at 78, n. 72. The controlling point, of course, is the practical burden on challengers. That the prohibition applies to both incumbents and challengers in no way establishes that it burdens them equally in that regard. Name recognition and other advantages held by incumbents ensure that as a general rule incumbents will be advantaged by the legislation the Court today upholds. The Government identifies no valid anticorruption interest justifying §§323(a), (b), (d), and (f). The very nature of the restrictions imposed by these provisions makes one all the more skeptical of the Court's explanation of the interests at stake. These provisions cannot stand under the First Amendment. 2. New FECA §323(e) </s> Ultimately, only one of the challenged Title I provisions satisfies Buckley's anticorruption rationale and the First Amendment's guarantee. It is §323(e). This provision is the sole aspect of Title I that is a direct and necessary regulation of federal candidates' and officeholders' receipt of quids. Section 323(e) governs "candidate[s], individual[s] holding Federal office, agent[s] of a candidate or an individual holding Federal office, or an entity directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained or controlled by or acting on behalf of 1 or more candidates or individuals holding Federal office." 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(e) (Supp. 2003). These provisions, and the regulations that follow, limit candidates' and their agents' solicitation of soft money. The regulation of a candidate's receipt of funds furthers a constitutionally sufficient interest. More difficult, however, is the question whether regulation of a candidate's solicitation of funds also furthers this interest if the funds are given to another. I agree with the Court that the broader solicitation regulation does further a sufficient interest. The making of a solicited gift is a quid both to the recipient of the money and to the one who solicits the payment (by granting his request). Rules governing candidates' or officeholders' solicitation of contributions are, therefore, regulations governing their receipt of quids. This regulation fits under Buckley's anticorruption rationale. B. Standard of Review </s> It is common ground between the majority and this opinion that a speech-suppressing campaign finance regulation, even if supported by a sufficient Government interest, is unlawful if it cannot satisfy our designated standard of review. See ante, at 24-27. In Buckley, we applied "closely drawn" scrutiny to contribution limitations and strict scrutiny to expenditure limitations. Compare 424 U.S., at 25, with id., at 44-45. Against that backdrop, the majority assumes that because Buckley applied the rationale in the context of contribution and expenditure limits, its application gives Congress and the Court the capacity to classify any challenged campaign finance regulation as either a contribution or an expenditure limit. Thus, it first concludes Title I's regulations are contributions limits and then proceeds to apply the lesser scrutiny. "Complex as its provisions may be, §323, in the main, does little more than regulate the ability of wealthy individuals, corporations, and unions to contribute large sums of money to influence federal elections, federal candidates, and federal officeholders." Ante, at 28. </s> Though the majority's analysis denies it, Title I's dynamics defy this facile, initial classification. </s> Title I's provisions prohibit the receipt of funds; and in most instances, but not all, this can be defined as a contribution limit. They prohibit the spending of funds; and in most instances this can be defined as an expenditure limit. They prohibit the giving of funds to nonprofit groups; and this falls within neither definition as we have ever defined it. Finally, they prohibit fundraising activity; and the parties dispute the classification of this regulation (the challengers say it is core political association, while the Government says it ultimately results only in a limit on contribution receipts). </s> The majority's classification overlooks these competing characteristics and exchanges Buckley's substance for a formulaic caricature of it. Despite the parties' and the majority's best efforts on both sides of the question, it ignores reality to force these regulations into one of the two legal categories as either contribution or expenditure limitations. Instead, these characteristics seem to indicate Congress has enacted regulations that are neither contribution nor expenditure limits, or are perhaps both at once. </s> Even if the laws could be classified in broad terms as only contribution limits, as the majority is inclined to do, that still leaves the question what "contribution limits" can include if they are to be upheld under Buckley. Buckley's application of a less exacting review to contribution limits must be confined to the narrow category of money gifts that are directed, in some manner, to a candidate or officeholder. Any broader definition of the category contradicts Buckley's quid pro quo rationale and overlooks Buckley's language, which contemplates limits on contributions to a candidate or campaign committee in explicit terms. See 424 U.S., at 13 (applying less exacting review to "contribution ... limitations in the Act prohibit[ing] individuals from contributing more than $25,000 in a single year or more than $1,000 to any single candidate for an election campaign"); id., at 45 ("[T]he contribution limitations' [apply a] total ban on the giving of large amounts of money to candidates"). See also id., at 20, 25, 28. </s> The Court, it must be acknowledged, both in Buckley and on other occasions, has described contribution limits due some more deferential review in less than precise terms. At times it implied that donations to political parties would also qualify as contributions whose limitation too would be subject to less exacting review. See id., at 23-24, n.24 ("[T]he general understanding of what constitutes a political contribution[:] Funds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary constitute a contribution"). See also Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S., at ___ (2003) (slip op., at 14) ("'[C]ontributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association'"). </s> These seemingly conflicting statements are best reconciled by reference to Buckley's underlying rationale for applying less exacting review. In a similar, but more imperative, sense proper application of the standard of review to regulations that are neither contribution nor expenditure limits (or which are both at once) can only be determined by reference to that rationale. </s> Buckley's underlying rationale is this: Less exacting review applies to Government regulations that "significantly interfere" with First Amendment rights of association. But any regulation of speech or associational rights creating "markedly greater interference" than such significant interference receives strict scrutiny. Unworkable and ill advised though it may be, Buckley unavoidably sets forth this test: "Even a '"significant interference" with protected rights of political association' may be sustained if the State demonstrates [1] a sufficiently important interest and [2] employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms. Cousins v. Wigoda, [419 U.S. 477, 488 (1975)]; NAACP v. Button, [371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)]; Shelton v. Tucker [364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)]." 424 U.S., at 25. </s> "The markedly greater burden on basic freedoms [referring to 'the freedom of speech and association'] caused by [expenditure limits] thus cannot be sustained simply by invoking the interest in maximizing the effectiveness of the less intrusive contribution limitations. Rather, the constitutionality of [the expenditure limits] turns on whether the governmental interests advanced in its support satisfy the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression." Id., at 44-45.† </s> The majority, oddly enough, first states this standard with relative accuracy, but then denies it. Compare: "The relevant inquiry [in determining the level of scrutiny] is whether the mechanism adopted to implement the contribution limit, or to prevent circumvention of that limit, burdens speech in a way that a direct restriction on the contribution itself would not," ante, at 28-29, with: </s> "None of this is to suggest that the alleged associational burdens imposed on parties by §323 have no place in the First Amendment analysis. It is only that we account for them in the application, rather than the choice, of the appropriate level of scrutiny." Ante, at 31. </s> The majority's attempt to separate out how burdens on speech rights and burdens on associational rights affect the standard of review is misguided. It is not even true to Buckley's unconventional test. Buckley, as shown in the quotations above, explained the lower standard of review by reference to the level of burden on associational rights, and it explained the need for a higher standard of review by reference to the higher burdens on both associational and speech rights. In light of Buckley's rationale, and in light of this Court's ample precedent affirming that burdens on speech necessitate strict scrutiny review, see 424 U.S., at 44-45 ("[E]xacting scrutiny [applies] to limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression"), "closely drawn" scrutiny should be employed only in review of a law that burdens rights of association, and only where that burden is significant, not markedly greater. Since the Court professes not to repudiate Buckley, it was right first to say we must determine how significant a burden BCRA's regulations place on First Amendment rights, though it should have specified that the rights implicated are those of association. Its later denial of that analysis flatly contradicts Buckley. </s> The majority makes Buckley's already awkward and imprecise test all but meaningless in its application. If one is viewing BCRA through Buckley's lens, as the majority purports to do, one must conclude the Act creates markedly greater associational burdens than the significant burden created by contribution limitations and, unlike contribution limitations, also creates significant burdens on speech itself. While BCRA contains federal contribution limitations, which significantly burden association, it goes even further. The Act entirely reorders the nature of relations between national political parties and their candidates, between national political parties and state and local parties, and between national political parties and nonprofit organizations. </s> The many and varied aspects of Title I's regulations impose far greater burdens on the associational rights of the parties, their officials, candidates, and citizens than do regulations that do no more than cap the amount of money persons can contribute to a political candidate or committee. The evidence shows that national parties have a long tradition of engaging in essential associational activities, such as planning and coordinating fundraising with state and local parties, often with respect to elections that are not federal in nature. This strengthens the conclusion that the regulations now before us have unprecedented impact. It makes impossible, moreover, the contrary conclusion--which the Court's standard of review determination necessarily implies--that BCRA's soft money regulations will not much change the nature of association between parties, candidates, nonprofit groups, and the like. Similarly, Title I now compels speech by party officials. These officials must be sure their words are not mistaken for words uttered in their official capacity or mistaken for soliciting prohibited soft, and not hard, money. Few interferences with the speech, association, and free expression of our people are greater than attempts by Congress to say which groups can or cannot advocate a cause, or how they must do it. </s> Congress has undertaken this comprehensive reordering of association and speech rights in the name of enforcing contribution limitations. Here, however, as in Buckley, "[t]he markedly greater burden on basic freedoms caused by [BCRA's pervasive regulation] cannot be sustained simply by invoking the interest in maximizing the effectiveness of the less intrusive contribution limitations." Id., at 44-45. BCRA fundamentally alters, and thereby burdens, protected speech and association throughout our society. Strict scrutiny ought apply to review of its constitutionality. Under strict scrutiny, the congressional scheme, for the most part, cannot survive. This is all but acknowledged by the Government, which fails even to argue that strict scrutiny could be met. 1. New FECA §323(e) </s> Because most of the Title I provisions discussed so far do not serve a compelling or sufficient interest, the standard of review analysis is only dispositive with respect to new FECA §323(e). As to §323(e), 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(e) (Supp. 2003), I agree with the Court that this provision withstands constitutional scrutiny. Section 323(e) is directed solely to federal candidates and their agents; it does not ban all solicitation by candidates, but only their solicitation of soft money contributions; and it incorporates important exceptions to its limits (candidates may receive, solicit, or direct funds that comply with hard money standards; candidates may speak at fundraising events; candidates may solicit or direct unlimited funds to organizations not involved with federal election activity; and candidates may solicit or direct up to $20,000 per individual per year for organizations involved with certain federal election activity (e.g., GOTV, voter registration)). These provisions help ensure that the law is narrowly tailored to satisfy First Amendment requirements. For these reasons, I agree §323(e) is valid. 2. New FECA §§323(a), (b), (d), and (f) </s> Though these sections do not survive even the first test of serving a constitutionally valid interest, it is necessary as well to examine the vast overbreadth of the remainder of Title I, so the import of the majority's holding today is understood. Sections 323(a), (b), (d), and (f), 2 U.S.C.A. §§441i(a), (b), (d), and (f) (Supp. 2003), are not narrowly tailored, cannot survive strict scrutiny, and cannot even be considered closely drawn, unless that phrase is emptied of all meaning. First, the sections all possess fatal overbreadth. By regulating conduct that does not pose quid pro quo dangers, they are incursions on important categories of protected speech by voters and party officials. </s> At the next level of analytical detail, §323(a) is overly broad as well because it regulates all national parties, whether or not they present candidates in federal elections. It also regulates the national parties' solicitation and direction of funds in odd-numbered years when only state and local elections are at stake. </s> Likewise, while §323(b) might prohibit some state party conduct that would otherwise be undertaken in conjunction with a federal candidate, it reaches beyond that to a considerable range of campaign speech by the state parties on nonfederal issues. A state or local party might want to say: "The Democratic slate for state assembly opposes President Bush's tax policy .... Elect the Republican slate to tell Washington, D.C. we don't want higher taxes." Section 323(b) encompasses this essential speech and prohibits it equally with speech that poses a federal officeholder quid quo pro danger. </s> Other predictable political circumstances further demonstrate §323(b)'s overbreadth. It proscribes the use of soft money for all state party voter registration efforts occurring within 120 days of a federal election. So, the vagaries of election timing, not any real interest related to corruption, will control whether state parties can spend nonfederally regulated funds on ballot efforts. This overreaching contradicts important precedents that recognize the need to protect political speech for campaigns related to ballot measures. See generally Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. 290 (1981); First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). </s> Section 323(b) also fails the narrow tailoring requirement because less burdensome regulatory options were available. The Government justifies the provision as an attempt to stop national parties from circumventing the soft money allocation constraints they faced under the prior FECA regime. We are told that otherwise the national parties would let the state parties spend money on their behalf. If, however, the problem were avoidance of allocation rates, Congress could have made any soft money transferred by a national party to a state party subject to the allocation rates that governed the national parties' similar use of the money. </s> Nor is §323(d) narrowly tailored. The provision, proscribing any solicitation or direction of funds, prohibits the parties from even distributing or soliciting regulated money (i.e., hard money). It is a complete ban on this category of speech. To prevent circumvention of contribution limits by imposing a complete ban on contributions is to burden the circumventing conduct more severely than the underlying suspect conduct could be burdened. </s> By its own terms, the statute prohibits speech that does not implicate federal elections. The provision prohibits any transfer to a §527 organization, irrespective of whether the organization engages in federal election activity. This is unnecessary, as well, since Congress enacted a much narrower provision in §323(a)(2) to prevent circumvention by the parties via control of other organizations. Section 323(a)(2) makes "any entity that is directly or indirectly . . . controlled by" the national parties subject to the same §323(a) prohibitions as the parties themselves. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i (Supp. 2003). </s> Section 323(f), too, is not narrowly tailored or even close to it. It burdens a substantial body of speech and expression made entirely independent of any federal candidate. The record, for example, contains evidence of Alabama Attorney General Pryor's reelection flyers showing a picture of Pryor shaking hands with President Bush and stating: "Bush appointed Pryor to be Alabama co-chairman of the George W. Bush for President campaign." A host of circumstances could make such statements advisable for state candidates to use without any coordination with a federal candidate. Section 323(f) incorporates no distinguishing feature, such as an element of coordination, to ensure First Amendment protected speech is not swept up within its bounds. </s> Compared to the narrowly tailored effort of §323(e), which addresses in direct and specific terms federal candidates' and officeholders' quest for dollars, these sections cast a wide net not confined to the critical categories of federal candidate or officeholder involvement. They are not narrowly tailored; they are not closely drawn; they flatly violate the First Amendment; and even if they do encompass some speech that poses a regulable quid pro quo danger, that little assurance does not justify or permit a regime which silences so many legitimate voices in this protected sphere. C. Coordination Provisions </s> Other BCRA Title II sections require analysis alongside the provisions of Title I, for they, too, are regulations that principally operate within the ambit of Buckley's anticorruption principle. BCRA §§202 and 214 are two of these provisions. They involve the Act's new definition of coordination. BCRA §213 is another. It institutes a new system in which the parties are forced to choose between two different types of relationships with their candidates. 1. </s> I agree with the majority that §§214(b) and (c) do not merit our review because they are not now justiciable. See ante, at 118. I disagree, however, with the majority's view that §214(a), §214's sole justiciable provision, is valid. Nor can I agree that §202 is valid in its entirety. Section 214(a) amends FECA to define, as hard money contributions to a political party, expenditures an individual makes in concert with the party. See ante, at 114. This provision, in my view, must fall. As the earlier discussion of Title I explains, individual contributions to the political parties cannot be capped in the soft money context. Since an individual's soft money contributions to a party may not be limited, it follows with even greater force that an individual's expenditure of money, coordinated with the party for activities on which the party could spend unlimited soft money, cannot be capped. </s> This conclusion emerges not only from an analysis of Title I but also from Colorado I. There, Justice Breyer's opinion announcing the judgment of the Court concluded political parties had a constitutional right to engage in independent advocacy on behalf of a candidate. 518 U.S. 604 (1996). That parties can spend unlimited soft money on this activity follows by necessary implication. A political party's constitutional right to spend money on advocacy independent of a candidate is burdened by §214(a) in a direct and substantial way. The statute commands the party to refrain from coordinating with an individual engaging in advocacy even if the individual is acting independently of the candidate. </s> Section 202 functions in a manner similar to the operation of §214(a). It directs that when persons make "electioneering communications," see new FECA §304(f)(3), 2 U.S.C.A. §434(f)(3) (Supp. 2003), in a coordinated fashion with a candidate or a party, the coordinated communication expense must be treated as a hard money contribution by the person to that candidate or party. The trial court erroneously believed it needed to determine whether §304's definition of electioneering communications was itself unconstitutional to assess this provision. While a statutory definition may lead to an unconstitutional result under one application, it may lead to a constitutional result under another. Compare infra, at 35-36; infra, at 38, with infra, at 63-66. It is unhelpful to talk in terms of the definition being unconstitutional or constitutional when the only relevant question is whether, as animated by a substantive prohibition, here §202, the definition leads to unconstitutional results. The other Title II provisions that employ §304's electioneering communication definition are analyzed below, within the context of the corporate speech rationale and the disclosure provisions. Section 202, however, must be judged under the anticorruption rationale because it does not distinguish according to corporate or union status, and it does not involve disclosure requirements. Section 202 simply limits the speech of all "persons." </s> Section 202 does satisfy Buckley's anticorruption rationale in one respect: It treats electioneering communications expenditures made by a person in coordination with a candidate as hard money contributions to that candidate. For many of the same reasons that §323(e) is valid, §202, in this single way, is valid: it regulates conduct that poses a quid pro quo danger--satisfaction of a candidate'srequest. </s> Insofar as §202 regulates coordination with a political party, however, it suffers from the same flaws as §214(a). Congress has instructed us, as much as possible, to sever any infirm portions of statutory text from the valid parts, see BCRA §401. Following that instruction, I would uphold §202's text as to its candidate coordination regulation (the first clause of new FECA §315(a)(7)(C)(ii), 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(a)(7)(C)(ii) (Supp. 2003), but rule invalid its text that applies the coordination provision to political parties. </s> This provision includes an "advance contracts" aspect as well. That aspect of the provision, on its own, would be invalid, for many of the reasons discussed below with respect to the advance disclosure requirements embodied in BCRA §§201 and 212. See infra, at 38-39. 2. </s> The final aspect of BCRA that implicates Buckley's anticorruption rationale is §213, the forced choice provision. The majority concludes §213 violates the Constitution. I agree and write on this aspect of the case to point out that the section's unlawfulness flows not from the unique contours of the statute that settle how much political parties may spend on their candidate's campaign, see ante, at 109-113, but from its raw suppression of constitutionally protected speech. Section 213 unconstitutionally forces the parties to surrender one of two First Amendment rights. We affirmed that parties have a constitutionally protected right to make independent expenditures in Colorado I. I continue to believe, moreover, that even under Buckley a political party has a protected right to make coordinated expenditures with its candidates. See Colorado II, 478 U.S. 109, 144-145 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). This role would be undermined in the absence of a party's ability to coordinate with candidates. Cf. Colorado I, supra, at 629 (parties can "give effect to their views only by selecting and supporting candidates") (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). Section 213's command that the parties abandon one First Amendment right or the other offends the Constitution even more than a command that a person choose between a First Amendment right and a statutory right. II. TITLE II PROVISIONS A. Disclosure Provisions </s> BCRA §201, which requires disclosure of electioneering communications, including those coordinated with the party but independent of the candidate, does not substantially relate to a valid interest in gathering data about compliance with contribution limits or in deterring corruption. Contra, ante, at 89. As the above analysis of Title I demonstrates, Congress has no valid interest in regulating soft money contributions that do not pose quid pro quo corruption potential. In the absence of a valid basis for imposing such limits the effort here to ensure compliance with them and to deter their allegedly corrupting effects cannot justify disclosure. The regulation does substantially relate to the other interest the majority details, however. See ibid. This assures its constitutionality. For that reason, I agree with the Court's judgment upholding the disclosure provisions contained in §201 of Title II, with one exception. Section 201's advance disclosure requirement--the aspect of the provision requiring those who have contracted to speak to disclose their speech in advance--is, in my view, unconstitutional. Advance disclosure imposes real burdens on political speech that post hoc disclosure does not. It forces disclosure of political strategy by revealing where ads are to be run and what their content is likely to be (based on who is running the ad). It also provides an opportunity for the ad buyer's opponents to dissuade broadcasters from running ads. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees National Right to Life Committee, Inc., etal. in No. 02-1733 etal., pp. 44-46, and nn. 42-43. Against those tangible additional burdens, the Government identifies no additional interest uniquely served by advance disclosure. If Congress intended to ensure that advertisers could not flout these disclosure laws by running an ad before the election, but paying for it afterwards, see ante, at 93-94, then Congress should simply have required the disclosure upon the running of the ad. Burdening the First Amendment further by requiring advance disclosure is not a constitutionally acceptable alternative. To the extent §201 requires advance disclosure, it finds no justification in its subordinating interests and imposes greater burdens than the First Amendment permits. </s> Section 212, another disclosure provision, likewise incorporates an advance disclosure requirement. The plaintiffs challenge only this advance disclosure requirement, and not the broader substance of this section. The majority concludes this challenge is not ripe. I disagree. </s> The statute commands advance disclosure. The FEC has issued a regulation under §212 that, by its terms,does not implement this particular requirement. See68 Fed. Reg. 404, 452 (2003) (to be codified at 11 CFR §109.10(c)(d)). Adoption of a regulation that does not implement the statute to its full extent does not erase the statutory requirement. This is not a case in which a statute is ambiguous and the agency interpretation can be relied upon to avoid a statutory obligation that is uncertain or arguable. The failure of the regulation at this point to require advance disclosure is of no moment. Contra, 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 251 (per curiam). The validity of §212 is an issue presented for our determination; it is ripe; and the advance disclosure requirement, for the reasons given when discussing the parallel provision under §201, is unconstitutional. Contra, ante, at 106 (declining to address the ripeness question in light of the majority's rejection of the challenge to advance notice in §201). B. BCRA §203 </s> The majority permits a new and serious intrusion on speech when it upholds §203, the key provision in Title II that prohibits corporations and labor unions from using money from their general treasury to fund electioneering communications. The majority compounds the error made in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and silences political speech central to the civic discourse that sustains and informs our democratic pro-cesses. Unions and corporations, including nonprofit corporations, now face severe criminal penalties for broadcasting advocacy messages that "refe[r] to a clearly identified candidate," 2 U.S.C.A. §431(20)(A)(iii) (Supp. 2003), in an election season. Instead of extending Austin to suppress new and vibrant voices, I would overrule it and return our campaign finance jurisprudence to principles consistent with the First Amendment. 1. </s> The Government and the majority are right about one thing: The express-advocacy requirement, with its list of magic words, is easy to circumvent. The Government seizes on this observation to defend BCRA §203, arguing it will prevent what it calls "sham issue ads" that are really to the same effect as their more express counterparts. Ante, at 78, 85-87. What the Court and the Government call sham, however, are the ads speakers find most effective. Unlike express ads that leave nothing to the imagination, the record shows that issues ads are preferred by almost all candidates, even though politicians, unlike corporations, can lawfully broadcast express ads if they so choose. It is a measure of the Government's disdain for protected speech that it would label as a sham the mode of communication sophisticated speakers choose because it is the most powerful. The Government's use of the pejorative label should not obscure §203's practical effect: It prohibits a mass communication technique favored in the modern political process for the very reason that it is the most potent. That the Government would regulate it for this reason goes only to prove the illegitimacy of the Government's purpose. The majority's validation of it is not sustainable under accepted First Amendment principles. The problem is that the majority uses Austin, a decision itself unfaithful to our First Amendment precedents, to justify banning a far greater range of speech. This has it all backwards. If protected speech is being suppressed, that must be the end of the inquiry. </s> The majority's holding cannot be reconciled with First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), which invalidated a Massachusetts law prohibiting banks and business corporations from making expenditures "for the purpose of" influencing referendum votes on issues that do not "materially affect" their business interests. Id., at 767. Bellotti was decided in the face of the same arguments on which the majority now relies. Corporate participation, the Government argued in Bellotti, "would exert an undue influence on the outcome of a referendum vote." Id., at 789. The influence, presumably, was undue because "immense aggregations of wealth" were facilitated by the "unique state-conferred corporate structure." Austin, 494 U.S., at 660. With these "state-created advantages," id., at 659, corporations would "drown out other points of view" and "destroy the confidence of the people in the democratic process." Bellotti, 435 U.S., at 789. Bellotti rejected these arguments in emphatic terms: "To be sure, corporate advertising may influence the outcome of the vote; this would be its purpose. But the fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it: The Constitution 'protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing.' Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S., at 689.... '[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment....' Buckley, 424 U.S., at 48-49." Id., at 790-791. </s> Bellotti similarly dismissed the argument that the prohibition was necessary to "protec[t] corporate shareholders" "by preventing the use of corporate resources in furtherance of views with which some shareholders may disagree." Id., at 792-793. Among other problems, the statute was overinclusive: "[It] would prohibit a corporation from supporting or opposing a referendum proposal even if its shareholders unanimously authorized the contribution or expenditure.... Acting through their power to elect the board of directors or to insist upon protective provisions in the corporation's charter, shareholders normally are presumed competent to protect their own interests.... [M]inority shareholders generally have access to the judicial remedy of a derivative suit to challenge corporate disbursements .... Assuming, arguendo, that protection of shareholders is a 'compelling' interest under the circumstances of this case, we find 'no substantially relevant correlation between the governmental interest asserted and the State's effort' to prohibit appellants from speaking." Id., at 794-795. </s> See also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (providing analogous protections to union members). </s> Austin turned its back on this holding, not because the Bellotti Court had overlooked the Government's interest in combating quid pro quo corruption, but because a new majority decided to recognize "a different type of corruption," Austin, 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (MCFL), the prohibition extends even to nonprofit corporations organized to promote a point of view. Aside from its disregard of precedents, the majority's ready willingness to equate corruption with all organizations adopting the corporate form is a grave insult to nonprofit and for-profit corporations alike, entities that have long enriched our civic dialogue. </s> Austin was the first and, until now, the only time our Court had allowed the Government to exercise the power to censor political speech based on the speaker's corporate identity. The majority's contrary contention is simply incorrect. Contra, ante, at 96-97 ("Since our decision in Buckley, Congress' power to prohibit corporations and unions from using funds in their treasuries to finance advertisements expressly advocating the election or defeat of candidates in federal elections has been firmly embedded in our law"). I dissented in Austin, 494 U.S., at 695, and continue to believe that the case represents an indefensible departure from our tradition of free and robust debate. Two of my colleagues joined the dissent, including a member of today's majority. Ibid. (O'Connor and Scalia, JJ.). See also id., at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting). </s> To be sure, Bellotti concerns issue advocacy, whereas Austin is about express advocacy. This distinction appears to have accounted for the position of at least two members of the Court. See 494 U.S., at 675-676 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The Michigan law . . . prohibits corporations from using treasury funds only for making independent expenditures in support of, or in opposition to, any candidate in state elections. A corporation remains free ... to use general treasury funds to support an initiative proposal in a state referendum" (citation omitted)); id., at 678 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[T]here is a vast difference between lobbying and debating public issues on the one hand, and political campaigns for election to public office on the other"). The distinction, however, between independent expenditures for commenting on issues, on the one hand, and supporting or opposing a candidate, on the other, has no First Amendment significance apart from Austin's arbitrary line. </s> Austin was based on a faulty assumption. Contrary to Justice Stevens' proposal that there is "vast difference between lobbying and debating public issues on the one hand, and political campaigns for election to public office on the other," ibid., there is a general recognition now that discussions of candidates and issues are quite often intertwined in practical terms. See, e.g., Brief for Intervenor-Defendants Senator John McCain etal. in No. 02-1674 etal., p.42 ("'[The] legal ... wall between issue advocacy and political advocacy ... is built of the same sturdy material as the emperor's clothing. Everyone sees it. No one believes it'" (quoting the chair of the Political Action Committee (PAC) of the National Rifle Association (NRA))). To abide by Austin's repudiation of Bellotti on the ground that Bellotti did not involve express advocacy is to adopt a fiction. Far from providing a rationale for expanding Austin, the evidence in these consolidated cases calls for its reexamination. Just as arguments about immense aggregations of corporate wealth and concerns about protecting shareholders and union members do not justify a ban on issue ads, they cannot sustain a ban on independent expenditures for express ads. In holding otherwise, Austin "forced a substantial amount of political speech underground" and created a species of covert speech incompatible with our free and open society. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov-ernment PAC, 528 U.S., at 406 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). </s> The majority not only refuses to heed the lessons of experience but also perpetuates the conflict Austin created with fundamental First Amendment principles. Buckley foresaw that "the distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application," 424 U.S., at 42; see also id., at 45. It recognized that "'[p]ublic discussion of public issues which also are campaign issues readily and often unavoidably draws in candidates and their positions, their voting records and other official conduct.'" Id., at 42, n.50. Hence, "'[d]iscussions of those issues, and as well more positive efforts to influence public opinion on them, tend naturally and inexorably to exert some influence on voting at elections.'" Ibid. In glossing over Austin's opposite--and false--assumption that express advocacy is different, the majority ignores reality and elevates a distinction rejected by Buckley in clear terms. </s> Even after Buckley construed the statute then before the Court to reach only express advocacy, it invalidated limits on independent expenditures, observing that "[a]dvocacy of the election or defeat of candidates for federal office is no less entitled to protection under the First Amendment than the discussion of political policy generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation." 447 U.S. 530 (1980). </s> Continued adherence to Austin, of course, cannot be justified by the corporate identity of the speaker. Not only does this argument fail to account for Bellotti, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). The exemption for broadcast media companies, moreover, makes the First Amendment problems worse, not better. See Austin, 494 U.S., at 712 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("An independent ground for invalidating this statute is the blanket exemption for media corporations. . . . All corporations communicate with the public to some degree, whether it is their business or not; and communication is of particular importance for nonprofit corporations"); see also id., at 690-691 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Amassed corporate wealth that regularly sits astride the ordinary channels of information is much more likely to produce the New Corruption (too much of one point of view) than amassed corporate wealth that is generally busy making money elsewhere"). In the end the majority can supply no principled basis to reason away Austin's anomaly. Austin's errors stand exposed, and it is our duty to say so. </s> I surmise that even the majority, along with the Government, appreciates these problems with Austin. That is why it invents a new justification. We are now told that "the government also has a compelling interest in insulating federal elections from the type of corruption arising from the real or apparent creation of political debts." Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants FEC etal. in No. 02-1674 etal., p.88. "[E]lectioneering communications paid for with the general treasury funds of labor unions and corporations," the Government warns, "endea[r] those entities to elected officials in a way that could be perceived by the public as corrupting." See 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 622-623 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (stating the Government's position). </s> This rationale has no limiting principle. Were we to accept it, Congress would have the authority to outlaw even pure issue ads, because they, too, could endear their sponsors to candidates who adopt the favored positions. Taken to its logical conclusion, the alleged Government interest "in insulating federal elections from ... the real or apparent creation of political debts" also conflicts with Buckley. If a candidate feels grateful to a faceless, impersonal corporation for making independent expenditures, the gratitude cannot be any less when the money came from the CEO's own pocket. Buckley, however, struck down limitations on independent expenditures and rejected the Government's corruption argument absent evidence of coordination. See 424 U.S., at 51. The Government's position would eviscerate the line between expenditures and contributions and subject both to the same "complaisant review under the First Amendment." Federal Election Committee v. Beaumont, 539 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 14). Complaisant or otherwise, we cannot cede authority to the Legislature to do with the First Amendment as it pleases. Since Austin is inconsistent with the First Amendment, its extension diminishes the First Amendment even further. For this reason §203 should be held unconstitutional. 2. </s> Even under Austin, BCRA §203 could not stand. All parties agree strict scrutiny applies; §203, however, is far from narrowly tailored. The Government is unwilling to characterize §203 as a ban, citing the possibility of funding electioneering communications out of a separate segregated fund. This option, though, does not alter the categorical nature of the prohibition on the corporation. "[T]he corporation as a corporation is prohibited from speaking." Austin, 494 U.S., at 681, n. (Scalia, J., dissenting). What the law allows--permitting the corporation "to serve as the founder and treasurer of a different association of individuals that can endorse or oppose political candidates"--"is not speech by the corporation." Ibid. </s> Our cases recognize the practical difficulties corporations face when they are limited to communicating through PACs. The majority need look no further than MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, for an extensive list of hurdles PACs have to confront: "Under [2 U.S.C.] §432 [(1982 ed.)], [MCFL] must appoint a treasurer, §432(a); ensure that contributions are forwarded to the treasurer within 10 or 30 days of receipt, depending on the amount of contribution, §432(b)(2); see that its treasurer keeps an account of every contribution regardless of amount, the name and address of any person who makes a contribution in excess of $50, all contributions received from political committees, and the name and address of any person to whom a disbursement is made regardless of amount, §432(c); and preserve receipts for all disbursements over $200 and all records for three years, §§432(c), (d). Under §433, MCFL must file a statement of organization containing its name, address, the name of its custodian of records, and its banks, safety deposit boxes, or other depositories, §§433(a), (b); must report any change in the above information within 10 days, §433(c); and may dissolve only upon filing a written statement that it will no longer receive any contributions nor make disbursements, and that it has no outstanding debts or obligations, §433(d)(1). </s> "Under §434, MCFL must file either monthly reports with the FEC or reports on the following schedule: quarterly reports during election years, a pre-election report no later than the 12th day before an election, a postelection report within 30 days after an election, and reports every 6 months during nonelection years. §§434(a)(4)(A), (B). These reports must contain information regarding the amount of cash on hand; the total amount of receipts, detailed by 10 different categories; the identification of each political committee and candidate's authorized or affiliated committee making contributions, and any persons making loans, providing rebates, refunds, dividends, or interest or any other offset to operating expenditures in an aggregate amount over $200; the total amount of all disbursements, detailed by 12 different categories; the names of all authorized or affiliated committees to whom expenditures aggregating over $200 have been made; persons to whom loan repayments or refunds have been made; the total sum of all contributions, operating expenses, outstanding debts and obligations, and the settlement terms of the retirement of any debt or obligation. §434(b). In addition, MCFL may solicit contributions for its separate segregated fund only from its 'members,' §§441b(b)(4)(A), (C), which does not include those persons who have merely contributed to or indicated support for the organization in the past." Id., at 253-254. </s> These regulations are more than minor clerical requirements. Rather, they create major disincentives for speech, with the effect falling most heavily on smaller entities that often have the most difficulty bearing the costs of compliance. Even worse, for an organization that has not yet set up a PAC, spontaneous speech that "refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office" becomes impossible, even if the group's vital interests are threatened by a piece of legislation pending before Congress on the eve of a federal election. See Brief for Appellants Chamber of Commerce of the United States etal. in No. 02-1756 etal., p.37. Couple the litany of administrative burdens with the categorical restriction limiting PACs' solicitation activities to "members," and it is apparent that PACs are inadequate substitutes for corporations in their ability to engage in unfettered expression. </s> Even if the newly formed PACs manage to attract members and disseminate their messages against these heavy odds, they have been forced to assume a false identity while doing so. As the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) points out, political committees are regulated in minute detail because their primary purpose is to influence federal elections. "The ACLU and thousands of other organizations like it," however, "are not created for this purpose and therefore should not be required to operate as if they were." Reply Brief for Appellant ACLU in No. 02-1734 etal., p.15. A requirement that coerces corporations to adopt alter egos in communicating with the public is, by itself, sufficient to make the PAC option a false choice for many civic organizations. Forcing speech through an artificial "secondhand endorsement structure...debases the value of the voice of nonprofit corporate speakers ... [because] PAC's are interim, adhoc organizations with little continuity or responsibility." Austin, 494 U.S., at 708-709 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In contrast, their sponsoring organizations "have a continuity, a stability, and an influence" that allows "their members and the public at large to evaluate their ... credibility." Id., at 709. </s> The majority can articulate no compelling justification for imposing this scheme of compulsory ventriloquism. If the majority is concerned about corruption and distortion of the political process, it makes no sense to diffuse the corporate message and, under threat of criminal penalties, to compel the corporation to spread the blame to its adhoc intermediary. </s> For all these reasons, the PAC option cannot advance the Government's argument that the provision meets the test of strict scrutiny. See, e.g., id., at 657-660; MCFL, 479 U.S. 238; see also United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826 (2000) ("When the purpose and design of a statute is to regulate speech by reason of its content, special consideration or latitude is not accorded to the Government merely because the law can somehow be described as a burden rather than outright suppression"). </s> Once we turn away from the distraction of the PAC option, the provision cannot survive strict scrutiny. Under the primary definition, §203 prohibits unions and corporations from funding from their general treasury any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which-- "(I) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; </s> "(II) is made within-- </s> "(aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election for the office sought by the candidate; or </s> "(bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a convention or caucus of a political partythat has authority to nominate a candidate, for the office sought by the candidate; and </s> "(III) in the case of a communication which refers to a candidate for an office other than President or Vice President, is targeted to the relevant electorate." 2 U.S.C.A. §434f(3)(A)(i) (Supp. 2003). </s> The prohibition, with its crude temporal and geographic proxies, is a severe and unprecedented ban on protected speech. As discussed at the outset, suppose a few Senators want to show their constituents in the logging industry how much they care about working families and propose a law, 60 days before the election, that would harm the environment by allowing logging in national forests. Under §203, a nonprofit environmental group would be unable to run an ad referring to these Senators in their districts. The suggestion that the group could form and fund a PAC in the short time required for effective participation in the political debate is fanciful. For reasons already discussed, moreover, an adhoc PAC would not be as effective as the environmental group itself in gaining credibility with the public. Never before in our history has the Court upheld a law that suppresses speech to this extent. </s> The group would want to refer to these Senators, either by name or by photograph, not necessarily because an election is at stake. It might be supposed the hypothetical Senators have had an impeccable environmental record, so the environmental group might have no previous or present interest in expressing an opinion on their candidacies. Or, the election might not be hotly contested in some of the districts, so whatever the group says would have no practical effect on the electoral outcome. The ability to refer to candidates and officeholders is important because it allows the public to communicate with them on issues of common concern. Section 203's sweeping approach fails to take into account this significant free speech interest. Under any conventional definition of overbreadth, it fails to meet strict scrutiny standards. It forces electioneering communications sponsored by an environmental group to contend with faceless and nameless opponents and consign their broadcast, as the NRA well puts it, to a world where politicians who threaten the environment must be referred to as "'He Whose Name Cannot Be Spoken.'" Reply Brief for Appellants NRA etal. in No. 02-1675 etal., p.19. </s> In the example above, it makes no difference to §203 or to the Court that the bill sponsors may have such well-known ideological biases that revealing their identity would provide essential instruction to citizens on whether the policy benefits them or their community. Nor does it make any difference that the names of the bill sponsors, perhaps through repetition in the news media, have become so synonymous with the proposal that referring to these politicians by name in an ad is the most effective way to communicate with the public. Section 203 is a comprehensive censor: On the pain of a felony offense, the ad must not refer to a candidate for federal office during the crucial weeks before an election. </s> We are supposed to find comfort in the knowledge that the ad is banned under §203 only if it "is targeted to the relevant electorate," defined as communications that can be received by 50,000 or more persons in the candidate's district. See 2 U.S.C.A. §434(f)(3)(C) (Supp. 2003). This Orwellian criterion, however, is analogous to a law, unconstitutional under any known First Amendment theory, that would allow a speaker to say anything he chooses, so long as his intended audience could not hear him. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-765 (1972) (discussing the "First Amendment right to receive information and ideas" (internal quotation marks omitted)). A central purpose of issue ads is to urge the public to pay close attention to the candidate's platform on the featured issues. By banning broadcast in the very district where the candidate is standing for election, §203 shields information at the heart of the First Amendment from precisely those citizens who most value the right to make a responsible judgment at the voting booth. </s> In defending against a facial attack on a statute with substantial overbreadth, it is no answer to say that corporations and unions may bring as-applied challenges on a case-by-case basis. When a statute is as out of bounds as §203, our law simply does not force speakers to "undertake the considerable burden (and sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through case-by-case litigation." Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. ___, ___ (2003) (slip op., at 5). If they instead "abstain from protected speech," they "har[m] not only themselves but society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas." Ibid. Not the least of the ill effects of today's decision is that our overbreadth doctrine, once a bulwark of protection for free speech, has now been manipulated by the Court to become but a shadow of its former self. </s> In the end the Government and intervenor-defendants cannot dispute the looseness of the connection between §203 and the Government's proffered interest in stemming corruption. At various points in their briefs, they drop all pretense that the electioneering ban bears a close relation to anticorruption purposes. Instead, they defend §203 on the ground that the targeted ads "may influence," are "likely to influence," or "will in all likelihood have the effect of influencing" a federal election. See Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants FEC etal. in No. 02-1674 etal., pp.14, 24, 84, 92-93, 94; Brief for Intervenor-Defendants Senator John McCain etal. in No. 02-1674 etal., pp.42-43. The mere fact that an ad may, in one fashion or another, influence an election is an insufficient reason for outlawing it. I should have thought influencing elections to be the whole point of political speech. Neither strict scrutiny nor any other standard the Court has adopted to date permits outlawing speech on the ground that it might influence an election, which might lead to greater access to politicians by the sponsoring organization, which might lead to actual corruption or the appearance of corruption. Settled law requires a real and close connection between end and means. The attenuated causation the majority endorses today is antithetical to the concept of narrow tailoring. 3. </s> As I would invalidate §203 under the primary definition, it is necessary to add a few words about the backup provision. As applied in §203, the backup definition prohibits corporations and unions from financing from their general treasury funds "any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that office (regardless of whether the communication expressly advocates a vote for or against a candidate) and which also is suggestive of no plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate." 2 U.S.C.A. §434f(3)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2003). </s> The prohibition under the backup has much of the same imprecision as the ban under the primary definition, though here there is even more overbreadth. Unlike the primary definition, the backup contains no temporal or geographic limitation. Any broadcast, cable, or satellite communications--not just those aired within a certain blackout period and received by a certain segment of the population--are prohibited, provided they "promote," "support," "attack," or "oppose" a candidate. There is no showing that such a permanent and ubiquitous restriction meets First Amendment standards for the relationship between means and ends. </s> The backup definition is flawed for the further reason that it is vague. The crucial words--"promotes," "support," "attack," "oppose"--are nowhere defined. In this respect the backup is similar to the provision in the Federal Election Campaign Act that Buckley held to be unconstitutionally vague. Cf. 424 U.S., at 39-44 ("'No person may make any expenditure ... relative to a clearly identified candidate during a calendar year which, when added to all other expenditures made by such person during the year advocating the election or defeat of such candidate, exceeds $1,000'"). </s> The statutory phrase "suggestive of no plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate" cannot cure the overbreadth or vagueness of the backup definition. Like other key terms in the provision, these words are not defined. The lack of guidance presents serious problems of uncertainty. If "plausible" means something close to "reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances," speakers will be provided with an insufficient degree of protection and will, as a result, engage in widespread self-censorship to avoid severe criminal penalties. </s> Given the statute's vagueness, even defendants' own experts disagree among themselves about whether specific ads fall within the prohibition. Hence, people "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at [the backup definition's] meaning and differ as to its application," Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). For these reasons, I would also invalidate the ban on electioneering communication under the backup definition. 4. </s> Before concluding the analysis on Title II, it is necessary to add a few words about the majority's analysis of §204. The majority attempts to minimize the damage done under §203 by construing §204 (the Wellstone Amendment) to incorporate an exception for MCFL-type corporations. See MCFL, 479 U.S. 238. Section 204, however, does no such thing. As even the majority concedes, the provision "does not, on its face, exempt MCFL organizations from its prohibition." Ante, at 105. Although we normally presume that legislators would not deliberately enact an unconstitutional statute, that presumption is inapplicable here. There is no ambiguity regarding what §204 is intended to accomplish. Enacted to supersede the Snowe-Jeffords Amendment that would have carved out precisely this exception for MCFL corporations, §204 was written to broaden BCRA's scope to include issue-advocacy groups. See, e.g., App. to Brief for Appellants NRA etal. in No. 02-1675 etal., pp.65a, 67a (Sen. Wellstone) ("[I]ndividuals with all this wealth" will "make their soft money contributions to these sham issue ads run by all these ... organizations, which under this loophole can operate with impunity" to run "poisonous ads." I have an amendment that ... make[s] sure ... this big money doesn't get [through]"). Instead of deleting the Snowe-Jeffords Amendment from the bill, however, the Wellstone Amendment was inserted in a separate section to preserve severability. Were we to indulge the presumption that Congress understood the law when it legislated, the Wellstone Amendment could be understood only as a frontal challenge to MCFL. Even were I to agree with the majority's interpretation of §204, however, my analysis of Title II remains unaffected. The First Amendment protects the right of all organizations, not just a subset of them, to engage in political speech. See Austin, 494 U.S., at 700-701 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The First Amendment does not permit courts to exercise speech suppression authority denied to legislatures"). 5. </s> Title II's vagueness and overbreadth demonstrate Congress' fundamental misunderstanding of the First Amendment. The Court, it must be said, succumbs to the same mistake. The majority begins with a denunciation of direct campaign contributions by corporations and unions. It then uses this rhetorical momentum as its leverage to uphold the Act. The problem, however, is that Title II's ban on electioneering communications covers general commentaries on political issues and is far removed from laws prohibiting direct contributions from corporate and union treasuries. The severe First Amendment burden of this ban on independent expenditures requires much stronger justifications than the majority offers. See Buckley, supra, at 23. The hostility toward corporations and unions that infuses the majority opinion is inconsistent with the viewpoint neutrality the First Amendment demands of all Government actors, including the members of this Court. Corporations, after all, are the engines of our modern economy. They facilitate complex operations on which the Nation's prosperity depends. To say these entities cannot alert the public to pending political issues that may threaten the country's economic interests is unprecedented. Unions are also an established part of the national economic system. They, too, have their own unique insights to contribute to the political debate, but the law's impact on them is just as severe. The costs of the majority's misplaced concerns about the "corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth," Austin, supra, at 660, moreover, will weigh most heavily on budget-strapped nonprofit entities upon which many of our citizens rely for political commentary and advocacy. These groups must now choose between staying on the sidelines in the next election or establishing a PAC against their institutional identities. PACs are a legal construct sanctioned by Congress. They are not necessarily the means of communication chosen and preferred by the citizenry. In the same vein the Court is quite incorrect to suggest that the mainstream press is a sufficient palliative for the novel and severe constraints this law imposes on the political process. The Court should appreciate the dynamic contribution diverse groups and associations make to the intellectual and cultural life of the Nation. It should not permit Congress to foreclose or restrict those groups from participating in the political process by constraints not applicable to the established press. CONCLUSION </s> The First Amendment underwrites the freedom to experiment and to create in the realm of thought and speech. Citizens must be free to use new forms, and new forums, for the expression of ideas. The civic discourse belongs to the people and the Government may not prescribe the means used to conduct it. The First Amendment commands that Congress "shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." The command cannot be read to allow Congress to provide for the imprisonment of those who attempt to establish new political parties and alter the civic discourse. Our pluralistic society is filled with voices expressing new and different viewpoints, speaking through modes and mechanisms that must be allowed to change in response to the demands of an interested public. As communities have grown and technology has evolved, concerted speech not only has become more effective than a single voice but also has become the natural preference and efficacious choice for many Americans. The Court, upholding multiple laws that suppress both spontaneous and concerted speech, leaves us less free than before. Today's decision breaks faith with our tradition of robust and unfettered debate. </s> For the foregoing reasons, with respect, I dissent from the Court's decision upholding the main features of Titles I and II. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF KENNEDY, J. BCRA §101(a), 116 Stat. 81, which sets forth new FECA §323, 2 U.S.C.A. §441i (Supp. 2003), provides: "SEC. 323. SOFT MONEY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. </s> "(a) NATIONAL COMMITTEES.-- </s> "(1) IN GENERAL.--A national committee of a political party (including a national congressional campaign committee of a political party) may not solicit, receive, or direct to another person a contribution, donation, or transfer of funds or any other thing of value, or spend any funds, that are not subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act. </s> "(2) APPLICABILITY.--The prohibition established by paragraph (1) applies to any such national committee, any officer or agent acting on behalf of such a national committee, and any entity that is directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained, or controlled by such a national committee. </s> "(b) STATE, DISTRICT, AND LOCAL COMMITTEES.-- </s> "(1) IN GENERAL.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), an amount that is expended or disbursed for Federal election activity by a State, district, or local committee of a political party (including an entity that is directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained, or controlled by a State, district, or local committee of a political party and an officer or agent acting on behalf of such committee or entity), or by an association or similar group of candidates for State or local office or of individuals holding State or local office, shall be made from funds subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act. </s> "(2) APPLICABILITY.-- </s> "(A) IN GENERAL.--Notwithstanding clause (i) or (ii) of section 301(20)(A), and subject to subparagraph (B), paragraph (1) shall not apply to any amount expended or disbursed by a State, district, or local committee of a political party for an activity described in either such clause to the extent the amounts expended or disbursed for such activity are allocated (under regulations prescribed by the Commission) among amounts-- </s> "(i) which consist solely of contributions subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act (other than amounts described in subparagraph (B)(iii)); and </s> "(ii) other amounts which are not subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act (other than any requirements of this subsection). </s> "(B) CONDITIONS.--Subparagraph (A) shall only apply if-- </s> "(i) the activity does not refer to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; </s> "(ii) the amounts expended or disbursed are not for the costs of any broadcasting, cable, or satellite communication, other than a communication which refers solely to a clearly identified candidate for State or local office; </s> "(iii) the amounts expended or disbursed which are described in subparagraph (A)(ii) are paid from amounts which are donated in accordance with State law and which meet the requirements of subparagraph (C), except that no person (including any person established, financed, maintained, or controlled by such person) may donate more than $10,000 to a State, district, or local committee of a political party in a calendar year for such expenditures or disbursements; and </s> "(iv) the amounts expended or disbursed are made solely from funds raised by the State, local, or district committee which makes such expenditure or disbursement, and do not include any funds provided to such committee from-- </s> "(I) any other State, local, or district committee of any State party, </s> "(II) the national committee of a political party (including a national congressional campaign committee of a political party), </s> "(III) any officer or agent acting on behalf of any committee described in subclause (I) or (II), or </s> "(IV) any entity directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained, or controlled by any committee described in subclause (I) or (II). </s> "(C) PROHIBITING INVOLVEMENT OF NATIONAL PARTIES, FEDERAL CANDIDATES AND OFFICEHOLDERS, AND STATE PARTIES ACTING JOINTLY.--Notwithstanding subsection (e) (other than subsection (e)(3)), amounts specifically authorized to be spent under subparagraph (B)(iii) meet the requirements of this subparagraph only if the amounts-- </s> "(i) are not solicited, received, directed, transferred, or spent by or in the name of any person described in subsection (a) or (e); and </s> "(ii) are not solicited, received, or directed through fundraising activities conducted jointly by 2 or more State, local, or district committees of any political party or their agents, or by a State, local, or district committee of a political party on behalf of the State, local, or district committee of a political party or its agent in one or more other States. </s> "(c) FUNDRAISING COSTS.--An amount spent by a person described in subsection (a) or (b) to raise funds that are used, in whole or in part, for expenditures and disbursements for a Federal election activity shall be made from funds subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act. </s> "(d) TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS.--A national, State, district, or local committee of a political party (including a national congressional campaign committee of a political party), an entity that is directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained, or controlled by any such national, State, district, or local committee or its agent, and an officer or agent acting on behalf of any such party committee or entity, shall not solicit any funds for, or make or direct any donations to-- </s> "(1) an organization that is described in section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of such Code (or has submitted an application for determination of tax exempt status under such section) and that makes expenditures or disbursements in connection with an election for Federal office (including expenditures or disbursements for Federal election activity); or </s> "(2) an organization described in section 527 of such Code (other than a political committee, a State, district, or local committee of a political party, or the authorized campaign committee of a candidate for State or local office). </s> "(e) FEDERAL CANDIDATES.-- </s> "(1) IN GENERAL.--A candidate, individual holding Federal office, agent of a candidate or an individual holding Federal office, or an entity directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained or controlled by or acting on behalf of 1 or more candidates or individuals holding Federal office, shall not-- </s> "(A) solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend funds in connection with an election for Federal office, including funds for any Federal election activity, unless the funds are subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act; or </s> "(B) solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend funds in connection with any election other than an election for Federal office or disburse funds in connection with such an election unless the funds-- </s> "(i) are not in excess of the amounts permitted with respect to contributions to candidates and political committees under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of section 315(a); and </s> "(ii) are not from sources prohibited by this Act from making contributions in connection with an election for Federal office. </s> "(2) STATE LAW.--Paragraph (1) does not apply to the solicitation, receipt, or spending of funds by an individual described in such paragraph who is or was also a candidate for a State or local office solely in connection with such election for State or local office if the solicitation, receipt, or spending of funds is permitted under State law and refers only to such State or local candidate, or to any other candidate for the State or local office sought by such candidate, or both. </s> "(3) FUNDRAISING EVENTS.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1) or subsection (b)(2)(C), a candidate or an individual holding Federal office may attend, speak, or be a featured guest at a fundraising event for a State, district, or local committee of a political party. </s> "(4) PERMITTING CERTAIN SOLICITATIONS.-- </s> "(A) GENERAL SOLICITATIONS.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection, an individual described in paragraph (1) may make a general solicitation of funds on behalf of any organization that is described in section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of such Code (or has submitted an application for determination of tax exempt status under such section) (other than an entity whose principal purpose is to conduct activities described in clauses (i) and (ii) of section 301(20)(A)) where such solicitation does not specify how the funds will or should be spent. </s> "(B) CERTAIN SPECIFIC SOLICITATIONS.--In addition to the general solicitations permitted under subparagraph (A), an individual described in paragraph (1) may make a solicitation explicitly to obtain funds for carrying out the activities described in clauses (i) and (ii) of section 301(20)(A), or for an entity whose principal purpose is to conduct such activities, if-- </s> "(i) the solicitation is made only to individuals; and </s> "(ii) the amount solicited from any individual during any calendar year does not exceed $20,000. </s> "(f) STATE CANDIDATES.-- </s> "(1) IN GENERAL.--A candidate for State or local office, individual holding State or local office, or an agent of such a candidate or individual may not spend any funds for a communication described in section 301(20)(A)(iii) unless the funds are subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act. </s> "(2) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN COMMUNICATIONS.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to an individual described in such paragraph if the communication involved is in connection with an election for such State or local office and refers only to such individual or to any other candidate for the State or local office held or sought by such individual, or both." BCRA §101(b), adds a definition of "federal election activity" to FECA §301, 2 U.S.C.A. §431(20) (Supp. 2003), which provides as follows: "(20) FEDERAL ELECTION ACTIVITY.-- </s> "(A) IN GENERAL.--The term 'Federal election activity' means-- </s> "(i) voter registration activity during the period that begins on the date that is 120 days before the date a regularly scheduled Federal election is held and ends on the date of the election; </s> "(ii) voter identification, get-out-the-vote activity, or generic campaign activity conducted in connection with an election in which a candidate for Federal office appears on the ballot (regardless of whether a candidate for State or local office also appears on the ballot); </s> "(iii) a public communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office (regardless of whether a candidate for State or local office is also mentioned or identified) and that promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that office (regardless of whether the communication expressly advocates a vote for or against a candidate); or </s> "(iv) services provided during any month by an employee of a State, district, or local committee of a political party who spends more than 25 percent of that individual's compensated time during that month on activities in connection with a Federal election. </s> "(B) EXCLUDED ACTIVITY.--The term 'Federal election activity' does not include an amount expended or disbursed by a State, district, or local committee of a political party for-- </s> "(i) a public communication that refers solely to a clearly identified candidate for State or local office, if the communication is not a Federal election activity described in subparagraph (A)(i) or (ii); </s> "(ii) a contribution to a candidate for State or local office, provided the contribution is not designated to pay for a Federal election activity described in subparagraph (A); </s> "(iii) the costs of a State, district, or local political convention; and </s> "(iv) the costs of grassroots campaign materials, including buttons, bumper stickers, and yard signs, that name or depict only a candidate for State or local office." Title 2 U.S.C.A. §§441b(a) and (b)(1)-(2) (Supp. 2003), as amended by BCRA §203, provide: "(a) It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by authority of any law of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election to any political office, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any political office, or for any corporation whatever, or any labor organization, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election at which presidential and vice presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, Congress are to be voted for, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of the foregoing offices, or for any candidate, political committee, or other person knowingly to accept or receive any contribution prohibited by this section, or any officer or any director of any corporation or any national bank or any officer of any labor organization to consent to any contribution or expenditure by the corporation, national bank, or labor organization, as the case may be, prohibited by this section. </s> "(b)(1) For the purposes of this section the term "labor organization" means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work. </s> "(2) For purposes of this section and section 79l(h) of Title 15, the term "contribution or expenditure" includes a contribution or expenditure, as those terms are defined in section 431 of this title, and also includes any direct or indirect payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money, or any services, or anything of value (except a loan of money by a national or State bank made in accordance with the applicable banking laws and regulations and in the ordinary course of business) to any candidate, campaign committee, or political party or organization, in connection with any election to any of the offices referred to in this section or for any applicable electioneering communication, but shall not include (A) communications by a corporation to its stockholders and executive or administrative personnel and their families or by a labor organization to its members and their families on any subject; (B) nonpartisan registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns by a corporation aimed at its stockholders and executive or administrative personnel and their families, or by a labor organization aimed at its members and their families; and (C) the establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by a corporation, labor organization, membership organization, cooperative, or corporation without capital stock." </s> FOOTNOTESFootnote *Together with No. 02-1675, National Rifle Association et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al., No. 02-1676, Federal Election Commission et al. v. McConnell, United States Senator, et al., No. 02-1702, McCain, United States Senator, et al. v. McConnell, United States Senator, et al., No. 02-1727, Republican National Committee et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al., No. 02-1733, National Right to Life Committee, Inc., et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al., No. 02-1734, American Civil Liberties Union v. Federal Election Commission et al., No. 02-1740, Adams et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al., No. 02-1747, Paul, United States Congressman, et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al., No. 02-1753, California Democratic Party et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al., No. 02-1755, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al., and No. 02-1756, Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al., also on appeal from the same court. FOOTNOTESFootnote **Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join this opinion in its entirety. Footnote 1The parties to the litigation are described in the findings of the District Court. 251 F.Supp. 2d 176, 221-226 (DC 2003) (per curiam). For the sake of clarity, we refer to the parties who challenged the law in the District Court as the "plaintiffs," referring to specific plaintiffs by name where necessary. We refer to the parties who intervened in defense of the law as the "intervenor-defendants." Footnote 2The Hatch Act also limited both the amount political committees could expend and the amount they could receive in contributions. Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640, 54 Stat. 767. Senator Bankhead, in offering the amendment from the Senate floor, said: </s> "'We all know that money is the chief source of corruption. We all know that large contributions to political campaigns not only put the political party under obligation to the large contributors, who demand pay in the way of legislation, but we also know that large sums of money are used for the purpose of conducting expensive campaigns through the newspapers and over the radio; in the publication of all sorts of literature, true and untrue; and for the purpose of paying the expenses of campaigners sent out into the country to spread propaganda, both true and untrue.'" United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 577-578 (1957) (quoting 86 Cong. Rec. 2720 (1940)). Footnote 3As a general rule, FECA permits corporations and unions to solicit contributions to their PACs from their shareholders or members, but not from outsiders. 2 U.S.C. §§441b(b)(4)(A), (C); see Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 198-199, and n. 1 (1982). Footnote 4The court held that one disclosure provision was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 832 (CADC 1975) (en banc) (per curiam) (invalidating 2 U.S.C. §437a (1970 ed., Supp. V)). No appeal was taken from that holding. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 10, n. 7 (1976) (per curiam). Footnote 5The Court of Appeals found: </s> "Large contributions are intended to, and do, gain access to the elected official after the campaign for consideration of the contributor's particular concerns. Senator Mathias not only describes this but also the corollary, that the feeling that big contributors gain special treatment produces a reaction that the average American has no significant role in the political process." Buckley, 519 F.2d, at 838 (footnotes omitted). </s> The court also noted: </s> "Congress found and the District Court confirmed that such contributions were often made for the purpose of furthering business or private interests by facilitating access to government officials or influencing governmental decisions, and that, conversely, elected officials have tended to afford special treatment to large contributors. See S. Rep. No. 93-689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5; Findings I, ¶ ;¶ ;108, 110, 118, 170." Id., at 838, n. 32. </s> Citing further evidence of corruption, the court explained: </s> "The disclosures of illegal corporate contributions in 1972 included the testimony of executives that they were motivated by the perception that this was necessary as a 'calling card, something that would get us in the door and make our point of view heard,' Hearings before the Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5442 (1973) (Ashland Oil Co.--Orin Atkins, Chairman) or 'in response to pressure for fear of a competitive disadvantage that might result,' id. at 5495, 5514 (American Airlines--George Spater, former chairman); see Findings I, ¶ ;105. The record before Congress was replete with specific examples of improper attempts to obtain governmental favor in return for large campaign contributions. See Findings I, ¶ ;¶ ;159-64." Id., at 839, n. 37. Footnote 6The court cited the intricate scheme of the American Milk Producers, Inc., as an example of the lengths to which contributors went to avoid their duty to disclose: </s> "Since the milk producers, on legal advice, worked on a $2500 limit per committee, they evolved a procedure, after consultation in November 1970 with Nixon fund raisers, to break down [their $2 million donation] into numerous smaller contributions to hundreds of committees in various states which could then hold the money for the President's reelection campaign, so as to permit the producers to meet independent reporting requirements without disclosure." Id., at 839, n.36. </s> The milk producers contributed large sums to the Nixon campaign "in order to gain a meeting with White House officials on price supports." Ibid. Footnote 7In 1977 the FEC promulgated a rule allowing parties to allocate their administrative expenses "on a reasonable basis" between accounts containing funds raised in compliance with FECA and accounts containing nonfederal funds, including corporate and union donations. 11 CFR §102.6(a)(2). In advisory opinions issued in 1978 and 1979, the FEC allowed parties similarly to allocate the costs of voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives between federal and nonfederal accounts. FEC Advisory Op. 1978-10; FEC Advisory Op. 1979-17. See 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 195-197 (per curiam). </s> In 1990 the FEC clarified the phrase "on a reasonable basis" by promulgating fixed allocation rates. 11 CFR §106.5 (1991). The regulations required the Republican National Committee (RNC) and Democratic National Committee (DNC) to pay for at least 60% of mixed-purpose activities (65% in presidential election years) with funds from their federal accounts. §106.5(b)(2). By contrast, the regulations required state and local committees to allocate similar expenditures based on the ratio of federal to nonfederal offices on the State's ballot, §106.5(d)(1), which in practice meant that they could expend a substantially greater proportion of soft money than national parties to fund mixed-purpose activities affecting both federal and state elections. See 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 198-199 (per curiam). Footnote 81 Defs. Exhs., Tab 1, Tbl. 2 (report of Thomas E. Mann, Chair & Sr. Fellow, Brookings Institution (hereinafter Mann Expert Report)); 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 197-201 (per curiam). Footnote 9Mann Expert Report 26; 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 441 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Footnote 10Id., at 494 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Footnote 11Mann Expert Report 24. Footnote 12In the 2000 election cycle, 35 of the 50 largest soft-money donors gave to both parties; 28 of the 50 gave more than $100,000 to both parties. Mann Expert Report Tbl. 6; see also 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 509 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 785, n. 77 (Leon, J.). Footnote 13A former chief executive officer of a large corporation explained: </s> "Business and labor leaders believe, based on their experience, that disappointed Members, and their party colleagues, may shun or disfavor them because they have not contributed. Equally, these leaders fear that if they refuse to contribute (enough), competing interests who do contribute generously will have an advantage in gaining access to and influencing key Congressional leaders on matters of importance to the company or union." App. 283, ¶ ;9 (declaration of Gerald Greenwald, United Airlines (hereinafter Greenwald Decl.)). </s> Amici Curiae Committee for Economic Development and various business leaders attest that corporate soft-money contributions are "coerced and, at bottom, wholly commercial" in nature, and that "[b]usiness leaders increasingly wish to be freed from the grip of a system in which they fear the adverse consequences of refusing to fill the coffers of the major parties." Brief for Committee for Economic Development etal. as Amici Curiae 28. Footnote 14See 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 480 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 842 (Leon, J.). Footnote 15See id., at 479-480 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 842-843 (Leon, J.). One former party official explained to the District Court: </s> "'Once you've helped a federal candidate by contributing hard money to his or her campaign, you are sometimes asked to do more for the candidate by making donations of hard and/or soft money to the national party committees, the relevant state party (assuming it can accept corporate contributions), or an outside group that is planning on doing an independent expenditure or issue advertisement to help the candidate's campaign.'" Id., at 479 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Footnote 16Id., at 532-537 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 875-879 (Leon, J.). As the former chair of one major advocacy organization's PAC put it, "'[i]t is foolish to believe there is any practical difference between issue advocacy and advocacy of a political candidate. What separates issue advocacy and political advocacy is a line in the sand drawn on a windy day.'" Id., at 536-537 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Tanya K. Metaksa, Opening Remarks at the American Assn. of Political Consultants Fifth General Session on "Issue Advocacy," Jan. 17, 1997, p.2); 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 878-879 (Leon, J.) (same). Footnote 17Id., at 304 (Henderson, J., concurring in judgment in part anddissenting in part); id., at 534 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 875-879 (Leon, J.). Footnote 18It is undisputed that very few ads--whether run by candidates, parties, or interest groups--used words of express advocacy. Id., at 303 (Henderson, J.); id., at 529 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 874 (Leon, J.). In the 1998 election cycle, just 4% of candidate advertisements used magic words; in 2000, that number was a mere 5%. App. 1334 (report of Jonathan S. Krasno, Yale University, & Frank J. Sorauf, University of Minnesota, pp. 53-54 (hereinafter Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report); see 1 Defs. Exhs., Tab 2, pp. 53-54). Footnote 19251 F.Supp. 2d, at 564, and n.6 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (citing report of Kenneth M. Goldstein, University of Wisconsin-Madison, App. A, Tbl. 16; see 3-R Defs. Exhs., Tab 7); Tr. of Oral Arg. 202-203; see also 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 305 (Henderson, J.). Footnote 20The spending on electioneering communications climbed dramatically during the last decade. In the 1996 election cycle, $135 to $150 million was spent on multiple broadcasts of about 100 ads. In the next cycle (1997-1998), 77 organizations aired 423 ads at a total cost between $270 and $340 million. By the 2000 election, 130 groups spent over an estimated $500 million on more than 1,100 different ads. Two out of every three dollars spent on issue ads in the 2000 cycle were attributable to the two major parties and six major interest groups. Id., at 303-304 (Henderson, J.) (citing Annenberg Public Policy Center, Issue Advertising in the 1999-2000 Election Cycle 1-15 (2001) (hereinafter Annenberg Report); see 38 Defs. Exhs., Tab 22); 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 527 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (same); id., at 879 (Leon, J.) (same). Footnote 21Id., at 540 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting internal AFL-CIO Memorandum from Brian Weeks to Mike Klein, "Electronic Buy for Illinois Senator," (Oct. 9, 1996), AFL-CIO 005244); 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 886 (Leon, J.) (same). Footnote 22The association was known as the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA). Id., at 232 (per curiam). Footnote 23Id., at 232-233. Other examples of mysterious groups included "Voters for Campaign Truth," "Aretino Industries," "Montanans for Common Sense Mining Laws," "American Seniors, Inc.," "American Family Voices," App. 1355 (Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report 71-77), and the "Coalition to Make our Voices Heard," 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 538 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Some of the actors behind these groups frankly acknowledged that "'in some places it's much more effective to run an ad by the 'Coalition to Make Our Voices Heard' than it is to say paid for by 'the men and women of the AFL-CIO.'" Ibid. (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting report of David B. Magleby, Brigham Young University 18-19 (hereinafter Magleby Expert Report), App. 1484-1485). Footnote 24251 F.Supp. 2d, at 518-519 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Footnote 25Id., at 478-479 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (citing declaration of Robert Hickmott, Senior V.P., Smith-Free Group, ¶ ;8 (hereinafter Hickmott Decl.); see 6-R Defs. Exhs., Tab 19, ¶ ;8). Footnote 26S. Rep. No. 105-167, vol. 4, p.4611 (1998) (hereinafter 1998 Senate Report); 5 id., at 7515. Footnote 273 id., at 4535 (additional views of Sen. Collins). Footnote 281 id., at 41-42, 195-200. The report included a memorandum written by the DNC finance chairman suggesting the use of White House coffees and "overnights" to give major donors "quality time" with the President, and noted that the guests accounted for $26.4 million in contributions. Id., at 194, 196. Footnote 292 id., at 2913-2914, 2921. Despite concerns about Tamraz's background and a possible conflict with United States foreign policy interests, he was invited to six events attended by the President. Id., at 2920-2921. Similarly, the minority noted that in exchange for Michael Kojima's contribution of $500,000 to the 1992 President's Dinner, he and his wife had been placed at the head table with President and Mrs. Bush. Moreover, Kojima received several additional meetings with the President, other administration officials, and United States embassy officials. 4 id., at 5418, 5422, 5428. Footnote 30The former requires an initial contribution of $100,000, and $25,000 for each of the next three years; the latter requires annual contributions of $15,000. 5 id., at 7968. Footnote 31Id., at 7971. Footnote 321 id., at 49; 3 id., at 3997-4006. Footnote 33Id., at 4466. Footnote 34Ibid. Footnote 35Id., at 4468-4470, 4480-4481, 4491-4494. Footnote 36Id., at 4492. Footnote 376 id., at 9394. Footnote 38The national party committees of the two major political parties are: the Republican National Committee (RNC); the Democratic National Committee (DNC); the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC); the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC); the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC); and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC). 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 468 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Footnote 39Justice Kennedy accuses us of engaging in a sleight of hand by conflating "unseemly corporate speech" with the speech of political parties and candidates, and then adverting to the "corporate speech rationale as if it were the linchpin of the litigation." Post, at 7 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). This is incorrect. The principles set forth here and relied upon in assessing Title I are the same principles articulated in Buckley and its progeny that regulations of contributions to candidates, parties, and political committees are subject to less rigorous scrutiny than direct restraints on speech--including "unseemly corporate speech." Footnote 40Since our decision in Buckley, we have consistently applied less rigorous scrutiny to contribution restrictions aimed at the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption. See, e.g., 453 U.S. 182, 195-196 (1981) (plurality opinion) (applying less rigorous scrutiny to FECA's $5,000 limit on contributions to multicandidate political committees); National Right to Work, 533 U.S. 431, 456 (2001) (applying less rigorous scrutiny to expenditures coordinated with a candidate); Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S.___, ___ (2003) (slip op., at 14-15) (applying less rigorous scrutiny to provisions intended to prevent circumvention of otherwise valid contribution limits). Footnote 41Indeed, Congress structured §323(b) in such a way as to free individual, corporate, and union donations to state committees for nonfederal elections from federal source and amount restrictions. Footnote 42Justice Kennedy's contention that less rigorous scrutiny applies only to regulations burdening political association, rather than political speech, misreads Buckley. In Buckley, we recognized that contribution limits burden both protected speech and association, though they generally have more significant impacts on the latter. 528 U.S. 377, 388 (2000) ("While we did not [in Buckley] attempt to parse [the] distinctions between the speech and association standards of scrutiny for contribution limits, we did make it clear that those restrictions bore more heavily on the associational right than on [the] freedom to speak. We consequently proceeded on the understanding that a contribution limitation surviving a claim of associational abridgment would survive a speech challenge as well, and we held the standard satisfied by the contribution limits under review." (citation omitted)). It is thus simply untrue in the campaign finance context that all "burdens on speech necessitate strict scrutiny review." Post, at 29. Footnote 43Justice Kennedy is no doubt correct that the associational burdens imposed by a particular piece of campaign-finance regulation may at times be so severe as to warrant strict scrutiny. Ibid. In light of our interpretation of §323(a), however, see infra, at 46-47, §323 does not present such a case. As Justice Kennedy himself acknowledges, even "significant interference" with "protected rights of association" are subject to less rigorous scrutiny. Beaumont, 539 U.S., at _____ (slip op., at 15); see post, at 28. There is thus nothing inconsistent in our decision to account for the particular associational burdens imposed by §323(a) when applying the appropriate level of scrutiny. Footnote 44The fact that the post-1990 explosion in soft-money spending on federal electioneering was accompanied by a series of efforts in Congress to clamp down on such uses of soft money (culminating, of course, in BCRA) underscores the fact that the FEC regulations permitted more than Congress, in enacting FECA, had ever intended. See J. Cantor, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: Campaign Finance Legislation in the 101st Congress (1990) (9 bills seeking to limit the influence of soft money introduced); J. Cantor, CRS Report for Congress: Campaign Finance Legislation in the 102nd Congress (1991) (10 such bills introduced); J. Cantor, CRS Report for Congress: Campaign Finance Legislation in the 103rd Congress (1993) (16 bills); J. Cantor, CRS Report for Congress: Campaign Finance Legislation in the 104th Congress (1996) (18 bills); see also 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 201-206 (per curiam) (discussing legislative efforts to curb soft money in 105th and subsequent Congresses). Footnote 45Justice Kennedy contends that the plurality's observation in Colorado I that large soft-money donations to a political party pose little threat of corruption "establish[es] that" such contributions are not corrupting. Post, at 17-18 (citing Colorado I, 518 U.S. 604, 616, 617-618 (1996)). The cited dictum has no bearing on the present case. Colorado I addressed an entirely different question--namely, whether Congress could permissibly limit a party's independent expenditures--and did so on an entirely different set of facts. It also had before it an evidentiary record frozen in 1990--well before the soft-money explosion of the 1990's. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 839 F.Supp. 1448, 1451 (Colo. 1993). Footnote 46Other business leaders agreed. For example, the chairman of the board and CEO of a major toy company explained: </s> "'Many in the corporate world view large soft money donations as a cost of doing business. ... I remain convinced that in some of the more publicized cases, federal officeholders actually appear to have sold themselves and the party cheaply. They could have gotten even more money, because of the potential importance of their decisions to the affected business.'" 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 491 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration of Alan G. Hassenfeld, CEO, Hasbro, Inc., ¶ ;16; see 6-R Defs. Exhs., Tab 17). </s> Similarly the chairman emeritus of a major airline opined: </s> "'Though a soft money check might be made out to a political party, labor and business leaders know that those checks open the doors of the offices of individual and important Members of Congress and the Administration.... Labor and business leaders believe--based on experience and with good reason--that such access gives them an opportunity to shape and affect governmental decisions and that their ability to do so derives from the fact that they have given large sums of money to the parties.'" 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 498 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Greenwald Decl. ¶ ;12, App. 283-284, ¶ ;10); 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 858-859 (Leon, J.) (same). Footnote 47Even more troubling is evidence in the record showing that national parties have actively exploited the belief that contributions purchase influence or protection to pressure donors into making contributions. As one CEO explained: </s> "'[I]f you're giving a lot of soft money to one side, the other side knows. For many economically-oriented donors, there is a risk in giving to only one side, because the other side may read through FEC reports and have staff or a friendly lobbyist call and indicate that someone with interests before a certain committee has had their contributions to the other side noticed. They'll get a message that basically asks: 'Are you sure you want to be giving only to one side? Don't you want to have friends on both sides of the aisle?' If your interests are subject to anger from the other side of the aisle, you need to fear that you may suffer a penalty if you don't give.... [D]uring the 1990's, it became more and more acceptable to call someone, saying you saw he gave to this person, so he should also give to you or the person's opponent.'" Id., at 510 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Randlett Decl. ¶ ;12, App. 715); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 868 (Leon, J.) (same). Footnote 48In addition to finding no support in our recent cases, see, e.g., Colorado II, 453 U.S. 182 (1981), we upheld FECA's $5,000 limit on contributions to multicandidate political committees. It is no answer to say that such limits were justified as a means of preventing individuals from using parties and political committees as pass-throughs to circumvent FECA's $1,000 limit on individual contributions to candidates. Given FECA's definition of "contribution," the $5,000 and $25,000 limits restricted not only the source and amount of funds available to parties and political committees to make candidate contributions, but also the source and amount of funds available to engage in express advocacy and numerous other noncoordinated expenditures. If indeed the First Amendment prohibited Congress from regulating contributions to fund the latter, the otherwise-easy-to-remedy exploitation of parties as pass-throughs (e.g., a strict limit on donations that could be used to fund candidate contributions) would have provided insufficient justification for such overbroad legislation. Footnote 49At another point, describing our "flawed reasoning," Justice Kennedy seems to suggest that Congress' interest in regulating the appearance of corruption extends only to those contributions that actually "create ... corrupt donor favoritism among ... officeholders." Post, at 16. This latter formulation would render Congress' interest in stemming the appearance of corruption indistinguishable from its interest in preventing actual corruption. Footnote 50In support of this claim, the political party plaintiffs assert that, in 2001, the RNC spent $15.6 million of nonfederal funds (30% of the nonfederal amount raised that year) on purely state and local election activity, including contributions to state and local candidates, transfers to state parties, and direct spending. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 102-103 (statement of counsel Bobby R. Burchfield); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 336-337 (Henderson, J.); id., at 464-465 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 830 (Leon, J.). Footnote 51The close relationship of federal officeholders and candidates to their parties answers not only The Chief Justice's concerns about §323(a), but also his fear that our analysis of §323's remaining provisions bespeaks no limiting principle. Post, at 6-7 (dissenting opinion). As set forth in our discussion of those provisions, the record demonstrates close ties between federal officeholders and the state and local committees of their parties. That close relationship makes state and local parties effective conduits for donors desiring to corrupt federal candidates and officeholders. Thus, in upholding §§323(b), (d), and (f), we rely not only on the fact that they regulate contributions used to fund activities influencing federal elections, but also that they regulate contributions to or at the behest of entities uniquely positioned to serve as conduits for corruption. We agree with The Chief Justice that Congress could not regulate financial contributions to political talk show hosts or newspaper editors on the sole basis that their activities conferred a benefit on the candidate. Post, at 7 (dissenting opinion). Footnote 52Plaintiffs claim that the option of soliciting hard money for state and local candidates is an illusory one, since several States prohibit state and local candidates from establishing multiple campaign accounts, which would preclude them from establishing separate accounts for federal funds. See Cal. Fair Pol. Practs. Comm'n Advisory Op. A-91-448 (Dec. 16, 1991), 1991 WL 772902; Colo. Const., Art. XXVIII, §2(3); Iowa Code §56.5A (Supp. 2003); and Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3517.10(J) (Anderson Supp. 2002). Plaintiffs maintain that §323(a) combines with these state laws to make it impossible for state and local candidates to receive hard-money donations. But the challenge we are considering is a facial one, and on its face §323(a) permits solicitations. The fact that a handful of States might interfere with the mechanism Congress has chosen for such solicitations is an argument that may be addressed in an as-applied challenge. Footnote 53Even opponents of campaign finance reform acknowledged that "a prohibition of soft money donations to national party committees alone would be wholly ineffective." The Constitution and Campaign Reform: Hearings on S. 522 before the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, 106th Cong., 2d Sess., 301 (2000) (statement of Bobby R. Burchfield, Partner, Covington & Burling). Footnote 54Generic campaign activity promotes a political party rather than a specific candidate. 2 U.S.C.A. §431(21). Footnote 55A public communication is "a communication by means of any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, mass mailing, or telephone bank to the general public, or any other form of general public political advertising." §431(22). Footnote 56So long as the communication does not constitute voter registration, voter identification, GOTV, or generic campaign activity. §431(20)(B)(i). Footnote 57Unless the contribution is earmarked for federal election activity. §431(20)(B)(ii). Footnote 58The statute gives the FEC responsibility for setting the allocation ratio. §441i(b)(2)(A); see also 11 CFR §300.33(b) (2003) (defining allocation ratios). Footnote 59One former Senator noted: </s> "'The fact is that much of what state and local parties do helps to elect federal candidates. The national parties know it; the candidates know it; the state and local parties know it. If state and local parties can use soft money for activities that affect federal elections, then the problem will not be solved at all. The same enormous incentives to raise the money will exist; the same large contributions by corporations, unions, and wealthy individuals will be made; the federal candidates who benefit from state party use of these funds will know exactly whom their benefactors are; the same degree of beholdenness and obligation will arise; the same distortions on the legislative process will occur; and the same public cynicism will erode the foundations of our democracy--except it will all be worse in the public's mind because a perceived reform was undercut once again by a loophole that allows big money into the system.'" 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 467 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Rudman Decl. ¶ ;19, App. 746). Footnote 60E.g., 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 479 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) ("'It is ... not uncommon for the RNC to put interested donors in touch with various state parties. This often occurs when a donor has reached his or her federal dollar limits to the RNC, but wishes to make additional contributions to the state party'" (quoting declaration of Thomas Josefiak, RNC Chief Counsel ¶ ;68, App 308)); see also Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 458 (quoting Congressman Wayne Allard's Aug. 27, 1996, fundraising letter informing the recipient that "'you are at the limit of what you can directly contribute to my campaign,'" but "'you can further help my campaign by assisting the Colorado Republican Party'"); 251 F. Supp 2d, at 454 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) ("'Both political parties have found spending soft money with its accompanying hard money match through their state parties to work smoothly, for the most part, and state officials readily acknowledge they are simply 'pass throughs' to the vendors providing the broadcast ads or direct mail'" (quoting Magleby Expert Report 37, App. 1510-1511.)). Footnote 61The 1998 Senate Report found that, in exchange for a substantial donation to state Democratic committees and candidates, the DNC arranged meetings for the donor with the President and other federal officials. 1 1998 Senate Report 43-44; 2 id., at 2907-2931; 5 id., at 7519. That same Report also detailed how Native American tribes that operated casinos made sizable soft-money contributions to state Democratic committees in apparent exchange for access and influence. 1 id., at 44-46; 2 id., at 3167-3194; see also McCain Decl., Exh. I (Weisskopf, The Busy Back-Door Men, Time, Mar. 31, 1997, p. 40)). Footnote 62Since voter identification is a necessary precondition of any GOTV program, the findings regarding GOTV funding obviously apply with equal force to the funding of voter identification efforts. Footnote 63With respect to GOTV, voter identification, and other generic campaign activity, the FEC has interpreted §323(b) to apply only to those activities conducted after the earliest filing deadline for access to the federal election ballot or, in States that do not conduct primaries, after January 1 of even-numbered years. 11 CFR §100.24(a)(1) (2002). Any activities conducted outside of those periods are completely exempt from regulation under §323(b). Of course, this facial challenge does not present the question of the FEC regulations' constitutionality. But the fact that the statute provides this basis for the FEC reasonably to narrow §301(20)(A)(ii) further calls into question plaintiffs' claims of facial overbreadth. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). Footnote 64We likewise reject the argument that §301(20)(A)(iii) is unconstitutionally vague. The words "promote," "oppose," "attack," and "support" clearly set forth the confines within which potential party speakers must act in order to avoid triggering the provision. These words "provide explicit standards for those who apply them" and "give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972). This is particularly the case here, since actions taken by political parties are presumed to be in connection with election campaigns. See Buckley, 413 U.S. 548, 580 (1973). Footnote 65Any doubts that donors would engage in such a seemingly complex scheme are put to rest by the record evidence in Buckley itself. See n.6, supra (setting forth the Court of Appeals' findings regarding the efforts of milk producers to obtain a meeting with White House officials). Footnote 66Section 501(c) organizations are groups generally exempted from taxation under the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. §501(a). These include §501(c)(3) charitable and educational organizations, as well as §501(c)(4) social welfare groups. Footnote 67Section 527 "political organizations" are, unlike §501(c) groups, organized for the express purpose of engaging in partisan political activity. They include any "party, committee, association, fund, or other organization (whether or not incorporated) organized and operated primarily for the purpose of directly or indirectly accepting contributions or making expenditures" for the purpose of "influencing or attempting to influence the selection, nomination, or appointment of any individual for Federal, State, or local public office." 26 U.S.C. §527(e). Footnote 68The record shows that many of the targeted tax-exempt organizations engage in sophisticated and effective electioneering activities for the purpose of influencing federal elections, including waging broadcast campaigns promoting or attacking particular candidates and conducting large-scale voter registration and GOTV drives. For instance, during the final weeks of the 2000 presidential campaign, the NAACP's National Voter Fund registered more than 200,000 people, promoted a GOTV hotline, ran three newspaper print ads, and made several direct mailings. 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 348-349 (Henderson, J.). The NAACP reports that the program turned out one million additional African-American voters and increased turnout over 1996 among targeted groups by 22% in New York, 50% in Florida, and 140% in Missouri. Ibid. The effort, which cost $10 million, was funded primarily by a $7 million contribution from an anonymous donor. Id., at 349 (citing cross-examination of Donald P. Green, Yale University 15-20, Exh. 3; see I Defs. Refiling Trs. on Pub. Record); 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 522 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (same); id., at 851 (Leon, J.) (same); see also id., at 349 (Henderson, J.) (stating that in 2000 the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League (NARAL) spent $7.5 million and mobilized 2.1 million pro-choice voters (citing declaration of Mary Jane Gallagher, Exec. V. P., NARAL, 8, App. 271-272, ¶ ;24)); 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 522 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (same). Footnote 69Notably, the FEC has interpreted §323(d)(2) to permit state, district, and local party committees to solicit donations to §527 organizations that are state-registered PACs, that support only state or local candidates, and that do not make expenditures or disbursements in connection with federal elections. 11 CFR §300.37(a)(3)(iv) (2003). The agency determined that this interpretation of "political committee"--at least with respect to state, district, and local committees--was consistent with BCRA's fundamental purpose of prohibiting soft money from being used in connection with federal elections. 67 Fed. Reg. 49106 (2002). Footnote 70Section 323(e)(1)(B) tightly constrains the ability of federal candidates and officeholders to solicit or spend nonfederal money in connection with state or local elections. Contributions cannot exceed FECA's analogous hard-money contribution limits or come from prohibited sources. In effect, §323(e)(1)(B) doubles the limits on what individuals can contribute to or at the behest of federal candidates and officeholders, while restricting the use of the additional funds to activities not related to federal elections. If the federal candidate or officeholder is also a candidate for state or local office, he or she may solicit, receive, and spend an unlimited amount of nonfederal money in connection with that election, subject only to state regulation and the requirement that such solicitation or expenditures refer only to the relevant state or local office. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(e)(2). Footnote 71See 148 Cong. Rec. S2143 (Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Feingold) (Section 323(f) does not prohibit "spending non-federal money to run advertisements that mention that [state or local candidates] have been endorsed by a Federal candidate or say that they identify with a position of a named Federal candidate, so long as those advertisements do not support, attack, promote or oppose the Federal candidate"). Footnote 72Justice Kennedy faults our "unwillingness" to confront that "Title I's entirety ... look[s] very much like an incumbency protection plan," citing §323(e), which provides officeholders and candidates with greater opportunities to solicit soft money than §§323(a) and (d) permit party officers. Post, at 23-24. But, §323(e) applies to both officeholders and candidates and allows only minimally greater opportunities for solicitation out of regard for the fact that candidates and officeholders, unlike party officers, can never step out of their official roles. Supra, at 70-71; 42 U.S.C.A. §441i(e). Any concern that Congress might opportunistically pass campaign-finance regulation for self-serving ends is taken into account by the applicable level of scrutiny. Congress must show concrete evidence that a particular type of financial transaction is corrupting or gives rise to the appearance of corruption and that the chosen means of regulation are closely drawn to address that real or apparent corruption. It has done so here. At bottom, Justice Kennedy has long disagreed with the basic holding of Buckley and its progeny that less rigorous scrutiny--which shows a measure of deference to Congress in an area where it enjoys particular expertise--applies to assess limits on campaign contributions. Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 465 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (joining Justice Thomas for the proposition that "Buckley should be overrruled" (citation omitted)); Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S., at 405-410 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Footnote 73BCRA also provides a "backup" definition of "electioneering communication," which would become effective if the primary definition were "held to be constitutionally insufficient by final judicial decision to support the regulation provided herein." 2 U.S.C.A. §434(f)(3)(A)(ii). We uphold all applications of the primary definition and accordingly have no occasion to discuss the backup definition. Footnote 74We then held that, so construed, the expenditure restriction did not advance a substantial government interest, because independent express advocacy did not pose a danger of real or apparent corruption, and the line between express advocacy and other electioneering activities was easily circumvented. Concluding that §608(e)(1)'s heavy First Amendment burden was not justified, we invalidated the provision. Buckley, 424 U.S., at 45-48. Footnote 75Our adoption of a narrowing construction was consistent with our vagueness and overbreadth doctrines. See Broadrick, 413 U.S., at 613; Grayned, 408 U.S., at 108-114. Footnote 76The provision at issue in MCFL--2 U.S.C. §441b (1982 ed.)--required corporations and unions to use separate segregated funds, rather than general treasury moneys, on expenditures made "'in connection with'" a federal election. MCFL, 479 U.S., at 241. We noted that Buckley had limited the statutory term "'expenditure'" to words of express advocacy "in order to avoid problems of overbreadth." 479 U.S., at 248. We held that "a similar construction" must apply to the expenditure limitation before us in MCFL and that the reach of 2 U.S.C. §441b was therefore constrained to express advocacy. 479 U.S., at 249 (emphasis added). Footnote 77As one major-party political consultant testified, "'it is rarely advisable to use such clumsy words as "vote for" or "vote against."'" 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 305 (Henderson, J.) (quoting declaration of Douglas L. Bailey, founder, Bailey, Deardourff & Assoc., 1-2, App. 24, ¶ ;3). He explained: "'All advertising professionals understand that the most effective advertising leads the viewer to his or her own conclusion without forcing it down their throat.'" 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 305 (Henderson, J.). Other political professionals and academics confirm that the use of magic words has become an anachronism. See id., at 531 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration of Raymond D. Strother, Pres., Strother/Duffy/Strother ¶ ;4, 9 Defs. Exhs., Tab 40); see Unsealed Pp. Vol., Tab 7); App. 1334-1335 (Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report)); see also 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 305 (Henderson, J.); id., at 532 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 875-76 (Leon, J.). Footnote 78One striking example is an ad that a group called "Citizens for Reform" sponsored during the 1996 Montana congressional race, in which Bill Yellowtail was a candidate. The ad stated: </s> "Who is Bill Yellowtail? He preaches family values but took a swing at his wife. And Yellowtail's response? He only slapped her. But 'her nose was not broken.' He talks law and order ... but is himself a convicted felon. And though he talks about protecting children, Yellowtail failed to make his own child support payments--then voted against child support enforcement. Call Bill Yellowtail. Tell him to support family values." 5 1998 Senate Report 6305 (minority views). </s> The notion that this advertisement was designed purely to discuss the issue of family values strains credulity. Footnote 79As discussed below, infra, at 97-103, BCRA §203 bars corporations and labor unions from funding electioneering communications with money from their general treasuries, instead requiring them to establish a "separate segregated fund" for such expenditures. 2 U.S.C.A. §441b(b)(2). Footnote 80Section 401 of BCRA provides: </s> "If any provision of this Act or amendment made by this Act . . ., or the application of a provision or amendment to any person or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act and amendments made by this Act, and the application of the provisions and amendment to any person or circumstance, shall not be affected by the holding." 2 U.S.C.A. §454 note. Footnote 81The disclosure requirements that BCRA §201 added to FECA §304 are actually somewhat less intrusive than the comparable requirements that have long applied to persons making independent expenditures. For example, the previous version of §304 required groups making independent expenditures to identify donors who contributed more than $200. 2 U. S. C. §434(c)(2)(C) (2000 ed.). The comparable requirement in the amendments applies only to donors of $1,000 or more. 2 U.S.C.A. §§434(f)(2)(E), (F) (Supp. 2003). Footnote 82NAACP v. Alabama arose out of a judgment holding the NAACP in contempt for refusing to produce the names and addresses of its members and agents in Alabama. The NAACP "made an uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members ha[d] exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility." 357 U.S., at 462. We thought it apparent that the compelled disclosure would "affect adversely" the NAACP and its members' ability "to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate." Id., at 462-463. Under these circumstances, we concluded that Alabama's interest in determining whether the NAACP was doing business in the State was plainly insufficient to justify its production order. Id., at 464-466. Footnote 83We stated: </s> "The District Court properly applied the Buckley test to the facts of this case. The District Court found 'substantial evidence of both governmental and private hostility toward and harassment of [Socialist Workers Party (SWP)] members and supporters.' Appellees introduced proof of specific incidents of private and government hostility toward the SWP and its members within the four years preceding the trial. These incidents, many of which occurred in Ohio and neighboring States, included threatening phone calls and hate mail, the burning of SWP literature, the destruction of SWP members' property, police harassment of a party candidate, and the firing of shots at an SWP office. There was also evidence that in the 12-month period before trial 22 SWP members, including 4 in Ohio, were fired because of their party membership. Although appellants contend that two of the Ohio firings were not politically motivated, the evidence amply supports the District Court's conclusion that 'private hostility and harassment toward SWP members make it difficult for them to maintain employment.' The District Court also found a past history of Government harassment of the SWP." Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1982) (paragraph break omitted). Footnote 84We cannot judge the likelihood that this will occur, as the record contains little if any description of the contractual provisions that commonly govern payments for electioneering communications. Nor does the record contain any evidence relating to Justice Kennedy's speculation, post, at 39-40, that advance disclosure may disadvantage an advertiser. Footnote 85New FECA §315(a)(7)(C) reads as follows: </s> "if -- </s> "(i) any person makes, or contracts to make, any disbursement for any electioneering communication (within the meaning of section 434(f)(3) of this title); and </s> "(ii) such disbursement is coordinated with a candidate or an authorized committee of such candidate, a Federal, State, or local political party or committee thereof, or an agent or official of any such candidate, party, or committee; </s> such disbursement or contracting shall be treated as a contribution to the candidate supported by the electioneering communication or that candidate's party and as an expenditure by that candidate or that candidate's party. . . ." 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(a)(7)(C). Footnote 86We have explained: </s> "The statutory purpose of §441b ... is to prohibit contributions or expenditures by corporations or labor organizations in connection with federal elections. 2 U.S.C. §441b(a). The section, however, permits some participation of unions and corporations in the federal electoral process by allowing them to establish and pay the administrative expenses of 'separate segregated fund[s],' which may be 'utilized for political purposes.' 2 U.S.C. §441b(b)(2)(C). The Act restricts the operations of such segregated funds, however, by making it unlawful for a corporation to solicit contributions to a fund established by it from persons other than its 'stockholders and their families and its executive or administrative personnel and their families.' 2 U.S.C. §441b(b)(4)(A)." National Right to Work, 459 U.S., at 201-202. Footnote 87The amendment is straightforward. Prior to BCRA, FECA §316(a) made it "unlawful ... for any corporation whatever, or any labor organization, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with" certain federal elections. 2 U.S.C. §441b(a) (2000 ed.). BCRA amends FECA §316(b)(2)'s definition of the term "contribution or expenditure" to include "any applicable electioneering communication." 2 U.S.C.A. §441b(b)(2) (Supp. 2003). Footnote 88As Justice Kennedy emphasizes in dissent, post, at 44-45, we assume that the interests that justify the regulation of campaign speech might not apply to the regulation of genuine issue ads. The premise that apparently underlies Justice Kennedy's principal submission is a conclusion that the two categories of speech are nevertheless entitled to the same constitutional protection. If that is correct, Justice Kennedy must take issue with the basic holding in Buckley and, indeed, with our recognition in First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), that unusually important interests underlie the regulation of corporations' campaign-related speech. In Bellotti we cited Buckley, among other cases, for the proposition that "[p]reserving the integrity of the electoral process, preventing corruption, and 'sustain[ing] the active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of the government' are interests of the highest importance." 514 U.S. 334 (1995). Footnote 89In a different but somewhat related argument, one set of plaintiffs contends that political campaigns and issue advocacy involve press activities, and that BCRA therefore interferes with speakers' rights under the Freedom of the Press Clause. U.S. Const., Amdt. 1. We affirm the District Court's conclusion that this contention lacks merit. Footnote 90The statutory scheme is somewhat complex. In its provision dealing with "Rules Relating to Electioneering Communications," BCRA §203(c)(2) (adding FECA §316(c)(2)) makes a blanket exception for designated nonprofit organizations, which reads as follows: </s> "Exception </s> "Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the term 'applicable electioneering communication' does not include a communication by a section 501(c)(4) organization or a political organization (as defined in section 527(e)(1) of Title 26) made under section 434(f)(2)(E) or (F) of this title if the communication is paid for exclusively by funds provided directly by individuals who are United States citizens or nationals or lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in section 1101(a)(20) of Title 8). For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term 'provided directly by individuals' does not include funds the source of which is an entity described in subsection (a) of this section." 2 U.S.C.A. §441b(c)(2) (Supp. 2003). </s> BCRA §204, however, amends FECA §316(c) to exclude "targeted communications" from that exception. New FECA §316(c)(6) states that the §316(c)(2) exception "shall not apply in the case of a targeted communication that is made by an organization described" in §316(b)(2). 2 U.S.C.A. ¶ ;441b(c)(6)(A). Subparagraph (B) then defines the term "targeted communication" for the purpose of the provision as including all electioneering communications. The parties and the judges on the District Court have assumed that amended FECA §316(c)(6) completely canceled the exemption for nonprofit corporations set forth in §316(c)(2). 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 804 (Leon, J.) ("Section 204 completely cancels out the exemption for all nonprofit corporations provided by Section 203"). Footnote 91"[A] unanimous Court in National Right to Work did not think the regulatory burdens on PACs, including restrictions on their ability to solicit funds, rendered a PAC unconstitutional as an advocacy corporation's sole avenue for making political contributions. See 459 U.S., at 201-202. There is no reason to think the burden on advocacy corporations is any greater today, or to reach a different conclusion here." Beaumont, 539 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 16). Footnote 92New FECA §304(g) provides: </s> "Time for reporting certain expenditures </s> "(1) Expenditures aggregating $1,000 </s> "(A) Initial report </s> "A person (including a political committee) that makes or contracts to make independent expenditures aggregating $1,000 or more after the 20th day, but more than 24 hours, before the date of an election shall file a report describing the expenditures within 24 hours. </s> "(B) Additional reports </s> "After a person files a report under subparagraph (A), the person shall file an additional report within 24 hours after each time the person makes or contracts to make independent expenditures aggregating an additional $1,000 with respect to the same election as that to which the initial report relates." 2 U.S.C.A. §434 (Supp. 2003). Footnote 93New FECA §315(d)(4) reads as follows: </s> "Independent versus coordinated expenditures by party </s> "(A) In general </s> "On or after the date on which a political party nominates a candidate, no committee of the political party may make-- </s> "(i) any coordinated expenditure under this subsection with respect to the candidate during the election cycle at any time after it makes any independent expenditure (as defined in section 431(17) of this title) with respect to the candidate during the election cycle; or </s> "(ii) any independent expenditure (as defined in section 431(17) of this title) with respect to the candidate during the election cycle at any time after it makes any coordinated expenditure under this subsection with respect to the candidate during the election cycle. </s> "(B) Application </s> "For purposes of this paragraph, all political committees established and maintained by a national political party (including all congressional campaign committees) and all political committees established and maintained by a State political party (including any subordinate committee of a State committee) shall be considered to be a single political committee. </s> "(C) Transfers </s> "A committee of a political party that makes coordinated expenditures under this subsection with respect to a candidate shall not, during an election cycle, transfer any funds to, assign authority to make coordinated expenditures under this subsection to, or receive a transfer of funds from, a committee of the political party that has made or intends to make an independent expenditure with respect to the candidate." 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(d)(4) (Supp. 2003). Footnote 94After exempting political parties from the general contribution and expenditure limitations of the statute, 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(d)(1), FECA §315(d) imposes the following substitute limitations on party spending: </s> "(2) The national committee of a political party may not make any expenditure in connection with the general election campaign of any candidate for President of the United States who is affiliated with such party which exceeds an amount equal to 2 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the United States (as certified under subsection (e) of this section). Any expenditure under this paragraph shall be in addition to any expenditure by a national committee of a political party serving as the principal campaign committee of a candidate for office of President of the United States. </s> "(3) The national committee of a political party, or a State committee of a political party, including any subordinate committee of a State committee, may not make any expenditure in connection with the general election campaign of a candidate for Federal office in a State who is affiliated with such party which exceeds-- </s> "(A) in the case of a candidate for election to the office of Senator, or of Representative from a State which is entitled to only one Representative, the greater of-- </s> "(i) 2 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the State (as certified under subsection (e) of this section); or </s> "(ii) $20,000; and </s> "(B) in the case of a candidate for election to the officer of Representative, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner in any other State, $10,000." 2 U.S.C. §§441a(d)(2)-(3). Footnote 95As amended by BCRA,§301(17) provides: </s> "Independent expenditure </s> "The term 'independent expenditure' means an expenditure by a person-- </s> "(A) expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate; and </s> "(B) that is not made in concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of such candidate, the candidate's authorized political committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its agents." 2 U.S.C.A. §431(17) (Supp. 2003). </s> The version of the definition prior to its amendment by BCRA also included the phrase "expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate." 2 U.S.C. §431(17) (2000 ed.). That definition had been adopted in 1976, presumably to reflect the narrowing construction that the Court adopted in Buckley. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, 90 Stat. 475. Footnote 96Although the District Court and all the parties to this litigation endorse the interpretation set forth in the text, it is not clear that subparagraph (B) should be read so broadly: The reference to "a State" instead of "the States" suggests that Congress meant to distinguish between committees associated with the party for each State (which would be grouped together by State, with each grouping treated as a single committee for purposes of the choice) and committees associated with a national party (which would likewise be grouped together and treated as a separate political committee). We need not resolve the interpretive puzzle, however, because even under the more limited reading a local party committee would be able to tie the hands of a state committee or other local committees in the same State. Footnote 97The italicized portion of the following partial quotation of FECA §315(a)(7) was added by §214 of BCRA: </s> "For purposes of this subsection-- </s> "(A) contributions to a named candidate made to any political committee authorized by such candidate to accept contributions on his behalf shall be considered to be contributions made to such candidate; </s> "(B)(i) expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents, shall be considered to be a contribution to such candidate; </s> "(ii) expenditures made by any person (other than a candidate or candidate's authorized committee) in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a national, State, or local committee of a political party, shall be considered to be contributions made to such party committee ...." 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(a)(7) (Supp. 2003). Footnote 98Pre-BCRA FEC regulations defined coordinated expenditures to include expenditures made "[a]t the request or suggestion of" a candidate or party; communications in which a candidate or party "exercised control or decision-making authority over the content, timing, location, mode, intended audience, volume of distribution, or frequency of placement"; and communications produced "[a]fter substantial discussion or negotiation" with a party or candidate, "the result of which is collaboration or agreement." 11 CFR §100.23(c)(2) (2001). Footnote 99Contrary to plaintiffs' contention, the statutory framework was not significantly different at the time of our decision in Buckley. The relevant provision, 18 U.S.C. §608(e)(1), treated as coordinated any expenditures "authorized or requested by the candidate." (Emphasis added.) And the legislative history, on which we relied for "guidance in differentiating individual expenditures that are contributions ... from those treated as independent expenditures," described as "independent" an expenditure made by a supporter "'completely on his own, and not at the request or suggestion of the candidate or his agen[t].'" 424 U.S., at 46-47, n. 53 (quoting S.Rep. No. 93-689, p.18 (1974)). FOOTNOTESFootnote **Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter join this opinion in its entirety. Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join this opinion, except with respect to BCRA §305. Justice Thomas joins this opinion with respect to BCRA §§304, 305, 307, 316, 319, and 403(b). Footnote 1To qualify for increased candidate contribution limits, the "opposition personal funds amount," which depends on expenditures by a candidate and her self-financed opponent, must exceed a "threshold amount." 2 U.S.C.A. §§441a(i)(1)(D), 441a-1(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 2003). Footnote 2If the "opposition personal funds amount" is at least 10 times the "threshold amount" in a Senate race, or exceeds $350,000 in a House of Representatives race, the coordinated party expenditure limits do not apply. §§441a(i)(1)(C)(iii), 441a-1(a)(1)(C). Footnote 3Although some examples were presented to the District Court, 251 F.Supp. 2d 176, 588-590 (2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.), none were offered to this Court. FOOTNOTESFootnote **Justice Stevens, Justice O'Connor, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg join this opinion in its entirety. FOOTNOTESFootnote **Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy join this opinion in itsentirety. Footnote 1The Court points out that state parties may use Levin funds for certain activities. Levin funds, however, are still federal restrictions on speech, even if they are less onerous than the restrictions placed on national parties. Footnote 2Ironically, in the Court's view, Congress cannot be trusted to exercise judgment independent of its parties' large donors in its usual voting decisions because donations may be used to further its members' reelection campaigns, but yet must be deferred to when it passes a comprehensive regulatory regime that restricts election-related speech. It seems to me no less likely that Congress would create rules that favor its Members' reelection chances, than be corrupted by the influx of money to its political parties, which may in turn be used to fund a portion of the Members' reelection campaigns. Footnote 3The Court's suggestion that the "close relationship" between federal officeholders and state and local political parties in some way excludes the media from its rationale is unconvincing, see ante, at 24, n.15 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in result in part, and dissenting in part), particularly because such a relationship may be proved with minimal evidence. Indeed, although the Court concludes that local political parties have a "close relationship" with federal candidates, thus warranting greater congressional regulation, I am unaware of any evidence in the record that indicates that local political parties have any relationship with federal candidates. Footnote 4BCRA does not even close all of the "loopholes" that currently exist. Nonprofit organizations are currently able to accept, without disclosing, unlimited donations for voter registration, voter identification, and get-out-the-vote activities, and the record indicates that such organizations already receive large donations, sometimes in the millions of dollars, for these activities, 251 F.Supp. 2d 176, 323 (DC 2003) (Henderson, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the NAACP Voter Fund received a single, anonymous $7 million donation for get-out-the-vote activities). There is little reason why all donations to these nonprofit organizations, no matter the purpose for which the money is used, will deserve any more protection than the Court provides state parties if Congress decides to regulate them. And who knows what the next "loophole" will be. Footnote 5Section 315(e), as amended by BCRA §504, provides: </s> "Political record </s> "(1) In general </s> "A licensee shall maintain, and make available for public inspection, a complete record of a request to purchase broadcast time that-- </s> "(A) is made by or on behalf of a legally qualified candidate for public office; or </s> "(B) communicates a message relating to any political matter of national importance, including-- </s> "(i) a legally qualified candidate; </s> "(ii) any election to Federal office; or </s> "(iii) a national legislative issue of public importance. </s> "(2) Contents of record </s> "A record maintained under paragraph (1) shall contain information regarding-- </s> "(A) whether the request to purchase broadcast time is accepted or rejected by the licensee; </s> "(B) the rate charged for the broadcast time; </s> "(C) the date and time on which the communication is aired; </s> "(D) the class of time that is purchased; </s> "(E) the name of the candidate to which the communication refers and the office to which the candidate is seeking election, the election to which the communication refers, or the issue to which the communication refers (as applicable); </s> "(F) in the case of a request made by, or on behalf of, a candidate, the name of the candidate, the authorized committee of the candidate, and the treasurer of such committee; and </s> "(G) in the case of any other request, the name of the person purchasing the time, the name, and phone number of a contact person for such person, and a list of the chief executive officers or members of the executive committee or of the board of directors of such person. </s> "(3) Time to maintain file </s> "The information required under this subsection shall be placed in a political file as soon as possible and shall be retained by the licensee for a period of not less than 2 years." Footnote 6Communications relating to candidates will be covered by the new Communications Act §315(e)(1)(A), so, in this context, we must consider, for example, the plaintiff-organizations, which may attemptto use the broadcast medium to convey a message espoused by the organizations. FOOTNOTESFootnote **Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer join this opinion in itsentirety. Footnote †Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992). FOOTNOTESFootnote **It is disillusioning to learn that the fabled quote is inaccurate. Wilson actually said: "[F]or years I thought what was good for our country was good for General Motors, and vice versa. The difference did not exist." Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1953). FOOTNOTESFootnote **Justice Scalia joins Parts I, II-A, and II-B of this opinion. Footnote 1The Court also rejected an overbreadth challenge, reasoning that "Congress was justified in concluding that the interest in safeguarding against the appearance of impropriety requires that the opportunity for abuse inherent in the process of raising large monetary contributions be eliminated." Buckley, 424 U.S., at 30. But this justification was inextricably intertwined with the Court's concern over the difficulty of isolating suspect contributions. If it were easy to isolate suspect contributions, and if bribery laws could be quickly and effectively enforced, then there would be no "opportunity for abuse inherent in the process," ibid., and hence no need for an otherwise overbroad contribution ceiling. Footnote 2Arguably, the current antibribery statute, 18 U.S.C. §201, is broad enough to cover the unspecified other "attempts ... to influence governmental action" that the Buckley Court seemed worried about. 424 U.S., at 28. Footnote 3Indeed, the principal contents of Senator McCain's declaration are his complaints that several bills he supported were defeated. The Senator also suggests, without evidence, that there had been some connection between the defeat of his favored policy outcomes and certain soft-money donors. See, e.g., App. 393-394, ¶ ;10 (declaration of Sen. John McCain ¶ ;10) (noting Democratic "parliamentary procedural device" used to block one of Senator McCain's proposed amendments to the Sarbanes-Oxley corporate governance bill). The possibility that his favored policy outcomes lost due to lack of public support, or because the opponents of the amendment honestly believed it would do harm to the public, does not appear to be addressed. Footnote 4Former Senators Simpson and Simon both seem to have the same response as Senator McCain, see n.3, supra, in having their favored interests voted down, and similarly do not consider alternative explanations for the failure of their proposals. See App. 811, ¶ ;11 (declaration of former Sen. Alan Simpson ¶ ;11); App. 805, ¶ ;14 (declaration of former Sen. Paul Simon ¶ ;14). Footnote 5Because there is not an iota of evidence supporting the Government's asserted interests in BCRA §318, I concur in the Court's conclusion that this provision is unconstitutional. Footnote 6The joint opinion continues yet another disturbing trend: the application of a complaisant level of scrutiny under the guise of "strict scrutiny." See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. ___ (2003). Footnote 7This is doubly so now that the Court has decided that there is no constitutional need for the showing even of an "agreement" in order to transform an expenditure into a "coordinated expenditur[e]" and hence into a contribution for FECA purposes. Ante, at 115-117 (joint opinion). Footnote 8The National Rifle Association (NRA) plaintiffs compellingly state that "[a]s a measure designed to prevent official corruption, of either the quid pro quo or the 'gratitude' variety, Title II ... makes no more sense than a bribery statute requiring corporations to pay for their bribes using funds from PACs." Brief for Appellants NRA etal. in No. 02-1675, pp.24-25. And, regarding the appearance of corruption: "Defendants' own witnesses concede that the public's perceptions of ads is not affected in the slightest by whether they are purchased with general treasury funds or with PAC money." Id., at 25. Footnote 9The fact that the Founders located the right to anonymous speech in the "freedom of the press" is of no moment, as "it makes little difference in terms of our analysis, which seeks to determine only whether the First Amendment, as originally understood, protects anonymous writing." McIntyre, 514 U.S., at 360 (Thomas, J., concurring). Footnote 10BCRA §212(a) is also unconstitutional. Although the plaintiffs only challenge the advance disclosure requirement of §212(a), by requiring disclosure of communications using express advocacy, the entire reporting requirement is unconstitutional for the same reasons that §201 is unconstitutional. Consequently, it follows that the advance disclosure provision is unconstitutional. </s> BCRA §§311 and 504 also violate the First Amendment. By requiring any television or radio advertisement that satisfies the definition of "electioneering communication" to include the identity of the sponsor, and even a "full-screen view of a representative of the political committee or other person making the statement" in the case of a television advertisement, new FECA §318, §311 is a virtual carbon copy of the law at issue in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (the only difference being the irrelevant distinction between a printed pamphlet and a television or radio advertisement). And §504 not only has the precise flaws of §201, but also sweeps broadly as well, covering any "message relating to any political matter of national importance, including ... a national legislative issue of public importance." Hence, both §§311 and 504 should be struck down. Footnote 11The Court, in upholding most of its provisions by concluding that the "express advocacy" limitation derived by Buckley is not a constitutionally mandated line, has, in one blow, overturned every Court of Appeals that has addressed this question (except, perhaps, one). See Clifton v. FEC, 114 F.3d 1309, 1312 (CA1 1997); Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 387 (CA2 2000); FEC v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049, 1064 (CA4 1997); Chamber of Commerce v. Moore, 288 F.3d 187, 193 (CA5 2000); Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963, 968-970 (CA8 1999); Citizens for Responsible Govt. State Political Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1187 (CA10 2000). The one possible exception is the Ninth Circuit. See FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 862-863 (1987). Footnote 12After all, the constitutional avoidance doctrine counsels us to adopt constructions of statutes to "avoid decision of constitutional questions," not to deliberately create constitutional questions. United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 373 (1971); see also United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909). Footnote 13This very case is an excellent example of why such a bright-line rule is necessary. The Court, having "rejected the notion that the First Amendment requires Congress to treat so-called issue advocacy differently from express advocacy," ante, at 87-88, proceeds to uphold significant new restrictions on speech that is, in every sense of the word, pure issue-related speech. The Court abandons the bright-line rule, and now subjects political speech of virtually any kind to the risk of regulation by Congress. Footnote 14Chief Justice Burger presciently commented on precisely this point in First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 796-797 (1978) (citations omitted): </s> "In terms of 'unfair advantage in the political process' and 'corporate domination of the electoral process,' it could be argued that such media conglomerates as I describe pose a much more realistic threat to valid interests than do appellants and similar entities not regularly concerned with shaping popular opinion on public issues. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, [418 U.S. 241 (1974)]. In Tornillo, for example, we noted the serious contentions advanced that a result of the growth of modern media empires 'has been to place in a few hands the power to inform the American people and shape public opinion.' 418 U.S., at 250." Footnote 15It appears that "circumvention" of the campaign finance laws by exploiting media exemptions is already being planned by one of the plaintiffs in this litigation. See Theimer, NRA Seeks Status as News Outlet, Washington Post A09 (Dec. 7, 2003) (reporting that the NRA is looking to acquire a broadcast outlet and seeking to be classified as a news organization). Footnote 16Given the quality of the evidence the Court relies upon to uphold Title I, the evidence should not be hard to come by. See Kane & Preston, Fox Chief on Hot Seat, Roll Call (June 12, 2003) ("GOP leaders such as House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-Texas) have labeled CNN as the 'Communist News Network' and the 'Clinton News Network'--suggesting they only presented the liberal viewpoint and that of former President Clinton"); Jones, Fox News Moves from the Margins to the Mainstream, Shorenstein Center, Harvard (Dec. 1, 2002) (quoting Al Gore as describing Fox News and the Washington Times as "part and parcel of the Republican Party"). Footnote 17See also 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 151 (1769) ("The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state"). FOOTNOTESFootnote **The Chief Justice joins this opinion in its entirety. Justice Scalia joins this opinion except to the extent it upholds new FECA §323(e)and BCRA §202. Justice Thomas joins this opinion with respect to BCRA §213. Footnote †See also Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. ___, ___ (2003) (slip op., at 14) ("[T]he basic premise we have followed in setting First Amendment standards for reviewing political financial restrictions [is that] the level of scrutiny is based on the importance of the 'political activity at issue' to effective speech or political association"); California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 582 (2000) ("We can think of no heavier burden on a political party's associational freedom. Proposition 198 is therefore unconstitutional unless it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest").

United States Supreme Court HESTER v. ILLINOIS(1969) No. 82 Argued: Decided: October 1, 1969 </s> April 27, 1970 </s> Marshall Kaplan, Chicago, Ill., for petitioner. Joel M. Flaum, Chicago, Ill., for respondent. On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Illinois. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, Mr. Justice BRENNAN, and Mr. Justice MARSHALL dissent.[ Hester v. Illinois 397 U.S. 660 (1970) ]

United States Supreme Court MAZER v. STEIN(1954) No. 228 Argued: December 3, 1953Decided: March 8, 1954 </s> Respondents are engaged in the manufacture and sale of electric lamps. One of the respondents created original works of sculpture, from the models of which china statuettes were made. The statuettes were used as bases for fully equipped electric lamps, which respondents sold. Respondents submitted the statuettes, without any lamp components added, for registration under the copyright law as "works of art" or reproductions thereof. Held: The statuettes were copyrightable. Pp. 202-219. </s> (a) The successive Copyright Acts, the legislative history of the 1909 Act, and the practice of the Copyright Office show that "works of art" and "reproductions of works of art" were intended by Congress to include the authority to copyright such statuettes. Pp. 208-214. </s> (b) That the statuettes, fitted as lamps or unfitted, may be patentable does not bar their copyright as works of art. Pp. 215-217. </s> (c) The intended or actual use in industry of an article eligible for copyright does not bar or invalidate its registration. P. 218. </s> (d) The subsequent registration of a work of art published as an element in a manufactured article is not a misuse of the copyright. Pp. 218-219. </s> 204 F.2d 472, affirmed. </s> Respondents sued petitioners for copyright infringement, and the District Court dismissed the complaint. 111 F. Supp. 359. The Court of Appeals reversed. 204 F.2d 472. This Court granted certiorari. 346 U.S. 811 . Affirmed, p. 219. </s> Max R. Kraus and Robert L. Kahn argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. [347 U.S. 201, 202] </s> George E. Frost argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Will Freeman and Charles F. Barber. </s> By special leave of Court, Benjamin Forman argued the cause for the Register of Copyrights, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Stern, Assistant Attorney General Burger and Paul A. Sweeney. </s> MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case involves the validity of copyrights obtained by respondents for statuettes of male and female dancing figures made of semivitreous china. The controversy centers around the fact that although copyrighted as "works of art," the statuettes were intended for use and used as bases for table lamps, with electric wiring, sockets and lamp shades attached. </s> Respondents are partners in the manufacture and sale of electric lamps. One of the respondents created original works of sculpture in the form of human figures by traditional clay-model technique. From this model, a production mold for casting copies was made. The resulting statuettes, without any lamp components added, were submitted by the respondents to the Copyright Office for registration as "works of art" or reproductions thereof under 5 (g) or 5 (h) of the copyright law, 1 and certificates [347 U.S. 201, 203] of registration issued. Sales (publication in accordance with the statute) as fully equipped lamps preceded the applications for copyright registration of the statuettes. 17 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) 10, 11, 13, 209; Rules and Regulations, 37 CFR, 1949, 202.8 and 202.9. Thereafter, the statuettes were sold in quantity throughout the country both as lamp bases and as statuettes. The sales in lamp form accounted for all but an insignificant portion of respondents' sales. </s> Petitioners are partners and, like respondents, make and sell lamps. Without authorization, they copied the statuettes, embodied them in lamps and sold them. </s> The instant case is one in a series of reported suits brought by respondents against various alleged infringers of the copyrights, all presenting the same or a similar question. 2 Because of conflicting decisions, 3 we granted certiorari. 346 U.S. 811 . In the present case respondents [347 U.S. 201, 204] sued petitioners for infringement in Maryland. Stein v. Mazer, 111 F. Supp. 359. Following the Expert decision and rejecting the reasoning of the District Court in the Rosenthal opinion, both referred to in the preceding note, the District Court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed and held the copyrights valid. Stein v. Mazer, 204 F.2d 472. 4 It said: "A subsequent utilization of a work of art in an article of manufacture in no way affects the right of the copyright owner to be protected against infringement of the work of art itself." Id., at 477. </s> Petitioners, charged by the present complaint with infringement of respondents' copyrights of reproductions of their works of art, seek here a reversal of the Court of Appeals decree upholding the copyrights. Petitioners in their petition for certiorari present a single question: </s> "Can statuettes be protected in the United States by copyright when the copyright applicant intended primarily to use the statuettes in the form of lamp [347 U.S. 201, 205] bases to be made and sold in quantity and carried the intentions into effect? </s> "Stripped down to its essentials, the question presented is: Can a lamp manufacturer copyright his lamp bases?" </s> The first paragraph accurately summarizes the issue. The last gives it a quirk that unjustifiably, we think, broadens the controversy. The case requires an answer, not as to a manufacturer's right to register a lamp base but as to an artist's right to copyright a work of art intended to be reproduced for lamp bases. As petitioners say in their brief, their contention "questions the validity of the copyright based upon the actions of the respondents." Petitioners question the validity of a copyright of a work of art for "mass" production. "Reproduction of a work of art" does not mean to them unlimited reproduction. Their position is that a copyright does not cover industrial reproduction of the protected article. Thus their reply brief states: </s> "When an artist becomes a manufacturer or a designer for a manufacturer he is subject to the limitations of design patents and deserves no more consideration than any other manufacturer or designer." </s> It is not the right to copyright an article that could have utility under 5 (g) and (h), note 1, supra, that petitioners oppose. Their brief accepts the copyrightability of the great carved golden saltcellar of Cellini but adds: </s> "If, however, Cellini designed and manufactured this item in quantity so that the general public could have salt cellars, then an entirely different conclusion would be reached. In such case, the salt cellar becomes an article of manufacture having utility in addition to its ornamental value and would therefore have to be protected by design patent." [347 U.S. 201, 206] </s> It is publication as a lamp and registration as a statue to gain a monopoly in manufacture that they assert is such a misuse of copyright as to make the registration invalid. </s> No unfair competition question is presented. The constitutional power of Congress to confer copyright protection on works of art or their reproductions is not questioned. 5 Petitioners assume, as Congress has in its [347 U.S. 201, 207] enactments and as do we, that the constitutional clause empowering legislation "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their [347 U.S. 201, 208] respective Writings and Discoveries," Art. I, 8, cl. 8, includes within the term "Authors" the creator of a picture or a statue. The Court's consideration will be limited to the question presented by the petition for the writ of certiorari. 6 In recent years the question as to utilitarian use of copyrighted articles has been much discussed. 7 </s> In answering that issue, a review of the development of copyright coverage will make clear the purpose of the Congress in its copyright legislation. In 1790 the First Congress conferred a copyright on "authors of any map, chart, book or books already printed." 8 Later, designing, engraving and etching were included; 9 in 1831 musical [347 U.S. 201, 209] compositions; 10 dramatic compositions in 1856; 11 and photographs and negatives thereof in 1865. 12 </s> The Act of 1870 defined copyrightable subject matter as: </s> ". . . any book, map, chart, dramatic or musical composition, engraving, cut, print, or photograph or negative thereof, or of a painting, drawing, chromo, statue, statuary, and of models or designs intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts." (Emphasis supplied.) 13 </s> The italicized part added three-dimensional work of art to what had been protected previously. 14 In 1909 Congress [347 U.S. 201, 210] again enlarged the scope of the copyright statute. 15 The new Act provided in 4: </s> "That the works for which copyright may be secured under this Act shall include all the writings of an author." 16 </s> Some writers interpret this section as being coextensive with the constitutional grant, 17 but the House Report, while inconclusive, indicates that it was "declaratory of existing law" only. 18 Section 5 relating to classes of writings in 1909 read as shown in the margin with subsequent additions not material to this decision. 19 </s> [347 U.S. 201, 211] Significant for our purposes was the deletion of the fine-arts clause of the 1870 Act. 20 Verbal distinctions between purely aesthetic articles and useful works of art ended insofar as the statutory copyright language is concerned. 21 </s> The practice of the Copyright Office, under the 1870 and 1874 Acts and before the 1909 Act, was to allow registration "as works of the fine arts" of articles of the same character as those of respondents now under challenge. Seven examples appear in the Government's [347 U.S. 201, 212] brief amicus curiae. 22 In 1910, interpreting the 1909 Act, the pertinent Copyright Regulations read as shown in the margin. 23 Because, as explained by the Government, this regulation "made no reference to articles which might fairly be considered works of art although they might also serve a useful purpose," it was reworded in 1917 as shown below. 24 The amicus brief gives sixty examples selected at five-year intervals, 1912-1952, said to be typical of registrations of works of art possessing utilitarian aspects. 25 The current pertinent regulation, published in 37 CFR, 1949, 202.8, reads thus: </s> "Works of art (Class G) - (a) In General. This class includes works of artistic craftsmanship, in so far as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned, such as artistic jewelry, [347 U.S. 201, 213] enamels, glassware, and tapestries, as well as all works belonging to the fine arts, such as paintings, drawings and sculpture. . . ." </s> So we have a contemporaneous and long-continued construction of the statutes by the agency charged to administer them that would allow the registration of such a statuette as is in question here. 26 </s> This Court once essayed to fix the limits of the fine arts. 27 That effort need not be appraised in relation to this copyright issue. It is clear Congress intended the scope of the copyright statute to include more than the traditional fine arts. Herbert Putnam, Esq., then Librarian of Congress and active in the movement to amend the copyright laws, told the joint meeting of the House and Senate Committees: </s> "The term `works of art' is deliberately intended as a broader specification than `works of the fine arts' in the present statute with the idea that there is subject-matter (for instance, of applied design, not yet within the province of design patents), which may properly be entitled to protection under the copyright law." 28 </s> The successive acts, the legislative history of the 1909 Act and the practice of the Copyright Office unite to show [347 U.S. 201, 214] that "works of art' and "reproductions of works of art" are terms that were intended by Congress to include the authority to copyright these statuettes. Individual perception of the beautiful is too varied a power to permit a narrow or rigid concept of art. As a standard we can hardly do better than the words of the present Regulation, 202.8, supra, naming the things that appertain to the arts. They must be original, that is, the author's tangible expression of his ideas. Compare Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 -60. Such expression, whether meticulously delineating the model or mental image or conveying the meaning by modernistic form or color, is copyrightable. 29 What cases there are confirm this coverage of the statute. 30 </s> The conclusion that the statues here in issue may be copyrighted goes far to solve the question whether their intended reproduction as lamp stands bars or invalidates their registration. This depends solely on statutory interpretation. Congress may after publication protect by copyright any writing of an author. Its statute creates the copyright. 31 It did not exist at common law even [347 U.S. 201, 215] though he had a property right in his unpublished work. 32 </s> But petitioners assert that congressional enactment of the design patent laws should be interpreted as denying protection to artistic articles embodied or reproduced in manufactured articles. 33 They say: </s> "Fundamentally and historically, the Copyright Office is the repository of what each claimant considers to be a cultural treasure, whereas the Patent Office is the repository of what each applicant considers to be evidence of the advance in industrial and technological fields." </s> Their argument is that design patents require the critical examination given patents to protect the public against monopoly. Attention is called to Gorham Co. v. White, 14 Wall. 511, interpreting the design patent law of 1842, 5 Stat. 544, granting a patent to anyone who by "their own industry, genius, efforts, and expense, may have invented or produced any new and original design for a manufacture . . . ." A pattern for flat silver was there upheld. 34 The intermediate and present law differs [347 U.S. 201, 216] little. "Whoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor, . . . " subject generally to the provisions concerning patents for invention. 171, 66 Stat. 805. As petitioner sees the effect of the design patent law: </s> "If an industrial designer can not satisfy the novelty requirements of the design patent laws, then his design as used on articles of manufacture can be copied by anyone." </s> Petitioner has furnished the Court a booklet of numerous design patents for statuettes, bases for table lamps and similar articles for manufacture, quite indistinguishable in type from the copyrighted statuettes here in issue. 35 Petitioner urges that overlapping of patent and copyright legislation so as to give an author or inventor a choice between patents and copyrights should not be permitted. We assume petitioner takes the position that protection for a statuette for industrial use can only be obtained by patent, if any protection can be given. 36 </s> [347 U.S. 201, 217] </s> As we have held the statuettes here involved copyrightable, we need not decide the question of their patentability. Though other courts have passed upon the issue as to whether allowance by the election of the author or patentee of one bars a grant of the other, we do not. 37 We do hold that the patentability of the statuettes, fitted as lamps or unfitted, does not bar copyright as works of art. Neither the Copyright Statute nor any other says that because a thing is patentable it may not be copyrighted. We should not so hold. 38 </s> Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the idea - not the idea itself. 39 Thus, in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 , the Court held that a copyrighted book on a peculiar system of bookkeeping was not infringed by a similar book using a similar plan which achieved similar results where the alleged infringer made a different arrangement of the columns and used different headings. The distinction is illustrated in Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 151, when the court speaks of two men, each a perfectionist, independently making [347 U.S. 201, 218] maps of the same territory. Though the maps are identical, each may obtain the exclusive right to make copies of his own particular map, and yet neither will infringe the other's copyright. Likewise a copyrighted directory is not infringed by a similar directory which is the product of independent work. 40 The copyright protects originality rather than novelty or invention - conferring only "the sole right of multiplying copies." 41 Absent copying there can be no infringement of copyright. 42 Thus, respondents may not exclude others from using statuettes of human figures in table lamps; they may only prevent use of copies of their statuettes as such or as incorporated in some other article. Regulation 202.8, supra, makes clear that artistic articles are protected in "form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects." See Stein v. Rosenthal, 103 F. Supp. 227, 231. The dichotomy of protection for the aesthetic is not beauty and utility but art for the copyright and the invention of original and ornamental design for design patents. We find nothing in the copyright statute to support the argument that the intended use or use in industry of an article eligible for copyright bars or invalidates its registration. We do not read such a limitation into the copyright law. </s> Nor do we think the subsequent registration of a work of art published as an element in a manufactured article, is a misuse of the copyright. This is not different from [347 U.S. 201, 219] the registration of a statuette and its later embodiment in an industrial article. </s> "The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration." United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 . However, it is "intended definitely to grant valuable, enforceable rights to authors, publishers, etc., without burden-some requirements; `to afford greater encouragement to the production of literary [or artistic] works of lasting benefit to the world.'" Washingtonian Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 . </s> The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in "Science and useful Arts." Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered. </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 17 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) 4: "The works for which copyright may be secured under this title shall include all the writings of an author." Id., 5: "The application for registration shall specify to which of the following classes the work in which copyright is claimed belongs: . . . . . "(g) Works of art; models or designs for works of art. "(h) Reproductions of a work of art." Errors of classification are immaterial. See note 19, infra. </s> [Footnote 2 An unreported action, Stein v. Zuckerman and DuBeshter, was pending in the Eastern District of New York. Note, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 877, 878, n. 8. We are advised that it was dismissed by consent February 24, 1953. </s> [Footnote 3 Stein v. Expert Lamp Co., 188 F.2d 611. Stein v. Expert Lamp Co., 96 F. Supp. 97, was the first action brought. Through an accident in presentation, the trial court determined the case as though the copyright was on a statuette with lamp attachments. It held the statuettes not copyrightable because this "was evidence of the practical use" intended. Id., at 98. On petition for reconsideration, it held the presence or absence of the attachments immaterial. Stein v. Mazer, 111 F. Supp. 359, 361; Rosenthal v. Stein, 205 F.2d 633, 634. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the ground that the Copyright Act "does not refer to articles of manufacture having a utilitarian purpose nor does it provide for a previous examination by a proper tribunal as to the originality of the matter offered for copyright . . . ." Stein v. Expert Lamp Co., 188 F.2d 611, 613. Stein v. Rosenthal, 103 F. Supp. 227, was a second infringement case. It was there held "Protection is not dissipated by taking an unadulterated object of art as copyrighted and integrating it into commercially valuable merchandise." Id., at 230. On appeal, the Court [347 U.S. 201, 204] of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, saying "The theory that the use of a copyrighted work of art loses its status as a work of art if and when it is put to a functional use has no basis in the wording of the copyright laws and there is nothing in the design-patent laws which excludes a work of art from the operation of the copyright laws." Rosenthal v. Stein, 205 F.2d 633, 635. In Stein v. Benaderet, 109 F. Supp. 364, 365, a district court of Michigan held that it is the "intent and purpose" of the designer which determines whether an object is copyrightable as a work of art. The court said plaintiffs should have applied for a design patent and held for defendants. An appeal is pending now in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The opinions in the above cases and those of the District Court and the Court of Appeals in the present litigation deserve careful reading. </s> [Footnote 4 In this case the Register of Copyrights participated as amicus curiae and supported respondents. Through the Solicitor General he has also filed a brief in this Court, and participated in the oral argument. 346 U.S. 882 . </s> [Footnote 5 We do not reach for constitutional questions not raised by the parties. Chicago & G. T. R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 ; New York ex rel. Rosevale Realty Co. v. Kleinert, 268 U.S. 646, 651 ; C. I. O. v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 472, 475 . The fact that the issue was mentioned in argument does not bring the question properly before us. Herbring v. Lee, 280 U.S. 111, 117 . No question of our jurisdiction emerges. Chicot County Dist. v. Bank, 308 U.S. 371 . Compare Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 , and Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 667 . Compare on the constitutional question the following: Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 , upheld the copyright of a photograph unanimously. It was said: "By writings in that clause is meant the literary productions of those authors, and Congress very properly has declared these to include all forms of writing, printing, engraving, etching, &c., by which the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible expression." Id., at 58. "These findings, we think, show this photograph to be an original work of art, the product of plaintiff's intellectual invention, of which plaintiff is the author, and of a class of inventions for which the Constitution intended that Congress should secure to him the exclusive right to use, publish and sell, as it has done by section 4952 of the Revised Statutes." Id., at 60. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 -250, upheld a copyright on circus posters. The Court said: "We shall do no more than mention the suggestion that painting and engraving unless for a mechanical end are not among the useful arts, the progress of which Congress is empowered by the Constitution to promote. The Constitution does not limit the useful to that which satisfies immediate bodily needs. . . . Personality always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even [347 U.S. 201, 207] in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man's alone. That something he may copyright unless there is a restriction in the words of the act." Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 63 , involved pirating by motion pictures of the copyrighted dramatic rights of a book. This Court said: "It is argued that the law construed as we have construed it goes beyond the power conferred upon Congress by the Constitution, to secure to authors for a limited time the exclusive right to their writings. Art. I, 8, cl. 8. It is suggested that to extend the copyright to a case like this is to extend it to the ideas as distinguished from the words in which those ideas are clothed. But there is no attempt to make a monopoly of the ideas expressed. The law confines itself to a particular, cognate and well known form of reproduction. If to that extent a grant of monopoly is thought a proper way to secure the right to the writings this court cannot say that Congress was wrong." See also Schreiber v. Thornton, 17 F. 603, reversed on other grounds, Thornton v. Schreiber, 124 U.S. 612 . See Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17 Geo. L. J. 109; 2 Story, Constitution (5th ed.), c. XIX. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 . Congress had passed a trade-mark act under the Patent and Copyright Clause. A unanimous Court held this effort to protect trade-marks was unconstitutional: "The ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention or discovery. . . . If we should endeavor to classify it under the head of writings of authors, the objections are equally strong. In this, as in regard to inventions, originality is required. And while the word writings may be liberally construed, as it has been, to include original designs for engravings, prints, &c., it is only such as are original, and are founded in the creative powers of the mind. The writings which are to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, prints, engravings, and the like." The trade-mark does not "depend upon novelty, invention, discovery, [347 U.S. 201, 208] or any work of the brain. It requires no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought. It is simply founded on priority of appropriation." See as to commerce, id., at 95-98; Robert, Commentary on the Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C.A. ( 81-1113, 1948) p. 265. </s> [Footnote 6 National Licorice Co. v. Labor Board, 309 U.S. 350, 357 , n. 2; General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175 ; Crown C. & S. Co. v. Ferdinand Gutmann Co., 304 U.S. 159 , and cases cited; Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90 . The policy is incorporated in Rule 38 (2), Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the practice of bringing "additional questions into a case" has been condemned recently in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 129 . </s> [Footnote 7 Ball, Law of Copyright and Literary Property (1944), 390; Howell, Copyright Law (1952), 130; 1 Ladas, The International Protection of Literary and Artistic Property (1938), 247; Weil, Copyright Law (1917), 227; Derenberg, Copyright No-Man's Land: Fringe Rights in Literary and Artistic Property, 1953 Copyright Problems Analyzed (CCH), 215; Pogue, Borderland - Where Copyright and Design Patent Meet, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 33; Notes, 21 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 353; 66 Harv. L. Rev. 877; 27 Ind. L. J. 130. See Report of the Copyright Committee, Board of Trade (London, October 1952), Artistic Copyright and Industrial Designs, 82 et seq. </s> [Footnote 8 1 Stat. 124. </s> [Footnote 9 2 Stat. 171. </s> [Footnote 10 4 Stat. 436. </s> [Footnote 11 11 Stat. 139. </s> [Footnote 12 13 Stat. 540. Between 1789 and 1904, there were in all some twenty-five laws dealing with copyrights. Solberg, Copyright in Congress (1905), 89-93. </s> [Footnote 13 86, 16 Stat. 212. This Act also vested control of records relating to copyrights in the Librarian of Congress and provided he should administer the law. Id., 85. </s> [Footnote 14 In connection with the phrase in the 1870 Act "intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts," see the 1874 amendatory Act, 18 Stat. 78, and Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 . Section 3 contained the following provision: "That in the construction of this act, the words `Engraving,' `cut' and `print' shall be applied only to pictorial illustrations or works connected with the fine arts, and no prints or labels designed to be used for any other articles of manufacture shall be entered under the copyright law, but may be registered in the Patent Office." This was repealed in 1939 and the following enacted: "SEC. 2. Section 5 (k) of the Act entitled `An Act to amend and consolidate the Acts respecting copyright' approved March 4, 1909, is hereby amended to read: `(k) Prints and pictorial illustrations including prints or labels used for articles of merchandise.'" 53 Stat. 1142. This was an amendment to 5 (k) of the Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1077. It is to be noted, however, that the 1909 Act did not conform to the 1874 language, but the present Act, 17 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) 5 (k), does contain the amendatory language of the 1939 Act. </s> [Footnote 15 S. Rep. No. 6187, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. 4: "The existing statutes attempt specifications which are unfortunate because necessarily imperfect and requiring frequent additions to cover new forms or new processes. The bill in its general definition substitutes a general term, `all the works of an author.' The term used in the constitution is `writings.' But Congress has always construed this term broadly, and in doing so has been uniformly supported by judicial decision. It has, for instance, interpreted it as authorizing subject-matter so remote from its popular significance as photographs, paintings, statuary, and dramas, even if unwritten. "As thus interpreted, the word `writings' would to-day in popular parlance be more nearly represented by the word `works;' and this the bill adopts; referring back, however, to the word `writings' by way of safe anchorage, but regarding this as including `all forms of record in which the thought of an author may be recorded and from which it may be read or reproduced.'" Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884), has held that photographs were copyrightable in spite of the argument that the Constitution only specified protection for "writings" of an "author." This decision made clear that "writings" was not limited to chirography and typography. </s> [Footnote 16 35 Stat. 1076. </s> [Footnote 17 Weil, Copyright Law (1917), 214; Howell, The Copyright Law (3d ed. 1952), 8. </s> [Footnote 18 H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 10. The report is not very clear on the point, however. </s> [Footnote 19 "The application for registration shall specify to which of the following classes the work in which copyright is claimed belongs: "(a) Books including composite and cyclopaedic works, directories, gazetteers, and other compilations; "(b) Periodicals, including newspapers; "(c) Lectures, sermons, addresses, prepared for oral delivery; "(d) Dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions; "(e) Musical compositions; "(f) Maps; "(g) Works of art; models or designs for works of art; "(h) Reproductions of a work of art; "(i) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character; "(j) Photographs; "(k) Prints and pictorial illustrations. "Provided, nevertheless, That the above specifications shall not be held to limit the subject-matter of copyright as defined in section four of this Act, nor shall any error in classification invalidate or impair the copyright protection secured under this Act." 35 Stat. 1076. Subsection (k) was amended by the addition of the words "including prints or labels used for articles of merchandise" in 1939. 53 Stat. 1142. See note 14, supra. Two more classes "(1) Motion-picture photoplays" and "(m) Motion pictures other than photoplays" were added in 1912. 37 Stat. 488. </s> [Footnote 20 See note 14, supra, for repeal of clause defining engraving cuts and prints in terms of "fine art." </s> [Footnote 21 Title 17 of the United States Code entitled "Copyrights" was codified into positive law in 1947 without change in the pertinent provisions. 61 Stat. 652, 17 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) 4, 5. </s> [Footnote 22 E. g., "A female figure bearing an urn in front partly supported by drapery around the head. The figure nude from the waist up and below this the form concealed by conventionalized skirt draperies which flow down and forward forming a tray at the base. Sides and back of skirt in fluted form. The whole being designed as a candle-stick with match tray. The figure standing and bent forward from hips and waist." </s> [Footnote 23 "Works of art. - This term includes all works belonging fairly to the so-called fine arts. (Paintings, drawings, and sculpture.) "Productions of the industrial arts utilitarian in purpose and character are not subject to copyright registration, even if artistically made or ornamented." Rules and Regulations for the Registration of Claims to Copyright, Bulletin No. 15 (1910), 8. </s> [Footnote 24 "Works of art and models or designs for works of art. This term includes all works belonging fairly to the so-called fine arts. (Paintings, drawings, and sculpture.) "The protection of productions of the industrial arts utilitarian in purpose and character even if artistically made or ornamented depends upon action under the patent law; but registration in the Copyright Office has been made to protect artistic drawings notwithstanding they may afterwards be utilized for articles of manufacture." 37 CFR, 1939, 201.4 (7). </s> [Footnote 25 E. g., "Lighting fixture design. By F. E. Guitini. [Bowlshaped bracket embellished with figure of half-nude woman standing [347 U.S. 201, 213] in bunch of flowers.] Copyright December 28, 1912. Registration number G 42645. Copyright claimant: Kathodion Bronze Works, New York." </s> [Footnote 26 Great Northern R. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 275 . </s> [Footnote 27 United States v. Perry, 146 U.S. 71, 74 . </s> [Footnote 28 Arguments before the Committees on Patents of the Senate and House of Representatives, conjointly, on S. 6330 and H. R. 19853, To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., June 6-9, 1906, p. 11. The statement is applicable to the 1909 Act since 5 (g) and (h) of the 1909 Act are identical with the same sections of S. 6330 and H. R. 19853. Although there were other hearings and reports (see 51 House Committee Hearings before [347 U.S. 201, 214] Committee on Patents (1906-1912), on Consolidating and Revising the Copyright Laws; H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 3), this statement of Mr. Putnam is the only explanation of the change in statutory language, though S. Rep. No. 6187, 59th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 11, refers to "works of art" as a new designation and mentioned the deletion of "fine" from the category. </s> [Footnote 29 Cf. H. C. White Co. v. Morton E. Converse & Son Co., 20 F.2d 311. </s> [Footnote 30 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony 111 U.S. 53, 60 ; Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 ; Louis De Jonge & Co. v. Breuker & Kessler Co., 182 F. 150, 152; F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, 193 F.2d 162, 164; see same case, 344 U.S. 228 ; Yuengling v. Schile, 12 F. 97, 100; Schumacher v. Schwencke, 25 F. 466; Pellegrini v. Allegrini, 2 F.2d 610. </s> [Footnote 31 Wheaton and Donaldson v. Peters and Grigg, 8 Pet. 591, 661; Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 . </s> [Footnote 32 Lord Brougham and Lord St. Leonards in Jefferys v. Boosey, IV H. L. C. 815, 968, 979, 10 Eng. Rep. 681, 741, 745. </s> [Footnote 33 Two cases are relied upon to support the position of the petitioners. Taylor Instrument Companies v. Fawley-Brost, 139 F.2d 98, and Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 82 U.S. App. D.C. 232, 161 F.2d 910. These cases hold that the Mechanical Patent Law and Copyright Laws are mutually exclusive. As to overlapping of Design Patent and Copyright Laws, however, a different answer has been given by the courts. Louis De Jonge & Co. v. Breuker & Kessler Co., 182 F. 150, affirmed on other grounds in 191 F. 35, and 235 U.S. 33 ; see also cases cited in note 37, infra. </s> [Footnote 34 This Court said, p. 525: "It is a new and original design for a manufacture, whether of metal or other material; . . . to be either worked into, or on, any article of manufacture; or a new and original shape or configuration of any article of manufacture - it is one or all of these that the law has in view. And the thing invented or produced, [347 U.S. 201, 216] for which a patent is given, is that which gives a peculiar or distinctive appearance to the manufacture, or article to which it may be applied, or to which it gives form. . . . It therefore proposes to secure for a limited time to the ingenious producer of those appearances the advantages flowing from them. . . . It is the appearance itself, therefore, no matter by what agency caused, that constitutes mainly, if not entirely, the contribution to the public which the law deems worthy of recompense." </s> [Footnote 35 E. g., Design Patent 170.445 Base for table lamps, a fanciful statuette of a girl standing in front of a high rock in bathing costume. </s> [Footnote 36 The English Copyright Act, 1911, 22, 4 Halsbury's Statutes of England (2d ed.), p. 800, does not protect designs registrable under the Patents and Designs Act (now the Registered Designs Act, 1949, 17 Halsbury's Statutes of England (2d ed.)) Unless such designs are not used or intended to be used as models or patterns to be multiplied by any industrial process. The Board of Trade has ruled that a design shall be deemed to be used as a model or pattern to be multiplied [347 U.S. 201, 217] by industrial process within the meaning of 22 when the design is reproduced or intended to be reproduced in more than fifty single articles. The Copyright (Industrial Designs) Rules, 1949, No. 2367, 1 Statutory Instruments 1949, p. 1453. </s> [Footnote 37 See Rosenthal v. Stein, note 3, supra; In re Blood, 57 App. D.C. 351, 23 F.2d 772; Korzybski v. Underwood & Underwood, Inc., 36 F.2d 727; William A. Meier Glass Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 95 F. Supp. 264, 267; Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffler, 16 F. Supp. 729; Louis De Jonge & Co. v. Breuker & Kessler Co., 182 F. 150; 66 Harv. L. Rev. 884; 52 Mich. L. Rev. 33; cf. Taylor Instrument Companies v. Fawley-Brost, 139 F.2d 98. </s> [Footnote 38 See, Pogue, Borderland - Where Copyright and Design Patent Meet, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 33, 58. </s> [Footnote 39 F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, 193 F.2d 162; Ansehl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co., 61 F.2d 131; Fulmer v. United States, 122 Ct. Cl. 195, 103 F. Supp. 1021; Muller v. Triborough Bridge Authority, 43 F. Supp. 298. </s> [Footnote 40 Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539. See, Anno. 26 A. L. R. 585. </s> [Footnote 41 Jeweler's Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83, 94. </s> [Footnote 42 White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 ; Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 ; Arustein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-469; Alfred Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103; Ansehl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co., supra; Christic v. Cohan, 154 F.2d 827. </s> Opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, in which MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs. </s> An important constitutional question underlies this case - a question which was stirred on oral argument but not treated in the briefs. It is whether these statuettes of dancing figures may be copyrighted. Congress has provided that "works of art," "models or designs for works of art," and "reproductions of a work of art" may be copyrighted (17 U.S.C. 5); and the Court holds that these statuettes are included in the words "works of art." But may statuettes be granted the monopoly of the copyright? </s> Article I, 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the [347 U.S. 201, 220] exclusive Right to their respective Writings . . . ." The power is thus circumscribed: it allows a monopoly to be granted only to "authors" for their "writings." Is a sculptor an "author" and is his statue a "writing" within the meaning of the Constitution? We have never decided the question. </s> Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 , held that a photograph could be copyrighted. </s> Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 , held that chromolithographs to be used as advertisements for a circus were "pictorial illustrations" within the meaning of the copyright laws. Broad language was used in the latter case, ". . . a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man's alone. That something he may copyright unless there is a restriction in the words of the act." 188 U.S., at 250 . But the constitutional range of the meaning of "writings" in the field of art was not in issue either in the Bleistein case nor in Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, 344 U.S. 228 , recently here on a writ of certiorari limited to a question of damages. </s> At times the Court has on its own initiative considered and decided constitutional issues not raised, argued, or briefed by the parties. Such, for example, was the case of Continental Bank v. Rock Island R. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 667 , in which the Court decided the constitutionality of 77 of the Bankruptcy Act though the question was not noticed by any party. We could do the same here and decide the question here and now. This case, however, is not a pressing one, there being no urgency for a decision. Moreover, the constitutional materials are quite meager (see Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17 Geo. L. J. 109 (1929); and much research is needed. </s> The interests involved in the category of "works of art," as used in the copyright law, are considerable. The [347 U.S. 201, 221] Copyright Office has supplied us with a long list of such articles which have been copyrighted - statuettes, book ends, clocks, lamps, door knockers, candlesticks, inkstands, chandeliers, piggy banks, sundials, salt and pepper shakers, fish bowls, casseroles, and ash trays. Perhaps these are all "writings" in the constitutional sense. But to me, at least, they are not obviously so. It is time that we came to the problem full face. I would accordingly put the case down for reargument. </s> [347 U.S. 201, 222]

United States Supreme Court GIORDENELLO v. UNITED STATES(1958) No. 515 Argued: Decided: June 30, 1958 </s> Certiorari granted and judgment reversed on authority of Giordenello v. United States, ante, p. 480. </s> Reported below: 249 F.2d 549. </s> William F. Walsh for petitioner. </s> Solicitor General Rankin for the United States. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reversed. No. 549, Giordenello v. United States, ante, p. 480, decided this day. </s> MR. JUSTICE BURTON, MR. JUSTICE CLARK, and MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER dissent for the reasons set forth in the dissenting opinion in No. 549, decided this day. </s> [357 U.S. 576, 577]

United States Supreme Court BRANCH et al. v. SMITH et al.(2003) No. 01-1437 Argued: December 10, 2002Decided: March 31, 2003 </s> After the 2000 census caused Mississippi to lose one congressional seat, the state legislature failed to pass a new redistricting plan. Anticipating a state-law deadline for qualifying candidates, appellants and cross-appellees (state plaintiffs) filed suit in October 2001, asking the State Chancery Court to issue a redistricting plan for the 2002 elections. In a similar action, appellees and cross-appellants (federal plaintiffs) asked the Federal District Court to enjoin the current plan and any state-court plan, and to order at-large elections pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §23-15-1039 and 2 U.S. C. §2a(c)(5) or, alternatively, to devise its own redistricting plan. The three-judge District Court permitted the state plaintiffs to intervene and concluded that it would assert jurisdiction if it became clear by January 7, 2002, that no state plan would be in place by March 1. On the eve of the state trial, the State Supreme Court ruled that the Chancery Court had jurisdiction to issue a redistricting plan. The Chancery Court adopted such a plan. On December 21, 2001, the state attorney general submitted that plan and the Supreme Court's decision to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for preclearance pursuant to §5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. DOJ requested additional information from the State, noting that the 60-day review period would commence once that information was received. The information was provided on February 20, 2002. Meanwhile, the Federal District Court promulgated a plan that would fix the State's congressional districts for the 2002 elections should the state-court plan not be precleared by February 25. When that date passed, the District Court enjoined the State from using the state-court plan and ordered that its own plan be used in 2002 and until the State produced a precleared, constitutional plan. The court based the injunction on the failure of the timely preclearance of the state-court plan, but found, in the alternative, that the state-court plan was unconstitutional. The State did not appeal. DOJ declined to make a determination about the preclearance submission because the District Court's injunction rendered the state-court plan incapable of administration. Held:The judgment is affirmed. 189 F.Supp.2d 548, affirmed. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III-A, holding: </s> 1.The District Court properly enjoined enforcement of the state-court plan. Pp.5-9. </s> (a)There are two critical distinctions between these cases and Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25. First, there is no suggestion here that the District Court failed to allow the state court adequate opportunity to develop a redistricting plan. Second, the state-court plan here was subject to §5 of the Voting Rights Act. The controversy over whether the state-court plan was precleared centers on §5's proviso that whenever a covered jurisdiction "shall enact or seek to administer" a voting change, the change may be enforced if the Attorney General does not object within 60 days. Pp.5-6. </s> (b)DOJ's failure to object within 60 days of the state attorney general's original submission did not render the state-court plan enforceable on February 25. A jurisdiction seeking preclearance must provide the Attorney General with information sufficient to prove that the change is nondiscriminatory. DOJ regulations--which are "wholly reasonable and consistent with the Act," Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 541--provide that incomplete state submissions do not start the 60-day clock, and that the clock begins to run from the date that requested information is received. DOJ's request here, which was neither frivolous nor unwarranted, postponed the 60-day period. Pp.6-7. </s> (c)The state-court plan was also not precleared 60 days after the state attorney general submitted the requested information. The State was "seek[ing] to administer" the changes within §5's meaning when its attorney general made his initial submission to DOJ and when he provided additional information. However, when the State failed to appeal the District Court's injunction, it ceased "seek[ing] to administer" the state-court plan. The 60-day period was no longer running, so the plan was not rendered enforceable by operation of law. Because a private party's actions are not those of a State, the state plaintiffs' appeal is insufficient to demonstrate that the State still "seek[s] to administer" the plan. Pp.7-9. </s> (d)Since this Court affirms the injunction on the ground that the state-court plan was not precleared and could not be precleared in time for the 2002 election, the Court vacates the District Court's alternative holding that such plan was unconstitutional. P.9. </s> 2.The District Court properly fashioned its own congressional reapportionment plan under 2 U.S.C. §2c. The tension between §§2a(c)(5) and 2c is apparent: Pending redistricting, §2a(c)(5) requires at-large elections if a State loses a congressional seat, while §2(c), which was enacted 26 years later, requires States with more than one Representative to use single-member districts. Contrary to the federal plaintiffs' contention, §2(c) is not limited to legislative action, but also applies to action by state and federal courts when the prescribed legislative action has not been forthcoming. When §2c was adopted in 1967, the issue was precisely the courts' involvement in fashioning electoral plans. The Voting Rights Act had recently been enacted, and this Court's decisions in, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, had ushered in a new era in which federal courts were overseeing efforts by badly malapportioned States to conform their congressional districts to one-person, one-vote standards. Given the risk that judges would simply order at-large elections, it is most unlikely that §2(c) was directed solely at legislative apportionment. Nor has any court found §2(c) to be so limited. In addition, §2c's language is most susceptible of this interpretation. Pp.9-16. </s> Justice Scalia, joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Ginsburg, concluded in Part III-B, that §2a(c)--where what it prescribes is constitutional (as it is in paragraph (5))--applies when a state legislature and the state and federal courts have all failed to redistrict pursuant to §2(c). This interpretation allows both §§2a(c) and 2c to be given effect. Section 2a(c) governs the manner of any election held "[u]ntil a State is redistricted in the manner provided by [state] law after any apportionment." When a court redistricts pursuant to §2c, it necessarily does so in such a manner because it must follow the State's "policies and preferences" for districting. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795. A court may invoke §2a(c)'s stopgap provision only when an election is so imminent that redistricting pursuant to state law (including §2c's mandate) cannot be completed without disrupting the election process. Mississippi's at-large provision should be deemed operative when §§2a(c)(2) and (5) would be: The state provision envisions both legislatively and judicially prescribed change and does not come into play as long as it is feasible for a state or federal court to complete redistricting. Pp.17-20. </s> Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter and Justice Breyer, while agreeing that the District Court properly enjoined the state-court plan's enforcement and promulgated its own plan under 2 U.S.C. §2c, concluded that §2c impliedly repealed §2a(c) and that the 1967 federal Act pre-empted Mississippi's statutory authorization for at-large congressional elections. The presumption against implied repeals, like that against pre-emption, is overcome if there is an irreconcilable conflict between the two provisions or if the later Act was clearly intended to "cove[r] the whole subject of the earlier one." Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503. By prohibiting States with more than one Representative from electing Representatives at-large, the 1967 Act unambiguously forbids elections that §2a(c)(5) would otherwise authorize. Thus, under either of Posadas' standards, the 1967 Act repealed the earlier §2a(c)(5) and pre-empted Mississippi's law. Any fair reading of the history leading to the 1967 Act's passage shows that the parties believed that the changes they were debating would completely replace §2a(c). The statute was the final gasp in a protracted legislative process. Four versions of the original bill expressly repealed §2a(c), and there was no disagreement about that provision. When that bill did not pass, its less controversial parts, including what is now §2c, were attached to a private bill. The absence of any discussion, debate, or reference to the repeal provision in the legislative process prevents its omission from the final private bill as being seen as a deliberate choice by Congress. Pp.1-7. Scalia, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and II, the opinion of the Court with respect to Part III-A, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts III-B and IV, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a concurring opinion, in Part II of which Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Souter and Breyer, JJ., joined. O'Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Thomas, J., joined. </s> BEATRICE BRANCH, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 01-1437v. </s> JOHN ROBERT SMITH etal. </s> JOHN ROBERT SMITH, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 01-1596v. </s> BEATRICE BRANCH etal. on appeals from the united states district court forthe southern district of mississippi [March 31, 2003] </s> Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III-A, and an opinion with respect to Parts III-B and IV, in which The Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Ginsburg join. </s> In these cases, we decide whether the District Court properly enjoined a Mississippi state court's proposed congressional redistricting plan and whether it properly fashioned its own congressional reapportionment plan rather than order at-large elections. I </s> The 2000 census caused Mississippi to lose one congressional seat, reducing its representation in the House of Representatives from five Members to four. The state legislature, however, failed to pass a new redistricting plan after the decennial census results were published in 2001. In anticipation of the March 1, 2002, state-law deadline for the qualification of candidates, see Miss. Code Ann. §23-15-299 (Lexis 2001), appellant and cross-appellee Beatrice Branch and others (state plaintiffs) filed suit in a Mississippi State Chancery Court in October 2001, asking the state court to issue a redistricting plan for the 2002 congressional elections. In November 2001, appellee and cross-appellant John Smith and others (federal plaintiffs) filed a similar action under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U.S.C. §1983, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, claiming that the current districting plan, Miss. Code Ann. §23-15-1037 (Lexis 2001), dividing the State into five, rather than four, congressional districts, was unconstitutional and unenforceable. The federal plaintiffs asked the District Court to enjoin the current redistricting plan, and subsequently asked it to enjoin any plan developed by a state court (which they asserted would violate Article I, §4, of the Constitution, and, in any event, could not be enforced until the state court's assertion of redistricting authority was precleared under §5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, 42 U.S.C. §1973c), and asked that it order at-large elections pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §23-15-1039 (2001) and 46 Stat. 26, 2 U.S.C. §2a(c)(5), or, alterna-tively, devise its own redistricting plan. A three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2284. Initially the District Court did not interfere with the State Chancery Court's efforts to develop a redistricting plan. In an order filed on December 5, 2001, Smith v. Clark, 189 F.Supp. 2d 502 (SD Miss.), the District Court permitted the state plaintiffs to intervene and deferred ruling on the federal plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. In staying its hand, the District Court recognized that "'the Constitution leaves with the States primary responsibility for apportionment of their federal congressional . . . districts,'" id., at 503 (quoting Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993)), but concluded that "if it is not clear to this court by January 7, 2002 that the State authorities can have a redistricting plan in place by March 1, we will assert our jurisdiction ... and if necessary, we will draft and implement a plan for reapportioning the state congressional districts," 189 F.Supp. 2d, at 503; see also 189 F.Supp. 2d 503, 505-506 (SD Miss. 2002). </s> On the eve of the State Chancery Court trial, the Mississippi Supreme Court denied petitions for writs of prohibition and mandamus filed by a state defendant and others challenging the Chancery Court's jurisdiction to engage in congressional redistricting. It held that the Chancery Court had jurisdiction to issue a redistricting plan. Inre Mauldin, Civ. No. 2001-M-01891 (Dec. 13, 2001), App. to Juris. Statement 110a. Following trial, on December 21, 2001, the State Chancery Court adopted a redistricting plan submitted by the state plaintiffs. On December 26, the state attorney general submitted that plan, along with the Mississippi Supreme Court's Mauldin decision (which arguably changed the process for drawing congressional districts by authorizing the Chancery Court to create a redistricting plan), to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for preclearance. On February 14, 2002, DOJ sent a letter to the state attorney general requesting additional information about the Mauldin decision, because "the information sent to date regarding this change in voting procedure is insufficient ...." App. to Juris. Statement 193a. The letter advised that the "sixty-day review period will begin when we receive the information specified." Id., at 196a. The state attorney general provided additional information on February 19 and 20, 2002. </s> Meanwhile, in January 2002, the District Court, expressing "serious doubts whether the Mississippi Supreme Court's Order and the plan adopted by the Chancery Court pursuant to that order will be precleared prior to the March 1 candidate qualification deadline," 189 F.Supp. 2d, at 508, had begun to develop its own redistricting plan, id., at 511. On February 4, 2002, it promulgated a redistricting plan to be used absent the timely preclearance of the Chancery Court plan. 189 F.Supp. 2d 512 (SD Miss.). On February 19, it ordered that, if the Chancery Court redistricting plan was not "precleared before the close of business on Monday, February 25, 2002," then the District Court's plan would fix the Mississippi congressional districts for the 2002 elections. 189 F.Supp. 2d 529, 548. February 25th came and went with no action by DOJ. On February 26, the District Court enjoined the State from using the Chancery Court plan and ordered use of the District Court's own plan in the 2002 elections and all succeeding elections until the State produced a constitutional redistricting plan that was precleared. 189 F.Supp. 2d 548, 559. The court said that the basis for its injunction and order was "reflected in our opinion of February 19, that is, the failure of the timely preclearance under §5 of the Voting Rights Act of the Hinds County Chancery Court's plan." Id., at 549. However, "in the event that on appeal it is determined that we erred in our February 19 ruling," the court put forth as its "alternative holding" that Article I, §4, of the United States Constitution prohibited the State Chancery Court from issuing a redistricting plan without express authorization from the state legislature. Ibid. </s> The State did not file a notice of appeal. On April 1, 2002, DOJ informed the State in a letter that "it would be inappropriate for the Attorney General to make a determination concerning [the State's preclearance] submission now" because the District Court's injunction rendered the state-court plan incapable of administration. App. 29. </s> The state plaintiffs--intervenors in the District Court--filed a timely notice of appeal from the District Court and a jurisdictional statement. The federal plaintiffs filed a jurisdictional statement on conditional cross-appeal. We noted probable jurisdiction in both appeals and consolidated them. 536 U.S. 903 (2002). II </s> At the outset we should observe two critical distinctions between these cases and the one that was before us in Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993). In Growe, the Federal District Court had refused to abstain or defer to state-court redistricting proceedings. Id., at 30-31. In reversing, we reminded the federal courts of "'what has been said on many occasions: reapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State through its legislature or other body, rather than of a federal court.'" Id., at 34 (quoting Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975)). We held that "[a]bsent evidence that these state branches will fail timely to perform that duty, a federal court must neither affirmatively obstruct state reapportionment nor permit federal litigation to be used to impede it." 507 U.S., at 34 (emphasis added). In the present case, unlike in Growe, there is no suggestion that the District Court failed to allow the state court adequate opportunity to develop a redistricting plan. The second distinction is that the state-court plan here, unlike that in Growe, was subject to §5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1973c. The District Court rested its injunction of the state-court plan on the ground that necessary preclearance had not been obtained. It is that challenged premise that we examine first. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act provides that whenever a covered jurisdiction, such as Mississippi, see 30 Fed. Reg. 9897 (1965), "shall enact or seek to administer" a change in "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure," the State must obtain preclearance from the District Court for the District of Columbia or the Attorney General before the change may be enforced. 42 U.S.C. §1973c. The Act requires preclearance of all voting changes, ibid.; see Dougherty County Bd. of Ed. v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 38-39 (1978), and there is no dispute that this includes voting changes mandated by order of a state court, see, e.g., Inre McMillin, 642 So.2d 1336, 1339 (Miss. 1994). Rather, the controversy pertains to the proviso in §1973c to the effect that, where the preclearance submission is made to the Attorney General, the voting change may be enforced if "the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission ...." </s> Appellants in No. 01-1437 (originally the state plaintiffs) assert that the District Court erred in believing that the Chancery Court's plan lacked preclearance. It was automatically rendered enforceable, they contend, by DOJ's failure to object within the 60-day period running from the state attorney general's initial submission on December 26, 2001--or, in the alternative, it was subsequently rendered enforceable by DOJ's failure to object within the 60-day period running from the state attorney general's submission of additional information on February 20, 2002. We consider each of these contentions in turn. A </s> Under §5, a jurisdiction seeking administrative preclearance must prove that the change is nondiscriminatory in purpose and effect. Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 328 (2000). It bears the burden of providing the Attorney General information sufficient to make that proof, Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 537-539 (1973), and failure to do so will cause the Attorney General to object, see ibid.; 28 CFR §51.52(c) (2002). In DOJ's view, however, incomplete state submissions do not start the 60-day clock for review. See §§51.27, 51.37. The regulations implementing §5 authorize a DOJ request for additional information from a jurisdiction that has initially "omitted information considered necessary for the evaluation of the submission." §51.37(a). If the jurisdiction responds by supplying the additional information (or stating that it is unavailable), the 60-day clock begins to run from the date the response is received. §51.37(c). We have upheld these regulations as being "wholly reasonable and consistent with the Act." Georgia v. United States, supra, at 541; accord, Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 504, n.19 (1977). DOJ's February 14 request for additional information was within the Attorney General's discretion under 28 CFR §51.37, thereby postponing the 60-day time period for objections until the requested information was received. The request was neither frivolous nor unwarranted. See Georgia v. United States, supra, at 541, n.13. DOJ believed that the Mississippi Supreme Court's Mauldin order, holding that the Chancery Court had jurisdiction to engage in redistricting, was a change in voting procedures, and it sought additional information demonstrating that this change would not have the purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a language minority group, as required under §5. The fact that the District Court identified the same issue as posing a hurdle to preclearance further suggests that DOJ's request was not frivolous. 189 F.Supp. 2d, at 508-509. The request for more information was not frivolous or unwarranted at the time it was made, regardless of whether it ultimately develops that Mauldin and the Chancery Court's assertion of jurisdiction to redistrict are not voting changes that required preclearance. B </s> Appellants contend that even if the State Chancery Court's plan was not precleared by operation of law on February 25, 2002, it was precleared on April 22, 60 days after the state attorney general submitted the additional information requested. We think not. Section 5 provides that "[w]henever a [covered jurisdiction] shall enact or seek to administer" a voting change, such a change may be enforced if it is submitted to the Attorney General and there is no objection by the Attorney General within 60 days. 42 U.S.C. §1973(c) (emphasis added). Clearly the State Chancery Court's redistricting plan was not "enacted" by the State of Mississippi. An "enactment" is the product of legislation, not adjudication. See Webster's New International Dictionary 841 (2d ed. 1949) (defining "enact" as "[t]o make into an act or law; esp., to perform the legislative act with reference to (a bill) which gives it the validity of law"); Black's Law Dictionary 910 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "legislate" as "[t]o make or enact laws"). The web of state and federal litigation before us is the consequence of the Mississippi Legislature's failure to enact a plan. The Chancery Court's redistricting plan, then, could be eligible for preclearance only if the State was "seek[ing] to administer" it. </s> There is no doubt that the State was "seek[ing] to administer" the changes for which preclearance was sought when the Mississippi attorney general made his initial submission to DOJ on December 26, 2001, and when he provided additional information regarding the state-court plan on February 20, 2002. On February 26, 2002, however, the District Court "enjoined [the State] from implementing the congressional redistricting plan adopted by the [state court]," 189 F.Supp. 2d, at 559, and the State never appealed that injunction. Uncontrovertibly, the State was no longer "seek[ing] to administer" the state-court plan, and thus the 60-day time period for DOJ review was no longer running. The passing of 60 days from the date of the State's February 20, 2002, submission of the additional requested information had no legal significance, and the state-court plan was not rendered enforceable by operation of law. </s> Appellants' argument--that their appeal, as intervenors, is sufficient to demonstrate that the State still "seek[s] to administer" the state-court plan--is invalid on its face. The actions of a private party are not the actions of a State and cannot satisfy the prerequisite to §5 preclearance. C </s> Since we affirm the injunction on the basis of the District Court's principal stated ground that the state-court plan had not been precleared and had no prospect of being precleared in time for the 2002 election, we have no occasion to address the District Court's alternative holding that the State Chancery Court's redistricting plan was unconstitutional--a holding that the District Court specified was set forth to cover the eventuality of the principal stated ground's being rejected on appeal--and therefore we vacate it as a basis for the injunction. The District Court's alternative holding is not to be regarded as supporting the injunction we have affirmed on the principal ground, or as binding upon state and federal officials should Mississippi seek in the future to administer a redistricting plan adopted by the Chancery Court. III </s> Having determined that the District Court properly enjoined enforcement of the state-court redistricting plan, we turn to the propriety of the redistricting plan that the District Court itself adopted. Cross-appellees in No. 01-1596 (originally the state plaintiffs) and the United States, as amicus curiae, argue that the District Court was required to draw (as it did) single-member congressional districts; cross-appellants in No. 01-1596 (originally the federal plaintiffs) contend that it was required to order at-large elections for the congressional seats. We must decide whether, as cross-appellees contend, the District Court was governed by the provisions of 2 U.S.C. §2c; or, as cross-appellants contend, by the provisions of 2 U.S.C. §2a(c)(5). A </s> Article I, §4, cl.1, of the Constitution provides that the "Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof ...." It reserves to Congress, however, the power "at any time by Law [to] make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators." Ibid. Pursuant to this authority, Congress in 1929 enacted the current statutory scheme governing apportionment of the House of Representatives. 2 U.S.C. §§2a(a), (b). In 1941, Congress added to those provisionsa subsection addressing what is to be done pendingredistricting: "Until a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof after any apportionment, the Representatives to which such State is entitled under such apportionment shall be elected in the following manner: (1) If there is no change in the number of Representatives, they shall be elected from the districts then prescribed by the law of such State, and if any of them are elected from the State at large they shall continue to be so elected; (2) if there is an increase in the number of Representatives, such additional Representative or Representatives shall be elected from the State at large and the other Representatives from the districts then prescribed by the law of such State; (3) if there is a decrease in the number of Representatives but the number of districts in such State is equal to such decreased number of Representatives, they shall be elected from the districts then prescribed by the law of such State; (4) if there is a decrease in the number of Representatives but the number of districts in such State is less than such number of Representatives, the number of Representatives by which such number of districts is exceeded shall be elected from the State at large and the other Representatives from the districts then prescribed by the law of such State; or (5) if there is a decrease in the number of Representatives and the number of districts in such State exceeds such decreased number of Representatives, they shall be elected from the State at large." §2a(c). </s> In 1967, 26 years after §2a(c) was enacted, Congress adopted §2c, which provides, as relevant here: "In each State entitled in the Ninety-first Congress or in any subsequent Congress thereafter to more than one Representative under an apportionment made pursuant to the provisions of section 2a(a) of this title, there shall be established by law a number of districts equal to the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled, and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established, no district to elect more than one Representative ...." </s> The tension between these two provisions is apparent: Section 2c requires States entitled to more than one Representative to elect their Representatives from single-member districts, rather than from multimember districts or the State at large. Section 2a(c), however, requires multimember districts or at-large elections in certain situations; and with particular relevance to the present cases, in which Mississippi, by reason of the 2000 census, lost a congressional seat, §2a(c)(5) requires at-large elections. Cross-appellants would reconcile the two provisions by interpreting the introductory phrase of §2a(c) ("Until a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof after any apportionment") and the phrase "established by law" in §2c to refer exclusively to legislative redistricting--so that §2c tells the legislatures what to do (single-member districting) and §2a(c) provides what will happen absent legislative action--in the present cases, the mandating of at-large elections. </s> The problem with this reconciliation of the provisions is that the limited role it assigns to §2c (governing legislative apportionment but not judicial apportionment) is contradicted both by the historical context of §2c's enactment and by the consistent understanding of all courts in the almost 40 years since that enactment. When Congress adopted §2c in 1967, the immediate issue was precisely the involvement of the courts in fashioning electoral plans. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 had recently been enacted, assigning to the federal courts jurisdiction to involve themselves in elections. See 79 Stat. 439 (as amended and codified at 42 U.S.C. §1973 et seq.). Even more significant, our decisions in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), had ushered in a new era in which federal courts were overseeing efforts by badly malapportioned States to conform their congressional electoral districts to the constitutionally required one-person, one-vote standards. In a world in which the role of federal courts in redistricting disputes had been transformed from spectating, see Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), to directing, the risk arose that judges forced to fashion remedies would simply order at-large elections. </s> At the time Congress enacted §2c, at least six District Courts, two of them specifically invoking 2 U.S.C. §2a(c)(5), had suggested that if the state legislature was unable to redistrict to correct malapportioned congressional districts, they would order the State's entire congressional delegation to be elected at large. On March 26, 1964, a three-judge District Court ordered that, pending enactment of a constitutional redistricting plan by the Michigan Legislature, all Michigan Representatives would be elected at large. Calkins v. Hare, 228 F.Supp. 824, 830 (ED Mich. 1964). On October 19, 1964, a three-judge District Court entered a similar order for the State of Texas. See Bush v. Martin, 251 F.Supp. 484, 489, and n.11, 490, and n.17 (SD Tex. 1966). On February 3, 1965, a three-judge District Court in Arkansas, whose House delegation had decreased from six to four Members after the 1960 census, stated that under §2a(c)(5), "if the Legislature . . . had taken no action [after the 1960 apportionment] the congressmen would have been required to run at large," and that the same reasoning would compel the court to require at-large elections if the legislature adopted malapportioned congressional districts. Park v. Faubus, 238 F.Supp. 62, 66 (ED Ark. 1965). On August 5, 1966, a three-judge District Court in Missouri, whose House delegation had decreased from 11 to 10 Members after the 1960 census, informed the State that if it was unable to redistrict in accordance with the Constitution, then pursuant to the "command of Section 2(a)(c) [sic]," "the congressional elections for Missouri will be ordered conducted at large until new and constitutional districts are created." Preisler v. Secretary of State of Missouri, 257 F.Supp. 953, 981, 982 (WD Mo. 1966), aff'd, 385 U.S. 450 (1967) (per curiam). In Meeks v. Anderson, 229 F.Supp. 271, 273-274 (Kan. 1964), and Baker v. Clement, 247 F.Supp. 886, 897-898 (MD Tenn. 1965), three-judge District Courts stayed their hands but held forth the possibility of requiring at-large elections. With all this threat of judicially imposed at-large elections, and (as far as we are aware) no threat of a legislatively imposed change to at-large elections, it is most unlikely that §2c was directed solely at legislative reapportionment. </s> Nor have the courts ever thought so. To the contrary, every court that has addressed the issue has held that §2c requires courts, when they are remedying a failure to redistrict constitutionally, to draw single-member districts whenever possible. The first court to examine §2c, just two weeks after the statute was enacted, was the three-judge District Court in Missouri that had previously threatened to order at-large elections in accordance with §2a(c)(5). In its decision on December 29, 1967, that court observed that the enactment of §2c had "relieved [it] of the prior existing Congressional command to order that the 1968 and succeeding congressional elections in Missouri be held at large," Preisler v. Secretary of State of Missouri, 279 F.Supp. 952, 969 (WD Mo. 1967), aff'd, 394 U.S. 526 (1969), and accordingly reversed its prior position and stated that it would fashion a districting plan if the State failed to fulfill its duty. Four years later, the Supreme Court of Virginia denied a writ of mandamus directing at-large elections to replace an allegedly unconstitutional Redistricting Act, on the ground that by reason of §2c "we cannot legally issue the writ." Simpson v. Mahan, 212 Va. 416, 417, 185 S.E. 2d 47, 48 (1971). The next year the Supreme Court of California reached the same conclusion that §2c required it to establish single-member districts, see Legislature v. Reinecke, 6 Cal. 3d 595, 602-603, 492 P.2d 385, 390 (1972), a conclusion that it reaffirmed in 1982, see Assembly of State of Cal. v. Deukmejian, 30 Cal. 3d 638, 664, 639 P.2d 939, 955 (1982). In Shayer v. Kirkpatrick, 541 F.Supp. 922, 926 (WD Mo.), aff'd subnom. Schatzle v. Kirkpatrick, 456 U.S. 966 (1982), the District Court concluded that "nothing in section 2c suggests any limitation on its applicability," and declined to order at-large elections pursuant to §2a(c)(5) because §2c "appears to prohibit at-large elections." And in Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F.Supp. 68 (Colo. 1982), the District Court reached a substantially identical result, although contemplating that §2a(c) provided a "stop-gap measure" in the "event that no constitutional redistricting plan exists on the eve of a congressional election, and there is not enough time for either the Legislature or the courts to develop an acceptable plan," id., at 77, and n. 23. </s> It bears noting that this Court affirmed two of the District Court decisions described above, see Preisler, 279 F. Supp 952, and Shayer, supra, one without discussing §2c, and one summarily. And in 1971 we observed in dictum that "[i]n 1967, Congress reinstated the single-member district requirement" that had existed before the enactment of §2a(c). Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 159, n. 39 (1971). </s> Of course the implausibility (given the circumstances of its enactment) that §2c was meant to apply only to legislative reapportionment, and the unbroken unanimity of state and federal courts in opposition to that interpretation, would be of no consequence if the text of §2c (and of §2a(c)) unmistakably demanded that interpretation. But it does not. Indeed, it is more readily susceptible of the opposite interpretation. </s> The clause "there shall be established by law a number of districts equal to the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled" could, to be sure, be so interpreted that the phrase "by law" refers only to legislative action. Its more common meaning, however, encompasses judicial decisions as well. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (referring to judicial decisions as "established law" in qualified immunity context); Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 407 (1998) (referring to judicial decisions as "established law" in the attorney-client privilege context); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 166 (1982) (referring to the judicially established standard of review for a 28 U.S.C. §2255 motion as "long-established law"); see also §2254(d)(1) ("clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States"); Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (it is "the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is"). </s> We think, therefore, that while §2c assuredly envisions legislative action, it also embraces action by state and federal courts when the prescribed legislative action has not been forthcoming. We might note that giving "by law" its less common meaning would cause the immediately following clause of §2c ("and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established" (emphasis added)) to exclude all courts from redistricting, including even state courts acting pursuant to state legislative authorization in the event of legislative default. It is hard to see what plausible congressional purpose this would serve. When, as here, the situation (a decrease in the number of Representatives, all of whom were formerly elected from single-member districts) enables courts to prescribe at-large elections under paragraph (5) of §2a(c) (assuming that section subsists, see infra, at 17), it can be said that there is a constitutional fallback. But what would occur if the situation called for application of paragraphs (1) to (4) of §2a(c), none of which is constitutionally enforceable when (as is usual) the decennial census has shown a proscribed degree of disparity in the voting population of the established districts? The absolute prohibition of §2c ("Representatives shall be elected only from [single-member] districts [legislatively] established") would be subject to no exception, and courts would (despite Baker v. Carr) be congressionally forbidden to act when the state legislature has not redistricted. Only when it is utterly unavoidable should we interpret a statute to require an unconstitutional result--and that is far from the situation here. </s> In sum, §2c is as readily enforced by courts as it is by state legislatures, and is just as binding on courts--federal or state--as it is on legislatures. B </s> Having determined that in enacting 2 U.S.C. §2c, Congress mandated that States are to provide for the election of their Representatives from single-member districts, and that this mandate applies equally to courts remedying a state legislature's failure to redistrict constitutionally, we confront the remaining question: what to make of §2a(c)? As observed earlier, the texts of §2c and §2a(c)(5) are in tension. Representatives cannot be "elected only from districts," §2c, while being elected "at large," §2a(c). Some of the courts confronted with this conflict have concluded that §2c repeals §2a(c) by implication. See Shayer v. Kirkpatrick, 541 F.Supp., at 927; Assembly of State of Cal. v. Deukmejian, 30 Cal. 3d, at 663-664, 639 P.2d, at 954. There is something to be said for that position--especially since paragraphs (1) through (4) of §2a(c) have become (because of postenactment decisions of this Court) in virtually all situations plainly unconstitutional. (The unlikely exception is the situation in which the decennial census makes no districting change constitutionally necessary.) Eighty percent of the section being a dead letter, why would Congress adhere to the flotsam of paragraph (5)? </s> We have repeatedly stated, however, that absent "a clearly expressed congressional intention," Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974), "repeals by implication are not favored," Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm'n, 393 U.S. 186, 193 (1968). An implied repeal will only be found where provisions in two statutes are in "irreconcilable conflict," or where the latter act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and "is clearly intended as a substitute." Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936). So while there is a strong argument that §2c was a substitute for §2a(c), we think the better answer is that §2a(c)--where what it prescribes is constitutional (as it is with regard to paragraph (5))--continues to apply. </s> Section 2a(c) is, of course, only provisionally applicable. It governs the manner of election for Representatives in any election held "[u]ntil a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof after any apportionment." That language clashes with §2c only if it is interpreted to forbid judicial redistricting unless the state legislature has first acted. On that interpretation, whereas §2c categorically instructs courts to redistrict, §2a(c)(5) forbids them to do anything but order at-large elections unless the state legislature has acted. But there is of course no need for such an interpretation. "Until a State is redistricted" can certainly refer to redistricting by courts as well as by legislatures. Indeed, that interpretation would seem the preferable one even if it were not a necessary means of reconciling the two sections. Under prior versions of §2a(c), its default or stopgap provisions were to be invoked for a State "until the legislature of such State . . . [had] redistrict[ed] such State." Act of Jan. 16, 1901, ch. 93, §4, 31 Stat. 734 (emphasis added); see Act of Feb. 7, 1891, ch. 116, §4, 26 Stat. 736 ("until such State be redistricted as herein prescribed by the legislature of said State" (emphasis added)); Act of Feb. 25, 1882, ch. 20, §3, 22 Stat. 6 ("shall be elected at large, unless the Legislatures of said States have provided or shall otherwise provide" (emphasis added)). These provisions are in stark contrast to the text of the current §2a(c): "[u]ntil a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof." </s> If the more expansive (and more natural) interpretation of §2a(c) is adopted, its condition can be met--and its demand for at-large elections suspended--by the very court that follows the command of §2c. For when a court, state or federal, redistricts pursuant to §2c, it necessarily does so "in the manner provided by [state] law." It must follow the "policies and preferences of the State, as expressed in statutory and constitutional provisions or in the reapportionment plans proposed by the state legislature," except, of course, when "adherence to state policy . . . detract[s] from the requirements of the Federal Constitution." White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795 (1973). Federal constitutional prescriptions, and federal statutory commands such as that of §2c, are appropriately regarded, for purposes of §2a(c), as a part of the state election law. </s> Thus, §2a(c) is inapplicable unless the state legislature, and state and federal courts, have all failed to redistrict pursuant to §2c. How long is a court to await that redistricting before determining that §2a(c) governs a forthcoming election? Until, we think, the election is so imminent that no entity competent to complete redistricting pursuant to state law (including the mandate of §2c) is able to do so without disrupting the election process. Only then may §2a(c)'s stopgap provisions be invoked. Thus, §2a(c) cannot be properly applied--neither by a legislature nor a court--as long as it is feasible for federal courts to effect the redistricting mandated by §2c. So interpreted, §2a(c) continues to function as it always has, as a last-resort remedy to be applied when, on the eve of a congressional election, no constitutional redistricting plan exists and there is no time for either the State's legislature or the courts to develop one. Cf. Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F.Supp., at 77-78. </s> There remains to be considered Mississippi's at-large election provision, which reads as follows: "Should an election of representatives in Congress occur after the number of representatives to which the state is entitled shall be changed, in consequence of a new apportionment being made by Congress, and before the districts shall have been changed to conform to the new apportionment, representatives shall be chosen as follows: In case the number of representatives to which the state is entitled be increased, then one (1) member shall be chosen in each district as organized, and the additional member or members shall be chosen by the electors of the state at large; and if the number of representatives shall be diminished, then the whole number shall be chosen by the electors of the state at large." Miss. Code Ann. §23-15-1039 (Lexis 2001). </s> There has been no interpretation of this provision by the Mississippi courts. We believe it was designed to track 2 U.S.C. §§2a(c)(2) and (5), and should be deemed operative when those provisions would be. That is to say, (1) the phrase "and before the districts shall have been changed to conform to the new apportionment" envisions both legislatively and judicially prescribed change, and (2) the statute does not come into play as long as it remains feasible for a state or federal court to complete redistricting. In these cases, the District Court properly completed the redistricting of Mississippi pursuant to 2 U.S.C. §2c and thus neither Mississippi Code §23-15-1039 nor 2 U.S.C. §2a(c) was applicable. IV </s> Justice O'Connor's opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part (hereinafter "the dissent") agrees that the District Court properly acted to remedy a constitutional violation, see post, at 9-10, but contends that it should have looked to §2a(c) rather than §2c in selecting an appropriate remedy. We think not. We have explained why it makes sense for §2c to apply until there is no longer any reasonable prospect for redistricting according to state law--whereupon §2a(c) applies. If, like the dissent, we were to forgo such analysis and simply ask, in the abstract, which of the two provisions has primacy, we would probably still select §2c--the only one cast in absolute, rather than conditional, terms. The dissent gives not the hint of a reason why it believes §2a(c) has primacy. It says that "[t]he text of §2a(c) directs federal courts to order at-large elections '[u]ntil a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof.'" Post, at 10. But it is equally true that §2c directs federal courts to redistrict absolutely and without qualification. The dissent does contemplate a role for federal courts in redrawing congressional districts, but only "after a State has been redistricted" in the first instance. Post, at 9. It is not entirely clear which entities the dissent considers competent to do this initial redistricting--certainly the legislature, and perhaps also state courts, but only if such "courts are part of the 'manner provided by the law thereof.'" Post, at 10, n.1. But the dissent also says that "a court should enforce §2a(c) before a 'State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof,' and a court should enforce §2c after a State" has been initially redistricted, post, at 9--which (if one takes the words at face value) leaves no room for any court to do the initial redistricting. We assume the dissent does not mean precisely what it has said. </s> The dissent implicitly differentiates between federal and state courts--effectively holding that state courts may undertake the initial redistricting that would satisfy §2a(c)'s prerequisite, but federal courts may not. It presumably rests this distinction upon the belief that state courts are capable of redistricting "in the manner provided by the law thereof," whereas federal courts are not. See post, at 10, n.1. To read that phrase as potentially including state--but not federal--courts, the dissent takes the word "manner" to refer to process or procedures, rather than substantive requirements. See ibid. (If the State's process for redistricting includes courts, then and only then may courts redistrict, rendering §2a(c) inapplicable) But such a reading renders the phrase "in the manner provided by the law thereof" redundant of the requirement that the state be "redistricted." Of course the State has not been redistricted if districts have been drawn by someone without authority to redistrict. Should an ambitious county clerk or individual legislator sit down and draw up a districting map, no one would think that the State has, within the meaning of the statute, been "redistricted." In our view, the word "manner" refers to the State's substantive "policies and preferences" for redistricting, White v. Weiser, 521 U.S. 74, 86 (1997); see also Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 42-43 (1982) (per curiam). Thus, when a federal court redistricts a State in a manner that complies with that State's substantive districting principles, it does so "in the manner provided by the law thereof." See supra, at 18-19.** While it certainly remains preferable for the State's legislature to complete its constitutionally required redistricting pursuant to the requirements of §2c, see Abrams, supra, at 101, or for the state courts to do so if they can, see Growe, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). When the State, through its legislature or other authorized body, cannot produce the needed decision, then federal courts are "left to embark on [the] delicate task" of redistricting, Abrams, supra, at 101. </s> The dissent claims that we have read the statutory phrase "[u]ntil a State is redistricted" to mean "[u]ntil . . . the election is so imminent that no entity competent to complete redistricting pursuant to the mandate of §2c is able to do so without disrupting the election process." Post, at 7. From that premise, it proceeds to mount a vigorous (and, in the principles it espouses, highly edifying) "plain meaning" attack upon our holding. Unfortunately, the premise is patently false. We, no less than the dissent, acknowledge that "the text tells us 'how long' §2a(c) should govern: 'until a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof,'" post, at 8. The issue is not how long §2a(c) governs, but how long a court (under the continuing mandate of §2a(c)) should wait before ordering an at-large election. The dissent treats §2a(c) as though it prescribes (in its application to the facts of the present case) the immediate establishment of statewide districts (i.e., an at-large election) for all Representatives. It prescribes no such thing. All it says is that "[u]ntil [the] State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof," Representatives "shall be elected from the State at large." The only point at which §2a(c) issues a command--the only point at which it bites--is at election time. Only if, at election time, redistricting "in the manner provided by [state] law" has not occurred, does §2a(c) become operative. </s> So despite the dissent's ardent protestations to the contrary, see ibid., the dissent, no less than we, must confront the question "[h]ow long is a court to await that redistricting before determining that §2a(c) governs a forthcoming election?" Surely the dissent cannot possibly believe that, since "the text tells us 'how long' §2a(c) should govern," ibid., a court can declare, immediately after congressional reapportionment, and before the state legislature has even had a chance to act, that the State's next elections for Representatives will be at large. We say that the state legislature (and the state and federal courts) should be given the full time available--right up until the time when further delay will disrupt the election process--to reapportion according to state law. Since the dissent disagrees with that, we wonder what its own time line might be. But to claim that there is no time line--simply to assert that "[§]2a(c) contains no imminence requirement," ibid.--is absurd. </s> The dissent suggests that our reading of §2c runs afoul of the Court's anticommandeering jurisprudence, see post, at 10-11, but in doing so the dissent fails to recognize that the state legislature's obligation to prescribe the "Times, Places and Manner" of holding congressional elections is grounded in Article I, §4, cl.1, of the Constitution itself and not any mere statutory requirement. Here, as acknowledged by the dissent, the federal plaintiffs "alleged a constitutional violation"--failure to provide for the election of the proper number of representatives in accordance with Article I, §2, cl.1--"and the federal court drew a plan to remedy that violation," post, at 10. In crafting its remedy, the District Court appropriately followed the "Regulations" Congress prescribed in §2c--"Regulations" that Article I, §4, cl.1, of the Constitution expressly permits Congress to make, see supra, at 10. To be sure §2c "envisions legislative action," supra, at 16, but in the context of Article I, §4, cl.1, such "Regulations" are expressly allowed. In enacting §2c (and §2a(c), for that matter), Congress was not placing a statutory obligation on the state legislatures as it was in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); rather, it was regulating (as the Constitution specifically permits) the manner in which a State is to fulfill its pre-existing constitutional obligations under Article I, §§2 and 4. Our interpretation of §2c no more permits a commandeering of the machinery of state government than does the dissent's understanding of §2a(c). Under our view, if the State fails to redistrict, then federal courts may do so. Under the dissent's view, if the State fails to redistrict (and loses congressional seats), then the federal courts must order at-large elections pursuant to §2a(c)(5). See, e.g., post, at 9. If our reading of §2c runs afoul of any anticommandeering principles, then the dissent commits the same sin. </s> Another straw man erected by the dissent is to be found in its insistence--as though in response to an argument of ours--that "[s]ince §2a(c) was enacted decades before the Baker line of cases, this subsequent development cannot change the interpretation of §2a(c)." Post, at 16. But we have never said that those cases changed the meaning of §2a(c); we have said that they help to explain the meaning of §2c, which was enacted after they were decided. And it is, of course, the most rudimentary rule of statutory construction (which one would have thought familiar to dissenters so prone to preachment on that subject, see, e.g., post, at 7, 14, 16) that courts do not interpret statutes in isolation, but in the context of the corpus juris of which they are a part, including later-enacted statutes: "The correct rule of interpretation is, that if divers statutes relate to the same thing, they ought all to be taken into consideration in construing any one of them . . . . If a thing contained in a subsequent statute, be within the reason of a former statute, it shall be taken to be within the meaning of that statute . . . ; and if it can be gathered from a subsequent statute in pari materia, what meaning the legislature attached to the words of a former statute, they will amount to a legislative declaration of its meaning, and will govern the construction of the first statute." United States v. Freeman, 3 How. 556, 564-565 (1845). </s> That is to say, the meaning of §2c (illuminated by the Baker v. Carr line of cases) sheds light upon the meaning of §2a(c). </s> Finally, the dissent gives the statutory phrase "redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof" a meaning that is highly unusual. It means, according to the dissent, "redistricted as state law requires," even when state law is unconstitutional--so that even an unconstitutional redistricting satisfies the "until" clause of §2a(c), and enables §2c to be applied. We know of no other instance in which a federal statute acknowledges to be "state law" a provision that violates the Supremacy Clause and is therefore a legal nullity. It is particularly peculiar for the dissent to allow an unconstitutional redistricting to satisfy the "until" clause when it will not allow a nonprecleared redistricting to satisfy the "until" clause (in those States subject to §5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1973c). See post, at 20-21. That is to say, in the dissent's view a redistricted State is not "redistricted" within the meaning of §2a(c) if the districts have not been precleared, but it is "redistricted" even if the districts are patently unconstitutional (so long as they have been precleared, or the State is not subject to the preclearance requirement). Section 2a(c), of course, has no "preclearance exception." If redistricting "in the manner provided by [state] law" is ineffective when a federal statute (§5 preclearance) has been disregarded, surely it is also ineffective when the Federal Constitution has been disregarded. It is not we but the dissent that reads into the text of §2a(c) ("redistricted in the manner provided by [state] law") distinctions that have no basis in reality. * * * </s> The judgment of the District Court is Affirmed. </s> BEATRICE BRANCH, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 01-1437v. </s> JOHN ROBERT SMITH etal. </s> JOHN ROBERT SMITH, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 01-1596v. </s> BEATRICE BRANCH etal. on appeals from the united states district court forthe southern district of mississippi [March 31, 2003] </s> Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Breyer join as to Part II, concurring. I </s> I join the Court's opinion and the plurality opinion in Parts III-B and IV. The Court's opinion makes clear why the District Court was correct to enjoin the redistrict-ing plan developed by the Mississippi State Chancery Court as not precleared under §5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §1973c. Ante, at 5-9. The Court then vacates the District Court's alternative holding that the state-court plan violated Article I, §4, of the United States Constitution. Ante, at 9. II </s> It seems appropriate to explain why, in my view, our ruling vacating the judgment is mandated by our earlier cases. There is precedent for our ruling. See Connor v. Waller, 421 U.S. 656 (1975) (per curiam); United States v. Board of Supervisors of Warren Cty., 429 U.S. 642, 646-647 (1977) (per curiam); Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 412 (1977); Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 542 (1978) (opinion of White, J.); see also post, at 1 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Once the District Court found no preclearance, it was premature, given this statutory scheme, for the court to consider the constitutional question. Where state reapportionment enactments have not been precleared in accordance with §5, the district court "err[s] in deciding the constitutional challenges" to these acts. Connor v. Waller, at 656. The rule prescribed by Connor reflects the purposes behind the Voting Rights Act. Concerned that "covered jurisdictions would exercise their ingenuity to devise new and subtle forms of discrimination, Congress prohibited those jurisdictions from implementing any change in voting procedure without obtaining preclearance under §5." Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 268 (1982). A jurisdiction covered by §5 must seek approval of either the Attorney General of the United States or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. See, e.g., Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 652 (1991); Lopez v. Monterey County, 519 U.S. 9, 12 (1996). Absent preclearance, a voting change is neither effective nor enforceable as a matter of federal law. Connor v. Waller, supra, at 656; Board of Supervisors, supra, at 645; Finch, supra, at 412; Wise, supra, at 542; Hathorn, supra, at 269; Clark, supra, at 652; post, at 17-18 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The process, in particular the administrative scheme, is designed to "'giv[e] the covered State a rapid method of rendering a new state election law enforceable.'" Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 538 (1973) (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 549 (1969)). To be consistent with the statutory scheme, the district courts should not entertain constitutional challenges to nonprecleared voting changes and in this way anticipate a ruling not yet made by the Executive. The proposed changes are not capable of implementation, and the constitutional objections may be resolved through the preclearance process. </s> The constitutional challenge presented to the District Court here fell within the ambit of the Connor rule. Our previous cases addressed contentions that the state reapportionment plan violated the one-person, one-vote principle or diluted minority voting strength. Connor v. Waller, 396 F.Supp. 1308, 1309 (SD Miss. 1975), rev'd, 421 U.S. 656 (1975) (per curiam); Board of Supervisors, supra, at 643-644; Wise, supra, at 538-539. In this litigation, appellees objected to the constitutionality of the state court's assumption of authority to devise a redistricting plan. The fact that appellees framed their constitutional argument to the state court's authority to pass a redistricting plan rather than to the plan's components does not make their claim reviewable. The plan was not yet precleared and so could not cause appellees injury through enforcement or implementation. </s> In deciding to address the constitutional challenge the District Court was motivated by the commendable purpose of enabling this Court to examine all the issues presented by the litigation in one appeal. This approach, however, forces the federal courts to undertake unnecessary review of complex constitutional issues in advance of an Executive determination and so risks frustrating the mechanism established by the Voting Rights Act. In these cases, for instance, the District Court's decision led to a delay in preclearance because the United States Attorney General (whether or not authorized to do so by the statute) refused to consider the state-court plan while the constitutional injunction remained in place. App. 28-29. The advance determination, moreover, can risk at least the perception that the Executive is revising the judgment of an Article III court. Adherence to the rule of Connor provides States covered by §5 with time to remedy constitutional defects without the involvement of federal courts. Given the statutory command of direct review to this Court, it also helps to ensure that only constitutional issues necessary to the resolution of the electoral dispute are brought to us. </s> BEATRICE BRANCH, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 01-1437v. </s> JOHN ROBERT SMITH etal. </s> JOHN ROBERT SMITH, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 01-1596v. </s> BEATRICE BRANCH etal. on appeals from the united states district court forthe southern district of mississippi [March 31, 2003] </s> Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter and Justice Breyer join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. </s> In 1967 Congress enacted a brief statutory provision that banned at-large elections for Representatives. In my opinion the portion of that statute that is codified at 2 U.S.C. §2c impliedly repealed §2a(c). The reasons that support that conclusion also persuade me that the 1967 federal Act pre-empted Mississippi's statutory authorization of at-large election of Representatives in Congress. Accordingly, while I join Parts I, II, and III-A of the Court's opinion, I do not join Parts III-B or IV. </s> The question whether an Act of Congress has repealed an earlier federal statute is similar to the question whether it has pre-empted a state statute. When Congress clearly expresses its intent to repeal or to pre-empt, we must respect that expression. When it fails to do so expressly, the presumption against implied repeals, like the presumption against pre-emption, can be overcome in two situations: (1) if there is an irreconcilable conflict between the provisions in the two Acts; or (2) if the later Act was clearly intended to "cove[r] the whole subject of the earlier one." Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936).1 </s> As I read the 1967 statute it entirely prohibits States that have more than one congressional district from adopting either a multimember district or electing their Representatives in at-large elections, with one narrow exception that applied to the 1968 election in two States. After a rather long and contentious legislative process, Congress enacted this brief provision: "AN ACT </s> "For the relief of Doctor Ricardo Vallejo Samala and to provide for congressional redistricting. </s> "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, for the purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Doctor Ricardo Vallejo Samala shall be held and considered to have been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence as of August 30, 1959. </s> "In each State entitled in the Ninety-first Congress or in any subsequent Congress thereafter to more than one Representative under an apportionment made pursuant to the provisions of subsection (a) of section 22 of the Act of June 18, 1929, entitled 'An Act to provide for apportionment of Representatives' (46 Stat. 26), as amended, there shall be established by law a number of districts equal to the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled, and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established, no district to elect more than one Representative (except that a State which is entitled to more than one Representative and which has in all previous elections elected its Representatives at Large may elect its Representatives at Large to the Ninety-first Congress)." Pub. L. 90-196, 81 Stat. 581 (emphasis added). </s> The second paragraph of this statute enacts a general rule prohibiting States with more than one congressional Representative from electing their Representatives to Congress in at-large elections.2 That the single exception to this congressional command applied only to Hawaii and New Mexico, and only to the 1968 election, emphasizes the fact that the Act applies to every other State and every other election. Thus, it unambiguously forbids elections that would otherwise have been authorized by §2a(c)(5). It both creates an "irreconcilable conflict" with the 1941 law and it "covers the whole subject" of at-large congressional elections. Posadas, 296 U.S., at 503. Under either of the accepted standards for identifying implied repeals, it repealed the earlier federal statute. In addition, this statute pre-empts the Mississippi statute setting the default rule as at-large elections. </s> The first paragraph of the 1967 statute suggests an answer to the question of why Congress failed to enact an express repeal of the 1941 law when its intent seems so obvious. The statute that became law in December 1967 was the final gasp in a protracted legislative process that began on January 17, 1967, when Chairman Celler of the House Judiciary Committee introduced H.R. 2508, renewing efforts made in the preceding Congress to provide legislative standards responsive to this Court's holding in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), that the one-person, one-vote principle applies to congressional elections.3 The bill introduced by Representative Celler in 1967 contained express language replacing §2a(c) in its entirety.4 H.R. 2508, as introduced, had three principal components that are relevant to the implied repeal analysis. First, the bill required single-member district elections: "[T]here shall be established by law a number of districts equal to the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled; and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established, no district to elect more than one Representative." H.R. 2508, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2 (1967). Second, the bill limited gerrymandering, requiring each district to "at all times be composed of contiguous territory, in as compact form as practicable." Ibid. Third, the bill required proportional representation: "[N]o district established in any State for the Ninetieth or any subsequent Congress shall contain a number of persons, excluding Indians not taxed, more than 15 per centum greater or less than the average obtained" by dividing the population by the number of Representatives. Ibid. </s> This bill generated great controversy and discussion. Importantly for present purposes, however, only two of the three components were discussed in depth at all. At no point, either in any of the numerous Conference Reports or lengthy floor debates, does any disagreement regarding the language expressly repealing §2a(c) or the single-member district requirement appear. Rather, the debate was confined to the gerrymandering requirement, the proportionality rule, and the scope and duration of the temporary exceptions to the broad prohibition against at-large elections. </s> The House Judiciary Committee amended the bill, limiting the proportional differences between districts in all States to not exceed 10 percent and creating an exception to the general rule for the 91st and 92d Congresses (1968 and 1970 elections) that allowed for "the States of Hawaii and New Mexico [to] continue to elect their Representatives at large" and for the proportional differences to be as large as 30 percent. H.R. Rep. No. 191, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1967). The House then passed this amended bill. The Senate Judiciary Committee then amended this bill, striking Hawaii from the exception and allowing for 35 percent, rather than 30 percent, variation between districts during the 91st and 92d Congresses. S.Rep. No. 291, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1967). The bill went to conference twice, and the conference recommended two sets of amendments. The first Conference Report, issued June 27, 1967, recommended striking any exception to the general rule and limiting proportional variation to 10 percent or less. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 435, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1965). After this compromise failed to pass either the House or the Senate, the conference then recommended a measure that was very similar to the second paragraph of the private bill eventually passed--a general rule requiring single-member districts with an exception, of unlimited duration, for Hawaii and New Mexico. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 795, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1965). Importantly, every version of the bill discussed in the House Report, the Senate Report, and both Conference Reports contained a provision expressly repealing §2a(c). In spite of these several modifications, the bill, as recommended by the last conference, failed to pass either chamber. </s> The decision to attach what is now §2c to the private bill reflected this deadlock. Indeed, proponents of this attachment remarked that they sought to take the uncontroversial components of the prior legislation to ensure that Congress would pass some legislation in response to Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).5 The absence of any discussion, debate, or reference to the provision expressly repealing §2a(c) in the private bill prevents its omission from the final bill as being seen as a deliberate choice by Congress. Any fair reading of the history leading up to the passage of this bill demonstrates that all parties involved were operating under the belief that the changes they were debating would completely replace §2a(c). Justice O'Connor has provided us with a convincing exposition of the flaws in Justice Scalia's textual interpretation of §2a(c)(5). See post, at 7-10 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). Ironically, however, she has been misled by undue reliance on the text of statutes enacted in 1882, 1891, 1901, and 1911--a period in our history long before the 1950's and 1960's when Congress enacted the voting rights legislation that recognized the central importance of protecting minority access to the polls. It was only then that an important federal interest in prohibiting at-large voting, particularly in States like Mississippi, became a matter of congressional concern. This intervening and dramatic historical change significantly lessens the relevance of these earlier statutes to the present analysis. </s> Moreover, her analysis of the implied repeal issue apparently assumes that if two provisions could coexist in the same statute, one could not impliedly repeal the other if they were enacted in successive statutes. Thus, she makes no comment on the proviso in the 1967 statute that preserved at-large elections in New Mexico and Hawaii for 1968. This proviso surely supports the conclusion that it was the only exception intended by Congress from the otherwise total prohibition of at-large elections. The authorization of at-large elections in the 1882 statute cited by Justice O'Connor was also set forth in a proviso; although the words "provided that" are omitted from the 1891, 1901, and 1911 statutes, they just contain examples of differently worded exceptions from a general rule. It is also important to note that the text of the 1967 statute, unlike the four earlier statutes, uses the word "only" to create a categorical prohibition against at-large elections. As a matter of plain English, the conflict between that prohibition and §2a(c) which permitted at-large elections, is surely irreconcilable. </s> Justice O'Connor's consideration of the legislative history of the 1967 statute fails to give appropriate consideration to the four bills that would have expressly repealed §2a(c)(5). See supra, at 4-7. Those bills, coupled with the absence of any expression by anyone involved in the protracted legislative process of an intent to preserve at-large elections anywhere except in New Mexico and Hawaii, provide powerful support for the conclusion that, as a literal reading of the text of §2c plainly states, Congress intended to enact a categorical prohibition of at-large elections. The odd circumstance that the final version of the prohibition was added to a private bill makes it quite clear that the omission of a clause expressly repealing §2a(c) was simply an inadvertence. Canons of statutory construction--such as the presumption against implied repeals or the presumption against pre-emption--are often less reliable guides in the search for congressional intent than a page or two of history. * * * </s> The history of the 1967 statute, coupled with the plain language of its text, leads to only one conclusion--Congress impliedly repealed §2a(c). It is far wiser to give effect to the manifest intent of Congress than, as the plurality attempts, to engage in tortured judicial legislation to preserve a remnant of an obsolete federal statute and an equally obsolete state statute. Accordingly, while I concur in the Court's judgment and opinion, I do not join Parts III-B or IV of the plurality opinion. </s> BEATRICE BRANCH, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 01-1437v. </s> JOHN ROBERT SMITH etal. </s> JOHN ROBERT SMITH, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 01-1596v. </s> BEATRICE BRANCH etal. on appeals from the united states district court forthe southern district of mississippi [March 31, 2003] </s> Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> I join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion because I agree that the Mississippi Chancery Court's redistricting plan lacks preclearance. I join Part II-C because it is consistent with our decisions holding that federal courts should not rule on a constitutional challenge to a non-precleared voting change when the change is not yet capable of implementation. See, e.g., Connor v. Waller, 421 U.S. 656 (1975) (per curiam); see also ante, p.1 (Kennedy, J., concurring). I cannot join Part III or Part IV, however, because I disagree with the Court that 2 U.S.C. §2c is a command to the States and I disagree with the plurality regarding the proper statutory construction of §2a(c)(5). I </s> First, I agree with the plurality's somewhat reluctant conclusion that §2c does not impliedly repeal §2a(c)(5). Here, it is quite easy to read §§2c and 2a(c) together. A natural statutory reading of §2a(c) gives force to both §§2c and 2a(c): Section 2a(c) applies "[u]ntil a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof." Section 2c applies after a State has "redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof." As both the plurality and Justice Stevens recognize, an implied repeal can exist only if the "provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict" or if "the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute." Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936). See also ante, at 17 (plurality opinion); ante, at 2 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Indeed, "'when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts ... to regard each as effective.'" Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976) (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)). We have not found any implied repeal of a statute since 1975. See Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 422 U.S. 659. And outside the antitrust context, we appear not to have found an implied repeal of a statute since 1917. See Lewis v. United States, 244 U.S. 134. Because it is not difficult to read §§2a(c) and 2c in a manner that gives force to both statutes, §2c cannot impliedly repeal §2a(c). See, e.g., United States v. Burroughs, 289 U.S. 159, 164 (1933) ("[I]f effect can reasonably be given to both statutes, the presumption is that the earlier is intended to remain in force"); Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., supra, at 155 ("Repeal is to be regarded as implied only if necessary to make the [later enacted law] work, and even then only to the minimum extent necessary. This is the guiding principle to reconciliation of the two statutory schemes" (alteration in original and internal quotation marks omitted)). </s> The previous versions of §§2c and 2a(c) confirm that an implied repeal does not exist here. Since 1882, versions of §§2c and 2a(c) have coexisted. Indeed, the 1882, 1891, 1901, and 1911 apportionment statutes all contained the single-member district requirement as well as the at-large default requirement. Compare Act of Feb. 25, 1882, ch. 20, §3, 22 Stat. 6 ("[T]he number to which such State may be entitled ... shall be elected by Districts ..., no one District electing more than one Representative" (emphasis added)) with ibid. (" ... shall be elected at large, unless the Legislatures of said States have provided or shall otherwise provide before the time fixed by law for the next election of Representatives therein" (emphasis added)); Act of Feb. 7, 1891, ch. 116, §3, 26 Stat. 735 ("[T]he number to which such State may be entitled ... shall be elected by districts" and "[t]he said districts shall be equal to the number of Representatives to which such State may be entitled in Congress, no one district electing more than one Representative" (emphasis added)) with §4, 26 Stat. 736 ("[S]uch additional Representative or Representatives shall be elected by the State at large" (emphasis added)); Act of Jan. 16, 1901, ch. 93, §3, 31 Stat. 734 ("[T]he number to which such State may be entitled ... shall be elected by districts" and "[t]he said districts shall be equal to the number of Representatives to which such State may be entitled in Congress, no one district electing more than one Representative" (emphasis added)) with §4, 31 Stat. 734 ("[I]f the number hereby provided for shall in any State be less than it was before the change hereby made, then the whole number to such State hereby provided for shall be elected at large, unless the legislatures of said States have provided or shall otherwise provide before the time fixed by law for the next election of Representatives therein" (emphasis added)); Act of Aug. 8, 1911, ch. 5, §3, 37 Stat. 14 ("[T]he Representatives ... shall be elected by districts" and "[t]he said districts shall be equal to the number of Representatives to which such State may be entitled in Congress, no one district electing more than one Representative" (emphasis added)) with §4, 37 Stat. 14 ("[S]uch additional Representative or Representatives shall be elected by the State at large ... until such State shall be redistricted in the manner provided by the laws thereof"). </s> Justice Stevens attempts to distinguish the prior versions of §2a(c) because they contained slightly different language than the present version of §2a(c). See ante, at 8. Even assuming, however, that the 1882 version of §2a(c) is slightly different from the present version, the versions of §2a(c) in effect in 1891, 1901, and 1911 are materially indistinguishable from the present version. Indeed, the 1911 statute--the one in effect at the time Congress enacted the present version of §2a(c)--is almost word for word the same as the current statute. Compare Act of Aug. 8, 1911, ch. 5, §4, 37 Stat. 14 ("until such State shall be redistricted in the manner provided by the laws thereof"), with 2 U.S.C. §2a(c) ("[u]ntil a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law therof"). See also Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 374 (1932) (noting that the 1911 version of §2a(c) would apply "unless and until new districts are created"). </s> Given this history of the two provisions coexisting in the same statute, I would not hold that §2c impliedly repeals §2a(c). The two statutes are "capable of co-existence" because each covers a different subject matter. Morton v. Mancari, supra, at 551. Section 2c was not intended to cover the whole subject of §2a(c) and was not "clearly intended as a substitute" for §2a(c). Posadas v. National City Bank, supra, at 503. Section 2a(c) (requiring at-large elections) applies unless or until the State redistricts, and §2c (requiring single-member districts) applies once the State has completed the redistricting process. </s> This Court has in fact read the prior versions of §§2c and 2a(c) so that the two did not conflict. In Smiley v. Holm, supra, we recognized that under the 1911 version of these provisions, at-large elections were an appropriate remedy if the State was not properly redistricted in the first instance. See id., at 374 ("[U]nless and until new districts are created, all representatives allotted to the State must be elected by the State at large"). </s> When the 1911 statute expired in 1929, Congress did not reenact it. Instead, Congress passed §2a(c), which took effect in 1941. Because §2a(c) concerned only at-large elections, no complementary single-member district requirement existed from 1941 until 1967. In 1967, Congress enacted §2c, which states in relevant part: "[T]here shall be established by law a number of districts equal to the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled, and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established, no district to elect more than one Representative ...." The relevant language of this statute tracks the language of the prior versions of §2c. Justice Stevens' only distinction between the prior versions of §2c and this version of §2c is that Congress added the word "only" to the latest version of §2c. See ante, at 4. But this one word is a thin reed on which to rest an implied repeal. Justice Stevens would hold that instead of expressly repealing §2a(c), Congress added the word "only" to §2c. This one-word addition that does not change the meaning of the statute is no basis for finding an implied repeal. </s> Justice Stevens argues that Congress intended to "'cove[r] the whole subject'" of at-large redistricting when it enacted §2c in 1967. Ante, at 3 (quoting Posadas v. National City Bank, 419 U.S. 102, 134 (1974) ("'Presumably Congress had given serious thought to the earlier statute .... Before holding that the result of the earlier consideration has been repealed or qualified, it is reasonable for a court to insist on the legislature's using language showing that it has made a considered determination to that end'"). </s> Justice Stevens' strongest argument is that the legislative history indicates that "all parties involved were operating under the belief that the changes they were debating would completely replace §2a(c)." Ante, at 7. Yet Justice Stevens acknowledges that Congress could have expressly repealed §2a(c). See ante, at 4, 8. Justice Stevens thinks the evidence that Congress tried to expressly repeal §2a(c) four times cuts strongly in favor of an implied repeal here. See ante, at 8. But these four attempts to repeal §2a(c) were unsuccessful. It is difficult to conclude that Congress can impliedly repeal a statute when it deliberately chose not to expressly repeal that statute. In this case, where the two provisions have co-existed historically, and where Congress explicitly rejected an express repeal of §2a(c), I would not find an implied repeal of §2a(c). </s> I would hold instead that Congress passed §2c in 1967 to restore redistricting law to its pre-1941 status, when §2a(c) became effective without any complementary provision regarding single-member districts. The floor statements and colloquy by Senators Baker and Bayh cited by Justice Stevens, see ante, at 6-7, n.5, cannot overcome the strong presumption against implied repeals, especially given the historical evidence that §§2c and 2a(c) had peacefully coexisted since the 19th century. And as explained in more detail in Part II-B, infra, the circumstances leading up to the passage of §2c in 1967 do not support a finding of implied repeal. </s> In short, because §§2a(c)(5) and 2c are capable of co-existence, and because the history shows that §2c does not cover the whole subject of §2a(c), I agree with the plurality that §2c does not impliedly repeal §2a(c), and therefore that §2a(c) "continues to apply." Ante, at 18. II A </s> Although the plurality acknowledges that §2a(c) remains in full force, it inexplicably adopts a reading of §2a(c) that has no textual basis. Under §2a(c)(5), the State must conduct at-large elections "[u]ntil a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof." Instead of simply reading the plain text of the statute, however, the plurality invents its own version of the text of §2a(c). The plurality holds that "[u]ntil a State is redistricted ..." means "[u]ntil ... the election is so imminent that no entity competent to complete redistricting pursuant ... to the mandate of §2c [] is able to do so without disrupting the election process." Ante, at 19. But such a reading is not faithful to the text of the statute. Like Justice Stevens, I believe that the Court's interpretation of §2a(c) is nothing more than "tortured judicial legislation." Ante, at 9. See also Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L.Rev. 1175, 1185 (1989) ("[W]hen one does not have a solid textual anchor oran established social norm from which to derive the general rule, its pronouncement appears uncomfortably like legislation"). Dictionary definitions confirm what the plain text says: "Until a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof" means "[u]ntil a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof." The meaning of the word "until" is not difficult to understand, nor is it some specialized term of art. See Webster's New International Dictionary 2794 (2d ed. 1957) (defining "until" to mean "[d]uring the whole time before"); Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1297 (10th ed. 1993) (defining "until" to mean "up to such time as" or "[b]efore"). The word "redistricted" also is not hard to comprehend. Id., at 980 (defining "redistrict" to mean "to divide anew into districts"); Black's Law Dictionary 1283 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "redistrict" to mean "[t]o organize into new districts, esp. legislative ones; reapportion"). While the Court employs dictionary definitions to interpret §5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, see ante, at 8, it notably refrains from using any dictionary definition for §2a(c). </s> Section 2a(c) contains no imminence requirement. It is not credible to say that "until a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof after any apportionment" means: "[u]ntil ... the election is so imminent that no entity competent to complete redistricting pursuant to ... the mandate of §2c [] is able to do so without disrupting the election process." Ante, at 19. The plurality characterizes §2a(c) as a "stopgap provisio[n]," but the text of §2a(c) is not so limited. Ibid. The plurality asks "[h]ow long is a court to await that redistricting before determining that §2a(c) governs a forthcoming election?" Ibid. Yet the text provides no basis for why the plurality would ask such a question. Indeed, the text tells us "how long" §2a(c) should govern: "until a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof." (Emphasis added.) Under the plurality's reading, however, §2a(c) would not apply even though §2a(c) by its terms should apply, as the State has not yet "redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof." The language of the statute cannot bear such a reading. Cf. Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 14 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("No amount of rationalization can change the reality of this normal (and as far as I know exclusive) English usage. The word in the statute simply will not bear the meaning that the Court assigns"). </s> The dispositive question is what the text says it is: Has a State "redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof"? 2 U.S.C. §2a(c). "Until a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof after any apportionment," a court cannot draw single-member districts. Ibid. (emphasis added). The court must apply the terms of §2a(c) and order at-large elections. If, however, the State is redistricted "in the manner provided by the law thereof," §2c applies. Thus, after a State has been redistricted, if a court determines that the redistricting violates the Constitution or the Voting Rights Act, the correct remedy for such a violation is the §2c procedure of drawing single-member districts that comport with federal statutory law and the Constitution. But "[u]ntil a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof," §2a(c)(5) mandates that a court order at-large elections. In short, a court should enforce §2a(c) before a "State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof," and a court should enforce §2c after a State has been "redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof." </s> The plurality seems to forget that in cases such as this one, a federal court has the power to redistrict only because private parties have alleged a violation of the Constitution or the Voting Rights Act. Sections 2a(c) and 2c do not create independently enforceable private rights of action themselves. Rather, both these provisions address the remedy that a federal court must order if it finds a violation of a constitutional or statutory right.1 The federal plaintiffs in this case alleged a constitutional violation, and the federal court drew a plan to remedy that violation. Having found a constitutional violation, the federal court was required to fashion the appropriate remedy of §2c or §2a(c) depending on whether the "State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof." 2 U.S.C. §2a(c). </s> The plurality's reading of §2a(c) also fails on its own terms. As the plurality appears to acknowledge, ante, at 21, the plain text of §2a(c) requires courts to apply §2a(c) before applying §2c. Yet the plurality never justifies why, when it is interpreting §2a(c), it looks to §2c instead of reading the plain language of §2a(c) itself. If state law really includes federal law, as the Court maintains, both §§2c and 2a(c) are equally applicable. The text of §2a(c) directs federal courts to order at-large elections "[u]ntil a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof." In deciding whether §2c or §2a(c) is applicable, it is no answer to escape the directive of §2a(c) by pointing to the text of §2c. Indeed, if one takes at face value the plurality's statement that §2a(c) "continues to apply," ante, at 18, a court should not look at §2c until the State complies with the terms of §2a(c). Section 2a(c) is antecedent to §2c, since §2a(c) defines when at-large elections are appropriate. </s> Moreover, the Court's interpretation of the interplay between §§2a(c) and 2c calls into question this Court's anti-commandeering jurisprudence. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) ("We have always understood that even where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts"); and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 912 (1997) ([S]tate legislatures are not subject to federal direction") (Scalia, J.). The plurality states that the anticommandeering jurisprudence is inapplicable to Article I, §4, because that section gives Congress the power to "Regulat[e]" the times, places, and manner of holding congressional elections. But of course, Article I, §8, uses similar language when it authorizes Congress to "regulate Commerce ... among the several States." Whether the anticommandeering principle of New York and Printz is as robust in the Article I, §4, context (the font of congressional authority here) as it is in the Article I, §8, context (the source of congressional authority in those cases) is a question that need not be definitively resolved here. In any event, the canon of constitutional avoidance counsels strongly against the reading of §§2c and 2a(c) adopted in Parts III and IV of the principal opinion. The Court's reading of §2c, see ante, at 15-16--also adopted by Justice Stevens--invites a future facial attack to the constitutional validity of §2c.2 </s> The history of the prior versions of §2c shows that §2c has never been treated as an absolute command. States routinely used at-large elections under the previous iterations of §2c, even though those versions of §2c also stated that Representatives "shall be elected by districts." Act of June 25, 1842, ch 47, §2, 5 Stat. 491; Act of July 14, 1862, ch. 170, 12 Stat. 572; Act of Feb. 2, 1872, 17 Stat. 28; cf. supra, at 3-4 (documenting the 1882, 1891, 1901, and 1911 versions of §2c). See also K. Martis, Historical Atlas of United States Congressional Districts 1789-1983, pp.4, 6 (1982) (hereinafter Martis) (documenting 36 States that used at-large elections from the 28th Congress--after Congress passed the first version of §2c in 1842--through the 70th Congress, when the last version of §2c expired in 1929).3 Indeed, in every Congress from 1843 until 1929, at least one State used some form of at-large representation. </s> Unless the Court is willing to say that these States openly flouted federal law, the only way to read this history is to acknowledge that §2c is not a statutory command. But see ante, at 19 (plurality opinion) (§2c is a "statutory comman[d]"). Rather, §2c and its predecessors tell States what type of redistricting legislation they are allowed to pass (all others being prohibited). This reading also comports with the pre-1842 history of congressional elections. Before Congress passed its first version of §2c in 1842, States routinely would elect more than one individual from a specific district. See Martis 4-5 (listing five States--Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania--that used multimember districts from the 3d Congress in 1793 through the 27th Congress in 1842). After the first version of §2c went into effect, however, States could no longer use multimember districts. Rather, States could either redistrict using single-member districts or use at-large elections. In short, §2c does not tell States that they must pass redistricting legislation. Section 2c is instead a restriction on the type of legislation that a State may pass--a restriction completely consistent with New York and Printz. And §2a(c) provides that at-large elections will be the default mechanism if States choose not to pass redistricting legislation. </s> An interpretation of §2a(c) which mandates that courts order at-large elections "[u]ntil a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof" does not mean that once a redistricting plan is in effect, §2a(c) applies if a court later deems the apportionment plan invalid. The words of §2a(c) specifically refer to the process in which the State redistricts: "in the manner provided by the law thereof." Section 2a(c) is no longer implicated after the State finishes its process of redistricting "in the manner provided by the law thereof after any apportionment." When all required action by the State is complete, and when the state plan first becomes effective, the "State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof." Ibid. B </s> Because the plurality's construction of §2a(c) has no statutory basis, the only way to understand the Court's opinion is that the Court is overlooking the words of the statute for nontextual prudential reasons. Cf. A. Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 18-23 (1997) (discussing the case of Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892), and noting that "Congress can enact foolish statutes as well as wise ones, and it is not for the courts to decide which is which and rewrite the former"). The only other prudential reason why the plurality would distort the plain text of §2a(c) is to hold sub silentio that §2c impliedly repeals §2a(c). Why else would the plurality note the "tension" between the two statutes, ante, at 17, note that "[t]here is something to be said for [the implied repeal] position," ibid., and engage in such a long exegesis about the historical context surrounding the enactment of §2c? See ante, at 12-15 (majority opinion). The plurality adopts the reading of §2a(c) proposed by one District Court in a 1982 decision. See Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F.Supp. 68 (Colo. 1982). As the United States recognizes in its brief, the reasoning of Carstens is nothing less than a partial implied repeal of §2a(c). See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29. ("Section 2c's unequivocal mandate that Members of the House of Representatives should be elected from single-member districts (except where exigencies of time render that impracticable, see Carston [sic] v. Lamm, supra) resolves that problem. It creates a workable and sensible regime that faithfully fulfills Congress's purpose when it enacted Section 2c in 1967"); see also id., at 10 ("While ... repeal by implication is disfavored, so is failure to give a later-enacted statute the full scope that its terms require"). </s> Moreover, neither the plurality nor Justice Stevens can rely on the historical context of the pre-1967 cases to support their interpretations of §§2a(c) and 2c. This history in fact cuts against them. It is true that before 1967, some district courts threatened to impose at-large elections if the state redistricting plan were ruled unconstitutional. See ante, at 13 (majority opinion) (citing cases). In all these cases, however, a legislature had already redistricted "in the manner provided by the law thereof." 2 U.S.C. §2a(c).4 </s> Thus, Congress' response in enacting §2(c) cannot be read to target anything more than situations in which a State had already "redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof." And of course, once a State was redistricted in this manner, §2a(c) by its terms would not apply. If anything, the enactment of §2c in 1967 clarified that the statutory balance between §§2c and 2a(c) that had existed in prior versions of the statute would continue to exist. </s> The cases cited by the Court do not resolve the question of what happens when a State fails to redistrict "in the manner provided by the law thereof." 2 U.S.C. §2a(c). The Court itself describes these pre-1967 cases as decisions where the courts "are remedying a failure to redistrict constitutionally." Ante, at 14. I agree with the Court that when a court strikes down a State's apportionment plan, §2c mandates that a court "draw single-member districts whenever possible." Ibid. The historical context confirms that once a State is redistricted, and the court rules that the plan is unconstitutional, §2c ensures that courts not order at-large elections. Because in these pre-1967 cases the legislature had redistricted "in the manner provided by the law thereof," §2a(c) was not applicable. Thus, the Court cannot rely on these pre-1967 cases to support the notion that the historical context surrounding the enactment of §2c renders §2a(c) toothless. Indeed, it is unclear why the Court examines this historical context at all. Cf. Bank One Chicago, N. A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 279 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("In my view a law means what its text most appropriately conveys, whatever the Congress that enacted it might have 'intended.' The law is what the law says, and we should content ourselves with reading it rather than psychoanalyzing those who enacted it"). </s> The Court also implies that it reads §2a(c) in the way it does because our decisions in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), "ushered in a new era in which federal courts were overseeing efforts by badly malapportioned States to conform their congressional electoral districts to the constitutionally required one-person, one-vote standards." Ante, at 12. For Justice Stevens, these decisions explain why Congress passed §2c. See ante, at 4, 6-7. But these watershed opinions cannot change the meaning of §2a(c). First, a later development cannot change an unamended statute. See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 780-784 (2000) (Scalia, J.). Since §2a(c) was enacted decades before the Baker line of cases, this subsequent development cannot change the interpretation of §2a(c). </s> Second, the Court's decision in Baker v. Carr, supra, rested in large part on the fact that courts were already involved in overseeing apportionment cases. Courts had been "directing" redistricting disputes since well before Baker. Ante, at 12. Indeed, the Court in Baker specifically acknowledged that "[a]n unbroken line of our precedents sustains the federal courts' jurisdiction of the subject matter of federal constitutional claims of this nature." 328 U.S. 549 (1946)). In Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S., at 375, for example, we specifically reached the redistricting question, and held that the prior versions of §§2c and 2a(c) mandated at-large elections "in the absence of a redistricting act." We held that at-large elections were required "in order to afford the representation to which the State is constitutionally entitled, and the general provisions of the Act of 1911 cannot be regarded as intended to have a different import." Ibid. </s> In Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932), the Court ruled on an issue strikingly similar to that in front of the Court today: the effect of the prior versions of §§2c and 2a(c) when the Mississippi congressional delegation was reduced by one seat. In fact, the District Court in Wood made a ruling on statutory grounds that would mirror the post-Baker constitutional review: "The District Court held that the new districts, created by the redistricting act, were not composed of compact and contiguous territory, having as nearly as practicable the same number of inhabitants, and hence failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of §3 of the Act of August 8, 1911." 287 U.S., at 5. See also Hume v. Mahan, 1 F.Supp. 142 (ED Ky. 1932). Likewise, before Baker, state courts had enforced prior versions of §§2c and 2a(c). See, e.g., Moran v. Bowley, 347 Ill. 148, 179 N.E. 526 (1932); State ex rel. Carroll v. Becker, 329 Mo. 501, 45 S.W. 2d 533 (1932). In short, while Baker and its progeny expanded the scope of federal court review, these cases did not change the fact that this Court recognized federal court jurisdiction over this subject matter at the time of §2a(c)'s enactment. Therefore, the Baker line of cases could not have caused §2a(c) to magically change meaning. </s> The plurality also seems to base its sub silentio holding of implied repeal on the fact that "[e]ighty percent" of §2a(c) is "dead letter." Ante, at 17. But even assuming that the first four parts of §2a(c) are currently unconstitutional, they were not necessarily unconstitutional when Congress passed §2c in 1967. For instance, §2a(c)(1) specifies that "[i]f there is no change in the number of Representatives, they shall be elected from the districts then prescribed by the law of such State." While it is true today that no district could in all probability remain exactly the same after an apportionment, it was not true in 1967. </s> This Court did not hold that a strict zero-deviation rule applied to redistricting cases until the 1983 decision of Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725. Indeed, the decision of this Court in Wesberry v. Sanders, supra, stated only that congressional districts must be equal to each other "as nearly as is practicable." Id., at 7-8. As Justice Stevens points out, after Wesberry, the House passed a bill in 1965 permitting congressional districts to deviate by as much as 15%. See ante, at 4-5. In 1967, in the same Congress that passed §2c, the House passed a bill permitting congressional districts to deviate by as much as 10%. See ante, at 5. And it appears that at least with the State of New Mexico, the congressional apportionment plan did not change after the 1970 census. See Martis247 (noting that New Mexico used its 1968 districting plan from the 91st through the 97th Congresses--in other words, from 1968 through 1983). These same principles also explain why as of 1967, §§2a(c)(2), 2a(c)(3), and 2a(c)(4) were similarly constitutional. </s> Even if parts of §2a(c) would be unconstitutional today, a court can redistrict the existing district lines to make the districts constitutional while ordering an at-large election for the additional Representatives. Indeed, this approach best accords with the principle that a federal court's "modifications of a state plan are limited to those necessary to cure any constitutional or statutory defect." Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 43 (1982) (per curiam). And even if only §2a(c)(5) were constitutional, the plurality correctly recognizes that §2a(c)(5) is easily severable from the rest of the statute. See ante, at 17. </s> Finally, the fact that a court must enter an order under §2a(c)(5) mandating at-large elections does not necessarily mean that the plan would violate §§2 or 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§1973, 1973c, or that traditional winner-take-all elections are required on a statewide basis. Rather, as cross-appellants acknowledge, Brief for Cross-Appellants in No. 01-1596, pp.27-28, Tr. of Oral. Arg. 47-48, a court could design an at-large election plan that awards seats on a cumulative basis, or by some other method that would result in a plan that satisfies the Voting Rights Act. Cf. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40 (1993); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616-617 (1982); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 897-898, 908-912 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); Dillard v. Chilton County Bd. of Ed., 699 F.Supp. 870 (MD Ala. 1988); see also S. Issacharoff, P. Karlan, & R. Pildes, The Law of Democracy 1091-1151 (rev. 2d ed. 2002); Pildes & Donoghue, Cumulative Voting in the United States, 1995 U. Chi. Legal F. 241, 251-257. </s> In short, I cannot agree that the phrase "[u]ntil a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof" contains any sort of "imminence" requirement, a requirement without any statutory mooring. And although the plurality claims to hold that §2c does not impliedly repeal §2a(c), the plurality's opinion makes sense only if §2c serves as a partial implied repeal of §2a(c). It is difficult to say, as the plurality does, that §2a(c) "continues to apply," ante, at 18, and also to say, as the plurality does, that §2a(c) applies only if "the election is so imminent that no entity competent to complete redistricting pursuant to ... the mandate of §2c [] is able to do so without disrupting the election process." Ante, at 19. Unless and until Congress expressly repeals §2a(c), I would hold that federal courts are required to order some form of at-large elections "[u]ntil a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof after any apportionment." III </s> Having concluded that §2a(c) applies "[u]ntil a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof after any apportionment," it is necessary to consider the question that the Court intentionally avoids: whether the State of Mississippi here has been "redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof." If it has not, §2a(c) applies, and the District Court should have ordered at-large elections. If it has been "redistricted," the District Court was correct to draw single-member districts under §2c. Under this Court's consistent case law, and under Mississippi state law, a State is not "redistricted" until the apportionment plan has been precleared under §5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1973c. Because Mississippi's plan has not been precleared, I would hold that §2a(c) applies. We have held that a "new reapportionment plan enacted by a State ... will not be considered 'effective as law,' until it has been submitted and has received clearance under §5." Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 542 (1978) (plurality opinion) (quoting Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 412 (1977)) (citation omitted). Accord, Connor v. Waller, 432 U.S. 491, 501-502 (1977) ("Section 5 requires covered jurisdictions to delay implementation of validly enacted state legislation until federal authorities have had an opportunity to determine whether that legislation conforms to the Constitution and to the provisions of the Voting Rights Act"); Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 652 (1991); Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 269 (1982) ("Our opinions repeatedly note that failure to follow [the preclearance procedures] renders the change unenforceable"). Indeed, in Hathorn v. Lovorn, we held that Mississippi itself could "not further implement [a] change until the parties comply with §5." Id., at 270. </s> Preclearance is the final step in the process of redistricting. If the apportionment plan is not precleared, it is not "effective as law," and cannot be implemented. Under our case law, then, a State is only redistricted once the clearance process is complete. Before a covered jurisdiction receives clearance, the Federal Government may force the State to make changes to the redistricting plan. Once a State receives preclearance, it may implement a voting change. </s> The Mississippi Supreme Court has recognized that the redistricting process is not complete until the apportionment plan is cleared: "Voting changes subject to §5 'will not be effective as law until and unless cleared.'" Inre McMillin, 642 So.2d 1336, 1339 (Miss. 1994) (quoting Connor v. Waller, supra, at 656). In McMillan, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that a plan for nonpartisan judicial elections passed by the legislature was not yet effective because it had not been precleared. 642 So.2d, at 1339. Consequently, the court ordered elections to occur under the old plan, which required partisan judicial elections. See ibid. ("Consequently, the statutes currently governing primary judicial elections and setting such elections for Tuesday, June 7, 1994, are the only enforceable provisions regarding said primaries"). Thus, despite the fact that the legislature had passed a law mandating nonpartisan judicial elections, despite the fact that the new law expressly repealed the old law, despite the fact that the Governor had signed the law, and despite the fact that the State had submitted the new law to the United States Attorney General for preclearance under §5, this new law was not operative for one reason: The United States Attorney General had not precleared this new law by the time of the new primary elections. See id., at 1338. Thus, at least in Mississippi, the old voting plan remains in effect until the new plan has been precleared. </s> Accordingly, the terms of §2a(c)(5) should apply here, and the District Court should have ordered at-large elections for the entire state congressional delegation. Congress can expressly repeal §2a(c) quite easily. But it has not done so. This Court should not presume to act in Congress' stead. And this Court should not read §2a(c) in a manner divorced from any semblance of textual fidelity in order for it to reach what it deems to be the "correct" or more unintrusive result. I therefore respectfully dissent from Part III-A of the Court's opinion and Parts III-B and IV of the plurality opinion. </s> FOOTNOTESFootnote *Together with No. 01-1596, Smith et al. v. Branch etal., also on appeal from the same court. FOOTNOTESFootnote **Contrary to the dissent's assertion, post, at 9-10, n.1, our reading creates no conflict with Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). Here a federal court granted relief on the basis of federal law--specifically, the Federal Constitution. The District Court did not "instruc[t] state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law," Pennhurst, supra, at 106; rather, it deferred to the State's "policies and preferences" for redistricting, White v. Weiser, 412 U. S. 783, 795 (1973). Far from intruding on state sovereignty, such deference respects it. FOOTNOTESFootnote 1Compare Posadas, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) ("[A] federal statute implicitly overrides state law either when the scope of a statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy a field exclusively, English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990), or when state law is in actual conflict with federal law"). Footnote 2The States of Hawaii and New Mexico were the only two States that met the statutory exception because they were "entitled to more than one Representative" and had "in all previous elections elected [their] Representatives at Large." Pub. L. 90-196, 81 Stat. 581. Footnote 3In 1965, the House of Representatives passed a bill identical, in all relevant respects, to the bill Representative Celler introduced in January 1967. See H.R. 5505, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). Footnote 4Specifically, §2a(c) would have been expressly repealed by the following language, present in all but the final version of H.R. 2508: "That section 22 of the Act of June 18, 1929, entitled 'An Act to provide for the fifteenth and subsequent decennial censuses and to provide for apportionment of Representatives' (46 Stat. 26), as amended, is amended as follows: </s> "Subsection (c) is amended by striking out all of the language in that subsection and inserting in place thereof the following: ...." H.R. 2508, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1967). Footnote 5Senator Bayh introduced one amendment to the private bill that excluded Hawaii and New Mexico while Senator Baker offered another that had no exceptions. Senator Bayh characterized his amendment as follows: "What I have tried to do is to take that part of the conference report over which there was no dispute, or a minimal amount of dispute, and attach that part to the bill which is now the pending business." 113 Cong. Rec. 31719 (1967). Senator Baker described his amendment as follows: "The measure makes no other provision. It has nothing to do with gerrymandering. It has nothing to do with compactness. It has nothing to do with census. It strictly provides in a straightforward manner that when there is more than one Member of the House of Representatives from a State, the State must be districted, and that the Members may not run at large. . . . I believe that my amendment is the most straightforward and direct and simple way to get at the most urgent need in the entire field of redistricting, and that is to prevent the several States of the Union from being under the threat of having their Representatives to the U.S. House of Representatives stand for election at large." Id., at 31718. </s> In a colloquy between Senators Bayh and Baker on the floor, they both agreed that the final amendment left no doubt as to its effect: "This will make it mandatory for all Congressmen to be elected by single-Member districts, whether the reapportionment is done by State legislatures or by a Federal court." Id., at 31720 (remarks of Senator Bayh). FOOTNOTESFootnote 1It does not matter whether §2a(c) applies exclusively to legislative redistricting. Under the terms of §2a(c), courts can be involved in the redistricting process. To the extent that courts are part of the "manner provided by the law thereof," courts may redistrict. 2 U.S.C. §2a(c). And contrary to the plurality's interpretation, the text of §2a(c) makes clear that this "manner" refers exclusively to state law. The manner in which a State redistricts can only refer to the process by which a State redistricts. Moreover, the plurality's conflation of state and federal law is in substantial tension with this Court's opinion in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (delineating a distinction between state and federal law when a federal court enters an injunction). Footnote 2It is just as coercive for Congress to say that if the State does not comply with a legislative command, a federal court will enter an injunction making the State conform with Congress' command. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-177 (1992) (striking down Congress' "take title" provision because the choice between two unconstitutional choices is "no choice at all"). If §2c is not a command, however, a State has the choice between passing redistricting legislation or using at-large elections. Section 2c merely limits the type of remedies that a federal court may adopt in response to a pre-existing violation of federal law. Neither it nor §2a(c) affirmatively provides courts the authority to draw districts absent a violation. Rather, §2a(c) specifies which remedy is appropriate for the constitutional violation. See 2 U.S.C. §2a(c) (a court must order at-large elections "[u]ntil a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof"). Footnote 3Alabama (43d, 44th, 63d, 64th Congresses), Arkansas (43d, 48th Congresses), California (31st-38th, 48th Congresses), Colorado (58th-63d Congresses), Connecticut (58th-62d Congresses), Florida (43d, 63d Congresses), Georgia (28th, 48th Congresses), Iowa (29th Congress), Kansas (43d, 48th, 53d-57th, 59th, 60th Congresses), Idaho (63d-65th Congresses), Illinois (37th-42d, 53d, 63d-70th Congresses), Indiana (43d Congress), Louisiana (43d Congress), New York (43d, 48th Congresses), Maine (48th Congress), Michigan (63d Congress), Minnesota (35th-37th, 63d Congresses), Mississippi (28th, 29th, 33d Congresses), Missouri (28th, 29th Congresses), Montana (63d-65th Congresses), New Hampshire (28th, 29th Congresses), New Mexico (62d Congress), North Carolina (48th Congress), North Dakota (58th-62d Congresses), Ohio (63d Congress), Oklahoma (63d Congress), Pennsylvania (43d, 48th-50th, 53d-57th, 63d-67th Congresses), South Carolina (43d Congress), South Dakota (51st-62d Congresses), Tennessee (43d Congress), Texas (43d, 63d-65th Congresses), Utah (63d Congress), Virginia (48th Congress), Washington (53d-60th, 63dCongresses), West Virginia (63d, 64th Congresses), Wisconsin (30th Congress). Footnote 4See, e.g., Calkins v. Hare, 228 F.Supp. 824, 825 (ED Mich. 1964) ("The plaintiffs have challenged the constitutionality of the congressional districting in this state"); Bush v. Martin, 251 F.Supp. 484, 488 (SD Tex. 1966) ("The question is whether the Texas 1965 Congressional Redistricting Act ... is constitutional"); Park v. Faubus, 238 F.Supp. 62, 63 (ED Ark. 1965) ("It is alleged that Act 5 of the Second Extraordinary Session of the Acts of the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas for the year of 1961, being the Act which divides the State of Arkansas into congressional districts, deprives plaintiff and others similarly situated of their right to vote" (citation omitted)); Preisler v. Secretary of State, 257 F.Supp. 953, 955 (WD Mo. 1966) (The "plaintiffs contest the constitutional validity of Missouri's 1965 Congressional Redistricting Act"); Meeks v. Anderson, 229 F.Supp. 271, 272 (Kan. 1964) ("The action was brought by qualified voters in four of the five Congressional Districts of Kansas, seeking to have Kansas Statutes, which is the last congressional reapportionment by the Kansas Legislature, declared unconstitutional" (citation omitted)); Baker v. Clement, 247 F.Supp. 886, 888 (MD Tenn. 1965) ("This case presents the question of whether the statute creating Tennessee's nine congressional districts violates Article 1, Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States").

United States Supreme Court BAREFOOT v. ESTELLE(1983) No. 82-6080 Argued: April 26, 1983Decided: July 6, 1983 </s> Petitioner was convicted of capital murder in a Texas state court after a jury trial. A separate sentencing hearing was then held before the same jury to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed. One of the questions submitted to the jury, as required by a Texas statute, was whether there was a probability that the petitioner would commit further criminal acts of violence and would constitute a continuing threat to society. In addition to introducing other evidence, the State called two psychiatrists, who, in response to hypothetical questions, testified that there was such a probability. The jury answered the question, as well as another question as to whether the killing had been deliberate, in the affirmative, thus requiring imposition of the death penalty. On appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected petitioner's contention that such use of psychiatric testimony at the sentencing hearing was unconstitutional, and affirmed the conviction and sentence. Ultimately, after this Court had denied certiorari and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had denied a habeas corpus application, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in Federal District Court raising the same claims with respect to the use of psychiatric testimony. The District Court rejected these claims and denied the writ, but issued a certificate of probable cause pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2253, which provides that an appeal may not be taken to a court of appeals from the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding where the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a state court "unless the justice or judge who rendered the order or a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of probable cause." The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals again denied a habeas corpus application, as well as denying a stay of execution. Shortly thereafter, the Court of Appeals also denied a stay of execution pending appeal of the District Court's judgment. This Court, treating an application for stay of execution as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment, granted certiorari. </s> Held: </s> 1. The Court of Appeals did not err in refusing to stay petitioner's death sentence. Pp. 887-896. [463 U.S. 880, 881] </s> (a) Although it did not formally affirm the District Court's judgment, there is no question that the Court of Appeals ruled on the merits of the appeal in the course of denying a stay and that petitioner had ample opportunity to address the merits, and such practice was within the bounds of this Court's prior decisions, such as Garrison v. Patterson, 391 U.S. 464 . The parties, as directed, filed briefs and presented oral arguments, thus making it clear that whether a stay would be granted depended on the probability of success on the merits. While it would have been advisable for the Court of Appeals to affirm expressly the District Court's judgment, as well as to deny the stay, the court's failure to do so does not conflict with Garrison and related cases. Although the Court of Appeals moved swiftly to deny the stay, this does not mean that its treatment of the merits was cursory or inadequate. On the contrary, the court's resolution of the primary issue on appeal, the admission of psychiatric testimony on dangerousness, reflects careful consideration. To remand to the Court of Appeals for verification that the District Court's judgment was affirmed, as petitioner urges, would be an unwarranted exaltation of form over substance. Pp. 888-892. </s> (b) The following procedural guidelines for handling applications for stays of execution on habeas corpus appeals pursuant to a certificate of probable cause are suggested: (1) A certificate of probable cause requires more than a showing of the absence of frivolity of the appeal. The petitioner must make a substantial showing of the denial of a federal right, the severity of the penalty in itself not sufficing to warrant automatic issuance of a certificate. (2) When a certificate of probable cause is issued, the petitioner must be afforded an opportunity to address the merits, and the court of appeals must decide the merits. (3) A court of appeals may adopt expedited procedures for resolving the merits of habeas corpus appeals, notwithstanding the issuance of a certificate of probable cause, but local rules should be promulgated stating the manner in which such cases will be handled and informing counsel that the merits of the appeal may be decided on the motion for a stay. (4) Where there are second or successive federal habeas corpus petitions, it is proper for the district court to expedite consideration of the petition, even where it cannot be concluded that the petition should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. 2254 Rule 9(b) because it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief. (5) Stays of execution are not automatic pending the filing and consideration of a petition for certiorari from this Court to a court of appeals which has denied a writ of habeas corpus. Applications for stays must contain the information and materials necessary to make a careful assessment of the merits and so reliably to determine [463 U.S. 880, 882] whether a plenary review and a stay are warranted. A stay of execution should first be sought from the court of appeals. Pp. 892-896. </s> 2. The District Court did not err on the merits in denying petitioner's habeas corpus petition. Pp. 896-905. </s> (a) There is no merit to petitioner's argument that psychiatrists, individually and as a group, are incompetent to predict with an acceptable degree of reliability that a particular criminal will commit other crimes in the future and so represent a danger to the community. To accept such an argument would call into question predictions of future behavior that are constantly made in other contexts. Moreover, under the generally applicable rules of evidence covering the admission and weight of unprivileged evidence, psychiatric testimony predicting dangerousness may be countered not only as erroneous in a particular case but also as generally so unreliable that it should be ignored. Nor, despite the view of the American Psychiatric Association supporting petitioner's view, is there any convincing evidence that such testimony is almost entirely unreliable and that the factfinder and the adversary system will not be competent to uncover, recognize, and take due account of its shortcomings. Pp. 896-903. </s> (b) Psychiatric testimony need not be based on personal examination of the defendant but may properly be given in response to hypothetical questions. Expert testimony, whether in the form of an opinion based on hypothetical questions or otherwise, is commonly admitted as evidence where it might help the factfinder do its job. Although this case involves the death penalty, there is no constitutional barrier to applying the ordinary rules of evidence governing the use of expert testimony. Pp. 903-904. </s> (c) The Texas courts, the District Court, and the Court of Appeals properly rejected petitioner's argument that even if the use of hypothetical questions in predicting dangerousness is acceptable as a general rule, the use made of them in his case violated his right to due process of law. Pp. 904-905. </s> Affirmed. </s> WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 906. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post p. 906. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in Parts I, II, III, and IV of which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 916. </s> Will Gray argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Carolyn Garcia. [463 U.S. 880, 883] </s> Jack Greenberg argued the cause for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were James M. Nabrit III, Joel Berger, John Charles Boger, Deborah Fins, James S. Liebman, and Anthony G. Amsterdam. </s> Douglas M. Becker, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Jim Mattox, Attorney General, and David R. Richards, Executive Assistant Attorney General. * </s> [Footnote * Joel I. Klein filed a brief for the American Psychiatric Association as amicus curiae urging reversal. </s> Daniel J. Popeo, Paul D. Kamenar, and Nicholas E. Calio filed a brief for the Washington Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging affirmance. </s> Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Morris Harrell, Marna S. Tucker, and E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., for the American Bar Association; by Gerald H. Goldstein, Maury Maverick, and Burt Neuborne for the Texas Civil Liberties Union et al.; and by Jim Smith, Attorney General of Florida, and Charles Corces, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Florida et al. </s> JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> We have two questions before us in this case: whether the District Court erred on the merits in rejecting the petition for habeas corpus filed by petitioner, and whether the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit correctly denied a stay of execution of the death penalty pending appeal of the District Court's judgment. </s> I </s> On November 14, 1978, petitioner was convicted of the capital murder of a police officer in Bell County, Tex. A separate sentencing hearing before the same jury was then held to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed. Under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071 (Vernon 1981), 1 two special questions were to be submitted to the [463 U.S. 880, 884] jury: whether the conduct causing death was "committed deliberately and with reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result"; and whether "there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." The State introduced into evidence petitioner's prior convictions and his reputation for lawlessness. The State also called two psychiatrists, John Holbrook and James Grigson, who, in response to hypothetical questions, testified that petitioner would probably commit further acts of violence and represent a continuing threat to society. The jury answered both of the questions put to them in the affirmative, a result which required the imposition of the death penalty. </s> On appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, petitioner urged, among other submissions, that the use of psychiatrists at the punishment hearing to make predictions [463 U.S. 880, 885] about petitioner's future conduct was unconstitutional because psychiatrists, individually and as a class, are not competent to predict future dangerousness. Hence, their predictions are so likely to produce erroneous sentences that their use violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. It was also urged, in any event, that permitting answers to hypothetical questions by psychiatrists who had not personally examined petitioner was constitutional error. The court rejected all of these contentions and affirmed the conviction and sentence on March 12, 1980, Barefoot v. State, 596 S. W. 2d 875; rehearing was denied on April 30, 1980. </s> Petitioner's execution was scheduled for September 17, 1980. On July 29, this Court granted a stay of execution pending the filing and disposition of a petition for certiorari, which was filed and then denied on June 29, 1981. Barefoot v. Texas, 453 U.S. 913 . Petitioner's execution was again scheduled by the state courts, this time for October 13, 1981. An application for habeas corpus to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was denied on October 7, 1981, whereafter a petition for habeas corpus was filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. Among other issues, petitioner raised the same claims with respect to the use of psychiatric testimony that he had presented to the state courts. The District Court stayed petitioner's execution pending action on the petition. An evidentiary hearing was held on July 28, 1982, at which petitioner was represented by competent counsel. On November 9, 1982, the District Court filed its findings and conclusions, rejecting each of the several grounds asserted by petitioner. The writ was accordingly denied; also, the stay of petitioner's death sentence was vacated. The District Court, however, granted petitioner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and issued a certificate of probable cause pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2253, which provides that an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding where the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a state court "unless the justice or judge who [463 U.S. 880, 886] rendered the order or a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of probable cause." Notice of appeal was filed on November 24, 1982. </s> At this point, the Texas courts set January 25, 1983, as the new execution date. A petition for habeas corpus and motion for stay of execution were then denied by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on December 21, 1982, and another motion for stay of execution was denied by the same court on January 11, 1983. </s> On January 14, petitioner moved the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to stay his execution pending consideration of his appeal from the denial of his petition for habeas corpus. On January 17, the parties were notified to present briefs and oral argument to the court on January 19. The case was heard on January 19, and, on January 20, the Court of Appeals issued an opinion and judgment denying the stay. 697 F.2d 593 (1983). The court's opinion recited that the court had studied the briefs and record filed and had heard oral argument at which petitioner's attorney was allowed unlimited time to discuss any matter germane to the case. The Court of Appeals was of the view that by giving the parties unlimited opportunity to brief and argue the merits as they saw fit, the requirements set forth in this Court's cases, such as Garrison v. Patterson, 391 U.S. 464 (1968), Nowakowski v. Maroney, 386 U.S. 542 (1967), and Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968), were satisfied. As the court understood those cases, when a certificate of probable cause is issued by the district court, the court of appeals must give the parties an opportunity to address the merits. In its view, the parties had been given "an unlimited opportunity to make their contentions upon the underlying merits by briefs and oral argument." 697 F.2d, at 596. The Court of Appeals then proceeded to address the merits of the psychiatric testimony issue, together with new claims not presented to the District Court, that the state court had no jurisdiction to resentence petitioner and that newly discovered evidence warranted [463 U.S. 880, 887] a new trial. Each of the grounds was discussed by the court and rejected. The court concluded that since the petition had no substantial merit, a stay should be denied. </s> Petitioner then filed an application for stay of execution with the Circuit Justice for the Fifth Circuit, who referred the matter to the Court. On January 24, 1983, the Court stayed petitioner's execution and, treating the application for stay as a petition for writ of certiorari before judgment, granted certiorari. 459 U.S. 1169 . The parties were directed to brief and argue "the question presented by the application, namely, the appropriate standard for granting or denying a stay of execution pending disposition of an appeal by a federal court of appeals by a death-sentenced federal habeas corpus petitioner, and also the issues on appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit." Ibid. The case was briefed and orally argued here, and we now affirm the judgment of the District Court. </s> II </s> With respect to the procedures followed by the Court of Appeals in refusing to stay petitioner's death sentence, it must be remembered that direct appeal is the primary avenue for review of a conviction or sentence, and death penalty cases are no exception. When the process of direct review - which, if a federal question is involved, includes the right to petition this Court for a writ of certiorari - comes to an end, a presumption of finality and legality attaches to the conviction and sentence. The role of federal habeas proceedings, while important in assuring that constitutional rights are observed, is secondary and limited. Federal courts are not forums in which to relitigate state trials. Even less is federal habeas a means by which a defendant is entitled to delay an execution indefinitely. The procedures adopted to facilitate the orderly consideration and disposition of habeas petitions are not legal entitlements that a defendant has a right to pursue irrespective of the contribution these procedures make toward [463 U.S. 880, 888] uncovering constitutional error. "It is natural that counsel for the condemned in a capital case should lay hold of every ground which, in their judgment, might tend to the advantage of their client, but the administration of justice ought not to be interfered with on mere pretexts." Lambert v. Barrett, 159 U.S. 660, 662 (1895). Furthermore, unlike a term of years, a death sentence cannot begin to be carried out by the State while substantial legal issues remain outstanding. Accordingly, federal courts must isolate the exceptional cases where constitutional error requires retrial or resentencing as certainly and swiftly as orderly procedures will permit. They need not, and should not, however, fail to give nonfrivolous claims of constitutional error the careful attention that they deserve. </s> For these reasons, we granted certiorari before judgment to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to stay petitioner's death sentence. </s> A </s> Petitioner urges that the Court of Appeals improperly denied a stay of execution while failing to act finally on his appeal. He suggests the possibility of remanding the case to the Court of Appeals without reaching the merits of the District Court's judgment. The heart of petitioner's submission is that the Court of Appeals, unless it believes the case to be entirely frivolous, was obligated to decide the appeal on its merits in the usual course and must, in a death case, stay the execution pending such disposition. The State responds that the Court of Appeals reached and decided the merits of the issues presented in the course of denying the stay and that petitioner had ample opportunity to address the merits. </s> We have previously held that "if an appellant persuades an appropriate tribunal that probable cause for an appeal exists, he must then be afforded an opportunity to address the underlying merits." Garrison v. Patterson, supra, at 466 (per curiam). See Nowakowski v. Maroney, supra; Carafas v. [463 U.S. 880, 889] LaVallee, supra. These decisions indicate that if a court of appeals is unable to resolve the merits of an appeal before the scheduled date of execution, the petitioner is entitled to a stay of execution to permit due consideration of the merits. But we have also held that the requirement of a decision on the merits "does not prevent the courts of appeals from adopting appropriate summary procedures for final disposition of such cases." Garrison v. Patterson, 391 U.S., at 466 . See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S., at 242 . In Garrison, after examining our prior holdings, we concluded: </s> "[N]othing [in these cases] prevents the courts of appeals from considering the questions of probable cause and the merits together, and nothing said there or here necessarily requires full briefing in every instance in which a certificate is granted. We hold only that where an appeal possesses sufficient merit to warrant a certificate, the appellant must be afforded adequate opportunity to address the merits, and that if a summary procedure is adopted the appellant must be informed, by rule or otherwise, that his opportunity will be limited." 391 U.S., at 466 . </s> We emphasized, ibid., that there must be ample evidence that in disposing of the appeal, the merits have been addressed, but that nothing in the cases or the applicable rules prevents a court of appeals from adopting summary procedures in such cases. </s> On the surface, it is not clear whether the Fifth Circuit's recent practice of requiring a showing of some prospect of success on the merits before issuing a stay of execution, O'Bryan v. Estelle, 691 F.2d 706, 708 (1982); Brooks v. Estelle, 697 F.2d 586 (1982), comports with these requirements. Approving the execution of a defendant before his appeal is decided on the merits would clearly be improper under Garrison, Nowakowski, and Carafas. However, a practice of deciding the merits of an appeal, when possible, [463 U.S. 880, 890] together with the application for a stay, is not inconsistent with our cases. </s> It appears clear that the Court of Appeals in this case pursued the latter course. The Court of Appeals was fully aware of our precedents and ruled that their requirements were fully satisfied. After quoting from Garrison, the Court of Appeals said: </s> "Our actions here fall under this language. Petitioner's motion is directed solely to the merits. The parties have been also afforded an unlimited opportunity to make their contentions upon the underlying merits and oral argument. This opinion demonstrates the reasons for our decision." 697 F.2d, at 596. </s> In a section of its opinion entitled "Merits of Appeal: Psychiatric Testimony on Dangerousness," the Court of Appeals then proceeded to address that issue and reject petitioner's contentions. </s> The course pursued by the Court of Appeals in this case was within the bounds of our prior decisions. In connection with acting on the stay, the parties were directed to file briefs and to present oral argument. In light of the Fifth Circuit's announced practice, O'Bryan v. Estelle, supra; Brooks v. Estelle, supra, it was clear that whether a stay would be granted depended on the probability of success on the merits. The parties addressed the merits and were given unlimited time to present argument. We do not agree that petitioner and his attorneys were prejudiced in their preparation of the appeal. The primary issue presented had been briefed and argued throughout the proceedings in the state courts and rebriefed and reargued in the District Court's habeas corpus proceeding. From the time the District Court ruled on the petition on November 9, 1982, petitioner had 71 days in which to prepare the briefs and arguments which were presented to the Fifth Circuit on January 19, 1983. [463 U.S. 880, 891] </s> Although the Court of Appeals did not formally affirm the judgment of the District Court, there is no question that the Court of Appeals ruled on the merits of the appeal, as its concluding statements demonstrate: </s> "This Court has had the benefit of the full trial court record except for a few exhibits unimportant to our considerations. We have read the arguments and materials filed by the parties. The petitioner is represented here, as he has been throughout the habeas corpus proceedings in state and federal courts, by a competent attorney experienced in this area of the law. We have heard full arguments in open court. Finding no patent substantial merit, or semblance thereof, to petitioner's constitutional objections, we must conclude and order that the motion for stay should be DENIED." 697 F.2d, at 599-600. </s> It would have been advisable, once the court had addressed the merits and arrived at these conclusions, to verify the obvious by expressly affirming the judgment of the District Court, as well as to deny the stay. The court's failure to do so, however, does not conflict with Garrison and related cases. Indeed, in Garrison itself, the Court noted that "[i]n an effort to determine whether the merits had been addressed . . . this Court solicited further submissions from the parties in this case." 391 U.S., at 466 , n. 2. If a formal decision on the merits were required, this inquiry would have been pointless. Moreover, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for not formally affirming the judgment of the District Court since this Court, over the dissent of three Justices arguing as petitioner does here, refused to stay an execution in a case where the Court of Appeals followed very similar procedures. Brooks v. Estelle, 459 U.S. 1061 (1982). 2 </s> [463 U.S. 880, 892] </s> Although the Court of Appeals moved swiftly to decide the stay, this does not mean that its treatment of the merits was cursory or inadequate. On the contrary, the court's resolution of the primary issue on appeal, the admission of psychiatric testimony on dangerousness, reflects careful consideration. For these reasons, to remand to the Court of Appeals for verification that the judgment of the District Court was affirmed would be an unwarranted exaltation of form over substance. </s> B </s> That the Court of Appeals' handling of this case was tolerable under our precedents is not to suggest that its course should be accepted as the norm or as the preferred procedure. It is a matter of public record that an increasing number of death-sentenced petitioners are entering the appellate stages of the federal habeas process. The fair and efficient consideration of these appeals requires proper procedures for the handling of applications for stays of executions and demands procedures that allow a decision on the merits of an appeal accompanying the denial of a stay. The development of these procedures is primarily a function of the courts of appeals and the rulemaking processes of the federal courts, but the following general guidelines can be set forth. </s> First. Congress established the requirement that a prisoner obtain a certificate of probable cause to appeal in order to prevent frivolous appeals from delaying the States' ability to impose sentences, including death sentences. 3 The primary [463 U.S. 880, 893] means of separating meritorious from frivolous appeals should be the decision to grant or withhold a certificate of probable cause. It is generally agreed that "probable cause requires something more than the absence of frivolity and that the standard is a higher one than the `good faith' requirement of 1915." Blackmun, Allowance of In Forma Pauperis Appeals in 2255 and Habeas Corpus Cases, 43 F. R. D. 343, 352 (1967). We agree with the weight of opinion in the Courts of Appeals that a certificate of probable cause requires petitioner to make a "substantial showing of the denial of [a] federal right." Stewart v. Beto, 454 F.2d 268, 270, n. 2 (CA5 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 925 (1972). See also Ramsey v. Hand, 309 F.2d 947, 948 (CA10 1962); Goode v. Wainwright, 670 F.2d 941 (CA11 1982). 4 In a capital case, the nature of the penalty is a proper consideration in determining whether to issue a certificate of probable cause, but the severity of the penalty does not in itself suffice to warrant the automatic issuing of a certificate. </s> Second. When a certificate of probable cause is issued by the district court, as it was in this case, or later by the court of appeals, petitioner must then be afforded an opportunity to address the merits, and the court of appeals is obligated to decide the merits of the appeal. Accordingly, a court of appeals, where necessary to prevent the case from becoming [463 U.S. 880, 894] moot by the petitioner's execution, should grant a stay of execution pending disposition of an appeal when a condemned prisoner obtains a certificate of probable cause on his initial habeas appeal. </s> Third. As our earlier cases have indicated, a court of appeals may adopt expedited procedures in resolving the merits of habeas appeals, notwithstanding the issuance of a certificate of probable cause. If a circuit chooses to follow this course, it would be advisable to promulgate a local rule stating the manner in which such cases will be handled and informing counsel that the merits of an appeal may be decided upon the motion for a stay. Even without special procedures, it is entirely appropriate that an appeal which is "frivolous and entirely without merit" be dismissed after the hearing on a motion for a stay. See, e. g., Local Rule 20, Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. We caution that the issuance of a certificate of probable cause generally should indicate that an appeal is not legally frivolous, and that a court of appeals should be confident that petitioner's claim is squarely foreclosed by statute, rule, or authoritative court decision, or is lacking any factual basis in the record of the case, before dismissing it as frivolous. </s> If an appeal is not frivolous, a court of appeals may still choose to expedite briefing and hearing the merits of all or of selected cases in which a stay of a death sentence has been requested, provided that counsel has adequate opportunity to address the merits and knows that he is expected to do so. If appropriate notice is provided, argument on the merits may be heard at the same time the motion for a stay is considered, and the court may thereafter render a single opinion deciding both the merits and the motion, unless exigencies of time preclude a considered decision on the merits, in which case the motion for a stay must be granted. In choosing the procedures to be used, the courts should consider whether the delay that is avoided by summary procedures warrants departing from the normal, untruncated processes of appellate [463 U.S. 880, 895] review. In instances where expedition of the briefing and argument schedule is not ordered, a court of appeals may nevertheless choose to advance capital cases on the docket so that the decision of these appeals is not delayed by the weight of other business. </s> Fourth. Second and successive federal habeas corpus petitions present a different issue. "To the extent that these involve the danger that a condemned inmate might attempt to use repeated petitions and appeals as a mere delaying tactic, the State has a quite legitimate interest in preventing such abuses of the writ." Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 40-41. Title 28 U.S.C. 2254 Rule 9(b) states that "a second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief . . . [or if] the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ." See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18 (1963); Advisory Committee Note to Rule 9(b), 28 U.S.C., p. 273. Even where it cannot be concluded that a petition should be dismissed under Rule 9(b), it would be proper for the district court to expedite consideration of the petition. The granting of a stay should reflect the presence of substantial grounds upon which relief might be granted. </s> Fifth. Stays of execution are not automatic pending the filing and consideration of a petition for a writ of certiorari from this Court to the court of appeals that has denied a writ of habeas corpus. It is well established that there "`must be a reasonable probability that four Members of the Court would consider the underlying issue sufficiently meritorious for the grant of certiorari or the notation of probable jurisdiction; there must be a significant possibility of reversal of the lower court's decision; and there must be a likelihood that irreparable harm will result if that decision is not stayed.'" White v. Florida, 458 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1982) (POWELL, J., in chambers) (quoting Times-Picayune Publishing Corp. v. [463 U.S. 880, 896] Schulingkamp, 419 U.S. 1301, 1305 (1974) (POWELL, J., in chambers)). Applications for stays of death sentences are expected to contain the information and materials necessary to make a careful assessment of the merits of the issue and so reliably to determine whether plenary review and a stay are warranted. A stay of execution should first be sought from the court of appeals, and this Court generally places considerable weight on the decision reached by the courts of appeals in these circumstances. </s> III </s> Petitioner's merits submission is that his death sentence must be set aside because the Constitution of the United States barred the testimony of the two psychiatrists who testified against him at the punishment hearing. There are several aspects to this claim. First, it is urged that psychiatrists, individually and as a group, are incompetent to predict with an acceptable degree of reliability that a particular criminal will commit other crimes in the future and so represent a danger to the community. Second, it is said that in any event, psychiatrists should not be permitted to testify about future dangerousness in response to hypothetical questions and without having examined the defendant personally. Third, it is argued that in the particular circumstances of this case, the testimony of the psychiatrists was so unreliable that the sentence should be set aside. As indicated below, we reject each of these arguments. </s> A </s> The suggestion that no psychiatrist's testimony may be presented with respect to a defendant's future dangerousness is somewhat like asking us to disinvent the wheel. In the first place, it is contrary to our cases. If the likelihood of a defendant's committing further crimes is a constitutionally acceptable criterion for imposing the death penalty, which it is, Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), and if it is not impossible for even a lay person sensibly to arrive at that conclusion, [463 U.S. 880, 897] it makes little sense, if any, to submit that psychiatrists, out of the entire universe of persons who might have an opinion on the issue, would know so little about the subject that they should not be permitted to testify. In Jurek, seven Justices rejected the claim that it was impossible to predict future behavior and that dangerousness was therefore an invalid consideration in imposing the death penalty. JUSTICES Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS responded directly to the argument, id., at 274-276: </s> "It is, of course, not easy to predict future behavior. The fact that such a determination is difficult, however, does not mean that it cannot be made. Indeed, prediction of future criminal conduct is an essential element in many of the decisions rendered throughout our criminal justice system. The decision whether to admit a defendant to bail, for instance, must often turn on a judge's prediction of the defendant's future conduct. Any sentencing authority must predict a convicted person's probable future conduct when it engages in the process of determining what punishment to impose. For those sentenced to prison, these same predictions must be made by parole authorities. The task that a Texas jury must perform in answering the statutory question in issue is thus basically no different from the task performed countless times each day throughout the American system of criminal justice. What is essential is that the jury have before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine. Texas law clearly assures that all such evidence will be adduced." </s> Although there was only lay testimony with respect to dangerousness in Jurek, there was no suggestion by the Court that the testimony of doctors would be inadmissible. To the contrary, the joint opinion announcing the judgment said that the jury should be presented with all of the relevant information. Furthermore, in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 473 </s> [463 U.S. 880, 898] (1981), in the face of a submission very similar to that presented in this case with respect to psychiatric testimony, we approvingly repeated the above quotation from Jurek and went on to say that we were in "no sense disapproving the use of psychiatric testimony bearing on future dangerousness." See also California v. Ramos, post, at 1005-1006, 1009-1010, n. 23; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203 -204 (1976) (joint opinion) (desirable to allow open and far-ranging argument that places as much information as possible before the jury). </s> Acceptance of petitioner's position that expert testimony about future dangerousness is far too unreliable to be admissible would immediately call into question those other contexts in which predictions of future behavior are constantly made. For example, in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975), we held that a nondangerous mental hospital patient could not be held in confinement against his will. Later, speaking about the requirements for civil commitments, we said: </s> "There may be factual issues in a commitment proceeding, but the factual aspects represent only the beginning of the inquiry. Whether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to either himself or others and is in need of confined therapy turns on the meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979). </s> In the second place, the rules of evidence generally extant at the federal and state levels anticipate that relevant, unprivileged evidence should be admitted and its weight left to the factfinder, who would have the benefit of cross-examination and contrary evidence by the opposing party. Psychiatric testimony predicting dangerousness may be countered not only as erroneous in a particular case but also as generally so unreliable that it should be ignored. If the jury may make up its mind about future dangerousness unaided by psychiatric testimony, jurors should not be barred from hearing the [463 U.S. 880, 899] views of the State's psychiatrists along with opposing views of the defendant's doctors. 5 </s> Third, petitioner's view mirrors the position expressed in the amicus brief of the American Psychiatric Association (APA). As indicated above, however, the same view was presented and rejected in Estelle v. Smith. We are no more convinced now that the view of the APA should be converted into a constitutional rule barring an entire category of expert testimony. 6 We are not persuaded that such testimony is almost entirely unreliable and that the factfinder and the adversary system will not be competent to uncover, recognize, and take due account of its shortcomings. </s> The amicus does not suggest that there are not other views held by members of the Association or of the profession generally. Indeed, as this case and others indicate, there are those doctors who are quite willing to testify at the sentencing hearing, who think, and will say, that they know what they are talking about, and who expressly disagree with the Association's point of view. 7 Furthermore, their [463 U.S. 880, 900] qualifications as experts are regularly accepted by the courts. If they are so obviously wrong and should be discredited, there should be no insuperable problem in doing so by calling [463 U.S. 880, 901] members of the Association who are of that view and who confidently assert that opinion in their amicus brief. Neither petitioner nor the Association suggests that psychiatrists are always wrong with respect to future dangerousness, only most of the time. Yet the submission is that this category of testimony should be excised entirely from all trials. We are unconvinced, however, at least as of now, that the adversary process cannot be trusted to sort out the reliable from the unreliable evidence and opinion about future dangerousness, particularly when the convicted felon has the opportunity to present his own side of the case. </s> We are unaware of and have not been cited to any case, federal or state, that has adopted the categorical views of the Association. 8 Certainly it was presented and rejected at every [463 U.S. 880, 902] stage of the present proceeding. After listening to the two schools of thought testify not only generally but also about the petitioner and his criminal record, the District Court found: </s> "The majority of psychiatric experts agree that where there is a pattern of repetitive assaultive and violent conduct, the accuracy of psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness dramatically rises. The accuracy of this conclusion is reaffirmed by the expert medical testimony in this case at the evidentiary hearing. . . . It would appear that Petitioner's complaint is not the diagnosis and prediction made by Drs. Holbrook and Grigson at the punishment phase of his trial, but that Dr. Grigson expressed extreme certainty in his diagnosis and prediction. . . . In any event, the differences among the experts were quantitative, not qualitative. The differences in opinion go to the weight [of the evidence] and not the admissibility of such testimony. . . . Such disputes are within the province of the jury to resolve. Indeed, it is a fundamental premise of our entire system of criminal jurisprudence that the purpose of the jury is to sort out the true testimony from the false, the important matters from the unimportant matters, and, when called upon to do so, to give greater credence to one party's expert witnesses than another's. Such matters occur routinely in the American judicial system, both civil and criminal." App. 13-14 (footnote omitted). [463 U.S. 880, 903] </s> We agree with the District Court, as well as with the Court of Appeals' judges who dealt with the merits of the issue and agreed with the District Court in this respect. </s> B </s> Whatever the decision may be about the use of psychiatric testimony, in general, on the issue of future dangerousness, petitioner urges that such testimony must be based on personal examination of the defendant and may not be given in response to hypothetical questions. We disagree. Expert testimony, whether in the form of an opinion based on hypothetical questions or otherwise, is commonly admitted as evidence where it might help the factfinder do its assigned job. As the Court said long ago in Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645, 657 (1879): </s> "Men who have made questions of skill or science the object of their particular study, says Phillips, are competent to give their opinions in evidence. Such opinions ought, in general, to be deduced from facts that are not disputed, or from facts given in evidence; but the author proceeds to say that they need not be founded upon their own personal knowledge of such facts, but may be founded upon the statement of facts proved in the case. Medical men, for example, may give their opinions not only as to the state of a patient they may have visited, or as to the cause of the death of a person whose body they have examined, or as to the nature of the instruments which caused the wounds they have examined, but also in cases where they have not themselves seen the patient, and have only heard the symptoms and particulars of his state detailed by other witnesses at the trial. Judicial tribunals have in many instances held that medical works are not admissible, but they everywhere hold that men skilled in science, art, or particular trades may give their opinions as witnesses in matters pertaining to their professional calling." [463 U.S. 880, 904] </s> See also Dexter v. Hall, 15 Wall. 9, 26-27 (1873); Forsyth v. Doolittle, 120 U.S. 73, 78 (1887); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 568 -569 (1897). </s> Today, in the federal system, Federal Rules of Evidence 702-706 provide for the testimony of experts. The Advisory Committee Notes touch on the particular objections to hypothetical questions, but none of these caveats lends any support to petitioner's constitutional arguments. Furthermore, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals could find no fault with the mode of examining the two psychiatrists under Texas law: </s> "The trial court did not err by permitting the doctors to testify on the basis of the hypothetical question. The use of hypothetical questions in the examination of expert witnesses is a well-established practice. 2 C. McCormick and R. Ray, Texas Evidence, 1402 (2d ed. 1956). That the experts had not examined appellant went to the weight of their testimony, not to its admissibility." 596 S. W. 2d, at 887. </s> Like the Court of Criminal Appeals, the District Court, and the Court of Appeals, we reject petitioner's constitutional arguments against the use of hypothetical questions. Although cases such as this involve the death penalty, we perceive no constitutional barrier to applying the ordinary rules of evidence governing the use of expert testimony. </s> C </s> As we understand petitioner, he contends that even if the use of hypothetical questions in predicting future dangerousness is acceptable as a general rule, the use made of them in his case violated his right to due process of law. For example, petitioner insists that the doctors should not have been permitted to give an opinion on the ultimate issue before the jury, particularly when the hypothetical questions [463 U.S. 880, 905] were phrased in terms of petitioner's own conduct; 9 that the hypothetical questions referred to controverted facts; 10 and that the answers to the questions were so positive as to be assertions of fact and not opinion. 11 These claims of misuse of the hypothetical questions, as well as others, were rejected by the Texas courts, and neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found any constitutional infirmity in the application of the Texas Rules of Evidence in this particular case. We agree. </s> IV </s> In sum, we affirm the judgment of the District Court. There is no doubt that the psychiatric testimony increased the likelihood that petitioner would be sentenced to death, but this fact does not make that evidence inadmissible, any more than it would with respect to other relevant evidence [463 U.S. 880, 906] against any defendant in a criminal case. At bottom, to agree with petitioner's basic position would seriously undermine and in effect overrule Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). Petitioner conceded as much at oral argument. Tr. of Oral Arg. 23-25. We are not inclined, however, to overturn the decision in that case. </s> The judgment of the District Court is </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Texas Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071 (Vernon 1981), provides: </s> "(a) Upon a finding that the defendant is guilty of a capital offense, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether [463 U.S. 880, 884] the defendant shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. The proceeding shall be conducted in the trial court before the trial jury as soon as practicable. In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence. This subsection shall not be construed to authorize the introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Texas. The state and the defendant or his counsel shall be permitted to present argument for or against sentence of death. </s> "(b) On conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall submit the following issues to the jury: </s> "(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result; </s> "(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and </s> "(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased. </s> "(c) The state must prove each issue submitted beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury shall return a special verdict of `yes' or `no' on each issue submitted." </s> The question specified in (b)(3) was not submitted to the jury. </s> [Footnote 2 In that case, we treated the application for stay as a petition for certiorari or in the alternative as a petition for certiorari before judgment. We denied the petition on either assumption. </s> [Footnote 3 The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 1, 14 Stat. 385, the first Act empowering federal courts to issue a writ of habeas corpus for persons in state custody, imposed an automatic stay of "any proceeding against such person" pending "such proceedings or appeal" involved in determination of a prisoner's petition. Id., at 386; see Rev. Stat. 766. This provision required a stay of execution pending disposition of an appeal in capital cases. Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425, 436 (1905); Lambert v. Barrett, 159 U.S. 660, 662 (1895). In 1908, concerned with the increasing number of frivolous habeas corpus petitions challenging capital sentences which delayed execution pending completion of the appellate process, [463 U.S. 880, 893] Congress inserted the requirement that a prisoner first obtain a certificate of probable cause to appeal before being entitled to do so. Act of Mar. 10, 1908, ch. 76, 35 Stat. 40. See H. R. Rep. No. 23, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1908); 42 Cong. Rec. 608-609 (1908). </s> [Footnote 4 The following quotation cogently sums up this standard: </s> "In requiring a `question of some substance', or a `substantial showing of the denial of [a] federal right,' obviously the petitioner need not show that he should prevail on the merits. He has already failed in that endeavor. Rather, he must demonstrate that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are `adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.'" Gordon v. Willis, 516 F. Supp. 911, 913 (ND Ga. 1980) (citing United States ex rel. Jones v. Richmond, 245 F.2d 234 (CA2), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 846 (1957)). </s> [Footnote 5 In this case, no evidence was offered by petitioner at trial to contradict the testimony of Doctors Holbrook and Grigson. Nor is there a contention that, despite petitioner's claim of indigence, the court refused to provide an expert for petitioner. In cases of indigency, Texas law provides for the payment of $500 for "expenses incurred for purposes of investigation and expert testimony." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 26.05(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982). </s> [Footnote 6 The federal cases cited in JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S dissent as rejecting "scientific proof," post, at 931, n. 9, are not constitutional decisions, but decisions of federal evidence law. The question before us is whether the Constitution forbids exposing the jury or judge in a state criminal trial to the opinions of psychiatrists about an issue that JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S dissent concedes the factfinders themselves are constitutionally competent to decide. </s> [Footnote 7 At trial, Dr. Holbrook testified without contradiction that a psychiatrist could predict the future dangerousness of an individual, if given enough background information about the individual. Tr. of Trial (T. Tr.) 2072-2073. Dr. Grigson obviously held a similar view. See id., at 2110, 2134. At the District Court hearing on the habeas petition, the State called two expert witnesses, Dr. George Parker, a psychologist, and Dr. Richard [463 U.S. 880, 900] Koons, a psychiatrist. Both of these doctors agreed that accurate predictions of future dangerousness can be made if enough information is provided; furthermore, they both deemed it highly likely that an individual fitting the characteristics of the one in the Barefoot hypothetical would commit future acts of violence. Tr. of Hearing (H. Tr.) 183-248. </s> Although Barefoot did not present any expert testimony at his trial, at the habeas hearing he called Dr. Fred Fason, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Wendell Dickerson, a psychologist. Dr. Fason did not dwell on the general ability of mental health professionals to predict future dangerousness. Instead, for the most part, he merely criticized the giving of a diagnosis based upon a hypothetical question, without an actual examination. He conceded that, if a medical student described a patient in the terms of the Barefoot hypothetical, his "highest order of suspicion," to the degree of 90% would be that the patient had a sociopathic personality. Id., at 22. He insisted, however, that this was only an "initial impression," and that no doctor should give a firm "diagnosis" without a full examination and testing. Id., at 22, 29-30, 36. Dr. Dickerson, petitioner's other expert, was the only person to testify who suggested that no reliable psychiatric predictions of dangerousness could ever be made. </s> We are aware that many mental health professionals have questioned the usefulness of psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness in light of studies indicating that such predictions are often inaccurate. For example, at the habeas hearing, Dr. Dickerson, one of petitioner's expert witnesses, testified that psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness were wrong two out of three times. Id., at 97, 108. He conceded, however, that, despite the high error rate, one "excellently done" study had shown "some predictive validity for predicting violence." Id., at 96, 97. Dr. John Monahan, upon whom one of the State's experts relied as "the leading thinker on this issue," id., at 195, concluded that "the `best' clinical research currently in existence indicates that psychiatrists and psychologists are accurate in no more than one out of three predictions of violent behavior over a several-year period among institutionalized populations that had both committed violence in the past . . . and who were diagnosed as mentally ill." J. Monahan, The Clinical Prediction of Violent Behavior 47-49 (1981) (emphasis in original). However, although Dr. Monahan originally believed that it was impossible to predict violent behavior, by the time he had completed his monograph, he felt that "there may be circumstances in which prediction is both empirically possible and ethically [463 U.S. 880, 901] appropriate," and he hoped that his work would improve the appropriateness and accuracy of clinical predictions. Id., at v. </s> All of these professional doubts about the usefulness of psychiatric predictions can be called to the attention of the jury. Petitioner's entire argument, as well as that of JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S dissent, is founded on the premise that a jury will not be able to separate the wheat from the chaff. We do not share in this low evaluation of the adversary process. </s> [Footnote 8 Petitioner relies on People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 631 P.2d 446 (1981). There the California Supreme Court held that in light of the general unreliability of such testimony, admitting medical testimony concerning future dangerousness was error in the context of a sentencing proceeding under the California capital punishment statutes. The court observed that "the testimony of [the psychiatrist was] not relevant to any of the listed factors" which the jury was to consider in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. Id., at 771-772, 631 P.2d, at 469. The court distinguished cases, however, where "the trier of fact is required by statute to determine whether a person is `dangerous,'" in which event "expert prediction, unreliable though it may be, is often the only evidence available to assist the trier of fact." Ibid. Furthermore, the court acknowledged that "despite the recognized general unreliability of predictions concerning future violence, it may be possible for a party in a particular case to show that a reliable prediction is possible. . . . A reliable prediction might also be conceivable if the defendant had exhibited a long-continued pattern of criminal violence such that any knowledgeable psychiatrist would anticipate future violence." Id., at 774, 631 P.2d, at 470. Finally, we note [463 U.S. 880, 902] that the court did not in any way indicate that its holding was based on constitutional grounds. </s> Petitioner also relies on White v. Estelle, 554 F. Supp. 851 (SD Tex. 1982). The court in that case did no more than express "serious reservations" about the use of psychiatric predictions based on hypotheticals in instances where the doctor has had no previous contact with the defendant. Id., at 858. The actual holding of the case, which is totally irrelevant to the issues here, was that the testimony of a doctor who had interviewed the defendant should have been excluded because, prior to the interview, the defendant had not been given Miranda warnings or an opportunity to consult with his attorney, as required by Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). </s> [Footnote 9 There is support for this view in our cases, United States v. Spaulding, 293 U.S. 498, 506 (1935), but it does not appear from what the Court there said that the rule was rooted in the Constitution. In any event, we note that the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence state as follows: </s> "The basic approach to opinions, lay and expert, in these rules is to admit them when helpful to the trier of fact. In order to render this approach fully effective and to allay any doubt on the subject, the so-called `ultimate issue' rule is abolished by the instant rule." 28 U.S.C. App., p. 571. </s> [Footnote 10 Nothing prevented petitioner from propounding a hypothetical to the doctors based on his own version of the facts. On cross-examination, both Drs. Holbrook and Grigson readily admitted that their opinions might change if some of the assumptions in the State's hypothetical were not true. T. Tr. 2104, 2132-2133. </s> [Footnote 11 The more certain a State's expert is about his prediction, the easier it is for the defendant to impeach him. For example, in response to Dr. Grigson's assertion that he was "100% sure" that an individual with the characteristics of the one in the hypothetical would commit acts of violence in the future, Dr. Fason testified at the habeas hearing that if a doctor claimed to be 100% sure of something without examining the patient, "we would kick him off the staff of the hospital for his arrogance." H. Tr. 48. Similar testimony could have been presented at Barefoot's trial, but was not. </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment. </s> For the reasons stated in Parts I and II of JUSTICE MARSHALL'S dissenting opinion, I agree that the Court of Appeals made a serious procedural error in this case. Nevertheless, since this Court has now reviewed the merits of petitioner's appeal, and since I agree with the ultimate conclusion that the judgment of the District Court must be affirmed, I join the Court's judgment. </s> JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, dissenting. </s> I cannot subscribe to the Court's conclusion that the procedure followed by the Court of Appeals in this case was "not inconsistent with our cases." Ante, at 890. Nor can I accept the notion that it would be proper for a court of appeals to adopt special "summary procedures" for capital cases. Ante, at 894. On the merits, I would vacate petitioner's death sentence. </s> I </s> I wholeheartedly agree that when a state prisoner has obtained a certificate of probable cause to appeal from the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, he "must then be afforded an opportunity to address the merits, and the court of appeals is obligated to decide the merits of the appeal." Ante, at 893. A prisoner who has made the showing necessary to obtain a certificate of probable cause has satisfied the only condition that Congress has placed on the right to appeal [463 U.S. 880, 907] in habeas corpus cases. 1 We have repeatedly held that once a certificate of probable cause has been granted, an appeal must be "duly considered" 2 and "disposed of on the merits" 3 by the court of appeals "in accord with its ordinary procedure." 4 </s> I likewise agree that "[a]pproving the execution of a defendant before his appeal is decided on the merits would clearly be improper," and that "a court of appeals, where necessary to prevent the case from becoming moot by the petitioner's execution, should grant a stay of execution pending disposition of [his] appeal." Ante, at 889, 893-894. A prisoner's right to appeal would be meaningless if the State were allowed to execute him before his appeal could be considered and decided. Although the question had not been decided by this Court until today, with the exception of the Fifth Circuit's rulings in this case and in Brooks v. Estelle, 697 F.2d 586, stay and cert. before judgment denied, 459 U.S. 1061 (1982), 5 the Courts of Appeals have consistently held that a stay of execution must be granted unless it is clear that the [463 U.S. 880, 908] prisoner's appeal is entirely frivolous. See, e. g., Goode v. Wainwright, 670 F.2d 941, 942 (CA11 1982); Shaw v. Martin, 613 F.2d 487, 492 (CA4 1980) (Phillips, J.); United States ex rel. DeVita v. McCorkle, 214 F.2d 823 (CA3 1954); Fouquette v. Bernard, 198 F.2d 96, 97 (CA9 1952) (Denman, C. J.). 6 This rule reflects a recognition of the simple fact that "[i]n the very nature of proceedings on a motion for stay of execution, the limited record coupled with the time constraints . . . preclude any fine-tuned inquiry into the actual merits." Shaw v. Martin, supra, at 492. </s> II </s> Given the Court's acceptance of these basic principles, I frankly do not understand how the Court can conclude that the Court of Appeals' treatment of this case was "tolerable." Ante, at 892. If, as the Court says, the Court of Appeals was "obligated to decide the merits of the appeal," ante, at 893, it most definitely failed to discharge that obligation, for the court never ruled on petitioner's appeal. It is simply false to say that "the Court of Appeals ruled on the merits of the appeal." Ante, at 891. The record plainly shows that the Court of Appeals did no such thing. It neither dismissed the appeal as frivolous nor affirmed the judgment of the District Court. The Court of Appeals made one ruling and one ruling only: it refused to stay petitioner's execution. Had this Court not granted a stay, petitioner would have been put to death without his appeal ever having been decided one way or the other. </s> The Court is flatly wrong in suggesting that any defect was merely technical because the Court of Appeals could have "verif[ied] the obvious by expressly affirming the judgment [463 U.S. 880, 909] of the District Court" at the same time it denied a stay. Ante, at 891. The Court of Appeals' failure to decide petitioner's appeal was no oversight. The court simply had no authority to decide the appeal on the basis of the papers before it. In response to a question on this very point at oral argument, respondent expressly conceded that the Court of Appeals was in no position to affirm the District Court's judgment: </s> "QUESTION: Do you think [the Court of Appeals] could as well have concluded that the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed? </s> "MR. BECKER: No, sir . . . ." Tr. of Oral. Arg. 39. </s> Neither the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, nor the local rules of the Fifth Circuit, nor any decision of the Fifth Circuit, would have authorized an affirmance prior to the filing of briefs on the merits. 7 </s> Nor could the Court of Appeals have dismissed petitioner's appeal as frivolous. Although Rule 20 of the local rules of the Fifth Circuit permits dismissal of a frivolous appeal, petitioner's appeal was not subject to dismissal under this Rule for the simple reason - also conceded by the State at oral argument, Tr. of Oral Arg. 32 - that it was not frivolous. </s> The Court of Appeals did not, because it could not, decide petitioner's appeal. What the court decided, and all that it decided, was that the likelihood of petitioner's prevailing on the merits was insufficient to justify the delay that would result from staying his execution pending the disposition of his [463 U.S. 880, 910] appeal. 8 The question before us is whether this ruling was permissible, and it cannot be avoided by erroneously assuming that the Court of Appeals could have decided petitioner's appeal at the same time it denied a stay. </s> The very principles stated by the Court in Part II-B of its opinion provide the answer to this question. Once a prisoner has obtained a certificate of probable cause to appeal, "the court of appeals is obligated to decide the merits of the appeal." Ante, at 893. We have so held on no less than three separate occasions. See Garrison v. Patterson, 391 U.S. 464, 466 (1968) (per curiam); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 242 (1968); Nowakowski v. Maroney, 386 U.S. 542, 543 (1967) (per curiam). As the Court also recognizes, ante, at 893-894, a court of appeals cannot fulfill this obligation if it permits the State to execute the prisoner before his appeal is decided. "[I]f there is probable cause for the appeal it would be a mockery of federal justice to execute [the prisoner] pending its consideration." Fouquette v. Bernard, supra, at 97. </s> The Court's effort to reconcile the procedure followed by the Court of Appeals with these principles is based on an egregious misreading of Garrison v. Patterson. Ante, at 891. We explicitly stated in Garrison that "when a district court grants a certificate of probable cause the court of appeals must `proceed to a disposition of the appeal in accord with its ordinary procedure.'" 391 U.S., at 466 , quoting Nowakowski v. Maroney, supra, at 543. In an attempt to avoid the obvious import of this statement, the Court quotes out of context a footnote in Garrison in which we stated that "[i]n an effort to determine whether the merits had been addressed" we had "solicited further submissions from the parties." 391 U.S., at 466 , n. 2. Even the most cursory examination of the opinion in Garrison shows why this footnote [463 U.S. 880, 911] provides no support whatsoever for the Court's conclusion that consideration of the merits in ruling on a stay makes an actual decision on the merits of an appeal unnecessary. </s> In Garrison, in contrast to this case, the Court of Appeals did decide the prisoner's appeal. It issued an order in which it granted a certificate of probable cause and in the next sentence affirmed the District Court's decision without explanation. Id., at 465. To determine whether this was merely a pro forma decision unaccompanied by any real consideration of the issues, we solicited further submissions from the parties "to determine whether the merits had been addressed . . . at the unrecorded hearing" before the Court of Appeals. Id., at 466, n. 2. Since the responses we received did not demonstrate that the Court of Appeals had actually considered the merits, ibid., we reversed and remanded for further consideration of the appeal. </s> Garrison establishes that consideration of the merits is necessary to satisfy a court of appeals' statutory obligation. It in no way suggests, however, that consideration of the merits can ever be a substitute for an actual ruling on the appeal. Garrison held that the Court of Appeals had failed to discharge its statutory obligation even though it did decide the prisoner's appeal. This holding cannot be transformed into authority for the proposition that a court of appeals need not decide a prisoner's appeal at all if it considers the merits of the appeal in ruling on an interlocutory motion. </s> The Court offers no justification for the procedure followed by the Court of Appeals because there is none. A State has no legitimate interest in executing a prisoner before he has obtained full review of his sentence. A stay of execution pending appeal causes no harm to the State apart from the minimal burden of providing a jail cell for the prisoner for the period of time necessary to decide his appeal. By contrast, a denial of a stay on the basis of a hasty finding that the prisoner is not likely to succeed on his appeal permits the State to execute him prior to full review of a concededly substantial [463 U.S. 880, 912] constitutional challenge to his sentence. If the court's hurried evaluation of the appeal proves erroneous, as is entirely possible when difficult legal issues are decided without adequate time for briefing and full consideration, the execution of the prisoner will make it impossible to undo the mistake. </s> Once a federal judge has decided, as the District Judge did here, that a prisoner under sentence of death has raised a substantial constitutional claim, it is a travesty of justice to permit the State to execute him before his appeal can be considered and decided. If a prisoner's statutory right to appeal means anything, a State simply cannot be allowed to kill him and thereby moot his appeal. </s> III </s> Not content with approving the precipitous procedure followed in this case, the Court also proceeds to suggest in Part II-B of its opinion that a court of appeals might properly adopt special "summary procedures" for "all or . . . selected cases in which a stay of a death sentence has been requested." Ante, at 894. </s> It is important to bear in mind that the Court's suggestion is directed at cases in which a certificate of probable cause to appeal has been granted and the court of appeals has concluded that the appeal is not frivolous. 9 If the prisoner had been sentenced to any punishment other than death, his appeal would therefore have been considered and decided in [463 U.S. 880, 913] accord with the court of appeals' ordinary procedure. But since he has been sentenced to death, and since his scheduled date of execution is imminent, his appeal is to be decided under special truncated procedures. In short, an appeal that raises a substantial constitutional question is to be singled out for summary treatment solely because the State has announced its intention to execute the appellant before the ordinary appellate procedure has run its course. </s> This is truly a perverse suggestion. If full briefing and argument are generally regarded as necessary to fair and careful review of a nonfrivolous appeal - and they are - there is absolutely no justification for providing fewer procedural protections solely because a man's life is at stake. Given the irreversible nature of the death penalty, it would be hard to think of any class of cases for which summary procedures would be less appropriate than capital cases presenting a substantial constitutional issue. </s> The difference between capital cases and other cases is "the basis of differentiation in law in diverse ways," Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 391 (1955) (footnote omitted), but until today it had never been suggested, so far as I know, that fewer safeguards are required where life is at stake than where only liberty or property is at stake. This Court has always insisted that the need for procedural safeguards is particularly great where life is at stake. Long before the Court established the right to counsel in all felony cases, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), it recognized that right in capital cases, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 -72 (1932). Time and again the Court has condemned procedures in capital cases that might be completely acceptable in an ordinary case. See, e. g., Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). [463 U.S. 880, 914] These decisions reflect an appreciation of the fundamental fact that </s> "the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two." Id., at 305 (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.) (footnote omitted). </s> Because of this basic difference between the death penalty and all other punishments, this Court has consistently recognized that there is "a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." Ibid. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 -118 (1982) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); Beck v. Alabama, supra, at 637-638; Lockett v. Ohio, supra, at 604-605 (plurality opinion). </s> By suggesting that special summary procedures might be adopted solely for capital cases, the majority turns this established approach on its head. Given that its suggestion runs contrary to this Court's repeated insistence on the particular need for reliability in capital cases, one would have expected some indication of why it might conceivably be appropriate to adopt such procedures. Instead, the suggestion is offered without explanation in a conclusory paragraph. In the entire majority opinion the only hint of a possible rationale is the Court's cryptic quotation of the following statement in Lambert v. Barrett, 159 U.S. 660, 662 (1895): </s> "It is natural that counsel for the condemned in a capital case should lay hold of every ground which, in their judgment, might tend to the advantage of their client, but the administration of justice ought not to be interfered with on mere pretexts." Quoted, ante, at 888. </s> If, as the quotation of this statement suggests, the Court's approval of summary procedures rests on an assumption that appeals by prisoners under sentence of death are generally [463 U.S. 880, 915] frivolous, the conclusive answer is that this assumption is contrary to both law and fact. </s> It is contrary to law because we are dealing here with cases in which the federal judge most familiar with the case has concluded that a substantial constitutional claim is presented and in which the court of appeals has agreed that the appeal is not frivolous. It is contrary to fact because experience shows that prisoners on death row have succeeded in an extraordinary number of their appeals. Of the 34 capital cases decided on the merits by Courts of Appeals since 1976 in which a prisoner appealed from the denial of habeas relief, the prisoner has prevailed in no fewer than 23 cases, or approximately 70% of the time. 10 In the Fifth Circuit, of the 21 capital cases in which the prisoner was the appellant, the prisoner has prevailed in 15 cases. 11 This record established beyond any doubt that a very large proportion of federal habeas corpus appeals by prisoners on death row are meritorious, even though they present claims that have been unsuccessful in the state courts, that this Court in its discretion has decided not to review on certiorari, and that a federal district judge has rejected. </s> In view of the irreversible nature of the death penalty and the extraordinary number of death sentences that have been found to suffer from some constitutional infirmity, it would be grossly improper for a court of appeals to establish special summary procedures for capital cases. The only consolation I can find in today's decision is that the primary responsibility for selecting the appropriate procedures for these appeals lies, as the Court itself points out, ante, at 892, with the courts of appeals. Cf. In re Burwell, 350 U.S. 521, 522 (1956) (per curiam). Notwithstanding the profoundly disturbing attitude reflected in today's opinion, I am hopeful that few circuit judges would ever support the adoption of [463 U.S. 880, 916] procedures that would afford less consideration to an appeal in which a man's life is at stake than to an appeal challenging an ordinary money judgment. </s> IV </s> Adhering to my view that the death penalty is under all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 358 -369 (1972) (MARSHALL, J., concurring), I would vacate petitioner's death sentence. </s> [Footnote 1 Title 28 U.S.C. 2253 provides that "[i]n a habeas corpus proceeding before a circuit or district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit where the proceeding is had," if the petitioner obtains a certificate of probable cause from "the justice or judge who rendered the order or a circuit justice or judge." </s> [Footnote 2 Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 242 (1968). </s> [Footnote 3 Garrison v. Patterson, 391 U.S. 464, 466 (1968) (per curiam). </s> [Footnote 4 Nowakowski v. Maroney, 386 U.S. 542, 543 (1967) (per curiam). See generally Blackmun, Allowance of In Forma Pauperis Appeals in 2255 and Habeas Corpus Cases, 43 F. R. D. 343 (1967). </s> [Footnote 5 While the Fifth Circuit followed a procedure in Brooks v. Estelle similar to that employed here, this Court's denial of Brooks' application for a stay and petition for certiorari before judgment does not constitute a precedent approving this procedure. Denials of certiorari never have precedential value, see, e. g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 497 (1953); Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 181 (1947); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 48 (1945), and the denial of a stay can have no precedential value either since the Court's order did not discuss the standard that courts of appeals should apply in passing on an application for a stay pending appeal. </s> [Footnote 6 Until its recent rulings the Fifth Circuit also followed this approach. See United States ex rel. Goins v. Sigler, 250 F.2d 128, 129 (1957). </s> It has long been the rule that a death sentence imposed by a federal court will be stayed as a matter of course if the defendant takes an appeal. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 38(a)(1) ("A sentence of death shall be stayed if an appeal is taken"). </s> [Footnote 7 See Tr. of Oral Arg. 41: </s> "QUESTION: [W]hy would you suggest it would be wrong for the Court of Appeals just to affirm? </s> "MR. BECKER: If that was their routine policy, I think they could. </s> "QUESTION: But it wasn't was it? </s> "MR. BECKER: No, sir, it wasn't. . . ." </s> In the memorandum respondent filed in the Court of Appeals opposing a stay, there was no suggestion that the court was in a position to decide the appeal. </s> [Footnote 8 In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on cases involving stays in ordinary civil litigation in which the denial of a stay will not result in the execution of one of the litigants before his appeal can be decided. </s> [Footnote 9 I agree with the Court that an appeal may be dismissed as frivolous only if it "is squarely foreclosed by statute, rule, or authoritative court decision, or is lacking any factual basis in the record." Ante, at 894. I would add that in view of the frequent changes in recent years in the law governing capital cases, see, e. g., Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981) (distinguishing Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919)); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (distinguishing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949)), the fact that an appeal challenges a holding of this Court does not make it frivolous if a plausible argument can be made that the decision in question has been called into question by later developments. </s> [Footnote 10 See Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 1e-6e. </s> [Footnote 11 See id., at 1e-4e. </s> JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL join as to Parts I-IV, dissenting. </s> I agree with most of what JUSTICE MARSHALL has said in his dissenting opinion. I, too, dissent, but I base my conclusion also on evidentiary factors that the Court rejects with some emphasis. The Court holds that psychiatric testimony about a defendant's future dangerousness is admissible, despite the fact that such testimony is wrong two times out of three. The Court reaches this result - even in a capital case - because, it is said, the testimony is subject to cross-examination and impeachment. In the present state of psychiatric knowledge, this is too much for me. One may accept this in a routine lawsuit for money damages, but when a person's life is at stake - no matter how heinous his offense - a requirement of greater reliability should prevail. In a capital case, the specious testimony of a psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an impressionable jury by the inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist's words, equates with death itself. </s> I </s> To obtain a death sentence in Texas, the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." Tex. [463 U.S. 880, 917] Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071(b)(2) (Vernon 1981). As a practical matter, this prediction of future dangerousness was the only issue to be decided by Barefoot's sentencing jury. 1 </s> At the sentencing hearing, the State established that Barefoot had two prior convictions for drug offenses and two prior convictions for unlawful possession of firearms. None of these convictions involved acts of violence. At the guilt stage of the trial, for the limited purpose of establishing that the crime was committed in order to evade police custody, see Barefoot v. State, 596 S. W. 2d 875, 886-887 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981), the State had presented evidence that Barefoot had escaped from jail in New Mexico where he was being held on charges of statutory rape and unlawful restraint of a minor child with intent to commit sexual penetration against the child's will. The prosecution also called several character witnesses at the sentencing hearing, from towns in five States. Without mentioning particular examples of Barefoot's conduct, these witnesses testified that Barefoot's reputation for being a peaceable and law-abiding citizen was bad in their respective communities. </s> Last, the prosecution called Doctors Holbrook and Grigson, whose testimony extended over more than half the hearing. Neither had examined Barefoot or requested the opportunity to examine him. In the presence of the jury, and over defense counsel's objection, each was qualified as an expert psychiatrist witness. Doctor Holbrook detailed at length his training and experience as a psychiatrist, which included a position as chief of psychiatric services at the Texas [463 U.S. 880, 918] Department of Corrections. He explained that he had previously performed many "criminal evaluations," Trial Tr. 2069, and that he subsequently took the post at the Department of Corrections to observe the subjects of these evaluations so that he could "be certain those opinions that [he] had were accurate at the time of trial and pretrial." Id., at 2070. He then informed the jury that it was "within [his] capacity as a doctor of psychiatry to predict the future dangerousness of an individual within a reasonable medical certainty," id., at 2072 (emphasis supplied), and that he could give "an expert medical opinion that would be within reasonable psychiatric certainty as to whether or not that individual would be dangerous to the degree that there would be a probability that that person would commit criminal acts of violence in the future that would constitute a continuing threat to society," id., at 2073 (emphasis supplied). </s> Doctor Grigson also detailed his training and medical experience, which, he said, included examination of "between thirty and forty thousand individuals," including 8,000 charged with felonies, and at least 300 charged with murder. Id., at 2109. He testified that with enough information he would be able to "give a medical opinion within reasonable psychiatric certainty as to the psychological or psychiatric makeup of an individual," id., at 2110 (emphasis supplied), and that this skill was "particular to the field of psychiatry and not to the average layman." Id., at 2111. </s> Each psychiatrist then was given an extended hypothetical question asking him to assume as true about Barefoot the four prior convictions for nonviolent offenses, the bad reputation for being law-abiding in various communities, the New Mexico escape, the events surrounding the murder for which he was on trial and, in Doctor Grigson's case, the New Mexico arrest. On the basis of the hypothetical question, Doctor Holbrook diagnosed Barefoot "within a reasonable psychiatr[ic] certainty," as a "criminal sociopath." Id., at 2097. He testified that he knew of no treatment that could change [463 U.S. 880, 919] this condition, and that the condition would not change for the better but "may become accelerated" in the next few years. Id., at 2100. Finally, Doctor Holbrook testified that, "within reasonable psychiatric certainty," there was "a probability that the Thomas A. Barefoot in that hypothetical will commit criminal acts of violence in the future that would constitute a continuing threat to society," and that his opinion would not change if the "society" at issue was that within Texas prisons rather than society outside prison. Id., at 2100-2101. </s> Doctor Grigson then testified that, on the basis of the hypothetical question, he could diagnose Barefoot "within reasonable psychiatric certainty" as an individual with "a fairly classical, typical, sociopathic personality disorder." Id., at 2127-2128. He placed Barefoot in the "most severe category" of sociopaths (on a scale of one to ten, Barefoot was "above ten"), and stated that there was no known cure for the condition. Id., at 2129. Finally, Doctor Grigson testified that whether Barefoot was in society at large or in a prison society there was a "one hundred percent and absolute" chance that Barefoot would commit future acts of criminal violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. Id., at 2131 (emphasis supplied). </s> On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned the psychiatrists about studies demonstrating that psychiatrists' predictions of future dangerousness are inherently unreliable. Doctor Holbrook indicated his familiarity with many of these studies but stated that he disagreed with their conclusions. Doctor Grigson stated that he was not familiar with most of these studies, and that their conclusions were accepted by only a "small minority group" of psychiatrists - "[i]t's not the American Psychiatric Association that believes that." Id., at 2134. </s> After an hour of deliberation, the jury answered "yes" to the two statutory questions, and Thomas Barefoot was sentenced to death. [463 U.S. 880, 920] </s> II </s> A </s> The American Psychiatric Association (APA), participating in this case as amicus curiae, informs us that "[t]he unreliability of psychiatric predictions of long-term future dangerousness is by now an established fact within the profession." Brief for American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae 12 (APA Brief). The APA's best estimate is that two out of three predictions of long-term future violence made by psychiatrists are wrong. Id., at 9, 13. The Court does not dispute this proposition, see ante, at 899-901, n. 7, and indeed it could not do so; the evidence is overwhelming. For example, the APA's Draft Report of the Task Force on the Role of Psychiatry in the Sentencing Process (1983) (Draft Report) states that "[c]onsiderable evidence has been accumulated by now to demonstrate that long-term prediction by psychiatrists of future violence is an extremely inaccurate process." Id., at 29. John Monahan, recognized as "the leading thinker on this issue" even by the State's expert witness at Barefoot's federal habeas corpus hearing, Hearing Tr. 195, concludes that "the `best' clinical research currently in existence indicates that psychiatrists and psychologists are accurate in no more than one out of three predictions of violent behavior," even among populations of individuals who are mentally ill and have committed violence in the past. J. Monahan, The Clinical Prediction of Violent Behavior 47-49 (1981) (emphasis deleted) (J. Monahan, Clinical Prediction); see also id., at 6-7, 44-50. Another study has found it impossible to identify any subclass of offenders "whose members have a greater-than-even chance of engaging again in an assaultive act." Wenk, Robison, & Smith, Can Violence Be Predicted?, 18 Crime & Delinquency 393, 394 (1972). Yet another commentator observes: "In general, mental health professionals . . . are more likely to be wrong than right when they predict legally relevant behavior. When predicting violence, dangerousness, and suicide, they are far more [463 U.S. 880, 921] likely to be wrong than right." Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev. 527, 600 (1978) (Morse, Analysis of Mental Health Law). Neither the Court nor the State of Texas has cited a single reputable scientific source contradicting the unanimous conclusion of professionals in this field that psychiatric predictions of long-term future violence are wrong more often than they are right. 2 </s> The APA also concludes, see APA Brief 9-16, as do researchers that have studied the issue, 3 that psychiatrists simply have no expertise in predicting long-term future dangerousness. [463 U.S. 880, 922] A layman with access to relevant statistics can do at least as well and possibly better; psychiatric training is not relevant to the factors that validly can be employed to make such predictions, and psychiatrists consistently err on the side of overpredicting violence. 4 Thus, while Doctors Grigson and Holbrook were presented by the State and by self-proclamation as experts at predicting future dangerousness, the scientific literature makes crystal clear that they had no expertise whatever. Despite their claims that they were able to predict Barefoot's future behavior "within reasonable psychiatric certainty," or to a "one hundred percent and absolute" certainty, there was in fact no more than a one in three chance that they were correct. 5 </s> [463 U.S. 880, 923] </s> B </s> It is impossible to square admission of this purportedly scientific but actually baseless testimony with the Constitution's paramount concern for reliability in capital sentencing. 6 </s> [463 U.S. 880, 924] Death is a permissible punishment in Texas only if the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability the defendant will commit future acts of criminal violence. The admission of unreliable psychiatric predictions of future violence, offered with unabashed claims of "reasonable medical certainty" or "absolute" professional reliability, creates an intolerable danger that death sentences will be imposed erroneously. </s> The plurality in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976), stated: </s> "Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." </s> The Court does not see fit to mention this principle today, yet it is as firmly established as any in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Only two weeks ago, in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884 (1983), the Court described the need for reliability in the application of the death penalty as one of the [463 U.S. 880, 925] basic "themes . . . reiterated in our opinions discussing the procedures required by the Constitution in capital sentencing determinations." See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 -112 (1982) (capital punishment must be "imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all"); id., at 118-119 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 -38, and n. 13 (1980); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 359 (1977) (plurality opinion); id., at 363-364 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment). State evidence rules notwithstanding, it is well established that, because the truth-seeking process may be unfairly skewed, due process may be violated even in a noncapital criminal case by the exclusion of evidence probative of innocence, see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), or by the admission of certain categories of unreliable and prejudicial evidence, see Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347 (1981) ("[i]t is the reliability of identification evidence that primarily determines its admissibility"); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969). 7 The reliability and admissibility of evidence considered by a capital sentencing factfinder is obviously of still greater constitutional concern. Cf. Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977). </s> The danger of an unreliable death sentence created by this testimony cannot be brushed aside on the ground that the "`jury [must] have before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine.'" Ante, at 897, quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (joint opinion announcing the judgment). Although committed to allowing a "wide scope of evidence" at presentence hearings, Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S., at 886 , [463 U.S. 880, 926] the Court has recognized that "consideration must be given to the quality, as well as the quantity, of the information on which the sentencing [authority] may rely." Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S., at 359 . Thus, very recently, this Court reaffirmed a crucial limitation on the permissible scope of evidence: "`[s]o long as the evidence introduced . . . do[es] not prejudice a defendant, it is preferable not to impose restrictions.'" Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S., at 886 , quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203 -204 (1976) (emphasis supplied). The Court all but admits the obviously prejudicial impact of the testimony of Doctors Grigson and Holbrook; granting that their absolute claims were more likely to be wrong than right, ante, at 899, n. 7, 901, the Court states that "[t]here is no doubt that the psychiatric testimony increased the likelihood that petitioner would be sentenced to death," ante, at 905. </s> Indeed, unreliable scientific evidence is widely acknowledged to be prejudicial. The reasons for this are manifest. "The major danger of scientific evidence is its potential to mislead the jury; an aura of scientific infallibility may shroud the evidence and thus lead the jury to accept it without critical scrutiny." Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197, 1237 (1980) (Giannelli, Scientific Evidence). 8 Where the public holds an exaggerated opinion of [463 U.S. 880, 927] the accuracy of scientific testimony, the prejudice is likely to be indelible. See United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (CA4), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975). There is little question that psychiatrists are perceived by the public as having a special expertise to predict dangerousness, a perception based on psychiatrists' study of mental disease. See J. Robitscher, The Powers of Psychiatry 187-188 (1980); Cocozza & Steadman, supra n. 2, 25 Soc. Probs., at 273; Morse, Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev., at 533-536. It is this perception that the State in Barefoot's case sought to exploit. Yet mental disease is not correlated with violence, see J. Monahan, Clinical Prediction 77-82; Steadman & Cocozza, supra n. 2, 69 J. Crim. L. & Criminology, at 230, and the stark fact is that no such expertise exists. Moreover, psychiatrists, it is said, sometimes attempt to perpetuate this illusion of expertise, Cocozza & Steadman, supra n. 2, 25 Soc. Probs., at 274, and Doctors Grigson and Holbrook - who purported to be able to predict future dangerousness "within reasonable psychiatric certainty," or absolutely - present extremely disturbing examples [463 U.S. 880, 928] of this tendency. The problem is not uncommon. See Giannelli, Scientific Evidence, 80 Colum. L. Rev., at 1238. </s> Furthermore, as is only reasonable, the Court's concern in encouraging the introduction of a wide scope of evidence has been to ensure that accurate information is provided to the sentencing authority without restriction. The joint opinion announcing the judgment in Gregg explained the jury's need for relevant evidence in these terms: </s> "If an experienced trial judge, who daily faces the difficult task of imposing sentences, has a vital need for accurate information . . . to be able to impose a rational sentence in the typical criminal case, then accurate sentencing information is an indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned determination of whether a defendant shall live or die by a jury of people who may never before have made a sentencing decision." 428 U.S., at 190 (emphasis supplied). </s> See California v. Ramos, post, at 1004 (Court holds jury instruction permissible at sentencing hearing on ground that it "gives the jury accurate information") (emphasis supplied). So far as I am aware, the Court never has suggested that there is any interest in providing deceptive and inaccurate testimony to the jury. </s> Psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness are not accurate; wrong two times out of three, their probative value, and therefore any possible contribution they might make to the ascertainment of truth, is virtually nonexistent. See Cocozza & Steadman, supra n. 2, 29 Rutgers L. Rev., at 1101 (psychiatric testimony not sufficiently reliable to support finding that individual will be dangerous under any standard of proof). Indeed, given a psychiatrist's prediction that an individual will be dangerous, it is more likely than not that the defendant will not commit further violence. It is difficult to understand how the admission of such predictions can be justified as advancing the search for truth, particularly in light of their clearly prejudicial effect. [463 U.S. 880, 929] </s> Thus, the Court's remarkable observation that "[n]either petitioner nor the [APA] suggests that psychiatrists are always wrong with respect to future dangerousness, only most of the time," ante, at 901 (emphasis supplied), misses the point completely, and its claim that this testimony was no more problematic than "other relevant evidence against any defendant in a criminal case," ante, at 905-906, is simply incredible. Surely, this Court's commitment to ensuring that death sentences are imposed reliably and reasonably requires that nonprobative and highly prejudicial testimony on the ultimate question of life or death be excluded from a capital sentencing hearing. </s> III </s> A </s> Despite its recognition that the testimony at issue was probably wrong and certainly prejudicial, the Court holds this testimony admissible because the Court is "unconvinced . . . that the adversary process cannot be trusted to sort out the reliable from the unreliable evidence and opinion about future dangerousness." Ante, at 901; see ante, at 899-901, n. 7. One can only wonder how juries are to separate valid from invalid expert opinions when the "experts" themselves are so obviously unable to do so. Indeed, the evidence suggests that juries are not effective at assessing the validity of scientific evidence. Giannelli, Scientific Evidence, 80 Colum. L. Rev., at 1239-1240, and n. 319. </s> There can be no question that psychiatric predictions of future violence will have an undue effect on the ultimate verdict. Even judges tend to accept psychiatrists' recommendations about a defendant's dangerousness with little regard for cross-examination or other testimony. Cocozza & Steadman, supra n. 2, 25 Soc. Probs., at 271 (in making involuntary commitment decisions, psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness accepted in 86.7% of cases); see Morse, Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev., at 536, n. 16, 603. There is every reason to believe that inexperienced [463 U.S. 880, 930] jurors will be still less capable of "separat[ing] the wheat from the chaff," despite the Court's blithe assumption to the contrary, ante, at 901, n. 7. The American Bar Association has warned repeatedly that sentencing juries are particularly incapable of dealing with information relating to "the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes," and similar predictive judgments. ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures 1.1(b), Commentary, pp. 46-47 (App. Draft 1968); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 18-1.1, Commentary, pp. 18.16, 18.24 to 18.25 (2d ed. 1980). Relying on the ABA's conclusion, the joint opinion announcing the judgment in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S., at 192 , recognized that "[s]ince the members of a jury will have had little, if any, previous experience in sentencing, they are unlikely to be skilled in dealing with the information they are given." But the Court in this case, in its haste to praise the jury's ability to find the truth, apparently forgets this well-known and worrisome shortcoming. </s> As if to suggest that petitioner's position that unreliable expert testimony should be excluded is unheard of in the law, the Court relies on the proposition that the rules of evidence generally "anticipate that relevant, unprivileged evidence should be admitted and its weight left to the factfinder, who would have the benefit of cross-examination and contrary evidence by the opposing party." Ante, at 898. But the Court simply ignores hornbook law that, despite the availability of cross-examination and rebuttal witnesses, "opinion evidence is not admissible if the court believes that the state of the pertinent art or scientific knowledge does not permit a reasonable opinion to be asserted." E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence 13, p. 31 (2d ed. 1972). Because it is feared that the jury will overestimate its probative value, polygraph evidence, for example, almost invariably is excluded from trials despite the fact that, at a conservative estimate, an experienced polygraph examiner can detect truth or deception correctly about 80 to 90 percent of the time. Ennis & Litwack, [463 U.S. 880, 931] supra n. 2, at 736. 9 In no area is purportedly "expert" testimony admitted for the jury's consideration where it cannot be demonstrated that it is correct more often than not. "It is inconceivable that a judgment could be considered an `expert' judgment when it is less accurate than the flip of a coin." Id., at 737. The risk that a jury will be incapable of separating "scientific" myth from reality is deemed unacceptably high. 10 </s> B </s> The Constitution's mandate of reliability, with the stakes at life or death, precludes reliance on cross-examination and the opportunity to present rebuttal witnesses as an antidote for this distortion of the truth-finding process. Cross-examination is unlikely to reveal the fatuousness of psychiatric [463 U.S. 880, 932] predictions because such predictions often rest, as was the case here, on psychiatric categories and intuitive clinical judgments not susceptible to cross-examination and rebuttal. Dix, supra, n. 2, at 44. Psychiatric categories have little or no demonstrated relationship to violence, and their use often obscures the unimpressive statistical or intuitive bases for prediction. J. Monahan, Clinical Prediction 31; Cocozza & Steadman, supra n. 2, 25 Soc. Probs., at 274. 11 The APA particularly condemns the use of the diagnosis employed by Doctors Grigson and Holbrook in this case, that of sociopathy: </s> "In this area confusion reigns. The psychiatrist who is not careful can mislead the judge or jury into believing that a person has a major mental disease simply on the basis of a description of prior criminal behavior. Or a psychiatrist can mislead the court into believing that an individual is devoid of conscience on the basis of a description of criminal acts alone. . . . The profession of psychiatry has a responsibility to avoid inflicting this confusion upon the courts and to spare the defendant the harm that may result. . . . Given our uncertainty about the implications of the finding, the diagnosis of sociopathy . . . should not be used to justify or to support predictions of future conduct. There is no certainty in this area." Draft Report 30. </s> It is extremely unlikely that the adversary process will cut through the facade of superior knowledge. THE CHIEF JUSTICE long ago observed: [463 U.S. 880, 933] </s> "The very nature of the adversary system . . . complicates the use of scientific opinion evidence, particularly in the field of psychiatry. This system of partisan contention, of attack and counterattack, at its best is not ideally suited to developing an accurate portrait or profile of the human personality, especially in the area of abnormal behavior. Although under ideal conditions the adversary system can develop for a jury most of the necessary fact material for an adequate decision, such conditions are rarely achieved in the courtrooms in this country. These ideal conditions would include a highly skilled and experienced trial judge and highly skilled lawyers on both sides of the case, all of whom in addition to being well-trained in the law and in the techniques of advocacy would be sophisticated in matters of medicine, psychiatry, and psychology. It is far too rare that all three of the legal actors in the cast meet these standards." Burger, Psychiatrists, Lawyers, and the Courts, 28 Fed. Prob. 3, 6 (June 1964). </s> Another commentator has noted: </s> "Competent cross-examination and jury instructions may be partial antidotes . . ., but they cannot be complete. Many of the cases are not truly adversarial; too few attorneys are skilled at cross-examining psychiatrists, laypersons overweigh the testimony of experts, and, in any case, unrestricted use of experts promotes the incorrect view that the questions are primarily scientific. There is, however, no antidote for the major difficulty with mental health `experts' - that they simply are not experts . . . . In realms beyond their true expertise, the law has little special to learn from them; too often their testimony is . . . prejudicial." Morse, Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev., at 626. [463 U.S. 880, 934] </s> See id., at 535-536. See also Dix, supra n. 2, at 44-45; Ennis & Litwack, supra n. 2, at 745; Note, supra n. 8, 70 Calif. L. Rev., at 1079-1080; J. Robitscher, The Powers of Psychiatry 202-203 (1980). </s> Nor is the presentation of psychiatric witnesses on behalf of the defense likely to remove the prejudicial taint of misleading testimony by prosecution psychiatrists. 12 No reputable expert would be able to predict with confidence that the defendant will not be violent; at best, the witness will be able to give his opinion that all predictions of dangerousness are unreliable. Consequently, the jury will not be presented with the traditional battle of experts with opposing views on the ultimate question. Given a choice between an expert who says that he can predict with certainty that the defendant, whether confined in prison or free in society, will kill again, and an expert who says merely that no such prediction can be made, members of the jury charged by law with making the prediction surely will be tempted to opt for the expert who claims he can help them in performing their duty, and who predicts dire consequences if the defendant is not put to death. 13 </s> Moreover, even at best, the presentation of defense psychiatrists will convert the death sentence hearing into a battle of [463 U.S. 880, 935] experts, with the Eighth Amendment's well-established requirement of individually focused sentencing a certain loser. The jury's attention inevitably will turn from an assessment of the propriety of sentencing to death the defendant before it to resolving a scientific dispute about the capabilities of psychiatrists to predict future violence. In such an atmosphere, there is every reason to believe that the jury may be distracted from its constitutional responsibility to consider "particularized mitigating factors," see Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S., at 272 , in passing on the defendant's future dangerousness. See Davis, supra n. 12, at 310. </s> One searches the Court's opinion in vain for a plausible justification for tolerating the State's creation of this risk of an erroneous death verdict. As one Court of Appeals has observed: </s> "A courtroom is not a research laboratory. The fate of a defendant . . . should not hang on his ability to successfully rebut scientific evidence which bears an `aura of special reliability and trustworthiness,' although, in reality the witness is testifying on the basis of an unproved hypothesis . . . which has yet to gain general acceptance in its field." United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (CA6 1977). </s> Ultimately, when the Court knows full well that psychiatrists' predictions of dangerousness are specious, there can be no excuse for imposing on the defendant, on pain of his [463 U.S. 880, 936] life, the heavy burden of convincing a jury of laymen of the fraud. 14 </s> IV </s> The Court is simply wrong in claiming that psychiatric testimony respecting future dangerousness is necessarily admissible in light of Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), or Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). As the Court recognizes, Jurek involved "only lay testimony." Ante, at 897. Thus, it is not surprising that "there was no suggestion by the Court that the testimony of doctors would be inadmissible," ibid., and it is simply irrelevant that the Jurek Court did not "disapprov[e]" the use of such testimony, see Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S., at 473 . [463 U.S. 880, 937] </s> In Smith, the psychiatric testimony at issue was given by the same Doctor Grigson who confronts us in this case, and his conclusions were disturbingly similar to those he rendered here. See id., at 459-460. The APA, appearing as amicus curiae, argued that all psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness should be excluded from capital sentencing proceedings. The Court did not reach this issue, because it found Smith's death sentence invalid on narrower grounds: Doctor Grigson's testimony had violated Smith's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Id., at 473. Contrary to the Court's inexplicable assertion in this case, ante, at 899, Smith certainly did not reject the APA's position. Rather, the Court made clear that "the holding in Jurek was guided by recognition that the inquiry [into dangerousness] mandated by Texas law does not require resort to medical experts." 451 U.S., at 473 (emphasis added). If Jurek and Smith held that psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness are admissible in a capital sentencing proceeding as the Court claims, this guiding recognition would have been irrelevant. </s> The Court also errs in suggesting that the exclusion of psychiatrists' predictions of future dangerousness would be contrary to the logic of Jurek. Jurek merely upheld Texas' substantive decision to condition the death sentence upon proof of a probability that the defendant will commit criminal acts of violence in the future. Whether the evidence offered by the prosecution to prove that probability is so unreliable as to violate a capital defendant's rights to due process is an entirely different matter, one raising only questions of fair procedure. 15 Jurek's conclusion that Texas may impose the [463 U.S. 880, 938] death penalty on capital defendants who probably will commit criminal acts of violence in no way establishes that the prosecution may convince a jury that this is so by misleading or patently unreliable evidence. </s> Moreover, Jurek's holding that the Texas death statute is not impermissibly vague does not lead ineluctably to the conclusion that psychiatric testimony is admissible. It makes sense to exclude psychiatric predictions of future violence while admitting lay testimony, see ante, at 896-897, because psychiatric predictions appear to come from trained mental health professionals, who purport to have special expertise. In view of the total scientific groundlessness of these predictions, psychiatric testimony is fatally misleading. See White v. Estelle, 554 F. Supp., at 858. Lay testimony, frankly based on statistical factors with demonstrated correlations to violent behavior, would not raise this substantial threat of unreliable and capricious sentencing decisions, inimical to the constitutional standards established in our cases; and such predictions are as accurate as any a psychiatrist could make. Indeed, the very basis of Jurek, as I understood it, was that such judgments can be made by laymen on the basis of lay testimony. </s> Our constitutional duty is to ensure that the State proves future dangerousness, if at all, in a reliable manner, one that ensures that "any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion." Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S., at 358 . Texas' choice of substantive factors does not justify loading the factfinding process against the defendant through the presentation of what is, at bottom, false testimony. </s> V </s> I would vacate petitioner's death sentence, and remand for further proceedings consistent with these views. </s> [Footnote 1 It appears that every person convicted of capital murder in Texas will satisfy the other requirement relevant to Barefoot's sentence, that "the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result," Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071(b)(1) (Vernon 1981), because a capital murder conviction requires a finding that the defendant "intentionally or knowingly cause[d] the death of an individual," see Tex. Penal Code Ann. 19.02(a)(1) (Vernon 1974); see also 19.03(a). </s> [Footnote 2 Among the many other studies reaching this conclusion are APA Task Force Report, Clinical Aspects of the Violent Individual 28 (1974) (90% error rate "[u]nfortunately . . . is the state of the art") (APA, Clinical Aspects); Steadman & Morrissey, The Statistical Prediction of Violent Behavior, 5 Law & Human Behavior 263, 271-273 (1981); Dix, Expert Prediction Testimony in Capital Sentencing: Evidentiary and Constitutional Considerations, 19 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 16 (1981); Schwitzgebel, Prediction of Dangerousness and Its Implications for Treatment, in W. Curran, A. McGarry, & C. Petty, Modern Legal Medicine, Psychiatry, and Forensic Science 783, 784-786 (1980); Cocozza & Steadman, Prediction in Psychiatry: An Example of Misplaced Confidence in Experts, 25 Soc. Probs. 265, 272-273 (1978); Report of the (American Psychological Association's) Task Force on the Role of Psychology in the Criminal Justice System, 33 Am. Psychologist 1099, 1110 (1978); Steadman & Cocozza, Psychiatry, Dangerousness and the Repetitively Violent Offender, 69 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 226, 227, 230 (1978); Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 Rutgers L. Rev. 1084, 1101 (1976); Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 439, 451-452 (1974); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 Calif. L. Rev. 693, 711-716 (1974). A relatively early study making this point is Rome, Identification of the Dangerous Offender, 42 F. R. D. 185 (1968). </s> [Footnote 3 See, e. g., APA, Clinical Aspects 28; 1 J. Ziskin, Coping with Psychiatric and Psychological Testimony 11, 19 (3d ed. 1981); Steadman & Morrissey, supra n. 2, at 264; Morse, Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev., at 599-600, 619-622; Cocozza & Steadman, supra n. 2, 25 Soc. Probs., at 274-275; Cocozza & Steadman, supra n. 2, 29 Rutgers L. Rev., at 1099-1100. </s> [Footnote 4 See APA Brief 14-16; APA, Clinical Aspects 25; J. Monahan, Clinical Prediction 86; Morse, Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev., at 598-600; Steadman & Cocozza, supra n. 2, 69 J. Crim. L. & Criminology, at 229-230; Diamond, supra n. 2, at 447. </s> That psychiatrists actually may be less accurate predictors of future violence than laymen, Ennis & Litwack, supra n. 2, at 734-735, may be due to personal biases in favor of predicting violence arising from the fear of being responsible for the erroneous release of a violent individual, see J. Monahan, Clinical Prediction 13, 22-25, 86; Morse, Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev., at 598-600. It also may be due to a tendency to generalize from experiences with past offenders on bases that have no empirical relationship to future violence, see Shah, Dangerousness: A Paradigm for Exploring Some Issues in Law and Psychology, American Psychologist 224, 229-230 (Mar. 1978), a tendency that may be present in Grigson's and Holbrook's testimony. Statistical prediction is clearly more reliable than clinical prediction, J. Monahan, Clinical Prediction 82; Steadman & Morrissey, supra n. 2, at 272 - and prediction based on statistics alone may be done by anyone, Morse, Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev., at 599-600; APA Brief 15-16. </s> [Footnote 5 Like the District Court, App. 13, and the Court of Appeals, id., at 20, the Court seeks to justify the admission of psychiatric testimony on the ground that "`[t]he majority of psychiatric experts agree that where there is a pattern of repetitive assaultive and violent conduct, the accuracy of psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness dramatically rises.'" Ante, at 902, quoting App. 13. The District Court correctly found that there [463 U.S. 880, 923] is empirical evidence supporting the common-sense correlation between repetitive past violence and future violence; the APA states that "[t]he most that can be said about any individual is that a history of past violence increases the probability that future violence will occur." Draft Report 29 (emphasis supplied). But psychiatrists have no special insights to add to this actuarial fact, and a single violent crime cannot provide a basis for a reliable prediction of future violence. APA, Clinical Aspects 23-24; see J. Monahan, Clinical Prediction 71-72; Steadman & Cocozza, supra n. 2, 69 J. Crim. L. & Criminology, at 229-230. </s> The lower courts and this Court have sought solace in this statistical correlation without acknowledging its obvious irrelevance to the facts of this case. The District Court did not find that the State demonstrated any pattern of repetitive assault and violent conduct by Barefoot. Recognizing the importance of giving some credibility to its experts' specious prognostications, the State now claims that the "reputation" testimony adduced at the sentencing hearing "can only evince repeated, widespread acts of criminal violence." Brief for Respondent 47. This is simply absurd. There was no testimony worthy of credence that Barefoot had committed acts of violence apart from the crime for which he was being tried; there was testimony only of a bad reputation for peaceable and law-abiding conduct. In light of the fact that each of Barefoot's prior convictions was for a nonviolent offense, such testimony obviously could have been based on antisocial but nonviolent behavior. Neither psychiatrist informed the jury that he considered this reputation testimony to show a history of repeated acts of violence. Moreover, if the psychiatrists or the jury were to rely on such vague hearsay testimony in order to show a "pattern of repetitive assault and violent conduct," Barefoot's death sentence would rest on information that might "bear no closer relation to fact than the average rumor or item of gossip," Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 359 (1977), and should be invalid for that reason alone. A death sentence cannot rest on highly dubious predictions secretly based on a factual foundation of hearsay and pure conjecture. See ibid. </s> [Footnote 6 Although I believe that the misleading nature of any psychiatric prediction of future violence violates due process when introduced in a capital sentencing hearing, admitting the predictions in this case - which were made without even examining the defendant - was particularly [463 U.S. 880, 924] indefensible. In the APA's words, if prediction following even an in-depth examination is inherently unreliable, </s> "there is all the more reason to shun the practice of testifying without having examined the defendant at all. . . . Needless to say, responding to hypotheticals is just as fraught with the possibility of error as testifying in any other way about an individual whom one has not personally examined. Although the courts have not yet rejected the practice, psychiatrists should." Draft Report 32-33. </s> Such testimony is offensive not only to legal standards; the APA has declared that "[i]t is unethical for a psychiatrist to offer a professional opinion unless he/she has conducted an examination." The Principles of Medical Ethics, With Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry 7(3), p. 9 (1981); see Opinions of the Ethics Committee on the Principles of Medical Ethics, With Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry, p. 27 (1983). The Court today sanctions admission in a capital sentencing hearing of "expert" medical testimony so unreliable and unprofessional that it violates the canons of medical ethics. </s> [Footnote 7 Cf. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 192 (1953) (prior to application of Fifth Amendment to the States, "reliance on a coerced confession vitiate[d] a [state] conviction because such a confession combines the persuasiveness of apparent conclusiveness with what judicial experience shows to be illusory and deceptive evidence"). </s> [Footnote 8 There can be no dispute about this obvious proposition: </s> "Scientific evidence impresses lay jurors. They tend to assume it is more accurate and objective than lay testimony. A juror who thinks of scientific evidence visualizes instruments capable of amazingly precise measurement, of findings arrived at by dispassionate scientific tests. In short, in the mind of the typical lay juror, a scientific witness has a special aura of credibility." Imwinkelried, Evidence Law and Tactics for the Proponents of Scientific Evidence, in Scientific and Expert Evidence 33, 37 (E. Imwinkelried ed. 1981). </s> See 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure 5217, p. 295 (1978) ("Scientific . . . evidence has great potential for misleading the jury. The low probative worth can often be concealed in the jargon of [463 U.S. 880, 927] some expert . . ."). This danger created by use of scientific evidence frequently has been recognized by the courts. Speaking specifically of psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness similar to those at issue, one District Court has observed that when such a prediction "is proffered by a witness bearing the title of `Doctor,' its impact on the jury is much greater than if it were not masquerading as something it is not." White v. Estelle, 554 F. Supp. 851, 858 (SD Tex. 1982). See Note - People v. Murtishaw: Applying the Frye Test to Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness in Capital Cases, 70 Calif. L. Rev. 1069, 1076-1077 (1982). In United States v. Addison, 162 U.S. App. D.C. 199, 202, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (1974), the court observed that scientific evidence may "assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen." Another court has noted that scientific evidence "is likely to be shrouded with an aura of near infallibility, akin to the ancient oracle of Delphi." United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 (CA8 1975). See United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (CA9 1973); United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 513 (Md. 1973); People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 461, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478, 493 (1968). </s> [Footnote 9 Other purportedly scientific proof has met a similar fate. See, e. g., United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (CA9 1978) (expert testimony identifying aircraft through "forward looking infrared system" inadmissible because unreliable and not generally accepted in scientific field to which it belongs); United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 558-559 (CA6 1977) (expert identification based on "ion microprobic analysis of human hair" not admissible because insufficiently reliable and accurate, and not accepted in its field); United States v. Addison, 162 U.S. App. D.C., at 203, 498 F.2d, at 745 (expert identification based on voice spectrogram inadmissible because not shown reliable); United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 893, 895 (ND Cal. 1976) (identification testimony of expert in "psycholinguistics" inadmissible because not demonstrably reliable), aff'd on other grounds, 563 F.2d 1331 (CA9 1977). </s> [Footnote 10 The Court observes that this well-established rule is a matter of evidence law, not constitutional law. Ante, at 899, n. 6. But the principle requiring that capital sentencing procedures ensure reliable verdicts, see supra, at 923-926, which the Court ignores, and the principle that due process is violated by the introduction of certain types of seemingly conclusive, but actually unreliable, evidence, see supra, at 925, and n. 7, which the Court also ignores, are constitutional doctrines of long standing. The teaching of the evidence doctrine is that unreliable scientific testimony creates a serious and unjustifiable risk of an erroneous verdict, and that the adversary process at its best does not remove this risk. We should not dismiss this lesson merely by labeling the doctrine nonconstitutional; its relevance to the constitutional question before the Court could not be more certain. </s> [Footnote 11 In one study, for example, the only factor statistically related to whether psychiatrists predicted that a subject would be violent in the future was the type of crime with which the subject was charged. Yet the defendant's charge was mentioned by the psychiatrists to justify their predictions in only one third of the cases. The criterion most frequently cited was "delusional or impaired thinking." Cocozza & Steadman, supra n. 2, 29 Rutgers L. Rev., at 1096. </s> [Footnote 12 For one thing, although most members of the mental health professions believe that such predictions cannot be made, defense lawyers may experience significant difficulties in locating effective rebuttal witnesses. Davis, Texas Capital Sentencing Procedures: The Role of the Jury and the Restraining Hand of the Expert, 69 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 300, 302 (1978). I presume that the Court's reasoning suggests that, were a defendant to show that he was unable, for financial or other reasons, to obtain an adequate rebuttal expert, a constitutional violation might be found. </s> [Footnote 13 "Although jurors may treat mitigating psychiatric evidence with skepticism, they may credit psychiatric evidence demonstrating aggravation. Especially when jurors' sensibilities are offended by a crime, they may seize upon evidence of dangerousness to justify an enhanced sentence." Dix, supra n. 2, at 43, n. 215. Thus, the danger of jury deference to expert opinions is particularly acute in death penalty cases. Expert testimony of this sort may permit juries to avoid the difficult and emotionally [463 U.S. 880, 935] draining personal decisions concerning rational and just punishment. Id., at 46. Doctor Grigson himself has noted both the superfluousness and the misleading effect of his testimony: </s> "`I think you could do away with the psychiatrist in these cases. Just take any man off the street, show him what the guy's done, and most of these things are so clearcut he would say the same things I do. But I think the jurors feel a little better when a psychiatrist says it - somebody that's supposed to know more than they know.'" Bloom, Killers and Shrinks, Texas Monthly 64, 68 (July 1978) (quoting Doctor Grigson). </s> [Footnote 14 The Court is far wide of the mark in asserting that excluding psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness from capital sentencing proceedings "would immediately call into question those other contexts in which predictions of future behavior are constantly made." Ante, at 898. Short-term predictions of future violence, for the purpose of emergency commitment or treatment, are considerably more accurate than long-term predictions. See APA Brief 12, n. 7; Monahan, Prediction Research and the Emergency Commitment of Dangerous Mentally Ill Persons: A Reconsideration, 135 Am. J. Psychiatry 198 (1978); J. Monahan, Clinical Prediction 59-60; Schwitzgebel, supra n. 2, at 786. In other contexts where psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness are made, moreover, the subject will not be criminally convicted, much less put to death, as a result of predictive error. The risk of error therefore may be shifted to the defendant to some extent. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 -430 (1979). The APA, discussing civil commitment proceedings based on determinations of dangerousness, states that in light of the unreliability of psychiatric predictions, "[c]lose monitoring, frequent follow-up, and a willingness to change one's mind about treatment recommendations and dispositions for violent persons, whether within the legal system or without, is the only acceptable practice if the psychiatrist is to play a helpful role in these assessments of dangerousness." APA, Clinical Aspects 30 (emphasis supplied). In a capital case there will be no chance for "follow-up" or "monitoring." A subsequent change of mind brings not justice delayed, but the despair of irreversible error. See Bonnie & Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 Va. L. Rev. 427, 442-446 (1980). </s> [Footnote 15 The Court's focus in the death penalty cases has been primarily on ensuring a fair procedure: </s> "In ensuring that the death penalty is not meted out arbitrarily or capriciously, the Court's principal concern has been more with the procedure by which the State imposes the death sentence than with the substantive factors the State lays before the jury as a basis for imposing death, once it has been determined that the defendant falls within the category of persons [463 U.S. 880, 938] eligible for the death penalty." California v. Ramos, post, at 999 (emphasis in original). </s> [463 U.S. 880, 939]

United States Supreme Court FROZEN FOOD EXP. v. UNITED STATES(1956) No. 158 Argued: March 7, 1956Decided: April 23, 1956 </s> After an investigation and hearing instituted on its own motion, the Interstate Commerce Commission issued an order listing a large number of specified commodities which it found not to be "agricultural" within the meaning of 203 (b) (6) of the Interstate Commerce Act, which exempts from the requirement of a permit or a certificate of public convenience and necessity motor vehicles used only in carrying "agricultural" commodities. A motor carrier transporting without a certificate or permit numerous commodities found by the Commission not to be "agricultural" commodities, and which had not been a party to the administrative proceeding, sued in a Federal District Court to enjoin and set aside the Commission's order. Held: The Commission's order is subject to judicial review, and the District Court should adjudicate the merits. United States v. Los Angeles R. Co., 273 U.S. 299 , distinguished. Pp. 41-45. </s> 128 F. Supp. 374, reversed. </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 159, Interstate Commerce Commission v. Frozen Food Express et al.; No. 160, American Trucking Associations, Inc., et al. v. Frozen Food Express et al.; and No. 161, Akron, Canton & Youngstown R. Co. et al. v. Frozen Food Express et al., also on appeal from the same court. </s> Carl L. Phinney argued the cause and filed a brief for Frozen Food Express, appellant in No. 158 and appellee in Nos. 159, 160 and 161. </s> Robert W. Ginnane argued the cause for the Interstate Commerce Commission appellant in No. 159 and appellee in No. 158. With him on the brief was Leo H. Pou. </s> David G. Macdonald argued the cause for the American Trucking Associations, Inc., et al., appellants in No. 160. With him on the brief were Francis W. McInerny, Peter T. Beardsley, Clarence D. Todd and Dale C. Dillon. [351 U.S. 40, 41] </s> Charles P. Reynolds and Carl Helmetag, Jr. submitted on brief for the Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co. et al., appellants in No. 161. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 Stat. 543, as amended, 49 U.S.C. 301 et seq., grants the Commission pervasive control over motor carriers. Common carriers and contract carriers by motor vehicle, subject to that part of the Act, must have a certificate of public convenience and necessity or a permit issued by the Commission. 206 (a), 209 (a). The Commission has powers of investigation to determine if a motor carrier has complied with the Act; and it has authority to issue an order compelling compliance. 204 (c). These requirements for a certificate or permit * are not, however, applicable to "motor vehicles used in carrying property consisting of ordinary livestock, fish (including shell fish), or agricultural (including horticultural) commodities (not including manufactured products thereof), if such motor vehicles are not used in carrying any other property, or passengers, for compensation." 203 (b) (6). </s> The controversy in these cases centers around this "agricultural" exemption. After an investigation instituted on its own motion, the Commission issued an order that specified commodities are not "agricultural" within the meaning of 203 (b) (6). </s> The hearing to determine the meaning and application of the term "agricultural . . . commodities (not including manufactured products thereof)" as used in 203 (b) (6) was held before an examiner. It was a public hearing at which various governmental officials and agencies and [351 U.S. 40, 42] various producers, shippers, and carriers appeared and presented evidence. The Commission's decision was in the form of a report and order. 52 M. C. C. 511. The report, which concerns various groups of commodities, covers 71 pages of the printed record. The findings list those commodities that the Commission finds are exempted under 203 (b) (6) and those that are not. The order of the Commission incorporates the "findings" and states that the proceeding "be, and it is hereby discontinued." </s> Frozen Food Express, the plaintiff, is a motor carrier transporting numerous commodities which the Commission ruled were nonexempt under 203 (b) (6) but which the carrier claims are "agricultural commodities." Plaintiff, who was not a party to the administrative proceeding, instituted suit before a three-judge District Court (28 U.S.C. 2325) to enjoin the order of the Commission and have it set aside, naming the United States and the Commission as defendants. 28 U.S.C. 1336; 49 Stat. 550, as amended, 49 U.S.C. 305 (g); 60 Stat. 243, 5 U.S.C. 1009. The complaint alleged that plaintiff is a common carrier by motor vehicle, holding a certificate of public convenience and necessity which authorizes it to transport certain commodities between designated points and places; that plaintiff is transporting, in addition to those commodities, commodities which are exempt under 203 (b) (6) and for which plaintiff has sought no authority from the Commission; that the Commission in its order has held the latter commodities nonexempt and accordingly has deprived it of the right granted by the statute; that the order of the Commission classifying certain commodities as nonexempt is unlawful; and that the Commission threatens to enjoin transportation of the commodities which plaintiff claims are exempt. The Secretary of Agriculture intervened, supporting plaintiff's position on some of the commodities. Other interveners [351 U.S. 40, 43] are trucking associations and railroads which support the Commission. The United States as a defendant supports the Commission on some of its findings and opposes it on others. </s> The District Court, being of the view that the case was controlled by United States v. Los Angeles R. Co., 273 U.S. 299 , dismissed the action, saying that the "order" of the Commission was not subject to judicial review. 128 F. Supp. 374. The cases are here by appeal. 28 U.S.C. 1253, 2101 (b). </s> We disagree with the District Court. We do not think United States v. Los Angeles R. Co., supra, is controlling here. In that case the "order" held nonreviewable was a valuation of a carrier's property made by the Commission. The Court held that the "order" was no more than a report of an investigation which might never be the basis of a proceeding before the Commission or a court. Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Court, said: </s> "The so-called order here complained of is one which does not command the carrier to do, or to refrain from doing, any thing; which does not grant or withhold any authority, privilege or license; which does not extend or abridge any power or facility; which does not subject the carrier to any liability, civil or criminal; which does not change the carrier's existing or future status or condition; which does not determine any right or obligation. This so-called order is merely the formal record of conclusions reached after a study of data collected in the course of extensive research conducted by the Commission, through its employees. It is the exercise solely of the function of investigation. . . ." 273 U.S. 309 -310. </s> The situation here is quite different. The determination by the Commission that a commodity is not an [351 U.S. 40, 44] exempt agricultural product has an immediate and practical impact on carriers who are transporting the commodities, and on shippers as well. The "order" of the Commission warns every carrier, who does not have authority from the Commission to transport those commodities, that it does so at the risk of incurring criminal penalties. 222 (a). Where unauthorized operations occur, the Commission may proceed administratively and issue a cease and desist order. 204 (c). Such orders of the Commission are enforceable by the courts. 222 (b). And wilful violation of a cease and desist order is ground for revocation of a certificate or permit. 212. The determination made by the Commission is not therefore abstract, theoretical, or academic. Cf. El Dorado Oil Works v. United States, 328 U.S. 12, 18 -19. The "order" of the Commission which classifies commodities as exempt or nonexempt is, indeed, the basis for carriers in ordering and arranging their affairs. Cf. Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 132 . Carriers who are without the appropriate certificate or permit, because they believe they carry exempt commodities, run civil and criminal risks. A carrier authorized to carry specified commodities and dependent on exempt articles for its return load may lose its right to operate at all, if it does not respect the Commission's "order." Carriers and shippers alike are told that they are or are not free to bargain for rates, that they must or must not pay the filed charges. The "order" of the Commission is in substance a "declaratory" one, see 60 Stat. 240, 5 U.S.C. 1004 (d), which touches vital interests of carriers and shippers alike and sets the standard for shaping the manner in which an important segment of the trucking business will be done. Cf. Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 . The consequences we have summarized are not conjectural. The Commission itself places this interpretation on its action and argues, contrary to its [351 U.S. 40, 45] position in the Los Angeles Case, supra, for finality of the order. We conclude that the issues raised in the complaint are justiciable and that the District Court should adjudicate the merits. </s> Reversed. </s> [Footnote * Exempted carriers are also not subject to the provisions concerning rates and charges, 217, 218, nor to the requirements concerning bodily injury and property damage insurance. 215. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting. </s> I do not agree that the District Court had jurisdiction to entertain this action to set aside the Commission's "order." It seems to me that the case falls squarely within those carefully developed rules which require that judicial intervention be withheld until administrative action has reached its complete development. I find nothing in the nature of the order which commends it to reviewability at this stage other than the fact that its promulgation was preceded by a lengthy investigation and that it contains a series of "findings" and "conclusions." These factors should not be permitted to obscure the true character of the order. </s> After a self-initiated investigation, in which various carriers participated, the Commission entered this order discontinuing the proceedings and incorporating the "findings of fact and conclusions" of the Commission. That the order was not intended to be a "legislative" regulation seems apparent, since it was not put in the form ordinarily used by the Commission in promulgating regulations. The order simply lists the commodities considered by the Commission and determines whether they are within the 203 (b) (6) exemption; it nowhere commands that carriers hauling commodities considered non-exempt comply either with the order or with the general requirements of the Interstate Commerce Act. It is clear, therefore, that no administrative or criminal proceeding can be brought for violation of the order itself. And it is equally clear that the proceeding did not conclude any rights as between any specific carriers and the Commission. [351 U.S. 40, 46] </s> The Interstate Commerce Act does, of course, provide for administrative and criminal sanctions to enforce compliance with its provisions. An uncertificated carrier hauling commodities non-exempt under 203 (b) (6) runs the risk of a criminal prosecution under 222 (a) of the Act. But the order has no operative effect in such a proceeding - it does not extend the carrier's criminal liability, which exists because of a violation of the Act and not the order. And if the enforcement takes the form of a cease and desist proceeding against a particular carrier, again the only question would be whether the Act, rather than the order, was being violated. If such an administrative proceeding is instituted, and a cease and desist order is issued, the carrier subject to that order would be entitled to contest the statutory authority of the Commission in judicial proceedings of precisely the scope brought here. </s> Nor can this order be likened to a determination of status, held reviewable in Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 . As I understand that case, the touchstone of the decision was that the determination "necessarily and immediately carried direction of obedience to previously formulated mandatory orders addressed generally to all carriers amenable to the Commission's authority." 307 U.S., at p. 144. The specific determination that a particular carrier must comply with Commission regulations is quite different from this order, which is directed to no one in particular and is binding on no one, not even the Commission. Neither can this order be analogized to a declaratory order directed to the status of a particular carrier, which might be reviewable as carrying with it a direct threat of prosecution - see Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, supra, at p. 132, n. 11. Indeed, the Commission itself does not consider its determinations the final answer to the meaning of the 203 (b) (6) exemption, even for administrative [351 U.S. 40, 47] purposes. This is evident from the proceedings in East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Frozen Food Express, post, p. 49, where in a cease and desist proceeding the Commission heard new evidence on whether the particular commodities there involved were within the exemption, and was evidently ready to reconsider the determinations embodied in the order involved here. </s> To be sure, the order does serve as a warning to carriers that the Commission interprets the Act in a particular way, and it is true that courts will give the Commission's views some indeterminate weight in construing the statute. But that very fact, instead of justifying a holding of reviewability, seems to me a strong argument against it. The Commission's willingness, in individual cases, to reconsider its determinations with respect to particular commodities points up the tentative nature of the conclusions here sought to be reviewed. When this action is heard on the merits, the District Court will have as an aid in construing the statute administrative interpretations which are admittedly inconclusive, and if they are to be given any weight it would seem important that this Court not do anything to freeze them in their present immature state. For all we know, the Commission's decision not to issue this order in the form of regulations may have been because it recognized the need for further study. </s> Years of experience have shown that 203 (b) (6) presents difficult problems of interpretation, and this Court should be wary of establishing a procedure which would prematurely throw into the courts questions of statutory construction not arising in the context of concrete facts, and which does not bring to the courts even the benefit of final interpretation by the agency assigned to administer the statute. That this should be done in a case where there is a right of direct appeal to this Court makes the wisdom of today's decision even more questionable. [351 U.S. 40, 48] </s> Lastly, the order does not have the immediate impact of the sort which, at times, has led this Court to regard particular administrative action as ripe for judicial review. In Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 , the very existence of the regulations had, without anything more, an immediate effect on the business of the party attacking them. There is much to be said for finding administrative action reviewable when it entails immediate practical consequences for those affected by it. Cf. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 . But the carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act are in no way worse off now than they were before this order issued; there is no greater liability or risk under the statute occasioned by the order, which has no more effect than would any other informal expression of views by the Commission. If anything, carriers are in a better position, since they can now make a more reasoned judgment as to the applicability of the statute to particular commodities, and this may have been the principal reason for the Commission making public its findings. </s> In my view, then, the language quoted by the majority from United States v. Los Angeles R. Co. aptly describes this order of the Commission, and I consider that wise decision controlling here. Neither the character nor the meaning of this order can be changed by the fact that the Commission, in asking us to hold it reviewable, calls it a "formal determination" of the scope of 203 (b) (6). The significant fact is that, as shown by East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Frozen Food Express, post, p. 49, the Commission itself does not consider its order definitive. Today's decision opens the door wide to premature judicial review of various kinds of administrative action, and I must withhold my assent from it. I would affirm the decision below. </s> [351 U.S. 40, 49]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. CITY OF CHICAGO(1970) No. 386 Argued: Decided: October 19, 1970 </s> Section 13a (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act does not require a railroad seeking to discontinue its segment of a through passenger train that is operated in conjunction with another railroad to give notice of the proposed discontinuance in States served only by the connecting line. </s> Nos. 386, 387, 396, and 410, 312 F. Supp. 442, reversed and remanded. </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 387, United States et al. v. Tennessee Public Service Commission et al., No. 396, Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Tennessee Public Service Commission et al., and No. 410, Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad et al. v. City of Chicago et al., also on appeal from the same court. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> These cases are a sequel to our decision in City of Chicago v. United States, 396 U.S. 162 , last Term. The Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad (C&EI) filed a notice under 13a (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 72 Stat. 571, 49 U.S.C. 13a (1), proposing to discontinue a pair of trains known as the "Georgian," operated by it between Chicago, Illinois, and Evansville, Indiana, and operated in conjunction with trains of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad (L&N) between Evansville, Indiana, and Atlanta, Georgia, crossing Kentucky and Tennessee en route. Part of this litigation grows out of the ICC's approval of the C&EI's discontinuance of the Chicago-Evansville segment of the "Georgian," evidenced by its termination of its investigation. </s> The L&N also operates the "Hummingbird" between Cincinnati, Ohio, and New Orleans, Louisiana. The [400 U.S. 8, 9] "Hummingbird" connects with the "Georgian" at Nashville, Tennessee, where coaches and sleepers are transferred between the two trains. Following the ICC's approval of C&EI's discontinuance, the L&N served notice of discontinuance of the "Hummingbird" 1 which the ICC also approved. </s> In City of Chicago v. United States, supra, we held that ICC decisions to discontinue such an investigation were reviewable and remanded the cases back to the District Court. That court then ordered consolidation and remanded back to the ICC for further hearings, holding that the notice served by the C&EI on the Governors of Illinois and Indiana and at every station along the Chicago-Evansville run was inadequate because the people of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Georgia, and the Governors of those States were not notified. The "Hummingbird" discontinuance was also remanded to the ICC because of its close relationship with the "Georgian." These appeals followed. </s> We note jurisdiction and reverse. Section 13a (1) provides: </s> "A carrier or carriers subject to this part, if their rights with respect to the discontinuance or change . . . of the operation or service of any train . . . are subject to any provision of the constitution or statutes of any State . . . shall mail to the Governor of each State in which such train . . . operated, and post in every station, depot or other facility served thereby, notice . . . of any such proposed discontinuance or change." </s> This section, as we read it, required C&EI to give notice in Illinois and Indiana, the only States in [400 U.S. 8, 10] which the line now in controversy has operated. No provision is made in 13a (1) for notice to States served by connecting railroads which might be affected by a discontinuance. </s> The dissent finds ambiguity in the phrase "such train" in 13a (1). It is argued that two interpretations of "such train" are possible: either the train of the C&EI between Chicago and Evansville or the "Georgian" between Chicago and Atlanta. By allowing discontinuance under 13a (1), however, the ICC must have interpreted "such train" to refer to a train operated by one railroad only; and it was only the Chicago-Evansville discontinuance that was before it at the time. The Commission ruled that: "Copies of the notices were duly served and posted in the manner required by section 13a (1) and our rules and regulations thereunder." 2 331 I. C. C. 447, 448. We defer on this issue to the definition of "train" given by the administrative agency which has oversight of the problem. See, e. g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 -17; Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410, 417 -418. </s> It is true that the C&EI and the L&N functioned in close harmony. Discontinuance of service on one line might have a substantial effect on the other. But this relationship is not unique in railroading. Congress is not unaware of the mutual interdependence of railroads. It designed a federal regulatory system that displaced a state regulatory system when the state system could defeat a carrier's attempt to discontinue a train. Hence we think it distorts 13a (1) to treat it so as to require [400 U.S. 8, 11] the giving of notice to States which had no regulatory power over the carrier. 3 </s> Accordingly, the decisions in Nos. 386 and 410 are reversed. Since Nos. 387 and 396 were remanded to the Commission solely because of their relation to Nos. 386 and 410, those decisions are also reversed. The causes are remanded to the District Court for review of any questions on the merits which may remain unresolved. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 No issue as to the adequacy of the notice given in the L&N proceeding is raised here. </s> [Footnote 2 The regulation at the time provided for "[a] certificate [stating] that a copy of the notice * * * has been mailed to the Governor and railroad regulatory body of each State in which the subject train or ferry is operated." (49 CFR 143.5 (j), formerly 43.5 (j) (see 32 Fed. Reg. 5606)). </s> [Footnote 3 Until 1958 railroad discontinuances required approval of the appropriate regulatory agency in each of the States in which the line operated. Congress knew of the financial difficulties of the railroads and concluded that the problem of discontinuance had to be removed from its parochial setting where state agencies too often required the "maintenance of uneconomic and unnecessary services and facilities." S. Rep. No. 1647, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 22. Therefore, Congress vested power over discontinuances in a body aware of the national transportation problems and needs. See generally City of Chicago v. United States, 396 U.S. 162 (1969), and Southern R. Co. v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 93 (1964). The problem of discontinuance of services as put to the Congress by the Association of American Railroads was described as follows: "[S]uch matters are subject to approval of State regulatory commissions and authority for such discontinuances or abandonments must be obtained within the scope of statutes or procedures under which those State commissions operate." Problems of the Railroads, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, p. 25 (Jan. 13, 1958). The legislation was responsive to that need and may not be easily construed to do more than track the jurisdiction of a State over the carrier in question. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK joins, dissenting. </s> I think these cases do not lend themselves to summary disposition. </s> The Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co. and the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. jointly operated [400 U.S. 8, 12] a train known as the "Georgian" which provided passenger service between Chicago, Illinois, and Atlanta, Georgia. At Evansville, Indiana, between the two terminal points on the "Georgian" run, the railroad companies switched engines and train crews; passengers, however, could remain in the railroad cars and continue through to the end of the run. The Chicago & Eastern Illinois sought ICC approval of its discontinuance of the Chicago-Evansville portion of the run; notice of the proposed discontinuance proceedings was not served on the Governors and residents of the States served by the Evansville-Atlanta portion of the "Georgian" run. After our remand in City of Chicago v. United States, 396 U.S. 162 (1969), the District Court held that notice of the ICC discontinuance proceedings should have been given to the Governors and residents of all the States served by the "Georgian" run. The Court, in Nos. 386 and 410, now summarily reverses that decision, holding that 13a (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 13a (1), requires that a carrier seeking to discontinue passenger service give notice only in those States having regulatory authority over the carrier. 1 </s> [400 U.S. 8, 13] </s> The issue, in my opinion, is not one justifying summary resolution, as an examination of the Court's opinion indicates. The Court relies in the first instance on the absence of an explicit provision in 13a (1) of the Act for notice to States served by "connecting railroads." However, the statutory provision in question is manifestly highly ambiguous with regard to the scope of the notice obligation in situations where two carriers, though subject to different state regulatory authorities, offer their services to the public in a manner which, from the consumer standpoint, is indistinguishable from passenger service offered by a single carrier. Section 13a (1) provides in relevant part: </s> "A carrier or carriers . . . if their rights with respect to the discontinuance or change, in whole or in part, of the operation or service of any train . . . operating from a point in one State to a point in any other State . . . are subject to any provision of the constitution or statutes of any State or any regulation or order of (or are the subject of any proceeding pending before) any court or an administrative or regulatory agency of any State, may, but shall not be required to, file with the Commission, and upon such filing shall mail to the Governor of each State in which such train . . . is operated, and post in every station, depot or other facility served thereby, notice at least thirty days in advance of any such proposed discontinuance or change. . . ." </s> Appellants in Nos. 386 and 410 argue that since 13a (1) accords carriers a right to commence discontinuance proceedings before the ICC if their rights with respect to the operation of train service are subject to any state regulatory authority, the scope of the notice requirement should be limited by the reach of the state regulatory power giving rise, in the first instance, to the carrier's right to go before the ICC. Appellees in [400 U.S. 8, 14] Nos. 386 and 410, for their part, contend that the notice requirement is geared to the areas through which "such train" is operated, not merely the areas reached by a State's regulatory power over the carrier. For my part, I find the language and structure of the statutory provision singularly opaque; and I am not aided in my choice between these competing constructions by the Court's observation that 13a (1) makes no provision for notice in States served by "connecting railroads." </s> In view of the structural and linguistic ambiguity of the statutory provision, the Court's reliance on the absence of an explicit reference to carrier arrangements of this sort would carry weight only if the legislative policy underlying 13a (1) of the Act solidly supported the result reached today. Lacking that, the description of congressional policy in n. 3 of the Court's opinion, ante, at 11, hardly warrants the Court's inference in the text of its opinion that the statutory purpose underpinning 13a (1) is served by a limitation of the notice requirements according to the reach of the State's regulatory power over the carrier filing with the ICC. 2 Indeed, the concern with state regulatory parochialism, and the resulting burden on interstate commerce caused [400 U.S. 8, 15] by economically wasteful passenger service arrangements, argue with at least equal force for an interpretation of the notice requirements of 13a (1) as reaching beyond the relatively narrow parochial interests likely to be called forth by only a particular State's participation in a hearing on the discontinuance of multicarrier service. </s> Apparently, the Court recognizes the inherent ambiguity of the statute. Thus, its opinion finally comes to rest on the principle of deference to the administrative agency's construction of the statute. Suffice it to say that I am not persuaded by the deference argument as applied to the agency's pro forma finding of adequate notice in this very litigation where the notice issue evidently was not before the agency at the time of its ruling. See 331 I. C. C. 447, 448. </s> The above considerations are not meant to reflect any conclusions concerning the merits of the statutory construction issue presented in these cases. To the contrary, my point is simply that, without briefs and oral argument by the parties on the merits of the question, I would refrain from choosing between the conflicting constructions of 13a (1) pressed upon the Court by the parties. Therefore, I would note probable jurisdiction in Nos. 386 and 410. I would withhold action in No. 387 pending dispositions in Nos. 386 and 410. In No. 396, I would note probable jurisdiction, limited to the questions concerning the District Court's action in reinstating the restraining order of September 6, 1968. </s> [Footnote 1 Nos. 387 and 396 are appeals by the Government, the ICC, and the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. challenging the District Court's holding that the issues involving the discontinuance of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.'s "Hummingbird" train are so factually related to the discontinuance of the "Georgian" run that the "Hummingbird" discontinuance should be remanded in light of the projected reconsideration of the "Georgian" discontinuance. In addition, the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., in No. 396, challenges the District Court's action in reinstating the September 6, 1968, restraining order entered by Judge Robson; that restraining order prohibited discontinuance of the "Hummingbird" trains pending resolution of the case in the District Court. On April 3, 1970, this Court stayed the District Court's action in reinstating the earlier restraining order. 397 U.S. 1019 . The effect of today's opinion on the status of that restraining order is unclear. </s> [Footnote 2 The disconnected nature of the Court's reasoning is nicely illustrated in n. 3 of its opinion, ante, at 11. We are offered two quotations - one from the Senate Report and the other from the Association of American Railroads - as legislative history supporting the Court's construction of 13a (1). The substance of both clearly supports the view of 13a (1) as seeking to remedy state regulatory parochialism. Unfortunately, neither quotation speaks to the question put in issue by the Court's rationale for summarily disposing of these cases; i. e., whether the congressional decision to proffer an alternative national forum as a remedy for state parochialism is to be construed solely in light of the carrier interest in escaping state regulatory agencies. Yet the Court, after reciting these quotations, chooses to draw the inference that the statute cannot be easily construed to do more than serve that interest of the carriers. I must respectfully submit that this is a rather obvious non sequitur. </s> [400 U.S. 8, 16]

United States Supreme Court STILL v. NORFOLK & WESTERN R. CO.(1961) No. 48 Argued: October 19, 1961Decided: November 13, 1961 </s> 1. Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, a railroad cannot escape liability for personal injuries negligently inflicted upon an employee by proving that he had obtained his job by making false representations upon which the railroad rightfully relied in hiring him. Pp. 35-46. </s> 2. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. v. Rock, 279 U.S. 410 , must be limited to its precise facts; and, in each case not involving the precise kind of fraud there involved, the terms "employed" and "employee," as used in the Act, must be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning, even though the employee's misrepresentations may have contributed to the injury or even to the accident upon which his claim is based. Pp. 37-46. </s> Reversed and remanded. </s> Sidney S. Sachs argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Lewis Jacobs. </s> Joseph M. Sanders argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs was Robert B. Claytor. </s> John J. Naughton filed a brief for the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The Federal Employers' Liability Act 1 requires railroads to pay damages for personal injuries negligently inflicted upon their employees. The question this case presents is whether a railroad can escape this statutory liability by proving that an employee so injured had obtained his job by making false representations upon which the railroad rightfully relied in hiring him. [368 U.S. 35, 36] </s> Petitioner brought this action in a West Virginia state court seeking damages for personal injuries from the respondent Norfolk & Western Railway Company, for which, as of the date of his alleged injuries, he had worked continuously, except for a one-year interruption, for some six years. By special plea, the railroad set up as a defense the contention that petitioner was not "employed" by it within the meaning of the Act 2 and alleged in support of this defense: (1) that petitioner had made false and fraudulent representations in his application for employment with regard to his physical condition and other matters pertinent to his eligibility and capacity to serve as a railroad employee; (2) that petitioner would not have been hired but for these misrepresentations and the fact that they misled the railroad's hiring officials; and (3) that the very physical defects which had been fraudulently concealed from the railroad contributed to the injury upon which petitioner's action is based. Petitioner's demurrer to this plea was overruled and evidence by both parties was presented to a jury. When all the evidence was in, however, the trial court directed the jury to bring in a verdict for the defendant on the ground that [368 U.S. 35, 37] the undisputed evidence showed that the railroad had been deceived into hiring petitioner by petitioner's fraudulent misrepresentations as to his health and that these misrepresentations had a "direct causal connection" with the injuries upon which petitioner's action is based. </s> Throughout the proceedings in the trial court, petitioner contended that no verdict should be directed against him on the grounds, among others: (1) that the allegations of fraud set up in the railroad's special plea were not sufficient in law to state a defense under the Act; and (2) that even if the plea were sufficient in law, it rested upon questions of fact which should be submitted to the jury. On writ of error, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals refused to overturn the trial court's action on either of these two grounds. Though we recognized that the case might possibly be disposed of on the second of these grounds, we granted certiorari to consider the important question raised by petitioner's first ground concerning the proper interpretation, scope and application of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 3 </s> The railroad's primary contention, which was accepted as the principal basis of the action of the trial court, is that the sufficiency in law of its fraud defense was established by this Court's decision in Minneapolis, St. Paul & S. Ste. Marie R. Co. v. Rock. 4 That case involved the railroad's liability for the negligent injury of one Joe Rock, who had obtained his employment by a whole series of fraudulent misrepresentations. Rock had originally applied for a job in his own name and had been rejected when his physical condition was found to be such that he did not meet the railroad's requirements. Several days later, he reapplied for the same job and, in order to conceal the fact that he had previously been refused employment because of his health, represented himself to be [368 U.S. 35, 38] "John Rock," an apparently fictitious name he assumed for the purpose. He next arranged to have one Lenhart pose as "John Rock" and take the railroad's physical examination. When Lenhart passed the physical, the railroad hired Joe Rock on the mistaken belief that he was "John Rock" and that he had Lenhart's physical condition. On this unusual combination of facts, this Court held that Rock could not recover damages against the railroad under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, saying: "Right to recover may not justify or reasonably be rested on a foundation so abhorrent to public policy." 5 </s> The railroad here seeks to bring itself within the Rock decision by arguing that Rock established the principle that any false representation which deceives the employer and results in a railroad worker's getting a job he would not otherwise have obtained is sufficient to bar the worker from recovering the damages Congress has provided for railroad workers negligently injured in the honest performance of their duties under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Although there is some language in the Rock opinion which might lend itself to such an interpretation, we think it plain that no such rule was ever intended. Certainly that was not the contemporaneous understanding of Rock among other courts as is plainly shown by the statements of Judge Nordbye when that interpretation of Rock was urged upon him only one year later at the trial of Minneapolis, St. Paul & S. Ste. Marie R. Co. v. Borum: "It is inconceivable to this court that Justice Butler intended to hold in the Rock case that every fraudulent violation of the rules framed for maintaining a certain standard of safety and efficiency of the employees would render such employment void and deny the defrauding employee any rights under the act. It seems quite clear that any fraud practiced by the plaintiff [368 U.S. 35, 39] herein at the most rendered the contract voidable." 6 And when the Borum case came here, this Court, although urged to do so, itself refused to extend Rock in any such manner. 7 The decision in Borum, considered in the light of the facts there involved, reflects clearly the contemporaneously understood limitations upon the Rock approach and the reluctance of this Court to extend the vague notions of public policy upon which that case rested to new factual situations. </s> Borum, who was forty-nine at the time, wanted a job with a railroad that had, in the interest of promoting safety and efficiency in its operations, adopted a rule against hiring men over forty-five. Knowing this, he told the railroad employment officials that he was only thirty-eight and, by this deliberate misrepresentation, obtained a job he would not otherwise have been given. Although Borum took the railroad's required physical examination, it apparently knew nothing of Borum's deception about his age until some seven years later, after he had lost both of his legs in an accident caused by the railroad's negligence and had filed suit against it for damages under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Just before trial of this case, a last-minute investigation turned up Borum's real age and the railroad sought to rely upon this fact to escape its liability under the Act. This Court unanimously upheld the Minnesota courts' determination that Borum had a right to recover despite his admittedly fraudulent and material misrepresentation [368 U.S. 35, 40] of his age, brushing aside the railroad's attempted reliance upon Rock on the ground "that the facts found, when taken in connection with those shown by uncontradicted evidence, are not sufficient to bring this case within the rule applied in Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co. v. Rock, supra, or the reasons upon which that decision rests." 8 </s> In support of this conclusion, the Court in Borum pointed to a number of factual differences with the Rock case. The first mentioned, and apparently the most important of these in the mind of the Court, was the fact that Rock, unlike Borum, had obtained his employment as an "impostor" by presenting himself to the railroad under an assumed name after his initial application in his own name had been rejected. Secondly, the Court pointed to the fact that Rock, again unlike Borum, had never been approved as physically fit for employment by the railroad's examining surgeon. Finally, the Court made reference to the fact that under the railroad's own rules, it could not have discharged Borum for his misrepresentation because more than thirty days had passed since his original provisional employment and the rules made this action final unless changed within that period. But no one of these facts, as the Court recognized, was sufficient to justify a distinction between Rock and Borum based upon an acceptable reconciling principle. In both cases, the worker had been guilty of making a material, false and fraudulent representation without which he would not have been employed. And if such a method of obtaining employment was, as intimated in Rock, to be considered so "abhorrent to public policy" that the normal distinction between "void" and "voidable" contracts was to be ignored, 9 the mere existence of a railroad [368 U.S. 35, 41] rule limiting the time for discharge without cause could not, of course, have overridden that policy. The Court therefore, as shown above, based its decision upholding Borum's right to recover upon all of the factual distinctions between his case and that of Rock and held merely that Rock would not be extended to cover these new facts. </s> This factual distinction of Rock, though sufficient to show the non-existence of any broad principle that material misrepresentations relied upon by a railroad in hiring bar recovery under the Act, proved completely unsatisfactory to establish affirmatively an intelligible guide by which lower courts could decide what misrepresentations were so "abhorrent to public policy" as to compel a forfeiture of the worker's right to recover under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. And since Borum, the lower federal courts and state courts have been forced to struggle with the baffling problem of how much and what kinds of fraud are sufficiently abhorrent without further guidance from this Court. Consequently, in almost all of such cases, the courts have been faced with a dilemma occasioned by the fact that both parties have been able to argue with considerable force that a decision in their favor is absolutely required by one or the other of the two decisions on the question by this Court. The result in a vast majority of these courts has been an acceptance of Rock as laying down a narrow public policy holding to which Borum establishes the need for courts to make broad exceptions in appropriate cases. And, perhaps not so surprisingly, most cases have been deemed appropriate ones for avoiding the harsh consequences of Rock, with the [368 U.S. 35, 42] courts creating new exceptions to allow recovery whenever a case did not fit within one already established. 10 Occasionally, as here, a worker has been held to be barred from recovery, but these few cases seem entirely [368 U.S. 35, 43] indistinguishable on any significant grounds from the many in which other courts have found or created exceptions. 11 </s> In this situation, it seems necessary for this Court, in the interest of the orderly administration of justice, to take a fresh look at this question in an effort to supply [368 U.S. 35, 44] an intelligible guide for future decisions. Having done so, we conclude that the Rock case, properly interpreted, lays down no general rule at all. In that case, the Court was confronted with an action by a railroad worker who, though undeniably an employee of the railroad in any practical or legal sense, had obtained his employment in what was deemed to be such an outrageous manner that it seemed to the Court at that time to be "abhorrent to public policy" to permit him to recover under the Act Congress had passed. 12 There is no occasion for us here to reconsider the correctness of that decision on the basis of the peculiar combination of facts involved in that case, for no such facts are involved here and, indeed, they may never arise again. We do conclude, however, that Rock must be limited to its precise facts. In the face of the legislative policy embodied in the Federal Employers' Liability Act that a railroad should pay damages to its workers and their families for personal injuries inflicted by the railroad's negligence upon those who perform its duties, considerations of public policy of the general kind [368 U.S. 35, 45] relied upon by the Court in Rock cannot be permitted to encroach further upon the special policy expressed by Congress in the Act. To facilitate this congressional policy, the terms "employed" and "employee" as used in the Act must, in all cases not involving the precise kind of fraud involved in Rock, be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning, and the status of employees who become such through other kinds of fraud, although possibly subject to termination through rescission of the contract of employment, must be recognized for purposes of suits under the Act. And this conclusion is not affected by the fact that an employee's misrepresentation may have, as is urged here, contributed to the injury or even to the accident upon which his action is based. This argument, which seems to have gained its popularity primarily as an exception by which the application of Rock could be avoided, 13 suggests that a railroad worker may be partially "employed" under the Act - that he may be able to recover for some injuries negligently inflicted upon him by the railroad and not be able to recover for others so inflicted, depending upon the circumstances of each particular injury. Even if this suggestion recommended itself to reason - which, other than as an exception to the broad [368 U.S. 35, 46] principle mistakenly drawn from Rock, it plainly does not - we would not be free to accept it. For it finds no support at all in the history, purpose or language of the Act which provides recovery for any "injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of" the railroad 14 and there is no prior authority of this Court which requires or even permits us to disregard or impair this controlling declaration of public policy. 15 </s> The petitioner in this case was an employee under the Act and is therefore entitled to recover if he suffered injuries due to the railroad's negligence. It was therefore error to direct a verdict against him on the railroad's plea of fraud. The case is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. </s> Reversed and remanded. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 45 U.S.C. 51-60. </s> [Footnote 2 "Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several States or Territories, or between any of the States and Territories, or between the District of Columbia and any of the States or Territories, or between the District of Columbia or any of the States or Territories and any foreign nation or nations, shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or, in case of the death of such employee, to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee; and, if none, then of such employee's parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee, for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment." 45 U.S.C. 51. (Emphasis supplied.) </s> [Footnote 3 365 U.S. 877 . </s> [Footnote 4 279 U.S. 410 . </s> [Footnote 5 Id., at 415. </s> [Footnote 6 Judge Nordbye's opinion is not reported but appears in the record in the Borum case certified to this Court. See also Qualls v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 112 Cal. App. 7, 17, 296 P. 645, 650: "This case [Rock] may be reasonably distinguished from the case at bar. In the Rock case the plaintiff was never really employed by the company. In the present case the plaintiff was employed." But cf. Fort Worth & Denver City R. Co. v. Griffith, 27 S. W. 2d 351, 354. </s> [Footnote 7 286 U.S. 447 . </s> [Footnote 8 Id., at 451. </s> [Footnote 9 "The general rule is that fraud of this character renders a contract voidable rather than void, but that rule has been ignored in the Rock [368 U.S. 35, 41] Case by the Supreme Court upon the ground that the safety of the traveling public is involved in a contract of this character, and for reasons of public policy it is held that the contract is void and, in effect, that appellee never became an employee of the appellant." Fort Worth & Denver City R. Co. v. Griffith, 27 S. W. 2d 351, 354. </s> [Footnote 10 See, e. g., Qualls v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 112 Cal. App. 7, 17, 296 P. 645, 650 (misrepresentations as to past employment record held "immaterial"); Powers v. Michigan Central R. Co., 268 Ill. App. 493, 498 (misrepresentations as to age and past employment record held insufficient to justify application of Rock because Rock "involved an unusual state of facts"); Dawson v. Texas & Pacific R. Co., 123 Tex. 191, 196, 70 S. W. 2d 392, 394 (misrepresentations as to past employment record and medical history held no bar because they were "in nowise connected with the cause of his injury and not related to his fitness or his ability to discharge the duties required of him"); Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v. Webster, 123 Tex. 197, 201, 70 S. W. 2d 394, 396 (misrepresentations as to previous injury and litigation arising out of that injury held no bar because "it was not shown that his physical condition was such as to make his employment inconsistent with plaintiff in error's proper policy or its reasonable rules to insure discharge of its duty to select fit employees"); Carter v. Peoria & Pekin Union R. Co., 275 Ill. App. 298, 303-304 (misrepresentations as to medical history held no bar because there was no "evidence to the effect that this former injury in any way disqualified or prevented appellant from properly performing his duties as switchman"); Phillips v. Southern Pacific Co., 14 Cal. App. 2d 454, 457, 58 P.2d 688, 690 (misrepresentations as to past employment record held no bar even though facilitated by the use of an assumed name because there was no showing of "a causal connection between the injury and the misstatements in the application for employment"); Laughter v. Powell, 219 N.C. 689, 698, 14 S. E. 2d 826, 832 (misrepresentations as to age held no bar because there was, despite these misrepresentations, "a contract of employment, even though voidable, by which the relation of master and servant, or employer and employee, was created between defendants and plaintiff"); Newkirk v. Los Angeles Junction R. Co., 21 Cal. 2d 308, 320, 131 P.2d 535, 543 (misrepresentations as to age held no bar because "[w]here employment is induced by fraudulent representations of the employee not going to the factum of the contract the employment exists although there may be ground for rescinding the contract, and recovery may be had from the employer for negligent injury to the employee at least where there is no causal connection between the [368 U.S. 35, 43] injury and the misrepresentation"); Matthews v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 54 Cal. App. 2d 549, 556, 129 P.2d 435, 441 (misrepresentations as to age and past employment record held no bar even though these misrepresentations were facilitated by the use of an assumed name and even though they may have contributed to the worker's injury because the rule requiring " `a causal connection between the injury and the misstatements' refers to the happening of the injury, not to its effects"); Blanton v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 215 Minn. 442, 446, 10 N. W. 2d 382, 384 (misrepresentations as to medical history and physical condition held no bar because "the jury could have found that there was no causal connection between the misrepresentation and plaintiff's hurt"); Casso v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 219 F.2d 303, 305 (misrepresentations as to medical history and physical condition held no bar because the misrepresentations were not "of such character that it `substantially affected the examining surgeon's conclusion that he was in good health and acceptable physical condition' "); Eresafe v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co., 250 F.2d 619, 621-622 (misrepresentations as to identity, medical history and physical condition held no bar because "[a] humane and realistic policy in such cases requires substantial proof of a direct causal connection between the misrepresentations made at the time of hiring and the subsequent injury to the employee"); White v. Thompson, 181 Kan. 485, 497-498, 312 P.2d 612, 621 (misrepresentations as to medical history and physical condition held no bar because "it is not alleged the misrepresentations had causal relation to plaintiff's fitness to perform his duties and to the injuries he sustained, or that they substantially affected the medical examiner's conclusion that plaintiff was in good health and acceptable physical condition, or that defendant remained unaware of the deception until after plaintiff's injuries"). </s> [Footnote 11 Only four cases have been brought to the attention of this Court in which the railroad has been permitted to prevail on an issue raised by the defense of fraudulent procurement of employment. One of these, Fort Worth & Denver City R. Co. v. Griffith, 27 S. W. 2d 351, [368 U.S. 35, 44] was decided before Borum by a court which felt itself entirely bound by Rock: "In deference to the holding of the Supreme Court of the United States, which we feel constrained to follow, the judgment is reversed and is here rendered for the appellant." Id., at 354. The other three are: Clark v. Union Pacific R. Co., 70 Idaho 70, 211 P.2d 402 (judgment for plaintiff reversed for failure to instruct the jury with regard to the railroad's fraud defense); Southern Pac. Co. v. Libbey, 199 F.2d 341 (judgment for plaintiff reversed for exclusion of evidence relating to railroad's fraud defense); and Talarowski v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 135 F. Supp. 503 (motion to strike the railroad's fraud defense denied). All four of these cases involved misrepresentations as to the worker's physical condition. Compare these cases with those cited in note 10, supra, especially with Blanton v. Northern Pacific R. Co.; Casso v. Pennsylvania R. Co.; Eresafe v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co.; and White v. Thompson. </s> [Footnote 12 For contemporaneous comment on the Rock decision, see Merrill, Misrepresentation to Secure Employment, 14 Minn. L. Rev. 646; Comment, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 141; Comment, 28 Mich. L. Rev. 357. </s> [Footnote 13 "A humane and realistic policy in such cases requires substantial proof of a direct causal connection between the misrepresentations made at the time of hiring and the subsequent injury to the employee, before any defense of fraud can be considered as a bar to a recovery." Eresafe v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co., 250 F.2d 619, 621-622. Mention of a requirement of direct causal connection between the misrepresentations and the injury can be found in cases prior to Rock, but there too the requirement was used to permit recovery despite fraud. See, e. g., St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. v. Brantley, 168 Ala. 579, 588, 53 So. 305, 307; Lupher v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 81 Kan. 585, 589, 106 P. 284, 286; Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio R. Co. v. Harris, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 434, 437, 107 S. W. 108, 110; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Lewis, 218 Ky. 197, 205, 291 S. W. 401, 404. </s> [Footnote 14 We do not, of course, mean to intimate that, in appropriate circumstances, evidence of a pre-existing physical defect might not be relevant on the issue of whether the injury complained of was caused by the railroad's negligence "in whole or in part" by tending to show either that the worker was not injured by the railroad at all, that, if injured, the railroad was not responsible for the full extent of the injury, or that damages should be diminished by the jury because of contributory negligence. </s> [Footnote 15 Indeed, if the decisions of this Court can be said to point in either direction, it is toward the conclusion that a causal connection between the injury and the misrepresentations is totally irrelevant. For, as this Court expressly recognized, there was no such connection in Rock. "While his [Rock's] physical condition was not a cause of his injuries, it did have direct relation to the propriety of admitting him to such employment." 279 U.S., at 415 . </s> MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, concurring in a judgment for a new trial. </s> The issue before the Court in this case is not the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict for or against an employee claiming recovery for injuries under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51-58. [368 U.S. 35, 47] It presents the question whether a misrepresentation by the petitioner regarding his health at the time the railroad hired him, bars recovery as a matter of law in view of our decision in Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. v. Rock, 279 U.S. 410 . That decision held the statutory remedies unavailable because, as its author pithily stated it on two occasions, Rock "was an impostor." 279 U.S., at 412 ; Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. v. Borum, 286 U.S. 447, 450 . </s> The Court does not now overrule Rock but says that it "must be limited to its precise facts." I take it this statement refers to the facts relevant to the result in that case; it does not mean that the plaintiff must be named Rock. </s> The scope of the Rock decision was defined in Borum, a case on which the Court's opinion now relies. The latter case came before this Court for review of the state court's refusal to set aside an arbitral finding that the plaintiff had been an employee. The judgment was affirmed on the basis that the evidence did not require a finding that deceit in obtaining employment had materially prejudiced the employer's efforts to select fit employees. The Court did not hold that the question of fraud in obtaining employment was improperly submitted to the trier of fact. </s> I would similarly dispose of this case; that is, upon a new trial the issue should not be withdrawn from the jury but submitted to it on the principle which governed the Borum case, supra. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER, dissenting. </s> Claiming to have suffered injuries to his back by the negligence of fellow servants in the course of his employment by the respondent railroad in interstate commerce, petitioner brought this action against the railroad in a West Virginia court under the beneficent provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 45 U.S.C. 51-58. [368 U.S. 35, 48] But application of the provisions of that Act is, in terms, made to depend upon, among other things, the existence of an employee status. At the conclusion of the evidence offered on the trial of the case before a jury, the railroad moved for a directed verdict upon the ground, among others, that petitioner did not occupy an employee status with the railroad. Believing that the undisputed evidence so clearly established that petitioner had procured his putative employment relation with the railroad by materially fraudulent misrepresentations to, and concealments from, the railroad and its examining physician of his now admitted congenitally defective back condition that reasonable men could not differ about it, the trial court granted the motion and directed the jury to, and it did, return a verdict for the railroad. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia declined to review, and we granted certiorari. 365 U.S. 877 . </s> This Court now not only reverses that judgment, but it also - I think quite gratuitously and erroneously - restricts the case of Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. v. Rock, 279 U.S. 410 , "to its precise facts." While the undisputed evidence of petitioner's fraud upon the railroad in procuring the putative employment relationship seems fairly clear to me, as it did to the two state courts. I concede that reasonable men may differ about it; and therefore, if we must here deal with such fact issues, I am able to say that the issue should not have been determined by the court as a matter of law, but instead should have been submitted to the jury for resolution. But I am unable to agree to what I think is the Court's gratuitous and erroneous restriction of the Rock case "to its precise facts," and so I dissent. </s> The question is not whether one who has obtained an employee status with a railroad by a flagrant fraud may maintain an action to recover for injuries willfully or negligently inflicted upon him under, and subject to the [368 U.S. 35, 49] conditions and defenses imposed by, the laws of the State in which the casualty occurred. Of course he may. His fraud, however flagrant, would not give the railroad a license to injure him. Rather the question is whether, despite his flagrant fraud in procuring the employee status, he may have the special benefits, and freedom from the normal defenses, given by Congress in the Federal Employers' Liability Act to one who has honestly acquired the status of and is truly an employee of a railroad. I think Congress did not intend to give those special benefits to a person who has acquired a putative employment relationship with a railroad by flagrant fraud, whether that fraud falls within the "precise facts" of the Rock case or within any of the myriad variations thereof. </s> While the fraud that induced the putative employment relationship in the Rock case was so clear that this Court was able to and did determine the question as one of law, and the somewhat less compelling evidence of fraud in this case does not legally require a like result, that case does stand for the age-old and sound proposition that fraud in the inducement of a contract vitiates the contract. I cannot agree to a repudiation of that principle. </s> Irrespective of its legally clear fraudulent facts, the fundamental issue in the Rock case was "whether, notwithstanding the means by which he got employment . . . [, petitioner] may maintain an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act." 279 U.S., at 413 . The same principle is involved here. Today, much as at the time of the Rock case, that "Act abrogates the fellow-servant rule [and] restricts the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk," id., at 413, yet here, as there, petitioner "in this action seeks, in virtue of its provisions and despite the rules of the common law, to hold [the railroad] liable for negligence of his fellow servants and notwithstanding his own negligence may have contributed [368 U.S. 35, 50] to cause his injuries." Ibid. Quite explicitly, Congress conferred the special remedies of that Act only upon those who occupy the status of employee. Surely that status, within the meaning of the Act, cannot be created by flagrant fraud, whether that fraud does or does not fall within the "precise facts" of the Rock case. Today, no less than at the time of the Rock case, "[t]he carriers owe a duty to their patrons [and to the public] as well as to those engaged in the operation of their railroads to take care . . . to exclude the unfit from their service. The enforcement of the Act is calculated to stimulate them to proper performance of that duty." 279 U.S., at 413 -414. One who fraudulently obstructs the discharge of that duty surely cannot be permitted to profit from his own wrong. These are the underlying principles of the Rock case, and I submit that they are sound. </s> Even though the evidence of petitioner's fraud in procuring the putative employment relationship here may not be sufficiently clear to enable the Court to declare it as a matter of law, and hence the issue must be submitted to the jury, surely the jury could find, on proper and sufficient evidence, that petitioner procured the putative employment relationship by fraud; and, since fraud in the inducement of the contract vitiates the contract, such a finding would establish that petitioner never, in truth, acquired the employment status which Congress intended to protect by the extraordinary provisions of the Act. Otherwise, "[t]he deception by which [petitioner may have] secured employment [would] set at naught the carrier's reasonable rule and practice established to promote the safety of [the public, its patrons and its] employees and to protect commerce." Such fraud would directly oppose "the public interest because calculated to embarrass and hinder the carrier in the performance of [368 U.S. 35, 51] its duties and to defeat important purposes sought to be advanced by the Act." 279 U.S., at 414 . </s> Only a fair measure of simple honesty is involved. Surely, Congress contemplated and expected that such would be necessary to create the status it was surrounding with these extraordinary rights. </s> Although the principles of the Rock case do not legally require a like result in this case, they properly do permit a jury, rightly instructed, to find, upon the aggravated evidence that so warrants, that the putative employment was induced by fraud. And if the jury should so find, it would follow that, in truth, the petitioner never did acquire and occupy an employee status within the meaning of the Act. This is but a simple application of the surely still valid principle that one may not profit from his own wrong. I think there is no call or reason here to tamper with the sound underlying principles of the Rock case. </s> [368 U.S. 35, 52]

United States Supreme Court BOWEN v. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSN.(1986) No. 84-1529 Argued: January 15, 1986Decided: June 9, 1986 </s> Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." In 1984, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) promulgated regulations requiring: (1) health care providers receiving federal funds to post notices that because of 504's prohibition against discrimination on the basis of handicap, health care should not be withheld from infants on the basis of their mental or physical impairments; (2) state child protective services agencies to establish procedures to prevent unlawful medical neglect of handicapped infants, and when considered necessary, in the judgment of the responsible official of the Department of Health and Human Services, to protect a handicapped infant's life or health; (3) immediate access to patient records; and (4) expedited compliance actions. In consolidated actions in Federal District Court, respondents sought to declare the regulations invalid and to enjoin their enforcement. The court granted the requested relief on the authority of United States v. University Hospital, 729 F.2d 144 (CA2), and the Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of that earlier decision. </s> Held: </s> The judgment is affirmed. </s> 794 F.2d 676, affirmed. </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, joined by JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and JUSTICE POWELL, concluded that the regulations in question are not authorized by 504. Pp. 624-647. </s> (a) A hospital's withholding of treatment from a handicapped infant when no parental consent has been given cannot violate 504, for without the parents' consent the infant is neither "otherwise qualified" for treatment nor has he been denied care "solely by reason of his handicap." There is nothing in the administrative record documenting the Secretary's belief that there exists "discriminatory withholding of medical care" in violation of 504 which would justify federal regulation. None [476 U.S. 610, 611] of the examples cited by the Secretary as justification for the regulation suggest that the hospitals receiving federal funds, as opposed to parents, withheld medical care on the basis of handicap. Pp. 630-636. </s> (b) The complaint-handling process the Secretary would impose on unwilling state agencies is totally foreign to the authority to prevent discrimination conferred on him by 504. While the Secretary can require state agencies to document their own compliance with 504, nothing in 504 authorizes him to commandeer state agencies to enforce compliance by other recipients of federal funds (in this instance, hospitals). Pp. 637-642. </s> (c) The Secretary's basis for federal intervention is perceived discrimination against handicapped infants in violation of 504, and yet the Secretary has pointed to no evidence that such discrimination occurs. The administrative record does not contain the reasoning and evidence necessary to sustain federal intervention into a historically state-administered decisional process that appears - for lack of any contrary evidence - to be functioning in full compliance with 504. Nothing in 504 authorizes the Secretary to dispense with the law's focus on discrimination and instead to employ federal resources to save the lives of handicapped newborns, without regard to whether they are victims of discrimination by recipients of federal funds or not. Section 504 does not authorize the Secretary to give unsolicited advice either to parents, to hospitals, or to state officials who are faced with difficult treatment decisions concerning handicapped children. The administrative record demonstrates that the Secretary has asserted the authority to conduct on-site investigations, to inspect hospital records, and to participate in the decisional process in emergency cases in which there was no colorable basis for believing that a violation of 504 had occurred or was about to occur. These investigative actions are not authorized by 504, and the regulations that purport to authorize a continuation of them are invalid. Pp. 642-647. </s> STEVENS, J., announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered an opinion in which MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. BURGER, C. J., concurred in the judgment. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined and in Parts I, II, IV, and V of which O'CONNOR, J., joined, post, p. 648. O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 665. REHNQUIST, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. </s> Deputy Assistant Attorney General Cooper argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, Deputy [476 U.S. 610, 612] Solicitor General Wallace, Edwin S. Kneedler, Brian K. Landsberg, and Mark L. Gross. </s> Richard L. Epstein argued the cause for respondents American Hospital Association et al. With him on the brief were Stuart M. Gerson, William G. Kopit, David H. Larry, and Robert W. McCann. Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr., argued the cause for respondents American Medical Association et al. With him on the brief were Carter G. Phillips, Vincent F. Prada, Newton N. Minow, Jack R. Bierig, Ann E. Allen, and Joseph A. Keyes, Jr. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Association on Mental Deficiency et al. by James W. Ellis and Ruth A. Luckasson; for the American Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities et al. by Thomas K. Gilhool, Frank J. Laski, Michael Churchill, and Timothy M. Cook; for the Association for Retarded Citizens of the United States et al. by Martin H. Gerry; for the Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, Inc., et al. by Barbara M. Milstein; for the Rutherford Institute et al. by W. Charles Bundren, Guy O. Farley, Jr., James J. Knicely, John W. Whitehead, Thomas O. Kotouc, Wendell R. Bird, and William B. Hollberg; for Carlton Johnson by James Bopp, Jr., and Thomas J. Marzen; and for David G. McLone, M. D., et al. by Dennis J. Horan, Victor G. Rosenblum, Edward R. Grant, and Maura K. Quinlan. </s> Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Academy of Pediatrics et al. by Stephan E. Lawton, Jack N. Goodman, and John A. Hodges; for the State University of New York by Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, Robert Hermann, Solicitor General, Frederick K. Mehlman, Stanley A. Camhi, Paul M. Glickman, Donna Miller, Martha O. Shoemaker, and Jane Levine, Assistant Attorneys General, and Sanford H. Levine; and for George P. Smith II, pro se. </s> James Bopp, Jr., filed a brief for Senator Orrin G. Hatch et al. as amici curiae. </s> JUSTICE STEVENS announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and JUSTICE POWELL join. </s> This case presents the question whether certain regulations governing the provision of health care to handicapped infants are authorized by 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. That section provides, in part: [476 U.S. 610, 613] </s> "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 87 Stat. 394, 29 U.S.C. 794. 1 </s> I </s> The American Medical Association, the American Hospital Association, and several other respondents 2 challenge the validity of Final Rules promulgated on January 12, 1984, by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services. 3 These Rules establish "Procedures relating to health care for handicapped infants," and in particular require the posting of informational notices, authorize expedited access to records and expedited compliance actions, and command state child protective services agencies to "prevent instances of unlawful medical neglect of handicapped infants." 45 CFR 84.55 (1985). </s> Although the Final Rules comprise six parts, only the four mandatory components are challenged here. 4 Subsection (b) [476 U.S. 610, 614] is entitled "Posting of informational notice" and requires every "recipient health care provider that provides health care services to infants in programs or activities receiving [476 U.S. 610, 615] Federal financial assistance" - a group to which we refer generically as "hospitals" - to post an informational notice in one of two approved forms. 45 CFR 84.55(b) (1985). Both forms include a statement that 504 prohibits discrimination on the basis of handicap, and indicate that because of this prohibition "nourishment and medically beneficial treatment (as determined with respect for reasonable medical judgments) should not be withheld from handicapped infants solely on the basis of their present or anticipated mental or physical impairments." 45 CFR 84.55(b)(3), (4) (1985). The notice's statement of the legal requirement does not distinguish between medical care for which parental consent has been obtained and that for which it has not. The notice must identify the telephone number of the appropriate child protective services agency and, in addition, a toll-free number for the Department that is available 24 hours a day. Ibid. Finally, the notice must state that the "identity of callers will be kept confidential" and that federal law prohibits retaliation "against any person who provides information about possible violations." Ibid. </s> Subsection (c), which contains the second mandatory requirement, sets forth "Responsibilities of recipient state child protective services agencies." Subsection (c) does not mention 504 (or any other federal statute) and does not even use the word "discriminate." It requires every designated agency to establish and maintain procedures to ensure that [476 U.S. 610, 616] "the agency utilizes its full authority pursuant to state law to prevent instances of unlawful medical neglect of handicapped infants." 45 CFR 84.55(c)(1). Mandated procedures must include (1) "[a] requirement that health care providers report on a timely basis . . . known or suspected instances of unlawful medical neglect of handicapped infants," 84.55(c)(1)(i); (2) a method by which the state agency can receive timely reports of such cases, 84.55(c)(1)(ii); (3) "immediate" review of those reports, including "on-site investigation," where appropriate, 84.55(c)(1)(iii); (4) protection of "medically neglected handicapped infants" including, where appropriate, legal action to secure "timely court order[s] to compel the provision of necessary nourishment and medical treatment," 84.55(c)(1)(iv); and (5) "[t]imely notification" to HHS of every report of "suspected unlawful medical neglect" of handicapped infants. The preamble to the Final Rules makes clear that this subsection applies "where a refusal to provide medically beneficial treatment is a result, not of decisions by a health care provider, but of decisions by parents." 49 Fed. Reg. 1627 (1984). </s> The two remaining mandatory regulations authorize "[e]xpedited access to records" and "[e]xpedited action to effect compliance." 45 CFR 84.55(d), (e) (1985). Subsection (d) provides broadly for immediate access to patient records on a 24-hour basis, with or without parental consent, "when, in the judgment of the responsible Department official, immediate access is necessary to protect the life or health of a handicapped individual." 84.55(d). Subsection (e) likewise dispenses with otherwise applicable requirements of notice to the hospital "when, in the judgment of the responsible Department official, immediate action to effect compliance is necessary to protect the life or health of a handicapped individual." 84.55(e). The expedited compliance provision is intended to allow "the government [to] see[k] a temporary restraining order to sustain the life of a handicapped infant in [476 U.S. 610, 617] imminent danger of death." 49 Fed. Reg. 1628 (1984). Like the provision affording expedited access to records, it applies without regard to whether parental consent to treatment has been withheld or whether the matter has already been referred to a state child protective services agency. </s> II </s> The Final Rules represent the Secretary's ultimate response to an April 9, 1982, incident in which the parents of a Bloomington, Indiana, infant with Down's syndrome and other handicaps refused consent to surgery to remove an esophageal obstruction that prevented oral feeding. On April 10, the hospital initiated judicial proceedings to override the parents' decision, but an Indiana trial court, after holding a hearing the same evening, denied the requested relief. On April 12 the court asked the local Child Protection Committee to review its decision. After conducting its own hearing, the Committee found no reason to disagree with the court's ruling. 5 The infant died six days after its birth. </s> Citing "heightened public concern" in the aftermath of the Bloomington Baby Doe incident, on May 18, 1982, the director of the Department's Office of Civil Rights, in response to a directive from the President, "remind[ed]" health care providers receiving federal financial assistance that newborn infants [476 U.S. 610, 618] with handicaps such as Down's syndrome were protected by 504. 47 Fed. Reg. 26027 (1982). 6 </s> This notice was followed, on March 7, 1983, by an "Interim Final Rule" contemplating a "vigorous federal role." 48 Fed. Reg. 9630. The Interim Rule required health care providers receiving federal financial assistance to post "in a conspicuous place in each delivery ward, each maternity ward, each pediatric ward, and each nursery, including each intensive care nursery" a notice advising of the applicability of 504 and the availability of a telephone "hotline" to report suspected violations of the law to HHS. Id., at 9631. Like the Final Rules, the Interim Rule also provided for expedited compliance actions and expedited access to records and facilities when, "in the judgment of the responsible Department official," immediate action or access was "necessary to protect the life or health of a handicapped individual." Id., at 9632. The Interim Rule took effect on March 22. </s> On April 6, 1983, respondents American Hospital Association et al. filed a complaint in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking a declaration that the Interim Final Rule was invalid and an injunction against its enforcement. Little more than a week later, on April 14, in a similar challenge brought by the American Academy of Pediatrics and other medical institutions, the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia declared the Interim Final Rule "arbitrary and capricious and promulgated in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act." American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 404 (1983). The District Judge in that case "conclude[d] that haste and inexperience ha[d] resulted in agency action based on inadequate consideration" of several relevant concerns [476 U.S. 610, 619] and, in the alternative, found that the Secretary had improperly failed to solicit public comment before issuing the Rule. Id., at 399-401. </s> On July 5, 1983, the Department issued new "Proposed Rules" on which it invited comment. Like the Interim Final Rule, the Proposed Rules required hospitals to post informational notices in conspicuous places and authorized expedited access to records to be followed, if necessary, by expedited compliance action. 48 Fed. Reg. 30851. In a departure from the Interim Final Rule, however, the Proposed Rules required federally assisted state child protective services agencies to utilize their "full authority pursuant to State law to prevent instances of medical neglect of handicapped infants." Ibid. Mandated procedures mirrored those contained in the Final Rules described above. Ibid. The preamble and appendix to the Proposed Rules did not acknowledge that hospitals and physicians lack authority to perform treatment to which parents have not given their consent. 7 </s> [476 U.S. 610, 620] </s> After the period for notice and comment had passed, HHS, on December 30, 1983, promulgated the Final Rules and announced that they would take effect on February 13, 1984. On March 12 of that year respondents American Hospital Association et al. amended their complaint and respondents American Medical Association et al. filed suit to declare the new regulations invalid and to enjoin their enforcement. The actions were consolidated in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York, which awarded the requested relief on the authority of the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. University Hospital, 729 F.2d 144 (1984). American Hospital Assn. v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 541 (1984); App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a. On appeal, the parties agreed that the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in University Hospital, if valid, required a judgment against the Government in this case. 8 In accordance with its earlier decision, the Court of Appeals summarily affirmed the District Court. 694 F.2d 676 (1984). Since the judgment here thus rests entirely on the reasoning of University Hospital, it is appropriate to examine that case now. </s> III </s> On October 11, 1983, after the Department's Interim Final Rule had been declared invalid but before it had promulgated the Final Rules challenged here, a child with multiple congenital defects known as "Baby Jane Doe" was born in Long [476 U.S. 610, 621] Island, New York, and was promptly transferred to University Hospital for corrective surgery. After consulting with physicians and other advisers, the parents decided to forgo corrective surgery that was likely to prolong the child's life, but would not improve many of her handicapping conditions. </s> On October 16, 1983, an unrelated attorney named Washburn filed suit in the New York Supreme Court, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the infant who would direct the hospital to perform the corrective surgery. The trial court granted that relief on October 20, but was reversed the following day by the Appellate Division which found that the "concededly concerned and loving parents" had "chosen one course of appropriate medical treatment over another" and made an informed decision that was "in the best interest of the infant." Weber v. Stony Brook Hospital, 95 App. Div. 2d 587, 589, 467 N. Y. S. 2d 685, 687 (per curiam). On October 28, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed, but on the ground that the trial court should not have entertained a petition to initiate child neglect proceedings by a stranger who had not requested the aid of the responsible state agency. Weber v. Stony Brook Hospital, 60 N. Y. 2d 208, 211-213, 456 N. E. 2d 1186, 1187-1188 (per curiam). </s> While the state proceedings were in progress, on October 19, HHS received a complaint from a "private citizen" that Baby Jane Doe was being discriminatorily denied medically indicated treatment. HHS promptly referred this complaint to the New York State Child Protective Service. (The agency investigated the charge of medical neglect and soon thereafter concluded that there was no cause for state intervention.) In the meantime, before the State Child Protective Service could act, HHS on October 22, 1983, made repeated requests of the hospital to make its records available for inspection in order to determine whether the hospital was in compliance with 504. The hospital refused the requests [476 U.S. 610, 622] and advised HHS that the parents had not consented to a release of the records. </s> Subsequently, on November 2, 1983, the Government filed suit in Federal District Court invoking its general authority to enforce 504 and 45 CFR 84.61 (1985), a regulation broadly authorizing access to information necessary to ascertain compliance. The District Court allowed the parents to intervene as defendants, expedited the proceeding, and ruled against the Government. It reasoned that the Government had no right of access to information because the record clearly established that the hospital had not violated the statute. United States v. University Hospital, State Univ. of N. Y. at Stony Brook, 575 F. Supp. 607, 614 (EDNY). Since the uncontradicted evidence established that the hospital "ha[d] at all times been willing to perform the surgical procedures in question, if only the parents . . . would consent," the hospital "failed to perform the surgical procedures in question, not because Baby Jane Doe [wa]s handicapped, but because her parents ha[d] refused to consent." Ibid. </s> The Court of Appeals affirmed. In an opinion handed down on February 23, 1984, six weeks after promulgation of the Final Rules, it agreed with the District Court that "an agency is not entitled to information sought in an investigation that `overreaches the authority Congress has given.'" 729 F.2d, at 150 (quoting Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 217 (1946)). It further held that although Baby Jane Doe was a "handicapped individual," she was not "otherwise qualified" within the meaning of 504 because "where medical treatment is at issue, it is typically the handicap itself that gives rise to, or at least contributes to the need for services"; as a result "the `otherwise qualified' criterion of section 504 cannot be meaningfully applied to a medical treatment decision." 729 F.2d, at 156. For the same reason, the Court of Appeals rejected the Government's argument that Baby Jane Doe had been "subjected to discrimination" under 504: "Where the handicapping condition [476 U.S. 610, 623] is related to the condition(s) to be treated, it will rarely, if ever, be possible to say with certainty that a particular decision was `discriminatory'." Id., at 157. The difficulty of applying 504 to individual medical treatment decisions confirmed the Court of Appeals in its view that "[C]ongress never contemplated that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act would apply to treatment decisions involving defective newborn infants when the statute was enacted in 1973, when it was amended in 1974, or at any subsequent time." Id., at 161. It therefore rejected "the far-reaching position advanced by the government in this case" and concluded that until Congress had spoken, "it would be an unwarranted exercise of judicial power to approve the type of investigation that ha[d] precipitated this lawsuit." Ibid. </s> Judge Winter dissented. He pointed out that 504 was patterned after 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in federally funded programs, and asserted that a refusal to provide medical treatment because of a person's handicapping condition is as clearly covered by 504 as a refusal based on a person's race is covered by 601: </s> "A judgment not to perform certain surgery because a person is black is not a bona fide medical judgment. So too, a decision not to correct a life threatening digestive problem because an infant has Down's Syndrome is not a bona fide medical judgment. The issue of parental authority is also quickly disposed of. A denial of medical treatment to an infant because the infant is black is not legitimated by parental consent." Id., at 162. </s> The Government did not file a certiorari petition in University Hospital. It did, however, seek review of the judgment in this case. We granted certiorari, 472 U.S. 1016 (1985), and we now affirm. [476 U.S. 610, 624] </s> IV </s> The Solicitor General is correct that "handicapped individual" as used in 504 includes an infant who is born with a congenital defect. If such an infant is "otherwise qualified" for benefits under a program or activity receiving federal financial assistance, 504 protects him from discrimination "solely by reason of his handicap." 9 It follows, under our decision in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985), that handicapped infants are entitled to "meaningful access" to medical services provided by hospitals, and that a hospital rule or state policy denying or limiting such access would be subject to challenge under 504. </s> However, no such rule or policy is challenged, or indeed has been identified, in this case. Nor does this case, in contrast to the University Hospital litigation, involve a claim that any specific individual treatment decision violates 504. This suit is not an enforcement action, and as a consequence it is not necessary to determine whether 504 ever applies to individual medical treatment decisions involving handicapped infants. Respondents brought this litigation to challenge the four mandatory components of the Final Rules on their face, 10 and the Court of Appeals' judgment which we review merely affirmed the judgment of the District Court which "declared invalid and enjoined enforcement of [the final] regulations, [476 U.S. 610, 625] purportedly promulgated pursuant to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794 (1982)." App. to Pet. for Cert. 2a. 11 The specific question presented by this [476 U.S. 610, 626] case, then, is whether the four mandatory provisions of the Final Rules are authorized by 504. </s> V </s> It is an axiom of administrative law that an agency's explanation of the basis for its decision must include "a `rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.'" Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). 12 Agency deference has not come so far that we will uphold regulations whenever it is possible to "conceive a basis" for administrative action. To the contrary, the "presumption of [476 U.S. 610, 627] regularity afforded an agency in fulfilling its statutory mandate" is not equivalent to "the minimum rationality a statute must bear in order to withstand analysis under the Due Process Clause." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S., at 43 , n. 9. Thus, the mere fact that there is "some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the [regulators]," United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (footnote omitted), under which they "might have concluded" that the regulation was necessary to discharge their statutorily authorized mission, Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955), will not suffice to validate agency decisionmaking. See Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639 -659 (1980) (opinion of STEVENS, J.); Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 169 (1962). Our recognition of Congress' need to vest administrative agencies with ample power to assist in the difficult task of governing a vast and complex industrial Nation carries with it the correlative responsibility of the agency to explain the rationale and factual basis for its decision, even though we show respect for the agency's judgment in both. </s> Before examining the Secretary's reasons for issuing the Final Rules, it is essential to understand the pre-existing state-law framework governing the provision of medical care to handicapped infants. In broad outline, state law vests decisional responsibility in the parents, in the first instance, subject to review in exceptional cases by the State acting as parens patriae. 13 Prior to the regulatory activity culminating [476 U.S. 610, 628] in the Final Rules, the Federal Government was not a participant in the process of making treatment decisions for newborn infants. We presume that this general framework was familiar to Congress when it enacted 504. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696 -697 (1979). It therefore provides an appropriate background for evaluating the Secretary's action in this case. </s> The Secretary has identified two possible categories of violations of 504 as justifications for federal oversight of handicapped infant care. First, he contends that a hospital's refusal to furnish a handicapped infant with medically beneficial treatment "solely by reason of his handicap" constitutes unlawful discrimination. Second, he maintains that a hospital's failure to report cases of suspected medical neglect to a [476 U.S. 610, 629] state child protective services agency may also violate the statute. We separately consider these two possible bases for the Final Rules. 14 </s> [476 U.S. 610, 630] </s> VI </s> In the immediate aftermath of the Bloomington Baby Doe incident, the Secretary apparently proceeded on the assumption that a hospital's statutory duty to provide treatment to handicapped infants was unaffected by the absence of parental consent. See supra, at 617-619. He has since abandoned that view. Thus, the preamble to the Final Rules correctly states that when "a non-treatment decision, no matter how discriminatory, is made by parents, rather than by the hospital, section 504 does not mandate that the hospital unilaterally overrule the parental decision and provide treatment notwithstanding the lack of consent." 49 Fed. Reg. 1631 (1984). A hospital's withholding of treatment when no parental consent has been given cannot violate 504, for without the consent of the parents or a surrogate decisionmaker the infant is neither "otherwise qualified" for treatment nor has he been denied care "solely by reason of his handicap." 15 Indeed, it would almost certainly be a tort as a matter of state law to operate on an infant without parental consent. This analysis makes clear that the Government's heavy reliance on the analogy to race-based refusals which violate 601 [476 U.S. 610, 631] of the Civil Rights Act is misplaced. If, pursuant to its normal practice, a hospital refused to operate on a black child whose parents had withheld their consent to treatment, the hospital's refusal would not be based on the race of the child even if it were assumed that the parents based their decision entirely on a mistaken assumption that the race of the child made the operation inappropriate. </s> Now that the Secretary has acknowledged that a hospital has no statutory treatment obligation in the absence of parental consent, it has become clear that the Final Rules are not needed to prevent hospitals from denying treatment to handicapped infants. The Solicitor General concedes that the administrative record contains no evidence that hospitals have ever refused treatment authorized either by the infant's parents or by a court order. Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. Even the Secretary never seriously maintained that posted notices, "hotlines," and emergency on-site investigations were necessary to process complaints against hospitals that might refuse treatment requested by parents. The parental interest in calling such a refusal to the attention of the appropriate authorities adequately vindicates the interest in enforcement of 504 in such cases, just as that interest obviates the need for a special regulation to deal with refusals to provide treatment on the basis of race which may violate 601 of the Civil Rights Act. </s> The Secretary's belated recognition of the effect of parental nonconsent is important, because the supposed need for federal monitoring of hospitals' treatment decisions rests entirely on instances in which parents have refused their consent. Thus, in the Bloomington, Indiana, case that precipitated the Secretary's enforcement efforts in this area, 16 as [476 U.S. 610, 632] well as in the University Hospital case that provided the basis for the summary affirmance in the case now before us, 17 the hospital's failure to perform the treatment at issue rested on the lack of parental consent. The Secretary's own summaries of these cases establish beyond doubt that the respective hospitals did not withhold medical care on the basis of handicap and therefore did not violate 504; as a result, they provide no support for his claim that federal regulation is needed in order to forestall comparable cases in the future. </s> The Secretary's initial failure to recognize that withholding of consent by parents does not equate with discriminatory denial of treatment by hospitals likewise undermines the Secretary's findings in the preamble to his proposed rulemaking. In that statement, the Secretary cited four sources in support of the claim that "Section 504 [is] not being uniformly followed." 48 Fed. Reg. 30847 (1983). None of the cited examples, however, suggests that recipients of federal financial assistance, as opposed to parents, had withheld medical care on the basis of handicap. 18 </s> [476 U.S. 610, 633] </s> Notwithstanding the ostensible recognition in the preamble of the effect of parental nonconsent on a hospital's obligation to provide care, in promulgating the Final Rules the Secretary persisted in relying on instances in which parents had refused consent to support his claim that, regardless of its "magnitude," there is sufficient evidence of "illegality" to justify "establishing basic mechanisms to allow for effective enforcement of a clearly applicable statute." 49 Fed. Reg. 1645 (1984). We have already discussed one source of this evidence - "the several specific cases cited in the preamble to the proposed rule." Ibid. Contrary to the Secretary's belief, these cases do not "support the proposition that handicapped infants may be subjected to unlawful discrimination." Ibid. In addition to the evidence relied on in prior notices, the Secretary included a summary of the 49 "Infant Doe [476 U.S. 610, 634] cases" that the Department had processed before December 1, 1983. 19 Curiously, however, by the Secretary's own admission none of the 49 cases had "resulted in a finding of discriminatory withholding of medical care." Id., at 1649. In fact, in the entire list of 49 cases there is no finding that a hospital failed or refused to provide treatment to a handicapped infant for which parental consent had been given. 20 </s> Notwithstanding this concession, the Secretary "believes three of these cases demonstrate the utility of the procedural [476 U.S. 610, 635] mechanisms called for in the final rules." Ibid. Accord, ibid. ("[T]hese cases provide additional documentation of the need for governmental involvement and the appropriateness of the procedures established by the final rules"). However, these three cases, which supposedly provide the strongest support for federal intervention, fail to disclose any discrimination against handicapped newborns in violation of 504. For example, in Robinson, Illinois, the Department conducted an on-site investigation when it learned that the "hospital (at the parents' request) failed to perform necessary surgery." Id., at 1646 (emphasis added). After "[t]he parents refused consent for surgery," "the hospital referred the matter to state authorities, who accepted custody of the infant and arranged for surgery and adoption," all "in compliance with section 504." Ibid. The Secretary concluded that "the involvement of the state child protective services agency," at the behest of the hospital, "was the most important element in bringing about corrective surgery for the infant . . . . Had there been no governmental involvement in the case, the outcome might have been much less favorable." Id., at 1649 (emphasis added). 21 </s> The Secretary's second example illustrates with even greater force the effective and nondiscriminatory functioning of state mechanisms and the consequent lack of support for federal intervention. In Daytona Beach, Florida, the Department's hotline received a complaint of medical neglect of a handicapped infant; immediate contact with the hospital and state agency revealed that "the parents did not consent to surgery" for the infant. Id., at 1648. Notwithstanding this information, which was confirmed by both the hospital and the state agency, and despite the fact that the state agency had "obtained a court order to provide surgery" the day before HHS was notified, the Department conducted an [476 U.S. 610, 636] on-site investigation. Ibid. In the third case, in Colorado Springs, Colorado, the Department intervened so soon after birth that "the decisionmaking process was in progress at the time the OCR [Office of Civil Rights] inquiry began," and "it is impossible to say the surgery would not have been provided without this involvement." Id., at 1649. "However," the Secretary added, "the involvement of OCR and the OCR medical consultant was cooperatively received by the hospital and apparently constructive." Ibid. </s> In sum, there is nothing in the administrative record to justify the Secretary's belief that "discriminatory withholding of medical care" in violation of 504 provides any support for federal regulation: In two of the cases (Robinson, Illinois, and Daytona Beach, Florida), the hospital's refusal was based on the absence of parental consent, but the parents' decision was overridden by state authorities and the operation was performed; in the third case (Colorado Springs, Colorado) it is not clear whether the parents would have given their consent or not, but the corrective surgery was in fact performed. 22 </s> [476 U.S. 610, 637] </s> VII </s> As a backstop to his manifestly incorrect perception that withholding of treatment in accordance with parental instructions necessitates federal regulation, the Secretary contends that a hospital's failure to report parents' refusals to consent to treatment violates 504, and that past breaches of this kind justify federal oversight. </s> By itself, 504 imposes no duty to report instances of medical neglect - that undertaking derives from state-law reporting obligations or a hospital's own voluntary practice. Although a hospital's selective refusal to report medical neglect of handicapped infants might violate 504, 23 the Secretary [476 U.S. 610, 638] has failed to point to any specific evidence that this has occurred. The 49 actual investigations summarized in the preamble to the Final Rules do not reveal any case in which a hospital either failed, or was accused of failing, to make an appropriate report to a state agency. 24 Nor can we accept the Solicitor General's invitation to infer discriminatory nonreporting from the studies cited in the Secretary's proposed rulemaking. Even assuming that cases in which parents have withheld consent to treatment for handicapped infants have gone unreported, that fact alone would not prove [476 U.S. 610, 639] that the hospitals involved had discriminated on the basis of handicap rather than simply failed entirely to discharge their state-law reporting obligations, if any, a matter which lies wholly outside the nondiscrimination mandate of 504. </s> The particular reporting mechanism chosen by the Secretary - indeed the entire regulatory framework imposed on state child protective services agencies - departs from the nondiscrimination mandate of 504 in a more fundamental way. The mandatory provisions of the Final Rules omit any direct requirement that hospitals make reports when parents refuse consent to recommended procedures. 25 Instead, the Final Rules command state agencies to require such reports, regardless of the state agencies' own reporting requirements (or lack thereof). 45 CFR 84.55(c)(1)(i) (1985). Far from merely preventing state agencies from remaining calculatedly indifferent to handicapped infants while they tend to the needs of the similarly situated nonhandicapped, the Final Rules command state agencies to utilize their "full authority" to "prevent instances of unlawful medical neglect of handicapped infants." 84.55(c)(1). The Rules effectively make medical neglect of handicapped newborns a state investigative priority, possibly forcing state agencies to shift scarce resources away from other enforcement activities - perhaps even from programs designed to protect handicapped children outside hospitals. The Rules also order state agencies to "immediate[ly]" review reports from hospitals, 84.55(c)(1)(iii), to conduct "on-site investigation[s]," ibid., and to take legal action "to compel the provision of necessary nourishment and medical treatment," [476 U.S. 610, 640] 84.55(c)(1)(iv) - all without any regard to the procedures followed by state agencies in handling complaints filed on behalf of nonhandicapped infants. These operating procedures were imposed over the objection of several state child protective services agencies that the requirement that they turn over reports to HHS "conflicts with the confidentiality requirements of state child abuse and neglect statutes," 49 Fed. Reg. 1627 (1984) - thereby requiring under the guise of nondiscrimination a service which state law denies to the nonhandicapped. 26 </s> The complaint-handling process the Secretary would impose on unwilling state agencies is totally foreign to the authority to prevent discrimination conferred on him by 504. "Section 504 seeks to assure evenhanded treatment," Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S., at 304 ; "neither the language, purpose, nor history of 504 reveals an intent to impose an affirmative-action obligation" on recipients of federal financial assistance, Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411 (1979). 27 The Solicitor General also recognizes that 504 is concerned with discrimination and with discrimination alone. In his attempt to distinguish the Secretary's 1976 determination that it "is beyond the authority of section 504" to promulgate regulations "concerning adequate [476 U.S. 610, 641] and appropriate psychiatric care or safe and humane living conditions for persons institutionalized because of handicap or concerning payment of fair compensation to patients who perform work," 41 Fed. Reg. 29548, 29559, the Solicitor General explains: </s> "This conclusion of course was consistent with the fact that, as relevant here, Section 504 is essentially concerned only with discrimination in the relative treatment of handicapped and nonhandicapped persons and does not confer any absolute right to receive particular services or benefits under federally assisted programs." Brief for Petitioner 40, n. 33. </s> See also 48 Fed. Reg. 30846 (1983) ("Section 504 is in essence an equal treatment, non-discrimination standard"). 28 </s> The Final Rules, however, impose just the sort of absolute obligation on state agencies that the Secretary had previously disavowed. The services state agencies are required to make available to handicapped infants are in no way tied to the level of services provided to similarly situated nonhandicapped infants. Instead, they constitute an "absolute right to receive particular services or benefits" under a federally assisted program. Even if a state agency were scrupulously impartial as between the protection it offered handicapped and nonhandicapped infants, it could still be denied federal funding for failing to carry out the Secretary's mission with sufficient zeal. </s> It is no answer to state, as does the Secretary, that these regulations are a necessary "`metho[d] . . . to give reasonable assurance' of compliance." 49 Fed. Reg. 1627 (1984) (quoting 45 CFR 80.4(b), which requires state agencies to [476 U.S. 610, 642] report on their compliance with Title VI). For while the Secretary can require state agencies to document their own compliance with 504, nothing in that provision authorizes him to commandeer state agencies to enforce compliance by other recipients of federal funds (in this instance, hospitals). State child protective services agencies are not field offices of the HHS bureaucracy, and they may not be conscripted against their will as the foot soldiers in a federal crusade. 29 As we stated in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S., at 307 , "nothing in the pre- or post-1973 legislative discussion of 504 suggests that Congress desired to make major inroads on the States' longstanding discretion to choose the proper mix" of services provided by state agencies. </s> VIII </s> Section 504 authorizes any head of an Executive Branch agency - regardless of his agency's mission or expertise - to promulgate regulations prohibiting discrimination against the handicapped. See S. Rep. No. 93-1297, pp. 39-40 (1974). 30 As a result of this rulemaking authority, the Secretary of [476 U.S. 610, 643] HHS has "substantial leeway to explore areas in which discrimination against the handicapped pos[es] particularly significant problems and to devise regulations to prohibit such discrimination." Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S., at 304 , n. 24. </s> Even according the greatest respect to the Secretary's action, however, deference cannot fill the lack of an evidentiary foundation on which the Final Rules must rest. The Secretary's basis for federal intervention is perceived discrimination against handicapped infants in violation of 504, and yet the Secretary has pointed to no evidence that such discrimination occurs. Neither the fact that regulators generally may rely on generic information in a particular field or comparable experience gained in other fields, nor the fact that regulations may be imposed for preventative or prophylactic reasons, can substitute for evidence supporting the Secretary's own chosen rationale. For the principle of agency accountability recited earlier means that "an agency's action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the agency itself." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S., at 50 (citations omitted). 31 </s> The need for a proper evidentiary basis for agency action is especially acute in this case because Congress has failed to indicate, either in the statute or in the legislative history, that it envisioned federal superintendence of treatment decisions traditionally entrusted to state governance. "[W]e must assume that the implications and limitations of our federal system constitute a major premise of all congressional legislation, though not repeatedly recited therein." United States v. Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 450 (1953) (opinion [476 U.S. 610, 644] of Jackson, J.). 32 Congress therefore "will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance," United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) - or to have authorized its delegates to do so - "unless otherwise the purpose of the Act would be defeated," FTC v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312 U.S. 349, 351 (1941). 33 Although the nondiscrimination [476 U.S. 610, 645] mandate of 504 is cast in language sufficiently broad to suggest that the question is "not one of authority, but of its appropriate exercise[,] [t]he propriety of the exertion of the authority must be tested by its relation to the purpose of the [statutory] grant and with suitable regard to the principle that whenever the federal power is exerted within what would otherwise be the domain of state power, the justification of the exercise of the federal power must clearly appear." Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194, 211 -212 (1931). Accord, Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois, 355 U.S. 300, 306 (1958). That is, "it must appear that there are findings, supported by evidence, of the essential facts . . . which would justify [the Secretary's] conclusion." Florida v. United States, 282 U.S., at 212 . The administrative record does not contain the reasoning and evidence that is necessary to sustain federal intervention into a historically state-administered decisional process that appears - for lack of any evidence to the contrary - to be functioning in full compliance with 504. </s> The history of these regulations exposes the inappropriateness of the extraordinary deference - virtually a carte blanche - requested by the Government. The Secretary's [476 U.S. 610, 646] present reading of 504 has evolved only after previous, patently erroneous interpretations had been found wanting. 34 The checkered history of these regulations began in 1982, when the Department notified hospitals that they would violate 504 if they "allow[ed] an infant" to remain in their care after "the infant's parents or guardian [had withheld consent to] treatment or nourishment discriminatorily." 47 Fed. Reg. 26027. By the time the Proposed Rules were announced one year later, the Secretary had abandoned that construction. But the Department substituted the equally untenable view that "the basic provision of nourishment, fluids, and routine nursing care" was "not an option for medical judgment" and that "[t]he decision to forego medical treatment of a correctable life-threatening defect because an infant also suffers from a permanent irremediable handicap that is not life-threatening, such as mental retardation, is a violation of Section 504," insinuating by omission that lack of parental consent did not alter the hospital's obligation to provide corrective surgery. 48 Fed. Reg. 30852, 30847 (1983). Although the preamble to the Final Rules corrects the prior erroneous signals from the Department that 504 authorizes it to override parental decisions and to save the lives of handicapped infants, it persists in advocating federal regulation on the basis of treatment denials precipitated by refusals of parental consent and on the ground that its experience with the Baby Doe hotline has demonstrated that "the assumption that handicapped infants will receive medically beneficial treatment is not always justified." 49 Fed. Reg. 1646 (1984). </s> This response, together with its previous remarks, makes irresistible the inference that the Department regards its [476 U.S. 610, 647] mission as one principally concerned with the quality of medical care for handicapped infants rather than with the implementation of 504. We could not quarrel with a decision by the Department to concentrate its finite compliance resources on instances of life-threatening discrimination rather than instances in which merely elective care has been withheld. Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). But nothing in the statute authorizes the Secretary to dispense with the law's focus on discrimination and instead to employ federal resources to save the lives of handicapped newborns, without regard to whether they are victims of discrimination by recipients of federal funds or not. Section 504 does not authorize the Secretary to give unsolicited advice either to parents, to hospitals, or to state officials who are faced with difficult treatment decisions concerning handicapped children. We may assume that the "qualified professionals" employed by the Secretary may make valuable contributions in particular cases, but neither that assumption nor the sincere conviction that an immediate "on-site investigation" is "necessary to protect the life or health of a handicapped individual" can enlarge the statutory powers of the Secretary. </s> The administrative record demonstrates that the Secretary has asserted the authority to conduct on-site investigations, to inspect hospital records, and to participate in the decisional process in emergency cases in which there was no colorable basis for believing that a violation of 504 had occurred or was about to occur. The District Court and the Court of Appeals correctly held that these investigative actions were not authorized by the statute and that the regulations which purport to authorize a continuation of them are invalid. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 "Handicapped individual" is defined in 7(7)(B) of the Act, as amended, as "any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 92 Stat. 2985, 29 U.S.C. 706(7)(B). </s> [Footnote 2 Respondents include the Hospital Association of New York State, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the Association of American Medical Colleges, the American Academy of Family Physicians, and certain individual physicians. </s> [Footnote 3 Margaret Heckler occupied the position of Secretary throughout the rulemaking period. On December 13, 1985, after certiorari had been granted, Dr. Otis Bowen assumed that position. Despite the fact that Dr. Bowen was not responsible for promulgation of the Final Rules, for the sake of continuity our references assume that he was. For ease of reference we refer to the Secretary, the Department, and HHS interchangeably. </s> [Footnote 4 In subsection (a) the Department "encourages each recipient health care provider that provides health care services to infants" to establish an [476 U.S. 610, 614] "Infant Care Review Committee (ICRC)" to assist in the development of treatment standards for handicapped infants and to provide assistance in making individual treatment decisions. 45 CFR 84.55(a) (1985). In subsection (f), the Department describes its version of a model ICRC. </s> Subsection (f) also provides that "[t]he activities of the ICRC will be guided by . . . [t]he interpretative guidelines of the Department." 45 CFR 84.55(f)(1)(ii)(A) (1985). These guidelines, which are "illustrative" and "do not independently establish rules of conduct," pt. 84, Appendix C, § (a), set forth the Department's interpretation of 504. Although they do not contain any definition of "discrimination," they do state that 504 is not applicable to parents and that the regulation applies to only two categories of activities of hospitals: (1) refusals to provide treatment or nourishment to handicapped infants whose parents have consented to, or requested, such treatment; and (2) the failure or refusal to take action to override a parental decision to withhold consent for medically beneficial treatment or nourishment. With respect to the second category, the guidelines state that the hospital may not "solely on the basis of the infant's present or anticipated future mental or physical impairments, fail to follow applicable procedures on reporting such incidents to the child protective services agency or to seek judicial review." 45 CFR pt. 84, Appendix C, § (a)(4) (1985). </s> With respect to the first category, the guidelines do not state that 504 categorically prohibits a hospital from withholding requested treatment or nourishment "solely on the basis of present or anticipated physical or mental impairments of an infant." 45 CFR pt. 84, Appendix C, § (a)(1). Rather, the substantive guidelines and two of the illustrative examples recognize that the etiology of and prognosis for particular handicapping conditions may justify "a refusal to treat solely on the basis of those handicapping conditions." § (a)(2) ( 504 does not require "futile treatment"); § (a)(5)(iii) ( 504 does not require treatment of anencephaly because it would "do no more than temporarily prolong the act of dying"); § (a)(iv) (same with severely premature and low birth weight infants). In general, the guidelines seem to make a hospital's liability under 504 dependent on proof that (1) it refused to provide requested treatment or nourishment solely on the basis of an infant's handicapping condition, and (2) the treatment or nourishment would have been medically beneficial. See §§ (a)(1)-(3), (5). </s> The guidelines also describe how HHS will respond to "complaints of suspected life threatening noncompliance" with 504 in this context, progressing [476 U.S. 610, 615] from telephone inquiries to the hospital to obtain information about the condition of the infant, to requests for access to records, and finally to onsite investigations and litigation in appropriate cases. § (b). The guidelines do not draw any distinction between cases in which parental consent has been withheld and those in which it has been given. Nor do they draw any distinction between cases in which hospitals have made a report of parental refusal to consent to treatment and those in which no report to a state agency has been made. They do announce that the "Department will also seek to coordinate its investigation with any related investigations by the state child protective services agency so as to minimize potential disruption," § (b)(4), indicating that the Department's investigations may continue even in cases that have previously been referred to a state agency. </s> [Footnote 5 At the instance of the local prosecutor, the Indiana courts on April 13 held another hearing at which the court concluded that "Baby Doe" had not been neglected under Indiana's Child in Need of Services statute. Additional attempts to seek judicial intervention were rebuffed the same day. On the following day, the Indiana Court of Appeals denied a request for an immediate hearing. In re Infant Doe, No. GU 8204-004A (Monroe County Cir. Ct., Apr. 12, 1982). The Indiana Supreme Court, by a vote of 3 to 1, rejected a petition for a writ of mandamus. State ex rel. Infant Doe v. Baker, No. 482 S 140 (May 27, 1982). The infant died while a stay was being sought in this Court, and we subsequently denied certiorari. Infant Doe v. Bloomington Hospital, 464 U.S. 961 (1983). </s> [Footnote 6 The notice maintained that hospitals would violate 504 if they "allow[ed] [an] infant" to remain in their care after "the infant's parents or guardian [had withheld consent to] treatment or nourishment discriminatorily." 47 Fed. Reg. 26027 (1982). The Secretary no longer subscribes to this reading of the statute. See 49 Fed. Reg. 1631 (1984). </s> [Footnote 7 In explaining the need for the Proposed Rules, the preamble, although mentioning "parental rights over their children," insisted that physicians' "acquiescence in nontreatment of Down's children is apparently because of the handicap," rather than, it must be supposed, lack of parental consent. 48 Fed. Reg. 30848 (1983). </s> The effect of parental nonconsent was not even mentioned in the appendix to the Proposed Rules. That section, which set forth the Department's view of "the manner in which Section 504 applies to the provision of health care services to handicapped infants," id., at 30851, declared that 504 mandated "the basic provision of nourishment, fluids, and routine nursing care." Id., at 30852. The provision of sustenance, according to the Department, was "not an option for medical judgment." Ibid. Thus, "[e]ven if a handicapped infant faces imminent and unavoidable death, no health care provider should take upon itself to cause death by starvation or dehydration." Ibid. </s> In addition to its unqualified endorsement of nourishment as required by 504, the appendix announced that "[a]ny decision not to correct intestinal atresia in a Down's Syndrome child, unless an additional complication medically warrants such decision, must be deemed a denial of services based on [476 U.S. 610, 620] the handicap of Down's Syndrome. The same reasoning applies to a case of Down's Syndrome [infant] with esophogeal atresia, and the denial of surgery to correct atresia." Ibid. (emphasis added). The Department did not discuss the relevance of parental nonconsent to the hospital's treatment obligation under 504, presumably because it was irrelevant given its understanding of the provision at that time. </s> [Footnote 8 Indeed, although the Government took an appeal from the District Court's judgment, it filed a motion for summary disposition after the Court of Appeals denied its motion for initial consideration en banc. Its motion expressly acknowledged that an affirmance was compelled by the decision in University Hospital. </s> [Footnote 9 As the case comes to us, we have no reason to review the Court of Appeals' assumption that the provision of health care to infants in hospitals receiving Medicare or Medicaid payments is a part of a "program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 635 -636 (1984). </s> [Footnote 10 See, e. g., Brief in Opposition for Respondents American Medical Assn. et al. 7-8, n. 8; Record, Doc. No. 4, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction 12 ("The Final Regulation which is challenged in this action contains four mandatory provisions" (citations omitted)); id., at 28 ("After University Hospital . . . must fall all of the mandatory obligations imposed by the Final Regulation"). Cf. App. 138-140 (complaint of American Medical Association et al.). </s> [Footnote 11 It is true that the District Court, in addition to declaring "[t]he Final Regulation . . . invalid and unlawful as exceeding" 504 and enjoining petitioner from "any further implementation of the Final Regulation," also declared invalid and enjoined "[a]ny other actions" of the Secretary "to regulate treatment involving impaired newborn infants taken under authority of Section 504, including currently pending investigation and other enforcement actions." App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a. This language must, however, be given a limited construction. The complaints in this case did not challenge the Department's authority to regulate all treatment decisions, but more precisely the mandatory provisions of the Final Rules and enforcement activity along those lines but undertaken pursuant to the Department's "general authority" to enforce 504, as occurred in the University Hospital litigation and in 41 of the 49 full-scale investigations conducted by the Secretary up to that point in time. See App. 138-139 (complaint of American Medical Association et al.); id., at 145 (same); id., at 159 (complaint of American Hospital Association et al.). See also Record, Doc. No. 4, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction 10-11. From these pleadings, the Court of Appeals apparently interpreted the District Court's use of the word "any" to forbid "[a]ny other actions" resembling the "currently pending investigation and other enforcement actions" specified in the injunction, App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a, rather than all possible regulatory and investigative activity that might involve the provision of health care to handicapped infants. Thus, as will become clear from our analysis of the Final Rules below, the injunction forbids continuation or initiation of regulatory and investigative activity directed at instances in which parents have refused consent to treatment and, if the Secretary were to undertake such action, efforts to seek compliance with affirmative requirements imposed on state child protective services agencies. "Because of the rightly serious view courts have traditionally taken of violations of injunctive orders, and because of the severity of punishment which may be imposed for such violation," Pasadena City Bd. of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 439 (1976); see Longshoremen v. Marine Trade Assn., 389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967); Gunn v. University Committee, 399 U.S. 383, 389 (1970), the Court of Appeals properly construed the District Court's judgment as pertaining to the regulations challenged in this litigation (and enforcement activity independent of the Final Rules but paralleling the procedures set forth therein). Cf. Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 477 (1974) (per curiam) [476 U.S. 610, 626] (noting desirability of precise construction of injunction orders to facilitate appellate review). It is, of course, the Court of Appeals' judgment that we are called on to review, not the District Court's. See Union Pacific R. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 163 U.S. 564, 593 (1896). Cf. Davis v. Packard, 6 Pet. 41, 49 (1832). Accordingly, we give great weight to the Court of Appeals' construction of the judgment it affirmed. Cf. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 301 -302 (1919). For purposes of comparison, the dissent's expansive reading of the judgment is supported neither by the Court of Appeals nor by the parties. See Brief for Respondents American Medical Assn. et al. 14, 48, n. 60. Cf. Brief for Respondents American Hospital Assn. et al. 4 (quoting final judgment of the District Court). In view of the fact that we affirm this judgment on reasoning narrower than that employed by the lower courts, it bears repetition that this Court "reviews judgments, not opinions." Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). See, e. g., Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292, 297 (1956); J. E. Riley Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 55, 59 (1940); Williams v. Norris, 12 Wheat. 117, 120 (1827); McClung v. Silliman, 6 Wheat. 598, 603 (1821). </s> [Footnote 12 See Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 105 -106 (1983); Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 -286 (1974); FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 249 (1972); FPC v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 393 U.S. 71, 72 -73 (1968) (per curiam); Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 613 (1946). </s> [Footnote 13 The basic pattern of decisionmaking is well summarized in the 1983 report of the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research: </s> "The paucity of directly relevant cases makes characterization of the law in this area somewhat problematic, but certain points stand out. First, there is a presumption, strong but rebuttable, that parents are the appropriate [476 U.S. 610, 628] decisionmakers for their infants. Traditional law concerning the family, buttressed by the emerging constitutional right of privacy, protects a substantial range of discretion for parents. Second, as persons unable to protect themselves, infants fall under the parens patriae power of the state. In the exercise of this authority, the state not only punishes parents whose conduct has amounted to abuse or neglect of their children but may also supervene parental decisions before they become operative to ensure that the choices made are not so detrimental to a child's interests as to amount to neglect and abuse. </s> ". . . [A]s long as parents choose from professionally accepted treatment options the choice is rarely reviewed in court and even less frequently supervened. The courts have exercised their authority to appoint a guardian for a child when the parents are not capable of participating in the decisionmaking or when they have made decisions that evidence substantial lack of concern for the child's interests. Although societal involvement usually occurs under the auspices of governmental instrumentalities - such as child welfare agencies and courts - the American legal system ordinarily relies upon the private initiative of individuals, rather than continuing governmental supervision, to bring the matter to the attention of legal authorities." Report, at 212-214 (footnotes omitted). </s> This summary accords with the Secretary's understanding of the state-law framework, at least in other contexts. See 50 Fed. Reg. 14880 (1985) (final rule implementing Child Abuse Amendments of 1984) ("The decision to provide or withhold medically indicated treatment is, except in highly unusual circumstances, made by the parents or legal guardian"). </s> [Footnote 14 Rather than address these issues, JUSTICE WHITE's dissent would remand to the Court of Appeals. See post, at 656. In light of its willingness to address the broader hypothetical question whether 504 ever authorizes regulation of medical treatment decisions - "even if the judgment below were limited to invalidation of these regulations," post, at 650, n. 4 - it comes as something of a surprise to read the references to the Solicitor General's argument that "this claim in its current form is not properly in the case," post, at 657, n. 9. The procedural objections are plainly without substance. Respondents AMA et al. raised the lack of factual support in their brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari. See Brief in Opposition for Respondents American Medical Assn. et al. 20 ("First, the fundamental problem with the Secretary's position is that it is based on a situation that has not occurred - and will not occur - in real life. . . . Not surprisingly, the Secretary cites no case where [his hypothetical problem] has occurred"); id., at 20-21; id., at 26 ("B. The Secretary Has Shown No Problem With the Historic State Law Framework That Warrants Direct Federal Investigation and Regulation"); id., at 26-29. The Solicitor General, although responding that such evidence exists, see Reply Memorandum for Petitioner 9, did not raise a procedural bar. As a result, the objection is waived. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 815 -816 (1985). Although further discussion of this objection is therefore unnecessary, the dissent is also wrong in suggesting that respondents' complaints did not raise "the lack of a factual basis involving situations in which parents have consented to treatment." Post, at 657, n. 9. In fact, the complaint of respondents AMA et al. alleged "COUNT II: Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act," App. 146, and incorporated by reference the allegation that "None of the mandatory provisions of the Final Regulation have a basis in fact or are designed to meet a documented problem," id., at 140. Accord, id., at 158 (complaint of respondents AHA et al.). The fact that our decision rests on grounds narrower than that relied on by the lower courts is surely not an infirmity. We can only add that the lack of factual support for these regulations was fully briefed in this Court, see especially Brief for Respondents American Medical Assn. et al. 39-41; Brief for Respondents American Hospital Assn. et al. 48-49, and the fact that the Solicitor General responds with so little, so late bespeaks the absence of evidentiary support for the regulations, not an inadequate opportunity to direct us to it. </s> The Solicitor General also contends, for the first time in his reply brief on the merits, see Reply Brief for Petitioner 16, n. 6, that the Final Rules are [476 U.S. 610, 630] "interpretative guidelines" which "merely explained the Secretary's construction of Section 504 in this setting," ibid. This assertion was rejected the only occasion on which it was tendered, see American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 401 (DC 1983), is belied by the Secretary's own decision to provide notice and request comment on the regulations, cf. 5 U.S.C. 553(b), and is patently without merit. To its credit, the dissent does not ultimately rely on either of these arguments. See post, at 657, n. 9. </s> [Footnote 15 Just as "[t]he failure of the hospital to itself provide the treatment" because of the unavailability of medical equipment or expertise would not be "on the basis of the handicap" but "on the fact that the hospital is incapable of providing the treatment," according to the Secretary's regulations, 49 Fed. Reg. 1637 (1984), it is equally clear that a refusal to provide care because of the absence of parental consent would not be "solely by reason of [the infant's] handicap." </s> [Footnote 16 The Secretary's summary of this case makes it clear that the hospital's failure to perform surgery was based on the parents' refusal of consent: </s> "Bloomington, Indiana. Investigation into April 1982, death of infant with Down's syndrome and esophageal atresia from whom surgery was [476 U.S. 610, 632] withheld on the instructions of the parents." Id., at 1646 (emphasis added). </s> As recounted earlier, the hospital initiated judicial review to override the parents' decision, but its efforts proved unavailing. The Solicitor General now acknowledges that there was no basis for finding a violation of 504 in this case. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 12. </s> [Footnote 17 Notwithstanding that the Secretary's summary of this case demonstrates both that treatment was withheld because of refusal of parental consent and that state-court proceedings to override the parents' decision had been instituted before the Department intervened, the Department proceeded with its own investigation anyway: </s> "Long Island, New York. October 19, 1983, complaint, based on newspaper article, that infant with spina bifida not receiving surgery due to refusal of parents to consent; legal proceedings ha[d] been initiated in State court. Inquiry initiated October 19. On October 27, HHS asked Department of Justice to commence legal action to overcome refusal of hospital to permit review of pertinent records." 49 Fed. Reg. 1649 (1984) (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 18 The Secretary first cited a 1973 survey by Raymond Duff and A. G. M. Campbell calculating that 14% of deaths in the special nursery of the Yale-New [476 U.S. 610, 633] Haven hospital "were related to withholding treatment." 48 Fed. Reg. 30847 (1983). The Secretary's solitary quotation from this study, accurately illustrating the locus of the treatment decisions reviewed by the authors, involved refusal of parental consent: </s> "`An infant with Down's syndrome and intestinal atresia, like the much publicized one at Johns Hopkins Hospital, was not treated because his parents thought the surgery was wrong for their baby and themselves. He died several days after birth.'" Ibid. (emphasis added) (quoting Duff & Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care Nursery, 289 New Eng. J. Med. 890, 891 (1973)). </s> The Secretary next referred to an incident at Johns Hopkins Hospital which, as the above quotation intimates, also concerned parental refusal of consent. Then followed brief mention of the "Bloomington Baby Doe" incident, in which the parents, as the Secretary now admits, refused consent to treatment despite the hospital's insistence that it be provided. The Secretary's fourth and final example involved "a 1979 death of an infant with Down's syndrome and an intestinal obstruction at the Kapiolani-Children's Medical Center in Honolulu, Hawaii," 48 Fed. Reg. 30847 (1983), which again appears to have resulted from "a lack of parental consent," id., at 30848. </s> Generalizing from these examples, the Secretary reported the results of a survey of physician attitudes. He faulted "[t]heir acquiescence in nontreatment of Down's children" which he surmised was "apparently because of the handicap represented by Down's syndrome." Ibid. See n. 22, infra. </s> [Footnote 19 The Secretary also reprinted selected quotations from various commenters reporting the existence of "discriminatory" decisions denying sustenance and care to handicapped infants. None of these comments disclosed whether those "discriminatory" decisions were made by parents or by hospitals. </s> [Footnote 20 The Secretary's repeated inability to identify a single treatment decision in violation of 504 lends an aura of unreality to JUSTICE WHITE's criticism of the Court of Appeals' decision in University Hospital. In explaining why he believes "the stated basis for the Court of Appeals' holding in University Hospital was incorrect," post, at 656; see post, at 655, n. 8, JUSTICE WHITE completely ignores the fact that the case involved a specific treatment decision made by parents. Since JUSTICE WHITE elsewhere agrees that parental decisions are not covered by 504, post, at 657, n. 10, and that the infant involved in the University Hospital case was therefore not "otherwise qualified" for treatment, post, at 654, n. 7, he implicitly acknowledges that the judgment in University Hospital is correct; only by ignoring the actual facts of that case - as well as the actual facts of the 49 cases that were investigated by the Secretary - and speculating about nonexistent hypothetical cases in which a hospital might refuse to provide treatment requested by parents, does the dissent offer any basis for questioning the decision in University Hospital. </s> Indeed, even the dissent's criticism of the reasoning of the Court of Appeals' decision is based on a hypothetical situation that the Court of Appeals did not address. That court was concerned with the treatment of cases in which "the handicapping condition is related to the condition(s) to be treated," 729 F.2d, at 157 (emphasis added); see id., at 147, whereas JUSTICE WHITE has carefully limited his hypothetical discussion to cases in which "the treatment is completely unrelated to the baby's handicapping condition." Post, at 655 (emphasis added). Thus, like bishops of opposite colors, the opinions of JUSTICE WHITE and the Court of Appeals do not even touch one another. </s> [Footnote 21 The preamble repeatedly makes the assumption that evidence showing the need for governmental involvement provides a basis for federal involvement. See, e. g., 49 Fed. Reg. 1649 (1984). </s> [Footnote 22 JUSTICE WHITE's dissent suggests that regulation of health care providers can be justified on a theory the Secretary did not advance - a supposed need to curtail discriminatory advice by biased physicians. See post, at 658-661. After observing that at least some handicapped infants have not been treated, the dissent identifies physician attitudes as a likely explanation and concludes that mandated informational notices were presumably designed to "foste[r] an awareness by health care professionals of their responsibility not to act in a discriminatory manner with respect to medical treatment decisions for handicapped infants." Post, at 660. </s> The dissent's theory finds no support in the text of the regulation, the reasoning of the Secretary, or the briefs filed on his behalf in this Court. The regulations in general - and the informational notices in particular - do not purport to place any constraints on the advice that physicians may give their patients. Moreover, since it is now clear that parental decisionmaking is not covered by 504, supra, at 630-631, the dissent's theory rests on the unstated premise that the statute may prevent the giving of advice to do something which 504 does not itself prohibit. It is hardly obvious that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits physicians from "aiding and abetting" [476 U.S. 610, 637] a parental decision which parents admittedly have a right to make. And if Congress did intend this counterintuitive result, one might expect an explanation from the Secretary as to how the hotlines and emergency on-site inspections contemplated by the Final Rules square with the constitutional doctrines on regulation, direct or indirect, of speech in general and of decisionmaking by health professionals in particular. </s> In reality, the Secretary neither found nor implied that physicians' predispositions against treating handicapped infants had resulted in parental refusals to consent to treatment. Indeed, he principally relied on attitudinal surveys for the converse proposition that regulation is necessary because parents refuse consent to treatment and physicians will "acquiesce in parental refus[als] to treat." 48 Fed. Reg. 30848 (1983). To the extent any theory may be discerned in the Secretary's two-column summary of physician surveys, it is that doctors would not correct "bad" parental decisions, not that they were responsible for helping them to make such choices in the first place. Moreover, even if the Secretary had relied on this evidence to insinuate that doctors imposed their own value judgments on parents by lobbying them to refuse consent, he never explains that the parental decisionmaking process is one in which doctors exercise the decisive influence needed to force such results. Compare ibid., with post, at 658-659. The Secretary, in short, has not even adumbrated a theory of "discrimination" remotely resembling the one invented by the dissent, and therefore has not made the essential connection between the evidence of physician attitudes and the regulatory choice made here. </s> [Footnote 23 Of course, 504 would be violated only if the hospital failed to report medical neglect of a handicapped infant when it would report such neglect of a similarly situated nonhandicapped infant. Because respondents have [476 U.S. 610, 638] challenged the Secretary's regulations on their face, we have no occasion to address the question whether infants with birth defects are similarly situated with infants in need of blood transfusions (the paradigm case in which hospitals have reported or have sought to override parental decisions, according to the Solicitor General, Brief for Petitioner 28, and n. 16), or whether a hospital could legitimately distinguish between the two situations on the basis of the different risks and benefits inhering in certain operations to correct birth defects, on the one hand, and blood transfusions, on the other hand. </s> [Footnote 24 To the contrary, the Secretary's case summaries reveal numerous instances in which hospitals have voluntarily reported instances of suspected medical neglect and have even initiated legal proceedings themselves. In the Bloomington, Indiana, case which prompted these regulations, and in the University Hospital case which supported the summary affirmance now before us, the parents' decision was the subject of judicial review in the state courts. In the Robinson, Illinois, case on which the Secretary relies as one of three examples illustrating the need for federal regulation, the hospital reported the parents' refusal to consent to state authorities who arranged for surgery and adoption. 49 Fed. Reg. 1646 (1984). Most dramatically, in the Daytona Beach, Florida, case HHS received its hotline complaint the day after the state agency had already obtained a court order overriding the parents' refusal to consent to surgery. Id., at 1648. Notwithstanding the Department's "immediate contact" with the hospital and the state agency - which surely must have made it clear that the case had already been reported to that agency and that there was no colorable basis for suspecting a violation of 504 - the Department conducted an on-site investigation. Ibid. In the third case on which the Secretary placed special emphasis, the Department intervened before the parents had decided whether to authorize treatment or not, so that no reporting obligation could have been triggered. Ibid. </s> [Footnote 25 The interpretative guidelines appended to the Final Rules do impose on hospitals and other health care providers the duty not to discriminate against handicapped infants in reporting instances of parental neglect. We do not address the question whether reporting, either as a hospital practice or as a requirement of state law, constitutes a "program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" under 504. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S., at 635 -636. Cf. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 570 -574 (1984). </s> [Footnote 26 JUSTICE WHITE's dissent, quoting the Secretary's explanation for these requirements, concludes that they form, in "substance," a nondiscrimination requirement. Post, at 663. This assertion is repetitive, not responsive. The rules governing state child protective services agencies operate independently of any provisions of state law; they go further than them in several respects; they flatly contradict them in others (e. g., confidentiality); and they do not accommodate the revision, modification, or repeal of state laws. To say that the Secretary can give detailed marching orders to state agencies upon discovering that both the agencies and HHS are working toward the same general objective - at least when defined with sufficient abstractness - would countenance a novel and serious intrusion on state autonomy. </s> [Footnote 27 See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S., at 410 (language and structure of 1973 Rehabilitation Act recognizes "the distinction between . . . evenhanded treatment . . . and affirmative efforts"). </s> [Footnote 28 The Secretary notes that "by enacting section 504 Congress intended to eliminate all of the `many forms of potential discrimination' against handicapped people through `the establishment of a broad governmental policy.' S. Rep. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1974)." 49 Fed. Reg. 1636 (1984). But no matter how broad the prohibition contained in 504 may be, what it prohibits is discrimination. </s> [Footnote 29 Important principles of federalism are implicated by any "federal program that compels state agencies . . . to function as bureaucratic puppets of the Federal Government." FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 783 (1982) (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.). </s> [Footnote 30 Twenty-seven agencies, including the National Endowment for the Arts, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Tennessee Valley Authority, have promulgated regulations forbidding discrimination on the basis of handicap in programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance. The Department of Housing and Urban Development has issued a proposed rulemaking. See Jones & Wolfe, Regulations Promulgated Pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973: A Brief History and Present Status 8-9 (Congressional Research Service, Feb. 28, 1986). There is thus not the same basis for deference predicated on expertise as we found with respect to the Environmental Protection Agency's interpretation of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments in Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S., at 842 -845, and with respect to the Federal Reserve Board's construction of the Bank Holding Act in Board of Governors, FRS v. Investment Company Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 56 , and n. 21 (1981). </s> [Footnote 31 Accord, American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 539 (1981); Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943). </s> [Footnote 32 See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 540 (1947) ("The underlying assumptions of our dual form of government, and the consequent presuppositions of legislative draftsmanship which are expressive of our history and habits, cut across what might otherwise be the implied range of legislation"). </s> [Footnote 33 Cf. Heublein, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 409 U.S. 275, 281 -282 (1972) ("`[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the Federal-State balance.'" (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S., at 349 ); Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 152 (1944) ("Where Congress has not clearly indicated a purpose to precipitate conflict [between federal agencies and state authority] we should be reluctant to do so by decision" (footnote omitted)); Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n, 318 U.S. 261, 275 (1943) ("An unexpressed purpose of Congress to set aside statutes of the states regulating their internal affairs is not lightly to be inferred and ought not to be implied where the legislative command, read in the light of its history, remains ambiguous"); FTC v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312 U.S., at 354 -355 ("The construction of 5 [of the Federal Trade Commission Act] urged by the Commission would thus give a federal agency pervasive control over myriads of local businesses in matters heretofore traditionally left to local custom or local law. . . . An inroad upon local conditions and local standards of such far-reaching import as is involved here, ought to await a clearer mandate from Congress"); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 513 (1940) ("The maintenance in our federal system of a proper distribution between state and national governments of police authority and of remedies private and public for public wrongs is of far-reaching importance. An intention to disturb the balance is not lightly to be imputed to Congress"); United States v. Altobella, 442 F.2d 310, 313-316 (CA7 1971); 3 C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Construction 62.01, p. 64 (4th ed. 1974) ("[T]he rule of strict construction [of statutes in derogation of sovereignty] serves a quasi-constitutional purpose in our federal system of split sovereignty by helping to secure both levels of sovereign power against encroachment by each other" (footnote omitted)). </s> The legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act does not support the notion that Congress intended intervention by federal officials into treatment [476 U.S. 610, 645] decisions traditionally left by state law to concerned parents and the attending physicians or, in exceptional cases, to state agencies charged with protecting the welfare of the infant. As the Court of Appeals noted, there is nothing in the legislative history that even remotely suggests that Congress contemplated the possibility that "section 504 could or would be applied to treatment decisions, involving defective newborn infants." 729 F.2d 144, 159 (1984). </s> "`As far as can be determined, no congressional committee or member of the House or Senate ever even suggested that section 504 would be used to monitor medical treatment of defective newborn infants or establish standards for preserving a particular quality of life. No medical group appeared alert to the intrusion into medical practice which some doctors apprehend from such an undertaking, nor were representatives of parents or spokesmen for religious beliefs that would be affected heard.'" Id., at 158 (quoting American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp., at 401). </s> [Footnote 34 The fact that the agency's interpretation "has been neither consistent nor longstanding . . . substantially diminishes the deference to be given to HEW's [now HHS's] present interpretation of the statute." Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S., at 412 , n. 11 (citing General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976)). [476 U.S. 610, 648] </s> CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER concurs in the judgment. </s> JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins and with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins as to Parts I, II, IV, and V, dissenting. </s> Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 forbids discrimination solely on the basis of handicap in programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance. The issue before us is whether the Secretary of Health and Human Services has any authority under the Act to regulate medical treatment decisions concerning handicapped newborn infants. Relying on its prior decision in United States v. University Hospital, 729 F.2d 144 (CA2 1984), the Court of Appeals held that the Secretary was without power in this respect and affirmed a decision of the District Court that 504 does not extend so far and that the Secretary may not regulate such decisions in any manner. </s> Although it is my view that we granted certiorari to address this issue, the plurality avoids it by first erroneously reading the decision below as enjoining only the enforcement of specific regulations and by then affirming on the basis that the promulgation of the regulations did not satisfy established principles of administrative law, a matter that the Court of Appeals had no occasion to, and did not, discuss. With all due respect, I dissent. </s> I </s> The plurality's initial and fundamental error is its statement that the only question presented here is the specific question whether the four mandatory provisions of the Final Rules issued by the Secretary are authorized by 504. This conclusion misconstrues the opinion and judgment of the Court of Appeals. The plurality concedes that the District Court's judgment on its face did not stop with enjoining the [476 U.S. 610, 649] enforcement of the final regulations. Ante, at 625-626, n. 11. In fact, the District Court permanently enjoined the Secretary from implementing the final regulations and also from "continuing or undertaking any other actions to investigate or regulate treatment decisions involving impaired newborn infants taken under authority of Section 504, including pending investigation and other enforcement actions." App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a-52a. This broad injunction ousted the Secretary from the field entirely and granted the precise relief sought by the complaint, which was filed after University Hospital and which sought to take full advantage of that decision. 1 The Court of Appeals affirmed and in no way modified the injunction that the District Court had entered. In doing so, the Court of Appeals relied on its previous determination in University Hospital that the Secretary had no statutory authority to regulate medical treatment decisions regarding newborn infants. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 2a-3a. 2 </s> [476 U.S. 610, 650] </s> It is true that the regulations themselves were invalidated and their enforcement enjoined. This result, however, was directly compelled by the University Hospital conclusion that the Secretary was without power to issue any regulations whatsoever that dealt with infants' medical care, and it did not comprise the whole relief awarded by the District Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. I thus see no justification for the plurality's distortion of the Court of Appeals' affirmance of the District Court's all-inclusive injunction, which, like University Hospital, now represents the law in the Second Circuit. 3 We should resolve the threshold statutory question that this case and University Hospital clearly pose - namely, whether the Secretary has any authority at all under the Act to regulate medical care decisions with respect to the handicapped newborn. 4 </s> II </s> Section 504 of the Act, which was construed in University Hospital, provides: </s> "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in section 706(7) of this title, [476 U.S. 610, 651] shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. 794. </s> After determining that 706(7), which defines handicapped persons, is not limited to adults and includes the newborn, the Court of Appeals in University Hospital construed the "otherwise qualified" language of 504 to limit the reach of the section to situations in which the handicap is "unrelated to, and thus improper to consideration of, the services in question." 729 F.2d, at 156. 5 This, concluded the Court of Appeals, would exclude most handicapped newborns because their handicaps are not normally irrelevant to the need for medical services. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals thought that the "otherwise qualified" limitation should not be applied in the "comparatively fluid context of medical treatment decisions" because "[w]here the handicapping condition is related to the condition(s) to be treated, it will [476 U.S. 610, 652] rarely, if ever, be possible to say with certainty that a particular decision was `discriminatory.'" Id., at 156-157. </s> Having identified these perceived incongruities between the language of 504 and the potential regulation of medical decisions regarding handicapped newborns, the Court of Appeals concluded that "[b]efore ruling that congress intended to spawn this type of litigation under section 504, we would want more proof than is apparent from the face of the statute." Id., at 157. Thus, the Court of Appeals turned to the legislative history, where it again found nothing to persuade it that Congress intended 504 to apply to medical treatment of handicapped infants and hence to enter a field so traditionally occupied by the States. Neither did it consider the current administrative interpretation of 504 to be a longstanding agency construction calling for judicial deference. In the Court of Appeals' view, therefore, the section was inapplicable to medical treatment decisions regarding the newborn absent some further indication of congressional intent. </s> I disagree with this conclusion, which the Court of Appeals adhered to in the case before us now. Looking first at the language of the statute, I agree with the Court of Appeals' preliminary conclusion that handicapped newborns are handicapped individuals covered by the Act. There is no reason for importing an age limitation into the statutory definition, and this Court has previously stated that " 504 protects handicapped persons of all ages from discrimination in a variety of programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance." Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1016 -1017 (1984). 6 This leaves the critical question whether a handicapped [476 U.S. 610, 653] infant can ever be "otherwise qualified" for medical treatment and hence possibly subjected to unlawful discrimination when he or she is denied such treatment. 7 </s> [476 U.S. 610, 654] </s> It may well be that our prior consideration of this language has implied that the Court of Appeals' construction is correct. In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979), we held that "[a]n otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap." This formulation may be read as implying that where a handicapped person meets all of the requirements normally necessary to receive a program's benefits regardless of his or her handicap, he or she is otherwise qualified because that handicap does not interfere with and is thus irrelevant to his or her qualification for the program. Thus, the Court of Appeals' view - that refusing treatment that is called for only because of the handicapping condition cannot constitute discrimination on the basis of handicap since there will be no similarly situated nonhandicapped newborn, i. e., one who needs the same treatment - draws support from our holding in Davis since it turns on the same underlying perception that discrimination occurs only when the handicapping condition is irrelevant to the qualification for the program. [476 U.S. 610, 655] </s> Even under the Court of Appeals' interpretation of "otherwise qualified," however, it does not follow that 504 may never apply to medical treatment decisions for the newborn. An esophageal obstruction, for example, would not be part and parcel of the handicap of a baby suffering from Down's syndrome, and the infant would benefit from and is thus otherwise qualified for having the obstruction removed in spite of the handicap. In this case, the treatment is completely unrelated to the baby's handicapping condition. If an otherwise normal child would be given the identical treatment, so should the handicapped child if discrimination on the basis of the handicap is to be avoided. 8 </s> It would not be difficult to multiply examples like this. And even if it is true that in the great majority of cases the handicap itself will constitute the need for treatment, I doubt that this consideration or any other mentioned by the Court of Appeals justifies the wholesale conclusion that 504 never applies to newborn infants with handicaps. That some or most failures to treat may not fall within 504, that discerning which failures to treat are discriminatory may be difficult, and that applying 504 in this area may intrude into the traditional functions of the State do not support the categorical [476 U.S. 610, 656] conclusion that the section may never be applied to medical decisions about handicapped infants. And surely the absence in the legislative history of any consideration of handicapped newborns does not itself narrow the reach of the statutory language. See Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Assn. v. Abbott Laboratories, 460 U.S. 150, 159 -162, and n. 18 (1983). Furthermore, the broad remedial purpose of the section would be undermined by excluding handicapped infants from its coverage; and if, as the plurality indicates, ante, at 642-643, the Secretary has substantial leeway to explore areas in which discrimination against the handicapped poses serious problems and to devise regulations to prohibit the discrimination, it is appropriate to take note of the Secretary's present view that 504 properly extends to the subject matter at issue here. Thus, I believe that the Court of Appeals in University Hospital incorrectly concluded that 504 may never apply to medical treatment decisions concerning handicapped newborn infants. Where a decision regarding medical treatment for a handicapped newborn properly falls within the statutory provision, it should be subject to the constraints set forth in 504. Consequently, I would reverse the judgment below. </s> III </s> Having determined that the stated basis for the Court of Appeals' holding in University Hospital was incorrect and that the decision below cannot be supported by University Hospital's blanket prohibition, I would remand the case to the Court of Appeals. Respondents have, as the plurality's opinion itself demonstrates, raised significant issues aside from the threshold statutory issue presented here. There are, for example, substantial questions regarding the scope of the Secretary's statutory authority in this area and whether these particular regulations are consistent with the statute. I would decline to reach and decide these questions for the first time in this Court without the benefit of the [476 U.S. 610, 657] lower courts' deliberations. 9 The plurality, however, has chosen to reach out and address one of those subsidiary issues. Because the plurality has resolved that issue in a manner that I find indefensible on its own terms, I too address it. </s> The plurality concludes that the four mandatory provisions of the final regulations are invalid because there is no "`rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.'" Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn., Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). The basis for this conclusion is the plurality's perception that two and only two wholly discrete categories of decisions are the object of the final regulations: (1) decisions made by hospitals to treat or not treat where parental consent has been given and (2) decisions made by hospitals to refer or not to refer a case to the state child protective services agency where parental consent has been withheld. 10 </s> [476 U.S. 610, 658] Since the Secretary has not specifically pointed to discriminatory actions that provably resulted from either of these two specific types of decisions, the plurality finds that the Secretary's conclusion that discrimination is occurring is unsupported factually. The plurality's characterization of the Secretary's rationale, however, oversimplifies both the complexity of the situations to which the regulations are addressed and the reasoning of the Secretary. </s> First, the Secretary's proof that treatment is in fact being withheld from handicapped infants is unquestioned by the plurality. It is therefore obvious that whoever is making them, decisions to withhold treatment from such infants are in fact being made. This basic understanding is critical to the Secretary's further reasoning, and the discussion accompanying the proposed regulations clearly indicates that this was the Secretary's starting point. See 48 Fed. Reg. 30847-30848 (1983). Proceeding with this factual understanding, the next question is whether such withholding of treatment constitutes prohibited discrimination under 504 in some or all situations. It is at this point that the plurality errs. In the plurality's view, only two narrow paradigmatic types of decisions were contemplated by the Secretary as potentially constituting discrimination in violation of the statute. See ante, at 628-629. The plurality does not explain, however, precisely what in the Secretary's discussion gives rise to this distillation, and my reading of the explanation accompanying the regulations does not leave me with so limited a view of the Secretary's concerns. </s> The studies cited by the Secretary in support of the regulations and other literature concerning medical treatment in this area generally portray a decisionmaking process in which the parents and the doctors and often other concerned persons as well are involved - although the parental decision to consent or not is obviously the critical one. 11 Thus, the parental [476 U.S. 610, 659] consent decision does not occur in a vacuum. In fact, the doctors (directly) and the hospital (indirectly) in most cases participate in the formulation of the final parental decision and in many cases substantially influence that decision. 12 Consequently, discrimination against a handicapped infant may assume guises other than the outright refusal to treat once parental consent has been given. Discrimination may occur when a doctor encourages or fails to discourage a parental decision to refuse consent to treatment for a handicapped child when the doctor would discourage or actually oppose a parental decision to refuse consent to the same treatment for a nonhandicapped child. Or discrimination may occur when a doctor makes a discriminatory treatment recommendation that the parents simply follow. Alternatively, discrimination may result from a hospital's explicit laissez-faire attitude about this type of discrimination on the part of doctors. </s> Contrary to the plurality's constrained view of the Secretary's justification for the regulations, the stated basis for those regulations reveals that the Secretary was cognizant of this more elusive discrimination. For example, the evidence cited most extensively by the Secretary in his initial proposal of these regulations was a study of attitudes of practicing and teaching pediatricians and pediatric surgeons. See 48 Fed. Reg. 30848 (1983) (citing Shaw, Randolph, & Manard, Ethical Issues in Pediatric Surgery: A National Survey of Pediatricians and Pediatric Surgeons, 60 Pediatrics 588 (1977)). This study indicated that a substantial number of these doctors (76.8% of pediatric surgeons and 49.5% of pediatricians) [476 U.S. 610, 660] would "acquiesce in parents' decision to refuse consent for surgery in a newborn with intestinal atresia if the infant also had . . . Down's syndrome." Id., at 590. It also indicated that a substantial minority (23.6% of pediatric surgeons and 13.2% of pediatricians) would in fact encourage parents to refuse consent to surgery in this situation and that only a small minority (3.4% of pediatric surgeons and 15.8% of pediatricians) would attempt to get a court order mandating surgery if the parents refused consent. In comparison, only a small minority (7.9% of pediatric surgeons and 2.6% of pediatricians) would acquiesce in parental refusal to treat intestinal atresia in an infant with no other anomaly. And a large majority (78.3% of pediatric surgeons and 88.4% of pediatricians) would try to get a court order directing surgery if parental consent were withheld for treatment of a treatable malignant tumor. The Secretary thus recognized that there was evidence that doctors would act differently in terms of attempts to affect or override parental decisions depending on whether the infant was handicapped. </s> Based on this evidence, the Secretary conceded that "[t]he full extent of discriminatory and life-threatening practices toward handicapped infants is not yet known" but concluded "that for even a single infant to die due to lack of an adequate notice and complaint procedure is unacceptable." 48 Fed. Reg. 30847 (1983). Thus, the Secretary promulgated the regulations at issue here. These regulations, in relevant part, require that a notice of the federal policies against discrimination on the basis of handicap be posted in a place where a hospital's health care professionals will see it. This requirement is, as the Secretary concluded, "[c]onsistent with the Department's intent to target the notice to nurses and other health care professionals." App. 25. The notice requirement, therefore, may reasonably be read as aimed at fostering an awareness by health care professionals of their responsibility not to act in a discriminatory manner with respect to medical treatment decisions for handicapped infants. [476 U.S. 610, 661] The second requirement of the regulations, that state agencies provide mechanisms for requiring and reporting medical neglect of handicapped children, is also consistent with the Secretary's focus on discrimination in the form of discriminatory reporting. 13 </s> I therefore perceive a rational connection between the facts found by the Secretary and the regulatory choice made. The Secretary identified an existing practice that there was reason to believe resulted from discrimination on the basis of handicap. Given this finding, the amorphous nature of much of the possible discrimination, the Secretary's profession that the regulations are appropriate no matter how limited the problem, 14 and the focus of the regulations on loci where unlawful discrimination seems most likely to occur and on persons likely to be responsible for it, I conclude that these regulations are not arbitrary and capricious and that the Court errs in striking them down on that basis. Although the Secretary's path here may be marked with "`less than ideal clarity,'" we will uphold such a decision "`if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned.'" Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Assn., 463 U.S., at 43 (quoting Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)). </s> The plurality also objects to the regulations' requirement concerning the state protective agencies' reporting procedures [476 U.S. 610, 662] on another ground. Specifically, the plurality finds that this requirement is in fact a substantive prescription rather than a prohibition of discrimination. The plurality bases this conclusion on the fact that the regulation sets forth specific procedures that must be adopted by state agencies. </s> The plurality's conclusion disregards the Secretary's explanation for this requirement. In the preamble to the proposed regulations, the Secretary explicitly stated: </s> "The Department has determined that under every state's law, failure of parents to provide necessary, medically indicated care to a child is either explicitly cited as grounds for action by the state to compel treatment or is implicitly covered by the state statute. These state statutes also provide for appropriate administrative and judicial enforcement authorities to prevent such instances of medical neglect, including requirements that medical personnel report suspected cases to the state child protective services agency, agency access to medical files, immediate investigations and authority to compel treatment." 48 Fed. Reg. 30848 (1983). </s> This finding was repeated in the statement accompanying the final regulations: </s> "Although there are some variations among state child protective statutes, all have the following basic elements: a requirement that health care providers report suspected cases of child abuse or neglect, including medical neglect; a mechanism for timely receipt of such reports; a process for administrative inquiry and investigation to determine the facts; and the authority and responsibility to seek an appropriate court order to remedy the apparent abuse and neglect, if it is found to exist." 49 Fed. Reg. 1627 (1984). </s> The regulations, in turn, require that the State provide these same services with respect to medical neglect of handicapped infants. See 45 CFR 84.55(c) (1985). The only [476 U.S. 610, 663] additional requirements imposed by the regulations involve provisions enabling the Department itself to review for compliance with the nondiscrimination requirements. Consequently, the regulations simply track the existing state procedures found to exist by the Secretary, requiring that funded state agencies provide those same procedures for handicapped children. The fact that the regulations specify the procedures that are necessary to ensure an absence of discrimination and do not instead speak in "nondiscrimination" terms is irrelevant. The substance of the requirement is nondiscrimination. The plurality's conclusion in this regard, however, apparently rests on a determination that implementation of a nondiscrimination mandate may be accomplished in only one form - even if the same result may be accomplished by another route. See ante, at 640, n. 26. I would not elevate regulatory form over statutory substance in this manner. In sum, the plurality's determination that the regulations were inadequately supported and explained as a matter of administrative law does not withstand examination of the Secretary's discussion of the underlying problem and of the contours of the regulations themselves. </s> IV </s> My disagreement with the plurality in this case does not end here, however. For even under its chosen rationale, I find its ultimate conclusion dubious. Having assiduously restricted its discussion to the validity of the regulations only, the plurality ends up concluding expansively that not only the regulations but also other investigations taken by the Secretary independent of the regulations are invalid. Thus, the Court apparently enjoins the Secretary's on-site investigations as well as "the regulations which purport to authorize a continuation of them." Ante, at 647. And the plurality rests this action on the conclusion that the lower courts "correctly held that these investigative actions were not authorized by the statute." Ibid. [476 U.S. 610, 664] </s> I am at a loss to understand the plurality's reasoning in this respect. In construing the judgment below, the plurality appears to conclude that, although the injunction entered by the District Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals did not purport to prohibit all actions by the Secretary under the statute, the injunction did in fact extend beyond merely these particular regulations. Thus, the plurality indicates that the judgment below applied as well to actions that "resemble," "parallel," or are "along [the] lines [of]" the regulations. Ante, at 625-626, n. 11. The plurality further defines what actions it believes the Court of Appeals and District Court contemplated: "[T]he injunction forbids continuation or initiation of regulatory and investigative activity directed at instances in which parents have refused consent to treatment and, if the Secretary were to undertake such action, efforts to seek compliance with affirmative requirements imposed on state child protective services agencies." Ante, at 625, n. 11. </s> Aside from the fact that I see absolutely nothing in either the District Court's or the Court of Appeals' judgment that would support a constrained reading of the broadly phrased relief awarded by the District Court and affirmed without modification by the Court of Appeals, 15 I have some doubt as to how different the Court's holding today is from a holding that 504 gives HHS no authority whatsoever over decisions to treat handicapped infants. The plurality's lack of coherence on this crucial point raises substantial doubts as to the reach of the holding and as to the basis for that holding. </s> Finally, I am puzzled as to how and why the plurality's determination that the regulations are invalid because they are arbitrary and capricious extends to other actions not taken under the regulations. The plurality apparently would enjoin all enforcement actions by the Secretary in situations in which parents have refused to consent to treatment. See ante, at 625-626, n. 11. Yet it is not clear to me that the [476 U.S. 610, 665] plurality's basis for invalidating these regulations would extend to all such situations. I do not see, for example, why the plurality's finding that the Secretary did not adequately support his conclusion that failures to report refusals to treat likely result from discrimination means that such a conclusion will never be justified. The Secretary might be able to prove that a particular hospital generally fails to report nontreatment of handicapped babies for a specific treatment where it reports nontreatment of nonhandicapped babies for the same treatment. In essence, a determination that these regulations were inadequately supported factually would not seem to be properly extended beyond actions taken pursuant to these regulations: The fact that the Secretary has not adequately justified generalized action under the regulations should not mean that individualized action in appropriate circumstances is precluded. </s> V </s> In sum, the plurality today mischaracterizes the judgment below and, based on that mischaracterization, is sidetracked from the straightforward issue of statutory construction that this case presents. The plurality incorrectly resolves an issue that was not fully addressed by the parties, gives no guidance to the Secretary or the other parties as to the proper construction of the governing statute, and fails adequately to explain the precise scope of the holding or how that holding is supported under the plurality's chosen rationale. From this misguided effort, I dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 I disagree with the plurality's conclusion that "[t]he complaints in this case did not challenge the Department's authority to regulate all treatment decisions, but more precisely the mandatory provisions of the Final Rules and enforcement activity along those lines but undertaken pursuant to the Department's `general authority' to enforce 504." Ante, at 625, n. 11. Although focusing most extensively on the regulations and pending HHS investigations, the complaint specifically cited the University Hospital holding that "Section 504 [does] not apply to `treatment decision involving defective newborn infants.'" App. 138. The complaint also specifically requested that the District Court "issue a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting the defendant from enforcing her final rule embodied in 45 CFR 84.55, 49 Fed. Reg. 1622, et seq. (Jan. 12, 1984), and prohibiting defendant from otherwise acting pursuant to the claimed authority of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 in regard to the medical treatment of infants with birth defects." Id., at 159. The complaint thus requested both invalidation of the regulations and an injunction against all other actions by the Secretary in this area. </s> [Footnote 2 The Court of Appeals' brief order affirming the District Court's judgment, although characterizing that judgment generally as having struck down the regulations, cited University Hospital and made no changes in the broad relief awarded by the District Court. The Court of Appeals [476 U.S. 610, 650] gave absolutely no indication that it was construing the District Court's judgment one whit less broadly than that judgment's language indicated. Nowhere, therefore, is there a justification for the plurality's reconstructive reading of the Court of Appeals' judgment. </s> [Footnote 3 I note in this regard that the parties as well do not appear to have contemplated the more limited reading of the judgment below adopted by the plurality. See Brief for Petitioner 9; Brief for Respondents American Hospital Association et al. 4; Brief for Respondents American Medical Association et al. 14. </s> [Footnote 4 I would not avoid the issue of the validity of University Hospital even if the judgment below were limited to invalidation of these regulations. Given that the judgment below, whether it extends as far as University Hospital or not, was based on the University Hospital view that all regulation of medical treatment decisions is outside the Secretary's 504 authority because of the nature of those decisions, I believe that the better approach here would be for the Court to determine the correctness of University Hospital in any case. </s> [Footnote 5 The Court of Appeals first addressed and reserved the question whether the hospital or its functions comprised a program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. Noting that this was a fact-specific inquiry, cf. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), the Court of Appeals assumed that the entire hospital was covered by 504 and proceeded to consider "whether, assuming the entire hospital is covered by section 504, the statute authorizes the type of investigation initiated here." 729 F.2d, at 151. </s> I also do not consider whether or under what circumstances hospitals or hospital neonatal programs may constitute programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance. The judgment of the District Court which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals does not set forth guidelines for interpreting this language in this context: It merely enjoins actions directed at such programs or activities. The regulations as well simply adopt the statutory language without interpreting it. Thus, I assume here that the 504 strictures would be applied only to appropriate programs or activities, and I therefore would leave discussion of this fact-specific issue for further proceedings. I would not now hold that 504 may never apply on this basis. </s> [Footnote 6 Although infants with birth defects are clearly handicapped individuals covered by 504, there is one manner in which they may differ from most other handicapped individuals for 504 purposes. Specifically, they may have a combination of conditions - some of which are medically correctable and some of which are not. In older handicapped individuals, medically correctable conditions may have been corrected so that only irreparable handicapping conditions remain. In a newborn infant, however, both correctable and incorrectable conditions may exist. Thus, since both of these [476 U.S. 610, 653] may interfere with major life activities, both types of conditions may be considered to be handicaps. In this context, however, it might make more sense to consider as handicaps only those conditions that cannot be medically treated to the point that they will not impair major life activities. For such correctable conditions would not be likely to cause the infant to be regarded as handicapped. In any case, I believe that defining an infant's handicap may well be a delicate problem and one that deserves some consideration. </s> [Footnote 7 It would appear that for an infant to be qualified for treatment his or her parents must have consented to such treatment. For the purposes of this discussion of whether the Court of Appeals was correct that medical treatment decisions may never be regulated by 504, I assume that parental consent has been given and that the arguably discriminatory treatment decision is being made by the hospital or doctor. The Court of Appeals in University Hospital concentrated on the nature of these decisions in concluding that 504 may not properly be applied, and I concentrate on that as well. That a situation in which treatment is refused where parental consent has been given may not have been shown to have arisen does not undermine this assumption here. The critical question is whether the operative provisions of 504 may ever apply here given the nature of the decision. </s> For the purposes of addressing the Court of Appeals' University Hospital analysis, the most straightforward fact situation to consider is one in which the benefit provided is the medical treatment itself and in which a hospital refuses treatment in the face of parental consent. In this context, the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the nature of the decisions themselves precludes application of 504 may be addressed with maximum simplicity. I note, however, that it may well be that the benefits provided by hospitals and doctors and covered by 504 extend beyond treatment itself. For example, one benefit provided by hospitals and doctors to patients who cannot make their own medical treatment decisions may be medical advice in those patients' best interest to those who must ultimately make the relevant medical treatment decisions. To the extent that the provision of this benefit is a program or activity covered by the statute, I would think that the statute requires that the same advice be given to parents of a handicapped baby as to the parents of a similarly situated nonhandicapped baby. Another benefit provided may be the reporting of nontreatment to the relevant state agency in the case of a parental decision not to treat. Again, [476 U.S. 610, 654] to the extent that the provision of this benefit is a program or activity covered by the statute, see n. 13, infra, I would think that 504 requires that the hospital or doctor report nontreatment of a handicapped baby when it would report the denial of the same treatment for a nonhandicapped baby. </s> My conclusions in this regard are buttressed by my view of 504's coverage in the case of a medical treatment decision regarding a black baby. If a hospital or doctor advised different or less efficacious treatment for a black baby than for a white baby, I believe that this would be discrimination under the statute. Similarly, a failure to report a parental decision not to treat because of race would seem to me to be illegally discriminatory - assuming that this decision otherwise came within the statute. </s> In sum, although these additional situations present the same issue as to when a handicapped baby is otherwise qualified and when such a baby is subjected to discrimination as does the direct example of a refusal to treat and although it may well be that it would be in these contexts that the statute would most likely be given effect, for simplicity's sake I have centered my discussion of University Hospital on the refusal-to-treat example. </s> [Footnote 8 There are substantial arguments that could be made that the Court of Appeals too narrowly read the statute. It could be argued, for example, that the benefit provided by hospitals is not defined in terms of specific treatments. Rather, the benefit is "general medical care for whatever happens to need treating." If this is the benefit, then a much broader application of the statute in this context is reasonable. Alternatively, even if the benefit is defined more narrowly, "reasonable accommodation" might require more than mere impartial dispensing of identical treatment. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299 -300, and nn. 19, 20 (1985). I need not resolve this issue of the exact meaning of 504 and Davis in this context, however, because my conclusion that University Hospital's broad reasoning was incorrect does not depend on it. Although I do not resolve these issues, I note that while the more expansive interpretations seem consistent with the interpretation adopted by the Secretary in the regulations, the more restrictive one does not. See 45 CFR pt. 84, Appendix C, §(a) (1985). </s> [Footnote 9 In addition, although the Secretary did not brief the merits of respondents' claim that the regulations are invalid because arbitrary and capricious, the Secretary did indicate his view that this claim in its current form is not properly in the case and that it is inadequate on its face. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 16, n. 6. </s> Specifically, the Secretary first asserts that respondents' argument as to the lack of factual basis involving situations in which parents have consented to treatment was not raised in the complaint. See App. 146 (challenging lack of showing of instances where "erroneous" parental decisions were made and where medical authorities did not take proper measures under state law). Thus, the Secretary contends that the first major claim addressed and relied on by the plurality was never properly raised. Second, the Secretary contends that these are interpretative regulations that impose no new substantive duties, see 49 Fed. Reg. 1628 (1984), and that no factual basis for their issuance need therefore be given. Cf. 5 U.S.C. 553(b). </s> These contentions, although not perhaps representing a procedural bar to our reaching this claim, see ante, at 629, n. 14, do provide an additional sign that the plurality's resolution of this case rests on shaky ground. </s> [Footnote 10 At this point in the case, as the plurality observes, all parties concerned agree that parental decisions are not included in 504's application. See ante, at 630. </s> [Footnote 11 See, e. g., Duff & Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care Nursery, 289 N. Eng. J. Med. 890 (1973). See also Gross, [476 U.S. 610, 659] Cox, Tatyrek, Pollay, & Barnes, Early Management and Decision Making for the Treatment of Myelomeningocele, 72 Pediatrics 450 (1983). </s> [Footnote 12 Presumably, the program or activity that 504 would apply to in this context would be the hospital's neonatal program of medical care or the hospital's program of medical care generally. In either case, actions of both doctors and hospitals that cause or permit discriminatory decisions that are taken as part of the program or activity would be subject to 504's constraints. </s> [Footnote 13 The plurality reserves the question whether reporting would be a program or activity receiving federal financial assistance, ante, at 639, n. 25, and I follow that course. </s> [Footnote 14 The plurality itself says that "regulations may be imposed for preventative prophylactic reasons," ante, at 643, but concludes that the Secretary here proceeded based on the perception of an actual problem rather than a need for prophylactic rules. To me, however, the Secretary's statement that the rules are appropriate if necessary for even one problem situation makes the plurality's distinction in this respect questionable: The line between a prophylactic rule and a rule that draws its justification from the likely existence of even one unlawful action seems to me a very fine one. </s> [Footnote 15 See nn. 1-2, supra, and accompanying text. </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting. </s> I fully agree with JUSTICE WHITE'S conclusion that the only question properly before us is whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the Secretary has no power under 29 U.S.C. 794 to regulate medical treatment decisions concerning handicapped newborn infants. I also agree that application of established principles of statutory construction and of the appropriate standard for judicial review [476 U.S. 610, 666] of agency action leads inescapably to the conclusion that the Secretary has the authority to regulate in this area. Because, however, I see no need at this juncture to address the details of the regulations or to assess whether they are sufficiently rational to survive review under 5 U.S.C. 706 (2)(A), I join only parts I, II, IV, and V of JUSTICE WHITE'S dissent. </s> [476 U.S. 610, 667]

United States Supreme Court ICC v. LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS(1987) No. 85-792 Argued: November 10, 1986Decided: June 8, 1987 </s> In October 1982, petitioner Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC or Commission) issued an order, which, inter alia, granted petitioner Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co. and another railroad the right to conduct operations using the tracks of a third, newly consolidated carrier. In April 1983, respondent Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE) filed a "Petition for Clarification" asking the ICC to declare that the earlier order did not authorize the tenant railroads to use their own crews on routes they had not previously served. In an order served on May 18, 1983, the ICC denied the petition, ruling that its prior decision did not require clarification since the tenant railroads' trackage rights applications had proposed that they use their own crews and the Commission's approval of the applications authorized such operations. BLE and respondent United Transportation Union then filed timely petitions for reconsideration of the May 18 order, contending, inter alia, that the tenant railroads' crewing procedures violated employee protections that had been included in the original order. In an order served on October 25, 1983, the ICC denied these petitions, responding in detail to the unions' contentions. On respondent unions' petitions for review, the Court of Appeals vacated the ICC orders of May 18 and October 25, rejecting the threshold claim that its review was time barred, and ruling for the unions on the merits. </s> Held: </s> 1. Although respondent unions' petitions for Court of Appeals review of the ICC's October 25, 1983, order were timely filed, they should have been dismissed since the order itself, whereby the Commission refused to reconsider its May 18, 1983, order refusing to clarify its prior approval order, is unreviewable. Pp. 277-284. </s> (a) Since an ICC order in a rail proceeding is "final on the date on which it is served," the unions' petitions for review of the October 25 order, which petitions were filed with the Court of Appeals on December [482 U.S. 270, 271] 16 and 23, 1983, were timely under the Hobbs Act, which requires that any person aggrieved by an ICC final order file a review petition within 60 days after the order's entry. P. 277. </s> (b) Only when a petition to reopen and reconsider an agency order alleges new evidence or changed circumstances is the agency's refusal to reopen subject to judicial review, and then only as to whether such refusal was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Where, as here, the petition to reopen is based not on new data but only on alleged "material error," the agency's denial of the petition is not subject to judicial review. Such an appeal would place before the court precisely the same substance that could have been brought before it by timely appeal from the original order. Review in that circumstance would serve no purpose if the reconsideration petition were filed within the agency's discretionary review period (and within the period for judicial review of the original order), since the petition would toll the judicial review period and thereby preserve a direct appeal of the original order until reconsideration was denied. On the other hand, if the reconsideration petition were untimely filed, judicial review would serve only the peculiar purpose of extending indefinitely the time within which seriously mistaken agency orders could be judicially overturned, since it would have to be shown not only that the original agency decision was unlawful, but that it was so unlawful that refusal to reconsider it is an abuse of discretion. It is irrelevant that the ICC's order discussed respondent unions' substantive claims at length, since it is the Commission's formal action, rather than its discussion, that is dispositive as to whether reconsideration was in fact granted or denied. Pp. 277-281. </s> (c) In addition to being implicit in the Hobbs Act's 60-day limitation on seeking judicial review, nonreviewability of refusals to reopen for material error is established by 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2), which precludes judicial review of action "committed to agency discretion by law." Refusals to reopen have traditionally been reviewed only when new evidence or changed circumstances are alleged, and it is impossible to devise an adequate standard of review when only material error is alleged. Application of the ordinary standards for reviewing errors of law and fact would entirely frustrate the Hobbs Act's time limitation, and the only other alternative - some form of "clearly erroneous" standard - would produce the strange result that only really bad mistakes (whatever that term might mean when considerable discretion is already afforded to agencies) would escape the time limitation. Nor does agency action become reviewable merely because the agency gives a "reviewable" reason - i. e., a reason that courts are well qualified to consider - for that action. Pp. 281-284. [482 U.S. 270, 272] </s> 2. Although the petition for Court of Appeals review of the ICC's May 18, 1983, order was timely filed, it should have been dismissed since the order itself, which denied BLE's petition for clarification of the earlier trackage rights approval order, is not appealable. Pp. 284-287. </s> (a) Even though the petition for judicial review was filed more than 60 days after the May 18 order was served, it was nonetheless effective because respondent unions' timely petitions for administrative reconsideration stayed the running of the Hobbs Act's filing period until the ICC denied reconsideration. Although a contrary conclusion is suggested by the language of 49 U.S.C. 10327(i), which provides that, notwithstanding the statutory provision authorizing ICC reconsideration of its orders, a Commission action is final and can be appealed on the day it is served, in view of prior constructions of similar language in 5 U.S.C. 704 that language must be construed merely to relieve parties from the requirement of petitioning for reconsideration before seeking judicial review, but not to prevent reconsideration petitions that are actually filed from rendering orders under reconsideration nonfinal. Pp. 284-285. </s> (b) If BLE's petition is treated as a genuine "Petition for Clarification" - i. e., as seeking only a specification, one way or the other, of what the original order meant - its denial is unappealable because BLE could not be considered "aggrieved" under the Hobbs Act by the ICC's unambiguous explanation in the order of what the earlier order meant. If, as is more likely, BLE's petition was actually treated by the parties as a petition to reopen based on what BLE felt to be a serious error of law, the petition's denial is unreviewable under the Court's analysis, supra, since BLE put forth no new evidence or changed circumstances. There can be no exception to the rule of nonreviewability even where an order is ambiguous and thereby causes a party to think that its interests are not infringed, since the Hobbs Act's time limit would then be held hostage to ever-present ambiguities. The remedy for such ambiguity is to petition the Commission for reconsideration within the 60-day period, thereby enabling judicial review to be pursued (if ICC resolution of the ambiguity is adverse) after disposition of that petition. Pp. 285-286. </s> 245 U.S. App. D.C. 311, 761 F.2d 714, vacated and remanded. </s> SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 287. </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 85-793, Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers et al., also on certiorari to the same court. </s> Henri F. Rush argued the cause for petitioner in No. 85-792. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Deputy Solicitor General Cohen, Robert S. Burk, and [482 U.S. 270, 273] Sidney L. Strickland, Jr. Joseph L. Manson III, argued the cause for petitioner in No. 85-793. With him on the briefs was Michael E. Roper. </s> Harold A. Ross argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers in both cases. John O'B. Clarke, Jr., argued the cause for respondent United Transportation Union in both cases. With him on the brief was Robert L. Hart. Charles A. Miller, Gregg H. Levy, and Mark B. Goodwin filed a brief for respondents Union Pacific Railroad Co. et al.Fn </s> Fn [482 U.S. 270, 273] Richard T. Conway, William F. Sheehan, and Kenneth P. Kolson filed a brief for the Association of American Railroads et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. </s> JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> On September 15, 1980, Union Pacific Railroad Co. (UP) and Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. (MP) and their respective corporate parents filed a joint application with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC or Commission) seeking permission for UP to acquire control of MP. The same day, a similar but separate application was jointly filed by UP and the Western Pacific Railroad Co. (WP). In a consolidated proceeding, the control applications were opposed by a number of labor organizations, including respondents Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE) and United Transportation Union (UTU), as well as several competing railroads, including petitioner Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co. (MKT) and the Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. (DRGW). MKT and DRGW, in addition to opposing the mergers, filed responsive applications seeking the right to conduct operations using the track of the new consolidated carrier in the event that the control applications were approved. MKT's request for trackage rights specified that "MKT, with its own employees, and at its sole cost and expense, shall operate its engines, cars and trains on and along Joint Track." Proposed Trackage Rights Agreement 5, Finance [482 U.S. 270, 274] Docket No. 30,000 (Sub.-No. 25). DRGW's application indicated that it "may, at its option, elect to employ its own crews for the movement of its trains, locomotives and cars to points on or over the Joint Track." Proposed Trackage Rights Agreement 6(c)(3), Finance Docket No. 30,000 (Sub.-No. 18). </s> On October 20, 1982, the ICC approved UP's control acquisitions and granted MKT's application for trackage rights over 200 miles of MP and UP track in four States and DRGW's application for rights over 619 miles of MP track between Pueblo and Kansas City. See Union Pacific Corp., Pacific Rail System, Inc. & Union Pacific R. Co. - Control - Missouri Pacific Corp. & Missouri Pacific R. Co., 366 I. C. C. 459 (1982), aff'd sub nom. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. ICC, 237 U.S. App. D.C. 99, 736 F.2d 708 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). The approved trackage rights were to become effective "immediately upon consummation of the consolidations." 366 I. C. C., at 590. </s> It is the Commission's standard practice, in pursuit of its statutory responsibility to shield railroad employees from dislocations resulting from actions that it approves, see 49 U.S.C. 11347, to impose on trackage rights transactions a set of employee protections known as the "NW-BN-Mendocino" conditions. See Norfolk and Western R. Co. - Trackage Rights - Burlington Northern, Inc., 354 I. C. C. 605 (1978), modified, Mendocino Coast R. Co. - Lease and Operate - California Western R. Co., 360 I. C. C. 653 (1980), aff'd sub nom. Railway Labor Executives' Assn. v. United States, 219 U.S. App. D.C. 23, 675 F.2d 1248 (1982). These provide, inter alia, for "the selection of forces from all employees involved," 354 I. C. C., at 610, in transactions involving the dismissal or displacement of employees, and for retention of "[t]he rates of pay, rules, working conditions and all collective bargaining and other rights, privileges and benefits . . . unless changed by future collective bargaining agreements or applicable statutes." Ibid. The ICC's October [482 U.S. 270, 275] 20, 1982, order indicated, without discussion, that approval of the trackage rights applications was "subject to the imposition of employee protective conditions to the extent specified in [NW-BN and Mendocino]." 366 I. C. C., at 654. See also id., at 471, 622. </s> The control transactions among UP, MP, and WP were consummated on December 22, 1982, at which point the grants of trackage rights also became effective. MKT commenced its operations, using its own crews, on or about January 6, 1983; and DRGW shortly thereafter entered into an agreement with MP providing "for using MP crews on [DRGW] trains for a temporary, interim period, after which [DRGW] will operate the trains with [its] own crews." App. in Nos. 83-2290 and 83-2317 (CADC), p. 6. Although numerous parties, including BLE, had petitioned for review of the Commission's October 20, 1982, order (which was affirmed in most respects some 18 months later, see Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. ICC, supra), no question concerning the crewing of MKT or DRGW trains was raised at that time. However, on April 4, 1983, BLE filed with the Commission a "Petition for Clarification," contending that the Commission had no jurisdiction to, and as a matter of consistent practice did not, inject itself into labor matters such as crew selection, and asking the Commission to declare that its October 20, 1982, order did not have the intent or effect of authorizing the tenant carriers to use their own crews on routes that they had not previously served. 1 In a brief order served May 18, 1983, the Commission denied the petition, ruling that its prior decision "does not require clarification." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 85-793, p. A38. The [482 U.S. 270, 276] tenant railroads, it said, had proposed to use their own crews in their trackage rights applications, and "our approval of the applications authorizes such operations." Ibid. </s> Within the period prescribed by Commission rules for filing petitions for administrative review, see 49 CFR 1115.3(e) (1986), both BLE and UTU sought "reconsideration" of the Commission's denial. In addition to repeating BLE's earlier arguments, the unions contended that the tenant railroads' crewing procedures constituted a unilateral change in working conditions forbidden by the NW-BN-Mendocino labor protective conditions, by the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151 et seq. (RLA), and by collective-bargaining agreements, and that the Commission had made no findings that would justify exempting the trackage rights transactions from applicable labor laws. In a lengthy order served on October 25, 1983, responding in some detail to all of the major contentions, the Commission denied the petitions. In particular, the Commission emphasized its reliance on 49 U.S.C. 11341(a), which provides that a carrier participating in a consolidation approved by the Commission "is exempt from the antitrust laws and from all other law . . . as necessary to let that person carry out the transaction . . . ." The Commission concluded that the exemption provided by this section extends to the RLA and is self-executing, requiring no findings by the Commission to make it effective. </s> On December 16, 1983, BLE petitioned for judicial review of the May 18, 1983, and October 25, 1983, orders; UTU petitioned for review of the latter order on December 23, 1983. The cases were consolidated, and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated both orders. 245 U.S. App. D.C. 311, 761 F.2d 714 (1985). The court rejected the threshold claim that the appeals were time barred, and concluded on the merits that if the ICC intended to exempt the railroads from the requirements of the RLA, it was required to explain, as it had not done, why that exemption [482 U.S. 270, 277] was necessary to effectuate the transactions it approved. The dissent disagreed on both counts. </s> MKT and the Commission filed petitions for certiorari on the question of the proper construction of 11341(a), which we granted and consolidated for argument. See 475 U.S. 1081 (1986). We now conclude that the petitions for review must be dismissed. </s> I </s> The petitions for review and the Court of Appeals' order encompass both the May 18, 1983, order refusing to clarify the Commission's prior approval order, and the October 25, 1983, order refusing to reconsider that refusal to clarify. We consider first the appeal of the latter order. </s> With certain exceptions not relevant here, see 28 U.S.C. 1336(b), judicial review of final orders of the ICC is governed by the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2341 et seq., which provides that any party aggrieved by a "final order" of the Commission "may, within 60 days after its entry, file a petition to review the order in the court of appeals wherein venue lies." 2344. A Commission order in a rail proceeding is "final on the date on which it is served." 49 U.S.C. 10327(i). The Commission's order refusing to reconsider its refusal to clarify thus became final on October 25, 1983, and the unions' petitions for review - filed on December 16, 1983, and December 23, 1983 - were therefore timely for purposes of reviewing that order (though they obviously were not timely for purposes of reviewing the original order of October 20, 1982). However, although the timeliness requirements of the Hobbs Act were satisfied, the order from which the unions have appealed is unreviewable. </s> The Commission's authority to reopen and reconsider its prior actions stems from 49 U.S.C. 10327(g), which provides: </s> "The Commission may, at any time on its own initiative because of material error, new evidence, or substantially changed circumstances - [482 U.S. 270, 278] </s> "(A) reopen a proceeding; </s> "(B) grant rehearing, reargument, or reconsideration of an action of the Commission; and </s> "(C) change an action of the Commission. </s> "An interested party may petition to reopen and reconsider an action of the Commission under this paragraph under regulations of the Commission." </s> When the Commission reopens a proceeding for any reason and, after reconsideration, issues a new and final order setting forth the rights and obligations of the parties, that order - even if it merely reaffirms the rights and obligations set forth in the original order - is reviewable on its merits. See, e. g., United States v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 329 U.S. 424 (1947). Where, however, the Commission refuses to reopen a proceeding, what is reviewable is merely the lawfulness of the refusal. Absent some provision of law requiring a reopening (which is not asserted to exist here), the basis for challenge must be that the refusal to reopen was "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion." 5 U.S.C. 706 (2)(A). We have said that overturning the refusal to reopen requires "a showing of the clearest abuse of discretion," United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc., 327 U.S. 515, 534 -535 (1946), and we have actually reversed the ICC only once, see Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 248 (1932), in a decision that was "promptly restricted . . . to its special facts, . . . and . . . stands virtually alone." ICC v. Jersey City, 322 U.S. 503, 515 (1944). See also Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 295 -296 (1974). More importantly for present purposes, all of our cases entertaining review of a refusal to reopen appear to have involved petitions alleging "new evidence" or "changed circumstances" that rendered the agency's original order inappropriate. See id., at 295, and cases cited therein; Jersey City, supra, at 514-518, and cases cited therein. We know of no case in which we have reviewed the denial of a petition to reopen [482 U.S. 270, 279] based upon no more than "material error" in the original agency decision. There is good reason for distinguishing between the two. If review of denial to reopen for new evidence or changed circumstances is unavailable, the petitioner will have been deprived of all opportunity for judicial consideration - even on a "clearest abuse of discretion" basis - of facts which, through no fault of his own, the original proceeding did not contain. By contrast, where no new data but only "material error" has been put forward as the basis for reopening, an appeal places before the courts precisely the same substance that could have been brought there by appeal from the original order - but asks them to review it on the strange, one-step-removed basis of whether the agency decision is not only unlawful, but so unlawful that the refusal to reconsider it is an abuse of discretion. Such an appeal serves no purpose whatever where a petition for reconsideration has been filed within a discretionary review period specifically provided by the agency 2 (and within the period allotted for judicial review of the original order), since in that situation the petition tolls the period for judicial review of the original order, which can therefore be appealed to the courts directly after the petition for reconsideration is denied. And where the petition is filed outside that period (and outside the [482 U.S. 270, 280] period for judicial review of the original order) judicial review would serve only the peculiar purpose of extending indefinitely the time within which seriously mistaken agency orders can be judicially overturned. That is to say, the Hobbs Act's 60-day limitation provision would effectively be subjected to a proviso that reads: "Provided, however, that if the agency error is so egregious that refusal to correct it would be an abuse of discretion, judicial review may be sought at any time." </s> For these reasons, we agree with the conclusion reached in an earlier case by the Court of Appeals that, where a party petitions an agency for reconsideration on the ground of "material error," i. e., on the same record that was before the agency when it rendered its original decision, "an order which merely denies rehearing of . . . [the prior] order is not itself reviewable." Microwave Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 169 U.S. App. D.C. 154, 156, n. 7, 515 F.2d 385, 387, n. 7 (1974). See also SEC v. Louisiana Public Service Comm'n, 353 U.S. 368, 371 -372 (1957); National Bank of Davis v. Comptroller of Currency, 233 U.S. App. D.C. 284, 285, and n. 3, 725 F.2d 1390, 1391, and n. 3 (1984); 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2). This rule is familiar from other contexts. If a judicial panel or an en banc court denies rehearing, no one supposes that that denial, as opposed to the panel opinion, is an appealable action (though the filing of a timely rehearing petition, like the filing of a timely petition for agency reconsideration, extends the time for appealing from the original decision). </s> It is irrelevant that the Commission's order refusing reconsideration discussed the merits of the unions' claims at length. Where the Commission's formal disposition is to deny reconsideration, and where it makes no alteration in the underlying order, we will not undertake an inquiry into whether reconsideration "in fact" occurred. In a sense, of course, it always occurs, since one cannot intelligently rule upon a petition to reconsider without reflecting upon, among [482 U.S. 270, 281] other things, whether clear error was shown. It would hardly be sensible to say that the Commission can genuinely deny reconsideration only when it gives the matter no thought; nor to say that the character of its action (as grant or denial) depends upon whether it chooses to disclose its reasoning. Rather, it is the Commission's formal action, rather than its discussion, that is dispositive. Accordingly, the petitions for review of the Commission's October 25, 1983, order refusing to reconsider its May 18, 1983, refusal to clarify should have been dismissed. </s> That portion of the concurrence which deals with the issue of jurisdiction (Part I) consists largely of the citation and discussion of numerous cases affording judicial review of agency refusals to reopen. In the third from last paragraph, however, one finds the acknowledgment that all these cases involved refusals "based upon new evidence or changed circumstances" rather than upon "material error," post, at 293-294, and are therefore fully in accord with the principle set forth in the present opinion. The only point of dispute between this opinion and the concurrence is whether separate treatment of refusals to reopen based on material error has some basis in statute or is rather, as the concurrence would have it, "a pure creature of judicial invention." Post, at 294. </s> Even if our search for statutory authorization were limited to the text of the Hobbs Act, it seems to us not inventiveness but the most plebeian statutory construction to find implicit in the 60-day limit upon judicial review a prohibition against the agency's permitting, or a litigant's achieving, perpetual availability of review by the mere device of filing a suggestion that the agency has made a mistake and should consider the matter again. Substantial disregard of the Hobbs Act is effected, not by our opinion, but by what the concurrence delivers (after having rejected our views) in Part II of its opinion: on-the-merits review of an agency decision of law rendered 14 months before the petition for review was filed, using the same standard of review that would have been [482 U.S. 270, 282] applied had appeal been filed within the congressionally prescribed 60-day period. </s> Statutory authority for preventing this untoward result need not be sought solely in the Hobbs Act, however. While the Hobbs Act specifies the form of proceeding for judicial review of ICC orders, see 5 U.S.C. 703, it is the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) that codifies the nature and attributes of judicial review, including the traditional principle of its unavailability "to the extent that . . . agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. 701 (a)(2). We have recently had occasion to apply this limitation to the general grant of jurisdiction contained in 28 U.S.C. 1331, see Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); it applies to the general grant of jurisdiction of the Hobbs Act as well. In Chaney we found that the type of agency decision in question "has traditionally been `committed to agency discretion,' and . . . that the Congress enacting the APA did not intend to alter that tradition." Id., at 832. As discussed above, we perceive that a similar tradition of nonreviewability exists with regard to refusals to reconsider for material error, by agencies as by lower courts; and we believe that to be another tradition that 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2) was meant to preserve. We are confirmed in that view by the impossibility of devising an adequate standard of review for such agency action. One is driven either to apply the ordinary standards for reviewing errors of fact or law (in which event the time limitation of the Hobbs Act - or whatever other time limitation applies to the particular case - will be entirely frustrated); or else to adopt some "clearly erroneous" standard (which produces the strange result that only really bad mistakes escape the time limitation - whatever "really bad" might mean in this context where great deference is already accorded to agency action). The concurrence chooses to impale itself upon the first horn of this dilemma. </s> The concurrence's effort to bring SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), into the present discussion is misguided. [482 U.S. 270, 283] That case pertains to the basis that a court may use for the affirmance of agency action that is reviewable. (It may not affirm on a basis containing any element of discretion - including discretion to find facts and interpret statutory ambiguities - that is not the basis the agency used, since that would remove the discretionary judgment from the agency to the court.) Chenery has nothing whatever to do with whether agency action is reviewable. It does not establish, as the concurrence evidently believes, the principle that if the agency gives a "reviewable" reason for otherwise unreviewable action, the action becomes reviewable. To demonstrate the falsity of that proposition it is enough to observe that a common reason for failure to prosecute an alleged criminal violation is the prosecutor's belief (sometimes publicly stated) that the law will not sustain a conviction. That is surely an eminently "reviewable" proposition, in the sense that courts are well qualified to consider the point; yet it is entirely clear that the refusal to prosecute cannot be the subject of judicial review. </s> Finally, we may note that the concurrence's solution to review of denials of reconsideration, in addition to nullifying limitation periods, is simply not workable (or not workable on any basis the concurrence has explained) in the vast majority of cases. The concurrence reviews the Commission's stated conclusions regarding 49 U.S.C. 11341 on the usual basis applicable to agency conclusions of law, and reviews the Commission's stated refusal to consider the newly raised (though previously available) issue of RLA crewing rights on an "abuse of discretion" standard. The vast majority of denials of reconsideration, however, are made without statement of reasons, since 5 U.S.C. 555(e) exempts from the normal APA requirement of "a brief statement of the grounds for denial" agency action that consists of "affirming a prior denial." One wonders how, in this more normal context, the concurrence would go about determining what answer Chenery supplies to the question of reviewability - and, [482 U.S. 270, 284] if the answer permits review, what standard to apply. Under the proper analysis, the solution is clear: If the petition that was denied sought reopening on the basis of new evidence or changed circumstances review is available and abuse of discretion is the standard; otherwise, the agency's refusal to go back over ploughed ground is nonreviewable. </s> II </s> There remains BLE's appeal from the May 18, 1983, order denying its petition for clarification. While the petition for review was filed more than 60 days after that order was served, we conclude that it was nonetheless effective, because the timely petition for administrative reconsideration stayed the running of the Hobbs Act's limitation period until the petition had been acted upon by the Commission. A contrary conclusion is admittedly suggested by the language of the Hobbs Act and of 49 U.S.C. 10327(i), which provides that, "[n]otwithstanding" the provision authorizing the Commission to reopen and reconsider its orders ( 10327(g)), "an action of the Commission . . . is final on the date on which it is served, and a civil action to enforce, enjoin, suspend, or set aside the action may be filed after that date." This would seem to mean that the pendency of reconsideration motions does not render Commission orders nonfinal for purposes of triggering the Hobbs Act limitations period. The same argument could be made, however, with respect to a similar provision of the APA, 5 U.S.C. 704, which reads in relevant part: "Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise final is final for the purposes of this section [entitled `Actions Reviewable'] whether or not there has been presented or determined an application for . . . any form of reconsiderations, or, unless the agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency authority." That language has long been construed by this and other courts merely to relieve [482 U.S. 270, 285] parties from the requirement of petitioning for rehearing before seeking judicial review (unless, of course, specifically required to do so by statute - see, e. g., 15 U.S.C. 717r, 3416(a)), but not to prevent petitions for reconsideration that are actually filed from rendering the orders under reconsideration nonfinal. See American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service, 397 U.S. 532, 541 (1970) (dictum); CAB v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316, 326 -327 (1961) (dictum); id., at 339-343 (Whittaker, J., dissenting); Outland v. CAB, 109 U.S. App. D.C. 90, 93, 284 F.2d 224, 227 (1960). We can find no basis for distinguishing the language of 10327(i) from that of 704. The appeal from the denial of clarification was therefore timely. </s> As with the Commission's denial of reconsideration, however, its denial of clarification was not an appealable order. If BLE's motion is treated as a genuine "Petition for Clarification" - i. e., as seeking nothing more than specification, one way or the other, of what the original order meant with regard to crewing rights - then the denial is unappealable because BLE was not "aggrieved" by it within the meaning of the Hobbs Act. BLE could have been aggrieved by a refusal to clarify in this narrow sense only if the refusal left it uncertain as to the Commission's view of its rights or obligations, which plainly was not the case. Though the May 18, 1983, order denied the petition for clarification, the text of the denial made it unmistakably clear that the Commission interpreted the October 20, 1982, order as authorizing MKT and DRGW to use their own crews. BLE could, of course, disagree with that construction, but it could hardly complain that the clarification it sought had not been provided. </s> In fact, however, we think that BLE's petition was understood by all of the parties to be in effect a petition to reopen. BLE did not merely ask the Commission for clarification; it asked for clarification "in the manner set forth [in the petition]," App. in Nos. 83-2290 and 83-2317 (CADC), p. 5, i. e., for "clarification" that the October 20, 1982, order meant [482 U.S. 270, 286] what the unions believed it to mean. Most precisely described, the petition sought, in the alternative, clarification or (in the event clarification would be contrary to the union's interpretation) reopening of the earlier order. Even when the petition is viewed as a petition to reopen, however, the Commission's denial is no more reviewable than is its denial of the petitions for reconsideration discussed earlier. BLE brought forth no new evidence or changed circumstances; it merely urged the Commission to correct what BLE thought to be a serious error of law. That should have been sought many months earlier, by an appeal from the original order. </s> We are not prepared to acknowledge an exception to that requirement where an order is ambiguous, so that a party might think that its interests are not infringed. The remedy for such ambiguity is to petition the Commission for reconsideration within the 60-day period, enabling judicial review to be pursued (if Commission resolution of the ambiguity is adverse) after disposition of that petition. Otherwise, the time limits of the Hobbs Act would be held hostage to everpresent ambiguities. If, of course, the ICC's action here had gone beyond what was (at most) clarification of an ambiguity, and in the guise of interpreting the original order in fact revised it, that would have been a new order immediately appealable. It is impossible to make such a contention here. It was, at the very most, arguable that the Commission's routine reference to the general NW-BN-Mendocino conditions was meant to cause those conditions to supersede, in the event of conflict, the specific terms of the trackage rights applications that the Commission generally approved - and also far from certain that any conflict between the two existed, since it was unclear whether the protective conditions extended to the situation in which the landlord and tenant railroads conduct no joint operations and the tenant carries only traffic for its own account. [482 U.S. 270, 287] </s> The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals with instructions to dismiss the petitions for lack of jurisdiction. </s> Vacated and remanded. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Ordinarily, a petition for relief from a final order is denominated a "petition to reopen." See 49 CFR 1115.3(a), 1115.4(1986). A Commission rule, however, permits parties to "see[k] relief not provided for in any other rule," 49 CFR 1117.1 (1986), including clarification of the terms of a prior order. See Burlington Northern Inc. v. United States, 459 U.S. 131, 136 (1982). </s> [Footnote 2 The ICC's regulations, for example, provide as follows: </s> "(a) A discretionary appeal is permitted. It will be designated a `petition for administrative review,' except that, when it is related to an action of the entire Commission in the first instance, it must be designated a `petition to reopen.' </s> "(b) The petition will be granted only upon a showing of one or more of the following points: </s> . . . . . </s> "(3) The prior action was taken by the entire Commission in the first instance, and involves material error. </s> . . . . . </s> "(e) Petitions must be filed within 20 days after the service of the action or within any further period (not to exceed 20 days) as a division or the Commission may authorize." 49 CFR 1115.3 (1986). </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, concurring in the judgment. </s> Congress has authorized interested parties to petition the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC or Commission) to reopen a proceeding, grant rehearing or reconsideration, or change an action of the Commission "because of material error, new evidence, or substantially changed circumstances." 49 U.S.C. 10327(g). The statute draws no distinction between petitions alleging that the action was based on "material error" and petitions alleging "new evidence, or substantially changed circumstances." Nor does the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2341 et seq., which affords judicial review of agency orders, recognize any such distinction. Yet, solely because it believes that such a distinction is desirable as a matter of policy, the Court today fashions a new rule of "jurisdiction." </s> The Court holds that agency decisions denying petitions for reopening based on "material error" are not subject to judicial review, even if the denial is arbitrary or contrary to law. Because this holding is not supported by the relevant statutes, and is contrary to longstanding principles of administrative law, I cannot subscribe to it. Addressing the merits, I conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the ICC's decisions not to reopen the matter before it. To the extent that the Commission based those decisions on its reading of the statute, its reading was correct; to the extent that it refused to consider issues not raised previously, it did not abuse its discretion. </s> I </s> The Administrative Orders Review Act, 28 U.S.C. 2341 et seq., commonly known as the Hobbs Act, is quite plain in [482 U.S. 270, 288] spelling out when and where parties may file petitions for judicial review of agency decisions. After stating that the courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to "enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of all rules, regulations, or final orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission," 28 U.S.C. 2342 (except for certain orders not relevant here which are reviewed in the district courts, see 28 U.S.C. 2321), the Act provides: </s> "Any party aggrieved by the final order may, within 60 days after its entry, file a petition to review the order in the court of appeals where venue lies." 28 U.S.C. 2344. </s> The Court appears to agree that all of these elements were satisfied here. The denials of reopening and reconsideration constituted final orders; respondents were aggrieved parties; the petitions were filed within the required time period; and venue was appropriate in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Nonetheless, the Court concludes that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the petitions for want of jurisdiction. </s> I agree with the Court that the only agency actions properly before the Court of Appeals were the ICC's denial of clarification served on May 18, 1983 (which the Court properly treats as a motion to reopen), and the ICC's denial of reconsideration served on October 25, 1983. I also agree that, depending on an agency's regulations, a decision whether to reopen may be based on discretionary factors that will virtually always survive judicial review. But this does not divest the courts of appeals of jurisdiction; it simply means that an agency's decision based on such discretionary considerations will almost always, if not always, be upheld as not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). See United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc., 327 U.S. 515, 535 (1946). </s> Not every denial of a petition for reopening is premised on discretionary considerations. In many contexts the agency's [482 U.S. 270, 289] authority to exercise its discretion is limited by regulation, and the agency may choose to justify its denial of the petition on the ground that those criteria have not been satisfied. Here, for example, the regulations allowed the Commission to grant a petition for reopening of a decision reached by the entire Commission only if the petitioner could show either that "[t]he prior action . . . will be affected materially because of new evidence or changed circumstances," or that the prior action "involves material error." 49 CFR 1115.3 (1986). Similarly, a statute provides that the Commission may only supplement a prior order approving consolidations and related transactions if "cause exists," 49 U.S.C. 11351, a term that has been interpreted narrowly by some courts. See Illinois v. ICC, 713 F.2d 305, 310 (CA7 1983); Greyhound Corp. v. ICC, 215 U.S. App. D.C. 322, 330, 668 F.2d 1354, 1362 (1981). When an agency denies rehearing on a legal ground, such as when it premises its decision on its reading of the statute, the reviewing court has a significant role to play; it must decide whether that reading can be sustained, or whether it is contrary to law. 1 As we explained in Pierce Auto Freight Lines, the court's job is to ascertain [482 U.S. 270, 290] "whether there is warrant in the law and the facts for what the Commission has done." 327 U.S., at 536 . </s> One of the basic tenets of judicial review of agency decisions is that "an agency's order must be upheld, if at all, `on the same basis articulated in the order by the agency itself.'" FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 397 (1974), quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 -169 (1962). As the Court explained in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947): </s> "[A] simple but fundamental rule of administrative law . . . is . . . that a reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative action." Id., at 196. 2 </s> Consequently, when an agency explains that it has denied a petition for reopening based on its understanding of the underlying statute, a reviewing court may only uphold the agency decision if that reasoning withstands review. To be sure, an agency may announce that it has declined to consider the petition for reopening because it is duplicative, because it was filed so late in the day, or for some other discretionary consideration. If the agency explains its decision on such grounds, its reasoning must be scrutinized under an abuse-of-discretion standard. 3 But if the agency chooses not to proceed [482 U.S. 270, 291] in that fashion and to base its decision on its reading of a statute or a constitutional provision, its decision cannot be sustained on the conjecture that it has the discretion to deny reopening on a variety of grounds. If the court of appeals finds legal error, it must remand the case to the agency, which may then consider whether to exercise its discretion to grant the petition for reopening. 4 This is the lesson of Chenery and its progeny - a lesson the Court ignores today when it claims that "it is the Commission's formal action, rather than its discussion, that is dispositive." Ante, at 281. </s> The Court argues that it would be more prudent to require the parties to seek review in the court of appeals immediately after an agency's initial decision. This may or may not be true. 5 But our view of efficient procedure does not give us the power to rewrite the United States Code or the Code of Federal Regulations. Nor does it justify ignoring this Court's decisions explicitly holding that a denial of a petition for reopening is reviewable, see Giova v. Rosenberg, 379 U.S. 18 (1964); reversing an agency for failing to reopen a [482 U.S. 270, 292] matter, see Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 248 (1932); 6 or reviewing denials of petitions for reopening, see, e. g., Radio Corporation of America v. United States, 341 U.S. 412, 420 -421 (1951); Acker v. United States, 298 U.S. 426, 432 -433 (1936); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 47 -49 (1936); United States v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 288 U.S. 490, 492 -494 (1933); see also INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444 (1985); INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981). In many of these cases we have stressed the limited role courts play in reviewing agency denials of reopening; but, until today, we have never held that the courts lack jurisdiction to review the decisions at all. 7 As Judge Friendly put it: [482 U.S. 270, 293] </s> "The fact that reopening is a matter of agency discretion to a considerable extent . . . does not lead inevitably to a conclusion that such an exercise of administrative power is wholly immune from judicial examination; 10 (e) of the APA expressly authorizes the courts to set aside any administrative decision constituting an abuse of discretion. The question is whether the Secretary in deciding not to reopen enjoys absolute discretion . . . . Absent any evidence to the contrary, Congress may rather be presumed to have intended that the courts should fulfill their traditional role of defining and maintaining the proper bounds of administrative discretion." Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1, 5-6 (CA2 1966). 8 </s> The Court brushes off the many cases reviewing denials of petition for reopening by distinguishing between petitions for reopening based upon new evidence or changed circumstances and those based upon claims of material error. [482 U.S. 270, 294] Ante, at 278-280. According to the Court, denials of petitions for reopening that involve allegations of "new evidence" or "changed circumstances" are reviewable. Similarly, decisions reached after reopening are reviewable, even if the agency merely reaffirms its earlier decision. But, the Court proclaims, denials of petitions to reopen that allege only material error are not reviewable. Whether or not such a distinction might be reasonable, it is nevertheless a pure creature of judicial invention. I am unable to join such a creative reading of the plain language of the Hobbs Act. 9 </s> The Court's reliance on 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2) for the proposition that denials of petitions for reopening are nonreviewable because they are "committed to agency discretion by law" is conclusively rebutted by the Court's own analysis. If denials of petitions to reopen based on material error are discretionary then so are denials of petitions to reopen based on new facts or changed circumstances. Yet the Court concedes, as it must, that denials of petitions claiming new facts or changed circumstances are reviewable, notwithstanding the discretionary element. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), does not speak to this issue. Unlike a prosecutor's or an agency's decision not to take enforcement action, there is no dearth of "judicially manageable standards" in this context. Nor is there any basis for the Court's ability to "perceive that a . . . tradition of nonreviewability exists with regard to refusals to reconsider for material error." Ante, at 282. I am not sure what the Court's source for this tradition is, but it is surely not to be found in the decisions of the courts or in anything that Congress has said. </s> It seems clear to me that neither the Hobbs Act nor the Administrative Procedure Act recognizes the distinction that [482 U.S. 270, 295] the Court creates today. Thus, I am compelled to conclude, as the ICC itself recognizes, see Supplemental Memorandum for ICC 4, that the petitions for review in this case were timely, but only for the purpose of reviewing the Commission's orders denying clarification and reconsideration. </s> II </s> The Commission's decisions denying the petitions for clarification and reconsideration in this case were based partly on discretionary considerations and partly on the Commission's interpretation of the relevant law. The Commission read the statute as not requiring it to make a "necessity" finding (which it had not made), and concluded that any deficiencies in the "public interest" findings that it was required to make (and had made) were attributable to the unions' failure to raise the issue in the initial proceeding. I believe that the Commission's legal conclusion was sound, and that it did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider facts and theories that the unions could have brought up in their original objections to the transactions. </s> The petitions for clarification and reconsideration apparently were prompted by the unions' belated realization that the Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co. (MKT) and the Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. (DRGW) believed that they had the right to use their own crews to operate trains pursuant to their newly granted trackage rights over the Union Pacific Railroad Company's (UP) and Missouri Pacific Railroad Company's (MP) tracks. The unions argued that the Railway Labor Act (RLA), certain provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA), and their collective-bargaining agreements, gave UP and MP employees certain rights with respect to working those tracks. The MKT and DRGW, on the other hand, argued that even if such rights existed, the ICC had approved MKT's and DRGW's applications for trackage rights, and the applications had specified that the two railroads had the right to utilize their own [482 U.S. 270, 296] crews. In light of the ICC's approval, the railroads concluded, they were exempt under 49 U.S.C. 11341 from any conflicting law on the question of who would crew the trains. That statute provides: </s> "A carrier, corporation, or person participating in [an] approved or exempted transaction is exempt from the antitrust laws and from all other law, including State and municipal law, as necessary to let that person carry out the transaction, hold, maintain, and operate property, and exercise control or franchises acquired through the transaction." </s> In its denials of the petitions for clarification and reconsideration, the ICC rejected the unions' argument that in order for the exemption provision of 11341 to come into play, the ICC must make an actual, on the record, determination that the exemption is "necessary" to the transaction. The Commission explained: </s> "The terms of Section 11341 immunizing an approved transaction from any other laws are self-executing and there is no need for us expressly to order or to declare that a carrier is specifically relieved from certain restraints. See Brotherhood of Loc. Eng. [ v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 314 F.2d 424, 430-431 (CA8), cert denied, 375 U.S. 819 (1963)], citing Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Lease, 295 I. C. C. 696, at 432 (1958). </s> "In evaluating a transaction under the criteria of 49 U.S.C. 11344, we must consider the policies of statutes other than the Interstate Commerce Act to the extent that those policies are relevant to the determination of whether a proposal is consistent with the public interest. For example, the public interest evaluation must include consideration of the policies of the antitrust laws. See McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 87 (1944). [482 U.S. 270, 297] </s> "While the RLA, like the antitrust laws, embodies certain public policy considerations, the Interstate Commerce Act also specifies that interests of affected employees must be considered. In these proceedings, we gave full consideration to the impact of the consolidation on railroad employees in accordance with our established policies. 366 I. C. C. 618-22. </s> "The record in these proceedings is devoid of any suggestion by BLE, UTU, or any other party that the approval of the responsive trackage rights applications, subject to the usual labor protective conditions, would be in any way inconsistent with the policies of the RLA. In these circumstances, we can find no merit in UTU's argument that we improperly failed to reconcile the policies of the RLA with our decision." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 85-793, pp. A44-A45. </s> The Court of Appeals reversed, rejecting the ICC's argument that 11341 is self-executing and that the Commission need not make any explicit necessity findings. 245 U.S. App. D.C. 311, 320, 761 F.2d 714, 723 (1985). The court explained that "Congress has given ICC broad powers to immunize transactions from later legal obstacles, but this delegation by Congress is explicitly qualified by a necessity component. . . . In exercising its waiver authority ICC must do more than shake a wand to make a law go away. It must supply a reasoned basis for that exercise of its statutory authority." Ibid. Because it did not believe that the ICC had supplied justification for the necessity of waiving any RLA provisions regarding crew selection, the Court remanded the case for the ICC to determine whether it should "exercise its exemption authority." Id., at 322, 761 F.2d, at 725. Judge MacKinnon dissented, arguing that the statute is self-executing, and that the ICC is not required to make [482 U.S. 270, 298] any finding of necessity. Id., at 326-332, 761 F.2d, at 729-735. 10 </s> The Court of Appeals' holding was based on a misunderstanding of 11341. That statute, as its plain language indicates, does not condition exemptions on the ICC's announcing that a particular exemption is necessary to an approved transaction. Rather, 11341 automatically exempts a person from "other laws" whenever an exemption is "necessary to let that person carry out the transaction, hold, maintain, and operate property, and exercise control or franchises acquired through the transaction." The breadth of the exemption is defined by the scope of the approved transaction, 11 and no explicit announcement of exemption is required to make the statute applicable. As this Court explained with reference to 11341's predecessor: </s> "[A]pproval of a voluntary railroad merger which is within the scope of the Act is dependent upon three, and upon only three, considerations: First, a finding that it `will be consistent with the public interest.' ( 5 (2)(b).) Second, a finding that, subject to any modification made by the Commission, it is `just and reasonable.' ( 5 (2) (b).) Third, assent of a `majority . . . of the holders of the shares entitled to vote.' ( 5 (11).) When these [482 U.S. 270, 299] conditions have been complied with, the Commission-approved transaction goes into effect without the need for invoking any approval under state authority, and the parties are relieved of `restraints, limitations, and prohibitions of law, Federal, State, or municipal, insofar as may be necessary to enable them to carry into effect the transaction so approved . . . .' ( 5 (11).)." Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U.S. 182, 194 (1948). </s> See also Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Daniel, 333 U.S. 118, 124 (1948) (not necessary for Commission's order to manifest "a clear purpose to authorize the exemption"); 49 U.S.C. 11344(b) (listing items that Commission must consider in evaluating mergers). The present statute is no different in this respect; the exemption is self-executing. 12 </s> [482 U.S. 270, 300] </s> Of course, as the Commission explained, in conducting the public interest inquiry under 49 U.S.C. 11344 the Commission must consider that the legal consequence of approving the transaction as proposed will be to exempt the parties from the dictates of "other laws" to the extent necessary to carry out the transaction. 13 See McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 79 -88 (1944). But this is a far cry from requiring the Commission to predict exactly what type of exemptions will be required and, for each one, whether the transaction could survive absent the exemption. 14 </s> [482 U.S. 270, 301] </s> In its decision on the petition for reconsideration the Commission stated that it had considered the effect of the transaction on rail labor in its public interest calculations. Indeed, the original decision approving the transactions included a four-page discussion about its effect on labor, see Union Pacific - Control - Missouri Pacific, Western Pacific, 366 I. C. C. 462, 618-622 (1982) - issues the Commission is explicitly required to consider pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 11344(b), and 49 U.S.C. 11347 (1982 ed., Supp. III). Generally, the Commission concluded that the "transactions will directly benefit labor both by producing a substantial net increase in existing and future employment opportunities and by increasing the job security of their present employees." 366 I. C. C., at 619. To be sure, as the Commission itself recognized in its denial of the motion for reconsideration, it never explicitly considered the public interest ramifications of displacing any RLA provisions involving whose crew should be used in the newly granted trackage rights. But the ICC explained that it had not considered that issue because none of the unions had ever suggested that anything proposed by the railroads, including the MKT's and DRGW's use of their own crews, would be inconsistent with the RLA. </s> It is on this last point that the special considerations involving review of an agency's refusal to reopen a matter come into play. The agency clearly has the right to deny reopening to a party who failed to present evidence or to raise an objection that could have been presented or raised before the agency's initial decision was reached. 15 Indeed, even at the [482 U.S. 270, 302] time of the petition for clarification, the Commission did not believe that the unions had adequately supported their contention that the RLA had anything to say about the trackage rights issue. 16 Similarly, the Commission declined to address the other issues that the unions raised, such as whether MKT's and DRGW's use of their own crews violated the terms of the labor protective conditions that the Commission had imposed in the approval order. See App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 85-793, pp. A45-A50 (discussing the terms imposed pursuant to New York Dock R. Co. - Control - Brooklyn Eastern Dist., 360 I. C. C. 60 (1979), and Norfolk & Western R. Co. - Trackage Rights - BN, 354 I. C. C. 605 (1978), as modified by Mendocino Coast R. Co. - Lease and Operate, 360 I. C. C. 653, 664 (1980)). Surveying the many opportunities that the unions had to raise objections to the trackage rights proposals during the proceedings, the Commission concluded: </s> "BLE, UTU, and various other railway labor organizations participated in these proceedings, and none made any argument or presented any evidence that the responsive trackage rights proposals would violate any applicable labor agreement. Rather, the record supports the conclusion that the trackage rights operations, using the tenants' crews, could be implemented as approved without raising any dispute over crew assignments between the employees of different railroads." App. to Pet for Cert. in No. 85-793, p. A45. </s> It is thus clear that the agency's refusal to take action based on the unions' new claim that the use of the tenants' crews conflicted with various laws was based on the premise that [482 U.S. 270, 303] the unions had, so to speak, procedurally defaulted on those claims. There is no basis for concluding that this decision constituted an abuse of discretion. </s> I would therefore reverse the Court of Appeals on these grounds, not because it lacked jurisdiction. </s> [Footnote 1 In Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), the Court held that agency decisions not to take enforcement action are generally committed to agency discretion by law under 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2). Even so, the Court stressed that it was not dealing with "a refusal by the agency to institute proceedings based solely on the belief that it lacked jurisdiction." Id., at 833, n. 4; see also NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662 (1976) (reviewing agency's refusal to promulgate rule because refusal was based on agency's contention that it lacked jurisdiction); International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, & Agricultural Implement Workers v. Brock, 251 U.S. App. D.C. 239, 247, 783 F.2d 237, 245 (1986) (distinguishing decisions announcing that agency will not take enforcement action from decisions announcing substantive statutory interpretations). </s> Of course, an agency may, if it chooses, deny the petition on discretionary grounds without considering whether the petition makes a showing sufficient to support reopening under the statute or regulations. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 26 (1976). </s> [Footnote 2 Contrary to the Court's suggestion, ante, at 282-283, I do not believe that Chenery establishes whether agency action is reviewable. Chenery does, however, powerfully rebut the Court's contention that there is nothing to review when an agency bases a decision on an erroneous legal ground when it could have denied relief on discretionary grounds. </s> [Footnote 3 The Court ignores this fact when it claims that litigants will routinely disregard the Hobbs Act's 60-day limit on judicial review unless denials of reopening are declared nonreviewable. Because an agency has the right to reject the petition on discretionary grounds, without reaching the material [482 U.S. 270, 291] error alleged by the party, see n. 1, supra, litigants have the strongest of incentives to seek timely review of the agency's original decision. </s> [Footnote 4 That many or even most denials of petitions for reopening are made without statements of reasons does not make judicial review unworkable. Of course, to the extent that 5 U.S.C. 555(e) allows the agency to announce its denial without a statement, it may continue to do so. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). In such a case, the reviewing court may properly presume that the decision was reached on ordinary discretionary considerations, and may review the decision on that basis to ascertain whether it constitutes an abuse of discretion. </s> [Footnote 5 In some cases, an agency might base its order denying reopening on a new legal ground which it had not included in its original decision. Alternatively, the agency may clarify its earlier decision in a manner that gives rise to new legal challenges. In either event, it is surely unfair to deprive the aggrieved party of judicial review of an agency interpretation which he or she had no prior opportunity to challenge. The Court seems to agree that such an order would be reviewable, see ante, at 286, but, of course, cannot square this position with its newfound rule of "jurisdiction." </s> [Footnote 6 The Court is correct in observing that Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. "was `promptly restricted . . . to its special facts, . . . and . . . stands virtually alone.'" Ante, at 278, quoting ICC v. Jersey City, 322 U.S. 503, 515 (1944). But the unique aspect of the case is that it reversed the agency action - not that it reviewed the agency action. </s> [Footnote 7 In Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977), the Court held that judicial review was unavailable from the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare's final decision not to reopen a claim for benefits. The Court rested this holding on the statutory language there, which provides that an individual may seek review by commencing a civil action within 60 days "after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing." 42 U.S.C. 405(g). The Court explained that "[t]his provision clearly limits judicial review to a particular type of agency action, a `final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing.'" 430 U.S., at 108 . A denial of a petition for reopening did not satisfy this language, and the Court felt compelled "to respect" Congress' choice. Ibid. Similarly, in SEC v. Louisiana Public Service Comm'n, 353 U.S. 368 (1957), the Court held that the specific judicial review language in 15 U.S.C. 79k(b), which dealt with Commission orders that "revoke or modify" a previous order, restricted judicial review to the orders listed in the statute. Neither Sanders nor Louisiana Public Service Comm'n is relevant here for no such restrictive language applies to review of ICC decisions under the Hobbs Act. </s> The Court's citation of Court of Appeals decisions supporting its non-review position, ante, at 280, is not at all conclusive. Many decisions have held that such petitions are indeed reviewable. See Carter/Mondale Presidential Committee, Inc. v. FEC, 249 U.S. App. D.C. 349, 353-354, [482 U.S. 270, 293] 775 F.2d 1182, 1186-1187 (1985); Wausau v. United States, 703 F.2d 1042 (CA7 1983); Virginia Appalachian Lumber Corp. v. ICC, 197 U.S. App. D.C. 13, 19, 606 F.2d 1385, 1391 (1979); Provisioners Frozen Express, Inc. v. ICC, 536 F.2d 1303, 1305 (CA9 1976); B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Northwest Industries, Inc., 424 F.2d 1349, 1355 (CA3), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); Northeast Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 130 U.S. App. D.C. 278, 287-288, 400 F.2d 749, 758-759 (1968). Cases reviewing denials of reopening in the immigration context are too common to require citation. </s> In Provisioners Frozen Express, supra, the court dealt with a petition for review which, like the one here, had been filed more than 60 days after the initial decision, but within 60 days of the petition for reopening. The court held that the Commission's refusal to entertain the petition for reopening "did not create a new final order which would give the Court jurisdiction to review some five years of proceedings in this matter." Id., at 1305. But, the court hastened to add, it did have jurisdiction to determine "whether the Commission abused its discretion in rejecting [the] petition to reopen." Ibid. </s> [Footnote 8 Although, given the intervening decision in Sanders, supra, this case is no longer good law with respect to review of Social Security determinations, Judge Friendly's discussion on the general issue of denials of petitions to reopen continues to merit our respect. </s> [Footnote 9 The only statute other than the Hobbs Act that the Court refers to on this matter is 49 U.S.C. 10327(i) which specifies when an ICC order becomes final. That provision does not speak to the question of what types of orders are reviewable, and I do not read the Court's opinion as relying on it. </s> [Footnote 10 Judge MacKinnon also dissented from the Court of Appeals' holding that the petition was filed within sufficient time as to call into question the ICC's initial decision. 245 U.S. App. D.C., at 322-326, 761 F.2d, at 725-729. </s> [Footnote 11 There may, of course, be some limitations on the types of matters the ICC can approve as part of a transaction. See Palestine v. United States, 559 F.2d 408, 414 (CA5 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978) (looking at whether ICC approval was "germane to the success of the . . . transaction"). The Commission stated in this case that "[p]rovisions of trackage rights agreements designating which carrier's employees will perform trackage rights operations are material terms of the agreement." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 85-793, p. A50. In his dissent, Judge MacKinnon elaborated on this point. 245 U.S. App. D.C., at 329, 761 F.2d, at 732. </s> [Footnote 12 The legislative history of 11341 supports the meaning derived from its plain language. Section 407 of the Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, 41 Stat. 480, authorized Commission approvals of consolidations, and included a section providing: </s> "The carriers affected by any order made under the foregoing provisions of this section . . . shall be, and they are hereby, relieved from the operation of the `antitrust laws,' . . . and of all other restraints or prohibitions by law, State, or Federal, in so far as may be necessary to enable them to do anything authorized or required by an order made under and pursuant to the foregoing provisions of this section." 41 Stat. 482, amending 5(8) of the Interstate Commerce Act. </s> The operative language, with its self-executing phraseology, was incorporated into the 1940 amendment and recodification of the Transportation Act. See 7 of the Transportation Act of 1940, ch. 722, 54 Stat. 908-909, amending 5 (11). Again, when the Act was recodified as 49 U.S.C. 11341(a), no substantive change was affected. Pub. L. 95-473, 3(a), 92 Stat. 1466. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-1395, pp. 158-168 (1978). </s> In addition, the Commission has consistently treated the exemption as automatically flowing from an approval. See, e. g., Railway Express Agency, Inc., Notes, 348 I. C. C. 157, 215 (1975); Ex Parte No. 260, Revised Regulations Governing Interlocking Officers, 336 I. C. C. 679, 681-682 (1970); Texas Turnpike Authority Abandonment by St. Louis Southwestern R. Co., 328 I. C. C. 42, 46 (1965); Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co. Lease, 295 I. C. C. 696, 702 (1958); Control of Central Pacific by Southern Pacific, 76 I. C. C. 508, 515-517 (1923). A number of Courts of [482 U.S. 270, 300] Appeals have agreed. See Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. United Transportation Union, 782 F.2d 107, 111 (CA8 1986), cert. pending, No. 85-1054; Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 314 F.2d 424 (CA8), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 819 (1963). </s> [Footnote 13 This does not mean, as respondents fear, that a party claiming an exemption on the basis of 11341 need merely assert that its conduct is "necessary" in order to prevail in its claim. Any tribunal that is faced with a claim that a party is violating some "other law" has the responsibility of determining whether an exemption is "necessary to let that person carry out the transaction, hold, maintain, and operate property, and exercise control or franchises acquired through the transaction." 49 U.S.C. 11341. See Railway Express Agency, supra, at 215-218. </s> [Footnote 14 The Court of Appeals appeared to recognize the problems of its suggested approach when it agreed that the ICC need not "enumerate every legal obstacle that is waived in its approval," since to require the Commission to contemplate unforeseeable legal obstacles to fruition of the transaction would "undermine the approval authority's purpose of `facilitat[ing] merger and consolidation in the national transportation system.'" 245 U.S. App. D.C. 311, 320, n. 4, 761 F.2d 714, 723, n. 4 (1985), quoting County of Marin v. United States, 356 U.S. 412, 416 (1958). But, the court nonetheless held that the "ICC's decisionmaking process, either in the approval or in a later proceeding, must reveal evidence supporting a conclusion that waiver of a particular legal obstacle is necessary to effectuate the transaction." 245 U.S. App. D.C., at 320, n. 4, 761 F.2d, at 723, n. 4. The idea of having parties repeatedly return to the ICC for decisions on the necessity of an exemption is without basis in the statutory scheme, and would clearly not mitigate the delay and confusion surrounding consolidations. </s> [Footnote 15 I find no merit in respondents' suggestion that they had no notice that the Commission might consider allowing the MKT and DRGW to use their own crews in connection with their newly acquired trackage rights. Although the Commission's approval may have been ambiguous on this issue (the Commission does not think it was), the trackage rights proposals submitted by the MKT and DRGW explicitly stated that the railroads wished to be allowed to use their own crews. See ante, at 273-274; see also Missouri Pacific R. Co., supra, at 112; App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 85-793, pp. A45-A50. The ICC's conclusion that the unions should have been [482 U.S. 270, 302] aware of the terms of the proposals is entitled to substantial deference, resting as it does on the intricacies of practice before the Commission. </s> [Footnote 16 The Commission prefaced its discussion of the 11341 issue by concluding that the unions had not adequately demonstrated that "the trackage rights agreements . . . involve a change in UP-MP employees' working conditions in a manner contrary to RLA requirements." Id., at A43. </s> [482 U.S. 270, 304]

United States Supreme Court SOUTHERN R. CO. v. NORTH CAROLINA(1964) No. 74 Argued: Decided: February 17, 1964 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 93, United States et al. v. North Carolina et al., also on appeal to the same court. </s> The Interstate Commerce Commission under 13a (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act authorized appellant railway company to discontinue two intrastate passenger trains, which provided the last remaining railway passenger service between two cities, having found that the service constituted an undue burden on interstate commerce and that the present or future public convenience and necessity permitted discontinuance of the service. A three-judge District Court set aside the Commission's order on the ground that the Commission had applied erroneous legal standards by not taking proper account of the freight profits on the line and the overall prosperity of the carrier. Held: </s> 1. Under 13a (2) the Commission need not give effect to the prosperity of the intrastate operations of the carrier as a whole or any particular segment thereof in determining whether the operation of a specific intrastate train or service imposes an unjust or undue burden on interstate commerce. P. 104. </s> 2. The Commission may properly give varying weights to the overall prosperity of the carrier in different situations, balancing public convenience and necessity against undue burdens on interstate commerce. Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153 . Where the demands of public convenience and necessity are slight, as in this case, it is proper under 13a (2) for the Commission in determining the existence of a burden on interstate commerce to give little weight to the carrier's overall prosperity. Pp. 104-105. </s> 210 F. Supp. 675, reversed. </s> William T. Joyner argued the cause for appellant in No. 74. With him on the brief were Earl E. Eisenhart, Jr., Robert L. Randall and William H. Allen. [376 U.S. 93, 94] </s> Robert W. Ginnane argued the cause for the United States et al. in No. 93. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Orrick, Philip B. Heymann, Robert B. Hummel and H. Neil Garson. </s> Charles W. Barbee, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of North Carolina, and F. Gordon Battle argued the cause for appellees in both cases. With them on the brief were Thomas Wade Bruton, Attorney General of North Carolina, E. C. Bryson, Victor S. Bryant, A. H. Graham, Jr. and E. C. Brooks, Jr. </s> Edward J. Hickey, Jr. and James L. Highsaw, Jr. filed a brief for the Railway Labor Executives' Association, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In 1959 the appellant Southern Railway Company filed a petition with the North Carolina Utilities Commission for an order permitting it to discontinue operation of two intrastate passenger trains between Greensboro and Goldsboro, North Carolina, a distance of about 130 miles. The trains in question are No. 16, which operates eastbound in the morning from Greensboro to Goldsboro, and No. 13, consisting of the same equipment, which operates westbound in the late afternoon. Since 1958 these two trains have provided the last remaining railway passenger service between the two communities. The State Commission denied the petition, and its decision was upheld by the North Carolina Supreme Court. State of North Carolina v. Southern Railway Co., 254 N.C. 73, 118 S. E. 2d 21 (1961). </s> Thereafter the railway company filed a petition with the Interstate Commerce Commission pursuant to 13a (2) [376 U.S. 93, 95] of the Interstate Commerce Act, 1 seeking authority to discontinue operation of the trains. After a hearing at which several protestants, including the State of North Carolina, appeared, the examiner recommended that the petition be granted. Division 3 of the Commission agreed with the examiner and ordered discontinuance of the trains. The Division issued a report in which it found, inter alia, that the trains, which in 1948 had carried 56,739 passengers, carried only 14,776 passengers in [376 U.S. 93, 96] 1960, the last full year for which figures were available; that the direct expenses of operating the trains during the latter year were over three times their total revenue; that discontinuance of the trains would result in savings of at least $90,589 per year; that the need shown for these trains was relatively insubstantial when viewed in light of the density of the population of the area served; that existing alternate transportation service by rail, bus, airline, and other means was reasonably adequate; and that the discontinuance of the passenger train service would not seriously affect the industrial growth of the area. Against the background of these findings, the examiner and Commission considered, but gave "little or no weight" to the overall prosperity of the carrier. The Commission's basic conclusions were summed up as follows: </s> "that the public will not be materially inconvenienced by the discontinuance of the service here involved; that the savings to be realized by the carrier outweigh the inconvenience to which the public may be subjected by such discontinuance; that such savings will enable the carrier more efficiently to provide transportation service to the public which remains in substantial demand; and that the continued operation of trains Nos. 13 and 16 would constitute a wasteful service and would impose an undue burden on interstate commerce." 317 I. C. C. 255, 260. </s> After a petition for reconsideration by the entire Commission had been denied, the protestants instituted an action in a three-judge District Court seeking to set aside the order of the Commission. The court held, first, that it was erroneous as a matter of law for the Commission to order discontinuance of passenger trains under the provisions of 13a (2) without first determining whether, once the profits from freight operations on [376 U.S. 93, 97] the same line were taken into account, "the particular segment of the railway involved is contributing its fair share to the over-all company operations . . . ." 210 F. Supp. 675, 688. The court also proceeded to find, inter alia, that "Taking into account total operation of this line, there is a profit not a loss, a benefit, not a burden," 210 F. Supp., at 688; that passenger traffic had slightly increased during the first five months of 1961; that the carrier had done little to promote the use of the passenger trains; that continued existence of the alternative of railway passenger service might be considered a necessity under such circumstances as airline strikes or bad weather; and that, in light of the overall prosperity of the Southern Railway Company, "[t]he effect of the losses of the Greensboro-Goldsboro passenger service on the financial structure of the railroad is inconsequential." 2 210 F. Supp., at 688. On this basis, although it explicitly refused to set aside any of the subsidiary findings of fact on which the Commission's order was based, 210 F. Supp., at 689, 690, the court held that "the ultimate conclusions of the Interstate Commerce Commission that the service in question constitutes an undue burden on interstate commerce and that the present or future public convenience and necessity permits such discontinuance . . . are arbitrary and capricious because . . . not supported by [376 U.S. 93, 98] substantial evidence," 220 F. Supp., at 689. The court itself then concluded that discontinuance was not warranted. It therefore set aside the Commission's order, and perpetually enjoined the carrier from discontinuing the Greensboro-Goldsboro passenger trains. The United States, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the carrier all appealed. We noted probable jurisdiction and consolidated the cases for argument. 373 U.S. 907 . </s> The District Court's action in setting aside the Commission's conclusions as to public convenience and necessity and undue burden on interstate commerce was explicitly based upon the court's view that the Commission had applied erroneous legal standards in reaching those conclusions. The court did not question that the Commission's subsidiary findings of fact were supported by a substantial evidentiary foundation. It simply disagreed with the Commission as to the kind of evidence required to support an order permitting discontinuance of an intrastate passenger train under 13a (2). </s> The court reached its conclusion that the Commission had erred in not taking into account profits from freight operations along the Greensboro-Goldsboro line primarily in reliance upon this Court's decisions in Public Service Comm'n of Utah v. United States, 356 U.S. 421 , and Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois, 355 U.S. 300 . Both those cases dealt with 13 (4), which requires the Commission to change intrastate rates wherever such rates are found to discriminate against interstate commerce. This Court held in those cases that the Commission could not authorize higher intrastate rates either for passenger or freight operations without first taking into account the revenues derived by the carrier from the totality of intrastate operations. In 1958, the year in which 13a (2) was enacted, 13 (4) was amended to [376 U.S. 93, 99] permit the Commission to act "without a separation of interstate and intrastate property, revenues, and expenses, and without considering in totality the operations or results thereof of any carrier . . . wholly within any State." 3 The District Court's holding that the same kind of data should be considered in 13a (2) proceedings was premised upon the fact that no language similar to that of the 13 (4) amendment was included in 13a (2) and that proceedings under the latter provision, which permits discontinuance of given operations, have a far more serious impact upon intrastate passengers than proceedings under the former, which provides only for an increase in the rates to be charged. </s> But when 13 (4) was amended in 1958 as a result of the two decisions relied on by the District Court, Congress was simply reaffirming what it conceived as the original intent of the section. 4 There is therefore no reason to [376 U.S. 93, 100] assume that Congress regarded the new language as embodying a standard which had to be specifically incorporated into every statutory provision to which it was intended to apply. </s> The legislative history clearly indicates that Congress in enacting 13a (2) was addressing itself to a problem quite distinct from that reflected by overall unprofitable operation of an entire segment of railroad line. The Commission already had authority prior to 1958, under 1 (18)-(20), 5 to authorize discontinuance of all services on any given intrastate line where continuance of [376 U.S. 93, 101] such services would impose an undue burden on interstate commerce. Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153 . However, the Commission totally lacked power to discontinue particular trains or services while leaving the remaining services in operation. It was precisely this gap which 13a (2) was intended to fill. New Jersey v. New York, S. & W. R. Co., 372 U.S. 1, 5 -6. As both the House and Senate Committee Reports on the legislation which became 13a (2) make clear, Congress was primarily concerned with the problems posed by passenger services for which significant public demand no longer existed and which were consistently deficit-producing, thus forcing the carriers to subsidize their operation out of freight profits. 6 Far from permitting the carrier's need for discontinuance of passenger services to be balanced against profits from other operations conducted [376 U.S. 93, 102] along the same line, the bill as originally reported by the Senate Committee would have required the Commission to permit discontinuance, even if there was great public need for the service, so long as the continued operation of a particular service would result in a net loss to the carrier. 7 Senator Javits unsuccessfully attempted to amend the bill on the floor of the Senate to delete the net loss standard and to substitute a requirement that the Commission balance the public need for the service against the deficit resulting from it. 8 Such an amendment, proposed by Chairman Harris of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, was adopted by the House, 9 and accepted by the Senate in conference. The deletion of the net loss standard, however, by no means implied that freight profits along a given line could be offset against deficits incurred by passenger services for purposes of determining whether the latter constituted an undue burden on interstate operations or commerce. As Congressman Harris made clear after his amendment had been accepted, the situation "we are trying to get at" is that in which "the [freight] shippers of this country are making up a deficit every year . . . in losses in passenger service." 10 </s> The bill as originally reported by the Senate Committee would have applied the net loss standard to both interstate and intrastate operations, the Committee Report having concluded that state regulatory bodies required [376 U.S. 93, 103] "the maintenance of uneconomic and unnecessary services and facilities." 11 The bill was amended on the Senate floor to limit the Commission's discontinuance authority to interstate trains, 12 and the House version of the bill was similarly limited. 13 In conference, however, the Commission's authority over intrastate trains was restored and, except for differences in the procedures prerequisite to a hearing in the case of a wholly intrastate train, 14 the Commission was required to apply the same standard to interstate and intrastate operations in determining whether discontinuance of a train or service is justified. 15 Contrary to the suggestion of the District Court that its interpretation of 13a (2) must be accepted to avoid "requir[ing] the intrastate operations to bear more than their share," 210 F. Supp., at 680, the statutory scheme which Congress has embodied in 13a thus prescribes precisely the same substantive standard to govern discontinuance of either interstate or intrastate operations. 16 </s> [376 U.S. 93, 104] </s> All that need properly be considered under this standard, as both the language and history of 13a (2) thus make abundantly clear, is what effect the discontinuance of the specific train or service in question will have upon the public convenience and necessity and upon interstate operations or commerce. As the Commission has correctly summed up the matter in another case: </s> "The burden [upon the carrier's interstate operations or upon interstate commerce, as expressed in section 13a (2)] . . . is to be measured by the injurious effect that the continued operation of the train proposed for discontinuance would have upon interstate commerce. As is indicated by its legislative history, the purpose of section 13a (2) is to permit the discontinuance of the operation of services that `no longer pay their way and for which there is no longer sufficient public need to justify the heavy financial losses involved.' (S. Rep. 1647, 85th Cong.). Nowhere in section 13a (2) or elsewhere in the law is there any requirement that the prosperity of the intrastate operations of the carrier as a whole, or any particular segment thereof, must be given effect in determining whether the operation of an individual intrastate train imposes an unjust and undue burden on interstate commerce. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the apparent intent of the Congress." Southern Pac. Co., Partial Discontinuance, 312 I. C. C. 631, 633-634 (1961). </s> This Court has long recognized that the Commission may properly give varying weights to the overall prosperity [376 U.S. 93, 105] of the carrier in differing situations. Thus, in Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153 , which also involved a situation in which the Commission was required to balance public convenience and necessity against undue burdens on interstate commerce, it was specifically noted that "In many cases, it is clear that the extent of the whole traffic, the degree of dependence of the communities directly affected upon the particular means of transportation, and other attendant conditions, are such that the carrier may not justly be required to continue to bear the financial loss necessarily entailed by operation. In some cases . . . the question is whether abandonment may justly be permitted, in view of the fact that it would subject the communities directly affected to serious injury while continued operation would impose a relatively light burden upon a prosperous carrier." 271 U.S., at 168 -169. In cases falling within the latter category, such as those involving vital commuter services in large metropolitan areas where the demands of public convenience and necessity are large, it is of course obvious that the Commission would err if it did not give great weight to the ability of the carrier to absorb even large deficits resulting from such services. But where, as here, the Commission's findings make clear that the demands of public convenience and necessity are slight and that the situation is, therefore, one falling within the first category delineated in Colorado, it is equally proper for the Commission, in determining the existence of the burden on interstate commerce, to give little weight to the factor of the carrier's overall prosperity. </s> Whatever room there may be for differing views as to the wisdom of the policy reflected in 13a (2), it is the duty of the Commission to effectuate the statutory scheme. We cannot agree with the District Court that the Commission departed in any respect from that duty [376 U.S. 93, 106] here. We therefore reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand with instructions to reinstate the report and order of the Commission. </s> Reversed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Section 13a (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 13a (2), provides in pertinent part: "Where the discontinuance or change, in whole or in part, by a carrier or carriers subject to this chapter, of the operation or service of any train or ferry operated wholly within the boundaries of a single State is prohibited by the constitution or statutes of any State or where the State authority having jurisdiction thereof shall have denied an application or petition duly filed with it by said carrier or carriers for authority to discontinue or change, in whole or in part, the operation or service of any such train or ferry or shall not have acted finally on such an application or petition within one hundred and twenty days from the presentation thereof, such carrier or carriers may petition the Commission for authority to effect such discontinuance or change. The Commission may grant such authority only after full hearing and upon findings by it that (a) the present or future public convenience and necessity permit of such discontinuance or change, in whole or in part, of the operation or service of such train or ferry, and (b) the continued operation or service of such train or ferry without discontinuance or change, in whole or in part, will constitute an unjust and undue burden upon the interstate operations of such carrier or carriers or upon interstate commerce. When any petition shall be filed with the Commission under the provisions of this paragraph the Commission shall notify the Governor of the State in which such train or ferry is operated at least thirty days in advance of the hearing provided for in this paragraph, and such hearing shall be held by the Commission in the State in which such train or ferry is operated; and the Commission is authorized to avail itself of the cooperation, services, records and facilities of the authorities in such State in the performance of its functions under this paragraph." </s> [Footnote 2 It should be noted, in connection with the findings made by the District Court, that the Commission had noted that the increase in passenger traffic during 1961 was largely due to group movements of school children; that, as to Southern's failure to seek passengers, "prospective patrons who must be coaxed to use a service have no urgent need for it"; and that, after a broad study and investigation in 1959, the Commission had concluded that "public convenience and necessity" does not require the maintenance of deficit passenger services as a standby service for travelers who customarily travel by highway or by air. Railroad Passenger Train Deficit, 306 I. C. C. 417, 482. </s> [Footnote 3 49 U.S.C. 13 (4), as so amended, provides in pertinent part: "Whenever in any such investigation the Commission, after full hearing, finds that any such rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice causes any undue or unreasonable advantage, preference, or prejudice as between persons or localities in intrastate commerce on the one hand and interstate or foreign commerce on the other hand, or any undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against, or undue burden on, interstate or foreign commerce (which the Commission may find without a separation of interstate and intrastate property, revenues, and expenses, and without considering in totality the operations or results thereof of any carrier, or group or groups of carriers wholly within any State), which is hereby forbidden and declared to be unlawful, it shall prescribe the rate, fare, or charge, or the maximum or minimum, or maximum and minimum, thereafter to be charged, and the classification, regulation, or practice thereafter to be observed, in such manner as, in its judgment, will remove such advantage, preference, prejudice, discrimination, or burden . . . ." </s> [Footnote 4 "[I]t is the possible interpretation of these recent court decisions that would create a change in the present regulatory scheme." H. R. Rep. No. 2274, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 12. </s> [Footnote 5 49 U.S.C. 1 (18) provides in pertinent part: "No carrier by railroad subject to this chapter shall undertake the extension of its line of railroad, or the construction of a new line of railroad, or shall acquire or operate any line of railroad, or extension thereof, or shall engage in transportation under this chapter over or by means of such additional or extended line of railroad, unless and until there shall first have been obtained from the Commission a certificate that the present or future public convenience and necessity require or will require the construction, or operation, or construction and operation, of such additional or extended line of railroad, and no carrier by railroad subject to this chapter shall abandon all or any portion of a line of railroad, or the operation thereof, unless and until there shall first have been obtained from the Commission a certificate that the present or future public convenience and necessity permit of such abandonment." 49 U.S.C. 1 (19) provides in pertinent part: "The application for and issuance of any such certificate shall be under such rules and regulations as to hearings and other matters as the Commission may from time to time prescribe, and the provisions of this chapter shall apply to all such proceedings." 49 U.S.C. 1 (20) provides in pertinent part: "The Commission shall have power to issue such certificate as prayed for, or to refuse to issue it, or to issue it for a portion or portions of a line of railroad, or extension thereof, described in the application, or for the partial exercise only of such right or privilege, and may attach to the issuance of the certificate such terms and conditions as in its judgment the public convenience and necessity may require." </s> [Footnote 6 "A major cause of the worsening railroad situation is the unsatisfactory passenger situation. Not only is the passenger end of the business not making money - it is losing a substantial portion of that produced by freight operations. . . . . . "It is obvious that in very great measure these passenger losses are attributable to commuter service. . . . It is unreasonable to expect that such service should continue to be subsidized by the freight shippers throughout the country. "There are substantial losses, however, occurring in passenger service beyond those attributable solely to commuter service. Where this passenger service . . . cannot be made to pay its own way because of lack of patronage at reasonable rates, abandonment seems called for." H. R. Rep. No. 1922, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 11-12. "A most serious problem for the railroads is the difficulty and delay they often encounter when they seek to discontinue or change the operation of services or facilities that no longer pay their way and for which there is no longer sufficient public need to justify the heavy financial losses entailed. The subcommittee believes that the maintenance and operation of such outmoded services and facilities constitutes a heavy burden on interstate commerce." S. Rep. No. 1647, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 21. </s> [Footnote 7 S. 3778, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 6. See also the remarks of Senator Smathers, Chairman of the Surface Transportation Subcommittee, who made it clear that the net loss standard did not refer to all operations on a line or all operations within a State but rather to "the loss from the particular operation the railroad is rendering." 104 Cong. Rec. 10849. </s> [Footnote 8 See 104 Cong. Rec. 10846-10849. See also pp. 10838-10839. </s> [Footnote 9 104 Cong. Rec. 12547-12548. </s> [Footnote 10 104 Cong. Rec. 12551. </s> [Footnote 11 S. Rep. No. 1647, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 22. </s> [Footnote 12 104 Cong. Rec. 10862, 10864. </s> [Footnote 13 H. R. 12832, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 10. </s> [Footnote 14 Under 13a (2), which applies solely to intrastate trains, the Commission may not authorize discontinuance until after the appropriate state regulatory agency has been given an opportunity to act and has failed or refused to authorize discontinuance. See New Jersey v. New York, S. & W. R. Co., 372 U.S. 1, 4 . </s> [Footnote 15 See 49 U.S.C. 13a (1), (2). </s> [Footnote 16 The fact that Congress intended the same substantive standards to be applied both to intrastate and interstate discontinuances wholly vitiates appellees' argument that the Commission is required to take into account, wherever presented, the profitability of intrastate operations as a whole or any segment thereof whenever an intrastate service is sought to be discontinued. Thus, consideration of the overall prosperity of the carrier is necessarily relevant to a determination of the degree to which a deficit resulting from a given service constitutes an undue burden on interstate commerce. But neither the [376 U.S. 93, 104] profitability of such freight operations as are fortuitously conducted on the same line as a given passenger service nor the profitability of all operations within any given State bears any practical relationship either to the public's need for the service in question or to the burden which the deficit imposes on interstate commerce. </s> MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, dissenting. </s> This case involves more than the fate of the 6:10 between Greensboro and Goldsboro, North Carolina. It is the first litigation to reach this Court concerning the criteria to be applied by the Interstate Commerce Commission in proceedings seeking discontinuance of intrastate passenger trains under 13a (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 72 Stat. 571, 49 U.S.C. 13a (2). This section provides that where a State has failed or refused to allow discontinuance of an intrastate passenger train, the ICC may authorize the intrastate discontinuance if it finds "that (a) the present or future public convenience and necessity permit of such discontinuance . . . and (b) the continued operation . . . will constitute an unjust and undue burden upon the interstate operations of such carrier . . . or upon interstate commerce." The Court sustains the ICC in interpreting this provision to mean that, in determining whether an unprofitable intrastate passenger train shall be discontinued, the Commission need give: (1) "little or no weight" to the overall prosperity of the carrier, ante, at 96, and (2) no consideration whatsoever to the profitability of "the intrastate operations of the carrier as a whole, or any particular segment thereof," ante, at 104. 1 In my view the standards employed by the Commission were not the proper ones. Consequently, without intimating any opinion as to the merits of the discontinuance application, I would remand the [376 U.S. 93, 107] case to the Commission for further consideration and appropriate findings. See, e. g., Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. J-T Transport Co., Inc., 368 U.S. 81, 93 . </s> Since "[p]assenger deficits have become chronic in the railroad industry," Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois, 355 U.S. 300, 307 , the Court's decision will allow the Commission to authorize the Nation's railroads to discontinue virtually all intrastate passenger service - including most commuter services. It is difficult to conceive of a situation in this era of widespread bus, airline and automobile transportation in which the Commission cannot find that alternative services are more or less available to handle the diminished railroad passenger traffic. Such a finding coupled with a "net loss" on the passenger trains will meet the discontinuance standard approved by the Court. The Court concludes that this result has been mandated by Congress. If this were so, there would be no basis for dissent, since I agree entirely with the Court that "[w]hatever room there may be for differing views as to the wisdom of the policy . . ., it is the duty of the Commission [and the Court] to effectuate the statutory scheme." Ante, at 105. I do not believe, however, that it can be fairly concluded from the statute or from its legislative history that Congress intended, despite the ruling of a state authority, that intrastate passenger trains could be discontinued on the basis of the slender showing required by the ICC and approved by this Court. </s> The case turns upon the language and purpose of 13a (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act. This section was first enacted as part of the Transportation Act of 1958. It is true, as the Court points out, that this legislation reflects concern with "the worsening railroad situation." Ante, at 101, n. 6. But it is far from accurate to conclude that Congress was oblivious of the needs of the passenger public and of the primary responsibility of [376 U.S. 93, 108] state commissions for the regulation of purely intrastate service. Under 13a (2) a railroad seeking to discontinue an intrastate passenger train, as distinguished from an interstate operation, must first apply to the appropriate state commission. Only after the state commission has been given the opportunity and has failed or refused to act is the ICC authorized to intervene. The Commission may reverse the decision of the state agency only upon findings, supported by substantial evidence, that the service is not required by public convenience and necessity and that its continuance will constitute "an unjust and undue burden . . . upon interstate commerce." Senator Smathers, one of the bill's sponsors, explained that 13a (2): </s> "protected the right of the States, . . . by leaving to the State regulatory agencies the right to regulate and have a final decision with respect to the discontinuance of train service which originated and ended within one particular State, except when it could be established that intrastate service was a burden on interstate commerce." 104 Cong. Rec. 15528. </s> In this case the State of North Carolina points out that between 1951 and 1956, of 44 requests for discontinuance of intrastate passenger trains, some emanating from appellant Southern Railway, 42 were approved by the State. Indeed, on the line between Greensboro and Goldsboro, Southern operated three pairs of passenger trains until September 1954. The State, on Southern's application, authorized discontinuance of one pair of trains in 1954 and another pair in 1958. The two trains in question, No. 13 and No. 16, are the last remaining pair of east-west passenger trains between the two communities. They are the only interconnecting service at Greensboro for passengers from Goldsboro and intermediate points with north-south trains on Southern's main line. For such passengers, they furnish a convenient overnight pullman [376 U.S. 93, 109] service to Washington, New York and other east coast cities and conserve working time for the traveler having business at the north or south terminal cities. Trains 13 and 16 run on tracks leased by Southern from the state-owned North Carolina Railroad Company. The lease clearly contemplates both passenger and freight service. Furthermore, as the Court recites in its opinion, while during the relevant year Southern sustained a loss on its passenger service on the line of approximately $90,000, it made a profit of over $600,000 on freight on the same leased line and an overall profit on its entire system in excess of $36,000,000. While passenger traffic on this line has declined in recent years, the traffic is still substantial - 14,776 passengers used the two trains in 1960, an increase of more than 500 over the previous year - and the area served has been growing in population and industrial importance. On these facts, the state agency denied Southern's request to discontinue the two trains. In overruling the decision of the State, the ICC, as already stated, gave "little or no weight" to Southern's overall prosperity and no consideration whatsoever to its freight profits on the line. In my view, the Commission wrongfully ignored these factors and the Court errs in approving this action of the Commission. </s> I read the Act and its history to require the Commission to take into account all material factors established by evidence presented by the parties and bearing on the issues of public need and burden on interstate commerce. The three-judge District Court properly observed that these issues are "not susceptible of scientific measurement or exact formulae but are questions of degree and involve the balancing of conflicting interests." 210 F. Supp. 675, 684. I cannot comprehend how the Commission can achieve a proper balance without fully considering the railroad's relevant profit data. The issues - whether the public need will allow discontinuance of the [376 U.S. 93, 110] passenger service and whether continued operation will unduly burden interstate commerce - are interrelated. Under any common-sense view of the statute, the amount of the railroad's financial loss on the two intrastate passenger trains cannot be considered in isolation from its freight profits on that line, its intrastate profits, or its overall prosperity. The words "unjust" and "undue" clearly indicate that Congress intended that the mere fact that a particular passenger train is operating at a loss - i. e., is a burden - would not in itself justify discontinuance of that train. The burden must be "unjust" and "undue," and whether this is so cannot be determined except in light of the total circumstances. The final determination must be made by balancing all the relevant factors - "the effort being to decide what fairness to all concerned demands." Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 169 . As the decisions of this Court plainly indicate, this does not mean that discontinuance is prohibited unless intrastate passenger and freight service considered together show a net loss or overall profits are substantially impaired. Colorado v. United States, supra; Transit Comm'n v. United States, 284 U.S. 360 . Rather, freight profits and overall profits are merely factors to be considered by the Commission in determining whether the particular passenger loss constitutes an unjust and undue burden on interstate commerce when balanced against the public need. 2 Such profits may not be the controlling factors but, when presented, they are to be considered. [376 U.S. 93, 111] </s> The Court dealt with an aspect of the intrastate passenger problem in Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois, 355 U.S. 300 , and Public Service Comm'n of Utah v. United States, 356 U.S. 421 . These cases involved the construction of 13 (4) of the Interstate Commerce Act which authorizes the Commission to change intrastate rates whenever such rates discriminatorily burden interstate commerce. In the Chicago case the Court said: </s> "[W]e do not think that the deficit from this single commuter operation can fairly be adjudged to work an undue discrimination against the Milwaukee Road's interstate operations without findings which take the deficit into account in the light of the carrier's other intrastate revenues from Illinois traffic, freight and passenger. The basic objective of 13 (4), applied in the light of 15a (2) to this case, is to prevent a discrimination against the carrier's interstate traffic which would result from saddling that traffic with an undue burden of providing intrastate services. A fair picture of the intrastate operation, and whether the intrastate traffic unduly discriminates against interstate traffic, is not shown, in this case, by limiting consideration to the particular commuter service in disregard of the revenue contributed by the other intrastate services." 355 U.S., at 307 -308. [376 U.S. 93, 112] </s> The major premise of the opinion of the Court today, however, is that Congress expressly overruled the Chicago and Public Service Commission cases by amending 13 (4) in the Transportation Act of 1958. It is, of course, true that 13 (4) was amended after these decisions to allow the ICC to determine that intrastate railway rates discriminated against interstate commerce "without a separation of interstate and intrastate property, revenues, and expenses, and without considering in totality the operations or results thereof of any carrier . . . wholly within any State." 72 Stat. 570, 49 U.S.C. 13 (4). I cannot agree, however, with the Court's view that Congress by so amending 13 (4), which deals solely with rate cases, intended that there be read into 13a (2), which deals solely with discontinuances, language which was not similarly incorporated. Section 13a (2) was initially enacted at the same time that 13 (4) was amended. If Congress had intended that the ICC need not consider all relevant factors in discontinuance cases, the proposed 13a (2) could easily have been altered to include the language that was added to 13 (4) by amendment. </s> In any event, even if the differing language is to be understood as importing the same standards, it seems to me that the Court reads the amendment to 13 (4) too broadly. The legislative history shows that Congress intended the amendment to allow the ICC to make a decision under 13 (4) without considering the totality of the carrier's operations when the parties have not presented these facts to the Commission. When these data are presented, however, and put in issue the amended section would not permit the Commission to ignore the evidence. The amendment provides that the Commission may make its determination without a separation of revenues. The permissive "may," read in light of the legislative history, reflects the intent of Congress "that [376 U.S. 93, 113] a decision of the Commission will not be upset simply because it fails to find specifically these facts where they have not been put in issue by the evidence before the Commission, but this does not mean that such facts where relevant and pertinent are not to be considered." 210 F. Supp. 675, 682. This interpretation of the amendment is supported by this Court's affirmance of the decision of the three-judge District Court in Utah Citizens Rate Assn. v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 12, aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 649 . The District Court there said: </s> "We believe that a matter of procedure rather than any substantive change in the basic transportation policy of the Congress is involved. If this were not so, serious conceptual and constitutional, and further practical difficulties, would be invited. But there seems no reason why Congress cannot provide or clarify a procedural factor to render more practical the formula it has theretofore established, and which was, under existing law appropriately considered by the majority in [Public Service Comm'n of Utah v. United States, 356 U.S. 421. In our opinion the amendment in this area does no more than to obviate the previously determined necessity of affirmative findings or evidence showing that the intrastate passenger deficit is not lower than the interstate or concerning the profitableness of, or circumstances surrounding, segments of intrastate operations with which the Commission was not immediately concerned. The legislative history of the amendment bolsters this view. There is nothing therein inconsistent with the further recognition that to rebut the prima facie presumption resulting from the amendment those who claim intrastate traffic as a whole is not discriminating against interstate commerce may show as an affirmative matter favorable aspects of intrastate operations. The dissenting [376 U.S. 93, 114] opinion to this effect referred to the then pending bill couched in the same language as that later adopted in the Transportation Act of 1958, and the Committee, considering the pending legislation, cited the dissenting opinion with apparent approval." 3 192 F. Supp., at 18-20. </s> The dissenting opinion referred to by the court had said: </s> "Of course, those who contend that intrastate traffic as a whole is not discriminating against interstate traffic may come forward and show, as they may in respect to any claimed dissimilarity of conditions surrounding interstate and intrastate traffic, some favorable aspect of intrastate operations that the Commission should take into account. In the absence of such a showing, however, the Commission should be able to assume that discrimination shown to exist as to the particular segments of intrastate and interstate traffic with which the 13 (4) proceeding is concerned is not offset by other conditions that this Court speculates may affect wholly different segments of intrastate commerce." Public Service Comm'n of Utah v. United States, supra, at 462-463. </s> It necessarily follows that if 13 (4), with its amendatory language, does not permit the Commission to ignore evidence of all relevant facts actually offered by the parties in a rate case, such evidence cannot be disregarded in a discontinuance proceeding under 13a (2) which lacks even the amending language. </s> Finally, the legislative history of 13a (2) plainly demonstrates that the Court has mistaken the intent of Congress. The bill initially considered by the Senate [376 U.S. 93, 115] provided that discontinuance would be denied and the continuance approved if the Commission found that: </s> "the operation or service of such train . . . is required by public convenience and necessity and that such operation or service will not result in a net loss therefrom to the carrier or carriers and will not otherwise unduly burden interstate or foreign commerce . . . ." S. 3778, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (Emphasis added.) </s> As the Court notes in its opinion, Senator Javits opposed this "net loss" standard. Ante, at 102. The Court, however, misses the import of Senator Javits' view, which, since it ultimately prevailed, is highly significant. The Senator objected on the ground that the net loss criterion would authorize the discontinuance of any intrastate commuter train which, considered by itself, showed a net loss. He noted that under the proposal, whenever a net loss was shown, discontinuance could follow regardless of whether that loss unduly burdened interstate commerce. The Senator analyzed the proposed bill in a manner most relevant to the present case: </s> "It is my view, as the bill is now written, that question of law [as to the meaning of `net loss therefrom'] will be decided in terms of a net loss on the particular section of a railroad which is sought to be discontinued, rather than the net loss on the total operations of the carrier of which that section of the road is a part." 104 Cong. Rec. 10847. </s> Senator Javits concluded that the bill should be amended to insure that the ICC be given a "balanced authority to deal with the situation, both in respect to losses and in respect to the public in the way of convenience and necessity." Id., at 10848. (Emphasis added.) Senator Smathers, a sponsor of the proposed bill, did not deny the accuracy of Senator Javits' interpretation. Indeed, [376 U.S. 93, 116] Senator Smathers responded: "We construe the words `net loss' to mean the loss from the particular operation the railroad is rendering." Id., at 10849. Although Senator Javits was initially unsuccessful in his efforts to defeat the passage of the net loss provision, his arguments prevailed, as the Court notes, both in the House and in the final bill. </s> On the floor of the House, Representative Harris, Chairman of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, offered an amendment deleting the net loss clause. It was argued that the bill would: </s> "without this amendment, put the public entirely at the mercy of the railroad by establishing a new standard for the discontinuance of train service by a mere showing of a loss in the operation of any train. . . . We cannot go so far afield as to say that unless every single item of service shows a profit the railroad can discontinue any service regardless of public convenience and necessity." id., at 12547-12548. </s> The deleting amendment prevailed in the House, and at Conference the "net loss" provision of the Senate bill was abandoned in favor of the House proposal. Congress, therefore, in acting on the recommendations of Senator Javits and Congressman Harris specifically rejected the proposed net loss standard. The Court today, however, appears to adopt in substantial measure the rejected standard. 4 If, as the Court holds, the Commission need [376 U.S. 93, 117] give "little or no weight" to the overall prosperity of the carrier and no consideration whatever to the profitability of its total intrastate operations, it would seem that the governing criterion in determining whether interstate commerce is unduly burdened is the "net loss" on a particular passenger train. 5 This certainly does not allow the [376 U.S. 93, 118] ICC "a balanced authority to deal with the situation, both in respect to losses and in respect to the public in the way of convenience and necessity." </s> The result intended by Congress certainly cannot be achieved by allowing the Commission to make a final ruling on a discontinuance application without considering the question of undue or unjust burden. 6 A "balanced authority" for the ICC surely means that before overriding state action and authorizing the discontinuance of a wholly intrastate passenger train, the Commission must consider all substantial evidence presented by the parties and bearing upon whether the discontinuance is consistent with public necessity and whether the continued operation will constitute an unjust and undue burden upon interstate commerce. In making this determination the factors for the Commission to consider necessarily include the character and population of the territory served; the passenger traffic or lack of it; the alternative transportation facilities; the losses on the passenger operation as compared with the revenue from freight on the particular line and the revenue from intrastate business as well as the profitability of the railroad as a whole. 7 </s> The requirement that the Commission consider such factors certainly does not mean that it is precluded from [376 U.S. 93, 119] authorizing the abandonment of an uneconomic passenger train because the remainder of the railroad's intrastate or overall operations are profitable. 8 It means only that in making its determination the Commission shall give appropriate consideration to all relevant factors. One factor or a combination may prove controlling but all must be considered in making the statutory determination. This the Commission refused to do and, therefore, its isolated finding that public convenience and necessity would permit a discontinuance was insufficient, absent an appropriate consideration of the burden on commerce, to sustain its conclusion. </s> Although I agree, for the reasons stated, with the threejudge District Court in its interpretation of 13a (2), I am nevertheless of the view that that court misconstrued its reviewing role in finding that the operation of the two trains between Greensboro and Goldsboro served the public need and constituted no burden on interstate commerce. The court should not have determined this issue on the record before it but should have remanded the case for further proceedings by the Commission under the correct legal standard. See, e. g., Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. J-T Transport Co., Inc., 368 U.S. 81, 93 . </s> [Footnote 1 See the statement of the hearing examiner set forth in note 4, infra. </s> [Footnote 2 See Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 168 -169 (Brandeis, J.): "In many cases, it is clear that the extent of the whole traffic, the degree of dependence of the communities directly affected upon the particular means of transportation, and other attendant conditions, are such that the carrier may not justly be required to continue to bear the financial loss necessarily entailed by operation. In some cases, although the volume of the whole traffic is small, the question is whether abandonment may justly be permitted, in view of the fact that it would subject the communities directly affected to [376 U.S. 93, 111] serious injury while continued operation would impose a relatively light burden upon a prosperous carrier. The problem and the process are substantially the same in these cases as where the conflict is between the needs of intrastate and of interstate commerce. Whatever the precise nature of these conflicting needs, the determination is made upon a balancing of the respective interests - the effort being to decide what fairness to all concerned demands. In that balancing, the fact of demonstrated prejudice to interstate commerce and the absence of earnings adequate to afford reasonable compensation are, of course, relevant and may often be controlling. But the Act does not make issuance of the certificate dependent upon a specific finding to that effect." </s> [Footnote 3 See the Conference Report, H. R. Rep. No. 2274, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. </s> [Footnote 4 The report of the hearing examiner, which was accepted by the Commission and is now approved by the Court, made it clear that a net loss standard was utilized: "At the hearing, protestants emphasized the fact that petitioner's net railway operating income in 1960 was $36,107,599, and that its net income alone from freight operations on the line between Greensboro and Goldsboro averages $630,000, thus contending that the overall prosperity of the petitioner, as well as its intrastate freight operations, [376 U.S. 93, 117] must be given effect in the disposition of the issues involved herein. With these contentions, the examiner disagrees. The legislative history of section 13a (2) indicates that the purpose thereof is to permit the discontinuance of the operation of services that `no longer pay their way and for which there is no longer any public need to justify the heavy financial losses involved.' (S. Rep. 1647, 85th Cong.). (Emphasis supplied). In considering a somewhat similar contention, in Southern Pacific Co. - Partial Discontinuance of Passenger Trains, Los Angeles, etc. [312 I. C. C. 631], the Commission made the following pertinent statement: "`Nowhere in section 13a (2) or elsewhere in the law is there any requirement that the prosperity of the intrastate operations of the carrier as a whole, or any particular segment thereof, must be given effect in determining whether the operation of an individual intrastate train imposes an unjust and undue burden on interstate commerce. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the apparent intent of the Congress.' "In this same connection, the argument that losing passenger operations must be supported by constantly increasing freight rates is also untenable. In rejecting this argument, the Commission stated that such `theory of regulation would not be consonant with the national transportation policy, and would be fraught with disastrous possibilities.' Great Northern Ry. Co. Discontinuance of Service, 307 I. C. C. 59, 61. Similarly, the fact that petitioner's system operations are profitable is entitled to little or no weight. . . ." </s> [Footnote 5 This does not imply that either the Commission or the Court has failed to acknowledge that a carrier must show that public convenience and necessity will permit the requested discontinuance. However, as I have indicated, supra, at 107, unless the Commission relates this finding as to public convenience to an appropriate consideration of the burden issue, the availability of alternative means of transportation coupled with the fact of losses on diminished passenger traffic will suffice to sanction discontinuances in virtually all cases. </s> [Footnote 6 Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 168 , "The benefit . . . of the abandonment must be weighed against the inconvenience . . . . Conversely, the benefits to particular communities and commerce of continued operation must be weighed against the burden thereby imposed upon other commerce." </s> [Footnote 7 The conclusion that 13a (2) contemplates the weighing of such factors is reinforced by the use of the same balancing approach under 1 (18), 1 (20), of the Interstate Commerce Act, 41 Stat. 477, 478, as amended, 49 U.S.C. 1 (18), 1 (20). These provisions, enacted in 1920, empower the ICC to permit abandonment of lines (as distinguished from particular trains), where continued operation of the [376 U.S. 93, 119] entire intrastate line would burden interstate commerce. See Colorado v. United States, supra; Transit Comm'n v. United States, 284 U.S. 360 . </s> [Footnote 8 The ICC has never been precluded from authorizing abandonment of an uneconomic branch line (as distinguished from the particular trains) merely because the remainder of the railroad's intrastate operations were profitable. See note 7, supra. </s> [376 U.S. 93, 120]

United States Supreme Court FROZEN FOOD EXP. v. UNITED STATES(1956) No. 158 Argued: March 7, 1956Decided: April 23, 1956 </s> After an investigation and hearing instituted on its own motion, the Interstate Commerce Commission issued an order listing a large number of specified commodities which it found not to be "agricultural" within the meaning of 203 (b) (6) of the Interstate Commerce Act, which exempts from the requirement of a permit or a certificate of public convenience and necessity motor vehicles used only in carrying "agricultural" commodities. A motor carrier transporting without a certificate or permit numerous commodities found by the Commission not to be "agricultural" commodities, and which had not been a party to the administrative proceeding, sued in a Federal District Court to enjoin and set aside the Commission's order. Held: The Commission's order is subject to judicial review, and the District Court should adjudicate the merits. United States v. Los Angeles R. Co., 273 U.S. 299 , distinguished. Pp. 41-45. </s> 128 F. Supp. 374, reversed. </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 159, Interstate Commerce Commission v. Frozen Food Express et al.; No. 160, American Trucking Associations, Inc., et al. v. Frozen Food Express et al.; and No. 161, Akron, Canton & Youngstown R. Co. et al. v. Frozen Food Express et al., also on appeal from the same court. </s> Carl L. Phinney argued the cause and filed a brief for Frozen Food Express, appellant in No. 158 and appellee in Nos. 159, 160 and 161. </s> Robert W. Ginnane argued the cause for the Interstate Commerce Commission appellant in No. 159 and appellee in No. 158. With him on the brief was Leo H. Pou. </s> David G. Macdonald argued the cause for the American Trucking Associations, Inc., et al., appellants in No. 160. With him on the brief were Francis W. McInerny, Peter T. Beardsley, Clarence D. Todd and Dale C. Dillon. [351 U.S. 40, 41] </s> Charles P. Reynolds and Carl Helmetag, Jr. submitted on brief for the Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co. et al., appellants in No. 161. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 Stat. 543, as amended, 49 U.S.C. 301 et seq., grants the Commission pervasive control over motor carriers. Common carriers and contract carriers by motor vehicle, subject to that part of the Act, must have a certificate of public convenience and necessity or a permit issued by the Commission. 206 (a), 209 (a). The Commission has powers of investigation to determine if a motor carrier has complied with the Act; and it has authority to issue an order compelling compliance. 204 (c). These requirements for a certificate or permit * are not, however, applicable to "motor vehicles used in carrying property consisting of ordinary livestock, fish (including shell fish), or agricultural (including horticultural) commodities (not including manufactured products thereof), if such motor vehicles are not used in carrying any other property, or passengers, for compensation." 203 (b) (6). </s> The controversy in these cases centers around this "agricultural" exemption. After an investigation instituted on its own motion, the Commission issued an order that specified commodities are not "agricultural" within the meaning of 203 (b) (6). </s> The hearing to determine the meaning and application of the term "agricultural . . . commodities (not including manufactured products thereof)" as used in 203 (b) (6) was held before an examiner. It was a public hearing at which various governmental officials and agencies and [351 U.S. 40, 42] various producers, shippers, and carriers appeared and presented evidence. The Commission's decision was in the form of a report and order. 52 M. C. C. 511. The report, which concerns various groups of commodities, covers 71 pages of the printed record. The findings list those commodities that the Commission finds are exempted under 203 (b) (6) and those that are not. The order of the Commission incorporates the "findings" and states that the proceeding "be, and it is hereby discontinued." </s> Frozen Food Express, the plaintiff, is a motor carrier transporting numerous commodities which the Commission ruled were nonexempt under 203 (b) (6) but which the carrier claims are "agricultural commodities." Plaintiff, who was not a party to the administrative proceeding, instituted suit before a three-judge District Court (28 U.S.C. 2325) to enjoin the order of the Commission and have it set aside, naming the United States and the Commission as defendants. 28 U.S.C. 1336; 49 Stat. 550, as amended, 49 U.S.C. 305 (g); 60 Stat. 243, 5 U.S.C. 1009. The complaint alleged that plaintiff is a common carrier by motor vehicle, holding a certificate of public convenience and necessity which authorizes it to transport certain commodities between designated points and places; that plaintiff is transporting, in addition to those commodities, commodities which are exempt under 203 (b) (6) and for which plaintiff has sought no authority from the Commission; that the Commission in its order has held the latter commodities nonexempt and accordingly has deprived it of the right granted by the statute; that the order of the Commission classifying certain commodities as nonexempt is unlawful; and that the Commission threatens to enjoin transportation of the commodities which plaintiff claims are exempt. The Secretary of Agriculture intervened, supporting plaintiff's position on some of the commodities. Other interveners [351 U.S. 40, 43] are trucking associations and railroads which support the Commission. The United States as a defendant supports the Commission on some of its findings and opposes it on others. </s> The District Court, being of the view that the case was controlled by United States v. Los Angeles R. Co., 273 U.S. 299 , dismissed the action, saying that the "order" of the Commission was not subject to judicial review. 128 F. Supp. 374. The cases are here by appeal. 28 U.S.C. 1253, 2101 (b). </s> We disagree with the District Court. We do not think United States v. Los Angeles R. Co., supra, is controlling here. In that case the "order" held nonreviewable was a valuation of a carrier's property made by the Commission. The Court held that the "order" was no more than a report of an investigation which might never be the basis of a proceeding before the Commission or a court. Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Court, said: </s> "The so-called order here complained of is one which does not command the carrier to do, or to refrain from doing, any thing; which does not grant or withhold any authority, privilege or license; which does not extend or abridge any power or facility; which does not subject the carrier to any liability, civil or criminal; which does not change the carrier's existing or future status or condition; which does not determine any right or obligation. This so-called order is merely the formal record of conclusions reached after a study of data collected in the course of extensive research conducted by the Commission, through its employees. It is the exercise solely of the function of investigation. . . ." 273 U.S. 309 -310. </s> The situation here is quite different. The determination by the Commission that a commodity is not an [351 U.S. 40, 44] exempt agricultural product has an immediate and practical impact on carriers who are transporting the commodities, and on shippers as well. The "order" of the Commission warns every carrier, who does not have authority from the Commission to transport those commodities, that it does so at the risk of incurring criminal penalties. 222 (a). Where unauthorized operations occur, the Commission may proceed administratively and issue a cease and desist order. 204 (c). Such orders of the Commission are enforceable by the courts. 222 (b). And wilful violation of a cease and desist order is ground for revocation of a certificate or permit. 212. The determination made by the Commission is not therefore abstract, theoretical, or academic. Cf. El Dorado Oil Works v. United States, 328 U.S. 12, 18 -19. The "order" of the Commission which classifies commodities as exempt or nonexempt is, indeed, the basis for carriers in ordering and arranging their affairs. Cf. Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 132 . Carriers who are without the appropriate certificate or permit, because they believe they carry exempt commodities, run civil and criminal risks. A carrier authorized to carry specified commodities and dependent on exempt articles for its return load may lose its right to operate at all, if it does not respect the Commission's "order." Carriers and shippers alike are told that they are or are not free to bargain for rates, that they must or must not pay the filed charges. The "order" of the Commission is in substance a "declaratory" one, see 60 Stat. 240, 5 U.S.C. 1004 (d), which touches vital interests of carriers and shippers alike and sets the standard for shaping the manner in which an important segment of the trucking business will be done. Cf. Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 . The consequences we have summarized are not conjectural. The Commission itself places this interpretation on its action and argues, contrary to its [351 U.S. 40, 45] position in the Los Angeles Case, supra, for finality of the order. We conclude that the issues raised in the complaint are justiciable and that the District Court should adjudicate the merits. </s> Reversed. </s> [Footnote * Exempted carriers are also not subject to the provisions concerning rates and charges, 217, 218, nor to the requirements concerning bodily injury and property damage insurance. 215. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting. </s> I do not agree that the District Court had jurisdiction to entertain this action to set aside the Commission's "order." It seems to me that the case falls squarely within those carefully developed rules which require that judicial intervention be withheld until administrative action has reached its complete development. I find nothing in the nature of the order which commends it to reviewability at this stage other than the fact that its promulgation was preceded by a lengthy investigation and that it contains a series of "findings" and "conclusions." These factors should not be permitted to obscure the true character of the order. </s> After a self-initiated investigation, in which various carriers participated, the Commission entered this order discontinuing the proceedings and incorporating the "findings of fact and conclusions" of the Commission. That the order was not intended to be a "legislative" regulation seems apparent, since it was not put in the form ordinarily used by the Commission in promulgating regulations. The order simply lists the commodities considered by the Commission and determines whether they are within the 203 (b) (6) exemption; it nowhere commands that carriers hauling commodities considered non-exempt comply either with the order or with the general requirements of the Interstate Commerce Act. It is clear, therefore, that no administrative or criminal proceeding can be brought for violation of the order itself. And it is equally clear that the proceeding did not conclude any rights as between any specific carriers and the Commission. [351 U.S. 40, 46] </s> The Interstate Commerce Act does, of course, provide for administrative and criminal sanctions to enforce compliance with its provisions. An uncertificated carrier hauling commodities non-exempt under 203 (b) (6) runs the risk of a criminal prosecution under 222 (a) of the Act. But the order has no operative effect in such a proceeding - it does not extend the carrier's criminal liability, which exists because of a violation of the Act and not the order. And if the enforcement takes the form of a cease and desist proceeding against a particular carrier, again the only question would be whether the Act, rather than the order, was being violated. If such an administrative proceeding is instituted, and a cease and desist order is issued, the carrier subject to that order would be entitled to contest the statutory authority of the Commission in judicial proceedings of precisely the scope brought here. </s> Nor can this order be likened to a determination of status, held reviewable in Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 . As I understand that case, the touchstone of the decision was that the determination "necessarily and immediately carried direction of obedience to previously formulated mandatory orders addressed generally to all carriers amenable to the Commission's authority." 307 U.S., at p. 144. The specific determination that a particular carrier must comply with Commission regulations is quite different from this order, which is directed to no one in particular and is binding on no one, not even the Commission. Neither can this order be analogized to a declaratory order directed to the status of a particular carrier, which might be reviewable as carrying with it a direct threat of prosecution - see Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, supra, at p. 132, n. 11. Indeed, the Commission itself does not consider its determinations the final answer to the meaning of the 203 (b) (6) exemption, even for administrative [351 U.S. 40, 47] purposes. This is evident from the proceedings in East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Frozen Food Express, post, p. 49, where in a cease and desist proceeding the Commission heard new evidence on whether the particular commodities there involved were within the exemption, and was evidently ready to reconsider the determinations embodied in the order involved here. </s> To be sure, the order does serve as a warning to carriers that the Commission interprets the Act in a particular way, and it is true that courts will give the Commission's views some indeterminate weight in construing the statute. But that very fact, instead of justifying a holding of reviewability, seems to me a strong argument against it. The Commission's willingness, in individual cases, to reconsider its determinations with respect to particular commodities points up the tentative nature of the conclusions here sought to be reviewed. When this action is heard on the merits, the District Court will have as an aid in construing the statute administrative interpretations which are admittedly inconclusive, and if they are to be given any weight it would seem important that this Court not do anything to freeze them in their present immature state. For all we know, the Commission's decision not to issue this order in the form of regulations may have been because it recognized the need for further study. </s> Years of experience have shown that 203 (b) (6) presents difficult problems of interpretation, and this Court should be wary of establishing a procedure which would prematurely throw into the courts questions of statutory construction not arising in the context of concrete facts, and which does not bring to the courts even the benefit of final interpretation by the agency assigned to administer the statute. That this should be done in a case where there is a right of direct appeal to this Court makes the wisdom of today's decision even more questionable. [351 U.S. 40, 48] </s> Lastly, the order does not have the immediate impact of the sort which, at times, has led this Court to regard particular administrative action as ripe for judicial review. In Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 , the very existence of the regulations had, without anything more, an immediate effect on the business of the party attacking them. There is much to be said for finding administrative action reviewable when it entails immediate practical consequences for those affected by it. Cf. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 . But the carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act are in no way worse off now than they were before this order issued; there is no greater liability or risk under the statute occasioned by the order, which has no more effect than would any other informal expression of views by the Commission. If anything, carriers are in a better position, since they can now make a more reasoned judgment as to the applicability of the statute to particular commodities, and this may have been the principal reason for the Commission making public its findings. </s> In my view, then, the language quoted by the majority from United States v. Los Angeles R. Co. aptly describes this order of the Commission, and I consider that wise decision controlling here. Neither the character nor the meaning of this order can be changed by the fact that the Commission, in asking us to hold it reviewable, calls it a "formal determination" of the scope of 203 (b) (6). The significant fact is that, as shown by East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Frozen Food Express, post, p. 49, the Commission itself does not consider its order definitive. Today's decision opens the door wide to premature judicial review of various kinds of administrative action, and I must withhold my assent from it. I would affirm the decision below. </s> [351 U.S. 40, 49]

United States Supreme Court ROUSEY et ux. v. JACOWAY(2005) No. 03-1407 Argued: December 1, 2004Decided: April 4, 2005 </s> Several years after petitioners deposited distributions from their pension plans into Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), they filed a joint petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. They sought to shield portions of their IRAs from their creditors by claiming them as exempt from the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. §522(d)(10)(E), which provides, inter alia, that a debtor may withdraw from the estate his "right to receive ... a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract on account of ... age." Respondent Jacoway, the Bankruptcy Trustee, objected to the Rouseys' exemption and moved for turnover of the IRAs to her. The Bankruptcy Court sustained her objection and granted her motion, and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) agreed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that, even if the Rouseys' IRAs were "similar plans or contracts" to the plans specified in §522(d)(10)(E), their IRAs gave them no right to receive payment "on account of age," but were instead savings accounts readily accessible at any time for any purpose. Held:The Rouseys can exempt IRA assets from the bankruptcy estate because the IRAs fulfill both of the §522(d)(10)(E) requirements at issue here--they confer a right to receive payment on account of age and they are similar plans or contracts to those enumerated in §522(d)(10)(E). Pp.4-14. (a)The Court reaffirms its suggestion in Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 762-763, that IRAs like the Rouseys' can be exempted from the bankruptcy estate pursuant to §522(d)(10)(E). Pp.4-5. </s> (b)The Rouseys' IRAs provide a right to payment "on account of ... age" within §522(d)(10)(E)'s meaning. The quoted phrase requires that the right to receive payment be "because of" age. Bank of America Nat. Trust and Sav. Assn. v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 526 U.S. 434, 450-451. This meaning comports with the common, dictionary understanding of "on account of," and §522(d)(10)(E)'s context does not suggest another meaning. The statutes governing IRAs persuade the Court that Jacoway is mistaken in arguing that there is no causal connection between that right and age or any other factor because the Rouseys' IRAs provide a right to payment on demand. Their right to receive payment of the entire balance is not in dispute. Because their accounts qualify as IRAs under 26 U.S.C. §408(a), they have a nonforfeitable right to the balance held in those accounts, §408(a)(4). That right is restricted by a 10 percent tax penalty on any withdrawal made before age 59, §72(t). Contrary to Jacoway's contention, this 10 percent penalty is substantial. It applies proportionally to any amounts withdrawn and prevents access to the 10 percent that the Rouseys would forfeit should they withdraw early. It therefore effectively prevents access to the entire balance in their IRAs and limits their right to "payment" of the balance. And because this condition is removed when the accountholder turns age 59, the Rouseys' right to the balance of their IRAs is a right to payment "on account of" age. Pp.5-8. </s> (c)The Rouseys' IRAs are "similar plan[s] or contract[s]" to the "stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, [or] annuity ... plan[s]" listed in §522(d)(10)(E). To be "similar," an IRA must be like, though not identical to, the listed plans or contracts, and consequently must share characteristics common to them. Because the Bankruptcy Code does not define the listed plans, the Court looks to their ordinary meaning. E.g., United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757. Dictionary definitions reveal that, although the listed plans are dissimilar to each other in some respects, their common feature is that they provide income that substitutes for wages earned as salary or hourly compensation. That the income the Rouseys will derive from their IRAs is likewise income that substitutes for wages lost upon retirement is demonstrated by the facts that (1) regulations require distribution to begin no later than the calendar year after the year the accountholder turns 70; (2) taxation of IRA money is deferred until the year in which it is distributed; (3) withdrawals before age 59 are subject to the 10 percent penalty; and (4) failure to take the requisite minimum distributions results in a 50 percent tax penalty on funds improperly remaining in the account. The Court rejects Jacoway's argument that IRAs cannot be similar plans or contracts because the Rouseys have complete access to them. This argument is premised on her view that the 10 percent penalty is modest, a premise with which the Court does not agree. The Court also rejects Jacoway's contention that the availability of IRA withdrawals exempt from the early withdrawal penalty renders the Rouseys' IRAs more like savings accounts. Sections 522(d)(10)(E)(i) through (iii)--which preclude the debtor from using the §522(d)(10)(E) exemption if an insider established his plan or contract; the right to receive payment is on account of age or length of service; and the plan does not qualify under specified Internal Revenue Code sections, including the section governing IRAs--not only suggest generally that the Rouseys' IRAs are exempt, but also support the Court's conclusion that they are "similar plan[s] or contract[s]" under §522(d)(10)(E). Pp.8-14. 347 F.3d 689, reversed and remanded. Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. </s> RICHARD GERALD ROUSEY, et ux., PETITIONERS v. JILL R. JACOWAY on writ of certiorari to the united states court ofappeals for the eighth circuit [April 4, 2005] </s> Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The Bankruptcy Code permits debtors to exempt certain property from the bankruptcy estate, allowing them to retain those assets rather than divide them among their creditors. 11 U.S.C. §522. The question in this case is whether debtors can exempt assets in their Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) from the bankruptcy estate pursuant to §522(d)(10)(E). We hold that IRAs can be so exempted. I </s> Petitioners Richard and Betty Jo Rousey were formerly employed at Northrup Grumman Corp. At the termination of their employment, Northrup Grumman required them to take lump-sum distributions from their employer-sponsored pension plans. Inre Rousey, 283 B.R. 265, 268 (Bkrtcy. App. Panel CA8 2002); Brief for Petitioners 2. The Rouseys deposited the lump sums into two IRAs, one in each of their names. 283 B.R., at 268. The Rouseys' accounts qualify as IRAs under a number of requirements imposed by the Internal Revenue Code. Each account is "a trust created or organized in the United States for the exclusive benefit of an individual or his beneficiaries." 26 U.S.C. §408(a) (2000 ed. and Supp. II). The Internal Revenue Code limits the types of assets in which IRA-holders may invest their accounts, §§408(a)(3), (a)(5), and provides that the balance in IRAs is nonforfeitable, §408(a)(4). It also caps yearly contributions to IRAs. §408(o)(2). Withdrawals made before the accountholder turns 5912 are, with limited exceptions, subject to a 10 percent tax penalty. §72(t). </s> IRA contributions receive favorable tax treatment. In particular, the Internal Revenue Code generally defers taxation of the money placed in IRAs and the income earned from those sums until the assets are withdrawn. See §219(a) (contributions to IRAs are tax deductible); §408(e)(1) (IRA is tax exempt). Moreover, within a certain timeframe accountholders can, as the Rouseys did here, roll over distributions received from other retirement plans. §408(a)(1). The Internal Revenue Code encourages such rollovers by making them nontaxable. §§408(d)(3), 402(c)(1), 403(b)(8), and 457(e)(16). </s> The Rouseys' IRA agreements, as well as relevant regulations, provide that their "entire interest in the custodial account must be, or begin to be, distributed by" April 1 following the calendar yearend in which they reach age 7012. Inre Rousey, 275 B.R. 307, 310 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Ark. 2002). The IRA agreements permit withdrawal prior to age 5912, but note the federal tax penalties applicable to such distributions. Id., at 311. </s> Several years after establishing their IRAs, the Rouseys filed a joint Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Arkansas. In the schedules and statements accompanying their petition, the Rouseys sought to shield portions of their IRAs from their creditors by claiming them as exempt from the bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §522(d)(10)(E). This exemption provides that a debtor may withdraw from the bankruptcy estate his "right to receive-- ..... "(E) a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor...." </s> The Bankruptcy Court appointed respondent Jill R. Jacoway as the Chapter 7 Trustee. As Trustee, Jacoway is responsible for overseeing the liquidation of the bankruptcy estate and the distribution of the proceeds. She objected to the Rouseys' claim for the exemption of their IRAs and moved for turnover of those sums to her. The Bankruptcy Court sustained Jacoway's objection and granted her motion. 275 B.R., at 309. </s> The Rouseys appealed. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) agreed with the Bankruptcy Court that the Rouseys could not exempt their IRAs under §522(d)(10)(E). It concluded that the IRAs were not "'similar plan[s] or contract[s]'" to stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, or annuity plans, because, by contrast to the limited access permitted in such plans, the Rouseys had "unlimited access" to the funds held in their IRAs. 283 B.R., at 272. That access also meant, the BAP reasoned, that the Rouseys had complete control over the funds in their IRAs, "subject only to a ten percent tax penalty." Id., at 273. Because they had such control, the payments from the IRAs were not "on account of any factor listed in 11 U.S.C. §522(d)(10)(E)." Ibid. </s> The Rouseys again appealed and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals concluded that, even if the Rouseys' IRAs were "'similar plans or contracts'" to stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, or annuity plans, their IRAs gave them no right to receive payment "'on account of age.'" Inre Rousey, 347 F.3d 689, 693 (2003). Like the BAP, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the Rouseys' right to payment was conditioned neither on age nor on any of the other statutory factors. Their IRAs were instead "readily accessible savings accounts of which the debtors may easily avail themselves (albeit with some discouraging tax consequences) at any time for any purpose." Ibid. The Court of Appeals recognized that several of its sister Circuits had reached a contrary result. Ibid. See Inre Brucher, 243 F.3d 242, 243-244 (CA6 2001); Inre McKown, 203 F.3d 1188, 1190 (CA9 2000); Inre Dubroff, 119 F.3d 75, 78 (CA2 1997); Inre Carmichael, 100 F.3d 375, 378 (CA5 1996). </s> We granted certiorari to resolve this division among the Courts of Appeals regarding whether debtors can exempt IRAs from the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. §522(d)(10)(E). 541 U.S. 1085 (2004). II </s> As a general matter, upon the filing of a petition for bankruptcy, "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property" become the property of the bankruptcy estate and will be distributed to the debtor's creditors. §541(a)(1). To help the debtor obtain a fresh start, the Bankruptcy Code permits him to withdraw from the estate certain interests in property, such as his car or home, up to certain values. See, e.g., §522(d); United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 72, n. 1 (1982). In this case, the Rouseys claimed their IRAs as exempt under §522(d)(10)(E). Under the terms of the statute, see supra, at 3, the Rouseys' right to receive payment under their IRAs must meet three requirements to be exempted under this provision: (1) the right to receive payment must be from "a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract"; (2) the right to receive payment must be "on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service"; and (3) even then, the right to receive payment may be exempted only "to the extent" that it is "reasonably necessary to support" the accountholder or his dependents. §522(d)(10)(E). The dispute in this case is whether the Rouseys' IRAs fulfill the first and second requirements. This Court implied that IRAs like the Rouseys' satisfy both elements in Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992). There, in construing another section of the Bankruptcy Code, this Court stated that IRAs could be exempted pursuant to §522(d)(10)(E). Id., at 762-763 ("Although a debtor's interest [in an IRA] could not be excluded under §541(c)(2) ... , that interest nevertheless could be exempted under §522(d)(10)(E)" (footnote omitted)). We now reaffirm that statement and conclude that IRAs can be exempted from the bankruptcy estate pursuant to §522(d)(10)(E). A </s> We turn first to the requirement that the payment be "on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service." Ibid. We have interpreted the phrase "on account of" elsewhere within the Bankruptcy Code to mean "because of," thereby requiring a causal connection between the term that the phrase "on account of" modifies and the factor specified in the statute at issue. Bank of America Nat. Trust and Sav. Assn. v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 526 U.S. 434, 450-451 (1999). In reaching that conclusion, we noted that "because of" was "certainly the usage meant for the phrase at other places in the [bankruptcy] statute," including the provision at issue here--§522(d)(10)(E). Ibid. This meaning comports with the common understanding of "on account of." See, e.g., Random House Dictionary of the English Language 13 (2d ed. 1987) (listing as definitions "by reason of," "because of"); Webster's Third New International Dictionary 13 (1981) (hereinafter Webster's 3d) (same). The context of this provision does not suggest that Congress deviated from the term's ordinary meaning. Thus, "on account of" in §522(d)(10)(E) requires that the right to receive payment be "because of" illness, disability, death, age, or length of service. Jacoway argues that the Rouseys' right to receive payment from their IRAs is not "because of" these listed factors. In particular, she asserts that the Rouseys can withdraw funds from their IRAs for any reason at all, so long as they are willing to pay a 10 percent penalty. Thus, Jacoway maintains that there is no causal connection between the Rouseys' right to payment and age (or any other factor), because their IRAs provide a right to payment on demand. </s> We disagree. The statutes governing IRAs persuade us that the Rouseys' right to payment from IRAs is causally connected to their age. Their right to receive payment of the entire balance is not in dispute. Because their accounts qualify as IRAs under 26 U.S.C. §408(a) (2000 ed. and Supp. II), the Rouseys have a nonforfeitable right to the balance held in those accounts, §408(a)(4). That right is restricted by a 10 percent tax penalty that applies to withdrawals from IRAs made before the accountholder turns 5912. Contrary to Jacoway's contention, this tax penalty is substantial. The deterrent to early withdrawal it creates suggests that Congress designed it to preclude early access to IRAs. The low rates of early withdrawals are consistent with the notion that this penalty substantially deters early withdrawals from such accounts.1 Because the 10 percent penalty applies proportionally to any amounts withdrawn, it prevents access to the 10 percent that the Rouseys would forfeit should they withdraw early, and thus it effectively prevents access to the entire balance in their IRAs.2 It therefore limits the Rouseys' right to "payment" of the balance of their IRAs. And because this condition is removed when the accountholder turns age 5912, the Rouseys' right to the balance of their IRAs is a right to payment "on account of" age.3 The Rouseys no more have an unrestricted right to payment of the balance in their IRAs than a contracting party has an unrestricted right to breach a contract simply because the price of doing so is the payment of damages.4 Accordingly, we conclude that the Rouseys' IRAs provide a right to payment on account of age. B </s> In addition to requiring that the IRAs provide a right to payment "on account of" age or one of the other factors listed in the statute, 11 U.S.C. §522(d)(10)(E) also requires the Rouseys' IRAs to be "stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan[s] or contract[s]." No party contends that the Rouseys' IRAs are stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, or annuity plans or contracts. The issue, then, is whether the Rouseys' IRAs are "similar plan[s] or contract[s]" within the meaning of §522(d)(10)(E). To be "similar," an IRA must be like, though not identical to, the specific plans or contracts listed in §522(d)(10)(E), and consequently must share characteristics common to the listed plans or contracts. See American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1206 (1981) (hereinafter Am. Hert.); Webster's 3d 2120. The Rouseys contend that IRAs are "similar" to stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, or annuity plans or contracts, in that they have the same "primary purpose," namely, "enabl[ing] Americans to save for their retirement." Reply Brief for Petitioners 13. Jacoway counters that IRAs are unlike the listed plans because those plans provide "deferred compensation," Brief for Respondent 22, whereas IRAs allow complete access to deposited funds and are therefore not deferred at all, id., at 22-24. We agree with the Rouseys that IRAs are similar to the plans specified in the statute. Those plans, like the Rouseys' IRAs, provide a substitute for wages (by wages, for present purposes, we mean compensation earned as hourly or salary income), and are not mere savings accounts. The Rouseys' IRAs are therefore "similar plan[s] or contract[s]" within the meaning of §522(d)(10)(E). </s> We turn first to the characteristics the specific plans and contracts listed in §522(d)(10)(E) share. The Bankruptcy Code does not define the terms "profitsharing," "stock bonus," "pension," or "annuity." Accordingly, we look to the ordinary meaning of these terms. United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997); Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). A "profitsharing" plan, of course, is "[a] system by which employees receive a share of the profits of a business enterprise." Am. Hert. 1045.5 Profitsharing plans may provide deferred compensation, but they may also be "cash plans" in which a predetermined percentage of the profits is distributed to employees at set intervals. J. Langbein & B. Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law 48 (3d ed. 2000). A stock bonus plan is like a profitsharing plan, except that it distributes company stock rather than cash from profits. Id., at 49.6 A pension is defined as "a fixed sum ... paid under given conditions to a person following his retirement from service (as due to age or disability) or to the surviving dependents of a person entitled to such a pension." Webster's 3d 1671.7 Finally, an annuity is "an amount payable yearly or at other regular intervals ... for a certain or uncertain period (as for years, for life, or in perpetuity)." Id., at 88.8 </s> The common feature of all of these plans is that they provide income that substitutes for wages earned as salary or hourly compensation. This understanding of the plans' similarities comports with the other types of payments that a debtor may exempt under §522(d)(10)--all of which concern income that substitutes for wages. See, e.g., §522(d)(10)(A) ("social security benefit, unemployment compensation, or a local public assistance benefit"); §522(d)(10)(B) ("a veterans' benefit"); §522(d)(10)(C) ("disability, illness, or unemployment benefit"); §522(d)(10)(D) ("alimony, support, or separate maintenance"). But the plans are dissimilar in other respects: Employers establish and contribute to stock bonus, profitsharing, and pension plans or contracts, whereas an individual can establish and contribute to an annuity on terms and conditions he selects. Moreover, pension plans and annuities provide deferred payment, whereas profitsharing or stock bonus plans may or may not provide deferred payment. And while a pension provides retirement income, none of these other plans necessarily provides retirement income. What all of these plans have in common is that they provide income that substitutes for wages. </s> Several considerations convince us that the income the Rouseys will derive from their IRAs is likewise income that substitutes for wages. First, the minimum distribution requirements, as discussed above, require distribution to begin at the latest in the calendar year after the year in which the accountholder turns 7012. Thus, accountholders must begin to withdraw funds when they are likely to be retired and lack wage income. Second, the Internal Revenue Code defers taxation of money held in accounts qualifying as IRAs under 26 U.S.C. §408(a) (2000 ed. and Supp. II) until the year in which it is distributed, treating it as income only in such years. §§219, 408(e) (2000 ed. and Supp. II). This tax treatment further encourages accountholders to wait until retirement to withdraw the funds: The later withdrawal occurs, the longer the taxes on the amounts are deferred. Third, absent the applicability of other exceptions discussed above, withdrawals before age 5912 are subject to a tax penalty, restricting preretirement access to the funds. Finally, to ensure that the beneficiary uses the IRA in his retirement years, an accountholder's failure to take the requisite minimum distributions results in a 50-percent tax penalty on funds improperly remaining in the account. §4974(a). All of these features show that IRA income substitutes for wages lost upon retirement and distinguish IRAs from typical savings accounts. </s> We find unpersuasive Jacoway's contention that the IRAs cannot be similar plans or contracts because the Rouseys have complete access to them. At bottom, this contention rests, as did her "on account of" argument, on the premise that the tax penalty imposed for early withdrawal is modest and hence not a true limit on the withdrawal of funds. As explained above, however, that penalty erects a substantial barrier to early withdrawal. Supra, at 6-7. Funds in a typical savings account, by contrast, can be withdrawn without age-based penalty. </s> We also reject Jacoway's argument that the availability of IRA withdrawals exempt from the 10 percent penalty renders the Rouseys' IRAs more like savings accounts. While Jacoway is correct that the Internal Revenue Code permits penalty-free early withdrawals in certain limited circumstances, 26 U.S.C. §72(t)(2), these exceptions do not reduce the IRAs to savings accounts. </s> The exceptions are narrow. For example, penalty-free early distributions for health insurance premiums are limited to unemployed individuals who have received unemployment compensation for at least 12 consecutive weeks and have taken those distributions during the same year in which the unemployment compensation is made. §72(t)(2)(D). These payments are further limited to the actual amount paid for insurance for the accountholder, his spouse, and his dependents. §72(t)(2)(D)(iii). The Internal Revenue Code likewise caps the amount of, and sets qualifications for, both the higher education expenses and first-time home purchases for which penalty-free early distributions can be taken. §§72(t)(2)(E), 72(t)(7) (higher education expenses); §§72(t)(2)(F), 72(t)(8) (home purchases). The Internal Revenue Code also permits penalty-free distributions to a beneficiary on the death of the accountholder or in the event that the accountholder becomes disabled. §§72(t)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii).9 </s> These exceptions are limited in amount and scope. Even with these carveouts, an early withdrawal without penalty remains the exception, rather than the rule. And as we explained in discussing the "on account of" requirement, withdrawals from other retirement plans receive similar tax treatment. </s> Our conclusion that the Rouseys' IRAs can be exempt under 11 U.S.C. §522(d)(10)(E) finds support in clauses (i)-(iii) of §522(d)(10)(E). These clauses bring into the estate certain rights to payment that otherwise would be exempt under §522(d)(10)(E). They provide that a right to receive payment cannot be exempt if: "(i) such plan or contract was established by or under the auspices of an insider that employed the debtor at the time the debtor's rights under such plan or contract arose; </s> "(ii) such payment is on account of age or length of service; and </s> " (iii) such plan or contract does not qualify under section 401(a), 403(a), 403(b) or 408 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986." </s> Thus, clauses (i)-(iii) preclude the debtor from using this exemption if an insider established his plan or contract; the right to receive payment is on account of age or length of service; and the plan does not qualify under the specified Internal Revenue Code sections, including the section that governs IRAs, 26 U.S.C. §408 (2000 ed. and Supp. II). </s> As a general matter, it makes little sense to exclude from the exemption plans that fail to qualify under §408, unless all plans that do qualify under §408, including IRAs, are generally within the exemption. If IRAs were not within 11 U.S.C. §522(d)(10)(E), Congress would not have referred to them in its exception. McKown, 203 F.3d, at 1190. More specifically, clause (iii) suggests that plans qualifying under 26 U.S.C. §408 (2000 ed. and Supp. II), including IRAs are similar plans or contracts. The other sections of the Internal Revenue Code cited in clause (iii)--§§401(a), 403(a), and 403(b)--all establish requirements for tax-qualified retirement plans that take the form of, among other things, annuities, profitsharing plans, and stock bonus plans. By grouping §408 with these other plans that are of the specific types listed in subparagraph (E), clause (iii) suggests that IRAs are similar to them. Thus, the text of these clauses not only suggests generally that the Rouseys' IRAs are exempt, but also supports our conclusion that they are "similar plan[s] or contract[s]" under 11 U.S.C. §522(d)(10)(E). *** </s> In sum, the Rouseys' IRAs fulfill both of §522(d)(10)(E)'s requirements at issue here--they confer a right to receive payment on account of age and they are similar plans or contracts to those enumerated in §522(d)(10)(E). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. </s> FOOTNOTESFootnote 1See Amromin & Smith, What Explains Early Withdrawals from Retirement Accounts? Evidence From a Panel of Taxpayers, 56 National Tax Journal 595, 602 (Sept. 2003) (Table 1) (3.4 percent of IRA holders took penalized withdrawals in 1996); In re Cilek, 115 B.R. 974, 988, n.15 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Wis. 1990) ("[O]f the $6,457,306,674 deposited in IRAs in the nation's credit unions, only 1.2% was withdrawn early and suffered a tax penalty during 1987, and only 1.27% was withdrawn during 1988"); see also Sabelhaus, Projecting IRA Balances and Withdrawals, 20 Employee Benefit Research Institute Notes 1, 3 (May 1999) (finding that "[t]he pattern in both [1993 and 1996] suggests infrequent withdrawals from IRAs" by those under 5912 and noting the consistency of this pattern with the view that the penalty "has a big impact on withdrawal behavior"). Footnote 2We need not and do not reach the question whether penalties of less than 10 percent or of a fixed amount would also be a sufficient barrier to early withdrawal. Footnote 3The Rouseys are entitled to penalty-free distributions because of factors apart from age in certain circumstances. See 26 U.S.C. §§72(t)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv) (permitting penalty-free distributions due to the death of or disability of the IRA-holder, or as substantially equal periodic payments for the life expectancy of the accountholder); 72(t)(2)(B) (medical expenses); 72(t)(2)(D)-(F) (health insurance premiums, certain higher education expenses, and first-time home purchase). But these circumstances are confined to specific and narrow uses. See infra, at 12-13. Thus, that there are other circumstances in which the Rouseys can receive payment does not change our conclusion that they have a right to payment on account of age, for these exceptions do not undermine the fact that they cannot obtain unrestricted use of their funds until age 59. Moreover, §522(d)(10)(E) requires that the right to payment be on account of age--not that it be solely on account of this factor. Footnote 4O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79 (1996), and Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995), upon which Jacoway relies, Brief for Respondent 17-19, are consistent with our conclusion that petitioners' IRAs satisfy the statute's "on account of" requirement. Those cases involved the meaning of the phrase "on account of" in a tax provision that permitted the exclusion from income of damages received "'on account' of personal injuries." O'Gilvie, supra, at 81 (emphasis deleted); Schleier, supra, at 329. In both cases, we rejected the claim that damages that were punitive in nature were on account of personal injuries, since such damages did not compensate for the personal injuries. O'Gilvie, supra, at 83-84; Schleier, supra, at 331-332. In so holding in O'Gilvie, we expressly rejected a "but for" causation reading of the statute. See 519 U.S., at 82-83. We instead concluded, as we have here, that the phrase "on account of" means "'by reason of[, or] because of.'" Id., at 83. Footnote 5See also 12 Oxford English Dictionary 580 (2d ed. 1989) (OED) ("[T]he sharing of profits, spec. between employer and employed"); Webster's 3d 1811 ("[A] system or process under which employees receive a part of the profits of an industrial or commercial enterprise"). Footnote 6See also id., at 2247 (defining "stock bonus" as "a bonus paid to corporation executives and employees in shares of stock"). Footnote 7See also Am. Hert. 970 ("sum of money paid regularly as a retirement benefit or by way of patronage"). Footnote 8See also id., at 54 ("[T]he annual payment of an allowance or income"; "[t]he interest or dividends paid annually on an investment of money"); 1 OED 488 ("[a] yearly grant, allowance, or income," or "[a]n investment of money, whereby the investor becomes entitled to receive a series of equal annual payments, which, except in the case of perpetual annuities, includes the ultimate return of both principal and interest"). Footnote 9The statute also permits penalty-free early withdrawal in the form of substantially equal periodic payments made for the life expectancy of the accountholder. 26 U.S.C. §72(t)(2)(iv). This exception is likewise limited. If these payments are modified before the accountholder turns 5912 or within five years of the start of those payments, the accountholder must pay not only the taxes that would have been imposed on those previous payments, including the 10 percent penalty, but also interest for the period in which the tax payment was deferred. §72(q)(3). As a result, if an accountholder uses this exception, he must use only this form of early withdrawal, lest he pay the penalty, taxes, and interest. The statute permits penalty-free withdrawals for medical expenses, which is likewise limited. §72(t)(2)(B). The amount that can be withdrawn is capped by the amount that can be deducted in a given year. Ibid.

United States Supreme Court McLEOD v. GENERAL ELECTRIC(1967) No. 645 Argued: Decided: January 16, 1967 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 774, International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO v. General Electric Co. et al., also on petition for writ of certiorari to the same court. </s> The union (IUE) filed an unfair labor practice charge against respondent company (GE) under 8 (a) (1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, because of GE's refusal to bargain collectively over a new contract, such refusal having been based upon IUE's inclusion among the bargaining representatives of persons from other labor organizations. The NLRB's Regional Director issued a complaint and notice of hearing and secured from the District Court a temporary injunction under 10 (j) restraining GE from declining to meet with IUE's designated representatives. The Court of Appeals, applying a different standard under 10 (j) from the one used by the District Court, reversed. Thereafter IUE and GE entered into a three-year agreement to replace the expired contract. Held: The Court of Appeals' judgment is set aside so that the District Court can determine the effect of the new contract upon the appropriateness of injunctive relief, the proper standard under 10 (j) being immaterial if relief thereunder is now improper whichever standard is applied. </s> Certiorari granted; 366 F.2d 847, set aside and remanded. </s> Solicitor General Marshall, Richard A. Posner, Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli and Norton J. Come for petitioner in No. 645. </s> Irving Abramson and Ruth Weyand for petitioner in No. 774 and for respondent International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, in No. 645. </s> David L. Benetar for respondent General Electric Co. in both cases. [385 U.S. 533, 534] </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The petitions for certiorari are granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is set aside with direction to that court to enter a new judgment consistent with this opinion. </s> The Regional Director of the Second Region of the National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint and notice of hearing upon a charge filed by the International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO (IUE). The charge alleged that General Electric Company violated 8 (a) (1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. 158 (a) (1) and (5), in refusing to bargain upon the renewal of an expiring collective bargaining agreement because of "the inclusion among the persons designated by the Union to represent it . . . of persons who also represented other labor organizations which engaged in collective bargaining with" the company. Pursuant to 10 (j) of the Act the Regional Director also obtained a temporary injunction in the District Court for the Southern District of New York restraining the company from "[f]ailing or refusing to meet, confer and bargain collectively in good faith with . . . [IUE], by declining to meet with the selected representatives of . . . [IUE] because of the presence of any representatives of other unions whom IUE and its constituent locals have invited to attend for the purpose of participating in the discussion and advising or consulting with IUE and its constituent locals." The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. 366 F.2d 847. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN stayed the Court of Appeals' judgment pending action on the petition for writ of certiorari filed in No. 645. </s> The District Court and the Court of Appeals differed regarding the proper standard which should be determinative of the right to injunctive relief under 10 (j). [385 U.S. 533, 535] The District Court applied a dual test: (1) whether "the impact upon the public interest is grave enough to justify swifter corrective action than the normal process of Board adjudication and court enforcement," 257 F. Supp. 690, 708, and (2) "whether the Board has `reasonable cause to believe' that the accused party has been guilty of unfair labor practices." 257 F. Supp., at 709. The Court of Appeals on the other hand considered the proper standard to be whether the Board had "demonstrated that an injunction is necessary to preserve the status quo or to prevent any irreparable harm." 366 F.2d, at 850. </s> We do not think it appropriate however to decide at this time the proper construction of 10 (j). For on October 14, 1966, after the decision of the Court of Appeals, the company and IUE agreed upon a three-year collective bargaining agreement to replace the expired contract. We think that the District Court should determine in the first instance the effect of this supervening event upon the appropriateness of injunctive relief. The controversy over the proper standard for injunctive relief is immaterial if such relief is now improper whichever standard is applied. We therefore dissolve the stay granted by MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and set aside the judgment of the Court of Appeals with direction to enter a new judgment setting aside the order of the District Court and remanding to that court for such further proceedings as may be appropriate in light of the supervening event. See Calhoun v. Latimer, 377 U.S. 263 ; Scranton v. Drew, 379 U.S. 40 . </s> It is so ordered. </s> [385 U.S. 533, 536]

United States Supreme Court PERALTA v. HEIGHTS MEDICAL CENTER, INC.(1988) No. 86-1430 Argued: November 30, 1987Decided: February 24, 1988 </s> In 1982, a default judgment was entered against appellant in appellee medical center's Texas state-court suit to recover a sum allegedly due under appellant's guarantee of a hospital debt incurred by one of his employees. The judgment was recorded, a writ of attachment was issued, and appellant's real property was sold to satisfy the judgment. In 1984, appellant initiated a bill of review proceeding seeking, inter alia, to set aside the default judgment and void the sale, and alleging that, since the original service of process itself showed it was untimely made and, in fact, he had never been personally served, the judgment was void under Texas law. The court entered summary judgment for appellee on the ground that it must be shown in a bill of review proceeding that the complainant had a meritorious defense to the action in which the judgment was entered, which appellant conceded he did not have. In affirming, the State Court of Appeals rejected appellant's contention that the meritorious-defense requirement violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, declaring that the requirement was "not onerous." The State Supreme Court denied appellant's application for a writ of error, noting "No Reversible Error." </s> Held: </s> The holding below contravenes this Court's precedents, under which a judgment entered without notice or service violates the Due Process Clause. See, e. g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 ; Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 . The argument that appellant suffered no harm from the default judgment since the same judgment would again be entered on retrial absent a meritorious defense is untenable because, had he had notice of the suit, appellant might have impleaded the employee whose debt had been guaranteed, worked out a settlement, paid the debt, or sold the property himself rather than suffer its sale at a constable's auction for allegedly much less than its true value. Nor is there any doubt that the entry of the judgment itself had substantial adverse consequences, since the judgment was entered on county records, became a lien on appellant's property which impaired his ability to mortgage or alienate the property, and was the basis for issuance of the writ of execution under which the property was promptly sold, again without notice. The contention that appellant has other [485 U.S. 80, 81] remedies to escape the consequences of an invalid judgment and should be left to pursue those avenues will not be considered here, since there is no indication that it was raised below. Pp. 84-87. </s> Reversed. </s> WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except KENNEDY, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. </s> Bruce Ian Schimmel argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Stephen P. Dillon and Michael J. Kator. </s> Jack E. Urquhart argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Jack G. Carnegie, Paul A. Share, and Emil T. Bayko. * </s> [Footnote * Jim Mattox, Attorney General, Mary F. Keller, Executive Assistant Attorney General, and Javier P. Guajardo, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of Texas as amicus curiae. </s> JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Heights Medical Center, Inc. (hereafter appellee), sued appellant Peralta in February 1982 to recover some $5,600 allegedly due under appellant's guarantee of a hospital debt incurred by one of his employees. Citation issued, the return showing personal, but untimely, service. Appellant did not appear or answer, and on July 20, 1982, default judgment was entered for the amount claimed, plus attorney's fees and costs. </s> In June 1984, appellant began a bill of review proceeding in the Texas courts to set aside the default judgment and obtain other relief. 1 In the second amended petition, it was alleged [485 U.S. 80, 82] that the return of service itself showed a defective service 2 and that appellant in fact had not been personally served at all. The judgment was therefore void under Texas law. It was also alleged that the judgment was abstracted and recorded in the county real property records, thereby creating a cloud on appellant's title, that a writ of attachment was issued, and that, unbeknownst to him, his real property was sold to satisfy the judgment and for much less than its true value. Appellant prayed that the default judgment be vacated, the abstract of judgment be expunged from the county real property records, the constable's sale be voided, and that judgment for damages be entered against the Medical Center and Mr. and Mrs. Paul Seng-Ngan Chen, the purchasers at the constable's sale and appellees here. </s> Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that in a bill of review proceeding such as appellant filed, it must be shown that petitioner had a meritorious defense to the action in which judgment had been entered, that petitioner was prevented from proving his defense by the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposing party, and that there had been no fault or negligence on petitioner's part. Although it was assumed for the purposes of summary judgment that there had been defective service and that this lapse excused proof of the second and third requirement for obtaining a bill of review, it was assertedly necessary, nevertheless, to show a meritorious defense, which appellant had conceded [485 U.S. 80, 83] he did not have. In response to the motion, appellant repeated the allegations in his petition and filed an affidavit denying that he had ever been personally served or had ever been notified of the entry of default judgment 3 or of the sale of his property. Appellee's motion for summary judgment was granted. Record 54. </s> Appellant's motion for rehearing for the first time asserted federal constitutional claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. Appellee answered that under Texas law there were three avenues by which to attack a judgment on the grounds that it was void for want of service: an appeal within 30 days of the judgment; by writ of error within 6 months; and by bill of review. It being too late to seek either of the first two courses, appellee urged that the bill of review was the only route then open to appellant, and that route was not available to him - even assuming he did not receive notice of the action filed against him - since he had no meritorious defense. Appellee denied that the meritorious-defense requirement threatened any federal constitutional rights. Rehearing was denied. </s> On appeal to the Texas Court of Appeals, appellant repeated his claims that in the absence of valid service of process and notice of the judgment, showing a meritorious defense was not necessary under Texas law and requiring it violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Appellee argued that despite the allegation of no service and no notice of judgment, the meritorious-defense requirement prevented relief and that even though the bill of review was the only avenue of relief, the State could constitutionally insist on the showing of a meritorious defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reciting the three elements essential for granting a bill of review and holding that a meritorious defense must be shown [485 U.S. 80, 84] whether there had been proper service and notice or not. 715 S. W. 2d 721 (1986). The court rejected the due process challenge because it viewed the meritorious-defense requirement as "not onerous." Id., at 722. Rehearing was denied, as was the application for a writ of error filed with the Texas Supreme Court, that court noting, "No Reversible Error." App. to Juris. Statement 2a. </s> Because the holding below appeared problematic in light of our precedents, we noted probable jurisdiction. 481 U.S. 1067 (1987). The case was briefed and argued, and we now reverse. 4 </s> In opposition to summary judgment, appellant denied that he had been personally served and that he had notice of the judgment. The case proceeded through the Texas courts on that basis, 5 and it is not denied by appellee that under our cases, a judgment entered without notice or service is constitutionally infirm. "An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them the opportunity to present their objections." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). Failure to give notice violates "the most rudimentary demands of due process of law." Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965). See also [485 U.S. 80, 85] World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110 (1969); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878). </s> The Texas courts nevertheless held, as appellee urged them to do, that to have the judgment set aside, appellant was required to show that he had a meritorious defense, apparently on the ground that without a defense, the same judgment would again be entered on retrial and hence appellant had suffered no harm from the judgment entered without notice. But this reasoning is untenable. As appellant asserts, had he had notice of the suit, he might have impleaded the employee whose debt had been guaranteed, worked out a settlement, or paid the debt. He would also have preferred to sell his property himself in order to raise funds rather than to suffer it sold at a constable's auction. </s> Nor is there any doubt that the entry of the judgment itself had serious consequences. It is not denied that the judgment was entered on the county records, became a lien on appellant's property, 6 and was the basis for issuance of a writ of execution under which appellant's property was promptly sold without notice. Even if no execution sale had yet occurred, the lien encumbered the property and impaired appellant's ability to mortgage or alienate it; and state procedures for creating and enforcing such liens are subject to the strictures of due process. See Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 604 (1974); Hodge v. Muscatine County, [485 U.S. 80, 86] 196 U.S. 276, 281 (1905). Here, we assume that the judgment against him and the ensuing consequences occurred without notice to appellant, notice at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner that would have given him an opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, supra, at 552. </s> In this Court, appellee insists that appellant has other remedies to escape the consequences of an invalid judgment and should be left to pursue those avenues. This argument, which is made for the first time in this litigation and which appellant disputes, is apparently offered as an alternative ground for affirming the judgment below. We are not required, however, to entertain such submissions, particularly when there is no indication that they were raised below, and we are especially disinclined to become involved in resolving disputes about Texas law that should have been presented to the state courts. We shall deal with the case as it came here and affirm or reverse based on the ground relied on below. </s> Appellee's position below was that appellant either had a remedy by bill of review or not at all, and that that remedy was unavailable since no meritorious defense had been shown. It appears to us that the Texas courts decided the case on this basis. There was no mention of other remedies, no suggestion that appellant had sought the wrong remedy; and it seems obvious that had a meritorious defense been shown, and the allegations on service and notice found to be true, the offending judgment would have been vacated. The Texas court held that the default judgment must stand absent a showing of a meritorious defense to the action in which judgment was entered without proper notice to appellant, a judgment that had substantial adverse consequences to appellant. By reason of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that holding is plainly infirm. </s> Where a person has been deprived of property in a manner contrary to the most basic tenets of due process, "it is no answer to say that in his particular case due process of law would have led to the same result because he had no adequate [485 U.S. 80, 87] defense upon the merits." Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 424 (1915). As we observed in Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S., at 552 , only "wip[ing] the slate clean . . . would have restored the petitioner to the position he would have occupied had due process of law been accorded to him in the first place." The Due Process Clause demands no less in this case. </s> The judgment below is </s> Reversed. </s> JUSTICE KENNEDY took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b(f) provides: </s> "On expiration of the time within which the trial court has plenary power, a judgment cannot be set aside by the trial court except by bill of review for sufficient cause, filed within the time allowed by law; provided that the court may at any time correct a clerical error in the record of a judgment and render judgment nunc pro tunc under Rule 316, and may also sign an order declaring a previous judgment or order to be void because signed after the court's plenary power had expired." </s> [Footnote 2 The petition alleged that the record contained a return of service of process, showing that service was effected more than 90 days after its issuance, contrary to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 101 (repealed effective Jan. 1, 1988). Record 41. The parties agree that under Texas law at the time of this suit, the citation lost its official status after 90 days. Texas courts have held that service after the 90th day is a nullity, depriving the court of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Lewis v. Lewis, 667 S. W. 2d 910, 911 (Tex. App. 1984); Kem v. Krueger, 626 S. W. 2d 143, 144 (Tex. App. 1981); Lemothe v. Cimbalista, 236 S. W. 2d 681, 682 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951). </s> [Footnote 3 Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 239(a) requires that notice of default judgment be mailed to the defendant at the address which the party taking the judgment is required to file with the clerk. Appellant argued in the Court of Appeals that neither of these requirements had been fulfilled. </s> [Footnote 4 Further examination of the record indicates that appellee was correct in challenging our appellate jurisdiction, Motion to Dismiss 3-4, because there was no explicit challenge to the constitutionality of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b(f) and because the Texas courts did not pass on any such issue. Charleston Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Alderson, 324 U.S. 182, 185 (1945); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 562 , n. 4 (1980). Treating the filed papers as a petition for certiorari, however, we grant the petition. We nevertheless continue to refer to Peralta and Heights Medical Center as appellant and appellee. </s> [Footnote 5 Appellee conceded at oral argument that for purposes of this decision, we must assume the truth of appellant's claims that he was never served with process. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39. </s> [Footnote 6 Under Texas law a judgment entitles the judgment creditor to a lien on the debtor's property. As a matter of right and without notice and hearing, a judgment creditor can have the judgment abstracted and recorded. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 52.002, 52.004(a) (1984 and Supp. 1988). Such a recorded abstract "constitutes a lien on the real property of the defendant located in the county in which the abstract is recorded and indexed, including real property acquired after such recording and indexing," 52.001, and the holder of a judgment lien will have a superior interest to a later purchaser. Masterson v. Adams, 197 S. W. 2d 154, 156 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946). </s> [485 U.S. 80, 88]

United States Supreme Court SPRINGFIELD TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DIST. v. KNOLL(1985) No. 82-1889 Argued: January 14, 1985Decided: April 17, 1985 </s> Respondent filed suit in Federal District Court on April 21, 1981, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that petitioner School District, in August 1979, May 1980, and December 1980, had discriminated against her on the basis of sex in failing to promote her to an administrative position. The court dismissed the 1983 claim because it was not brought within the 6-months limitations period under the Pennsylvania statute applicable to actions against a government official for acts done in the execution of his office. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the 6-year "residuary" provision of the Pennsylvania limitations scheme was applicable. </s> Held: </s> The Court of Appeals' judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for further consideration in the light of the decision in Wilson v. Garcia, ante, p. 261, that all 1983 claims should be characterized for statute of limitations purposes as actions to recover damages for injuries to the person. </s> 699 F.2d 137, vacated and remanded. </s> Charles Potash argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was Harris F. Goldich. </s> Robert H. Chanin argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Michael H. Gottesman, Robert M. Weinberg, and Jeremiah A. Collins. * </s> [Footnote * A brief for the State of Pennsylvania et al. as amici curiae urging reversal was filed by LeRoy S. Zimmerman, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, and Andrew S. Gordon and Allen C. Warshaw, Senior Deputy Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General of their respective States as follows: Michael A. Lilly of Hawaii, Robert T. Stephan of Kansas, John D. Ashcroft of Missouri, Paul L. Douglas of Nebraska, Gregory H. Smith of New Hampshire, Rufus L. Edmisten of North Carolina, and Anthony Celebrezze of Ohio. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> On April 21, 1981, respondent commenced this action alleging, in part, that the petitioner School District discriminated [471 U.S. 288, 289] against her on the basis of sex in failing to promote her to an administrative position. She sought equitable and compensatory relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for the alleged acts of discrimination which occurred in August 1979, May 1980, and September 1980. </s> The District Court dismissed the 1983 claim because it was not brought within the 6-month limitations period which applies to </s> "[a]n action against any officer of any government unit for anything done in the execution of his office, except an action subject to another limitation specified in this subchapter." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 5522(b)(1) (1982). </s> The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the "application of the six-month limitations period would be inconsistent with the policies and legislative history underlying 1983" and that "the six-year residuary provision of the limitations scheme should govern this dispute." 699 F.2d 137, 139 (CA3 1983). We granted certiorari, 468 U.S. 1204 (1984), and heard argument. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is now vacated, and the case is remanded for further consideration in light of our decision in Wilson v. Garcia, ante, p. 261, in which we have held that all 1983 claims should be characterized for statute of limitations purposes as actions to recover damages for injuries to the person. </s> It is so ordered. </s> JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> [471 U.S. 288, 290]

United States Supreme Court ICC v. TEXAS(1987) No. 85-1222 Argued: December 10, 1986Decided: January 20, 1987 </s> Since the 1930's, railroads, motor carriers, and freight forwarders have offered both trailer-on-flatcar (TOFC) and container-on-flatcar (COFC) services, forms of mixed train and truck transportation whereby loaded truck trailers or containers to be placed on truck trailers are transported on railroad flatcars and then hauled by trucks on the highways. A provision of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C. 10505(f), authorizes the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to exempt from state regulation "transportation that is provided by a rail carrier as a part of a continuous intermodal movement." In 1981, the ICC adopted a regulation exempting from state regulation, and covering both the motor and rail portions of, "Plan II TOFC/COFC service," which involves door-to-door service by a railroad that moves its own trailers or containers on flatcars. In 1982, petitioner railroad companies petitioned the Texas Railroad Commission to apply the ICC's exemption to Texas intrastate TOFC/COFC traffic. The State Commission granted a partial exemption covering the rail portion but not the truck portion of intrastate Plan II service. The railroad companies then petitioned for review of that decision by the ICC, which held that the State Commission's assertion of regulatory jurisdiction over the truck portion of Plan II service was inconsistent with the ICC's 1981 regulation. On review of the ICC's order, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the truck portion of the intrastate movements at issue was not "transportation . . . provided by a rail carrier" within the meaning of 10505(f) but rather was "transportation provided by a motor carrier" within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. 10521(b)(1), which reserves such intrastate transportation for state regulation. </s> Held: </s> The grant of authority to the ICC under 10505(f) encompasses the motor freight portion of a Plan II shipment entirely within the State. Since all of the elements of the Plan II service at issue are provided on equipment owned and operated by a rail carrier over which the ICC has jurisdiction, the plain language of 10505(f) unambiguously supports [479 U.S. 450, 451] the ICC's position. Although 10521(b)(1) can be read to support a contrary result, the correct, and more natural, reading of the statute is that all of the Plan II service provided by interstate rail carriers on equipment that they own is "transportation provided by a rail carrier" subject to the ICC's 10505(f) jurisdiction. A contrary result would be inconsistent with the ICC's historical treatment of Plan II service as "provided by a railroad," and would make 10521(b)(1) authorize state regulation of TOFC/COFC services in areas where it has already been rejected. Moreover, the ICC's special statutory authority to determine the proper interrelationship of different modes of transportation supports its interpretation of the Staggers Rail Act. In its statement of rail transportation policy, Congress has unambiguously expressed its interest in allowing free competition, to the maximum extent possible, to govern the financial health of the railroad industry. Pp. 455-461. </s> 770 F.2d 452, reversed. </s> STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 85-1267, Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co. et al. v. Texas et al., also on certiorari to the same court. </s> Richard G. Taranto argued the cause for petitioner in No. 85-1222. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Deputy Solicitor General Cohen, Robert H. Klonoff, Robert S. Burk, Henri F. Rush, and H. Glenn Scammel. Michael E. Roper argued the cause for petitioners in No. 85-1267. With him on the briefs were Robert B. Batchelder and Hugh L. McCulley. </s> Fernando Rodriguez, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Mary F. Keller, Executive Assistant Attorney General, Larry J. Laurent, Special Assistant Attorney General, and Douglas Fraser, Assistant Attorney General. </s> JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Trailer-on-flatcar (TOFC or "piggyback") service, a form of mixed train and truck transportation, enables a carrier to transport a trailer and its contents over rail on a flatcar and then to haul the trailer on the highway. The goods need not be unloaded and reloaded when they move from the rail mode to the truck mode; the shipment remains within the trailer or container during the entire journey. Various forms of [479 U.S. 450, 452] TOFC and container-on-flatcar (COFC) 1 service have been offered to the public by railroads, motor carriers, and freight forwarders since the 1930's. 2 These cases concern the extent of the State of Texas' jurisdiction over what is known as "Plan II TOFC/COFC service," which has long been defined as follows: </s> "Plan II (All-Rail): </s> "Door-to-door service performed by the railroad, which moves its own trailers or containers on flatcars under open tariffs usually similar to those of truckers." See American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U.S. 397, 403 (1967). </s> The ICC's statutory authority includes jurisdiction to grant exemptions from regulation as well as to regulate. In 1980, Congress enacted the Staggers Rail Act, 94 Stat. 1895, 49 U.S.C. 10101 et seq., which authorizes the ICC to exempt from state regulation "transportation that is provided by a rail carrier as a part of a continuous intermodal movement." See 10505(f). It is undisputed that the ICC may grant an exemption from regulation to interstate TOFC/ COFC transportation provided by a rail carrier. The question [479 U.S. 450, 453] presented is whether the grant of authority to the ICC under 10505(f) encompasses the motor freight portion of a Plan II TOFC/COFC shipment entirely within the State of Texas. </s> I </s> In 1981, the Commission adopted a regulation exempting Plan II service from state regulation. 3 The regulation unambiguously covers both the motor portion and the rail portion of Plan II service. 4 In a separate case involving interstate Plan II shipments, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the regulation, specifically rejecting an argument that the Commission had no authority to exempt the motor portion of the intermodal service. It held that "railowned truck TOFC/COFC service is `transportation that is provided by a rail carrier.'" American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. ICC, 656 F.2d 1115, 1120 (1981). </s> On September 27, 1982, Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company, Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, and Southern Pacific Transportation Company (Railroads) petitioned the Railroad Commission of Texas (RCT) to apply the ICC's exemption to their Texas intrastate TOFC/COFC traffic. App. 7-10. The RCT took the position that it retained the authority to regulate the motor carrier segment of intrastate transportation provided by an interstate rail carrier. The Staggers Rail Act provides that a state commission may regulate intrastate transportation provided by a rail carrier, but [479 U.S. 450, 454] only to the extent that it conforms with the federal Act and only if the ICC determines that the State's proposed regulatory standards and procedures are consistent with federal standards and procedures. 5 The RCT granted a partial exemption which covered the rail but not the pre-rail and post-ex-rail truck service portions of the intrastate TOFC/COFC service. Id., at 11-12. </s> The Railroads petitioned the ICC under 49 U.S.C. 11501(c) to review the RCT's decision and to grant the full TOFC/COFC exemption. The ICC held that the State Commission's assertion of regulatory jurisdiction over "incidental pre-rail and ex-rail over-the-road movements" of Plan II TOFC/COFC service was inconsistent with the federal standards contained in its 1981 regulation. 6 The State of Texas sought review of the ICC's order in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Railroads intervened as respondents. That court reversed, holding that the truck portion of the intrastate movements at issue was not "transportation . . . provided by a rail carrier" within the meaning of 10505(f) 7 </s> [479 U.S. 450, 455] but rather was "transportation provided by a motor carrier" within the meaning of 10521(b)(1). 8 Texas v. United States, 770 F.2d 452 (1985). The Court of Appeals distinguished American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. ICC, supra, as limited to TOFC/COFC shipments that at some point in their journey crossed a state boundary. When the service is purely intrastate, the Court of Appeals held, the motor portions of TOFC/ COFC service by railroad-owned trucks constitute transportation provided by a motor carrier under 10521(b)(1) and for that reason are expressly reserved for state regulation. We granted the petitions for certiorari of the ICC and the Railroads, 476 U.S. 1157 (1986). We are persuaded that the Court of Appeals erred. </s> II </s> It is undisputed that the Commission's power to grant these exemptions from state regulation is coextensive with its own authority to regulate, or not to regulate, these intermodal movements by rail carriers. 9 We therefore focus our [479 U.S. 450, 456] review on the extent of the Commission's jurisdiction over the trucking segment of intrastate TOFC/COFC activities. Since all of the railroads interested in this proceeding are engaged in interstate commerce, the Commission has authority over the intrastate transportation, as well as the interstate transportation, provided by such carriers. 10 All of the elements of the Plan II TOFC/COFC service at issue are provided on equipment owned and operated by a rail carrier over which the ICC has jurisdiction. Thus, the plain language of 10505(f) unambiguously supports the ICC's position. 11 </s> It is true, of course, that the text of 10521(b)(1) can be read to support the contrary result because it is possible to [479 U.S. 450, 457] regard the rail carrier as a "motor carrier" during the truck portion of the intermodal movement. We believe, however, that the correct, and certainly the more natural, reading of the statute is that all of the TOFC/COFC service provided by interstate rail carriers on equipment which they own is "transportation provided by a rail carrier" subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC. 12 </s> The position urged by respondents encounters three serious difficulties. First, it is inconsistent with the agency's historical treatment of Plan II TOFC/COFC service as "provided by a railroad." In Ex parte 230, Substituted Service-Charges and Practices of For-Hire Carriers and Freight Forwarders (Piggyback Service), 322 I. C. C. 301, 304-305, 309-312 (1964), the Commission stated: </s> "Under plan II, the railroad holds out to provide a complete door-to-door service under a single bill of lading. Neither the shipper nor the consignee intervenes in any way in the overall transportation activities or does anything beyond tendering the shipment to the railroad at origin or at the shipper's loading dock." Id., at 311. </s> The Commission recognized that the distinctive element of Plan II service was not the use of trailers or containers to offer door-to-door pickup and delivery service via rail and [479 U.S. 450, 458] highway, but rather the identity of the carrier offering this service: </s> "[A]ll three - rail carrier, motor carrier, and freight forwarder - are even today providing, through the use of piggyback, services which in physical characteristics are substantially similar. Any one of the three can offer a transportation service which includes door-to-door pickup and delivery, movement of loaded trailers between a shipper's premises and a rail yard, and line-haul transportation of the loaded trailers by rail. The railroad does this under its plan II TOFC tariff; the trucker does it under plan I, in which it is encouraged by the railroads . . . and the freight forwarder does it through use of plans III and IV rail tariffs." Id., at 330. </s> In none of the plans was a rail carrier treated either as a hybrid, or as a motor carrier, during the truck segment of the intermodal movement. Presumably, in enacting 10505, Congress was aware of the Commission's consistent practice of regulating railroads as "rail carriers" even when they performed Plan II intermodal service. </s> Second, the State's interpretation of 10521(b)(1) would make that section authorize state regulation of TOFC/COFC services in areas where it has already been rejected. The term "intrastate transportation provided by a motor carrier" must refer either to the intrastate motor portion of any TOFC/COFC movement or to the entire intrastate movement when a portion of it is performed by truck service. If the term refers only to the motor portion, the State's reading of the statute would preserve the State's power to regulate the intrastate motor portion of an interstate Plan II TOFC/ COFC shipment. But Texas acknowledges that it has no such power. 13 Alternatively, if the term refers to every intrastate [479 U.S. 450, 459] shipment that includes a motor segment, the railroad must be regarded as a "motor carrier" even during the rail portion of the intermodal movement, and the RCT would retain the power to regulate the entire intrastate movement. Again, Texas does not claim that authority. We think it clear that the only way to square the words of the statute with those aspects of the ICC's jurisdiction that the State does accept is to hold that the ICC's authority over intrastate transportation provided by an interstate rail carrier encompasses the entire movement, even when it includes a truck segment under Plan II. 14 </s> Third, the special statutory authority of the Commission to determine the proper interrelationship of different modes [479 U.S. 450, 460] of transportation supports its interpretation of the Staggers Rail Act. 15 The statute was a response to the concern that differing state and federal standards applying to the industry and excessive governmental regulation by both federal and state authorities had contributed to the financial difficulties of major railroads. 16 In its statement of rail transportation policy, Congress unambiguously expressed its interest in allowing free competition, to the maximum extent possible, to govern the financial health of the railroad industry. 17 The importance of that policy is confirmed by the fact that the [479 U.S. 450, 461] statement of general transportation policy applicable to all types of carriers, which generally prescribes the impartial regulation of all competing modes of transportation, is introduced by an exception providing that the special policy statement endorsing competition in railroad transportation shall prevail when transportation policy has an impact on rail carriers. 18 Even if the question of the extent to which 10521(b)(1) restricts the Commission's power under 10505 in these cases were in doubt, the statutory statement of policy priorities would lead us to agree with the ICC's view that the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of competition, rather than partial state regulation of Plan II TOFC/COFC service. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The petitions for certiorari include both TOFC and COFC service. Pet. for Cert. in No. 85-1222, p. I; Pet. for Cert. in No. 85-1267, p. i. A container, unlike a trailer, cannot itself be hauled on the highway by a tractor rig; it must first be placed on a suitable truck trailer. For the purposes of this opinion, however, there are no relevant differences between TOFC and COFC service. "TOFC service is inherently bimodal in that its basic characteristic is the combination of the inherent advantages of rail and motor transportation: the railroad's ability to provide efficient line-haul transportation of huge volumes of freight for great distances at high speed; and the motor carrier's ability to provide door-to-door, and if necessary job- or farm-site, pickup and delivery." Ex parte No. 230, Substituted Service-Charges and Practices of For-Hire Carriers and Freight Forwarders (Piggyback Service), 322 I. C. C. 301, 329 (1964). </s> [Footnote 2 See generally id., at 305-309 (describing growth of TOFC service). </s> [Footnote 3 See 49 CFR 1039.13 (1986). See also Improvement of TOFC/COFC Regulation, 364 I. C. C. 731, aff'd, American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. ICC, 656 F.2d 1115 (CA5 1981). </s> [Footnote 4 The exemption encompasses "[r]ailroad and truck transportation provided by a rail carrier as part of a continuous intermodal movement." 49 CFR 1039.13 (1986) (emphasis added). In some plans, the motor portion of an intermodal movement is performed by a trucking company, freight forwarder, or shipper. See American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U.S. 397, 403 (1967). In such plans, the exemption applies only to the rail portion of the intermodal service. </s> [Footnote 5 See 49 U.S.C. 11501. At the time it issued the decision at issue in this case, the Railroad Commission of Texas had provisional certification to regulate intrastate transportation provided by a rail carrier. The Commission no longer has this statutory authority to regulate intrastate rail rates, classification, rules, and practices of interstate carriers because it was denied certification by the ICC in Ex parte No. 388 (Sub-No. 31), State Intrastate Rail Rate Authority - Texas, 1 I. C. C. 2d 26 (1984), aff'd, Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. United States, 246 U.S. App. D.C. 352, 765 F.2d 221 (1985). </s> [Footnote 6 See ICC No. 39627, Petition Under 49 U.S.C. 11501(c) by Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company, et al., for Review of an Order of the Railroad Commission of Texas, decided Jan. 19, 1984 (Service Date Jan. 23, 1984); ICC, No. 39704, Petition of Road-Rail Transportation Company, Inc., Under 49 U.S.C. 11501(c) for Review of an Order of the Railroad Commission of Texas, decided Apr. 11, 1984 (Service Date Apr. 13, 1984). </s> [Footnote 7 Section 10505(f) provides: "The Commission may exercise its authority under this section to exempt transportation that is provided by a rail carrier as a part of a continuous intermodal movement." </s> [Footnote 8 Section 10521(b)(1) provides: "(b) This subtitle does not - "(1) except as provided in sections 10922(c)(2), 10935, and 11501(e) of this title, affect the power of a State to regulate intrastate transportation provided by a motor carrier." Sections 10922, 10935, and 11501(e) are not relevant to the issue. </s> [Footnote 9 The ICC found that the Railroad Commission of Texas' refusal to apply the entire TOFC/COFC exemption violated federal standards and procedures binding upon the State Commission, and authorized the Railroads "to establish any rate, classification, rule, or practice pertaining to intrastate rail or motor transportation provided by a rail carrier as part of a continuous intermodal movement within the State of Texas, to the same extent and in the same manner that they establish rates, classifications, rules, or practices for similar interstate movements." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 85-1222, pp. 21a-22a. The Court of Appeals stated: "The thrust of the argument of the State of Texas is that the I. C. C. lacks jurisdiction over the trucking segment of the totally intrastate TOFC activities of the intrastate [sic] rail carriers. Without this jurisdiction, [479 U.S. 450, 456] Texas maintains, the I. C. C. could not exempt the intrastate highway transportation from state regulation. We are constrained to agree." Texas v. United States, 770 F.2d 452, 453 (CA5 1985) (emphasis added). This quotation reveals an incompleteness in the Court of Appeals' reasoning. If the rail carriers were "intrastate rail carriers," the ICC would not have had jurisdiction over either the rail or the motor portion of their intrastate movements. But this conclusion does not necessarily extend to the rail and motor portions of intrastate movements by all other rail carriers, specifically those that operate across state boundaries. In fact, the Railroads in this proceeding are all interstate rail carriers, and the ICC has consistently exercised jurisdiction over their intrastate, as well as their interstate, movements. See n. 14, infra. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals did not err in its underlying conclusion that the ICC's authority to grant an exemption from federal regulation coincides with its authority to grant an exemption from state regulation. In its argument in this case, the State of Texas also recognizes that the scope of the ICC's authority over exemptions from state regulation is coextensive with its own jurisdiction either to impose federal regulation or to grant an exemption from federal regulation. Thus, although this case involves the ICC's effort to grant exemptions from regulation, the same legal question would be presented if the ICC were trying to regulate the rates for an interstate rail carrier's intrastate movements, and the carrier asserted that only the state commission had such power. </s> [Footnote 10 See 49 U.S.C. 10501 and 11501. The Commission does not assert jurisdiction over wholly intrastate carriers; nor does it assert the authority to exempt such carriers from state regulation. </s> [Footnote 11 See n. 7, supra. </s> [Footnote 12 Our holding that the ICC's jurisdiction under 10505(f) includes the intrastate portions of Plan II TOFC/COFC service applies whether or not a State has been certified under 49 U.S.C. 11501. Because the Railroad Commission of Texas is not now certified to regulate railroads, the statute independently places the truck portion of intra-Texas TOFC/COFC service within the jurisdiction of the ICC: "Any intrastate transportation provided by a rail carrier in a State which may not exercise jurisdiction over an intrastate rate, classification, rule, or practice of that carrier due to a denial of certification under this subsection shall be deemed to be transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission under [ 10501 et seq.]." 49 U.S.C. 11501(b)(4)(B). </s> [Footnote 13 And of course the Fifth Circuit so held in American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. ICC, 656 F.2d 1115 (1981). The reason why Texas does not have that power is that the statute plainly authorized the ICC either to regulate, or to exempt from regulation, such continuous interstate movements. We think it clear that the ICC's authority over intrastate rail transportation [479 U.S. 450, 459] by an interstate rail carrier encompasses the entire movement, even when it includes a truck segment. This conclusion was at least implicit in the Fifth Circuit's opinion in American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. ICC, supra, at 1120: "[R]ail-owned truck TOFC/COFC service is `transportation that is provided by a rail carrier.' Had Congress intended to limit the Commission's exemption authority to rail transportation, it could easily have done so by using that language. Instead, it chose the broad `transportation-that-is-provided-by-a-rail-carrier' language and presumably did so with knowledge that it previously had defined `transportation' to include the movement of passengers or property by motor vehicle." (Citations omitted; footnotes omitted.) </s> [Footnote 14 The Court of Appeals based its conclusion that "transportation provided by a rail carrier" should be defined more narrowly for intrastate traffic than for interstate commerce on the "potential mischief" of exempting intrastate rail travel from regulation. The Court of Appeals focused on the hypothetical example of a small intrastate rail carrier that provides minimal rail service within a city and extensive truck service to convey goods to and from the city, and is exempt from state regulation. See 770 F.2d, at 454-455. This scenario could only occur, however, if the ICC had authority to exempt such transportation from regulation. But because the hypothetical railroad is only an intrastate carrier, the ICC would not have any jurisdiction over it, and the speculative potential for mischief would not exist. In this case, by contrast, the Railroads are interstate carriers whose TOFC/COFC services include some segments entirely within Texas. See Guide to Piggyback Routes, Distribution 190, 196 (July 1982) (route diagrams for TOFC/COFC service). See also n. 9, supra. </s> [Footnote 15 "[W]e cannot accept arguments based upon arguable inference from nonspecific statutory language, limiting the Commission's power to adopt rules which, essentially, reflect its judgment in light of current facts as to the proper interrelationship of several modes of transportation with respect to an important new development." American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U.S., at 410 . The reading of the Act proposed by respondents impermissibly limits the ICC's power to implement national transportation policy in the evolving area of intermodal transportation. </s> [Footnote 16 See H. R. Rep. No. 96-1035, pp. 38, 61, 128-130 (1980); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-1430, p. 79 (1980). </s> [Footnote 17 Section 10101a "establishes a specific rail transportation policy to guide the Commission in its duties in regulation of the railroad industry." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-1430, supra, at 80. Section 10101a provides, in part: "10101a. Rail transportation policy "In regulating the railroad industry, it is the policy of the United States Government - "(1) to allow, to the maximum extent possible, competition and the demand for services to establish reasonable rates for transportation by rail; . . . . . "(4) to ensure the development and continuation of a sound rail transportation system with effective competition among rail carriers and with other modes, to meet the needs of the public and the national defense; "(5) to foster sound economic conditions in transportation and to ensure effective competition and coordination between rail carriers and other modes; . . . . . "(7) to reduce regulatory barriers to entry into and exit from the industry." </s> [Footnote 18 Section 10101 provides in part: "(a) Except where policy has an impact on rail carriers, in which case the principles of section 10101a of this title shall govern, to ensure the development, coordination, and preservation of a transportation system that meets the transportation needs of the United States, including the United States Postal Service and national defense, it is the policy of the United States Government to provide for the impartial regulation of the modes of transportation . . . ." </s> [479 U.S. 450, 462]

United States Supreme Court ALBERTSON v. MILLARD(1953) No. 384 Argued: February 2, 1953Decided: March 16, 1953 </s> Five days after enactment of the Michigan Communist Control Act of April 17, 1952, the Communist Party of Michigan and its Executive Secretary sued in a Federal District Court for a declaratory judgment that it violates the Federal Constitution and for an injunction against its enforcement. The District Court found the Act constitutional but temporarily restrained its enforcement pending appeal to this Court. A similar suit was brought in a state court but is being held in abeyance pending the decision of this Court. The Act has not been construed or applied by the Michigan courts or executive authorities. Held: Judgment vacated and cause remanded with directions to vacate the restraining order and to hold the proceedings in abeyance a reasonable time pending construction of the statute by the state courts. Pp. 242-245. </s> 106 F. Supp. 635, judgment vacated and cause remanded. </s> Ernest Goodman argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief was Joseph A. Brown. </s> Edmund E. Shepherd, Solicitor General of Michigan, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Frank G. Millard, Attorney General, and Daniel J. O'Hara and Ben H. Cole, Assistant Attorneys General. </s> Osmond K. Fraenkel and Walter M. Nelson filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> On April 17, 1952, the Governor of Michigan signed the Michigan Communist Control Bill. On April 22, 1952, the Communist Party of Michigan and William Albertson, its Executive Secretary, filed a complaint in the United [345 U.S. 242, 243] States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Sections 2-5, inclusive, and Section 7 of the Act were alleged to violate various provisions of the Federal Constitution. A declaratory judgment to that effect was sought, along with an injunction to prevent state officials and officers from enforcing the Act. A three-judge District Court found the Act constitutional, 106 F. Supp. 635, and an appeal was taken to this Court. </s> Section 5 of the Act requires the registration of Communists, the Communist Party and Communist front organizations, and Section 7 prevents them from appearing on any ballot in the State. "Communist," "Communist Party," and "Communist front organization" are given a statutory meaning by the Michigan Legislature. * Mich. Acts 1952, No. 117. [345 U.S. 242, 244] </s> These definitions are challenged by the appellants as void for vagueness. The definition of a Communist as ". . . a member of the communist party, notwithstanding the fact that he may not pay dues to, or hold a card in, said party . . . ." is said to be vague since once dues and cards are eliminated as criteria there are no readily apparent means of determining who is a member. As to the definition of the Communist Party as an organization ". . . substantially directed, dominated or controlled by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or its satellites" it is contended there are no standards as to what is a "satellite." In regard to the definition of both Communist Party and Communist front organization as an organization which ". . . in any manner advocates, or acts to further, the world communist movement" appellants point to the failure to define the "world communist movement" as creating vagueness. The answers given to these and possibly other problems of construction and interpretation arising under the definitions in Sections 2-4 will determine the ultimate scope of the Act. </s> Interpretation of state legislation is primarily the function of state authorities, judicial and administrative. The construction given to a state statute by the state courts is binding upon federal courts. There has been no interpretation of this statute by the state courts. The absence of such construction stems from the fact this action in federal court was commenced only five days after the statute became law. </s> There is pending in the Circuit Court for Wayne County, Michigan, a bill seeking a declaratory judgment that the Act is unconstitutional, both on federal and state [345 U.S. 242, 245] grounds. That action is being held in abeyance pending our mandate and decision in this case. </s> We deem it appropriate in this case that the state courts construe this statute before the District Court further considers the action. See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947); American Federation of Labor v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946); and Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944). </s> The judgment is vacated and the cause remanded to the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan with directions to vacate the restraining order it issued and to hold the proceedings in abeyance a reasonable time pending construction of the statute by the state courts either in pending litigation or other litigation which may be instituted. </s> It is so ordered. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK dissents. </s> [Footnote * "Sec. 2. A `communist' is a person who: "(a) Is a member of the communist party, notwithstanding the fact that he may not pay dues to, or hold a card in, said party; or "(b) Knowingly contributes funds or any character of property to the communist party; or "(c) Commits or advocates the commission of any act reasonably calculated to further the overthrow of the government of the United States of America, the government of the state of Michigan, or the government of any political subdivision of either of them, by force or violence; or "(d) Commits or advocates the commission of any act reasonably calculated to further the overthrow of the government of the United States, the government of the state of Michigan, or the government of any political subdivision of either of them, by unlawful or unconstitutional means, and the substitution of a communist government or a government intended to be substantially directed, dominated or controlled by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or its satellites. "Sec. 3. The `communist party' is any organization which is substantially directed, dominated or controlled by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or its satellites, or which in any manner advocates, or acts to further, the world communist movement. "Sec. 4. A `communist front organization' is any organization, the members of which are not all communists, but which is substantially directed, dominated or controlled by communists or by the [345 U.S. 242, 244] communist party, or which in any manner advocates, or acts to further, the world communist movement. The attorney general of the state of Michigan annually shall prepare and cause to be published a list of all such communist front organizations." </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting. </s> There doubtless will be instances where it is uncertain whether a particular person is a "Communist" or whether a particular group is included in the "Communist Party" as those terms are defined in the Michigan Act. But as I read this record there cannot be the slightest doubt that the Communist Party of Michigan is what it purports to be and that appellant Albertson, its Executive Secretary, is one of its members. In other words, it is plain beyond argument that the appellants are covered by the Michigan Act. </s> The case is therefore ripe for decision. It is not clouded with abstract questions. There are no ambiguities involving these appellants. The constitutional questions do not turn on any niceties in the interpretation of the Michigan law. The case is therefore unlike Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 , and its forebears where the nature of the constitutional issue [345 U.S. 242, 246] would depend on the manner in which uncertain and ambiguous state statutes were construed. See especially A. F. of L. v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 598 . Here there are but two questions: </s> (1) Can Michigan require the Communist Party of Michigan and its Executive Secretary to register? </s> (2) Can Michigan forbid the name of any Communist or of any nominee of the Communist Party to be printed on the ballot in any primary or general election in the state? </s> In my view no decision of the Michigan state courts can make those two issues any more precise or specific than the present case makes them. </s> [345 U.S. 242, 247]

United States Supreme Court NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK & TRUST CO.(1998) No. 96-843 Argued: October 6, 1997Decided: February 25, 1998 </s> </s> The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) interprets §109 of the Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA)-which provides that "[f]ederal credit union membership shall be limited to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district"-to permit federal credit unions to be composed of multiple, unrelated employer groups, each having its own distinct common bond of occupation. After the NCUA approved a series of charter amendments adding several unrelated employer groups to the membership of petitioner AT&T Family Federal Credit Union (ATTF), respondents, five commercial banks and the American Bankers Association, brought this action under §10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). They asserted that the NCUA's decision was contrary to law because §109 unambiguously requires that the same common bond of occupation unite each member of an occupationally defined federal credit union. The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that respondents lacked standing to challenge the decision because their interests were not within the "zone of interests" to be protected by §109. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed and reversed. On remand, the District Court entered summary judgment against respondents, applying the analysis announced in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 , and holding </s> -----* Together with No. 96-847, AT&T Family Federal Credit Union et </s> al. v. First National Bank & Trust Co. et al., also on certiorari to the </s> same court. that the NCUA had permissibly interpreted §109. The Court of Appeals again reversed, concluding that the District Court had incorrectly applied Chevron . </s> Held: 1. Respondents have prudential standing under the APA to seek federal-court review of the NCUA's interpretation of §109. Pp. 7-19. </s> (a) A plaintiff will have prudential standing under by §10(a) of the APA if the interest the plaintiff seeks to protect is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute in question. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 -153. P. 7. </s> (b) Although this Court's prior cases have not stated a clear rule for determining when a plaintiff's interest is "arguably within the zone of interests" to be protected by a statute, four of them have held that competitors of financial institutions have prudential standing to challenge agency action relaxing statutory restrictions on those institutions' activities. Data Processing, supra, at 157; Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45, 46 (per curiam); Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 621 ; Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn. , 479 U.S. 388, 403 . Pp. 7-11. </s> (c) In applying the "zone of interests" test, the Court does not ask whether Congress specifically intended the statute at issue to benefit the plaintiff, see, e.g., Clarke, supra, at 399-400. Instead, it discerns the interests "arguably . . . to be protected" by the statutory provision and inquires whether the plaintiff's interests affected by the agency action in question are among them, see, e.g., Data Processing, supra, at 153. By its express terms, §109 limits membership in every federal credit union to members of definable "groups." Because federal credit unions may, as a general matter, offer banking services only to members, see, e.g., 12 U. S. C. §§1757(5)-(6), §109 also restricts the markets that every federal credit union can serve. Although these markets need not be small, they unquestionably are limited. The link between §109's regulation of membership and its limitation on the markets that can be served is unmistakable. Thus, even if it cannot be said that Congress had the specific purpose of benefiting commercial banks, one of the interests "arguably . . . to be protected" by §109 is an interest in limiting the markets that federal credit unions can serve. This interest is precisely the interest of respondents affected by the NCUA's interpretation of §109. As competitors of federal credit unions, respondents certainly have an interest in limiting the markets that federal credit unions can serve, and the NCUA's interpretation has affected that interest by allowing federal credit unions to increase their customer base. Section 109 cannot be distinguished in this regard from the statutory provisions at issue in Clarke, ICI, Arnold Tours, and Data Processing. Pp. 11-15. </s> (d) Respondents' interest is therefore arguably within the zone of interests to be protected by §109. Petitioners principally argue that respondents lack standing because there is no evidence that the Congress that enacted §109 was concerned with commercial banks' competitive interests. This argument is misplaced. To accept that argument, the Court would have to reformulate the "zone of interests" test to require that Congress have specifically intended to benefit a particular class of plaintiffs before a plaintiff from that class could have standing under the APA to sue. Petitioners also mistakenly rely on Air Courier Conference v. Postal Workers, 498 U.S. 517, 519 . Unlike the plaintiffs there who were denied standing, respondents here have "competitive and direct injury," 498 U.S., at 528 , n. 5, as well as an interest "arguably . . . to be protected" by the statute in question. Under the Court's precedents, it is irrelevant that in enacting the FCUA, Congress did not specifically intend to protect commercial banks, as is the fact that respondents' objectives in this action are not eleemosynary in nature. Pp. 15-19. </s> 2. The NCUA's interpretation of §109-whereby a common bond of occupation must unite only the members of each unrelated employer group-is impermissible under the first step of the analysis set forth in Chevron , see 467 U. S. , at 842-843, because that interpretation is contrary to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress that the same common bond of occupation must unite each member of an occupationally defined federal credit union. Several considerations compel this conclusion. First, the NCUA's interpretation makes the statutory phrase "common bond" surplusage when applied to a federal credit union made up of multiple unrelated employer groups, because each such "group" already has its own "common bond," employment with a particular employer. If the phrase "common bond" is to be given any meaning when the employees in such groups are joined together, a different "common bond"-one extending to each and every employee considered together-must be found to unite them. Second, the interpretation violates the established canon of construction that similar language within the same statutory section must be accorded a consistent meaning. Section 109 consists of two parallel clauses: Federal credit union membership is limited "to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district." The NCUA has never interpreted, and does not contend that it could interpret, the geographic limitation to permit a credit union to be composed of members from an unlimited number of unrelated geographic units. The occupational limitation must be interpreted in the same way. Finally, the NCUA's interpretation has the potential to read the words "shall be limited" out of the statute entirely. The interpretation would allow the chartering of a conglomerate credit union whose members included the employees of every company in the United States. Section 109 cannot be considered a limitation on credit union membership if at the same time it permits such a limitless result. Pp. 19-23. </s> 90 F. 3d 525, affirmed. </s> THOMAS , J., delivered an opinion, which was for the Court except as to footnote 6. REHNQUIST , C. J., and KENNEDY and GINSBURG , JJ., joined that opinion in full, and SCALIA , J., joined except as to footnote 6. O'CONNOR , J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS , SOUTER , and BREYER , JJ., joined. </s> NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. </s> U.S. Supreme Court </s> Nos. 96-843 AND 96-847 </s> v. </s> ET AL . AT&T FAMILY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, ET AL .,PETITIONERS 96-847 v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST CO. ET AL . ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT [February 25, 1998] </s> JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to footnote 6. * </s> Section 109 of the Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA), 48 Stat. 1219, 12 U.S.C. § 1759 provides that "[f]ederal credit union membership shall be limited to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district." Since 1982, the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the agency charged with administering the FCUA, has interpreted §109 to permit federal credit unions to be composed of multiple unrelated employer groups, each having its own common bond of occupation. In this case, respondents, five banks and the American Bankers Association, have challenged this interpretation on the ground that §109 unambiguously requires that the same common bond of occupation unite every member of an occupationally defined federal credit union. We granted certiorari to answer two questions. First, do respondents have standing under the Administrative Procedure Act to seek federal court review of the NCUA's interpretation? Second, under the analysis set forth in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), is the NCUA's interpretation permissible? We answer the first question in the affirmative and the second question in the negative. We therefore affirm. </s> I </s> A </s> In 1934, during the Great Depression, Congress enacted the FCUA, which authorizes the chartering of credit unions at the national level and provides that federal credit unions may, as a general matter, offer banking services only to their members. Section 109 of the FCUA, which has remained virtually unaltered since the FCUA's enactment, expressly restricts membership in federal credit unions. In relevant part, it provides: </s> "Federal credit union membership shall consist of the incorporators and such other persons and incorporated and unincorporated organizations, to the extent permitted by rules and regulations prescribed by the Board, as may be elected to membership and as such shall each, subscribe to at least one share of its stock and pay the initial installment thereon and a uniform entrance fee if required by the board of directors; except that Federal credit union membership shall be limited to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district." </s> 12 U.S.C. § 1759 (emphasis added). </s> Until 1982, the NCUA and its predecessors consistently interpreted §109 to require that the same common bond of occupation unite every member of an occupationally defined federal credit union. In 1982, however, the NCUA reversed its longstanding policy in order to permit credit unions to be composed of multiple unrelated employer groups. See IRPS 82-1, 47 Fed. Reg. 16775 (1982). It thus interpreted §109's common bond requirement to apply only to each employer group in a multiple-group credit union, rather than to every member of that credit union. See IRPS 82-3, 47 Fed. Reg. 26808 (1982). Under the NCUA's new interpretation, all of the employer groups in a multiple-group credit union had to be located "within a well-defined area," ibid. , but the NCUA later revised this requirement to provide that each employer group could be located within "an area surrounding the [credit union's] home or a branch office that can be reasonably served by the [credit union] as determined by NCUA." IRPS 89-1, 54 Fed. Reg. 31170 (1989). Since 1982, therefore, the NCUA has permitted federal credit unions to be composed of wholly unrelated employer groups, each having its own distinct common bond. </s> B </s> After the NCUA revised its interpretation of §109, petitioner AT&T Family Federal Credit Union (ATTF) expanded its operations considerably by adding unrelated employer groups to its membership. As a result, ATTF now has approximately 110,000 members nationwide, only 35% of whom are employees of AT&T and its affiliates. See Brief for Petitioner NCUA 9. The remaining members are employees of such diverse companies as the Lee Apparel Company, the Coca-Cola Bottling Company, the Ciba-Geigy Corporation, the Duke Power Company, and the American Tobacco Company. See App. 54-79. </s> In 1990, after the NCUA approved a series of amendments to ATTF's charter that added several such unrelated employer groups to ATTF's membership, respondents brought this action. Invoking the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702 respondents claimed that the NCUA's approval of the charter amendments was contrary to law because the members of the new groups did not share a common bond of occupation with ATTF's existing members, as respondents alleged §109 required. ATTF and petitioner Credit Union National Association were permitted to intervene in the case as defendants. </s> The District Court dismissed the complaint. It held that respondents lacked prudential standing to challenge the NCUA's chartering decision because their interests were not within the "zone of interests" to be protected by §109, as required by this Court's cases interpreting the APA. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. National Credit Union Admin. , 772 F. Supp. 609 (DC 1991), rev'd, 988 F. 2d 1272 (CADC), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 907 (1993). The District Court rejected as irrelevant respondents' claims that the NCUA's interpretation had caused them competitive injury, stating that the legislative history of the FCUA demonstrated that it was passed "to establish a place for credit unions within the country's financial market, and specifically not to protect the competitive interest of banks." 772 F. Supp., at 612. The District Court also determined that respondents were not "suitable challengers" to the NCUA's interpretation, as that term had been used in prior prudential standing cases from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Ibid. </s> The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. National Credit Union Admin., 988 F. 2d 1272 (CADC), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 907 (1993). The Court of Appeals agreed that "Congress did not, in 1934, intend to shield banks from competition from credit unions," id., at 1275, and hence respondents could not be said to be "intended beneficiaries" of §109. Relying on two of our prudential standing cases involving the financial services industry, Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971), and Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U.S. 388 (1987), the Court of Appeals nonetheless concluded that respondents' interests were sufficiently congruent with the interests of § 109's intended beneficiaries that respondents were "suitable challengers" to the NCUA's chartering decision; therefore, their suit could proceed. See 988 F. 2d, at 1276-1278. 1 </s> On remand, the District Court applied the two-step analysis that we announced in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and held that the NCUA had permissibly interpreted §109. 863 F. Supp. 9 (DC 1994), rev'd, 90 F. 3d 525 (CADC 1996). It first asked whether, in enacting §109, Congress had spoken directly to the precise question at issue-whether the same common bond of occupation must unite members of a federal credit union composed of multiple employer groups. See 863 F. Supp., at 12. It determined that because §109 could plausibly be understood to permit an occupationally defined federal credit union to consist of several employer "groups," each having its own distinct common bond of occupation, Congress had not unambiguously addressed this question. See ibid. The District Court then stated that it was unnecessary to decide, under the second step of Chevron , whether the NCUA's interpretation was reasonable, because respondents had not "seriously argued" that the interpretation was unreasonable. See id., at 13-14. Accordingly, the District Court entered summary judgment against respondents. See ibid. </s> The Court of Appeals again reversed. 90 F. 3d 525 (CADC 1996). It held that the District Court had incorrectly applied the first step of Chevron : Congress had indeed spoken directly to the precise question at issue and had unambiguously indicated that the same common bond of occupation must unite members of a federal credit union composed of multiple employer groups. See id., at 527. The Court of Appeals reasoned that because the concept of a "common bond" is implicit in the term "group," the term "common bond" would be surplusage if it applied only to the members of each constituent "group" in a multiplegroup federal credit union. See id., at 528. It further noted that the NCUA had not interpreted §109's geographical limitation to allow federal credit unions to comprise groups from multiple unrelated "neighborhood[s], communit[ies], or rural district[s]" and stated that the occupational limitation should not be interpreted differently. See id., at 528-529. The NCUA's revised interpretation of §109 was therefore impermissible. 2 </s> See id . at 529. Because of the importance of the issues presented, 3 we granted certiorari. 519 U. S. ___ (1997). </s> II </s> Respondents claim a right to judicial review of the NCUA's chartering decision under §10(a) of the APA, which provides: </s> "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." </s> 5 U.S.C. § 702. </s> We have interpreted §10(a) of the APA to impose a prudential standing requirement in addition to the requirement, imposed by Article III of the Constitution, that a plaintiff have suffered a sufficient injury-in-fact. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970) (Data Processing) . 4 </s> For a plaintiff to have prudential standing under the APA, "the interest sought to be protected by the complainant [must be] arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute . . . in question." Id., at 153. </s> Based on four of our prior cases finding that competitors of financial institutions have standing to challenge agency action relaxing statutory restrictions on the activities of those institutions, we hold that respondents' interest in limiting the markets that federal credit unions can serve is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected by §109. Therefore, respondents have prudential standing under the APA to challenge the NCUA's interpretation. </s> A </s> Although our prior cases have not stated a clear rule for determining when a plaintiff's interest is "arguably within the zone of interests" to be protected by a statute, they nonetheless establish that we should not inquire whether there has been a congressional intent to benefit the wouldbe plaintiff. In Data Processing, supra , the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the Comptroller) had interpreted the National Bank Act's incidental powers clause, Rev. Stat. §5136, 12 U.S.C. § 24 Seventh, to permit national banks to perform data processing services for other banks and bank customers. See Data Processing, supra, at 151. The plaintiffs, a data processing corporation and its trade association, alleged that this interpretation was impermissible because providing data processing services was not, as was required by the statute, "[an] incidental powe[r] . . . necessary to carry on the business of banking." See 397 U.S., at 157 , n. 2. </s> In holding that the plaintiffs had standing, we stated that §10(a) of the APA required only that "the interest sought to be protected by the complainant [be] arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute . . . in question." Id., at 153. In determining that the plaintiffs' interest met this requirement, we noted that although the relevant federal statutes-the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24 Seventh, and the Bank Service Corporation Act, 76 Stat. 1132, 12 U.S.C. § 1864--did not "in terms protect a specified group[,] . . . their general policy is apparent; and those whose interests are directly affected by a broad or narrow interpretation of the Acts are easily identifiable." Data Processing, 397 U.S., at 157 . "[A]s competitors of national banks which are engaging in data processing services," the plaintiffs were within that class of "aggrieved persons" entitled to judicial review of the Comptroller's interpretation. Ibid. </s> Less than a year later, we applied the "zone of interests" test in Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970) (Arnold Tours) (per curiam) . There, certain travel agen cies challenged a ruling by the Comptroller, similar to the one contested in Data Processing , that permitted national banks to operate travel agencies. See 400 U.S., at 45 . In holding that the plaintiffs had prudential standing under the APA, we noted that it was incorrect to view our decision in Data Processing as resting on the peculiar legislative history of §4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act, which had been passed in part at the behest of the data processing industry. See id., at 46. We stated explicitly that "we did not rely on any legislative history showing that Congress desired to protect data processors alone from competition." Ibid. We further explained: </s> "In Data Processing . . . . [w]e held that §4 arguably brings a competitor within the zone of interests protected by it. Nothing in the opinion limited §4 to protecting only competitors in the data processing field. When national banks begin to provide travel services for their customers, they compete with travel agents no less than they compete with data processors when they provide data-processing services to their customers." </s> Ibid. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). </s> A year later, we decided Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) (ICI) . In that case, an investment company trade association and several individual investment companies alleged that the Comptroller had violated, inter alia , §21 of the Glass-Steagall Act 5 </s> by permitting national banks to establish and operate what in essence were early versions of mutual funds. We held that the plaintiffs, who alleged that they would be injured by the competition resulting from the Comptroller's action, had standing under the APA and stated that the case was controlled by Data Processing . See 401 U.S., at 621 . Significantly, we found unpersuasive Justice Harlan's argument in dissent that the suit should be dismissed because "neither the language of the pertinent provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act nor the legislative history evince[d] any congressional concern for the interests of petitioners and others like them in freedom from competition." 401 U.S., at 640 . </s> Our fourth case in this vein was Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U.S. 388 (1987) (Clarke). There, a securities dealers trade association sued the Comptroller, this time for authorizing two national banks to offer discount brokerage services both at their branch offices and at other locations inside and outside their home States. See id., at 391. The plaintiff contended that the Comptroller's action violated the McFadden Act, which permits national banks to carry on the business of banking only at authorized branches, and to open new branches only in their home States and only to the extent that state-chartered banks in that State can do so under state law. See id., at 391-392. </s> We again held that the plaintiff had standing under the APA. Summarizing our prior holdings, we stated that although the "zone of interests" test "denies a right of review if the plaintiff's interests are . . . marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute," id. , at 399, "there need be no indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff," id., at 399-400 (citing ICI ). We then determined that by limiting the ability of national banks to do business outside their home States, "Congress ha[d] shown a concern to keep national banks from gaining a monopoly control over credit and money." Id., at 403. The interest of the securi ties dealers in preventing national banks from expanding into the securities markets directly implicated this concern because offering discount brokerage services would allow national banks "access to more money, in the form of credit balances, and enhanced opportunities to lend money, viz., for margin purchases." Ibid. The case was thus analogous to Data Processing and ICI: "In those cases the question was what activities banks could engage in at all; here, the question is what activities banks can engage in without regard to the limitations imposed by state branching law." 479 U.S., at 403 . </s> B </s> Our prior cases, therefore, have consistently held that for a plaintiff's interests to be arguably within the "zone of interests" to be protected by a statute, there does not have to be an "indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff." Id., at 399-400 (citing ICI ); see also Arnold Tours, supra, at 46 (citing Data Processing ). The proper inquiry is simply "whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected . . . by the statute." Data Processing , 397 U.S., at 153 (emphasis added). Hence in applying the "zone of interests" test, we do not ask whether, in enacting the statutory provision at issue, Congress specifically intended to benefit the plaintiff. Instead, we first discern the interests "arguably . . . to be protected" by the statutory provision at issue; we then inquire whether the plaintiff's interests affected by the agency action in question are among them. </s> Section 109 provides that "[f]ederal credit union membership shall be limited to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a welldefined neighborhood, community, or rural district." 12 U.S.C. § 1759. By its express terms, §109 limits membership in every federal credit union to members of definable "groups." Because federal credit unions may, as a general matter, offer banking services only to members, see, e.g., 12 U. S. C. §§1757(5)-(6), §109 also restricts the markets that every federal credit union can serve. Although these markets need not be small, they unquestionably are limited. The link between §109's regulation of federal credit union membership and its limitation on the markets that federal credit unions can serve is unmistakable. Thus, even if it cannot be said that Congress had the specific purpose of benefiting commercial banks, one of the interests "arguably . . . to be protected" by §109 is an interest in limiting the markets that federal credit unions can serve. 6 This interest is precisely the interest of respondents affected by the NCUA's interpretation of §109. As competitors of federal credit unions, respondents certainly have an interest in limiting the markets that federal credit unions can serve, and the NCUA's interpretation has affected that interest by allowing federal credit unions to increase their customer base. 7 </s> Section 109 cannot be distinguished from the statutory provisions at issue in Clarke, ICI, Arnold Tours, and Data Processing. Although in Clarke the McFadden Act appeared to be designed to protect only the interest of state banks in parity of treatment with national banks, we nonetheless determined that the statute also limited "the extent to which [national] banks [could] engage in the discount brokerage business and hence limit[ed] the competitive impact on nonbank discount brokerage houses." Clarke, 479 U.S., at 403 . Accordingly, although Congress did not intend specifically to protect securities dealers, one of the interests "arguably . . . to be protected" by the statute was an interest in restricting national bank market power. The plaintiff securities dealers, as competitors of national banks, had that interest, and that interest had been affected by the interpretation of the McFadden Act they sought to challenge, because that interpretation had allowed national banks to expand their activities and serve new customers. See ibid. </s> Similarly, in ICI , even though in enacting the GlassSteagall Act, Congress did not intend specifically to benefit investment companies and may have sought only to protect national banks and their depositors, one of the interests "arguably . . . to be protected" by the statute was an interest in restricting the ability of national banks to enter the securities business. The investment company plaintiffs, as competitors of national banks, had that interest, and that interest had been affected by the Comptroller's interpretation allowing national banks to establish mutual funds. </s> So too, in Arnold Tours and Data Processing , although in enacting the National Bank Act and the Bank Service Corporation Act, Congress did not intend specifically to benefit travel agents and data processors and may have been concerned only with the safety and soundness of national banks, one of the interests "arguably . . . to be protected" by the statutes was an interest in preventing national banks from entering other businesses' product markets. As competitors of national banks, travel agents and data processors had that interest, and that interest had been affected by the Comptroller's interpretations opening their markets to national banks. See also NationsBank of N. C., N. A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995) (deciding that the Comptroller had permissibly interpreted 12 U.S.C. § 24 Seventh to allow national banks to act as agents in the sale of annuities; insurance agents' standing to challenge the interpretation not questioned). </s> C </s> Petitioners attempt to distinguish this case principally on the ground that there is no evidence that Congress, when it enacted the FCUA, was at all concerned with the competitive interests of commercial banks, or indeed at all concerned with competition. See Brief for Petitioner ATTF 21-22. Indeed, petitioners contend that the very reason Congress passed the FCUA was that "[b]anks were simply not in the picture" as far as small borrowers were concerned, and thus Congress believed it necessary to create a new source of credit for people of modest means. See id., at 25. </s> The difficulty with this argument is that similar arguments were made unsuccessfully in each of Data Processing , Arnold Tours , ICI , and Clarke . In Data Processing , the Comptroller argued against standing for the following reasons: </s> "[P]etitioners do not contend that Section 24 Seventh had any purpose . . . to protect the interest of potential competitors of national banks. The reason is clear: the legislative history of the Section dispels all possible doubt that its enactment in 1864 (13 Stat. 101) was for the express and sole purpose of creating a strong national banking system . . . . To the extent that the protection of a competitive interest was at the bottom of the enactment of Section 24 Seventh, it was the interest of national banks and not of their com petitors." </s> Brief for Comptroller of the Currency in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, O. T. 1969, No. 85, pp. 19-20. </s> Similarly, in Arnold Tours , the Comptroller contended that the position of the travel agents was "markedly different from that of the data processors," who could find in the legislative history "some manifestation of legislative concern for their competitive position." Memorandum for Comptroller of the Currency in Opposition in Arnold Tours, Inc . v. Camp, O. T. 1970, No. 602, pp. 3-4. And inICI , the Comptroller again urged us not to find standing, because- </s> "[t]he thrust of the legislation, and the concern of the drafters, was to protect the banking public through the maintenance of a sound national banking system . . . . . . . . . </s> "There was no Congressional objective to protect mutual funds or their investment advisers or underwriters." </s> Brief for Comptroller of Currency in Investment Company Institute v. Camp , O. T. 1970, No. 61, pp. 27-29 (internal quotation marks omitted). "Indeed, the Congressional attitude toward the investment bankers can only be characterized as one of distaste. For example, in discussing the private investment bankers, Senator Glass pointed out that many of them had ' unloaded millions of dollars of worthless investment securities upon the banks of this country.' " Id., at 30, n. 22 (citation omitted). </s> Finally, in Clarke , the Comptroller contended that "[t]here is no doubt that Congress had only one type of competitive injury in mind when it passed the [McFadden] Act-the type that national and state banks might inflict upon each other." Brief for Federal Petitioner in Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., O. T. 1985, No. 85-971, p. 24. </s> In each case, we declined to accept the Comptroller's argument. In Data Processing , we considered it irrelevant that the statutes in question "d[id] not in terms protect a specified group," because "their general policy [was] apparent[,] and those whose interests [were] directly affected by a broad or narrow interpretation of [the statutes] [were] easily identifiable." 397 U.S., at 157 . In Arnold Tours , we similarly believed it irrelevant that Congress had shown no concern for the competitive position of travel agents in enacting the statutes in question. See 400 U.S., at 46 . In ICI, we were unmoved by Justice Harlan's comment in dissent that the Glass-Steagall Act was passed in spite of its positive effects on the competitive position of investment banks. See 401 U.S., at 640 (Harlan, J., dissenting). And in Clarke , we did not debate whether the Congress that enacted the McFadden Act was concerned about the competitive position of securities dealers. See 479 U.S., at 403 . The provisions at issue in each of these cases, moreover, could be said merely to be safety-and-soundness provisions, enacted only to protect national banks and their depositors and without a concern for competitive effects. We nonetheless did not hesitate to find standing. </s> We therefore cannot accept petitioners' argument that respondents do not have standing because there is no evidence that the Congress that enacted §109 was concerned with the competitive interests of commercial banks. To accept that argument, we would have to reformulate the "zone of interests" test to require that Congress have specifically intended to benefit a particular class of plaintiffs before a plaintiff from that class could have standing under the APA to sue. We have refused to do this in our prior cases, and we refuse to do so today. </s> Petitioners also mistakenly rely on our decision in Air Courier Conference v. Postal Workers, 498 U.S. 517 (1991). In Air Courier , we held that the interest of Postal Service employees in maximizing employment opportunities was not within the "zone of interests" to be protected by the postal monopoly statutes, and hence those employees did not have standing under the APA to challenge a Postal Service regulation suspending its monopoly over certain international operations. See id., at 519. We stated that the purposes of the statute were solely to increase the revenues of the Post Office and to ensure that postal services were provided in a manner consistent with the public interest, see id., at 526-27. Only those interests, therefore, and not the interests of Postal Service employees in their employment, were "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected" by the statute. Cf. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990) (stating that an agency reporting company would not have prudential standing to challenge an agency's failure to comply with a statutory mandate to conduct hearings on the record). We further noted that although the statute in question regulated competition, the interests of the plaintiff employees had nothing to do with competition. See Air Courier, supra, at 528, n. 5 (stating that "[e]mployees have generally been denied standing to enforce competition laws because they lack competitive and direct injury"). In this case, not only do respondents have "competitive and direct injury," 498 U.S., at 528 , n. 5, but, as the foregoing discussion makes clear, they possess an interest that is "arguably . . . to be protected" by §109. </s> Respondents' interest in limiting the markets that credit unions can serve is "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected" by §109. Under our precedents, it is irrelevant that in enacting the FCUA, Congress did not specifically intend to protect commercial banks. Although it is clear that respondents' objectives in this action are not eleemosynary in nature, 8 </s> under our prior cases that too is beside the point. 9 </s> III </s> Turning to the merits, we must judge the permissibility of the NCUA's current interpretation of §109 by employing the analysis set forth in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under that analysis, we first ask whether Congress has "directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Id., at 842843. If we determine that Congress has not directly spoken to the precise question at issue, we then inquire whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable. See id., at 843-844. Because we conclude that Congress has made it clear that the same common bond of occupation must unite each member of an occupationally defined federal credit union, we hold that the NCUA's contrary interpretation is impermissible under the first step of Chevron . </s> As noted, §109 requires that "[f]ederal credit union membership shall be limited to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district . " Respondents contend that because §109 uses the article "a"-" i.e. , one"-in conjunction with the noun "common bond," the "natural reading" of §109 is that all members in an occupationally defined federal credit union must be united by one common bond. See Brief for Respondents 33. Petitioners reply that because §109 uses the plural noun "groups," it permits multiple groups, each with its own common bond, to constitute a federal credit union. See Brief for Petitioner NCUA 29-30. </s> Like the Court of Appeals, we do not think that either of these contentions, standing alone, is conclusive. The article "a" could be thought to convey merely that one bond must unite only the members of each group in a multiplegroup credit union, and not all of the members in the credit union taken together. See 90 F. 3d, at 528. Similarly, the plural word "groups" could be thought to refer not merely to multiple groups in a particular credit union, but rather to every single "group" that forms a distinct credit union under the FCUA. See ibid. Nonetheless, as the Court of Appeals correctly recognized, additional considerations compel the conclusion that the same common bond of occupation must unite all of the members of an occupationally defined federal credit union. </s> First, the NCUA's current interpretation makes the phrase "common bond" surplusage when applied to a federal credit union made up of multiple unrelated employer groups, because each "group" in such a credit union already has its own "common bond." See ibid. To use the facts of this case, the employees of AT&T and the employees of the American Tobacco Company each already had a "common bond" before being joined together as members of ATTF. The former were bonded because they worked for AT&T, and the latter were bonded because they worked for the American Tobacco Company. If the phrase "common bond" is to be given any meaning when these employees are joined together, a different "common bond"-one extending to each and every employee considered together-must be found to unite them. Such a "common bond" exists when employees of different subsidiaries of the same company are joined together in a federal credit union; it does not exist, however, when employees of unrelated companies are so joined. See ibid. Put another way, in the multiple employer group context, the NCUA has read the statute as though it merely stated that "[f]ederal credit union membership shall be limited to occupational groups," but that is simply not what the statute provides. </s> Second, the NCUA's interpretation violates the established canon of construction that similar language contained within the same section of a statute must be accorded a consistent meaning. See Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 225 (1992). Section 109 consists of two parallel clauses: Federal credit union membership is limited "to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district." 12 U.S.C. § 1759 (emphasis added). The NCUA concedes that even though the second limitation permits geographically defined credit unions to have as members more than one "group," all of the groups must come from the same "neighborhood, community, or rural district." See Brief for Petitioner NCUA 37. The reason that the NCUA has never interpreted, and does not contend that it could interpret, the geographical limitation to allow a credit union to be composed of members from an unlimited number of unrelated geographic units, is that to do so would render the geographical limitation meaningless. Under established principles of statutory interpretation, we must interpret the occupational limitation in the same way. </s> Petitioners have advanced one reason why we should interpret the occupational limitation differently. They contend that whereas the geographical limitation uses the word "within" and is thus "prepositional," the occupational limitation uses the word "having" and is thus "participial" (and therefore less limiting). See Brief for Petitioner NCUA 31. There is, however, no reason why a participial phrase is inherently more open-ended than a prepositional one; indeed, certain participial phrases can narrow the relevant universe in an exceedingly effective manner-for example, "persons having February 29th as a wedding anniversary." Reading the two parallel clauses in the same way, we must conclude that, just as all members of a geographically defined federal credit union must be drawn from the same "neighborhood, community or rural district," members of an occupationally defined federal credit union must be united by the same "common bond of occupation." </s> Finally, by its terms, §109 requires that membership in federal credit unions "shall be limited." The NCUA's interpretation-under which a common bond of occupation must unite only the members of each unrelated employer group-has the potential to read these words out of the statute entirely. The NCUA has not contested that, under its current interpretation, it would be permissible to grant a charter to a conglomerate credit union whose members would include the employees of every company in the United States. Nor can it: Each company's employees would be a "group," and each such "group" would have its own "common bond of occupation." Section 109, however, cannot be considered a limitation on credit union membership if at the same time it permits such a limitless result. </s> For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the NCUA's current interpretation of §109 is contrary to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress and is thus impermissible under the first step of Chevron . 10 </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed. Affirmed. </s> U.S. Supreme Court </s> Nos. 96-843 AND 96-847 </s> v. </s> ET AL . AT&T FAMILY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, ET AL .,PETITIONERS 96-847 v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST CO. ET AL . ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT [February 25, 1998] </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR , with whom JUSTICE STEVENS , JUSTICE SOUTER , and JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting. </s> In determining that respondents have standing under the zone-of-interests test to challenge the National Credit Union Administration's (NCUA's) interpretation of the "common bond" provision of the Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA), 12 U.S.C. § 1759 the Court applies the test in a manner that is contrary to our decisions and, more importantly, that all but eviscerates the zone-of-interests requirement. In my view, under a proper conception of the inquiry, "the interest sought to be protected by" respondents in this case is not "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected" by the common bond provision. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. </s> I </s> Respondents brought this suit under §10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702. To establish their standing to sue here, respondents must demonstrate that they are "adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute." Ibid .; see Air Courier Conference v. Postal Workers, 498 U.S. 517, 523 (1991); Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 882 -883 (1990). The two aspects of that requirement correspond to the familiar concepts in standing doctrine of "injury in fact" under Article III of the Constitution and "zone of interests" under our prudential standing principles. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U. S. ___, ___ (1997) (slip op., at 6). </s> First, respondents must show that they are "adversely affected or aggrieved," i.e. , have suffered injury in fact. Air Courier , supra , at 523; National Wildlife Federation , supra , at 883. In addition, respondents must establish that the injury they assert is "within the meaning of a relevant statute," i.e. , satisfies the zone-of-interests test. Air Courier , supra , at 523; National Wildlife Federation , supra , at 883, 886. Specifically, "the plaintiff must establish that the injury he complains of ( his aggrievement, or the adverse effect upon him ), falls within the 'zone of interests' sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint." National Wildlife Federation , supra , at 883; see also Air Courier , supra , at 523-524. </s> The "injury respondents complain of," as the Court explains, is that the NCUA's interpretation of the common bond provision "allows persons who might otherwise be their customers to be . . . customers" of petitioner AT&T Family Federal Credit Union. Ante , at 7, n. 4. Put another way, the injury is a loss of respondents' customer base to a competing entity, or more generally, an injury to respondents' commercial interest as a competitor. The relevant question under the zone-of-interests test, then, is whether injury to respondents' commercial interest as a competitor "falls within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the [common bond] provision." E.g. , Air Courier , supra , at 523-524. For instance, in Data Processing , where the plaintiffs-like respondents here-alleged competitive injury to their commercial interest, we found that the plaintiffs had standing because "their commercial interest was sought to be protected by the . . . provision which they alleged had been violated." Bennett , supra , at ___ (slip op., at 21) (discussing Data Processing ). </s> The Court adopts a quite different approach to the zoneof-interests test today, eschewing any assessment of whether the common bond provision was intended to protect respondents' commercial interest. The Court begins by observing that the terms of the common bond provision-"[f]ederal credit union membership shall be limited to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district," 12 U.S.C. § 1759-expressly limit membership in federal credit unions to persons belonging to certain "groups." Then, citing other statutory provisions that bar federal credit unions from serving nonmembers, see §§1757(5)-(6), the Court reasons that one interest sought to be protected by the common bond provision "is an interest in limiting the markets that federal credit unions can serve." Ante , at 12. The Court concludes its analysis by observing simply that respondents, "[a]s competitors of federal credit unions, . . . certainly have [that] interest . . . , and the NCUA's interpretation has affected that interest." Ante , at 13 (emphasis added). </s> Under the Court's approach, every litigant who establishes injury in fact under Article III will automatically satisfy the zone-of-interests requirement, rendering the zone-of-interests test ineffectual. See Air Courier , supra , at 524 ("mistak[e]" to "conflat[e] the zone-of-interests test with injury in fact"). That result stems from the Court's articulation of the relevant "interest." In stating that the common bond provision protects an "interest in limiting the markets that federal credit unions can serve," ante , at 12, the Court presumably uses the term "markets" in the sense of customer markets, as opposed to, for instance, product markets: The common bond requirement and the provisions prohibiting credit unions from serving nonmembers combine to limit the customers a credit union can serve, not the services a credit union can offer. </s> With that understanding, the Court's conclusion that respondents "have" an interest in "limiting the [customer] markets that federal credit unions can serve" means little more than that respondents "have" an interest in enforcing the statute. The common bond requirement limits a credit union's membership, and hence its customer base, to certain groups, 12 U.S.C. § 1759 and in the Court's view, it is enough to establish standing that respondents "have" an interest in limiting the customers a credit union can serve. The Court's additional observation that respondents' interest has been "affected" by the NCUA's interpretation adds little to the analysis; agency interpretation of a statutory restriction will of course affect a party who has an interest in the restriction. Indeed, a party presumably will bring suit to vindicate an interest only if the interest has been affected by the challenged action. The crux of the Court's zone-of-interests inquiry, then, is simply that the plaintiff must "have" an interest in enforcing the pertinent statute. </s> A party, however, will invariably have an interest in enforcing a statute when he can establish injury in fact caused by an alleged violation of that statute. An example we used in National Wildlife Federation illustrates the point. There, we hypothesized a situation involving "the failure of an agency to comply with a statutory provision requiring 'on the record' hearings." 497 U. S ., at 883. That circumstance "would assuredly have an adverse effect upon the company that has the contract to record and transcribe the agency's proceedings," and so the company would establish injury in fact. Ibid. But the company would not satisfy the zone-of-interests test, because "the provision was obviously enacted to protect the interests of the parties to the proceedings and not those of the reporters." Ibid. ; see Air Courier , 498 U.S., at 524 . Under the Court's approach today, however, the reporting company would have standing under the zone-of-interests test: Because the company is injured by the failure to comply with the requirement of on-the-record hearings, the company would certainly "have" an interest in enforcing the statute. </s> Our decision in Air Courier , likewise cannot be squared with the Court's analysis in this case. Air Courier involved a challenge by postal employees to a decision of the Postal Service suspending its statutory monopoly over certain international mailing services. The postal employees alleged a violation of the Private Express Statutes (PES)-the provisions that codify the Service's postal monopoly-citing as their injury in fact that competition from private mailing companies adversely affected their employment opportunities. 498 U. S. , at 524. We concluded that the postal employees did not have standing under the zone-of-interests test, because "the PES were not designed to protect postal employment or further postal job opportunities." Id., at 528. As with the example from National Wildlife Federation , though, the postal employees would have established standing under the Court's analysis in this case: The employees surely "had" an interest in enforcing the statutory monopoly given that suspension of the monopoly caused injury to their employment opportunities. </s> In short, requiring simply that a litigant "have" an interest in enforcing the relevant statute amounts to hardly any test at all. That is why our decisions have required instead that a party "establish that the injury he complains of . . . falls within the 'zone of interests' sought to be protected by the statutory provision" in question. National Wildlife Federation , supra , at 883 (emphasis added); see Bennett , 520 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 21). In Air Courier , for instance, after noting that the asserted injury in fact was "an adverse effect on employment opportunities of postal workers," we characterized "[t]he question before us" as "whether the adverse effect on the employment opportunities of postal workers . . . is within the zone of interests encompassed by the PES." 498 U.S., at 524 ; see also National Wildlife Federation , supra , at 885-886 (noting that asserted injury is to the plaintiffs' interests in "recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment," and finding those particular interests "are among the sorts of interests [the] statutes were specifically designed to protect"). </s> Our decision last Term in Bennett v. Spear is in the same vein. There, the Fish and Wildlife Service, in an effort to preserve a particular species of fish, issued a biological opinion that had the effect of requiring the maintenance of minimum water levels in certain reservoirs. A group of ranchers and irrigation districts brought suit asserting a "competing interest in the water," alleging, in part, injury to their commercial interest in using the reservoirs for irrigation water. 520 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4). The plaintiffs charged that the Service had violated a provision of the Endangered Species Act requiring "use [of] the best scientific and commercial data available." Id., at ___ (slip op., at 21). We did not ask simply whether the plaintiffs "had" an interest in holding the Service to the "best data" requirement. Instead, we assessed whether the injury asserted by the plaintiffs fell within the zone of interests protected by the "best data" provision, and concluded that the economic interests of parties adversely affected by erroneous biological opinions are within the zone of interests protected by that statute. Ibid. (observ ing that one purpose of the "best data" provision "is to avoid needless economic dislocation produced by agency officials zealously but unintelligently pursuing their environmental objectives"). </s> The same approach should lead the Court to ask in this case whether respondents' injury to their commercial interest as competitors falls within the zone of interests protected by the common bond provision. Respondents recognize that such an inquiry is mandated by our decisions. They argue that "the competitive interests of banks were among Congress's concerns when it enacted the Federal Credit Union Act," and that the common bond provision was motivated by "[c]ongressional concerns that chartering credit unions could inflict an unwanted competitive injury on the commercial banking industry." Brief for Respondents 24-25. The Court instead asks simply whether respondents have an interest in enforcing the common bond provision, an approach tantamount to abolishing the zone-of-interests requirement altogether. </s> II </s> Contrary to the Court's suggestion, ante , at 13-15, its application of the zone-of-interests test in this case is not in concert with the approach we followed in a series of cases in which the plaintiffs, like respondents here, alleged that agency interpretation of a statute caused competitive injury to their commercial interests. In each of those cases, we focused, as in Bennett , Air Courier , and National Wildlife Federation , on whether competitive injury to the plaintiff's commercial interest fell within the zone of interests protected by the relevant statute. </s> The earliest of the competitor standing decisions was Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), in which we first formulated the zone-of-interests requirement. There, an association of data processors challenged a decision of the Comptroller of the Currency allowing national banks to provide data processing services. The data processors alleged violation of, among other statutes, §4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 1132, which provided that "[n]o bank service corporation may engage in any activity other than the performance of bank services." 397 U. S ., at 154-155. We articulated the applicable test as "whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute . . . in question." Id., at 153. </s> In answering that question, we assessed whether the injury asserted by the plaintiffs was to an interest arguably within the zone of interests protected by the relevant statute. The data processors, like respondents here, asserted "economic injury" from the "competition by national banks in the business of providing data processing services." Id., at 152, 154. We concluded that the data processors' "commercial interest was sought to be protected by the anti-competition limitation contained in §4," Bennett , supra , at ___ (slip op., at 21) (discussing Data Processing ), explaining that the provision "arguably brings a competitor within the zone of interests protected by it," 397 U.S., at 156 . </s> Our decision in Data Processing was soon followed by another case involving §4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act, Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970) (per curiam) . Arnold Tours was similar to Data Processing , except that the plaintiffs were a group of travel agents challenging an analogous ruling of the Comptroller authorizing national banks to provide travel services. The travel agents, like the data processors, alleged injury to their commercial interest as competitors. 400 U.S., at 45 . Not surprisingly, we ruled that the travel agents had established standing, on the ground that Congress did not "desir[e] to protect data processors alone from competi tion" through §4. Id., at 46. Unlike in this case, then, our decisions in Arnold Tours and Data Processing turned on the conclusion that economic injury to competitors fell within the zone of interests protected by the relevant statute. </s> We decided Investment Company Institute v. Camp (ICI ) , 401 U.S. 617 (1971), later in the same Term as Arnold Tours . The case involved a challenge by an association of investment companies to a regulation issued by the Comptroller that authorized national banks to operate mutual funds. The investment companies alleged that the regulation violated provisions of the Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 162, barring national banks from entering the business of investment banking. We found that the investment companies had standing, but did not rest that determination simply on the notion that the companies had an interest in enforcing the prohibition against banks entering the investment business. Instead, we observed that, as in Data Processing , "Congress had arguably legislated against . . . competition" through the Glass-Steagall Act. 401 U.S., at 620 -621. </s> The final decision in this series was Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U.S. 388 (1987). That case involved provisions of the McFadden Act, 44 Stat. 1228, allowing a national bank to establish branch offices only in its home State, and then only to the extent that banks of the home State were permitted to have branches under state law. The statute defined a "branch" office essentially as one that offered core banking services. The Comptroller allowed two banks to establish discount brokerage offices at locations outside the allowable branching area, on the rationale that brokerage services did not constitute core banking services and that the offices therefore were not "branch" offices. Representatives of the securities industry challenged the Comptroller's action, alleging a violation of the statutory branching limitations. We held that the plaintiffs had standing under the zoneof-interests test, but again, not simply on the ground that they had an interest in enforcing the branching limits. Instead, we found that, as in ICI , Congress had "arguably legislated against . . . competition" through those provisions. 479 U.S., at 403 (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, Congress demonstrated "a concern to keep national banks from gaining a monopoly control over credit and money through unlimited branching." Ibid. ; see also id. , at 410 (STEVENS , J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("The general policy against branching was based in part on a concern about the national banks' potential for becoming massive financial institutions that would establish monopolies on financial services"). The Court makes no analogous finding in this case that Congress, through the common bond provision, sought to prevent credit unions from gaining "monopoly control" over the customers of banking services. </s> It is true, as the Court emphasizes repeatedly, see ante , at 8-11, 13-17, that we did not require in this line of decisions that the statute at issue was designed to benefit the particular party bringing suit. See Clarke , supra , at 399400. In Arnold Tours and Data Processing , for instance, it was sufficient that Congress desired to protect the interests of competitors generally through §4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act, even if Congress did not have in mind the particular interests of travel agents or data processors. See Arnold Tours , supra , at 46. In Clarke , likewise, the antibranching provisions of the McFadden Act may have been intended primarily to protect state banks, and not the securities industry, from competitive injury. Respondents thus need not establish that the common bond provision was enacted specifically to benefit commercial banks, any more than they must show that the provision was intended to benefit Lexington State Bank, Piedmont State Bank, or any of the particular banks that filed this suit. </s> In each of the competitor standing cases, though, we found that Congress had enacted an "anti-competition limitation," see Bennett , 520 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 21) (discussing Data Processing ), or, alternatively, that Congress had "legislated against . . . competition," see Clarke , supra , at 403; ICI , supra , at 620-621, and accordingly, that the plaintiff-competitor's "commercial interest was sought to be protected by the anti-competition limitation" at issue, Bennett , supra , at __ (slip op., at 21). We determined, in other words, that "the injury [the plaintiff] complain[ed] of . . . [fell] within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the [relevant] statutory provision." National Wildlife Federation , 497 U.S., at 883 . The Court fails to undertake that analysis here. </s> III </s> Applying the proper zone-of-interests inquiry to this case, I would find that competitive injury to respondents' commercial interests does not arguably fall within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the common bond provision. The terms of the statute do not suggest a concern with protecting the business interests of competitors. The common bond provision limits "[f]ederal credit union membership . . . to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a welldefined neighborhood, community, or rural district." 12 U.S.C. § 1759. And the provision is framed as an exception to the preceding clause, which confers membership on "incorporators and such other persons and incorporated and unincorporated organizations . . . as may be elected . . . and as such shall each, subscribe to at least one share of its stock and pay the initial installment thereon and a uniform entrance fee." Ibid. The language suggests that the common bond requirement is an internal organizational principle concerned primarily with defining mem bership in a way that secures a financially sound organization. There is no indication in the text of the provision or in the surrounding language that the membership limitation was even arguably designed to protect the commercial interests of competitors. </s> Nor is there any nontextual indication to that effect. Significantly, the operation of the common bond provision is much different from the statutes at issue in Clarke , ICI , and Data Processing . Those statutes evinced a congressional intent to legislate against competition, e.g. , Clarke , supra , at 403, because they imposed direct restrictions on banks generally, specifically barring their entry into certain markets. In Data Processing and ICI , "the question was what activities banks could engage in at all," and in Clarke , "the question [was] what activities banks [could] engage in without regard to the limitations imposed by state branching law." 479 U.S., at 403 . </s> The operation of the common bond provision does not likewise denote a congressional desire to legislate against competition. First, the common bond requirement does not purport to restrict credit unions from becoming large, nationwide organizations, as might be expected if the provision embodied a congressional concern with the competitive consequences of credit union growth. See Brief for Petitioner NCUA 25-26 (Navy Federal Credit Union has 1.6 million members; American Airlines Federal Credit Union has 157,000 members); see also S. Rep. No. 555, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934) (citing "employees of the United States Government" as a "specific group with a common bond of occupation or association"). </s> More tellingly, although the common bond provision applies to all credit unions, the restriction operates against credit unions individually: The common bond requirement speaks only to whether a particular credit union's membership can include a given group of customers, not to whether credit unions in general can serve that group. Even if a group of would-be customers does not share the requisite bond with a particular credit union, nothing in the common bond provision prevents that same group from joining a different credit union that is within the same "neighborhood, community, or rural district" or with whose members the group shares an adequate "occupation[al] or association[al]" connection. 12 U.S.C. § 1759. Also, the group could conceivably form its own credit union. In this sense, the common bond requirement does not limit credit unions collectively from serving any customers, nor does it bar any customers from being served by credit unions. </s> In Data Processing , ICI , and Clarke , by contrast, the statutes operated against national banks generally, prohibiting all banks from competing in a particular market: Banks in general were barred from providing a specific type of service ( Data Processing and ICI ), or from providing services at a particular location ( Clarke ). Thus, whereas in Data Processing customers could not obtain data processing services from any national bank, and in Clarke customers outside of the permissible branching area likewise could not obtain financial services from any national bank, in this case customers who lack an adequate bond with the members of a particular credit union can still receive financial services from a different credit union. Unlike the statutes in Data Processing , ICI , and Clarke , then, the common bond provision does not erect a competitive boundary excluding credit unions from any identifiable market. </s> The circumstances surrounding the enactment of the FCUA also indicate that Congress did not intend to legislate against competition through the common bond provision. As the Court explains, ante , at 12, n. 6, the FCUA was enacted in the shadow of the Great Depression; Congress thought that the ability of credit unions to "come through the depression without failures, when banks have failed so notably, is a tribute to the worth of cooperative credit and indicates clearly the great potential value of rapid national credit union extension." S. Rep. No. 555, supra , at 3-4. Credit unions were believed to enable the general public, which had been largely ignored by banks, to obtain credit at reasonable rates. See id., at 2-3; First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. National Credit Union Administration , 988 F. 2d 1272, 1274 (CADC), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 907 (1993). The common bond requirement "was seen as the cement that united credit union members in a cooperative venture, and was, therefore, thought important to credit unions' continued success." 988 F. 2d, at 1276. "Congress assumed implicitly that a common bond amongst members would ensure both that those making lending decisions would know more about applicants and that borrowers would be more reluctant to default." Ibid. ; see ante , at 12, n. 6; A. Burger & T. Dacin, Field of Membership: An Evolving Concept 7-8 (2d ed. 1992). </s> The requirement of a common bond was thus meant to ensure that each credit union remains a cooperative institution that is economically stable and responsive to its members' needs. See 988 F. 2d, at 1276. As a principle of internal governance designed to secure the viability of individual credit unions in the interests of the membership, the common bond provision was in no way designed to impose a restriction on all credit unions in the interests of institutions that might one day become competitors. "Indeed, the very notion seems anomalous, because Congress' general purpose was to encourage the proliferation of credit unions, which were expected to provide service to those would-be customers that banks disdained." Id., at 1275; see also Branch Bank & Trust Co. v. National Credit Union Administration Bd. , 786 F. 2d 621, 625-626 (CA4 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1063 (1987). </s> That the common bond requirement would later come to be viewed by competitors as a useful tool for curbing a credit union's membership should not affect the zone-ofinterests inquiry. The pertinent question under the zoneof-interests test is whether Congress intended to protect certain interests through a particular provision, not whether, irrespective of congressional intent, a provision may have the effect of protecting those interests. See Clarke , 479 U.S., at 394 (the "matter [is] basically one of interpreting congressional intent"); id., at 400; 988 F. 2d, at 1276 ("To be sure, as time passed-as credit unions flourished and competition among consumer lending institutions intensified-bankers began to see the common bond requirement as a desirable limitation on credit union expansion. . . . But that fact, assuming it is true, hardly serves to illuminate the intent of the Congress that first enacted the common bond requirement in 1934"). Otherwise, competitors could bring suits challenging the interpretation of a host of provisions in the FCUA that might have the unintended effect of furthering their competitive interest, such as restrictions on the loans credit unions can make or on the sums credit unions can borrow. See 12 U. S. C. §§1757(5), (6). </s> In this light, I read our decisions as establishing that there must at least be some indication in the statute, beyond the mere fact that its enforcement has the effect of incidentally benefiting the plaintiff, from which one can draw an inference that the plaintiff's injury arguably falls within the zone of interests sought to be protected by that statute. The provisions we construed in Clarke , ICI , and Data Processing , allowed such an inference: Where Congress legislates against competition, one can properly infer that the statute is at least arguably intended to protect competitors from injury to their commercial interest, even if that is not the statute's principal objective. See Bennett , 520 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 21-22) (indicating that zoneof-interests test is satisfied if one of several statutory objectives corresponds with the interest sought to be pro tected by the plaintiff). Accordingly, "there [was] sound reason to infer" in those cases "that Congress intended [the] class [of plaintiffs] to be relied upon to challenge agency disregard of the law." Clarke , supra , at 403 (internal quotation marks omitted). </s> The same cannot be said of respondents in this case, because neither the terms of the common bond provision, nor the way in which the provision operates, nor the circumstances surrounding its enactment, evince a congressional desire to legislate against competition. This, then, is a case where "the plaintiff's interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit." 479 U.S., at 399 . The zone-of-interests test "seeks to exclude those plaintiffs whose suits are more likely to frustrate than to further statutory objectives," id., at 397, n. 12, and one can readily envision circumstances in which the interests of competitors, who have the incentive to suppress credit union expansion in all circumstances, would be at odds with the statute's general aim of supporting the growth of credit unions that are cohesive and hence financially stable. </s> The Court's attempt to distinguish Air Courier , ante , at 17-18, is instructive in this regard. The Court observes that here, unlike in Air Courier , the plaintiffs suffer "competitive and direct injury." 498 U.S., at 528 , n. 5. But the lack of competitive injury was pertinent in Air Courier because the statutes alleged to have been violated-the PES-were "competition statutes that regulate the conduct of competitors." Ibid. The common bond provision, for all the noted reasons, is not a competition law, and so the mere presence of "competitive and direct injury" should not establish standing. See Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 5 -6 (1968). Thus, while in Air Courier "the statute in question regulated competition [but] the interests of the plaintiff employees had nothing to do with competition," ante , at 18, here, the common bond provision does not regulate competition but the interests of the plaintiff have everything to do with competition. In either case, the plaintiff's injury is at best "marginally related" to the interests sought to be protected by the statute, Clarke , supra , at 399, and the most that can be said is that the provision has the incidental effect of benefiting the plaintiffs. That was not enough to establish standing in Air Courier , and it should not suffice here. </s> IV </s> Prudential standing principles "are 'founded in concern about the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society.'" Bennett , supra , at ___ (slip op., at 6) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). The zone-of-interests test is an integral part of the prudential standing inquiry, and we ought to apply the test in a way that gives it content. The analysis the Court undertakes today, in my view, leaves the zone-of-interests requirement a hollow one. As with the example in National Wildlife Federation , where the reporting company suffered injury from the alleged statutory violation, but the injury to the company's commercial interest was not within the zone of interests protected by the statute, here, too, respondents suffer injury from the NCUA's interpretation of the common bond requirement, but the injury to their commercial interest is not within the zone of interests protected by the provision. Applying the zone-of-interests inquiry as it has been articulated in our decisions, I conclude that respondents have failed to establish standing. I would therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case with instructions that it be dismissed. </s> Footnotes </s> [Footnote * Justice Scalia joins this opinion, except as to footnote 6. [Footnote 1 The Court of Appeals' holding that respondents had prudential standing conflicted with a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reached prior to this Court's decision in Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U.S. 388 (1987). See Branch Bank & Trust Co. v. National Credit Union Administration Bd. , 786 F. 2d 621 (CA4 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1063 (1987). [Footnote 2 A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit later reached a similar conclusion, with one judge dissenting. See First City Bank v. National Credit Union Administration Bd., 111 F. 3d 433 (CA6 1997). [Footnote 3 According to the NCUA, since 1982, thousands of federal credit unions have relied on the NCUA's revised interpretation of §109. See Pet. for Cert. in No. 96-843, p. 14. Moreover, following the Court of Appeals' decision on the merits, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted a nationwide injunction prohibiting the NCUA from approving the addition of unrelated employer groups to any federal credit union. See Brief for Petitioner ATTF 14, n. 5. [Footnote 4 In this case, it is not disputed that respondents have suffered an injury-in-fact because the NCUA's interpretation allows persons who might otherwise be their customers to be members, and therefore customers, of ATTF. [Footnote 5 Under §21 of the Glass-Steagall Act, it is unlawful "[f]or any person, firm, [or] corporation . . engaged in the business of issuing . . . securities, to engage at the same time to any extent whatever in the business of receiving deposits." §21 of the Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 189, 12 U.S.C. § 378(a). [Footnote 6 The legislative history of §109, upon which petitioners so heavily rely, supports this conclusion. Credit unions originated in mid-19th century Europe as cooperative associations that were intended to provide credit to persons of small means; they were usually organized around some common theme, either geographic or associational. See General Accounting Office, Credit Unions: Reforms for Ensuring Future Soundness 24 (July 1991). Following the European example, in the 1920's many States passed statutes authorizing the chartering of credit unions, and a number of those statutes contained provisions similar to §109's common bond requirement. See A. Burger & T. Dacin, Field of Membership: An Evolving Concept 6 (2d ed. 1992). During the Great Depression, in contrast to widespread bank failures at both the state and national level, there were no involuntary liquidations of state-chartered credit unions. See S. Rep. No. 555, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934). The cooperative nature of the institutions, which state-law common bond provisions reinforced, was believed to have contributed to this result. See Credit Unions: Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 19-20, 26 (1933). A common bond provision was thus included in the District of Columbia Credit Union Act, which Congress passed in 1932; it was identical to the FCUA's common bond provision enacted two years later. When Congress enacted the FCUA, sponsors of the legislation emphasized that the cooperative nature of credit unions allowed them to make credit available to persons who otherwise would not qualify for loans. See S. Rep. No. 555, supra , at 1, 3. The legislative history thus confirms that §109 was thought to reinforce the cooperative nature of credit unions, which in turn was believed to promote their safety and soundness and allow access to credit to persons otherwise unable to borrow. Because, by its very nature, a cooperative institution must serve a limited market, the legislative history of §109 demonstrates that one of the interests "arguably . . . to be protected" by §109 is an interest in limiting the markets that federal credit unions can serve. [Footnote 7 Contrary to the dissent's contentions, see post, at 1,7, our formulation does not "eviscerat[e]" or "abolish[]" the zone of interests requirement. Nor can it be read to imply that in order to have standing under the APA, a plaintiff must merely have an interest in enforcing the statute in question. The test we have articulated--discerning the interests "arguably . . to be protected" by the statutory provision at issue and inquiring whether the plaintiff's interests affected by the agency action in question are among them--differs only as a matter of semantics from the formulation that the dissent has accused us of "eviscerating" or "abolishing," see , post , at 2 (stating that the plaintiff must establish that "the injury he complains of . . . falls within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint") (internal quotations and citation omitted). Our only disagreement with the dissent lies in the application of the zone of interests test. Because of the unmistakable link between §109's express restriction on credit union membership and the limitation on the markets that federal credit unions can serve, there is objectively "some indication in the statute," post, at 15, that respondents' interest is "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected" by §109. Hence respondents are more than merely incidental beneficiaries of §109's effects on competition. [Footnote 8 The data processing companies, travel agents, investment companies, and securities dealers that challenged the Comptroller's rulings in our prior cases certainly did not bring suit to advance the noble goal of maintaining the safety and soundness of national banks, or to promote the interests of national bank depositors. [Footnote 9 Unlike some of our prudential standing cases, no suggestion is made in this case that Congress has sought to preclude judicial review of agency action. See, e.g., Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, [Footnote 467 U. S. 340 (1984). [Footnote 10 We have no need to consider §109's legislative history, which, as both courts below found, is extremely "murky" and a "slender reed on which to place reliance." 90 F. 3d at 530 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

United States Supreme Court ANDREWS v. UNITED STATES(1963) No. 491 Argued: Decided: May 20, 1963 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 494, Donovan v. United States, also on certiorari to the same Court. </s> In a Federal District Court, petitioners were convicted of violating certain federal criminal statutes and were sentenced to imprisonment. Their convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals; but their cases were remanded for resentencing. They were resentenced, and the judgments were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Several years later, petitioners moved in the District Court that their sentences be vacated and that they be resentenced, on the ground that they had not been given an opportunity to make statements in their own behaves, as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 (a), either when they were originally sentenced or when they were resentenced. Finding this to be true, the District Court granted their motions and ordered that petitioners be returned to it for resentencing. Without waiting for them to be resentenced, the Government appealed to the Court of Appeals. Held: Petitioners' motions should be considered as having been made in collateral proceedings under 28 U.S.C. 2255; the District Court's orders were interlocutory, not final; and the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction of the Government's appeal. Pp. 335-340. </s> 301 F.2d 376, judgment set aside and cases remanded. </s> E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., by appointment of the Court, 371 U.S. 885 , argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners. </s> Wayne G. Barnett argued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller, Beatrice Rosenberg and Richard W. Schmude. [373 U.S. 334, 335] </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The two petitioners and a co-defendant were convicted in a Federal District Court upon a three-count indictment charging that they had (1) assaulted a Post Office employee with intent to rob in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2114, (2) put the life of the Post Office employee in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2114, and (3) conspired together to violate the aforesaid statute in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371. The district judge sentenced each defendant to concurrent prison terms of 25 years on Count 2 and five years on Count 3. 1 None of the defendants was asked before the sentences were imposed whether he had anything to say in his own behalf. On appeal, the convictions were affirmed, but the cases were remanded to the District Court for resentencing on Count 2, on the ground that the trial judge had been in error in thinking that under the statute 2 he was without power to suspend sentence and grant probation on that count. United States v. Donovan, 242 F.2d 61. Upon remand, the District Court suspended the 25-year sentence which had been imposed on the petitioners' co-defendant, but resentenced the two [373 U.S. 334, 336] petitioners to 25-year prison terms. Again neither petitioner was afforded an opportunity to speak in his own behalf before the sentences were imposed. The Court of Appeals reaffirmed the convictions. United States v. Donovan, 252 F.2d 788. </s> The proceedings now before us began when the petitioner Donovan filed a motion in the District Court requesting that his sentence "be vacated and he be resentenced" on the ground that, contrary to Rule 32 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, he had been afforded no opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf either at the time of the original sentence or when the sentence was reimposed. 3 The District Court granted the motion and ordered that Donovan "be returned to this district for resentencing." The petitioner Andrews then wrote to Judge Murphy, the district judge who had acted on Donovan's motion, pointing out that "the identical circumstances exist with me" and asking for similar relief. Judge Murphy ordered that Andrews too be returned to the District Court for resentencing. The Government filed a notice of appeal from both orders, and the resentencing of the petitioners was stayed upon the Government's motion. The Court of Appeals ruled that its appellate jurisdiction had been properly invoked, and on the merits reversed the orders of the District Court, holding that under this Court's decisions in Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 , and Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 , the sentencing court's failure to comply with Rule 32 (a) did not constitute a ground for collateral relief. 301 F.2d 376. We granted certiorari, 371 U.S. 812 . </s> As to the merits of the issue decided by the Court of Appeals, the petitioners contend that there was here not [373 U.S. 334, 337] a mere failure to comply with the formal requirements of Rule 32 (a) as in Hill and Machibroda, but that a number of aggravating circumstances accompanied the sentencing court's denial of the petitioners' right of allocation. And the Court's opinions in Hill and Machibroda, say the petitioners, clearly implied that collateral relief would be available in a case where such circumstances were shown to exist. Cf. United States v. Taylor, 303 F.2d 165, 167-168. But the petitioners argue preliminarily that the Government had no right of appeal in these cases. We agree with the petitioners that the Court of Appeals did not have appellate jurisdiction, and accordingly, without reaching the merits, we set aside the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the cases to the District Court so that the petitioners may be resentenced in accordance with the District Court's orders. </s> The motion which Donovan filed in the sentencing court was denominated by him as one made under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 4 Anderson's letter did not mention Rule 35, but in an affidavit opposing Anderson's request, an Assistant United States Attorney conceded that the "factual and legal posture of this application therefore is identical to the similar motion of Robert L. Donovan." Both applications were filed in the District Court under the docket number of the original criminal case. </s> In view of this treatment of the motions by the parties and the trial court, the Court of Appeals was asked to consider the motions also as filed in the original criminal cases under Rule 35, and to hold that the trial court's rulings could not be appealed by the Government because they did not come within the limited purview of the Criminal Appeals Act. 5 This reasoning the Court of Appeals [373 U.S. 334, 338] declined to adopt, treating the motions instead as having been brought under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 2255. </s> The court was correct in regarding Hill v. United States, supra, as requiring this view, in the case of a prisoner in custody under the sentence he is attacking. Cf. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 . And in this area of the law, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, "adjudication upon the underlying merits of claims is not hampered by reliance upon the titles petitioners put upon their documents." 301 F.2d, at 378. See Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 . Section 2255 explicitly authorizes a prisoner in custody under a sentence imposed by a federal court to attack such a sentence collaterally upon the ground that the sentence "was imposed in violation of the . . . laws of the United States," by moving the trial court "to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence." 6 </s> An action under 28 U.S.C. 2255 is a separate proceeding, independent of the original criminal case. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 . The Criminal Appeals Act has no applicability to such a proceeding. Instead, 2255 itself provides that "An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order entered on the motion as from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas corpus." [373 U.S. 334, 339] </s> We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals, however, that under this provision the Government had a right to take appeals at the time it sought to do so in these cases, because we think it clear that the orders were interlocutory, not final. For a federal prisoner 2255 can perform the full service of habeas corpus, by effecting the immediate and unconditional discharge of the prisoner. Sanders v. United States, ante, p. 1. But the provisions of the statute make clear that in appropriate cases a 2255 proceeding can also be utilized to provide a more flexible remedy. In the present cases neither of the petitioners ever asked for his unconditional release. What they asked, and were granted, was the vacation of the sentences they were serving so that they might be returned to the trial court to be resentenced in proceedings in which their right to allocution would be accorded them. Such a remedy is precisely authorized by the statute. Under 2255 a petitioner may "move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence." 7 And in response to such a motion a District Court is expressly authorized to "discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate." 8 </s> [373 U.S. 334, 340] Where, as here, what was appropriately asked and appropriately granted was the resentencing of the petitioners, it is obvious that there could be no final disposition of the 2255 proceedings until the petitioners were resentenced. Cf. Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 518 . </s> The long-established rule against piecemeal appeals in federal cases and the overriding policy considerations upon which that rule is founded have been repeatedly emphasized by this Court. See, e. g., DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121 ; Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394 ; Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 . The standards of finality to which the Court has adhered in habeas corpus proceedings have been no less exacting. See, e. g., Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364 . There the Court said that the rule as to finality "requires that the judgment to be appealable should be final not only as to all the parties, but as to the whole subject-matter and as to all the causes of action involved." 252 U.S., at 370 . </s> The basic reason for the rule against piecemeal interlocutory appeals in the federal system is particularly apparent in the cases before us. Until the petitioners are resentenced, it is impossible to know whether the Government will be able to show any colorable claim of prejudicial error. The District Court may, as before, sentence the petitioners to the same 25 years' imprisonment; it may place one or both of them on probation; it may make some other disposition with respect to their sentences. But until the court acts, none of the parties to this controversy will have had a final adjudication of his claims by the trial court in these 2255 proceedings. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is set aside, and the cases are remanded to the District Court for the Southern District of New York for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 No sentence was imposed on Count 1, because the court concluded that the conviction under this count had merged with the conviction under Count 2. </s> [Footnote 2 "Whoever assaults any person having lawful charge, control, or custody of any mail matter or of any money or other property of the United States, with intent to rob, steal, or purloin such mail matter, money, or other property of the United States, or robs any such person of mail matter, or of any money, or other property of the United States, shall, for the first offense, be imprisoned not more than ten years; and if in effecting or attempting to effect such robbery he wounds the person having custody of such mail, money, or other property of the United States, or puts his life in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon, or for a subsequent offense, shall be imprisoned twenty-five years." 18 U.S.C. 2114. </s> [Footnote 3 Rule 32 (a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides in pertinent part as follows: "Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment." </s> [Footnote 4 Rule 35 provides in pertinent part as follows: "The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time." </s> [Footnote 5 18 U.S.C. 3731. The Government makes no claim of a right to appeal under the Criminal Appeals Act. No question as to the [373 U.S. 334, 338] availability of a writ of mandamus is presented by this case. See United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469 . Cf. United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55 . </s> [Footnote 6 The first paragraph of 28 U.S.C. 2255 provides: "A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence." </s> [Footnote 7 See note 6, supra. </s> [Footnote 8 The third paragraph of 2255 provides: "Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate." </s> [373 U.S. 334, 341]

United States Supreme Court AERO MAYFLOWER TRANSIT CO. V. BOARD OF R. R. COM'RS(1947) No. 39 Argued: October 15, 1947Decided: December 8, 1947 </s> Appeal from the Supreme Court of the State of Montana. [ Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of R. R. Com'rs 332 U.S. 495 (1947) ] </s> [332 U.S. 495 , 496] </s> Mr. Edmond G. Toomey, of Helena, Mont., for appellant. Mr. Clarence Hanley, of Helena, Mont., for appellees. </s> Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE delivered the opinion of the Court. Again we are asked to decide whether state taxes as applied to an interstate motor carrier run afoul of the commerce clause, Art. I, 8, of the Federal Constitution. Two distinct Montana levies are questioned. Both are imposed by that state's Motor Carriers Act, Rev.Codes Mont.(1935) 3847.1-3847.28. One is a flat tax of $10 for each vehicle operated by a motor carrier over the state's highways, payable on issuance of a certificate or permit, which must be secured before operations begin, and annually thereafter. 3847. 16(a).1 The other is a quarterly fee of one-half of one per cent of the motor car- </s> [332 U.S. 495 , 497] </s> rier's 'gross operating revenue,' but with a minimum annual fee of $15 per vehicle for class C carriers, in which group appellant falls. 3847.27.2 Each tax is declared expressly to be laid 'in consideration of the use of the highways of this state' and to be 'in addition to all other licenses, fees and taxes imposed upon motor vehicles in this state.' Prior to July 1, 1941, the fees collected pursuant to 3847.16(a) and 3847.27 were paid into the state treasury and credited to 'the motor carrier fund.'3 After that date, by virtue of Mont.Laws, 1941, c. 14, 2, they were allocated to the state's general fund. Appellant is a Kentucky corporation, with its principal offices in Indianapolis, Indiana. Its business is exclusively interstate. It consists in transporting household </s> [332 U.S. 495 , 498] </s> goods and office furniture from points in one state to destinations in another. Appellant does no intrastate business in Montana. The volume of its interstate business there is continuous and substantial, not merely casual or occasional. 4 It holds a certificate of convenience and necessity issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission, pursuant to which its business in Montana and elsewhere is conducted. In 1935 appellant received a class C permit to operate over Montana highways, as required by state law. 5 Until 1937, apparently, it complied with Montana requirements, including the payment of registration and license plate fees for its vehicles operating in Montana and of the 5õ per gallon tax on gasoline purchased there. 6 However, in 1937 and thereafter appellant refused to pay the flat $10 fee imposed by 3847.16(a) and the $ 15 minimum 'gross revenue' tax laid by 3847.27. In consequence, after hearing on order to show cause, the appellee </s> [332 U.S. 495 , 499] </s> board7 in 1939 revoked the 1935 permit and brought this suit in a state court to enjoin appellant from further operations in Montana. Upon appellant's cross-complaint, the trial court issued an order restraining the board from enforcing the 'gross revenue' tax laid by 3847.27. But at the same time it enjoined appellant from operating in Montana until it paid the fees imposed by 3847.16(a). On appeal the state supreme court held both taxes applicable to interstate as well as intrastate motor carriers and construed the term 'gross operating revenue' in 3847.27 to mean 'gross revenue derived from operations in Montana.'8 It then sustained both taxes as against appellant's constitutional objections, state and federal. Accordingly, it reversed the trial court's judgment insofar as the 'gross revenue' tax had been held invalid, but affirmed the decision relating to the flat $10 tax. Mont., 172 P.2d 452, 460. We put aside at the start appellant's suggestion that the Supreme Court of Montana has misconstrued the state statutes and therefore that we should consider them, for purposes of our limited function, according to appellant's view of their literal import. The rule is too well settled to permit of question that this Court not only accepts but is bound by the construction given to </s> [332 U.S. 495 , 500] </s> state statutes by the state courts. 9 Accordingly, we accept the state court's rulings, insofar as they are material, that the two sections apply alike to interstate and intrastate commerce and that 'gross operating revenue' as employed in 3847.27 comprehends only such revenue derived from appellant's operations within Montana, not outside that state. 10 </s> Moreover, since Montana has not demanded or sought to enforce payment by appellant of more than the flat $15 minimum fee for class C carriers under 3847.27,11 we limit our consideration of the so-called 'gross revenue' tax to that fee. This too is in accordance with the state supreme court's declaration: 'Even if it be admitted </s> [332 U.S. 495 , 501] </s> that the manner of arriving at a sound basis upon which the tax on gross revenue (should be calculated) is not provided by the statute, a c ntention to which we do not agree, no difficulty would arise in putting into effect the minimum fee of $15.00 required for each company vehicle operated within the state.'12 Although the state court did not concede that the statute comprehended no workable or sound basis for calculating the tax above the minimum, we take this statement as a clear declaration that it would sustain the minimum charge even if for some reason the amount of the tax above the minimum would have to fall. With the issues thus narrowed, we have, in effect, two flat taxes, one for $10, the other for $15, payable annually upon each vehicle operated on Montana highways in the course of appellant's business, with each tax expressly declared to be in addition to all others and to be imposed 'in consideration of the use of the highways of this state.' Neither exaction discriminates against interstate commerce. Each applies alike to local and interstate operations. Neither undertakes to tax traffic or movements </s> [332 U.S. 495 , 502] </s> taking place outside Montana or the gross returns from such movements or to use such returns as a measure of the amount of the tax. Both levies apply exclusively to operations wholly within the state or the proceeds of such operations, although those operations are interstate in character. Moreover, it is not material to the validity of either tax that the state also imposes and collects the vehicle registration and license fee and the gallonage tax on gasoline purchased in Montana. The validity of those taxes neither is questioned nor well could be. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 ; Aero Transit Co. v. Georgia Commission, 295 U.S. 285 ; Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506 ; Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport, 289 U.S. 249 . Nor does their exaction have any significant relationship to the imposition of the taxes now in question. Dixie Ohio Co. v. Commission, 306 U.S. 72, 78 , 438; Interstate Busses Corporation v. Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245, 251 , 231. They are imposed for distinct purposes and the proceeds, as appellant concedes, are devoted to different uses, namely, the policing of motor traffic and the maintenance of the state's highways. 13 </s> Concededly the proceeds of the two taxes presently involved are not allocated to those objects. 14 Rather they now go into the state's general fund subject to appropriation for general state purposes. 15 Indeed this fact, in appellant's view, is the vice of the statute. But in that </s> [332 U.S. 495 , 503] </s> view appellant of the exactions. It is far too late to question that a state, consistently with the commerce clause, may lay upon motor vehicles engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, or upon those who own and so operate them, a fair and reasonable, nondiscriminatory tax as compensation for the use of its highways. Hendrick v. Maryland, supra; Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S. 554 ; Aero Transit Co. v. Georgia Commission, supra; Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U.S. 407 ; Dixie Ohio Co. v. Commission, supra; Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 ; cf. South Carolina Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 . Moreover 'common carriers for hire, who make the highways their place of business, may properly be charged an extra tax for such use.' Clark v. Poor, supra, 274 U.S. at page 557, 47 S.Ct. at page 703. The present taxes on their face are exacted 'in consideration of the use of the highways of this state,' that is, they are laid for the privilege of using those highways. And the aggregate amount of the two taxes taken together is less than the amount of similar taxes this Court has heretofore sustained. Cf. Dixie Ohio Co. v. Commission, supra; Aero Transit Co. v. Georgia Commission, supra. The state builds the highways and owns them. 16 Motor carriers for hire, and particularly truckers of heavy goods, like appellant, make especially arduous use of roadways, entailing wear and tear much beyond that resulting from general indiscriminate public use. Morf v. Bingaman, supra, 298 U.S. at page 411, 56 S.Ct. at page 758. Although the state may not discriminate against or exclude such interstate traffic generally in the use of its highways, this does not mean that the state is required to furnish those facilities to it free of charge or indeed on equal terms with other traffic not inflicting similar destructive effects. Cf. Clark v. Poor, supra; Morf v. Bingaman, supra, 298 U.S. at page 411, 56 S.Ct. at page 758. Interstate traffic equally with </s> [332 U.S. 495 , 504] </s> intrastate may be required to pay a fair share of the cost and maintenance reasonably related to the use made of the highways. This does not mean, as appellant seems to assume, that the proceeds of all taxes levied for the privilege of using the highways must be allocated directly and exclusively to maintaining them. Clark v. Poor, supra, 274 U.S. at page 557, 47 S.Ct. at page 703; Morf v. Bingaman, supra, 298 U.S. at page 412, 56 S.Ct. at page 758. That is true, although this Court has held invalid, as forbidden by the commerce clause, certain state taxes on interstate motor carriers because laid 'not as compensation for the use of the highways, but for the privilege of doing the interstate bus business.' Interstate Transit, Inc., v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183, 186 , 381; cf. McCarroll v. Dixie Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 179 , 506. Those cases did not hold that all state exactions for the privilege of using the state's highways are valid only if their proceeds are required to go directly and exclusively for highway maintenance, policing and administration. Both before and after the Interstate Transit decision this Court has sustained state taxes expressly laid on the privilege of using the highways, as applied to interstate motor carriers, declaring in each instance that it is immaterial whether the proceeds are allocated to highway uses or others. Clark v. Poor, supra, 274 U.S. at page 557, 47 S. Ct. at page 703; Morf v. Bingaman, supra, 298 U.S. at page 412, 56 S.Ct. at page 758.17 Appellant therefore confuses a tax 'assessed for a proper purpose and * * * not objectionable in amount,' Clark v. Poor, supra, 274 U.S. at page 557, 47 S.Ct. at page 703, that is, a tax affirmatively laid for the privilege of using the state's highways, with a tax not imposed on that privilege but upon some other such as the privilege of doing the interstate business. Though necessarily related, in view of the nature of interstate motor traffic, the two privileges are not identical, and it is useless to confuse them or to confound a tax for the priv- </s> [332 U.S. 495 , 505] </s> ilege of using the highways with one the proceeds of which are necessarily devoted to maintaining them. Whether the proceeds of a tax are used or required to be used for highway maintenance 'may be of significance,' as the Court has said, 'when the point is otherwise in doubt, to show that the fee is in fact laid for that purpose and is thus a charge for the privilege of using the highways. Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, supra. But where the manner of the levy, like that prescribed by the present statute, definitely identifies it as a fee charged for the grant of the privilege, it is immaterial whether the state places the fees collected in the pocket out of which it pays highway maintenance charges or in some other.' Morf v. Bingaman, supra, 298 U.S. at page 412, 56 S.Ct. at page 758.18 The exactions in the present case fall clearly within the rule of Morf v. Bingaman and its predecessors in authority, and therefore, like that case, outside the decisions in the Interstate Transit and like cases. Both taxes are levied 'in consideration of the use of the highways of this state,' that is, as compensation for their use, and bear only on the privilege of using them, not on the privilege of doing the interstate business. Moreover, the flat $10 fee laid by 3847.16(a) is further identified as one on the privilege of use by the fact that 'unlike the general tax in Interstate Transit, Inc., v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183 , the levy of which was unrelated to the use of the highways, grant of the privilege of their use is by the present statute made conditional upon payment of the fee.' Morf v. Bingaman, supra, 298 U. S. at page 410, 56 S.Ct. at page 757. The minimum so-called 'gross revenue' fee, on the other hand, is technically conditioned on the receipt of </s> [332 U.S. 495 , 506] </s> such revenue from the operations within Montana. But the flat minimum of $ 15 annually, which is all we have before us in the shape the case has taken for the purposes of decision here, has none of the alleged vices characteristic of gross income taxes heretofore held to vitiate such taxes laid by the states on interstate commerce. And appellant has advanced no tenable basis in rebuttal of the legislative declaration that this tax too is exacted in consideration of the use of the state's highways, i.e., for the privilege of using them, not for that of doing the interstate business. Here, as in Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U.S. 407, 411 , 758, 'there is ample support for a legislative determination that the peculiar character of this traffic involves a special type of use of the highways,' with enhanced wear, tear and hazards laying heavier burdens on the state for maintenance and policing than other types of traffic create. It is to compensate for these burdens that the taxes are imposed and appellant has not sustained its burden. Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., supra, 306 U.S. at page 599, 59 S.Ct. at page 753, and authorities cited, of showing that the levies have no reasonable relation to that end. 19 </s> It is of no consequence that the state has seen fit to lay two exactions, substantially identical, rather than combine them into one, or that appellant pays other taxes </s> [332 U.S. 495 , 507] </s> which in fact are devoted to highway maintenance. For the state does not exceed its constitutional powers by imposing more than one form of tax. Interstate Busses Corporation v. Blodgett, supra; Dixie Ohio Co. v. Commission, supra. And, as we have said, the aggregate amount of both taxes combined is less than that of taxes heretofore sustained. In view of these facts there is not even semblance of substance to appellant's contention that the taxes are excessive. Neither is there merit in its other arguments, which we have considered, including those urging due process and equal protection grounds for invalidating the levies. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Montana is affirmed. Affirmed. Footnotes </s> [Footnote 1 The section was enacted originally as Mont.Laws, 1931, c. 184, 16. Textually it is as follows: '(a) In addition to all of the licenses, fees or taxes imposed upon motor vehicles in this state, and in consideration of the use of the public highways of this state, every motor carrier, as defined in this act, shall, at the time of the issuance of a certificate and annually thereafter, on or between the first day of July and the fifteenth day of July, of each calendar year, pay to the board of railroad commissioners of the state of Montana the sum of ten dollars ($10.00), for every motor vehicle operated by the carrier over or upon the public highways of this state. * * *' In further relation to issuance of the permit, see note 5. </s> [Footnote 2 This section originally was Mont.Laws, 193 , c. 100, 2. It reads as follows: 'In addition to all other licenses, fees and taxes imposed upon motor vehicles in this state and in consideration of the use of the highways of this state, every motor carrier holding a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the public service commission, shall between the first and fifteenth days of January, April, July and October of each year, file with the public service commission a statement showing the gross operating revenue of such carrier for the preceding three months of operation, or portion thereof, and shall pay to the board a fee of one-half of one per cent of the amount of such gross operating revenue; provided, however, that the minimum annual fee which shall be paid by each class A and class B carrier for each vehicle registered and/or operated under the provisions of the motor carrier act shall be thirty dollars ($30.00) and the minimum annual fee which shall be paid by each class C carrier for each vehicle registered and/or operated under the motor carrier act shall be fifteen dollars ($15.00).' Section 3847.2, Rev.Codes Mont. (1935), contains the definitions of the three classes of carriers. [Footnote 3 The moneys in the motor carrier fund were subject to appropriation for use in supervision and regulation of many activities other than those connected with the public highways. See Rev.Codes Mont. (1935), 3847.17, 3847.28; and cf. note 13. </s> [Footnote 4 Appellant's answer and cross-complaint set forth statistics concerning its use of Montana highways during the years 1937, 1938 and 1939. The figures show appellant's equipment operating on Montana highways during 227 days in 1937, 385 trucking days in 1938; and 405 trucking days in 1939. See also note 6. [Footnote 5 The statute was Mont.Laws, 1931, c. 184, 23, now Rev.Codes Mont. ( 1935), 3847.23. The section applied the act of which it was a part to interstate and foreign commerce 'insofar as such application may be permitted under the provisions of' the Federal Constitution, treaties and acts of Congress, but expressly exempted interstate carriers from making 'any showing of public convenience and necessity' in order to secure the certificate or permit. [Footnote 6 These taxes were imposed separately from the two involved in this case. Appellant's brief states the registration and license plate fees increased from $660.50 in 1937 to $1,212.50 in 1938 and to $1,630.50 in 1939. The gasoline tax increased from $745.30 in 1937 t $1,257.90 in 1938 and $1,649.98 in 1939. The gallonage tax, though ultimately borne by the consumer, was laid on the sale and collected from the dealer. </s> [Footnote 7 It should be noted that 'the board of railroad commissioners,' as used in 3847.16(a), and 'the public service commission,' as used in 3847.27, designate a single body, invested with regulatory power over various public utilities in addition to motor carriers, e.g., railroads, common carriers of oil, etc. By Rev.Codes Mont. (1935), 3880, 'The board of railroad commissioners * * * shall be ex-officio the public service commission hereby created * * *.' The two terms were said by the Montana Supreme Court in this case to be 'used interchangeably.' 172 P.2d 452, 461. [Footnote 8 This judicial construction was embodied in an amendment to the section made by Mont.Laws, 1947, c. 73, 2. </s> [Footnote 9 Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 ; Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232 ; Minnesota v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 , 126 A.L.R. 530; Morehead v. N.Y. ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 103 A.L.R. 1445; cf. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 , 114 A.L.R. 1487. [Footnote 10 Acting not only in the view that statutes are presumptively constitutional and, if necessary, are to be so construed as to make them so, the court noted that 3847.16(b) expressly provides that, when service 'is rendered partly in this state and partly in an adjoining state or foreign country,' carriers 'shall comply with the provisions of this act' concerning 'payment of compensation' and making reports by showing 'the total business performed within the limits of this state.' (Emphasis added.) Accordingly it held that 3847.27 and 3847.16 should be read together and the limitation of 3847.16(b) 'within the limits of this state' thus became a part of 3847.27 as well as 3847.16(a). Mont., 172 P.2d 452, 460. [Footnote 11 Appellant's vice president and general manager, Wheating, testified that for purposes of applying 3847.27 he had calculated, for each of the years 1939 through 1942, 'the (gross) income for that operation of the load miles operated in Montana by using an average income per mile figure based upon the probable load factor we would have had in Montana.' (Emphasis added.) On this basis the amount of the tax as calculated at one-half of one per cent quarterly was substantially below the statutory minimum for each of the four years. See note 19. These figures apparently were reported to and accepted by the board as the basis for its demands upon the taxpayer for the flat $15 minimum annual tax. </s> [Footnote 12 Mont., 172 P.2d 452, 460. Appellant had argued, as it does here, that even if the 'gross revenue' tax is limited to revenue derived from operations in Montana, it is nevertheless invalid for want of any prescribed method on the face of the statute for ascertaining or calculating the tax. The state court held that the statute by necessary implication authorized the board to 'adopt any fair and reasonable mode of enforcement designed to effectuate the purposes of the Act.' Mont., 172 P. 2d 452, 461. In view of our limitation of the question before us, as stated in the text, we need not express opinion concerning this ruling or any tax above the minimum calculated in accordance with it. Cf. note 11. In another connection the state supreme court adverted to the separability clause contained in 3847.24 of the statute, though not referring to it expressly in relation to the statement quoted in the text. </s> [Footnote 13 See note 6 and text. It is admitted by the pleadings that the proceeds of he vehicle registration and license tax and the gallonage tax are allocated to the construction, repair and maintenance of state highways. [Footnote 14 The board concedes in the brief filed here that the state supreme court was in error in the statement that the revenue from the two taxes presently in issue 'is devoted to the building, repairing and policing of such highways * * *.' Mont., 172 P.2d 452, 462. [Footnote 15 See note 3 and text. </s> [Footnote 16 It is immaterial that the state receives federal aid for state road construction, a fact on which appellant places some emphasis. </s> [Footnote 17 See note 18 infra and text. </s> [Footnote 18 In Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S. 554, 557 , 703, the Court stated: 'Since the tax is assessed for a proper purpose and is not objectionable in amount, the use to which the proceeds are put is not a matter which concerns the plaintiffs.' </s> [Footnote 19 Appellant claims that the $15 minimum fee is unreasonable since it is roughly ten times greater than the tax that would be required if the percentage standard provided in the statute were applied. To accept appellant's position would mean that a state could never impose a minimum fee, but would have to adjust its taxes to the inevitable variations in the use of the highways made by various carriers. The Federal Constitution does not require the state to elaborate a system of motor vehicle taxation which will reflect with exact precision every graduation in use. In return for the $15 fee appellant can do business grossing $3,000 per vehicle annually for operations on Montana roads. Appellant was not wronged by its failure to make the full use of the highways permitted. Aero Transit Co. v. Georgia Commission, 295 U.S. 285 ; Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U.S. 407 ; cf. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 .

United States Supreme Court HILL v. UNITED STATES(1962) No. 68 Argued: December 5, 1961Decided: January 22, 1962 </s> In a Federal District Court, petitioner was convicted of two federal crimes and sentenced to imprisonment. He was represented by counsel both at the trial and when sentence was imposed; but, before imposing sentence, the judge failed to comply with the requirement of Rule 32 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that he afford petitioner an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf. Petitioner took no appeal; but five years later he moved under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate the sentence because of the judge's failure to comply with Rule 32 (a). Held: </s> 1. Failure to follow the formal requirements of Rule 32 (a) is not of itself an error that can be raised by collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Pp. 425-429. </s> 2. Though petitioner denominated his motion as one brought under 28 U.S.C. 2255, it may be considered as a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; but the narrow function of that Rule is to permit correction of an illegal sentence, not to re-examine errors occurring at the trial or other proceedings prior to the imposition of sentence. P. 430. </s> 282 F.2d 352, affirmed. </s> Curtis R. Reitz, by appointment of the Court, 365 U.S. 841 , argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. </s> Julia P. Cooper argued the cause for the United States. With her on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller, Richard J. Medalie and Beatrice Rosenberg. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In 1954 a jury in a Federal District Court found the petitioner guilty of transporting a kidnapped person in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1201, and [368 U.S. 424, 425] of transporting a stolen automobile in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2312. The petitioner was represented by court-appointed counsel at his trial. When, with counsel, he appeared before the District Judge for sentencing, the petitioner was not asked whether he wished to make a statement in his own behalf. The District Judge, after noting his familiarity with the petitioner's character and history, imposed consecutive prison sentences of twenty years and three years for the two offenses of which the jury had found the petitioner guilty. There was no appeal. 1 </s> The present litigation began in 1959 with the filing of a motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Among various grounds for relief asserted, the motion alleged that the petitioner at the time of sentencing had been "denied the right under Rule 32 (a) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Title 18 U.S.C. to have the opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment." The District Court denied the motion without explicitly discussing the Rule 32 (a) claim. 186 F. Supp. 441. The Court of Appeals affirmed, per curiam, 282 F.2d 352. We granted certiorari "limited to the question of whether petitioner may raise his claim under Federal Criminal Rule 32 (a) in the proceeding which he has now brought." 365 U.S. 841 . </s> Rule 32 (a) in pertinent part provides: "Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to [368 U.S. 424, 426] present any information in mitigation of punishment." The meaning of this Rule was before the Court last Term in Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301 . Although there was no Court opinion in the Green case, eight members of the Court concurred in the view that Rule 32 (a) requires a district judge before imposing sentence to afford every convicted defendant an opportunity personally to speak in his own behalf. There thus remains no doubt as to what the Rule commands. Moreover, the present record makes clear that this petitioner was not given an express opportunity to make a personal statement at the time he was sentenced. This case, therefore, is totally unembarrassed by any such factual controversy as divided the Court in Green. The only issue presented is whether a district court's failure explicitly to afford a defendant an opportunity to make a statement at the time of sentencing furnishes, without more, grounds for a successful collateral attack upon the judgment and sentence. 2 We hold that the failure to follow the formal requirements of Rule 32 (a) is not of itself an error that can be raised by collateral attack, and we accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. </s> Section 2255 of Title 28, U.S.C., provides that a prisoner in custody under sentence of a federal court may file a motion in the "court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence." The statute states four grounds upon which such relief may be claimed: (1) "that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States;" (2) "that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence;" (3) "that the sentence was in excess of the [368 U.S. 424, 427] maximum authorized by law;" and (4) that the sentence "is otherwise subject to collateral attack." 3 </s> The circumstances which led Congress in 1948 to enact this legislation were reviewed in detail by Chief Justice Vinson, writing for the Court in United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 . It is unnecessary to review again here this legislative history, with which Chief Justice Vinson, as Chairman of the Judicial Conference of the United States, was particularly familiar. Suffice it to say that it conclusively appears from the historic context in which 2255 was enacted that the legislation was intended simply to provide in the sentencing court a remedy exactly commensurate with that which had previously been available by habeas corpus in the court of the district where the prisoner was confined. 4 See Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 421 (concurring opinion). </s> "[A] review of the history of Section 2255 shows that it was passed at the instance of the Judicial Conference to meet practical difficulties that had arisen in administering the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts. Nowhere in the history of Section 2255 do we find any purpose to impinge upon prisoners' rights of collateral attack upon their convictions. On the contrary, the sole purpose was to minimize the difficulties encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the same rights in [368 U.S. 424, 428] another and more convenient forum." United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S., at 219 . (Emphasis added.) 5 </s> The failure of a trial court to ask a defendant represented by an attorney whether he has anything to say before sentence is imposed is not of itself an error of the character or magnitude cognizable under a writ of habeas corpus. It is an error which is neither jurisdictional nor constitutional. It is not a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice, nor an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure. It does not present "exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent." Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27 . See Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 ; Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 ; Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 . </s> In Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 , the Court held that the remedy of habeas corpus was unavailable in circumstances far more compelling than are presented here. There the petitioners at their criminal trial had been denied an opportunity to present a defense which subsequent decisions of this Court had held should clearly have been available to them. What was said in that case is apposite here: </s> "We are dealing here with a problem which has radiations far beyond the present cases. The courts which tried the defendants had jurisdiction over their persons and over the offense. They committed an error of law . . . . That error did not go to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Congress, moreover, [368 U.S. 424, 429] has provided a regular, orderly method for correction of all such errors by granting an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals and by vesting us with certiorari jurisdiction. It is not uncommon after a trial is ended and the time for appeal has passed to discover that a shift in the law or the impact of a new decision has given increased relevance to a point made at the trial but not pursued on appeal. . . . If in such circumstances, habeas corpus could be used to correct the error, the writ would become a delayed motion for a new trial, renewed from time to time as the legal climate changed. Error which was not deemed sufficiently adequate to warrant an appeal would acquire new implications. . . . Wise judicial administration of the federal courts counsels against such course, at least where the error does not trench on any constitutional rights of defendants nor involve the jurisdiction of the trial court." 332 U.S., at 181 -182. </s> It is to be noted that we are not dealing here with a case where the defendant was affirmatively denied an opportunity to speak during the hearing at which his sentence was imposed. Nor is it suggested that in imposing the sentence the District Judge was either misinformed or uninformed as to any relevant circumstances. Indeed, there is no claim that the defendant would have had anything at all to say if he had been formally invited to speak. Whether 2255 relief would be available if a violation of Rule 32 (a) occurred in the context of other aggravating circumstances is a question we therefore do not consider. We decide only that such collateral relief is not available when all that is shown is a failure to comply with the formal requirements of the Rule. 6 </s> [368 U.S. 424, 430] </s> It is suggested that although the petitioner denominated his motion as one brought under 28 U.S.C. 2255, we may consider it as a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 7 This is correct. Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 418 , 422. But, as the Rule's language and history make clear, the narrow function of Rule 35 is to permit correction at any time of an illegal sentence, not to re-examine errors occurring at the trial or other proceedings prior to the imposition of sentence. 8 The sentence in this case was not illegal. The punishment meted out was not in excess of that prescribed by the relevant statutes, multiple terms were not imposed for the same offense, nor were the terms of the sentence itself legally or constitutionally invalid in any other respect. 9 </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 In an earlier motion filed under 28 U.S.C. 2255 the petitioner claimed that he had been prevented by government agents from appealing the judgment of conviction. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals set aside the District Court's order and directed that a hearing be had on the motion. 256 F.2d 957. After a hearing before a different district judge, the motion was again denied. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 268 F.2d 203. </s> [Footnote 2 The majority of the Court in the Green case did not decide whether the issue of a Rule 32 (a) violation could be raised on collateral attack, or whether such a violation "would constitute an error per se rendering the sentence illegal." 365 U.S., at 303 . </s> [Footnote 3 "A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence." 28 U.S.C. 2255. </s> [Footnote 4 See Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F. R. D. 171. </s> [Footnote 5 The Courts of Appeals, at least since the Hayman decision, appear to have consistently understood the substantive scope of 2255 to be the same as that of habeas corpus. See, e. g., Larson v. United States, 275 F.2d 673 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Black v. United States, 269 F.2d 38 (C. A. 9th Cir.); Taylor v. United States, 229 F.2d 826, 832 (C. A. 8th Cir.); Kreuter v. United States, 201 F.2d 33, 35 (C. A. 10th Cir.). </s> [Footnote 6 See Van Hook v. United States, 365 U.S. 609 , for the relief afforded on direct appeal in a case where the sentencing judge disregarded the mandate of Rule 32 (a). </s> [Footnote 7 Rule 35 provides in pertinent part: "The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time." </s> [Footnote 8 As has been pointed out, Rule 35 "was a codification of existing law and was intended to remove any doubt created by the decision in United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 67 , as to the jurisdiction of a District Court to correct an illegal sentence after the expiration of the term at which it was entered." Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S., at 422 (concurring opinion). </s> [Footnote 9 Compare Heflin v. United States, supra. In that case Rule 35 was invoked in a situation where we unanimously recognized that the only issue was whether "the sentence imposed was illegal on its face." 358 U.S., at 418 (Court opinion), 422 (concurring opinion). Heflin involved the imposition of separate consecutive sentences for a single offense. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN concur, dissenting. </s> The petitioner James Hill brought this proceeding to vacate two sentences under which he is imprisoned in a federal penitentiary, alleging that the sentences are [368 U.S. 424, 431] illegal because the trial judge who imposed them had not given him the opportunity required by Rule 32 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure "to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment." Conceding that the sentences thus challenged were imposed without according petitioner his right to speak, the Court nonetheless denies relief under Rule 35's provision for the correction of "illegal" sentences on the ground that the sentences though imposed in flat violation of Rule 32 (a), were not "illegal" within the special meaning which the majority now ascribes to that word for the purposes of Rule 35. 1 The basic explanation offered for this drastic contraction of the ordinary meaning of the word "illegal" is this single statement in the Court's opinion: </s> "The punishment meted out was not in excess of that prescribed by the relevant statutes, multiple terms were not imposed for the same offense, nor were the terms of the sentence itself legally or constitutionally invalid in any other respect." </s> That statement to me amounts to something less than an entirely satisfactory justification for such a begrudging interpretation of Rule 35. </s> The Court's holding certainly finds no support in the language of Rule 35. That Rule, although painstakingly drawn by lawyers and approved both by Judges and by the Congress, simply provides for the correction of an "illegal sentence" without regard to the reasons why that sentence is illegal and contains not a single word to support [368 U.S. 424, 432] the Court's conclusion that only a sentence illegal by reason of the punishment it imposes is "illegal" within the meaning of the Rule. I would have thought that a sentence imposed in an illegal manner - whether the amount or form of the punishment meted out constitutes an additional violation of law or not - would be recognized as an "illegal sentence" under any normal reading of the English language. 2 And precisely this sort of common-sense understanding of the language of Rule 35 has prevailed generally among the lower federal courts that deal with questions of the proper interpretation and application of these Rules as an everyday matter. Those courts have expressed their belief that, even where the punishment imposed upon a defendant is entirely within the limits prescribed for the crime of which he was convicted, a sentence imposed in a prohibited manner - as, for example, a sentence imposed upon an absent defendant in violation of the command of Rule 43 that a defendant be present at sentencing 3 - is an "illegal sentence" subject to correction under Rule 35. 4 </s> [368 U.S. 424, 433] </s> The Court's contrary decision today, however, was perhaps foreshadowed last Term by the narrow scope given to Rule 32 (a) when the issue of the meaning of that Rule came before us for the first time in Green v. United States. 5 That case, like this one, involved an attempt to vacate a sentence as "illegal" under Rule 35 on the ground that the trial judge had failed to accord the defendant his right to make a statement before sentencing. The record there showed merely that the trial judge, in the presence of both the defendant and his counsel, had asked generally, "Did you want to say something?" and that, in response to this question, the attorney rather than the defendant had spoken. Recognizing that the right accorded by Rule 32 (a) is a personal right which must be extended to the defendant himself, the Court nonetheless denied relief, largely upon the view expressed by four members of the Court that: "A record, certainly this record, unlike a play, is unaccompanied with stage directions which may tell the significant cast of the eye or the nod of the head. It may well be that the defendant himself was recognized and sufficiently apprised of his right to speak and chose to exercise this right through his counsel." 6 This conclusion was reached in spite of the fact that the Government's brief before this Court expressly conceded that Green had not been personally afforded an opportunity to speak. </s> But even in Green, not one member of the Court went so far as even to intimate - unless such an intimation was implicit in the concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE STEWART 7 - that a sentence undeniably imposed in disregard [368 U.S. 424, 434] of the legal right of a defendant to speak for himself would not be an "illegal sentence." Four members of the Court - THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and I - expressly stated the view that such a sentence could be corrected under Rule 35's provision for the correction of "illegal" sentences. And four other members of the Court, in an opinion written by MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, emphasized the importance of the right of the defendant to speak for himself, saying: "The most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself." 8 Although it is true that these latter four members of the Court joined in refusing to set aside the sentence in that case, their stated ground was: "The defendant has failed to meet his burden of showing that he was not accorded the personal right which Rule 32 (a) guarantees, and we therefore find that his sentence was not illegal." 9 In the light of all these statements, it is not surprising that the Courts of Appeals for both the First and the Fifth Circuits have regarded the combined opinions in Green as requiring the correction of sentences as illegal when the defendant is able "to meet his burden of showing that he was not accorded the personal right which Rule 32 (a) guarantees." 10 </s> I think that a due observance of the requirements of Rule 32 (a), resting as they do upon the anciently recognized right of a defendant to speak to the court before sentence is imposed, is important to the proper administration of justice in the federal courts. And it seems to me that the Court is mistaken in thinking that the importance of that right is not reflected in this very case, for I cannot agree with the Court's conclusion that "there is [368 U.S. 424, 435] no claim that the defendant would have had anything at all to say if he had been formally invited to speak." According to the petitioner's brief, the denial of his right to speak was particularly injurious to him here because he had several previous convictions which presumably were known to the sentencing judge. 11 In this connection, he says: "Petitioner has been and is presently seeking collateral relief from those judgments and, indeed, has already had one set aside. This mitigating evidence, if known to the sentencing court, might have a profound impact upon the sentence imposed." </s> More importantly, however, whether the right to speak before sentence would have been of value to petitioner in this particular case or not, the right is one recognized by a rule which has the force of law and a sentence imposed in violation of law is plainly "illegal." If the Court is unhappy with the wording of Rule 35 - a wording adopted by the Court itself and submitted to Congress for approval as required by law - whatever change is necessary to bring the Rule into conformity with the Court's present preferences should be incorporated into the explicit language of the Rule and submitted to Congress for its approval. I would reverse this case and remand it to allow the District Court to resentence petitioner after granting him his right to speak under Rule 32 (a). </s> [Footnote 1 Petitioner's attack upon his sentences was originally brought as a motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Since I agree with the Court that a motion under 2255 must, where appropriate, also be considered as a motion under Rule 35, and because I think petitioner is plainly entitled to relief under that Rule, I find it unnecessary to consider the question discussed by the Court as to whether petitioner is also entitled to relief under 2255. </s> [Footnote 2 This does not of course mean that Rule 35 permits attack upon a sentence based upon mere trial errors. Rule 35 applies to any "illegal sentence," not to any illegal conviction, and thus by its terms the Rule protects only those rights which a defendant retains even if the judgment of guilt against him is proper. See Cook v. United States, 171 F.2d 567, 570-571. </s> [Footnote 3 Rule 43 provides: "The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by these rules. . . ." </s> [Footnote 4 See Cook v. United States, 171 F.2d 567; Crowe v. United States, 200 F.2d 526. Cf. Williamson v. United States, 265 F.2d 236, 239. Similarly, it has also been held that Rule 35's corrective force extends to a sentence illegal by reason of the fact that the defendant upon whom it was imposed was insane at the time of sentencing. Byrd v. Pescor, 163 F.2d 775. See also Duggins v. United States, 240 F.2d 479, 483-484. </s> [Footnote 5 365 U.S. 301 . </s> [Footnote 6 Id., at 304-305. </s> [Footnote 7 But cf. MR. JUSTICE STEWART'S concurring opinion in Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 420 , in which the four other members of the present majority concurred. </s> [Footnote 8 365 U.S., at 304 . </s> [Footnote 9 Id., at 305. </s> [Footnote 10 Domenica v. United States, 292 F.2d 483; Jenkins v. United States, 293 F.2d 96. </s> [Footnote 11 Rule 32 (c) provides for a presentence investigation and report to the trial judge for use in imposing sentence which "shall contain any prior criminal record of the defendant . . . ." Since this is not the sort of information which normally finds its way into the record at the trial itself, a defendant's only chance to explain or rebut such evidence will often be by exercise of his right under 32 (a). </s> [368 U.S. 424, 436]

United States Supreme Court KOIS v. WISCONSIN(1972) No. 71-5625 Argued: Decided: June 26, 1972 </s> Petitioner was convicted under an obscenity statute for publishing in his underground newspaper pictures of nudes and a sex poem. The State Supreme Court upheld the conviction as not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. Held: In the context in which they appeared, the photographs were rationally related to a news article, in conjunction with which they appeared, and were entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection. In view of the poem's content and placement with other poems inside the newspaper, its dominant theme cannot be said to appeal to prurient interest. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 . </s> Certiorari granted; 51 Wis. 2d 668, 188 N. W. 2d 467, reversed. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> Petitioner was convicted in the state trial court of violating a Wisconsin statute prohibiting the dissemination of "lewd, obscene or indecent written matter, picture, sound recording, or film." Wis. Stat. 944.21 (1) (a) (1969). He was sentenced to consecutive one-year terms in the Green Bay Reformatory and fined $1,000 on each of two counts. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld his conviction against the contention that he had been deprived of freedom of the press in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 51 Wis. 2d 668, 188 N. W. 2d 467. </s> Petitioner was the publisher of an underground newspaper called Kaleidoscope. In an issue published in May 1968, that newspaper carried a story entitled "The One Hundred Thousand Dollar Photos" on an interior page. The story itself was an account of the arrest of one of Kaleidoscope's photographers on a charge of possession [408 U.S. 229, 230] of obscene material. Two relatively small pictures, showing a nude man and nude woman embracing in a sitting position, accompanied the article and were described in the article as "similar" to those seized from the photographer. The article said that the photographer, while waiting in the district attorney's office, had heard that bail might be set at $100,000. The article went on to say that bail had in fact been set originally at $100, then raised to $250, and that later the photographer had been released on his own recognizance. The article purported to detail police tactics that were described as an effort to "harass" Kaleidoscope and its staff. </s> Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), held that obscenity was not protected under the First or Fourteenth Amendments. Material may be considered obscene when "to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest." 354 U.S., at 489 . In enunciating this test, the Court in Roth quoted from Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 -102: </s> "The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment. The exigencies of the colonial period and the efforts to secure freedom from oppressive administration developed a broadened conception of these liberties as adequate to supply the public need for information and education with respect to the significant issues of the times. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) </s> We do not think it can fairly be said, either considering the article as it appears or the record before the state [408 U.S. 229, 231] court, that the article was a mere vehicle for the publication of the pictures. A quotation from Voltaire in the flyleaf of a book will not constitutionally redeem an otherwise obscene publication, but if these pictures were indeed similar to the one seized - and we do not understand the State to contend differently - they are relevant to the theme of the article. We find it unnecessary to consider whether the State could constitutionally prohibit the dissemination of the pictures by themselves, because in the context in which they appeared in the newspaper they were rationally related to an article that itself was clearly entitled to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thornhill v. Alabama, supra. The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. The conviction on count one must therefore be reversed. </s> In its August 1968 issue, Kaleidoscope published a two-page spread consisting of 11 poems, one of which was entitled "Sex Poem." The second count of petitioner's conviction was for the dissemination of the newspaper containing this poem. The poem is an undisguisedly frank, play-by-play account of the author's recollection of sexual intercourse. But, as the Roth Court emphasized, "sex and obscenity are not synonymous. . . . The portrayal of sex, e. g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press." 354 U.S., at 487 . A reviewing court must, of necessity, look at the context of the material, as well as its content. </s> In this case, considering the poem's content and its placement amid a selection of poems in the interior of a newspaper, we believe that it bears some of the earmarks of an attempt at serious art. While such earmarks are not inevitably a guarantee against a finding of obscenity, and while in this case many would conclude [408 U.S. 229, 232] that the author's reach exceeded his grasp, this element must be considered in assessing whether or not the "dominant" theme of the material appeals to prurient interest. While "contemporary community standards," Roth v. United States, 354 U.S., at 489 , must leave room for some latitude of judgment, and while there is an undeniably subjective element in the test as a whole, the "dominance" of the theme is a question of constitutional fact. Giving due weight and respect to the conclusions of the trial court and to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, we do not believe that it can be said that the dominant theme of this poem appeals to prurient interest. The judgment on the second count, therefore, must also be reversed. </s> Reversed. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART concurs in the judgment. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring in the judgment. </s> I concur in the judgment because neither logic, history, nor the plain meaning of the English language will support the obscenity exception this Court has engrafted onto the First Amendment. </s> This case, moreover, is further testimony to the morass in which this Court has placed itself in the area of obscenity. Men are sent to prison under definitions which they cannot understand, and on which lower courts and members of this Court cannot agree. Here, the Court is forced to examine the thematic content of the two newspapers for the publication of which petitioner was prosecuted in order to hold that they are constitutionally protected. Highly subjective inquiries such as this do not lend themselves to a workable or predictable rule of law, nor should they be the basis of fines or imprisonment. </s> In this case, the vague umbrella of obscenity laws was used in an attempt to run a radical newspaper out of [408 U.S. 229, 233] business and to impose a two-year sentence and a $2,000 fine upon its publisher. If obscenity laws continue in this uneven and uncertain enforcement, then the vehicle has been found for the suppression of any unpopular tract. The guarantee of free expression will thus be diluted and in its stead public discourse will only embrace that which has the approval of five members of this Court. </s> The prospect is not imaginary now that the Bill of Rights, applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, is coming to be a "watered down" version, meaning not what it says but only what a majority of this Court thinks fit and proper. </s> [408 U.S. 229, 234]

United States Supreme Court PALMER OIL CORP. v. AMERADA CORP.(1952) No. 301 Argued: April 25, 1952Decided: May 12, 1952 </s> Appellants contend that Okla. Stat., 1941 (Cum. Supp. 1949), Tit. 52, 286.1-286.17, providing for unitized management of common sources of supply of oil and gas in Oklahoma, and an order of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission thereunder, violated Art. I, 10 of the Federal Constitution and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Held: In the light of Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 , and other decisions of this Court cited in the opinion, appellants have failed to raise any substantial federal question, and the appeals are dismissed. Pp. 391-392. </s> 204 Okla. 543, 231 P.2d 997, appeals dismissed. </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 302, Farwell et al. v. Amerada Petroleum Corp. et al., also on appeal from the same court. </s> Mark H. Adams argued the cause for appellants in No. 301. With him on the brief were Charles E. Jones and Coleman Hayes. </s> Reford Bond, Jr. argued the cause and filed a brief for appellants in No. 302. </s> R. M. Williams argued the cause for appellees. On the brief were Harry D. Page and Booth Kellough for the Amerada Petroleum Corp., W. H. Brown for the Anderson-Prichard Oil Corp., Gentry Lee and R. O. Mason for the Cities Service Oil Co., Villard Martin for the Foster Petroleum Corp., Archie D. Gray and James B. Diggs, Jr. for the Gulf Oil Corp., Earl A. Brown and Robert W. Richards for the Magnolia Petroleum Co., Rayburn L. Foster, Harry D. Turner and Mr. Williams for the Phillips Petroleum Co., V. P. Crowe for the Stephens Petroleum [343 U.S. 390, 391] Co. et al., M. Darwin Kirk for the Sunray Oil Corp. and Ferrill H. Rogers for the Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, appellees. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> These two appeals challenge the constitutionality of Okla. Stat., 1941 (Cum. Supp. 1949), Tit. 52, 286.1-286.17, providing for unitized management of common sources of supply of oil and gas in Oklahoma. This statute was repealed by the Oklahoma Legislature on May 26, 1951, Okla. Laws 1951, c. 3a, 16, p. 142, and we ordered the causes continued in order to determine the effect of this repeal on the matters raised in these appeals. 342 U.S. 35 (1951). After being advised by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma that this repeal had no effect on these causes, we noted probable jurisdiction and heard argument. </s> Appellants contend that this statute and an order issued thereunder by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission impair their contractual rights in violation of U.S. Const., Art. I, 10, and amount to a denial of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, appellants argue that the statute is an unreasonable exercise of the State's police power and an unreasonable delegation of legislative and judicial power to private groups. In addition, appellants maintain that the statute is too vague and indefinite to furnish the Commission with any reasonable guide for the issuance of orders approving unitization plans, and that the evidence does not support the Commission's findings of fact. </s> In the light of our previous decisions, appellants have failed to raise any substantial federal questions and the appeals are therefore dismissed. Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., [343 U.S. 390, 392] 311 U.S. 570 (1941); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 , as amended, 311 U.S. 614, 615 (1940); Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 305 U.S. 376 (1939); Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 435 , 436, 437 (1934); Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U.S. 210 (1932). </s> Dismissed. </s> [343 U.S. 390, 393]

United States Supreme Court LURK v. UNITED STATES(1961) No. 669 Argued: Decided: May 29, 1961 </s> Petitioner applied to a Federal Court of Appeals for leave to appeal in forma pauperis from his robbery conviction, on the ground, inter alia, that it was unconstitutional because his trial in a Federal District Court was presided over by a retired judge of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, who had retired before 1958. Leave was denied by the Court of Appeals without opinion. Held: The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded on the authority of Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 . </s> Reversed and remanded. </s> Eugene Gressman argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. </s> Oscar H. Davis argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller, Beatrice Rosenberg and Philip R. Monahan. </s> By special leave of Court, Francis M. Shea argued the cause for the Judges of the Court of Claims, as amici curiae. With him on the brief was Richard T. Conway. </s> Bennett Boskey filed a brief for Mark Coppedge, Jr., as amicus curiae, urging reversal. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to that court. Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 . </s> MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, whom MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE STEWART join, dissenting. </s> In my view Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 , on the basis of which the case is sent back to the Court of [366 U.S. 712, 713] Appeals, does not fit the facts and circumstances of this case. </s> In support of his contention that he was wrongfully denied the right to appeal in forma pauperis, petitioner presents for our consideration two grounds for reversal of his conviction of robbery in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The first contention, concerning the admission at his trial of allegedly prejudicial evidence, is so lacking in merit as to be plainly frivolous. It would not justify an appeal in forma pauperis. But petitioner also raises a jurisdictional question, viz., whether he could constitutionally be tried by a court presided over by a retired judge of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. This question, therefore, would have warranted review by the Court of Appeals. </s> Solution of this problem will call into consideration a number of subsidiary questions. What are the characteristics of an Article III court? Is the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals an Article III court? If so, when did it become such a court? Assuming arguendo that the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has been an Article III court only since 1958 (when Congress enacted legislation conferring that status), what is the bearing of this fact on the status of a judge who retired from the court prior to that time? </s> These are not questions on which, with all due respect, a lower court can be of effective assistance to this Court. They do not involve the evaluation of evidence or the application of rules of local law or special familiarity and experience with the materials and the underlying considerations on which judgment must be based. On the contrary, the constitutional history and the cases upon which the decision ultimately must turn are the special concern of this Court. Indeed, the questions posed would be entirely suitable for certification to this Court by a lower [366 U.S. 712, 714] appellate court. See 28 U.S.C. 1254. Cf. United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55 . Furthermore, the administration of justice in the federal courts demands a speedy disposition of this dispute. Until it is settled, assignment of retired judges to help clear dockets in federal courts under a litigious cloud will be hampered by uncertainty. </s> Nothing could be more obvious than that the Court of Appeals, no matter how it may decide the question now put in its keeping, will have it only temporarily. The inevitable final destination of the case is this Court. Decision here should not be delayed by wastefully time-consuming remand to the Court of Appeals of a question that is already before us. </s> [366 U.S. 712, 715]

United States Supreme Court RAILWAY LABOR ASSN. v. U.S.(1964) No. 130 Argued: Decided: December 7, 1964 </s> District Court's judgment dismissing appellant railway employees' complaint to set aside in part Interstate Commerce Commission railroad merger orders for failure to protect employees' interests under certain provisions of a collective bargaining agreement vacated insofar as that judgment relates to those provisions, with instructions to remand case to ICC for clarification of orders. </s> 226 F. Supp. 521, vacated and remanded. </s> Clarence M. Mulholland, Edward J. Hickey, Jr., James L. Highsaw, Jr., William G. Mahoney and William H. King for appellants. </s> Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Orrick, Philip B. Heymann, Robert B. Hummel and Elliott Moyer for the United States; Robert W. Ginnane and Leonard S. Goodman for Interstate Commerce Commission; and Hugh B. Cox, W. Graham Claytor, Jr., and Richard S. Arnold for Southern Railway Co. et al., appellees. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> This appeal is from a judgment of a three-judge District Court, 226 F. Supp. 521, dismissing appellants' complaint to set aside orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 317 I. C. C. 557, 729, relating to the Southern Railway Company's acquisition of control through stock ownership of the Central of Georgia Railway Company. Appellants, representing railway employees, object that under the Commission's orders, the employees are not protected as provided by 4, 5, [379 U.S. 199, 200] and 9 of the Washington Job Protection Agreement. We agree with the suggestion of the Solicitor General that this case should be remanded to the Interstate Commerce Commission for clarification of its orders insofar as they relate to the agreement. For this reason, the motion of the Interstate Commerce Commission to affirm the judgment of the District Court is denied. The motion of intervenor-appellees Southern Railway Company and Central of Georgia Railway Company to defer consideration of the jurisdictional statement is denied. Appellants' motion to limit the appeal to questions related to 4, 5, and 9 of the Washington Job Protection Agreement is granted. The judgment of the District Court is vacated insofar as it relates to 4, 5, and 9 of the Washington Agreement, and this case is remanded to that court with instructions to remand it to the Interstate Commerce Commission with instructions to amend its reports and orders as necessary to deal with appellants' request that 4, 5, and 9 be included as protective conditions, specifically indicating why each of these provisions is either omitted or included. See United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R. Co., 294 U.S. 499, 511 . </s> Vacated and remanded. </s> [379 U.S. 199, 201]

United States Supreme Court FCC v. PACIFICA FOUNDATION(1978) No. 77-528 Argued: Decided: July 3, 1978 </s> A radio station of respondent Pacifica Foundation (hereinafter respondent) made an afternoon broadcast of a satiric monologue, entitled "Filthy Words," which listed and repeated a variety of colloquial uses of "words you couldn't say on the public airwaves." A father who heard the broadcast while driving with his young son complained to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which, after forwarding the complaint for comment to and receiving a response from respondent, issued a declaratory order granting the complaint. While not imposing formal sanctions, the FCC stated that the order would be "associated with the station's license file, and in the event subsequent complaints are received, the Commission will then decide whether it should utilize any of the available sanctions it has been granted by Congress." In its memorandum opinion, the FCC stated that it intended to "clarify the standards which will be utilized in considering" the growing number of complaints about indecent radio broadcasts, and it advanced several reasons for treating that type of speech differently from other forms of expression. The FCC found a power to regulate indecent broadcasting, inter alia, in 18 U.S.C. 1464 (1976 ed.), which forbids the use of "any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communications." The FCC characterized the language of the monologue as "patently offensive," though not necessarily obscene, and expressed the opinion that it should be regulated by principles analogous to the law of nuisance where the "law generally speaks to channeling behavior rather than actually prohibiting it." The FCC found that certain words in the monologue depicted sexual and excretory activities in a particularly offensive manner, noted that they were broadcast in the early afternoon "when children are undoubtedly in the audience," and concluded that the language as broadcast was indecent and prohibited by 1464. A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals reversed, one judge concluding that the FCC's action was invalid either on the ground that the order constituted censorship, which was expressly forbidden by 326 of the Communications Act of 1934, or on the ground that the FCC's opinion was the functional equivalent of [438 U.S. 726, 727] a rule, and as such was "overbroad." Another judge, who felt that 326's censorship provision did not apply to broadcasts forbidden by 1464, concluded that 1464, construed narrowly as it has to be, covers only language that is obscene or otherwise unprotected by the First Amendment. The third judge, dissenting, concluded that the FCC had correctly condemned the daytime broadcast as indecent. Respondent contends that the broadcast was not indecent within the meaning of the statute because of the absence of prurient appeal. Held: The judgment is reversed. Pp. 734-741; 748-750; 761-762. </s> 181 U.S. App. D.C. 132, 556 F.2d 9, reversed. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I-III and IV-C, finding: </s> 1. The FCC's order was an adjudication under 5 U.S.C. 554 (e) (1976 ed.), the character of which was not changed by the general statements in the memorandum opinion; nor did the FCC's action constitute rulemaking or the promulgation of regulations. Hence, the Court's review must focus on the FCC's determination that the monologue was indecent as broadcast. Pp. 734-735. </s> 2. Section 326 does not limit the FCC's authority to sanction licensees who engage in obscene, indecent, or profane broadcasting. Though the censorship ban precludes editing proposed broadcasts in advance, the ban does not deny the FCC the power to review the content of completed broadcasts. Pp. 735-738. </s> 3. The FCC was warranted in concluding that indecent language within the meaning of 1464 was used in the challenged broadcast. The words "obscene, indecent, or profane" are in the disjunctive, implying that each has a separate meaning. Though prurient appeal is an element of "obscene," it is not an element of "indecent," which merely refers to noncomformance with accepted standards of morality. Contrary to respondent's argument, this Court in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 , has not foreclosed a reading of 1464 that authorizes a proscription of "indecent" language that is not obscene, for the statute involved in that case, unlike 1464, focused upon the prurient, and dealt primarily with printed matter in sealed envelopes mailed from one individual to another, whereas 1464 deals with the content of public broadcasts. Pp. 738-741. </s> 4. Of all forms of communication, broadcasting has the most limited First Amendment protection. Among the reasons for specially treating indecent broadcasting is the uniquely pervasive presence that medium of expression occupies in the lives of our people. Broadcasts extend into the privacy of the home and it is impossible completely to avoid [438 U.S. 726, 728] those that are patently offensive. Broadcasting, moreover, is uniquely accessible to children. Pp. 748-750. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concluded in Parts IV-A and IV-B: </s> 1. The FCC's authority to proscribe this particular broadcast is not invalidated by the possibility that its construction of the statute may deter certain hypothetically protected broadcasts containing patently offensive references to sexual and excretory activities. Cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 . Pp. 742-743. </s> 2. The First Amendment does not prohibit all governmental regulation that depends on the content of speech. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 . The content of respondent's broadcast, which was "vulgar," "offensive," and "shocking," is not entitled to absolute constitutional protection in all contexts; it is therefore necessary to evaluate the FCC's action in light of the context of that broadcast. Pp. 744-748. </s> MR. JUSTICE POWELL, joined by MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concluded that the FCC's holding does not violate the First Amendment, though, being of the view that Members of this Court are not free generally to decide on the basis of its content which speech protected by the First Amendment is most valuable and therefore deserving of First Amendment protection, and which is less "valuable" and hence less deserving of protection, he is unable to join Part IV-B (or IV-A) of the opinion. Pp. 761-762. </s> STEVENS, J., announced the Court's judgment and delivered an opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I-III and IV-C, in which BURGER, C. J., and REHNQUIST, J., joined, and in all but Parts IV-A and IV-B of which BLACKMUN and POWELL, JJ., joined, and an opinion as to Parts IV-A and IV-B, in which BURGER, C. J., and REHNQUIST, J., joined. POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 755. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 762. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 777. </s> Joseph A. Marino argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Robert R. Bruce and Daniel M. Armstrong. </s> Harry M. Plotkin argued the cause for respondent Pacifica Foundation. With him on the brief were David Tillotson and Harry F. Cole. Louis F. Claiborne argued the cause for [438 U.S. 726, 729] the United States, a respondent under this Court's Rule 21 (4). With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Civiletti, and Jerome M. Feit. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Anthony H. Atlas for Morality in Media, Inc.; and by George E. Reed and Patrick F. Geary for the United States Catholic Conference. </s> Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by J. Roger Wollenberg, Timothy B. Dyk, James A. McKenna, Jr., Carl R. Ramey, Erwin G. Krasnow, Floyd Abrams, J. Laurent Scharff, Corydon B. Dunham, and Howard Monderer for the American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., et al.; by Henry R. Kaufman, Joel M. Gora, Charles Sims, and Bruce J. Ennis for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; by Irwin Karp for the Authors League of America, Inc.; by James Bouras, Barbara Scott, and Fritz E. Attaway for the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.; and by Paul P. Selvin for the Writers Guild of America, West Inc. </s> Charles M. Firestone filed a brief for the Committee for Open Media as amicus curiae. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court (Parts I, II, III, and IV-C) and an opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST joined (Parts IV-A and IV-B). </s> This case requires that we decide whether the Federal Communications Commission has any power to regulate a radio broadcast that is indecent but not obscene. </s> A satiric humorist named George Carlin recorded a 12-minute monologue entitled "Filthy Words" before a live audience in a California theater. He began by referring to his thoughts about "the words you couldn't say on the public, ah, airwaves, um, the ones you definitely wouldn't say, ever." He proceeded to list those words and repeat them over and over again in a variety of colloquialisms. The transcript of the recording, which is appended to this opinion, indicates frequent laughter from the audience. </s> At about 2 o'clock in the afternoon on Tuesday, October 30, 1973, a New York radio station, owned by respondent Pacifica [438 U.S. 726, 730] Foundation, broadcast the "Filthy Words" monologue. A few weeks later a man, who stated that he had heard the broadcast while driving with his young son, wrote a letter complaining to the Commission. He stated that, although he could perhaps understand the "record's being sold for private use, I certainly cannot understand the broadcast of same over the air that, supposedly, you control." </s> The complaint was forwarded to the station for comment. In its response, Pacifica explained that the monologue had been played during a program about contemporary society's attitude toward language and that, immediately before its broadcast, listeners had been advised that it included "sensitive language which might be regarded as offensive to some." Pacifica characterized George Carlin as "a significant social satirist" who "like Twain and Sahl before him, examines the language of ordinary people. . . . Carlin is not mouthing obscenities, he is merely using words to satirize as harmless and essentially silly our attitudes towards those words." Pacifica stated that it was not aware of any other complaints about the broadcast. </s> On February 21, 1975, the Commission issued a declaratory order granting the complaint and holding that Pacifica "could have been the subject of administrative sanctions." 56 F. C. C. 2d 94, 99. The Commission did not impose formal sanctions, but it did state that the order would be "associated with the station's license file, and in the event that subsequent complaints are received, the Commission will then decide whether it should utilize any of the available sanctions it has been granted by Congress." 1 </s> [438 U.S. 726, 731] </s> In its memorandum opinion the Commission stated that it intended to "clarify the standards which will be utilized in considering" the growing number of complaints about indecent speech on the airwaves. Id., at 94. Advancing several reasons for treating broadcast speech differently from other forms of expression, 2 the Commission found a power to regulate indecent broadcasting in two statutes: 18 U.S.C. 1464 (1976 ed.), which forbids the use of "any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communications," 3 and 47 U.S.C. 303 (g), which requires the Commission to "encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest." 4 </s> The Commission characterized the language used in the Carlin monologue as "patently offensive," though not necessarily obscene, and expressed the opinion that it should be regulated by principles analogous to those found in the law of nuisance where the "law generally speaks to channeling behavior more than actually prohibiting it. . . . [T]he concept [438 U.S. 726, 732] of `indecent' is intimately connected with the exposure of children to language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience." 56 F. C. C. 2d, at 98. 5 </s> Applying these considerations to the language used in the monologue as broadcast by respondent, the Commission concluded that certain words depicted sexual and excretory activities in a patently offensive manner, noted that they "were broadcast at a time when children were undoubtedly in the audience (i. e., in the early afternoon)," and that the prerecorded language, with these offensive words "repeated over and over," was "deliberately broadcast." Id., at 99. In summary, the Commission stated: "We therefore hold that the language as broadcast was indecent and prohibited by 18 U.S.C. [] 1464." 6 Ibid. </s> After the order issued, the Commission was asked to clarify its opinion by ruling that the broadcast of indecent words as part of a live newscast would not be prohibited. The Commission issued another opinion in which it pointed out that [438 U.S. 726, 733] it "never intended to place an absolute prohibition on the broadcast of this type of language, but rather sought to channel it to times of day when children most likely would not be exposed to it." 59 F. C. C. 2d 892 (1976). The Commission noted that its "declaratory order was issued in a specific factual context," and declined to comment on various hypothetical situations presented by the petition. 7 Id., at 893. It relied on its "long standing policy of refusing to issue interpretive rulings or advisory opinions when the critical facts are not explicitly stated or there is a possibility that subsequent events will alter them." Ibid. </s> The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, with each of the three judges on the panel writing separately. 181 U.S. App. D.C. 132, 556 F.2d 9. Judge Tamm concluded that the order represented censorship and was expressly prohibited by 326 of the Communications Act. 8 Alternatively, Judge Tamm read the Commission opinion as the functional equivalent of a rule and concluded that it was "overbroad." 181 U.S. App. D.C., at 141, 556 F.2d, at 18. Chief Judge Bazelon's concurrence rested on the Constitution. He was persuaded that 326's prohibition against censorship is inapplicable to broadcasts forbidden by 1464. However, he concluded that 1464 [438 U.S. 726, 734] must be narrowly construed to cover only language that is obscene or otherwise unprotected by the First Amendment. 181 U.S. App. D.C., at 140-153, 556 F.2d, at 24-30. Judge Leventhal, in dissent, stated that the only issue was whether the Commission could regulate the language "as broadcast." Id., at 154, 556 F.2d, at 31. Emphasizing the interest in protecting children, not only from exposure to indecent language, but also from exposure to the idea that such language has official approval, id., at 160, and n. 18, 556 F.2d, at 37, and n. 18, he concluded that the Commission had correctly condemned the daytime broadcast as indecent. </s> Having granted the Commission's petition for certiorari, 434 U.S. 1008 , we must decide: (1) whether the scope of judicial review encompasses more than the Commission's determination that the monologue was indecent "as broadcast"; (2) whether the Commission's order was a form of censorship forbidden by 326; (3) whether the broadcast was indecent within the meaning of 1464; and (4) whether the order violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. </s> I </s> The general statements in the Commission's memorandum opinion do not change the character of its order. Its action was an adjudication under 5 U.S.C. 554 (e) (1976 ed.); it did not purport to engage in formal rulemaking or in the promulgation of any regulations. The order "was issued in a specific factual context"; questions concerning possible action in other contexts were expressly reserved for the future. The specific holding was carefully confined to the monologue "as broadcast." </s> "This Court . . . reviews judgments, not statements in opinions." Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292, 297 . That admonition has special force when the statements raise constitutional questions, for it is our settled practice to avoid the unnecessary decision of such issues. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568 -569. However appropriate [438 U.S. 726, 735] it may be for an administrative agency to write broadly in an adjudicatory proceeding, federal courts have never been empowered to issue advisory opinions. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 . Accordingly, the focus of our review must be on the Commission's determination that the Carlin monologue was indecent as broadcast. </s> II </s> The relevant statutory questions are whether the Commission's action is forbidden "censorship" within the meaning of 47 U.S.C. 326 and whether speech that concededly is not obscene may be restricted as "indecent" under the authority of 18 U.S.C. 1464 (1976 ed.). The questions are not unrelated, for the two statutory provisions have a common origin. Nevertheless, we analyze them separately. </s> Section 29 of the Radio Act of 1927 provided: </s> "Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the licensing authority the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the licensing authority which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio communications. No person within the jurisdiction of the United States shall utter any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication." 44 Stat. 1172. </s> The prohibition against censorship unequivocally denies the Commission any power to edit proposed broadcasts in advance and to excise material considered inappropriate for the airwaves. The prohibition, however, has never been construed to deny the Commission the power to review the content of completed broadcasts in the performance of its regulatory duties. 9 </s> [438 U.S. 726, 736] </s> During the period between the original enactment of the provision in 1927 and its re-enactment in the Communications Act of 1934, the courts and the Federal Radio Commission held that the section deprived the Commission of the power to subject "broadcasting matter to scrutiny prior to its release," but they concluded that the Commission's "undoubted right" to take note of past program content when considering a licensee's renewal application "is not censorship." 10 </s> [438 U.S. 726, 737] </s> Not only did the Federal Radio Commission so construe the statute prior to 1934; its successor, the Federal Communications Commission, has consistently interpreted the provision in the same way ever since. See Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 701 (1964). And, until this case, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has consistently agreed with this construction. 11 Thus, for example, in his opinion in Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 131 U.S. App. D.C. 146, 403 F.2d 169 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 , Judge Wright forcefully pointed out that the Commission is not prevented from canceling the license of a broadcaster who persists in a course of improper programming. He explained: </s> "This would not be prohibited `censorship,' . . . any more than would the Commission's considering on a license renewal application whether a broadcaster allowed `coarse, vulgar, suggestive, double-meaning' programming; programs containing such material are grounds for denial of a license renewal." 131 U.S. App. D.C., at 150-151, n. 3. 403 F.2d, at 173-174, n. 3. </s> See also Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 123 U.S. App. D.C. 328, 359 F.2d 994 (1966). </s> Entirely apart from the fact that the subsequent review of program content is not the sort of censorship at which the statute was directed, its history makes it perfectly clear that it was not intended to limit the Commission's power to regulate the broadcast of obscene, indecent, or profane language. A single section of the 1927 Act is the source of both [438 U.S. 726, 738] the anticensorship provision and the Commission's authority to impose sanctions for the broadcast of indecent or obscene language. Quite plainly, Congress intended to give meaning to both provisions. Respect for that intent requires that the censorship language be read as inapplicable to the prohibition on broadcasting obscene, indecent, or profane language. </s> There is nothing in the legislative history to contradict this conclusion. The provision was discussed only in generalities when it was first enacted. 12 In 1934, the anticensorship provision and the prohibition against indecent broadcasts were re-enacted in the same section, just as in the 1927 Act. In 1948, when the Criminal Code was revised to include provisions that had previously been located in other Titles of the United States Code, the prohibition against obscene, indecent, and profane broadcasts was removed from the Communications Act and re-enacted as 1464 of Title 18. 62 Stat. 769 and 866. That rearrangement of the Code cannot reasonably be interpreted as having been intended to change the meaning of the anticensorship provision. H. R. Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A106 (1947). Cf. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 162 . </s> We conclude, therefore, that 326 does not limit the Commission's authority to impose sanctions on licensees who engage in obscene, indecent, or profane broadcasting. </s> III </s> The only other statutory question presented by this case is whether the afternoon broadcast of the "Filthy Words" [438 U.S. 726, 739] monologue was indecent within the meaning of 1464. 13 Even that question is narrowly confined by the arguments of the parties. </s> The Commission identified several words that referred to excretory or sexual activities or organs, stated that the repetitive, deliberate use of those words in an afternoon broadcast when children are in the audience was patently offensive, and held that the broadcast was indecent. Pacifica takes issue with the Commission's definition of indecency, but does not dispute the Commission's preliminary determination that each of the components of its definition was present. Specifically, Pacifica does not quarrel with the conclusion that this afternoon broadcast was patently offensive. Pacifica's claim that the broadcast was not indecent within the meaning of the statute rests entirely on the absence of prurient appeal. </s> The plain language of the statute does not support Pacifica's argument. The words "obscene, indecent, or profane" are [438 U.S. 726, 740] written in the disjunctive, implying that each has a separate meaning. Prurient appeal is an element of the obscene, but the normal definition of "indecent" merely refers to nonconformance with accepted standards of morality. 14 </s> Pacifica argues, however, that this Court has construed the term "indecent" in related statutes to mean "obscene," as that term was defined in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 . Pacifica relies most heavily on the construction this Court gave to 18 U.S.C. 1461 in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 . See also United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n. 7 (18 U.S.C. 1462) (dicta). Hamling rejected a vagueness attack on 1461, which forbids the mailing of "obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile" material. In holding that the statute's coverage is limited to obscenity, the Court followed the lead of Mr. Justice Harlan in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 . In that case, Mr. Justice Harlan recognized that 1461 contained a variety of words with many shades of meaning. 15 Nonetheless, he thought that the phrase "obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile," taken as a whole, was clearly limited to the obscene, a reading well grounded in prior judicial constructions: "[T]he statute since its inception has always been taken as aimed at obnoxiously debasing portrayals of sex." 370 U.S., at 483 . In Hamling the Court agreed with Mr. Justice Harlan that 1461 was meant only to regulate obscenity in the mails; by reading into it the limits set by Miller v. California, supra, the Court adopted a construction which assured the statute's constitutionality. [438 U.S. 726, 741] </s> The reasons supporting Hamling's construction of 1461 do not apply to 1464. Although the history of the former revealed a primary concern with the prurient, the Commission has long interpreted 1464 as encompassing more than the obscene. 16 The former statute deals primarily with printed matter enclosed in sealed envelopes mailed from one individual to another; the latter deals with the content of public broadcasts. It is unrealistic to assume that Congress intended to impose precisely the same limitations on the dissemination of patently offensive matter by such different means. 17 </s> Because neither our prior decisions nor the language or history of 1464 supports the conclusion that prurient appeal is an essential component of indecent language, we reject Pacifica's construction of the statute. When that construction is put to one side, there is no basis for disagreeing with the Commission's conclusion that indecent language was used in this broadcast. [438 U.S. 726, 742] </s> IV </s> Pacifica makes two constitutional attacks on the Commission's order. First, it argues that the Commission's construction of the statutory language broadly encompasses so much constitutionally protected speech that reversal is required even if Pacifica's broadcast of the "Filthy Words" monologue is not itself protected by the First Amendment. Second, Pacifica argues that inasmuch as the recording is not obscene, the Constitution forbids any abridgment of the right to broadcast it on the radio. </s> A </s> The first argument fails because our review is limited to the question whether the Commission has the authority to proscribe this particular broadcast. As the Commission itself emphasized, its order was "issued in a specific factual context." 59 F. C. C. 2d, at 893. That approach is appropriate for courts as well as the Commission when regulation of indecency is at stake, for indecency is largely a function of context - it cannot be adequately judged in the abstract. </s> The approach is also consistent with Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 . In that case the Court rejected an argument that the Commission's regulations defining the fairness doctrine were so vague that they would inevitably abridge the broadcasters' freedom of speech. The Court of Appeals had invalidated the regulations because their vagueness might lead to self-censorship of controversial program [438 U.S. 726, 743] content. Radio Television News Directors Assn. v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002, 1016 (CA7 1968). This Court reversed. After noting that the Commission had indicated, as it has in this case, that it would not impose sanctions without warning in cases in which the applicability of the law was unclear, the Court stated: </s> "We need not approve every aspect of the fairness doctrine to decide these cases, and we will not now pass upon the constitutionality of these regulations by envisioning the most extreme applications conceivable, United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 694 (1948), but will deal with those problems if and when they arise." 395 U.S., at 396 . </s> It is true that the Commission's order may lead some broadcasters to censor themselves. At most, however, the Commission's definition of indecency will deter only the broadcasting of patently offensive references to excretory and sexual organs and activities. 18 While some of these references may be protected, they surely lie at the periphery of First Amendment concern. Cf. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 380 -381. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 61 . The danger dismissed so summarily in Red Lion, in contrast, was that broadcasters would respond to the vagueness of the regulations by refusing to present programs dealing with important social and political controversies. Invalidating any rule on the basis of its hypothetical application to situations not before the Court is "strong medicine" to be applied "sparingly and only as a last resort." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 . We decline to administer that medicine to preserve the vigor of patently offensive sexual and excretory speech. [438 U.S. 726, 744] </s> B </s> When the issue is narrowed to the facts of this case, the question is whether the First Amendment denies government any power to restrict the public broadcast of indecent language in any circumstances. 19 For if the government has any such power, this was an appropriate occasion for its exercise. </s> The words of the Carlin monologue are unquestionably "speech" within the meaning of the First Amendment. It is equally clear that the Commission's objections to the broadcast were based in part on its content. The order must therefore fall if, as Pacifica argues, the First Amendment prohibits all governmental regulation that depends on the content of speech. Our past cases demonstrate, however, that no such absolute rule is mandated by the Constitution. </s> The classic exposition of the proposition that both the content and the context of speech are critical elements of First Amendment analysis is Mr. Justice Holmes' statement for the Court in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 : </s> "We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying all that was said in the circular would have been within their constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done. . . . The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words [438 U.S. 726, 745] that may have all the effect of force. . . . The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." </s> Other distinctions based on content have been approved in the years since Schenck. The government may forbid speech calculated to provoke a fight. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 . It may pay heed to the "`commonsense differences' between commercial speech and other varieties." Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, supra, at 381. It may treat libels against private citizens more severely than libels against public officials. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 . Obscenity may be wholly prohibited. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 . And only two Terms ago we refused to hold that a "statutory classification is unconstitutional because it is based on the content of communication protected by the First Amendment." Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., supra, at 52. </s> The question in this case is whether a broadcast of patently offensive words dealing with sex and excretion may be regulated because of its content. 20 Obscene materials have been denied the protection of the First Amendment because their content is so offensive to contemporary moral standards. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 . But the fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection. For it is a central tenet of the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of [438 U.S. 726, 746] ideas. 21 If there were any reason to believe that the Commission's characterization of the Carlin monologue as offensive could be traced to its political content - or even to the fact that it satirized contemporary attitudes about four-letter words 22 - First Amendment protection might be required. But that is simply not this case. These words offend for the same reasons that obscenity offends. 23 Their place in the hierarchy of First Amendment values was aptly sketched by Mr. Justice Murphy when he said: "[S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S., at 572 . </s> Although these words ordinarily lack literary, political, or scientific value, they are not entirely outside the protection of the First Amendment. Some uses of even the most offensive words are unquestionably protected. See, e. g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 . Indeed, we may assume, arguendo, that this monologue would be protected in other contexts. Nonetheless, [438 U.S. 726, 747] the constitutional protection accorded to a communication containing such patently offensive sexual and excretory language need not be the same in every context. 24 It is a characteristic of speech such as this that both its capacity to offend and its "social value," to use Mr. Justice Murphy's term, vary with the circumstances. Words that are commonplace in one setting are shocking in another. To paraphrase Mr. Justice Harlan, one occasion's lyric is another's vulgarity. Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 . 25 </s> In this case it is undisputed that the content of Pacifica's broadcast was "vulgar," "offensive," and "shocking." Because content of that character is not entitled to absolute constitutional protection under all circumstances, we must consider its [438 U.S. 726, 748] context in order to determine whether the Commission's action was constitutionally permissible. </s> C </s> We have long recognized that each medium of expression presents special First Amendment problems. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 -503. And of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment protection. Thus, although other speakers cannot be licensed except under laws that carefully define and narrow official discretion, a broadcaster may be deprived of his license and his forum if the Commission decides that such an action would serve "the public interest, convenience, and necessity." 26 Similarly, although the First Amendment protects newspaper publishers from being required to print the replies of those whom they criticize, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 , it affords no such protection to broadcasters; on the contrary, they must give free time to the victims of their criticism. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 . </s> The reasons for these distinctions are complex, but two have relevance to the present case. First, the broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans. Patently offensive, indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder. Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 . Because the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer from unexpected program content. To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he [438 U.S. 726, 749] hears indecent language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow. One may hang up on an indecent phone call, but that option does not give the caller a constitutional immunity or avoid a harm that has already taken place. 27 </s> Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read. Although Cohen's written message might have been incomprehensible to a first grader, Pacifica's broadcast could have enlarged a child's vocabulary in an instant. Other forms of offensive expression may be withheld from the young without restricting the expression at its source. Bookstores and motion picture theaters, for example, may be prohibited from making indecent material available to children. We held in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 , that the government's interest in the "well-being of its youth" and in supporting "parents' claim to authority in their own household" justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression. [438 U.S. 726, 750] Id., at 640 and 639. 28 The case with which children may obtain access to broadcast material, coupled with the concerns recognized in Ginsberg, amply justify special treatment of indecent broadcasting. </s> It is appropriate, in conclusion, to emphasize the narrowness of our holding. This case does not involve a two-way radio conversation between a cab driver and a dispatcher, or a telecast of an Elizabethan comedy. We have not decided that an occasional expletive in either setting would justify any sanction or, indeed, that this broadcast would justify a criminal prosecution. The Commission's decision rested entirely on a nuisance rationale under which context is all-important. The concept requires consideration of a host of variables. The time of day was emphasized by the Commission. The content of the program in which the language is used will also affect the composition of the audience, 29 and differences between radio, television, and perhaps closed-circuit transmissions, may also be relevant. As Mr. Justice Sutherland wrote, a "nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, - like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 . We simply hold that when the Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise [438 U.S. 726, 751] of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT </s> The following is a verbatim transcript of "Filthy Words" prepared by the Federal Communications Commission. </s> Aruba-du, ruba-tu, ruba-tu. I was thinking about the curse words and the swear words, the cuss words and the words that you can't say, that you're not supposed to say all the time, [']cause words or people into words want to hear your words. Some guys like to record your words and sell them back to you if they can, (laughter) listen in on the telephone, write down what words you say. A guy who used to be in Washington knew that his phone was tapped, used to answer, Fuck Hoover, yes, go ahead. (laughter) Okay, I was thinking one night about the words you couldn't say on the public, ah, airwaves, um, the ones you definitely wouldn't say, ever, [']cause I heard a lady say bitch one night on television, and it was cool like she was talking about, you know, ah, well, the bitch is the first one to notice that in the litter Johnie right (murmur) Right. And, uh, bastard you can say, and hell and damn so I have to figure out which ones you couldn't and ever and it came down to seven but the list is open to amendment, and in fact, has been changed, uh, by now, ha, a lot of people pointed things out to me, and I noticed some myself. The original seven words were, shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, mother-fucker, and tits. Those are the ones that will curve your spine, grow hair on your hands and (laughter) maybe, even bring us, God help us, peace without honor (laughter) um, and a bourbon. (laughter) And now the first thing that we noticed was that word fuck was really repeated in there because the word motherfucker is a compound word and it's another form of the word fuck. (laughter) You want to be a purist it [438 U.S. 726, 752] doesn't really - it can't be on the list of basic words. Also, cocksucker is a compound word and neither half of that is really dirty. The word - the half sucker that's merely suggestive (laughter) and the word cock is a half-way dirty word, 50% dirty - dirty half the time, depending on what you mean by it. (laughter) Uh, remember when you first heard it, like in 6th grade, you used to giggle. And the cock crowed three times, heh (laughter) the cock - three times. It's in the Bible, cock in the Bible. (laughter) And the first time you heard about a cock-fight, remember - What? Huh? naw. It ain't that, are you stupid? man. (laughter, clapping) It's chickens, you know, (laughter) Then you have the four letter words from the old Anglo-Saxon fame. Uh, shit and fuck. The word shit, uh, is an interesting kind of word in that the middle class has never really accepted it and approved it. They use it like, crazy but it's not really okay. It's still a rude, dirty, old kind of gushy word. (laughter) They don't like that, but they say it, like, they say it like, a lady now in a middle-class home, you'll hear most of the time she says it as an expletive, you know, it's out of her mouth before she knows. She says, Oh shit oh shit, (laughter) oh shit. If she drops something, Oh, the shit hurt the broccoli. Shit. Thank you. (footsteps fading away) (papers ruffling) </s> Read it! (from audience) </s> Shit! (laughter) I won the Grammy, man, for the comedy album. Isn't that groovy? (clapping, whistling) (murmur) That's true. Thank you. Thank you man. Yeah. (murmur) (continuous clapping) Thank you man. Thank you. Thank you very much, man. Thank, no, (end of continuous clapping) for that and for the Grammy, man, [']cause (laughter) that's based on people liking it man, yeh, that's ah, that's okay man. (laughter) Let's let that go, man. I got my Grammy. I can let my hair hang down now, shit. (laughter) Ha! So! Now the word shit is okay for the man. At work you can say it like crazy. Mostly figuratively, Get that shit out of here, [438 U.S. 726, 753] will ya? I don't want to see that shit anymore. I can't cut that shit, buddy. I've had that shit up to here. I think you're full of shit myself. (laughter) He don't know shit from Shinola. (laughter) you know that? (laughter) Always wondered how the Shinola people felt about that (laughter) Hi, I'm the new man from Shinola. (laughter) Hi, how are ya? Nice to see ya. (laughter) How are ya? (laughter) Boy, I don't know whether to shit or wind my watch. (laughter) Guess, I'll shit on my watch. (laughter) Oh, the shit is going to hit de fan. (laughter) Built like a brick shit-house. (laughter) Up, he's up shit's creek. (laughter) He's had it. (laughter) He hit me, I'm sorry. (laughter) Hot shit, holy shit, tough shit, eat shit, (laughter) shit-eating grin. Uh, whoever thought of that was ill. (murmur laughter) He had a shit-eating grin! He had a what? (laughter) Shit on a stick. (laughter) Shit in a handbag. I always like that. He ain't worth shit in a handbag. (laughter) Shitty. He acted real shitty. (laughter) You know what I mean? (laughter) I got the money back, but a real shitty attitude. Heh, he had a shit-fit. (laughter) Wow! Shit-fit. Whew! Glad I wasn't there. (murmur, laughter) All the animals - Bull shit, horse shit, cow shit, rat shit, bat shit. (laughter) First time I heard bat shit, I really came apart. A guy in Oklahoma, Boggs, said it, man. Aw! Bat shit. (laughter) Vera reminded me of that last night, ah (murmur). Snake shit, slicker than owl shit. (laughter) Get your shit together. Shit or get off the pot. (laughter) I got a shit-load full of them. (laughter) I got a shit-pot full, all right. Shit-head, shit-heel, shit in your heart, shit for brains, (laughter) shit-face, heh (laughter) I always try to think how that could have originated; the first guy that said that. Somebody got drunk and fell in some shit, you know. (laughter) Hey, I'm shit-face. (laughter) Shit-face, today. (laughter) Anyway, enough of that shit. (laughter) The big one, the word fuck that's the one that hangs them up the most. [']Cause in a lot of cases that's the very act that [438 U.S. 726, 754] hangs them up the most. So, it's natural that the word would, uh, have the same effect. It's a great word, fuck, nice word, easy word, cute word, kind of. Easy word to say. One syllable, short u. (laughter) Fuck. (Murmur) You know, it's easy. Starts with a nice soft sound fuh ends with a kuh. Right? (laughter) A little something for everyone. Fuck (laughter) Good word. Kind of a proud word, too. Who are you? I am FUCK. (laughter) FUCK OF THE MOUNTAIN. (laughter) Tune in again next week to FUCK OF THE MOUNTAIN. (laughter) It's an interesting word too, [']cause it's got a double kind of a life - personality - dual, you know, whatever the right phrase is. It leads a double life, the word fuck. First of all, it means, sometimes, most of the time, fuck. What does it mean? It means to make love. Right? We're going to make love, yeh, we're going to fuck, yeh, we're going to fuck, yeh, we're going to make love. (laughter) we're really going to fuck, yeh, we're going to make love. Right? And it also means the beginning of life, it's the act that begins life, so there's the word hanging around with words like love, and life, and yet on the other hand, it's also a word that we really use to hurt each other with, man. It's a heavy. It's one that you have toward the end of the argument. (laughter) Right? (laughter) You finally can't make out. Oh, fuck you man. I said, fuck you. (laughter, murmur) Stupid fuck. (laughter) Fuck you and everybody that looks like you. (laughter) man. It would be nice to change the movies that we already have and substitute the word fuck for the word kill, wherever we could, and some of those movie cliches would change a little bit. Madfuckers still on the loose. Stop me before I fuck again. Fuck the ump, fuck the ump, fuck the ump, fuck the ump, fuck the ump. Easy on the clutch Bill, you'll fuck that engine again. (laughter) The other shit one was, I don't give a shit. Like it's worth something, you know? (laughter) I don't give a shit. Hey, well, I don't take no shit, (laughter) you know what I mean? You know why I don't take no shit? (laughter) [438 U.S. 726, 755] [']Cause I don't give a shit. (laughter) If I give a shit, I would have to pack shit. (laughter) But I don't pack no shit cause I don't give a shit. (laughter) You wouldn't shit me, would you? (laughter) That's a joke when you're a kid with a worm looking out the bird's ass. You wouldn't shit me, would you? (laughter) It's an eight-year-old joke but a good one. (laughter) The additions to the list. I found three more words that had to be put on the list of words you could never say on television, and they were fart, turd and twat, those three. (laughter) Fart, we talked about, it's harmless It's like tits, it's a cutie word, no problem. Turd, you can't say but who wants to, you know? (laughter) The subject never comes up on the panel so I'm not worried about that one. Now the word twat is an interesting word. Twat! Yeh, right in the twat. (laughter) Twat is an interesting word because it's the only one I know of, the only slang word applying to the, a part of the sexual anatomy that doesn't have another meaning to it. Like, ah, snatch, box and pussy all have other meanings, man. Even in a Walt Disney movie, you can say, We're going to snatch that pussy and put him in a box and bring him on the airplane. (murmur, laughter) Everybody loves it. The twat stands alone, man, as it should. And two-way words. Ah, ass is okay providing you're riding into town on a religious feast day. (laughter) You can't say, up your ass. (laughter) You can say, stuff it! (murmur) There are certain things you can say its weird but you can just come so close. Before I cut, I, uh, want to, ah, thank you for listening to my words, man, fellow, uh space travelers. Thank you man for tonight and thank you also. (clapping whistling) </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 56 F. C. C. 2d, at 99. The Commission noted: </s> "Congress has specifically empowered the FCC to (1) revoke a station's license (2) issue a cease and desist order, or (3) impose a monetary forfeiture for a violation of Section 1464, 47 U.S.C. [] 312 (a), 312 (b), 503 (b) (1) (E). The FCC can also (4) deny license renewal or (5) grant a short term renewal, 47 U.S.C. [] 307, 308." Id., at 96 n. 3. </s> [Footnote 2 "Broadcasting requires special treatment because of four important considerations: (1) children have access to radios and in many cases are unsupervised by parents; (2) radio receivers are in the home, a place where people's privacy interest is entitled to extra deference, see Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970); (3) unconsenting adults may tune in a station without any warning that offensive language is being or will be broadcast; and (4) there is a scarcity of spectrum space, the use of which the government must therefore license in the public interest. Of special concern to the Commission as well as parents is the first point regarding the use of radio by children." Id., at 97. </s> [Footnote 3 Title 18 U.S.C. 1464 (1976 ed.) provides: </s> "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." </s> [Footnote 4 Section 303 (g) of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1082, as amended, as set forth in 47 U.S.C. 303 (g), in relevant part, provides: </s> "Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the Commission from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires, shall - </s> . . . . . </s> "(g) . . . generally encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest." </s> [Footnote 5 Thus, the Commission suggested, if an offensive broadcast had literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, and were preceded by warnings, it might not be indecent in the late evening, but would be so during the day, when children are in the audience. 56 F. C. C. 2d, at 98. </s> [Footnote 6 Chairman Wiley concurred in the result without joining the opinion. Commissioners Reid and Quello filed separate statements expressing the opinion that the language was inappropriate for broadcast at any time. Id., at 102-103. Commissioner Robinson, joined by Commissioner Hooks, filed a concurring statement expressing the opinion: "[W]e can regulate offensive speech to the extent it constitutes a public nuisance. . . . The governing idea is that `indecency' is not an inherent attribute of words themselves; it is rather a matter of context and conduct. . . . If I were called on to do so, I would find that Carlin's monologue, if it were broadcast at an appropriate hour and accompanied by suitable warning, was distinguished by sufficient literary value to avoid being `indecent' within the meaning of the statute." Id., at 107-108, and n. 9. </s> [Footnote 7 The Commission did, however, comment: </s> "`[I]n some cases, public events likely to produce offensive speech are covered live, and there is no opportunity for journalistic editing.' Under these circumstances we believe that it would be inequitable for us to hold a licensee responsible for indecent language. . . . We trust that under such circumstances a licensee will exercise judgment, responsibility, and sensitivity to the community's needs, interests and tastes." 59 F. C. C. 2d, at 893 n. 1. </s> [Footnote 8 "Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio communication." 48 Stat. 1091, 47 U.S.C. 326. </s> [Footnote 9 Zechariah Chafee, defending the Commission's authority to take into account program service in granting licenses, interpreted the restriction on [438 U.S. 726, 736] "censorship" narrowly: "This means, I feel sure, the sort of censorship which went on in the seventeenth century in England - the deletion of specific items and dictation as to what should go into particular programs." 2 Z. Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 641 (1947). </s> [Footnote 10 In KFKB Broadcasting Assn. v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 60 App. D.C. 79, 47 F.2d 670 (1931), a doctor who controlled a radio station as well as a pharmaceutical association made frequent broadcasts in which he answered the medical questions of listeners. He often prescribed mixtures prepared by his pharmaceutical association. The Commission determined that renewal of the station's license would not be in the public interest, convenience, or necessity because many of the broadcasts served the doctor's private interests. In response to the claim that this was censorship in violation of 29 of the 1927 Act, the Court held: </s> "This contention is without merit. There has been no attempt on the part of the commission to subject any part of appellant's broadcasting matter to scrutiny prior to its release. In considering the question whether the public interest, convenience, or necessity will be served by a renewal of appellant's license, the commission has merely exercised its undoubted right to take note of appellant's past conduct, which is not censorship." 60 App. D.C., at 81, 47 F.2d, at 672. </s> In Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 61 App. D.C. 311, 62 F.2d 850 (1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 , the station was controlled by a minister whose broadcasts contained frequent references to "pimps" and "prostitutes" as well as bitter attacks on the Roman Catholic Church. The Commission refused to renew the license, citing the nature of the broadcasts. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding the First Amendment concerns did not prevent the Commission from regulating broadcasts that "offend the religious susceptibilities of thousands . . . or offend youth and innocence by the free use of words suggestive of sexual immorality." 61 App. D.C., at 314, 62 F.2d, at 853. The court recognized that the licensee had a right to broadcast this material free of prior [438 U.S. 726, 737] restraint, but "this does not mean that the government, through agencies established by Congress, may not refuse a renewal of license to one who has abused it." Id., at 312, 62 F.2d, at 851. </s> [Footnote 11 See, e. g., Bay State Beacon, Inc. v. FCC, 84 U.S. App. D.C. 216, 171 F.2d 826 (1948); Idaho Microwave, Inc. v. FCC, 122 U.S. App. D.C. 253, 352 F.2d 729 (1965); National Assn. of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 136 U.S. App. D.C. 352, 420 F.2d 194 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 . </s> [Footnote 12 See, e. g., 67 Cong. Rec. 12615 (1926) (remarks of Sen. Dill); id., at 5480 (remarks of Rep. White); 68 Cong. Rec. 2567 (1927) (remarks of Rep. Scott); Hearings on S. 1 and S. 1754 before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 (1926); Hearings on H. R. 5589 before the House Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 and 40 (1926). See also Hearings on H. R. 8825 before the House Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., passim (1928). </s> [Footnote 13 In addition to 1464, the Commission also relied on its power to regulate in the public interest under 47 U.S.C. 303 (g). We do not need to consider whether 303 may have independent significance in a case such as this. The statutes authorizing civil penalties incorporate 1464, a criminal statute. See 47 U.S.C. 312 (a) (6), 312 (b) (2), and 503 (b) (1) (E) (1970 ed. and Supp. V). But the validity of the civil sanctions is not linked to the validity of the criminal penalty. The legislative history of the provisions establishes their independence. As enacted in 1927 and 1934, the prohibition on indecent speech was separate from the provisions imposing civil and criminal penalties for violating the prohibition. Radio Act of 1927, 14, 29, and 33, 44 Stat. 1168 and 1173; Communications Act of 1934, 312, 326, and 501, 48 Stat. 1086, 1091, and 1100, 47 U.S.C. 312, 326, and 501 (1970 ed. and Supp. V). The 1927 and 1934 Acts indicated in the strongest possible language that any invalid provision was separable from the rest of the Act. Radio Act of 1927, 38, 44 Stat. 1174; Communications Act of 1934, 608, 48 Stat. 1105, 47 U.S.C. 608. Although the 1948 codification of the criminal laws and the addition of new civil penalties changes the statutory structure, no substantive change was apparently intended. Cf. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 162 . Accordingly, we need not consider any question relating to the possible application of 1464 as a criminal statute. </s> [Footnote 14 Webster defines the term as "a: altogether unbecoming: contrary to what the nature of things or what circumstances would dictate as right or expected or appropriate: hardly suitable: UNSEEMLY . . . b: not conforming to generally accepted standards of morality: . . . ." Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1966). </s> [Footnote 15 Indeed, at one point, he used "indecency" as a shorthand term for "patent offensiveness," 370 U.S., at 482 , a usage strikingly similar to the Commission's definition in this case. 56 F. C. C. 2d, at 98. </s> [Footnote 16 "`[W]hile a nudist magazine may be within the protection of the First Amendment . . . the televising of nudes might well raise a serious question of programming contrary to 18 U.S.C. 1464. . . . Similarly, regardless of whether the "4-letter words" and sexual description, set forth in "lady Chatterly's Lover," (when considered in the context of the whole book) make the book obscene for mailability purposes, the utterance of such words or the depiction of such sexual activity on radio or TV would raise similar public interest and section 1464 questions.'" En banc Programing Inquiry, 44 F. C. C. 2303, 2307 (1960). See also In re WUHYFM, 24 F. C. C. 2d 408, 412 (1970); In re Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 27 R. R. 2d 285, on reconsideration, 41 F. C. C. 2d 777 (1973), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, 169 U.S. App. D.C. 166, 515 F.2d 397 (1974); In re Mile High Stations, Inc., 28 F. C. C. 795 (1960); In re Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 33 F. C. C. 250 (1962), reconsideration denied, 34 F. C. C. 101 (1963), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Robinson v. FCC, 118 U.S. App. D.C. 144, 334 F.2d 534 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 . </s> [Footnote 17 This conclusion is reinforced by noting the different constitutional limits on Congress' power to regulate the two different subjects. Use of the postal power to regulate material that is not fraudulent or obscene [438 U.S. 726, 742] raises "grave constitutional questions." Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 156 . But it is well settled that the First Amendment has a special meaning in the broadcasting context. See, e. g., FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 ; Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 ; Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 . For this reason, the presumption that Congress never intends to exceed constitutional limits, which supported Hamling's narrow reading of 1461, does not support a comparable reading of 1464. </s> [Footnote 18 A requirement that indecent language be avoided will have its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language. </s> [Footnote 19 Pacifica's position would, of course, deprive the Commission of any power to regulate erotic telecasts unless they were obscene under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 . Anything that could be sold at a newsstand for private examination could be publicly displayed on television. </s> We are assured by Pacifica that the free play of market forces will discourage indecent programming. "Smut may," as Judge Leventhal put it, "drive itself from the market and confound Gresham," 181 U.S. App. D.C., at 158, 556 F.2d, at 35; the prosperity of those who traffic in pornographic literature and films would appear to justify skepticism. </s> [Footnote 20 Although neither MR. JUSTICE POWELL nor MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN directly confronts this question, both have answered it affirmatively, the latter explicitly, post, at 768 n. 3, and the former implicitly by concurring in a judgment that could not otherwise stand. </s> [Footnote 21 See, e. g., Madison School District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 -176; First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 . </s> [Footnote 22 The monologue does present a point of view; it attempts to show that the words it uses are "harmless" and that our attitudes toward them are "essentially silly." See supra, at 730. The Commission objects, not to this point of view, but to the way in which it is expressed. The belief that these words are harmless does not necessarily confer a First Amendment privilege to use them while proselytizing, just as the conviction that obscenity is harmless does not license one to communicate that conviction by the indiscriminate distribution of an obscene leaflet. </s> [Footnote 23 The Commission stated: "Obnoxious, gutter language describing these matters has the effect of debasing and brutalizing human beings by reducing them to their mere bodily functions . . . ." 56 F. C. C. 2d, at 98. Our society has a tradition of performing certain bodily functions in private, and of severely limiting the public exposure or discussion of such matters. Verbal or physical acts exposing those intimacies are offensive irrespective of any message that may accompany the exposure. </s> [Footnote 24 With respect to other types of speech, the Court has tailored its protection to both the abuses and the uses to which it might be put. See, e. g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (special scienter rules in libel suits brought by public officials); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (government may strictly regulate truthfulness in commercial speech). See also Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 82 n. 6 (POWELL, J., concurring). </s> [Footnote 25 The importance of context is illustrated by the Cohen case. That case arose when Paul Cohen entered a Los Angeles courthouse wearing a jacket emblazoned with the words "Fuck the Draft." After entering the courtroom, he took the jacket off and folded it. 403 U.S., at 19 n. 3. So far as the evidence showed, no one in the courthouse was offended by his jacket. Nonetheless, when he left the courtroom, Cohen was arrested, convicted of disturbing the peace, and sentenced to 30 days in prison. </s> In holding that criminal sanctions could not be imposed on Cohen for his political statement in a public place, the Court rejected the argument that his speech would offend unwilling viewers; it noted that "there was no evidence that persons powerless to avoid [his] conduct did in fact object to it." Id., at 22. In contrast, in this case the Commission was responding to a listener's strenuous complaint, and Pacifica does not question its determination that this afternoon broadcast was likely to offend listeners. It should be noted that the Commission imposed a far more moderate penalty on Pacifica than the state court imposed on Cohen. Even the strongest civil penalty at the Commission's command does not include criminal prosecution. See n. 1, supra. </s> [Footnote 26 47 U.S.C. 309 (a), 312 (a) (2); FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 229 . Cf. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 ; Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 . </s> [Footnote 27 Outside the home, the balance between the offensive speaker and the unwilling audience may sometimes tip in favor of the speaker, requiring the offended listener to turn away. See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 . As we noted in Cohen v. California: </s> "While this Court has recognized that government may properly act in many situations to prohibit intrusion into the privacy of the home of unwelcome views and ideas which cannot be totally banned from the public dialogue . . ., we have at the same time consistently stressed that `we are often "captives" outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech.'" 403 U.S., at 21 . </s> The problem of harassing phone calls is hardly hypothetical. Congress has recently found it necessary to prohibit debt collectors from "plac[ing] telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller's identity"; from "engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number"; and from "us[ing] obscene or profane language or language the natural consequence of which is to abuse the hearer or reader." Consumer Credit Protection Act Amendments, 91 Stat. 877, 15 U.S.C. 1692d (1976 ed., Supp. II). </s> [Footnote 28 The Commission's action does not by any means reduce adults to hearing only what is fit for children. Cf. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 . Adults who feel the need may purchase tapes and records or go to theaters and nightclubs to hear these words. In fact, the Commission has not unequivocally closed even broadcasting to speech of this sort; whether broadcast audiences in the late evening contain so few children that playing this monologue would be permissible is an issue neither the Commission nor this Court has decided. </s> [Footnote 29 Even a prime-time recitation of Geoffrey Chaucer's Miller's Tale would not be likely to command the attention of many children who are both old enough to understand and young enough to be adversely affected by passages such as: "And prively he caughte hire by the queynte." The Canterbury Tales, Chaucer's Complete Works (Cambridge ed. 1933), p. 58, l. 3276. </s> MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. </s> I join Parts I, II, III, and IV-C of MR. JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion. The Court today reviews only the Commission's holding that Carlin's monologue was indecent "as broadcast" [438 U.S. 726, 756] at two o'clock in the afternoon, and not the broad sweep of the Commission's opinion. Ante, at 734-735. In addition to being consistent with our settled practice of not deciding constitutional issues unnecessarily, see ante, at 734; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345 -348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), this narrow focus also is conducive to the orderly development of this relatively new and difficult area of law, in the first instance by the Commission, and then by the reviewing courts. See 181 U.S. App. D.C. 132, 158-160, 556 F.2d 9, 35-37 (1977) (Leventhal, J., dissenting). </s> I also agree with much that is said in Part IV of MR. JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion, and with its conclusion that the Commission's holding in this case does not violate the First Amendment. Because I do not subscribe to all that is said in Part IV, however, I state my views separately. </s> I </s> It is conceded that the monologue at issue here is not obscene in the constitutional sense. See 56 F. C. C. 2d 94, 98 (1975); Brief for Petitioner 18. Nor, in this context, does its language constitute "fighting words" within the meaning of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Some of the words used have been held protected by the First Amendment in other cases and contexts. E. g., Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Papish v. University of Missouri Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); see also Eaton v. Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697 (1974). I do not think Carlin, consistently with the First Amendment, could be punished for delivering the same monologue to a live audience composed of adults who, knowing what to expect, chose to attend his performance. See Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972) (POWELL, J., concurring in result). And I would assume that an adult could not constitutionally be prohibited from purchasing a recording or transcript of the monologue [438 U.S. 726, 757] and playing or reading it in the privacy of his own home. Cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). </s> But it also is true that the language employed is, to most people, vulgar and offensive. It was chosen specifically for this quality, and it was repeated over and over as a sort of verbal shock treatment. The Commission did not err in characterizing the narrow category of language used here as "patently offensive" to most people regardless of age. </s> The issue, however, is whether the Commission may impose civil sanctions on a licensee radio station for broadcasting the monologue at two o'clock in the afternoon. The Commission's primary concern was to prevent the broadcast from reaching the ears of unsupervised children who were likely to be in the audience at that hour. In essence, the Commission sought to "channel" the monologue to hours when the fewest unsupervised children would be exposed to it. See 56 F. C. C. 2d, at 98. In my view, this consideration provides strong support for the Commission's holding. 1 </s> The Court has recognized society's right to "adopt more stringent controls on communicative materials available to youths than on those available to adults." Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975); see also, e. g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 n. 17 (1973); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 -641 (1968); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). This recognition stems in large part from the fact that "a child . . . is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees." Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 649-650 (STEWART, J., concurring in result). Thus, children may not be able to protect themselves from speech which, although shocking to most adults, generally may be avoided by the unwilling [438 U.S. 726, 758] through the exercise of choice. At the same time, such speech may have a deeper and more lasting negative effect on a child than on an adult. For these reasons, society may prevent the general dissemination of such speech to children, leaving to parents the decision as to what speech of this kind their children shall hear and repeat: </s> "[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society. `It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.' Prince v. Massachusetts, [321 U.S. 158 , 166 (1944)]. The legislature could properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for example, who have this primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility." Id., at 639. </s> The Commission properly held that the speech from which society may attempt to shield its children is not limited to that which appeals to the youthful prurient interest. The language involved in this case is as potentially degrading and harmful to children as representations of many erotic acts. </s> In most instances, the dissemination of this kind of speech to children may be limited without also limiting willing adults' access to it. Sellers of printed and recorded matter and exhibitors of motion pictures and live performances may be required to shut their doors to children, but such a requirement has no effect on adults' access. See id., at 634-635. The difficulty is that such a physical separation of the audience cannot be accomplished in the broadcast media. During most of the broadcast hours, both adults and unsupervised children are likely to be in the broadcast audience, and the broadcaster cannot reach willing adults without also reaching [438 U.S. 726, 759] children. This, as the Court emphasizes, is one of the distinctions between the broadcast and other media to which we often have adverted as justifying a different treatment of the broadcast media for First Amendment purposes. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 -387 (1969); Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (DC 1971), aff'd sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972); see generally Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 -503 (1952). In my view, the Commission was entitled to give substantial weight to this difference in reaching its decision in this case. </s> A second difference, not without relevance, is that broadcasting - unlike most other forms of communication - comes directly into the home, the one place where people ordinarily have the right not to be assaulted by uninvited and offensive sights and sounds. Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, supra, at 209; Cohen v. California, 403 U.S., at 21 ; Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970). Although the First Amendment may require unwilling adults to absorb the first blow of offensive but protected speech when they are in public before they turn away, see, e. g., Erznoznik, supra, at 210-211, but cf. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 903 -909 (1972) (POWELL, J., dissenting), a different order of values obtains in the home. "That we are often `captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech and other sound does not mean we must be captives everywhere." Rowan v. Post Office Dept., supra, at 738. The Commission also was entitled to give this factor appropriate weight in the circumstances of the instant case. This is not to say, however, that the Commission has an unrestricted license to decide what speech, protected in other media, may be banned from the airwaves in order to protect [438 U.S. 726, 760] unwilling adults from momentary exposure to it in their homes. 2 Making the sensitive judgments required in these cases is not easy. But this responsibility has been reposed initially in the Commission, and its judgment is entitled to respect. </s> It is argued that despite society's right to protect its children from this kind of speech, and despite everyone's interest in not being assaulted by offensive speech in the home, the Commission's holding in this case is impermissible because it prevents willing adults from listening to Carlin's monologue over the radio in the early afternoon hours. It is said that this ruling will have the effect of "reduc[ing] the adult population . . . to [hearing] only what is fit for children." Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 ,383 (1957). This argument is not without force. The Commission certainly should consider it as it develops standards in this area. But it is not sufficiently strong to leave the Commission powerless to act in circumstances such as those in this case. </s> The Commission's holding does not prevent willing adults from purchasing Carlin's record, from attending his performances, or, indeed, from reading the transcript reprinted as an appendix to the Court's opinion. On its face, it does not prevent respondent Pacifica Foundation from broadcasting the monologue during late evening hours when fewer children are likely to be in the audience, nor from broadcasting discussions of the contemporary use of language at any time during the day. The Commission's holding, and certainly the Court's holding today, does not speak to cases involving the isolated [438 U.S. 726, 761] use of a potentially offensive word in the course of a radio broadcast, as distinguished from the verbal shock treatment administered by respondent here. In short, I agree that on the facts of this case, the Commission's order did not violate respondent's First Amendment rights. </s> II </s> As the foregoing demonstrates, my views are generally in accord with what is said in Part IV-C of MR. JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion. See ante, at 748-750. I therefore join that portion of his opinion. I do not join Part IV-B, however, because I do not subscribe to the theory that the Justices of this Court are free generally to decide on the basis of its content which speech protected by the First Amendment is most "valuable" and hence deserving of the most protection, and which is less "valuable" and hence deserving of less protection. Compare ante, at 744-748; Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 -73 (1976) (opinion of STEVENS, J.), with id., at 73 n. 1 (POWELL, J., concurring). 3 In my view, the result in this case does not turn on whether Carlin's monologue, viewed as a whole, or the words that constitute it, have more or less "value" than a candidate's campaign speech. This is a judgment for each person to make, not one for the judges to impose upon him. 4 </s> [438 U.S. 726, 762] </s> The result turns instead on the unique characteristics of the broadcast media, combined with society's right to protect its children from speech generally agreed to be inappropriate for their years, and with the interest of unwilling adults in not being assaulted by such offensive speech in their homes. Moreover, I doubt whether today's decision will prevent any adult who wishes to receive Carlin's message in Carlin's own words from doing so, and from making for himself a value judgment as to the merit of the message and words. Cf. id., at 77-79 (POWELL, J., concurring). These are the grounds upon which I join the judgment of the Court as to Part IV. </s> [Footnote 1 See generally Judge Leventhal's thoughtful opinion in the Court of Appeals. 181 U.S. App. D.C. 132, 155-158, 556 F.2d 9, 32-35 (1977) (dissenting opinion). </s> [Footnote 2 It is true that the radio listener quickly may tune out speech that is offensive to him. In addition, broadcasters may preface potentially offensive programs with warnings. But such warnings do not help the unsuspecting listener who tunes in at the middle of a program. In this respect, too, broadcasting appears to differ from books and records, which may carry warnings on their face, and from motion pictures and live performances, which may carry warnings on their marquees. </s> [Footnote 3 The Court has, however, created a limited exception to this rule in order to bring commercial speech within the protection of the First Amendment. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 455 -456 (1978). </s> [Footnote 4 For much the same reason, I also do not join Part IV-A. I had not thought that the application vel non of overbreadth analysis should depend on the Court's judgment as to the value of the protected speech that might be deterred. Cf. ante, at 743. Except in the context of commercial speech, see Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 380 -381 (1977), it has not in the past. See, e. g., Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972). </s> As MR. JUSTICE STEVENS points out, however, ante, at 734, the Commission's order was limited to the facts of this case; "it did not [438 U.S. 726, 762] purport to engage in formal rulemaking or in the promulgation of any regulations." In addition, since the Commission may be expected to proceed cautiously, as it has in the past, cf. Brief for Petitioner 42-43, and n. 31, I do not foresee an undue "chilling" effect on broadcasters' exercise of their rights. I agree, therefore, that respondent's overbreadth challenge is meritless. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, dissenting. </s> I agree with MR. JUSTICE STEWART that, under Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), and United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973), the word "indecent" in 18 U.S.C. 1464 (1976 ed.) must be construed to prohibit only obscene speech. I would, therefore, normally refrain from expressing my views on any constitutional issues implicated in this case. However, I find the Court's misapplication of fundamental First Amendment principles so patent, and its attempt to impose its notions of propriety on the whole of the American people so misguided, that I am unable to remain silent. </s> I </s> For the second time in two years, see Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), the Court refuses to embrace the notion, completely antithetical to basic First Amendment values, that the degree of protection the First [438 U.S. 726, 763] Amendment affords protected speech varies with the social value ascribed to that speech by five Members of this Court. See opinion of MR. JUSTICE POWELL, ante, at 761-762. Moreover, as do all parties, all Members of the Court agree that the Carlin monologue aired by Station WBAI does not fall within one of the categories of speech, such as "fighting words," Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), or obscenity, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), that is totally without First Amendment protection. This conclusion, of course, is compelled by our cases expressly holding that communications containing some of the words found condemnable here are fully protected by the First Amendment in other contexts. See Eaton v. Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697 (1974); Papish v. University of Missouri Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972); Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). Yet despite the Court's refusal to create a sliding scale of First Amendment protection calibrated to this Court's perception of the worth of a communication's content, and despite our unanimous agreement that the Carlin monologue is protected speech, a majority of the Court 1 nevertheless finds that, on the facts of this case, the FCC is not constitutionally barred from imposing sanctions on Pacifica for its airing of the Carlin monologue. This majority apparently believes that the FCC's disapproval of Pacifica's afternoon broadcast of Carlin's "Dirty Words" recording is a permissible time, place, and manner regulation. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). Both the opinion of my Brother STEVENS and the opinion of my Brother POWELL rely principally on two factors in reaching this conclusion: (1) the capacity of a radio broadcast to intrude into the unwilling listener's home, [438 U.S. 726, 764] and (2) the presence of children in the listening audience. Dispassionate analysis, removed from individual notions as to what is proper and what is not, starkly reveals that these justifications, whether individually or together, simply do not support even the professedly moderate degree of governmental homogenization of radio communications - if, indeed, such homogenization can ever be moderate given the pre-eminent status of the right of free speech in our constitutional scheme - that the Court today permits. </s> A </s> Without question, the privacy interests of an individual in his home are substantial and deserving of significant protection. In finding these interests sufficient to justify the content regulation of protected speech, however, the Court commits two errors. First, it misconceives the nature of the privacy interests involved where an individual voluntarily chooses to admit radio communications into his home. Second, it ignores the constitutionally protected interests of both those who wish to transmit and those who desire to receive broadcasts that many - including the FCC and this Court - might find offensive. </s> "The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is . . . dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner. Any broader view of this authority would effectively empower a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections." Cohen v. California, supra, at 21 I am in wholehearted agreement with my Brethren that an individual's right "to be let alone" when engaged in private activity within the confines of his own home is encompassed within the "substantial privacy interests" to which Mr. Justice Harlan referred in Cohen, and is entitled to the greatest solicitude. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). However, I believe that an individual's actions in switching on [438 U.S. 726, 765] and listening to communications transmitted over the public airways and directed to the public at large do not implicate fundamental privacy interests, even when engaged in within the home. Instead, because the radio is undeniably a public medium, these actions are more properly viewed as a decision to take part, if only as a listener, in an ongoing public discourse. See Note, Filthy Words, the FCC, and the First Amendment: Regulating Broadcast Obscenity, 61 Va. L. Rev. 579, 618 (1975). Although an individual's decision to allow public radio communications into his home undoubtedly does not abrogate all of his privacy interests, the residual privacy interests he retains vis-a-vis the communication he voluntarily admits into his home are surely no greater than those of the people present in the corridor of the Los Angeles courthouse in Cohen who bore witness to the words "Fuck the Draft" emblazoned across Cohen's jacket. Their privacy interests were held insufficient to justify punishing Cohen for his offensive communication. </s> Even if an individual who voluntarily opens his home to radio communications retains privacy interests of sufficient moment to justify a ban on protected speech if those interests are "invaded in an essentially intolerable manner," Cohen v. California, supra, at 21, the very fact that those interests are threatened only by a radio broadcast precludes any intolerable invasion of privacy; for unlike other intrusive modes of communication, such as sound trucks, "[t]he radio can be turned off," Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 ,302 (1974) - and with a minimum of effort. As Chief Judge Bazelon aptly observed below, "having elected to receive public air waves, the scanner who stumbles onto an offensive program is in the same position as the unsuspecting passers-by in Cohen and Erznoznik [v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)]; he can avert his attention by changing channels or turning off the set." 181 U.S. App. D.C. 132, 149, 556 F.2d 9, 26 (1977). Whatever the minimal discomfort suffered by a [438 U.S. 726, 766] listener who inadvertently tunes into a program he finds offensive during the brief interval before he can simply extend his arm and switch stations or flick the "off" button, it is surely worth the candle to preserve the broadcaster's right to send, and the right of those interested to receive, a message entitled to full First Amendment protection. To reach a contrary balance, as does the Court, is clearly to follow MR. JUSTICE STEVENS' reliance on animal metaphors, ante, at 750-751, "to burn the house to roast the pig." Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). </s> The Court's balance, of necessity, fails to accord proper weight to the interests of listeners who wish to hear broadcasts the FCC deems offensive. It permits majoritarian tastes completely to preclude a protected message from entering the homes of a receptive, unoffended minority. No decision of this Court supports such a result. Where the individuals constituting the offended majority may freely choose to reject the material being offered, we have never found their privacy interests of such moment to warrant the suppression of speech on privacy grounds. Cf. Lehman v. Shaker Heights, supra. Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970), relied on by the FCC and by the opinions of my Brothers POWELL and STEVENS, confirms rather than belies this conclusion. In Rowan, the Court upheld a statute, 39 U.S.C. 4009 (1964 ed., Supp. IV), permitting householders to require that mail advertisers stop sending them lewd or offensive materials and remove their names from mailing lists. Unlike the situation here, householders who wished to receive the sender's communications were not prevented from doing so. Equally important, the determination of offensiveness vel non under the statute involved in Rowan was completely within the hands of the individual householder; no governmental evaluation of the worth of the mail's content stood between the mailer and the householder. In contrast, the visage of the censor is all too discernible here. [438 U.S. 726, 767] </s> B </s> Most parents will undoubtedly find understandable as well as commendable the Court's sympathy with the FCC's desire to prevent offensive broadcasts from reaching the ears of unsupervised children. Unfortunately, the facial appeal of this justification for radio censorship masks its constitutional insufficiency. Although the government unquestionably has a special interest in the well-being of children and consequently "can adopt more stringent controls on communicative materials available to youths than on those available to adults," Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975); see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 106 -107 (1973) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), the Court has accounted for this societal interest by adopting a "variable obscenity" standard that permits the prurient appeal of material available to children to be assessed in terms of the sexual interests of minors. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). It is true that the obscenity standard the Ginsberg Court adopted for such materials was based on the then-applicable obscenity standard of Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), and that "[w]e have not had occasion to decide what effect Miller [v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)] will have on the Ginsberg formulation." Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, supra, at 213 n. 10. Nevertheless, we have made it abundantly clear that "under any test of obscenity as to minors . . . to be obscene `such expression must be, in some significant way, erotic.'" 422 U.S., at 213 n. 10, quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S., at 20 . </s> Because the Carlin monologue is obviously not an erotic appeal to the prurient interests of children, the Court, for the first time, allows the government to prevent minors from gaining access to materials that are not obscene, and are therefore protected, as to them. 2 It thus ignores our recent admonition [438 U.S. 726, 768] that "[s]peech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them." 422 U.S., at 213 -214. 3 The Court's refusal to follow its own pronouncements is especially lamentable since it has the anomalous subsidiary effect, at least in the radio context at issue here, of making completely unavailable to adults material which may not constitutionally be kept even from children. This result violates in spades the principle of Butler v. Michigan, supra. Butler involved a challenge to a Michigan statute that forbade the publication, sale, or distribution of printed material "tending to incite minors to violent or depraved or immoral acts, manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of youth." 352 U.S., at 381 . Although Roth v. United States, supra, had not yet been decided, it is at least arguable that the material the statute in Butler was designed to suppress could have been constitutionally denied to children. Nevertheless, this Court [438 U.S. 726, 769] found the statute unconstitutional. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter reasoned: </s> "The incidence of this enactment is to reduce the adult population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children. It thereby arbitrarily curtails one of those liberties of the individual, now enshrined in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that history has attested as the indispensable conditions for the maintenance and progress of a free society." 352 U.S., at 383 -384. </s> Where, as here, the government may not prevent the exposure of minors to the suppressed material, the principle of Butler applies a fortiori. The opinion of my Brother POWELL acknowledges that there lurks in today's decision a potential for "`reduc[ing] the adult population . . . to [hearing] only what is fit for children,'" ante, at 760, but expresses faith that the FCC will vigilantly prevent this potential from ever becoming a reality. I am far less certain than my Brother POWELL that such faith in the Commission is warranted, see Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, 169 U.S. App. D.C. 166, 187-190, 515 F.2d 397, 418-421 (1975) (statement of Bazelon, C. J., as to why he voted to grant rehearing en banc); and even if I shared it, I could not so easily shirk the responsibility assumed by each Member of this Court jealously to guard against encroachments on First Amendment freedoms. </s> In concluding that the presence of children in the listening audience provides an adequate basis for the FCC to impose sanctions for Pacifica's broadcast of the Carlin monologue, the opinions of my Brother POWELL, ante, at 757-758, and my Brother STEVENS, ante, at 749-750, both stress the time-honored right of a parent to raise his child as he sees fit - a right this Court has consistently been vigilant to protect. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Yet this principle supports a [438 U.S. 726, 770] result directly contrary to that reached by the Court. Yoder and Pierce hold that parents, not the government, have the right to make certain decisions regarding the upbringing of their children. As surprising as it may be to individual Members of this Court, some parents may actually find Mr. Carlin's unabashed attitude towards the seven "dirty words" healthy, and deem it desirable to expose their children to the manner in which Mr. Carlin defuses the taboo surrounding the words. Such parents may constitute a minority of the American public, but the absence of great numbers willing to exercise the right to raise their children in this fashion does not alter the right's nature or its existence. Only the Court's regrettable decision does that. 4 </s> C </s> As demonstrated above, neither of the factors relied on by both the opinion of my Brother POWELL and the opinion of my Brother STEVENS - the intrusive nature of radio and the presence of children in the listening audience - can, when taken on its own terms, support the FCC's disapproval of the Carlin monologue. These two asserted justifications are further plagued by a common failing: the lack of principled limits on their use as a basis for FCC censorship. No such limits come readily to mind, and neither of the opinions constituting the Court serve to clarify the extent to which the FCC may assert the privacy and children-in-the-audience rationales as justification for expunging from the airways protected communications the Commission finds offensive. Taken to their logical extreme, these rationales would support the cleansing of public [438 U.S. 726, 771] radio of any "four-letter words" whatsoever, regardless of their context. The rationales could justify the banning from radio of a myriad of literary works, novels, poems, and plays by the likes of Shakespeare, Joyce, Hemingway, Ben Johnson, Henry Fielding, Robert Burns, and Chaucer; they could support the suppression of a good deal of political speech, such as the Nixon tapes; and they could even provide the basis for imposing sanctions for the broadcast of certain portions of the Bible. 5 </s> In order to dispel the specter of the possibility of so unpalatable a degree of censorship, and to defuse Pacifica's overbreadth challenge, the FCC insists that it desires only the authority to reprimand a broadcaster on facts analogous to those present in this case, which it describes as involving "broadcasting for nearly twelve minutes a record which repeated over and over words which depict sexual or excretory activities and organs in a manner patently offensive by its community's contemporary standards in the early afternoon when children were in the audience." Brief for Petitioner 45. The opinions of both my Brother POWELL and my Brother STEVENS take the FCC at its word, and consequently do no more than permit the Commission to censor the afternoon broadcast of the "sort of verbal shock treatment," opinion of MR. JUSTICE POWELL, ante, at 757, involved here. To insure that the FCC's regulation of protected speech does not exceed these bounds, my Brother POWELL is content to rely upon the judgment of the [438 U.S. 726, 772] Commission while my Brother STEVENS deems it prudent to rely on this Court's ability accurately to assess the worth of various kinds of speech. 6 For my own part, even accepting that this case is limited to its facts, 7 I would place the responsibility and the right to weed worthless and offensive communications from the public airways where it belongs and where, until today, it resided: in a public free to choose those communications worthy of its attention from a marketplace unsullied by the censor's hand. </s> II </s> The absence of any hesitancy in the opinions of my Brothers POWELL and STEVENS to approve the FCC's censorship of the Carlin monologue on the basis of two demonstrably inadequate grounds is a function of their perception that the decision will result in little, if any, curtailment of communicative exchanges protected by the First Amendment. Although the extent to [438 U.S. 726, 773] which the Court stands ready to countenance FCC censorship of protected speech is unclear from today's decision, I find the reasoning by which my Brethren conclude that the FCC censorship they approve will not significantly infringe on First Amendment values both disingenuous as to reality and wrong as a matter of law. </s> My Brother STEVENS, in reaching a result apologetically described as narrow, ante, at 750, takes comfort in his observation that "[a] requirement that indecent language be avoided will have its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication," ante, at 743 n. 18, and finds solace in his conviction that "[t]here are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language." Ibid. The idea that the content of a message and its potential impact on any who might receive it can be divorced from the words that are the vehicle for its expression is transparently fallacious. A given word may have a unique capacity to capsule an idea, evoke an emotion, or conjure up an image. Indeed, for those of us who place an appropriately high value on our cherished First Amendment rights, the word "censor" is such a word. Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, recognized the truism that a speaker's choice of words cannot surgically be separated from the ideas he desires to express when he warned that "we cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S., at 26 . Moreover, even if an alternative phrasing may communicate a speaker's abstract ideas as effectively as those words he is forbidden to use, it is doubtful that the sterilized message will convey the emotion that is an essential part of so many communications. This, too, was apparent to Mr. Justice Harlan and the Court in Cohen. </s> "[W]e cannot overlook the fact, because it is well illustrated by the episode involved here, that much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys [438 U.S. 726, 774] not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall message sought to be communicated." Id., at 25-26. </s> My Brother STEVENS also finds relevant to his First Amendment analysis the fact that "[a]dults who feel the need may purchase tapes and records or go to theaters and nightclubs to hear [the tabooed] words." Ante, at 750 n. 28. My Brother POWELL agrees: "The Commission's holding does not prevent willing adults from purchasing Carlin's record, from attending his performances, or, indeed, from reading the transcript reprinted as an appendix to the Court's opinion." Ante, at 760. The opinions of my Brethren display both a sad insensitivity to the fact that these alternatives involve the expenditure of money, time, and effort that many of those wishing to hear Mr. Carlin's message may not be able to afford, and a naive innocence of the reality that in many cases, the medium may well be the message. </s> The Court apparently believes that the FCC's actions here can be analogized to the zoning ordinances upheld in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). For two reasons, it is wrong. First, the zoning ordinances found to pass constitutional muster in Young had valid goals other than the channeling of protected speech. Id., at 71 n. 34 (opinion of STEVENS, J.); id., at 80 (POWELL, J., concurring). No such goals are present here. Second, and crucial to the opinions of my Brothers POWELL and STEVENS in Young - opinions, which, as they do in this case, supply the bare five-person majority of the Court - the ordinances did not restrict the access of distributors or exhibitors to the market or impair [438 U.S. 726, 775] the viewing public's access to the regulated material. Id., at 62, 71 n. 35 (opinion of STEVENS, J.); id., at 77 (POWELL, J., concurring). Again, this is not the situation here. Both those desiring to receive Carlin's message over the radio and those wishing to send it to them are prevented from doing so by the Commission's actions. Although, as my Brethren point out, Carlin's message may be disseminated or received by other means, this is of little consolation to those broadcasters and listeners who, for a host of reasons, not least among them financial, do not have access to, or cannot take advantage of, these other means. </s> Moreover, it is doubtful that even those frustrated listeners in a position to follow my Brother POWELL'S gratuitous advice and attend one of Carlin's performances or purchase one of his records would receive precisely the same message Pacifica's radio station sent its audience. The airways are capable not only of carrying a message, but also of transforming it. A satirist's monologue may be most potent when delivered to a live audience; yet the choice whether this will in fact be the manner in which the message is delivered and received is one the First Amendment prohibits the government from making. </s> III </s> It is quite evident that I find the Court's attempt to unstitch the warp and woof of First Amendment law in an effort to reshape its fabric to cover the patently wrong result the Court reaches in this case dangerous as well as lamentable. Yet there runs throughout the opinions of my Brothers POWELL and STEVENS another vein I find equally disturbing: a depressing inability to appreciate that in our land of cultural pluralism, there are many who think, act, and talk differently from the Members of this Court, and who do not share their fragile sensibilities. It is only an acute ethnocentric myopia that enables the Court to approve the censorship of communications solely because of the words they contain. [438 U.S. 726, 776] </s> "A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, J.). The words that the Court and the Commission find so unpalatable may be the stuff of everyday conversations in some, if not many, of the innumerable subcultures that compose this Nation. Academic research indicates that this is indeed the case. See B. Jackson, "Get Your Ass in the Water and Swim Like Me" (1974); J. Dillard, Black English (1972); W. Labov, Language in the Inner City: Studies in the Black English Vernacular (1972). As one researcher concluded, "[w]ords generally considered obscene like `bullshit' and `fuck' are considered neither obscene nor derogatory in the [black] vernacular except in particular contextual situations and when used with certain intonations." C. Bins, "Toward an Ethnography of Contemporary African American Oral Poetry," Language and Linguistics Working Papers No. 5, p. 82 (Georgetown Univ. Press 1972). Cf. Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 361 (CA1 1969) (finding the use of the word "motherfucker" commonplace among young radicals and protesters). </s> Today's decision will thus have its greatest impact on broadcasters desiring to reach, and listening audiences composed of, persons who do not share the Court's view as to which words or expressions are acceptable and who, for a variety of reasons, including a conscious desire to flout majoritarian conventions, express themselves using words that may be regarded as offensive by those from different socio-economic backgrounds. 8 </s> [438 U.S. 726, 777] In this context, the Court's decision may be seen for what, in the broader perspective, it really is: another of the dominant culture's inevitable efforts to force those groups who do not share its mores to conform to its way of thinking, acting, and speaking. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 -511 (1977) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). </s> Pacifica, in response to an FCC inquiry about its broadcast of Carlin's satire on "`the words you couldn't say on the public . . . airways,'" explained that "Carlin is not mouthing obscenities, he is merely using words to satirize as harmless and essentially silly our attitudes towards those words." 56 F. C. C. 2d, at 95, 96. In confirming Carlin's prescience as a social commentator by the result it reaches today, the Court evinces an attitude toward the "seven dirty words" that many others besides Mr. Carlin and Pacifica might describe as "silly." Whether today's decision will similarly prove "harmless" remains to be seen. One can only hope that it will. </s> [Footnote 1 Where I refer without differentiation to the actions of "the Court," my reference is to this majority, which consists of my Brothers POWELL and STEVENS and those Members of the Court joining their separate opinions. </s> [Footnote 2 Even if the monologue appealed to the prurient interest of minors, [438 U.S. 726, 768] it would not be obscene as to them unless, as to them, "the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). </s> [Footnote 3 It may be that a narrowly drawn regulation prohibiting the use of offensive language on broadcasts directed specifically at younger children constitutes one of the "other legitimate proscription[s]" alluded to in Erznoznik. This is so both because of the difficulties inherent in adapting the Miller formulation to communications received by young children, and because such children are "not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of the First Amendment guarantees." Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649 -650 (1968) (STEWART, J., concurring). I doubt, as my Brother STEVENS suggests, ante, at 745 n. 20, that such a limited regulation amounts to a regulation of speech based on its content, since, by hypothesis, the only persons at whom the regulated communication is directed are incapable of evaluating its content. To the extent that such a regulation is viewed as a regulation based on content, it marks the outermost limits to which content regulation is permissible. </s> [Footnote 4 The opinions of my Brothers POWELL and STEVENS rightly refrain from relying on the notion of "spectrum scarcity" to support their result. As Chief Judge Bazelon noted below, "although scarcity has justified increasing the diversity of speakers and speech, it has never been held to justify censorship." 181 U.S. App. D.C., at 152, 556 F.2d, at 29 (emphasis in original). See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396 (1969). </s> [Footnote 5 See, e. g., I Samuel 25:22: "So and more also do God unto the enemies of David, if I leave of all that pertain to him by the morning light any that pisseth against the wall"; II Kings 18:27 and Isaiah 36:12: "[H]ath he not sent me to the men which sit on the wall, that they may eat their own dung, and drink their own piss with you?"; Ezekiel 23:3: "And they committed whoredoms in Egypt; they committed whoredoms in their youth; there were their breasts pressed, and there they bruised the teats of their virginity."; Ezekiel 23:21: "Thus thou calledst to remembrance the lewdnes of thy youth, in bruising thy teats by the Egyptians for the paps of thy youth." The Holy Bible (King James Version) (Oxford 1897). </s> [Footnote 6 Although ultimately dependent upon the outcome of review in this Court, the approach taken by my Brother STEVENS would not appear to tolerate the FCC's suppression of any speech, such as political speech, falling within the core area of First Amendment concern. The same, however, cannot be said of the approach taken by my Brother POWELL, which, on its face, permits the Commission to censor even political speech if it is sufficiently offensive to community standards. A result more contrary to rudimentary First Amendment principles is difficult to imagine. </s> [Footnote 7 Having insisted that it seeks to impose sanctions on radio communications only in the limited circumstances present here, I believe that the FCC is estopped from using either this decision or its own orders in this case, 56 F. C. C. 2d 94 (1975) and 59 F. C. C. 2d 892 (1976), as a basis for imposing sanctions on any public radio broadcast other than one aired during the daytime or early evening and containing the relentless repetition, for longer than a brief interval, of "language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs." 56 F. C. C. 2d, at 98. For surely broadcasters are not now on notice that the Commission desires to regulate any offensive broadcast other than the type of "verbal shock treatment" condemned here, or even this "shock treatment" type of offensive broadcast during the late evening. </s> [Footnote 8 Under the approach taken by my Brother POWELL, the availability of broadcasts about groups whose members constitute such audiences might also be affected. Both news broadcasts about activities involving these groups and public affairs broadcasts about their concerns are apt to contain interviews, statements, or remarks by group leaders and members which may contain offensive language to an extent my Brother POWELL finds unacceptable. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting. </s> The Court today recognizes the wise admonition that we should "avoid the unnecessary decision of [constitutional] issues." Ante, at 734. But it disregards one important application of this salutary principle - the need to construe an Act of Congress so as to avoid, if possible, passing upon its constitutionality. 1 It is apparent that the constitutional questions raised by the order of the Commission in this case are substantial. 2 Before deciding them, we should be certain that it is necessary to do so. [438 U.S. 726, 778] </s> The statute pursuant to which the Commission acted, 18 U.S.C. 1464 (1976 ed.), 3 makes it a federal offense to utter "any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication." The Commission held, and the Court today agrees, that "indecent" is a broader concept than "obscene" as the latter term was defined in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 , because language can be "indecent" although it has social, political, or artistic value and lacks prurient appeal. 56 F. C. C. 2d 94, 97-98. 4 But this construction of 1464, while perhaps plausible, is by no means compelled. To the contrary, I think that "indecent" should properly be read as meaning no more than "obscene." Since the Carlin monologue concededly was not "obscene," I believe that the Commission lacked statutory authority to ban it. Under this construction of the statute, it is unnecessary to address the difficult and important issue of the Commission's constitutional power to prohibit speech that [438 U.S. 726, 779] would be constitutionally protected outside the context of electronic broadcasting. </s> This Court has recently decided the meaning of the term "indecent" in a closely related statutory context. In Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 , the petitioner was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 1461, which prohibits the mailing of "[e]very obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article." The Court "construe[d] the generic terms in [ 1461] to be limited to the sort of `patently offensive representations or descriptions of that specific "hard core" sexual conduct given as examples in Miller v. California.'" 418 U.S., at 114 , quoting United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n. 7. Thus, the clear holding of Hamling is that "indecent" as used in 1461 has the same meaning as "obscene" as that term was defined in the Miller case. See also Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 190 (18 U.S.C. 1465). </s> Nothing requires the conclusion that the word "indecent" has any meaning in 1464 other than that ascribed to the same word in 1461. 5 Indeed, although the legislative history is largely silent, 6 such indications as there are support the view that 1461 and 1464 should be construed similarly. The view that "indecent" means no more than "obscene" in 1461 and similar statutes long antedated Hamling. See United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093 (No. 14,571) (CC SDNY 1879); Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 500 -501; [438 U.S. 726, 780] Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 482 -484, 487 (opinion of Harlan, J.). 7 And although 1461 and 1464 were originally enacted separately, they were codified together in the Criminal Code of 1948 as part of a chapter entitled "Obscenity." There is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that Congress intended that the same word in two closely related sections should have different meanings. See H. R. Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A104-A106 (1947). </s> I would hold, therefore, that Congress intended, by using the word "indecent" in 1464, to prohibit nothing more than obscene speech. 8 Under that reading of the statute, the Commission's order in this case was not authorized, and on that basis I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. </s> [Footnote 1 See, e. g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366 -367; United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 ; Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 569 ; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (Brandeis, J., concurring); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 . </s> [Footnote 2 The practice of construing a statute to avoid a constitutional confrontation is followed whenever there is "`a serious doubt'" as to the [438 U.S. 726, 778] statute's constitutionality. E. g., United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45 ; Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (opinion of Holmes, J.). Thus, the Court has construed a statute to avoid raising a doubt as to its constitutionality even though the Court later in effect held that the statute, otherwise construed, would have been constitutionally valid. Compare General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U.S. 553 , with Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 . </s> [Footnote 3 The Court properly gives no weight to the Commission's passing reference in its order to 47 U.S.C. 303 (g). Ante, at 739 n. 13. For one thing, the order clearly rests only upon the Commission's interpretation of the term "indecent" in 1464; the attempt by the Commission in this Court to assert that 303 (g) was an independent basis for its action must fail. Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 -95; SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 117 -118. Moreover, the general language of 303 (g) cannot be used to circumvent the terms of a specific statutory mandate such as that of 1464. "[T]he Commission's power in this respect is limited by the scope of the statute. Unless the [language] involved here [is] illegal under 1464., the Commission cannot employ the statute to make [it] so by agency action." FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284, 290 . </s> [Footnote 4 The Commission did not rely on 1464's prohibition of "profane" language, and it is thus unnecessary to consider the scope of that term. </s> [Footnote 5 The only Federal Court of Appeals (apart from this case) to consider the question has held that "`obscene' and `indecent' in 1464 are to be read as parts of a single proscription, applicable only if the challenged language appeals to the prurient interest." United States v. Simpson, 561 F.2d 53, 60 (CA7). </s> [Footnote 6 Section 1464 originated as part of 29 of the Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1172, which was re-enacted as 326 of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1091. Neither the committee reports nor the floor debates contain any discussion of the meaning of "obscene, indecent or profane language." </s> [Footnote 7 When the Federal Communications Act was amended in 1968 to prohibit "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent" telephone calls, 82 Stat. 112, 47 U.S.C. 223, the FCC itself indicated that it thought this language covered only "obscene" telephone calls. See H. R. Rep. No. 1109, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 7-8 (1968). </s> [Footnote 8 This construction is further supported by the general rule of lenity in construing criminal statutes. See Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 285 . The Court's statement that it need not consider the meaning 1464 would have in a criminal prosecution, ante, at 739 n. 13, is contrary to settled precedent: </s> "It is true . . . that these are not criminal cases, but it is a criminal statute that we must interpret. There cannot be one construction for the Federal Communications Commission and another for the Department of Justice. If we should give 1464. the broad construction urged by the Commission, the same construction would likewise apply in criminal cases." FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., supra, at 296. </s> [438 U.S. 726, 781]

United States Supreme Court GINSBERG v. NEW YORK(1968) No. 47 Argued: January 16, 1968Decided: April 22, 1968 </s> Appellant, who operates a stationery store and luncheonette, was convicted of selling "girlie" magazines to a 16-year-old boy in violation of 484-h of the New York Penal Law. The statute makes it unlawful "knowingly to sell . . . to a minor" under 17 "(a) any picture . . . which depicts nudity . . . and which is harmful to minors," and "(b) any . . . magazine . . . which contains [such pictures] and which, taken as a whole, is harmful to minors." Appellant's conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court. He was denied leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. Held: </s> 1. The magazines here involved are not obscene for adults and appellant is not barred from selling them to persons 17 years of age or older. Pp. 634-635. </s> 2. Obscenity is not within the area of protected speech or press, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 , and there is no issue here of the obscenity of the material involved as appellant does not argue that the magazines are not "harmful to minors." P. 635. </s> 3. It is not constitutionally impermissible for New York, under this statute, to accord minors under 17 years of age a more restricted right than that assured to adults to judge and determine for themselves what sex material they may read and see. Pp. 637-643. </s> (a) The State has power to adjust the definition of obscenity as applied to minors, for even where there is an invasion of protected freedoms "the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 . Pp. 638-639. </s> (b) Constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in the rearing of their children is basic in our society, and the legislature could properly conclude that those primarily responsible for children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility. P. 639. [390 U.S. 629, 630] </s> (c) The State has an independent interest in protecting the welfare of children and safeguarding them from abuses. Pp. 640-641. </s> (d) This Court cannot say that the statute, in defining obscenity on the basis of its appeal to minors under 17, has no rational relation to the objective of safeguarding such minors from harm. Pp. 641-643. </s> 4. Subsections (f) and (g) of 484-h are not void for vagueness. Pp. 643-645. </s> (a) The New York Court of Appeals, in Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N. Y. 2d 71, 76, 218 N. E. 2d 668, 671, construed the definition of obscenity "harmful to minors" in subsection (f) "as virtually identical to" this Court's most recent statement of the elements of obscenity in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 , and accordingly the definition gives adequate notice of what is prohibited and does not offend due process requirements. P. 643. </s> (b) Since the New York Legislature's attention was drawn to People v. Finkelstein, 9 N. Y. 2d 342, 174 N. E. 2d 470, which defined the nature of scienter for New York's general obscenity statute, when it considered 484-h, it may be inferred that the reference in provision (i) of subsection (g) to knowledge of the "character and content" of the material incorporates the gloss given the term "character" in People v. Finkelstein. P. 644. </s> (c) Provision (ii) of subsection (g) states expressly that a defendant must be acquitted on the ground of "honest mistake" if he proves that he made "a reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of such minor." P. 645. </s> Affirmed. </s> Emanuel Redfield argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Benjamin E. Winston. </s> William Cahn argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was George Danzig Levine. </s> Briefs of amici curiae, urging reversal, were filed by Osmond K. Fraenkel, Edward J. Ennis, Melvin L. Wulf and Alan H. Levine for the American Civil Liberties Union et al., by Morris B. Abram and Jay Greenfield for the Council for Periodical Distributors Associations, Inc., [390 U.S. 629, 631] by Horace S. Manges and Marshall C. Berger for the American Book Publishers Council, Inc., and by Irwin Karp for the Authors League of America, Inc. </s> Brief of amicus curiae, urging affirmance, was filed by Charles H. Keating, Jr., and James J. Clancy for the Citizens for Decent Literature, Inc. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case presents the question of the constitutionality on its face of a New York criminal obscenity statute which prohibits the sale to minors under 17 years of age of material defined to be obscene on the basis of its appeal to them whether or not it would be obscene to adults. </s> Appellant and his wife operate "Sam's Stationery and Luncheonette" in Bellmore, Long Island. They have a lunch counter, and, among other things, also sell magazines including some so-called "girlie" magazines. Appellant was prosecuted under two informations, each in two counts, which charged that he personally sold a 16-year-old boy two "girlie" magazines on each of two dates in October 1965, in violation of 484-h of the New York Penal Law. He was tried before a judge without a jury in Nassau County District Court and was found guilty on both counts. 1 The judge found (1) that the [390 U.S. 629, 632] magazines contained pictures which depicted female "nudity" in a manner defined in subsection 1 (b), that is "the showing of . . . female . . . buttocks with less than a full opaque covering, or the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any portion thereof below the top of the nipple . . .," and (2) that the pictures were "harmful to minors" in that they had, within the meaning of subsection 1 (f) [390 U.S. 629, 633] "that quality of . . . representation . . . of nudity . . . [which] . . . (i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, and (ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and (iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors." He held that both sales to the 16-year-old boy therefore constituted the violation under 484-h of "knowingly to sell . . . to a minor" under 17 of "(a) any picture . . . which depicts nudity . . . and which is harmful to minors," and "(b) any . . . magazine . . . which contains . . . [such pictures] . . . and which, taken as a whole, is harmful to minors." The conviction was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Term, Second Department, of the Supreme Court. Appellant was denied leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals and then appealed to this Court. We noted probable jurisdiction. 388 U.S. 904 . We affirm. 2 </s> [390 U.S. 629, 634] </s> I. </s> The "girlie" picture magazines involved in the sales here are not obscene for adults, Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 . 3 But 484-h does not bar the appellant [390 U.S. 629, 635] from stocking the magazines and selling them to persons 17 years of age or older, and therefore the conviction is not invalid under our decision in Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 . </s> Obscenity is not within the area of protected speech or press. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 . The three-pronged test of subsection 1 (f) for judging the obscenity of material sold to minors under 17 is a variable from the formulation for determining obscenity under Roth stated in the plurality opinion in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 . Appellant's primary attack upon 484-h is leveled at the power of the State to adapt this Memoirs formulation to define the material's obscenity on the basis of its appeal to minors, and thus exclude material so defined from the area of protected expression. He makes no argument that the magazines are not "harmful to minors" within the definition in subsection 1 (f). Thus "[n]o issue is presented . . . concerning the obscenity of the material involved." Roth, supra, at 481, n. 8. </s> The New York Court of Appeals "upheld the Legislature's power to employ variable concepts of obscenity" 4 </s> [390 U.S. 629, 636] in a case in which the same challenge to state power to enact such a law was also addressed to 484-h. Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N. Y. 2d 71, 218 N. E. 2d 668, appeal dismissed for want of a properly presented federal question, sub nom. Bookcase, Inc. v. Leary, 385 U.S. 12 . In sustaining state power to enact the law, the Court of Appeals said, Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, at 75, 218 N. E. 2d, at 671: </s> "[M]aterial which is protected for distribution to adults is not necessarily constitutionally protected from restriction upon its dissemination to children. In other words, the concept of obscenity or of unprotected matter may vary according to the group to whom the questionable material is directed or from whom it is quarantined. Because of the State's exigent interest in preventing distribution to children of objectionable material, it can exercise its power to protect the health, safety, welfare and morals of its community by barring the distribution to children of books recognized to be suitable for adults." </s> Appellant's attack is not that New York was without power to draw the line at age 17. Rather, his contention is the broad proposition that the scope of the constitutional freedom of expression secured to a citizen to read or see material concerned with sex cannot be made to depend upon whether the citizen is an adult or a minor. He accordingly insists that the denial to minors under 17 of access to material condemned by 484-h, insofar as that material is not obscene for persons 17 years of age or older, constitutes an unconstitutional deprivation of protected liberty. </s> We have no occasion in this case to consider the impact of the guarantees of freedom of expression upon the totality of the relationship of the minor and the State, cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 . It is enough for the purposes of this case that we inquire whether it was [390 U.S. 629, 637] constitutionally impermissible for New York, insofar as 484-h does so, to accord minors under 17 a more restricted right than that assured to adults to judge and determine for themselves what sex material they may read or see. We conclude that we cannot say that the statute invades the area of freedom of expression constitutionally secured to minors. 5 </s> Appellant argues that there is an invasion of protected rights under 484-h constitutionally indistinguishable from the invasions under the Nebraska statute forbidding children to study German, which was struck down in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 ; the Oregon statute interfering with children's attendance at private and parochial schools, which was struck down in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 ; and the statute compelling children against their religious scruples to give the flag salute, which was struck down in West Virginia [390 U.S. 629, 638] State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 . We reject that argument. We do not regard New York's regulation in defining obscenity on the basis of its appeal to minors under 17 as involving an invasion of such minors' constitutionally protected freedoms. Rather 484-h simply adjusts the definition of obscenity "to social realities by permitting the appeal of this type of material to be assessed in terms of the sexual interests . . ." of such minors. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 509 ; Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, supra, at 75, 218 N. E. 2d, at 671. That the State has power to make that adjustment seems clear, for we have recognized that even where there is an invasion of protected freedoms "the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults . . . ." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 . 6 In Prince we sustained the conviction [390 U.S. 629, 639] of the guardian of a nine-year-old girl, both members of the sect of Jehovah's Witnesses, for violating the Massachusetts Child Labor Law by permitting the girl to sell the sect's religious tracts on the streets of Boston. </s> The well-being of its children is of course a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate, and, in our view, two interests justify the limitations in 484-h upon the availability of sex material to minors under 17, at least if it was rational for the legislature to find that the minors' exposure to such material might be harmful. First of all, constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society. "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, supra, at 166. The legislature could properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for example, who have this primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility. Indeed, subsection 1 (f) (ii) of 484-h expressly recognizes the parental role in assessing sex-related material harmful to minors according "to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors." Moreover, the prohibition against sales to minors does not bar parents who so desire from purchasing the magazines for their children. 7 </s> [390 U.S. 629, 640] </s> The State also has an independent interest in the well-being of its youth. The New York Court of Appeals squarely bottomed its decision on that interest in Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, supra, at 75, 218 N. E. 2d, at 671. Judge Fuld, now Chief Judge Fuld, also emphasized its significance in the earlier case of People v. Kahan, 15 N. Y. 2d 311, 206 N. E. 2d 333, which had struck down the first version of 484-h on grounds of vagueness. In his concurring opinion, id., at 312, 206 N. E. 2d, at 334, he said: </s> "While the supervision of children's reading may best be left to their parents, the knowledge that parental control or guidance cannot always be provided and society's transcendent interest in protecting the welfare of children justify reasonable regulation of the sale of material to them. It is, therefore, altogether fitting and proper for a state to include in a statute designed to regulate the sale of pornography to children special standards, broader than those embodied in legislation aimed at controlling dissemination of such material to adults." </s> In Prince v. Massachusetts, supra, at 165, this Court, too, recognized that the State has an interest "to protect the welfare of children" and to see that they are "safeguarded from abuses" which might prevent their "growth into free and independent well-developed men [390 U.S. 629, 641] and citizens." The only question remaining, therefore, is whether the New York Legislature might rationally conclude, as it has, that exposure to the materials proscribed by 484-h constitutes such an "abuse." </s> Section 484-e of the law states a legislative finding that the material condemned by 484-h is "a basic factor in impairing the ethical and moral development of our youth and a clear and present danger to the people of the state." It is very doubtful that this finding expresses an accepted scientific fact. 8 But obscenity is not protected expression and may be suppressed without a showing of the circumstances which lie behind the phrase "clear and present danger" in its application to protected speech. Roth v. United States, supra, at 486-487. 9 To sustain state power to exclude material defined as obscenity by 484-h requires only that we be able to say that it was not irrational for the legislature to find that exposure to material condemned by the statute is harmful to minors. In Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, at 400, we were able to say that children's knowledge of the German language "cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful." That cannot be said by us of minors' reading and seeing sex material. To be sure, there is no lack of "studies" which purport to demonstrate that obscenity is or is not "a basic factor in impairing the ethical and moral development of . . . youth and a clear and present [390 U.S. 629, 642] danger to the people of the state." But the growing consensus of commentators is that "while these studies all agree that a causal link has not been demonstrated, they are equally agreed that a causal link has not been disproved either." 10 We do not demand of legislatures [390 U.S. 629, 643] "scientifically certain criteria of legislation." Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110 . We therefore cannot say that 484-h, in defining the obscenity of material on the basis of its appeal to minors under 17, has no rational relation to the objective of safeguarding such minors from harm. </s> II. </s> Appellant challenges subsections (f) and (g) of 484-h as in any event void for vagueness. The attack on subsection (f) is that the definition of obscenity "harmful to minors" is so vague that an honest distributor of publications cannot know when he might be held to have violated 484-h. But the New York Court of Appeals construed this definition to be "virtually identical to the Supreme Court's most recent statement of the elements of obscenity. [Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418," Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, supra, at 76, 218 N. E. 2d, at 672. The definition therefore gives "men in acting adequate notice of what is prohibited" and does not offend the requirements of due process. Roth v. United States, supra, at 492; see also Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 520 . </s> As is required by Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 484 -h prohibits only those sales made "knowingly." The challenge to the scienter requirement of subsection (g) centers on the definition of "knowingly" insofar as it includes "reason to know" or "a belief or ground for belief which warrants further inspection or inquiry of both: (i) the character and content of any material described herein which is reasonably susceptible of examination by the defendant, and (ii) the age of the [390 U.S. 629, 644] minor, provided however, that an honest mistake shall constitute an excuse from liability hereunder if the defendant made a reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of such minor." </s> As to (i), 484-h was passed after the New York Court of Appeals decided People v. Finkelstein, 9 N. Y. 2d 342, 174 N. E. 2d 470, which read the requirement of scienter into New York's general obscenity statute, 1141 of the Penal Law. The constitutional requirement of scienter, in the sense of knowledge of the contents of material, rests on the necessity "to avoid the hazard of self-censorship of constitutionally protected material and to compensate for the ambiguities inherent in the definition of obscenity," Mishkin v. New York, supra, at 511. The Court of Appeals in Finkelstein interpreted 1141 to require "the vital element of scienter" and defined that requirement in these terms: "A reading of the statute [ 1141] as a whole clearly indicates that only those who are in some manner aware of the character of the material they attempt to distribute should be punished. It is not innocent but calculated purveyance of filth which is exorcised . . . ." 9 N. Y. 2d, at 344-345, 174 N. E. 2d, at 471. (Emphasis supplied.) In Mishkin v. New York, supra, at 510-511, we held that a challenge to the validity of 1141 founded on Smith v. California, supra, was foreclosed in light of this construction. When 484-h was before the New York Legislature its attention was directed to People v. Finkelstein, as defining the nature of scienter required to sustain the statute. 1965 N. Y. S. Leg. Ann. 54-56. We may therefore infer that the reference in provision (i) to knowledge of "the character and content of any material described herein" incorporates the gloss given the term "character" in People v. Finkelstein. In that circumstance Mishkin requires rejection of appellant's challenge to provision (i) and makes it unnecessary for [390 U.S. 629, 645] us to define further today "what sort of mental element is requisite to a constitutionally permissible prosecution," Smith v. California, supra, at 154. </s> Appellant also attacks provision (ii) as impermissibly vague. This attack however is leveled only at the proviso according the defendant a defense of "honest mistake" as to the age of the minor. Appellant argues that "the statute does not tell the bookseller what effort he must make before he can be excused." The argument is wholly without merit. The proviso states expressly that the defendant must be acquitted on the ground of "honest mistake" if the defendant proves that he made "a reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of such minor." Cf. 1967 Penal Law 235.22 (2), n. 1, supra. </s> Affirmed. </s> [For concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE HARLAN see post, p. 704.] </s> APPENDIX A TO OPINION OF THE COURT. </s> New York Penal Law 484-h as enacted by L. 1965, c. 327, provides: </s> 484-h. Exposing minors to harmful materials </s> 1. Definitions. As used in this section: </s> (a) "Minor" means any person under the age of seventeen years. </s> (b) "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area or buttocks with less than a full opaque covering, or the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any portion thereof below the top of the nipple, or the depiction of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state. [390 U.S. 629, 646] </s> (c) "Sexual conduct" means acts of masturbation, homosexuality, sexual intercourse, or physical contact with a person's clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks or, if such person be a female, breast. </s> (d) "Sexual excitement" means the condition of human male or female genitals when in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal. </s> (e) "Sado-masochistic abuse" means flagellation or torture by or upon a person clad in undergarments, a mask or bizarre costume, or the condition of being fettered, bound or otherwise physically restrained on the part of one so clothed. </s> (f) "Harmful to minors" means that quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sadomasochistic abuse, when it: </s> (i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, and </s> (ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and </s> (iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors. </s> (g) "Knowingly" means having general knowledge of, or reason to know, or a belief or ground for belief which warrants further inspection or inquiry of both: </s> (i) the character and content of any material described herein which is reasonably susceptible of examination by the defendant, and </s> (ii) the age of the minor, provided however, that an honest mistake shall constitute an excuse from liability hereunder if the defendant made a reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of such minor. [390 U.S. 629, 647] </s> 2. It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to sell or loan for monetary consideration to a minor: </s> (a) any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture film, or similar visual representation or image of a person or portion of the human body which depicts nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which is harmful to minors, or </s> (b) any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter however reproduced, or sound recording which contains any matter enumerated in paragraph (a) of subdivision two hereof, or explicit and detailed verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of sexual excitement, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which, taken as a whole, is harmful to minors. </s> 3. It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to exhibit for a monetary consideration to a minor or knowingly to sell to a minor an admission ticket or pass or knowingly to admit a minor for a monetary consideration to premises whereon there is exhibited, a motion picture, show or other presentation which, in whole or in part, depicts nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which is harmful to minors. </s> 4. A violation of any provision hereof shall constitute a misdemeanor. </s> APPENDIX B TO OPINION OF THE COURT. </s> State obscenity statutes having some provision referring to distribution to minors are: </s> Cal. Pen. Code 311-312 (Supp. 1966); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 40-9-16 to 40-9-27 (1963); Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. 53-243 to 53-245 (Supp. 1965); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, 435, 711-713 (1953); Fla. Stat. Ann. 847.011-847.06 (1965 and Supp. 1968); Ga. Code Ann. 26-6301 to 26-6309a (Supp. 1967); Hawaii Rev. [390 U.S. 629, 648] Laws 267-8 (1955); Idaho Code Ann. 18-1506 to 18-1510 (Supp. 1967); Ill. Ann. Stat., c. 38, 11-20 to 11-21 (Supp. 1967); Iowa Code Ann. 725.4-725.12 (1950); Ky. Rev. Stat. 436.100-436.130, 436.540-436.580 (1963 and Supp. 1966); La. Rev. Stat. 14:91.11, 14:92, 14:106 (Supp. 1967); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, 2901-2905 (1964); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, 417-425 (1957 and Supp. 1967); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., c. 272, 28-33 (1959 and Supp. 1968); Mich. Stat. Ann. 28.575-28.579 (1954 and Supp. 1968); Mo. Ann. Stat. 563.270-563.310 (1953 and Supp. 1967); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. 94-3601 to 94-3606 (1947 and Supp. 1967); Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-926.09 to 28-926.10 (1965 Cum. Supp.); Nev. Rev. Stat. 201.250, 207.180 (1965); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 571-A:1 to 571-A:5 (Supp. 1967); N. J. Stat. Ann. 2A:115-1.1 to 2A:115-4 (Supp. 1967); N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-189 (Supp. 1967); N. D. Cent. Code 12-21-07 to 12-21-09 (1960); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2903.10-2903.11, 2905.34-2905.39 (1954 and Supp. 1966); Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21, 1021-1024, 1032-1039 (1958 and Supp. 1967); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, 3831-3833, 4524 (1963 and Supp. 1967); R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. 11-31-1 to 11-31-10 (1956 and Supp. 1967); S. C. Code Ann. 16-414.1 to 16-421 (1962 and Supp. 1967); Tex. Pen. Code, Arts. 526, 527b (1952 and Supp. 1967); Utah Code Ann. 76-39-5, 76-39-17 (Supp. 1967); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, 2801-2805 (1959); Va. Code Ann. 18.1-227 to 18.1-236.3 (1960 and Supp. 1966); W. Va. Code Ann. 61-8-11 (1966); Wyo. Stat. Ann. 6-103, 7-148 (1957). </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Appellant makes no attack upon 484-h as applied. We therefore have no occasion to consider the sufficiency of the evidence, or such issues as burden of proof, whether expert evidence is either required or permissible, or any other questions which might be pertinent to the application of the statute. Appellant does argue that because the trial judge included a finding that two of the magazines "contained verbal descriptions and narrative accounts of sexual excitement and sexual conduct," an offense not charged in the informations, the conviction must be set aside under Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 . But this case was tried and the appellant [390 U.S. 629, 632] was found guilty only on the charges of selling magazines containing pictures depicting female nudity. It is therefore not a case where defendant was tried and convicted of a violation of one offense when he was charged with a distinctly and substantially different offense. The full text of 484-h is attached as Appendix A. It was enacted in L. 1965, c. 327, to replace an earlier version held invalid by the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Kahan, 15 N. Y. 2d 311, 206 N. E. 2d 333, and People v. Bookcase, Inc., 14 N. Y. 2d 409, 201 N. E. 2d 14. Section 484-h in turn was replaced by L. 1967, c. 791, now 235.20-235.22 of the Penal Law. The major changes under the 1967 law added a provision that the one charged with a violation "is presumed to [sell] with knowledge of the character and content of the material sold . . .," and the provision that "it is an affirmative defense that: (a) The defendant had reasonable cause to believe that the minor involved was seventeen years old or more; and (b) Such minor exhibited to the defendant a draft card, driver's license, birth certificate or other official or apparently official document purporting to establish that such minor was seventeen years old or more." Neither addition is involved in this case. We intimate no view whatever upon the constitutional validity of the presumption. See in general Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 ; Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 ; 41 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 791 (1966); 30 Albany L. Rev. 133 (1966). The 1967 law also repealed outright 484-i which had been enacted one week after 484-h. L. 1965, c. 327. It forbade sales to minors under the age of 18. The New York Court of Appeals sustained its validity against a challenge that it was void for vagueness. People v. Tannenbaum, 18 N. Y. 2d 268, 220 N. E. 2d 783. For an analysis of 484-i and a comparison with 484-h see 33 Brooklyn L. Rev. 329 (1967). </s> [Footnote 2 The case is not moot. The appellant might have been sentenced to one year's imprisonment, or a $500 fine or both. N. Y. Penal Law 1937. The trial judge however exercised authority under N. Y. Penal Law 2188 and on May 17, 1966, suspended sentence on all counts. Under 470-a of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure, the judge could thereafter recall appellant and impose sentence only within one year, or before May 17, 1967. The judge did not do so. Although St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41 , held that a criminal case had become moot when the petitioner finished serving his sentence before direct review in this Court, St. Pierre also recognized that the case would not have been moot had "petitioner shown that under either state or federal law further penalties or disabilities can be imposed on him as result of the judgment which has now been satisfied." Id., at 43. The State of New York concedes in its brief in this Court addressed to mootness "that certain disabilities do flow from the conviction." The brief states that among these is "the possibility of ineligibility for licensing under state and municipal license laws regulating various lawful occupations . . . ." Since the argument, the parties advised the Court that, although this is the first time appellant has been convicted of any [390 U.S. 629, 634] crime, this conviction might result in the revocation of the license required by municipal law as a prerequisite to engaging in the luncheonette business he carries on in Bellmore, New York. Bellmore is an "unincorporated village" within the Town of Hempstead, Long Island, 1967 N. Y. S. Leg. Man. 1154. The town has a licensing ordinance which provides that the "Commissioner of Buildings . . . may suspend or revoke any license issued, in his discretion, for . . . (e) conviction of any crime." LL 21, Town of Hempstead, eff. December 1, 1966, 8.1 (e). In these circumstances the case is not moot since the conviction may entail collateral consequences sufficient to bring the case within the St. Pierre exception. See Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 220 -222. We were not able to reach that conclusion in Tannenbaum v. New York, 388 U.S. 439 , or Jacobs v. New York, 388 U.S. 431 , in which the appeals were dismissed as moot. In Tannenbaum there was no contention that the convictions under the now repealed 484-i entailed any collateral consequences. In Jacobs the appeal was dismissed on motion of the State which alleged, inter alia, that New York law did not impose "any further penalty upon conviction of the misdemeanor here in issue." Appellant did not there show, or contend, that his license might be revoked for "conviction of any crime"; he asserted only that the conviction might be the basis of a suspension under a provision of the Administrative Code of the City of New York requiring the Department of Licenses to assure that motion picture theaters are not conducted in a manner offensive to "public morals." </s> [Footnote 3 One of the magazines was an issue of the magazine "Sir." We held in Gent v. Arkansas, decided with Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 , that an Arkansas statute which did not reflect a specific and limited state concern for juveniles was unconstitutional insofar as it was applied to suppress distribution of another issue of that magazine. Other cases which turned on findings of nonobscenity of this type of magazine include: Central Magazine Sales, Ltd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 50 ; Conner v. City of Hammond, 389 U.S. 48 ; Potomac News Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 47 ; Mazes v. Ohio, 388 U.S. 453 ; A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 388 U.S. 452 ; Books, Inc. v. United States, 388 U.S. 449 ; Aday v. United States, [390 U.S. 629, 635] 388 U.S. 447 ; Avansino v. New York, 388 U.S. 446 ; Sheperd v. New York, 388 U.S. 444 ; Friedman v. New York, 388 U.S. 441 ; Keney v. New York, 388 U.S. 440 ; see also Rosenbloom v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 450 ; Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 . </s> [Footnote 4 People v. Tannenbaum, 18 N. Y. 2d 268, 270, 220 N. E. 2d 783, 785, dismissed as moot, 388 U.S. 439 . The concept of variable obscenity is developed in Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 5 (1960). At 85 the authors state: "Variable obscenity . . . furnishes a useful analytical tool for dealing with the problem of denying adolescents access to material aimed at a primary audience of sexually mature adults. For variable obscenity focuses attention upon the make-up of primary and peripheral audiences in varying circumstances, and provides a reasonably satisfactory means for delineating the obscene in each circumstance." </s> [Footnote 5 Suggestions that legislatures might give attention to laws dealing specifically with safeguarding children against pornographic material have been made by many judges and commentators. See, e. g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (opinion of JUSTICES BRENNAN and Goldberg); id., at 201 (dissenting opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 498 , n. 1 (dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE STEWART); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 366 F.2d 590, 593; In re Louisiana News Co., 187 F. Supp. 241, 247; United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156; United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564; R. Kuh, Foolish Figleaves? 258-260 (1967); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L. J. 877, 939 (1963); Gerber, A Suggested Solution to the Riddle of Obscenity, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 834, 848 (1964); Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 Col. L. Rev. 391, 413, n. 68 (1963); Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 7; Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 7, 75. The obscenity laws of 35 other States include provisions referring to minors. The laws are listed in Appendix B to this opinion. None is a precise counterpart of New York's 484-h and we imply no view whatever on questions of their constitutionality. </s> [Footnote 6 Many commentators, including many committed to the proposition that "[n]o general restriction on expression in terms of `obscenity' can . . . be reconciled with the first amendment," recognize that "the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults," and accordingly acknowledge a supervening state interest in the regulation of literature sold to children, Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L. J. 877, 938, 939 (1963): "Different factors come into play, also, where the interest at stake is the effect of erotic expression upon children. The world of children is not strictly part of the adult realm of free expression. The factor of immaturity, and perhaps other considerations, impose different rules. Without attempting here to formulate the principles relevant to freedom of expression for children, it suffices to say that regulations of communication addressed to them need not conform to the requirements of the first amendment in the same way as those applicable to adults." See also Gerber, supra, at 848; Kalven, supra, at 7; Magrath, supra, at 75. Prince v. Massachusetts is urged to be constitutional authority for such regulation. See, e. g., Kuh, supra, at 258-260; [390 U.S. 629, 639] Comment, Exclusion of Children from Violent Movies, 67 Col. L. Rev. 1149, 1159-1160 (1967); Note, Constitutional Problems in Obscenity Legislation Protecting Children, 54 Geo. L. J. 1379 (1966). </s> [Footnote 7 One commentator who argues that obscenity legislation might be constitutionally defective as an imposition of a single standard of public morality would give effect to the parental role and accept [390 U.S. 629, 640] laws relating only to minors. Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 Col. L. Rev. 391, 413, n. 68 (1963): "One must consider also how much difference it makes if laws are designed to protect only the morals of a child. While many of the constitutional arguments against morals legislation apply equally to legislation protecting the morals of children, one can well distinguish laws which do not impose a morality on children, but which support the right of parents to deal with the morals of their children as they see fit." See also Elias, Sex Publications and Moral Corruption: The Supreme Court Dilemma, 9 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 302, 320-321 (1967). </s> [Footnote 8 Compare Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S., at 424 (opinion of DOUGLAS, J.) with id., at 441 (opinion of Clark, J.). See Kuh, supra, cc. 18-19; Gaylin, Book Review, 77 Yale L. J. 579, 591-595 (1968); Magrath, supra, at 52. </s> [Footnote 9 Our conclusion in Roth, at 486-487, that the clear and present danger test was irrelevant to the determination of obscenity made it unnecessary in that case to consider the debate among the authorities whether exposure to pornography caused antisocial consequences. See also Mishkin v. New York, supra; Ginzburg v. United States, supra; Memoirs v. Massachusetts, supra. </s> [Footnote 10 Magrath, supra, at 52. See, e. g., id., at 49-56; Dibble, Obscenity: A State Quarantine to Protect Children, 39 So. Cal. L. Rev. 345 (1966); Wall, Obscenity and Youth: The Problem and a Possible Solution, Crim. L. Bull., Vol. 1, No. 8, pp. 28, 30 (1965); Note, 55 Cal. L. Rev. 926, 934 (1967); Comment, 34 Ford. L. Rev. 692, 694 (1966). See also J. Paul & M. Schwartz, Federal Censorship: Obscenity in the Mail, 191-192; Blakey, Book Review, 41 Notre Dame Law. 1055, 1060, n. 46 (1966); Green, Obscenity, Censorship, and Juvenile Delinquency, 14 U. Toronto L. Rev. 229, 249 (1962); Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 295, 373-385 (1954); Note, 52 Ky. L. J. 429, 447 (1964). But despite the vigor of the ongoing controversy whether obscene material will perceptibly create a danger of antisocial conduct, or will probably induce its recipients to such conduct, a medical practitioner recently suggested that the possibility of harmful effects to youth cannot be dismissed as frivolous. Dr. Gaylin of the Columbia University Psychoanalytic Clinic, reporting on the views of some psychiatrists in 77 Yale L. J., at 592-593, said: "It is in the period of growth [of youth] when these patterns of behavior are laid down, when environmental stimuli of all sorts must be integrated into a workable sense of self, when sensuality is being defined and fears elaborated, when pleasure confronts security and impulse encounters control - it is in this period, undramatically and with time, that legalized pornography may conceivably be damaging." Dr. Gaylin emphasizes that a child might not be as well prepared as an adult to make an intelligent choice as to the material he chooses to read: "[P]sychiatrists . . . made a distinction between the reading of pornography, as unlikely to be per se harmful, and the permitting of the reading of pornography, which was conceived as potentially destructive. The child is protected in his reading of pornography by the knowledge that it is pornographic, i. e., disapproved. It is outside of parental standards and not a part of his identification [390 U.S. 629, 643] processes. To openly permit implies parental approval and even suggests seductive encouragement. If this is so of parental approval, it is equally so of societal approval - another potent influence on the developing ego." Id., at 594. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring in the result. </s> A doctrinaire, knee-jerk application of the First Amendment would, of course, dictate the nullification of [390 U.S. 629, 649] this New York statute. 1 But that result is not required, I think, if we bear in mind what it is that the First Amendment protects. </s> The First Amendment guarantees liberty of human expression in order to preserve in our Nation what Mr. Justice Holmes called a "free trade in ideas." 2 To that end, the Constitution protects more than just a man's freedom to say or write or publish what he wants. It secures as well the liberty of each man to decide for himself what he will read and to what he will listen. The Constitution guarantees, in short, a society of free choice. Such a society presupposes the capacity of its members to choose. </s> When expression occurs in a setting where the capacity to make a choice is absent, government regulation of that expression may co-exist with and even implement First Amendment guarantees. So it was that this Court sustained a city ordinance prohibiting people from imposing their opinions on others "by way of sound trucks with loud and raucous noises on city streets." 3 And so it was that my Brothers BLACK and DOUGLAS thought that the First Amendment itself prohibits a person from foisting his uninvited views upon the members of a captive audience. 4 </s> I think a State may permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child 5 - like someone in a captive audience - is not possessed of that [390 U.S. 629, 650] full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees. It is only upon such a premise, I should suppose, that a State may deprive children of other rights - the right to marry, for example, or the right to vote - deprivations that would be constitutionally intolerable for adults. 6 </s> I cannot hold that this state law, on its face, 7 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. </s> [Footnote 1 The First Amendment is made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 . </s> [Footnote 2 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (dissenting opinion). </s> [Footnote 3 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86 . </s> [Footnote 4 Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 466 (dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK), 467 (dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS). </s> [Footnote 5 The appellant does not challenge New York's power to draw the line at age 17, and I intimate no view upon that question. </s> [Footnote 6 Compare Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 ; Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 . </s> [Footnote 7 As the Court notes, the appellant makes no argument that the material in this case was not "harmful to minors" within the statutory definition, or that the statute was unconstitutionally applied. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs, dissenting. </s> While I would be willing to reverse the judgment on the basis of Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 , for the reasons stated by my Brother FORTAS, my objections strike deeper. </s> If we were in the field of substantive due process and seeking to measure the propriety of state law by the standards of the Fourteenth Amendment, I suppose there would be no difficulty under our decisions in sustaining this act. For there is a view held by many that the so-called "obscene" book or tract or magazine has a deleterious effect upon the young, although I seriously doubt the wisdom of trying by law to put the fresh, evanescent, natural blossoming of sex in the category of "sin." </s> That, however, was the view of our preceptor in this field, Anthony Comstock, who waged his war against "obscenity" from the year 1872 until his death in 1915. Some of his views are set forth in his book Traps for the Young, first published in 1883, excerpts from which I set out in Appendix I to this opinion. [390 U.S. 629, 651] </s> The title of the book refers to "traps" created by Satan "for boys and girls especially." Comstock, of course, operated on the theory that every human has an "inborn tendency toward wrongdoing which is restrained mainly by fear of the final judgment." In his view any book which tended to remove that fear is a part of the "trap" which Satan created. Hence, Comstock would have condemned a much wider range of literature than the present Court is apparently inclined to do. 1 </s> It was Comstock who was responsible for the Federal Anti-Obscenity Act of March 3, 1873. 17 Stat. 598. It was he who was also responsible for the New York Act which soon followed. He was responsible for the organization of the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice, which by its act of incorporation was granted onehalf of the fines levied on people successfully prosecuted by the Society or its agents. </s> I would conclude from Comstock and his Traps for the Young and from other authorities that a legislature could not be said to be wholly irrational 2 (Ferguson [390 U.S. 629, 652] v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 ; and see Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 ; Daniel v. Family Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 ; Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 ) if it decided that sale of "obscene" material to the young should be banned. 3 </s> The problem under the First Amendment, however, has always seemed to me to be quite different. For its mandate (originally applicable only to the Federal Government but now applicable to the States as well by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment) is directed to any law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." I appreciate that there are those who think that [390 U.S. 629, 653] "obscenity" is impliedly excluded; but I have indicated on prior occasions why I have been unable to reach that conclusion. 4 See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 , [390 U.S. 629, 654] 482 (dissenting opinion); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508 (dissenting opinion). And the corollary of that view, as I expressed it in Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 , 468 (dissenting opinion), is that Big Brother can no more say what a person shall listen to or read than he can say what shall be published. </s> This is not to say that the Court and Anthony Comstock are wrong in concluding that the kind of literature New York condemns does harm. As a matter of fact, the notion of censorship is founded on the belief that speech and press sometimes do harm and therefore can be regulated. I once visited a foreign nation where the regime of censorship was so strict that all I could find in the bookstalls were tracts on religion and tracts on mathematics. Today the Court determines the constitutionality of New York's law regulating the sale of literature to children on the basis of the reasonableness of the law in light of the welfare of the child. If the problem of state and federal regulation of "obscenity" is in the field of substantive due process, I see no reason to limit the legislatures to protecting children alone. The "juvenile delinquents" I have known are mostly over [390 U.S. 629, 655] 50 years of age. If rationality is the measure of the validity of this law, then I can see how modern Anthony Comstocks could make out a case for "protecting" many groups in our society, not merely children. </s> While I find the literature and movies which come to us for clearance exceedingly dull and boring, I understand how some can and do become very excited and alarmed and think that something should be done to stop the flow. It is one thing for parents 5 and the religious organizations to be active and involved. It is quite a different matter for the state to become implicated as a censor. As I read the First Amendment, it was designed to keep the state and the hands of all state officials off the printing presses of America and off the distribution systems for all printed literature. Anthony Comstock wanted it the other way; he indeed put the police and prosecutor in the middle of this publishing business. </s> I think it would require a constitutional amendment to achieve that result. If there were a constitutional amendment, perhaps the people of the country would come up with some national board of censorship. Censors are, of course, propelled by their own neuroses. 6 </s> [390 U.S. 629, 656] That is why a universally accepted definition of obscenity is impossible. Any definition is indeed highly subjective, turning on the neurosis of the censor. Those who have a deep-seated, subconscious conflict may well become either great crusaders against a particular kind of literature or avid customers of it. 7 That, of course, is the danger of letting any group of citizens be the judges of what other people, young or old, should read. Those would be issues to be canvassed and debated in case of a constitutional amendment creating a regime of censorship in the country. And if the people, in their wisdom, launched us on that course, it would be a considered choice. </s> Today this Court sits as the Nation's board of censors. With all respect, I do not know of any group in the country less qualified first, to know what obscenity is when they see it, and second, to have any considered judgment as to what the deleterious or beneficial impact of a particular publication may be on minds either young or old. </s> I would await a constitutional amendment that authorized the modern Anthony Comstocks to censor literature before publishers, authors, or distributors can be fined or jailed for what they print or sell. </s> APPENDIX I TO OPINION OF MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, DISSENTING. </s> A. COMSTOCK, TRAPS FOR THE YOUNG 20-22 (1883). </s> And it came to pass that as Satan went to and fro upon the earth, watching his traps and rejoicing over [390 U.S. 629, 657] his numerous victims, he found room for improvement in some of his schemes. The daily press did not meet all his requirements. The weekly illustrated papers of crime would do for young men and sports, for brothels, gin-mills, and thieves' resorts, but were found to be so gross, so libidinous, so monstrous, that every decent person spurned them. They were excluded from the home on sight. They were too high-priced for children, and too cumbersome to be conveniently hid from the parent's eye or carried in the boy's pocket. So he resolved to make another trap for boys and girls especially. </s> He also resolved to make the most of these vile illustrated weekly papers, by lining the news-stands and shop-windows along the pathway of the children from home to school and church, so that they could not go to and from these places of instruction without giving him opportunity to defile their pure minds by flaunting these atrocities before their eyes. </s> And Satan rejoiced greatly that professing Christians were silent and apparently acquiesced in his plans. He found that our most refined men and women went freely to trade with persons who displayed these traps for sale; that few, if any, had moral courage to enter a protest against this public display of indecencies, and scarcely one in all the land had the boldness to say to the dealer in filth, "I will not give you one cent of my patronage so long as you sell these devil-traps to ruin the young." And he was proud of professing Christians and respectable citizens on this account, and caused honorable mention to be made of them in general order to his imps, because of the quiet and orderly assistance thus rendered him. </s> Satan stirred up certain of his willing tools on earth by the promise of a few paltry dollars to improve greatly on the death-dealing quality of the weekly death-traps, and forthwith came a series of new snares of fascinating [390 U.S. 629, 658] construction, small and tempting in price, and baited with high-sounding names. These sure-ruin traps comprise a large variety of half-dime novels, five and ten cent story papers, and low-priced pamphlets for boys and girls. </s> This class includes the silly, insipid tale, the coarse, slangy story in the dialect of the barroom, the blood-and-thunder romance of border life, and the exaggerated details of crimes, real and imaginary. Some have highly colored sensational reports of real crimes, while others, and by far the larger number, deal with most improbable creations of fiction. The unreal far outstrips the real. Crimes are gilded, and lawlessness is painted to resemble valor, making a bid for bandits, brigands, murderers, thieves, and criminals in general. Who would go to the State prison, the gambling saloon, or the brothel to find a suitable companion for the child? Yet a more insidious foe is selected when these stories are allowed to become associates for the child's mind and to shape and direct the thoughts. </s> The finest fruits of civilization are consumed by these vermin. Nay, these products of corrupt minds are the eggs from which all kinds of villainies are hatched. Put the entire batch of these stories together, and I challenge the publishers and vendors to show a single instance where any boy or girl has been elevated in morals, or where any noble or refined instinct has been developed by them. </s> The leading character in many, if not in the vast majority of these stories, is some boy or girl who possesses usually extraordinary beauty of countenance, the most superb clothing, abundant wealth, the strength of a giant, the agility of a squirrel, the cunning of a fox, the brazen effrontery of the most daring villain, and who is utterly destitute of any regard for the laws of God or man. Such a one is foremost among desperadoes, the companion and [390 U.S. 629, 659] beau-ideal of maidens, and the high favorite of some rich person, who by his patronage and indorsement lifts the young villain into lofty positions in society, and provides liberally of his wealth to secure him immunity for his crimes. These stories link the pure maiden with the most foul and loathsome criminals. Many of them favor violation of marriage laws and cheapen female virtue. </s> APPENDIX II TO OPINION OF MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, DISSENTING. </s> A SPECIAL TO THE WASHINGTON POST [March 3, 1968] </s> by </s> AUSTIN C. WEHRWEIN </s> White Bear Lake, Minn., March 2. - Faced with the threat of a law suit, the school board in this community of 12,000 north of St. Paul is reviewing its mandatory sex education courses, but officials expressed fear that they couldn't please everybody. </s> Mothers threatened to picket and keep their children home when sex education films are scheduled. Mrs. Robert Murphy, the mother of five who led the protests, charged that the elementary school "took the privacy out of marriage." </s> "Now," she said, "our kids know what a shut bedroom door means. The program is taking their childhood away. The third graders went in to see a movie on birth and came out adults." </s> She said second-grade girls have taken to walking around with "apples and oranges under their blouses." Her seventh-grade son was given a study sheet on menstruation, she said, demanding "why should a seventh-grade boy have to know about menstruation?" </s> Mrs. Murphy, who fears the program will lead to experimentation, [390 U.S. 629, 660] said that it was "pagan" and argued that even animals don't teach their young those things "before they're ready." </s> "One boy in our block told his mother, `Guess what, next week our teacher's gonna tell us how daddy fertilized you,'" reported Mrs. Martin Capeder. "They don't need to know all that." </s> But Norman Jensen, principal of Lincoln School, said that the program, which runs from kindergarten through the 12th grade, was approved by the school district's PTA council, the White Bear Lake Ministerial Association and the district school board. It was based, he said, on polls that showed 80 per cent of the children got no home sex education, and the curriculum was designed to be "matter-of-fact." </s> The protesting parents insisted they had no objection to sex education as such, but some said girls should not get it until age 12, and boys only at age 15 - "or when they start shaving." </s> (In nearby St. Paul Park, 71 parents have formed a group called "Concerned Parents Against Sex Education" and are planning legal action to prevent sex education from kindergarten through seventh grade. They have also asked equal time with the PTAs of eight schools in the district "to discuss topics such as masturbation, contraceptives, unqualified instructors, religious belief, morality and attitudes.") </s> The White Bear protesters have presented the school board with a list of terms and definitions deemed objectionable. Designed for the seventh grade, it included vagina, clitoris, erection, intercourse and copulation. A film, called "Fertilization and Birth" depicts a woman giving birth. It has been made optional after being shown to all classes. </s> Mrs. Ginny McKay, a president of one of the local PTAs defended the program, saying "Sex is a natural and [390 U.S. 629, 661] beautiful thing. We (the PTA) realized that the parents had to get around to where the kids have been for a long time." </s> But Mrs. Murphy predicted this result: "Instead of 15 [sic] and 15-year-old pregnant girls, they'll have 12 and 13-year-old pregnant girls." </s> APPENDIX III TO OPINION OF MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, DISSENTING. </s> (A). T. SCHROEDER, OBSCENE LITERATURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 277-278 (1911). </s> It thus appears that the only unifying element generalized in the word "obscene," (that is, the only thing common to every conception of obscenity and indecency), is subjective, is an affiliated emotion of disapproval. This emotion under varying circumstances of temperament and education in different persons, and in the same person in different stages of development, is aroused by entirely different stimuli, and by fear of the judgment of others, and so has become associated with an infinite variety of ever-changing objectives, with not even one common characteristic in objective nature; that is, in literature or art. </s> Since few men have identical experiences, and fewer still evolve to an agreement in their conceptional and emotional associations, it must follow that practically none have the same standards for judging the "obscene," even when their conclusions agree. The word "obscene," like such words as delicate, ugly, lovable, hateful, etc., is an abstraction not based upon a reasoned, nor sense-perceived, likeness between objectives, but the selection or classification under it is made, on the basis of similarity in the emotions aroused, by an infinite variety of images; and every classification thus made, in turn, depends in each person upon his fears, his hopes, his [390 U.S. 629, 662] prior experience, suggestions, education, and the degree of neuro-sexual or psycho-sexual health. Because it is a matter wholly of emotions, it has come to be that "men think they know because they feel, and are firmly convinced because strongly agitated." </s> This, then, is a demonstration that obscenity exists only in the minds and emotions of those who believe in it, and is not a quality of a book or picture. Since, then, the general conception "obscene" is devoid of every objective element of unification; and since the subjective element, the associated emotion, is indefinable from its very nature, and inconstant as to the character of the stimulus capable of arousing it, and variable and immeasurable as to its relative degrees of intensity, it follows that the "obscene" is incapable of accurate definition or a general test adequate to secure uniformity of result, in its application by every person, to each book of doubtful "purity." </s> Being so essentially and inextricably involved with human emotions that no man can frame such a definition of the word "obscene," either in terms of the qualities of a book, or such that, by it alone, any judgment whatever is possible, much less is it possible that by any such alleged "test" every other man must reach the same conclusion about the obscenity of every conceivable book. Therefore, the so-called judicial "tests" of obscenity are not standards of judgment, but, on the contrary, by every such "test" the rule of decision is itself uncertain, and in terms invokes the varying experiences of the test[e]rs within the foggy realm of problematical speculation about psychic tendencies, without the help of which the "test" itself is meaningless and useless. It follows that to each person the "test," of criminality, which should be a general standard of judgment, unavoidably becomes a personal and particular standard, differing in all persons [390 U.S. 629, 663] according to those varying experiences which they read into the judicial "test." It is this which makes uncertain, and, therefore, all the more objectionable, all the present laws against obscenity. Later it will be shown that this uncertainty in the criteria of guilt renders these laws unconstitutional. </s> (B). KALLEN, THE ETHICAL ASPECTS OF CENSORSHIP, IN 5 SOCIAL MEANING OF LEGAL CONCEPTS 34, 50-51 (N. Y. U. 1953). </s> To this authoritarian's will, difference is the same thing as inferiority, wickedness and corruption; he can apprehend it only as a devotion to error and a commitment to sin. He can acknowledge it only if he attributes to it moral turpitude and intellectual vice. Above all, difference must be for him, by its simple existence, an aggression against the good, the true, the beautiful and the right. His imperative is to destroy it; if he cannot destroy it, to contain it; if he cannot contain it, to hunt it down, cut it off and shut it out. </s> Certain schools of psychology suggest that this aggression is neither simple nor wholly aggression. They suggest that it expresses a compulsive need to bring to open contemplation the secret parts of the censor's psychosomatic personality, and a not less potent need to keep the secret and not suffer the shamefaced dishonor of their naked exposures. The censor's activities, in that they call for a constant public preoccupation with such secret parts, free his psyche from the penalties of such concern while transvaluing at the same time his pursuit and inspection of the obscene, the indecent, the pornographic, the blasphemous and the otherwise shameful into an honorable defense of the public morals. The censor, by purporting, quite unconscious of his actual dynamic, to protect the young from corruption, frees his consciousness [390 U.S. 629, 664] to dwell upon corruption without shame or dishonor. Thus, Anthony Comstock could say with overt sincerity: "When the genius of the arts produces obscene, lewd and lascivious ideas, the deadly effect upon the young is just as perceptible as when the same ideas are represented by gross experience in prose and poetry. . . . If through the eye and ear the sensuous book, picture or story is allowed to enter, the thoughts will be corrupted, the conscience seared, so such things reproduced by fancy in the thoughts awaken forces for evil which will explode with irresistible force carrying to destruction every human safeguard to virtue and honor." Did not evil Bernard Shaw, who gave the English language the word comstockery, declare himself, in his preface to The Shewing-Up of Blanco Posnet, "a specialist in immoral, heretical plays . . . to force the public to reconsider its morals"? So the brave Comstock passionately explored and fought the outer expressions of the inner forces of evil and thus saved virtue and honor from destruction. </s> But could this observation of his be made, save on the basis of introspection and not the scientific study of others? For such a study would reveal, for each single instance of which it was true, hundreds of thousands of others of which it was false. Like the correlation of misfortune with the sixth day of the week or the number 13, this basic comstockery signalizes a fear-projected superstition. It is an externalization of anxiety and fear, not a fact objectively studied and appraised. And the anxiety and fear are reaction-formations of the censor's inner self. </s> Of course, this is an incomplete description of the motivation and logic of censorship. In the great censorial establishments of the tradition, these more or less unconscious drives are usually items of a syndrome whose dominants are either greed for pelf, power, and prestige, reinforced by anxiety that they might be lost, [390 U.S. 629, 665] or anxiety that they might be lost reinforced by insatiable demands for more. </s> Authoritarian societies usually insure these goods by means of a prescriptive creed and code for which their rulers claim supernatural origins and supernatural sanctions. The enforcement of the prescriptions is not entrusted to a censor alone. The ultimate police-power is held by the central hierarchy, and the censorship of the arts is only one department of the thought-policing. </s> (C). CRAWFORD, LITERATURE AND THE PSYCHOPATHIC, 10 PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW 440, 445-446 (1923). </s> Objection, then, to modern works on the ground that they are, in the words of the objectors, "immoral," is made principally on the basis of an actual desire to keep sexual psychopathies intact, or to keep the general scheme of repression, which inevitably involves psychopathic conditions, intact. The activities of persons professionally or otherwise definitely concerned with censorship furnish proof evident enough to the student of such matters that they themselves are highly abnormal. It is safe to say that every censorship has a psychopath back of it. </s> Carried to a logical end, censorship would inevitably destroy all literary art. Every sexual act is an instinctive feeling out for an understanding of life. Literary art, like every other type of creative effort, is a form of sublimation. It is a more conscious seeking for the same understanding that the common man instinctively seeks. The literary artist, having attained understanding, communicates that understanding to his readers. That understanding, whether of sexual or other matters, is certain to come into conflict with popular beliefs, fears, and taboos because these are, for the most part, based on error. . . . [T]he presence of an opinion concerning which one thinks it would be unprofitable, immoral, or [390 U.S. 629, 666] unwise to inquire is, of itself, strong evidence that that opinion is nonrational. Most of the more deep-seated convictions of the human race belong to this category. Anyone who is seeking for understanding is certain to encounter this nonrational attitude. </s> The act of sublimation on the part of the writer necessarily involves an act of sublimation on the part of the reader. The typical psychopathic patient and the typical public have alike a deep-rooted unconscious aversion to sublimation. Inferiority and other complexes enter in to make the individual feel that acts of sublimation would destroy his comfortable, though illusory, sense of superiority. Again, there is the realization on the part of the mass of people that they are unable to sublimate as the artist does, and to admit his power and right to do so involves destruction of the specious sense of superiority to him. It is these two forms of aversion to sublimation which account for a considerable part of public objection to the arts. The common man and his leader, the psychopathic reformer, are aiming unconsciously at leveling humanity to a plane of pathological mediocrity. </s> To the student of abnormal psychology the legend, popular literature, and literature revelatory of actual life, are all significant. In the legend he finds race taboos, in the popular literature of the day he discovers this reinforced by the mass of contemporary and local taboos, in literature that aims to be realistically revelatory of life he finds material for study such as he can hardly obtain from any group of patients. The frankness which he seeks in vain from the persons with whom he comes into personal contact, he can find in literature. It is a field in which advances may be made comparable to the advances of actual scientific research. </s> Moreover, the student of abnormal psychology will commend realistic, revelatory literature not only to his [390 U.S. 629, 667] patients, who are suffering from specific psychopathic difficulties, but to the public generally. He will realize that it is one of the most important factors in the development of human freedom. No one is less free than primitive man. The farther we can get from the attitude of the legend and its slightly more civilized successor, popular literature, the nearer we shall be to a significant way of life. </s> (D). J. RINALDO, PSYCHOANALYSIS OF THE "REFORMER" 56-60 (1921). </s> The other aspect of the humanist movement is a very sour and disgruntled puritanism, which seems at first glance to protest and contradict every step in the libidinous development. As a matter of fact it is just as much an hysterical outburst as the most sensuous flesh masses of Rubens, or the sinuous squirming lines of Louis XV decoration. Both are reactions to the same morbid past experience. </s> The Puritan like the sensualist rebels at the very beginning against the restraint of celibacy. Unfortunately, however, he finds himself unable to satisfy the libido in either normal gratification or healthy converted activities. His condition is as much one of super-excitement as that of the libertine. Unable to find satisfaction in other ways, from which for one reason or another he is inhibited, he develops a morbid irritation, contradicting, breaking, prohibiting and thwarting the manifestations of the very exciting causes. </s> Not being able to produce beautiful things he mars them, smashing stained glass windows, destroying sculptures, cutting down May-poles, forbidding dances, clipping the hair, covering the body with hideous misshapen garments and silencing laughter and song. He cannot build so he must destroy. He cannot create so he hinders creation. He is a sort of social abortionist and like an [390 U.S. 629, 668] abortionist only comes into his own when there is an illegitimate brat to be torn from the womb. He cries against sin, but it is the pleasure of sin rather than the sin he fights. It is the enjoyment he is denied that he hates. </s> From no age or clime or condition is he absent; but never is he a dominant and deciding factor in society till that society has passed the bounds of sanity. Those who wait the midwife never call in the abortionist, nor does he ever cure the real sickness of his age. That he does survive abnormal periods to put his impress on the repressions of later days is due to the peculiar economy of his behavior. The libertine destroys himself, devouring his substance in self-satisfaction. The reformer devours others, being somewhat in the nature of a tax on vice, living by the very hysteria that destroys his homologous opposite. </s> In our own day we have reached another of those critical periods strikingly similar in its psychological symptoms and reactions, at least, to decadent Rome. We have the same development of extravagant religious cults, Spiritism, Dowieism, "The Purple Mother," all eagerly seized upon, filling the world with clamor and frenzy; the same mad seeking for pleasure, the same breaking and scattering of forms, the same orgy of gluttony and extravagance, the same crude emotionalism in art, letter and the theater, the same deformed and inverted sexual life. </s> Homo-sexualism may not be openly admitted, but the "sissy" and his red necktie are a familiar and easily understood property of popular jest and pantomime. It is all a mad jazz jumble of hysterical incongruities, dog dinners, monkey marriages, cubism, birth control, feminism, free-love, verse libre, and moving pictures. Through it all runs the strident note of puritanism. As one grows so does the other. Neither seems to precede or follow. [390 U.S. 629, 669] </s> It would be a rash man indeed who would attempt to give later beginnings to the reform movements than to the license they seem so strongly to contradict. Significant indeed is the fact that their very license is the strongest appeal of the reformer. Every movie must preach a sermon and have a proper ending, but the attempted rape is as seldom missing as the telephone; and it is this that thrills and is expected to thrill. </s> The same sexual paradox we saw in the eunuch priests and harlot priestesses of Isis we see in the vice-crusading, vice-pandering reformers. Back of it all lies a morbid sexual condition, which is as much behind the anti-alcoholism of the prohibitionist, as behind the cropped head of his puritan father, and as much behind the birthcontrol, vice-crusading virgins as behind their more amiable sisters of Aphrodite. </s> Interpreted then in the light of their history, libertinism and reformism cannot be differentiated as cause and effect, action and reaction, but must be associated as a two-fold manifestation of the same thing, an hysterical condition. They differ in externals, only insofar as one operates in license and the other in repression, but both have the same genesis and their development is simultaneous. </s> (E). H. LASSWELL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND POLITICS 94-96 (1930). </s> Another significant private motive, whose organization dates from early family days, but whose influence was prominent in adult behavior, was A's struggle to maintain his sexual repressions. ["A" is an unidentified, nonfictional person whose life history was studied by the author.] He erected his very elaborate personal prohibitions into generalized prohibitions for all society, and just as he laid down the law against brother-hatred, he condemned "irregular" sexuality and gambling and drinking, [390 U.S. 629, 670] its associated indulgences. He was driven to protect himself from himself by so modifying the environment that his sexual impulses were least often aroused, but it is significant that he granted partial indulgence to his repressed sexuality by engaging in various activities closely associated with sexual operations. Thus his sermons against vice enabled him to let his mind dwell upon rich fantasies of seduction. His crusading ventures brought him to houses of ill fame, where partly clad women were discoverable in the back rooms. These activities were rationalized by arguing that it was up to him as a leader of the moral forces of the community to remove temptation from the path of youth. At no time did he make an objective inquiry into the many factors in society which increase or diminish prostitution. His motives were of such an order that he was prevented from self-discipline by prolonged inspection of social experience. </s> That A was never able to abolish his sexuality is sufficiently evident in his night dreams and day dreams. In spite of his efforts to "fight" these manifestations of his "antisocial impulses," they continued to appear. Among the direct and important consequences which they produced was a sense of sin, not only a sense of sexual sin, but a growing conviction of hypocrisy. His "battle" against "evil" impulses was only partially successful, and this produced a profound feeling of insecurity. </s> This self-punishing strain of insecurity might be alleviated, he found, by publicly reaffirming the creed of repression, and by distracting attention to other matters. A's rapid movements, dogmatic assertions, and diversified activities were means of escape from this gnawing sense of incapacity to cope with his own desires and to master himself. Uncertain of his power to control himself, he was very busy about controlling others, and engaged in endless committee sessions, personal conferences, and public meetings for the purpose. He always managed [390 U.S. 629, 671] to submerge himself in a buzzing life of ceaseless activity; he could never stand privacy and solitude, since it drove him to a sense of futility; and he couldn't undertake prolonged and laborious study, since his feeling of insecurity demanded daily evidence of his importance in the world. </s> A's sexual drives continued to manifest themselves, and to challenge his resistances. He was continually alarmed by the luring fear that he might be impotent. Although he proposed marriage to two girls when he was a theology student, it is significant that he chose girls from his immediate entourage, and effected an almost instantaneous recovery from his disappointments. This warrants the inference that he was considerably relieved to postpone the test of his potency, and this inference is strengthened by the long years during which he cheerfully acquiesced in the postponement of his marriage to the woman who finally became his wife. He lived with people who valued sexual potency, particularly in its conventional and biological demonstration in marriage and children, and his unmarried state was the object of good-natured comment. His pastoral duties required him to "make calls" on the sisters of the church, and in spite of the cheer which he was sometimes able to bring to the bedridden, there was the faint whisper of a doubt that this was really a man's job. And though preaching was a socially respectable occupation, there was something of the ridiculous in the fact that one who had experienced very little of life should pass for a privileged censor of all mankind. </s> [Footnote 1 Two writers have explained Comstock as follows: "He must have known that he could not wall out from his own mind all erotic fancies, and so he turned all the more fiercely upon the ribaldry of others." H. Broun & M. Leech, Anthony Comstock 27 (1927). A notable forerunner of Comstock was an Englishman, Thomas Bowdler. Armed with a talent for discovering the "offensive," Bowdler expurgated Shakespeare's plays and Gibbon's History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. The result was "The Family Shakespeare," first published in 10 volumes in 1818, and a version of Gibbon's famous history "omitting everything of an immoral or irreligious nature, and incidentally rearranging the order of chapters to be in the strict chronology so dear to the obsessional heart." M. Wilson, The Obsessional Compromise, A Note on Thomas Bowdler (1965) (paper in Library of the American Psychiatric Association, Washington, D.C.). </s> [Footnote 2 "The effectiveness of more subtle forms of censorship as an instrument of social control can be very great. They are effective over [390 U.S. 629, 652] a wider field of behavior than is propaganda in that they affect convivial and `purely personal' behavior. "The principle is that certain verbal formulae shall not be stated, in print or in conversation; from this the restriction extends to the discussion of certain topics. A perhaps quite rationally formulated taboo is imposed; it becomes a quasi-religious factor for the members of the group who subscribe to it. If they are a majority, and the taboo does not affect some master-symbol of an influential minority, it is apt to become quite universal in its effect. A great number of taboos - to expressive and to other acts - are embodied in the mores of any people. The sanction behind each taboo largely determines its durability - in the sense of resistance opposed to the development of contradictory counter-mores, or of simple disintegration from failure to give returns in personal security. If it is to succeed for a long time, there must be recurrent reaffirmations of the taboo in connection with the sanctioning power. "The occasional circulation of stories about a breach of the taboo and the evil consequences that flowed from this to the offender and to the public cause (the sanctioning power) well serves this purpose. Censorship of this sort has the color of voluntary acceptance of a ritualistic avoidance, in behalf of oneself and the higher power. A violation, after the primitive patterns to which we have all been exposed, strikes at both the sinner and his god." The William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation Memorandum: Propaganda & Censorship, 3 Psychiatry 628, 631 (1940). </s> [Footnote 3 And see Gaylin, Book Review: The Prickly Problems of Pornography, 77 Yale L. J. 579, 594. </s> [Footnote 4 My Brother HARLAN says that no other Justice of this Court, past or present, has ever "stated his acceptance" of the view that "obscenity" is within the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Post, at 705. That observation, however, should not be understood as demonstrating that no other members of this Court, since its first Term in 1790, have adhered to the view of my Brother BLACK and myself. For the issue "whether obscenity is utterance within the area of protected speech and press" was only "squarely presented" to this Court for the first time in 1957. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 . This is indeed understandable, for the state legislatures have borne the main burden in enacting laws dealing with "obscenity"; and the strictures of the First Amendment were not applied to them through the Fourteenth until comparatively late in our history. In Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 , decided in 1925, the Court assumed that the right of free speech was among the freedoms protected against state infringement by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 , 373; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 . In 1931, Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 , held that the right of free speech was guaranteed in full measure by the Fourteenth Amendment. But even after these events "obscenity" cases were not inundating this Court; and even as late as 1948, the Court could say that many state obscenity statutes had "lain dormant for decades." Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 511 . In several cases prior to Roth, the Court reviewed convictions under federal statutes forbidding the sending of "obscene" materials through the mails. But in none of these cases was the question squarely presented or decided whether "obscenity" was protected speech under the First Amendment; rather, the issues were limited to matters of statutory construction, or questions of procedure, such as the sufficiency of the indictment. See United States v. Chase, 135 U.S. 255 ; Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604 ; Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29 ; Swearingen v. United States, 161 U.S. 446 ; Andrews v. United States, 162 U.S. 420 ; Price v. United States, 165 U.S. 311 ; Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486 ; Bartell v. United States, 227 U.S. 427 ; Dysart v. United States, 272 U.S. 655 ; United States v. Limehouse, 285 U.S. 424 . Thus, Roth v. United States, supra, which involved both a challenge to 18 U.S.C. 1461 (punishing the [390 U.S. 629, 654] mailing of "obscene" material) and, in a consolidated case (Alberts v. California), an attack upon Cal. Pen. Code 311 (prohibiting, inter alia, the keeping for sale or advertising of "obscene" material), was the first case authoritatively to measure federal and state obscenity statutes against the prohibitions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. I cannot speak for those who preceded us in time; but neither can I interpret occasional utterances suggesting that "obscenity" was not protected by the First Amendment as considered expressions of the views of any particular Justices of the Court. See, e. g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 -572; Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 . The most that can be said, then, is that no other members of this Court since 1957 have adhered to the view of my Brother BLACK and myself. </s> [Footnote 5 See Appendix II to this opinion. </s> [Footnote 6 Reverend Fr. Juan de Castaniza of the 16th century explained those who denounced obscenity as expressing only their own feelings. In his view they had too much reason to suspect themselves of being "obscene," since "vicious men are always prone to think others like themselves." T. Schroeder, A Challenge to Sex Censors 44-45 (1938). "Obscenity, like witchcraft . . . consists, broadly speaking, of a [delusional] projection of certain emotions (which, as the very word implies, emanate from within) to external things and an endowment of such things (or in the case of witchcraft, of such persons) with the moral qualities corresponding to these inward states. . . . "Thus persons responsible for the persistent attempts to suppress the dissemination of popular knowledge concerning sex matters betray themselves unwittingly as the bearers of the very impulses they would so ostentatiously help others to avoid. Such persons should [390 U.S. 629, 656] know through their own experience that ignorance of a subject does not insure immunity against the evils of which it treats, nor does the propitiatory act of noisy public disapproval of certain evils signify innocence or personal purity." Van Teslaar, Book Review, 8 J. Abnormal Psychology 282, 286 (1913). </s> [Footnote 7 See Appendix III to this opinion. </s> MR. JUSTICE FORTAS, dissenting. </s> This is a criminal prosecution. Sam Ginsberg and his wife operate a luncheonette at which magazines are offered for sale. A 16-year-old boy was enlisted by his mother to go to the luncheonette and buy some [390 U.S. 629, 672] "girlie" magazines so that Ginsberg could be prosecuted. He went there, picked two magazines from a display case, paid for them, and walked out. Ginsberg's offense was duly reported to the authorities. The power of the State of New York was invoked. Ginsberg was prosecuted and convicted. The court imposed only a suspended sentence. But as the majority here points out, under New York law this conviction may mean that Ginsberg will lose the license necessary to operate his luncheonette. </s> The two magazines that the 16-year-old boy selected are vulgar "girlie" periodicals. However tasteless and tawdry they may be, we have ruled (as the Court acknowledges) that magazines indistinguishable from them in content and offensiveness are not "obscene" within the constitutional standards heretofore applied. See, e. g., Gent v. Arkansas, 386 U.S. 767 (1967). These rulings have been in cases involving adults. </s> The Court avoids facing the problem whether the magazines in the present case are "obscene" when viewed by a 16-year-old boy, although not "obscene" when viewed by someone 17 years of age or older. It says that Ginsberg's lawyer did not choose to challenge the conviction on the ground that the magazines are not "obscene." He chose only to attack the statute on its face. Therefore, the Court reasons, we need not look at the magazines and determine whether they may be excluded from the ambit of the First Amendment as "obscene" for purposes of this case. But this Court has made strong and comprehensive statements about its duty in First Amendment cases - statements with which I agree. See, e. g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187 -190 (1964) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). * </s> [390 U.S. 629, 673] </s> In my judgment, the Court cannot properly avoid its fundamental duty to define "obscenity" for purposes of censorship of material sold to youths, merely because of counsel's position. By so doing the Court avoids the essence of the problem; for it the State's power to censor freed from the prohibitions of the First Amendment depends upon obscenity, and if obscenity turns on the specific content of the publication, how can we sustain the conviction here without deciding whether the particular magazines in question are obscene? </s> The Court certainly cannot mean that the States and cities and counties and villages have unlimited power to withhold anything and everything that is written or pictorial from younger people. But it here justifies the conviction of Sam Ginsberg because the impact of the Constitution, it says, is variable, and what is not obscene for an adult may be obscene for a child. This it calls "variable obscenity." I do not disagree with this, but I insist that to assess the principle - certainly to apply it - the Court must define it. We must know the extent to which literature or pictures may be less offensive than Roth requires in order to be "obscene" for purposes of a statute confined to youth. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). </s> I agree that the State in the exercise of its police power - even in the First Amendment domain - may make proper and careful differentiation between adults and children. But I do not agree that this power may be used on an arbitrary, free-wheeling basis. This is not a case where, on any standard enunciated by the Court, [390 U.S. 629, 674] the magazines are obscene, nor one where the seller is at fault. Petitioner is being prosecuted for the sale of magazines which he had a right under the decisions of this Court to offer for sale, and he is being prosecuted without proof of "fault" - without even a claim that he deliberately, calculatedly sought to induce children to buy "obscene" material. Bookselling should not be a hazardous profession. </s> The conviction of Ginsberg on the present facts is a serious invasion of freedom. To sustain the conviction without inquiry as to whether the material is "obscene" and without any evidence of pushing or pandering, in face of this Court's asserted solicitude for First Amendment values, is to give the State a role in the rearing of children which is contrary to our traditions and to our conception of family responsibility. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). It begs the question to present this undefined, unlimited censorship as an aid to parents in the rearing of their children. This decision does not merely protect children from activities which all sensible parents would condemn. Rather, its undefined and unlimited approval of state censorship in this area denies to children free access to books and works of art to which many parents may wish their children to have uninhibited access. For denial of access to these magazines, without any standard or definition of their allegedly distinguishing characteristics, is also denial of access to great works of art and literature. </s> If this statute were confined to the punishment of pushers or panderers of vulgar literature I would not be so concerned by the Court's failure to circumscribe state power by defining its limits in terms of the meaning of "obscenity" in this field. The State's police power may, within very broad limits, protect the parents and their children from public aggression of panderers and pushers. This is defensible on the theory that they cannot [390 U.S. 629, 675] protect themselves from such assaults. But it does not follow that the State may convict a passive luncheonette operator of a crime because a 16-year-old boy maliciously and designedly picks up and pays for two girlie magazines which are presumably not obscene. </s> I would therefore reverse the conviction on the basis of Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967) and Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). </s> [Footnote * "[W]e reaffirm the principle that, in `obscenity' cases as in all others involving rights derived from the First Amendment guarantees [390 U.S. 629, 673] of free expression, this Court cannot avoid making an independent constitutional judgment on the facts of the case as to whether the material involved is constitutionally protected." 378 U.S., at 190 . See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 545 , n. 8 (1965). </s> [390 U.S. 629, 676]

United States Supreme Court U.S. v. PACIFIC COAST WHOLESALERS(1950) No. 113 Argued: January 10, 1950Decided: February 6, 1950 </s> An association of wholesale automobile parts dealers organized and operated in good faith, on a nonprofit basis, for the purpose of effecting savings in freight charges for its members by securing the benefits of carload, truckload, or other volume rates, held exempt under 402 (c) (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act from regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission as a freight forwarder. Pp. 690-691. </s> (a) The basis of the shipments - whether f. o. b. destination (or delivered price) or f. o. b. origin - is not determinative. P. 691. </s> 81 F. Supp. 991, affirmed. </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 114, Freight Forwarders Institute v. Pacific Coast Wholesalers' Association et al., also on appeal from the same court. </s> A three-judge district court set aside and enjoined enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission requiring the appellee in No. 113 to discontinue operations as a freight forwarder without a permit from the Commission. 81 F. Supp. 991. On appeal to this Court, affirmed, p. 691. </s> J. Roger Wollenberg argued the cause for the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission, appellants in No. 113. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Bergson and Daniel W. Knowlton. H. L. Underwood was also of counsel. </s> Harry C. Ames argued the cause and filed a brief for the Freight Forwarders Institute, appellant in No. 114. </s> Hugh Gordon and Wyman C. Knapp were on a brief for the Pacific Coast Wholesalers' Association et al., appellees. [338 U.S. 689, 690] </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The appellee, Pacific Coast Wholesalers' Association, was formed by seven Los Angeles auto parts dealers in 1935; incorporated under California law as a nonprofit corporation in 1943; and had forty-one members and issued freight bills exceeding one million dollars in annual value in 1945. The issue presented is whether this association, with respect to the shipments here involved, is subject to regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission as a freight forwarder or stands in exempt status under 402 (c) (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act. This section reads as follows: </s> "The provisions of this part shall not be construed to apply (1) to the operations of a shipper, or a group or association of shippers, in consolidating or distributing freight for themselves or for the members thereof, on a nonprofit basis, for the purpose of securing the benefits of carload, truckload, or other volume rates, . . . ." 1 </s> The Interstate Commerce Commission, in 1945, considered the status of the appellee in its first decision in this matter. At that time, it concluded that "It has been established in this proceeding that the traffic handled is for members of the association, that the association was founded and has been operated, in good faith, for the purpose of effecting savings in freight charges for its members by securing the benefits of carload, truckload, or other volume rates, and that the association is operated on a nonprofit basis. These are operations of the character contemplated by the exemption referred to, and may be continued without obtaining authority therefor from this Commission." 264 I. C. C. 134, 142. </s> In 1947, the Commission reversed its position as it applied to shipments on an f. o. b. destination or delivered [338 U.S. 689, 691] price basis. 269 I. C. C. 504. It left standing the exemption of the association from regulation by the Commission in respect of shipments on an f. o. b. origin basis. It was stated that the legal obligation to pay the freight charges rested on the nonmember consignor, who paid the full less-than-carload rate, rather than on the consignee association member. It was therefore held that the difference between the rate paid by the nonmember and the carload transportation cost was profit to the association, and that the association was holding out its service to the general public. In this view, the Commission concluded that appellee was not qualified for the exempt status on f. o. b. destination or delivered price shipments. </s> A decree of the three-judge district court set aside the Commission's order as without rational basis. 81 F. Supp. 991. The court considered as decisive that no shipments by the association were ever undertaken except at the behest and for the benefit of a member. Looking to the agency between member and association, rather than that between buyer and seller, the court saw no reasonable ground for ruling that the association was on a profit basis, or that it was holding its service out to the general public. We agree. </s> There is nothing in the language of the Act or the legislative history to suggest that Congress intended the exemption to turn on the type of shipment which was involved, whether f. o. b. origin or f. o. b. destination (delivered price). On the contrary, it is clear that the nature of the relationship between the members and the group was thought to be determinative. Under that test, the valid claim of the association to the statutory exemption is established by the original Commission decision. The judgment below is </s> Affirmed. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 56 Stat. 285, 49 U.S.C. 1002 (c) (1). </s> [338 U.S. 689, 692]

United States Supreme Court PENFIELD CO. OF CALIFORNIA v. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COM'N.(1947) No. 453 Argued: January 16, 1947Decided: March 31, 1947 </s> Rehearing Denied May 5, 1947 </s> See 331 U.S. 865 , 67 S.Ct. 1301.[ Penfield Co. of California v. Securities & Exchange Com'n. 330 U.S. 585 (1947) ] </s> [330 U.S. 585, 587] Mr. Morris Lavine, of Los Angeles, Cal., for petitioners. Mr. Roger S. Foster, of Washington, D.C., for respondent. </s> Mr. Justice DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. The Securities and Exchange Commission, acting pursuant to its authority under 20(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, 86, 15 U.S.C. 77t, 15 U.S.C.A. 77t(a), issued orders directing an investigation to determine whether Penfield Company had violated the Act in the sale of stock or other securities. In the course of that investigation it directed a subpoena duces tecum to Young, as an officer of Penfield, requiring him to produce certain books of the corporation covering a four year period ending in April, 1943. See 19(b) of the Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 77s(b). Upon Young's refusal to appear and produce the books and records, the Commission filed an application with the District Court for an order enforcing the subpoena. 1 After a hearing, the court ordered [330 U.S. 585, 588] Young, as an officer of Penfield, to produce them. 2 Young persisted in his non-compliance. The Commission then applied to the District Court for a rule to show cause why Young should not be adjudged in contempt-a proceeding which, as we shall see, was one for civil contempt. The District Court delayed action on the motion until after disposition of a criminal case involving Young, Penfield, and others. When that case was concluded, the court, after hearing, adjudged Young to be in contempt. It refused, however, to grant any coercive relief designed to force Young to produce the documents but instead imposed on him a flat, unconditional fine of $50.00 which he paid. 3 [330 U.S. 585, 589] That was on July 2, 1945. On September 24, 1945, the Commission filed a notice of appeal in the District Court and subsequently a statement of points challenging as error the action of the District Court in imposing the $50.00 fine, instead of a remedial penalty calculated to make Young produce the documents. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the District Court erred in imposing the fine and directing that Young be ordered imprisoned until he produced the documents. 9 Cir., 157 F.2d 65. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by Penfield Co. and Young. Neither the District Court nor the Circuit Court of Appeals rendered judgment against Penfield. Nor is any relief sought by or against it here. Accordingly the writ is dismissed as to Penfield. First. It is argued that since no application for an allowance of an appeal was made, the Circuit Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain it. 4 If the appeal was in a suit of a civil nature, the filing of the notice of appeal with the District Court was adequate under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5 </s> [330 U.S. 585, 590] It is the nature of the relief asked that is determinative of the nature of the proceeding. Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.S. 217, 220 , 52 S.Ct. 315, 316. This was not a proceeding in which the United States was a party and in which it was seeking to vindicate the public interest. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 445 , 31 S.Ct. 492, 499, 34 L.R.A.,N.S., 874. The contempt proceedings were instituted as a part of the proceedings in which the Commission sought enforcement of a subpoena. The relief which the Commission sought was production of the documents; and the only sanction asked was a penalty designed to compel their production. Where a fine or imprisonment imposed on the contemnor is 'intended to be remedial by coercing the defendant to do what he had refused to do', Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., supra, 221 U.S. at page 442, 31 S.Ct. at page 498, 34 L.R.A.,N.S., 874, and remedy is one for civil contempt. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 , 67 S.Ct. 677. Then 'the punishment is wholly remedial, serves only the purposes of the complainant, and is not intended as a deterrent to offenses against the public.' McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61, 64 , 59 S.Ct. 685, 686. One who is fined, unless by a day certain he produces the books, has it in his power to avoid any penalty. And those who are imprisoned until they obey the order, 'carry the keys of their prison in their own pockets.' In re Nevitt, 8 Cir ., 117 F. 448, 461. Fine and imprisonment are then employed not to vindicate the public interest but as coercive sanctions to compel the contemnor to do what the law made it his duty to do. See Doyle v. London Guarantee Co., 204 U.S. 599 , 27 S.Ct. 313; Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358 , 49 S.Ct. 173; Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U.S. 105 , 57 S.Ct. 57; McCrone v. United States, supra. The Act gives the Commission authority to require the production of books and records in the course of its investi- [330 U.S. 585, 591] gations. And in absence of a basis for saying that its demand exceeds lawful limits (Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 , 66 S.Ct. 494), it is entitled to the aid of the court in obtaining them. 6 A refusal of the court to enforce its prior order for the production of the documents denies the Commission that statutory relief. The issue thus raised poses a problem in civil, not criminal, contempt. 7 </s> Where a judgment of contempt is embodied in a single order which contains an admixture of criminal and civil elements, the criminal aspect of the order fixes its character for purposes of procedure on review. Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107 , 42 S.Ct. 427. But there was no such admixture here. The District Court refused to grant any remedial relief to the Commission. The denial of that relief was the ground of the Commission's appeal. The order of denial being final, was appealable, Lamb v. Cramer, supra, 285 U.S. at pages 220, 221, 52 S.Ct. at pages 316, 317, and the right to appeal from it was in no way dependent on an appeal from the imposition of the fine. Second. The question on the merits is two-fold: (1) whether the Circuit Court of Appeals erred in granting the Commission remedial relief by directing that Young be required to produce the documents; and (2) whether that court exceeded its authority in reversing the judgment which imposed the fine and in substituting a term of imprisonment conditioned on continuance of the contempt. As we have already noted, the Act requires the production of documents demanded pursuant to lawful orders of the Commission and lends judicial aid to obtain them. There is no basis in the record before us for saying that [330 U.S. 585, 592] the demand of the Commission exceeded lawful limits. There is, however, a suggestion that the District Court was warranted in denying remedial relief since the contempt hearing came after a criminal trial of petitioners in another case, during the course of which many of Penfield's books and records were examined. The thought apparently is that the Commission had probed enough into Penfield's affairs. But the District Court did not hold that the Commission's request had become moot, that the documents produced satisfied its legitimate needs, or that the additional ones sought were irrelevant to its statutory functions. 8 We agree with the Circuit Court of Appeals that at least in absence of such a finding, the refusal of the District Court to grant the full remedial relief which the Act places behind the orders of the Commission was an abuse of discretion. The records might well disclose other offenses against the Securities Act of 1933 which the Commission administers. The history of this case reveals a long, persistent effort to defeat the inves igation. The fact that Young paid the fine and did not appeal indicates that the judgment of contempt may have been an easy victory for him. On the other hand, the dilatory tactics employed suggest that if justice was to be done, coercive sanctions were necessary. When the Circuit Court of Appeals substituted imprisonment for the fine, it put a civil remedy in the place of a criminal punishment. For the imprisonment authorized would be suffered only if the documents were not produced or would continue only so long as Young was recalcitrant. On the other hand, the fine imposed by the District Court, unlike that involved in Fox v. Capital Co., [330 U.S. 585, 593] supra, 299 U.S. at pages 106, 107, 57 S.Ct. at page 58, was unconditional and not relief of a coercive nature such as the Commission sought. It was solely and exclusively punitive in character. Cf. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 42 , 43 S., 61 S.Ct. 810, 812, 813. As already noted, Young did not appeal from the order holding him in contempt and subjecting him to a fine. Young maintains, however, that once the fine was imposed and paid, the jurisdiction of the court was exhausted; that the Circuit Court of Appeals was without authority to substitute another penalty or to add to the one already imposed and satisfied. That argument rests on the statute granting federal courts the power to punish contempts of their authority, Judicial Code 268, 28 U.S.C. 385, 28 U.S. C.A. 385, and the decisions construing it. The statute gives the federal courts power 'to punish, by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of the court, contempts of their authority,' including violations of their lawful orders. At least in a criminal contempt proceeding both fine and imprisonment may not be imposed since the statute provides alternative penalties. In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 , 63 S.Ct. 470. Hence if a fine is imposed on a contemnor and he pays it, the sentence may not thereafter be amended so as to provide for imprisonment. The argument here is that after a fine for criminal contempt is paid, imprisonment may not be added to, or substituted for the fine, as a coercive sanction in a civil contempt proceeding. If that position is sound, then the statutory limitation of 'fine or imprisonment' would preclude a court from imposing a fine as a punitive measure and imprisonment as a remedial measure, or vice versa. The dual function of contempt has long been recognized-(1) vindication of the public interest by punishment of contemptuous conduct; ( 2) coercion to compel the contemnor to do what the law requires of him. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., supra, 221 U.S. at pages 441 et seq., 31 S.Ct. at page 498, 34 L.R.A., N.S., 874; United States v. United Mine Workers, supra. [330 U.S. 585, 594] As stated in Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 327 , 24 S.Ct. 665, 666, 'The purpose of contempt proceedings is to uphold the power of the court, and also to secure to suitors therein the rights by it awarded.' We assume, arguendo, that the statute allowing fine or imprisonment governs civil as well as criminal contempt proceedings. If the statute is so construed, we find in it no barrier to the imposition of both a fine as a punitive exaction and imprisonment as a coercive sanction, or vice versa. 9 That practice has been approved. Kreplik v. Couch Patents Co., 1 Cir., 190 F. 565, 571. And see Phillips Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n, D.C., 208 F. 335, 340. When the court imposes a find as a penalty, it is punishing yesterday's contemptuous conduct. When it adds the coercive sanction of imprisonment, it is announcing the consequences of tomor ow's contumacious conduct. At least in that situation the offenses are not the same. And the most that the statute forbids is the imposition of both fine and imprisonment for the same offense. Young raises objections that go to the merits of the judgment of contempt. These were considered and determined against him by the District Court. Since he did not appeal from the adverse judgment, he is precluded from renewing the objections at this stage. Le Tulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 421 , 422 S., 60 S.Ct. 313, 316, 317; Helvering v. Pfeiffer, 302 U.S. 247, 250 , 251 S., 58 S.Ct. 159, 160, 161. [330 U.S. 585, 595] There is a difference of view among us whether the portion of the order of the Circuit Court of Appeals which set aside the unconditional fine of $50 imposed on Young is here for review. But if we assume that it is, a majority of the Court is of the opinion that the Circuit Court of Appeals was correct in setting it aside, since the fine was imposed in a civil contempt proceeding. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., supra. AFFIRMED. </s> Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE (concurring). But for the decision in United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 , 67 S.Ct. 677, I should have no difficulty in concluding with the Court that this contempt proceeding was exclusively civil in character and that, consequently, no criminal penalty could be imposed, coercive relief alone being allowable in such a case. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 ,1 31 S.Ct. 492, 34 L.R.A.,N.S., 874. That decision held that the imposition of criminal punishment in a civil contempt proceeding 'was as fundamentally erroneous as if in an action of 'A vs. B, for assault and battery,' the judgment entered had been that the defendant be confined in prison for twelve months.' 221 U.S. at page 449, 31 S.Ct. at page 501, 34 L.R.A., N.S., 874. By every test applied in the Gompers case this proceeding was civil, not criminal in character. Here as there the proceeding was entitled, instituted and conducted as collateral to civil litigation. It sought only remedial relief, namely, the production of specified books and records. 2 </s> [330 U.S. 585, 596] And issuance of the citation was grounded upon disobedience of the court's lawful order for their production. 3 </s> This act, like the act of disobedience in the Gompers case, constituted conduct which would have sustained either civil or criminal penalty in appropriate proceedings. But the unequivocal ruling of that case was that criminal penalties cannot be applied in civil contempt proceedings. 221 U.S. at pages 444, 449, 451, 452, 31 S.Ct. at pages 499, 501, 502, 34 L.R.A., N.S., 874. Not only the result, but the whole tenor of the opinion was of the effect that the character of the proceeding as a whole, whether as civil or criminal, must be correlated with the character of the penalty imposed, and that the two cannot be scrambled, regardless of the fact that the conduct constituting the contempt would support the imposition of either type of relief in a proceeding appropriate to the kind of relief given. 4 Not simply the remedy sought but the character of the proceeding in which it is pursued, it was held, determines the validity of the relief afforded. 5 </s> [330 U.S. 585, 597] This ruling, as I have previously maintained, was one not only of historical grounding but of constitutional compulsion. 6 Moreover, it recently has been reinforced by Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, requiring that the notice prescribed for instituting the proceeding 'shall state the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as such.' 7 (Emphasis added.) Hence, under the rule of the Gompers case and others following it, it is clear that the district judge had no power in this case to impose the criminal penalty of a flat $50 fine and it is equally clear, on the record, 8 that he ex- [330 U.S. 585, 598] ceeded his power in denying the Commission civil coercive relief altogether. 9 </s> Moreover, I think it is clear that both of these problems are presented for our determination on the state of the record here. It is true that Young did not appeal from the District Court's judgment to the Circuit Court of Appeals, and that he paid the fine. But the Commission appealed from that judgment in its entirety, as it had a right to do,10 unless the payment of the fine exhausted all judicial power to deal further with the proceeding. This indeed is a basis upon which Young maintains that the Circuit Court of Appeals had no power to reverse the District Court's judgment. 11 </s> [330 U.S. 585, 599] But clearly, as the Court holds, such power could not be wanting, if the litigation was exclusively civil in character. On the contrary the action of the Circuit Court of Appeals was exactly in accordance with the ruling in the Gompers case and was required by it. In both cases the proceedings were wholly civil in character In both a criminal penalty was imposed. And in both the judgment laying it was reversed and the cause was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings looking only to the giving of civil relief. The only difference is that in the Gompers case the contemnors had not entered upon the service of the void criminal sentence of imprisonment but appealed from it, while here Young paid the fine and did not appeal. That action on his part, however, cannot oust the Commission of its statutory right of appeal and review or of its right to civil relief. 12 If the contempt proceeding were criminal in character, a different question might be presented. 13 But compliance with a void criminal penalty, void because imposed in a wholly civil proceedings, cannot [330 U.S. 585, 600] make it valid or oust either the courts of their civil jurisdiction in matters of relief or opposing parties of their rights in that respect. In short, the Commission was forced to appeal from the judgment rendered, if it was not to acquiesce in what the court had done and thereby suffer unauthorized thwarting of its statutory investigating power. That judgment was rightfully taken in its entirety to the Circuit Court of Appeals, was reviewed by that court, and was reversed not partially but completely. 14 Our action in granting certiorari brought here for review the entire judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals, including its reversal of the criminal judgment rendered by the District Court as well [330 U.S. 585, 601] as its mandate for civil relief. 15 Hence in my opinion we are forced to take action upon the judgment as a whole, in both civil and criminal phases. Since I am in agreement with the Court's view that the Gompers ruling and others in accord with it are controlling in this case, I think the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals should be affirmed, though with modification in one respect. 16 I ind it difficult, however, to reconcile the action taken here with what was done in the Mine Workers decision. A majority there held, as I thought contrary to the Gompers ruling, that civil and criminal contempt could be prosecuted in a single contempt proceeding conducted according to the rules of procedure applicable in equity causes,17 and that both types of relief, civil and criminal, could be imposed in such a mixed proceeding. It was also held that on review the appellate court is free to substitute its own judgment concerning the nature and extent of both types of relief for that of the trial court, and therefore that in remanding the cause for further proceedings there was no necessity to leave room for the further exercise of the trial court's discretion in relation to either type of relief. If in that case a single mixed proceeding could suffice without regard to the requirements of Rule 42(b) and the [330 U.S. 585, 602] Gompers line of decisions concerning procedures to be followed in instituting and conducting contempt proceedings, for the imposition of both civil and criminal penalties, I see no valid reason why the same thing could not be done in this cause or why both the criminal fine imposed by the District Court and the civil relief given by the Circuit Court of Appeals should not be allowed to stand. It is true that if the proceeding is to be taken as having been both civil and criminal a serious question would be presented on the terms of 268 of the Judicial Code whether imposition and payment of the fine here did not exhaust judicial power to deal further with the proceeding, more especially in its criminal phase. 18 But that question too, I take it, necessarily would be settled if the Mine Workers ruling were to govern here. It is also true that in this case the United States was not a party by that name, as it was in the Mine Workers case, to the civil litigation in which the contempt proceeding arose or to the contempt proceeding itself. But the Commission was the moving party in both, representative as such of the public interest as the trial court pointed out. 19 And, in view of the vast liberality allowed by the Mine Workers decision concerning matters of procedure and relief in contempt proceedings, it hardly can be a solid ground for distinguishing the cases that in one the public interest was represented, as to the criminal phase, eo nomine United States, in the other under the name of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Cf. In re Bradley, [330 U.S. 585, 603] 318 U.S. 50 , 63 S.Ct. 470. Notwithstanding these difficulties, since the Court rests the decision in this cause upon the Gompers rule, which in my opinion represents the settled law, I join in the affirmance of the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals, both insofar as it reversed the District Court's judgment because of the denial of coercive relief and in relation to its reversal of the criminal penalty imposed by the District Court. But, while there can be no question of the Court of Appeals' power in proper cases to review and revise civil relief given in the District Court, in this case no such relief had been awarded. In my opinion the question of the character and scope of that relief was a matter, in the first instance, for the District Court's judgment rather than for the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, I would modify the judgment of reversal in the civil phase so that the cause would be remanded to the District Court with directions to exercise its discretion in framing the relief adequate and appropriate to make effective the Commission's right to disclosure. 20 </s> Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, with whom concurs Mr. Justice JACKSON, dissenting. Beginning with the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887, 49 U.S.C.A. 1 et seq., it became a conventional feature of Congressional regulatory legislation to give administrative agencies authority to issue subpoenas for relevant information. Congress has never attempted, however, to confer upon an administrative agency itself the power to compel obedience to such a subpoena. It is beside the point to consider [330 U.S. 585, 604] whether Congress was deterred by constitutional difficulties. That Congress should so consistently have withheld powers of testimonial compulsion from administrative agencies discloses a policy that speaks with impressive significance. Instead of authorizing agencies to enforce their subpoenas, Congress has required them to resort to the courts for enforcement. In the discharge of that duty courts act as courts and not as administrative adjuncts. The power of Congress to impose on courts the duty of enforcing obedience to an administrative subpoena was sustained precisely because courts were not to be automata carrying out the wishes of the administrative. They were discharging judicial power with all the implications of the judicial function in our constitutional scheme. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 , 14 S.Ct. 1125; Id., 155 U.S. 3 , 15 S.Ct. 19. Accordingly, an order directing obedience to a subpoena by the Securities and Exchange Commission, like a subpoena of any other federal agency, does not issue as a matter of course. An administrative subpoena may be contested on the ground that it exceeds the bounds set by the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search and seizure; that the inquiry is outside the scope of the authority delegated to the agency; that the testimony sought to be elicited is irrelevant to the subject matter of the inquiry; that the person to whom it is directed cannot be held responsible for the production of the papers. See Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, supra, 154 U.S. at pages 479 and 489, 14 S.Ct. at pages 1134, 1138; Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 211 U.S. 407 , 29 S. Ct. 115; Ellis v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 237 U.S. 434 , 35 S.Ct. 645; Smith v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 245 U.S. 33 , 38 S.Ct. 30; Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 , 44 S.Ct. 336, 32 A.L.R. 786; Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 , 66 S.Ct. 494. And see Lilienthal, The Power to Compel Testimony, 39 Harv.L.Rev. 694. [330 U.S. 585, 605] In this case, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued a subpoena to Young, as officer of the Penfield Company, for the production of books and records of the company covering the period May 1, 1939, to April 9, 1943. Upon Young's failure to comply, the Commission applied to the District Court, on April 13, 1943, for an order compelling obedience. From this order an appeal was taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals which affirmed the order on June 30, 1944, 9 Cir., 143 F.2d 746, its mandate being spread on the record of the District Court on December 7, 1944. Young having persisted in his refusal to comply, the Securities and Exchange Commission, on January 24, 1945, applied for a rule to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt. The District Court postponed final hearings on the ord r to show cause, pending, apparently, the completion of a criminal trial of Young and the Penfield Company then before the Court, on an indictment growing out of the inquiry for which the subpoena had been issued. It was not until July 2, 1945, after the petitioners had been acquitted in the criminal proceeding, that the rule to show cause was heard. The District Court found petitioner Young guilty of contempt of court for disobedience of its order of June 1, 1943 requiring the production of records called for by the subpoena issued by the S.E.C. But the Court refused the Government's request to impose a contingent punishment to secure production of the records. Instead, it sentenced Young to the payment of a fine of $50. Without objection Young paid this fine, and consistently thereafter maintained that by such payment judicial power had exhausted itself. See In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 , 63 S.Ct. 470. The Government appealed from this disposition by the District Court on the ground that the District Court, having adjudged Young to be in contempt, erred in ordering Young to pay a fine of $50 and stand committed until the fine was paid, instead of imposing [330 U.S. 585, 606] a remedial penalty, calculated to coerce Young to produce or allow inspection of the books and records of the Penfield Co., pursuant to the order of June 1, 1943. On the basis of this appeal, which challenged what the District Court did and what it refused to do, the Circuit Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, reversed the order of the lower court: 'The order imposing the fine is reversed and the case remanded to the district court for an order requiring Young's imprisonment to compel his obedience to the order to produce the documents in question.' 9 Cir., 157 F.2d 65, 67. This Court then granted certiorari, the petition for which asked this Court to 'reverse the judgment and order of the Circuit Court of Appeals in this case.' There was thus properly before the Circuit Court of Appeals the judgment imposing the fine of $50 and refusing to give coercive remedy, and there is accordingly before us the correctness of the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals setting aside the $50 fine and ordering coercive decree. The judgment immediately before us is that of the Circuit Court of Appeals setting aside the fine imposed by the District Court and reversing its refusal to issue a coercive order. The ultimate question is the correctness of what the District Court did not what it refused to do. It is essential therefore to focus attention on the precise circumstances in which the District Court acted as it did. This is what the record tells us: 'Mr. Cuthbertson: So far as the punishment which the Court might see fit to impose, that is up to the Court. We are still anxious to get a look at these books and records, so I suggest to the Court, if he be so disposed, whatever punishment the Court might see fit to impose would be in connection with or so long as he refused to produce his books and records for our inspection. [330 U.S. 585, 607] 'The Court: I don't think that I am going to be disposed to do anything like that. I sat here for six weeks and listened to books and records. The Government produced people from all over the United States in connection with the Penfield matter. </s> 'Mr. Cuthbertson: I might say, your Honor, that we have in mind that these books and records may disclose certain acts other than those charged in the indictment. We don't propose to go over the same matter that the Court went over in connection with the criminal case. </s> 'The Court: The Court can take judicial notice of its own books and records, and in that trial the evidence was clear and definite and positive from all of the Government's witnesses, that during one period of time this defendant had nothing whatsoever to do with the Penfield Company. Whether that period of time is covered by what the Securities and Exchange Commission seeks or not, I don't know. </s> 'The judgment and sentence of the Court is that the efendant pay a fine of $50, and stand committed until paid.' </s> Bearing in mind that the District Court was not an automaton which must unquestioningly compel obedience to a subpoena simply because the Commission had issued it, we must consider whether the District Court had abused the fair limits of judicial discretion. If a District Court believes that howsoever relevant a demand for documents may have been at the time it was made, circumstances had rendered the subpoena obsolete, it is entitled to consider the merits of the subpoena as of the time that its enforcement is sought and not as of the time that it was issued. The above colloquy means nothing unless it means that Judge Hall was of the view that events had apparently rendered needless the call from Young for the [330 U.S. 585, 608] documents. He may have been wrong in that belief. At all events it was the view of a judge who had presided for six weeks over a trial in which these matters were canvassed. The Circuit Court of Appeals did not have before it, nor have we, the knowledge or the basis for knowledge that Judge Hall had, and so neither court can say with any confidence that he did not have ground for thinking that the change in circumstances revealed in the course of the trial obviated the need for the demand that was made upon Young. We surely ought not to reverse the action of the district judge on the abstract assumption that papers ordered to be produced as relevant to an inquiry at the time the subpoena issued, continued relevant several months later. We ought not to assume that a subpoena was proper months later when a proceeding lasting more than six weeks before the judge who had approved the subpoena in the first instance persuaded him that the circumstances no longer called for carrying out the terms of the subpoena. When the trial judge stated his understanding that the intervening circumstances had rendered inappropriate the use of his coercive powers, counsel for the Government did not gainsay the judge's view. The failure of Government counsel to contradict the interpretation of facts by the Court does not present any technical ground of not allowing a point to be raised on appeal to which no exception was taken. The significance of counsel's silence is its confirmation of the judge's interpretation of the circumstances. At least in the absence of contradiction, the interpretation of the facts by the trial judge was a proper basis for the exercise of his judicial discretion. On the record before us, Judge Hall exercised allowable discretion in finding that the subpoena had spent its force, and in concluding not to compel obedience to it. At the same time, he was justified in finding that because Young had disobeyed the subpoena while it was still alive, he [330 U.S. 585, 609] should be fined and made to feel that one cannot flout a court's authority with impunity. The question, then, is whether the Court could impose what constituted a fine for criminal contempt, that is, to vindicate the law as such, without a formal pleading charging Young with such disobedience. We do not think Judge Hall had to direct the clerk to issue an attachment against Young to inform him of that which he obviously knew and which the proceedings had made abundantly clear to him. The true significance of our opinion in United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 , 67 S.Ct. 677, as we understand it, is that contempt proceedings are sui generis and should be treated as such in their practical incidence. They are not to be circumscribed by procedural formalities or by traditional limitations of what are ordinarily called crimes, except insofar as due process of law and the other standards of decency and fairness in the administration of federal justice may require. On this record we find not the faintest denial of any safeguard or of appropriate procedural protection. We think the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals should be reversed and that of the District Court reinstated. </s> Footnotes </s> [Footnote 1 Sec. 22(b), 15 U.S.C.A. 77v(b), provides: 'In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any person, any of the said United States courts, within the jurisdiction of which said person guilty of contumacy or refusal to obey is found or resides, upon application by the Commission may issue to such person an order requiring such person to appear before the Commission, or one of its examiners designated by it, there to produce documentary evidence if so ordered, or there to give evidence touching the matter in question; and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by said court as a contempt thereof.' </s> [Footnote 2 That order was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 9 Cir., 143 F.2d 746, 154 A.L.R. 1027. [Footnote 3 The request of the Commission and the ruling of the court are made clear by the following colloquy: 'Mr. Cuthbertson: So far as the punishment which the Court might see fit to impose, that is up to the Court. We are still anxious to get a look at these books and records, so I suggest to the Court, if he be so disposed, whatever punishment the Court might see fit to impose would be in connection with or so long as he refuses to produce his books and records for our inspection. </s> 'The Court: I don't think that I am doing to be disposed to do anything like that. I sat here for six weeks and listened to books and records. The Government produced people from all ver the United States in connection with the Penfield matter. </s> 'Mr. Cuthbertson: I might say, your Honor, that we have in mind that these books and records may disclose certain acts other than those charged in the indictment. We don't propose to go over the same matter that the Court went over in connection with the criminal case. </s> 'The Court: The Court can take judicial notice of its own books and records, and in that trial the evidence was clear and definite and positive from all of the Government's witnesses, that during one period of time this defendant had nothing whatsoever to do with the Penfield Company. Whether that period of time is covered by what the Securities and Exchange Commission seeks or not, I don't know. </s> 'The judgment and sentence of the Court is that the defendant pay a fine of $50, and stand committed until paid.' </s> [Footnote 4 Section 8(c) of the Act of February 13, 1925, 43 Stat. 936, 940, as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. 230, 28 U.S.C.A. 230 provides: 'No ... appeal intended to bring any judgment or decree before a circuit court of appeals for review shall be allowed unless application therefore be duly made within three months after the entry of such judgment or decree.' See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Pillsbury, 301 U.S. 174 , 57 S.Ct. 682; Georgia Hartford Lumber Co. v. Compania, 323 U.S. 334 , 65 S.Ct. 293. [Footnote 5 Rule 73(a), 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, provides in part: 'When an appeal is permitted by law from a district court to a circuit court of Appeals and within the time prescribed, a party may appeal from a judgment by filing with the district court a notice of appeal.' Where a Rule of Civil Procedure conflicts with a prior statute, the Rule prevails. 48 Stat. 1064, 28 U.S.C. 723b, 28 U.S.C.A. 723b. </s> [Footnote 6 See 22(b), supra, note 1. [Footnote 7 This thus disposes of the further contention that the appeal was not timely under the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C.Supp. II 682, 18 U.S. C.A. 682. United States v. Hark, 320 U.S. 531 , 64 S.Ct. 359 88 L.Ed. 290. </s> [Footnote 8 As will be seen from note 3, supra, the court, immediately prior to rendering its sentence, noted that there was one period during which Young was not connected with Penfield Co. But the court added: 'Whether that period of time is covered by what the Securities and Exchange Commission seeks or not, I don't know.' </s> [Footnote 9 Some rules governing criminal contempts are, of course, different from those governing civil contempts. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., supra, 221 U.S. at pages 444, 446-449, 31 S.Ct. at pages 499, 500-501, 34 L.R.A.,N.S., 874. If those differences are satisfied and if, as in In re Swan, 150 U.S. 637 , 14 S.Ct. 225; Matter of Christensen Engineering Co., 194 U.S. 458 , 24 S.Ct. 729; In re Merchants' Stock & Grain Co., 223 U.S. 639 , 32 S.Ct. 339, 56 S.Ct. 584; Farmers & Mechanics Nat. Bank v. Wilkinson, 266 U.S. 503 , 45 S.Ct. 144, the criminal penalty and the remedial relief are segregated, no problem of the adequacy of the order for purposes of appellate review is presented. No question is raised here as to the propriety of combining civil and criminal contempt in the same proceeding. </s> [Footnote 1 See In re Fox, 3 Cir., 96 F.2d 23; Norstrom v. Wahl, 7 Cir., 41 F. 2d 910. [Footnote 2 The application in contempt was made by affidavit setting forth the facts alleged to constitute the violation. The contempt proceeding was entered upon the civil docket, being cause 'No. 2863, Civil, Securities and Exchange Commission v. Penfield Company of California.' Young was first commanded to appear and show cause why a further order should not be made directing him 'to show cause why an order should not be made holding said A.W. Young in contempt of this Court and to be dealt with accordingly.' The order of citation followed in the same terms. At the hearing counsel for the Commission maintained consistently and urgently that the proceeding was exclusively civil, not criminal in character. Not until pronouncement of judgment was any step taken indicat ng the proceeding to be criminal in nature. </s> [Footnote 3 The validity of the order for production was sustained on appeal. 9 Cir., 143 F.2d 746. [Footnote 4 See the Court's discussion in Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 , particularly at pages 444-449, 451 ff., 31 S.Ct. 492, at pages 499-501, 34 L.R.A.,N.S., 874; see also discussion in United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 263 , 67 S.Ct. 677, dissenting opinion, p. 730, Part III. [Footnote 5 The Gompers opinion, as I understand it, does not hold that the character of the relief sought is exclusively the criterion of the character of the proceeding. It was said to be a factor to be taken into account. But, in view of the Court's stress upon other factors, including the private or public character of the complainant, whether or not the contempt proceeding arises in and as corollary to civil litigation, and the necessity for observing distinct procedural requirements in the course of trial, the case seems clearly to rule that the character of the proceeding determines the nature of the relief which can be given rather than the reverse. </s> [Footnote 6 See the references cited in note 4 supra; and see note 5. [Footnote 7 'A criminal contempt except as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on notices. The notice shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as such. The notice shall be given orally by the judge in open court in the presence of the defendant or, on application of the United States attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose, by an order to show cause or an order of arrest. ...' Rule 42(b), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. following section 687. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 372 , 67 S.Ct. 677, dissenting opinion, p. 735, and note 45. The rule did not become effective until March 21, 1946, hence was not applicable to the present proceeding which was instituted and concluded in the trial court prior to that date. [Footnote 8 See text infra. The record does not show that the function of the subpoena had been exhausted at the time of the judgment in contempt, alt ough this was Young's contention accepted, apparently, by the District Court. The contrary, in fact, affirmatively appeals. The subpoena did not purport to be issued exclusively in connection with and for the purposes of the criminal trial which transpired in the District Court between its issuance and the time of the judgment in contempt. Counsel for the Commission expressly stated that the subpoena was not limited to that matter and the court said, after referring to the period of the criminal suit: 'Whether that period of time is covered by what the Securities and Exchange Commission seeks or not, I do not know.' The court made no finding that the subpoena's function had been exhausted. The only reason assigned for refusing civil relief was that the court had sat in the criminal trial for six weeks during which it had 'listened to books and records,' as well as witnesses produced 'from all over the United States in connection with the Penfield matter.' Taking judicial notice of its own proceedings, the court said: '... in that trial the evidence was clear and definite ... that during one period of time this defendant (Young) had nothing whatsoever to do with the Penfield Company.' These grounds, of course, were not the equivalent of finding that the records covered by the subpoena had been produced or that the Commission had no power or valid reason for pursuing its statutory investigation through the subpoena beyond the confines of the closed criminal trial. </s> [Footnote 9 See note 8. And see text infra preceding note 20. [Footnote 10 28 U.S.C.A. 225, 28 U.S.C.A. 225; see Clarke v. Federal Trade Commission, 9 Cir., 128 F.2d 542; Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.S. 217, 220 , 52 S. Ct. 315. [Footnote 11 The principal contention in this respect is based on 268 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. 385, 28 U.S.C.A. 385, and the decision in In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 , 63 S.Ct. 470. The Bradley case, however, was one in criminal contempt and the decision was that in such a case 268 forbids imposition as penalty of both fine and imprisonment. The penalties being alternative by the section's terms, it was held that payment of the fine exhausted the court's power. The Bradley case therefore presented no question of the applicability of 268 in civil contempt proceedings or of its effect if applicable. Compare the majority and concurring opinions in In re Sixth & Wisconsin Tower, Inc., 7 Cir., 108 F.2d 538. It cannot be taken as having ruled that the court's invalid imposition of criminal punishment in civil contempt proceedings or satisfaction of such a void sentence exhausts either the trial court's power or that of an appellate court on review to deal with the civil contempt by affording civil relief or to avoid the invalid criminal judgment. Whether or not 268, if applicable to a so-called mixed civil- criminal contempt proceeding, would forbid the imposition of relief both by way of fine and imprisonment, one punitive, the other coercive and remedial, need not be considered in view of the holding that this proceeding was exclusively civil in character. </s> [Footnote 12 See notes 10, 14. [Footnote 13 See note 11 supra. </s> [Footnote 14 The opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals states: 'Young did not appeal from the order holding him in contempt. That decision is final and the only question before us is the extent of the remedy to which the Commission is entitled.' 9 Cir., 157 F.2d 65, 66. Ruling that the cause did not become moot by reason of Young's payment of the fine, the court further held the District Court had abused its 'discretion' in not granting the full relief sought by the Commission. The concluding paragraph of the opinion stated: 'The order imposing the fine is reversed and the case remanded to the district court for an order requiring Young's imprisonment to compel his obedience to the order to produce the documents in question.' The opinion concluded: 'The order of the district court is reversed,' 9 Cir., 157 F.2d at page 67, and the formal order for judgment entitled 'decree' directed 'that the order of the said District Court in this cause be, and hereby is, reversed, and that this cause be, and hereby is remanded to the said District Court for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion of this Court.' The notice of appeal filed in the District Court is not set forth in the printed record here. But the 'Statement of Points on Which the Appellant Intends to Rely,' filed in the Court of Appeals, specifies that 'the District Court erred in ordering Young to pay a fine of $50.00 instead of imposing a remedial penalty calculated to coerce Young to produce or allow inspection of the books and records. ...' In this state of the record it cannot be taken that the appeal and the judgment of the Court of Appeals did not comprehend the criminal penalty. </s> [Footnote 15 This Court's action in granting certiorari, 329 U.S. 706 , 67 S.Ct. 202, was not limited to any question or phase of the Court of Appeals' action, but brought up the judgment in its entirety. Since that court's judgment comprehended the reversal of the criminal penalty imposed by the District Court, that phase of the Court of Appeals' judgment is necessarily here for review and determination. [Footnote 16 See text at note 20. [Footnote 17 See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 363 , 67 S. Ct. 677, dissenting opinion, p. 730, Part III. The rule to show cause issued in that case provided: 'It Is Further Ordered, that the accused, and each of them, shall, unless waived by them, be tried upon said charges of contempt by the court with an advisory jury to be empanelled by this court.' (Emphasis added.) The advisory jury was waived. </s> [Footnote 18 See note 11 supra and text. [Footnote 19 The court inquired of Commission counsel, in response to argument that the proceeding was exclusively civil, since it arose in the course of civil litigation and sought only remedial relief for one of the parties, and not as an independent proceeding in the public interest to vindicate the court's power: 'The Securities and Exchange Commission does not operate for itself, does it? I mean it operates in the public interest doesn't it?' </s> [Footnote 20 E. Ingraham Co. v. Germanow, 2 Cir., 4 F.2d 1002, 1003.

United States Supreme Court COMMISSIONER v. KORELL(1950) No. 384 Argued: February 7, 1950Decided: June 5, 1950 </s> In 1944, an individual taxpayer purchased at a premium price of $121 certain taxable corporate bonds with a face value of $100 which were then callable at $104. Upon payment of $40, each bond was convertible at the option of the holder into a share of common stock which then had a market value of $163. Held: Under 125 of the Internal Revenue Code, the taxpayer, in his income tax return for 1944, was entitled to deduct, as "amortizable bond premium" on each bond, the difference between the purchase price of $121 and the call price of $104. Pp. 620-628. </s> (a) The callability and convertibility of these bonds did not remove them from the reach of 125. Pp. 623-624. </s> (b) That the premium may have been paid for the conversion privilege, rather than for a higher rate of interest, did not prevent it from being amortizable under 125. Pp. 624-628. </s> (c) The term "bond premium" in 125 means any extra payment, regardless of the reason therefor. P. 627. </s> 176 F.2d 152, affirmed. </s> The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed respondent's deduction in his individual income tax return of "amortizable bond premium" under 125 of the Internal Revenue Code. The Tax Court overruled the Commissioner. 10 T. C. 1001. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 176 F.2d 152. This Court granted certiorari. 338 U.S. 890 . Affirmed, p. 628. </s> Arnold Raum argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Caudle, Ellis N. Slack and Oscar H. Davis. [339 U.S. 619, 620] </s> Paul L. Peyton argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. </s> Nat Schmulowitz and Peter S. Sommer filed a brief for Shoong et al., as amici curiae, supporting respondent. </s> MR. CHIEF JUSTICE VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The tax consequences of a purchase of convertible bonds are in issue here. In August, 1944, respondent, an individual taxpayer, purchased certain American Telephone and Telegraph Company bonds, each having a face value of $100, at a premium price averaging slightly in excess of $121. Each bond was convertible into a share of common stock, at the option of the bondholder, upon the payment of $40. The market price of the stock was over $163 when respondent made his bond purchases. The bonds were callable prior to maturity date according to a schedule appearing in the indenture; had the corporation given appropriate notice at the dates of respondent's purchases, the bonds would have been redeemed at $104. </s> In his 1944 income tax return, respondent claimed a deduction in excess of $8,600 for amortizable bond premium. He computed his deduction on each bond as the difference between his purchase price, $121, and the call price, $104. This computation is concededly correct if the deduction is allowable. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner here, refused to allow any such deduction. His theory was that 125 of the Internal Revenue Code establishing the deduction for "amortizable bond premium" did not include premium paid for the conversion privilege. A contrary view of the statute was adopted by the Tax Court. 10 T. C. 1001 (1948). The court below affirmed, holding that respondent was entitled to the amortization deduction. 176 F.2d 152 (1949). We granted certiorari, 338 U.S. 890 (1949), to resolve [339 U.S. 619, 621] the conflict between the decision below and that of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Commissioner v. Shoong, 177 F.2d 131 (1949). </s> Prior to 1942, bond premium was irrelevant for tax purposes. Whether or not the purchase price exceeded the face value of the bond, the holder considered the full price as the basis for capital gain or loss, and reported all taxable interest received as income. 1 In presenting its 1942 tax proposals, however, the Treasury adopted the view that each receipt of interest is not entirely income but is partially a restoration of capital. Its spokesman pointed to the consequent discrimination against holders of taxable bonds: they were being taxed on a return of capital, while holders of tax-exempt bonds were not. 2 To remedy this inequity, the Treasury recommended that amortization of premium be permitted in the case of taxable bonds, and that the basis for capital gain or loss for all bonds be adjusted by the amount of deduction allowable for taxables and disallowable for tax-exempts. These recommendations were ultimately included in the Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 798, 822, as 113 and 125 of the Internal Revenue Code. </s> Section 125 contains four subsections. 3 In (a), the general rule is established, applicable "In the case of any [339 U.S. 619, 622] bond . . .," that the deduction for amortizable bond premium may not be taken if the interest is tax-exempt, but may be if the bond interest is taxable. Taxpayers holding bonds in the latter category may elect whether [339 U.S. 619, 623] or not to amortize in accordance with rules laid down in subsection (c). Subsection (b) defines the method of computing "the amount of bond premium, in the case of the holder of any bond . . . ." Petitioner urges that this does not define the kind of bond premium which is amortizable; respondent contends that this provision establishes a mandatory computation applicable to any bond premium. Subsection (d) consists of a general definition of "bond" and certain exceptions thereto, chiefly bonds held for sale or as stock in trade. That the securities purchased by respondent fall within the general definition and without the exceptions is undisputed. </s> There can be no doubt that the callability and convertibility of these bonds do not remove them from the reach of 125. The role of such bonds was specifically brought into the congressional discussion by at least one witness at the hearings. 4 And the Congress rendered unmistakably clear answers in the language of the Act, e. g., by express reference to "earlier call date," 125 (b) (1), and in both Committee Reports. "The fact that a bond is callable or convertible into stock does not of itself [339 U.S. 619, 624] prevent the application of this section. In the case of a callable bond, the earliest call date will, for the purposes of this section, be considered as the maturity date. Hence, the total premium is required to be spread over the period from the date as of which the basis of the bond is established down to the earliest call date, rather than down to the maturity date. In the case of a convertible bond, if the option to convert the bond into stock rests with the owner of the bond [as it did in this case], the bond is within the purview of this section." 5 The express decision of Congress to include the type of bonds purchased by respondent is of course binding on the courts. </s> Petitioner concedes that the bonds purchased by respondent are within the reach of 125, but he urges that this case does not involve the kind of premium which Congress had in mind. The argument is that this premium was paid for the conversion privilege, whereas Congress intended to include only that premium (entitled "true" premium by petitioner) which is paid for securing a higher rate of interest than the market average and for nothing else. We reject this argument as inapposite to the structure of the statute, unsupported by the legislative history and inconsistent with the normal use of the term "bond premium." </s> As Congress wrote the statute, the scope of "bond premium" is adequately denoted by defining "bond." There was no need for Congress to qualify both words in order to make its meaning clear; "premium" as an isolated term may not be defined in the statute nor explained in the legislative history, but "premium" is never used in the statute apart from its mate "bond." No attempt to define and distinguish the reasons for paying premium [339 U.S. 619, 625] mark the pertinent Treasury Regulations 111, 29.125. They mirror the structure of the statute and are constructed in terms of "bonds." Again, we note that the bonds here involved are without question embraced by the statute. </s> To be sure, Congress might have proceeded by defining "premium" (and "true" premium) rather than, or as well as "bond." But we cannot reject the clear and precise avenue of expression actually adopted by the Congress because in a particular case we may know, if the bonds are disposed of prior to our decision, that the public revenues would be maximized by adopting another statutory path. Congress was legislating for the generality of cases. It not only created a new deduction but also required that the basis be adjusted to the extent of the deduction allowable for taxables and disallowable for tax-exempts. 6 The adjustment increased the revenue potential, for the lower basis obviously raised possible capital gain and lowered allowable capital loss. In the case of tax-exempt bonds, which had a total par value in 1942 of over 58.5 billion dollars, 7 there was no allowable deduction to be set off against this new revenue potential. In the case of taxable bonds, whether the tax paid on capital gains will exceed the tax avoided by the deduction depends in each particular instance upon the uncertainties of market fluctuations and tax rates and the cluster of [339 U.S. 619, 626] other factors which induces a bondholder to act and determines his tax in given years. 8 These factors may combine in a specific case to produce an effect upon revenue which to some may appear too drastic for Congress to have intended. But there is nothing in this record to indicate that Congress or the Treasury anticipated that the total long-run effect of 113 and 125 on the yield from both taxables and tax-exempts would be to decrease federal revenue. And even if Congress had expected that some loss of revenue would be entailed, it might have decided that more equal treatment of taxpayers was more important than possible revenue loss; it cannot be argued that Congress lacked the legislative discretion to have reached such a conclusion. If in practice these sections are causing such loss of revenue as to indicate that Congress may have erred in its balancing of the competing considerations involved, the amendment must obviously be enacted by the Congress and not the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or this Court. </s> The legislative history fails to intimate that Congress intended to confine the deduction to bonds the premium on which was paid for a higher-than-market interest rate. At most, petitioner's presentation of the legislative materials suggests that Congress may have had the bondholder who was seeking a higher interest rate primarily in mind; but it does not establish that Congress in fact legislated with reference to him exclusively. 9 Congress, [339 U.S. 619, 627] and the Treasury in advising Congress, may well have concluded that the best manner of affording him relief and correcting the inequitable treatment of bondholders whose interest receipts were taxable, was to define the scope of the amendment by reference to types of bonds rather than causes of premium payment. </s> As "bond premium" is used by accountants and other writers in the securities field, it is any payment in addition to face value. 10 There is no suggestion that the words have only a limited significance, echoing petitioner's "true" premium, applicable solely to that extra price caused by the desire to obtain a higher than average interest yield. On the contrary, some authors have noted the variety of causes which induce the payment of bond premium, and the practical impossibility of disentangling and isolating them for the purpose of relative evaluation, as would be required if petitioner's reading of the statute were upheld. 11 We adopt the view that "bond premium" in 125 means any extra payment, regardless of the reason therefor, in accordance with the firmly established [339 U.S. 619, 628] principle of tax law that the ordinary meaning of terms is persuasive of their statutory meaning. 12 </s> We conclude that Congress made no distinctions based upon the inducements for paying the premium. Congress delimited the bond premium it wished to make amortizable in terms of categories of bonds, and there is no doubt that respondent purchased bonds which are included within the purview of 125. Respondent is therefore entitled to this deduction and the judgment below is </s> Affirmed. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK dissents. He believes that this case should be decided in accordance with, and for the reasons given by, the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Commissioner v. Shoong, 177 F.2d 131 (1949). </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 271 U.S. 109, 116 (1926); cf. Old Colony R. Co. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 561 (1932). </s> [Footnote 2 Statement of Randolph Paul, then Tax Adviser to the Secretary of the Treasury and subsequently General Counsel of the Department, 1 Hearings before House Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revisions of 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1942). </s> [Footnote 3 Int. Rev. Code 125, titled "Amortizable Bond Premium," reads as follows: "(a) General rule. In the case of any bond, as defined in subsection (d), the following rules shall apply to the amortizable bond premium (determined under subsection (b)) on the bond for any taxable year beginning after December 31, 1941: "(1) Interest wholly or partially taxable. In the case of a bond (other than a bond the interest on which is excludible from gross [339 U.S. 619, 622] income), the amount of the amortizable bond premium for the taxable year shall be allowed as a deduction. "(2) Interest wholly tax-exempt. In the case of any bond the interest on which is excludible from gross income, no deduction shall be allowed for the amortizable bond premium for the taxable year. "(3) Adjustment of credit in case of interest partially tax-exempt. In the case of any bond the interest on which is allowable as a credit against net income, the credit provided in section 25(a) (1) or (2), or section 26 (a), as the case may be, shall be reduced by the amount of the amortizable bond premium for the taxable year. "(For adjustment to basis on account of amortizable bond premium, see section 113 (b) (1) (H)). [See note 6, post, p. 625.] "(b) Amortizable bond premium - "(1) Amount of bond premium. For the purposes of paragraph (2), the amount of bond premium, in the case of the holder of any bond, shall be determined with reference to the amount of the basis (for determining loss on sale or exchange) of such bond, and with reference to the amount payable on maturity or on earlier call date, with adjustments proper to reflect unamortized bond premium with respect to the bond, for the period prior to the date as of which subsection (a) becomes applicable with respect to the taxpayer with respect to such bond. "(2) Amount amortizable. The amortizable bond premium of the taxable year shall be the amount of the bond premium attributable to such year. "(3) Method of determination. The determinations required under paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be made - "(A) in accordance with the method of amortizing bond premium regularly employed by the holder of the bond, if such method is reasonable; "(B) in all other cases, in accordance with regulations prescribing reasonable methods of amortizing bond premium, prescribed by the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary. "(c) Election on taxable and partially taxable bonds - "(1) Eligibility to elect and bonds with respect to which election permitted. This section shall apply with respect to the following [339 U.S. 619, 623] classes of taxpayers with respect to the following classes of bonds only if the taxpayer has elected to have this section apply. . . . . . "(d) Definition of bond. As used in this section, the term `bond' means any bond, debenture, note, or certificate or other evidence of indebtedness, issued by any corporation and bearing interest (including any like obligation issued by a government or political subdivision thereof), with interest coupons or in registered form, but does not include any such obligation which constitutes stock in trade of the taxpayer or any such obligation of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or any such obligation held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business." </s> [Footnote 4 See statement of Roy C. Osgood, 2 Hearings before Senate Committee on Finance on H. R. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1728-29 (1942). </s> [Footnote 5 H. R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (1942). Precisely the same language appears in S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 94 (1942). U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, 29.125-5, is of identical tenor. </s> [Footnote 6 Int. Rev. Code 113 (b) (1) provides that "Proper adjustment in respect of the property shall in all cases be made . . . (H) in the case of any bond (as defined in section 125) the interest on which is wholly exempt from the tax imposed by this chapter, to the extent of the amortizable bond premium disallowable as a deduction pursuant to section 125 (a) (2), and in the case of any other bond (as defined in such section) to the extent of the deductions allowable pursuant to section 125 (a) (1) with respect thereto." See note 3, ante, p. 621, for the text of 125. </s> [Footnote 7 Of this amount, 25.5 billion was wholly, and 33.0 billion partially tax-exempt. Statistical Abstract of the United States 372 (1948). </s> [Footnote 8 In this case, the record does not disclose how petitioner disposed of the bonds. If for some reason he had sold them after six months at a price above 138, his capital gain would have exceeded the deduction he took on the bond premium. This possibility is not merely theoretical, for the bonds in fact stood above 138 for over a year, starting in August, 1945. </s> [Footnote 9 Petitioner cites H. R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1942), and the statements of John O'Brien, 1 Hearings before Senate Committee on Finance on H. R. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1942), and Randolph Paul, 1 Hearings before House Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1942). None of these can be taken as a clear statement excluding premium reflecting financial inducements other than the interest rate. </s> [Footnote 10 E. g., "When bonds sell at a price greater than par, they are said to sell at a premium . . . ." Financial Handbook 1210 (3d ed. 1948); ". . . bond premium - the amount by which issue price, or cost at later date, exceeds maturity value . . . ." Paton, Advanced Accounting 197 (1941); Grossman, Investment Principles and Practice 14 (1939); Noble, Accounting Principles 447 (4th ed. 1945). And see Old Colony R. Co. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 555 (1932); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 271 U.S. 109, 116 (1926); 4 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, 831 (1935); 2 Scott on Trusts 239.2 (1939). </s> [Footnote 11 See, e. g., 1 Dewing, Financial Policy of Corporations 662 (4th ed. 1941); Saliers and Holmes, Basic Accounting Principles 509 (1937); 4 (pt. 1) Bogert, Trusts and Trustees 319 (1935); 2 Scott on Trusts 1337 (1939); Williams, Are Convertibles Now Attractive? 83 Mag. of Wall St. 134 (1948). </s> [Footnote 12 Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6 -7 (1947); Helvering v. Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247, 249 (1941); Helvering v. San Joaquin Fruit & Investment Co., 297 U.S. 496, 499 (1936); Lang v. Commissioner, 289 U.S. 109, 111 (1933); cf. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Phillips, 332 U.S. 168, 171 (1947). </s> [339 U.S. 619, 629]

United States Supreme Court GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. ET AL . v. JOINER(1997) No. 96-188 Argued: October 14, 1997Decided: December 15, 1997 </s> </s> After he was diagnosed with small-cell lung cancer, respondent Joiner sued in Georgia state court, alleging, inter alia , that his disease was </s> "promoted" by his workplace exposure to chemical "PCBs" and derivative "furans" and "dioxins" that were manufactured by, or present in materials manufactured by, petitioners. Petitioners removed the case to federal court and moved for summary judgment. Joiner responded with the depositions of expert witnesses, who testified that PCBs, furans, and dioxins can promote cancer, and opined that Joiner' exposure to those chemicals was likely responsible for his cancer. The District Court ruled that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Joiner had been exposed to PCBs, but granted summary judgment for petitioners because (1) there was no genuine issue as to whether he had been exposed to furans and dioxins, and (2) his experts' testimony had failed to show that there was a link between exposure to PCBs and small-cell lung cancer and was therefore inadmissible because it did not rise above "subjective belief or unsupported speculation." In reversing, the Eleventh Circuit applied "a particularly stringent standard of review" to hold that the District Court had erred in excluding the expert testimony. </s> Held: 1. Abuse of discretion-the standard ordinarily applicable to review of evidentiary rulings-is the proper standard by which to review a district court's decision to admit or exclude expert scientific evidence. Contrary to the Eleventh Circuit's suggestion, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , did not somehow alter this general rule in the context of a district court's decision to exclude scientific evidence. Daubert did not address the appellate review standard for evidentiary rulings at all, but did indicate that, while the Federal Rules of Evidence allow district courts to admit a somewhat broader range of scientific testimony than did pre-existing law, they leave in place the trial judge's "gatekeeper" role of screening such evidence to ensure that it is not only relevant, but reliable. Id., at 589. A court of appeals applying "abuse of discretion" review to such rulings may not categorically distinguish between rulings allowing expert testimony and rulings which disallow it. Compare Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 172 , with United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 . This Court rejects Joiner's argument that because the granting of summary judgment in this case was "outcome determinative," it should have been subjected to a more searching standard of review. On a summary judgment motion, disputed issues of fact are resolved against the moving party-here, petitioners. But the question of admissibility of expert testimony is not such an issue of fact, and is reviewable under the abuse of discretion standard. In applying an overly "stringent" standard, the Eleventh Circuit failed to give the trial court the deference that is the hallmark of abuse of discretion review. Pp. 4-5. </s> 2. A proper application of the correct standard of review indicates that the District Court did not err in excluding the expert testimony at issue. The animal studies cited by respondent's experts were so dissimilar to the facts presented here- i.e., the studies involved infant mice that developed alveologenic adenomas after highly concentrated, massive doses of PCBs were injected directly into their peritoneums or stomachs, whereas Joiner was an adult human whose small-cell carcinomas allegedly resulted from exposure on a much smaller scale-that it was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to have rejected the experts' reliance on those studies. Nor did the court abuse its discretion in concluding that the four epidemiological studies on which Joiner relied were not a sufficient basis for the experts' opinions, since the authors of two of those studies ultimately were unwilling to suggest a link between increases in lung cancer and PCB exposure among the workers they examined, the third study involved exposure to a particular type of mineral oil not necessarily relevant here, and the fourth involved exposure to numerous potential carcinogens in addition to PCBs. Nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. Pp. 6-9. </s> 3. These conclusions, however, do not dispose of the entire case. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the District Court's conclusion that Joiner had not been exposed to furans and dioxins. Because petitioners did not challenge that determination in their certiorari petition, the question whether exposure to furans and dioxins contributed to Joiner's cancer is still open. Pp. 9-10. </s> 78 F. 3d 524, reversed and remanded. </s> REHNQUIST , C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and II, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Part III, in which O'CONNOR , SCALIA , KENNEDY , SOUTER , THOMAS , GINSBURG , and BREYER , JJ., joined. BREYER , J., filed a concurring opinion. STEVENS , J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. </s> U.S. Supreme Court </s> No. 96-188 </s> GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, ET AL ., PETI-TIONERS v. ROBERT K. JOINER </s> ET UX . ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT [December 15, 1997] </s> CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the </s> Court. </s> We granted certiorari in this case to determine what standard an appellate court should apply in reviewing a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony under Daubert v . Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). We hold that abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard. We apply this standard and conclude that the District Court in this case did not abuse its discretion when it excluded certain proffered expert testimony. </s> I </s> Respondent Robert Joiner began work as an electrician in the Water & Light Department of Thomasville, Georgia (City) in 1973. This job required him to work with and around the City's electrical transformers, which used a mineral-based dielectric fluid as a coolant. Joiner often had to stick his hands and arms into the fluid to make repairs. The fluid would sometimes splash onto him, occasionally getting into his eyes and mouth. In 1983 the City discovered that the fluid in some of the transformers was contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). PCBs are widely considered to be hazardous to human health. Congress, with limited exceptions, banned the production and sale of PCBs in 1978. See 90 Stat. 2020, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(2)(A). </s> Joiner was diagnosed with small cell lung cancer in 1991. He 1 </s> sued petitioners in Georgia state court the following year. Petitioner Monsanto manufactured PCBs from 1935 to 1977; petitioners General Electric and Westinghouse Electric manufactured transformers and dielectric fluid. In his complaint Joiner linked his development of cancer to his exposure to PCBs and their derivatives, polychlorinated dibenzofurans (furans) and polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (dioxins). Joiner had been a smoker for approximately eight years, his parents had both been smokers, and there was a history of lung cancer in his family. He was thus perhaps already at a heightened risk of developing lung cancer eventually. The suit alleged that his exposure to PCBs "promoted" his cancer; had it not been for his exposure to these substances, his cancer would not have developed for many years, if at all. </s> Petitioners removed the case to federal court. Once there, they moved for summary judgment. They contended that (1) there was no evidence that Joiner suffered significant exposure to PCBs, furans, or dioxins, and (2) there was no admissible scientific evidence that PCBs promoted Joiner's cancer. Joiner responded that there were numerous disputed factual issues that required resolution by a jury. He relied largely on the testimony of expert witnesses. In depositions, his experts had testified that PCBs alone can promote cancer and that furans and dioxins can also promote cancer. They opined that since Joiner had been exposed to PCBs, furans, and dioxins, such exposure was likely responsible for Joiner's cancer. </s> The District Court ruled that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Joiner had been exposed to PCBs. But it nevertheless granted summary judgment for petitioners because (1) there was no genuine issue as to whether Joiner had been exposed to furans and dioxins, and (2) the testimony of Joiner's experts had failed to show that there was a link between exposure to PCBs and small cell lung cancer. The court believed that the testimony of respondent's experts to the contrary did not rise above "subjective belief or unsupported speculation." 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1329 (ND Ga. 1994). Their testimony was therefore inadmissible. </s> The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. 78 F. 3d 524 (1996). It held that "[b]ecause the Federal Rules of Evidence governing expert testimony display a preference for admissibility, we apply a particularly stringent standard of review to the trial judge's exclusion of expert testimony." Id. at 529. Applying that standard, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court had erred in excluding the testimony of Joiner's expert witnesses. The District Court had made two fundamental errors. First, it excluded the experts' testimony because it "drew different conclusions from the research than did each of the experts." The Court of Appeals opined that a district court should limit its role to determining the "legal reliability of proffered expert testimony, leaving the jury to decide the correctness of competing expert opinions." Id. at 533. Second, the District Court had held that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Joiner had been exposed to furans and dioxins. This was also incorrect, said the Court of Appeals, because testimony in the record supported the proposition that there had been such exposure. </s> We granted petitioners' petition for a writ of certiorari, 520 U. S. _____ (1997), and we now reverse. </s> II </s> Petitioners challenge the standard applied by the Court of Appeals in reviewing the District Court's decision to exclude respondent's experts' proffered testimony. They argue that that court should have applied traditional "abuse of discretion" review. Respondent agrees that abuse of discretion is the correct standard of review. He contends, however, that the Court of Appeals applied an abuse of discretion standard in this case. As he reads it, the phrase "particularly stringent" announced no new standard of review. It was simply an acknowledgement that an appellate court can and will devote more resources to analyzing district court decisions that are dispositive of the entire litigation. All evidentiary decisions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. He argues, however, that it is perfectly reasonable for appellate courts to give particular attention to those decisions that are outcome-determinative. </s> We have held that abuse of discretion is the proper standard of review of a district court's evidentiary rulings. Old Chief v. United States , 519 U. S. ____, ____ n. 1 (1997) (slip op., at 1-2, n.1), United States v. Abel , 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984). Indeed, our cases on the subject go back as far as Spring Co . v. Edgar , 99 U.S. 645, 658 (1879) where we said that "cases arise where it is very much a matter of discretion with the court whether to receive or exclude the evidence; but the appellate court will not reverse in such a case, unless the ruling is manifestly erroneous." The Court of Appeals suggested that Daubert somehow altered this general rule in the context of a district court's decision to exclude scientific evidence. But Daubert did not address the standard of appellate review for evidentiary rulings at all. It did hold that the "austere" Frye standard of "general acceptance" had not been carried over into the Federal Rules of Evidence. But the opinion also said: </s> "That the Frye test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence does not mean, however, that the Rules themselves place no limits on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence. Nor is the trial judge disabled from screening such evidence. To the contrary, under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." </s> 509 U.S., at 589 (footnote omitted). </s> Thus, while the Federal Rules of Evidence allow district courts to admit a somewhat broader range of scientific testimony than would have been admissible under Frye , they leave in place the "gatekeeper" role of the trial judge in screening such evidence. A court of appeals applying "abuse of discretion" review to such rulings may not categorically distinguish between rulings allowing expert testimony and rulings which disallow it. Compare Beech Aircraft Corp v. Rainey , 488 U.S. 153, 172 (1988) (applying abuse of discretion review to a lower court's decision to exclude evidence) with United States v . Abel , supra at 54 (applying abuse of discretion review to a lower court's decision to admit evidence). We likewise reject respondent's argument that because the granting of summary judgment in this case was "outcome determinative," it should have been subjected to a more searching standard of review. On a motion for summary judgment, disputed issues of fact are resolved against the moving party-here, petitioners. But the question of admissibility of expert testimony is not such an issue of fact, and is reviewable under the abuse of discretion standard. </s> We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in its review of the exclusion of Joiner's experts' testimony. In applying an overly "stringent" review to that ruling, it failed to give the trial court the deference that is the hallmark of abuse of discretion review. See, e.g. , Koon v. United States , 518 U. S. ____, ____ (1996)(slip op., at 14-15). </s> III </s> We believe that a proper application of the correct standard of review here indicates that the District Court did not abuse its discretion. Joiner's theory of liability was that his exposure to PCBs and their derivatives "promoted" his development of small cell lung cancer. In support of that theory he proffered the deposition testimony of expert witnesses. Dr. Arnold Schecter testified that he believed it "more likely than not that Mr. Joiner's lung cancer was causally linked to cigarette smoking and PCB exposure." App. at 107. Dr. Daniel Teitelbaum testified that Joiner's "lung cancer was caused by or contributed to in a significant degree by the materials with which he worked." Id. at 140. </s> Petitioners contended that the statements of Joiner's experts regarding causation were nothing more than speculation. Petitioners criticized the testimony of the experts in that it was "not supported by epidemiological studies . . . [and was] based exclusively on isolated studies of laboratory animals." Joiner responded by claiming that his experts had identified "relevant animal studies which support their opinions." He also directed the court's attention to four epidemiological studies 2 </s> on which his experts had relied. </s> The District Court agreed with petitioners that the animal studies on which respondent's experts relied did not support his contention that exposure to PCBs had contributed to his cancer. The studies involved infant mice that had developed cancer after being exposed to PCBs. The infant mice in the studies had had massive doses of PCBs injected directly into their peritoneums 3 </s> or stomachs. Joiner was an adult human being whose alleged exposure to PCBs was far less than the exposure in the animal studies. The PCBs were injected into the mice in a highly concentrated form. The fluid with which Joiner had come into contact generally had a much smaller PCB concentration of between 0-500 parts per million. The cancer that these mice developed was alveologenic adenomas; Joiner had developed small-cell carcinomas. No study demonstrated that adult mice developed cancer after being exposed to PCBs. One of the experts admitted that no study had demonstrated that PCBs lead to cancer in any other species. </s> Respondent failed to reply to this criticism. Rather than explaining how and why the experts could have extrapolated their opinions from these seemingly far-removed animal studies, respondent chose "to proceed as if the only issue [was] whether animal studies can ever be a proper foundation for an expert's opinion." Joiner , 864 F. Supp. at 1324. Of course, whether animal studies can ever be a proper foundation for an expert's opinion was not the issue. The issue was whether these experts' opinions were sufficiently supported by the animal studies on which they purported to rely. The studies were so dissimilar to the facts presented in this litigation that it was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to have rejected the experts' reliance on them. </s> The District Court also concluded that the four epidemiological studies on which respondent relied were not a sufficient basis for the experts' opinions. The first such study involved workers at an Italian capacitor 4 </s> plant who had been exposed to PCBs. Bertazzi, Riboldi, Pesatori, Radice, & Zocchetti, Cancer Mortality of Capacitor Manu facturing Workers, 11 American Journal of Industrial Medicine 165 (1987). The authors noted that lung cancer deaths among ex-employees at the plant were higher than might have been expected, but concluded that "there were apparently no grounds for associating lung cancer deaths (although increased above expectations) and exposure in the plant." Id. at 172. Given that Bertazzi et al . were unwilling to say that PCB exposure had caused cancer among the workers they examined, their study did not support the experts' conclusion that Joiner's exposure to PCBs caused his cancer. </s> The second study followed employees who had worked at Monsanto's PCB production plant. J. Zack & D. Munsch, Mortality of PCB Workers at the Monsanto Plant in Sauget, Illinois (Dec. 14, 1979)(unpublished report), 3 Rec., Doc. No. 11. The authors of this study found that the incidence of lung cancer deaths among these workers was somewhat higher than would ordinarily be expected. The increase, however, was not statistically significant and the authors of the study did not suggest a link between the increase in lung cancer deaths and the exposure to PCBs. </s> The third and fourth studies were likewise of no help. The third involved workers at a Norwegian cable manufacturing company who had been exposed to mineral oil. Ronneberg, Andersen, Skyberg, Mortality and Incidence of Cancer Among Oil-Exposed Workers in a Norwegian Cable Manufacturing Company, 45 British Journal of Industrial Medicine 595 (1988). A statistically significant increase in lung cancer deaths had been observed in these workers. The study, however, (1) made no mention of PCBs and (2) was expressly limited to the type of mineral oil involved in that study, and thus did not support these experts' opinions. The fourth and final study involved a PCB-exposed group in Japan that had seen a statistically significant increase in lung cancer deaths. Kuratsune, Nakamura, Ikeda, & Hirohata, Analysis of Deaths Seen Among Pa tients with Yusho-A Preliminary Report, 16 Chemosphere, Nos. 8/9, 2085 (1987). The subjects of this study, however, had been exposed to numerous potential carcinogens, including toxic rice oil that they had ingested. </s> Respondent points to Daubert 's language that the "focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate." 509 U.S., at 595 . He claims that because the District Court's disagreement was with the conclusion that the experts drew from the studies, the District Court committed legal error and was properly reversed by the Court of Appeals. But conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another. Trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data. But nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered. See Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc ., 959 F. 2d 1349, 1360 (CA 6), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826 (1992). That is what the District Court did here, and we hold that it did not abuse its discretion in so doing. </s> We hold, therefore, that abuse of discretion is the proper standard by which to review a district court's decision to admit or exclude scientific evidence. We further hold that, because it was within the District Court's discretion to conclude that the studies upon which the experts relied were not sufficient, whether individually or in combination, to support their conclusions that Joiner's exposure to PCBs contributed to his cancer, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding their testimony. These conclusions, however, do not dispose of this entire case. </s> Respondent's original contention was that his exposure to PCBs, furans, and dioxins contributed to his cancer. The District Court ruled that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Joiner had been exposed to PCBs, but concluded that there was no genuine issue as to whether he had been exposed to furans and dioxins. The District Court accordingly never explicitly considered if there was admissible evidence on the question whether Joiner's alleged exposure to furans and dioxins contributed to his cancer. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's conclusion that there had been no exposure to furans and dioxins. Petitioners did not challenge this determination in their petition to this Court. Whether Joiner was exposed to furans and dioxins, and whether if there was such exposure, the opinions of Joiner's experts would then be admissible, remain open questions. We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> U.S. Supreme Court </s> No. 96-188 </s> GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, ET AL ., PETI-TIONERS v. ROBERT K. JOINER </s> ET UX . ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT [December 15, 1997] </s> JUSTICE BREYER , concurring. </s> The Court's opinion, which I join, emphasizes Daubert 's statement that a trial judge, acting as "gatekeeper, " must " 'ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.' " Ante , at 5 (quoting Daubert v . Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)). This requirement will sometimes ask judges to make subtle and sophisticated determinations about scientific methodology and its relation to the conclusions an expert witness seeks to offer-particularly when a case arises in an area where the science itself is tentative or uncertain, or where testimony about general risk levels in human beings or animals is offered to prove individual causation. Yet, as amici have pointed out, judges are not scientists and do not have the scientific training that can facilitate the making of such decisions. See, e.g., Brief for Trial Lawyers for Public Justice as Amicus Curiae 15; Brief for The New England Journal of Medicine et al. as Amici Curiae 2 ("Judges . . . are generally not trained scientists "). </s> Of course, neither the difficulty of the task nor any comparative lack of expertise can excuse the judge from exercising the "gatekeeper" duties that the Federal Rules impose-determining, for example, whether particular expert testimony is reliable and "will assist the trier of fact," Fed. Rule Evid. 702, or whether the "probative value" of testimony is substantially outweighed by risks of prejudice, confusion or waste of time. Fed. Rule Evid. 403. To the contrary, when law and science intersect, those duties often must be exercised with special care. </s> Today's toxic tort case provides an example. The plaintiff in today's case says that a chemical substance caused, or promoted, his lung cancer. His concern, and that of others, about the causes of cancer is understandable, for cancer kills over one in five Americans. See U. S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, National Center for Health Statistics, Health United States 1996-97 and Injury Chartbook 117 (1997) (23.3% of all deaths in 1995). Moreover, scientific evidence implicates some chemicals as potential causes of some cancers. See, e.g., U. S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, National Toxicology Program, 1 Seventh Annual Report on Carcinogens, pp. v-vi (1994). Yet modern life, including good health as well as economic well-being, depends upon the use of artificial or manufactured substances, such as chemicals. And it may, therefore, prove particularly important to see that judges fulfill their Daubert gatekeeping function, so that they help assure that the powerful engine of tort liability, which can generate strong financial incentives to reduce, or to eliminate, production, points towards the right substances and does not destroy the wrong ones. It is, thus, essential in this science-related area that the courts administer the Federal Rules of Evidence in order to achieve the "end[s]" that the Rules themselves set forth, not only so that proceedings may be "justly determined," but also so "that the truth may be ascertained." Fed. Rule Evid. 102. I therefore want specially to note that, as cases presenting significant science-related issues have increased in number, see Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee 97 (Apr. 2, 1990) ("Economic, statistical, technological, and natural and social scientific data are becoming increasingly important in both routine and complex litigation"), judges have increasingly found in the Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure ways to help them overcome the inherent difficulty of making determinations about complicated scientific or otherwise technical evidence. Among these techniques are an increased use of Rule 16's pretrial conference authority to narrow the scientific issues in dispute, pretrial hearings where potential experts are subject to examination by the court, and the appointment of special masters and specially trained law clerks. See J. Cecil & T. Willging, CourtAppointed Experts: Defining the Role of Experts Appointed Under Federal Rule of Evidence 706, pp. 83-88 (1993); J. Weinstein, Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation 107110 (1995); cf. Kaysen, In Memoriam: Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., 100 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 713-715 (1987) (discussing a judge's use of an economist as a law clerk in United States v . United Shoe Machinery Corp. , 110 F. Supp. 295 (D Mass 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954)). In the present case, the New England Journal of Medicine has filed an amici brief "in support of neither petitioners nor respondents" in which the Journal writes: </s> "[A] judge could better fulfill this gatekeeper function if he or she had help from scientists. Judges should be strongly encouraged to make greater use of their inherent authority . . . to appoint experts . . . . Reputable experts could be recommended to courts by established scientific organizations, such as the National Academy of Sciences or the American Association for the Advancement of Science." </s> Brief for The New England Journal of Medicine 18-19; cf. Fed. Rule Evid. 706 (court may "on its own motion or on the motion of any party" appoint an expert to serve on behalf of the court, and this expert may be selected as "agreed upon by the parties" or chosen by the court); see also Weinstein, supra, at 116 (a court should sometimes "go beyond the experts proffered by the parties" and "utilize its powers to appoint independent experts under Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence"). Given this kind of offer of cooperative effort, from the scientific to the legal community, and given the various Rules-authorized methods for facilitating the courts' task, it seems to me that Daubert 's gatekeeping requirement will not prove inordinately difficult to implement; and that it will help secure the basic objectives of the Federal Rules of Evidence; which are, to repeat, the ascertainment of truth and the just determination of proceedings. Fed. Rule Evid. 102. </s> U.S. Supreme Court </s> No. 96-188 -------- </s> ., PETI-TIONERS v. ROBERT K. JOINER </s> ET UX . ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT [December 15, 1997] </s> JUSTICE STEVENS , concurring in part and dissenting in </s> part. </s> The question that we granted certiorari to decide is whether the Court of Appeals applied the correct standard of review. That question is fully answered in Parts I and II of the Court's opinion. Part III answers the quite different question whether the District Court properly held that the testimony of plaintiff 's expert witnesses was inadmissible. Because I am not sure that the parties have adequately briefed that question, or that the Court has adequately explained why the Court of Appeals' disposition was erroneous, I do not join Part III. Moreover, because a proper answer to that question requires a study of the record that can be performed more efficiently by the Court of Appeals than by the nine members of this Court, I would remand the case to that court for application of the proper standard of review. </s> One aspect of the record will illustrate my concern. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, Joiner's experts relied on "the studies of at least thirteen different researchers, and referred to several reports of the World Health Organization that address the question of whether PCBs cause cancer." 78 F. 3d 524, 533 (CA11 1996). Only one of those studies is in the record, and only six of them were dis cussed in the District Court opinion. Whether a fair appraisal of either the methodology or the conclusions of Joiner's experts can be made on the basis of such an incomplete record is a question that I do not feel prepared to answer. </s> It does seem clear, however, that the Court has not adequately explained why its holding is consistent with Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 1 </s> as interpreted in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 2 In general, scientific testimony that is both relevant and reliable must be admitted and testimony that is irrelevant or unreliable must be excluded. Id. , at 597. In this case, the District Court relied on both grounds for exclusion. </s> The relevance ruling was straightforward. The District Court correctly reasoned that an expert opinion that exposure to PCBs, "furans" and "dioxins" together may cause lung cancer would be irrelevant unless the plaintiff had been exposed to those substances. Having already found that there was no evidence of exposure to furans and dioxins, 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1318-1319 (ND Ga. 1994), it necessarily followed that this expert opinion testimony was inadmissible. Correctly applying Daubert, the District Court explained that the experts' testimony "mani- festly does not fit the facts of this case, and is therefore inadmissible." 864 F. Supp., at 1322. Of course, if the evidence raised a genuine issue of fact on the question of Joiner's exposure to furans and dioxins-as the Court of Appeals held that it did-then this basis for the ruling on admissibility was erroneous, but not because the district judge either abused her discretion or misapplied the law. 3 </s> The reliability ruling was more complex and arguably is not faithful to the statement in Daubert that "[t]he focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate." 509 U.S., at 595 . Joiner's experts used a "weight of the evidence" methodology to assess whether Joiner's exposure to transformer fluids promoted his lung cancer. 4 </s> They did not suggest that any one study provided adequate support for their conclusions, but instead relied on all the studies taken together (along with their interviews of Joiner and their review of his medical records). The District Court, however, examined the studies one by one and concluded that none was sufficient to show a link between PCBs and lung cancer. 864 F. Supp., at 1324-1326. The focus of the opinion was on the separate studies and the conclusions of the experts, not on the experts' methodology. Id. , at 1322 ("Defendants . . . persuade the court that Plaintiffs' expert testimony would not be admissible . . . by attacking the conclusions that Plaintiffs' experts draw from the studies they cite"). </s> Unlike the District Court, the Court of Appeals expressly decided that a "weight of the evidence" methodology was scientifically acceptable. 5 </s> To this extent, the Court of Appeals' opinion is persuasive. It is not intrinsically "unscientific" for experienced professionals to arrive at a conclusion by weighing all available scientific evidencethis is not the sort of "junk science" with which Daubert was concerned. 6 </s> After all, as Joiner points out, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) uses the same methodology to assess risks, albeit using a somewhat different threshold than that required in a trial. Brief for Respondents 40-41 (quoting EPA, Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33992, 33996 (1986)). Petitioners' own experts used the same scientific approach as well. 7 </s> And using this methodology, it would seem that an expert could reasonably have concluded that the study of workers at an Italian capacitor plant, coupled with data from Monsanto's study and other studies, raises an inference that PCBs promote lung cancer. 8 </s> The Court of Appeals' discussion of admissibility is faithful to the dictum in Daubert that the reliability inquiry must focus on methodology, not conclusions. Thus, even though I fully agree with both the District Court's and this Court's explanation of why each of the studies on which the experts relied was by itself unpersuasive, a critical question remains unanswered: When qualified experts have reached relevant conclusions on the basis of an acceptable methodology, why are their opinions inadmissible? Daubert quite clearly forbids trial judges from assessing the validity or strength of an expert's scientific conclusions, which is a matter for the jury. 9 </s> Because I am per- suaded that the difference between methodology and conclusions is just as categorical as the distinction between means and ends, I do not think the statement that "conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another," ante , at 9, is either accurate or helps us answer the difficult admissibility question presented by this record. </s> In any event, it bears emphasis that the Court has not held that it would have been an abuse of discretion to admit the expert testimony. The very point of today's holding is that the abuse of discretion standard of review applies whether the district judge has excluded or admitted evidence. Ante , at 5. And nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district judge to reject an expert's conclusions and keep them from the jury when they fit the facts of the case and are based on reliable scientific methodology. </s> Accordingly, while I join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion, I do not concur in the judgment or in Part III of its opinion. </s> Footnotes </s> [Footnote 1 Joiner's wife was also a plaintiff in the suit and is a respondent here. For convenience, we refer to respondent in the singular. [Footnote 2 Epidemiological studies examine the pattern of disease in human populations. [Footnote 3 The peritoneum is the lining of the abdominal cavity. [Footnote 4 A capacitor is an electrical component that stores an electric charge. [Footnote 1 Rule 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." [Footnote 2 The specific question on which the Court granted certiorari in Daubert was whether the rule of Frye v. United States , 54 App. D. C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923), remained valid after the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, but the Court went beyond that issue and set forth alternative requirements for admissibility in place of the Frye test. Even though the Daubert test was announced in dicta, see 509 U.S., at 598 -601 (REHNQUIST, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), we should not simply ignore its analysis in reviewing the District Court's rulings. [Footnote 3 Petitioners do not challenge the Court of Appeals' straightforward review of the District Court's summary judgment ruling on exposure to furans and dioxins. As today's opinion indicates, ante , at 10, it remains an open question on remand whether the District Court should admit expert testimony that PCBs, furans and dioxins together promoted Joiner's cancer. [Footnote 4 Dr. Daniel Teitelbaum elaborated on that approach in his deposition testimony: "[A]s a toxicologist when I look at a study, I am going to require that that study meet the general criteria for methodology and statistical analysis, but that when all of that data is collected and you ask me as a patient, 'Doctor, have I got a risk of getting cancer from this?' That those studies don't answer the question, that I have to put them all together in my mind and look at them in relation to everything I know about the substance and everything I know about the exposure and come to a conclusion. I think when I say, 'To a reasonable medical probability as a medical toxicologist, this substance was a contributing cause,' . . . to his cancer, that that is a valid conclusion based on the totality of the evidence presented to me. And I think that that is an appropriate thing for a toxicologist to do, and it has been the basis of diagnosis for several hundred years, anyway." Supp. App. to Brief for Respondents 19. [Footnote 5 The court explained: "Opinions of any kind are derived from individual pieces of evidence, each of which by itself might not be conclusive, but when viewed in their entirety are the building blocks of a perfectly reasonable conclusion, one reliable enough to be submitted to a jury along with the tests and criticisms cross-examination and contrary evidence would supply." 78 F. 3d 524, 532 (CA11 1996). [Footnote 6 An example of "junk science" that should be excluded under Daubert as too unreliable would be the testimony of a phrenologist who would purport to prove a defendant's future dangerousness based on the contours of the defendant's skull. [Footnote 7 See, e.g., Deposition of Dr. William Charles Bailey, Supp. App. to Brief for Respondents 56 ("I've just reviewed a lot of literature and come to some conclusions . . "). [Footnote 8 The Italian capacitor plant study found that workers exposed to PCBs had a higher-than-expected rate of lung cancer death, though "the numbers were small [and] the value of the risk estimate was not statistically significant." 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1324 (ND Ga. 1994). The Monsanto study also found a correlation between PCB exposure and lung cancer death, but the results were not statistically significant. Id. , at 1325. Moreover, it should be noted that under Georgia law, which applies in this diversity suit, Joiner need only show that his exposure to PCBs "promoted" his lung cancer, not that it was the sole cause of his cancer. Brief for Respondents 7, n. 16 (quoting Brief for Appellants in No. 94-9131 (CA 11), pp. 7-10). [Footnote 9 The Court stated in Daubert : "Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence. . . . Additionally, in the event the trial court concludes that the scintilla of evidence presented supporting a position is insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the position more likely than not is true, the court remains free to direct a judgment, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 50(a), and likewise to grant summary judgment, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56. . . . These conventional devices, rather than wholesale exclusion under an uncompromising 'general acceptance' test, are the appropriate safeguards where the basis of scientific testimony meets the standards of Rule 702." 509 U.S., at 596 .

United States Supreme Court RAILROAD TRAINMEN v. VIRGINIA BAR(1964) No. 34 Argued: January 13, 1964Decided: April 20, 1964 </s> An injunction issued by a state court, prohibiting, as the unlawful solicitation of litigation and the unauthorized practice of law, a labor union from advising injured members or their dependents to obtain legal assistance before settling claims and recommending specific lawyers to handle such claims, infringes rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 , followed. </s> Judgment and decree vacated, and case remanded </s> Beecher E. Stallard and John J. Naughton argued the cause for petitioner. With them on the briefs were Edward B. Henslee and Arnold Elkind. </s> Aubrey R. Bowles, Jr. argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Aubrey R. Bowles III. </s> Wayland B. Cedarquist, Holcombe H. Perry, Warren H. Resh and Earl Sneed filed a brief for the American Bar Association, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The Virginia State Bar brought this suit in the Chancery Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia, [377 U.S. 1, 2] against the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, an investigator employed by the Brotherhood, and an attorney designated its "Regional Counsel," to enjoin them from carrying on activities which, the Bar charged, constituted the solicitation of legal business and the unauthorized practice of law in Virginia. 1 It was conceded that in order to assist the prosecution of claims by injured railroad workers or by the families of workers killed on the job the Brotherhood maintains in Virginia and throughout the country a Department of Legal Counsel which recommends to Brotherhood members and their families the names of lawyers whom the Brotherhood believes to be honest and competent. Finding that the Brotherhood's plan resulted in "channeling all, or substantially all," the workers' claims to lawyers chosen by the Department of Legal Counsel, the court issued an injunction against the Brotherhood's carrying out its plan in Virginia. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed summarily over objections that the injunction abridges the Brotherhood's rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, which guarantee freedom of speech, petition and assembly. We granted certiorari to consider this constitutional question in the light of our recent decision in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 . 2 </s> 372 U.S. 905 . </s> The Brotherhood's plan is not a new one. Its roots go back to 1883, when the Brotherhood was founded as a fraternal and mutual benefit society to promote the welfare of the trainmen and "to protect their families by the exercise of benevolence, very needful in a calling so [377 U.S. 1, 3] hazardous as ours . . . ." 3 Railroad work at that time was indeed dangerous. In 1888 the odds against a railroad brakeman's dying a natural death were almost four to one; 4 the average life expectancy of a switchman in 1893 was seven years. 5 It was quite natural, therefore, that railroad workers combined their strength and efforts in the Brotherhood in order to provide insurance and financial assistance to sick and injured members and to seek safer working conditions. The Trainmen and other railroad Brotherhoods were the moving forces that brought about the passage of the Safety Appliance Act 6 in 1893 to make railroad work less dangerous; they also supported passage of the Federal Employers' Liability Act 7 of 1908 to provide for recovery of damages for injured railroad workers and their families by doing away with harsh and technical common-law rules which sometimes made recovery difficult or even impossible. It soon became apparent to the railroad workers, however, that simply having these federal statutes on the books was not enough to assure that the workers would receive the full benefit of the compensatory damages Congress intended they should have. Injured workers or their families often fell prey on the one hand to persuasive claims adjusters eager to gain a quick and cheap settlement [377 U.S. 1, 4] for their railroad employers, or on the other to lawyers either not competent to try these lawsuits against the able and experienced railroad counsel or too willing to settle a case for a quick dollar. </s> It was to protect against these obvious hazards to the injured man or his widow that the workers through their Brotherhood set up their Legal Aid Department, since renamed Department of Legal Counsel, the basic activities of which the court below has enjoined. Under their plan the United States was divided into sixteen regions and the Brotherhood selected, on the advice of local lawyers and federal and state judges, a lawyer or firm in each region with a reputation for honesty and skill in representing plaintiffs in railroad personal injury litigation. When a worker was injured or killed, the secretary of his local lodge would go to him or to his widow or children and recommend that the claim not be settled without first seeing a lawyer, and that in the Brotherhood's judgment the best lawyer to consult was the counsel selected by it for that area. 8 </s> There is a dispute between the parties as to the exact meaning of the decree rendered below, but the Brotherhood in this Court objects specifically to the provisions which enjoin it </s> ". . . from holding out lawyers selected by it as the only approved lawyers to aid the members or their families; . . . or in any other manner soliciting or encouraging such legal employment of the selected lawyers; . . . and from doing any act or combination of acts, and from formulating and putting into practice any plan, pattern or design, the [377 U.S. 1, 5] result of which is to channel legal employment to any particular lawyer or group of lawyers . . . ." 9 </s> The Brotherhood admits that it advises injured members and their dependents to obtain legal advice before making settlement of their claims and that it recommends particular attorneys to handle such claims. The result of the plan, the Brotherhood admits, is to channel legal employment to the particular lawyers approved by the Brotherhood as legally and morally competent to handle injury claims for members and their families. It is the injunction against this particular practice which the Brotherhood, on behalf of its members, contends denies them rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. We agree with this contention. </s> It cannot be seriously doubted that the First Amendment's guarantees of free speech, petition and assembly give railroad workers the right to gather together for the lawful purpose of helping and advising one another in asserting the rights Congress gave them in the Safety Appliance Act and the Federal Employers' Liability Act, statutory rights which would be vain and futile if the workers could not talk together freely as to the best [377 U.S. 1, 6] course to follow. The right of members to consult with each other in a fraternal organization necessarily includes the right to select a spokesman from their number who could be expected to give the wisest counsel. That is the role played by the members who carry out the legal aid program. And the right of the workers personally or through a special department of their Brotherhood to advise concerning the need for legal assistance - and, most importantly, what lawyer a member could confidently rely on - is an inseparable part of this constitutionally guaranteed right to assist and advise each other. </s> Virginia undoubtedly has broad powers to regulate the practice of law within its borders; 10 but we have had occasion in the past to recognize that in regulating the practice of law a State cannot ignore the rights of individuals secured by the Constitution. 11 For as we said in NAACP v. Button, supra, 371 U.S., at 429 , "a State cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels." Here what Virginia has sought to halt is not a commercialization of the legal profession which might threaten the moral and ethical fabric of the administration of justice. It is not "ambulance chasing." The railroad workers, by recommending competent lawyers to each other, obviously are not themselves engaging in the practice of law, nor are they or the lawyers whom [377 U.S. 1, 7] they select parties to any soliciting of business. It is interesting to note that in Great Britain unions do not simply recommend lawyers to members in need of advice; they retain counsel, paid by the union, to represent members in personal lawsuits, 12 a practice similar to that which we upheld in NAACP v. Button, supra. </s> A State could not, by invoking the power to regulate the professional conduct of attorneys, infringe in any way the right of individuals and the public to be fairly represented in lawsuits authorized by Congress to effectuate a basic public interest. Laymen cannot be expected to know how to protect their rights when dealing with practiced and carefully counseled adversaries, cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , and for them to associate together to help one another to preserve and enforce rights granted them under federal laws cannot be condemned as a threat to legal ethics. 13 The State can no more keep these workers from using their cooperative plan to advise one another than it could use more direct means to bar them from resorting to the courts to vindicate their legal rights. The right to petition the courts cannot be so handicapped. </s> Only last Term we had occasion to consider an earlier attempt by Virginia to enjoin the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People from advising prospective litigants to seek the assistance of particular attorneys. In fact, in that case, unlike this one, the attorneys were actually employed by the association which recommended them, and recommendations were made even to nonmembers. NAACP v. Button, supra. We held that "although the petitioner has amply shown that its activities fall within the First Amendment's [377 U.S. 1, 8] protections, the State has failed to advance any substantial regulatory interest, in the form of substantive evils flowing from petitioner's activities, which can justify the broad prohibitions which it has imposed." 371 U.S., at 444 . 14 In the present case the State again has failed to show any appreciable public interest in preventing the Brotherhood from carrying out its plan to recommend the lawyers it selects to represent injured workers. The Brotherhood's activities fall just as clearly within the protection of the First Amendment. And the Constitution protects the associational rights of the members of the union precisely as it does those of the NAACP. </s> We hold that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right of the members through their Brotherhood to maintain and carry out their plan for advising workers who are injured to obtain legal advice and for recommending specific lawyers. Since the part of the decree to which the Brotherhood objects infringes those rights, it cannot stand; and to the extent any other part of the decree forbids these activities it too must fall. And, of course, lawyers accepting employment under this constitutionally protected plan have a like protection which the State cannot abridge. </s> The judgment and decree are vacated and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART took no part in the disposition of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The investigator and the Regional Counsel were not served with process and are not parties. </s> [Footnote 2 We do not find it necessary to consider the Brotherhood's additional argument that the decree violates the Brotherhood's right to represent workers which is guaranteed by the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U.S.C. 151-188. </s> [Footnote 3 Constitution of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen Insurance Department, Preamble. </s> [Footnote 4 Interstate Commerce Commission, Third Annual Report (1889), 85. </s> [Footnote 5 Griffith, "The Vindication of a National Public Policy Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act," 18 Law and Contemp. Prob. 160, 163. </s> [Footnote 6 27 Stat. 531, as amended, 45 U.S.C. 1-43. </s> [Footnote 7 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U.S.C. 51-60. An earlier version of the law passed two years earlier, 34 Stat. 232, had been held unconstitutional. Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 . The constitutionality of the 1908 statute was sustained in the Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 . </s> [Footnote 8 The Brotherhood also provides a staff, now at its own expense, to investigate accidents to help gather evidence for use by the injured worker or his family should a trial be necessary to vindicate their rights. </s> [Footnote 9 Certain other provisions of the decree enjoin the Brotherhood from sharing counsel fees with lawyers whom it recommended and from countenancing the sharing of fees by its regional investigators. The Brotherhood denies that it has engaged in such practices since 1959, in compliance with a decree of the Supreme Court of Illinois. See In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N. E. 2d 163. Since the Brotherhood is not objecting to the other provisions of the decree except insofar as they might later be construed as barring the Brotherhood from helping injured workers or their families by recommending that they not settle without a lawyer and by recommending certain lawyers selected by the Brotherhood, it is only to that extent that we pass upon the validity of the other provisions. Because of our disposition of the case, we do not consider the Brotherhood's claim that the findings of the court were not supported by substantial evidence. </s> [Footnote 10 The Bar relies on the common law, the Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Association, adopted into the rules of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, 171 Va. xviii, and several Virginia statutes prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law. The Canons of Ethics to which the Bar refers prohibit respectively stirring up of litigation, control or exploitation by a lay agency of professional services of a lawyer, and aiding the unauthorized practice of law. Canons 28, 35, 47. The statutes respectively set the qualifications for the practice of law in the State and provide for injunctions against "running, capping, soliciting and maintenance." Virginia Code, 1950, 54-42, 54-83.1. </s> [Footnote 11 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 ; Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 ; Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 . </s> [Footnote 12 See Feather, The Essence of Trade Unionism (London, 1963), 42-43. </s> [Footnote 13 Cf. Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953), 167; Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 515, 225 P.2d 508, 514 (Carter, J., dissenting), 36 Cal. 2d, at 521, 225 P.2d, at 518 (Traynor, J., dissenting). </s> [Footnote 14 See also Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 ; Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 ; Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 ; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 ; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 . [377 U.S. 1, 9] </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK, whom MR. JUSTICE HARLAN joins, dissenting. </s> By its decision today the Court overthrows state regulation of the legal profession and relegates the practice of law to the level of a commercial enterprise. The Court permits a labor union - contrary to state law - to engage in the unauthorized practice of soliciting personal injury cases from among its membership on behalf of 16 regional attorneys whom its president has placed on the union's approved list. Local officials of the union call on each member suffering an injury and seek to secure employment of these approved attorneys in the prosecution of claims for damages arising therefrom. Moreover the union, through its president, not only controls the appointment and dismissal of the approved attorney but also has considerable influence over his fees and often controls the disposition of cases. Furthermore, from 1930 to at least 1959, the union had required these approved attorneys to pay to it a portion of their fees, usually 25%. Such an arrangement may even now be in effect through the ruse of reimbursement for investigatory services rendered by the union. This state of affairs degrades the profession, proselytes the approved attorneys to certain required attitudes and contravenes both the accepted ethics of the profession and the statutory and judicial rules of acceptable conduct. </s> The Court excuses the practice on the policy ground that the union membership needs a corps of attorneys experienced in personal injury litigation because ordinary "lawyers [are] either not competent to try these lawsuits against the able and experienced railroad counsel or too willing to settle a case for a quick dollar." To me this is a serious indictment of the profession. In the cases that I have passed on here - numbering about 177 during the past 15 years - I dare say that counsel for the railroad employee has exhibited advocacy not inferior to that of [377 U.S. 1, 10] his opponent (although I do not remember that any one of the 16 approved attorneys appeared in these cases). Indeed, the railroad employee has prevailed in practically all of the cases and the recoveries have ranged as high as $625,000. See Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 372 U.S. 108 (1963); Transcript of Record, p. 7. Under these facts the Court's rationale will not stand up, even as a policy ground for approving this patent violation of the cardinal ethics of our profession and flagrant disobedience to the law of most of our States. </s> The Court depends upon NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), to support its position. But there the vital fact was that the claimed privilege was a "form of political expression" to secure, through court action, constitutionally protected civil rights. 1 Personal injury litigation is not a form of political expression, but rather a procedure for the settlement of damage claims. No guaranteed civil right is involved. Here, the question involves solely the regulation of the profession, a power long recognized as belonging peculiarly to the State. Button, as well as its ancestry cited by the majority in the footnotes, is not apposite. </s> Finally, no substantive evil would result from the activity permitted in Button. But here the past history of the union indicates the contrary. Its Legal Aid Department (now the Department of Legal Counsel) was set up in 1930 for the admitted purposes of advising members "relative to their rights respecting claims for damages" and assisting them "in negotiating settlements . . . ." The Department had a complete reporting service on all major [377 U.S. 1, 11] injuries or deaths suffered by its members, regional investigators to whom such reports were referred, and the 16 approved regional counsel (many of whom remain the same today) to whom the cases were channeled for prosecution and who split their fees with the union. And, what is of even more significance, the trial court in this case found "that the defendant Brotherhood still adheres to the pattern and design of the plan formulated and implemented in 1930." </s> The union admits that it did operate in this manner until 1959 but says that it has now reformed its operation. But the record shows that this identical union plan has been before several other courts 2 and, while the union has repeatedly promised to reform, as here, it has consistently renewed the same practices. But even if the union has sincerely reformed, which I doubt, the plan it now proposes to follow is subject to the same deficiencies. It includes: the approval of 16 regional attorneys by the president of the union, who also has power to discharge them at his pleasure; the solicitation of all injured members by the local officials of the Brotherhood who urge the employment of an approved counsel; the furnishing of the name of the approved counsel to the injured brother as the only attorney approved by the Brotherhood; the furnishing of the names and addresses of injured members to the approved attorneys; the furnishing of investigative services to the approved attorney, the cost of which, it is indicated, comes from the fees received by the latter; and, finally, the "tooting" of the approved attorneys in union literature and meetings. [377 U.S. 1, 12] </s> I do not read the decree approved by the State as prohibiting union members from recommending an attorney to their brothers in the union. Virginia has sought only to halt the gross abuses of channeling and soliciting litigation which have been going on here for 30 years. The potential for evil in the union's system is enormous and, in my view, will bring disrepute to the legal profession. The system must also work to the disadvantage of the Brotherhood members by directing their claims into the hands of the 16 approved attorneys who are subject to the control of one man, the president of the union. Finally, it will encourage further departures from the high standards set by canons of ethics as well as by state regulatory procedures and will be a green light to other groups who for years have attempted to engage in similar practices. E. g., Chicago Bar Assn. v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 Ill. 50, 199 N. E. 1; Rhode Island Bar Assn. v. Automobile Service Assn., 55 R. I. 122, 179 A. 139; cf. Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). </s> [Footnote 1 "In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving private differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment by all government, federal, state and local, for the members of the Negro community in this country. It is thus a form of political expression." NAACP v. Button, supra, at 429. </s> [Footnote 2 E. g., In re Petition of Committee on Rule 28 of the Cleveland Bar Assn., 15 Ohio L. Abs. 106 (1933); In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N. E. 2d 163 (1958); In re O'Neill, 5 F. Supp. 465 (E. D. N. Y. 1933); Young v. Gulf M. & O. R. Co., No. 3957 (E. D. Mo. 1946); Reynolds v. Gulf M. O. & Texas Pac. R. Co., No. 772 (E. D. Tenn. 1946); North Carolina ex rel. McLean v. Hice, Superior Ct. of N.C., County of Buncombe (1948). </s> [377 U.S. 1, 13]

United States Supreme Court SANDRA K. FORNEY v. KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY(1998) No. 97-5737 Argued: April 22, 1998Decided: June 15, 1998 </s> </s> Petitioner Forney sought judicial review of a Social Security Administration final determination denying her disability benefits. When the District Court found that determination inadequately supported by the evidence and remanded the case to the agency for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Forney appealed, contending that the agency's denial of benefits should be reversed outright. The Ninth Circuit, however, decided that she did not have the legal right to appeal. Before this Court, both Forney and the Solicitor General agree that she had the right to appeal, so an amicus has been appointed to defend the Ninth Circuit's decision. </s> Held: A Social Security disability claimant seeking court reversal of an agency decision denying benefits may appeal a district court order remanding the case to the agency for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This Court has previously held that the language of the Social Security Act's "judicial review" provision-"district courts" (reviewing, for example, agency denials of disability claims) "have the power to enter . . . a judgment affirming, modifying or reversing [an agency] decision . . . with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing," and such "judgment . . . shall be final except that it shall be subject to review in the same manner as" other civil action judgments, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (emphases added)means that a district court order remanding a Social Security disability claim to the agency for further proceedings is a "final judgment" appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617 . Finkelstein differs from this case in that it involved an appeal by the Government. However, Finklestein 's logic makes that feature irrelevant here. That case reasoned, primarily from §405(g)'s language, that a district court judgment remanding a Social Security disability case fell within the "class of orders" that are appealable under §1291. Neither the statute nor Finkelstein suggests that such an order could be final for purposes of an appeal by the Government, but not a claimant, or permits an inference that finality turns on the order's importance, or the availability of an avenue for appeal from the agency determination that might emerge after remand. The Ninth Circuit erred in concluding that Forney could not appeal because she was the prevailing party. A party is "aggrieved" and ordinarily can appeal a decision granting in part and denying in part the remedy requested, United States v. Jose , 519 U.S. 54, 56 ; Forney, who sought reversal of the administrative decision denying benefits and, in the alternative, a remand, received some, but not all, of the relief requested. The Solicitor General disputes the Ninth Circuit's assertion that a rule permitting appeals in these circumstances would impose additional, and unnecessary, burdens upon federal appeals courts. If the Solicitor General proves wrong in his prediction, the remedy must be legislative, for the statutes at issue do not give the courts the power to redefine or subdivide the classes of cases where appeals will (or will not) lie. Pp. 2-7. </s> 108 F. 3d 228, reversed and remanded. </s> BREYER , J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. </s> NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. </s> U.S. Supreme Court </s> No. 97-5737 </s> SANDRA K. FORNEY, PETITIONER v. KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY </s> ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [June 15, 1998] </s> JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The question in this case is whether a Social Security disability claimant seeking court reversal of an agency decision denying benefits may appeal a district court order remanding the case to the agency for further proceedings. We conclude that the law authorizes such an appeal. </s> I </s> Sandra K. Forney, the petitioner, applied for Social Security disability benefits under §223 of the Social Security Act, as added, 70 Stat. 815, and as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 423. A Social Security Administration Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined (1) that Forney had not worked since the onset of her medical problem, and (2) that she was more than minimally disabled, but (3) that she was not disabled enough to qualify for benefits automatically. Moreover, her disability, (4) while sufficiently serious to prevent her return to her former work (cook, kitchen manager, or baker), (5) was not serious enough to prevent her from holding other jobs available in the economy (such as order clerk or telephone answering service operator). App. 12-28. The ALJ consequently denied her disability claim, id ., at 28, and the Administration's Appeals Council denied Forney's request for review, App. to Pet. for Cert. 39-40; see generally Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 -142 (1987) (setting forth five-part "disability" test); 20 CFR §404.1520 (1997) (same). </s> Forney then sought judicial review in Federal District Court. The court found the agency's final determinationthat Forney could hold other jobs-inadequately supported because those jobs "require frequent or constant reaching," but the record showed that Forney's "ability to reach is impaired." Forney v. Secretary , Civ. No. 94-6357 (D. Ore., May 1, 1995); App. 127-128. The District Court then entered a judgment, which remanded the case to the agency for further proceedings (pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Id ., at 128. </s> Forney sought to appeal the remand order. She contended that, because the Government had already had sufficient opportunity to prove the existence of other relevant employment (and for other reasons), the agency's denial of benefits should be reversed outright. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not hear her claim, however, for it decided that Forney did not have the legal right to appeal. Forney v. Chater , 108 F. 3d 228, 234 (1997). </s> Forney sought certiorari. Both she and the Solicitor General agreed that Forney had the legal right to appeal from the District Court's judgment. The Solicitor General suggested that we reverse the Ninth Circuit and remand the case so that it could hear Forney's appeal. We granted certiorari to consider the merits of this position, and we appointed an amicus to defend the Ninth Circuit's decision. We now agree with Forney and the Solicitor General that the Court of Appeals should have heard Forney's appeal. </s> II </s> Section 1291 of Title 28 of the United States Code grants the "courts of appeals . . . jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts" (emphasis added). Forney's appeal falls within the scope of this jurisdictional grant. That is because the District Court entered its judgment under the authority of the special "judicial review" provision of the Social Security Act, which says, in its fourth sentence, that "district court[s]" (reviewing, for example, agency denials of Social Security disability claims) </s> "shall have power to enter . . . a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the [agency] with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing," </s> 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (emphasis added), </s> and which adds, in its eighth sentence, that the </s> " judgment of the court shall be final except that it shall be subject to review in the same manner as a judgment in other civil actions," </s> ibid. (emphases added). </s> This Court has previously held that this statutory language means what it says, namely, that a district court order remanding a Social Security disability benefit claim to the agency for further proceedings is a "final judgment" for purposes of §1291 and it is, therefore, appealable. Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617 (1990); see also Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 294 (1993) (statute that requires attorney's fees application to be filed within "thirty days of final judgment" requires filing within 30 days of entry of §405(g) "sentence four" district court remand order, not within 30 days of final agency decision after remand). Finkelstein is not identical to the case before us. It involved an appeal by the Government; this case involves an appeal by a disability benefits claimant. Moreover, the need for immediate appeal in Finkelstein was arguably greater than that here. The District Court there had invalidated a set of Health and Human Services regulations, and the Government might have found it difficult to obtain appellate review of this matter of general importance. Further, the Court, in Finkelstein , said specifically that it would "express no opinion about appealability" where a party seeks to "appeal on the ground that" the district court should have granted broader relief. 496 U.S., at 623 , n. 3. Finkelstein 's logic, however, makes these features of that case irrelevant here. Finkelstein focused upon a "class of orders" that Congress had made "appealable under §1291." Id., at 628. It reasoned, primarily from the language of §405(g), that a district court judgment remanding a Social Security disability benefit case fell within that class. Nothing in the language, either of the statute or the Court's opinion, suggests that such an order could be "final" for purposes of appeal only when the Government seeks to appeal but not when the claimant seeks to do so. Nor does the opinion's reasoning permit an inference that "finality" turns on the order's importance, or the availability (or lack of availability) of an avenue for appeal from the different, later, agency determination that might emerge after remand. </s> The Ninth Circuit itself recognized that the District Court's judgment was "final" for purposes of appeal, for it said that any effort "to conclude" that a judgment remanding the case is "not final for the claimant" was "inconsistent" with Finkelstein . 108 F. 3d, at 232. The court added that it would be "error for the district court to attempt to retain jurisdiction" after remanding the case; and it wrote that the remand judgment, which ended the "civil action," must be " 'final' in a formalistic sense . . . for all parties to it." Ibid . </s> The Court of Appeals nonetheless reached a "no appeal" conclusion-but on a different ground. It pointed out that a "party normally may not appeal [a] decision in its favor." Ibid . (citing Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241, 242 (1939)). And it said that Forney had obtained a decision in her favor here. Because Forney "may, on remand, secure all of the relief she seeks," the court wrote, she is a "prevailing" party and therefore cannot appeal. 108 F. 3d, at 232-233. </s> We do not agree. We concede that this Court has held that a "party who receives all that he has sought generally is not aggrieved by the judgment affording the relief and cannot appeal from it." Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980). But this Court also has clearly stated that a party is "aggrieved" and ordinarily can appeal a decision "granting in part and denying in part the remedy requested." United States v. Jose , 519 U.S. 54, 56 (1996). And this latter statement determines the outcome of this case. </s> Forney's complaint sought as relief: </s> "1. That this court reverse and set aside the decision . . . denying [the] claim for disability benefits; </s> "2. In the alternative, that this court remand the case back to the Secretary for proper evaluation of the evidence or a hearing de novo ." </s> App. 37. </s> The context makes clear that, from Forney's perspective, the second "alternative," which means further delay and risk, is only half a loaf. Thus, the District Court's order gives petitioner some, but not all, of the relief she requested; and she consequently can appeal the District Court's order insofar as it denies her the relief she has sought. Indeed, to hold to the contrary would deny a disability claimant the right to seek reversal (instead of remand) through a cross-appeal in cases where the Government itself appeals a remand order, as the Government has every right to do. See Finkelstein, supra, at 619. The Solicitor General points to many cases that find a right to appeal in roughly comparable circumstances. See Brief for United States 21, n. 12 (citing Gargoyles, Inc . v. United States , 113 F. 3d 1572 (CA Fed. 1997) (permitting appeal where prevailing party recovered reasonable royalty but was denied lost profits); Castle v. Rubin , 78 F. 3d 654 (CADC 1996) (per curiam) (permitting appeal where prevailing party awarded partial back pay but denied reinstatement and front pay); La Plante v. American Honda Motor Co. , 27 F. 3d 731 (CA1 1994) (permitting appeal where prevailing party awarded compensatory but not punitive damages); Graziano v. Harrison , 950 F. 2d 107 (CA3 1991) (permitting appeal where prevailing party awarded damages but denied attorney's fees); Ragen Corp . v. Kearney & Trecker Corp ., 912 F. 2d 619 (CA3 1990) (permitting appeal where prevailing party denied consequential damages); Carrigan v. Exxon Co., U. S. A., 877 F. 2d 1237 (CA5 1989) (permitting appeal where prevailing party awarded damages but not injunctive relief)). </s> The contrary authority that amicus , through diligent efforts, has found arose in less closely analogous circumstances and consequently does not persuade us. Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of the Judgment Below 17 and n. 13; see, e.g. , Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 518 (1956) (order granting Government's motion to dismiss indictment without prejudice as not appealable by defendant in part because the dismissal would not be "final" ) (emphasis added); see also CH2M Hill Central, Inc. v. Herman , 131 F. 3d 1244, 1246-1247 (CA7 1997) (claimant cannot appeal agency appeals panel remand of case for further agency hearing, for appeals order is not type of final agency decision that is reviewable under relevant judicial review statute); Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Bath Iron Works Corp. , 853 F. 2d 11, 16 (CA1 1988) (same); Stripe-A-Zone v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'rs , 643 F. 2d 230, 233 (CA5 1981) (same). </s> Finally, we recognize that the Ninth Circuit expressed concern that a rule of law permitting appeals in these circumstances would impose additional, and unnecessary, burdens upon federal appeals courts. The Solicitor General, while noting that the federal courts reviewed nearly 10,000 Social Security Administration decisions in 1996, says that the "[p]ractical [c]onsequences" of permitting appeals "[a]re limited." Brief for United States 26; Reply Brief for United States 17, n. 13. Except for unusual cases, he believes, a claimant obtaining a remand will prefer to return to the agency rather than to appeal immediately seeking outright agency reversal-because appeal means further delay, because the chance of obtaining reversal should be small, and because the appeal (if it provokes a government cross-appeal) risks losing all. Brief for United States 26-29. </s> Regardless, as we noted in Finkelstein , congressional statutes governing appealability normally proceed by defining "classes" of cases where appeals will (or will not) lie. 496 U.S., at 628 . The statutes at issue here do not give courts the power to redefine, or to subdivide, those classes, according to whether or not they believe, in a particular case, further agency proceedings might obviate the need for an immediate appeal. Thus, if the Solicitor General proves wrong in his prediction, the remedy must be legislative in nature. </s> For these reasons, the judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered.

United States Supreme Court LOBER v. UNITED STATES(1953) No. 30 Argued: October 16, 1953Decided: November 9, 1953 </s> Decedent had transferred property to himself as trustee for his minor children, reserving discretionary power to invest and reinvest the principal and income, which were to be paid to the children when they attained certain ages. The trusts were declared irrevocable; but decedent reserved the right to pay over to the children at any time any or all of the trust assets. Held: The value of the trust assets was includable in decedent's estate for estate tax purposes, under 811 (d) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code. Pp. 335-337. </s> 124 Ct. Cl. 44, 108 F. Supp. 731, affirmed. </s> David Stock argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. </s> Charles K. Rice argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Stern, Assistant Attorney General Holland, Ellis N. Slack, Lee A. Jackson, Marvin E. Frankel and Elizabeth B. Davis. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This is an action for an estate tax refund brought by the executors of the estate of Morris Lober. In 1924 he signed an instrument conveying to himself as trustee money and stocks for the benefit of his young son. In 1929 he executed two other instruments, one for the benefit of a daughter, the other for a second son. The terms of these three instruments were the same. Lober was to handle the funds, invest and reinvest them as he deemed proper. He could accumulate and reinvest the income with the same freedom until his children reached twenty-one years of age. When twenty-one they were to be paid the accumulated income. Lober could hold the principal of each trust until the beneficiary reached twenty-five. In case he died [346 U.S. 335, 336] his wife was to be trustee with the same broad powers Lober had conveyed to himself. The trusts were declared to be irrevocable, and as the case reaches us we may assume that the trust instruments gave Lober's children a "vested interest" under state law, so that if they had died after creation of the trusts their interests would have passed to their estates. A crucial term of the trust instruments was that Lober could at any time he saw fit turn all or any part of the principal of the trusts over to his children. Thus he could at will reduce the principal or pay it all to the beneficiaries, thereby terminating any trusteeship over it. </s> Lober died in 1942. By that time the trust property was valued at more than $125,000. The Internal Revenue Commissioner treated this as Lober's property and included it in his gross estate. That inclusion brought this lawsuit. The Commissioner relied on 811 (d) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 811 (1946 ed.). That section, so far as material here, required inclusion in a decedent's gross estate of the value of all property that the decedent had previously transferred by trust "where the enjoyment thereof was subject at the date of his death to any change through the exercise of a power . . . to alter, amend, or revoke . . . ." In Commissioner v. Holmes, 326 U.S. 480 , we held that power to terminate was the equivalent of power to "alter, amend, or revoke" it, and we approved taxation of the Holmes estate on that basis. Relying on the Holmes case, the Court of Claims upheld inclusion of these trust properties in Lober's estate. 124 Ct. Cl. 44, 108 F. Supp. 731. This was done despite the assumption that the trust conveyances gave the Lober children an indefeasible "vested interest" in the properties conveyed. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had reached a contrary result where the circumstances were substantially the same, in Hays' Estate v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 169, 172-174. Because of this conflict, we granted certiorari. 345 U.S. 969 . [346 U.S. 335, 337] </s> Petitioners stress a factual difference between this and the Holmes case. The Holmes trust instrument provided that if a beneficiary died before expiration of the trust his children succeeded to his interest, but if he died without children, his interest would pass to his brothers or their children. Thus the trustee had power to eliminate a contingency that might have prevented passage of a beneficiary's interest to his heirs. Here we assume that upon death of the Lober beneficiaries their part in the trust estate would, under New York law, pass to their heirs. But we cannot agree that this difference should change the Holmes result. </s> We pointed out in the Holmes case that 811 (d) (2) was more concerned with "present economic benefit" than with "technical vesting of title or estates." And the Lober beneficiaries, like the Holmes beneficiaries, were granted no "present right to immediate enjoyment of either income or principal." The trust instrument here gave none of Lober's children full "enjoyment" of the trust property, whether it "vested" in them or not. To get this full enjoyment they had to wait until they reached the age of twenty-five unless their father sooner gave them the money and stocks by terminating the trust under the power of change he kept to the very date of his death. This father could have given property to his children without reserving in himself any power to change the terms as to the date his gift would be wholly effective, but he did not. What we said in the Holmes case fits this situation too: "A donor who keeps so strong a hold over the actual and immediate enjoyment of what he puts beyond his own power to retake has not divested himself of that degree of control which 811 (d) (2) requires in order to avoid the tax." Commissioner v. Holmes, supra, at 487. </s> Affirmed. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON dissent. </s> [346 U.S. 335, 338]

United States Supreme Court NEVADA v. UNITED STATES(1983) No. 81-2245 Argued: April 27, 1983Decided: June 24, 1983 </s> In 1913, the United States sued in Federal District Court, in what is known as the Orr Ditch litigation, to adjudicate water rights to the Truckee River for the benefit of both the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation (Reservation) and the Newlands Reclamation Project (Project). Named as defendants were all water users on the Truckee River in Nevada. Eventually, in 1944, the District Court entered a final decree, pursuant to a settlement agreement, awarding various water rights to the Reservation and the Project, which by this time was now under the management of the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District (TCID). In 1973, the United States filed the present action in the same District Court on behalf of the Reservation, seeking additional rights to the Truckee River, and the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe (Tribe) was permitted to intervene in support of the United States. Named as defendants were all persons presently claiming water rights to the Truckee River and its tributaries in Nevada, including the defendants in the Orr Ditch litigation and their successors, individual farmers who owned land in the Project, and the TCID. The defendants asserted res judicata as an affirmative defense, claiming that the United States and the Tribe were precluded by the Orr Ditch decree from litigating the asserted claim. The District Court sustained the defense and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the Orr Ditch decree concluded the dispute between, on the one hand, the Orr Ditch defendants, their successors in interest, and subsequent appropriators of the Truckee River, and, on the other hand, the United States and the Tribe, but not the dispute between the tribe and the Project landowners. The court found that since neither the Tribe nor the Project landowners were parties in Orr Ditch but instead were represented by the United States, and since their interests may have conflicted in that proceeding, it could not be found that the United States had intended to bind these nonparties inter se, absent a specific statement of adversity in the pleadings. [463 U.S. 110, 111] </s> Held: </s> Res judicata prevents the United States and the Tribe from litigating the instant claim. Pp. 121-145. </s> (a) Where the Government represented the Project landowners in Orr Ditch, the landowners, not the Government, received the beneficial interest in the water rights confirmed to the Government. Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82 ; Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 . Therefore, the Government is not at liberty to simply reallocate the water rights decreed to the Reservation and the Project as if it owned those rights. Pp. 121-128. </s> (b) The cause of action asserted below is the same cause of action that was asserted in the Orr Ditch case. The record in that case, including the final decree and amended complaint, clearly shows that the Government was given an opportunity to litigate the Reservation's entire water rights to the Truckee River, and that the Government intended to take advantage of that opportunity. Pp. 130-134. </s> (c) All of the parties below are bound by the Orr Ditch decree. The United States, as a party to the Orr Ditch litigation acting as a representative for the interests of the Reservation and the Project, cannot relitigate the Reservation's water rights with those who could use the Orr Ditch decree as a defense. The Tribe, whose interests were represented in Orr Ditch by the United States, also is bound by the Orr Ditch decree as are the Orr Ditch defendants and their successors. Moreover, under circumstances where after the Orr Ditch litigation was commenced the legal relationships were no longer simply those between the United States and the tribe, but were also those between the United States, TCID, and the Project landowners, the interests of the Tribe and the Project landowners were sufficiently adverse so that both are now bound by the Orr Ditch decree. It need not be determined what the effect of the Government's representation of different interests would be under the law of private trustees and fiduciaries for that law does not apply where Congress has decreed that the Government have dual responsibilities. The Government does not "compromise" its obligation to one interest that Congress obliges it to represent when it simultaneously performs another task for another interest that Congress has obligated it by statute to do. And as to the defendants below who appropriated water from the Truckee River subsequent to the Orr Ditch decree, they too, as a necessary exception to the res judicata mutuality requirement, can use that decree against the plaintiffs below. These defendants have relied just as much on that decree in participating in the development of western Nevada as have the parties in the Orr Ditch case, and any other conclusion would make it impossible finally to quantify a reserved water right. Pp. 134-144. </s> 649 F.2d 1286 and 666 F.2d 351, affirmed in part and reversed in part. [463 U.S. 110, 112] </s> REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. BRENNAN, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 145. </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 81-2276, Truckee-Carson Irrigation District v. United States et al.; and No. 82-38, Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation District et al., also on certiorari to the same court. </s> E. Barrett Prettyman, Special Deputy Attorney General of Nevada, argued the cause for petitioner in No. 81-2245. With him on the briefs were Brian McKay, Attorney General, Richard H. Bryan, former Attorney General, Larry D. Struve, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and John W. Hoffman and Harold A. Swafford, Special Deputy Attorneys General. Frederick G. Girard argued the cause for petitioner in No. 81-2276. With him on the briefs were James W. Johnson, Jr., and Janet K. Goldsmith. Messrs. Bryan, Prettyman, Hoffman, Swafford, Johnson, and Girard, and Ms. Goldsmith filed a postargument memorandum for petitioners in Nos. 81-2245 and 81-2276. Robert S. Pelcyger argued the cause for petitioner in No. 82-38. With him on the briefs were Michael R. Thorp, Scott B. McElroy, and Jeanne S. Whiteing. </s> Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Dinkins, Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne, Robert L. Klarquist, and Dirk D. Snel. Messrs. McKay, Prettyman, Hoffman, and Swafford filed a brief for respondent State of Nevada in No. 82-38. Louis S. Test, Steven P. Elliott, and Mills Lane filed a brief for respondents City of Reno et al. in No. 82-38. Messrs. Johnson and Girard and Ms. Goldsmith filed a brief for respondent Truckee-Carson Irrigation District in No. 82-38. Messrs. Pelcyger, Thorp, and McElroy filed a brief for respondent Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians in Nos. 81-2245 and 81-2276. Richard W. Blakey, Gordon H. DePaoli, and John Madariaga filed a brief for respondent Sierra Pacific Power Co. in No. 82-38.Fn </s> Fn [463 U.S. 110, 112] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of New Mexico by Jeff Bingaman, Attorney General, and Peter Thomas White, Special Assistant Attorney General; and for the State of Alabama et al. by Charles A. Graddick, Attorney General of Alabama, Linley E. Pearson, [463 U.S. 110, 113] Attorney General of Indiana, William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana, William A. Allain, Attorney General of Mississippi, Paul L. Douglas, Attorney General of Nebraska, and Jan Eric Cartwright, Attorney General of Oklahoma. </s> Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Sierra Club et al. by John D. Leshy, Joseph L. Sax, and Ralph W. Johnson; and for the Hoopa Valley Tribe et al. by Alan C. Stay and Steven S. Anderson. </s> Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the State of Washington et al. by Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Attorney General of Washington, Charles B. Roe, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Robert E. Mack, Assistant Attorney General, David H. Leroy, Attorney General of Idaho, and Phillip J. Rassier and Neil L. Tillquist, Deputy Attorneys General; for the State of Arizona et al. by Mark V. Meierhenry, Attorney General of South Dakota, Mark White, Attorney General of Texas, David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General of Utah, Steven F. Freudenthal, Attorney General of Wyoming, Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, George Deukmejian, Attorney General of California, Michael T. Greely, Attorney General of Montana, Robert O. Wefald, Attorney General of North Dakota, and David Frohnmayer, Attorney General of Oregon; for the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District et al. by Frederick J. Martone; and for the City of Los Angeles et al. by R. L. Knox, Jr., Maurice C. Sherrill, Justin McCarthy, Carl Boronkay, Jerome C. Muys, Roberta L. Halladay, Ira Reiner, Gilbert W. Lee, John W. Witt, Joseph Kase, Jr., and Roy H. Mann; and for Yakima Valley Canal Co. et al. by Donald H. Bond. [463 U.S. 110, 113] </s> JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In 1913 the United States sued to adjudicate water rights to the Truckee River for the benefit of the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation and the planned Newlands Reclamation Project. Thirty-one years later, in 1944, the United States District Court for the District of Nevada entered a final decree in the case pursuant to a settlement agreement. In 1973 the United States filed the present action in the same court on behalf of the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation, seeking additional water rights to the Truckee River. The issue thus presented is whether the Government may partially undo the 1944 decree, or whether principles of res judicata prevent it, and the intervener Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, from litigating this claim on the merits. [463 U.S. 110, 114] </s> I </s> Nevada has, on the average, less precipitation than any other State in the Union. Except for drainage in the southeastern part of the State into the Colorado river, and drainage in the northern part of the State into the Columbia River, the rivers that flow in Nevada generally disappear into "sinks." Department of Agriculture Yearbook, Climate and Man (1941). The present litigation relates to water rights in the Truckee River, one of the three principal rivers flowing through west central Nevada. It rises in the High Sierra in Placer County, Cal., flows into and out of Lake Tahoe, and thence down the eastern slope of the Sierra Nevada mountains. It flows through Reno, Nev., and after a course of some 120 miles debouches into Pyramid Lake, which has no outlet. </s> It has been said that Pyramid Lake is "widely considered the most beautiful desert lake in North America [and that its] fishery [has] brought it worldwide fame. A species of cutthroat trout. . . grew to world record size in the desert lake and attracted anglers from throughout the world." S. Wheeler, The Desert Lake 90-92 (1967). The first recorded sighting of Pyramid Lake by non-Indians occurred in January 1844 when Captain John C. Fremont and his party camped nearby. In his journal Captain Fremont reported that the lake "broke upon our eyes like the ocean" and was "set like a gem in the mountains." 1 The Expeditions of John Charles Fremont 604-605 (D. Jackson & M. Spence eds. 1970). Commenting upon the fishery, as well as the Pyramid Lake Indians that his party was camping with, Captain Fremont wrote: </s> "An Indian brought in a large fish to trade, which we had the inexpressible satisfaction to find was a salmon trout; we gathered round him eagerly. The Indians were amused with our delight, and immediately brought in numbers; so that the camp was soon stocked. Their flavor was excellent - superior, in fact, to that of any fish I [463 U.S. 110, 115] have ever known. They were of extraordinary size - about as large as the Columbia river salmon - generally from two to four feet in length." Id., at 609. </s> When first viewed by Captain Fremont in early 1844, Pyramid Lake was some 50 miles long and 12 miles wide. Since that time the surface area of the lake has been reduced by about 20,000 acres. </s> The origins of the cases before us are found in two historical events involving the Federal Government in this part of the country. First, in 1859 the Department of the Interior set aside nearly half a million acres in what is now western Nevada as a reservation for the area's Paiute Indians. In 1874 President Ulysses S. Grant by Executive Order confirmed the withdrawal as the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation. The Reservation includes Pyramid Lake, the land surrounding it, the lower reaches of the Truckee River, and the bottom land alongside the lower Truckee. </s> Then, with the passage of the Reclamation Act of 1902, 32 Stat. 388, the Federal Government was designated to play a more prominent role in the development of the West. That Act directed the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw from public entry arid lands in specified Western States, reclaim the lands through irrigation projects, and then to restore the lands to entry pursuant to the homestead laws and certain conditions imposed by the Act itself. Accordingly, the Secretary withdrew from the public domain approximately 200,000 acres in western Nevada, which ultimately became the Newlands Reclamation Project. The Project was designed to irrigate a substantial area in the vicinity of Fallon, Nev., with waters from both the Truckee and the Carson Rivers. </s> The Carson River, like the Truckee, rises on the eastern slope of the High Sierra in Alpine County, Cal., and flows north and northeast over a course of about 170 miles, finally disappearing into Carson sink. The Newlands Project accomplished the diversion of water from the Truckee River to [463 U.S. 110, 116] the Carson River by constructing the Derby Diversion Dam on the Truckee River, and constructing the Truckee Canal through which the diverted waters would be transported to the Carson River. Experience in the early days of the Project indicated the necessity of a storage reservoir on the Carson River, and accordingly Lahontan Dam was constructed and Lahontan Reservoir behind that dam was created. The combined waters of the Truckee and Carson Rivers impounded in Lahontan Reservoir are distributed for irrigation and related uses on downstream lands by means of lateral canals within the Newlands Reclamation Project. </s> Before the works contemplated by the Project went into operation, a number of private landowners had established rights to water in the Truckee River under Nevada law. The Government also asserted on behalf of the Indians of the Pyramid Lake Indian reservation a reserved right under the so-called "implied-reservation-of-water" doctrine set forth in Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). 1 The United States therefore filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada in March 1913, commencing what became known as the Orr Ditch litigation. The Government, for the benefit of both the Project and the Pyramid Lake Reservation, asserted a claim to 10,000 cubic feet of water per second for the Project and a claim to 500 cubic feet per second for the Reservation. The complaint named as defendants all water users on the Truckee River in Nevada. The Government expressly sought a final decree quieting title to the rights of all parties. [463 U.S. 110, 117] </s> Following several years of hearings, a Special Master issued a report and proposed decree in July 1924. The report awarded the Reservation an 1859 priority date in the Truckee River for 58.7 second-feet and 12,412 acre-feet annually of water to irrigate 3,130 acres of Reservation lands. 2 The Project was awarded a 1902 priority date for 1,500 cubic feet per second to irrigate, to the extent the amount would allow, 3 232,800 acres of land within the Project. In February 1926 the District Court entered a temporary restraining order declaring the water rights as proposed by the Special Master. "One of the primary purposes" for entering a temporary order was to allow for an experimental period during which modifications of the declared rights could be made if necessary. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 81-2245, p. 186a (hereafter Nevada App.). </s> Not until almost 10 years later, in the midst of a prolonged drought, was interest stimulated in concluding the Orr Ditch litigation. Settlement negotiations were commenced in 1934 by the principal organizational defendants in the case, Washoe County Water Conservation District and the Sierra Pacific Power Co., and the representatives of the [463 U.S. 110, 118] Project and the Reservation. The United States still acted on behalf of the Reservation's interests, but the Project was now under the management of the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District (TCID). 4 The defendants and TCID proposed an agreement along the lines of the temporary restraining order. The United States objected, demanding an increase in the Reservation's water rights to allow for the irrigation of an additional 2,745 acres of Reservation land. After some resistance, the Government's demand was accepted and a settlement agreement was signed on July 1, 1935. The District Court entered a final decree adopting the agreement on September 8, 1944. 5 No appeal was taken. Thus, 31 years after its inception the Orr Ditch litigation came to a close. </s> On December 21, 1973, the Government instituted the action below seeking additional rights to the Truckee River for the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation; the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe was permitted to intervene in support of the United States. The Government named as defendants all persons presently claiming water rights to the Truckee River and its tributaries in Nevada. The defendants include the defendants in the Orr Ditch litigation and their successors, approximately 3,800 individual farmers that own land in the Newlands Reclamation Project, and TCID. The District Court certified the Project farmers as a class and directed TCID to represent their interests. 6 </s> [463 U.S. 110, 119] </s> In its complaint the Government purported not to dispute the rights decreed in the Orr Ditch case. Instead, it alleged that Orr Ditch determined only the Reservation's right to "water for irrigation," Nevada App. 157a, not the claim now being asserted for "sufficient waters of the Truckee River. . . [for] the maintenance and preservation of Pyramid Lake, [and for] the maintenance of the lower reaches of the Truckee River as a natural spawning ground for fish," id., at 155a-156a. The complaint further averred that in establishing the Reservation the United States had intended that the Pyramid Lake fishery be maintained. Since the additional water now being claimed is allegedly necessary for that purpose, the Government alleged that the Executive Order creating the Reservation must have impliedly reserved a right to this water. 7 </s> The defendants below asserted res judicata as an affirmative defense, saying that the United States and the Tribe were precluded by the Orr Ditch decree from litigating this claim. Following a separate trial on this issue, the District Court sustained the defense and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. </s> In its decision, the District Court first determined that all of the parties in this action were parties, or in privity with [463 U.S. 110, 120] parties, in the Orr Ditch case. The District Court then found that the Orr Ditch litigation "was intended by all concerned, lawyers, litigants and judges, as a general all inclusive water adjudication suit which sought to adjudicate all rights and claims in and to the waters of the Truckee. . . and required all parties to fully set up their respective water right claims." Nevada App. 185a. The court determined that in accordance with this general intention, the United States had intended in Orr Ditch "to assert as large a water right as possible for the Indian reservation." Nevada App. 185a. The District Court further explained: </s> "[T]he cause of action sought to be asserted in this proceeding by the plaintiff and the Tribe is the same quiet title cause of action asserted by the plaintiff in Orr Ditch for and on behalf of the Tribe and its members, that is, a Winters implied and reserved water right for the benefit of the reservation, with a priority date of December 8, 1859, from a single source of water supply, i. e., the Truckee Watershed. The plaintiff and the Tribe may not litigate several different types of water use claims, all arising under the Winters doctrine and all derived from the same water source in a piece-meal fashion. There was but one cause of action in equity to quiet title in plaintiff and the Tribe based upon the Winters reserved right theory." Id., at 188a. </s> The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. 649 F.2d 1286 (1981), modified, 666 F.2d 351 (1982). The Court of Appeals agreed that the causes of action asserted in Orr Ditch and the instant litigation are the same and that the United States and the Tribe cannot relitigate this cause of action with the Orr Ditch defendants or subsequent appropriators of the Truckee River. But the Court of Appeals found that the Orr Ditch decree did not conclude the dispute between the Tribe and the owners of Newlands Project lands. The court said that litigants are not to be bound by a prior judgment unless they were adversaries [463 U.S. 110, 121] under the earlier pleadings or unless the specific issue in dispute was actually litigated in the earlier case and the court found that neither exception applied here. </s> The Court of Appeals conceded that "[a] strict adversity requirement does not necessarily fit the realities of water adjudications." 649 F.2d, at 1309. Nevertheless, the court found that since neither the Tribe nor the Project landowners were parties in Orr Ditch but instead were both represented by the United States, and since their interests may have conflicted in that proceeding, the court would not find that the Government had intended to bind these nonparties inter se absent a specific statement of adversity in the pleadings. We granted certiorari in the cases challenging the Court of Appeals' decision, 459 U.S. 904 (1982), and we now affirm in part and reverse in part. </s> II </s> The Government opens the "Summary of Argument" portion of its brief by stating: "The court of appeals has simply permitted a reallocation of the water decreed in Orr Ditch to a single party - the United States - from reclamation uses to a Reservation use with an earlier priority. The doctrine of res judicata does not bar a single party from reallocating its water in this fashion . . . ." Brief for United States 21. We are bound to say that the Government's position, if accepted, would do away with half a century of decided case law relating to the Reclamation Act of 1902 and water rights in the public domain of the West. </s> It is undisputed that the primary purpose of the Government in bringing the Orr Ditch suit in 1913 was to secure water rights for the irrigation of land that would be contained in the Newlands Project, and that the Government was acting under the aegis of the Reclamation Act of 1902 in bringing that action. 8 Section 8 of that Act provides: [463 U.S. 110, 122] </s> "That nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such laws, and nothing herein shall in any way affect any right of any State or of the Federal Government or of any landowner, appropriator, or user of water in, to, or from any interstate stream or the waters thereof: Provided, That the right to the use of water acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right." 32 Stat. 390. </s> In California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978), we described in greater detail the history and structure of the Reclamation Act of 1902, and stated: </s> "The projects would be built on federal land and the actual construction and operation of the projects would be in the hands of the Secretary of the Interior. But the Act clearly provided that state water law would control in the appropriation and later distribution of the water." Id., at 664 (emphasis added). </s> In two leading cases, Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82 (1937), and Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945), this Court has [463 U.S. 110, 123] discussed the beneficial ownership of water rights in irrigation projects built pursuant to the Reclamation Act. In Ickes v. Fox, the Court said: </s> "Although the government diverted, stored and distributed the water, the contention of petitioner that thereby ownership of the water or water-rights became vested in the United States is not well founded. Appropriation was made not for the use of the government, but, under the Reclamation Act, for the use of the land owners; and by the terms of the law and of the contract already referred to, the water-rights became the property of the land owners, wholly distinct from the property right of the government in the irrigation works. Compare Murphy v. Kerr, 296 Fed. 536, 544, 545. The government was and remained simply a carrier and distributor of the water (ibid.), with the right to receive the sums stipulated in the contracts as reimbursement for the cost of construction and annual charges for operation and maintenance of the works. As security therefore, it was provided that the government should have a lien upon the lands and the water rights appurtenent thereto - a provision which in itself imports that the water-rights belong to another than the lienor, that is to say, to the land owner. </s> "The federal government, as owner of the public domain, had the power to dispose of the land and water composing it together or separately; and by the Desert Land Act of 1877 (c. 107, 19 Stat. 377), if not before, Congress had severed the land and waters constituting the public domain and established the rule that for the future the lands should be patented separately. Acquisition of the government title to a parcel of land was not to carry with it a water-right; but all non-navigable waters were reserved for the use of the public under the [463 U.S. 110, 124] laws of the various arid-land states. California Power Co. v. Beaver Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 162 . And in those states, generally, including the State of Washington, it long has been established law that the right to the use of water can be acquired only by prior appropriation for a beneficial use; and that such right when thus obtained is a property right, which, when acquired for irrigation, becomes, by state law and here by express provision of the Reclamation Act as well, part and parcel of the land upon which it is applied." 300 U.S., at 94 -96. </s> In Nebraska v. Wyoming, the Court stated: </s> "The Secretary of the Interior pursuant to 3 of the Reclamation Act withdrew from public entry certain public lands in Nebraska and Wyoming which were required for the North Platte Project and the Kendrick Project. Initiation of both projects was accompanied by filings made pursuant to 8 in the name of the Secretary of the Interior for and on behalf of the United States. Those filings were accepted by the state officials as adequate under state law. They established the priority dates for the projects. There were also applications to the States for permits to construct canals and ditches. They described the land to be served. The orders granting the applications fixed the time for completion of the canal, for application of the water to the land, and for proof of appropriation. Individual water users contracted with the United States for the use of project water. These contracts were later assumed by the irrigation districts. Irrigation districts submitted proof of beneficial use to the state authorities on behalf of the project water users. The state authorities accepted that proof and issued decrees and certificates in favor of the individual water users. The certificates named as appropriators the individual landowners. They designated the number of acres included, the use for which [463 U.S. 110, 125] the appropriation was made, the amount of the appropriation, and the priority date. The contracts between the United States and the irrigation districts provided that after the stored water was released from the reservoir it was under the control of the appropriate state officials. </s> "All of these steps make plain that those projects were designed, constructed and completed according to the pattern of state law as provided in the Reclamation Act. We can say here what was said in Ickes v. Fox, supra, pp. 94-95: `Although the government diverted, stored and distributed the water, the contention of petitioner that thereby ownership of the water or water-rights became vested in the United States is not well founded. Appropriation was made not for the use of the government, but, under the Reclamation Act, for the use of the land owners; and by the terms of the law and of the contract already referred to, the water-rights became the property of the land owners, wholly distinct from the property right of the government in the irrigation works. Compare Murphy v. Kerr, 296 Fed. 536, 544, 545. The government was and remained simply a carrier and distributor of the water (ibid.), with the right to receive the sums stipulated in the contracts as reimbursement for the cost of construction and annual charges for operation and maintenance of the works.' </s> "The property right in the water right is separate and distinct from the property right in the reservoirs, ditches or canals. The water right is appurtenant to the land, the owner of which is the appropriator. The water right is acquired by perfecting an appropriation, i. e., by an actual diversion followed by an application within a reasonable time of the water to a beneficial use. See Murphy v. Kerr, 296 F. 536, 542, 544, 545; Commonwealth Power Co. v. State Board, 94 Neb. 613, 143 N. W. 937; Kersenbrock v. Boyes, 95 Neb. 407, 145 [463 U.S. 110, 126] N. W. 837. Indeed 8 of the Reclamation Act provides as we have seen that `the right to the use of water acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right.'" 325 U.S., at 613 -614. </s> The law of Nevada, in common with most other Western States, requires for the perfection of a water right for agricultural purposes that the water must be beneficially used by actual application on the land. Prosole v. Steamboat Canal Co., 37 Nev. 154, 159-161, 140 P. 720, 722 (1914). Such a right is appurtenant to the land on which it is used. Id., at 160-161, 140 P., at 722. </s> In the light of these cases, we conclude that the Government is completely mistaken if it believes that the water rights confirmed to it by the Orr Ditch decree in 1944 for use in irrigating lands within the Newlands Reclamation Project were like so many bushels of wheat, to be bartered, sold, or shifted about as the Government might see fit. Once these lands were acquired by settlers in the Project, the Government's "ownership" of the water rights was at most nominal; the beneficial interest in the rights confirmed to the Government resided in the owners of the land within the Project to which these water rights became appurtenant upon the application of Project water to the land. As in Ickes v. Fox and Nebraska v. Wyoming, the law of the relevant State and the contracts entered into by the landowners and the United States make this point very clear. 9 </s> [463 U.S. 110, 127] </s> The Government's brief is replete with references to its fiduciary obligation to the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians, as it properly should be. But the Government seems wholly to ignore in the same brief the obligations that necessarily devolve upon it from having mere title to water rights for the Newlands Project, when the beneficial ownership of these water rights resides elsewhere. </s> Both the briefs of the parties and the opinion of the Court of Appeals focus their analysis of res judicata on provisions relating to the relationship between private trustees and fiduciaries, especially those governing a breach of duty by the fiduciary to the beneficiary. While these undoubtedly provide useful analogies in cases such as these, they cannot be regarded as finally dispositive of the issues. This Court has long recognized "the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government" in its dealings with Indian tribes, see, e. g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942). These concerns have been traditionally focused on the Bureau of Indian Affairs within the Department of the Interior. Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365, 374 (1968). See 25 U.S.C. 1. [463 U.S. 110, 128] </s> But Congress in its wisdom, when it enacted the Reclamation Act of 1902, required the Secretary of the Interior to assume substantial obligations with respect to the reclamation of arid lands in the western part of the United States. Additionally, in 26 of the Act of Apr. 21, 1904, 33 Stat. 225, Congress provided for the inclusion of irrigable lands of the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation within the Newlands Project, and further authorized the Secretary, after allotting five acres of such land to each Indian belonging to the Reservation, to reclaim and dispose of the remainder of the irrigable Reservation land to settlers under the Reclamation Act. </s> Today, particularly from our vantage point nearly half a century after the enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U.S.C. 461 et seq., it may well appear that Congress was requiring the Secretary of the Interior to carry water on at least two shoulders when it delegated to him both the responsibility for the supervision of the Indian tribes and the commencement of reclamation projects in areas adjacent to reservation lands. But Congress chose to do this, and it is simply unrealistic to suggest that the Government may not perform its obligation to represent Indian tribes in litigation when Congress has obliged it to represent other interests as well. In this regard, the Government cannot follow the fastidious standards of a private fiduciary, who would breach his duties to his single beneficiary solely by representing potentially conflicting interests without the beneficiary's consent. The Government does not "compromise" its obligation to one interest that Congress obliges it to represent by the mere fact that it simultaneously performs another task for another interest that Congress has obligated it by statute to do. </s> With these observations in mind, we turn to the principles of res judicata that we think are involved in this case. </s> III </s> Recent cases in which we have discussed principles of estoppel by judgment include Federated Department Stores, [463 U.S. 110, 129] Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980); Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979). But what we said with respect to this doctrine more than 80 years ago is still true today; it ensures "the very object for which civil courts have been established, which is to secure the peace and repose of society by the settlement of matters capable of judicial determination. Its enforcement is essential to the maintenance of social order; for, the aid of judicial tribunals would not be invoked for the vindication of rights of person and property, if . . . conclusiveness did not attend the judgments of such tribunals." Southern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 49 (1897). 10 </s> Simply put, the doctrine of res judicata provides that when a final judgment has been entered on the merits of a case, "[i]t is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, [463 U.S. 110, 130] concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose." Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1877). The final "judgment puts an end to the cause of action, which cannot again be brought into litigation between the parties upon any ground whatever." Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948). See Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 375 , 378 (1940). 11 </s> To determine the applicability of res judicata to the facts before us, we must decide first if the "cause of action" which the Government now seeks to assert is the "same cause of action" that was asserted in Orr Ditch; we must then decide whether the parties in the instant proceeding are identical to or in privity with the parties in Orr Ditch. We address these questions in turn. </s> A </s> Definitions of what constitutes the "same cause of action" have not remained static over time. Compare Restatement of Judgments 61 (1942) with Restatement (Second) of Judgments 24 (1982). 12 See generally 1B J. Moore, J. Lucas, & [463 U.S. 110, 131] T. Currier, Moore's Federal Practice § 0.4101., pp. 348-363 (1983). We find it unnecessary in these cases to parse any minute differences which these differing tests might produce, because whatever standard may be applied the only conclusion allowed by the record in the Orr Ditch case is that the Government was given an opportunity to litigate the Reservation's entire water rights to the Truckee, and that the Government intended to take advantage of that opportunity. </s> In its amended complaint in Orr Ditch, the Government averred: </s> "Until the several rights of the various claimants, parties hereto, including the United States, to the use of the [463 U.S. 110, 132] waters flowing in said river and its said tributaries in Nevada or used in Nevada have been settled, and the extent, nature, and order in time of each right to divert said waters from said river and its tributaries has been judicially determined the United States cannot properly protect its rights in and to the said waters, and to protect said rights otherwise than as herein sought if they could be protected would necessitate a multiplicity of suits." Nevada App. 10a. </s> The final decree in Orr Ditch clearly shows that the parties to the settlement agreement and the District Court intended to accomplish this purpose. The decree provided in part: </s> "The parties, persons, corporations, intervenors, grantees, successors in interest and substituted parties hereinbefore named, and their and each of their servants, agents, attorneys, assigns and all persons claiming by, through or under them and their successors, in or to the water rights or lands herein mentioned or described, are and each of them is hereby forever enjoined and restrained from asserting or claiming any rights in or to the waters of the Truckee River or its tributaries, or the waters of any of the creeks or streams or other waters hereinbefore mentioned except the rights, specified, determined and allowed by this decree . . . ." Nevada App. 145a (emphasis added). </s> We need not, however, stop here. For evidence more directly showing the Government's intention to assert in Orr Ditch the Reservation's full water rights, we return to the amended complaint, where it was alleged: </s> "16. On or about or prior to the 29th day of November, 1859, the Government of the United States, having for a long time previous thereto recognized the fact that certain Pah Ute and other Indians were, and they and [463 U.S. 110, 133] their ancestors had for many years been, residing upon and using certain lands in the northern part of the said Truckee River Valley and around said Pyramid Lake . . . and the said Government being desirous of protecting said Indians and their descendants in their homes, fields, pastures, fishing, and their use of said lands and waters, and in affording to them an opportunity to acquire the art of husbandry and other arts of civilization, and to become civilized, did reserve said lands from any and all forms of entry or sale and for the sole use of said Indians, and for their benefit and civilization. On, to wit, the 23d day of March, 1874, the said lands, having been previously surveyed, were by order of the then President of the United States, for the purposes aforesaid, withdrawn from sale or other disposition, and set apart for the Pah Ute and other Indians aforesaid. </s> . . . . . </s> "The United States by setting aside said lands for said purposes and creating said reservation, and by virtue of the matters and things in this paragraph set forth, did on, to wit, the 29th day of November, 1859, reserve from further appropriation, appropriate and set aside for its own use in, on, and about said Indian reservation, and the land thereof, from and of the waters of the said Truckee River, five hundred (500) cubic feet of water per second of time." Nevada App. 6a-8a. </s> This cannot be construed as anything less than a claim for the full "implied-reservation-of-water" rights that were due the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation. </s> This conclusion is fortified by comparing the Orr Ditch complaint with the complaint filed in the proceedings below where, for example, the Government alleged: </s> "Members of the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians have lived on the shores of Pyramid Lake from time [463 U.S. 110, 134] immemorial. . . . They have relied upon water from the Truckee River for irrigation, for domestic uses, for maintenance of the lower segment of the Truckee River as a natural spawning ground for lake fish and for maintenance of the lake as a viable fishery. </s> . . . . . </s> "In establishing the Pyramid Lake Reservation in 1859, there was, by implication, reserved for the benefit of the Pyramid Lake Indians sufficient water from the Truckee River for the maintenance and preservation of Pyramid Lake, for the maintenance of the lower reaches of the Truckee River as a natural spawning ground for fish and the other needs of the inhabitants of the Reservation such as irrigation and domestic use." Nevada App. 153a-154a. </s> While the Government focuses more specifically on the Tribe's reliance on fishing in this later complaint, it seems quite clear to us that they are asserting the same reserved right for purposes of "fishing" and maintenance of "lands and waters" that was asserted in Orr Ditch. 13 </s> B </s> Having decided that the cause of action asserted below is the same cause of action asserted in the Orr Ditch litigation, [463 U.S. 110, 135] we must next determine which of the parties before us are bound by the earlier decree. As stated earlier, the general rule is that a prior judgment will bar the "parties" to the earlier lawsuit, "and those in privity with them," from relitigating the cause of action. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S., at 352 . </s> There is no doubt but that the United States was a party to the Orr Ditch proceeding, acting as a representative for the Reservation's interests and the interests of the Newlands Project, and cannot relitigate the Reservation's "implied-reservation-of-water" rights with those who can use the Orr Ditch decree as a defense. See United States v. Title Insurance & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 482 -486 (1924). We also hold that the Tribe, whose interests were represented in Orr Ditch by the United States, can be bound by the Orr Ditch decree. 14 This Court left little room for an argument to the contrary in Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413 (1912), where it plainly said that "it could not, consistently with any principle, be tolerated that, after the United States on behalf of its wards had invoked the jurisdiction of its courts . . . these wards should themselves be permitted to relitigate the question." Id., at 446. See also Restatement (Second) of Judgments 41(1)(d) (1982). We reaffirm that principle now. 15 </s> [463 U.S. 110, 136] </s> We then turn to the issue of which defendants in the present litigation can use the Orr Ditch decree against the Government and the Tribe. There is no dispute but that the Orr Ditch defendants were parties to the earlier decree and [463 U.S. 110, 137] that they and their successors can rely on the decree. The Court of Appeals so held, and we affirm. </s> The Court of Appeals reached a different conclusion concerning TCID and the Project farmers that it now represents. The Court of Appeals conceded that the Project's interests, [463 U.S. 110, 138] like the Reservation's interests, were represented in Orr Ditch by the United States and thus that TCID, like the Tribe, stands with respect to that litigation in privity with the United States. The court further stated, however, that "[a]s a general matter, a judgment does not conclude parties who were not adversaries under the pleadings," and that in "representative litigation we should be especially careful not to infer adversity between interests represented by a single litigant." 649 F.2d, at 1309. Since the pleadings in Orr Ditch did not specifically allege adversity between the claims asserted on behalf of the Newlands Project and those asserted on behalf of the Reservation, the Court of Appeals ruled that the decree did not conclude the dispute between them. </s> At the commencement of the Orr Ditch litigation, the United States sought water rights both for the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation and for the irrigation of lands in the Newlands Project. It was obviously not "adverse" to itself in seeking these two separate allocations of water rights, and even if we were to treat the Paiute Tribe and the beneficial [463 U.S. 110, 139] owners of water rights within the Project as being in privity with the Government, it might be that in a different kind of litigation the res judicata consequences would be different. But as the Court of Appeals noted: </s> "A strict adversity requirement does not necessarily fit the realities of water adjudications. All parties' water rights are interdependent. See Frost v. Alturas, 11 Idaho 294, 81 P. 996, 998 (1905); Kinney, Irrigation and Water Rights at 277. Stability in water rights therefore requires that all parties be bound in all combinations. Further, in many water adjudications there is no actual controversy between the parties; the proceedings may serve primarily an administrative purpose." 649 F.2d, at 1309. </s> We agree with these observations of the Court of Appeals. That court felt, however, that these factors did not control these cases because the "Tribe and the Project were neither parties nor co-parties, however. They were non-parties who were represented simultaneously by the same government attorneys." Ibid. We disagree with the Court of Appeals as to the consequence of this fact. </s> It has been held that the successors in interest of parties who are not adversaries in a stream adjudication nevertheless are bound by a decree establishing priority of rights in the stream. See, e. g., Morgan v. Udy, 58 Idaho 670, 79 P.2d 295 (1938). In that case the Idaho court said: </s> "`[I]n the settlement of cases of this character every user of water on the stream and all of its tributaries in litigation are interested in the final award to each claimant . . . . Every claimant of the water of either stream, it matters not whether it be at the upper or lower end of either, or after the junction of the two, is interested in a final adjudication of all the claimants of all the waters that flow to the claimants at the lower end of the stream [463 U.S. 110, 140] after its junction. In other words, . . . it matters but little who are plaintiffs and who are defendants in the settlement of cases of this character; the real issue being who is first in right to the use of the waters in dispute.'" Id., at 681, 79 P.2d, at 299. </s> This rule seems to be generally applied in stream adjudications in the Western States, where these actions play a critical role in determining the allocation of scarce water rights, and where each water rights claim by its "very nature raise[s] issues inter se as to all such parties for the determination of one claim necessarily affects the amount available for the other claims. Marlett v. Prosser, 1919, 66 Colo. 91, 179 P. 141, 142." City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 180 P.2d 699, 715 (Cal. App. 1947). See Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Ellison Ranching Co., 52 Nev. 279, 296-297, 286 P. 120, 123 (1930); In re Chewaucan River, 89 Ore. 659, 666, 171 P. 402, 403-404 (1918). See also 6 Waters and Water Rights 513.2, p. 304 (R. Clark ed. 1972 and Supp. 1978). </s> In these cases, as we have noted, the Government as a single entity brought the action seeking a determination both of the Tribe's reserved rights and of the water rights necessary for the irrigation of land within the Newlands Project. But it separately pleaded the interests of both the Project and the Reservation. During the settlement negotiations the interests of the Project, and presumably of the landowners to whom the water rights actually accrued, were represented by the newly formed TCID and the interests of the Reservation were represented by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The settlement agreement was signed by the Government and by TCID. It would seem that at this stage of the litigation the interests of the Tribe and TCID were sufficiently adverse for the latter to oppose the Bureau's claim for additional water rights for the Reservation during the settlement negotiations. </s> The Court of Appeals held, however, that "in representative litigation we should be especially careful not to infer adversity [463 U.S. 110, 141] between interests represented by a single litigant," 649 F.2d, at 1309, analogizing the Government's position to that of a trustee under the traditional law of trusts. But as we have indicated previously, we do not believe that this analogy from the world of private law may be bodily transposed to the present situation. </s> The Court of Appeals went on to conclude: "By representing the Tribe and the Project against the Orr Ditch defendants, the government compromised its duty of undivided loyalty to the Tribe. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts, supra, 170, & Comments p, q, r." Id., at 1310. This section of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959) is entitled "Duty of Loyalty," and states that "(1) the trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary." Comments p, q, and r deal respectively with "[c]ompetition with the beneficiary," "[a]ction in the interest of a third person," and "[d]uty of trustee under separate trusts." </s> As we previously intimated, we think the Court of Appeals' reasoning here runs aground because the Government is simply not in the position of a private litigant or a private party under traditional rules of common law or statute. Our cases make this plain in numerous areas of the law. See United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426, 431 -432 (1949); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917). In the latter case, the Court said: </s> "As a general rule laches or neglect of duty on the part of officers of the Government is no defense to a suit by it to enforce a public right or protect a public interest. . . . A suit by the United States to enforce and maintain its policy respecting lands which it holds in trust for all the people stands upon a different plane in this and some other respects from the ordinary private suit to regain the title to real property or to remove a cloud from it." Ibid. [463 U.S. 110, 142] </s> And in the very area of the law with which we deal in these cases, this Court said in Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S., at 444 -445: </s> "There can be no more complete representation than that on the part of the United States in acting on behalf of these dependents - whom Congress, with respect to the restricted lands, has not yet released from tutelage. Its efficacy does not depend on the Indian's acquiescence. It does not rest upon convention, nor is it circumscribed by rules which govern private relations. It is a representation which traces its source to the plenary control of Congress in legislating for the protection of the Indians under its care, and it recognizes no limitations that are inconsistent with the discharge of the national duty." </s> These cases, we believe, point the way to the correct resolution of the instant cases. The United States undoubtedly owes a strong fiduciary duty to its Indian wards. See Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S., at 296 -297; Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 497 -498 (1937). It may be that where only a relationship between the Government and the tribe is involved, the law respecting obligations between a trustee and a beneficiary in private litigation will in many, if not all, respects adequately describe the duty of the United States. But where Congress has imposed upon the United States, in addition to its duty to represent Indian tribes, a duty to obtain water rights for reclamation projects, and has even authorized the inclusion of reservation lands within a project, the analogy of a faithless private fiduciary cannot be controlling for purposes of evaluating the authority of the United States to represent different interests. </s> At least by 1926, when TCID came into being, and very likely long before, when conveyances of the public domain to settlers within the Reclamation Project necessarily carried with them the beneficial right to appropriate water reserved to the Government for this purpose, third parties entered [463 U.S. 110, 143] into the picture. The legal relationships were no longer simply those between the United States and the Paiute Tribe, but also those between the United States, TCID, and the several thousand settlers within the Project who put the Project water to beneficial use. We find it unnecessary to decide whether there would be adversity of interests between the Tribe, on the one hand, and the settlers and TCID, on the other, if the issue were to be governed by private law respecting trusts. We hold that under the circumstances described above, the interests of the Tribe and the Project landowners were sufficiently adverse so that both are now bound by the final decree entered in the Orr Ditch suit. </s> We turn finally to those defendants below who appropriated water from the Truckee subsequent to the Orr Ditch decree. These defendants, we believe, give rise to a difficult question, but in the final analysis we agree with the Court of Appeals that they too can use the Orr Ditch decree against the plaintiffs below. While mutuality has been for the most part abandoned in cases involving collateral estoppel, see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971), it has remained a part of the doctrine of res judicata. Nevertheless, exceptions to the res judicata mutuality requirement have been found necessary, see 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 4464, pp. 586-588 (1981 and Supp. 1982), and we believe that such an exception is required in these cases. </s> Orr Ditch was an equitable action to quiet title, an in personam action. But as the Court of Appeals determined, it "was no garden variety quiet title action." 649 F.2d, at 1308. As we have already explained, everyone involved in Orr Ditch contemplated a comprehensive adjudication of water rights intended to settle once and for all the question of how much of the Truckee River each of the litigants was entitled to. Thus, even though quiet title actions are in [463 U.S. 110, 144] personam actions, water adjudications are more in the nature of in rem proceedings. Nonparties such as the subsequent appropriators in these cases have relied just as much on the Orr Ditch decree in participating in the development of western Nevada as have the parties of that case. We agree with the Court of Appeals that under "these circumstances it would be manifestly unjust . . . not to permit subsequent appropriators" to hold the Reservation to the claims it made in Orr Ditch; "[a]ny other conclusion would make it impossible ever finally to quantify a reserved water right." 649 F.2d, at 1309. 16 </s> [463 U.S. 110, 145] </s> IV </s> In conclusion we affirm the Court of Appeals' finding that the cause of action asserted below and the cause of action asserted in Orr Ditch are one and the same. We also affirm the Court of Appeals' finding that the Orr Ditch decree concluded the controversy on this cause of action between, on the one hand, the Orr Ditch defendants, their successors in interest, and subsequent appropriators of the Truckee River, and, on the other hand, the United States and the Tribe. We reverse the Court of Appeals, however, with respect to its finding concerning TCID, and the Project farmers it represents, and hold instead that the Orr Ditch decree also ended the dispute raised between these parties and the plaintiffs below. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 In Winters v. United States, this Court construed the agreements creating the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation. While the agreements did not purport to claim any water rights from the Milk River, this Court held that the Federal Government had impliedly reserved a right to the amount of river water necessary to effectuate the purposes of the agreements. Since then we have recognized and applied the Winters doctrine in other contexts, see United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 698 (1978); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976), including when interpreting an Executive Order that created an Indian reservation, see Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598 (1963). </s> [Footnote 2 Congress had passed a provision in 1904 authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to include in the Newlands Reclamation Project lands located in the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation. Act of Apr. 21, 1904, 26, 33 Stat. 225. If such lands were included, each individual Indian living on the Reservation was to be allotted five acres of the reclaimed land. The Special Master's report, and the District Court's temporary order, provided additional water rights for the Reservation in the event the allotments were made. Congress abandoned the plan, however, before it was ever implemented. Act of June 18, 1934, 1, 48 Stat. 984. See 649 F.2d 1286, 1294 (CA9 1981). </s> [Footnote 3 Notwithstanding the Project's 1902 priority, it was awarded far less water than the Government had claimed. While it was recognized that the 1,500 cubic feet per second, together with the water obtained from the Carson River, would not irrigate the Project's entire 232,800 acres, in the subsequent settlement negotiations the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, then representing the interest of the Project, agreed to this lesser amount. The Court of Appeals noted that "there has never been irrigated more than about 65,000 acres of land in the Project." Id., at 1292, n. 1. </s> [Footnote 4 The newly formed Truckee-Carson Irrigation District had assumed operational control of the Newlands Project pursuant to a contract entered into with the Government on December 18, 1926. </s> [Footnote 5 The 9-year gap between the agreement and the final decree was attributable to a provision in the agreement that it would be submitted to the District Court only after completion of the new upstream storage reservoir. </s> [Footnote 6 The Government did not name as defendants in its original complaint the Project landowners. Citing the absence of these claimants, the named defendants moved to dismiss for failure to join indispensable parties. Subsequently, the Government moved to amend its complaint so as to join the Project landowners as a class. After a hearing, the motion to amend was granted. App. 193-204. </s> [Footnote 7 Between 1920 and 1940 the surface area of Pyramid Lake was reduced by about 20,000 acres. The decline resulted in a delta forming at the mouth of the Truckee that prevented the fish indigenous to the lake, the Lahontan cutthroat trout and the cui-ui, from reaching their spawning grounds in the Truckee River, resulting in the near extinction of both species. Efforts to restore the fishery have occurred since that time. Pyramid Lake has been stabilized for several years and, augmented by passage of the Washoe Project Act of 1956, 4, 70 Stat. 777, the lake is being restocked with cutthroat trout and cui-ui. Fish hatcheries operated by both the State of Nevada and the United States have been one source for replenishing the lake. In 1976 the Marble Bluff Dam and Fishway was completed, enabling the fish to bypass the delta to their spawning grounds in the Truckee. Both the District Court and Court of Appeals observed that "these restoration efforts `appear to justify optimism for eventual success.'" 649 F.2d, at 1294. See Nevada App. 184a. </s> [Footnote 8 In its amended complaint in Orr Ditch, the Government plainly stated that the Newlands Project was initiated pursuant to the Reclamation Act, and that the litigation was designed to quiet title to the Government's right [463 U.S. 110, 122] to the amount of water necessary to irrigate the lands set aside for the Project. Nevada App. 2a-5a. The final decree, entered pursuant to the settlement agreement, gave the United States a specified amount of water "in the Truckee River for the irrigation of 232,800 acres of lands on the Newlands Project, for storage in the Lahontan Reservoir, for generating power, for supplying the inhabitants of cities and towns on the project and for domestic and other purposes . . . ." Id., at 59a. </s> [Footnote 9 The contracts entered into between the Project landowners and the United States, or TCID acting pursuant to its agreement with the Government, are similar to those addressed by the Court in Ickes v. Fox and Nebraska v. Wyoming. Five different contracts have been used since the creation of the Newlands Project. Two of the forms provide for an exchange of a vested water right by the landowner in return for the right to use project water. The remaining three provide the landowner a water right in that amount which may be beneficially applied to a specified tract [463 U.S. 110, 127] of land. App. 197, n. 2. One of these latter types, and the one the District Court found was most commonly used on the Newlands Project, provides in part: </s> "IN PURSUANCE of the provisions of the act of June 17, 1902 (32 Stat., 388), and acts amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto, especially the act of August 9, 1912 (37 Stat., 265), and the act of August 13, 1914 (38 Stat., 686), all herein styled the reclamation law, and the rules and regulations established under said law, and the terms of that certain Contract between the United States of America and the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, dated Dec. 18th, 1926, and subject to the conditions named in this instrument, application is hereby made to the TRUCKEE-CARSON IRRIGATION DISTRICT, herein styled District, by the UNDERSIGNED, herein styled Applicant, for a permanent water right for the irrigation of and to be appurtenant to all of the irritable area now or hereafter developed under the above-named project within the tract of land described in paragraph 2." 4 Record, Doc. No. 92, Exhibit C (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 10 The policies advanced by the doctrine of res judicata perhaps are at their zenith in cases concerning real property, land and water. See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 620 (1983); United States v. California & Oregon Land Co., 192 U.S. 355, 358 -359 (1904); 2 A. Freeman, Law of Judgments 874, pp. 1848-1849 (5th ed. 1925). As this Court explained over a century ago in Minnesota Co. v. National Co., 3 Wall. 332 (1866): </s> "Where questions arise which affect titles to land it is of great importance to the public that when they are once decided they should no longer be considered open. Such decisions become rules of property, and many titles may be injuriously affected by their change . . . . [W]here courts vacillate and overrule their own decisions . . . affecting the title to real property, their decisions are retrospective and may affect titles purchased on the faith of their stability. Doubtful questions on subjects of this nature, when once decided, should be considered no longer doubtful or subject to change." Id., at 334. </s> A quiet title action for the adjudication of water rights, such as the Orr Ditch suit, is distinctively equipped to serve these policies because "it enables the court of equity to acquire jurisdiction of all the rights involved and also of all the owners of those rights, and thus settle and permanently adjudicate in a single proceeding all the rights, or claims to rights, of all the claimants to the water taken from a common source of supply." 3 C. Kinney, Law of Irrigation and Water Rights 1535, p. 2764 (2d ed. 1912). </s> [Footnote 11 The corollary preclusion doctrine to res judicata is collateral estoppel. While the latter may be used to bar a broader class of litigants, it can be used only to prevent "relitigation of issues actually litigated" in a prior lawsuit. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 , n. 5 (1979). While the District Court concluded that the cause of action for reserved water rights asserted in Orr Ditch was the same as that asserted in the proceedings below, the District Court found, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the specific issue of a "water right for fishery purposes" was not actually litigated in Orr Ditch. Nevada App. 189a; 649 F.2d, at 1311. Therefore collateral estoppel was thought to be inapposite. It has been argued that these conclusions were erroneous, but because of our disposition of the cases we need not address this question. </s> [Footnote 12 Under the first Restatement of Judgment 61 (1942), causes of action were to be deemed the same "if the evidence needed to sustain the second action would have sustained the first action." In the Restatement (Second) [463 U.S. 110, 131] of Judgments (1982), a more pragmatic approach, one "not capable of a mathematically precise definition," was adopted. Id., 24, Comment b. Under this approach causes of actions are the same if they arise from the same "transaction"; whether they are products of the same "transaction" is to be determined by "giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage." Id., 24. </s> The Tribe argues that the first Restatement of Judgments standard should control because it was the prevailing standard at the time of Orr Ditch. While we find that the result would be the same under either version of the Restatement of Judgments, we nevertheless point out that the Tribe is somewhat mistaken in this argument. Although the "same evidence" standard was "[o]ne of the tests" used at the time, The Haytian Republic, 154 U.S. 118, 125 (1894), it was not the only one. For example, in Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316 (1927), the Court concluded: </s> "A cause of action does not consist of facts, but of the unlawful violation of a right which the facts show. The number and variety of the facts alleged do not establish more than one cause of action so long as their result, whether they be considered severally or in combination, is the violation of but one right by a single legal wrong. . . . `The facts are merely the means, and not the end. They do not constitute the cause of action, but they show its existence by making the wrong appear. "The thing, therefore, which in contemplation of law as its cause, becomes a ground for action, is not the group of facts alleged in the declaration, bill, or indictment, but the result of these in a legal wrong, the existence of which, if true, they conclusively evince."' Chobanian v. Washburn Wire Company, 33 R. I. 289, 302." Id., at 321. </s> [Footnote 13 The District Court held that neither the United States nor the Tribe can "litigate several different types of water use claims, all arising under the Winters doctrine and all derived from the same water source in a piecemeal fashion. There was but one cause of action . . . based upon the Winters reserved right theory." Nevada App. 188a. The Court of Appeals observed, however, that the Government could have sought, even though it did not, an adjudication of a reserved right for certain purposes, such as irrigation, leaving open the possibility of expanding the Reservation's water rights for other purposes, such as the fishery. 649 F.2d, at 1302. We need not resolve this dispute because we agree with the Court of Appeals that in Orr Ditch the Government made no effort to split its Winters cause of action. </s> [Footnote 14 We, of course, do not pass judgment on the quality of representation that the Tribe received. In 1951 the Tribe sued the Government before the Indian Claims Commission for damages, basing its claim of liability on the Tribe's receipt of less water for the fishery than it was entitled to. Northern Paiute Tribe v. United States, 30 Ind. Cl. Comm'n 210 (1973). In a settlement the Tribe was given $8 million in return for its waiver of further liability on the part of the United States. </s> [Footnote 15 This Court held in Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44 (1940), that persons vicariously represented in a class action could not be bound by a judgment in the case where the representative parties had interests that impermissibly conflicted with those of persons represented. See also Restatement (Second) of Judgments 42(1)(d) (1982). The Tribe seeks to [463 U.S. 110, 136] take advantage of this ruling, arguing that the Government's primary interest in Orr Ditch was to obtain water rights for the Newlands Reclamation Project and that by definition any water rights given to the Tribe would conflict with that interest. We reject this contention. </s> We have already said that the Government stands in a different position than a private fiduciary where Congress has decreed that the Government must represent more than one interest. When the Government performs such duties it does not by that reason alone compromise its obligation to any of the interests involved. </s> The Justice Department's involvement in Orr Ditch began with a letter from the Secretary of the Interior to the Attorney General requesting that a single suit be brought by the Government for a determination "of all water rights in Lake Tahoe and Truckee River above the intake of the Truckee-Carson Reclamation project." App. 263. A Special Assistant United States Attorney assigned to the matter was apparently the first to recognize that the Government should in the same suit seek to establish the water rights to the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation. In a memorandum where the Special Assistant explained the reserved-water-rights holding of Winters, he advanced the view that "[t]hese Indian reservation water rights are important and should be established to the fullest extent because they are senior and superior to most if not all the other rights on the river." App. 269-270. </s> Contemporaneously with this report, the Acting Director of the Reclamation Service notified the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that an assertion of the Reservation's rights should be included in Orr Ditch. The claim was advanced accordingly and thereafter the Bureau of Indian Affairs was kept aware of the Orr Ditch proceedings; during the settlement negotiations the BIA directly participated. The BIA is the agency of the Federal Government "charged with fulfilling the trust obligations of the United States" to Indians, Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365, 374 (1968), and there is nothing in the record of this case to indicate that any official outside of the BIA attempted to influence the BIA's decisions in a manner inconsistent with these obligations. </s> The record suggests that the BIA alone may have made the decision not to press claims for a fishery water right, for reasons which hindsight may render questionable, but which did not involve other interests represented [463 U.S. 110, 137] by the Government. For instance, in a 1926 letter to a federal official on the Pyramid Lake Reservation, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs explained: </s> "We feel that the Indians would be wise to assume that Truckee River water will be used practically as far as it can be for irrigation, and that the thing for the Indians to do is, if possible, instead of trying to stop such development to direct it so that it will inure to their benefit. </s> . . . . . </s> ". . . [I]f their ultimate welfare depends in part on their being able to hold their own in a civilized world . . . they should look forward to a different means of livelihood, in part at least, from their ancestral one, of fishing and hunting. They should expect not only to farm their allotments but also to do other sorts of work and have other ways of making a living." App. 435-436. </s> Furthermore, the District Court found that during the pendency of the Orr Ditch proceedings "a serious and reasonable doubt existed as to whether any Winters reserved water right could be claimed at all for an executive order Indian reservation." Nevada App. 185a. </s> In pressing for a different conclusion, the Tribe relies primarily on a finding by the District Court that it was the intention of the Government in Orr Ditch "to assert as large a water right as possible for the Indian reservation, and to do everything possible to protect the fish for the benefit of the Indians and the white population insofar as it was `consistent with the larger interests involved in the propositions having to do with the reclamation of thousands of acres of arid and now useless land for the benefit of the country as a whole.'" Nevada App. 185a. The Tribe's focus on this ambiguous finding, however, has not blinded us to the District Court's specific finding on the alleged conflict. </s> "[T]here was a foreseeable conflict of purposes created by the Congress within the Interior Department and as between the Bureau of Reclamation on the one hand in asserting large water rights for its reclamation projects and the Bureau of Indian Affairs on the other in the performance of its obligations to protect the rights and interests of the Indians on the Pyramid [463 U.S. 110, 138] Lake Paiute Indian Reservation. [T]his conflict of purposes was apparent prior to and during the Orr Ditch proceedings and was resolved within the executive department of government by top-level executive officers acting within the scope of their Congressionally-delegated duties and authority and were political and policy decisions of those officials charged with that responsibility, which decisions resulted in the extinguishment of the alleged fishery purposes water right. . . . The government lawyers in Orr Ditch, both departmental, agency and bureaus, as well as those charged with the responsibility for the actual conduct of the litigation, are not chargeable with an impermissible conflict of purpose or interest in carrying out the decisions and directions of their superiors in the executive department of government. . . ." Id., at 189a-190a. </s> The District Court's finding reflects the nature of a democratic government that is charged with more than one responsibility; it does not describe conduct that would deprive the United States of the authority to conduct litigation on behalf of diverse interests. </s> [Footnote 16 The Tribe makes the argument that even if res judicata would otherwise apply, it cannot be used in these cases because to do so would deny the Tribe procedural due process. The Tribe argues that in Orr Ditch they were given neither the notice required by Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), nor the full and fair opportunity to be heard required by Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982). Mullane, which involved a final accounting between a trustee and beneficiaries, is of course inapposite. Hansberry was based upon an impermissible conflict in a class action between the representatives of the class and certain class members; we have already said that such a conflict did not exist in these cases and that in any event this litigation is governed by different rules than those that apply in private representative litigation. Logan did not involve a fiduciary relationship, and like Mullane, was a suit where the complaining party would be left without recourse. In these cases, the Tribe, through the Government as their representative, was given adequate notice and a full and fair opportunity to be heard. If in carrying out its role as representative, the Government violated its obligations to the Tribe, then the Tribe's remedy is against the Government, not against third parties. As we have noted earlier, the Tribe has already taken advantage of that remedy. </s> Finally, TCID challenges the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Secretary of the Interior is not authorized to negotiate and execute an out-of-court settlement of disputed Indian water rights, and therefore that the Orr Ditch settlement agreement did not provide an independent bar to the Tribe's attempt to relitigate the Orr Ditch cause of action. Brief for Petitioner in No. 81-2276, pp. 42-48. Because of our disposition of the cases, we need not address this issue. </s> JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring. </s> The mere existence of a formal "conflict of interest" does not deprive the United States of authority to represent Indians in litigation, and therefore to bind them as well. If, however, the United States actually causes harm through a breach of its trust obligations the Indians should have a remedy against it. I join the Court's opinion on the understanding that it reaffirms that the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe has a remedy against the United States for the breach of duty that the United States has admitted. See ante, at 144, n. 16. </s> In the final analysis, our decision today is that thousands of small farmers in northwestern Nevada can rely on specific promises made to their forebears two and three generations ago, and solemnized in a judicial decree, despite strong claims on the part of the Pyramid Lake Paiutes. The availability of water determines the character of life and culture in this region. Here, as elsewhere in the West, it is insufficient to satisfy all claims. In the face of such fundamental natural limitations, the rule of law cannot avert large measures of loss, destruction, and profound disappointment, no matter [463 U.S. 110, 146] how scrupulously evenhanded are the law's doctrines and administration. Yet the law can and should fix responsibility for loss and destruction that should have been avoided, and it can and should require that those whose rights are appropriated for the benefit of others receive appropriate compensation. * </s> [Footnote * I also note that the District Court found that one of the purposes for establishment of the Pyramid Lake Reservation was "to provide the Indians with access to Pyramid Lake . . . in order that they might obtain their sustenance, at least in part, from these historic fisheries." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 81-2245, p. 183a. As a consequence, the Tribe retains a Winters right, at least in theory, to water to maintain the fishery, a right which today's ruling does not question. To some extent it may be possible to satisfy the Tribe's claims consistent with the Orr Ditch decree - for instance, through judicious management of the Derby Dam and Lahontan Reservoir, improvement of the quality of the Newlands Project irrigation works, application of heretofore unappropriated floodwaters, or invocation of the decree's provisions for restricting diversions in excess of those allowed by the decree. </s> [463 U.S. 110, 147]

United States Supreme Court MARSHALL v. HARE(1964) No. 962 Argued: Decided: June 22, 1964 </s> Judgment reversed and case remanded. </s> Reported below: 227 F. Supp. 989. </s> Theodore Sachs for appellants. </s> Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General of Michigan, Stanton S. Faville, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and James R. Ramsey and Russell A. Searl, Assistant Attorneys General, for Hare et al.; and Edmund E. Shepherd and R. William Rogers for Beadle et al., appellees. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The judgment below is reversed. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 ; Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 . The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views stated in our opinions in Reynolds v. Sims and in the other cases relating to state legislative apportionment decided along with Reynolds. </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK and MR. JUSTICE STEWART would affirm the judgment because the Michigan system of legislative apportionment is clearly a rational one and clearly does not frustrate effective majority rule. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN dissents for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 . </s> [378 U.S. 561, 562]

United States Supreme Court COSTLE v. PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION(1980) No. 78-1472 Argued: December 5, 1979Decided: March 18, 1980 </s> Section 402 (a) (1) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) authorizes the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), "after opportunity for public hearing," to issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant upon condition that such discharge will meet all applicable requirements of the FWPCA or such conditions as the Administrator determines are necessary to carry out the Act's goals and objectives. Implementing regulations provide for public notice of the proposed issuance, denial, or modification of a permit; direct the EPA Regional Administrator to hold a public hearing on the proposed action if he finds a significant degree of public interest; and permit any interested person to request an "adjudicatory hearing" after the EPA's determination to take the proposed action. Such a request will be granted if it "[s]ets forth material issues of fact relevant to the questions of whether a permit should be issued; denied or modified." Respondent city of Los Angeles (city) owns a sewage treatment plant that is operated under permits issued by the EPA pursuant to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), established by the FWPCA. The city's current permit, as issued in 1975, conditioned continued discharges from the sewage treatment plant into the Pacific Ocean on the city's compliance with a schedule for achieving full secondary treatment of wastewater by October 1, 1979. In April 1977, the EPA advised the city that it proposed to extend the expiration date of the 1975 permit for a second time, to December 17, 1979, with all other terms and conditions of the permit to remain unchanged. Notice of the proposed action was published in the Los Angeles Times, but neither the city nor any other party, including respondent Pacific Legal Foundation, requested a hearing or filed comments on the proposed extension, and the EPA Regional Administrator determined that public interest in the modification proposal was insufficient to warrant a public hearing. After respondent Kilroy's postdetermination request for an adjudicatory hearing was denied on the ground that it did not set forth material [445 U.S. 198, 199] issues of fact relevant to the question whether the permit should be extended, respondents filed petitions with the Court of Appeals seeking review of the Regional Administrator's action. The Court of Appeals held that the EPA had failed to provide the "opportunity for public hearing" required by 402 (a) (1) when it extended the federal permit, and remanded for a "proper hearing." In so holding, the court concluded that the EPA is required to justify every failure to hold a hearing on a permit action by proof that the material facts supporting the action "are not subject to dispute." </s> Held: </s> 1. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the EPA is required to hold a public hearing on every NPDES permit action it takes unless it can show that the material facts supporting its action "are not subject to dispute." Rather, the implementing regulations in question are fully consistent with the FWPCA's purpose to provide the public with an "opportunity" for a hearing concerning agency actions respecting water pollution control, and are valid. Pp. 213-216. </s> 2. Respondents have failed to demonstrate that the regulations in question were not applied properly in the context of this case. Pp. 216-220. </s> (a) Under the circumstances presented here, it was reasonable for the Regional Administrator to extend the permit's expiration date without further public hearing, on the grounds that the public had not exhibited a significant degree of interest in the proposed action, and that information pertinent to such a decision would not have been adduced if a hearing had been held. Pp. 216-218. </s> (b) The form of notice by newspaper publication was adequate. The city's argument that the notice was inadequate because its understanding of the compliance schedules was contrary to the EPA's was not pertinent to the agency's decision to extend the permit's expiration date. Pp. 218-219. </s> (c) The EPA did not err in failing to hold an adjudicatory hearing on the issues raised in respondent Kilroy's request because that request did not set forth material issues of fact pertinent to the question whether the permit's expiration date should be extended. Pp. 219-220. </s> 586 F.2d 650, reversed. </s> BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. </s> William Alsup argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney [445 U.S. 198, 200] General Moorman, Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne, Angus Macbeth, and Raymond W. Mushal. </s> Robert K. Best argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondents Pacific Legal Foundation et al. were Ronald A. Zumbrun and Thomas E. Hookano, Burt Pines and Frederick N. Merkin filed a brief for respondent City of Los Angeles. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case, in a sense, is a tale of a great city's - and the Nation's - basic problems in disposing of human waste. "How" and "where" are the ultimate questions, and they are intertwined. The issues presently before the Court, however, center in the administrative processes by which the city and the Nation seek to resolve those basic problems. </s> I </s> Respondent city of Los Angeles owns and operates the Hyperion Wastewater Treatment Plant located in Playa Del Rey, Cal. Since 1960, the Hyperion plant has processed most of the city's sewage, and has discharged the wastes through three "outfalls" extending into the Pacific Ocean. The shortest outfall terminates about one mile from the coastline in 50 feet of water. It is operative only during emergencies caused by increased sewage flow during wet weather or by power failures at the pumping plant. The second outfall terminates about five miles out. Approximately 340 million gallons of treated wastewater are discharged every day into the ocean, at a depth of 187 feet, through that outfall. This wastewater receives at least "primary treatment," 1 but about [445 U.S. 198, 201] one-third of the flow also receives "secondary treatment" 2 by an activated sludge process. The third outfall terminates about seven miles from the coast. It is through this third outfall that the solids that have been removed during treatment are discharged into the ocean, at a depth of 300 feet. Prior to discharge the solid materials, commonly referred to as sludge, have been digested, screened, and diluted with secondary effluent. App. 3-4. </s> The Hyperion plant is operated under permits issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the California Regional Water Quality Control Board (CRWQCB). Such permits are issued pursuant to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), established by 402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), as added by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 880, and as amended, 33 U.S.C. 1342 (1976 ed. and Supp. II). 3 The FWPCA was enacted with a [445 U.S. 198, 202] stated and obviously worthy objective, that is, "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 101 (a), 86 Stat. 816, 33 U.S.C. 1251 (a). In order to achieve that objective, Congress declared that "it is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985." 101 (a) (1). </s> As one means of reaching that goal, Congress in 301 (a) of the FWPCA provided: "Except as in compliance with this section and sections 302, 306, 307, 318, 402, and 404 of this Act [33 U.S.C. 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344], the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful." 86 Stat. 844, 33 U.S.C. 1311 (a). Section 402 (a) (1) authorizes the Administrator of the EPA, "after opportunity for public hearing," to issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant, notwithstanding 301 (a), upon condition that such discharge will meet all applicable requirements established in other sections of the Act, or such conditions as the Administrator determines are necessary to carry out the Act's goals and objectives. 86 Stat. 880, 33 U.S.C. 1342 (a) (1). One of the requirements applicable to an NPDES permit for a publicly owned treatment works, such as the Hyperion plant, is specified in 301 (b) (1) (B). That provision requires such works in existence on July 1, 1977, to achieve "effluent limitations based upon secondary treatment as defined by the Administrator." 4 86 Stat. 845, 33 U.S.C. 1311 (b) (1) (B). [445 U.S. 198, 203] </s> II </s> The EPA has promulgated regulations providing for notice and public participation in any permit proceeding under the NPDES. Those regulations, implementing the statutory requirement that any NPDES permit be issued "after opportunity for public hearing," are the focus of this case. The regulations state: "Public notice of the proposed issuance, denial or modification of every permit or denial shall be circulated in a manner designed to inform interested and potentially interested persons of the discharge and of the proposed determination to issue, deny, or modify a permit for the discharge." 40 CFR 125.32 (a) (1978). 5 That public notice "shall include at least": (1) circulation of the notice within the affected geographical area by posting in the post office and "public places" nearest the applicant's premises, or posting "near the entrance to the applicant's premises and in nearby places," or publication in local newspapers; (2) the mailing of notice to the permit applicant and "appropriate" federal and state authorities; and (3) the mailing of notice to any person or group who has requested placement on the NPDES permit mailing list for actions affecting the geographical area. Ibid. </s> Following the issuance of public notice the EPA Regional [445 U.S. 198, 204] Administrator is directed to provide at least a 30-day period during which interested persons may submit written views concerning the proposed action or may request that a hearing be held. 125.32 (b) (1). If the Regional Administrator "finds a significant degree of public interest in a proposed permit," he is directed to hold a public hearing on the proposed action at which interested parties may submit oral or written statements and data. 125.34. Following a determination by the Regional Administrator to take a proposed permit action, he is directed to forward a copy of that determination to any person who has submitted written comments. If the determination is substantially changed from the initial proposed action, he must give public notice of that determination. In either event, his determination constitutes the final action of the EPA unless a timely request for an adjudicatory hearing is granted. 125.35. </s> Any interested person, within 10 days following the date of the determination, may request an "adjudicatory hearing" or a "legal decision" with respect to the determination. 125.36 (b). A request for an adjudicatory hearing is to be granted by the Regional Administrator if the request "[s]ets forth material issues of fact relevant to the questions of whether a permit should be issued, denied or modified." 125.36 (c) (1) (ii). Issues of law, on the other hand, are not to be considered at an adjudicatory hearing. If a request for an adjudicatory hearing raises a legal issue, that issue is to be referred by the hearing officer to the EPA's Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and the General Counsel for resolution. If a request for an adjudicatory hearing raises only legal issues, a hearing will not be granted and the Regional Administrator will refer those issues to the aforementioned officers. 125.36 (m). </s> III </s> The EPA and the CRWQCB first issued a joint permit to the city of Los Angeles for discharges of treated sewage [445 U.S. 198, 205] from the Hyperion plant in November 1974. See App. 4. That permit, covering only the 1- and 5-mile outfalls, was issued following EPA publication of notice of its intent to issue a permit, an opportunity for the submission of written comments, and a public hearing. On August 18, 1975, the 1974 permit was rescinded by the federal and state authorities, and replaced with a permit covering all three outfalls. Id., at 3. The 1975 permit conditioned continued discharges from the Hyperion plant on compliance by the city with a schedule designed to achieve full secondary treatment of wastewater by October 1, 1979, and the gradual elimination of the discharge of sludge into the ocean over a 30-month period following "concept approval" of a plan for alternative disposal of the sludge. Id., at 17-19. 6 </s> In July 1976, the EPA notified Los Angeles that its 1975 NPDES permit would expire on February 1, 1977, and that a new permit would be needed if discharges were to continue beyond that date. Record 44. The city filed an application for a new permit on July 30. Id., at 45-80. Thereafter, in September 1976, the CRWQCB suggested to the EPA that the city's current permit might be extended for six months to take into account any effect of pending federal legislation that would modify the FWPCA's mandatory compliance dates [445 U.S. 198, 206] for achievement of effluent limitations based upon secondary treatment. Id., at 119. See n. 4, supra. On January 24, 1977, after a public hearing, the EPA and the CRWQCB did extend the expiration date of the 1975 permit from February 1 to June 30, 1977, citing inadequate time to review the city's application for a new permit. App. 93. 7 </s> [445 U.S. 198, 207] </s> On April 26, 1977, the EPA advised the city that it again proposed to extend the expiration date of its NPDES permit for the Hyperion plant, this time from June 30, 1977, to December 17, 1979. 8 All other terms and conditions of the [445 U.S. 198, 208] permit were to remain unchanged. App. 115-120. Notice of the proposed action was published in the Los Angeles Times the following day. See L. A. Times, Apr. 27, 1977, part V, p. 2, cols. 6-7. That notice described the permit and its proposed modification, and advised persons wishing to comment upon objections or to appear at a public hearing to submit their comments or requests for a hearing to the regional office of the EPA within 30 days. Neither the city nor the respondent PLF, nor any other party, requested a hearing or filed comments on the proposed extension, and the EPA's Regional Administrator determined that public interest in the modification proposal was insufficient to warrant convening a public hearing. On May 23, at a public hearing, the CRWQCB officially extended the expiration date of the state permit for the Hyperion plant until December 17, 1979. App. 154. On June 2, 1977, the Regional Administrator of the EPA transmitted to the city his final determination to extend the time of expiration of the federal permit to the same 1979 date. Id., at 149. </s> On June 10, 1977, the PLF filed a Freedom of Information Act request with the regional enforcement division of the EPA, seeking information concerning the proposed extension of the expiration date of the Hyperion permit and, specifically, whether that extension had been approved. Id., at 157. When informed by telephone on June 13 that the EPA's final determination had been made on June 2, and that a request for an adjudicatory hearing could be accepted only if filed that day, see 40 CFR 125.36 (b) (1), respondent Kilroy, represented by PLF attorneys, filed such a request. Under EPA regulations, Kilroy's request for a hearing, if granted, would automatically stay the effectiveness of the permit modification pending disposition of the request. 125.35 (d) (2). [445 U.S. 198, 209] </s> Respondent Kilroy's request for an adjudicatory hearing presented two issues that he wished to raise: </s> "1. Whether the requirements of the permit should be modified in that the project that is the subject of the compliance schedule set forth in NPDES permit CA010991 [the Hyperion permit] is being evaluated in an EIS by the EPA pursuant to the requirements of NEPA, the compliance schedule should not be mandated in an NPDES permit until the NEPA study is completed; and </s> "2. Whether the procedures used and the record developed were adequate [for the] issuance of an NPDES permit." App. 160. </s> Within 10 days of receiving Kilroy's request, the Regional Administrator responded by certified mail, stating his determination that the request did not set forth material issues of fact relevant to the question whether the permit should be extended. Thus, he concluded that Kilroy's request had not met the requirements of 40 CFR 125.36 (c) (1) (ii). The Regional Administrator did construe the request, however, as one raising issues of law relating to the appropriate interpretation to be given regulations that had been promulgated under the FWPCA. He therefore certified to the EPA's General Counsel three issues of law raised by the request. App. 166. 9 Before the General Counsel's ruling [445 U.S. 198, 210] on the certified issues of law was announced, respondents PLF and Kilroy, joined now by the city of Torrance, therefore a stranger to the formal proceedings, filed a timely petition with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit seeking review of the Regional Administrator's action extending the expiration date of the Hyperion permit. A similar petition was filed by respondent city of Los Angeles. The petitions were consolidated for review. The Court of Appeals stayed the effect of the compliance schedules incorporated within the 1975 permit, pending final disposition of the consolidated cases. Even though the city's NPDES permit for the Hyperion plant, as modified by the EPA on June 2, 1977, stated that it expired December 17, 1979, the terms of the permit, other than those aspects of the compliance schedules requiring completion after January 1, 1977, have remained in effect, both through the Court of Appeals' stay and by operation of law. 10 The case, therefore, clearly has not become moot. [445 U.S. 198, 211] </s> IV </s> The Court of Appeals remanded the matter to the Administrator for the holding of a "proper hearing." 586 F.2d 650, 660-661 (CA9 1978). After first determining that it had jurisdiction to hear respondents' petitions, and rejecting Los Angeles' argument that only the State of California had the authority to extend the Hyperion NPDES permit, id., at 654-657, the court held that the EPA had failed to provide the "opportunity for public hearing" required by 402 (a) (1) when it extended that permit. All parties agreed that the EPA had not in fact conducted a hearing prior to its extension of the permit on June 2, 1977. The EPA contended, however, that an opportunity for a hearing had been provided; it claimed that notice of the proposed extension had been published and that, when no one requested a hearing, it was proper under agency regulations for the Regional Administrator to conclude that there was insufficient public interest in the permit extension to necessitate a hearing. See 40 CFR 125.34 (a). The Court of Appeals rejected the EPA's contention, holding: </s> "The fact that no one requested a hearing prior to the decision is appropriately considered in this analysis, but it is not decisive. It must be shown that the material facts supporting the decision are not subject to dispute." 586 F.2d, at 658-659 (footnotes omitted). [445 U.S. 198, 212] </s> The court also relied on language in Independent Bankers Assn. v. Board of Governors, 170 U.S. App. D.C. 278, 516 F.2d 1206 (1975), to the effect that certain "opportunity for hearing" requirements of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended, 84 Stat. 1765, 12 U.S.C. 1843 (c) (8), required the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to hold an evidentiary hearing unless it could "show that the parties could gain nothing thereby, because they disputed none of the material facts upon which the agency's decision could rest." 170 U.S. App. D.C., at 292, 516 F.2d, at 1220. </s> The Court of Appeals distinguished decisions of this Court in which it was held that a failure to request a hearing constituted a waiver of any right thereto under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 742, 30 U.S.C. 801 et seq., and that an agency may place the burden of demonstrating that a case presents disputed issues of material fact on the party challenging the agency's action. 586 F.2d, at 658-659, nn. 3 and 4 (discussing National Coal Operators' Assn. v. Kleppe, 423 U.S. 388, 397 -398 (1976); Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 620 (1973); and United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956)). </s> On the record before it, the Court of Appeals concluded that "the reasonableness of the EPA's compliance schedule [incorporated within the Hyperion NPDES permit] depends upon facts that may be disputed and with respect to which the record in this case is silent." 586 F.2d, at 659. With respect to such factors as the adequacy of the Palos Verdes or other landfill site, the ability of the city to acquire the capacity to transport sludge to that site within designated time limits, and the possible effect on navigable waters of land disposal of the sludge, the court stated: "[W]e can conclude unequivocally neither that the parties have no dispute about these matters nor that they do." Ibid. Thus, the court found itself unable to deny respondents an adjudicatory hearing on the ground that there was no dispute concerning the [445 U.S. 198, 213] material facts upon which the EPA's decision to extend the permit had been based. </s> The Administrator of the EPA petitioned this Court for review of the question whether 402 (a) (1) requires the EPA to conduct an adjudicatory hearing before taking action on an NPDES permit issuance or modification where, after notice of the proposed action, no one requested a hearing before the action was taken and the only request filed subsequently raised no material issue of fact. 11 We granted certiorari to review this important issue in a rapidly developing area of the law. 442 U.S. 928 (1979). </s> V </s> A </s> Petitioner's basic contentions are that the EPA was entitled to condition the availability of a public hearing on the extension of the Hyperion permit on the filing of a proper request, and that it similarly was entitled to condition an adjudicatory hearing following its extension decision on the identification of a disputed issue of material fact by an interested party. We agree with both contentions. </s> Initially, we must state our disagreement with respondents' characterization of the holding of the Court of Appeals. They argue that the court's decision was based on a finding that the EPA in this case did not comply with its own regulations governing public participation in the NPDES permit issuance process, rather than on a legal conclusion that the regulations [445 U.S. 198, 214] are invalid. We conclude, on the contrary, that, although the court did not explicitly hold the regulations to be invalid, its decision renders them essentially meaningless. Rather than permitting the Regional Administrator to decide, in the first instance, whether there is sufficient public interest in a proposed issuance or modification of a permit to justify a public hearing, 40 CFR 125.34 (a), and to limit any adjudicatory hearing to the situation where an interested party raises a material issue of fact, 125.36 (c) (1) (ii), the Court of Appeals would require the agency to justify every failure to hold a hearing by proof that the material facts supporting its action "are not subject to dispute." 586 F.2d, at 659. This holding is contrary to this Court's approval in past decisions of agency rules, similar to those at issue here, that have required an applicant who seeks a hearing to meet a threshold burden of tendering evidence suggesting the need for a hearing. See, e. g., Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S., at 620 -621, and cases cited therein. </s> Moreover, it is important to note that the regulations described in Part II of this opinion, supra, were designed to implement the statutory command that permits be issued "after opportunity for public hearing." 402 (a) (1), 86 Stat. 880, 33 U.S.C. 1342 (a) (1) (emphasis supplied). In the past, this Court has held that a similar statutory requirement that an "opportunity" for a hearing be provided may be keyed to a request for a hearing. See National Coal Operators' Assn. v. Kleppe, 423 U.S., at 398 -399. 12 And only recently [445 U.S. 198, 215] the Court re-emphasized the fundamental administrative law principle that "the formulation of procedures was basically to be left within the discretion of the agencies to which Congress had confided the responsibility for substantive judgments." Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978). </s> Neither can we ignore the fact that under the standard applied by the Court of Appeals, the EPA would be required to hold hearings on most of the actions it takes with respect to NPDES permit issuances and modifications. Hearings would be required even in cases, such as this, in which the proposed action only extends a permit's expiration date without at all affecting the substantive conditions that had been considered during earlier hearings. The Administrator advises us that each year the EPA grants about 100 requests for adjudicatory hearings under the NPDES program, issues about 2,200 permits, and takes thousands of actions with respect to permits. Brief for Petitioner 34-35; see United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 834, n. 14 (CA7 1977). Affirmance of the Court of Appeals' rationale obviously would raise serious questions about the EPA's ability to administer the NPDES program. See Weinberger, 412 U.S., at 621 ; E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 132 -133 (1977). </s> We recognize the validity of respondents' contention that the legislative history of the FWPCA indicates a strong congressional desire that the public have input in decisions concerning the elimination of water pollution. The FWPCA itself recites: </s> "Public participation in the development, revision, and enforcement of any regulation, standard, effluent limitation, plan, or program established by the Administrator . . . under this Act shall be provided for, encouraged, and assisted by the Administrator." 101 (e), 86 Stat. 817, 33 U.S.C. 1251 (e). [445 U.S. 198, 216] </s> Passages in the FWPCA's legislative history indicate that this general policy of encouraging public participation is applicable to the administration of the NPDES permit program. See, e. g., 118 Cong. Rec. 37060 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Dingell during debate on override of the President's veto of the FWPCA). The Report of the Committee on Public Works accompanying the Senate bill emphasized that an essential element of the NPDES program is public participation, and that "[t]he public must have a genuine opportunity to speak on the issue of protection of its waters." S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 72 (1971). </s> Nonetheless, we conclude that the regulations the EPA has promulgated to implement this congressional policy are fully consistent with the legislative purpose, and are valid. Respondents, in fact, do not contest seriously the proposition that the EPA's regulations are valid on their face; the thrust of their arguments before this Court has been that the EPA, in this instance, failed to apply its regulations consistently with their purpose. </s> B </s> Having rejected the Court of Appeals' invalidation of the EPA's public participation regulations, we turn to the issues framed by respondents. First, PLF and Kilroy contend that the EPA's regulations required the Regional Administrator to hold a public hearing in this case because there was a "significant degree of public interest" in the extension of the Hyperion permit. See 40 CFR 125.34 (a). They also place substantial reliance upon those agency regulations that set general guidelines for public participation in water pollution control. During the period at issue here, one such regulation provided: </s> "Where the opportunity for public hearing is called for in the Act, and in other appropriate instances, a public hearing shall be held if the hearing official finds significant public interest (including the filing of requests or [445 U.S. 198, 217] petitions for such hearing) or pertinent information to be gained. Instances of doubt should be resolved in favor of holding the hearing, or if necessary, of providing alternative opportunity for public participation." 40 CFR 105.7 (c). </s> Notwithstanding the orientation of these regulations toward the encouragement of public participation in the NPDES permit issuance process, our examination of the record leads us to reject respondents' contention that the EPA failed to comply with its regulations in this case. It is undisputed that the most controversial aspects of the Hyperion permit - the compliance schedule for secondary treatment, the "sludge-out" requirement, and the resultant requirement that the city develop an alternative method of sludge disposal - were all included within the 1975 permit. That permit was issued following EPA publication of advance notice of its tentative determination to revise the initial 1974 permit, and a hearing on the proposed revisions. None of the respondents objected to the issuance of the 1975 permit or requested an adjudicatory hearing. We agree with the position advanced by petitioner that respondents may not reopen consideration of substantive conditions contained within the 1975 permit through hearing requests relating to a proposed permit modification that did not even purport to affect those conditions. </s> The EPA's determination to modify the 1975 permit by extending its expiration date to December 17, 1979, was made following newspaper publication of the proposed action, including notice of an opportunity for submission of comments and hearing requests. Respondent Los Angeles received an individual notice of the EPA's tentative determination to extend the permit, and raised no objection. Respondents PLF and Kilroy, who argue that the EPA was aware of their interest in the Hyperion permit and their opposition to the Interim Sludge Disposal Project, could have received such individual notice if they had asked to be placed on the EPA's [445 U.S. 198, 218] mailing list for notices of proposed agency actions within the pertinent geographical area. 40 CFR 125.32 (a) (3). They made no such request. Under the circumstances, we think it reasonable that the Regional Administrator decided to extend the expiration date of the permit without another public hearing, on the grounds that the public had not exhibited a significant degree of interest in the action under consideration, and that information pertinent to such a decision would not have been adduced if a hearing had been held. This simply is not a case in which doubt existed concerning the need for a hearing. </s> Second, respondents suggest that the EPA's provision of notice to the general public concerning the proposed permit extension was inadequate. The PLF and Kilroy argue that notice by newspaper publication was not adequate to apprise interested parties of the EPA's tentative determination, and was inconsistent with the policy of encouraging public participation that underlies the statute and regulations. Based on our conclusion that the EPA's regulations implementing the rather amorphous "opportunity for public hearing" requirement of 402 are valid, we have no hesitancy in concluding that the form of notice provided in this case, fully consistent with the regulations, was not inadequate. </s> Los Angeles argues that it was not given adequate notice of the proposed extension of its permit because it was never informed that the EPA regarded the federal "sludge-out" compliance schedule contained in the 1975 permit not to have been modified by subsequent orders of the CRWQCB. See n. 6, supra. This argument was not addressed directly by the Court of Appeals. It would be appropriate, therefore, for this Court not to attempt to resolve it here, even if we had an adequate record to do so. More fundamentally, however, an additional reason dictates that the city's argument not be resolved in the context of this lawsuit at all. Los Angeles claims that the more lenient sludge-out schedule adopted by [445 U.S. 198, 219] the CRWQCB in its order of May 24, 1976 (incorporating within the Hyperion permit a four-phase alternative sludge disposal plan to be completed by April 1, 1980) has been approved by the EPA with respect to the federal permit. The EPA presently takes the position that state modifications of the sludge-out plan, adopted pursuant to California law, did not alter the initial compliance schedule incorporated in the 1975 federal permit. The agency's position will be tested in United States v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 77 3047 R (CD Cal., filed Aug. 12, 1977), an enforcement action brought by the Government under 309 of the FWPCA, 86 Stat. 859, 33 U.S.C. 1319 (1976 ed. and Supp. II). </s> The enforcement action seeks to enjoin the city from violating the conditions of its permit and to impose civil penalties against the city for past failures to comply with the permit's schedules. App. 181. It has been stayed by the Court of Appeals pending the outcome of this case. Brief for Petitioner 17, n. 13. The argument that the city raises here concerning its understanding of the compliance schedules will be resolved far more effectively in the Government's enforcement action than in the adjudicatory hearing the Court of Appeals would have awarded respondents in this case. 13 Furthermore, even if the city had raised its argument in a public hearing on the proposed permit extension, that argument would have had little relevance to the EPA's final determination because the EPA's proposed action did not purport to change the substantive conditions that are the focus of the city's complaint. </s> Finally, respondents suggest that the EPA erred in not holding an adjudicatory hearing on the issues raised in respondent Kilroy's request. We agree with petitioner, however, who contends that Kilroy's request raised legal, rather [445 U.S. 198, 220] than factual, issues, and who notes that respondents treated the request in that fashion in arguing the issues Kilroy presented before the EPA's General Counsel. See n. 9, supra. Even in their arguments before this Court, respondents have continued to raise factual issues that are relevant only to their contention that greater adverse effects on both the marine and land environment will result from the Interim Sludge Disposal Project than from the continued discharge of sludge into the ocean. If such issues had been raised in a timely request for an adjudicatory hearing, we agree with petitioner that the EPA could have taken the position that such issues, regardless of their merits, were not pertinent to a determination to extend the Hyperion permit's expiration date. That determination had no impact on the compliance schedule for "sludge-out" that already had long been in effect. 14 </s> C </s> In sum, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the EPA is required to hold a public hearing on every NPDES permit action it takes unless it can show that the material facts supporting its action "are not subject to [445 U.S. 198, 221] dispute." We hold, rather, that the agency's regulations implementing the statutory requirement of "an opportunity for public hearing" under 402 of the FWPCA are valid. Respondents have failed to demonstrate that those regulations were not applied properly in the context of this case. The Court of Appeals' judgment remanding the case to the agency for an adjudicatory hearing on the EPA's extension of the expiration date of Los Angeles' NPDES permit for its Hyperion Wastewater Treatment Plant is reversed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Under applicable regulations, the Environmental Protection Agency defines "primary treatment" as "the first stage in wastewater treatment where substantially all floating or settleable solids, are removed by floatation and/or sedimentation." 40 CFR 125.58 (m) (1979). </s> [Footnote 2 The agency by its regulations describes "secondary treatment" as that treatment which will attain "the minimum level of effluent quality . . . in terms of . . . parameters [sic]." These so-called "parameters" (but compare any dictionary's definition of this term) are specified levels of biochemical oxygen demand, suspended solids, and pH values. 40 CFR 125.58 (r) and 133.102 (1979). </s> [Footnote 3 In March 1973, the EPA and the California State Water Resources Control Board entered into an understanding that gave the State primary responsibility for administering the NPDES program in California, with the EPA retaining jurisdiction over discharges beyond the limits of the territorial sea, that is, more than three miles out from the coastline. EPA permits are thus required for the Hyperion plant's discharges through the 5- and 7-mile outfalls. The CRWQCB, acting pursuant to California's Porter-Cologne Act, Cal. Water Code Ann. 13260 et seq. (West 1971), also requires a state permit for these outfalls. </s> A general description of the original Federal Water Pollution Control Act passed in 1948, 62 Stat. 1155, the events that led to the 1972 Amendment, and the operation of the NPDES program, with particular emphasis on its implementation in California, is set forth in EPA v. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200, 202 -209 (1976), and need not be repeated here. </s> [Footnote 4 Although the EPA has taken the position in this litigation that 301 (b) (1) (B) required the city to end the Hyperion plant's discharge of sludge into the ocean by July 1, 1977, the compliance schedule incorporated in the 1975 NPDES permit required the city to achieve total "sludge-out" by April 1978. The EPA asserts that this less stringent compliance schedule was necessitated by the practical inability of Los Angeles to meet the FWPCA's requirements. Reply Brief for Petitioner 8, n. 5. Congress subsequently has acted to permit the operator of a publicly owned treatment works, in certain circumstances, to request the [445 U.S. 198, 203] EPA Administrator to extend the time allowed for achieving the limitations of 301 (b) (1) (B). Compliance must be attained, however, by July 1, 1983. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-217, 45, 91 Stat. 1584, 33 U.S.C. 1311 (i) (1) (1976 ed., Supp. II). The city has applied for an extension of the July 1, 1977, secondary-treatment deadline established by 301 (b) (1) (B), but that application has not yet been acted upon by the EPA. Brief for Respondent City of Los Angeles 6, n. 5. </s> [Footnote 5 The EPA's public participation regulations were modified after the events central to this case took place. 44 Fed. Reg. 32854 (1979). Many features of the regulations that are at issue here, however, have been retained. See 40 CFR 124.41-45, 124.61-64, 124.71-101, 124.111-127, and 124.131-135 (1979). All references in this opinion to the EPA's public participation regulations, unless otherwise designated, are to the 1978 compilation. </s> [Footnote 6 On December 1, 1975, the CRWQCB issued an order modifying the city's compliance schedule for alternative sludge disposal. That order announced that "concept approval" had been given on October 1, 1975, and fixed definite dates for achieving the elimination of sludge discharge into the ocean. Total "sludge-out" was to be achieved by April 1, 1978. App. 51. In subsequent orders, the CRWQCB found that the city had failed to meet several deadlines for the submission of plans and specifications for various phases of the sludge discharge elimination project. The CRWQCB then modified the relevant compliance dates, and extended the deadline for total "sludge-out" to April 1, 1980. Id., at 57. The city has taken the position in this litigation that the CRWQCB's extension of the deadline for total "sludge-out" has been incorporated within the compliance schedule of the Hyperion plant's federal permit as well. See infra, at 218-219. </s> [Footnote 7 In the meantime, a significant public controversy had developed concerning the EPA's approval of the city's alternative sludge disposal project. That project, to be funded by construction grants awarded under Title II of the FWPCA, 86 Stat. 833, 33 U.S.C. 1281 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. II), has been referred to as the Hyperion Treatment Plant Interim Sludge Disposal Project. (The parties, commendably, have refrained from referring to this project as the HTPISDP, and so shall we.) The project called for the implementation of a process at the plant by which the digested sludge would be dewatered, formed into cakes, and hauled by truck to a sanitary landfill in Palos Verdes. An environmental impact appraisal developed by the EPA has estimated that when the trucking project is fully operational it will require 255 round trips per week over a distance of 42 miles. The city of Los Angeles and its Chamber of Commerce opposed the project, and objected when the EPA decided to fund it without preparing and evaluating an environmental impact statement (EIS), which they alleged to be required under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 852, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. App. 63. Respondent Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) also objected. It requested the EPA to suspend those conditions on the city's NPDES permit that required it to cease ocean discharge of sewage sludge from the Hyperion plant. This request was based on PLF's interpretation of the requirements of the FWPCA with respect to the discharge of pollutants into the oceans. The PLF argued that 403 of the FWPCA, 86 Stat. 883, 33 U.S.C. 1343, required the EPA to perform a full environmental analysis of the effects on the ocean of the cessation of sludge discharge from the Hyperion plant, as well as the economic and social costs that would be involved in replacing ocean discharge with the landfill project. App. 84. The Regional Administrator of the EPA denied the PLF's request on January 31, 1977, taking the view that the FWPCA required all publicly owned treatment works to achieve effluent limitations based upon secondary treatment by July 1, 1977, and that this requirement mandated that the Hyperion plant cease the discharge of sewage sludge into the ocean. The Regional Administrator also noted that the conditions placed upon the 1975 permit had not been challenged during [445 U.S. 198, 207] the public hearings that preceded its issuance, and that no interested party had requested an adjudicatory hearing concerning those conditions. He therefore refused to reopen consideration of the 1975 permit. Id., at 89. By the time of the Regional Administrator's response to the PLF, the city's permit already had been extended to June 30, 1977. </s> The PLF then attempted, unsuccessfully, to prevent the EPA from funding the Interim Sludge Disposal Project without preparing an EIS on its decision to do so. See Pacific Legal Foundation v. Quarles, 440 F. Supp. 316 (CD Cal. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-3844 (CA9). Subsequent to the District Court's decision in Quarles, however, the EPA voluntarily agreed to prepare an EIS on the project's funding. Brief for Petitioner 15, n. 12. </s> Still another PLF lawsuit relating to the Hyperion permit and its "sludge-out" schedule is pending. In that action the PLF has sued officials of the EPA and the Department of the Interior claiming that those agencies have failed to carry out their statutory obligations under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 884, 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., in approving the alternative sludge disposal project. The PLF contends that the elimination of sludge discharge into the ocean will adversely affect the food chain that supports the existence of gray whales and brown pelicans, and that trucks going to and from the landfill site will kill the El Segundo butterfly. Brief for Petitioner 15, n. 12. The District Court granted the PLF's motion for partial summary judgment on its contention that the agencies had not fulfilled their statutory obligation, and has required the EPA to consider, during the course of the hearing ordered by the Court of Appeals in this case, the effects of the permit's "sludge-out" schedule on endangered species. Pacific Legal Foundation v. Andrus, Civ. No. C-78-3464-AAH (SX) (CD Cal. May 8, 1979), appeals docketed, Nos. 79-3472, 79-3566, 79-3661 (CA9). </s> We, of course, express no view on the merits of these related PLF challenges to the Hyperion permit's compliance schedules. </s> [Footnote 8 The Administrator of the EPA has the authority to issue NPDES permits "for fixed terms not exceeding five years." 402 (a) (3), (b) (1) (B), 86 Stat. 880, 881, 33 U.S.C. 1342 (a) (3), (b) (1) (B) (1976 ed. and Supp. II). The respondents have not challenged the substantive authority of the Administrator to extend the expiration of a permit [445 U.S. 198, 208] to a date within five years of its initial issuance, so long as such permit modification is implemented in accordance with applicable procedural requirements. </s> [Footnote 9 The following were the issues of law certified by the Regional Administrator to the General Counsel: </s> "1. Must EPA conduct an informal public hearing prior to taking action to extend the expiration date of an NPDES permit where public notice of the proposed action was published more than 30 days in advance of the action? </s> "2. Must a detailed factual record be developed prior to modification of an NPDES permit where the only modification made to the permit is the extension of the permit's expiration date? </s> "3. May the expiration date of an NPDES permit be extended where a project covered by the compliance schedule is being evaluated by EPA [445 U.S. 198, 210] in an Environmental Impact Statement for the purpose of determining whether a grant should be made to assist in the construction of the project?" App. 168. </s> Following the parties' presentation of written briefs on these and related issues, the General Counsel ruled against respondent Kilroy. She concluded that the EPA has the authority to extend the expiration date of an NPDES permit through modification, and that an opportunity for a public hearing on such a modification must be provided. A hearing is to be held, however, only if the Regional Administrator finds a significant degree of public interest in the proposed modification. The General Counsel refrained from addressing the second certified issue because Kilroy's brief did not challenge specifically the adequacy of the record supporting the permit modification. Finally, she ruled that the EPA has the authority to extend the expiration date of a permit requiring the implementation of a project, even though funding for that project is undergoing evaluation in an EIS. The General Counsel relied on the District Court's decision in Pacific Legal Foundation v. Quarles, see n. 7, supra, as support for the latter ruling. App. 194. </s> [Footnote 10 The Court of Appeals in December 1977 stayed the compliance schedules incorporated within the Hyperion plant's NPDES permit pending [445 U.S. 198, 211] proceedings on remand to the EPA. The effluent limitations that were in effect on January 1, 1977, however, as well as the permit's monitoring and reporting requirements, have remained operative pending final resolution of this dispute. 586 F.2d 650, 660-661 (CA9 1978). Because the EPA has not yet acted upon the city's application, filed July 30, 1976, for a new NPDES permit, the terms and conditions of the 1975 permit have remained in effect by operation of law, even though the permit expiration date has now passed. See 5 U.S.C. 558 (c) (a federal license with reference to an activity of a continuing nature does not expire until a timely application for renewal thereof has been finally determined by the pertinent agency); Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. </s> [Footnote 11 Respondents PLF and Kilroy suggest that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed as having been improvidently granted because petitioner has inserted issues in his brief on the merits that were not included within the question presented in his petition for certiorari. We decline the invitation to dismiss the writ. We note, however, that a decision in this case does not require us to resolve petitioner's contention, challenged by respondents as a "new issue," that Congress did not intend adjudicatory hearings under 402 of the FWPCA to be governed by the formal requirements of an adjudication "on the record" set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 554 (1976 ed. and Supp. II). </s> [Footnote 12 To the extent the Court of Appeals' holding to the contrary relied upon the decision in Independent Bankers Assn. v. Board of Governors, 170 U.S. App. D.C. 278, 516 F.2d 1206 (1975), such reliance was misplaced. The passage from that opinion relied upon by the Court of Appeals itself demonstrates that the decision stands for the proposition that a party waives its right to an adjudicatory hearing where it fails to dispute the material facts upon which the agency's decision rests. See supra, at 212. </s> [Footnote 13 The Court of Appeals' stay of the compliance schedules incorporated within the 1975 permit did not remove the basis for the Government's enforcement action. That action challenges several alleged violations of the Hyperion NPDES permit that predated January 1, 1977. App. 183-187. See n. 10, supra. </s> [Footnote 14 Respondents' litigation strategy throughout the proceedings culminating in this opinion seems to have been based, at least in part, on a fear that the EPA may evade further public scrutiny of the compliance schedules incorporated within the 1975 NPDES permit by issuing continued extensions of that permit rather than acting upon the city's application for a new permit. See supra, at 205-206. If that potential for evasion ever did exist, it was a limited one. Under 402 (b) (1) (B) of the FWPCA, the EPA could have set the expiration date for the initial 1975 permit as late as August 1980, and the agency actions that culminated in this lawsuit would have been unnecessary. Now that the outside date for extensions of the 1975 permit is approaching, any additional extension for purposes of avoiding further hearings on the permit's compliance schedules would have little practical impact. We note, as well, that Los Angeles, under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706 (1) (a reviewing court shall "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed") may obtain judicial review of prolonged agency inaction with respect to its application for a new permit. </s> [445 U.S. 198, 222]

United States Supreme Court MORTON v. MANCARI(1974) No. 73-362 Argued: April 24, 1974Decided: June 17, 1974 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 73-364, Amerind v. Mancari et al., also on appeal from the same court. </s> Appellees, non-Indian employees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), brought this class action claiming that the employment preference for qualified Indians in the BIA provided by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 contravened the anti-discrimination provisions of the Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1972, and deprived them of property rights without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment. A three-judge District Court held that the Indian preference was implicitly repealed by 11 of the 1972 Act proscribing racial discrimination in most federal employment, and enjoined appellant federal officials from implementing any Indian employment preference policy in the BIA. Held: </s> 1. Congress did not intend to repeal the Indian preference, and the District Court erred in holding that it was repealed by the 1972 Act. Pp. 545-551. </s> (a) Since in extending general anti-discrimination machinery to federal employment in 1972, Congress in no way modified and thus reaffirmed the preferences accorded Indians by 701 (b) and 703 (i) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for employment by Indian tribes or by private industries located on or near Indian reservations, it would be anomalous to conclude that Congress intended to eliminate the longstanding Indian preferences in BIA employment, as being racially discriminatory. Pp. 547-548. </s> (b) In view of the fact that shortly after it passed the 1972 Act Congress enacted new Indian preference laws as part of the Education Amendments of 1972, giving Indians preference in Government programs for training teachers of Indian children, it is improbable that the same Congress condemned the BIA preference as racially discriminatory. Pp. 548-549. [417 U.S. 535, 536] </s> (c) The 1972 extension of the Civil Rights Act to Government employment being largely just a codification of prior anti-discrimination Executive Orders, with respect to which Indian preferences had long been treated as exceptions, there is no reason to presume that Congress affirmatively intended to erase such preferences. P. 549. </s> (d) This is a prototypical case where an adjudication of repeal by implication is not appropriate, since the Indian preference is a longstanding, important component of the Government's Indian program, whereas the 1972 anti-discrimination provisions, being aimed at alleviating minority discrimination in employment, are designed to deal with an entirely different problem. The two statutes, thus not being irreconcilable, are capable of co-existence, since the Indian preference, as a specific statute applying to a specific situation, is not controlled or nullified by the general provisions of the 1972 Act. Pp. 549-551. </s> 2. The Indian preference does not constitute invidious racial discrimination in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment but is reasonable and rationally designed to further Indian self-government. Pp. 551-555. </s> (a) If Indian preference laws, which were derived from historical relationships and are explicitly designed to help only Indians, were deemed invidious racial discrimination, 25 U.S.C. in its entirety would be effectively erased and the Government's commitment to Indians would be jeopardized. Pp. 551-553. </s> (b) The Indian preference does not constitute "racial discrimination" or even "racial" preference, but is rather an employment criterion designed to further the cause of Indian self-government and to make the BIA more responsive to the needs of its constituent groups. Pp. 553-554. </s> (c) As long as the special treatment of Indians can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed. Pp. 554-555. </s> 359 F. Supp. 585, reversed and remanded. </s> BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. </s> Harry R. Sachse argued the cause for appellants in No. 73-362. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Pottinger, Carlton R. Stoiber, and M. Patricia Schaffer. Harris D. Sherman [417 U.S. 535, 537] argued the cause for appellant in No. 73-364. With him on the briefs was Stuart J. Land. </s> Gene E. Franchini argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees in both cases.Fn </s> Fn [417 U.S. 535, 537] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Theodore S. Hope, Jr., William C. Pelster, and Joseph E. Fortenberry for Montana Inter-Tribal Policy Board et al., and by Sanford Jay Rosen for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, also known as the Wheeler-Howard Act, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U.S.C. 461 et seq., accords an employment preference for qualified Indians in the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA or Bureau). Appellees, non-Indian BIA employees, challenged this preference as contrary to the anti-discrimination provisions of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. II), and as violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. A three-judge Federal District Court concluded that the Indian preference under the 1934 Act was impliedly repealed by the 1972 Act. 359 F. Supp. 585 (NM 1973). We noted probable jurisdiction in order to examine the statutory and constitutional validity of this longstanding Indian preference. 414 U.S. 1142 (1974); 415 U.S. 946 (1974). </s> I </s> Section 12 of the Indian Reorganization Act, 48 Stat. 986, 25 U.S.C. 472, provides: </s> "The Secretary of the Interior is directed to establish standards of health, age, character, experience, knowledge, and ability for Indians who may be appointed, without regard to civil-service laws, [417 U.S. 535, 538] to the various positions maintained, now or hereafter, by the Indian Office, 1 in the administration of functions or services affecting any Indian tribe. Such qualified Indians shall hereafter have the preference to appointment to vacancies in any such positions." 2 </s> In June 1972, pursuant to this provision, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, issued a directive (Personnel Management Letter No. 72-12) (App. 52) stating that the BIA's policy would be to grant a preference to qualified Indians not only, as before, in the initial hiring stage, but also in the situation where an Indian and a non-Indian, both already employed by the BIA, were competing for a promotion within the Bureau. 3 The record indicates that this policy was implemented immediately. [417 U.S. 535, 539] </s> Shortly thereafter, appellees, who are non-Indian employees of the BIA at Albuquerque, 4 instituted this class action, on behalf of themselves and other non-Indian employees similarly situated, in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, claiming that the "so-called `Indian Preference Statutes,'" App. 15, were repealed by the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act and deprived them of rights to property without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 5 Named as defendants were the Secretary of the Interior, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and the BIA Directors for the Albuquerque and Navajo Area Offices. Appellees claimed that implementation and enforcement of the new preference policy "placed and will continue to place [appellees] at a distinct disadvantage in competing for promotion and training programs with Indian employees, all of which has and will continue to subject the [appellees] to discrimination and deny them equal employment opportunity." App. 16. [417 U.S. 535, 540] </s> A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2282 because the complaint sought to enjoin, as unconstitutional, the enforcement of a federal statute. Appellant Amerind, a nonprofit organization representing Indian employees of the BIA, moved to intervene in support of the preference; this motion was granted by the District Court and Amerind thereafter participated at all stages of the litigation. </s> After a short trial focusing primarily on how the new policy, in fact, has been implemented, the District Court concluded that the Indian preference was implicitly repealed by 11 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 111, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16 (a) (1970 ed., Supp. II), proscribing discrimination in most federal employment on the basis of race. 6 Having found that Congress repealed the preference, it was unnecessary for the District Court to pass on its constitutionality. The court permanently enjoined appellants "from implementing any policy in the Bureau of Indian Affairs which would hire, promote, or reassign any person in preference to another solely for the reason that such person is an Indian." The execution and enforcement of the judgment of the District Court was [417 U.S. 535, 541] stayed by MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL on August 16, 1973, pending the disposition of this appeal. </s> II </s> The federal policy of according some hiring preference to Indians in the Indian service dates at least as far back as 1834. 7 Since that time, Congress repeatedly has enacted various preferences of the general type here at issue. 8 The purpose of these preferences, as variously expressed in the legislative history, has been to give Indians a greater participation in their own self-government; 9 to further the Government's trust obligation [417 U.S. 535, 542] toward the Indian tribes; 10 and to reduce the negative effect of having non-Indians administer matters that affect Indian tribal life. 11 </s> The preference directly at issue here was enacted as an important part of the sweeping Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. The overriding purpose of that particular Act was to establish machinery whereby Indian tribes would be able to assume a greater degree of self-government, both politically and economically. 12 Congress was seeking to modify the then-existing situation whereby the primarily non-Indian-staffed BIA had plenary control, for all practical purposes, over the lives and destinies of the federally recognized Indian tribes. Initial congressional proposals would have diminished substantially the role of the BIA by turning over to federally chartered self-governing Indian communities many of the functions [417 U.S. 535, 543] normally performed by the Bureau. 13 Committee sentiment, however, ran against such a radical change in the role of the BIA. 14 The solution ultimately adopted was to strengthen tribal government while continuing the active role of the BIA, with the understanding that the Bureau would be more responsive to the interests of the people it was created to serve. </s> One of the primary means by which self-government would be fostered and the Bureau made more responsive was to increase the participation of tribal Indians in the BIA operations. 15 In order to achieve this end, it was recognized that some kind of preference and exemption from otherwise prevailing civil service requirements was necessary. 16 Congressman Howard, the House sponsor, expressed the need for the preference: </s> "The Indians have not only been thus deprived of civic rights and powers, but they have been largely [417 U.S. 535, 544] deprived of the opportunity to enter the more important positions in the service of the very bureau which manages their affairs. Theoretically, the Indians have the right to qualify for the Federal civil service. In actual practice there has been no adequate program of training to qualify Indians to compete in these examinations, especially for technical and higher positions; and even if there were such training, the Indians would have to compete under existing law, on equal terms with multitudes of white applicants. . . . The various services on the Indian reservations are actually local rather than Federal services and are comparable to local municipal and county services, since they are dealing with purely local Indian problems. It should be possible for Indians with the requisite vocational and professional training to enter the service of their own people without the necessity of competing with white applicants for these positions. This bill permits them to do so." 78 Cong. Rec. 11729 (1934). </s> Congress was well aware that the proposed preference would result in employment disadvantages within the BIA for non-Indians. 17 Not only was this displacement unavoidable if room were to be made for Indians, but it was explicitly determined that gradual replacement of non-Indians with Indians within the Bureau was a desirable feature of the entire program for self-government. 18 </s> [417 U.S. 535, 545] Since 1934, the BIA has implemented the preference with a fair degree of success. The percentage of Indians employed in the Bureau rose from 34% in 1934 to 57% in 1972. This reversed the former downward trend, see n. 16, supra, and was due, clearly, to the presence of the 1934 Act. The Commissioner's extension of the preference in 1972 to promotions within the BIA was designed to bring more Indians into positions of responsibility and, in that regard, appears to be a logical extension of the congressional intent. See Freeman v. Morton, 162 U.S. App. D.C. 358, 499 F.2d 494 (1974), and n. 5, supra. </s> III </s> It is against this background that we encounter the first issue in the present case: whether the Indian preference was repealed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, was the first major piece of federal legislation prohibiting discrimination in private employment on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 (a). Significantly, 701 (b) and 703 (i) of that Act explicitly exempted from its coverage the preferential employment of Indians by Indian tribes or by industries located on or near Indian reservations. 42 U.S.C. 2000e (b) and 2000e-2 (i). 19 This exemption reveals a clear congressional [417 U.S. 535, 546] recognition, within the framework of Title VII, of the unique legal status of tribal and reservation-based activities. The Senate sponsor, Senator Humphrey, stated on the floor by way of explanation: </s> "This exemption is consistent with the Federal Government's policy of encouraging Indian employment and with the special legal position of Indians." 110 Cong. Rec. 12723 (1964). 20 </s> The 1964 Act did not specifically outlaw employment discrimination by the Federal Government. 21 Yet the mechanism for enforcing longstanding Executive Orders forbidding Government discrimination had proved ineffective for the most part. 22 In order to remedy this, Congress, by the 1972 Act, amended the 1964 Act and [417 U.S. 535, 547] proscribed discrimination in most areas of federal employment. See n. 6, supra. In general, it may be said that the substantive anti-discrimination law embraced in Title VII was carried over and applied to the Federal Government. As stated in the House Report: </s> "To correct this entrenched discrimination in the Federal service, it is necessary to insure the effective application of uniform, fair and strongly enforced policies. The present law and the proposed statute do not permit industry and labor organizations to be the judges of their own conduct in the area of employment discrimination. There is no reason why government agencies should not be treated similarly . . . ." H. R. Rep. No. 92-238, on H. R. 1746, pp. 24-25 (1971). </s> Nowhere in the legislative history of the 1972 Act, however, is there any mention of Indian preference. </s> Appellees assert, and the District Court held, that since the 1972 Act proscribed racial discrimination in Government employment, the Act necessarily, albeit sub silentio, repealed the provision of the 1934 Act that called for the preference in the BIA of one racial group, Indians, over non-Indians: </s> "When a conflict such as in this case, is present, the most recent law or Act should apply and the conflicting Preferences passed some 39 years earlier should be impliedly repealed." Brief for Appellees 7. </s> We disagree. For several reasons we conclude that Congress did not intend to repeal the Indian preference and that the District Court erred in holding that it was repealed. </s> First: There are the above-mentioned affirmative provisions in the 1964 Act excluding coverage of tribal employment [417 U.S. 535, 548] and of preferential treatment by a business or enterprise on or near a reservation. 42 U.S.C. 2000e (b) and 2000e-2 (i). See n. 19, supra. These 1964 exemptions as to private employment indicate Congress' recognition of the longstanding federal policy of providing a unique legal status to Indians in matters concerning tribal or "on or near" reservation employment. The exemptions reveal a clear congressional sentiment that an Indian preference in the narrow context of tribal or reservation-related employment did not constitute racial discrimination of the type otherwise proscribed. In extending the general anti-discrimination machinery to federal employment in 1972, Congress in no way modified these private employment preferences built into the 1964 Act, and they are still in effect. It would be anomalous to conclude that Congress intended to eliminate the longstanding statutory preferences in BIA employment, as being racially discriminatory, at the very same time it was reaffirming the right of tribal and reservation-related private employers to provide Indian preference. Appellees' assertion that Congress implicitly repealed the preference as racially discriminatory, while retaining the 1964 preferences, attributes to Congress irrationality and arbitrariness, an attribution we do not share. </s> Second: Three months after Congress passed the 1972 amendments, it enacted two new Indian preference laws. These were part of the Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 235, 20 U.S.C. 887c (a) and (d), and 1119a (1970 ed., Supp. II). The new laws explicitly require that Indians be given preference in Government programs for training teachers of Indian children. It is improbable, to say the least, that the same Congress which affirmatively approved and enacted these additional and similar Indian preferences was, at the same time, condemning [417 U.S. 535, 549] the BIA preference as racially discriminatory. In the total absence of any manifestation of supportive intent, we are loathe to imply this improbable result. </s> Third: Indian preferences, for many years, have been treated as exceptions to Executive Orders forbidding Government employment discrimination. 23 The 1972 extension of the Civil Rights Act to Government employment is in large part merely a codification of prior anti-discrimination Executive Orders that had proved ineffective because of inadequate enforcement machinery. There certainly was no indication that the substantive proscription against discrimination was intended to be any broader than that which previously existed. By codifying the existing anti-discrimination provisions, and by providing enforcement machinery for them, there is no reason to presume that Congress affirmatively intended to erase the preferences that previously had coexisted with broad anti-discrimination provisions in Executive Orders. </s> Fourth: Appellees encounter head-on the "cardinal rule . . . that repeals by implication are not favored." Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936); Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342-343, 363 (1842); Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp. v. Washington [417 U.S. 535, 550] Metropolitan Area Transit Comm'n, 393 U.S. 186, 193 (1968). They and the District Court read the congressional silence as effectuating a repeal by implication. There is nothing in the legislative history, however, that indicates affirmatively any congressional intent to repeal the 1934 preference. Indeed, as explained above, there is ample independent evidence that the legislative intent was to the contrary. </s> This is a prototypical case where an adjudication of repeal by implication is not appropriate. The preference is a longstanding, important component of the Government's Indian program. The anti-discrimination provision, aimed at alleviating minority discrimination in employment, obviously is designed to deal with an entirely different and, indeed, opposite problem. Any perceived conflict is thus more apparent than real. </s> In the absence of some affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456 -457 (1945). Clearly, this is not the case here. A provision aimed at furthering Indian self-government by according an employment preference within the BIA for qualified members of the governed group can readily co-exist with a general rule prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of race. Any other conclusion can be reached only by formalistic reasoning that ignores both the history and purposes of the preference and the unique legal relationship between the Federal Government and tribal Indians. </s> Furthermore, the Indian preference statute is a specific provision applying to a very specific situation. The 1972 Act, on the other hand, is of general application. Where there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general [417 U.S. 535, 551] one, regardless of the priority of enactment. See, e. g., Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 753, 758 (1961); Rodgers v. United States, 185 U.S. 83, 87 -89 (1902). </s> The courts are not at liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments, and when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective. "When there are two acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both if possible . . . . The intention of the legislature to repeal `must be clear and manifest.'" United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939). In light of the factors indicating no repeal, we simply cannot conclude that Congress consciously abandoned its policy of furthering Indian self-government when it passed the 1972 amendments. </s> We therefore hold that the District Court erred in ruling that the Indian preference was repealed by the 1972 Act. </s> IV </s> We still must decide whether, as the appellees contend, the preference constitutes invidious racial discrimination in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The District Court, while pretermitting this issue, said: "[W]e could well hold that the statute must fail on constitutional grounds." 359 F. Supp., at 591. </s> Resolution of the instant issue turns on the unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal law and upon the plenary power of Congress, based on a history of treaties and the assumption of a "guardian-ward" status, to legislate on behalf of federally recognized Indian tribes. The plenary power of Congress to deal with the special problems of Indians is drawn both explicitly and implicitly [417 U.S. 535, 552] from the Constitution itself. Article I, 8, cl. 3, provides Congress with the power to "regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes," and thus, to this extent, singles Indians out as a proper subject for separate legislation. Article II, 2, cl. 2, gives the President the power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties. This has often been the source of the Government's power to deal with the Indian tribes. The Court has described the origin and nature of the special relationship: </s> "In the exercise of the war and treaty powers, the United States overcame the Indians and took possession of their lands, sometimes by force, leaving them an uneducated, helpless and dependent people, needing protection against the selfishness of others and their own improvidence. Of necessity, the United States assumed the duty of furnishing that protection, and with it the authority to do all that was required to perform that obligation and to prepare the Indians to take their place as independent, qualified members of the modern body politic. . . ." Board of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 715 (1943). </s> See also United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383 -384 (1886). </s> Literally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes and reservations, and certainly all legislation dealing with the BIA, single out for special treatment a constituency of tribal Indians living on or near reservations. If these laws, derived from historical relationships and explicitly designed to help only Indians, were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of the United States Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment of the Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized. See [417 U.S. 535, 553] Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee, 244 F. Supp. 808, 814 n. 13 (ED Wash. 1965), aff'd, 384 U.S. 209 (1966). </s> It is in this historical and legal context that the constitutional validity of the Indian preference is to be determined. As discussed above, Congress in 1934 determined that proper fulfillment of its trust required turning over to the Indians a greater control of their own destinies. The overly paternalistic approach of prior years had proved both exploitative and destructive of Indian interests. Congress was united in the belief that institutional changes were required. An important part of the Indian Reorganization Act was the preference provision here at issue. </s> Contrary to the characterization made by appellees, this preference does not constitute "racial discrimination." Indeed, it is not even a "racial" preference. 24 </s> [417 U.S. 535, 554] Rather, it is an employment criterion reasonably designed to further the cause of Indian self-government and to make the BIA more responsive to the needs of its constituent groups. It is directed to participation by the governed in the governing agency. The preference is similar in kind to the constitutional requirement that a United States Senator, when elected, be "an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen," Art. I, 3, cl. 3, or that a member of a city council reside within the city governed by the council. Congress has sought only to enable the BIA to draw more heavily from among the constituent group in staffing its projects, all of which, either directly or indirectly, affect the lives of tribal Indians. The preference, as applied, is granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and activities are governed by the BIA in a unique fashion. See n. 24, supra. In the sense that there is no other group of people favored in this manner, the legal status of the BIA is truly sui generis. 25 Furthermore, the preference applies only to employment in the Indian service. The preference does not cover any other Government agency or activity, and we need not consider the obviously more difficult question that would be presented by a blanket exemption for Indians from all civil service examinations. Here, the preference is reasonably and directly related to a legitimate, nonracially based goal. This is the principal characteristic that generally is absent from proscribed forms of racial discrimination. </s> On numerous occasions this Court specifically has upheld legislation that singles out Indians for particular [417 U.S. 535, 555] and special treatment. See, e. g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705 (1943) (federally granted tax immunity); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (same); Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee, 384 U.S. 209 (1966), aff'g 244 F. Supp. 808 (ED Wash. 1965) (statutory definition of tribal membership, with resulting interest in trust estate); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (tribal courts and their jurisdiction over reservation affairs). Cf. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974) (federal welfare benefits for Indians "on or near" reservations). This unique legal status is of long standing, see Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 (1832), and its sources are diverse. See generally U.S. Dept. of Interior, Federal Indian Law (1958); Comment, The Indian Battle for Self-Determination, 58 Calif. L. Rev. 445 (1970). As long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed. Here, where the preference is reasonable and rationally designed to further Indian self-government, we cannot say that Congress' classification violates due process. </s> The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The Indian Health Service was transferred in 1954 from the Department of the Interior to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Act of Aug. 5, 1954, 1, 68 Stat. 674, 42 U.S.C. 2001. Presumably, despite this transfer, the reference in 12 to the "Indian Office" has continuing application to the Indian Health Service. See 5 CFR 213.3116 (b) (8). </s> [Footnote 2 There are earlier and more narrowly drawn Indian preference statutes. 25 U.S.C. 44, 45, 46, 47, and 274. For all practical purposes, these were replaced by the broader preference of 12. Although not directly challenged in this litigation, these statutes, under the District Court's decision, clearly would be invalidated. </s> [Footnote 3 The directive stated: </s> "The Secretary of the Interior announced today [June 26, 1972] he has approved the Bureau's policy to extend Indian Preference to training and to filling vacancies by original appointment, reinstatement and promotions. The new policy was discussed with the National President of the National Federation of Federal Employees under National Consultation Rights NFFE has with the Department. Secretary Morton and I jointly stress that careful attention must be given to protecting the Rights of non-Indian employees. The new policy provides as follows: Where two or more candidates who meet [417 U.S. 535, 539] the established qualification requirements are available for filling a vacancy. If one of them is an Indian, he shall be given preference in filling the vacancy. This new policy is effective immediately, and is incorporated into all existing programs such as the Promotion Program. Revised Manual releases will be issued promptly for review and comment. You should take immediate steps to notify all employees and recognized unions of this policy." App. 52-53. </s> [Footnote 4 The appellees state that none of them is employed on or near an Indian reservation. Brief for Appellees 8. The District Court described the appellees as "teachers . . . or programmers, or in computer work." 359 F. Supp. 585, 587 (NM 1973). </s> [Footnote 5 The specific question whether 12 of the 1934 Act authorizes a preference in promotion as well as in initial hiring was not decided by the District Court and is not now before us. We express no opinion on this issue. See Freeman v. Morton, 162 U.S. App. D.C. 358, 499 F.2d 494 (1974). See also Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Hickel, 432 F.2d 956 (CA10 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 981 (1971) (preference held inapplicable to reduction in force). </s> [Footnote 6 Section 2000e-16 (a) reads: </s> "All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment (except with regard to aliens employed outside the limits of the United States) in military departments as defined in section 102 of Title 5, in executive agencies (other than the General Accounting Office) as defined in section 105 of Title 5 (including employees and applicants for employment who are paid from nonappropriated funds), in the United States Postal Service and the Postal Rate Commission, in those units of the Government of the District of Columbia having positions in the competitive service, and in those units of the legislative and judicial branches of the Federal Government having positions in the competitive service, and in the Library of Congress shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." </s> [Footnote 7 Act of June 30, 1834, 9, 4 Stat. 737, 25 U.S.C. 45: </s> "[I]n all cases of the appointments of interpreters or other persons employed for the benefit of the Indians, a preference shall be given to persons of Indian descent, if such can be found, who are properly qualified for the execution of the duties." </s> [Footnote 8 Act of May 17, 1882, 6, 22 Stat. 88, and Act of July 4, 1884, 6, 23 Stat. 97, 25 U.S.C. 46 (employment of clerical, mechanical, and other help on reservations and about agencies); Act of Aug. 15, 1894, 10, 28 Stat. 313, 25 U.S.C. 44 (employment of herders, teamsters, and laborers, "and where practicable in all other employments" in the Indian service); Act of June 7, 1897, 1, 30 Stat. 83, 25 U.S.C. 274 (employment as matrons, farmers, and industrial teachers in Indian schools): Act of June 25, 1910, 23, 36 Stat. 861, 25 U.S.C. 47 (general preference as to Indian labor and products of Indian industry). </s> [Footnote 9 Senator Wheeler, cosponsor of the 1934 Act, explained the need for a preference as follows: </s> "We are setting up in the United States a civil service rule which prevents Indians from managing their own property. It is an entirely different service from anything else in the United States, because these Indians own this property. It belongs to them. What the policy of this Government is and what it should be is to teach these Indians to manage their own business and control their own funds and to administer their own property, and the civil service has worked very poorly so far as the Indian Service is concerned . . . ." Hearings on S. 2755 and S. 3645 before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, p. 256 (1934). </s> [Footnote 10 A letter, contained in the House Report to the 1934 Act, from President F. D. Roosevelt to Congressman Howard states: </s> "We can and should, without further delay, extend to the Indian the fundamental rights of political liberty and local self-government and the opportunities of education and economic assistance that they require in order to attain a wholesome American life. This is but the obligation of honor of a powerful nation toward a people living among us and dependent upon our protection." H. R. Rep. No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1934). </s> [Footnote 11 "If the Indians are exposed to any danger, there is none greater than the residence among them of unprincipled white men." H. R. Rep. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess., 98 (1834) (letter dated Feb. 10, 1834, from Indian Commissioners to the Secretary of War). </s> [Footnote 12 As explained by John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs: </s> "[T]his bill is designed not to prevent the absorption of Indians in white communities, but rather to provide for those Indians unwilling or unable to compete in the white world some measures of self-government in their own affairs." Hearing on S. 2755 before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, p. 26 (1934). </s> [Footnote 13 Hearings on H. R. 7902, Readjustment of Indian Affairs, before the House Committee on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1-7 (1934) (hereafter House Hearings). See also Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 -153, n. 9 (1973). </s> [Footnote 14 House Hearings 491-497. </s> [Footnote 15 "[Section 12] was intended to integrate the Indian into the government service connected with the administration of his affairs. Congress was anxious to promote economic and political self-determination for the Indian." Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Hickel, 432 F.2d, at 960 (footnote omitted). </s> [Footnote 16 "The bill admits qualified Indians to the position [sic] in their own service. </s> "Thirty-four years ago, in 1900, the number of Indians holding regular positions in the Indian Service, in proportion to the total of positions, was greater than it is today. </s> "The reason primarily is found in the application of the generalized civil service to the Indian Service, and the consequent exclusion of Indians from their own jobs." House Hearings 19 (memorandum dated Feb. 19, 1934, submitted by Commissioner Collier to the Senate and House Committees on Indian Affairs). </s> [Footnote 17 Congressman Carter, an opponent of the bill, placed in the Congressional Record the following observation by Commissioner Collier at the Committee hearings: </s> "[W]e must not blind ourselves to the fact that the effect of this bill if worked out would unquestionably be to replace white employees by Indian employees. I do not know how fast, but ultimately it ought to go very far indeed." 78 Cong. Rec. 11737 (1934). </s> [Footnote 18 "It should be possible for Indians to enter the service of their own people without running the gauntlet of competition with whites for these positions. Indian progress and ambition will be enormously strengthened as soon as we adopt the principle that the Indian Service shall gradually become, in fact as well as in name, an Indian service predominantly in the hands of educated and competent Indians." Id., at 11731 (remarks of Cong. Howard). </s> [Footnote 19 Section 701 (b) excludes "an Indian Tribe" from the Act's definition of "employer." Section 703 (i) states: </s> "Nothing contained in this subchapter shall apply to any business or enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with respect to any [417 U.S. 535, 546] publicly announced employment practice of such business or enterprise under which a preferential treatment is given to any individual because he is an Indian living on or near a reservation." </s> [Footnote 20 Senator Mundt supported these exemptions on the Senate floor by claiming that they would allow Indians "to benefit from Indian preference programs now in operation or later to be instituted." 110 Cong. Rec. 13702 (1964). </s> [Footnote 21 The 1964 Act, however, did contain a proviso, expressed in somewhat precatory language: </s> "That it shall be the policy of the United States to insure equal employment opportunities for Federal employees without discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 78 Stat. 254. </s> This statement of policy was re-enacted as 5 U.S.C. 7151, 80 Stat. 523 (1966), and the 1964 Act's proviso was repealed, id., at 662. </s> [Footnote 22 "This disproportionatte [sic] distribution of minorities and women throughout the Federal bureaucracy and their exclusion from higher level policy-making and supervisory positions indicates the government's failure to pursue its policy of equal opportunity. </s> "A critical defect of the Federal equal employment program has been the failure of the complaint process. That process has impeded rather than advanced the goal of the elimination of discrimination in Federal employment. . . ." H. R. Rep. No. 92-238, on H. R. 1746, pp. 23-24 (1971). </s> [Footnote 23 See, e. g., Exec. Order No. 7423, July 26, 1936, 1 Fed. Reg. 885-886, 3 CFR 189 (1936-1938 Comp.). When President Eisenhower issued an Order prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race in the civil service, Exec. Order No. 10577, 4.2, Nov. 22, 1954, 19 Fed. Reg. 7521, 3 CFR 218 (1954-1958 Comp.), he left standing earlier Executive Orders containing exceptions for the Indian service. Id., 301. See also 5 CFR 213.3112 (a) (7), which provides a civil service exemption for: </s> "All positions in the Bureau of Indian Affairs and other positions in the Department of the Interior directly and primarily related to the providing of services to Indians when filled by the appointment of Indians who are one-fourth or more Indian blood." </s> See also 5 CFR 213.3116 (b) (8) (Indian Health Services). </s> [Footnote 24 The preference is not directed towards a "racial" group consisting of "Indians"; instead, it applies only to members of "federally recognized" tribes. This operates to exclude many individuals who are racially to be classified as "Indians." In this sense, the preference is political rather than racial in nature. The eligibility criteria appear in 44 BIAM 335, 3.1: </s> ".1 Policy - An Indian has preference in appointment in the Bureau. To be eligible for preference in appointment, promotion, and training, an individual must be one-fourth or more degree Indian blood and be a member of a Federally-recognized tribe. It is the policy for promotional consideration that where two or more candidates who meet the established qualification requirements are available for filling a vacancy, if one of them is an Indian, he shall be given preference in filling the vacancy. In accordance with the policy statement approved by the Secretary, the Commissioner may grant exceptions to this policy by approving the selection and appointment of non-Indians, when he considers it in the best interest of the Bureau. </s> "This program does not restrict the right of management to fill positions by methods other than through promotion. Positions may be filled by transfers, reassignment, reinstatement, or initial appointment." App. 92. </s> [Footnote 25 Senator Wheeler described the BIA as "an entirely different service from anything else in the United States." Hearings on S. 2755 and S. 3645 before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, p. 256 (1934). </s> [417 U.S. 535, 556]

United States Supreme Court HEWITT v. HELMS(1987) No. 85-1630 Argued: March 4, 1987Decided: June 19, 1987 </s> After more than seven weeks in administrative segregation pending an investigation into his possible involvement in a state prison riot, respondent inmate was found guilty of misconduct by a prison hearing committee and sentenced to six months of disciplinary confinement solely on the basis of an officer's report of the statements of an undisclosed informant. Respondent filed suit against petitioner prison officials for damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983, but was released on parole before any decision was rendered. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's entry of summary judgment against respondent, finding, inter alia, that his misconduct conviction constituted a denial of due process since it was based solely on hearsay. The District Court was instructed to enter summary judgment for respondent unless petitioners could establish an immunity defense, and was given authority to determine the appropriateness and availability of the relief respondent requested. On remand, respondent pursued only his damages claim. The District Court granted summary judgment for petitioners on the basis of qualified immunity, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. While the appeal was pending, the State Corrections Bureau (Bureau) revised its regulations to include procedures for the use of confidential source information in inmate disciplinary proceedings. The District Court then denied respondent's claim for attorney's fees on the ground that he was not a "prevailing party" as required by 42 U.S.C. 1988, but the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that its prior holding that his constitutional rights had been violated was "a form of judicial relief." In the alternative, the court directed the District Court to reconsider whether respondent's suit was a "catalyst" for the amendment of the Bureau's regulations. </s> Held: </s> Respondent is not a "prevailing party" eligible for attorney's fees under 1988. A plaintiff must receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to "prevail." Respondent obtained neither a damages award, injunction, or declaratory judgment, nor a consent decree, settlement, or other relief without benefit of a formal judgment. Pp. 759-764. </s> (a) A favorable judicial statement of law in the course of litigation that results in judgment against the plaintiff does not suffice to render [482 U.S. 755, 756] him a "prevailing party." The Court of Appeals' treatment of its initial constitutional holding as "a form of judicial relief" - presumably a form of declaratory judgment - was in error, since the court neither granted nor ordered relief of any kind. Even if respondent's nonmonetary claims were not rendered moot by his release from prison, and it could be said that those claims were kept alive by his interest in expunging his misconduct conviction from his prison record, his counsel never took the steps necessary to have a declaratory judgment or expungement order properly entered. The argument that the Court of Appeals' initial holding is a "vindication of rights" that is at least the equivalent of declaratory relief ignores the fact that a judicial decree is not the end of the judicial process but is rather the means of prompting some action (or cessation of action) by the defendant. Here, respondent obtained nothing from petitioners. Moreover, equating statements of law (even legal holdings enroute to a final judgment for the defendant) with declaratory judgments has the practical effect of depriving the defendant of any valid defenses that a court might take into account in deciding whether to enter a declaratory judgment. Furthermore, the same considerations that influence courts to issue declaratory judgments may not enter into the decision whether to include statements of law in opinions. However, if they do, the court's decision is not appealable in the same manner as its entry of a declaratory judgment. Pp. 759-763. </s> (b) The alternative argument that a hearing is required to determine whether respondent's suit prompted the Bureau to amend its regulations also fails. Even if respondent can demonstrate a clear causal link between his lawsuit and the amendment, and can "prevail" by having the State take action that his complaint did not in terms request, he did not obtain redress from that amendment since he had long since been released from prison at the time it was issued. Pp. 763-764. </s> 780 F.2d 367, reversed. </s> SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 764. </s> Thomas G. Saylor, Jr., First Deputy Attorney General of Pennsylvania, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were LeRoy S. Zimmerman, Attorney General, Allen C. Warshaw, Executive Deputy Attorney General, Andrew S. Gordon, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and Gregory R. Neuhauser, Senior Deputy Attorney General. [482 U.S. 755, 757] </s> Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Harriet S. Shapiro, and William Kanter. </s> Robert H. Vesely argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was John M. Humphrey. * </s> [Footnote * Benna Ruth Solomon, Joyce Holmes Benjamin, and Peter J. Kalis filed a brief for the National Governors' Association et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. </s> JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case presents the peculiar-sounding question whether a party who litigates to judgment and loses on all of his claims can nonetheless be a "prevailing party" for purposes of an award of attorney's fees. </s> Following a prison riot at the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, inmate Aaron Helms was placed in administrative segregation, a form of restrictive custody, pending an investigation into his possible involvement in the disturbance. More than seven weeks later, a prison hearing committee, relying solely on an officer's report of the testimony of an undisclosed informant, found Helms guilty of misconduct for striking a corrections officer during the riot. Helms was sentenced to six months of disciplinary restrictive confinement. </s> While still incarcerated, Helms brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against a number of prison officials, alleging that the lack of a prompt hearing on his misconduct charges and his conviction for misconduct on the basis of uncorroborated hearsay testimony violated his rights to due process. The prison officials asserted qualified immunity from suit and contested the constitutional claims on the merits. Before any decision was rendered, Helms was released from prison on parole. </s> Nearly six months after Helms' release, the District Court rendered summary judgment against him on his constitutional [482 U.S. 755, 758] claims without passing on the defendants' assertions of immunity. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, finding that "Helms was denied due process unless he was afforded a hearing, within a reasonable time of his initial [segregative] confinement, to determine whether he represented the type of `risk' warranting administrative detention," Helms v. Hewitt, 655 F.2d 487, 500 (1981) (Helms I), and that he "suffered a denial of due process by being convicted on a misconduct charge when the only evidence offered against him was a hearsay recital, by the charging officer, of an uncorroborated report of an unidentified informant." Id., at 502. The District Court was instructed to enter summary judgment for Helms on the latter claim unless the defendants could establish an immunity defense. </s> Before the proceedings on remand could take place, we granted certiorari to determine whether Helms' administrative segregation violated the Due Process Clause. We concluded that the prison's informal, nonadversarial procedures for determining the need for restrictive custody provided all the process that is due when prisoners are removed from the general prison population. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983). Certiorari was not sought on, and we did not decide, the question whether Helms' misconduct conviction violated his constitutional rights. When the case was returned to the Court of Appeals, it therefore reaffirmed its instruction to the District Court to enter judgment for Helms on this claim unless the defendants established a defense of official immunity. Helms v. Hewitt, 712 F.2d 48 (1983) (Helms II). </s> In the District Court, Helms pursued only his claims for damages. The District Court granted summary judgment for all the defendants on the basis of qualified immunity, because the constitutional right at issue was not "clearly established," Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982), at the time of Helms' misconduct hearing. See App. 22a-47a. Helms appealed, seeking both damages and expungement of his misconduct conviction. The defendants argued to the [482 U.S. 755, 759] Court of Appeals that all claims for injunctive and declaratory relief had been waived by the failure to pursue them in the District Court, and in any event were moot because Helms was no longer in prison. While that appeal was pending, the Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections revised its regulations to include for the first time procedures for the use of confidential-source information in inmate disciplinary proceedings. See BC-ADM 801 Administrative Directive: Inmate Disciplinary Procedures V(F) (1984), App. 101a-102a (Directive 801). The District Court's decision was affirmed without opinion. Helms v. Hewitt, 745 F.2d 46 (1984) (Helms III). </s> Helms then sought attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988, which provides in relevant part: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of [ 1983], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." The District Court denied the claim on the ground that Helms was not a "prevailing party": the defendants' official immunity precluded a damages award, Helms' release from prison made his claims for injunctive relief moot, and he could not claim that his suit was a "catalyst" for the amendment of Directive 801 because he neither sought nor benefited from that action. App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a-39a. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that its prior holding that Helms' constitutional rights were violated was "a form of judicial relief which serves to affirm the plaintiff's assertion that the defendants' actions were unconstitutional and which will serve as a standard of conduct to guide prison officials in the future." 780 F.2d 367, 370 (1986) (Helms IV). The court also directed the District Court to reconsider whether Helms' suit was a "catalyst" for the amendment of Directive 801. We granted certiorari. 476 U.S. 1181 (1986). </s> In order to be eligible for attorney's fees under 1988, a litigant must be a "prevailing party." Whatever the outer boundaries of that term may be, Helms does not fit within [482 U.S. 755, 760] them. Respect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail. See Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 757 (1980). Helms obtained no relief. Because of the defendants' official immunity he received no damages award. No injunction or declaratory judgment was entered in his favor. Nor did Helms obtain relief without benefit of a formal judgment - for example, through a consent decree or settlement. See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980). The most that he obtained was an interlocutory ruling that his complaint should not have been dismissed for failure to state a constitutional claim. That is not the stuff of which legal victories are made. Cf. Hanrahan, supra, at 758-759. </s> The Court of Appeals treated its 1981 holding that Helms' misconduct conviction was unconstitutional as "a form of judicial relief" - presumably (since nothing else is even conceivable) a form of declaratory judgment. It was not that. Helms I explicitly left it to the District Court "to determine the appropriateness and availability of the requested relief," 655 F.2d, at 503; the Court of Appeals granted no relief of its own, declaratory or otherwise. The petitioners contend that the court in fact could not have granted declaratory or injunctive relief at that point, since all of Helms' nonmonetary claims were moot as a result of his release from prison. Even if that is not correct, and Helms' interest in expungement of the misconduct conviction from his prison record was enough to keep those claims alive, the fact is that Helms' counsel never took the steps necessary to have a declaratory judgment or expungement order properly entered. Consequently, Helms received no judicial relief. </s> It is settled law, of course, that relief need not be judicially decreed in order to justify a fee award under 1988. A lawsuit sometimes produces voluntary action by the defendant that affords the plaintiff all or some of the relief he sought through a judgment - e. g., a monetary settlement or a [482 U.S. 755, 761] change in conduct that redresses the plaintiff's grievances. When that occurs, the plaintiff is deemed to have prevailed despite the absence of a formal judgment in his favor. See Maher, supra, at 129. The Court of Appeals held, and Helms argues here, that the statement of law in Helms I that Helms' disciplinary proceeding was unconstitutional is a "vindication of . . . rights," Brief for Respondent 19, that is at least the equivalent of declaratory relief, just as a monetary settlement is the informal equivalent of relief by way of damages. To suggest such an equivalency is to lose sight of the nature of the judicial process. In all civil litigation, the judicial decree is not the end but the means. At the end of the rainbow lies not a judgment, but some action (or cessation of action) by the defendant that the judgment produces - the payment of damages, or some specific performance, or the termination of some conduct. Redress is sought through the court, but from the defendant. This is no less true of a declaratory judgment suit than of any other action. The real value of the judicial pronouncement - what makes it a proper judicial resolution of a "case or controversy" rather than an advisory opinion - is in the settling of some dispute which affects the behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff. The "equivalency" doctrine is simply an acknowledgment of the primacy of the redress over the means by which it is obtained. If the defendant, under the pressure of the lawsuit, pays over a money claim before the judicial judgment is pronounced, the plaintiff has "prevailed" in his suit, because he has obtained the substance of what he sought. Likewise in a declaratory judgment action: if the defendant, under pressure of the lawsuit, alters his conduct (or threatened conduct) towards the plaintiff that was the basis for the suit, the plaintiff will have prevailed. That is the proper equivalent of a judicial judgment which would produce the same effect; a judicial statement that does not affect the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant is not an equivalent. As a consequence of the present lawsuit, Helms obtained nothing [482 U.S. 755, 762] from the defendants. The only "relief" he received was the moral satisfaction of knowing that a federal court concluded that his rights had been violated. The same moral satisfaction presumably results from any favorable statement of law in an otherwise unfavorable opinion. There would be no conceivable claim that the plaintiff had "prevailed," for instance, if the District Court in this case had first decided the question of immunity, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a published opinion which said: "The defendants are immune from suit for damages, and the claim for expungement is either moot or has been waived, but if not for that we would reverse because Helms' constitutional rights were violated." That is in essence what happened here, except that the Court of Appeals expressed its view on the constitutional rights before, rather than after, it had become apparent that the issue was irrelevant to the case. There is no warrant for having status as a "prevailing party" depend upon the essentially arbitrary order in which district courts or courts of appeals choose to address issues. </s> Besides the incompatibility in principle, there is a very practical objection to equating statements of law (even legal holdings en route to a final judgment for the defendant) with declaratory judgments: The equation deprives the defendant of valid defenses to a declaratory judgment to which he is entitled. Imagine that following Helms I, Helms' counsel, armed with the holding that his client's constitutional rights had been violated, pressed the District Court for entry of a declaratory judgment. The defendants would then have had the opportunity to contest its entry not only on the ground that the case was moot but also on equitable grounds. The fact that a court can enter a declaratory judgment does not mean that it should. See 28 U.S.C. 2201 (a court "may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration") (emphasis added); Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111, 112 (1962); Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood, 333 U.S. 426 , [482 U.S. 755, 763] 431 (1948). If, for example, Helms I had unambiguously involved only a claim for damages, the requested declaratory judgment would not definitively "settle the controversy between the parties," 10A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 2759, p. 648 (2d ed. 1983), because immunity might still preclude liability. See generally E. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 299 (2d ed. 1941). If the only effect of a declaratory judgment in those circumstances would be to provide a possible predicate for a fee award against defendants who may ultimately be found immune, and thus to undermine the doctrine of official immunity, it is conceivable that the court might take that into account in deciding whether to enter a judgment. The same considerations may not enter into the decision whether to include statements of law in opinions - or if they do, the court's decision is not appealable in the same manner as its entry of a declaratory judgment. </s> We conclude that a favorable judicial statement of law in the course of litigation that results in judgment against the plaintiff does not suffice to render him a "prevailing party." Any other result strains both the statutory language and common sense. </s> The Court of Appeals held in the alternative, and Helms argues in the alternative here, that a hearing is needed to determine whether Helms' lawsuit prompted the Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections to amend its regulations in 1984 to provide standards for the use of informant testimony at disciplinary hearings. We need not decide the circumstances, if any, under which this "catalyst" theory could justify a fee award under 1988, because even if Helms can demonstrate a clear causal link between his lawsuit and the State's amendment of its regulations, and can "prevail" by having the State take action that his complaint did not in terms request, he did not and could not get redress from promulgation of the informant-testimony regulations. When Directive 801 was amended, Helms had long since been released from prison. [482 U.S. 755, 764] Although he has subsequently been returned to prison, and is presumably now benefiting from the new procedures (to the extent that they influence prison administration even when not directly being applied), that fortuity can hardly render him, retroactively, a "prevailing party" in this lawsuit, even though he was not such when the final judgment was entered. </s> For the reasons stated, the judgment of the court of appeals is </s> Reversed. </s> JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting. </s> The Court makes a number of sweeping statements in its opinion, most of which are of no help in resolving the present case. In my view, the application of settled law to the facts of this case, tangled as they are, leads to conclusions other than those reached by the Court. </s> I </s> The Court's account of the history of this litigation is complete, but a summary may be helpful. Respondent originally claimed in the District Court both procedural and substantive violations of due process in connection with his prison misconduct conviction, and raised in addition a pendent state claim. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and the expungement of his prison disciplinary record. App. 19a-21a. Petitioners alleged immunity defenses, as well as contesting the merits of the federal and state claims. The District Court initially dismissed both the procedural and substantive due process causes of action. The Court of Appeals reversed as to both claims. Helms v. Hewitt, 655 F.2d 487 (CA3 1981). We granted certiorari only as to procedural due process and reversed, reinstating the District Court's grant of summary judgment for petitioners. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983). On remand from this Court, the Court of Appeals noted that its substantive due process [482 U.S. 755, 765] holding concerning the use of anonymous informant evidence was unaffected by our decision, and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of respondent unless petitioners were immune. Helms v. Hewitt, 712 F.2d 48, 49 (1983); see 655 F.2d, at 502-503 ("[O]n remand, if the defendants do not establish official immunity . . . the district court should enter summary judgment for Helms"). </s> The District Court, on remand from the Court of Appeals, concluded that petitioners were immune from the payment of damages because the law concerning the use of anonymous informant evidence in prison disciplinary proceedings "was not so clear and well established" at the time of respondent's disciplinary proceeding as to overcome petitioners' qualified official immunity. App. 47a. Respondent appealed from this second order granting summary judgment for petitioners. During the pendently of this appeal the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania issued Administrative Directive 801, App. 85a-116a, which incorporated policies with respect to the use of anonymous informant evidence in prison misconduct proceedings consistent with the earlier holding of the Court of Appeals. Id., at 101a-102a. The Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the District Court's judgment in a summary order. Helms v. Hewitt, 745 F.2d 46 (CA3 1984). Respondent then moved for fees in the District Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988. </s> II </s> Some aspects of the procedural development of this case may be difficult to fathom, but at the very least the case does not present, as the Court declares, a fee application by "a party who litigates to judgment and loses on all of his claims." Ante, at 757. Respondent's complaint alleged two federal causes of action. We held that respondent had not stated a viable cause of action for violation of his right to procedural due process. The final word on the substantive due process claim, however, was spoken by the Court of Appeals, which directed the District Court to enter summary judgment [482 U.S. 755, 766] for respondent on that claim unless the petitioners were immune. </s> The Court devotes much of its opinion to demonstrating on theoretical grounds that this statement by the Court of Appeals was not a declaratory judgment. I think that effort unnecessary; it is plain from the language of the first opinion of the Court of Appeals that it was not entering judgment for respondent. Instead, consistent with the ordinary practice of appellate courts, it simply found respondent's cause of action good as a matter of law, and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for respondent insofar as such a judgment was not incompatible with petitioners' immunity, if any. 655 F.2d, at 502-503. The District Court then found that petitioners were entitled to qualified immunity. This precluded any remedy in damages against petitioners, but by no means prevented the ordering of declaratory or injunctive relief or a grant of attorney's fees. See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 543 -544 (1984). Respondent's complaint sought relief in the form of a declaratory judgment and an injunction expunging his prison disciplinary record. 1 Under the Court of Appeals' remand order, the District Court could, and probably should, have entered judgment granting the requested declaratory and injunctive relief. Instead, the District Court [482 U.S. 755, 767] first took up the question of immunity, and upon finding qualified immunity precipitately issued an order closing the case. App. 48a. No order was entered disposing of respondent's pending claims for equitable relief. 2 </s> Respondent contends, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the issuance of Administrative Directive 801 during the pendently of the subsequent appeal might be the sort of informal relief justifying a fee award, if the Commonwealth's change of policy was "catalyzed" by respondent's lawsuit. There is no dispute that informal relief may be sufficient to support a fee award under 1988. See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 -130 (1980). The Court wisely leaves for another day any discussion of the general circumstances under which action "catalyzed" by a lawsuit may be characterized as informal relief for purposes of 1988. Ante, at 763. But the Court errs in holding that Administrative Directive 801 cannot constitute relief, even under a "catalyst" theory, because respondent derived no benefit from it. The Directive does not, of course, provide an informal equivalent to respondent's request for injunctive relief, because it did not effect an expungement of his disciplinary record. But the Directive may be, in substance, functionally equivalent to respondent's requested declaratory relief. As the Court correctly states, in a declaratory judgment action "if the defendant, under pressure of the lawsuit, alters his conduct (or threatened [482 U.S. 755, 768] conduct) towards the plaintiff . . . the plaintiff will have prevailed." Ante, at 761. The Court observes that respondent is once again an inmate of the Commonwealth's prisons. Ante, at 764. The behavior of the Commonwealth's officials toward respondent is as effectively constrained by Directive 801 today as it would have been by a formal declaratory judgment. 3 </s> In sum, respondent's claim for fees is based upon the following premises: that the Court of Appeals held his civil rights cause of action good as a matter of law; that at the time of the District Court's judgment on the issue of immunity, respondent had outstanding meritorious claims for equitable relief; that the judgment as to petitioners' immunity did not foreclose the granting of equitable relief or an award of attorney's fees; and that the issuance of Directive 801 during the pendently of litigation provided respondent, by the voluntary action of petitioners and those in privity with them, informal relief substantially equivalent to the relief sought in respondent's prayer for a declaratory judgment. None of these propositions is subject to serious dispute, and none is rejected by the Court today. The question remains, of course, whether there is any causal connection between the litigation instituted by respondent and the Commonwealth's promulgation of Directive 801. This is an issue of fact which can only be resolved in the District Court. Should the District Court find that the promulgation of Directive 801 was not "catalyzed" by this litigation, then the error of respondent's counsel in failing to move in the District Court for formal entry of a declaratory judgment, to which respondent was clearly entitled [482 U.S. 755, 769] under the Court of Appeals' two remand orders, would probably foreclose any fee award. But any such conclusion must await further factfinding. </s> III </s> The disposition of this chaotic case depends upon the procedural accidents of extended litigation conducted with less than exemplary precision by the parties and the District Court. While the Court sensibly declines to establish any broadly applicable doctrine upon a basis as unreliable as the present record, it nonetheless indulges in a theoretical exposition which varies substantially from the few ascertainable facts. If further review of this litigation was a prudent exercise of our certiorari jurisdiction, which I doubt, it should have occurred after the necessary facts had been found, and the general fog of confusion dispelled, by the District Court. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it remanded to the District Court for factual findings on respondent's "catalyst" theory. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Petitioners have taken the position that these requests for declaratory and injunctive relief were somehow mooted by respondent's release on parole in the early stages of this litigation. Brief for Petitioners 24. Indeed, petitioners represent to the Court that the District Court found that "[respondent's] claim for injunctive relief had been rendered moot by his release from prison in 1980." Id., at 10. This statement is flagrantly inaccurate. The District Court in fact held that "plaintiff did not seek any relief which became mooted during the controversy." App. to Pet. for Cert 38a. Petitioners have offered no authority, nor can they, for the remarkable proposition that the request for expungement of respondent's record became moot upon his parole. Nor, since the expungement would have depended upon the finding that respondent's due process rights were violated, have they explained how the request for declaratory relief supposedly became moot. </s> [Footnote 2 The record does not contain the briefs, if any, filed with the Court of Appeals on respondent's appeal from the District Court's order. Accordingly it is not clear whether respondent challenged only the District Court's holding on immunity, or also its failure to award equitable relief. Nor is it clear, since the District Court's order did not dispose of all respondent's outstanding claims, whether respondent might not even now move in the District Court for the equitable relief requested in the complaint. The issuance of such equitable relief would, of course, support a fee award under 42 U.S.C. 1988. The remand ordered by the Court of Appeals in the judgment presently before us would give the District Court an opportunity to rectify the substantial confusion engendered by its earlier proceedings. </s> [Footnote 3 The Court characterizes respondent's renewed incarceration as a "fortuity," evidently implying that it has no relevance to this case. But the record does not disclose whether respondent was imprisoned after parole revocation proceedings, or instead as the result of a subsequent criminal conviction. If respondent's parole was revoked, then it is his temporary release during the course of the litigation, rather than his reincarceration, which is a "fortuity" in determining respondent's entitlement to attorney's fees. </s> [482 U.S. 755, 1]

United States Supreme Court U.S. v. AMERICAN BLDG. MAINT. INDUSTRIES(1975) No. 73-1689 Argued: April 22, 1975Decided: June 24, 1975 </s> The Government brought this civil antitrust action against appellee, one of the largest suppliers of janitorial services in the country, with 56 branches serving more than 500 communities in the United States and Canada, and providing about 10% of such service sales in Southern California, contending that appellee's acquisition of two Southern California janitorial service firms (the Benton companies), which supplied about 7% of such services in Southern California, violated 7 of the Clayton Act. That section provides that "[n]o corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire . . . the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire . . . the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." The Benton companies, some of whose customers engaged in interstate operations, performed all their services within California, locally recruited labor (which accounted for their major expenses) and locally purchased incidental equipment and supplies. The District Court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment, holding that there had been no 7 violation. The Government contends that "engaged in commerce" as used in 7 encompasses corporations like the Benton companies engaged in intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, and that in any event the Benton companies' activities were sufficiently interstate to come within 7. Held: </s> 1. The phrase "engaged in commerce" as used in 7 of the Clayton Act means engaged in the flow of interstate commerce, and was not intended to reach all corporations engaged in activities subject to the federal commerce power; hence, the phrase does not encompass corporations engaged in intrastate activities substantially affecting interstate commerce, and 7 can be applicable only when both the acquiring corporation and the acquired [422 U.S. 271, 272] corporation are engaged in interstate commerce. Pp. 275-283. </s> (a) The jurisdictional requirements of 7 cannot be satisfied merely by showing that allegedly anticompetitive acquisitions and activities affect commerce. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 ; FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 . Pp. 276-277. </s> (b) The precise "in commerce" language of 7 is not co-extensive with the reach of power under the Commerce Clause and is thus not to be equated with 1 of the Sherman Act which reaches the impact of intrastate conduct on interstate commerce. Pp. 277-279. </s> (c) When Congress re-enacted 7 in 1950 with the same "engaged in commerce" limitation, the phrase had long since become a term of art, indicating a limited assertion of federal jurisdiction, and prior to that time Congress had frequently distinguished between activities "in commerce" and broader activities "affecting commerce." Pp. 279-281. </s> (d) Limiting 7 to its plain meaning comports with the enforcement policies that the FTC and the Justice Department have consistently pursued. Pp. 281-282. </s> 2. Since the Benton companies did not participate directly in the sale, purchase, or distribution of goods or services in interstate commerce, they were not "engaged in commerce" within the meaning of 7. And neither supplying local services to corporations engaged in interstate commerce nor using locally bought supplies manufactured outside California sufficed to satisfy 7's "in commerce" requirement. Pp. 283-286. </s> 401 F. Supp. 1005, affirmed. </s> STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and MARSHALL, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, and in all but Part III of which WHITE, J., joined. WHITE, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 286. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 286. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 287. </s> Deputy Assistant Attorney General Wilson argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Kauper, William L. Patton, Carl D. Lawson, and Lee I. Weintraub. [422 U.S. 271, 273] </s> Marcus Mattson argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Anthonie M. Voogd. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The Government commenced this civil antitrust action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, contending that the appellee, American Building Maintenance Industries, had violated 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18, by acquiring the stock of J. E. Benton Management Corp., and by merging Benton Maintenance Co. into one of the appellee's wholly owned subsidiaries. Following discovery proceedings and the submission of memoranda and affidavits by both parties, the District Court granted the appellee's motion for summary judgment, holding that there had been no violation of 7 of the Clayton Act. The Government brought an appeal to this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 419 U.S. 1104 . 1 </s> I </s> The appellee, American Building Maintenance Industries, is one of the largest suppliers of janitorial services in the country, with 56 branches serving more than 500 communities in the United States and Canada. It is also the single largest supplier of janitorial services in southern California (the area comprising Los Angeles, Orange, San Bernardino, Riverside, Santa Barbara, and Ventura Counties), providing approximately 10% of the sales of such services in that area. [422 U.S. 271, 274] </s> Both of the acquired companies, J. E. Benton Management Corp. and Benton Maintenance Co., also supplied janitorial services in Southern California. 2 Together their sales constituted approximately 7% of the total janitorial sales in that area. Although both Benton companies serviced customers engaged in interstate operations, all of their janitorial and maintenance contracts with those customers were performed entirely within California. Neither of the Benton companies advertised nationally, and their use of interstate communications facilities to conduct business was negligible. 3 </s> The major expense of providing janitorial services is the cost of the labor necessary to perform the work. The Benton companies recruited the unskilled workers needed to supply janitorial services entirely from the local labor market in Southern California. The incidental equipment and supplies utilized in providing those janitorial services, except in concededly insignificant amounts, were purchased from local distributors. 4 </s> [422 U.S. 271, 275] </s> It is unquestioned that the appellee, American Building Maintenance Industries, was and is actively engaged in interstate commerce. But on the basis of the above facts the District Court concluded that at the time of the challenged acquisition and merger neither Benton Management Corp. nor Benton Maintenance Co. was "engaged in commerce" within the meaning of 7 of the Clayton Act. Accordingly, the District Court held that there had been no violation of that law. </s> The Government's appeal raises two questions: First, does the phrase "engaged in commerce" as used in 7 of the Clayton Act encompass corporations engaged in intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce? Second, if the language of 7 requires proof of actual engagement in the flow of interstate commerce, were the Benton companies' activities sufficient to satisfy that standard? </s> II </s> Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18, provides in pertinent part: </s> "No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." </s> Under the explicit reach of 7, therefore, not only must the acquiring corporation be "engaged in commerce," but [422 U.S. 271, 276] the corporation or corporations whose stock or assets are acquired must be "engaged also in commerce." 5 </s> The distinct "in commerce" language of 7, the Court observed earlier this Term, "appears to denote only persons or activities within the flow of interstate commerce - the practical, economic continuity in the generation of goods and services for interstate markets and their transport and distribution to the consumer. If this is so, the jurisdictional requirements of [ 7] cannot be satisfied merely by showing that allegedly anticompetitive acquisitions and activities affect commerce." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 . But even more unambiguous support for this construction of the narrow "in commerce" language enacted by Congress in 7 of the Clayton Act is to be found in an earlier decision of this Court, FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 . </s> In Bunte Bros. the Court was required to determine the scope of 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45, which authorized the Commission to proceed only against "unfair methods of competition in commerce." The Court squarely held that the Commission's 5 jurisdiction was limited to unfair methods of competition occurring in the flow of interstate commerce. The contention that "in commerce" should be read as if it meant "affecting interstate commerce" was emphatically rejected: "The construction of 5 urged by the Commission would thus give a federal agency pervasive control over myriads of local businesses in matters heretofore traditionally left to local custom or local law. . . . An inroad upon local [422 U.S. 271, 277] conditions and local standards of such far-reaching import as is involved here, ought to await a clearer mandate from Congress." 312 U.S., at 354 -355. 6 </s> The phrase "in commerce" does not, of course, necessarily have a uniform meaning whenever used by Congress. See, e. g., Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 520 -521. But the Bunte Bros. construction of 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act is particularly relevant to a proper interpretation of the "in commerce" language in 7 of the Clayton Act since both sections were enacted by the 63d Congress, and both were designed to deal with closely related aspects of the same problem - the protection of free and fair competition in the Nation's marketplaces. See FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 647 -648. </s> The Government argues, however, that despite its basic identity to 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the phrase "engaged in commerce" in 7 of the Clayton Act should be interpreted to mean engaged in any activity that is subject to the constitutional power of Congress over interstate commerce. The legislative history of the Clayton Act, the Government contends, demonstrates that the "in commerce" language of 7 was intended to be coextensive with the reach of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. Moreover, the argument continues, 7 was designed to supplement the [422 U.S. 271, 278] Sherman Act and to arrest the creation of trusts or monopolies in their incipiency, United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 , and it would be anomalous, in light of this history and purpose, to hold that the Clayton Act's jurisdictional scope is more restricted than that of the Sherman Act. </s> It is certainly true that the Court has held that in the Sherman Act, "Congress wanted to go to the utmost extent of its Constitutional power in restraining trust and monopoly agreements . . . ." United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533, 558 . Accordingly the Sherman Act has been applied to local activities which, although not themselves within the flow of interstate commerce, substantially affect interstate commerce. See, e. g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 ; United States v. Employing Plasterers Assn., 347 U.S. 186 . But the Government's argument that 7 should likewise be read to reach intrastate corporations affecting interstate commerce is not persuasive. </s> Unlike 7, with its precise "in commerce" language, 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1, prohibits every contract, combination, or conspiracy "in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . . . ." "The jurisdictional reach of 1 thus is keyed directly to effects on interstate markets and the interstate flow of goods." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S., at 194 . No similar concern for the impact of intrastate conduct on interstate commerce is evident in 7's "engaged in commerce" requirements. </s> The Government's contention that it would be anomalous for Congress to have strengthened the antitrust laws by curing perceived deficiencies in the Sherman Act and at the same time to have limited the jurisdictional scope of those remedial provisions founders also on the express [422 U.S. 271, 279] language of 7. Thus, although the Sherman Act proscribes every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce, whether entered into by a natural person, partnership, corporation, or other form of business organization, 7 of the Clayton Act is explicitly limited to corporate acquisitions. Yet it surely could not be seriously argued that this "anomaly" must be ignored, and 7 extended to reach an allegedly anticompetitive acquisition of partnership assets. 7 There is no more justification for concluding that the equally explicit "in commerce" limitation on 7's reach should be disregarded. </s> More importantly, whether or not Congress in enacting the Clayton Act in 1914 intended to exercise fully its power to regulate commerce, and whatever the understanding of the 63d Congress may have been as to the extent of its Commerce Clause power, the fact is that [422 U.S. 271, 280] when 7 was re-enacted in 1950, the phrase "engaged in commerce" had long since become a term of art, indicating a limited assertion of federal jurisdiction. In Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 , for example, the Court had drawn a sharp distinction between activities in the flow of interstate commerce and intrastate activities that affect interstate commerce. Id., at 542-544. Similarly, the Court's opinion in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 , two years later, had emphasized that congressional authority to regulate commerce was not limited to activities actually "in commerce," but extended as well to conduct that substantially affected interstate commerce. And the Bunte Bros. decision in 1941 had stressed the distinction between unfair methods of competition "in commerce" and those that "affected commerce," in limiting the scope of the Commission's authority under the "in commerce" language of 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. </s> Congress, as well, in the years prior to 1950 had repeatedly acknowledged its recognition of the distinction between legislation limited to activities "in commerce," and an assertion of its full Commerce Clause power so as to cover all activity substantially affecting interstate commerce. Section 10 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 453, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 160 (a), for example, empowered the National Labor Relations Board to prevent any person from engaging in an unfair labor practice "affecting commerce." Section 2 (7) of the Act, 49 Stat. 450, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 152 (7), in turn, defined "affecting commerce" to mean "in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce . . . ." Similarly, the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, c. 127, 50 Stat. 72, providing for the fixing of prices for bituminous coal, the proscription of unfair trade practices, and the establishment of marketing procedures, [422 U.S. 271, 281] applied to sales and transactions "in or directly affecting interstate commerce in bituminous coal." 50 Stat. 76. </s> In marked contrast to the broad "affecting commerce" jurisdictional language utilized in those statutes, however, Congress retained the narrower "in commerce" formulation when it amended and re-enacted 7 of the Clayton Act in 1950. The 1950 amendments were designed in large part to "plug the loophole" that existed in 7 as initially enacted in 1914, by expanding its coverage to include acquisitions of assets, as well as acquisitions of stock. In addition, other language in 7 was amended to make plain the full reach of the section's prohibitions. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 311 -323. Yet, despite the sweeping changes made to effectuate those purposes, and despite decisions of this Court, such as Bunte Bros., that had limited the reach of the phrase "in commerce" in similar regulatory legislation, Congress preserved the requirement that both the acquiring and the acquired companies be "engaged in commerce." </s> This congressional action cannot be disregarded, as the Government would have it, as simply a result of congressional inattention, for Congress was fully aware in enacting the 1950 amendments that both the original and the newly amended versions of 7 were limited to corporations "engaged in commerce." See e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 5-6. Rather, the decision to re-enact 7 with the same "in commerce" limitation can be rationally explained only in terms of a legislative intent, at least in 1950, not to apply the rather drastic prohibitions of 7 of the Clayton Act to the full range of corporations potentially subject to the commerce power. </s> Finally, the Government's contention that a limitation of the scope of 7 to its plain meaning would undermine [422 U.S. 271, 282] the section's remedial purpose is belied by the past enforcement policy of the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice - the two governmental agencies charged with enforcing the section's prohibitions. Clayton Act 11, 15, 15 U.S.C. 21 (a), 25. The Federal Trade Commission has repeatedly held that 7 applies only to an acquisition in which both the acquired and the acquiring companies are engaged directly in interstate commerce. E. g., Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F. T. C. 944, 1068-1069; Beatrice Foods Co., 67 F. T. C. 473, 730-731; Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 75 F. T. C. 813, 918. And while the Government explains that it has never taken a formal position that 7 does not apply to intrastate firms affecting interstate commerce, it does concede that previous 7 cases brought by the Department of Justice have invariably involved firms clearly engaged in the flow of interstate commerce. 8 In light of this consistent enforcement practice, it is difficult to credit the argument that 7's remedial purpose would be frustrated by construing literally 7's twice-enacted "in commerce" requirement. [422 U.S. 271, 283] </s> In sum, neither the legislative history nor the remedial purpose of 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended and reenacted in 1950, supports an expansion of the scope of 7 beyond that defined by its express language. Accordingly, we hold that the phrase "engaged in commerce" as used in 7 of the Clayton Act means engaged in the flow of interstate commerce, and was not intended to reach all corporations engaged in activities subject to the federal commerce power. </s> III </s> The Government alternatively argues that even if 7 applies only to corporations engaged in the flow of interstate commerce, the Benton companies' activities at the time of the acquisition and merger placed them in that flow. To support this contention the Government relies primarily on the fact that the Benton companies performed a substantial portion of their janitorial services for enterprises which were themselves clearly engaged in selling products in interstate and international markets and in providing interstate communication facilities. 9 But simply supplying localized services to a corporation engaged in interstate commerce does not satisfy the "in commerce" requirement of 7. </s> To be engaged "in commerce" within the meaning of 7, a corporation must itself be directly engaged in the production, distribution, or acquisition of goods or services in interstate commerce. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S., at 195 . At the time of the acquisition and merger, however, the Benton companies were completely insulated from any direct participation [422 U.S. 271, 284] in interstate markets or the interstate flow of goods or services. The firms' activities were limited to providing janitorial services within Southern California to corporations that made wholly independent pricing decisions concerning their own products. Consequently, whether or not their effect on interstate commerce was sufficiently substantial to come within the ambit of the constitutional power of Congress under the Commerce Clause, in providing janitorial services the Benton companies were not themselves "engaged in commerce" within the meaning of 7. Cf. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S., at 227 -235. 10 </s> [422 U.S. 271, 285] </s> Similarly, although the Benton companies used janitorial equipment and supplies manufactured in large part outside of California, they did not purchase them directly from suppliers located in other States. Cf. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F. T. C., at 1068-1069. Rather, those products were purchased in intrastate transactions from local distributors. Once again, therefore, the Benton companies were separated from direct participation in interstate commerce by the pricing and other marketing decisions of independent intermediaries. By the time the Benton companies purchased their janitorial supplies, the flow of commerce had ceased. See Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S., at 542 -543. 11 </s> In short, since the Benton companies did not participate directly in the sale, purchase, or distribution of goods or services in interstate commerce, they were not "engaged in commerce" within the meaning of 7 of the Clayton Act. 12 The District Court, therefore, properly [422 U.S. 271, 286] concluded that the acquisition and merger in this case were not within the coverage of 7 of the Clayton Act. </s> The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The Government appealed directly to this Court pursuant to 2 of the Expediting Act, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 29. The Government's notice of appeal was filed on February 7, 1974, before the effective date of the recent amendments to the Act. See Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. 93-528, 7, 88 Stat. 1710. </s> [Footnote 2 At the time of the acquisition and merger, Jess E. Benton, Jr., owned all the stock of J. E. Benton Management Corp., and 85% of the stock of Benton Maintenance Co. In addition to supplying janitorial services, Benton Management conducted some real estate business and provided building management services entirely within the Southern California area. Benton Maintenance was engaged exclusively in providing janitorial services. The Government has made no claim that the nonjanitorial activities of Benton Management Corp. have any bearing on the issues presented by this case. </s> [Footnote 3 The District Court found that the Benton companies made only 10 out-of-state telephone calls related to business activities during the 18-month period prior to the challenged acquisition and merger. The charges for those calls were $19.78. During the same period the Benton companies sent or received only some 200 interstate letters, a number of which were either directed to or received from governmental agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service. </s> [Footnote 4 Although many of the janitorial supplies were manufactured outside of California, the District Court found that Benton's direct [422 U.S. 271, 275] interstate purchases for the 16-month period prior to the challenged acquisition and merger amounted to a total of less than $140. </s> [Footnote 5 "Commerce," as defined by 1 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 12, means "trade or commerce among the several States and with foreign nations . . . ." The phrase "engaged in commerce" is not defined by the Act. </s> [Footnote 6 Congress recently acted to provide such a "clearer mandate," amending the Federal Trade Commission Act by replacing the phrase "in commerce" with "in or affecting commerce" in 5, 6, and 12 of the Act. Magnuson-Moss Warranty - Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 201, 88 Stat, 2193, 15 U.S.C. 45 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). The amendments were specifically designed to expand the Commission's jurisdiction beyond the limits defined by Bunte Bros. and to make it coextensive with the constitutional power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. See H. R. Rep. No. 93-1107, pp. 29-31 (1974). </s> [Footnote 7 The Federal Trade Commission has held that such acquisitions may be challenged under 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which forbids unfair methods of competition on the part of persons and partnerships, as well as corporations. Beatrice Foods Co., 67 F. T. C. 473, 724-727. It is, of course, well established that the Commission has broad power to apply 5 to reach transactions which violate the standards of the Clayton Act, although technically not subject to the Act's prohibitions. See, e. g., FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 320 -321; cf. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 . We have no occasion in the case now before us to decide whether application of 5 to assets acquisitions by or from noncorporate business entities constitutes an appropriate exercise of that power; nor need we consider whether the acquisition of the stock or assets of an intrastate corporation that affected interstate commerce could be challenged by the Commission under the recent jurisdictional amendments to 5. See n. 6, supra. See generally Oppenheim, Guides to Harmonizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act with the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 821; Reeves, Toward a Coherent Antitrust Policy: The Role of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act in Price Discrimination Regulation, 16 B. C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 151, 167-171. </s> [Footnote 8 Despite this concession, the Government somewhat inconsistently argues that the present case does not in fact involve a substantial departure from the previous 7 enforcement pattern. In the past, the Government asserts, the United States has challenged acquisitions of "essentially local business that affected interstate commerce." United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 , is cited as an example of such a challenge. But the District Court in that case expressly found that both of the merging grocery chains directly participated in the flow of interstate commerce because each purchased more than 51% of its supplies from outside of California. See 233 F. Supp. 976, 978. And in United States v. County National Bank, 339 F. Supp. 85, the only other case cited by the Government to support its contention that the case now before us does not involve a departure from previous enforcement policy, the sole question was quite different from that here in issue - whether the "Bennington area" was a "section of the country" within the meaning of 7 of the Clayton Act. </s> [Footnote 9 The Benton companies derived 80% to 90% of their revenues from performance of janitorial service contracts for the Los Angeles facilities of interstate and international corporations such as Mobil Oil Corp., Rockwell International Corp., Teledyne, Inc., and Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. </s> [Footnote 10 The Government notes that this Court has held that maintenance workers servicing buildings in which goods are produced for interstate markets are covered by Fair Labor Standards Act provisions applicable to employees engaged in the production of goods for commerce. See, e. g., Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 ; Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U.S. 173 . In Kirschbaum the Court reasoned: "Without light and heat and power the tenants could not engage, as they do, in the production of goods for interstate commerce. The maintenance of a safe, habitable building is indispensable to that activity." 316 U.S., at 524 . Similarly, the Government argues, in the present case the Benton janitorial services were so essential to the interstate operations of their customers that they, too, should be considered part of the flow of commerce. </s> The Fair Labor Standards Act, however, is not confined, as is 7 of the Clayton Act, to activities that are actually "in commerce." At the time of the decisions relied upon by the Government, the Act provided that "an employee shall be deemed to have been engaged in the production of goods [for interstate commerce] if such employee was employed in producing, manufacturing, mining, handling, transporting, or in any other manner working on such goods, or in any process or occupation necessary to the production thereof . . . ." Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 3 (j), 52 Stat. 1061, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 203 (j) (1946 ed.) (emphasis added). Congress thus expressly intended to reach not only those employees who directly participated in the production of goods for interstate markets, but [422 U.S. 271, 285] also those employees outside the flow of commerce but nonetheless necessary to it. Although Congress in 1950 could constitutionally have extended 7 of the Clayton Act to reach comparable activity, it chose not to do so. See supra, at 279-281. </s> [Footnote 11 The Government does not suggest that the purchase of janitorial equipment and supplies from local distributors placed the Benton companies in the flow of commerce, although it does argue that because of those purchases the firms had a substantial effect on interstate commerce - an issue not relevant in light of our construction of the reach of 7 of the Clayton Act. </s> [Footnote 12 The Government contends that the sale of janitorial services "necessarily" involves interstate communications, solicitations, and negotiations, and that such interstate activity should be viewed as part of the flow of interstate commerce. The merits of that argument need not be considered, however, since the record before the District Court does not support a finding that any of the Benton janitorial service contracts were obtained through interstate solicitation or negotiation. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring. </s> I concur in the judgment and in Parts I and II of the Court's opinion. I do not join Part III, for I doubt that the interposition of a California wholesaler or distributor between the Benton companies and out-of-state manufactures of janitorial supplies necessarily requires that the Benton companies be found not to be "in commerce" merely because they buy directly from out-of-state suppliers only a negligible amount of their supplies. For the purposes of 7 of the Clayton Act, a remedial statute, the regular movement of goods from out-of-state manufacturer to local wholesaler and then to retailer or institutional consumer is at least arguably sufficient to place the latter in the stream of commerce, particularly where it appears that when the complaint was filed, cf. United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 378 U.S. 158, 168 (1964), the "local" distributor from which supplies were being purchased was a wholly owned subsidiary of the acquiring company, a national concern admittedly in commerce. In this case, however, the United States makes no such contention and appellee's motion for summary judgment was not opposed by the Government on that theory. It is therefore inappropriate to address the issue at this time; and on this record, I concur in the judgment that the Benton companies were not in commerce. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, dissenting. </s> For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 204 -207 [422 U.S. 271, 287] (1974), decided earlier this Term, I cannot agree that the "in commerce" language of 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18, was intended to give that statute a narrower jurisdictional reach than the "affecting commerce" standard which we have read into the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1 et seq. On the record in this case, it is beyond question that the activities of the acquired firms have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. I would therefore reverse the summary judgment granted below and remand for further proceedings in the District Court. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting. </s> I believe that the scope of the Clayton Act should be held to extend to acquisitions and sales having a substantial effect on interstate commerce. I therefore dissent. For me, the reach of 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18, is as broad as that of the Sherman Act, and should not be given the narrow construction we properly have given, just this Term, to the Robinson-Patman Act. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974). </s> For more than a quarter of a century the Court has held that the Sherman Act should be construed broadly to reach the full extent of the commerce power, and to proscribe those restraints that substantially affect interstate commerce. See, e. g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 234 (1948); United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944). The Clayton Act was enacted to supplement the Sherman Act, and to "arrest in its incipiency" any restraint or substantial lessening of competition. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957). To ascribe [422 U.S. 271, 288] to Congress the intent to exercise less than its full commerce power in the Clayton Act, which has as its purpose the supplementation of the protections afforded by the Sherman Act, is both highly anomalous and, it seems to me, unwarranted. Section 7 should not be limited, as the Court limits it today, to corporations engaged in interstate commerce, but should be held to include those intrastate activities substantially affecting interstate commerce. </s> [422 U.S. 271, 289]

United States Supreme Court BARTLETT, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, ET AL. v. STRICKLAND ET AL.(2009) No. 07-689 Argued: October 14, 2008Decided: March 9, 2009 </s> Despite the North Carolina Constitution's "Whole County Provision" prohibiting the General Assembly from dividing counties when drawing its own legislative districts, in 1991 the legislature drew House District 18 to include portions of four counties, including Pender County, for the asserted purpose of satisfying §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. At that time, District 18 was a geographically compact majority-minority district. By the time the district was to be redrawn in 2003, the African-American voting-age population in District 18 had fallen below 50 percent. Rather than redrawing the district to keep Pender County whole, the legislators split portions of it and another county. District 18's African-American voting-age population is now 39.36 percent. Keeping Pender County whole would have resulted in an African-American voting-age population of 35.33 percent. The legislators' rationale was that splitting Pender County gave African-American voters the potential to join with majority voters to elect the minority group's candidate of choice, while leaving Pender County whole would have violated §2 of the Voting Rights Act. </s> Pender County and others filed suit, alleging that the redistricting plan violated the Whole County Provision. The state-official defendants answered that dividing Pender County was required by §2. The trial court first considered whether the defendants had established the three threshold requirements for §2 liability under Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 51, only the first of which is relevant here: whether the minority group "is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district." The court concluded that although African-Americans were not a majority of District 18's voting-age population, the district was a "de facto" majority-minority district because African-Americans could get enough support from crossover majority voters to elect their preferred candidate. The court ultimately determined, based on the totality of the circumstances, that §2 required that Pender County be split, and it sustained District 18's lines on that rationale. The State Supreme Court reversed, holding that a minority group must constitute a numerical majority of the voting-age population in an area before §2 requires the creation of a legislative district to prevent dilution of that group's votes. Because African-Americans did not have such a numerical majority in District 18, the court ordered the legislature to redraw the district. Held:The judgment is affirmed. 361 N.C. 491, 649 S.E. 2d 364, affirmed. Justice Kennedy, joined by The Chief Justice and Justice Alito, concluded that §2 does not require state officials to draw election-district lines to allow a racial minority that would make up less than 50 percent of the voting-age population in the redrawn district to join with crossover voters to elect the minority's candidate of choice. Pp.5-21. </s> 1.As amended in 1982, §2 provides that a violation "is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the [election] processes ... in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a [protected] class [who] have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." 42 U.S.C. §1973(b). Construing the amended §2 in Gingles, supra, at 50-51, the Court identified three "necessary preconditions" for a claim that the use of multimember districts constituted actionable vote dilution. It later held that those requirements apply equally in §2 cases involving single-member districts. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40-41. Only when a party has established the requirements does a court proceed to analyze whether a §2 violation has occurred based on the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1013. Pp.5-7. </s> 2.Only when a geographically compact group of minority voters could form a majority in a single-member district has the first Gingles requirement been met. Pp.7-21. </s> (a)A party asserting §2 liability must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the minority population in the potential election district is greater than 50 percent. The Court has held both that §2 can require the creation of a "majority-minority" district, in which a minority group composes a numerical, working majority of the voting-age population, see, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 154-155, and that §2 does not require the creation of an "influence" district, in which a minority group can influence the outcome of an election even if its preferred candidate cannot be elected, see League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, ___ (LULAC). This case involves an intermediate, "crossover" district, in which the minority makes up less than a majority of the voting-age population, but is large enough to elect the candidate of its choice with help from majority voters who cross over to support the minority's preferred candidate. Petitioners' theory that such districts satisfy the first Gingles requirement is contrary to §2, which requires a showing that minorities "have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to ... elect representatives of their choice," 42 U.S.C. §1973(b). Because they form only 39 percent of District 18's voting-age population, African-Americans standing alone have no better or worse opportunity to elect a candidate than any other group with the same relative voting strength. Recognizing a §2 claim where minority voters cannot elect their candidate of choice based on their own votes and without assistance from others would grant special protection to their right to form political coalitions that is not authorized by the section. Nor does the reasoning of this Court's cases support petitioners' claims. In Voinovich, for example, the Court stated that the first Gingles requirement "would have to be modified or eliminated" to allow crossover-district claims. 507 U.S., at 158. Indeed, mandatory recognition of such claims would create serious tension with the third Gingles requirement, that the majority votes as a bloc to defeat minority-preferred candidates, see 478 U.S., at 50-51, and would call into question the entire Gingles framework. On the other hand, the Court finds support for the clear line drawn by the majority-minority requirement in the need for workable standards and sound judicial and legislative administration. By contrast, if §2 required crossover districts, determining whether a §2 claim would lie would require courts to make complex political predictions and tie them to race-based assumptions. Heightening these concerns is the fact that because §2 applies nationwide to every jurisdiction required to draw election-district lines under state or local law, crossover-district claims would require courts to make predictive political judgments not only about familiar, two-party contests in large districts but also about regional and local elections. Unlike any of the standards proposed to allow crossover claims, the majority-minority rule relies on an objective, numerical test: Do minorities make up more than 50 percent of the voting-age population in the relevant geographic area? Given §2's text, the Court's cases interpreting that provision, and the many difficulties in assessing §2 claims without the restraint and guidance provided by the majority-minority rule, all of the federal courts of appeals that have interpreted the first Gingles factor have required a majority-minority standard. The Court declines to depart from that uniform interpretation, which has stood for more than 20 years. Because this case does not involve allegations of intentional and wrongful conduct, the Court need not consider whether intentional discrimination affects the Gingles analysis. Pp.7-15. </s> (b)Arguing for a less restrictive interpretation, petitioners point to §2's guarantee that political processes be "equally open to participation" to protect minority voters' "opportunity ... to elect representatives of their choice," 42 U.S.C. §1973(b), and assert that such "opportunit[ies]" occur in crossover districts and require protection. But petitioners emphasize the word "opportunity" at the expense of the word "equally." The statute does not protect any possible opportunity through which minority voters could work with other constituencies to elect their candidate of choice. Section 2 does not guarantee minority voters an electoral advantage. Minority groups in crossover districts have the same opportunity to elect their candidate as any other political group with the same relative voting strength. The majority-minority rule, furthermore, is not at odds with §2's totality-of-the-circumstances test. See, e.g., Growe, supra, at 40. Any doubt as to whether §2 calls for this rule is resolved by applying the canon of constitutional avoidance to steer clear of serious constitutional concerns under the Equal Protection Clause. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381-382. Such concerns would be raised if §2 were interpreted to require crossover districts throughout the Nation, thereby "unnecessarily infus[ing] race into virtually every redistricting." LULAC, supra, at 446. Pp.16-18. </s> (c)This holding does not consider the permissibility of crossover districts as a matter of legislative choice or discretion. Section 2 allows States to choose their own method of complying with the Voting Rights Act, which may include drawing crossover districts. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 480-482. Moreover, the holding should not be interpreted to entrench majority-minority districts by statutory command, for that, too, could pose constitutional concerns. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900. Such districts are only required if all three Gingles factors are met and if §2 applies based on the totality of the circumstances. A claim similar to petitioners' assertion that the majority-minority rule is inconsistent with §5 was rejected in LULAC, supra, at ___. Pp.19-21. </s> Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, adhered to his view in Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 891, 893 (opinion concurring in judgment), that the text of §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 does not authorize any vote dilution claim, regardless of the size of the minority population in a given district. The Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, framework for analyzing such claims has no basis in §2's text and "has produced ... a disastrous misadventure in judicial policymaking," Holder, supra, at 893. P.1. Kennedy, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Alito, J., joined. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Scalia, J., joined. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., and Breyer, J., filed dissenting opinions. </s> GARY BARTLETT, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THENORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS,etal., PETITIONERS v. DWIGHTSTRICKLAND etal. on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of north carolina [March 9, 2009] </s> Justice Kennedy announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice and Justice Alito join. </s> This case requires us to interpret §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §1973 (2000 ed.). The question is whether the statute can be invoked to require state officials to draw election-district lines to allow a racial minority to join with other voters to elect the minority's candidate of choice, even where the racial minority is less than 50 percent of the voting-age population in the district to be drawn. To use election-law terminology: In a district that is not a majority-minority district, if a racial minority could elect its candidate of choice with support from crossover majority voters, can §2 require the district to be drawn to accommodate this potential? I </s> The case arises in a somewhat unusual posture. State authorities who created a district now invoke the Voting Rights Act as a defense. They argue that §2 required them to draw the district in question in a particular way, despite state laws to the contrary. The state laws are provisions of the North Carolina Constitution that prohibit the General Assembly from dividing counties when drawing legislative districts for the State House and Senate. Art. II, §§3, 5. We will adopt the term used by the state courts and refer to both sections of the state constitution as the Whole County Provision. See Pender County v. Bartlett, 361 N.C. 491, 493, 649 S.E. 2d 364, 366 (2007) (case below). It is common ground that state election-law requirements like the Whole County Provision may be superseded by federal law--for instance, the one-person, one-vote principle of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Here the question is whether §2 of the Voting Rights Act requires district lines to be drawn that otherwise would violate the Whole County Provision. That, in turn, depends on how the statute is interpreted. </s> We begin with the election district. The North Carolina House of Representatives is the larger of the two chambers in the State's General Assembly. District 18 of that body lies in the southeastern part of North Carolina. Starting in 1991, the General Assembly drew District 18 to include portions of four counties, including Pender County, in order to create a district with a majority African-American voting-age population and to satisfy the Voting Rights Act. Following the 2000 census, the North Carolina Supreme Court, to comply with the Whole County Provision, rejected the General Assembly's first two statewide redistricting plans. See Stephenson v. Bartlett, 355 N.C. 354, 375, 562 S.E.2d 377, 392, stay denied, 535 U.S. 1301 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., in chambers); Stephenson v. Bartlett, 357 N.C. 301, 314, 582 S.E.2d 247, 254 (2003). </s> District 18 in its present form emerged from the General Assembly's third redistricting attempt, in 2003. By that time the African-American voting-age population had fallen below 50 percent in the district as then drawn, and the General Assembly no longer could draw a geographically compact majority-minority district. Rather than draw District 18 to keep Pender County whole, however, the General Assembly drew it by splitting portions of Pender and New Hanover counties. District 18 has an African-American voting-age population of 39.36 percent. App. 139. Had it left Pender County whole, the General Assembly could have drawn District 18 with an African-American voting-age population of 35.33 percent. Id., at 73. The General Assembly's reason for splitting Pender County was to give African-American voters the potential to join with majority voters to elect the minority group's candidate of its choice. Ibid. Failure to do so, state officials now submit, would have diluted the minority group's voting strength in violation of §2. </s> In May 2004, Pender County and the five members of its Board of Commissioners filed the instant suit in North Carolina state court against the Governor of North Carolina, the Director of the State Board of Elections, and other state officials. The plaintiffs alleged that the 2003 plan violated the Whole County Provision by splitting Pender County into two House districts. App. 5-14. The state-official defendants answered that dividing Pender County was required by §2. Id., at 25. As the trial court recognized, the procedural posture of this case differs from most §2 cases. Here the defendants raise §2 as a defense. As a result, the trial court stated, they are "in the unusual position" of bearing the burden of proving that a §2 violation would have occurred absent splitting Pender County to draw District 18. App. to Pet. for Cert. 90a. </s> The trial court first considered whether the defendant state officials had established the three threshold requirements for §2 liability under Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986)--namely, (1) that the minority group "is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district," (2) that the minority group is "politically cohesive," and (3) "that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." </s> As to the first Gingles requirement, the trial court concluded that, although African-Americans were not a majority of the voting-age population in District 18, the district was a "de facto" majority-minority district because African-Americans could get enough support from crossover majority voters to elect the African-Americans' preferred candidate. The court ruled that African-Americans in District 18 were politically cohesive, thus satisfying the second requirement. And later, the plaintiffs stipulated that the third Gingles requirement was met. App. to Pet. for Cert. at 102a-103a, 130a. The court then determined, based on the totality of the circumstances, that §2 required the General Assembly to split Pender County. The court sustained the lines for District 18 on that rationale. Id., at 116a-118a. </s> Three of the Pender County Commissioners appealed the trial court's ruling that the defendants had established the first Gingles requirement. The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed. It held that a "minority group must constitute a numerical majority of the voting population in the area under consideration before Section 2 ... requires the creation of a legislative district to prevent dilution of the votes of that minority group." 361 N.C., at 502, 649 S.E. 2d, at 371. On that premise the State Supreme Court determined District 18 was not mandated by §2 because African-Americans do not "constitute a numerical majority of citizens of voting age." Id., at 507, 649 S.E. 2d, at 374. It ordered the General Assembly to redraw District 18. Id., at 510, 649 S.E. 2d, at 376. </s> We granted certiorari, 552 U.S. ___ (2008), and now affirm. II </s> Passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was an important step in the struggle to end discriminatory treatment of minorities who seek to exercise one of the most fundamental rights of our citizens: the right to vote. Though the Act as a whole was the subject of debate and controversy, §2 prompted little criticism. The likely explanation for its general acceptance is that, as first enacted, §2 tracked, in part, the text of the Fifteenth Amendment. It prohibited practices "imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color." 79 Stat. 437; cf. U.S. Const., Amdt. 15 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude"); see also S.Rep. No. 162, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, pp. 19-20 (1965). In Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1980), this Court held that §2, as it then read, "no more than elaborates upon ... the Fifteenth Amendment" and was "intended to have an effect no different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself." In 1982, after the Mobile ruling, Congress amended §2, giving the statute its current form. The original Act had employed an intent requirement, prohibiting only those practices "imposed or applied ... to deny or abridge" the right to vote. 79 Stat. 437. The amended version of §2 requires consideration of effects, as it prohibits practices "imposed or applied ... in a manner which results in a denial or abridgment" of the right to vote. 96 Stat. 134, 42 U.S.C. §1973(a) (2000 ed.). The 1982 amendments also added a subsection, §2(b), providing a test for determining whether a §2 violation has occurred. The relevant text of the statute now states: "(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color [or membership in a language minority group], as provided in subsection (b) of this section. </s> "(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." 42 U.S.C. §1973. </s> This Court first construed the amended version of §2 in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). In Gingles, the plaintiffs were African-American residents of North Carolina who alleged that multimember districts diluted minority voting strength by submerging black voters into the white majority, denying them an opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice. The Court identified three "necessary preconditions" for a claim that the use of multimember districts constituted actionable vote dilution under §2: (1) The minority group must be "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district," (2) the minority group must be "politically cohesive," and (3) the majority must vote "sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." Id., at 50-51. </s> The Court later held that the three Gingles requirements apply equally in §2 cases involving single-member districts, such as a claim alleging vote dilution because a geographically compact minority group has been split between two or more single-member districts. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40-41 (1993). In a §2 case, only when a party has established the Gingles requirements does a court proceed to analyze whether a violation has occurred based on the totality of the circumstances. Gingles, supra, at 79; see also Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1013 (1994). III A </s> This case turns on whether the first Gingles requirement can be satisfied when the minority group makes up less than 50 percent of the voting-age population in the potential election district. The parties agree on all other parts of the Gingles analysis, so the dispositive question is: What size minority group is sufficient to satisfy the first Gingles requirement? At the outset the answer might not appear difficult to reach, for the Gingles Court said the minority group must "demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district." 478 U.S., at 50. This would seem to end the matter, as it indicates the minority group must demonstrate it can constitute "a majority." But in Gingles and again in Growe the Court reserved what it considered to be a separate question--whether, "when a plaintiff alleges that a voting practice or procedure impairs a minority's ability to influence, rather than alter, election results, a showing of geographical compactness of a minority group not sufficiently large to constitute a majority will suffice." Growe, supra, at 41, n.5; see also Gingles, supra, at 46-47, n.12. The Court has since applied the Gingles requirements in §2 cases but has declined to decide the minimum size minority group necessary to satisfy the first requirement. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 154 (1993); DeGrandy, supra, at 1009; League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 443 (2006) (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (LULAC). We must consider the minimum-size question in this case. </s> It is appropriate to review the terminology often used to describe various features of election districts in relation to the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. In majority-minority districts, a minority group composes a numerical, working majority of the voting-age population. Under present doctrine, §2 can require the creation of these districts. See, e.g., Voinovich, supra, at 154 ("Placing black voters in a district in which they constitute a sizeable and therefore 'safe' majority ensures that they are able to elect their candidate of choice"); but see Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 922-923 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). At the other end of the spectrum are influence districts, in which a minority group can influence the outcome of an election even if its preferred candidate cannot be elected. This Court has held that §2 does not require the creation of influence districts. LULAC, supra, at 445 (opinion of Kennedy,J.). </s> The present case involves an intermediate type of district--a so-called crossover district. Like an influence district, a crossover district is one in which minority voters make up less than a majority of the voting-age population. But in a crossover district, the minority population, at least potentially, is large enough to elect the candidate of its choice with help from voters who are members of the majority and who cross over to support the minority's preferred candidate. 361 N.C., at 501-502, 649 S.E. 2d, at 371 (case below). This Court has referred sometimes to crossover districts as "coalitional" districts, in recognition of the necessary coalition between minority and crossover majority voters. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 483 (2003); see also Pildes, Is Voting Rights Law Now at War with Itself? Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L.Rev. 1517, 1539 (2002) (hereinafter Pildes). But that term risks confusion with coalition-district claims in which two minority groups form a coalition to elect the candidate of the coalition's choice. See, e.g., Nixon v. Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381, 1393 (CA6 1996) (en banc). We do not address that type of coalition district here. The petitioners in the present case (the state officials who were the defendants in the trial court) argue that §2 requires a crossover district, in which minority voters might be able to persuade some members of the majority to cross over and join with them. </s> Petitioners argue that although crossover districts do not include a numerical majority of minority voters, they still satisfy the first Gingles requirement because they are "effective minority districts." Under petitioners' theory keeping Pender County whole would have violated §2 by cracking the potential crossover district that they drew as District 18. See Gingles, 478 U.S., at 46, n.11 (vote dilution "may be caused by the dispersal of blacks into districts in which they constitute an ineffective minority of voters"). So, petitioners contend, §2 required them to override state law and split Pender County, drawing District 18 with an African-American voting-age population of 39.36 percent rather than keeping Pender County whole and leaving District 18 with an African-American voting-age population of 35.33 percent. We reject that claim. </s> First, we conclude, the petitioners' theory is contrary to the mandate of §2. The statute requires a showing that minorities "have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to ... elect representatives of their choice." 42 U.S.C. §1973(b) (2000 ed.). But because they form only 39 percent of the voting-age population in District 18, African-Americans standing alone have no better or worse opportunity to elect a candidate than does any other group of voters with the same relative voting strength. That is, African-Americans in District 18 have the opportunity to join other voters--including other racial minorities, or whites, or both--to reach a majority and elect their preferred candidate. They cannot, however, elect that candidate based on their own votes and without assistance from others. Recognizing a §2 claim in this circumstance would grant minority voters "a right to preserve their strength for the purposes of forging an advantageous political alliance." Hall v. Virginia, 385 F.3d 421, 431 (CA4 2004); see also Voinovich, supra, at 154 (minorities in crossover districts "could not dictate electoral outcomes independently"). Nothing in §2 grants special protection to a minority group's right to form political coalitions. "[M]inority voters are not immune from the obligation to pull, haul, and trade to find common political ground." DeGrandy, 512 U.S., at 1020. </s> Although the Court has reserved the question we confront today and has cautioned that the Gingles requirements "cannot be applied mechanically," Voinovich, supra, at 158, the reasoning of our cases does not support petitioners' claims. Section 2 does not impose on those who draw election districts a duty to give minority voters the most potential, or the best potential, to elect a candidate by attracting crossover voters. In setting out the first requirement for §2 claims, the Gingles Court explained that "[u]nless minority voters possess the potential to elect representatives in the absence of the challenged structure or practice, they cannot claim to have been injured by that structure or practice." 478 U.S., at 50, n.17. The Growe Court stated that the first Gingles requirement is "needed to establish that the minority has the potential to elect a representative of its own choice in some single-member district." 507 U.S., at 40. Without such a showing, "there neither has been a wrong nor can be a remedy." Id., at 41. There is a difference between a racial minority group's "own choice" and the choice made by a coalition. In Voinovich, the Court stated that the first Gingles requirement "would have to be modified or eliminated" to allow crossover-district claims. 507 U.S., at 158. Only once, in dicta, has this Court framed the first Gingles requirement as anything other than a majority-minority rule. See DeGrandy, 512 U.S., at 1008 (requiring "a sufficiently large minority population to elect candidates of its choice"). And in the same case, the Court rejected the proposition, inherent in petitioners' claim here, that §2 entitles minority groups to the maximum possible voting strength: "[R]eading §2 to define dilution as any failure to maximize tends to obscure the very object of the statute and to run counter to its textually stated purpose. One may suspect vote dilution from political famine, but one is not entitled to suspect (much less infer) dilution from mere failure to guarantee a political feast." Id., at 1016-1017. </s> Allowing crossover-district claims would require us to revise and reformulate the Gingles threshold inquiry that has been the baseline of our §2 jurisprudence. Mandatory recognition of claims in which success for a minority depends upon crossover majority voters would create serious tension with the third Gingles requirement that the majority votes as a bloc to defeat minority-preferred candidates. It is difficult to see how the majority-bloc-voting requirement could be met in a district where, by definition, white voters join in sufficient numbers with minority voters to elect the minority's preferred candidate. (We are skeptical that the bloc-voting test could be satisfied here, for example, where minority voters in District 18 cannot elect their candidate of choice without support from almost 20 percent of white voters. We do not confront that issue, however, because for some reason respondents conceded the third Gingles requirement in state court.) </s> As the Gingles Court explained, "in the absence of significant white bloc voting it cannot be said that the ability of minority voters to elect their chosen representatives is inferior to that of white voters." 478 U.S., at 49, n.15. Were the Court to adopt petitioners' theory and dispense with the majority-minority requirement, the ruling would call in question the Gingles framework the Court has applied under §2. See LULAC, 548 U.S., at 490, n.8. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("All aspects of our established analysis for majority-minority districts in Gingles and its progeny may have to be rethought in analyzing ostensible coalition districts"); cf. Metts v. Murphy, 363 F.3d 8, 12 (CA1 2004) (en banc) (per curiam) (allowing influence-district claim to survive motion to dismiss but noting "there is tension in this case for plaintiffs in any effort to satisfy both the first and third prong of Gingles"). </s> We find support for the majority-minority requirement in the need for workable standards and sound judicial and legislative administration. The rule draws clear lines for courts and legislatures alike. The same cannot be said of a less exacting standard that would mandate crossover districts under §2. Determining whether a §2 claim would lie--i.e., determining whether potential districts could function as crossover districts--would place courts in the untenable position of predicting many political variables and tying them to race-based assumptions. The judiciary would be directed to make predictions or adopt premises that even experienced polling analysts and political experts could not assess with certainty, particularly over the long term. For example, courts would be required to pursue these inquiries: What percentage of white voters supported minority-preferred candidates in the past? How reliable would the crossover votes be in future elections? What types of candidates have white and minority voters supported together in the past and will those trends continue? Were past crossover votes based on incumbency and did that depend on race? What are the historical turnout rates among white and minority voters and will they stay the same? Those questions are speculative, and the answers (if they could be supposed) would prove elusive. A requirement to draw election districts on answers to these and like inquiries ought not to be inferred from the text or purpose of §2. Though courts are capable of making refined and exacting factual inquiries, they "are inherently ill-equipped" to "make decisions based on highly political judgments" of the sort that crossover-district claims would require. Holder, 512 U.S., at 894 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). There is an underlying principle of fundamental importance: We must be most cautious before interpreting a statute to require courts to make inquiries based on racial classifications and race-based predictions. The statutory mandate petitioners urge us to find in §2 raises serious constitutional questions. See infra, at 16-18. </s> Heightening these concerns even further is the fact that §2 applies nationwide to every jurisdiction that must draw lines for election districts required by state or local law. Crossover-district claims would require courts to make predictive political judgments not only about familiar, two-party contests in large districts but also about regional and local jurisdictions that often feature more than two parties or candidates. Under petitioners' view courts would face the difficult task of discerning crossover patterns in nonpartisan contests for a city commission, a school board, or a local water authority. The political data necessary to make such determinations are nonexistent for elections in most of those jurisdictions. And predictions would be speculative at best given that, especially in the context of local elections, voters' personal affiliations with candidates and views on particular issues can play a large role. </s> Unlike any of the standards proposed to allow crossover-district claims, the majority-minority rule relies on an objective, numerical test: Do minorities make up more than 50 percent of the voting-age population in the relevant geographic area? That rule provides straightforward guidance to courts and to those officials charged with drawing district lines to comply with §2. See LULAC, supra, at 485 (opinion of Souter, J.) (recognizing need for "clear-edged rule"). Where an election district could be drawn in which minority voters form a majority but such a district is not drawn, or where a majority-minority district is cracked by assigning some voters elsewhere, then--assuming the other Gingles factors are also satisfied--denial of the opportunity to elect a candidate of choice is a present and discernible wrong that is not subject to the high degree of speculation and prediction attendant upon the analysis of crossover claims. Not an arbitrary invention, the majority-minority rule has its foundation in principles of democratic governance. The special significance, in the democratic process, of a majority means it is a special wrong when a minority group has 50 percent or more of the voting population and could constitute a compact voting majority but, despite racially polarized bloc voting, that group is not put into a district. </s> Given the text of §2, our cases interpreting that provision, and the many difficulties in assessing §2 claims without the restraint and guidance provided by the majority-minority rule, no federal court of appeals has held that §2 requires creation of coalition districts. Instead, all to consider the question have interpreted the first Gingles factor to require a majority-minority standard. See Hall, 385 F.3d, at 427-430 (CA4 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 961 (2005); Valdespino v. Alamo Heights Independent School Dist., 168 F.3d 848, 852-853 (CA5 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1114 (2000); Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818, 828-829 (CA6 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1138 (1999); Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d 1303, 1311-1312 (CA10 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1229 (1997); Romero v. Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1424, n.7, 1425-1426 (CA9 1989), overruled on other grounds, 914 F.2d 1136, 1141 (CA9 1990); McNeil v. Springfield Park Dist., 851 F.2d 937, 947 (CA7 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1031 (1989). Cf. Metts, 363 F.3d, at 11 (expressing unwillingness "at the complaint stage to foreclose the possibility" of influence-district claims). We decline to depart from the uniform interpretation of §2 that has guided federal courts and state and local officials for more than 20 years. </s> To be sure, the Gingles requirements "cannot be applied mechanically and without regard to the nature of the claim." Voinovich, 507 U.S., at 158. It remains the rule, however, that a party asserting §2 liability must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the minority population in the potential election district is greater than 50 percent. No one contends that the African-American voting-age population in District 18 exceeds that threshold. Nor does this case involve allegations of intentional and wrongful conduct. We therefore need not consider whether intentional discrimination affects the Gingles analysis. Cf. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 14 (evidence of discriminatory intent "tends to suggest that the jurisdiction is not providing an equal opportunity to minority voters to elect the representative of their choice, and it is therefore unnecessary to consider the majority-minority requirement before proceeding to the ultimate totality-of-the-circumstances analysis"); see also Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 771 (CA9 1990). Our holding does not apply to cases in which there is intentional discrimination against a racial minority. B </s> In arguing for a less restrictive interpretation of the first Gingles requirement petitioners point to the text of §2 and its guarantee that political processes be "equally open to participation" to protect minority voters' "opportunity ... to elect representatives of their choice." 42 U.S.C. §1973(b) (2000 ed.). An "opportunity," petitioners argue, occurs in crossover districts as well as majority-minority districts; and these extended opportunities, they say, require §2 protection. But petitioners put emphasis on the word "opportunity" at the expense of the word "equally." The statute does not protect any possible opportunity or mechanism through which minority voters could work with other constituencies to elect their candidate of choice. Section 2 does not guarantee minority voters an electoral advantage. Minority groups in crossover districts cannot form a voting majority without crossover voters. In those districts minority voters have the same opportunity to elect their candidate as any other political group with the same relative voting strength. </s> The majority-minority rule, furthermore, is not at odds with §2's totality-of-the-circumstances test. The Court in DeGrandy confirmed "the error of treating the three Gingles conditions as exhausting the enquiry required by §2." 512 U.S., at 1013. Instead the Gingles requirements are preconditions, consistent with the text and purpose of §2, to help courts determine which claims could meet the totality-of-the-circumstances standard for a §2 violation. See Growe, 507 U.S., at 40 (describing the "Gingles threshold factors"). </s> To the extent there is any doubt whether §2 calls for the majority-minority rule, we resolve that doubt by avoiding serious constitutional concerns under the Equal Protection Clause. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381-382 (2005) (canon of constitutional avoidance is "a tool for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts"). Of course, the "moral imperative of racial neutrality is the driving force of the Equal Protection Clause," and racial classifications are permitted only "as a last resort." Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 518, 519 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). "Racial classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers. Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters--a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire." Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993). If §2 were interpreted to require crossover districts throughout the Nation, "it would unnecessarily infuse race into virtually every redistricting, raising serious constitutional questions." LULAC, 548 U.S., at 446 (opinion of Kennedy, J.); see also Ashcroft, 539 U.S., at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring). That interpretation would result in a substantial increase in the number of mandatory districts drawn with race as "the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision." Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995). </s> On petitioners' view of the case courts and legislatures would need to scrutinize every factor that enters into districting to gauge its effect on crossover voting. Injecting this racial measure into the nationwide districting process would be of particular concern with respect to consideration of party registration or party influence. The easiest and most likely alliance for a group of minority voters is one with a political party, and some have suggested using minority voters' strength within a particular party as the proper yardstick under the first Gingles requirement. See, e.g., LULAC, supra, at 485-486 (opinion of Souter, J.) (requiring only "that minority voters ... constitute a majority of those voting in the primary of ... the party tending to win in the general election"). That approach would replace an objective, administrable rule with a difficult "judicial inquiry into party rules and local politics" to determine whether a minority group truly "controls" the dominant party's primary process. McLoughlin, Gingles in Limbo: Coalitional Districts, Party Primaries and Manageable Vote Dilution Claims, 80 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 312, 349 (2005). More troubling still is the inquiry's fusion of race and party affiliation as a determinant when partisan considerations themselves may be suspect in the drawing of district lines. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id., at 316 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); see also Pildes 1565 (crossover-district requirement would essentially result in political party "entitlement to ... a certain number of seats"). Disregarding the majority-minority rule and relying on a combination of race and party to presume an effective majority would involve the law and courts in a perilous enterprise. It would rest on judicial predictions, as a matter of law, that race and party would hold together as an effective majority over time--at least for the decennial apportionment cycles and likely beyond. And thus would the relationship between race and party further distort and frustrate the search for neutral factors and principled rationales for districting. </s> Petitioners' approach would reverse the canon of avoidance. It invites the divisive constitutional questions that are both unnecessary and contrary to the purposes of our precedents under the Voting Rights Act. Given the consequences of extending racial considerations even further into the districting process, we must not interpret §2 to require crossover districts. C </s> Our holding that §2 does not require crossover districts does not consider the permissibility of such districts as a matter of legislative choice or discretion. Assuming a majority-minority district with a substantial minority population, a legislative determination, based on proper factors, to create two crossover districts may serve to diminish the significance and influence of race by encouraging minority and majority voters to work together toward a common goal. The option to draw such districts gives legislatures a choice that can lead to less racial isolation, not more. And as the Court has noted in the context of §5 of the Voting Rights Act, "various studies have suggested that the most effective way to maximize minority voting strength may be to create more influence or [crossover] districts." Ashcroft, 539 U.S., at 482. Much like §5, §2 allows States to choose their own method of complying with the Voting Rights Act, and we have said that may include drawing crossover districts. See id., at 480-483. When we address the mandate of §2, however, we must note it is not concerned with maximizing minority voting strength, DeGrandy, 512 U.S., at 1022; and, as a statutory matter, §2 does not mandate creating or preserving crossover districts. Our holding also should not be interpreted to entrench majority-minority districts by statutory command, for that, too, could pose constitutional concerns. See Miller v. Johnson, supra; Shaw v. Reno, supra. States that wish to draw crossover districts are free to do so where no other prohibition exists. Majority-minority districts are only required if all three Gingles factors are met and if §2 applies based on a totality of the circumstances. In areas with substantial crossover voting it is unlikely that the plaintiffs would be able to establish the third Gingles precondition--bloc voting by majority voters. See supra, at 11. In those areas majority-minority districts would not be required in the first place; and in the exercise of lawful discretion States could draw crossover districts as they deemed appropriate. See Pildes 1567 ("Districts could still be designed in such places that encouraged coalitions across racial lines, but these districts would result from legislative choice, not ... obligation"). States can--and in proper cases should--defend against alleged §2 violations by pointing to crossover voting patterns and to effective crossover districts. Those can be evidence, for example, of diminished bloc voting under the third Gingles factor or of equal political opportunity under the §2 totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. And if there were a showing that a State intentionally drew district lines in order to destroy otherwise effective crossover districts, that would raise serious questions under both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. See Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 481-482 (1997); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13-14. There is no evidence of discriminatory intent in this case, however. Our holding recognizes only that there is no support for the claim that §2 can require the creation of crossover districts in the first instance. </s> Petitioners claim the majority-minority rule is inconsistent with §5, but we rejected a similar argument in LULAC, 548 U.S., at 446 (opinion of Kennedy,J.). The inquiries under §§2 and 5 are different. Section 2 concerns minority groups' opportunity "to elect representatives of their choice," 42 U.S.C. §1973(b) (2000 ed.), while the more stringent §5 asks whether a change has the purpose or effect of "denying or abridging the right to vote," §1973c. See LULAC, supra, at 446; Bossier Parish, supra, at 476-480. In LULAC, we held that although the presence of influence districts is relevant for the §5 retrogression analysis, "the lack of such districts cannot establish a §2 violation." 548 U.S., at 446 (opinion of Kennedy,J.); see also Ashcroft, 539 U.S., at 482-483. The same analysis applies for crossover districts: Section 5 "leaves room" for States to employ crossover districts, id., at 483, but §2 does not require them. IV </s> Some commentators suggest that racially polarized voting is waning--as evidenced by, for example, the election of minority candidates where a majority of voters are white. See Note, The Future of Majority-Minority Districts in Light of Declining Racially Polarized Voting, 116 Harv. L.Rev. 2208, 2209 (2003); see also id., at 2216-2222; Pildes 1529-1539; Bullock & Dunn, The Demise of Racial Districting and the Future of Black Representation, 48 Emory L.J. 1209 (1999). Still, racial discrimination and racially polarized voting are not ancient history. Much remains to be done to ensure that citizens of all races have equal opportunity to share and participate in our democratic processes and traditions; and §2 must be interpreted to ensure that continued progress. It would be an irony, however, if §2 were interpreted to entrench racial differences by expanding a "statute meant to hasten the waning of racism in American politics." DeGrandy, supra, at 1020. Crossover districts are, by definition, the result of white voters joining forces with minority voters to elect their preferred candidate. The Voting Rights Act was passed to foster this cooperation. We decline now to expand the reaches of §2 to require, by force of law, the voluntary cooperation our society has achieved. Only when a geographically compact group of minority voters could form a majority in a single-member district has the first Gingles requirement been met. </s> The judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina is affirmed. It is so ordered. </s> GARY BARTLETT, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, etal., PETITIONERS v. DWIGHT STRICKLAND etal. on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of north carolina [March 9, 2009] </s> Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joins, concurring in the judgment. </s> I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my opinion in Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 891 (1994) (opinion concurring in judgment). The text of §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 does not authorize any vote dilution claim, regardless of the size of the minority population in a given district. See 42 U.S.C. §1973(a) (2000 ed.) (permitting only a challenge to a "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure"); see also Holder, supra, at 893 (stating that the terms "'standard, practice, or procedure'" "reach only state enactments that limit citizens' access to the ballot"). I continue to disagree, therefore, with the framework set forth in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), for analyzing vote dilution claims because it has no basis in the text of §2. I would not evaluate any Voting Rights Act claim under a test that "has produced such a disastrous misadventure in judicial policymaking." Holder, supra, at 893. For these reasons, I concur only in the judgment. </s> GARY BARTLETT, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, etal., PETITIONERS v. DWIGHT STRICKLAND etal. on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of north carolina [March 9, 2009] </s> Justice Souter, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting. </s> The question in this case is whether a minority with under 50% of the voting population of a proposed voting district can ever qualify under §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) as residents of a putative district whose minority voters would have an opportunity "to elect representatives of their choice." 42 U.S.C. §1973(b) (2000 ed.). If the answer is no, minority voters in such a district will have no right to claim relief under §2 from a statewide districting scheme that dilutes minority voting rights. I would hold that the answer in law as well as in fact is sometimes yes: a district may be a minority-opportunity district so long as a cohesive minority population is large enough to elect its chosen candidate when combined with a reliable number of crossover voters from an otherwise polarized majority. </s> In the plurality's view, only a district with a minority population making up 50% or more of the citizen voting age population (CVAP) can provide a remedy to minority voters lacking an opportunity "to elect representatives of their choice." This is incorrect as a factual matter if the statutory phrase is given its natural meaning; minority voters in districts with minority populations under 50% routinely "elect representatives of their choice." The effects of the plurality's unwillingness to face this fact are disturbing by any measure and flatly at odds with the obvious purpose of the Act. If districts with minority populations under 50% can never count as minority-opportunity districts to remedy a violation of the States' obligation to provide equal electoral opportunity under §2, States will be required under the plurality's rule to pack black voters into additional majority-minority districts, contracting the number of districts where racial minorities are having success in transcending racial divisions in securing their preferred representation. The object of the Voting Rights Act will now be promoting racial blocs, and the role of race in districting decisions as a proxy for political identification will be heightened by any measure. I </s> Recalling the basic premises of vote-dilution claims under §2 will show just how far astray the plurality has gone. Section 2 of the VRA prohibits districting practices that "resul[t] in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race." 42 U.S.C. §1973(a). A denial or abridgment is established if, "based on the totality of circumstances," it is shown that members of a racial minority "have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." §1973(b). Since §2 was amended in 1982, 96 Stat. 134, we have read it to prohibit practices that result in "vote dilution," see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), understood as distributing politically cohesive minority voters through voting districts in ways that reduce their potential strength. See id., at 47-48. There are two classic patterns. Where voting is racially polarized, a districting plan can systemically discount the minority vote either "by the dispersal of blacks into districts in which they constitute an ineffective minority of voters" or from "the concentration of blacks into districts where they constitute an excessive majority," so as to eliminate their influence in neighboring districts. Id., at 46, n. 11. Treating dilution as a remediable harm recognizes that §2 protects not merely the right of minority voters to put ballots in a box, but to claim a fair number of districts in which their votes can be effective. See id., at 47. </s> Three points follow. First, to speak of a fair chance to get the representation desired, there must be an identifiable baseline for measuring a group's voting strength. Id., at 88 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) ("In order to evaluate a claim that a particular multimember district or single-member district has diluted the minority group's voting strength to a degree that violates §2, ... it is ... necessary to construct a measure of 'undiluted' minority voting strength"). Several baselines can be imagined; one could, for example, compare a minority's voting strength under a particular districting plan with the maximum strength possible under any alternative.1 Not surprisingly, we have conclusively rejected this approach; the VRA was passed to guarantee minority voters a fair game, not a killing. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1016-1017 (1994). We have held that the better baseline for measuring opportunity to elect under §2, although not dispositive, is the minority's rough proportion of the relevant population. Id., at 1013-1023. Thus, in assessing §2 claims under a totality of the circumstances, including the facts of history and geography, the starting point is a comparison of the number of districts where minority voters can elect their chosen candidate with the group's population percentage. Ibid; see also League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 436 (2006) (LULAC) ("We proceed now to the totality of the circumstances, and first to the proportionality inquiry, comparing the percentage of total districts that are [minority] opportunity districts with the [minority] share of the citizen voting-age population").2 </s> Second, the significance of proportionality means that a §2 claim must be assessed by looking at the overall effect of a multidistrict plan. A State with one congressional seat cannot dilute a minority's congressional vote, and only the systemic submergence of minority votes where a number of single-member districts could be drawn can be treated as harm under §2. So a §2 complaint must look to an entire districting plan (normally, statewide), alleging that the challenged plan creates an insufficient number of minority-opportunity districts in the territory as a whole. See id., at 436-437. </s> Third, while a §2 violation ultimately results from the dilutive effect of a districting plan as a whole, a §2 plaintiff must also be able to place himself in a reasonably compact district that could have been drawn to improve upon the plan actually selected. See, e.g., De Grandy, supra, at 1001-1002. That is, a plaintiff must show both an overall deficiency and a personal injury open to redress. </s> Our first essay at understanding these features of statutory vote dilution was Thornburg v. Gingles, which asked whether a multimember district plan for choosing representatives by at-large voting deprived minority voters of an equal opportunity to elect their preferred candidates. In answering, we set three now-familiar conditions that a §2 claim must meet at the threshold before a court will analyze it under the totality of circumstances: "First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district.... Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive.... Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." 478 U.S., at 50-51. </s> As we have emphasized over and over, the Gingles conditions do not state the ultimate standard under §2, nor could they, since the totality of the circumstances standard has been set explicitly by Congress. See LULAC, supra, at 425-426; De Grandy, supra, at 1011. Instead, each condition serves as a gatekeeper, ensuring that a plaintiff who proceeds to plenary review has a real chance to show a redressable violation of the ultimate §2 standard. The third condition, majority racial bloc voting, is necessary to establish the premise of vote-dilution claims: that the minority as a whole is placed at a disadvantage owing to race, not the happenstance of independent politics. Gingles, 478 U.S., at 51. The second, minority cohesion, is there to show that minority voters will vote together to elect a distinct representative of choice. Ibid. And the first, a large and geographically compact minority population, is the condition for demonstrating that a dilutive plan injures the §2 plaintiffs by failing to draw an available remedial district that would give them a chance to elect their chosen candidate. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40-41 (1993); Gingles, supra, at 50. II </s> Though this case arose under the Constitution of North Carolina, the dispositive issue is one of federal statutory law: whether a district with a minority population under 50%, but large enough to elect its chosen candidate with the help of majority voters disposed to support the minority favorite, can ever count as a district where minority voters have the opportunity "to elect representatives of their choice" for purposes of §2. I think it clear from the nature of a vote-dilution claim and the text of §2 that the answer must be yes. There is nothing in the statutory text to suggest that Congress meant to protect minority opportunity to elect solely by the creation of majority-minority districts. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 155 (1993) ("[Section 2] says nothing about majority-minority districts"). On the contrary, §2 "focuses exclusively on the consequences of apportionment," ibid., as Congress made clear when it explicitly prescribed the ultimate functional approach: a totality of the circumstances test. See 42 U.S.C. §1973(b) ("A violation ... is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown ..."). And a functional analysis leaves no doubt that crossover districts vindicate the interest expressly protected by §2: the opportunity to elect a desired representative. It has been apparent from the moment the Court first took up §2 that no reason exists in the statute to treat a crossover district as a less legitimate remedy for dilution than a majority-minority one (let alone to rule it out). See Gingles, supra, at 90, n.1 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) ("[I]f a minority group that is not large enough to constitute a voting majority in a single-member district can show that white support would probably ... enable the election of the candidates its members prefer, that minority group would appear to have demonstrated that, at least under this measure of its voting strength, it would be able to elect some candidates of its choice"); see also Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself? Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L.Rev. 1517, 1553 (2002) (hereinafter Pildes) ("What should be so magical, then, about whether there are enough black voters to become a formal majority so that a conventional 'safe' district can be created? If a safe and a coalition district have the same probability of electing a black candidate, are they not functionally identical, by definition, with respect to electing such candidates?"). </s> As these earlier comments as much as say, whether a district with a minority population under 50% of CVAP may redress a violation of §2 is a question of fact with an obvious answer: of course minority voters constituting less than 50% of the voting population can have an opportunity to elect the candidates of their choice, as amply shown by empirical studies confirming that such minority groups regularly elect their preferred candidates with the help of modest crossover by members of the majority. See, e.g., id., at 1531-1534, 1538. The North Carolina Supreme Court for example, determined that voting districts with a black voting age population of as little as 38.37% have an opportunity to elect black candidates, Pender Cty. v. Bartlett, 361 N.C. 491, 494-495, 649 S.E. 2d 364, 366-367 (2007), a factual finding that has gone unchallenged and is well supported by electoral results in North Carolina. Of the nine House districts in which blacks make up more than 50% of the voting age population (VAP), all but two elected a black representative in the 2004 election. See App. 109. Of the 12 additional House districts in which blacks are over 39% of the VAP, all but one elected a black representative in the 2004 election. Ibid. It would surely surprise legislators in North Carolina to suggest that black voters in these 12 districts cannot possibly have an opportunity to "elect [the] representatives of their choice." </s> It is of course true that the threshold population sufficient to provide minority voters with an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice is elastic, and the proportions will likely shift in the future, as they have in the past. See Pildes 1527-1532 (explaining that blacks in the 1980s required well over 50% of the population in a district to elect the candidates of their choice, but that this number has gradually fallen to well below 50%); id., at 1527, n.26 (stating that some courts went so far as to refer to 65% "as a 'rule of thumb' for the black population required to constitute a safe district"). That is, racial polarization has declined, and if it continues downward the first Gingles condition will get easier to satisfy. </s> But this is no reason to create an arbitrary threshold; the functional approach will continue to allow dismissal of claims for districts with minority populations too small to demonstrate an ability to elect, and with "crossovers" too numerous to allow an inference of vote dilution in the first place. No one, for example, would argue based on the record of experience in this case that a district with a 25% black population would meet the first Gingles condition. And the third Gingles requirement, majority-bloc voting, may well provide an analytical limit to claims based on crossover districts. See LULAC, 548 U.S., at 490, n. 8 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting the interrelationship of the first and third Gingles factors); see also post, at 1-5 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (looking to the third Gingles condition to suggest a mathematical limit to the minority population necessary for a cognizable crossover district). But whatever this limit may be, we have no need to set it here, since the respondent state officials have stipulated to majority-bloc voting, App. to Pet. for Cert. 130a. In sum, §2 addresses voting realities, and for practical purposes a 39%-minority district in which we know minorities have the potential to elect their preferred candidate is every bit as good as a 50%-minority district. </s> In fact, a crossover district is better. Recognizing crossover districts has the value of giving States greater flexibility to draw districting plans with a fair number of minority-opportunity districts, and this in turn allows for a beneficent reduction in the number of majority-minority districts with their "quintessentially race-conscious calculus," De Grandy, 512 U.S., at 1020, thereby moderating reliance on race as an exclusive determinant in districting decisions, cf. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). See also Pildes 1547-1548 ("In contrast to the Court's concerns with bizarrely designed safe districts, it is hard to see how coalitional districts could 'convey the message that political identity is, or should be, predominantly racial.'... Coalitional districts would seem to encourage and require a kind of integrative, cross-racial political alliance that might be thought consistent with, even the very ideal of, both the VRA and the U.S. Constitution" (quoting Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 980 (1996))). A crossover is thus superior to a majority-minority district precisely because it requires polarized factions to break out of the mold and form the coalitions that discourage racial divisions. III A </s> The plurality's contrary conclusion that §2 does not recognize a crossover claim is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of vote-dilution claims, a mistake epitomized in the following assessment of the crossover district in question: "[B]ecause they form only 39 percent of the voting-age population in District 18, African-Americans standing alone have no better or worse opportunity to elect a candidate than does any other group of voters with the same relative voting strength [in District 18]." Ante, at 9-10. </s> See also ante, at 16 ("[In crossover districts,] minority voters have the same opportunity to elect their candidate as any other political group with the same relative voting strength"). </s> The claim that another political group in a particular district might have the same relative voting strength as the minority if it had the same share of the population takes the form of a tautology: the plurality simply looks to one district and says that a 39% group of blacks is no worse off than a 39% group of whites would be. This statement might be true, or it might not be, and standing alone it demonstrates nothing. </s> Even if the two 39% groups were assumed to be comparable in fact because they will attract sufficient crossover (and so should be credited with satisfying the first Gingles condition), neither of them could prove a §2 violation without looking beyond the 39% district and showing a disproportionately small potential for success in the State's overall configuration of districts. As this Court has explained before, the ultimate question in a §2 case (that is, whether the minority group in question is being denied an equal opportunity to participate and elect) can be answered only by examining the broader pattern of districts to see whether the minority is being denied a roughly proportionate opportunity. See LULAC, 548 U.S., at 436-437. Hence, saying one group's 39% equals another's, even if true in particular districts where facts are known, does not mean that either, both, or neither group could show a §2 violation. The plurality simply fails to grasp that an alleged §2 violation can only be proved or disproved by looking statewide. B </s> The plurality's more specific justifications for its counterfactual position are no more supportable than its 39% tautology. 1 </s> The plurality seems to suggest that our prior cases somehow require its conclusion that a minority population under 50% will never support a §2 remedy, emphasizing that Gingles spoke of a majority and referred to the requirement that minority voters have "'the potential to elect'" their chosen representatives. Ante, at 10 (quoting, Gingles, 478 U.S., at 50, n.17). It is hard to know what to make of this point since the plurality also concedes that we have explicitly and repeatedly reserved decision on today's question. See LULAC, supra, at 443 (plurality opinion); De Grandy, 512 U.S., at 1009; Voinovich, 507 U.S., at 154; Growe, 507 U.S., at 41, n.5; Gingles, supra, at 46-47, n. 12. In fact, in our more recent cases applying §2, Court majorities have formulated the first Gingles prong in a way more consistent with a functional approach. See LULAC, supra, at 430 ("[I]n the context of a challenge to the drawing of district lines, 'the first Gingles condition requires the possibility of creating more than the existing number of reasonably compact districts with a sufficiently large minority population to elect candidates of its choice'" (quoting De Grandy, supra, at 1008)). These Court majorities get short shrift from today's plurality. In any event, even if we ignored Gingles's reservation of today's question and looked to Gingles's "potential to elect" as if it were statutory text, I fail to see how that phrase dictates that a minority's ability to compete must be singlehanded in order to count under §2. As explained already, a crossover district serves the same interest in obtaining representation as a majority-minority district; the potential of 45% with a 6% crossover promises the same result as 51% with no crossover, and there is nothing in the logic of §2 to allow a distinction between the two types of district. </s> In fact, the plurality's distinction is artificial on its own terms. In the past, when black voter registration and black voter turnout were relatively low, even black voters with 55% of a district's CVAP would have had to rely on crossover voters to elect their candidate of choice. See Pildes 1527-1528. But no one on this Court (and, so far as I am aware, any other court addressing it) ever suggested that reliance on crossover voting in such a district rendered minority success any less significant under §2, or meant that the district failed to satisfy the first Gingles factor. Nor would it be any answer to say that black voters in such a district, assuming unrealistic voter turnout, theoretically had the "potential" to elect their candidate without crossover support; that would be about as relevant as arguing in the abstract that a black CVAP of 45% is potentially successful, on the assumption that black voters could turn out en masse to elect the candidate of their choice without reliance on crossovers if enough majority voters stay home. 2 </s> The plurality is also concerned that recognizing the "potential" of anything under 50% would entail an exponential expansion of special minority districting; the plurality goes so far as to suggest that recognizing crossover districts as possible minority-opportunity districts would inherently "entitl[e] minority groups to the maximum possible voting strength." Ante, at 11. But this conclusion again reflects a confusion of the gatekeeping function of the Gingles conditions with the ultimate test for relief under §2. See ante, at 9-10 ("African-Americans standing alone have no better or worse opportunity to elect a candidate than does any other group of voters with the same relative voting strength"). As already explained, supra, at 5-6, the mere fact that all threshold Gingles conditions could be met and a district could be drawn with a minority population sufficiently large to elect the candidate of its choice does not require drawing such a district. This case simply is about the first Gingles condition, not about the number of minority-opportunity districts needed under §2, and accepting Bartlett's position would in no way imply an obligation to maximize districts with minority voter potential. Under any interpretation of the first Gingles factor, the State must draw districts in a way that provides minority voters with a fair number of districts in which they have an opportunity to elect candidates of their choice; the only question here is which districts will count toward that total. 3 </s> The plurality's fear of maximization finds a parallel in the concern that treating crossover districts as minority-opportunity districts would "create serious tension" with the third Gingles prerequisite of majority-bloc voting. Ante, at 11. The plurality finds "[i]t ... difficult to see how the majority-bloc-voting requirement could be met in a district where, by definition, white voters join in sufficient numbers with minority voters to elect the minority's preferred candidate." Ibid. It is not difficult to see. If a minority population with 49% of the CVAP can elect the candidate of its choice with crossover by 2% of white voters, the minority "by definition" relies on white support to elect its preferred candidate. But this fact alone would raise no doubt, as a matter of definition or otherwise, that the majority-bloc-voting requirement could be met, since as much as 98% of the majority may have voted against the minority's candidate of choice. As explained above, supra, at 8, the third Gingles condition may well impose an analytical floor to the minority population and a ceiling on the degree of crossover allowed in a crossover district; that is, the concept of majority-bloc voting requires that majority voters tend to stick together in a relatively high degree. The precise standard for determining majority-bloc voting is not at issue in this case, however; to refute the plurality's 50% rule, one need only recognize that racial cohesion of 98% would be bloc voting by any standard.3 4 </s> The plurality argues that qualifying crossover districts as minority-opportunity districts would be less administrable than demanding 50%, forcing courts to engage with the various factual and predictive questions that would come up in determining what percentage of majority voters would provide the voting minority with a chance at electoral success. Ante, at 12-13. But claims based on a State's failure to draw majority-minority districts raise the same issues of judicial judgment; even when the 50% threshold is satisfied, a court will still have to engage in factually messy enquiries about the "potential" such a district may afford, the degree of minority cohesion and majority-bloc voting, and the existence of vote-dilution under a totality of the circumstances. See supra, at 5-6, 8. The plurality's rule, therefore, conserves an uncertain amount of judicial resources, and only at the expense of ignoring a class of §2 claims that this Court has no authority to strike from the statute's coverage. 5 </s> The plurality again misunderstands the nature of §2 in suggesting that its rule does not conflict with what the Court said in Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 480-482 (2003): that crossover districts count as minority-opportunity districts for the purpose of assessing whether minorities have the opportunity "to elect their preferred candidates of choice" under §5 of the VRA, 42 U.S.C.A. §1973c(b) (Supp. 2008). While the plurality is, of course, correct that there are differences between the enquiries under §2 and §5, ante, at 20, those differences do not save today's decision from inconsistency with the prior pronouncement. A districting plan violates §5 if it diminishes the ability of minority voters to "elect their preferred candidates of choice," §1973c(b), as measured against the minority's previous electoral opportunity, Ashcroft, supra, at 477. A districting plan violates §2 if it diminishes the ability of minority voters to "elect representatives of their choice," 42 U.S.C. §1973(b) (2000 ed.), as measured under a totality of the circumstances against a baseline of rough proportionality. It makes no sense to say that a crossover district counts as a minority-opportunity district when comparing the past and the present under §5, but not when comparing the present and the possible under §2. 6 </s> Finally, the plurality tries to support its insistence on a 50% threshold by invoking the policy of constitutional avoidance, which calls for construing a statute so as to avoid a possibly unconstitutional result. The plurality suggests that allowing a lower threshold would "require crossover districts throughout the Nation," ante, at 17, thereby implicating the principle of Shaw v. Reno that districting with an excessive reliance on race is unconstitutional ("excessive" now being equated by the plurality with the frequency of creating opportunity districts). But the plurality has it precisely backwards. A State will inevitably draw some crossover districts as the natural byproduct of districting based on traditional factors. If these crossover districts count as minority-opportunity districts, the State will be much closer to meeting its §2 obligation without any reference to race, and fewer minority-opportunity districts will, therefore, need to be created purposefully. But if, as a matter of law, only majority-minority districts provide a minority seeking equality with the opportunity to elect its preferred candidates, the State will have much further to go to create a sufficient number of minority-opportunity districts, will be required to bridge this gap by creating exclusively majority-minority districts, and will inevitably produce a districting plan that reflects a greater focus on race. The plurality, however, seems to believe that any reference to race in districting poses a constitutional concern, even a State's decision to reduce racial blocs in favor of crossover districts. A judicial position with these consequences is not constitutional avoidance. IV </s> More serious than the plurality opinion's inconsistency with prior cases construing §2 is the perversity of the results it portends. Consider the effect of the plurality's rule on North Carolina's districting scheme. Black voters make up approximately 20% of North Carolina's VAP4 and are distributed throughout 120 State House districts, App. to Pet. for Cert. 58a. As noted before, black voters constitute more than 50% of the VAP in 9 of these districts and over 39% of the VAP in an additional 12. Supra, at 7-8. Under a functional approach to §2, black voters in North Carolina have an opportunity to elect (and regularly do elect) the representative of their choice in as many as 21 House districts, or 17.5% of North Carolina's total districts. See App. 109-110. North Carolina's districting plan is therefore close to providing black voters with proportionate electoral opportunity. According to the plurality, however, the remedy of a crossover district cannot provide opportunity to minority voters who lack it, and the requisite opportunity must therefore be lacking for minority voters already living in districts where they must rely on crossover. By the plurality's reckoning, then, black voters have an opportunity to elect representatives of their choice in, at most, nine North Carolina House districts. See ibid. In the plurality's view, North Carolina must have a long way to go before it satisfies the §2 requirement of equal electoral opportunity.5 A State like North Carolina faced with the plurality's opinion, whether it wants to comply with §2 or simply to avoid litigation, will, therefore, have no reason to create crossover districts. Section 2 recognizes no need for such districts, from which it follows that they can neither be required nor be created to help the State meet its obligation of equal electoral opportunity under §2. And if a legislature were induced to draw a crossover district by the plurality's encouragement to create them voluntarily, ante, at 20-21, it would open itself to attack by the plurality based on the pointed suggestion that a policy favoring crossover districts runs counter to Shaw. The plurality has thus boiled §2 down to one option: the best way to avoid suit under §2, and the only way to comply with §2, is by drawing district lines in a way that packs minority voters into majority-minority districts, probably eradicating crossover districts in the process. </s> Perhaps the plurality recognizes this aberrant implication, for it eventually attempts to disavow it. It asserts that "§2 allows States to choose their own method of complying with the Voting Rights Act, and we have said that may include drawing crossover districts. . . . [But] §2 does not mandate creating or preserving crossover districts." Ante, at 19. See also, ante, at 20 (crossover districts "can be evidence ... of equal political opportunity ..."). But this is judicial fiat, not legal reasoning; the plurality does not even attempt to explain how a crossover district can be a minority-opportunity district when assessing the compliance of a districting plan with §2, but cannot be one when sought as a remedy to a §2 violation. The plurality cannot have it both ways. If voluntarily drawing a crossover district brings a State into compliance with §2, then requiring creation of a crossover district must be a way to remedy a violation of §2, and eliminating a crossover district must in some cases take a State out of compliance with the statute. And when the elimination of a crossover district does cause a violation of §2, I cannot fathom why a voter in that district should not be able to bring a claim to remedy it. </s> In short, to the extent the plurality's holding is taken to control future results, the plurality has eliminated the protection of §2 for the districts that best vindicate the goals of the statute, and has done all it can to force the States to perpetuate racially concentrated districts, the quintessential manifestations of race consciousness in American politics. </s> I respectfully dissent. </s> GARY BARTLETT, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, etal., PETITIONERS v. DWIGHT STRICKLAND etal. on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of north carolina [March 9, 2009] </s> Justice Ginsburg, dissenting. </s> I join Justice Souter's powerfully persuasive dissenting opinion, and would make concrete what is implicit in his exposition. The plurality's interpretation of §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 is difficult to fathom and severely undermines the statute's estimable aim. Today's decision returns the ball to Congress' court. The Legislature has just cause to clarify beyond debate the appropriate reading of §2. </s> GARY BARTLETT, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, etal., PETITIONERS v. DWIGHT STRICKLAND etal. on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of north carolina [March 9, 2009] </s> Justice Breyer, dissenting. </s> I join Justice Souter's opinion in full. I write separately in light of the plurality's claim that a bright-line 50% rule (used as a Gingles gateway) serves administrative objectives. In the plurality's view, that rule amounts to a relatively simple administrative device that will help separate at the outset those cases that are more likely meritorious from those that are not. Even were that objective as critically important as the plurality believes, however, it is not difficult to find other numerical gateway rules that would work better. </s> Assume that a basic purpose of a gateway number is to separate (1) districts where a minority group can "elect representatives of their choice," from (2) districts where the minority, because of the need to obtain majority crossover votes, can only "elect representatives" that are consensus candidates. 42 U. S. C. §1973(b) (2000 ed.); League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U. S. 399, 445 (2006) (plurality opinion). At first blush, one might think that a 50% rule will work in this respect. After all, if a 50% minority population votes as a bloc, can it not always elect the candidate of its choice? And if a minority population constitutes less than 50% of a district, is not any candidate elected from that district always a consensus choice of minority and majority voters? The realities of voting behavior, however, make clear that the answer to both these questions is "no." See, e.g., Brief for Nathaniel Persily etal. as Amici Curiae 5-6. ("Fifty percent is seen as a magic number by some because under conditions of complete racial polarization and equal rates of voting eligibility, registration, and turnout, the minority community will be able to elect its candidate of choice. In practice, such extreme conditions are never present. . . . [S]ome districts must be more than 50% minority, while others can be less than 50% minority, in order for the minority community to have an equal opportunity to elect its candidate of choice" (emphasis added)); see also ante, at 8 (Souter, J., dissenting). </s> No voting group is 100% cohesive. Except in districts with overwhelming minority populations, some crossover votes are often necessary. The question is how likely it is that the need for crossover votes will force a minority to reject its "preferred choice" in favor of a "consensus candidate." A 50% number does not even try to answer that question. To the contrary, it includes, say 51% minority districts, where imperfect cohesion may, in context, prevent election of the "minority-preferred" candidate, while it excludes, say, 45% districts where a smaller but more cohesive minority can, with the help of a small and reliable majority crossover vote, elect its preferred candidate. </s> Why not use a numerical gateway rule that looks more directly at the relevant question: Is the minority bloc large enough, is it cohesive enough, is the necessary majority crossover vote small enough, so that the minority (tending to vote cohesively) can likely vote its preferred candidate (rather than a consensus candidate) into office? See ante, at 7 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[E]mpirical studies confirm[] that . . . minority groups" constituting less than 50% of the voting population "regularly elect their preferred candidates with the help of modest crossover by members of the majority"); see also Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War With Itself? Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N. C. L. Rev. 1517, 1529-1535 (2002) (reviewing studies showing small but reliable crossover voting by whites in districts where minority voters have demonstrated the ability to elect their preferred candidates without constituting 50% of the population in that district). We can likely find a reasonably administrable mathematical formula more directly tied to the factors in question. </s> To take a possible example: Suppose we pick a numerical ratio that requires the minority voting age population to be twice as large as the percentage of majority crossover votes needed to elect the minority's preferred candidate. We would calculate the latter (the percentage of majority crossover votes the minority voters need) to take account of both the percentage of minority voting age population in the district and the cohesiveness with which they vote. Thus, if minority voters account for 45% of the voters in a district and 89% of those voters tend to vote cohesively as a group, then the minority needs a crossover vote of about 20% of the majority voters to elect its preferred candidate. (Such a district with 100 voters would have 45 minority voters and 55 majority voters; 40 minority voters would vote for the minority group's preferred candidate at election time; the minority voters would need 11 more votes to elect their preferred candidate; and 11 is about 20% of the majority's 55.) The larger the minority population, the greater its cohesiveness, and thus the smaller the crossover vote needed to assure success, the greater the likelihood that the minority can elect its preferred candidate and the smaller the likelihood that the cohesive minority, in order to find the needed majority crossover vote, must support a consensus, rather than its preferred, candidate. </s> In reflecting the reality that minority voters can elect the candidate of their choice when they constitute less than 50% of a district by relying on a small majority crossover vote, this approach is in no way contradictory, or even in tension with, the third Gingles requirement. Since Gingles itself, we have acknowledged that the requirement of majority-bloc voting can be satisfied even when some small number of majority voters crossover to support a minority-preferred candidate. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 59 (1986) (finding majority-bloc voting where the majority group supported African-American candidates in the general election at a rate of between 26% and 49%, with an average support of one-third). Given the difficulty of obtaining totally accurate statistics about cohesion, or even voting age population, the district courts should administer the numerical ratio flexibly, opening (or closing) the Gingles gate (in light of the probable merits of a case) where only small variances are at issue (e.g., where the minority group is 39% instead of 40% of a district). But the same is true with a 50% number (e.g., where the minority group is 49% instead of 50% of a district). See, e.g., Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 15. </s> I do not claim that the 2-to-1 ratio is a perfect rule; I claim only that it is better than the plurality's 50% rule. After all, unlike 50%, a 2-to-1 ratio (of voting age minority population to necessary non-minority crossover votes) focuses directly upon the problem at hand, better reflects voting realities, and consequently far better separates at the gateway likely sheep from likely goats. See Gingles, supra, at 45 (The Section 2 inquiry depends on a "'functional' view of the political process" and "'a searching practical evaluation of the past and present reality.'" (quoting S. Rep. No. 97-417, p.30, and n. 120 (1982)); Gingles, supra, at 94-95 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) ("[T]here is no indication that Congress intended to mandate a single, universally applicable standard for measuring undiluted minority voting strength, regardless of local conditions . . . "). In most cases, the 50% rule and the 2-to-1 rule would have roughly similar effects. Most districts where the minority voting age population is greater than 50% will almost always satisfy the 2-to-1 rule; and most districts where the minority population is below 40% will almost never satisfy the 2-to-1 rule. But in districts with minority voting age populations that range from 40% to 50%, the divergent approaches of the two standards can make a critical difference--as well they should. </s> In a word, Justice Souter well explains why the majority's test is ill suited to the statute's objectives. I add that the test the majority adopts is ill suited to its own administrative ends. Better gateway tests, if needed, can be found. </s> With respect, I dissent. </s> FOOTNOTESFootnote 1We have previously illustrated this in stylized fashion: </s> "Assume a hypothetical jurisdiction of 1,000 voters divided into 10 districts of 100 each, where members of a minority group make up 40 percent of the voting population and voting is totally polarized along racial lines. With the right geographic dispersion to satisfy the compactness requirement, and with careful manipulation of district lines, the minority voters might be placed in control of as many as 7 of the 10 districts. Each such district could be drawn with at least 51 members of the minority group, and whether the remaining minority voters were added to the groupings of 51 for safety or scattered in the other three districts, minority voters would be able to elect candidates of their choice in all seven districts." Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1016 (1994). Footnote 2Of course, this does not create an entitlement to proportionate minority representation. Nothing in the statute promises electoral success. Rather, §2 simply provides that, subject to qualifications based on a totality of circumstances, minority voters are entitled to a practical chance to compete in a roughly proportionate number of districts. Id., at 1014, n.11. "[M]inority voters are not immune from the obligation to pull, haul, and trade to find common political ground." Id., at 1020. Footnote 3This case is an entirely inappropriate vehicle for speculation about a more exact definition of majority-bloc voting. See supra, at 8-9. The political science literature has developed statistical methods for assessing the extent of majority-bloc voting that are far more nuanced than the plurality's 50% rule. See, e.g., Pildes 1534-1535 (describing a "falloff rate" that social scientists use to measure the comparative rate at which whites vote for black Democratic candidates compared to white Democratic candidates and noting that the falloff rate for congressional elections during the 1990s in North Carolina was 9%). But this issue was never briefed in this case and is not before us, the respondents having stipulated to the existence of majority-bloc voting, App. to Pet. for Cert. 130a, and there is no reason to attempt to accomplish in this case through the first Gingles factor what would actually be a quantification of the third. Footnote 4Compare Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, 2000 Voting Age Population and Voting-Age Citizens (PHC-T-31) (Table 1-1), online at http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/briefs/phc-t31/index.html (as visited March 5, 2009, and available in Clerk of Court's case file) (total VAP in North Carolina is 6,087,996), with id., Table 1-3 (black or African-American VAP is 1,216,622). Footnote 5Under the same logic, North Carolina could fracture and submerge in majority-dominated districts the 12 districts in which black voters constitute between 35% and 49% of the voting population and routinely elect the candidates of their choice without ever implicating §2, and could do so in districts not covered by §5 without implicating the VRA at all. The untenable implications of the plurality's rule do not end there. The plurality declares that its holding "does not apply to cases in which there is intentional discrimination against a racial minority." Ante, at 15. But the logic of the plurality's position compels the absurd conclusion that the invidious and intentional fracturing of crossover districts in order to harm minority voters would not state a claim under §2. After all, if the elimination of a crossover district can never deprive minority voters in the district of the opportunity "to elect representatives of their choice," minorities in an invidiously eliminated district simply cannot show an injury under §2.

United States Supreme Court BOULDEN v. HOLMAN(1969) No. 644 Argued: February 26, 1969Decided: April 2, 1969 </s> Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in accordance with the jury's verdict. After the conviction was affirmed by the Alabama Supreme Court petitioner requested federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that the introduction of a confession into evidence at his trial (which antedated Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 , and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 ) violated his constitutional rights. After a full hearing the District Court found the confession voluntary and the Court of Appeals affirmed. In his brief in this Court petitioner raised the question whether the jury that sentenced him to death was selected in accordance with the principles recently announced in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 . Held: </s> 1. The lower courts' holding that petitioner's confession was voluntary is justified. Pp. 479-481. </s> 2. Since several veniremen were excused for cause apparently because they voiced general objections to the death penalty, it appears that the sentence of death cannot constitutionally stand under Witherspoon, supra, and the cause is remanded to the District Court where this belated issue may be fully considered. Pp. 481-484. </s> 385 F.2d 102, vacated and remanded. </s> William B. Moore, Jr., by appointment of the Court, 393 U.S. 930 , argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. </s> David W. Clark, Assistant Attorney General of Alabama, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was MacDonald Gallion, Attorney General. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The petitioner was convicted in the Circuit Court of Morgan County, Alabama, of first-degree murder, and [394 U.S. 478, 479] was sentenced to death in accordance with the verdict of the jury. After the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, 278 Ala. 437, 179 So.2d 20, the petitioner instituted this habeas corpus proceeding in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. District Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., denied relief, 257 F. Supp. 1013, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 385 F.2d 102, rehearing denied, 393 F.2d 932, 395 F.2d 169. We granted certiorari. 393 U.S. 822 . </s> I. </s> Although there was substantial additional evidence of the petitioner's guilt, his conviction was based in part on a confession he had made some days after his arrest. His request for habeas corpus relief rested on a claim that the introduction of that confession into evidence violated his rights under the Constitution. 1 Since his [394 U.S. 478, 480] trial antedated our decisions in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 , and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , that claim is essentially a contention that under the constitutional standards prevailing prior to those decisions, his confession was made involuntarily. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 ; Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 . </s> After holding a full hearing regarding the issue and considering the state court record, the District Court, in an opinion applying the proper constitutional standards, was unable to conclude that the petitioner's confession was "other than voluntarily made." The confession, the court found, "simply was not coerced." 257 F. Supp., at 1017, 1016. The Court of Appeals, likewise applying appropriate standards, similarly could "find from the record here no plausible suggestion that Boulden's will was overborne . . . ." 385 F.2d, at 107. 2 </s> Little purpose would be served by an extensive summation of the record in the District Court proceedings and in the state trial court. The question whether a confession was voluntarily made necessarily turns on the "totality of the circumstances" 3 in any particular case, and most of the relevant circumstances surrounding the petitioner's confession are set out in the opinions of the District Court and the Court of Appeals. Suffice it to say that we have made an independent study of the entire record 4 and have determined that, although the [394 U.S. 478, 481] issue is a relatively close one, the conclusion reached by the District Court and the Court of Appeals was justified. </s> II. </s> In seeking habeas corpus the petitioner challenged only the admission of his confession into evidence, and his petition for certiorari was limited to that claim. In his brief and in oral argument on the merits, however, he has raised a substantial additional question: whether the jury that sentenced him to death was selected in accordance with the principles underlying our decision last Term in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 . </s> We held in Witherspoon that "a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction." 391 U.S., at 522 . In the present case, the record indicates that no less than 15 prospective jurors were excluded by the prosecution under an Alabama statute that provides: </s> "On the trial for any offense which may be punished capitally, . . . it is a good cause of challenge by the state that the person has a fixed opinion against capital . . . punishmen[t] . . . ." 5 </s> That statutory standard has been construed by the Alabama Supreme Court to authorize the exclusion of potential jurors who, although "opposed to capital punishment, . . . would hang some men." Untreinor v. State, 146 Ala. 26, 33, 41 So. 285, 287. </s> However, as we emphasized in Witherspoon, "The critical question . . . is not how the phrases employed in this area have been construed by courts and commentators. [394 U.S. 478, 482] What matters is how they might be understood - or misunderstood - by prospective jurors." 391 U.S., at 516 , n. 9. "The most that can be demanded of a venireman in this regard," we said, "is that he be willing to consider all of the penalties provided by state law, and that he not be irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings. If the voir dire testimony in a given case indicates that veniremen were excluded on any broader basis than this, the death sentence cannot be carried out . . . ." Id., at 522, n. 21. We made it clear that "[u]nless a venireman states unambiguously that he would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment no matter what the trial might reveal, it simply cannot be assumed that that is his position." Id., at 516, n. 9. </s> It appears that at the petitioner's trial two prospective jurors were excluded only after they had acknowledged that they would "never" be willing to impose the death penalty. 6 Eleven veniremen, however, appear to have been excused for cause simply on the basis of their affirmative [394 U.S. 478, 483] answers to the question whether, in the statutory language, they had "a fixed opinion against" capital punishment. The following excerpt from the record is typical of those instances: </s> "THE COURT: Do you have a fixed opinion against capital punishment? </s> "MR. SEIBERT: Yes, sir. </s> "MR. HUNDLEY: We challenge. </s> "THE COURT: Defendant? </s> "MR. CHENAULT: No questions. </s> "THE COURT: Stand aside. You are excused." </s> Two other veniremen seem to have been excluded merely by virtue of their statements that they did not "believe in" capital punishment. 7 Yet it is entirely possible that [394 U.S. 478, 484] a person who has "a fixed opinion against" or who does not "believe in" capital punishment might nevertheless be perfectly able as a juror to abide by existing law - to follow conscientiously the instructions of a trial judge and to consider fairly the imposition of the death sentence in a particular case. </s> It appears, therefore, that the sentence of death imposed upon the petitioner cannot constitutionally stand under Witherspoon v. Illinois. We do not, however, finally decide that question here, for several reasons. First, the Witherspoon issue was not raised in the District Court, in the Court of Appeals, 8 or in the petition for certiorari filed in this Court. A further hearing directed to the issue might conceivably modify in some fashion the conclusion so strongly suggested by the record now before us. Further, it is not clear whether the petitioner has exhausted his state remedies with respect to this issue. Finally, in the event it turns out, as now appears, that relief from this death sentence must be ordered, a local federal court will be far better equipped than are we to frame an appropriate decree with due regard to available Alabama procedures. </s> Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded to the District Court, [394 U.S. 478, 485] where the issue that has belatedly been brought to our attention may be properly and fully considered. </s> It is so ordered. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK, while still adhering to his dissent in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 532 , acquiesces in the Court's judgment and opinion. </s> MR. JUSTICE FORTAS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Two confessions were in fact obtained, although only the second was actually introduced into evidence. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals properly noted that the second confession might have been the "end product of the earlier" one, in that "the accused [may have been] acutely aware that he had earlier made admissions against his interest and was, therefore, merely repeating his ostensibly uneraseable [sic] words of confession." 385 F.2d, at 106. See Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346 ; Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 ; cf. United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 . Consequently, in order to determine whether the second confession was properly admitted, they passed upon the voluntariness of the first as well as the second confession. We have considered the record in like fashion. </s> There is evidence that even before his two formal confessions were obtained, the petitioner had, shortly after his arrest, admitted killing the deceased. The evidence was controverted, both as to whether the petitioner made any such admission and as to whether, if he did, the admission was voluntary. It is suggested in dissent that because the opinions of the District Court and the Court of Appeals do not explicitly refer to that evidence, it must be assumed that those courts did not consider it, and that the conclusions they reached should therefore not be sustained. We cannot agree. The [394 U.S. 478, 480] petitioner has consistently contended that the events immediately following his arrest contributed to the involuntariness of his later confessions, and we are unable to assume that the evidence referred to was not considered by the District Court and the Court of Appeals. In any event, our own decision with respect to the voluntariness issue has been reached with that evidence fully in mind. </s> [Footnote 2 In affirming the petitioner's conviction, the Alabama Supreme Court had reached a like conclusion. 278 Ala., at 446-452, 179 So.2d ___, at 28-34. </s> [Footnote 3 Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 . </s> [Footnote 4 See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 316 . </s> [Footnote 5 Ala. Code, Tit. 30, 57. </s> [Footnote 6 "THE COURT: . . . Do you have a fixed opinion against capital or penitentiary punishment? </s> "JOHN L. NELSON raised his hand. </s> "MR. HUNDLEY: Challenge. </s> "THE COURT: Do you have a fixed opinion against capital or penitentiary punishment? </s> "MR. NELSON: Capital punishment. </s> "THE COURT: You think you would never be willing to inflict the death penalty in any type case? </s> "MR. NELSON: Yes, sir. </s> "MR. HUNDLEY: We challenge. </s> "THE COURT: Defendant? </s> "MR. CHENAULT: No questions. </s> "THE COURT: Stand aside, Mr. Nelson. </s> "E. O. MOON raised his hand. [394 U.S. 478, 483] </s> "THE COURT: Do you have a fixed opinion against capital or penitentiary punishment? </s> "MR. MOON: Capital punishment. </s> "THE COURT: You mean you would never inflict the death penalty on [sic] any case? </s> "MR. MOON: That's right. </s> "MR. HUNDLEY: Challenge. </s> "THE COURT: Defendant? </s> "MR. CHENAULT: No questions. </s> "THE COURT: Stand aside, Mr. Moon." </s> [Footnote 7 "THE COURT: What is your position on capital punishment or penitentiary punishment? </s> "MR. COLLIER: I don't believe in capital punishment. </s> "THE COURT: State? </s> "MR. HUNDLEY: Challenge. </s> "THE COURT: Any questions, Mr. Chenault? </s> "MR. CHENAULT: No questions. </s> "THE COURT: You are excused. . . . </s> . . . . </s> "MR. PATTON: . . . and I don't believe in capital punishment. </s> "MR. HUNDLEY: I'll challenge Mr. Patton on that answer, on the ground he doesn't believe in capital punishment. </s> "THE COURT: Any questions by the defendant? </s> "MR. CHENAULT: No questions. </s> "THE COURT: We . . . will let you stand aside." </s> As the initial portion of this colloquy and that set out in footnote [394 U.S. 478, 484] 6 indicate, Alabama law also authorizes the exclusion of any potential juror who has a "fixed opinion against . . . penitentiary" punishment. Ala. Code, Tit. 30, 57. Two veniremen were excused when they merely responded affirmatively to the disjunctively phrased question whether they had "a fixed opinion against capital or penitentiary punishment." It is thus not possible to discern from the record which type of punishment they objected to, although the more likely assumption would be that it was capital punishment. We did not in Witherspoon pass upon the validity of the "penitentiary" analogue to death-qualification of jurors, and we intimate today no opinion regarding that question. </s> [Footnote 8 The Court of Appeals' decision was rendered prior to our decision in Witherspoon. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> I agree that the case must be remanded to the District Court for a determination of the Witherspoon question, and I therefore join in Part II of the Court's opinion. However, I believe that on remand the District Court should also consider an aspect of petitioner's coerced confession claim which the opinions in the two courts below completely ignore, and to which this Court pays only passing attention. </s> The Court states that "[t]wo confessions were in fact obtained, although only the second was actually introduced into evidence." Ante, at 479, n. 1. The first of these was obtained during several hours of interrogation in the Limestone County jail on the night of petitioner's arrest, May 1, 1964. The second was obtained during petitioner's re-enactment of the crime on May 6. The courts below examined the circumstances in which both confessions were obtained, and concluded that both were voluntary. In my opinion this does not exhaust the coerced confession issue. </s> As the Court is compelled to recognize, petitioner made inculpatory statements on, not two, but three different occasions. The first of these was on the afternoon [394 U.S. 478, 486] of May 1, preceding the interrogation at the jail. 1 On that afternoon, petitioner was apprehended by law enforcement officers near the scene of the crime. According to petitioner, an officer of the Highway Patrol approached him and asked his name: </s> "I told him; then he told me to run because he had been wanting to kill him a nigger a long time . . . . [H]e told me to run, and then he throwed the rifle up like he was getting ready to shoot there." Record Transcript 539-540. </s> Petitioner was taken to the scene of the crime, where he was placed, in handcuffs, in a police car alone with Highway Patrol Captain Williams. He was not given any of the Miranda warnings. 2 As petitioner related: </s> "Captain Williams asked me what had happened, and I started to tell him; he cussed me and told [394 U.S. 478, 487] me it wasn't . . . . I told Captain Williams I didn't do it, and he told me that I did . . . and he told me I was lying again. And he got mad and start cussing. . . . Well, he called me a little bastard and few more names . . . . Then he told me about if I didn't confess, that the officers that was wanting to kill me, he wasn't going to stop them. . . . I told him if he would get me out of there and wouldn't let them bother me, I would confess." </s> Later, two other officers got into the back of the car. One of them "asked me how old I was, and I told him, and he told me I was old enough to die." Record Transcript 544. </s> There were about 15 or 20 officers at the scene, some of whom were armed with rifles and shotguns. Captain Williams testified that a "pretty good size crowd" was gathering - "I would say, in my best judgment, twenty-five or thirty cars . . . and people milling around out in the road." Record Transcript 647-648. It was under these circumstances that petitioner first admitted to Captain Williams that he had committed the crime. </s> Apparently because of the hostile crowd, petitioner was finally carried away from the area in a convoy of three cars; he was taken to a jail in another county as a precautionary measure. Thereafter he made what the courts have treated as the "first" confession. </s> The District Court was not, of course, obliged to credit petitioner's testimony concerning the officers' threats - some of which, but by no means all, was controverted by respondent's witnesses. But the court did not even address itself to the testimony. Indeed, except for the oblique statement that "[t]here was no evidence . . . that the protection afforded Boulden on this occasion was inadequate," 257 F. Supp. 1013, 1014 (1966); 385 F.2d 102, 104 (1967), neither of the courts below alluded to, let alone examined, the circumstances or the factual and [394 U.S. 478, 488] legal consequences of the events occurring on the afternoon of May 1, 1964. 3 </s> Without speculating as to the possible explanations for this disturbing lacuna in the opinions below, I would broaden the remand of this case so as to allow the District Court to consider whether petitioner was subjected to improper coercion on the afternoon of May 1, and what effect the events of that afternoon had on the voluntariness of the confession introduced into evidence at petitioner's trial. See Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346 (1968); id., at 350 (separate opinion). </s> [Footnote 1 This appears not only from petitioner's and respondent's oral evidence at the habeas corpus hearing, but also from the transcript of the interrogation of the night of May 1, in which Captain Williams stated: </s> "Billy, now you understand what we are doing, we just want to talk to you, want you to tell us the truth about everything that happened today. Now you know you talked with me today in the car and I just want you to repeat it all for Lt. Watts here . . . ." Appendix 57. (Emphasis added.) </s> [Footnote 2 "The review of voluntariness in cases in which the trial was held prior to our decisions in Escobedo and Miranda is not limited in any manner by these decisions. On the contrary, that a defendant was not advised of his right to remain silent or of his right respecting counsel at the outset of interrogation, as is now required by Miranda, is a significant factor in considering the voluntariness of statements later made. . . . Thus, the fact that Davis was never effectively advised of his rights gives added weight to the other circumstances described below which made his confessions involuntary." Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740 -741 (1966). </s> It may additionally be noted that petitioner in the present case was a slight, sickly youth, with an I. Q. of 83. </s> [Footnote 3 In dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Tuttle, joined by Chief Judge Brown, focused on this issue: </s> "It is clear that there was an illegal interrogation and inculpatory statement obtained from this prisoner immediately following the shooting and it is clear beyond doubt that in the eliciting of the confession subsequently admitted by the State Court as a valid confession, much stress was placed by the officers on the fact that Boulden had already confessed under the circumstances which I find completely impermissible. . . . Here, it is clear beyond doubt that what has been held to be a legal confession was obtained by the officers repeatedly calling the accused's attention to the fact that he had already made sufficiently damaging statements and that they merely wanted him to fill in the details." 395 F.2d 169 (1968). </s> [394 U.S. 478, 489]

United States Supreme Court GOODMAN v. LUKENS STEEL CO.(1987) No. 85-1626 Argued: April 1, 1987Decided: June 19, 1987 </s> In 1973, petitioners in No. 85-1626 (hereinafter petitioners), including individual employees of Lukens Steel Co. (Lukens), brought suit in Federal District Court against Lukens and the employees' collective-bargaining agents (Unions), asserting racial discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The court held that Pennsylvania's 6-year statute of limitations governing contract claims applied to 1981 claims, that Lukens had discriminated in certain respects, and that the Unions were also guilty of discriminatory practices in failing to challenge Lukens' discriminatory discharges of probationary employees, in failing and refusing to assert instances of racial discrimination as grievances, and in tolerating and tacitly encouraging racial harassment. The court entered injunctive orders against Lukens and the Unions, reserving damages issues for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals held that Pennsylvania's 2-year statute of limitations governing personal injury actions, rather than the 6-year statute, controlled the 1981 claims, but affirmed the liability judgment against the Unions. </s> Held: </s> 1. The Court of Appeals was correct in selecting the Pennsylvania 2-year limitations period governing personal injury actions as the most analogous state statute of limitations to govern all 1981 suits. Section 1981 speaks not only to personal rights to contract, but also to personal rights to sue, to testify, and to equal rights under all laws for the security of persons and property; and all persons are to be subject to like punishments, taxes, and burdens of every kind. Cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 . The Court of Appeals also properly concluded that the 2-year statute should be applied retroactively to petitioners here, even though the court overruled its prior 1977 and 1978 decisions that refused to apply Pennsylvania's 2-year personal injury statute to the 1981 claims involved in those cases. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 , advises that nonretroactivity is appropriate in certain circumstances, including when the decision overrules clear Circuit precedent on which the complaining party is entitled to rely. However, until the Court of Appeals' 1977 decision, there had [482 U.S. 656, 657] been no authoritative specification of which statute of limitations applied to an employee's 1981 claims, and hence no clear precedent on which petitioners could have relied when they filed their complaint in 1973. As for the other Chevron factors, applying the 2-year statute here will not frustrate any federal law or result in inequity to the workers who are charged with knowledge that it was an unsettled question as to how far back from the date of filing their complaint the damages period would reach. Pp. 660-664. </s> 2. The courts below properly held that the Unions violated Title VII and 1981. Because both courts agreed on the facts pertaining to whether the Unions had treated blacks and whites differently and intended to discriminate on the basis of race, this Court will not examine the record, absent the Unions' showing of extraordinary reasons for doing so. There is no merit to the Unions' contention that the judgment rests on the erroneous legal premise that Title VII and 1981 are violated if a union passively sits by and does not affirmatively oppose the employer's racially discriminatory employment practices. In fact, both courts below concluded that the case against the Unions was one of more than mere acquiescence, in that the Unions deliberately chose not to assert claims of racial discrimination by the employer. Nor is there any merit to the argument that the only basis for Title VII liability was 703(c)(3)'s prohibition against a union's causing or attempting to cause illegal discrimination by an employer, which was not supported by the record. Both courts found that the Unions had discriminated on the basis of race by the way in which they represented the workers, and the Court of Appeals held that the deliberate choice not to process grievances violated 703(c)(1), the plain language of which supports such conclusion. Furthermore, the District Court properly rejected the Unions' explanation that, in order not to antagonize the employer, they did not include racial discrimination claims in grievances claiming other contract violations. A union that intentionally fails to assert discrimination claims, either to avoid antagonizing the employer and thus to improve chances of success on other issues, or in deference to the desires of its white membership, is liable under both Title VII and 1981, regardless of whether, as a subjective matter, its leaders are favorably disposed toward minorities. Pp. 664-669. </s> 777 F.2d 113, affirmed. </s> WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and STEVENS, J., joined, in Part I of which POWELL and SCALIA, JJ., joined, and in Part II of which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, [482 U.S. 656, 658] post, p. 669. POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which SCALIA, J., joined, and in Parts I, II, III, and IV of which O'CONNOR, J., joined, post. p. 680. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 689. </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 85-2010, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, et al. v. Goodman et al., also on certiorari to the same court. </s> Robert M. Weinberg argued the cause for petitioners in No. 85-2010 and for respondent Union in No. 85-1626. With him on the briefs were Julia Penny Clark, Michael H. Gottesman, Laurence Gold, David Silberman, Bernard Kleiman, and Carl Frankel. </s> William H. Ewing argued the cause for petitioners in No. 85-1626 and for respondents in No. 85-2010. With him on the briefs for petitioners in No. 85-1626 were Arnold P. Borish and Daniel Segal. Messrs. Ewing, Borish, Segal, and Leslie A. Hayes filed a brief for respondents in No. 85-2010.Fn </s> Fn [482 U.S. 656, 658] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, Deputy Solicitor General Ayer, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Carvin, Roger Clegg, and David K. Flynn; and for the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Robert F. Mullen, Harold R. Tyler, James Robertson, Norman Redlich, William L. Robinson. Judith A. Winston, Richard T. Seymour, Joan Bertin, Judith L. Lichtman, Grover G. Hankins, Antonia Hernandez, and E. Richard Larson. </s> Robert E. Williams and Douglas S. McDowell filed a brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae urging affirmance. </s> JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In 1973, individual employees 1 of Lukens Steel Company (Lukens) brought this suit on behalf of themselves and others, asserting racial discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., 2 and [482 U.S. 656, 659] 42 U.S.C. 1981 3 against their employer and their collective-bargaining agents, the United Steelworkers of America and two of its local unions (Unions). 4 After a bench trial, the District Court specified the periods for which Title VII claims could be litigated; it also reaffirmed a pretrial order that the Pennsylvania 6-year statute of limitations governing claims on contracts, replevin, and trespass 5 applied to the 1981 claims and that claims with respect to the period after July 14, 1967, were accordingly not barred. On the merits, the District Court found that Lukens had discriminated in certain respects, but that in others plaintiffs had not made out a case. 6 The District Court concluded that the Unions were also guilty of discriminatory practices, specifically in failing [482 U.S. 656, 660] to challenge discriminatory discharges of probationary employees, failing and refusing to assert instances of racial discrimination as grievances, and in tolerating and tacitly encouraging racial harassment. 580 F. Supp. 1114 (ED Pa. 1984). The District Court entered separate injunctive orders against Lukens and the Unions, reserving damages issues for further proceedings. Lukens and the Unions appealed, challenging the District Court's liability conclusions as well as its decision that the Pennsylvania 6-year statute of limitations, rather than the 2-year statute applicable to personal injuries, would measure the period of liability under 1981. </s> The Court of Appeals, differing with the District Court, held that the 2-year statute of limitations controlled but affirmed the liability judgment against the Unions. 777 F.2d 113 (CA3 1985). 7 The employees' petition for certiorari in No. 85-1626 challenged the Court of Appeals' choice of the 1981 limitations period. The Unions' petition in No. 85-2010 claimed error in finding them liable under Title VII and 1981. We granted both petitions, 479 U.S. 982 (1986). We address in Part I the limitations issue in No. 85-1626 and the Unions' liability in Part II. </s> I </s> Because 1981, like 1982 and 1983, does not contain a statute of limitations, federal courts should select the most appropriate or analogous state statute of limitations. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 -268 (1985); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180 -182 (1976); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975). In Wilson, the reach of which is at issue in this case, there were three [482 U.S. 656, 661] holdings: for the purpose of characterizing a claim asserted under 1983, federal law, rather than state law, is controlling; a single state statute of limitations should be selected to govern all 1983 suits; and because claims under 1983 are in essence claims for personal injury, the state statute applicable to such claims should be borrowed. Petitioners in No. 85-1626 (hereafter petitioners), agree with the Court of Appeals that the first two Wilson holdings apply in 1981 cases, but insist that the third does not. Their submission is that 1981 deals primarily with economic rights, more specifically the execution and enforcement of contracts, and that the appropriate limitations period to borrow is the one applicable to suits for interference with contractual rights, which in Pennsylvania was six years. </s> The Court of Appeals properly rejected this submission. Section 1981 has a much broader focus than contractual rights. The section speaks not only of personal rights to contract, but personal rights to sue, to testify, and to equal rights under all laws for the security of persons and property; and all persons are to be subject to like punishments, taxes, and burdens of every kind. Section 1981 of the present Code was 1977 of the Revised Statutes of 1874. Its heading was and is "Equal rights under the law" and is contained in a chapter entitled "Civil Rights." Insofar as it deals with contracts, it declares the personal right to make and enforce contracts, a right, as the section has been construed, that may not be interfered with on racial grounds. The provision asserts, in effect, that competence and capacity to contract shall not depend upon race. It is thus part of a federal law barring racial discrimination, which, as the Court of Appeals said, is a fundamental injury to the individual rights of a person. Wilson's characterization of 1983 claims is thus equally appropriate here, particularly since 1983 would reach state action that encroaches on the rights protected by 1981. That 1981 has far-reaching economic consequences does not change this conclusion, since such impact flows from [482 U.S. 656, 662] guaranteeing the personal right to engage in economically significant activity free from racially discriminatory interference. The Court of Appeals was correct in selecting the Pennsylvania 2-year limitations period governing personal injury actions. </s> We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the 2-year statute, adopted in compliance with Wilson, should be applied in this case. The usual rule is that federal cases should be decided in accordance with the law existing at the time of decision. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 486 , n. 16 (1981); Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 281 (1969); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, 109 (1801). But Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), advises that nonretroactivity is appropriate in certain defined circumstances. There the Court held that a decision specifying the applicable state statute of limitations in another context should not be applied retroactively because the decision overruled clear Circuit precedent on which the complaining party was entitled to rely, because the new limitations period had been occasioned by a change in the substantive law the purpose of which would not be served by retroactivity, and because retroactive application would be inequitable. Petitioners argue that the same considerations are present here. We disagree. </s> It is true, as petitioners point out, that the Court of Appeals decision in this case overruled prior Third Circuit cases, Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Assn., 559 F.2d 894 (1977); Davis v. United States Steel Supply, Div. of United States Steel Corp., 581 F.2d 335, 338, 341, n. 8 (1978), each of which had refused to apply the Pennsylvania 2-year personal injury statute of limitations to the 1981 claims involved in those cases. But until Meyers was decided in 1977, there had been no authoritative specification of which statute of limitations applied to an employee's 1981 claims, and hence no clear precedent on which petitioners [482 U.S. 656, 663] could have relied when they filed their complaint in this case in 1973. In a later case, Al-Khazraji v. St. Francis College, 784 F.2d 505, 512-514 (1986), the Court of Appeals refused to apply retroactively the same 2-year statute in an employment discrimination 1981 case because the case was filed when clear Circuit precedent specified a longer statute. Distinguishing its decision there from the case now before us, the Court of Appeals said: "In 1973, when the complaint was filed in the Goodman case, there was no established precedent in the Third Circuit to indicate the appropriate limitations period for Section 1981 claims." 784 F.2d, at 512. It was obviously for this reason that the Court of Appeals here said that its decision "should be given the customary retroactive effect." 777 F.2d, at 120. The court cited its prior decision in Smith v. Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188 (1985), 8 a post-Wilson case in which the Court of Appeals applied retroactively the 2-year statute in a 1983 employment termination case because of the unsettled law in the Third and other Circuits. </s> As for the remainder of the Chevron factors, applying the 2-year personal injury statute, which is wholly consistent with Wilson v. Garcia and with the general purposes of statutes of repose, will not frustrate any federal law or result in inequity to the workers who are charged with knowledge that it was an unsettled question as to how far back from the date of filing their complaint the damages period would [482 U.S. 656, 664] reach. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals properly applied the 2-year statute of limitations to the present case. 9 </s> II </s> This case was tried for 32 days in 1980. One-hundred fifty-seven witnesses testified and over 2,000 exhibits were introduced. On February 13, 1984, the District Court filed its findings and conclusions. In an introductory section discussing the relevant legal principles, the trial judge discussed, among other things, the nature of "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact" cases under Title VII, recognizing that in the former the plaintiff must prove not only disparate treatment, but trace its cause to intentional racial discrimination, an unnecessary element in disparate-impact cases. The District Court also emphasized that proof of discriminatory intent is crucial in 1981 cases and that such intent cannot be made out by showing only facially neutral conduct that burdens one race more than another. </s> The District Court proceeded to find that the company had violated Title VII in several significant respects, including the discharge of employees during their probationary period, the toleration of racial harassment by employees, initial job assignments, promotions, and decisions on incentive pay. The court also found that in these identical ways the company had also violated 1981, a finding the court could not have made without concluding that the company had intentionally discriminated on a racial basis in these respects. </s> Similarly, the Unions were found to have discriminated on racial grounds in violation of both Title VII and 1981 certain ways: failing to challenge discriminatory discharges of probationary employees; failure and refusal to assert racial [482 U.S. 656, 665] discrimination as a ground for grievances; and toleration and tacit encouragement of racial harassment. </s> What the conduct of the Unions had been and whether they had treated blacks and whites differently were questions of historical fact that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) enjoins appellate courts to accept unless clearly erroneous. So is the issue of whether the Unions intended to discriminate based on race. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 -288 (1982). The Court of Appeals did not set aside any of the District Court's findings of fact that are relevant to this case. That is the way the case comes to us, and both courts below having agreed on the facts, we are not inclined to examine the record for ourselves absent some extraordinary reason for undertaking this task. Nothing the Unions have submitted indicates that we should do so. "A court of law, such as this Court is, rather than a court for correction of errors in factfinding, cannot undertake to review concurrent findings of fact by two courts below in the absence of a very obvious and exceptional showing of error." Graver Mfg. Co. v. Linde Co., 336 U.S. 271, 275 (1949). See also United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 273 (1978). Unless there are one or more errors of law inhering in the judgment below, as the Unions claim there are, we should affirm it. </s> The Unions contend that the judgment against them rests on the erroneous legal premise that Title VII and 1981 are violated if a union passively sits by and does not affirmatively oppose the employer's racially discriminatory employment practices. It is true that the District Court declared that mere union passivity in the face of employer discrimination renders the union liable under Title VII and, if racial animus is properly inferrable, under 1981 as well." 10 We need not [482 U.S. 656, 666] discuss this rather abstract observation, for the court went on to say that the evidence proves "far more" than mere passivity. 11 As found by the court, the facts were that since 1965, the collective-bargaining contract contained an express clause binding both the employer and the Unions not to discriminate on racial grounds; that the employer was discriminating against blacks in discharging probationary employees, which the Unions were aware of but refused to do anything about by way of filing proffered grievances or otherwise; that the Unions had ignored grievances based on instances of harassment which were indisputably racial in nature; and that the Unions had regularly refused to include assertions of racial discrimination in grievances that also asserted other contract violations. 12 </s> In affirming the District Court's findings against the Unions, the Court of Appeals also appeared to hold that the [482 U.S. 656, 667] Unions had an affirmative duty to combat employer discrimination in the workplace. 777 F.2d, at 126-127. But it, too, held that the case against the Unions was much stronger than one of mere acquiescence in that the Unions deliberately chose not to assert claims of racial discrimination by the employer. It was the Court of Appeals' view that these intentional and knowing refusals discriminated against the victims who were entitled to have their grievances heard. </s> The Unions submit that the only basis for any liability in this case under Title VII is 703(c)(3), which provides that a Union may not "cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section," 78 Stat. 256, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(c)(3), and that nothing the District Court found and the Court of Appeals accepted justifies liability under this prohibition. We need not differ with the Unions on the reach of 703(c)(3), for 703(c)(1) makes it an unlawful practice for a Union to "exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C. 2000-2(c)(1). (Emphasis added.) Both courts below found that the Unions had indeed discriminated on the basis of race by the way in which they represented the workers, and the Court of Appeals expressly held that "[t]he deliberate choice not to process grievances also violated 703(c)(1) of Title VII." 777 F.2d, at 127. The plain language of the statute supports this conclusion. </s> The Court of Appeals is also faulted for stating that the Unions had violated their duty of fair representation, which the Unions assert has no relevance to this case. But we do not understand the Court of Appeals to have rested its affirmance on this ground, for as indicated above, it held that the Unions had violated 703. </s> The Unions insist that it was error to hold them liable for not including racial discrimination claims in grievances claiming other violations of the contract. The Unions followed [482 U.S. 656, 668] this practice, it was urged, because these grievances could be resolved without making racial allegations and because the employer would "get its back up" if racial bias was charged, thereby making it much more difficult to prevail. The trial judge, although initially impressed by this seemingly neutral reason for failing to press race discrimination claims, ultimately found the explanation "unacceptable" because the Unions also ignored grievances which involved racial harassment violating the contract covenant against racial discrimination but which did not also violate another provision. The judge also noted that the Unions had refused to complain about racially based terminations of probationary employees, even though the express undertaking not to discriminate protected this group of employees, as well as others, and even though, as the District Court found, the Unions knew that blacks were being discharged at a disproportionately higher rate than whites. In the judgment of the District Court, the virtual failure by the Unions to file any race-bias grievances until after this lawsuit started, knowing that the employer was practicing what the contract prevented, rendered the Unions' explanation for their conduct unconvincing. 13 </s> As we understand it, there was no suggestion below that the Unions held any racial animus against or denigrated blacks generally. Rather, it was held that a collective-bargaining agent could not, without violating Title VII and [482 U.S. 656, 669] 1981, follow a policy of refusing to file grievable racial discrimination claims however strong they might be and however sure the agent was that the employer was discriminating against blacks. The Unions, in effect, categorized racial grievances as unworthy of pursuit and, while pursuing thousands of other legitimate grievances, ignored racial discrimination claims on behalf of blacks, knowing that the employer was discriminating in violation of the contract. Such conduct, the courts below concluded, intentionally discriminated against blacks seeking a remedy for disparate treatment based on their race and violated both Title VII and 1981. As the District Court said: "A union which intentionally avoids asserting discrimination claims, either so as not to antagonize the employer and thus improve its chances of success on other issues, or in deference to the perceived desires of its white membership, is liable under both Title [VII] and 1981, regardless of whether, as a subjective matter, its leaders were favorably disposed toward minorities." 580 F. Supp., at 1160. </s> The courts below, in our view, properly construed and applied Title VII and 1981. Those provisions do not permit a union to refuse to file any and all grievances presented by a black person on the ground that the employer looks with disfavor on and resents such grievances. It is no less violative of these laws for a union to pursue a policy of rejecting disparate-treatment grievances presented by blacks solely because the claims assert racial bias and would be very troublesome to process. </s> In both Nos. 85-1626 and 85-2010, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The United Political Action Committee of Chester County was also a plaintiff in the case. </s> [Footnote 2 The part of Title VII relevant to the suit against the Unions is 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(c), which provides: </s> "(c) Labor organization practices </s> "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization - [482 U.S. 656, 659] </s> "(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; </s> "(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or </s> "(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section." </s> [Footnote 3 Section 1981 reads as follows: </s> "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other." </s> [Footnote 4 United Steelworkers of America is the certified bargaining agent. The two locals act on its behalf. </s> [Footnote 5 Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 12, 31 (Purdon 1931), repealed by Judiciary Act of 1976, Act No. 142, 1976 Pa. Laws 586. Under the 1976 Act, the new statute of limitations does not apply to claims arising prior to June 27, 1978. </s> [Footnote 6 The judgment against Lukens is not at issue in the cases brought here. </s> [Footnote 7 Judge Garth dissented on the question of which statute of limitations to apply to the workers' 1981 claim. 777 F.2d, at 130. He acknowledged that all 1981 claims should be treated the same; but in his view, 1981 claims involved injury to economic rights and the personal injury characterization adopted by the Court in Wilson was ill suited for claims arising under 1981. </s> [Footnote 8 In the Smith case, the Third Circuit applied our three-part test in Chevron, in concluding that Wilson should be applied to the case then before it. The court remarked: "We have held that where application of the law had been erratic and inconsistent, without clear precedent on which plaintiff could reasonably rely in waiting to file suit, a subsequent Supreme Court decision on the applicable limitations period cannot be said to have overruled clear past precedent on which the litigants may have relied." 764 F.2d, at 194-195. The court went on to note that at the time plaintiffs in that case filed suit, the Third Circuit had not ruled definitively on which limitations period applied to the particular 1983 claim at issue there. </s> [Footnote 9 The Court of Appeals recognized that giving retroactive effect to its statute of limitations holding would require reexamination of some of the liability determinations by the District Court in light of the shorter limitations period. </s> [Footnote 10 The first part of this statement must have been addressed to disparate impact, for discriminatory motive is required in disparate-treatment Title VII cases as it is in 1981 claims. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 -336, n. 15 (1977); General Building Contractors Assn., [482 U.S. 656, 666] Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982). Because the District Court eventually found that in each respect the Unions violated both Title VII and 1981 in exactly the same way, liability did not rest on a claim under Title VII that did not rest on intentional discrimination. </s> [Footnote 11 The District Court commented that there was substantial evidence, related to events occurring prior to the statute of limitations period, which "casts serious doubt on the unions' total commitment to racial equality." 580 F. Supp. 1114, 1157 (ED Pa. 1984). The District Court noted that it was the company, not the Unions, which pressed for a nondiscrimination clause in the collective-bargaining agreement. The District Court found that the Unions never took any action over the segregated locker facilities at Lukens and did not complain over other discriminatory practices by the company. The District Court found that when one employee approached the president of one of the local unions to complain about the segregated locker facilities in 1962, the president dissuaded him from complaining to the appropriate state agency. The District Court, however, found "inconclusive" the evidence offered in support of the employees' claim that the Unions' discriminated against blacks in their overall handling of grievances under the collective-bargaining agreement. </s> [Footnote 12 The District Court also found that although the Unions had objected to the company's use of certain tests, they had never done so on racial grounds, even though they "were certainly chargeable with knowledge that many of the tests" had a racially disparate impact. Id., at 1159. </s> [Footnote 13 The District Court also rejected the Unions' argument that much of the workers' case involved discrimination by the company in making initial job assignments, and that it had no control over those assignments. The court found that once hired, new employees were entitled to the protection of the collective-bargaining agreement, including the protection afforded by the nondiscrimination clause: </s> "To require blacks to continue to work in lower paying and less desirable jobs, in units disparately black, is to discriminate against them in violation of the collective bargaining agreement (and, of course, also in violation of Title VII). It is very clear, on the record in this case, that the defendant unions never sought to avail themselves of this rather obvious mechanism for protecting the interests of their members." 580 F. Supp., at 1160. </s> JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> I join Part II of the Court's opinion, affirming the Court of Appeals' decision that the Unions engaged in race discrimination [482 U.S. 656, 670] in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. I dissent, however, from Part I, which characterizes all 1981 actions as tort actions, and holds that they are subject to state statutes of limitations for personal injury. Section 1981, in its original conception and its current application, is primarily a proscription of race discrimination in the execution, administration, and enforcement of contracts. Our analysis in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), requires us to hold, therefore, that 1981 actions are governed by state statutes of limitations for interference with contractual relations. </s> I </s> In Wilson, the Court had to determine the most appropriate statute of limitations to apply to claims brought under 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now codified at 42 U.S.C. 1983. First, the Court decided that characterization of a 1983 action, for the purpose of selecting a state statute of limitations, was a matter of federal law. 471 U.S., at 268 -271. The Court then held that the federal interest in "uniformity, certainty, and the minimization of unnecessary litigation" required that all 1983 actions receive a single broad characterization for statute-of-limitations purposes. Id., at 275. For reasons identical to those stated in Wilson, the Court today concludes that 1981, like 1983, must receive a single broad characterization for statute-of-limitations purposes. I agree. The Court goes on to hold, however, that claims brought under 1983 and 1981 should receive the same characterization, and here I part company with the Court. </s> In Wilson, the Court relied on the history of 1983 in its determination that claims under the statute were best characterized as tort actions for damages resulting from personal injury. The Court observed that 1983, originally known as the Ku Klux Act, was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and that the "specific historical catalyst" for 1983 [482 U.S. 656, 671] was "the campaign of violence and deception in the South, fomented by the Ku Klux Klan." Id., at 276. The Court highlighted the legislative history of 1983, which made clear that Congress was attempting to stop a wave of murders, lynchings, and whippings and to eliminate "the refuge that local authorities extended to the authors of these outrageous incidents." Ibid. From this, the Court concluded that "[t]he atrocities that concerned Congress in 1871 plainly sounded in tort." Id., at 277. More specifically, the Court determined that, among the many types of tort claims filed under 1983, the "action for the recovery of damages for personal injuries" was the most analogous common-law cause of action. Id., at 276. </s> Performing a like historical analysis of 1981, I conclude that it should be characterized as an action for recovery of damages for interference with contractual relations. Section 1981, originally enacted as 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 1 presently provides: </s> "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other." </s> Clearly, the "full and equal benefit" and "punishment" clauses guarantee numerous rights other than equal treatment in the execution, administration, and the enforcement of contracts. In this sense 1981, like 1983, is broadly concerned with "the equal status of every `person.'" Wilson, supra, at 277 (emphasis in original). But 1981 was primarily [482 U.S. 656, 672] intended, and has been most frequently utilized, to remedy injury to a narrower category of contractual or economic rights. </s> The main targets of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were the "Black Codes," enacted in Southern States after the Thirteenth Amendment was passed. 2 Congress correctly perceived that the Black Codes were in fact poorly disguised substitutes for slavery: </s> "They defined racial status; forbade blacks from pursuing certain occupations or professions (e. g. skilled artisans, merchants, physicians, preaching without a license); forbade owning firearms or other weapons; controlled the movement of blacks by systems of passes; [482 U.S. 656, 673] required proof of residence; prohibited the congregation of groups of blacks; restricted blacks from residing in certain areas; and specified an etiquette of deference to whites, as, for example, by prohibiting blacks from directing insulting words at whites." H. Hyman & W. Wiecek, Equal Justice Under Law 319 (1982). 3 </s> In addition, the "formidable hand of custom," id., at 321, interposed itself between blacks and economic independence, forcing Congress to move against private, as well as state-sanctioned economic discrimination. See generally Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Come Round At Last: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 55 Va. L. Rev. 272, 279 (1969). 4 </s> Obviously, both the Black Codes and longstanding custom imposed a number of discriminatory prohibitions that were noneconomic, and the 39th Congress therefore had significant [482 U.S. 656, 674] concerns that lay outside the economic realm. Nonetheless, as the Court has often acknowledged, 5 the Legislature's central concerns in 1866 revolved around actions taken by the States and by private parties which consigned black Americans to lives of perpetual economic subservience to their former masters. These concerns were often denominated "civil rights" because, in the mid-19th century, "civil rights were commonly defined, especially by lawyers, as primarily economic." Hyman & Wiecek, supra, at 299. 6 </s> Congress clearly believed that freedom would be empty for black men and women if they were not also assured an equal opportunity to engage in business, to work, and to bargain for sale of their labor. In the debates, it emerged time and again that Congress sought to identify and guarantee those rights that would enable a person to sustain an independent economic unit (a family) once the master-slave relation had been dismantled: [482 U.S. 656, 675] </s> "[Section 1981's] object is to secure to a poor, weak class of laborers the right to make contracts for their labor, the power to enforce the payment of their wages, and the means of holding and enjoying the proceeds of their toil." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1159 (1866) (Rep. Windom). </s> "It is idle to say that a citizen shall have the right to life, yet to deny him the right to labor, whereby he alone can live. It is a mockery to say that a citizen may have a right to live, and yet deny him the right to make a contract to secure the privilege and the rewards of labor. It is worse than mockery to say that men may be clothed by the national authority with the character of citizens, yet may be stripped by State authority of the means by which citizens may exist." Id., at 1833 (Rep. Lawrence). 7 </s> [482 U.S. 656, 676] </s> The historical origins of 1981 therefore demonstrate its dominant concern with economic rights. The preeminence of this concern is even clearer if one looks at 1981 in conjunction with 42 U.S.C. 1982, which was simultaneously enacted. The plain language of 1982 speaks squarely and exclusively to economic rights and relations. It provides that "[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." Both 1981 and 1982 were derived from 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866; their wording and their identical legislative history have led the Court to construe them similarly. See Runyon, 427 U.S., at 171 -173; Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., Inc., 410 U.S. 431, 440 (1973). 8 Looking at 1981 and 1982 in tandem, it is apparent that the primary thrust of the 1866 Congress was the provision of equal rights and treatment in the matrix of contractual and quasi-contractual relationships that form the economic sphere. </s> The Court maintains that 1981 must be characterized as a personal injury action because it is "part of a federal law barring racial discrimination," which is "a fundamental injury to [482 U.S. 656, 677] the individual rights of a person." Ante, at 661. If this reasoning is the real basis of Wilson, its historical analysis was completely superfluous. Any act of racism doubtless inflicts personal injury. At its core, it is an act of violence - a denial of another's right to equal dignity. 9 In many contexts, therefore, racially discriminatory acts are violations of federal civil rights laws. But the availability of a federal forum should not obscure the fact that the type of injury inflicted by discrimination will vary. Discrimination may overlap with almost all categories of legal claims, but does not wholly embrace any one. An assault, a breach of contract, an infliction of emotional distress, an unjust discharge, a refusal to hire or promote - all may be motivated by racial discrimination, but they are not for that reason the same type of legal claim. Bringing a claim under a civil rights Act should not alter this fact. Our analysis in Wilson requires us to differentiate between race discrimination that results in a tort and race discrimination that interferes with contractual relations. 10 </s> [482 U.S. 656, 678] </s> This Court has acknowledged the central theme of 1981: "the Act was meant, by its broad terms, to proscribe discrimination in the making or enforcement of contracts against, or in favor of, any race." McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 295 (1976). We should recognize this primary historical concern again today and, as Wilson requires, reflect it in our choice of the appropriate state statute of limitations for 1981 claims. </s> II </s> Even aside from its inconsistency with the intent of the 39th Congress, the application of the state statute of limitations for personal injury to 1981 actions is the wrong choice as a practical matter. An overwhelming number of 1981 actions concern enforcement of economic rights. See Comment, Developments in the Law - Section 1981, 15 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 29, 34 (1980) ("Plaintiffs in section 1981 suits have relied predominantly on the statute's guarantee of the right to contract free from racial discrimination"); see also Brief for Petitioners in No. 85-1626, pp. 18-19. It is well known that States apply different, usually longer limitations periods to contractual claims than to those sounding in tort. 11 Personal injury actions are often based upon a single, dramatic event, and depend upon evidence of physical injury or eyewitness testimony that becomes less accessible and less trustworthy with the passage of time. In contrast, contract actions or injury to economic relations may involve an extended relationship between parties and may be supported by documentary evidence. See, e. g., Comment, 15 Harv. Civ. [482 U.S. 656, 679] Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev., supra, at 225, 228. Obviously, a breach of contract or a refusal to contract resulting from race discrimination can occur in one traumatic moment, but, as a general rule, state legislatures have concluded that contract actions frequently have an evidentiary foundation with a greater life expectancy, and thus warrant a longer limitations period. 12 </s> The Court has said that "the length of the period allowed for instituting suit inevitably reflects a value judgment concerning the point at which the interests in favor of protecting [482 U.S. 656, 680] valid claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones." Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463 -464 (1975). Today we have required States to apply in contract cases a "value judgment" reached with regard to torts. Inevitably, the statute of limitations henceforth used in 1981 cases will be wrong most of the time. 13 </s> III </s> It may well be that "it is the fate of contract to be swallowed up by tort (or for both of them to be swallowed up in a generalized theory of civil obligation)," G. Gilmore, The Death of Contract 94 (1974), but it has not happened yet. The general obligation to treat all persons with equal dignity undeniably prohibits discrimination based on race. Yet that obligation is still imposed in a legal system that classifies obligations, a system that distinguishes between obligations based on contract and those based on the reasonable person's duty of care. Section 1981 actions were primarily intended to, and most often do, vindicate claims which related to contractual rights, and we should apply a state statute of limitations governing contractual relations to them. I respectfully dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 It was reenacted, with minor changes, as 16 of the Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 144, and was recodified in 1874. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 -169, n. 8 (1976). </s> [Footnote 2 See B. Schwartz, From Confederation to Nation: The American Constitution 1835-1877, p. 191 (1973) ("The purpose of the act as explained by Lyman Trumbull, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, in his address introducing the proposed legislation, was to carry into effect the Thirteenth Amendment by destroying the discrimination against the Negro that existed in the laws of the southern states, particularly the Black Codes enacted since emancipation"); id., at 193 ("Before the Thirteenth Amendment, slaves could not own property, and after emancipation the southern states enacted Black Codes to perpetuate this disability. This was the `incident of slavery' which the 1866 statute was aimed at, relying for its enforcement on the Thirteenth Amendment"); 6 C. Fairman, History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864-1888, p. 110 (1971) ("Eight Southern legislatures were in session at some time in December 1865. Each addressed itself to the status of the Negro. . . . The Southern States had spoken, and the impact was felt in Congress from the moment it assembled. In a major aspect, the problem was economic"); K. Stampp, The Era of Reconstruction 1865-1877, p. 123 (1965) ("This condition of economic helplessness . . . enabled the white landholders, with the aid of the Black Codes, to re-establish bondage in another form. The congressional Committee on Reconstruction heard a great deal of convincing testimony about the use of southern vagrancy laws and various extra-legal coercive devices to force Negroes back into agricultural labor under strict discipline. This testimony suggested that there was a close relationship between the securing of civil and political rights on the one hand and the establishment of economic independence on the other"). </s> [Footnote 3 The Black Codes had "attenuated counterparts" in some Northern States, usually "prohibiting the ingress of blacks into the state, imposing Jim Crow in public facilities, or prohibiting blacks from voting." H. Hyman & W. Wiecek, Equal Justice Under Law 320 (1982). </s> [Footnote 4 It has been pointed out that "the Black Codes told only part of the story" of the attempt to prevent blacks from controlling their own labor. Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Come Round At Last: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 55 Va. L. Rev. 272, 279 (1969). The Joint Committee on Reconstruction heard testimony demonstrating that, even apart from the restriction of formal law, black access to land and labor markets was in practice severely limited, that physical compulsion was used to force freedmen to sign employment contracts at low rates, that cartels of white plantation owners fixed the wages of black workers by agreement, and that whites refused to sell land to blacks. See id., at 279-283; see also Report of C. Schurz, S. Exec. Doc. No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 24 (1865) ("The opposition to the negro's controlling his own labor, carrying on business independently on his own account - in one word, working for his own benefit - showed itself in a variety of ways"). Section 1981 banned racial discrimination in contractual relations, whether individuals were expressly or constructively denied the right to contract because of race, or were provided a lesser opportunity than others, in the form of less favorable contract terms or unequal treatment, discouraging entry into contractual relations. </s> [Footnote 5 See General Building Contractors Assn. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 386 (1982) ("The principal object of the legislation was to eradicate the Black Codes, laws enacted by Southern legislatures imposing a range of civil disabilities on freedmen"); Runyon, 427 U.S., at 172 (racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts for education is a "classic violation of 1981"); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 295 (1976) (Section 1981 prohibits "discrimination in the making or enforcement of contracts"); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975) (Section 1981 "on its face relates primarily to racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts"); cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968) (the rights protected by 42 U.S.C. 1982 would be mere "paper guarantee[s]" if Congress could not "assure that a dollar in the hands of a Negro will purchase the same thing as a dollar in the hands of a white man"). </s> [Footnote 6 See also Hyman & Wiecek, supra, at 300 ("There were many civil rights. How many, no one knew, although lawyers tended to classify them neatly in terms of primarily economic, contract relationships"); id., at 301 ("The right Americans . . . enjoyed[,] the opportunity to enter into almost limitless civil relationships, and to gain or lose from these involvements was considered a precious right. This right underlay what Republicans meant by free labor"). </s> [Footnote 7 There are many passages to similar effect. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1151 (1866) (Rep. Thayer): </s> "Sir, if it is competent for the new-formed Legislatures of the rebel States to enact laws which oppress this large class of people who are dependent for protection upon the United States Government, to retain them still in a state of real servitude; if it is practicable for these Legislatures to pass laws and enforce laws which reduce this class of people to the condition of bondmen; laws which prevent the enjoyment of the fundamental rights of citizenship; laws which declare, for example, that they shall not have the privilege of purchasing a home for themselves and their families; laws which impair their ability to make contracts for labor in such manner as virtually to deprive them of the power of making such contracts, and which then declare them vagrants because they have no homes and because they have no employment; I say, if it is competent for these Legislatures to pass and enforce such laws, then I demand to know, of what practical value is the amendment abolishing slavery in the United States?" </s> See also id., at 1160 (Rep. Windom): </s> "[Blacks] are denied a home in which to shelter their families, prohibited from carrying on any independent business, and then arrested and sold as vagrants because they have no homes and no business. </s> "Planters combine together to compel them to work for such wages as their former masters may dictate, and deny them the privilege of hiring to any one without the consent of the master; and in order to make it [482 U.S. 656, 676] impossible for them to seek employment elsewhere, the pass system is still enforced . . . . Do you call that man free who cannot choose his own employer, or name the wages for which he will work? Do you call him a freeman who is denied the most sacred of all possessions, a home? Is he free who cannot bring a suit in court for the defense of his rights? Sir, if this be liberty, may none ever know what slavery is." </s> [Footnote 8 The Court has previously acknowledged and relied upon the differing legislative histories and purposes of 1981 and 1982 on the one hand, and 1983 on the other, to demonstrate that the statutes should receive differing interpretations. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973) (holding that the District of Columbia is not a "State or Territory" under 1983, although it is under 1982). Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 205 -206 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part) ("Different problems of statutory meaning are presented by two enactments deriving from different constitutional sources"). </s> [Footnote 9 The tortious aspect of racial discrimination has been noted by the Court in Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 , n. 10 (1974) (citing C. Gregory & H. Kalven, Cases and Materials on Torts 961 (2d ed. 1969)), in which JUSTICE MARSHALL suggested that racial discrimination might eventually be treated as a "dignitary tort." </s> [Footnote 10 The Court appears to argue that because " 1983 would reach state action that encroaches on the rights protected by 1981," ante, at 661, it is important that they have the same statute of limitations. As Judge Garth demonstrated below, this argument is without merit: </s> "It is true that the same nucleus of operative fact sometimes could be characterized as either a 1981 and/or 1983 claim and thereby receive different limitations treatment if [a different statute were] applied under 1981. Such variations, however, are commonplace in the law. In a run-of-the-mill automobile accident case, for example, identical facts could give rise to warranty claims sounding in contract and strict liability claims sounding in tort - each to be governed by a different statute of limitations. This is not thought to be a `bizarre result,' and the possibility that the same or similar facts could support causes of action under different Civil Rights statutes is no more `bizarre.'" 777 F.2d 113, 136 (CA3 1985). </s> [Footnote 11 A longer statute of limitations might actually reduce federal litigation. Cases arising under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., are likely to overlap with 1981 claims. If a short limitations period is imposed, plaintiffs in such cases will be forced to file their suits before exhausting administrative remedies, for fear of running out of time. </s> [Footnote 12 See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 282 (1985) (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting) ("[A] legislature's selection of differing limitations periods for a claim sounding in defamation and one based on a written contract is grounded in its evaluation of the characteristics of those claims relevant to the realistic life expectancy of the evidence and the adversary's reasonable expectations of repose"); 777 F.2d, at 138 (statement of Judge Garth sur petition for rehearing) ("Most states have concluded that economically grounded causes of action will more frequently arise from patterned and well-documented courses of conduct than will claims for personal injury . . . . There is no reason we should not respect these policy choices, grounded as they are in real and substantial differences between and among causes of action, in applying civil rights statutes which reflect the same differences"); Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Assn., 559 F.2d 894, 903, n. 26 (CA3 1977) (quoting Dudley v. Textron, Inc., Burkart-Randall Division, 386 F. Supp. 602, 606 (ED Pa. 1975) (Section 1981 and 1982 cases normally involve "patterned-type behavior, frequently involving documentary proof'"; accordingly, "`[t]he passage of time is less likely to impede the proof of facts'")); Dupree v. Hertz Corp., 419 F. Supp. 764, 767 (ED Pa. 1976) ("[T]he passage of time is not as likely to interfere with the proof of an employment discrimination case as it would affect the memories of witnesses in a personal injury action"); Dudley v. Textron, Inc., supra, at 606 ("[Section] 1983 actions have typically involved tort claims arising from personal injury, in many cases involving physical conduct of an irregular or sudden nature. By contrast, claims made pursuant to 1981 usually arise out of employment contract relationships which consist of more patterned-type behavior, frequently involving documentary proof in the form of employment records. Accordingly, the passage of time is less likely to impede the proof of facts in a 1981, than in a 1983, case and a longer statute of limitations under 1981 is, therefore, more appropriate"). </s> [Footnote 13 Pennsylvania formerly applied a 6-year statute of limitations to contract actions. Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 42 5527 (Purdon 1981). This statute has generally been applied to 1981 actions arising in Pennsylvania "where the gist of the cause of action is economic rather than bodily injury caused by interference with the employment rights of black workers," 777 F.2d, at 131 (Garth, J., dissenting), and I would apply it here. </s> JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins, and with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins as to Parts I through IV, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> I concur in the Court's holding that the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions should apply to claims arising under 42 U.S.C. 1981. I also agree that the Court's ruling on the statute of limitations question should [482 U.S. 656, 681] apply to the parties in this case and therefore join Part I of the Court's opinion. I dissent, however, from Part II of the Court's opinion, that affirms the judgment against the Unions for violating 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The ambiguous findings of the District Court, accepted by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, do not provide adequate support for the Court's conclusion that the Unions engaged in intentional discrimination against black members. Neither of the courts below specifically found that the Unions were motivated by racial animus, or that they are liable to black members under the alternative Title VII theory of disparate impact. Accordingly, I would remand to permit the District Court to clarify its findings of fact and to make additional findings if necessary. </s> I </s> Close examination of the findings of the District Court is essential to a proper understanding of this case. The plaintiffs, blacks employed by the Lukens Steel Company, sued the United Steelworkers of America and two of its local unions (Unions) for alleged violations of 1981 and Title VII. The plaintiffs' allegations were directed primarily at the Unions' handling of grievances on behalf of black members. The District Court found that "[t]he steady increase in grievance filings each year has not produced a corresponding increase in the capacity of the grievance-processing system to handle complaints." 580 F. Supp. 1114, 1158 (ED Pa. 1984). Consequently, the court found, the Unions gave priority to "[s]erious grievances" - that is, "those involving more than a four-day suspension, and those involving discharges." Ibid. In an effort to reduce the backlog of grievances, the Unions disposed of many less serious grievances by simply withdrawing them and reserving the right to seek relief in a later grievance proceeding. The District Court found "no hard evidence to support an inference that these inadequacies disadvantage blacks to a greater extent than whites." Ibid. [482 U.S. 656, 682] The incomplete evidence in the record suggests that the percentage of grievances filed on behalf of black employees was proportional to the number of blacks in the work force. Ibid. Of the relatively few grievances that proceeded all the way to arbitration, the District Court found that the number asserted on behalf of black members was proportional to the number of blacks in the work force. Ibid. Moreover, black members had a slightly higher rate of success in arbitration than white members. Id., at 1158-1159. In sum, the District Court found that "plaintiffs' generalized evidence concerning perceptions about racial inequities in the handling of grievances does not, without more, establish a prima facie case . . . ." 1 Id., at 1159. </s> The District Court concluded, however, that the plaintiffs were "on firmer ground" in challenging the Unions' "repeated failures, during the limitations period, to include racial discrimination as a basis for grievances or other complaints against the company." Ibid. Beginning in 1965, the Unions' collective-bargaining agreements with the employer prohibited discrimination on the basis of race against any employee, permanent or probationary. It is undisputed that the Unions "were reluctant to assert racial discrimination as a basis for a grievance." Ibid. The court found the Unions' explanation for this reluctance facially reasonable. Ibid. The Unions observed that employees were more likely to obtain relief if a grievance based on racial discrimination was framed as a violation of another provision of the collective-bargaining agreement that did not require proof of racial animus. Moreover, when faced with an allegation of racial discrimination, [482 U.S. 656, 683] "the company tended `to get its back up' and resist [the] charge." Ibid. The court nevertheless rejected the Unions' explanation, for two reasons. First, the court found that the Unions "virtually ignored" the "numerous instances of harassment, which were indisputably racial in nature, but which did not otherwise plainly violate a provision of the collective bargaining agreement." Id., at 1160. Second, the court concluded that "vigorous pursuit of claims of racial discrimination would have focused attention upon racial issues and compelled some change in racial attitudes," and that the Unions' "unwillingness to assert racial discrimination claims as such rendered the non-discrimination clause in the collective bargaining agreement a dead letter." Ibid. </s> The District Court also found that the Unions had adopted a policy of refusing to process any grievances on behalf of probationary employees, despite the fact that the collective-bargaining agreement prohibited employers from discriminating against any employee, permanent or probationary, on the basis of race. The Unions adhered to this policy, the court found, even though they "knew that blacks were being discharged . . . at a disproportionately higher rate than whites." Id., at 1159. Finally, the court found that the Unions failed to object to written tests administered by the employer on the ground that it had a disparate impact on black members, even though they "were certainly chargeable with knowledge that many of the tests . . . were notorious in that regard." Ibid. The court found, however, that the Unions objected to "tests of all kinds," on the ground that they gave an unfair advantage to younger employees who had recently completed their formal education. Ibid. </s> The Court of Appeals accepted each of the District Court's findings of fact and affirmed the judgment against the Unions. 777 F.2d 113 (CA3 1985). The appellate court concluded that the Unions' "deliberate choice not to process grievances" violated Title VII "because it discriminated against the victims who were entitled to representation." [482 U.S. 656, 684] Id., at 127. The Court of Appeals also concluded that "[t]he district court's finding of intentional discrimination properly supports the claims under 1981 as well." Ibid. </s> II </s> A </s> As the Court recognizes, plaintiffs can recover under 1981 only for intentional discrimination. Ante, at 665-666, n. 10; General Building Contractors Assn., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 382 -391 (1982). The Court also recognizes that a valid claim under Title VII must be grounded on proof of disparate treatment or disparate impact. Ante, at 664. A disparate-treatment claim, like a 1981 claim, requires proof of a discriminatory purpose. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 -336, n. 15 (1977). Of course, "`[d]iscriminatory purpose' . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences." Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (citation omitted). It implies that the challenged action was taken "at least in part `because of,' not merely `in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Ibid. (footnote omitted). The Court concedes that "there was no suggestion below that the Unions held any racial animus against or denigrated blacks generally." Ante, at 668. It nevertheless concludes that the Unions violated Title VII and 1981 because they "refuse[d] to file any and all grievances presented by a black person on the ground that the employer looks with disfavor on and resents such grievances," ante, at 669, and "pursue[d] a policy of rejecting disparate-treatment grievances presented by blacks solely because the claims assert racial bias and would be very troublesome to process," ibid. In my view, this description of the Union's conduct, and thus the Court's legal conclusion, simply does not fit the facts found by the District Court. </s> The Unions offered a nondiscriminatory reason for their practice of withdrawing grievances that did not involve a discharge [482 U.S. 656, 685] or lengthy suspension. According to the Unions, this policy, that is racially neutral on its face, was motivated by the Unions' nondiscriminatory interest in using the inadequate grievance system to assist members who faced the most serious economic harm. The District Court made no finding that the Unions' explanation was a pretext for racial discrimination. The Unions' policy against pursuing grievances on behalf of probationary employees also permitted the Unions to focus their attention on members with the most to lose. Similarly, the Unions' stated purpose for processing racial grievances on nonracial grounds - to obtain the swiftest and most complete relief possible for the claimant, see 580 F. Supp., at 1159 - was not racially invidious. The Unions opposed the use of tests that had a disparate impact on black members, although not on that ground. Their explanation was that more complete relief could be obtained by challenging the tests on nonracial grounds. 1 App. 237. The District Court made no finding that the Unions' decision to base their opposition on nonracial grounds was motivated by racial animus. 2 Absent a finding that the Unions intended to discriminate [482 U.S. 656, 686] against black members, the conclusion that the Unions are liable under 1981 or the disparate-treatment theory of Title VII is unjustified. </s> B </s> Although the District Court stated that the plaintiffs raised both disparate-treatment and disparate-impact claims, 580 F. Supp., at 1119, it did not make specific findings nor did it conclude that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover under a disparate-impact theory. Indeed, the limited amount of statistical evidence discussed by the District Court indicates that the Unions' grievance procedures did not have a disparate impact on black members. See supra, at 682. Moreover, neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals considered the validity of potential defenses to disparate-impact claims. For example, before the court properly could have held the Unions liable on a disparate-impact theory, the court should have considered whether the Unions' practices were justified by the doctrine of business - or union - necessity. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). The court also should have considered arguments that some of the challenged practices, such as the Unions' refusal to pursue grievances of probationary employees, were justifiable as part of a bona fide seniority system. 3 See Ford [482 U.S. 656, 687] Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 239 -240 (1982). Because this Court is reluctant to consider alternative theories of liability not expressly passed upon by the lower courts, see Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 -581 (1978), I would remand to the District Court to permit it to consider whether the Unions are liable under a disparate-impact theory. 4 </s> III </s> The Court does not reach the question whether a union may be held liable under Title VII for "mere passivity" in the face of discrimination by the employer, because it agrees with the courts below that the record shows more than mere passivity on the part of the Unions. Ante, at 665-666. I disagree with that conclusion, and so must consider whether the judgment can be affirmed on the ground that Title VII imposes an affirmative duty on unions to combat discrimination by the employer. </s> The starting point for analysis of this statutory question is, as always, the language of the statute itself. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43 (1986). Section 703(c), the provision of Title VII governing suits against unions, does not suggest that the union has a duty to take affirmative steps to remedy employer discrimination. 5 Section 703(c)(1) makes it unlawful for a union "to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual [482 U.S. 656, 688] because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(c)(1). This subsection parallels 703 (a)(1), that applies to employers. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1). This parallelism, and the reference to union membership, indicate that 703(c)(1) prohibits direct discrimination by a union against its members; it does not impose upon a union an obligation to remedy discrimination by the employer. Moreover, 703(c)(3) specifically addresses the union's interaction with the employer, by outlawing efforts by the union "to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section." 2000e-2(c)(3). If Congress had intended to impose on unions a duty to challenge discrimination by the employer, it hardly could have chosen language more ill suited to its purpose. First, "[t]o say that the union `causes' employer discrimination simply by allowing it is to stretch the meaning of the word beyond its limits." 1 A. Larson & L. Larson, Employment Discrimination, 44.50, p. 9-40 (1985). Moreover, the language of 703(c)(3) is taken in haec verba from 8(b)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(2). That provision of the NLRA has been held not to impose liability for passive acquiescence in wrong-doing by the employer. Indeed, well before the enactment of Title VII, the Court held that even encouraging or inducing employer discrimination is not sufficient to incur liability under 8(b)(2). Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 703 (1951). </s> In the absence of a clear statement of legislative intent, the Court has been reluctant to read Title VII to disrupt the basic policies of the labor laws. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79 (1977). Unquestionably an affirmative duty to oppose employer discrimination could work such a disruption. A union, unlike an employer, is a democratically controlled institution directed by the will of its constituents, subject to the duty of fair representation. Like other representative entities, unions must balance the [482 U.S. 656, 689] competing claims of its constituents. A union must make difficult choices among goals such as eliminating racial discrimination in the workplace, removing health and safety hazards, providing better insurance and pension benefits, and increasing wages. The Court has recognized that "[t]he complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected." Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). For these reasons unions are afforded broad discretion in the handling of grievances. Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 51 (1979); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 -194 (1967). Union members' suits against their unions may deplete union treasuries, and may induce unions to process frivolous claims and resist fair settlement offers. Electrical Workers v. Foust, supra, at 51-52; Vaca v. Sipes, supra, at 191-193. The employee is not without a remedy, because union members may file Title VII actions directly against their employers. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). I therefore would hold that Title VII imposes on unions no affirmative duty to remedy discrimination by the employer. </s> IV </s> I agree that the judgment in No. 85-1626 should be affirmed. For the reasons stated above, I would vacate the judgment in No. 85-2010 and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> [Footnote 1 The District Court found that black union members "actively participated" in union meetings and affairs. 580 F. Supp., at 1157. A black member served as chairman of the grievance committee, and other black members served on the committee. Brief for Petitioners in No. 85-2010, p. 7; 2 App. 714-715. The percentage of black shop stewards, the Unions' primary representatives in the grievance process, frequently exceeded the percentage of black members in the bargaining unit. Brief for Petitioners in No. 85-2010, p. 7; 2 App. 634-640. </s> [Footnote 2 Of course, an inference of discriminatory intent may arise from evidence of objective factors, including the inevitable or foreseeable consequences of the challenged policy or practice. Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 , n. 25 (1979); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). But when "the impact is essentially an unavoidable consequence of a . . . policy that has in itself always been deemed to be legitimate, . . . the inference simply fails to ripen into proof." Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, supra, at 279, n. 25. </s> The District Court did not expressly rely on any inference of racial animus drawn from the consequences of the Unions' grievance policies. Indeed, it appears that the District Court imposed liability for intentional discrimination without finding that the Unions acted, or failed to act, with the purpose of harming black members. The District Court's primary justification for imposing liability was that "mere union passivity in the face of employer-discrimination renders the unions liable under Title VII and, if racial animus is properly inferrable, under 1981 as well." 580 F. Supp., at 1160 (citations omitted). It then stated: [482 U.S. 656, 686] </s> "Moreover, the evidence in this case proves far more than mere passivity on the part of the unions. The distinction to be observed is between a union which, through lethargy or inefficiency simply fails to perceive problems or is inattentive to their possible solution (in which case, at least arguably, the union's inaction has no connection with race) and a union which, aware of racial discrimination against some of its members, fails to protect their interests." Ibid. </s> Far from inferring racial animus from the foreseeable consequences of the Unions' inaction, the District Court merely stated its view that union passivity - whether deliberate or inadvertent - is a basis for liability without regard to the Unions' purpose or intent. </s> [Footnote 3 Although these defenses do not appear to have been raised by the Unions in the courts below, this is not surprising in view of the fact that the plaintiffs did not present evidence or legal arguments to support a disparate-impact theory. </s> [Footnote 4 An additional consideration supporting a remand is the Court's determination that a 2-year statute of limitations applies rather than the 6-year statute of limitations applied by the District Court. It is not clear whether the District Court would impose liability on the Unions based solely on their conduct after 1971. The Court of Appeals vacated the District Court's finding that racial harassment was a classwide problem because it could not determine from the record whether racial harassment after 1971 amounted to more than "a few isolated incidents." 777 F.2d 113, 121 (CA3 1985). Moreover, there is evidence in the record that the Unions filed grievances explicitly alleging racial discrimination after 1971. 2 App. 412, 422, 491, 657, 659, 684. </s> [Footnote 5 Section 703, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(c), is set out in full ante, at 658-659, n. 2. </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment in No. 85-1626 and dissenting in No. 85-2010. </s> In light of the Court's decision to apply a uniform characterization for limitations purpose to actions arising under 42 U.S.C. 1981, I agree that the most appropriate choice is each State's limitations period for personal injury suits. But see Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 -287 (1985) (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting). Although I doubt whether the Court's decision should be given general retroactive effect, I agree that the Court should adhere to its policy of applying the rule [482 U.S. 656, 690] it announces to the parties before the Court. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967). I therefore concur in the judgment of the Court in No. 85-1626. I join Parts I through IV of JUSTICE POWELL'S opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, as to No. 85-2010. </s> [482 U.S. 656, 691]

United States Supreme Court SUTPHEN ESTATES v. UNITED STATES(1951) No. 25 Argued: October 11, 1951Decided: November 5, 1951 </s> Pursuant to a decree in Sherman Act proceedings against certain motion picture companies, a plan for the reorganization of Warner Bros. provided for the separation of Warner's theatre business from its production and distribution business. Two new companies were to be formed, one to receive the theatre assets, the other to receive the production and distribution assets; and Warner Bros. was to be dissolved. Warner was guarantor of a long-term lease of theatre properties made by appellant to a Warner subsidiary; and, under the plan of reorganization, the guaranty was to be assumed only by the new theatre company. Appellant sought to intervene in the Sherman Act proceedings to protect its guaranty, but the District Court denied leave. Held: </s> 1. If appellant was entitled to intervene as of right, the order denying leave is appealable. P. 20. </s> 2. The decree in the Sherman Act proceedings is not res judicata of the rights which appellant sought to protect through intervention, and appellant was therefore not entitled to intervene as of right under Rule 24 (a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. P. 21. </s> 3. On the record in this case, appellant has not shown that it will be "adversely affected" by the reorganization, and hence may not intervene as of right under Rule 24 (a) (3). P. 22. </s> 4. The claim of injury to appellant is too speculative and too contingent on unknown factors to conclude that the court's denial of leave to intervene was an abuse of its discretion under Rule 24 (b). P. 23. </s> Appeal dismissed. </s> In proceedings under the Sherman Antitrust Act, the District Court entered a consent decree against Warner Bros. and certain of its subsidiaries, and entered an order denying appellant's motion for leave to intervene. On [342 U.S. 19, 20] a direct appeal to this Court from this order and from the consent decree, the appeal is dismissed, p. 23. </s> H. G. Pickering argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Bertram F. Shipman. </s> Charles H. Weston argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman and Assistant Attorney General Morison. </s> Joseph M. Proskauer argued the cause for Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. et al., appellees. With him on the brief were R. W. Perkins and Harold Berkowitz. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Rule 24 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part as follows: </s> "(a) INTERVENTION OF RIGHT. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: . . . (2) when the representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the action; or (3) when the applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property which is in the custody or subject to the control or disposition of the court or an officer thereof." </s> Appellant claims intervention of right in the Sherman Act proceedings involving the reorganization of certain producers and distributors of motion picture films whose activities had been found to violate the Act. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 . If appellant may intervene as of right, the order of the court denying intervention is appealable. See Railroad Trainmen v. B. & O. R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 524 ; 32 Stat. [342 U.S. 19, 21] 823, as amended, 15 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 29. It was to resolve that question that we postponed the question of our jurisdiction of the appeal to the hearing on the merits. </s> The present controversy stems from the reorganization of Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., pursuant to a decree of the court in the Sherman Act proceedings. Under this decree provision is made for the divorcement of Warner's theatre business from its production and distribution business. The various steps in the reorganization are not material here. It is sufficient to note that according to the plan the stockholders of Warner will vote a dissolution of Warner. Two new companies will be formed, one to receive the theatre assets, the other to receive the production and distribution assets. Each of the new companies will distribute its capital stock pro rata to Warner's stockholders. </s> Warner is a guarantor of a lease of theatre properties made by appellant to a subsidiary of a subsidiary of Warner. The lease, executed in 1928 and modified in 1948, is for a term of 98 years. The plan of reorganization submitted to the stockholders provides, as we read it and as construed by counsel for appellees on oral argument, that liabilities of the class in which the guaranty falls will be assumed by the new theatre company. Appellant seeks intervention to protect its guaranty. </s> There is intervention as of right under Rule 24 (a) (2) "when the representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the action." Appellant, however, is not a privy of Warner; its rights not only do not derive from Warner, they are indeed adverse to Warner. The decree in this case, like that in Credits Commutation Co. v. United States, 177 U.S. 311 , therefore is not res judicata of the rights sought to be protected through intervention. [342 U.S. 19, 22] </s> Nor is appellant entitled to intervene as of right by reason of Rule 24 (a) (3). It is true that this is a case of "a distribution or other disposition of property which is in the custody or subject to the control or disposition of the court . . ." within the meaning of Rule 24 (a) (3). For it is the authority of the court under the Sherman Act that sanctions and directs the reorganization. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., supra, pp. 170 et seq. Appellant argues that it is "adversely affected" by the disposition of the property. It points out that under the plan its guarantor is dissolved and his property divided among two new companies, only one of which assumes the guarantor's liabilities under the lease. It argues that it is entitled to a judicially ascertained equivalent for the Warner guaranty. And it claims that in this case that equivalent would be a guaranty by each of the new companies. </s> We do not think, however, that on this record appellant has shown that it will be "adversely affected" by the reorganization within the meaning of Rule 24 (a) (3). It will have the guaranty of the new theatre company. No showing is made or attempted that that company lacks the financial strength to assume the responsibilities of the guaranty. No showing is made or attempted that the contingent liability under the guaranty is so imminent and onerous as to make the guaranty of the new company substantially less valuable than the guaranty of Warner's. For all we know, a guaranty of a company in the theatre business, freed from the hazards of the production and distribution business, may be even more valuable than the guaranty of Warner's. We do not pass here on the fairness of the plan of reorganization. Cf. Continental Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 156 . We hold only that appellant has not maintained the burden of showing that under Rule 24 (a) (3) it may intervene as of right. [342 U.S. 19, 23] </s> Permissive intervention is governed by Rule 24 (b). But we have said enough to show that the claim of injury to appellant is too speculative and too contingent on unknown factors to conclude that there was an abuse of discretion in denying leave to intervene. The court had ample reason to prevent the administration of the decree from being burdened with a collateral issue that on this record can properly be adjudicated elsewhere. The appeal is therefore </s> Dismissed. </s> MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, MR. JUSTICE CLARK, and MR. JUSTICE MINTON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting. </s> Warner Brothers, Inc., has been guarantor on a lease of theater properties made by appellant Sutphen Estates. Under a court decree of dissolution Warner is to be split up into two companies, only one of which will expressly assume the Warner guarantee to Sutphen. Sutphen's lease can no longer be guaranteed by the combined assets of the illegal corporation we have ordered dissolved. Perhaps it is inevitable that the guarantee will be impaired to some extent, but we should insure that Sutphen suffers no more than its fair share of whatever losses may result from the enforcement of the antitrust laws. </s> I am of the opinion that the issue of impairment can best be and should be determined by the District Court as a part of the dissolution proceedings. Furthermore, I cannot assent to an opinion that permits this question of impairment to remain open for adjudication elsewhere at some indefinite time in the future. </s> Dissolution of Warner, which we have ordered, cannot be completely consummated if the decree leaves in doubt whether both new companies are jointly obligated on [342 U.S. 19, 24] Sutphen's lease. Cf. Continental Insurance Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 156, 173 -174. Surely, if we have the power to order a dissolution to prevent Sherman Act violations, we have power to insure that the newly created companies are permanently and totally disinterested in each other's future activities, and are in no way united by past obligations. </s> [342 U.S. 19, 25]

United States Supreme Court INTERNATIONAL SALT CO. V. U. S.(1947) No. 46 Argued: October 16, 1947Decided: November 10, 1947 </s> Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. [ International Salt Co. v. U. S. 332 U.S. 392 (1947) ] </s> [332 U.S. 392 , 393] </s> Mr. Lemuel Skidmore, of New York City, for appellant. Mr. Robert L. Stern, of Washington, D.C., for appellee. </s> Mr. Justice JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court. The Government brought this civil action to enjoin the International Salt Company, appellant here, from carrying out provisions of the leases of its patented machines to the effect that lessees would use therein only International's salt products. The restriction is alleged to violate 1 of the Sherman Act,1 and 3 of the Clayton Act. 2 Upon appellant's answer and admissions of fact, the Government moved for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, upon the ground that no issue as to a material fact was presented and </s> [332 U.S. 392 , 394] </s> that, on the admissions, judgment followed as matter of law. Neither party submitted affidavits. Judgment was granted3 and appeal was taken directly to this Court. 4 </s> It was established by pleadings or admissions that the International Salt Company is engaged in interstate commerce in salt, of which it is the country's largest producer for industrial uses. It also owns patents on two machines for utilization of salt products. One, the 'Lixator,' dissolves rock salt into a brine used in various industrial processes. The other, the 'Saltomat,' injects salt, in tablet form, into canned products during the canning process. The principal distribution of each of these machines is under leases which, among other things, require the lessees to purchase from appellant all unpatented salt and salt tablets consumed in the leased machines. Appellant had outstanding 790 leases of an equal number of 'Lixators,' all of which leases were on appellant's standard form containing the tying clause5 and other </s> [332 U.S. 392 , 395] </s> standard provisions; of 50 other leases which somewhat varied the terms, all but 4 contained the tying clause. It also had in effect 73 leases of 96 'Saltomats,' all containing the restrictive clause. 6 In 1944, appellant sold approximately 119,000 tons of salt, for about $500,000, for use in these machines. The appellant's patents confer a limited monopoly of the invention they reward. From them appellant derives a right to restrain others from making, vending or using the patented machines. But the patents confer no right </s> [332 U.S. 392 , 396] </s> to restrain use of, or trade in, unpatented salt. By contracting to close this market for salt against competition, International has engaged in a restraint of trade for which its patents afford no immunity from the anti- trust laws. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 788 , 62 S. Ct. 402; Mercoid Corporation v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 ; Mercoid Corporation v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 . Appellant contends, however, that summary judgment was unauthorized because it precluded trial of alleged issues of fact as to whether the restraint was unreasonable within the Sherman Act or substantially lessened competition or tended to create a monopoly in salt within the Clayton Act. We think the admitted facts left no genuine issue. Not only is price-fixing unreasonable, per se, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 ; United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 50 A.L.R. 989, but also it is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market. Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission, 2 Cir., 114 F.2d 80, affirmed, 312 U.S. 457, 668 . The volume of business affected by these contracts cannot be said to be insignificant or insubstantial and the tendency of the arrangement to accomplishment of monopoly seems obvious. Under the law, agreements are forbidden which 'tend to create a monopoly,' and it is immaterial that the tendency is a creeping one rather than one that proceeds at full gallop; nor does the law await arrival at the goal before condemning the direction of the movement. Appellant contends, however, that the 'Lixator' contracts are saved from unreasonableness and from the tendency to monopoly because they provided that if any competitor offered salt of equal grade at a lower price, the lessee should be free to buy in the open market, unless appellant would furnish the salt at an equal price; and </s> [332 U.S. 392 , 397] </s> the 'Saltomat' agreements provided that the lessee was entitled to the benefit of any general price reduction in lessor's salt tablets. The 'Lixator' provision does, of course, afford a measure of protection to the lessee, but it does not avoid the stifling effect of the agreement on competition. The appellant had at all times priority on the business at equal prices. A competitor would have to undercut appellant's price to have any hope of capturing the market, while appellant could hold that market by merely meeting competition. We do not think this concession relieves the contract of being a restraint of trade, albeit a less harsh one than would result in the absence of such a provision. The 'Saltomat' provision obviously has no effect of legal significance since it gives the lessee nothing more than a right to buy appellant's salt tablets at appellant's going price. All purchases must in any event be of appellant's product. Appellant also urges that since under the leases it remained under an obligation to repair and maintain the machines, it was reasonable to confine their use to its own salt because its high quality assured satisfactory functioning and low maintenance cost. The appellant's rock salt is alleged to have an average sodium chloride content of 98.2%. Rock salt of other producers, it is said, 'does not run consistent in sodium chloride content and in many instances runs as low as 95% of sodium chloride.' This greater percentage of insoluble impurities allegedly disturbs the functioning of the 'Lixator' machine. A somewhat similar claim is pleaded as to the 'Saltomat.' Of course, a lessor may impose on a lessee reasonable restrictions designed in good faith to minimize maintenance burdens and to assure satisfactory operation. We may assume, as matter of argument, that if the 'Lixator' functions best on rock salt of average sodium chloride content of 98.2%, the lessee might be required to use </s> [332 U.S. 392 , 398] </s> only salt meeting such a specification of quality. But it is not pleaded, nor is it argued, that the machine is allergic to salt of equal quality produced by any one except International. If others cannot produce salt equal to reasonable specifications for machine use, it is one thing; but it is admitted that, at times, at least, competitors do offer such a product. They are, however, shut out of the market by a provision that limits it, not in terms of quality, but in terms of a particular vendor. Rules for use of leased machinery must not be disguised restraints of free competition, though they may set reasonable standards which all suppliers must meet. Cf. International Business Machines Corporation v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 . Appellant urges other objections to the summary judgment. The tying clause has not been insisted upon in all leases, nor has it always been enforced when it was included. But these facts do not justify the general use of the restriction which has been admitted here. The appellant also strongly objects to the provisions of the sixth paragraph of the decree. 7 Appellant denies </s> [332 U.S. 392 , 399] </s> the necessity for such provision and it is true that the record discloses no threat to discriminate after the judgment of the Court is pronounced. It also suggests that we modify the judgment to accept a proposed alternative provision8 similar to one it says it urged upon the District Court, which rejected it. The record does not show what proceedings were had between rendering of the court's opinion and signing of the decree. The specific ground of objection raised by appellant to paragraph sixth is that International may find it necessary in some sections of the country to reduce the rental rates of the machines in order that its machines may compete with those of others. Of course, the Clayton Act itself9 permits one charged with price discrimination to show that he lowered his price in good faith to meet competition. Obviously, the District Court was not intending to prevent competition or to disable the appellant from meeting or offering it. The Government, too, says it would not oppose permitting a lower price to meet, in good faith, the equally low price of a competitor if the need arose. </s> [332 U.S. 392 , 400] </s> The short of the contention is that since the company never has threatened to violate any decree entered in this case to restrain future use of the illegal leases, it feels that the provision invalidating the objectionable leases should end the matter and that, as to any additional provisions, appellant is entitled to stand before the court in the same position as one who has never violated the law at all-that the injunction should go no farther than the violation or threat of violation. We cannot agree that the consequences of proved violations are so limited. The fact is established that the appellant already has wedged itself into this salt market by methods forbidden by law. The District Court is not obliged to assume, contrary to common experience, that a violator of the antitrust laws will relinquish the fruits of his violation more completely than the court requires him to do. And advantages already in hand may be held by methods more subtle and informed, and more difficult to prove, than those which, in the first place, win a market. When the purpose to restrain trade appears from a clear violation of law, it is not necessary that all of the untraveled roads to that end be left open and that only the worn one be closed. The usual ways to the prohibited goal may be blocked against the proven transgressor and the burden put upon him to bring any proper claims for relief to the court's attention. And it is desirable, in the interests of the court and of both litigants, that the decree be as specific as possible, not only in the core of its relief, but in its outward limits, so that parties may known their duties and unintended contempts may not occur. The framing of decrees should take place in the District rather than in Appellate Courts. 10 They are invested </s> [332 U.S. 392 , 401] </s> with large discretion to model their judgments to fit the exigencies of the particular case. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 185 , 260; United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 . In an equity suit, the end to be served is not punishment of past transgression, nor is it merely to end specific illegal practices. A public interest served by such civil suits is that they effectively pry open to competition a market that has been closed by defendants' illegal restraints. If this decree accomplishes less than that, the Government has won a lawsuit and lost a cause. The District Court has retained jurisdiction, by the terms of its judgment, for the purpose of 'enabling any of the parties to apply to the court at any time for such further orders and directions as may be necessary or appropriate for the construction or carrying out of the judgment' and 'for the amendment, modification or termination of any of its provisions. * * *' We think it would not be good judicial administration to strike paragraph VI from the judgment to meet a hypothetical situation when the District Court has purposely left the way open to remedy any such situations if and when the need arises. The factual basis of the claim for modification should appear in evidentiary form before the District Court rather than in the argumentative form in which it is before us. Nor are we impressed that this will require a multitude of separate applications. Once the concrete problem is before the District Court it will no doubt be able to fashion a provision that will avoid repetitious applications which would be as vexatious to the Court as to the litigants. We leave the appellant to proper appli- </s> [332 U.S. 392 , 402] </s> cation to the court below and deny the relief here, upon the present state of the record, without prejudice. Judgment affirmed. </s> Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, whom Mr. Justice REED and Mr. Justice BURTON, join, dissenting in part. Agreeing wholeheartedly with the Court's opinion on the main issue, I am left unpersuaded by its justification for retaining Paragraph VI1 in the judgment. </s> [332 U.S. 392 , 403] </s> Inasmuch as the holder of patents on machines is not obliged to dispose of them to all comers or to do so at a uniform price, Paragraph VI in and of itself undoubtedly deprives appellant of a legal right. It is not merely a theoretical right. Practical considerations may make it important for appellant to act upon its legal right not to have a uniform price for all its customers. It was conceded at the bar that competition may require this. No doubt, when a court condemns practices as violative of the Sherman Law and the Clayton Act, it has the duty so to fashion its decree as to put an effective stop to that which is condemned. But the law also respects the wisdom of not burning even part of a house in order to roast a pig. Ordinarily, therefore, when acts are found to have been done in violation of antitrust legislation, restraint of such acts in the future is the adequate relief. See New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 200 U.S. 361, 404 , 282; Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 77 , 522, 34 L.R.A.,N.S. 834, Ann.Cas.1912D, 734; National Labor Relations Board v. Express Publishing Company, 312 U.S. 426 , 435-437, 699, 700. Reflecting the dictates of fairness, equity does not put under ban that which is intrinsically legitimate unless for all practical purposes it is tied with the illegitimate, or the circumstances of the case makes it reasonable to assume that pursuit of what is legitimate would be a cover for doing what is forbidden. The Government argues, in effect, that to compel appellant to observe uniformity of price for its machines removes any temptation for more favorable treatment of a customer who buys its salt. But that is precisely the aim of the main decree-it prohibits extension of the patent for the machines by requiring as a condition of its acquisition the purchase of non-patented salt. The presupposition of Paragraph VI is that the appellant will disobey that which the court explicitly forbids, so that the with- </s> [332 U.S. 392 , 404] </s> drawal of an otherwise legal right to fix the purchase price of patented machines is employed as a precautionary screw to hold the appellant down from disobeying the court's decree. Surely a court of equity ought not to add to its prohibition of the illicit a prohibition of the licit unless the two are practically intertwined or there is some ground for believing that the licit will surreptitiously be misused in order to accomplish the illicit. There should be no such prohibition merely as a re-enforcement of the appropriate presupposition that a litigant, not shown to have ben recalcitrant or underhanded, will obey the court's decree. If he does, the power of contempt is there to enforce obedience. It is suggested that if the presupposition of obedience is to be entertained it is unnecessary to enjoin even illegal conduct. But, surely, it is one thing to decree prohibition of conduct found to be illegal and a wholly different thing to add thereto the prohibition of that which is otherwise legal on the theory that thereby any temptation to persist in the forbidden illegality is removed. Upon the record before us there is nothing to suggest that the appellant is likely to disobey the decree not only of the District Court against a continuance of illegal leases, but what in effect, upon affirmance, becomes a decree of this Court. It must be remembered that the Government saw fit to move for judgment on the pleadings. It thereby raised a pure legal question as to the validity of the leases on their face. The Government chose not to try to lay bare, as is often done in Sherman Law cases, fair and unfair practices inextricably blended. In such a situation the lawful has to fall with the unlawful. Having invited judgment on the bare bones of the pleadings which merely raise the validity of the tying clauses, the Government is not entitled to remedies which go beyond the justification of the pleadings. The Gov- </s> [332 U.S. 392 , 405] </s> ernment ought not to have it both ways. The Government is not entitled to a provision in the decree which can be justified only on some indication in the record, of which here there is none, that appellant's past shows a devious temper which needs to be hobbled by withdrawing a conceded legal right. In comparable situations, where orders of the Federal Trade Commission come here for review, this Court has sought to protect otherwise legitimate rights even where a business has indulged in unfair methods of competition. The Commission is not authorized to make its order needlessly destructive. The baby is not to be thrown out with the bath. See Federal Trade Commission v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212 , and Jacob Siegel Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 327 U.S. 608 . Accordingly, if this were a review of an order of the Federal Trade Commission, I should remit the order for appropriate reconsideration by the Commission. Since this is a review of a lower federal court and the record presumably presents to us all that was before the District Court in support of Paragraph VI, we could dispose of the matter here. But the molding of decrees in Sherman Law cases is normally the business of district courts. They have a scope of discretion which should not unduly be cut off by a recasting of the decree on appeal here. (It is worth nothing that the availability of the Federal Trade Commission in the role of a master in chancery to help mold decrees in suits under the anti- trust statutes apparently does not apply to a suit like the present, where judgment was asked on the pleadings and no testimony was taken. See 7 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717, 722, 15 U.S.C. 47, 15 U. S.C.A. 47.) And so I would remand the case to the District Court. It has been suggested that Paragraph VI is merely a roundabout way of saying that the appellant should not discriminate in the price of its </s> [332 U.S. 392 , 406] </s> patented machines in favor of a purchaser of its salt. If such was the intention of Paragraph VI, the District Court will want to convey such meaning less ambiguously. 2 </s> As the paragraph stands, I do not see how any lawyer would advise that the appellant could vary its prices among customers in different localities for a legitimate reason without each time going to the District Court for a modification of the decree. That is not a burden which, on this record, ought to be placed on the appellant. The undue sting of Paragraph VI is not saved by the fact that it is 'specific.' Of course it is in the interest of courts and of litigants that the terms of a decree be as specific as possible. But the desideratum of explicitness does not dispense with the requirement that remedies be appropriate to the condemned illegality. It does not draw the sting of undue prohibition of lawful conduct to make the prohibition specific. Footnotes </s> [Footnote 1 26 Stat. 209, 1, 15 U.S.C. 1, 15 U.S.C.A. 1. [Footnote 2 38 Stat. 730, 3, 15 U.S.C. 14, 15 U.S.C.A. 14. </s> [Footnote 3 6 F.R.D. 302. [Footnote 4 Probable jurisdiction noted April 28, 1947. [Footnote 5 'It is further mutually agreed that the said Lixate Process Dissolver shall be installed by and at the expense of said Lessee and shall be maintained and kept in repair during the term of this lease by and at the expense of said Lessee; that the said Lixate Process Dissolver shall be used for dissolving and converting into brine only those grades of rock salt purchased by the Lessee from the Lessor at prices and upon terms and conditions hereafter agreed upon, provided: 'If at any time during the term of this lease a general reduction in price of grade of salt suitable for use in the said Lixate Process Dissolver shall be made, said Lessee shall give said Lessor an opportunity to provide a competitive grade of salt at any such competitive price quoted, and in case said Lessor shall fail or be unable to do so, said Lessee, upon continued payments of the rental herein agreed upon, shall have the privilege of continued use of the said equipment with salt purchased in the open market, until such time as said Lessor shall furnish a suitable grade of salt at the said competitive price.' </s> It further provides as follows: 'Should said Lessee fail to pay promptly the aforesaid rental, or shall at any time discontinue purchasing its requirement of salt from said Lessor, or otherwise breach any of the terms and conditions of this lease, said Lessor shall have the right, upon 30 days' written notice of intention to do so, to remove the said Lixate Process Dissolver from the possession of said Lessee.' </s> [Footnote 6 'It is further mutually agreed that the said Salt Tablet Depositor( s) shall be installed and maintained in good condition during the term of this lease; that the said Salt Tablet Depositor(s) shall be used only in conjunction with Salt Tablets sold or manufactured by the Lessor, and that the Lessee shall purchase from the Lessor or its agent, Salt Tablets for use in the Salt Tablet Depositor(s) at prices and upon terms and conditions hereinafter agreed upon, Provided: If at any time during the term of this lease, a general reduction in Lessor's price of Salt Tablets suitable for use in the Depositor(s) shall be made, said Lessor shall provide said Lessee with Salt Tablets at a like price.' The lease further provides: '* * * should Lessee fail to pay promptly the aforesaid rental, or at any time discontinue purchasing its requirements of Salt Tablets for said Salt Tablet Depositor(s) from said Lessor, or its agent, or otherwise breach any of the terms and conditions of this lease, said Lessor shall have the right, upon 10 days' written notice of intention to do so, to remove the said Salt Tablet Depositor(s) from the premises and/or possession of said Lessee.' </s> [Footnote 7 Defendant International Salt is directed to offer to lease or sell or license the use of the Lixator or Saltomat machines, or any other machine which is then being or about to be offered or shall have been offered by such defendant in the United States embodying inventions covered by any of the patents referred to in paragraph II hereof, to any applicant on non-discriminatory terms and conditions; provided that (a) A machine or machines is or are available for such purposes and (b) Defendant shall not be required to make such offer unless it is offering, about to offer, or has offered such machines for lease or sale or license within the United States and at any time the defendant may discontinue the business of renting or selling or licensing the use of such machines; and (c) Such sale or lease or license is not required to be made without cash payment or security to any person not having proper credit rating, and (d) The rental or sale price or license royalty may differ as to different types and sizes of machines and from time to time so long as the rental or sale price or royalty at any one time is uniform as to each size or type of machine. The terms of this paragraph shall apply to all future contracts and modifications of existing contracts. Any person with whom defendant International Salt now has a lease agreement relating to the Lixator or Saltomat machines may elect to retain his rights under the existing lease or to enter into a lease or sale or license contract with defendant International Salt in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph. </s> [Footnote 8 Defendant would be enjoined 'from refusing to sell, lease or license the use of any such machine to any person, firm or corporation, or from discriminating in the terms of any contract of sale, lease or license of any such machine with any person, firm or corporation, against the prospective buyer, lessee or licensee on the ground that he has used or dealt in, or intends or proposes to use or deal in, salt not manufactured or sold by the defendant International Salt.' [Footnote 9 38 Stat. 730, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. 13(b), 15 U.S.C.A. 13(b). </s> [Footnote 10 That court is authorized, but not required, to call upon the Federal Trade Commission to assist in framing decrees in antitrust cases. 7, Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 722, 15 U.S.C.A. 47. This would seem unnecessary if Congress intended a simple prohibition of the particular practice proved before the court. It indicates the Congress has intended decrees to deal with the future economic condition of the enterprise as well as past violations. </s> [Footnote 1 VI. Defendant International Salt is directed to offer to lease or sell or license the use of the Lixator or Saltomat Machines, or any other machine which is then being or about to be offered or shall have been offered by such defendant in the United States embodying inventions covered by any of the patents referred to in paragraph II hereof, to any applicant on non-discriminatory terms and conditions; provided that (a) A machine or machines is or are available for such purposes and (b) Defendant shall not be required to make such offer unless it is offering, about to offer, or has offered such machines for lease or sale or license within the United States and at any time the defendant may discontinue the business of renting or selling or licensing the use of such machines; and (c) Such sale or lease or license is not required to be made without cash payment or security to any person not having proper credit rating, and (d) The rental or sale price or license royalty may differ as to different types and sizes of machines and from time to time so long as the rental or sale price or royalty at any one time is uniform as to each size or type of machine. The terms of this paragraph shall apply to all future contracts and modifications of existing contracts. Any person with whom defendant International Salt now has a lease agreement relating to the Lixator or Saltomat machines may elect to retain his rights under the existing lease or to enter into a lease or sale or license contract with defendant International Salt in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph. </s> [Footnote 2 See the clause which the appellant proposed to the District Court, enjoining it 'from refusing to sell, lease or license the use of any such machine to any person, firm or corporation, or from discriminating in the terms of any contract of sale, lease or license of any such machine with any person, firm or corporation, against the prospective buyer, lessee or licensee on the ground that he has used or dealt in, or intends or proposes to use or deal in, salt not manufactured or sold by the defendant International Salt.'

United States Supreme Court SLAGLE v. OHIO(1961) No. 105 Argued: Decided: May 15, 1961 </s> Appellants appeared pursuant to subpoenas before the Ohio Un-American Activities Commission, a joint state legislative committee, which was investigating subversive activities in Ohio. Each appellant was sworn and examined and each objected to most of the questions propounded on the ground that an answer would compel him to be a witness against himself in violation of the Ohio Constitution and of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In most instances, the Commission apparently sustained or acquiesced in their objections, and appellants were not directed to answer; but in a few instances some of them were directed to answer one or more questions but flatly refused to do so, although they had both constructive and actual knowledge of an Ohio statute which forbade the use of the testimony of a witness before a legislative committee in any criminal proceeding against him. For refusing to answer certain questions, appellants were tried for contempt in a state court under an Ohio statute and were convicted on some counts. Their convictions were sustained by an intermediate Court of Appeals; their appeals to the State Supreme Court were dismissed; and they appealed to this Court. </s> Held: </s> 1. Since appellants failed to show that any timely insistence was made in the state courts that the state statute, as applied, is repugnant to the Federal Constitution, treaties or laws, the appeals are dismissed; but, since various constitutional claims were made below and renewed in this Court and at least one of them raises questions of public importance, certiorari is granted. P. 264. </s> 2. The judgments against two of the appellants are reversed and those against the other appellants are reversed as to certain counts and affirmed by an equally divided Court as to other counts. Pp. 264-268. </s> (a) On the record in this case, to hold that these witnesses willfully and contumaciously refused to answer the questions to which they objected but which they were not directed to answer would deprive them of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 264-267. [366 U.S. 259, 260] </s> (b) The Court is equally divided as to appellants' contentions that (1) because the Ohio immunity statute does not afford immunity from federal prosecution, they could not lawfully be compelled to answer questions over their Fifth-Amendment objections to them, (2) the questions which they refused to answer were not pertinent to the inquiry, and (3) the Commission's investigation was without legislative purpose. Pp. 267-268. </s> 170 Ohio St. 216, 163 N. E. 2d 177, affirmed in part, by an equally divided Court, and reversed in part. </s> Thelma C. Furry argued the cause and filed a brief for appellants. </s> Norman J. Putman argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Pursuing its statutory powers and duties to investigate subversive activities in Ohio, 1 the Ohio Un-American [366 U.S. 259, 261] Activities Commission scheduled a hearing to commence at the Stark County Courthouse on the morning of October 21, 1953, and subpoenaed these five appellants to appear and testify before it at that time and place. Each appeared with counsel, was sworn and examined. Though having both constructive and actual knowledge of Ohio's immunity statute, 2 each objected to most of the questions propounded 3 on the ground that an answer would compel him to be a witness against himself, in violation of the Ohio Constitution and of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 4 Appellants were [366 U.S. 259, 262] not, in most instances, directed to answer, but in a few instances some of them (Perry, Cooper and Mladajan) were directed to answer the question, yet flatly refused to do so. 5 </s> [366 U.S. 259, 263] </s> Acting pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 103.35, 6 the members of the Commission who sat at the hearing authorized the chairman to cause contempt proceedings to be initiated against appellants under Ohio Rev. Code 2705.02 to 2705.09, 7 and on December 24, 1953, each appellant was separately indicted in the court of common pleas of Stark County on 10 counts - each count charging willful failure, in violation of 2705.02, to answer a question propounded by the Commission. Upon a joint trial to the court, each appellant was convicted and sentenced on some of the counts. 8 On consolidated appeals, the [366 U.S. 259, 264] Stark County Court of Appeals affirmed, 9 the Supreme Court of Ohio, finding no debatable constitutional question presented, dismissed appellants' appeals to that court, 170 Ohio St. 216, 163 N. E. 2d 177, and, on appeals to this Court, we postponed further consideration of our jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits. 364 U.S. 811 . </s> Appellants simply assert that we have jurisdiction over these appeals under 28 U.S.C. 1257 (2). Despite the plain import of our postponing order, see Rule 16, par. 4, of this Court, they have entirely failed to show that any "timely insistence [was made] in the state courts that a state statute, as applied, is repugnant to the federal Constitution, treaties or laws." Charleston Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Alderson, 324 U.S. 182, 185 . Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed. See Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 435 . But since various federal constitutional claims were made below and are renewed here, 28 U.S.C. 1257 (3), we consider the appeal papers as petitions for certiorari and, in view of the public importance of at least one of the questions presented, grant certiorari, 28 U.S.C. 2103. </s> Appellants' principal contention here is that the judgments, finding them guilty of willful refusal to answer the Commission's questions although the Commission did not overrule their timely objections to the questions nor direct that they be answered, but appeared to sustain, or at least to acquiesce in, those objections, deprive appellants of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the peculiar factual situation presented, and limited to the questions which they were not directed [366 U.S. 259, 265] to answer, we have concluded that appellants are right in this contention. </s> Surely traditional notions of fair play contemplate that a person summoned to testify before any adjudicatory or investigatory body, including a legislative investigatory committee, may object to any question put to him upon any available ground, however tenuous. And the Ohio Commission, several times and in many ways, clearly gave appellants to understand that such was their right at this hearing. Exercising that right, if not actually accepting the Commission's invitation, appellants, except for a few preliminary questions, objected to most of the questions put to them, principally on the ground of the Fifth Amendment (but see note 4). With important exceptions to be noted, instead of overruling the objection or in any way directing the witness to answer the question, the Commission gave every indication that it sustained, or at least acquiesced in, the objection by immediately passing on to the next question. That process was scores of times repeated. </s> But, and lending emphasis to its normal acquiescence in the objections, the Commission, at times, adopted another and very different procedure. When the Commission's counsel advised the Commission that he considered a particular question to be competent and important and asked that the witness be directed to answer it, the chairman, in each such instance, directed the witness to answer the question. And in every such instance care was taken, either by the Commission's counsel or its chairman, to have the record show that at least a quorum of the Commission were then present and sitting. In that manner, as more fully shown in note 5, Slagle was directed to answer one question, and thereupon promptly answered it, but he was not directed to answer any other question; Bohus was not directed to answer any question; [366 U.S. 259, 266] Perry was thus directed to answer the two questions that were made the subjects of Counts 1 and 2 of her indictment (she was acquitted on Count 2), but was not directed to answer the questions upon which the other eight counts of her indictment were based; Cooper was thus directed to answer the four questions that were made the subjects of Counts 1, 2, 5 and 6 of her indictment, but was not directed to answer the questions upon which the other six counts of her indictment were based; and Mladajan was thus directed to answer the question that was made the subject of Count 6 of her indictment, but was not directed to answer the questions upon which the other nine counts of her indictment were based. </s> No particular form of words is necessary either to sustain or overrule an objection and thus either to excuse or require an answer to the question. All that is necessary is that the hearing tribunal make plain its disposition of the objection and whether or not an answer to the question is expected and required. If, as frequently happens, after an objection has been made, the hearing officer, addressing the examiner, merely says, "Pass on to your next question," it would indeed be plain that he had, at least temporarily, sustained or acquiesced in the objection and was not requiring an answer to be given. That is almost precisely what happened here. Though, upon these objections being made, the Commission did not formally direct its counsel to pass on to his next question, either the counsel or some member of the Commission did in fact immediately pass on to the next question. Those objections must therefore be regarded as sustained or acquiesced in by the Commission. To hold that these witnesses, in these circumstances, willfully and contumaciously refused to answer those questions would deeply offend traditional notions of fair play and deprive them of due process. [366 U.S. 259, 267] </s> That "a clear disposition of the witness' objection is a prerequisite to prosecution for contempt is supported by long-standing tradition here and in other English-speaking nations. In this country the tradition has been uniformly recognized in the procedure of both state and federal courts." Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 167 -168, and cases cited. See also Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 202 ; Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219, 223 . "Because of the [Commission's] consistent failure to advise [appellants] of [its] position as to [their] objections, [appellants were] left to speculate about the risk of possible prosecution for contempt; [they were] not given a clear choice between standing on [their] objection[s] and compliance with a committee ruling." Bart v. United States, supra, at 223. </s> In these circumstances, to hold that these witnesses willfully and contumaciously refused to answer the questions to which they objected but which they were not directed to answer would deprive them of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. </s> As to appellants' remaining contentions, including, (1) that because the Ohio immunity statute (see note 2) does not afford immunity from federal prosecution, they could not lawfully be compelled to answer questions over their Fifth Amendment objections to them, (2) that the questions which they refused to answer were not pertinent to the inquiry, and (3) that the Commission's investigation was without legislative purpose, the Court is equally divided. </s> It follows that the judgments against Slagle and Bohus must be reversed; that the judgment against Perry must be reversed as to Counts 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9, and affirmed, by an equally divided Court, as to Count 1; that the judgment against Cooper must be reversed as to Counts 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9, and affirmed, by an equally divided Court, [366 U.S. 259, 268] as to Counts 1, 2, 5 and 6; and that the judgment against Mladajan must be reversed as to Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 10, and affirmed, by an equally divided Court, as to Count 6. </s> Appeals dismissed and certiorari granted. On writs of certiorari, judgments reversed as to Slagle and Bohus; judgments reversed in part and affirmed, by an equally divided Court, in part as to Perry, Cooper and Mladajan. </s> MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Ohio Rev. Code 103.34 provides: </s> "POWERS AND DUTIES. </s> "The un-American activities commission shall: </s> "(A) Investigate, study, and analyze: </s> "(1) All facts relating to the activities of persons, groups, and organizations whose membership includes persons who have as their objective or may be suspected of having as their objective the overthrow or reform of our constitutional governments by fraud, force, violence, or other unlawful means; </s> "(2) All facts concerning persons, groups, and organizations, known to be or suspected of being dominated by or giving allegiance to a foreign power or whose activities might adversely affect the contribution of this state to the national defense, the safety and security of this state, the functioning of any agency of the state or national government, or the industrial potential of this state; </s> "(3) The operation and effect of the laws of this state, of the several other states, and of the United States, which purport to outlaw and control the activities enumerated in this section and [366 U.S. 259, 261] to recommend such additional legislation or revision of existing laws as may seem advisable and necessary; </s> "(B) Maintain a liaison with any agency of the federal, state, or local governments in devising and promoting means of disclosing those persons and groups who seek to alter or destroy the government of this state or of the United States by force, violence, intimidation, sabotage, or threats of the same. </s> "The commission has such additional right, duties, and powers as are necessary to enable it fully to exercise those specifically set forth in this section and to accomplish its lawful objectives and purposes." </s> [Footnote 2 Ohio Rev. Code 101.44 provides: </s> "Except a person who, in writing, requests permission to appear before a committee or subcommittee of the general assembly, or of either house thereof, or who, in writing, waives the rights, privileges, and immunities granted by this section, the testimony of a witness examined before a committee or subcommittee shall not be used as evidence in a criminal proceeding against such witness, nor shall a person be prosecuted or subjected to a penalty or forfeiture on account of a transaction, matter, or thing, concerning which he testifies, or produces evidence. This section does not exempt a witness from the penalties for perjury." </s> [Footnote 3 Except for a few preliminary questions, each appellant objected to and declined to answer most of the questions propounded - Slagle, 97 of the next 129 questions; Bohus, 97 of the next 99 questions; Perry, 110 of the next 118 questions; Cooper, 76 of the next 103 questions; and Mladajan, 88 of the next 123 questions. </s> [Footnote 4 In addition to various state grounds, each appellant based his objections to the questions on the Fifth Amendment, but Slagle also [366 U.S. 259, 262] invoked the First and Fourteenth Amendments, Perry also invoked the First, Fourth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, and appellant Cooper also invoked the Fourth and Ninth Amendments, to the United States Constitution. </s> [Footnote 5 Appellant Slagle, too, was directed by the chairman to answer one question, but he thereupon answered it. He was not directed to answer any other question. </s> Appellant Bohus was not directed to answer any of the questions. </s> Appellant Perry was directed by the chairman to answer the question, "What is your husband's name?" but refused to answer and that refusal was made the subject of Count 1 of the indictment against her. She was also directed to answer the question, "What are your parents' names?" but refused to answer and that refusal was made the subject of Count 2 of the indictment. However, the trial court acquitted her on that count on the ground that the question was immaterial. She was not directed to answer any other question. </s> Appellant Cooper was directed to answer the following questions: </s> "Where did you reside prior to September, 1948?" (Count 1.) </s> "What was your name at the time you were born; what was the name given you on baptism?" (Count 2.) </s> "Did you ever live in the City of St. Louis, Missouri?" (Count 5.) </s> "What is your husband's name, Mrs. Cooper?" (Count 6.) </s> But she nevertheless refused to answer in each instance and those refusals were made the subjects of Counts 1, 2, 5 and 6, respectively, of the indictment against her. Although she refused, when directed, to answer another question, she was not indicted for that refusal. She was not directed to answer the questions on which Counts 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the indictment were based. </s> Appellant Mladajan was directed to answer the question, "Mrs. Mladajan, have you ever been in meetings at the Croatian Hall at any time except in your capacity as an employee?" but she refused to answer and that refusal was made the subject of Count 6 of the indictment against her. She was not directed to answer any other question. </s> [Footnote 6 Ohio Rev. Code 103.35 provides, in relevant part, that "[i]n case of . . . the refusal of any person . . . to testify to any matters regarding which he may be lawfully interrogated . . . the chairman may be authorized by a majority of the members sitting at the time the alleged offense is committed, to cause a proceeding for contempt to be filed and prosecuted in the court of common pleas of any county under sections 2705.03 to 2705.09, inclusive, of the Revised Code. . . ." </s> [Footnote 7 Ohio Rev. Code 2705.02 provides, in pertinent part: </s> "A person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished as for a contempt: </s> . . . . . </s> "(C) A failure . . . to answer as a witness, when lawfully required." </s> Ohio Rev. Code 2705.05 provides: </s> "Upon the day fixed for the trial in a contempt proceeding the court shall investigate the charge, and hear any answer or testimony which the accused makes or offers. </s> "The court shall then determine whether the accused is guilty of the contempt charge. If it is found that he is guilty, he may be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than ten days, or both." </s> [Footnote 8 Appellant Slagle was convicted on Counts 3 to 10, inclusive; Bohus was convicted on Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9; Perry was convicted on Counts 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9; Cooper was convicted on Counts 1 to 9, inclusive; Mladajan was convicted on Counts 1 to 8, inclusive, and 10. Each was sentenced to imprisonment for 10 days [366 U.S. 259, 264] on each count - the sentences on all counts, in each instance, to run concurrently - and was fined $500 on each count, but the fines, other than the first one, were remitted in each instance. </s> [Footnote 9 The opinion of the Stark County Court of Appeals is not reported. </s> [366 U.S. 259, 269]

United States Supreme Court MEMOIRS v. MASSACHUSETTS(1966) No. 368 Argued: Decided: March 21, 1966 </s> Appellee, the Attorney General of Massachusetts, brought this civil equity action for an adjudication of obscenity of Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure (Fanny Hill), and appellant publisher intervened. Following a hearing, including expert testimony and other evidence, assessing the book's character but not the mode of distribution, the trial court decreed the book obscene and not entitled to the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that a patently offensive book which appeals to prurient interest need not be unqualifiedly worthless before it can be deemed obscene. Held: The judgment is reversed. Pp. 415-433. </s> 349 Mass. 69, 206 N. E. 2d 403, reversed. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE FORTAS, concluded that: </s> 1. Under the test in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 , as elaborated in subsequent cases, each of three elements must independently be satisfied before a book can be held obscene: (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value. P. 418. </s> 2. Since a book cannot be proscribed as obscene unless found to be utterly without redeeming social value, the Supreme Judicial Court erroneously interpreted the federal constitutional standard. Pp. 419-420. </s> 3. On the premise, not assessed here, that it has the requisite prurient appeal, is patently offensive, and has only a modicum of social importance, evidence of commercial exploitation of the book for the sake of prurient appeal to the exclusion of all other values [383 U.S. 413, 414] might in a different proceeding justify the conclusion that the publication and distribution of Memoirs was not constitutionally protected. Ginzburg v. United States, post, p. 463. Pp. 420-421. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE STEWART concur in the reversal for the reasons given in their respective dissenting opinions in Ginzburg v. United States, post, p. 476 and p. 497 and Mishkin v. New York, post, p. 515 and p. 518. P. 421. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS concluded that: </s> 1. Since the First Amendment forbids censorship of expression of ideas not linked with illegal action, Fanny Hill cannot be proscribed. Pp. 426; 427-433. </s> 2. Even under the prevailing view of the Roth test the book cannot be held to be obscene in view of substantial evidence showing that it has literary, historical, and social importance. P. 426. </s> 3. Since there is no power under the First Amendment to control mere expression, the manner in which a book that concededly has social worth is advertised and sold is irrelevant. P. 427. </s> 4. There is no basis in history for the view expressed in Roth that "obscene" speech is "outside" the protection of the First Amendment. Pp. 428-431. </s> 5. No interest of society justifies overriding the guarantees of free speech and press and establishing a regime of censorship. Pp. 431-433. </s> Charles Rembar argued the cause and filed briefs for appellants. </s> William I. Cowin, Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Edward W. Brooke, Attorney General, and John E. Sullivan, Assistant Attorney General. </s> Charles H. Keating, Jr., and James J. Clancy filed a brief for Citizens for Decent Literature, Inc., et al., as amici curiae, urging affirmance. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE FORTAS join. [383 U.S. 413, 415] </s> This is an obscenity case in which Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure (commonly known as Fanny Hill), written by John Cleland in about 1750, was adjudged obscene in a proceeding that put on trial the book itself, and not its publisher or distributor. The proceeding was a civil equity suit brought by the Attorney General of Massachusetts, pursuant to General Laws of Massachusetts, Chapter 272, 28C-28H, to have the book declared obscene. 1 Section 28C requires that the petition commencing the suit be "directed against [the] book by name" and that an order to show cause "why said book should not be judicially determined to be obscene" be published in a daily newspaper and sent by registered mail "to all persons interested in the publication." Publication of the order in this case occurred in a Boston daily newspaper, and a copy of the order was sent by registered mail to G. P. Putnam's Sons, alleged to be the publisher and copyright holder of the book. </s> As authorized by 28D, G. P. Putnam's Sons intervened in the proceedings in behalf of the book, but it did not claim the right provided by that section to have the issue of obscenity tried by a jury. At the hearing before a justice of the Superior Court, which was conducted, under 28F, "in accordance with the usual course of proceedings in equity," the court received the book in evidence and also, as allowed by the section, heard the testimony of experts 2 and accepted other evidence, such [383 U.S. 413, 416] as book reviews, in order to assess the literary, cultural, or educational character of the book. This constituted the entire evidence, as neither side availed itself of the [383 U.S. 413, 417] opportunity provided by the section to introduce evidence "as to the manner and form of its publication, advertisement, and distribution." 3 The trial justice entered a final decree, which adjudged Memoirs obscene and declared that the book "is not entitled to the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States against action by the Attorney General or other law enforcement officer pursuant to the provisions of . . . 28B, or otherwise." 4 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decree. 349 Mass. 69, 206 N. E. 2d 403 (1965). We noted probable jurisdiction. 382 U.S. 900 . We reverse. 5 </s> [383 U.S. 413, 418] </s> I. </s> The term "obscene" appearing in the Massachusetts statute has been interpreted by the Supreme Judicial Court to be as expansive as the Constitution permits: the "statute covers all material that is obscene in the constitutional sense." Attorney General v. The Book Named "Tropic of Cancer," 345 Mass. 11, 13, 184 N. E. 2d 328, 330 (1962). Indeed, the final decree before us equates the finding that Memoirs is obscene within the meaning of the statute with the declaration that the book is not entitled to the protection of the First Amendment. 6 Thus the sole question before the state courts was whether Memoirs satisfies the test of obscenity established in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 . </s> We defined obscenity in Roth in the following terms: "[W]hether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." 354 U.S., at 489 . Under this definition, as elaborated in subsequent cases, three elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value. </s> The Supreme Judicial Court purported to apply the Roth definition of obscenity and held all three criteria satisfied. We need not consider the claim that the court erred in concluding that Memoirs satisfied the prurient [383 U.S. 413, 419] appeal and patent offensiveness criteria; for reversal is required because the court misinterpreted the social value criterion. The court applied the criterion in this passage: </s> "It remains to consider whether the book can be said to be `utterly without social importance.' We are mindful that there was expert testimony, much of which was strained, to the effect that Memoirs is a structural novel with literary merit; that the book displays a skill in characterization and a gift for comedy; that it plays a part in the history of the development of the English novel; and that it contains a moral, namely, that sex with love is superior to sex in a brothel. But the fact that the testimony may indicate this book has some minimal literary value does not mean it is of any social importance. We do not interpret the `social importance' test as requiring that a book which appeals to prurient interest and is patently offensive must be unqualifiedly worthless before it can be deemed obscene." 349 Mass., at 73, 206 N. E. 2d, at 406. </s> The Supreme Judicial Court erred in holding that a book need not be "unqualifiedly worthless before it can be deemed obscene." A book cannot be proscribed unless it is found to be utterly without redeeming social value. This is so even though the book is found to possess the requisite prurient appeal and to be patently offensive. Each of the three federal constitutional criteria is to be applied independently; the social value of the book can neither be weighed against nor canceled by its prurient appeal or patent offensiveness. 7 Hence, [383 U.S. 413, 420] even on the view of the court below that Memoirs possessed only a modicum of social value, its judgment must be reversed as being founded on an erroneous interpretation of a federal constitutional standard. </s> II. </s> It does not necessarily follow from this reversal that a determination that Memoirs is obscene in the constitutional sense would be improper under all circumstances. On the premise, which we have no occasion to assess, that Memoirs has the requisite prurient appeal and is patently offensive, but has only a minimum of social value, the circumstances of production, sale, and publicity are relevant in determining whether or not the publication or distribution of the book is constitutionally protected. Evidence that the book was commercially exploited for the sake of prurient appeal, to the exclusion of all other values, might justify the conclusion that the book was utterly without redeeming social importance. It is not that in such a setting the social value test is relaxed so as to dispense with the requirement that a book be utterly devoid of social value, but rather that, as we elaborate in Ginzburg v. United States, post, pp. 470-473, where the purveyor's sole emphasis is on the sexually provocative aspects of his publications, a court could accept his evaluation at its face value. In this proceeding, however, the courts were asked to judge the obscenity of Memoirs in the abstract, and the declaration of obscenity was neither aided nor limited by a specific set of circumstances of production, sale, and publicity. 8 </s> [383 U.S. 413, 421] All possible uses of the book must therefore be considered, and the mere risk that the book might be exploited by panderers because it so pervasively treats sexual matters cannot alter the fact - given the view of the Massachusetts court attributing to Memoirs a modicum of literary and historical value - that the book will have redeeming social importance in the hands of those who publish or distribute it on the basis of that value. </s> Reversed. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE STEWART concur in the reversal for the reasons stated in their respective dissenting opinions in Ginzburg v. United States, post, p. 476 and p. 497, and Mishkin v. New York, post, p. 515 and p. 518. </s> APPENDIX TO OPINION OF MR. JUSTICE </s> BRENNAN. </s> STATE STATUTE. </s> MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL LAWS, CHAPTER 272. </s> . . . . . </s> SECTION 28B. Whoever imports, prints, publishes, sells, loans or distributes, or buys, procures, receives, or [383 U.S. 413, 422] has in his possession for the purpose of sale, loan or distribution, a book, knowing it to be obscene, indecent or impure, or whoever, being a wholesale distributor, a jobber, or publisher sends or delivers to a retail storekeeper a book, pamphlet, magazine or other form of printed or written material, knowing it to be obscene, indecent or impure, which said storekeeper had not previously ordered in writing, specifying the title and quantity of such publication he desired, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five years or in a jail or house of correction for not more than two and one half years, or by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars not more than five thousand dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment in jail or the house of correction. </s> SECTION 28C. Whenever there is reasonable cause to believe that a book which is being imported, sold, loaned or distributed, or is in the possession of any person who intends to import, sell, loan or distribute the same, is obscene, indecent or impure, the attorney general, or any district attorney within his district, shall bring an information or petition in equity in the superior court directed against said book by name. Upon the filing of such information or petition in equity, a justice of the superior court shall, if, upon a summary examination of the book, he is of opinion that there is reasonable cause to believe that such book is obscene, indecent or impure, issue an order of notice, returnable in or within thirty days, directed against such book by name and addressed to all persons interested in the publication, sale, loan or distribution thereof, to show cause why said book should not be judicially determined to be obscene, indecent or impure. Notice of such order shall be given by publication once each week for two successive weeks in a daily newspaper published in the city of Boston and, if such information or petition be filed in any county other than [383 U.S. 413, 423] Suffolk county, then by publication also in a daily newspaper published in such other county. A copy of such order of notice shall be sent by registered mail to the publisher of said book, to the person holding the copyrights, and to the author, in case the names of any such persons appear upon said book, fourteen days at least before the return day of such order of notice. After the issuance of an order of notice under the provisions of this section, the court shall, on motion of the attorney general or district attorney, make an interlocutory finding and adjudication that said book is obscene, indecent or impure, which finding and adjudication shall be of the same force and effect as the final finding and adjudication provided in section twenty-eight E or section twenty-eight F, but only until such final finding and adjudication is made or until further order of the court. </s> SECTION 28D. Any person interested in the sale, loan or distribution of said book may appear and file an answer on or before the return day named in said notice or within such further time as the court may allow, and may claim a right to trial by jury on the issue whether said book is obscene, indecent or impure. </s> SECTION 28E. If no person appears and answers within the time allowed, the court may at once upon motion of the petitioner, or of its own motion, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default and if the court finds that the book is obscene, indecent or impure, may make an adjudication against the book that the same is obscene, indecent and impure. </s> SECTION 28F. If an appearance is entered and answer filed, the case shall be set down for speedy hearing, but a default and order shall first be entered against all persons who have not appeared and answered, in the manner provided in section twenty-eight E. Such hearing shall be conducted in accordance with the usual course of proceedings in equity including all rights of exception and [383 U.S. 413, 424] appeal. At such hearing the court may receive the testimony of experts and may receive evidence as to the literary, cultural or educational character of said book and as to the manner and form of its publication, advertisement, and distribution. Upon such hearing, the court may make an adjudication in the manner provided in said section twenty-eight E. </s> SECTION 28G. An information or petition in equity under the provisions of section twenty-eight C shall not be open to objection on the ground that a mere judgment, order or decree is sought thereby and that no relief is or could be claimed thereunder on the issue of the defendant's knowledge as to the obscenity, indecency or impurity of the book. </s> SECTION 28H. In any trial under section twenty-eight B on an indictment found or a complaint made for any offence committed after the filing of a proceeding under section twenty-eight C, the fact of such filing and the action of the court or jury thereon, if any, shall be admissible in evidence. If prior to the said offence a final decree had been entered against the book, the defendant, if the book be obscene, indecent or impure, shall be conclusively presumed to have known said book to be obscene, indecent or impure, or if said decree had been in favor of the book he shall be conclusively presumed not to have known said book to be obscene, indecent or impure, or if no final decree had been entered but a proceeding had been filed prior to said offence, the defendant shall be conclusively presumed to have had knowledge of the contents of said book. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The text of the statute appears in the Appendix. </s> [Footnote 2 In dissenting from the Supreme Judicial Court's disposition in this case, 349 Mass. 69, 74-75, 206 N. E. 2d 403, 406-407 (1965), Justice Whittemore summarized this testimony: "In the view of one or another or all of the following viz., the chairman of the English department at Williams College, a professor of English at Harvard College, an associate professor of English literature at Boston University, an associate professor of English at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and an assistant [383 U.S. 413, 416] professor of English and American literature at Brandeis University, the book is a minor `work of art' having `literary merit' and `historical value' and containing a good deal of `deliberate, calculated comedy.' It is a piece of `social history of interest to anyone who is interested in fiction as a way of understanding society in the past.'1. A saving grace is that although many scenes, if translated 1. "One of the witnesses testified in part as follows: `Cleland is part of what I should call this cultural battle that is going on in the 18th century, a battle between a restricted Puritan, moralistic ethic that attempts to suppress freedom of the spirit, freedom of the flesh, and this element is competing with a freer attitude towards life, a more generous attitude towards life, a more wholesome attitude towards life, and this very attitude that is manifested in Fielding's great novel "Tom Jones" is also evident in Cleland's novel. . . . [Richardson's] "Pamela" is the story of a young country girl; [his] "Clarissa" is the story of a woman trapped in a house of prostitution. Obviously, then Cleland takes both these themes, the country girl, her initiation into life and into experience, and the story of a woman in a house of prostitution, and what he simply does is to take the situation and reverse the moral standards. Richardson believed that chastity was the most important thing in the world; Cleland and Fielding obviously did not and thought there were more important significant moral values.'" into the present day language of `the realistic, naturalistic novel, could be quite offensive' these scenes are not described in such language. The book contains no dirty words and its language `functions . . . to create a distance, even when the sexual experiences are portrayed.' The response, therefore, is a literary response. The descriptions of depravity are not obscene because `they are subordinate to an interest which is primarily literary'; Fanny's reaction to the scenes of depravity was `anger,' `disgust, horror, [and] indignation.' The book `belongs to the history of English literature rather than the history of smut.'2." "2. In the opinion of the other academic witness, the headmaster of a private school, whose field is English literature, the book is without literary merit and is obscene, impure, hard core pornography, and is patently offensive." </s> [Footnote 3 The record in this case is thus significantly different from the records in Ginzburg v. United States, post, p. 463, and Mishkin v. New York, post, p. 502. See pp. 420-421, infra. </s> [Footnote 4 Section 28B makes it a criminal offense, inter alia, to import, print, publish, sell, loan, or distribute, buy, procure, receive, or possess for the purpose of sale, loan, or distribution, "a book, knowing it to be obscene." Section 28H provides that in any prosecution under 28B the decree obtained in a proceeding against the book "shall be admissible in evidence" and further that "[i]f prior to the said offence a final decree had been entered against the book, the defendant, if the book be obscene . . . shall be conclusively presumed to have known said book to be obscene . . . ." Thus a declaration of obscenity such as that obtained in this proceeding is likely to result in the total suppression of the book in the Commonwealth. The constitutionality of 28H has not been challenged in this appeal. </s> [Footnote 5 Although the final decree provides no coercive relief but only a declaration of the book's obscenity, our adjudication of the merits of the issue tendered, viz., whether the state courts erred in declaring the book obscene, is not premature. There is no uncertainty as to the content of the material challenged, and the Attorney General's petition commencing this suit states that the book "is being imported, sold, loaned, or distributed in the Commonwealth." The declaration of obscenity is likely to have a serious inhibitory effect on the distribution of the book, and this probable impact is to no small measure derived from possible collateral uses of the declaration in subsequent prosecutions under the Massachusetts criminal obscenity statute. See n. 4, supra. </s> [Footnote 6 We infer from the opinions below that the other adjectives describing the proscribed books in 28C-28H, "indecent" and "impure," have either been read out of the statute or deemed synonymous with "obscene." </s> [Footnote 7 "[M]aterial dealing with sex in a manner that advocates ideas . . . or that has literary or scientific or artistic value or any other form of social importance, may not be branded as obscenity and denied the constitutional protection. Nor may the constitutional status of the material be made to turn on a `weighing' of its social importance against its prurient appeal, for a work cannot be proscribed [383 U.S. 413, 420] unless it is `utterly' without social importance. See Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59 Cal. 2d 901, 920, 383 P.2d 152, 165, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800, 813 (1963)." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). Followed in, e. g., People v. Bruce, 31 Ill. 2d 459, 461, 202 N. E. 2d 497, 498 (1964); Trans-Lux Distributing Corp. v. Maryland Bd. of Censors, 240 Md. 98, 104-105, 213 A. 2d 235, 238-239 (1965). </s> [Footnote 8 In his dissenting opinion, 349 Mass., at 76-78, 206 N. E. 2d, at 408-409, Justice Cutter stated that, although in his view the book was not "obscene" within the meaning of Roth, "it could reasonably be found that distribution of the book to persons under the age of eighteen would be a violation of G. L. c. 272, 28, as tending to corrupt the morals of youth." (Section 28 makes it a crime to sell to "a person under the age of eighteen years a book . . . which is obscene . . . or manifestly tends to corrupt the morals of youth.") He concluded that the court should "limit the relief granted to a declaration that distribution of this book to persons under the age of eighteen may be found to constitute a violation of [G. L.] c. 272, 28, if that section is reasonably applied . . . ." However, the decree was not so limited and we intimate no view concerning the constitutionality of such a limited declaration regarding Memoirs. Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S., at 195 . </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring in the judgment. </s> Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure, or, as it is often titled, Fanny Hill, concededly is an erotic novel. It was first published in about 1749 and has endured to this [383 U.S. 413, 425] date, despite periodic efforts to suppress it. 1 The book relates the adventures of a young girl who becomes a prostitute in London. At the end, she abandons that life and marries her first lover, observing: </s> "Thus, at length, I got snug into port, where, in the bosom of virtue, I gather'd the only uncorrupt sweets: where, looking back on the course of vice I had run, and comparing its infamous blandishments with the infinitely superior joys of innocence, I could not help pitying, even in point of taste, those who, immers'd in gross sensuality, are insensible to the so delicate charms of VIRTUE, than which even PLEASURE has not a greater friend, nor than VICE a greater enemy. Thus temperance makes men lords over those pleasures that intemperance enslaves them to: the one, parent of health, vigour, fertility, cheerfulness, and every other desirable good of life; the other, of diseases, debility, barrenness, self-loathing, with only every evil incident to human nature. </s> ". . . The paths of Vice are sometimes strew'd with roses, but then they are for ever infamous for many a thorn, for many a cankerworm: those of Virtue are strew'd with roses purely, and those eternally unfading ones." 2 </s> In 1963, an American publishing house undertook the publication of Memoirs. The record indicates that an unusually large number of orders were placed by universities and libraries; the Library of Congress requested the [383 U.S. 413, 426] right to translate the book into Braille. But the Commonwealth of Massachusetts instituted the suit that ultimately found its way here, praying that the book be declared obscene so that the citizens of Massachusetts might be spared the necessity of determining for themselves whether or not to read it. </s> The courts of Massachusetts found the book "obscene" and upheld its suppression. This Court reverses, the prevailing opinion having seized upon language in the opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in which it is candidly admitted that Fanny Hill has at least "some minimal literary value." I do not believe that the Court should decide this case on so disingenuous a basis as this. I base my vote to reverse on my view that the First Amendment does not permit the censorship of expression not brigaded with illegal action. But even applying the prevailing view of the Roth test, reversal is compelled by this record which makes clear that Fanny Hill is not "obscene." The prosecution made virtually no effort to prove that this book is "utterly without redeeming social importance." The defense, on the other hand, introduced considerable and impressive testimony to the effect that this was a work of literary, historical, and social importance. 3 </s> [383 U.S. 413, 427] </s> We are judges, not literary experts or historians or philosophers. We are not competent to render an independent judgment as to the worth of this or any other book, except in our capacity as private citizens. I would pair my Brother CLARK on Fanny Hill with the Universalist minister I quote in the Appendix. If there is to be censorship, the wisdom of experts on such matters as literary merit and historical significance must be evaluated. On this record, the Court has no choice but to reverse the judgment of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, irrespective of whether we would include Fanny Hill in our own libraries. </s> Four of the seven Justices of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court conclude that Fanny Hill is obscene. 349 Mass. 69, 206 N. E. 2d 403. Four of the seven judges of the New York Court of Appeals conclude that it is not obscene. Larkin v. Putnam's Sons, 14 N. Y. 2d 399, 200 N. E. 2d 760. To outlaw the book on such a voting record would be to let majorities rule where minorities were thought to be supreme. The Constitution forbids abridgment of "freedom of speech, or of the press." Censorship is the most notorious form of abridgment. It substitutes majority rule where minority tastes or viewpoints were to be tolerated. </s> It is to me inexplicable how a book that concededly has social worth can nonetheless be banned because of the manner in which it is advertised and sold. However florid its cover, whatever the pitch of its advertisements, the contents remain the same. </s> Every time an obscenity case is to be argued here, my office is flooded with letters and postal cards urging me [383 U.S. 413, 428] to protect the community or the Nation by striking down the publication. The messages are often identical even down to commas and semicolons. The inference is irresistible that they were all copied from a school or church blackboard. Dozens of postal cards often are mailed from the same precinct. The drives are incessant and the pressures are great. Happily we do not bow to them. I mention them only to emphasize the lack of popular understanding of our constitutional system. Publications and utterances were made immune from majoritarian control by the First Amendment, applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth. No exceptions were made, not even for obscenity. The Court's contrary conclusion in Roth, where obscenity was found to be "outside" the First Amendment, is without justification. </s> The extent to which the publication of "obscenity" was a crime at common law is unclear. It is generally agreed that the first reported case involving obscene conduct is The King v. Sir Charles Sedley. 4 Publication of obscene literature, at first thought to be the exclusive concern of the ecclesiastical courts, 5 was not held to constitute an indictable offense until 1727. 6 A later case involved the publication of an "obscene and [383 U.S. 413, 429] impious libel" (a bawdy parody of Pope's "Essay on Man") by a member of the House of Commons. 7 On the basis of these few cases, one cannot say that the common-law doctrines with regard to publication of obscenity were anything but uncertain. "There is no definition of the term. There is no basis of identification. There is no unity in describing what is obscene literature, or in prosecuting it." There is little more than the ability to smell it." Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 47 (1938). </s> But even if the common law had been more fully developed at the time of the adoption of the First Amendment, we would not be justified in assuming that the Amendment left the common law unscathed. In Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 264 , we said: </s> "[T]o assume that English common law in this field became ours is to deny the generally accepted historical belief that `one of the objects of the Revolution was to get rid of the English common law on liberty of speech and of the press.' Schofield, Freedom of the Press in the United States, 9 Publications Amer. Sociol. Soc., 67, 76. </s> "More specifically, it is to forget the environment in which the First Amendment was ratified. In presenting the proposals which were later embodied in the Bill of Rights, James Madison, the leader in the preparation of the First Amendment, said: `Although I know whenever the great rights, the trial by jury, freedom of the press, or liberty of conscience, come in question in that body [Parliament], [383 U.S. 413, 430] the invasion of them is resisted by able advocates, yet their Magna Charta does not contain any one provision for the security of those rights, respecting which the people of America are most alarmed. The freedom of the press and rights of conscience, those choicest privileges of the people, are unguarded in the British Constitution.'" </s> And see Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 248 -249. </s> It is true, as the Court observed in Roth, that obscenity laws appeared on the books of a handful of States at the time the First Amendment was adopted. 8 But the First Amendment was, until the adoption of the Fourteenth, a restraint only upon federal power. Moreover, there is an absence of any federal cases or laws relative to obscenity in the period immediately after the adoption of the First Amendment. Congress passed no legislation relating to obscenity until the middle of the nineteenth century. 9 Neither reason nor history warrants exclusion of any particular class of expression from the protection of the First Amendment on nothing more than a judgment that it is utterly without merit. We faced the difficult questions the First Amendment poses with regard to libel in New York Times v. Sullivan, [383 U.S. 413, 431] 376 U.S. 254, 269 , where we recognized that "libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations." We ought not to permit fictionalized assertions of constitutional history to obscure those questions here. Were the Court to undertake that inquiry, it would be unable, in my opinion, to escape the conclusion that no interest of society with regard to suppression of "obscene" literature could override the First Amendment to justify censorship. </s> The censor is always quick to justify his function in terms that are protective of society. But the First Amendment, written in terms that are absolute, deprives the States of any power to pass on the value, the propriety, or the morality of a particular expression. Cf. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688 -689; Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 . Perhaps the most frequently assigned justification for censorship is the belief that erotica produce antisocial sexual conduct. But that relationship has yet to be proven. 10 Indeed, if one were to make judgments on the [383 U.S. 413, 432] basis of speculation, one might guess that literature of the most pornographic sort would, in many cases, provide a substitute - not a stimulus - for antisocial sexual conduct. See Murphy, The Value of Pornography, 10 Wayne L. Rev. 655, 661 and n. 19 (1964). As I read the First Amendment, judges cannot gear the literary diet of an entire nation to whatever tepid stuff is incapable of triggering the most demented mind. The First Amendment demands more than a horrible example or two of the perpetrator of a crime of sexual violence, in whose pocket is found a pornographic book, before it allows the Nation to be saddled with a regime of censorship. 11 </s> [383 U.S. 413, 433] </s> Whatever may be the reach of the power to regulate conduct, I stand by my view in Roth v. United States, supra, that the First Amendment leaves no power in government over expression of ideas. </s> APPENDIX TO OPINION OF MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, CONCURRING. </s> DR. PEALE AND FANNY HILL. </s> An Address by </s> Rev. John R. Graham, First Universalist Church of Denver. </s> December 1965. </s> . . . . . </s> At the present point in the twentieth century, it seems to me that there are two books which symbolize the human quest for what is moral. Sin, Sex and Self-Control by Dr. Norman Vincent Peale, the well-known clergyman of New York City, portrays the struggle of contemporary middle-class society to arrive at a means of stabilizing behavior patterns. At the same time, there is a disturbing book being sold in the same stores with Dr. Peale's volume. It is a seventeenth century English novel by John Cleland and it is known as Fanny Hill: The Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure. </s> Quickly, it must be admitted that it appears that the two books have very little in common. One was written in a day of scientific and technological sophistication, while the other is over two hundred years old. One is acclaimed in the pulpit, while the other is protested before the United States Supreme Court. Sin, Sex and Self-Control is authored by a Christian pastor, while [383 U.S. 413, 434] Fanny Hill represents thoughts and experiences of a common prostitute. As far as the general public seems to be concerned, one is moral and the other is hopelessly immoral. While Dr. Peale is attempting to redeem the society, most people believe that Fanny Hill can only serve as another instance in an overall trend toward an immoral social order. Most parents would be pleased to find their children reading a book by Dr. Peale, but I am afraid that the same parents would be sorely distressed to discover a copy of Fanny Hill among the school books of their offspring. </s> Although one would not expect to find very many similarities between the thoughts of a pastor and those of a prostitute, the subject matter of the two books is, in many ways, strangely similar. While the contents are radically different, the concerns are the same. Both authors deal with human experience. They are concerned with people and what happens to them in the world in which they live each day. But most significantly of all, both books deal with the age-old question of "What is moral?" I readily admit that this concern with the moral is more obvious in Dr. Peale's book than it is in the one by John Cleland. The search for the moral in Fanny Hill is clothed in erotic passages which seem to equate morality with debauchery as far as the general public is concerned. At the same time, Dr. Peale's book is punctuated with such noble terms as "truth," "love," and "honesty." </s> These two books are not very important in themselves. They may or may not be great literature. Whether they will survive through the centuries to come is a question, although John Cleland has an historical edge on Norman Vincent Peale! However, in a symbolic way they do represent the struggle of the moral quest and for this reason they are important. [383 U.S. 413, 435] </s> Dr. Peale begins his book with an analysis of contemporary society in terms of the moral disorder which is more than obvious today. He readily admits that the traditional Judeo-Christian standards of conduct and behavior no longer serve as strong and forceful guides. He writes: </s> "For more than forty years, ever since my ordination, I had been preaching that if a person would surrender to Jesus Christ and adopt strong affirmative attitudes toward life he would be able to live abundantly and triumphantly. I was still absolutely convinced that this was true. But I was also bleakly aware that the whole trend in the seventh decade of the twentieth century seemed to be away from the principles and practices of religion - not toward them." ( [383 U.S. 413, 1] .) </s> Dr. Peale then reflects on the various changes that have taken place in our day and suggests that although he is less than enthusiastic about the loss of allegiance to religion, he is, nevertheless, willing to recognize that one cannot live by illusion. </s> After much struggle, Dr. Peale then says that he was able to develop a new perspective on the current moral dilemma of our times. What first appeared to be disaster was really opportunity. Such an idea, coming from him, should not be very surprising, since he is more or less devoted to the concept of "positive thinking!" He concludes that our society should welcome the fact that the old external authorities have fallen. He does not believe that individuals should ever be coerced into certain patterns of behavior. </s> According to Dr. Peale, we live in a day of challenge. Our society has longed for a time when individuals would be disciplined by self-control, rather than being motivated by external compunction. Bravely and forth-rightly, [383 U.S. 413, 436] he announces that the time has now come when self-control can and must replace external authority. He is quick to add that the values contained in the Judeo-Christian tradition and "the American way of life" must never be abandoned for they emanate from the wellsprings of "Truth." What has previously been only an external force must now be internalized by individuals. </s> In many ways, Dr. Peale's analysis of the social situation and the solution he offers for assisting the individual to stand against the pressures of the times, come very close to the views of Sigmund Freud. He felt that society could and would corrupt the individual and, as a result, the only sure defense was a strong super-ego or conscience. This is precisely what Dr. Peale recommends. </s> Interestingly enough John Cleland, in Fanny Hill, is concerned with the same issues. Although the question of moral behavior is presented more subtly in his book, the problem with which he deals is identical. There are those who contend that the book is wholly without redeeming social importance. They feel that it appeals only to prurient interests. </s> I firmly believe that Fanny Hill is a moral, rather than an immoral, piece of literature. In fact, I will go as far as to suggest that it represents a more significant view of morality than is represented by Dr. Peale's book Sin, Sex and Self-Control. As is Dr. Peale, Cleland is concerned with the nature of the society and the relationship of the individual to it. Fanny Hill appears to me to be an allegory. In the story, the immoral becomes the moral and the unethical emerges as the ethical. Nothing is more distressing than to discover that what is commonly considered to be evil may, in reality, demonstrate characteristics of love and concern. </s> There is real irony in the fact that Fanny Hill, a rather naive young girl who becomes a prostitute, finds warmth, [383 U.S. 413, 437] understanding and the meaning of love and faithfulness amid surroundings and situations which the society, as a whole, condemns as debased and depraved. The world outside the brothel affirms its faith in the dignity of man, but people are often treated as worthless and unimportant creatures. However, within the world of prostitution, Fanny Hill finds friendship, understanding, respect and is treated as a person of value. When her absent lover returns, she is not a lost girl of the gutter. One perceives that she is a whole and healthy person who has discovered the ability to love and be loved in a brothel. </s> I think Cleland is suggesting that one must be cautious about what is condemned and what is held in honor. From Dr. Peale's viewpoint, the story of Fanny Hill is a tragedy because she did not demonstrate self-control. She refused to internalize the values inherent in the Judeo-Christian tradition and the catalog of sexual scenes in the book, fifty-two in all, are a symbol of the debased individual and the society in which he lives. </s> Dr. Peale and others, would be correct in saying that Fanny Hill did not demonstrate self-control. She did, however, come to appreciate the value of self-expression. At no time were her "clients" looked upon as a means to an end. She tried and did understand them and she was concerned about them as persons. When her lover, Charles, returned she was not filled with guilt and remorse. She accepted herself as she was and was able to offer him her love and devotion. </s> I have a feeling that many people fear the book Fanny Hill, not because of its sexual scenes, but because the author raises serious question with the issue of what is moral and what is immoral. He takes exception to the idea that repression and restraint create moral individuals. He develops the thought that self-expression is more human than self-control. And he dares to suggest that, in a situation which society calls immoral and [383 U.S. 413, 438] debased, a genuine love and respect for life and for people, as human beings, can develop. Far from glorifying vice, John Cleland points an accusing finger at the individual who is so certain as to what it means to be a moral man. </s> There are those who will quickly say that this "message" will be missed by the average person who reads Fanny Hill. But this is precisely the point. We become so accustomed to pre-judging what is ethical and what is immoral that we are unable to recognize that what we accept as good may be nothing less than evil because it harms people. </s> I know of no book which more beautifully describes meaningful relationships between a man and a woman than does Fanny Hill. In many marriages, men use a woman for sexual gratification and otherwise, as well as vice versa. But this is not the case in the story of Fanny Hill. The point is simply that there are many, many ways in which we hurt, injure and degrade people that are far worse than either being or visiting a prostitute. We do this all in the name of morality. </s> At the same time that Dr. Peale is concerned with sick people, John Cleland attempts to describe healthy ones. Fanny Hill is a more modern and certainly more valuable book than Sin, Sex and Self-Control because the author does not tell us how to behave, but attempts to help us understand ourselves and the nature of love and understanding in being related to other persons. Dr. Peale's writing emphasizes the most useful commodities available to man - self-centeredness and self-control. John Cleland suggests that self-understanding and self-expression may not be as popular, but they are more humane. </s> The "Peale approach" to life breeds contentment, for it suggests that each one of us can be certain as to what is good and true. Standards for thinking and behavior are available and all we need to do is appropriate them [383 U.S. 413, 439] for our use. In a day when life is marked by chaos and confusion, this viewpoint offers much in the way of comfort and satisfaction. There is only one trouble with it, however, and that is that it results in conformity, rigid behavior and a lack of understanding. It results in personality configurations that are marked with an intense interest in propositions about Truth and Right but, at the same time, build a wall against people. Such an attitude creates certainty, but there is little warmth. The idea develops that there are "my kind of people" and they are "right." It forces us to degrade, dismiss and ultimately attempt to destroy anyone who does not agree with us. </s> To be alive and sensitive to life means that we have to choose what we want. There is no possible way for a person to be a slave and free at the same time. Self-control and self-expression are at opposite ends of the continuum. As much as some persons would like to have both, it is necessary to make a choice, since restraint and openness are contradictory qualities. To internalize external values denies the possibility of self-expression. We must decide what we want, when it comes to conformity and creativity. If we want people to behave in a structured and predictable manner, then the ideal of creativity cannot have meaning. </s> . . . . . </s> Long ago Plato said, "What is honored in a country will be cultivated there." More and more, we reward people for thinking alike and as a result, we become frightened, beyond belief, of those who take exception to the current consensus. If our society collapses, it will not be because people read a book such as Fanny Hill. It will fall, because we will have refused to understand it. Decadence, in a nation or an individual, arises not because there is a lack of ability to distinguish between morality and immorality, but because the opportunity [383 U.S. 413, 440] for self-expression has been so controlled or strangled that the society or the person becomes a robot. </s> The issue which a Dr. Peale will never understand, because he is a victim of it himself and which John Cleland describes with brilliant clarity and sensitive persuasion is that until we learn to respect ourselves enough that we leave each other alone, we cannot discover the meaning of morality. </s> Dr. Peale and Fanny Hill offer the two basic choices open to man. Man is free to choose an autocentric existence which is marked by freedom from ambiguity and responsibility. Autocentricity presupposes a "closed world" where life is predetermined and animal-like. In contrast to this view, there is the allocentric outlook which is marked by an "open encounter of the total person with the world." Growth, spontaneity and expression are the goals of such an existence. </s> Dr. Peale epitomizes the autocentric approach. He offers "warm blankets" and comfortable "cocoons" for those who want to lose their humanity. On the other hand, Fanny Hill represents the allocentric viewpoint which posits the possibility for man to raise his sights, stretch his imagination, cultivate his sensitiveness as well as deepen and broaden his perspectives. In discussing the autocentric idea, Floyd W. Matson writes, </s> "Human beings conditioned to apathy and affluence may well prefer this regressive path of least resistance, with its promise of escape from freedom and an end to striving. But we know at least that it is open to them to choose otherwise: in a word, to choose themselves." (The Broken Image, page 193.) </s> In a day when people are overly sensitive in drawing lines between the good and the bad, the right and the wrong, as well as the true and the false, it seems to me [383 U.S. 413, 441] that there is great irony in the availability of a book such as Fanny Hill. Prostitution may be the oldest profession in the world, but we are ever faced with a question which is becoming more and more disturbing: "What does a prostitute look like?" </s> [Footnote 1 Memoirs was the subject of what is generally regarded as the first recorded suppression of a literary work in this country on grounds of obscenity. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336 (1821). The edition there condemned differed from the present volume in that it contained apparently erotic illustrations. </s> [Footnote 2 Memoirs, at 213-214 (Putnam ed. 1963). </s> [Footnote 3 The defense drew its witnesses from the various colleges located within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. These included: Fred Holly Stocking, Professor of English and Chairman of the English Department, Williams College; John M. Bullitt, Professor of English and Master of Quincy House, Harvard College; Robert H. Sproat, Associate Professor of English Literature, Boston University; Norman N. Holland, Associate Professor of English, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Ira Konigsberg, Assistant Professor of English and American Literature, Brandeis University. In addition, the defense introduced into evidence reviews of impartial literary critics. These are, in my opinion, of particular significance since their publication indicates that the book is of sufficient significance as to warrant serious critical comment. The [383 U.S. 413, 427] reviews were by V. S. Pritchett, New York Review of Books, p. 1 (Oct. 31, 1963); Brigid Brophy, New Statesman, p. 710 (Nov. 15, 1963); and J. Donald Adams, New York Times Book Review, p. 2 (July 28, 1963). And the Appendix to this opinion contains another contemporary view. </s> [Footnote 4 There are two reports of the case. The first is captioned Le Roy v. Sr. Charles Sidney, 1 Sid. 168, pl. 29 (K. B. 1663); the second is titled Sir Charles Sydlyes Case, 1 Keble 620 (K. B. 1663). Sir Charles had made a public appearance on a London balcony while nude, intoxicated, and talkative. He delivered a lengthy speech to the assembled crowd, uttered profanity, and hurled bottles containing what was later described as an "offensive liquor" upon the crowd. The proximate source of the "offensive liquor" appears to have been Sir Charles. Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 40-43 (1938). </s> [Footnote 5 The Queen v. Read, 11 Mod. 142 (Q. B. 1707). </s> [Footnote 6 Dominus Rex v. Curl, 2 Strange 789 (K. B. 1727). See Straus, The Unspeakable Curll (1927). </s> [Footnote 7 Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527 (K. B. 1770). The prosecution of Wilkes was a highly political action, for Wilkes was an outspoken critic of the government. See R. W. Postgate, That Devil Wilkes (1929). It has been suggested that the prosecution in this case was a convenient substitute for the less attractive charge of seditious libel. See Alpert, supra, at 45. </s> [Footnote 8 See 354 U.S., at 483 and n. 13. For the most part, however, the early legislation was aimed at blasphemy and profanity. See 354 U.S., at 482 -483 and n. 12. The first reported decision involving the publication of obscene literature does not come until 1821. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336. It was not until after the Civil War that state prosecutions of this sort became commonplace. See Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 295, 324-325 (1954). </s> [Footnote 9 Tariff Act of 1842, c. 270, 28, 5 Stat. 566 (prohibiting importation of obscene "prints"). Other federal legislation followed; the development of federal law is traced in Cairns, Paul, & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 46 Minn. L. Rev. 1009, 1010 n. 2 (1962). </s> [Footnote 10 See Cairns, Paul & Wishner, supra, 1034-1041; Lockhart & McClure, supra, at 382-387. And see the summary of Dr. Jahoda's studies prepared by her for Judge Frank, reprinted in United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 815-816 (concurring opinion). Those who are concerned about children and erotic literature would do well to consider the counsel of Judge Bok: "It will be asked whether one would care to have one's young daughter read these books. I suppose that by the time she is old enough to wish to read them she will have learned the biologic facts of life and the words that go with them. There is something seriously wrong at home if those facts have not been met and faced and sorted by then; it is not children so much as parents that should receive our concern about this. I should prefer that my own three daughters meet the facts of life and the literature of the world in my library than behind a neighbor's barn, for I can face the adversary there directly. If the young ladies are appalled by what they read, they can close the book at the bottom of page one; if they read further, they will learn what is in the world and in its [383 U.S. 413, 432] people, and no parents who have been discerning with their children need fear the outcome. Nor can they hold it back, for life is a series of little battles and minor issues, and the burden of choice is on us all, every day, young and old." Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101, 110. </s> [Footnote 11 It would be a futile effort even for a censor to attempt to remove all that might possibly stimulate antisocial sexual conduct: "The majority [of individuals], needless to say, are somewhere between the over-scrupulous extremes of excitement and frigidity . . . . Within this variety, it is impossible to define `hard-core' pornography, as if there were some singly lewd concept from which all profane ideas passed by imperceptible degrees into that sexuality called holy. But there is no `hard-core.' Everything, every idea, is capable of being obscene if the personality perceiving it so apprehends it. "It is for this reason that books, pictures, charades, ritual, the spoken word, can and do lead directly to conduct harmful to the self indulging in it and to others. Heinrich Pommerenke, who was a rapist, abuser, and mass slayer of women in Germany, was prompted to his series of ghastly deeds by Cecil B. DeMille's The Ten Commandments. During the scene of the Jewish women dancing about the Golden Calf, all the doubts of his life came clear: Women were the source of the world's trouble and it was his mission to both punish them for this and to execute them. Leaving the theater, he slew his first victim in a park nearby. John George Haigh, the British vampire who sucked his victims' blood through soda straws and dissolved [383 U.S. 413, 433] their drained bodies in acid baths, first had his murder-inciting dreams and vampire-longings from watching the `voluptuous' procedure of - an Anglican High Church Service!" Murphy, supra, at 668. </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK, dissenting. </s> It is with regret that I write this dissenting opinion. However, the public should know of the continuous flow of pornographic material reaching this Court and the increasing problem States have in controlling it. Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure, the book involved here, is typical. I have "stomached" past cases for almost 10 years without much outcry. Though I am not known to be a purist - or a shrinking violet - this book is too much even for me. It is important that the Court has refused to declare it obscene and thus affords it further circulation. In order to give my remarks the proper setting I have been obliged to portray the book's contents, which causes me embarrassment. However, quotations from typical episodes would so debase our Reports that I will not follow that course. </s> I. </s> Let me first pinpoint the effect of today's holding in the obscenity field. While there is no majority opinion in this case, there are three Justices who import a new test into that laid down in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), namely, that "[a] book cannot be proscribed unless it is found to be utterly without redeeming social value." I agree with my Brother WHITE that such a condition rejects the basic holding of Roth and gives the smut artist free rein to carry on his dirty business. My vote in that case - which was the deciding one for the majority opinion - was cast solely because the Court declared the test of obscenity to be: "whether to [383 U.S. 413, 442] the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." I understood that test to include only two constitutional requirements: (1) the book must be judged as a whole, not by its parts; and (2) it must be judged in terms of its appeal to the prurient interest of the average person, applying contemporary community standards. 1 Indeed, obscenity was denoted in Roth as having "such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived . . . is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. . . ." At 485 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). Moreover, in no subsequent decision of this Court has any "utterly without redeeming social value" test been suggested, much less expounded. My Brother HARLAN in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962), made no reference whatever to such a requirement in Roth. Rather he interpreted Roth as including a test of "patent offensiveness" besides "prurient appeal." Nor did my Brother BRENNAN in his concurring opinion in Manual Enterprises mention any "utterly without redeeming social value" test. The first reference to such a test was made by my Brother BRENNAN in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964), seven years after Roth. In an opinion joined only by Justice Goldberg, he there wrote: "Recognizing that the test for obscenity enunciated [in Roth] . . . is not perfect, we think any substitute would raise equally difficult problems, and we therefore adhere to that standard." Nevertheless, he proceeded to add: </s> "We would reiterate, however, our recognition in Roth that obscenity is excluded from the constitutional protection only because it is `utterly without redeeming social importance,' . . . ." [383 U.S. 413, 443] </s> This language was then repeated in the converse to announce this non sequitur: </s> "It follows that material dealing with sex in a manner that advocates ideas . . . or that has literary or scientific or artistic value or any other form of social importance, may not be branded as obscenity and denied the constitutional protection." At 191. </s> Significantly no opinion in Jacobellis, other than that of my Brother BRENNAN, mentioned the "utterly without redeeming social importance" test which he there introduced into our many and varied previous opinions in obscenity cases. Indeed, rather than recognizing the "utterly without social importance" test, THE CHIEF JUSTICE in his dissent in Jacobellis, which I joined, specifically stated: </s> "In light of the foregoing, I would reiterate my acceptance of the rule of the Roth case: Material is obscene and not constitutionally protected against regulation and proscription if `to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.'" (Emphasis added.) At 202. </s> THE CHIEF JUSTICE and I further asserted that the enforcement of this rule should be committed to the state and federal courts whose judgments made pursuant to the Roth rule we would accept, limiting our review to a consideration of whether there is "sufficient evidence" in the record to support a finding of obscenity. At 202. </s> II. </s> Three members of the majority hold that reversal here is necessary solely because their novel "utterly without redeeming social value" test was not properly interpreted or applied by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. [383 U.S. 413, 444] Massachusetts now has to retry the case although the "Findings of Fact, Rulings of Law and Order for Final Decree" of the trial court specifically held that "this book is `utterly without redeeming social importance' in the fields of art, literature, science, news or ideas of any social importance and that it is obscene, indecent and impure." I quote portions of the findings: </s> "Opinions of experts are admitted in evidence to aid the Court in its understanding and comprehension of the facts, but, of course, an expert cannot usurp the function of the Court. Highly artificial, stylistic writing and an abundance of metaphorical descriptions are contained in the book but the conclusions of some experts were pretty well strained in attempting to justify its claimed literary value: such as the book preached a moral that sex with love is better than sex without love, when Fanny's description of her sexual acts, particularly with the young boy she seduced, in Fanny's judgment at least, was to the contrary. Careful review of all the expert testimony has been made, but, the best evidence of all, is the book itself and it plainly has no value because of ideas, news or artistic, literary or scientific attributes. . . . Nor does it have any other merit. `This Court will not adopt a rule of law which states obscenity is suppressible but well written obscenity is not.' Mr. Justice Scileppi in People v. Fritch, 13 N. Y. 2d 119." (Emphasis added.) Finding 20. </s> None of these findings of the trial court were overturned on appeal, although the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts observed in addition that "the fact that the testimony may indicate this book has some minimal literary value does not mean it is of any social importance. We do not interpret the `social importance' test as requiring [383 U.S. 413, 445] that a book which appeals to prurient interest and is patently offensive must be unqualifiedly worthless before it can be deemed obscene." My Brother BRENNAN reverses on the basis of this casual statement, despite the specific findings of the trial court. Why, if the statement is erroneous, Brother BRENNAN does not affirm the holding of the trial court which beyond question is correct, one cannot tell. This course has often been followed in other cases. </s> In my view evidence of social importance is relevant to the determination of the ultimate question of obscenity. But social importance does not constitute a separate and distinct constitutional test. Such evidence must be considered together with evidence that the material in question appeals to prurient interest and is patently offensive. Accordingly, we must first turn to the book here under attack. I repeat that I regret having to depict the sordid episodes of this book. </s> III. </s> Memoirs is nothing more than a series of minutely and vividly described sexual episodes. The book starts with Fanny Hill, a young 15-year-old girl, arriving in London to seek household work. She goes to an employment office where through happenstance she meets the mistress of a bawdy house. This takes 10 pages. The remaining 200 pages of the book detail her initiation into various sexual experiences, from a lesbian encounter with a sister prostitute to all sorts and types of sexual debauchery in bawdy houses and as the mistress of a variety of men. This is presented to the reader through an uninterrupted succession of descriptions by Fanny, either as an observer or participant, of sexual adventures so vile that one of the male expert witnesses in the case was hesitant to repeat any one of them in the courtroom. [383 U.S. 413, 446] These scenes run the gamut of possible sexual experience such as lesbianism, female masturbation, homosexuality between young boys, the destruction of a maidenhead with consequent gory descriptions, the seduction of a young virgin boy, the flagellation of male by female, and vice versa, followed by fervid sexual engagement, and other abhorrent acts, including over two dozen separate bizarre descriptions of different sexual intercourses between male and female characters. In one sequence four girls in a bawdy house are required in the presence of one another to relate the lurid details of their loss of virginity and their glorification of it. This is followed the same evening by "publick trials" in which each of the four girls engages in sexual intercourse with a different man while the others witness, with Fanny giving a detailed description of the movement and reaction of each couple. </s> In each of the sexual scenes the exposed bodies of the participants are described in minute and individual detail. The pubic hair is often used for a background to the most vivid and precise descriptions of the response, condition, size, shape, and color of the sexual organs before, during and after orgasms. There are some short transitory passages between the various sexual episodes, but for the most part they only set the scene and identify the participants for the next orgy, or make smutty reference and comparison to past episodes. </s> There can be no doubt that the whole purpose of the book is to arouse the prurient interest. Likewise the repetition of sexual episode after episode and the candor with which they are described renders the book "patently offensive." These facts weigh heavily in any appraisal of the book's claims to "redeeming social importance." </s> Let us now turn to evidence of the book's alleged social value. While unfortunately the State offered little testimony, 2 </s> [383 U.S. 413, 447] the defense called several experts to attest that the book has literary merit and historical value. A careful reading of testimony, however, reveals that it has no substance. For example, the first witness testified: </s> "I think it is a work of art . . . it asks for and receives a literary response . . . presented in an orderly and organized fashion, with a fictional central character, and with a literary style . . . . I think the central character is . . . what I call an intellectual . . . someone who is extremely curious about life and who seeks . . . to record with accuracy the details of the external world, physical sensations, psychological responses . . . an empiricist . . . . I find that this tells me things . . . about the 18th century that I might not otherwise know." </s> If a book of art is one that asks for and receives a literary response, Memoirs is no work of art. The sole response evoked by the book is sensual. Nor does the orderly presentation of Memoirs make a difference; it presents nothing but lascivious scenes organized solely to arouse prurient interest and produce sustained erotic tension. 3 Certainly the book's baroque style cannot vitiate the determination of obscenity. From a legal standpoint, we must remember that obscenity is no less obscene though it be expressed in "elaborate language." Indeed, the more meticulous its presentation, the more it appeals to the prurient interest. To say that Fanny is an "intellectual" is an insult to those who travel under that tag. [383 U.S. 413, 448] She was nothing but a harlot - a sensualist - exploiting her sexual attractions which she sold for fun, for money, for lodging and keep, for an inheritance, and finally for a husband. If she was curious about life, her curiosity extended only to the pursuit of sexual delight wherever she found it. The book describes nothing in the "external world" except bawdy houses and debaucheries. As an empiricist, Fanny confines her observations and "experiments" to sex, with primary attention to depraved, lewd, and deviant practices. </s> Other experts produced by the defense testified that the book emphasizes the profound "idea that a sensual passion is only truly experienced when it is associated with the emotion of love" and that the sexual relationship "can be a wholesome, healthy, experience itself," whereas in certain modern novels "the relationship between the sexes is seen as another manifestation of modern decadence, insterility or perversion." In my view this proves nothing as to social value. The state court properly gave such testimony no probative weight. A review offered by the defense noted that "where `pornography' does not brutalize, it idealizes. The book is, in this sense, an erotic fantasy - and a male fantasy, at that, put into the mind of a woman. The male organ is phenomenal to the point of absurdity." Finally, it saw the book as "a minor fantasy, deluding as a guide to conduct, but respectful of our delight in the body . . . an interesting footnote in the history of the English novel." These unrelated assertions reveal to me nothing whatever of literary, historical, or social value. Another review called the book "a great novel . . . one which turns its convention upside down . . . ." Admittedly Cleland did not attempt "high art" because he was writing "an erotic novel. He can skip the elevation and get on with the erections." Fanny's "downfall" is seen as "one long delightful swoon into the depths of pleasurable sensation." [383 U.S. 413, 449] Rather than indicating social value in the book, this evidence reveals just the contrary. Another item offered by the defense described Memoirs as being "widely accredited as the first deliberately dirty novel in English." However, the reviewer found Fanny to be "no common harlot. Her `Memoirs' combine literary grace with a disarming enthusiasm for an activity which is, after all, only human. What is more, she never uses a dirty word." The short answer to such "expertise" is that none of these so-called attributes have any value to society. On the contrary, they accentuate the prurient appeal. </s> Another expert described the book as having "detectable literary merit" since it reflects "an effort to interpret a rather complex character . . . going through a number of very different adventures." To illustrate his assertion that the "writing is very skillfully done" this expert pointed to the description of a whore, "Phoebe, who is `red-faced, fat and in her early 50's, who waddles into a room.' She doesn't walk in, she waddles in." Given this standard for "skillful writing," it is not surprising that he found the book to have merit. </s> The remaining experts testified in the same manner, claiming the book to be a "record of the historical, psychological, [and] social events of the period." One has but to read the history of the 18th century to disprove this assertion. The story depicts nothing besides the brothels that are present in metropolitan cities in every period of history. One expert noticed "in this book a tendency away from nakedness during the sexual act which I find an interesting sort of sociological observation" on tastes different from contemporary ones. As additional proof, he marvels that Fanny "refers constantly to the male sexual organ as an engine . . . which is pulling you away from the way these events would be described in the 19th or 20th century." How this adds social value to the book [383 U.S. 413, 450] is beyond my comprehension. It only indicates the lengths to which these experts go in their effort to give the book some semblance of value. For example, the ubiquitous descriptions of sexual acts are excused as being necessary in tracing the "moral progress" of the heroine, and the giving of a silver watch to a servant is found to be "an odd and interesting custom that I would like to know more about." This only points up the bankruptcy of Memoirs in both purpose and content, adequately justifying the trial court's finding that it had absolutely no social value. </s> It is, of course, the duty of the judge or the jury to determine the question of obscenity, viewing the book by contemporary community standards. It can accept the appraisal of experts or discount their testimony in the light of the material itself or other relevant testimony. So-called "literary obscenity," i. e., the use of erotic fantasies of the hard-core type clothed in an engaging literary style has no constitutional protection. If a book deals solely with erotic material in a manner calculated to appeal to the prurient interest, it matters not that it may be expressed in beautiful prose. There are obviously dynamic connections between art and sex - the emotional, intellectual, and physical - but where the former is used solely to promote prurient appeal, it cannot claim constitutional immunity. Cleland uses this technique to promote the prurient appeal of Memoirs. It is true that Fanny's perverse experiences finally bring from her the observation that "the heights of [sexual] enjoyment cannot be achieved until true affection prepares the bed of passion." But this merely emphasizes that sex, wherever and however found, remains the sole theme of Memoirs. In my view, the book's repeated and unrelieved appeals to the prurient interest of the average person leave it utterly without redeeming social importance. [383 U.S. 413, 451] </s> IV. </s> In his separate concurrence, my Brother DOUGLAS asserts there is no proof that obscenity produces antisocial conduct. I had thought that this question was foreclosed by the determination in Roth that obscenity was not protected by the First Amendment. I find it necessary to comment upon Brother DOUGLAS' views, however, because of the new requirement engrafted upon Roth by Brother BRENNAN, i. e., that material which "appeals to a prurient interest" and which is "patently offensive" may still not be suppressed unless it is "utterly without redeeming social value." The question of antisocial effect thus becomes relevant to the more limited question of social value. Brother BRENNAN indicates that the social importance criterion encompasses only such things as the artistic, literary, and historical qualities of the material. But the phrasing of the "utterly without redeeming social value" test suggests that other evidence must be considered. To say that social value may "redeem" implies that courts must balance alleged esthetic merit against the harmful consequences that may flow from pornography. Whatever the scope of the social value criterion - which need not be defined with precision here - it at least anticipates that the trier of fact will weigh evidence of the material's influence in causing deviant or criminal conduct, particularly sex crimes, as well as its effect upon the mental, moral, and physical health of the average person. Brother DOUGLAS' view as to the lack of proof in this area is not so firmly held among behavioral scientists as he would lead us to believe. For this reason, I should mention that there is a division of thought on the correlation between obscenity and socially deleterious behavior. </s> Psychological and physiological studies clearly indicate that many persons become sexually aroused from reading [383 U.S. 413, 452] obscene material. 4 While erotic stimulation caused by pornography may be legally insignificant in itself, there are medical experts who believe that such stimulation frequently manifests itself in criminal sexual behavior or other antisocial conduct. 5 For example, Dr. George W. Henry of Cornell University has expressed the opinion that obscenity, with its exaggerated and morbid emphasis on sex, particularly abnormal and perverted practices, and its unrealistic presentation of sexual behavior and attitudes, may induce antisocial conduct by the average person. 6 A number of sociologists think that this material may have adverse effects upon individual mental health, with potentially disruptive consequences for the community. 7 </s> In addition, there is persuasive evidence from criminologists and police officials. Inspector Herbert Case of the Detroit Police Department contends that sex murder cases are invariably tied to some form of obscene literature. 8 And the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover, has repeatedly emphasized that pornography is associated with an overwhelmingly large number of sex crimes. Again, while the correlation between possession of obscenity and deviant behavior [383 U.S. 413, 453] has not been conclusively established, the files of our law enforcement agencies contain many reports of persons who patterned their criminal conduct after behavior depicted in obscene material. 9 </s> The clergy are also outspoken in their belief that pornography encourages violence, degeneracy and sexual misconduct. In a speech reported by the New York Journal-American August 7, 1964, Cardinal Spellman particularly stressed the direct influence obscenity has on immature persons. These and related views have been confirmed by practical experience. After years of service with the West London Mission, Rev. Donald Soper found that pornography was a primary cause of prostitution. Rolph, Does Pornography Matter? (1961), pp. 47-48. 10 </s> Congress and the legislatures of every State have enacted measures to restrict the distribution of erotic and pornographic material, 11 justifying these controls by reference to evidence that antisocial behavior may result in part from reading obscenity. 12 Likewise, upon another trial, the parties may offer this sort of evidence along with other "social value" characteristics that they attribute to the book. [383 U.S. 413, 454] </s> But this is not all that Massachusetts courts might consider. I believe it can be established that the book "was commercially exploited for the sake of prurient appeal, to the exclusion of all other values" and should therefore be declared obscene under the test of commercial exploitation announced today in Ginzburg and Mishkin. </s> As I have stated, my study of Memoirs leads me to think that it has no conceivable "social importance." The author's obsession with sex, his minute descriptions of phalli, and his repetitious accounts of bawdy sexual experiences and deviant sexual behavior indicate the book was designed solely to appeal to prurient interests. In addition, the record before the Court contains extrinsic evidence tending to show that the publisher was fully aware that the book attracted readers desirous of vicarious sexual pleasure, and sought to profit solely from its prurient appeal. The publisher's "Introduction" recites that Cleland, a "never-do-well bohemian," wrote the book in 1749 to make a quick 20 guineas. Thereafter, various publications of the book, often "embellished with fresh inflammatory details" and "highly exaggerated illustrations," appeared in "surreptitious circulation." Indeed, the cover of Memoirs tempts the reader with the announcement that the sale of the book has finally been permitted "after 214 years of suppression." Although written in a sophisticated tone, the "Introduction" repeatedly informs the reader that he may expect graphic descriptions of genitals and sexual exploits. For instance, it states: </s> "Here and there, Cleland's descriptions of love-making are marred by what perhaps could be best described as his adherence to the `longitudinal fallacy' - the formidable bodily equipment of his most [383 U.S. 413, 455] accomplished lovers is apt to be described with quite unnecessary relish . . . ." </s> Many other passages in the "Introduction" similarly reflect the publisher's "own evaluation" of the book's nature. The excerpt printed on the jacket of the hard-cover edition is typical: </s> "Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure is the product of a luxurious and licentious, but not a commercially degraded, era. . . . For all its abounding improprieties, his priapic novel is not a vulgar book. It treats of pleasure as the aim and end of existence, and of sexual satisfaction as the epitome of pleasure, but does so in a style that, despite its inflammatory subject, never stoops to a gross or unbecoming word." </s> Cleland apparently wrote only one other book, a sequel called Memoirs of a Coxcomb, published by Lancer Books, Inc. The "Introduction" to that book labels Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure as "the most sensational piece of erotica in English literature." I daresay that this fact alone explains why G. P. Putnam's Sons published this obscenity - preying upon prurient and carnal proclivities for its own pecuniary advantage. I would affirm the judgment. </s> [Footnote 1 See Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 5, 53-55 (1960). </s> [Footnote 2 In a preface to the paperbook edition, "A Note on the American History of Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure," the publisher itself mentions several critics who denied the book had any literary merit and found it totally undistinguished. These critics included Ralph Thompson and Clifton Fadiman. P. xviii. </s> [Footnote 3 As one review stated: "Yet all these pangs of defloration are in the service of erotic pleasure - Fanny's and the reader's. Postponing the culmination of Fanny's deflowering is equivalent to postponing the point where the reader has a mental orgasm." </s> [Footnote 4 For a summary of experiments with various sexual stimuli see Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 46 Minn. L. Rev. 1009 (1962). The authors cite research by Kinsey disclosing that obscene literature stimulated a definite sexual response in a majority of the male and female subjects tested. </s> [Footnote 5 E. g., Wertham, Seduction of the Innocent (1954), p. 164. </s> [Footnote 6 Testimony before the Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, S. Rep. No. 2381, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 8-12 (1956). </s> [Footnote 7 Sorokin, The American Sex Revolution (1956). </s> [Footnote 8 Testimony before the House Select Committee on Current Pornographic Materials, H. R. Rep. No. 2510, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 62 (1952). </s> [Footnote 9 See, e. g., Hoover, Combating Merchants of Filth: The Role of the FBI, 25 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 469 (1964); Hoover, The Fight Against Filth, The American Legion Magazine (May 1961). </s> [Footnote 10 For a general discussion see Murphy, Censorship: Government and Obscenity (1963), pp. 131-151. </s> [Footnote 11 The statutes are compiled in S. Rep. No. 2381, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 17-23 (1956). While New Mexico itself does not prohibit the distribution of obscenity, it has a statute giving municipalities the right to suppress "obscene" publications. N. M. Stat. 14-17-14 (1965 Supp.). </s> [Footnote 12 See Report of the New York State Joint Legislative Committee Studying the Publication and Dissemination of Offensive and Obscene Material (1958), pp. 141-166. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting. </s> The central development that emerges from the aftermath of Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 , is that no stable approach to the obscenity problem has yet been devised by this Court. Two Justices believe that the First and Fourteenth Amendments absolutely protect obscene and nonobscene material alike. Another Justice believes that neither the States nor the Federal Government may suppress any material save for "hard-core pornography." Roth in 1957 stressed prurience and [383 U.S. 413, 456] utter lack of redeeming social importance; 1 as Roth has been expounded in this case, in Ginzburg v. United States, post, p. 463, and in Mishkin v. New York, post, p. 502, it has undergone significant transformation. The concept of "pandering," emphasized by the separate opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE in Roth, now emerges as an uncertain gloss or interpretive aid, and the further requisite of "patent offensiveness" has been made explicit as a result of intervening decisions. Given this tangled state of affairs, I feel free to adhere to the principles first set forth in my separate opinion in Roth, 354 U.S., at 496 , which I continue to believe represent the soundest constitutional solution to this intractable problem. </s> My premise is that in the area of obscenity the Constitution does not bind the States and the Federal Government in precisely the same fashion. This approach is plainly consistent with the language of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and, in my opinion, more responsive to the proper functioning of a federal system of government in this area. See my opinion in Roth, 354 U.S., at 505 -506. I believe it is also consistent with past decisions of this Court. Although some 40 years have passed since the Court first indicated that the Fourteenth Amendment protects "free speech," see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 ; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 , the decisions have never declared that every utterance the Federal Government may not reach or every regulatory scheme it may not enact is also beyond the power of the State. The very criteria used in opinions to delimit the protection of free speech - the gravity of the evil being regulated, see Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 ; how "clear and present" is the danger, Schenck v. [383 U.S. 413, 457] United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (Holmes, J.); the magnitude of "such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger," United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (L. Hand, J.) - may and do depend on the particular context in which power is exercised. When, for example, the Court in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 , upheld a criminal group-libel law because of the "social interest in order and morality," 343 U.S., at 257 , it was acknowledging the responsibility and capacity of the States in such public-welfare matters and not committing itself to uphold any similar federal statute applying to such communications as Congress might otherwise regulate under the commerce power. See also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 . </s> Federal suppression of allegedly obscene matter should, in my view, be constitutionally limited to that often described as "hard-core pornography." To be sure, that rubric is not a self-executing standard, but it does describe something that most judges and others will "know . . . when [they] see it" (STEWART, J., in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 ) and that leaves the smallest room for disagreement between those of varying tastes. To me it is plain, for instance, that Fanny Hill does not fall within this class and could not be barred from the federal mails. If further articulation is meaningful, I would characterize as "hard-core" that prurient material that is patently offensive or whose indecency is self-demonstrating and I would describe it substantially as does MR. JUSTICE STEWART'S opinion in Ginzburg, post, p. 499. The Federal Government may be conceded a limited interest in excluding from the mails such gross pornography, almost universally condemned in this country. 2 But I believe the dangers of national [383 U.S. 413, 458] censorship and the existence of primary responsibility at the state level amply justify drawing the line at this point. </s> State obscenity laws present problems of quite a different order. The varying conditions across the country, the range of views on the need and reasons for curbing obscenity, and the traditions of local self-government in matters of public welfare all favor a far more flexible attitude in defining the bounds for the States. From my standpoint, the Fourteenth Amendment requires of a State only that it apply criteria rationally related to the accepted notion of obscenity and that it reach results not wholly out of step with current American standards. As to criteria, it should be adequate if the court or jury considers such elements as offensiveness, pruriency, social value, and the like. The latitude which I believe the States deserve cautions against any federally imposed formula listing the exclusive ingredients of obscenity and fixing their proportions. This approach concededly lacks precision, but imprecision is characteristic of mediating constitutional standards; 3 voluntariness of a confession, clear and present danger, and probable cause are only the most ready illustrations. In time and with more litigated examples, predictability increases, but there is no shortcut to satisfactory solutions in this field, and there is no advantage in supposing otherwise. </s> I believe the tests set out in the prevailing opinion, judged by their application in this case, offer only an [383 U.S. 413, 459] illusion of certainty and risk confusion and prejudice. The opinion declares that a book cannot be banned unless it is "utterly without redeeming social value" (ante, p. 418). To establish social value in the present case, a number of acknowledged experts in the field of literature testified that Fanny Hill held a respectable place in serious writing, and unless such largely uncontradicted testimony is accepted as decisive it is very hard to see that the "utterly without redeeming social value" test has any meaning at all. Yet the prevailing opinion, while denying that social value may be "weighed against" or "canceled by" prurience or offensiveness (ante, p. 419), terminates this case unwilling to give a conclusive decision on the status of Fanny Hill under the Constitution. 4 Apparently, the Court believes that the social value of the book may be negated if proof of pandering is present. Using this inherently vague "pandering" notion to offset "social value" wipes out any certainty the latter term might be given by reliance on experts, and admits into the case highly prejudicial evidence without appropriate restrictions. See my dissenting opinion in Ginzburg, post, p. 493. I think it more satisfactory to acknowledge that on this record the book has been shown to have some quantum of social value, that it may at the same time be deemed offensive and salacious, and that the State's decision to weigh these elements and to ban this particular work does not exceed constitutional limits. </s> A final aspect of the obscenity problem is the role this Court is to play in administering its standards, a matter [383 U.S. 413, 460] that engendered justified concern at the oral argument of the cases now decided. Short of saying that no material relating to sex may be banned, or that all of it may be, I do not see how this Court can escape the task of reviewing obscenity decisions on a case-by-case basis. The views of literary or other experts could be made controlling, but those experts had their say in Fanny Hill and apparently the majority is no more willing than I to say that Massachusetts must abide by their verdict. Yet I venture to say that the Court's burden of decision would be ameliorated under the constitutional principles that I have advocated. "Hard-core pornography" for judging federal cases is one of the more tangible concepts in the field. As to the States, the due latitude my approach would leave them ensures that only the unusual case would require plenary review and correction by this Court. </s> There is plenty of room, I know, for disagreement in this area of constitutional law. Some will think that what I propose may encourage States to go too far in this field. Others will consider that the Court's present course unduly restricts state experimentation with the still elusive problem of obscenity. For myself. I believe it is the part of wisdom for those of us who happen currently to possess the "final word" to leave room for such experimentation, which indeed is the underlying genius of our federal system. </s> On the premises set forth in this opinion, supplementing what I have earlier said in my opinions in Roth, supra, Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 , and Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S., at 203 , I would affirm the judgment of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. </s> [Footnote 1 Given my view of the applicable constitutional standards, I find no occasion to consider the place of "redeeming social importance" in the majority opinion in Roth, an issue which further divides the present Court. </s> [Footnote 2 This interest may be viewed from different angles. Compelling the Post Office to aid actively in disseminating this most obnoxious material may simply appear too offensive in itself. Or, more concretely, use of the mails may facilitate or insulate distribution so greatly that federal inaction amounts to thwarting state regulation. </s> [Footnote 3 The deterrent effect of vagueness for that critical class of books near the law's borderline could in the past be ameliorated by devices like the Massachusetts in rem procedure used in this case. Of course, the Court's newly adopted "panderer" test, turning as it does on the motives and actions of the particular defendant, seriously undercuts the effort to give any seller a yes or no answer on a book in advance of his own criminal prosecution. </s> [Footnote 4 As I understand the prevailing opinion, its rationale is that the state court may not condemn Fanny Hill as obscene after finding the book to have a modicum of social value; the opinion does note that proof of pandering "might justify the conclusion" that the book wholly lacks social value (ante, p. 420). Given its premise for reversal, the opinion has "no occasion to assess" for itself the pruriency, offensiveness, or lack of social value of the book (ante, p. 420). </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting. </s> In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 , the Court held a publication to be obscene if its predominant theme [383 U.S. 413, 461] appeals to the prurient interest in a manner exceeding customary limits of candor. Material of this kind, the Court said, is "utterly without redeeming social importance" and is therefore unprotected by the First Amendment. </s> To say that material within the Roth definition of obscenity is nevertheless not obscene if it has some redeeming social value is to reject one of the basic propositions of the Roth case - that such material is not protected because it is inherently and utterly without social value. </s> If "social importance" is to be used as the prevailing opinion uses it today, obscene material, however far beyond customary limits of candor, is immune if it has any literary style, if it contains any historical references or language characteristic of a bygone day, or even if it is printed or bound in an interesting way. Well written, especially effective obscenity is protected; the poorly written is vulnerable. And why shouldn't the fact that some people buy and read such material prove its "social value"? </s> A fortiori, if the predominant theme of the book appeals to the prurient interest as stated in Roth but the book nevertheless contains here and there a passage descriptive of character, geography or architecture, the book would not be "obscene" under the social importance test. I had thought that Roth counseled the contrary: that the character of the book is fixed by its predominant theme and is not altered by the presence of minor themes of a different nature. The Roth Court's emphatic reliance on the quotation from Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 , means nothing less: </s> "`. . . There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include [383 U.S. 413, 462] the lewd and obscene . . . . It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. . . .' (Emphasis added.)" 354 U.S., at 485 . </s> In my view, "social importance" is not an independent test of obscenity but is relevant only to determining the predominant prurient interest of the material, a determination which the court or the jury will make based on the material itself and all the evidence in the case, expert or otherwise. </s> Application of the Roth test, as I understand it, necessarily involves the exercise of judgment by legislatures, courts and juries. But this does not mean that there are no limits to what may be done in the name of Roth, Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 . Roth does not mean that a legislature is free to ban books simply because they deal with sex or because they appeal to the prurient interest. Nor does it mean that if books like Fanny Hill are unprotected, their nonprurient appeal is necessarily lost to the world. Literary style, history, teachings about sex, character description (even of a prostitute) or moral lessons need not come wrapped in such packages. The fact that they do impeaches their claims to immunity from legislative censure. </s> Finally, it should be remembered that if the publication and sale of Fanny Hill and like books are proscribed, it is not the Constitution that imposes the ban. Censure stems from a legislative act, and legislatures are constitutionally free to embrace such books whenever they wish to do so. But if a State insists on treating Fanny Hill as obscene and forbidding its sale, the First Amendment does not prevent it from doing so. </s> I would affirm the judgment below. </s> [383 U.S. 413, 463]

United States Supreme Court PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON CORP. v. FEENEY(1990) No. 89-386 Argued: February 26, 1990Decided: April 30, 1990 </s> Petitioner Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. (PATH) is an entity created by New York and New Jersey to operate certain transportation facilities. Alleging that they incurred injuries during their employment with PATH, respondents filed separate complaints against PATH in the District Court to recover damages pursuant to the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The court dismissed the complaints on the ground that PATH enjoyed the States' sovereign immunity and thus that the Eleventh Amendment deprived the court of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals reversed in both cases, holding that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the suits because, inter alia, any immunity that PATH possessed had been waived under identical statutes of both States, which provided that the States "consent to suits . . . against [PATH]," and that "[t]he foregoing consent is granted upon the condition that venue in any [such] suit . . . shall be laid within a . . . judicial district, established by . . . the United States." </s> Held: </s> The statutory consent to suit provision, as elucidated by the venue provision, establishes the States' waiver of any Eleventh Amendment immunity that might otherwise bar respondents' suits against PATH. It is appropriate here to assume, arguendo, that PATH is a state agency entitled to the States' sovereign immunity. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 279 . In determining whether a State has waived such immunity, this Court applies a particularly strict standard: A waiver will be given effect "only where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction." Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239 -240. Moreover, a State does not waive its immunity by consenting to suit only in its own courts, but must specify its intention to subject itself to suit in federal court. Id., at 241. Here, the statutory venue provision suffices to resolve any ambiguity contained in the general consent to suit provision by expressly indicating that the States' consent extends to suit in federal court. PATH's argument [495 U.S. 299, 300] that the venue provision cannot control the construction of the consent to suit provision is rejected. The venue provision directly indicates the extent of the States' waiver embodied in the consent provision, because the States passed both provisions as portions of the same Acts; because the venue provision expressly refers to and qualifies the consent provision; and because venue issues are closely related to immunity issues in that a State's constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may be sued. PATH's related argument that the venue provision cannot broaden the consent provision begs the question what the States intended through the latter provision. The venue provision elucidates rather than broadens the consent provision's meaning by removing an ambiguity: The venue provision would hardly qualify "[t]he foregoing consent" unless the States intended that consent to include federal court suits. Furthermore, PATH suggests no "reasonable construction" as an alternative to the interpretation that the phrase "judicial district, established . . . by the United States" sets forth consent to suit in federal court. Pp. 304-309. </s> 873 F.2d 628 and 873 F.2d 633, affirmed. </s> O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Part I, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Part II, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 309. </s> [Footnote * Together with Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Foster, also on certiorari to the same court (see this Court's Rule 12.2). </s> Joseph Lesser argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Arthur P. Berg, Anne M. Tannenbaum, and Carlene V. McIntyre. </s> Richard W. Miller argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Peter M. J. Reilly.Fn </s> Fn [495 U.S. 299, 300] Benna Ruth Solomon and Charles Rothfield filed a brief for the Council of State Governments et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. </s> Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for American Airlines, Inc., et al. by Lawrence Mentz; and for Pan American World Airways, Inc., et al. by Raymond T. Munsell. </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> These cases call upon the Court to determine whether the Eleventh Amendment bars respondents' suits in federal [495 U.S. 299, 301] court against an entity created by New York and New Jersey to operate certain transportation and other facilities. </s> I </s> In 1921, New York and New Jersey entered a bistate compact creating the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Authority). 1921 N. J. Laws, chs. 151, 154; see N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-1 et seq. (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 6401 et seq. (McKinney 1979). In accord with the Constitution's Compact Clause, Art. I, 10, cl. 3, Congress consented to the compact. 42 Stat. 174 (1921). Through the compact, the States created the Authority to achieve "a better co-ordination of the terminal, transportation and other facilities of commerce in, about and through the port of New York," N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-1 (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 6401 (McKinney 1979), and lodged in the Authority "full power and authority to purchase, construct, lease and/or operate any terminal or transportation facility within [the port] district." N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-7 (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 6407 (McKinney 1979). See generally United States Trust Co. of N. Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 4 -5 (1977); E. Bard, The Port of New York Authority (1942). The Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. (PATH), petitioner in these consolidated cases, is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Authority that operates an interstate railway system and other facilities. PATH is entitled to "all of the privileges, immunities, tax exemptions and other exemptions of the port authority" and is subject to suit to the same extent as the Authority. See N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-35.61 (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 6612 (McKinney 1979). </s> Respondents Patrick Feeney and Charles Foster alleged injuries incurred during their employment with PATH. Both filed separate complaints against PATH in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to recover damages pursuant to the Federal Employers' Liability [495 U.S. 299, 302] Act (FELA), 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U.S.C. 51 et seq. (1982 ed.), the Boiler Inspection Act, 36 Stat. 913, as amended, 45 U.S.C. 22 (1982 ed.), and the Safety Appliance Act, 27 Stat. 531, 45 U.S.C. 1 (1982 ed.). PATH moved to dismiss both complaints, asserting that PATH enjoyed New York and New Jersey's sovereign immunity and thus that the Eleventh Amendment deprived the federal court of jurisdiction over the suits. Relying in part on Port Authority Police Benevolent Assn., Inc. v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 819 F.2d 413 (CA3), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 953 (1987), the District Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment deprived it of jurisdiction and dismissed respondents' complaints. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-27, A-46. In Port Authority Police Benevolent Assn., the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reasoned that because the States had established the Authority as a state agency and continued to exercise extensive control over its operations, the Authority was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. 819 F.2d, at 413. The court also found no waiver of that immunity. Id., at 418, n. 2. </s> The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar Feeney's suit because "the Eleventh Amendment immunity either does not extend to [PATH] or has been waived." 873 F.2d 628, 628-629 (1989). The court concluded that PATH did not enjoy the States' sovereign immunity, principally because the treasuries of New York and New Jersey are largely insulated from PATH's liabilities. Id., at 631-632. In reaching its conclusion that the States had waived any immunity that PATH possessed, the court relied upon two provisions of an Act governing suits against the Authority and its subsidiaries and passed by New York (in 1950) and New Jersey (in 1951). 1951 N. J. Laws, ch. 204; 1950 N. Y. Laws, ch. 301; see N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-157 et seq. (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 7101 et seq. (McKinney 1979). The first section provided that the States "consent to suits, actions or proceedings of any form [495 U.S. 299, 303] or nature at law, in equity or otherwise . . . against the Port of New York Authority." N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-157 (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 7101 (McKinney 1979). Another section provided in part: </s> "The foregoing consent [of N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-157; N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 7101] is granted upon the condition that venue in any suit, action or proceeding against the Port Authority shall be laid within a county or a judicial district, established by one of said States or by the United States, and situated wholly or partially within the Port of New York District. The Port Authority shall be deemed to be a resident of each such county or judicial district for the purpose of such suits, actions, or proceedings." N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-162 (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 7106 (McKinney 1979). </s> The court concluded that, despite the "somewhat anomalous" location of an indication of waiver in a venue provision, the statutory provisions demonstrated "an intent to allow the Port Authority to be sued in the designated federal courts and is thus an explicit waiver, albeit partial, of the Eleventh Amendment [immunity]." 873 F.2d, at 633. The Second Circuit reversed the District Court's dismissal of Foster's complaint on identical grounds. 873 F.2d, at 633 (1989). Two days before the Second Circuit issued these decisions, the Third Circuit had reaffirmed and elaborated its conclusion that the States had not waived the sovereign immunity that extended to PATH. See Leadbeater v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 873 F.2d 45 (1989), cert. pending, No. 89-479. That court acknowledged that "[i]t is certainly arguable that the consent to suit statutes, read in light of this venue provision, create the `overwhelming implication' of consent to suit in federal court," but held that "[n]to without some unease, we conclude that the venue provision fails to constitute the requisite showing that the states intended to waive P. A. T. H.'s [E]leventh [A]mendment immunity." Id., at 49. To resolve this conflict, we granted certiorari to [495 U.S. 299, 304] review the consolidated decisions of the Second Circuit, 493 U.S. 932 (1989), and we now affirm. </s> II </s> The Eleventh Amendment states: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." This Court has drawn upon principles of sovereign immunity to construe the Amendment to "establish that `an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state.'" Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (quoting Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973)); see also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 29 (1989) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (plurality opinion). The Eleventh Amendment bar to suit is not absolute. States may consent to suit in federal court, see, e. g., Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883), and, in certain cases, Congress may abrogate the States' sovereign immunity. See, e. g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989). </s> Respondents challenge PATH's claim that it is a state agency entitled to the Eleventh Amendment immunity of New York and New Jersey. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959), guides our resolution of this issue. In Petty, the Court considered whether the Eleventh Amendment barred a federal court from entertaining an action under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 688 (1958 ed.), brought against the Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission. Similar to the Authority, the Commission constructed and operated transportation facilities pursuant to a [495 U.S. 299, 305] bistate compact entered by Tennessee and Missouri and ratified by Congress. The Court "assume[d] arguendo that this suit must be considered as one against the States since this bi-state corporation is a joint or common agency of Tennessee and Missouri," 359 U.S., at 279 , but concluded that the States had waived any immunity that the Commission possessed. Because we find that the States of New York and New Jersey have consented to suit against PATH in federal court, we conclude that a similar course is appropriate in this case. </s> Well-established law governs abrogation and waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Because "abrogation of sovereign immunity upsets `the fundamental constitutional balance between the Federal Government and the States,'" Dellmuth v. Muth, supra, at 227 (quoting Atascadero State Hospital, 473 U.S., at 238 ), and because States are unable directly to remedy a judicial misapprehension of that abrogation, the Court has adopted a particularly strict standard to evaluate claims that Congress has abrogated the States' sovereign immunity. See id., at 242 ("Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute"). Respondents do not assert that Congress has abrogated the States' sovereign immunity through any of the statutes that underlie their claims against PATH, and such arguments would be unavailing. See Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U.S., at 468 (opinion of Powell, J.); id., at 495 (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Similar solicitude for States' sovereign immunity underlies the standard that this Court employs to determine whether a State has waived that immunity. The Court will give effect to a State's waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity "`only where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.'" Atascadero State Hospital, supra, at 239-240 [495 U.S. 299, 306] (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (internal quotation omitted)). A State does not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by consenting to suit only in its own courts, see, e. g., Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981) (per curiam), and "[t]hus, in order for a state statute or constitutional provision to constitute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, it must specify the State's intention to subject itself to suit in federal court." Atascadero State Hospital, supra, at 241. </s> New York and New Jersey have expressly consented to suit in expansive terms. The statutory consent to suit provision, which provides that the States "consent to suits, actions, or proceedings of any form or nature at law, in equity or otherwise . . . against the Port of New York Authority," N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-157 (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 7101 (McKinney 1979), might be interpreted to encompass the States' consent to suit in federal court as well as state court. But such a broadly framed provision may also reflect only a State's consent to suit in its own courts. See, e. g., Atascadero State Hospital, supra, at 241. Sensitive to the values underlying the Eleventh Amendment, the Court has required that consent to suit in federal court be express and thus has construed such ambiguous and general consent to suit provisions, standing alone, as insufficient to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity. See 473 U.S., at 241 (general consent to suit provision did not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity because the "provision does not specifically indicate the State's willingness to be sued in federal court"); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944) ("When a state authorizes a suit against itself . . ., it is not consonant with our dual system for the federal courts to be astute to read the consent to embrace federal as well as state courts"). Other textual evidence of consent to suit in federal courts may resolve that ambiguity and sufficiently [495 U.S. 299, 307] clearly establish the scope of the State's more general consent to suit. In such circumstances, the Court must give effect to that clearly indicated consent to suit in federal court. </s> In this case, the statutory venue provision suffices to resolve any ambiguity contained in the States' general consent to suit provision by expressly indicating that the States' consent to suit extends to suit in federal court. The section provides that "[t]he foregoing consent [of N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-157 (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 7101 (McKinney 1979)] is granted on the condition that venue . . . shall be laid within a county or judicial district, established by one of said States or by the United States, and situated wholly or partially within the Port of New York District." N. J. Stat. Ann. 32:1-162 (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws 7106 (McKinney 1979). This provision eliminates the danger, identified in Atascadero State Hospital, supra, and Great Northern Life Ins. Co., supra, that federal courts may mistake a provision intended to allow suit in a State's own courts for a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Petitioner does not deny that the phrase "judicial district, established . . . by the United States" refers to the United States District Courts, but rather argues that the reference to venue cannot shape our construction of the general consent to suit provision. Although one might not look first to a venue provision to find evidence of waiver of sovereign immunity, we believe that the provision directly indicates the extent of the States' waiver embodied in the consent provision. The States passed the venue and consent to suit provisions as portions of the same Acts that set forth the nature, timing, and extent of the States' consent to suit. The venue provision expressly refers to and qualifies the more general consent to suit provision. Additionally, issues of venue are closely related to those concerning sovereign immunity, as this Court has indicated by emphasizing that "[a] State's constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may be sued." Pennhurst State School [495 U.S. 299, 308] and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S., at 99 . Petitioner's related argument that a venue provision cannot broaden the consent to suit provision begs the question what the States intended through the consent provision. The venue provision elucidates rather than broadens the consent to suit provision: It provides persuasive textual evidence that the consent to suit provision encompasses suits in federal court, and broadens the effect of the consent provision only to the extent of removing an ambiguity that called forth this Court's prudential canon of construction. The venue provision would hardly qualify "[t]he foregoing consent" unless the States intended that consent to include suits in federal court. </s> Finally, petitioner suggests no "reasonable construction," Atascadero State Hospital, 473 U.S., at 241 , that might be given to the venue provision's phrase, "judicial district, established . . . by the United States," other than that the States consented to suit in federal court. See Brief for Petitioner 36-38; Tr. of Oral Arg. 15-16. We agree with the court below that the phrase cannot reasonably be construed as an ineffectual attempt to limit venue for suits for which Congress has abrogated the States' immunity. See 873 F.2d, at 633; see also Leadbeater, 873 F.2d, at 49 (declining to accept similar construction). Amici curiae supporting petitioner also confess their inability to provide any reasonable alternative construction of the phrase. Brief for Council of State Governments et al. as Amici Curiae 17. The Third Circuit, in the course of upholding petitioner's immunity defense in a similar suit, professed similar bafflement regarding the import of the venue provision. See Leadbeater, 873 F.2d, at 49; supra, at 304. Petitioner essentially presents the choice between giving the venue provision its natural meaning and giving the provision no meaning at all. Charged with giving effect to the statute, we do not find the choice to be a difficult one. </s> We conclude that the statutory consent to suit provision, elucidated by the venue provision, establishes the States' [495 U.S. 299, 309] waiver of any Eleventh Amendment immunity that might otherwise bar respondents' suits against petitioner. The judgments of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit are therefore </s> Affirmed. </s> JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and JUSTICE STEVENS join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. </s> While I agree with the Court that New York and New Jersey consented, on behalf of the Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation (PATH), to suit in federal court, I write separately to add that their consent is not necessary to our decision today. I do not join Part II of the Court's opinion 1 because it presupposes the validity of this Court's current characterization of the Eleventh Amendment as cloaking the States with sovereign immunity unless abrogated by Congress or waived by the States themselves. I adhere to my belief that this doctrine "rests on flawed premises, misguided history, and an untenable vision of the needs of the federal system it purports to protect." Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 248 (1985) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); see also Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 497 (1987) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, under either the Court's or my own view of the Eleventh Amendment, 2 PATH and similarly situated interstate entities may be subjected to suit in federal courts. [495 U.S. 299, 310] </s> I </s> Respondents seek to hold PATH liable under a variety of federal statutes for injuries they have suffered. 3 In my view, the States' consent is irrelevant to these suits for two reasons. First, the Eleventh Amendment secures States only from being haled into federal court by out-of-state or foreign plaintiffs asserting state-law claims, where jurisdiction is based on diversity. The Amendment did not constitutionalize some general notion of state sovereign immunity; it is a jurisdictional provision. Neither States nor Congress may consent to jurisdiction that is not provided and, therefore, the question is not waiver but reach. In my opinion, the Eleventh Amendment does not reach, and therefore does not bar, suits brought under federal-question or admiralty jurisdiction. See Welch, supra, at 504-516 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 292 -293 (1986) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 78 -79 (1985) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Atascadero, supra, at 252-302 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); see also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23 (1989) (STEVENS, J., concurring). </s> Second, to the extent that States retain a common-law defense of state sovereign immunity, States surrendered that immunity, insofar as challenges under federal statutes are concerned, "`in the plan of the Convention'" 4 when they [495 U.S. 299, 311] agreed to form a union and granted Congress specifically enumerated powers. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 687 (1974) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 318 -322 (1973) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); see also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., supra, at 14 (plurality opinion) (quoting Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184, 191 -192 (1964)). Neither the Eleventh Amendment nor the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity, as I view them, would bar respondents' suits even had they been brought directly against New York or New Jersey because both suits allege violations of federal statutes. Thus, I would affirm the decisions below on that ground. </s> II </s> Even under the Court's current interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, however, I do not believe that PATH had any defense to waive. The Eleventh Amendment bars federal jurisdiction only over suits "commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States." PATH is a subsidiary of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority) which is a bistate agency created by interstate compact; it is not "one of the United States." By its terms, then, the Eleventh Amendment would appear to be inapplicable. But this Court has created two very limited exceptions to a literal reading of the phrase "one of the United States," so that immunity applies: (1) where the entity being sued is so intricately intertwined with the State that it can best be understood [495 U.S. 299, 312] as an "arm of the State"; and (2) where the State, though not a nominal party, is the real party in interest. I believe that no bistate agency falls within the first exception and that no bistate agency falls within the second exception if, like the Port Authority, it is independently and solely liable for any judgments levied against it. 5 </s> A </s> The inherent nature of interstate agencies precludes their being found so intricately intertwined with the State as to constitute an "arm of the State." The Court developed the "arm-of-the-State" doctrine as a tool for determining which entities created by a State enjoy its Eleventh Amendment protection and which do not. This Court has found that a private suit against a state agency is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (reversing a lower court's decision to enjoin the State of Alabama and the Alabama Board of Corrections). Nonetheless, this Court has long held that counties and cities are not so integrally related to the State that they are shielded from suit in federal court. In Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890), the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suit against counties in federal court, noting that the "Eleventh Amendment limits the jurisdiction [of the federal courts] only as to suits against a State." The Court continued: "[W]hile the county is territorially a [495 U.S. 299, 313] part of the State, yet politically it is also a corporation created by and with such powers as are given to it by the State. In this respect it is a part of the State only in that remote sense in which any city, town, or other municipal corporation may be said to be a part of the State." Ibid. See also Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 721 (1973) (county); Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248, 255 (1906) (county); Workman v. New York City, 179 U.S. 552, 565 -566 (1900) (city); cf. Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 533 -534 (1893) (rejecting state legislature's attempt to insulate county from federal jurisdiction by providing that county could only be sued in county courts). </s> In Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977), the Court noted that "[t]he bar of the Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal courts . . . does not extend to counties and similar municipal corporations" and looked to the "nature of the entity created by state law" to determine whether local school boards in Ohio appeared to be more like a county or city or more like an arm of the State. The Court concluded that the school boards' extensive powers to issue bonds and levy taxes, and their categorization under state law as a form of political subdivision, rendered them "[o]n balance . . . more like a county or city." Ibid. </s> The rule to be derived from our cases is that the Eleventh Amendment shields an entity from suit in federal court only when it is so closely tied to the State as to be the direct means by which the State acts, for instance a state agency. In contrast, when a State creates subdivisions and imbues them with a significant measure of autonomy, such as the ability to levy taxes, issue bonds, or own land in their own name, these subdivisions are too separate from the State to be considered its "arms." This is so even though these political subdivisions exist solely at the whim and behest of their State. See, e. g., ibid; Graham v. Folsom, supra, at 252. [495 U.S. 299, 314] </s> Interstate agencies lack even this close link to any one State. While a State has plenary power to create and destroy its political subdivisions, a State enjoys no such hegemony over an interstate agency. To begin with, a State cannot create such an agency at will. In order to do so, it must persuade another State, or several other States, to join it. Moreover, the creation of an interstate agency requires each State to relinquish to one or more sister States a part of its sovereignty. The regulatory powers exercised by an interstate agency are powers no longer inhering in any one compacting State; they are powers shared. Likewise, no one State has complete dominion over property owned, and proprietary activities operated, by such an agency. For instance, in order to achieve the practical advantages of coordinated planning and administration through the Port Authority, New York and New Jersey each has ceded partial control over the regulation and operation of transportation facilities in its own State since 1921 and for the foreseeable future. In order to change the Port Authority's organization or powers, the legislatures of both States must pass a bill to that effect. </s> In addition, States may not create an interstate agency without the express approval of Congress; they surrendered their right to do so "in the plan of the Convention" when they accepted the Interstate Compact Clause. The Clause provides: </s> "No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State. . . ." U.S. Const., Art. I, 10, cl. 3. </s> The Constitution also prohibits States from entering into any "Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation" either with other States or with foreign governments. Art. I, 10, cl. 1. 6 The Interstate [495 U.S. 299, 315] Compact Clause and the State Treaty Clause ensure that whatever sovereignty a State possesses within its own sphere of authority ends at its political border. 7 </s> Thus, it is not within the autonomous power of any State to create and regulate an interstate agency. Each State's sovereign will is circumscribed by that of the other States in the compact and circumscribed further by the veto power relinquished to Congress in the Constitution. If counties are not "arms" of their States merely because the State conferred a certain autonomy on them - an autonomy it can withdraw at [495 U.S. 299, 316] will - then an interstate agency, over which none of the compacting States exercises such untrammeled control, cannot be said to be an "arm" of any of them. 8 </s> B </s> Although this Court has held that a suit in which the State, rather than the nominal defendant, is the real party in interest is a suit against "one of the United States" within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment, a State is the real party in interest generally only when the State is directly liable for a money judgment. 9 In Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945), the Court held that a suit against a state treasury department and the individuals constituting its board for a refund of taxes [495 U.S. 299, 317] was a suit against the State because "when the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants." This Court relied on that decision 30 years later in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S., at 677 , in holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred a suit brought in federal court in which the nominal defendants were Illinois officials because the relief sought was an injunction ordering retroactive payments of benefits from the state treasury. The Court observed that "the rule has evolved that a suit [in federal court] by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment." Id., at 663. See also Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573 (1946) (tax refund); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944) (tax refund); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900) (tax refund); see generally Osborne v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824) (rejecting an Eleventh Amendment defense because the nominal defendant, not the State, was the real party in interest). 10 </s> [495 U.S. 299, 318] </s> Conversely, when a State is not liable for the obligations of an interstate agency, it is not a real party in interest in a suit against that agency. The court below found that no State is liable for PATH's obligations. It concluded: </s> "We believe it clear that a judgment against PATH would not be enforceable against either New York or New Jersey. The Port Authority is explicitly barred from pledging the credit of either state or from borrowing money in any name but its own. Even the provision [permitting] the appropriation of moneys for administrative expenses up to $100,000 per year requires prior approval by the governor of each state and an actual appropriation [by the legislature] before obligations for such expenses may be incurred. Moreover, the [provision's] phrase `salaries, office and other administrative expenses' clearly limits this essentially optional obligation of the two states to a very narrow category of expenses and thus also evidences an intent to insulate the states' treasuries from the vast bulk of the Port Authority's operating and capital expenses, including personal injury judgments. No provision commits the treasuries of the two states to satisfy judgments against the Port Authority." 873 F.2d 628, 631 (CA2 1989). </s> Therefore neither New York nor New Jersey is a real party in interest in respondents' suits, as this Court has understood and applied the concept in the Eleventh Amendment area. </s> C </s> This is not to say that the only restriction on whether an interstate agency can be sued in federal court is the Eleventh [495 U.S. 299, 319] Amendment. Congress may provide an interstate agency with an affirmative defense to its federal statutory obligations as Congress wishes, subject only to independent constitutional strictures such as the Equal Protection Clause. Congress would ordinarily be expected to address the matter through a specific statutory provision. It may also be that a court could legitimately infer Congress' intention to provide such a defense from its consent to an interstate compact the terms of which patently attempt to grant immunity from suit in federal court. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401 (1979). </s> But it cannot be disputed that there is no such showing here. Congress has not passed any law conferring any immunity on the Port Authority. Nor did the compact to which Congress consented include any provision attempting to grant immunity from suit in federal court. Consequently, I believe that this Court, following its current view of the Eleventh Amendment, could have rested its decision today on the absence of an Eleventh Amendment defense as well as on waiver. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 I join Part I of the opinion of the Court. </s> [Footnote 2 The Eleventh Amendment provides: </s> "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." </s> [Footnote 3 Both Patrick Feeney and Charles T. Foster asserted claims under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 51 et seq. (1982 ed.), the Boiler Inspection Act, 45 U.S.C. 22 (1982 ed.), and the Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. 1 (1982 ed.). </s> [Footnote 4 The phrase is Alexander Hamilton's. He used it in a passage reassuring States, which might have been concerned with the securities they issued and might not have wished to honor, that the grant of diversity jurisdiction in Article III would not annul their defense of sovereign immunity should they be sued in federal court under state law on a writ of debt. </s> "It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense, and the [495 U.S. 299, 311] general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the Government of every State in the Union. Unless therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the Convention, it will remain with the States. . . . [T]here is no color to pretend that the state governments would, by the adoption of that plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their own debts in their own way, free from every constraint, but that which flows from the obligations of good faith." The Federalist No. 81, p. 567 (H. Dawson ed. 1876) (second emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 5 This Court has twice before addressed the question whether a bistate entity could raise an Eleventh Amendment defense to federal jurisdiction, and twice rejected the specific immunity claim presented. See Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 279 -280 (1959) (not reaching "arm-of-the-State" issue but finding that any Eleventh Amendment bar had been waived); Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401 -402 (1979) (finding subject to federal jurisdiction at least a bistate entity whose parent States disclaimed any immunity for it, whose compact failed to disclose any congressional intent to protect it from federal jurisdiction, and whose obligations were not binding on either parent State). </s> [Footnote 6 The Framers had serious concerns about this problem, as shown by their inclusion of provisions even stricter than those in the Articles of [495 U.S. 299, 315] Confederation. In the Articles of Confederation, the limitation on the "sovereignty, freedom and independence" retained by each State was: </s> "`No two or more states shall enter into any treaty, confederation or alliance whatever between them, without the consent of the united states in congress assembled, specifying accurately the purpose for which the same is to be entered into, and how long it shall continue.'" Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution - A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 Yale L. J. 685, 693-694 (1925) (quoting Art. VI, Articles of Confederation). </s> [Footnote 7 That the Interstate Compact and State Treaty Clauses reflect a disfavor of intermediate-level sovereigns is well settled. See Frankfurter & Landis, supra, at 694 ("The absence of any powerful national capabilities on the part of the Confederacy, except in the conduct of foreign affairs, underlines the significance of these clauses [in the Articles of Confederation] as insurance against competing political power. This curb upon political combinations by the States was retained almost in haec verba by the Constitution"); V. Thursby, Interstate Cooperation, A Study of the Interstate Compact 4 (1953) (suggesting that one reason for the Compact Clause was that the Federal Government could be endangered by political combinations of the States); Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 518 (1893) (declaring that the compacts to which the Compact Clause refers are "those which may tend to increase and build up the political influence of the contracting States, so as to encroach upon or impair the supremacy of the United States or interfere with their rightful management of particular subjects placed under their control"); Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 248 (1833) (explaining that agreements between States for political purposes could "scarcely fail to interfere with the general purposes and intent of the [C]onstitution"). </s> [Footnote 8 Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979), is not inconsistent with this analysis. In that case, we noted that the Eleventh Amendment is available only to "`one of the United States,'" that its protection has never been extended to political subdivisions even though such entities exercise a "`slice of state power,'" and that there was "no justification for reading additional meaning into the limited language of the Amendment" so as to immunize a bistate agency unless Congress had indicated a desire to place the agency in a special position. Id., at 400-401. The Court noted that neither of the States that created the bistate agency could veto its actions and observed that the conclusion that "TRPA is not in fact an arm of the State subject to its control is perhaps most forcefully demonstrated by the fact that California has resorted to litigation in an unsuccessful attempt to impose its will on TRPA." Id., at 402. </s> [Footnote 9 This Court has also found that the Eleventh Amendment bars a suit seeking equitable relief where a state officer defendant is not alleged to have acted contrary to state or federal law and the State is the real party in interest. See Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982) (interpleader action). However, no State is a real party in interest in an action for prospective injective relief brought against an interstate agency, because any injunction would run against the agency, which is not an "arm of the State." See Part II-A, supra. Therefore, actions for prospective relief against an interstate agency would not be barred by the Eleventh Amendment, as the Court interprets it, whatever the agency's relationship to the States' treasuries. See generally Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). </s> [Footnote 10 This Court has not decided which arrangements between a State and a nominal defendant are sufficient to establish that the State is the real party in interest for Eleventh Amendment purposes. It may be that a simple indemnification clause, without more, does not trigger the doctrine. Lower courts have uniformly held that States may not cloak their officers with a personal Eleventh Amendment defense by promising, by statute, to indemnify them for damages awards imposed on them for actions taken in the course of their employment. See, e. g., Blaylock v. Schwinden, 862 F.2d 1352, 1354, n. 1 (CA9 1988) ("The eleventh amendment prohibits a district court from ordering payment of a judgment from the state treasury. The court may properly order the officials to pay damages under 1983, but if the officials desire indemnification under the state statute, they must bring their own action in state court"); Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 650-651 (CA7 1985) ("[T]he purpose of the Eleventh Amendment is only to protect the state against involuntary liability. If the State chooses to pick up the tab for its errant officers, its liability for their [495 U.S. 299, 318] torts is voluntary. . . . Moreover, it would be absurd if all a state had to do to put its employees beyond the reach of section 1983 and thereby make the statute ineffectual except against employees of local governments . . . was to promise to indemnify state employees for any damages awarded in such a suit"); Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 588 (CA6 1985) ("State cannot clothe [state officer] with [Eleventh Amendment] immunity by voluntarily agreeing to pay any judgment rendered against him"). </s> [495 U.S. 299, 320]

United States Supreme Court MECHLING BARGE LINES v. U.S.(1961) No. 41 Argued: Decided: December 18, 1961 </s> Over the protests of competing barge lines and without any hearing, investigation or findings, the Interstate Commerce Commission, basing its action on the first proviso in 4 (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, granted certain railroads temporary authority, pending further consideration, to charge less for certain long hauls of grain than for shorter hauls over the same line or route, notwithstanding the general prohibition of 4 (1). The barge lines sued in a Federal District Court under 28 U.S.C. 1336, which provides specifically for judicial review of the Commission's orders, and under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act, to have the order set aside and to have the Commission's practice of issuing such orders in such manner declared to be beyond its powers. The railroads then eliminated the long-haul short-haul rate discrimination; withdrew their applications to the Commission for its authorization; intervened in the suit; and, together with the Commission, moved for dismissal, on the grounds (1) of mootness, and (2) that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to grant a declaratory judgment. The District Court granted the motions to dismiss, and the barge lines appealed to this Court under 28 U.S.C. 1253. Held: </s> 1. The District Court should have vacated the Commission's order which it declined to review on the ground of mootness. Pp. 328-330. </s> 2. In view of the fact that, on this appeal, the Commission has conceded that it is obliged to make findings before issuing such an order and that the order here involved is fatally defective for want of such findings, and the Commission's further representation that it has amended its practice accordingly, a declaratory judgment passing on the challenged Commission practice should be withheld at this time in the exercise of judicial discretion. This Court, therefore, does not decide whether there was an "actual controversy" before the District Court, or whether that Court otherwise had jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment. Pp. 330-331. [368 U.S. 324, 325] </s> 3. The District Court's order dismissing the complaint is modified to provide that the proceedings are remanded to the Commission with direction to vacate and set aside the order here involved. P. 331. </s> 188 F. Supp. 386, judgment modified. </s> Edward B. Hayes argued the cause and filed briefs for appellants. </s> Daniel M. Friedman argued the cause for the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission, appellees. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Loevinger, Acting Assistant Attorney General Kirkpatrick, Richard A. Solomon, Lionel Kestenbaum, Robert W. Ginnane and H. Neil Garson. </s> Donald M. Tolmie argued the cause for intervening railroads. With him on the briefs were Edward A. Kaier, Robert H. Bierma, James M. Souby, Jr. and James E. Steffarud. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In December 1958 the appellee railroads published and filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission tariffs establishing through combination rates, from grain producing areas in Northern Illinois to certain Eastern destinations, which were lower than local or flat rates for the same commodities from Chicago to the same destinations. Since these tariffs would be in violation of the long- and short-haul provisions of 4 (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 1 the railroads simultaneously applied for the [368 U.S. 324, 326] administrative relief which is authorized by the first proviso to 4 (1). 2 Timely protests were filed by the appellant barge lines, alleging that the proposed railroad rates threatened the extinction of legitimate competition by water carriers for the traffic from the producing areas into Chicago. On January 9, 1959, Division 2 of the Commission entered Fourth Section Order No. 19059, authorizing the proposed railroad rates - although expressly withholding approval of them - pending further Commission action. 3 The Order was entered before any hearing had been held or investigation completed, and the Division did not set out any findings. On the same day, Division 2 ordered that an investigation be instituted with respect to the lawfulness of the rates. 4 </s> Pending final Commission determination as to whether permanent Fourth Section relief was warranted, and after Order 19059 had been in effect for 10 months, the appellant barge lines filed the action of which review is presently sought, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The complaint was based in part on the statutory procedure for review of Interstate Commerce [368 U.S. 324, 327] Commission orders, 5 and it prayed the court to set aside Order 19059 on the ground that the Commission lacked power to grant Fourth Section relief as to protested tariffs without first completing a full investigation, holding an adversary hearing, and making explicit findings that the statutory criteria for the granting of such relief had been met. 6 The complaint also sought relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act 7 and under the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act; 8 the complaint alleged that the challenged administrative practice was a continuing one, and prayed for a declaration that that practice was beyond the powers of the Commission. </s> Pending the determination of the action, the railroads eliminated the long-haul short-haul discrimination from their rates and notified the Commission by letter of their withdrawal of the Fourth Section application respecting which Order 19059 had granted temporary relief. Having [368 U.S. 324, 328] intervened as defendants in the pending lawsuit, the railroads, together with the Commission, then moved for dismissal of the action on the grounds, first, that as to the prayer for annulment of Order 19059 the withdrawal of the Fourth Section application had rendered the cause moot; and, second, that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to grant a declaratory judgment. 9 The District Court granted the motions to dismiss. 188 F. Supp. 386. The barge lines then perfected this appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1253, and we postponed decision as to our jurisdiction until hearing on the merits. 365 U.S. 865 . </s> We are, of course, in any event empowered and obliged to determine the jurisdictional questions in deciding whether the District Court correctly dismissed the case. And that is necessarily our initial inquiry on this appeal. Appellants do not deny that Order 19059 is presently devoid of practical effect, inasmuch as the Fourth Section application to which it relates has been withdrawn. Still, they insist that the case is neither moot nor inappropriate for the granting of declaratory relief. </s> First, appellants assert in their brief that they "have a continuing interest in having F. S. O. 19059 vacated since it would be a defense to any action by appellants against the railroads for damages suffered from the railroads' fourth section departure rates." Appellants point, in this connection, to certain of our decisions 10 which suggest [368 U.S. 324, 329] to them that they will be precluded from attacking Order 19059 collaterally and that the order must be set aside, if at all, by statutory direct review. </s> In United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 , this Court expressed the view that a party should not be concluded in subsequent litigation by a District Court's resolution of issues, when appellate review of the judgment incorporating that resolution, otherwise available as of right, fails because of intervening mootness. We there held that that principle should be implemented by the reviewing court's vacating the unreviewed judgment below. 11 We think the principle enunciated in Munsingwear at least equally applicable to unreviewed administrative orders, and we adopt its procedure here. The District Court should have vacated the order which it declined to review. 12 Since our disposition rests solely [368 U.S. 324, 330] on the mootness occasioned by the railroads' elimination of the long-haul short-haul discrimination, it is not to be taken as foreclosing determination, on any appropriate future occasion, as to (a) whether the Commission was empowered to enter Order 19059 utilizing the procedures it did; (b) whether Order 19059 was effective to authorize the Fourth Section departures to which it related; or (c) whether the pendency of Order 19059 establishes a defense for the railroads if the appellants carry out their intention expressed to us to predicate a damage suit against the railroads on the alleged violation of the statute. Of course, we here intimate no view as to whether there may exist a cause of action for damages in favor of a competing carrier predicated on a Fourth Section departure. </s> Second, appellants assert in their brief that since "the . . . practice of the Commission in granting `temporary' authority for Fourth Section departures to the Railroads over the protests of the appellants and without any hearing or findings in the order granting such authority" is a "continuing" one, there is presently an actual controversy within the jurisdiction of the Court to resolve by declaratory judgment. 13 </s> We think it significant on this aspect of the case that the Commission has, on this appeal, conceded that it is obliged to make findings and that the challenged order is fatally defective because no supporting findings were made. The Commission further represents that it has amended its practice accordingly. It thus appears that one of the "continuing" practices whose validity appellants [368 U.S. 324, 331] would have us adjudicate continues no longer. Nor would it be appropriate to decide at this juncture whether the Commission is required to hold an evidentiary hearing prior to granting "temporary Fourth Section relief." Despite the Commission's present insistence that it is not so required, experience with its newly adopted practice of making findings in respect of all protested Fourth Section Orders may lead the Commission to provide for a hearing - at least under some circumstances. </s> Declaratory judgment is a remedy committed to judicial discretion. Nor need this Court first have the view of a lower court before it may decide that such discretion ought not be exercised. Public Service Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 . We think that sound discretion withholds the remedy where it appears that a challenged "continuing practice" is, at the moment adjudication is sought, undergoing significant modification so that its ultimate form cannot be confidently predicted. We do not, therefore, reach the possibly difficult questions whether appellants' challenge to the Commission's "continuing practice" gives rise to an actual controversy, or whether the District Court was on these pleadings otherwise possessed of jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment. 14 </s> The order of the District Court dismissing the complaint is modified to provide that the proceedings are remanded to the Interstate Commerce Commission with direction to vacate and set aside Order 19059. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 24 Stat. 380, as amended, 49 U.S.C. 4 (1): </s> "It shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to this chapter or chapter 12 of this title to charge or receive any greater compensation in the aggregate for the transportation of passengers, or of like kind of property, for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line or route in the same direction, the shorter being included within the longer distance . . . ." </s> [Footnote 2 "Provided, That upon application to the Commission and after investigation, such carrier, in special cases, may be authorized by the Commission to charge less for longer than for shorter distances for the transportation of passengers or property, and the Commission may from time to time prescribe the extent to which such designated carriers may be relieved from the operation of the foregoing provisions of this section, but in exercising the authority conferred upon it in this proviso, the Commission shall not permit the establishment of any charge to or from the more distant point that is not reasonably compensatory for the service performed; and no such authorization shall be granted on account of merely potential water competition not actually in existence . . . ." </s> [Footnote 3 Fourth Section Order No. 19059, Jan. 9, 1959, Grain and Grain Products from Illinois to the East. </s> [Footnote 4 Docket No. 32790, Jan. 9, 1959, Corn, Oats, Soybeans - Illinois to the East. </s> [Footnote 5 Jurisdiction to enjoin and set aside orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission is conferred on the District Courts by 28 U.S.C. 1336. Section 1398 locates venue in the district of the plaintiff's residence or principal office. Section 2322 makes the United States a nominal defendant, 2323 authorizes the intervention of the Commission or of any interested party, and 2325 requires such actions to be heard and determined by a three-judge court. </s> [Footnote 6 The complaint alleged that the statutory requirement that the rate for the longer haul be "reasonably compensatory" had, by authoritative administrative gloss, been imbued with four distinct criteria, namely, that a rate so described must </s> "(1) cover and more than cover the extra or additional expenses incurred in handling the traffic to which it applies; (2) be no lower than necessary to meet existing competition; (3) not be so low as to threaten the extinction of legitimate competition by water carriers; and (4) not impose an undue burden on other traffic or jeopardize the appropriate return on the value of carrier property generally, as contemplated in section 15a of the act." </s> [Footnote 7 28 U.S.C. 2201, 2202. </s> [Footnote 8 60 Stat. 243, 5 U.S.C. 1009. </s> [Footnote 9 As to lack of jurisdiction to grant a declaratory judgment it was argued not only that there was no "actual controversy" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2201, but also that the statutory provisions set forth in note 5, supra, which incorporate no provision for declaratory relief, provide the exclusive mode of judicial review of Interstate Commerce Commission orders. </s> [Footnote 10 Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 258 U.S. 377 (shipper's action to compel allotment of cars in contravention of I. C. C. rules must be brought in federal court pursuant to statutory review procedure); Venner v. Michigan Central R. Co., 271 U.S. 127 (stockholder's suit to enjoin railroad from acquiring equipment as [368 U.S. 324, 329] authorized by I. C. C. order must be brought in federal court pursuant to statutory review procedure); Callanan Road Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 507 (authority of I. C. C. to amend certificate cannot be raised collaterally in proceeding to interpret amended certificate). </s> [Footnote 11 Such has been the long-standing practice of this Court in civil cases. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 -40, n. 2; Cozart v. Wilson, 352 U.S. 884 . In Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 355 U.S. 179 , this Court, having been apprised that the temporary Fourth Section relief order there under attack had been superseded and mooted by a subsequent Commission order, vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint - thus leaving the challenged administrative order unannulled. We do not consider that case to have established any precedent demanding our adherence here, since all the parties there joined in representing to the Court that the challenged order "is now only of academic interest." Memorandum Suggesting That the Cause is Moot, p. 3. </s> [Footnote 12 In their letter informing the Commission of the withdrawal of their Fourth Section application, the railroads expressed their understanding that "the temporary Fourth Section Orders issued in response to this Application will be cancelled and the authority discontinued." </s> [Footnote 13 Appellants state that on several previous occasions judicial review of the practice which they challenge has failed because of intervening mootness occasioned either by the withdrawal of applications, citing Coastwise Line v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 305; American Commercial Barge Line Co. v. United States, Civ. No. 11772 (S. D. Tex. 1959), or by superseding Commission orders, citing Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 355 U.S. 179 . </s> [Footnote 14 See note 9, supra. </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS join, dissenting. </s> Believing that an actual controversy still exists in this case, I cannot agree that it is moot. In my opinion, the [368 U.S. 324, 332] events occurring subsequent to the filing of this suit have not negated the necessity for a decision on the issues raised by the complaint, and I would vacate the dismissal of the three-judge District Court and remand the case to it with instructions to pass on these issues. </s> The complaint filed by appellant barge lines sought to set aside, for lack of statutorily required findings, a temporary order of the Commission permitting certain railroads to impose higher tariffs for the transportation of grain "for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line or route." The complaint also asked for a declaration that it was unlawful under the Act for the Commission and the railroads to engage in a practice whereby such illegal temporary orders in a continuous series were utilized to by-pass the long- and short-haul provisions of 4 (1) of the Act. The railroads in question intervened in the case shortly after the complaint was filed. The issues raised by the complaint are two-fold: (1) the validity of the temporary order, and (2) the validity of the alleged continuing practice used against appellants. </s> The three-judge District Court thought that the elimination by the railroads of the long-haul short-haul discrimination, accompanied by the withdrawal of the application which had sought permission for such discrimination, left the decision as to the validity of the temporary order a meaningless issue. This overlooks the fact that the validity of this order is still an actual controversy between the appellants and the intervening railroads. Neither the concession of invalidity by the Commission nor the vacation of the order pursuant to the Court's opinion is determinative of the order's validity. Upon the determination of this issue rests the ability of the appellants to collect damages occasioned by the tariffs used by the railroads pursuant to the temporary order, assuming that a plausible theory of liability exists (a [368 U.S. 324, 333] question which I need not now decide). For authority indicating that the validity issue is saved from mootness by the possibility that the order may "be the basis of further proceedings," see Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). Moreover, I note the fact that appellants would not be barred from challenging the order in a later suit - the point relied upon by the majority in affirming - does not render the issue moot in this case. </s> If the only need for a decision on the validity of this temporary order were to aid a suit for damages which might possibly be brought, I might not formally take issue with the decision below and its affirmance by my Brethren. However, because of the second issue raised by the complaint, 1 i. e., an alleged circumvention of the Act by the utilization of a continuous stream of such temporary orders, the validity of this order, as well as the practice which gave birth to it, is presently disputed in this very case. </s> The continuing practice of which the appellants complain consists of an application by the railroads for an order permitting the imposition of a lower tariff for a long-haul than is charged for a short-haul over the same line; the issuance by the Commission of a temporary order without the necessary findings required by 4 (1); the maintenance of such temporary order as long as possible by delaying the final disposition of the application; and the withdrawal or vacation of such order whenever a judicial test of its validity appears imminent, thereby frustrating any review on the ground of mootness. It is claimed that by continually repeating this process the railroads and the Commission have kept in effect an [368 U.S. 324, 334] illegal tariff for transportation by rail to the damage of the competing barge lines. </s> The lower court, although recognizing that the continuing practice issue was before it, felt that this question did not present a justiciable controversy. The opinion of the Court affirms this result by saying that regardless of whether this question presents an actual controversy, it is sound judicial discretion to withhold any relief because the Commission has renounced before this Court the challenged practice. It appears that the Court has placed itself in the dubious position of upholding a discretion that was never exercised on a ground that was never presented. I am mystified by the tactic which in effect exercises a discretion committed initially to the trial court in order to avoid deciding "possibly difficult questions" properly before this Court. </s> In my view the complaint as interpreted and applied by the court below raises an actual controversy as to the validity of the alleged practice. 2 Even though there is a controversy, the court below in the exercise of its discretion might decide that no relief, either injunctive or declaratory, is called for; however, I do not feel that the intervening partial repentance by the Commission compels the lower court to refuse relief. Rather I would think that the Commission's representation is only one fact to be considered along with all the other circumstances which appellants' affidavits indicate they would [368 U.S. 324, 335] show if afforded the opportunity. 3 Furthermore, the court below might take note of preceding cases which indicate that the railroads have played hanky-panky with their rates for years in an effort to attract freight away from the waterways. 4 </s> To sum up, at the time this case was dismissed as moot there was a charge that the Commission and the railroad intervenors were following a practice of using illegal "temporary" orders to frustrate the purpose of Congress to have the Act "so administered as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages" of "all modes of transportation subject [thereto]. . . ." Based on this practice the appellants prayed that the temporary orders and the continuous practice be declared illegal and enjoined and for other appropriate relief. Under the record here presented, I am convinced that there is a controversy which if heard could be amenable to judicial relief. I would vacate the dismissal and remand the case to the court below for its consideration of the issues raised and for its decision thereon, including whether, in the exercise of its discretion, any injunctive or declarative relief is [368 U.S. 324, 336] called for; and with the further instruction, in accordance with the practice utilized in Bryan v. Austin, 354 U.S. 933 (1957), that upon appellants' request they be granted leave to amend their pleadings to meet the changed condition of the case as brought about by the Commission's intervening concession that its order was void, as well as its renouncement of the challenged practice. Indeed, some of our cases indicate that if appellants at that time chose to assert their cause of action for damages, that too might be included in such amendment, in which event that claim would be heard by a single judge of the three-judge court. Compare Bryan v. Austin, supra; Public Service Comm'n v. Brashear Freight Lines, 312 U.S. 621 (1941). </s> [Footnote 1 It could be argued that even if the continuing practice was not an issue in the case, its existence could be considered in determining whether the case is moot. See Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498 (1911). </s> [Footnote 2 Analysis of the complaint reveals that appellants alleged the Commission "still follows the practice of entering such orders without supporting findings." It was requested that "the absence of any power and authority in the Commission to enter temporary fourth-section orders prior to a hearing, and to enter them without supporting findings, be definitely established." Also, appellants noted that the validity of the Commission's temporary order might become moot by the entry of a final order, "just as other cases in which similar relief has been sought have become moot before the issues could be determined by the Supreme Court." </s> [Footnote 3 Such other factors would include evidence that, in 1958-1959 alone, the water carriers had protested eight other separate and distinct 4 relief applications in which temporary orders similar to that involved here were sought and obtained; that in over a year only one of these applications had been formally acted upon by the Commission; that two of these applications were withdrawn in the face of pending tests; that five of these applications are still awaiting final decision before the Commission with temporary orders having been in effect for over one and a half years; that these temporary rates were avowedly designed by the railroads to divert freight from the water carriers; and that as a result the water carriers lost thousands of tons of grain shipments per year. </s> [Footnote 4 Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Mechling, 330 U.S. 567 (1947); Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Inland Waterways Corp., 319 U.S. 671, 692 -703 (dissenting opinion) (1943). Also see cases cited note 13 of the Court's opinion. </s> [368 U.S. 324, 337]

United States Supreme Court IDAHO v. WRIGHT(1990) No. 89-260 Argued: April 18, 1990Decided: June 27, 1990 </s> Respondent Wright was charged under Idaho law with two counts of lewd conduct with a minor, specifically her 5 1/2- and 2 1/2-year-old daughters. At the trial, it was agreed that the younger daughter was not "capable of communicating to the jury." However, the court admitted, under Idaho's residual hearsay exception, certain statements she had made to a pediatrician having extensive experience in child abuse cases. The doctor testified that she had reluctantly answered questions about her own abuse, but had spontaneously volunteered information about her sister's abuse. Wright was convicted on both counts, but appealed only from the conviction involving the younger child. The State Supreme Court reversed, finding that the admission of the doctor's testimony under the residual hearsay exception violated Wright's rights under the Confrontation Clause. The court noted that the child's statements did not fall within a traditional hearsay exception and lacked "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" because the doctor had conducted the interview without procedural safeguards: he failed to videotape the interview, asked leading questions, and had a preconceived idea of what the child should be disclosing. This error, the court found, was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. </s> Held: </s> The admission of the child's hearsay statements violated Wright's Confrontation Clause rights. Pp. 813-827. </s> (a) Incriminating statements admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule are not admissible under the Confrontation Clause unless the prosecution produces, or demonstrates the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use and unless the statement bears adequate indicia of reliability. The reliability requirement can be met where the statement either falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or is supported by a showing of "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 . Although it is presumed here that the child was unavailable within the meaning of the Clause, the evidence will be barred unless the reliability requirement is met. Pp. 813-817. </s> (b) Idaho's residual hearsay exception is not a firmly rooted hearsay exception for Confrontation Clause purposes. It accommodates ad hoc instances in which statements not otherwise falling within a recognized hearsay exception might be sufficiently reliable to be admissible at trial, and thus does not share the same tradition of [497 U.S. 805, 806] reliability supporting the admissibility of statements under a firmly rooted hearsay exception. To rule otherwise would require that virtually all codified hearsay exceptions be found to assume constitutional stature, something which this Court has declined to do. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 -156. Pp. 817-818. </s> (c) In determining that "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" were not shown, the State Supreme Court erred in placing dispositive weight on the lack of procedural safeguards at the interview, since such safeguards may in many instances be inappropriate or unnecessary to a determination whether a given statement is sufficiently trustworthy for Confrontation Clause purposes. Rather, such trustworthiness guarantees must be shown from the totality of those circumstances that surround the making of the statement and render the declarant particularly worthy of belief. As is the case with statements admitted under a firmly rooted hearsay exception, see e.g., Green, supra, at 161, evidence possessing "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" must be so trustworthy that adversarial testing would add little to its reliability. In child abuse cases, factors used to determine trustworthiness guarantees - such as the declarant's mental state and the use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age - must relate to whether the child was particularly likely to be telling the truth when the statement was made. The State's contention that evidence corroborating a hearsay statement may properly support a finding that the statement bears such trustworthiness guarantees is rejected, since this would permit admission of presumptively unreliable statements, such as those made under duress, by bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other evidence at trial. That result is at odds with the requirement that hearsay evidence admitted under the Clause be so trustworthy that cross-examination of the declarant would be of marginal utility. Also rejected is Wright's contention that the child's statements are per se or presumptively unreliable on the ground that the trial court found the child incompetent to testify at trial. The court found only that she was not capable of communicating to the jury, and implicitly found that, at the time she made the statements, she was capable of receiving just impressions of the facts and of relating them truly. Moreover, the Clause does not erect a per se rule barring the admission of prior statements of a declarant who is unable to communicate to the jury at the time of trial. See, e. g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 -244. Pp. 818-825. </s> (d) In admitting the evidence, the trial court identified only two factors - whether the child had a motive to make up her story and whether, given her age, the statements were of the type that one would expect a child to fabricate - relating to circumstances surrounding the making of [497 U.S. 805, 807] the statements. The State Supreme Court properly focused on the presumptive unreliability of the out-of-court statements and on the suggestive manner in which the doctor conducted his interview. Viewing the totality of the circumstances, there is no special reason for supposing that the incriminating statements about the child's own abuse were particularly trustworthy. Her statement about her sister presents a closer question. Although its spontaneity and the change in her demeanor suggest that she may have been telling the truth, spontaneity may be an inaccurate indicator of trustworthiness where there has been prior interrogation, prompting, or manipulation by adults. Moreover, the statement was not made under circumstances of reliability comparable to those required, for example, for the admission of excited utterances or statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Because the State does not challenge the State Supreme Court's determination that the Confrontation Clause error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court will not revisit the issue. Pp. 825-827. </s> 116 Idaho 382, 775 P.2d 1224, affirmed. </s> O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, STEVENS, and SCALIA, JJ. joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 827. </s> James T. Jones, Attorney General of Idaho, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were John J. McMahon, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and Myrna A. I. Stahman, Deputy Attorney General. </s> Deputy Solicitor General Bryson argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Dennis, and Michael R. Dreeben. </s> Rolf Michael Kehne, by appointment of the Court, 493 U.S. 1067 , argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. * </s> [Footnote * A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania et al. by Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Attorney General of Pennsylvania, and Marylou Barton, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Douglas B. Baily, Attorney General of Alaska, Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, Steve Clark, Attorney General of Arkansas, Duane Woodard, Attorney General of Colorado, Charles M. Oberly III, Attorney General of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Linley E. Pearson, [497 U.S. 805, 808] Attorney General of Indiana, Tom Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, Frederic J. Cowan, Attorney General of Kentucky, William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana, Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, James M. Shannon, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelly, Attorney General of Michigan, Mike Moore, Attorney General of Mississippi, William L. Webster, Attorney General of Missouri, Marc Racicot, Attorney General of Montana, Robert M. Spire, Attorney General of Nebraska, Brian McKay, Attorney General of Nevada, John P. Arnold, Attorney General of New Hampshire, Robert Del Tufo, Attorney General Designate of New Jersey, Hal Stratton, Attorney General of New Mexico, Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General of North Carolina, Nicholas Spaeth, Attorney General of North Dakota, Robert H. Henry, Attorney General of Oklahoma, T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina, Roger A. Tellinghuisen, Attorney General of South Dakota, Paul Van Dam, Attorney General of Utah, Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General of Vermont, Godfrey R. de Castro, Attorney General of the Virgin Islands, Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General of Virginia, and Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General of Wyoming. </s> Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union by Margaret A. Berger and Steven R. Sharpiro; and for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Natman Schaye. </s> Stephan E. Lawton, John E. B. Myers, Kirk B. Johnson, and Thomas R. Finn filed a brief for the American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children et al. as amicus curiae. [497 U.S. 805, 808] </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case requires us to decide whether the admission at trial of certain hearsay statements made by a child declarant to an examining pediatrician violates a defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. </s> I </s> Respondent Laura Lee Wright was jointly charged with Robert L. Giles of two counts of lewd conduct with a minor under 16, in violation of Idaho Code 18-1508 (1987). The alleged victims were respondent's two daughters, one of whom was 5 1/2 and the other 2 1/2 years old at the time the crimes were charged. [497 U.S. 805, 809] </s> Respondent and her ex-husband, Louis Wright, the father of the older daughter, had reached an informal agreement whereby each parent would have custody of the older daughter for six consecutive months. The allegations surfaced in November, 1986, when the older daughter told Cynthia Goodman, Louis Wright's female companion, that Giles had had sexual intercourse with her while respondent held her down and covered her mouth, App. 47-55; 3 Tr. 456-460, and that she had seen respondent and Giles do the same thing to respondent's younger daughter, App. 48-49, 61; 3 Tr. 460. The younger daughter was living with her parents - respondent and Giles - at the time of the alleged offenses. </s> Goodman reported the older daughter's disclosures to the police the next day, and took the older daughter to the hospital. A medical examination of the older daughter revealed evidence of sexual abuse. One of the examining physicians was Dr. John Jambura, a pediatrician with extensive experience in child abuse cases. App. 91-94. Police and welfare officials took the younger daughter into custody that day for protection and investigation. Dr. Jambura examined her the following day and found conditions "strongly suggestive of sexual abuse with vaginal contact," occurring approximately two to three days prior to the examination. Id., at 105, 106. </s> At the joint trial of respondent and Giles, the trial court conducted a voir dire examination of the younger daughter, who was three years old at the time of trial, to determine whether she was capable of testifying. Id., at 32-38. The court concluded, and the parties agreed, that the younger daughter was "not capable of communicating to the jury." Id., at 39. </s> At issue in this case is the admission at trial of certain statements made by the younger daughter to Dr. Jambura in response to questions he asked regarding the alleged abuse. Over objection by respondent and Giles, the trial court permitted Dr. Jambura to testify before the jury as follows: [497 U.S. 805, 810] </s> "Q. [By the prosecutor] Now, calling your attention then to your examination of Kathy Wright on November 10th. What - would you describe any interview dialogue that you had with Kathy at that time? Excuse me, before you get into that, would you lay a setting of where this took place and who else might have been present? </s> "A. This took place in my office, in my examining room, and, as I recall, I believe previous testimony I said that I recall a female attendant being present, I don't recall her identity. </s> "I started out with basically, `Hi, how are you,' you know, `What did you have for breakfast this morning?' Essentially a few minutes of just sort of chitchat. </s> "Q. Was there response from Kathy to that first - those first questions? </s> "A. There was. She started to carry on a very relaxed animated conversation. I then proceeded to just gently start asking questions about, `Well, how are things at home,' you know, those sorts. Gently moving into the domestic situation and then moved into four questions in particular, as I reflected in my records, `Do you play with daddy? Does daddy play with you? Does daddy touch you with his pee-pee? Do you touch his pee-pee?' And again, we then established what was meant by pee-pee, it was a generic term for genital area. </s> "Q. Before you get into that, what was, as best you recollect, what was her response to the question `Do you play with daddy?' </s> "A. Yes, we play - I remember her making a comment about yes we play a lot, and expanding on that and talking about spending time with daddy. </s> "Q. And `Does daddy play with you?' Was there any response? [497 U.S. 805, 811] </s> "A. She responded to that as well, that they played together in a variety of circumstances and, you know, seemed very unaffected by the question. </s> "Q. And then what did you say and her response? </s> "A. When I asked her `Does daddy touch you with his pee-pee,' she did admit to that. When I asked, `do you touch his pee-pee,' she did not have any response. </s> "Q. Excuse me. Did you notice any change in her affect or attitude in that line of questioning? </s> "A. Yes. </s> "Q. What did you observe? </s> "A. She would not - oh, she did not talk any further about that. She would not elucidate what exactly - what kind of touching was taking place, or how it was happening. She did, however, say that daddy does do this with me, but he does it a lot more with my sister than with me. </s> "Q. And how did she offer that last statement? Was that in response to a question or was that just a volunteered statement? </s> "A. That was a volunteered statement as I sat and waited for her to respond, again after she sort of clammed-up, and that was the next statement that she made after just allowing some silence to occur." Id., at 121-123. </s> On cross-examination, Dr. Jambura acknowledged that a picture that he drew during his questioning of the younger daughter had been discarded. Id., at 124. Dr. Jambura also stated that although he had dictated notes to summarize the conversation, his notes were not detailed, and did not record any changes in the child's affect or attitude. Id., at 123-124. </s> The trial court admitted these statements under Idaho's residual hearsay exception, which provides in relevant part: </s> "Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial. - The following are not excluded by the [497 U.S. 805, 812] hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness. </s> . . . . . </s> "(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence." Idaho Rule Evid. 803(24). </s> Respondent and Giles were each convicted of two counts of lewd conduct with a minor under 16 and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. Each appealed only from the conviction involving the younger daughter. Giles contended that the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Jambura's testimony under Idaho's residual hearsay exception. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed his conviction. State v. Giles, 115 Idaho 984, 772 P.2d 191 (1989). Respondent asserted that the admission of Dr. Jambura's testimony under the residual hearsay exception nevertheless violated her rights under the Confrontation Clause. The Idaho Supreme Court agreed and reversed respondent's conviction. 116 Idaho 382, 775 P.2d 1224 (1989). </s> The Supreme Court of Idaho held that the admission of the inculpatory hearsay testimony violated respondent's federal constitutional right to confrontation because the testimony did not fall within a traditional hearsay exception and was based on an interview that lacked procedural safeguards. Id., at 385, 775 P.2d, at 1227. The court found Dr. Jambura's interview technique inadequate because "the questions and answers were not recorded on videotape for preservation and perusal by the defense at or before trial; and, [497 U.S. 805, 813] blatantly leading questions were used in the interrogation." Ibid. The statements also lacked trustworthiness, according to the court, because "this interrogation was performed by someone with a preconceived idea of what the child should be disclosing." Ibid. Noting that expert testimony and child psychology texts indicated that children are susceptible to suggestion and are therefore likely to be misled by leading questions, the court found that "[t]he circumstances surrounding this interview demonstrate dangers of unreliability which, because the interview was not [audio or video] recorded, can never be fully assessed." Id., at 388, 775 P.2d, at 1230. The court concluded that the younger daughter's statements lacked the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness necessary to satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation Clause, and that therefore the trial court erred in admitting them. Id., at 389, 775 P.2d, at 1231. Because the court was not convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have reached the same result had the error not occurred, the court reversed respondent's conviction on the count involving the younger daughter and remanded for a new trial. Ibid. </s> We granted certiorari, 493 U.S. 1041 (1990), and now affirm. </s> II </s> The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him." </s> From the earliest days of our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, we have consistently held that the Clause does not necessarily prohibit the admission of hearsay statements against a criminal defendant, even though the admission of such statements might be thought to violate the literal terms of the Clause. See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965). [497 U.S. 805, 814] We reaffirmed only recently that "[w]hile a literal interpretation of the Confrontation Clause could bar the use of any out-of-court statements when the declarant is unavailable, this Court has rejected that view as "unintended and too extreme." Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980)); see also Maryland v. Craig, post, at 847 ("[T]he [Confrontation] Clause permits, where necessary, the admission of certain hearsay statements against a defendant despite the defendant's inability to confront the declarant at trial"). </s> Although we have recognized that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, we have also been careful not to equate the Confrontation Clause's prohibitions with the general rule prohibiting the admission of hearsay statements. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 -156 (1970); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970) (plurality opinion); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 393 , n. 5 (1986). The Confrontation Clause, in other words, bars the admission of some evidence that would otherwise be admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., Green, supra, at 155-156; Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Pointer, supra. </s> In Ohio v. Roberts, we set forth "a general approach" for determining when incriminating statements admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule also meet the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. 448 U.S., at 65 . We noted that the Confrontation Clause "operates in two separate ways to restrict the range of admissible hearsay." Ibid. "First, in conformance with the Framers' preference for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of necessity. In the usual case . . ., the prosecution must either produce or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant." Ibid. (citations omitted). Second, once a witness is shown to be unavailable, "his statement is admissible only [497 U.S. 805, 815] if it bears adequate `indicia of reliability.' Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Id., at 66 (footnote omitted); see also Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972). </s> Applying this general analytical framework to the facts of Roberts, supra, we held that the admission of testimony given at a preliminary hearing, where the declarant failed to appear at trial despite the State's having issued five separate subpoenas to her, did not violate the Confrontation Clause. 448 U.S., at 67 -77. Specifically, we found that the State had carried its burden of showing that the declarant was unavailable to testify at trial, see Barber, supra, at 724-725; Mancusi, supra, at 212, and that the testimony at the preliminary hearing bore sufficient indicia of reliability, particularly because defense counsel had had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at the preliminary hearing, see Mancusi, supra, at 216. </s> We have applied the general approach articulated in Roberts to subsequent cases raising Confrontation Clause and hearsay issues. In United States v. Inadi, supra, we held that the general requirement of unavailability did not apply to incriminating out-of-court statements made by a non-testifying co-conspirator, and that therefore the Confrontation Clause did not prohibit the admission of such statements, even though the government had not shown that the declarant was unavailable to testify at trial. 475 U.S., at 394 -400. In Bourjaily v. United States, supra, we held that such statements also carried with them sufficient "indicia of reliability" because the hearsay exception for co-conspirator statements was a firmly rooted one. 483 U.S., at 182 -184. </s> Applying the Roberts approach to this case, we first note that this case does not raise the question whether, before a child's out-of-court statements are admitted, the Confrontation [497 U.S. 805, 816] Clause requires the prosecution to show that a child witness is unavailable at trial - and, if so, what that showing requires. The trial court in this case found that respondent's younger daughter was incapable of communicating with the jury, and defense counsel agreed. App. 39. The court below neither questioned this finding, nor discussed the general requirement of unavailability. For purposes of deciding this case, we assume without deciding that, to the extent the unavailability requirement applies in this case, the younger daughter was an unavailable witness within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. </s> The crux of the question presented is therefore whether the State, as the proponent of evidence presumptively barred by the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause, has carried its burden of proving that the younger daughter's incriminating statements to Dr. Jambura bore sufficient indicia of reliability to withstand scrutiny under the Clause. The court below held that, although the trial court had properly admitted the statements under the State's residual hearsay exception, the statements were "fraught with the dangers of unreliability which the Confrontation Clause is designed to highlight and obviate." 116 Idaho, at 389, 775 P.2d, at 1231. The State asserts that the court below erected too stringent a standard for admitting the statements, and that the statements were, under the totality of the circumstances, sufficiently reliable for Confrontation Clause purposes. </s> In Roberts, we suggested that the "indicia of reliability" requirement could be met in either of two circumstances: where the hearsay statement "falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception," or where it is supported by "a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 448 U.S., at 66 ; see also Bourjaily, supra, at 183 ("[T]he co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is firmly enough rooted in our jurisprudence that, under this Court's holding in Roberts, a court need not independently inquire into the reliability of such statements"); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543 (1986) [497 U.S. 805, 817] ("[E]ven if certain hearsay evidence does not fall within `a firmly rooted hearsay exception,' and is thus presumptively unreliable and inadmissible for Confrontation Clause purposes, it may nonetheless meet Confrontation Clause reliability standards if it is supported by a `showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness'") (footnote and citation omitted). </s> We note at the outset that Idaho's residual hearsay exception, Idaho Rule Evid. 803(24), under which the challenged statements were admitted, App. 113-115, is not a firmly rooted hearsay exception for Confrontation Clause purposes. Admission under a firmly rooted hearsay exception satisfies the constitutional requirement of reliability because of the weight accorded longstanding judicial and legislative experience in assessing the trustworthiness of certain types of out-of-court statements. See Mattox, 156 U.S., at 243 ; Roberts, 448 U.S., at 66 ; Bourjaily, 483 U.S., at 183 ; see also Lee, supra, at 552 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) ("[S]tatements squarely within established hearsay exceptions possess `the imprimatur of judicial and legislative experience,' . . . and that fact must weigh heavily in our assessment of their reliability for constitutional purposes") (citation omitted). The residual hearsay exception, by contrast, accommodates ad hoc instances in which statements not otherwise falling within a recognized hearsay exception might nevertheless be sufficiently reliable to be admissible at trial. See, e.g., Senate Judiciary Committee's Note on Fed.Rule Evid. 803(24), 28 U.S.C. App., pp. 786-787; E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence 324.1, pp. 907-909 (3d ed. 1984). Hearsay statements admitted under the residual exception, almost by definition, therefore do not share the same tradition of reliability that supports the admissibility of statements under a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Moreover, were we to agree that the admission of hearsay statements under the residual exception automatically passed Confrontation Clause scrutiny, virtually every codified hearsay exception would assume constitutional stature, [497 U.S. 805, 818] a step this Court has repeatedly declined to take. See Green, 399 U.S., at 155 -156; Evans, 400 U.S., at 86 -87 (plurality opinion); Inadi, 475 U.S., at 393 , n. 5; see also Evans, supra, at 94-95 (Harlan, J., concurring in result). </s> The State, in any event, does not press the matter strongly, and recognizes that, because the younger daughter's hearsay statements do not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, they are "presumptively unreliable and inadmissible for Confrontation Clause purposes," Lee, supra, at 543, and "must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness," Roberts, supra, at 66. The court below concluded that the State had not made such a showing, in large measure because the statements resulted from an interview lacking certain procedural safeguards. The court below specifically noted that Dr. Jambura failed to record the interview on videotape, asked leading questions, and questioned the child with a preconceived idea of what she should be disclosing. See 116 Idaho, at 388, 775 P.2d, at 1230. </s> Although we agree with the court below that the Confrontation Clause bars the admission of the younger daughter's hearsay statements, we reject the apparently dispositive weight placed by that court on the lack of procedural safeguards at the interview. Out-of-court statements made by children regarding sexual abuse arise in a wide variety of circumstances, and we do not believe the Constitution imposes a fixed set of procedural prerequisites to the admission of such statements at trial. The procedural requirements identified by the court below, to the extent regarded as conditions precedent to the admission of child hearsay statements in child sexual abuse cases, may in many instances be inappropriate or unnecessary to a determination whether a given statement is sufficiently trustworthy for Confrontation Clause purposes. See, e.g., Nelson v. Farrey, 874 F.2d 1222, 1229 (CA7 1989) (videotape requirement not feasible, [497 U.S. 805, 819] especially where defendant had not yet been criminally charged), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1042 (1990); J. Myers, Child Witness Law and Practice 4.6, pp. 129-134 (1987) (use of leading questions with children, when appropriate, does not necessarily render responses untrustworthy). Although the procedural guidelines propounded by the court below may well enhance the reliability of out-of-court statements of children regarding sexual abuse, we decline to read into the Confrontation Clause a preconceived and artificial litmus test for the procedural propriety of professional interviews in which children make hearsay statements against a defendant. </s> The State responds that a finding of "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" should instead be based on a consideration of the totality of the circumstances, including not only the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement but also other evidence at trial that corroborates the truth of the statement. We agree that "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" must be shown from the totality of the circumstances, but we think the relevant circumstances include only those that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief. This conclusion derives from the rationale for permitting exceptions to the general rule against hearsay: </s> "The theory of the hearsay rule . . . is that the many possible sources of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness which may lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness can best be brought to light and exposed, if they exist, by the test of cross-examination. But this test or security may in a given instance be superfluous; it may be sufficiently clear, in that instance, that the statement offered is free enough from the risk of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness so that the test of cross-examination would be a work of supererogation." 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence 1420, p. 251 (J. Chadbourne rev. 1974). [497 U.S. 805, 820] In other words, if the declarant's truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility, then the hearsay rule does not bar admission of the statement at trial. The basis for the "excited utterance" exception, for example, is that such statements are given under circumstances that eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation, and that therefore the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement provide sufficient assurance that the statement is trustworthy and that cross-examination would be superfluous. See, e.g., 6 Wigmore, supra, 1745-1764; 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence § 803(2)01. (1988); Advisory Committee's Note on Fed.Rule Evid. 803(2), 28 U.S.C. App., p. 778. Likewise, the "dying declaration" and "medical treatment" exceptions to the hearsay rule are based on the belief that persons making such statements are highly unlikely to lie. See, e.g., Mattox, 156 U.S., at 244 ("[T]he sense of impending death is presumed to remove all temptation to falsehood, and to enforce as strict an adherence to the truth as would the obligation of oath"); Queen v. Osman, 15 Cox Crim.Cas. 1, 3 (Eng.N. Wales Cir. 1881) (Lush, L.J.) ("[N]o person, who is immediately going into the presence of his Maker will do so with a lie upon his lips"); Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for the Purpose of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment, 67 N.C.L.Rev. 257 (1989). "The circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness on which the various specific exceptions to the hearsay rule are based are those that existed at the time the statement was made, and do not include those that may be added by using hindsight." Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 292 (CA7 1979). </s> We think the "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" required for admission under the Confrontation Clause must likewise be drawn from the totality of circumstances that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief. Our precedents [497 U.S. 805, 821] have recognized that statements admitted under a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception are so trustworthy that adversarial testing would add little to their reliability. See Green, 399 U.S., at 161 (examining "whether subsequent cross-examination at the defendant's trial will still afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement"); see also Mattox, supra, at 244; Evans, 400 U.S., at 88 -89 (plurality opinion); Roberts, 448 U.S., at 65 , 73. Because evidence possessing "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" must be at least as reliable as evidence admitted under a firmly rooted hearsay exception, see Roberts, supra, at 66, we think that evidence admitted under the former requirement must similarly be so trustworthy that adversarial testing would add little to its reliability. See Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S., at 544 (determining indicia of reliability from the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement); see also State v. Ryan, 103 Wash.2d 165, 174, 691 P.2d 197, 204 (1984) ("Adequate indicia of reliability [under Roberts] must be found in reference to circumstances surrounding the making of the out-of-court statement, and not from subsequent corroboration of the criminal act"). Thus, unless an affirmative reason, arising from the circumstances in which the statement was made, provides a basis for rebutting the presumption that a hearsay statement is not worthy of reliance at trial, the Confrontation Clause requires exclusion of the out-of-court statement. </s> The state and federal courts have identified a number of factors that we think properly relate to whether hearsay statements made by a child witness in child sexual abuse cases are reliable. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 201, 735 P.2d 801, 811 (1987) (spontaneity and consistent repetition); Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 948 (CA4 1988) (mental state of the declarant); State v. Sorenson, 143 Wis.2d 226, 246, 421 N.W.2d 77, 85 (1988) (use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age); State v. Kuone, 243 Kan. 218, 221-222, 757 P.2d 289, 292-293 (1988) (lack [497 U.S. 805, 822] of motive to fabricate). Although these cases (which we cite for the factors they discuss and not necessarily to approve the results that they reach) involve the application of various hearsay exceptions to statements of child declarants, we think the factors identified also apply to whether such statements bear "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" under the Confrontation Clause. These factors are, of course, not exclusive, and courts have considerable leeway in their consideration of appropriate factors. We therefore decline to endorse a mechanical test for determining "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" under the Clause. Rather, the unifying principle is that these factors relate to whether the child declarant was particularly likely to be telling the truth when the statement was made. </s> As our discussion above suggests, we are unpersuaded by the State's contention that evidence corroborating the truth of a hearsay statement may properly support a finding that the statement bears "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." To be admissible under the Confrontation Clause, hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at trial. Cf. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986). "[T]he Clause countenances only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that "there is no material departure from the reason of the general rule." Roberts, supra, at 65 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934)). A statement made under duress, for example, may happen to be a true statement, but the circumstances under which it is made may provide no basis for supposing that the declarant is particularly likely to be telling the truth - indeed, the circumstances may even be such that the declarant is particularly unlikely to be telling the truth. In such a case, cross-examination at trial would be highly useful to probe the declarant's state-of-mind when he made the statements; the presence of evidence tending [497 U.S. 805, 823] to corroborate the truth of the statement would be no substitute for cross-examination of the declarant at trial. </s> In short, the use of corroborating evidence to support a hearsay statement's "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" would permit admission of a presumptively unreliable statement by bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other evidence at trial, a result we think at odds with the requirement that hearsay evidence admitted under the Confrontation Clause be so trustworthy that cross-examination of the declarant would be of marginal utility. Indeed, although a plurality of the Court in Dutton v. Evans looked to corroborating evidence as one of four factors in determining whether a particular hearsay statement possessed sufficient indicia of reliability, see 400 U.S., at 88 , we think the presence of corroborating evidence more appropriately indicates that any error in admitting the statement might be harmless * , rather than that any basis exists for presuming the declarant to be trustworthy. See id., at 90 (BLACKMUN, J., joined by Burger, C.J., concurring) (finding admission of the statement at issue to be harmless error, if error at all); see also 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence 418, p. 143 (1980) (discussing Evans). [497 U.S. 805, 824] </s> Moreover, although we considered in Lee v. Illinois the "interlocking" nature of a codefendant's and a defendant's confessions to determine whether the codefendant's confession was sufficiently trustworthy for confrontation purposes, we declined to rely on corroborative physical evidence and indeed rejected the "interlock" theory in that case. 476 U.S., at 545 -546. We cautioned that "[t]he true danger inherent in this type of hearsay is, in fact, its selective reliability." Id., at 545. This concern applies in the child hearsay context as well: Corroboration of a child's allegations of sexual abuse by medical evidence of abuse, for example, sheds no light on the reliability of the child's allegations regarding the identity of the abuser. There is a very real danger that a jury will rely on partial corroboration to mistakenly infer the trustworthiness of the entire statement. Furthermore, we recognized the similarity between harmless-error analysis and the corroboration inquiry when we noted in Lee that the harm of "admission of the [hearsay] statement [was that it] poses too serious a threat to the accuracy of the verdict to be countenanced by the Sixth Amendment." Ibid. (emphasis added). </s> Finally, we reject respondent's contention that the younger daughter's out-of-court statements in this case are per se unreliable, or at least presumptively unreliable, on the ground that the trial court found the younger daughter incompetent to testify at trial. First, respondent's contention rests upon a questionable reading of the record in this case. The trial court found only that the younger daughter was "not capable of communicating to the jury." App. 39. Although Idaho law provides that a child witness may not testify if he "appear[s] incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly," Idaho Code 9-202 (Supp. 1989); Idaho Rule Evid. 601(a), the trial court in this case made no such findings. Indeed, the more reasonable inference is that, by ruling that the statements were admissible under Idaho's residual hearsay [497 U.S. 805, 825] exception, the trial court implicitly found that the younger daughter, at the time she made the statements, was capable of receiving just impressions of the facts and of relating them truly. See App. 115. In addition, we have in any event held that the Confrontation Clause does not erect a per se rule barring the admission of prior statements of a declarant who is unable to communicate to the jury at the time of trial. See, e.g., Mattox, 156 U.S., at 243 -244; see also 4 Louisell & Mueller, supra, 486, pp. 1041-1045. Although such inability might be relevant to whether the earlier hearsay statement possessed particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, a per se rule of exclusion would not only frustrate the truth-seeking purpose of the Confrontation Clause, but would also hinder States in their own "enlightened development in the law of evidence," Evans, 400 U.S., at 95 (Harlan, J., concurring in result). </s> III </s> The trial court in this case, in ruling that the Confrontation Clause did not prohibit admission of the younger daughter's hearsay statements, relied on the following factors: </s> "In this case, of course, there is physical evidence to corroborate that sexual abuse occurred. It would also seem to be the case that there is no motive to make up a story of this nature in a child of these years. We're not talking about a pubescent youth who may fantasize. The nature of the statements themselves as to sexual abuse are such that they fall outside the general believability that a child could make them up or would make them up. This is simply not the type of statement, I believe, that one would expect a child to fabricate. </s> "We come then to the identification itself. Are there any indicia of reliability as to identification? From the doctor's testimony, it appears that the injuries testified to occurred at the time that the victim was in the custody of the Defendants. The [older daughter] has testified as to identification of [the] perpetrators. Those - the identification [497 U.S. 805, 826] of the perpetrators in this case are persons well known to the [younger daughter]. This is not a case in which a child is called upon to identify a stranger or a person with whom they would have no knowledge of their identity or ability to recollect and recall. Those factors are sufficient indicia of reliability to permit the admission of the statements." App. 115. </s> Of the factors the trial court found relevant, only two relate to circumstances surrounding the making of the statements: whether the child had a motive to "make up a story of this nature" and whether, given the child's age, the statements are of the type "that one would expect a child to fabricate." Ibid. The other factors on which the trial court relied, however, such as the presence of physical evidence of abuse, the opportunity of respondent to commit the offense, and the older daughter's corroborating identification, relate instead to whether other evidence existed to corroborate the truth of the statement. These factors, as we have discussed, are irrelevant to a showing of the "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" necessary for admission of hearsay statements under the Confrontation Clause. </s> We think the Supreme Court of Idaho properly focused on the presumptive unreliability of the out-of-court statements and on the suggestive manner in which Dr. Jambura conducted the interview. Viewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the younger daughter's responses to Dr. Jambura's questions, we find no special reason for supposing that the incriminating statements were particularly trustworthy. The younger daughter's last statement regarding the abuse of the older daughter, however, presents a closer question. According to Dr. Jambura, the younger daughter "volunteered" that statement "after she sort of clammed-up." Id., at 123. Although the spontaneity of the statement and the change in demeanor suggest that the younger daughter was telling the truth when she made the statement, we note that it is possible that, "[i]f there is evidence of prior interrogation, [497 U.S. 805, 827] prompting, or manipulation by adults, spontaneity may be an inaccurate indicator of trustworthiness." Robinson, 153 Ariz., at 201, 735 P.2d, at 811. Moreover, the statement was not made under circumstances of reliability comparable to those required, for example, for the admission of excited utterances or statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Given the presumption of inadmissibility accorded accusatory hearsay statements not admitted pursuant to a firmly rooted hearsay exception, Lee, 476 U.S., at 543 , we agree with the court below that the State has failed to show that the younger daughter's incriminating statements to the pediatrician possessed sufficient "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" under the Confrontation Clause to overcome that presumption. </s> The State does not challenge the Idaho Supreme Court's conclusion that the Confrontation Clause error in this case was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and we see no reason to revisit the issue. We therefore agree with that court that respondent's conviction involving the younger daughter must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Idaho is affirmed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> [Footnote * The dissent suggests that the Court unequivocally rejected this view in Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 192 (1987), but the quoted language on which the dissent relies, post at 832, is taken out of context. Cruz involved the admission at a joint trial of a nontestifying codefendant's confession that incriminated the defendant. where the jury was instructed to consider that confession only against the codefendant, and where the defendant's own confession, corroborating that of his codefendant, was introduced against him. The Court in Cruz, relying squarely on Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), held that the admission of the codefendant's confession violated the Confrontation Clause. 481 U.S., at 193 . The language on which the dissent relies appears in a paragraph discussing whether the "interlocking" nature of the confessions was relevant to the applicability of Bruton (the Court concluded that it was not). The Court in that case said nothing about whether the codefendant's confession would be admissible against the defendant simply because it may have "interlocked" with the defendant's confession. </s> JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting. </s> The issue is whether the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is violated when statements from a child who is unavailable to testify at trial are admitted under a hearsay exception against a defendant who stands accused of abusing her. The Court today holds that it is not, provided that the child's statements bear "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). I agree. My disagreement is with the rule the Court invents to control this inquiry, and with the Court's ultimate determination that the statements in question here must be inadmissible as violative of the Confrontation Clause. [497 U.S. 805, 828] </s> Given the principle, for cases involving hearsay statements that do not come within one of the traditional hearsay exceptions, that admissibility depends upon finding particular guarantees of trustworthiness in each case, it is difficult to state rules of general application. I believe the Court recognizes this. The majority errs, in my view, by adopting a rule that corroboration of the statement by other evidence is an impermissible part of the trustworthiness inquiry. The Court's apparent ruling is that corroborating evidence may not be considered in whole or in part for this purpose. 1 This limitation, at least on a facial interpretation of the Court's analytic categories, is a new creation by the Court; it likely will prove unworkable, and does not even square with the examples of reliability indicators the Court itself invokes; and it is contrary to our own precedents. </s> I see no constitutional justification for this decision to prescind corroborating evidence from consideration of the question whether a child's statements are reliable. It is a matter of common sense for most people that one of the best ways to determine whether what someone says is trustworthy is to see if it is corroborated by other evidence. In the context of child abuse, for example, if part of the child's hearsay statement is that the assailant tied her wrists or had a scar on his lower abdomen, and there is physical evidence or testimony to corroborate the child's statement, evidence which the child [497 U.S. 805, 829] could not have fabricated, we are more likely to believe that what the child says is true. Conversely, one can imagine a situation in which a child makes a statement which is spontaneous or is otherwise made under circumstances indicating that it is reliable, but which also contains undisputed factual inaccuracies so great that the credibility of the child's statements is substantially undermined. Under the Court's analysis, the statement would satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation Clause despite substantial doubt about its reliability. Nothing in the law of evidence or the law of the Confrontation Clause countenances such a result; on the contrary, most federal courts have looked to the existence of corroborating evidence or the lack thereof to determine the reliability of hearsay statements not coming within one of the traditional hearsay exceptions. See 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence 472, p. 929 (1980) (collecting cases); 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence § 804(b)(5)01. (1988) (same). Specifically with reference to hearsay statements by children, a review of the cases has led a leading commentator on child witness law to conclude flatly: "If the content of an out-of-court statement is supported or corroborated by other evidence, the reliability of the hearsay is strengthened." J. Myers, Child Witness Law and Practice 5.37, p. 364 (1987). 2 The Court's apparent misgivings [497 U.S. 805, 830] about the weight to be given corroborating evidence, see ante at 824, may or may not be correct, but those misgivings do not justify wholesale elimination of this evidence from consideration in derogation of an overwhelming judicial and legislative consensus to the contrary. States are of course free, as a matter of state law, to demand corroboration of an unavailable child declarant's statements as well as other indicia of reliability before allowing the statements to be admitted [497 U.S. 805, 831] into evidence. Until today, however, no similar distinction could be found in our precedents interpreting the Confrontation Clause. If anything, the many state statutes requiring corroboration of a child declarant's statements emphasize the relevance, not the irrelevance, of corroborating evidence to the determination whether an unavailable child witness's statements bear particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, which is the ultimate inquiry under the Confrontation Clause. In sum, whatever doubt the Court has with the weight to be given the corroborating evidence found in this case is no justification for rejecting the considered wisdom of virtually the entire legal community that corroborating evidence is relevant to reliability and trustworthiness. </s> Far from rejecting this common-sense proposition, the very cases relied upon by the Court today embrace it. In Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), we considered whether the confession of a codefendant that "interlocked" with a defendant's own confession bore particularized guarantees of trustworthiness so that its admission into evidence against the defendant did not violate the Confrontation Clause. Although the Court's ultimate conclusion was that the confession did not bear sufficient indicia of reliability, its analysis was far different from that utilized by the Court in the present case. The Court today notes that, in Lee, we determined the trustworthiness of the confession by looking to the circumstances surrounding its making, see ante at 821; what the Court omits from its discussion of Lee is the fact that we also considered the extent of the "interlock," that is, the extent to which the two confessions corroborated each other. The Court in Lee was unanimous in its recognition of corroboration as a legitimate indicator of reliability; the only disagreement was whether the corroborative nature of the confessions and the circumstances of their making were sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. See 476 U.S., at 546 (finding insufficient indicia of reliability, "flowing from either [497 U.S. 805, 832] the circumstances surrounding the confession or the `interlocking' character of the confessions," to support admission of the codefendant's confession) (emphasis added); id., at 557 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) (finding the codefendant's confession supported by sufficient indicia of reliability including, inter alia, "extensive and convincing corroboration by petitioner's own confession" and "further corroboration provided by the physical evidence"). See also New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648, 649 , n. * (1986) (REHNQUIST, J., concurring); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88 -89 (1970) (plurality opinion). </s> The Court today suggests that the presence of corroborating evidence goes more to the issue of whether the admission of the hearsay statements was harmless error than whether the statements themselves were reliable, and therefore admissible. See ante at 823. Once again, in the context of interlocking confessions, our previous cases have been unequivocal in rejecting this suggestion: </s> "Quite obviously, what the "interlocking" nature of the codefendant's confession pertains to is not its harmfulness, but rather its reliability: If it confirms essentially the same facts as the defendant's own confession, it is more likely to be true." Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 192 (1987) (emphasis in original). </s> It was precisely because the "interlocking" nature of the confessions heightened their reliability as hearsay that we noted in Cruz that, "[o]f course, the defendant's confession may be considered at trial in assessing whether his codefendant's statements are supported by sufficient "indicia of reliability" to be directly admissible against him." Id., at 193-194 (citing Lee, supra, at 543-544). In short, corroboration has been an essential element in our past hearsay cases, and there is no justification for a categorical refusal to consider it here. </s> Our Fourth Amendment cases are also premised upon the idea that corroboration is a legitimate indicator of reliability. [497 U.S. 805, 833] We have long held that corroboration is an essential element in determining whether police may act on the basis of an informant's tip, for the simple reason that "because an informant is shown to be right about some things, he is probably right about other facts that he has alleged." Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331 (1990). See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 , 245 (1983); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415 (1969); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960). </s> The Court does not offer any justification for barring the consideration of corroborating evidence other than the suggestion that corroborating evidence does not bolster the "inherent trustworthiness" of the statements. Ante at 822. But for purposes of determining the reliability of the statements, I can discern no difference between the factors that the Court believes indicate "inherent trustworthiness" and those, like corroborating evidence, that apparently do not. Even the factors endorsed by the Court will involve consideration of the very evidence the Court purports to exclude from the reliability analysis. The Court notes that one test of reliability is whether the child "use[d] . . . terminology unexpected of a child of similar age." Ante, at 821. But making this determination requires consideration of the child's vocabulary skills and past opportunity, or lack thereof, to learn the terminology at issue. And, when all of the extrinsic circumstances of a case are considered, it may be shown that use of a particular word or vocabulary in fact supports the inference of prolonged contact with the defendant, who was known to use the vocabulary in question. As a further example, the Court notes that motive to fabricate is an index of reliability. Ibid. But if the suspect charges that a third person concocted a false case against him and coached the child, surely it is relevant to show that the third person had no contact with the child or no opportunity to suggest false testimony. Given the contradictions inherent in the Court's test when [497 U.S. 805, 834] measured against its own examples, I expect its holding will soon prove to be as unworkable as it is illogical. </s> The short of the matter is that both the circumstances existing at the time the child makes the statements and the existence of corroborating evidence indicate, to a greater or lesser degree, whether the statements are reliable. If the Court means to suggest that the circumstances surrounding the making of a statement are the best indicators of reliability, I doubt this is so in every instance. And, if it were true in a particular case, that does not warrant ignoring other indicators of reliability such as corroborating evidence, absent some other reason for excluding it. If anything, I should think that corroborating evidence in the form of testimony or physical evidence, apart from the narrow circumstances in which the statement was made, would be a preferred means of determining a statement's reliability for purposes of the Confrontation Clause, for the simple reason that, unlike other indicators of trustworthiness, corroborating evidence can be addressed by the defendant and assessed by the trial court in an objective and critical way. </s> In this case, the younger daughter's statements are corroborated in at least four respects: (1) physical evidence that she was the victim of sexual abuse; (2) evidence that she had been in the custody of the suspect at the time the injuries occurred; (3) testimony of the older daughter that their father abused the younger daughter, thus corroborating the younger daughter's statement; and (4) the testimony of the older daughter that she herself was abused by their father, thus corroborating the younger daughter's statement that her sister had also been abused. These facts, coupled with the circumstances surrounding the making of the statements acknowledged by the Court as suggesting that the statements are reliable, give rise to a legitimate argument that admission of the statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause. Because the Idaho Supreme Court did not consider these factors, I would vacate its judgment reversing respondent's [497 U.S. 805, 835] conviction and remand for it to consider in the first instance whether the child's statements bore "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" under the analysis set forth in this separate opinion. </s> For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The Court also states that the child's hearsay statements are "presumptively unreliable." Ante at 818. I take this to mean only that the government bears the burden of coming forward with indicia of reliability sufficient for the purposes of the Confrontation Clause, and that, if it fails to do so, the statements are inadmissible. A presumption of unreliability exists as a counterweight to the indicia of reliability offered by the government only where there is an affirmative reason to believe that a particular category of hearsay may be unreliable. See, e.g., Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 545 (1986) ("[A] codefendant's confession is presumptively unreliable as to the passages detailing the defendant's conduct or culpability because those passages may well be the product of the codefendant's desire to shift or spread blame, curry favor, avenge himself, or divert attention to another"). </s> [Footnote 2 A sampling of cases using corroborating evidence as to support a finding that a child's statements were reliable includes: United States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 1445 (CA8 1986); United States v. Cree, 778 F.2d 474, 477 (CA8 1985); United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1204 (CA9 1979); State v. Allen, 157 Ariz. 165, 176-178, 755 P.2d 1153, 1164-1166 (1988); State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 204, 735 P.2d 801 814 (1987); State v. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d 308, 315 (Minn.App. 1986); State v. Soukup, 376 N.W.2d 498, 501 (Minn.App. 1985); State v. Doe, 94 N.M. 637, 639, 614 P.2d 1086, 1088 (App. 1980); State v. McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 159, 164 (S.D. 1984); United States v. Quick, 22 M.J. 722, 724 (A.C.M.R. 1986). Numerous other cases rely upon corroboration pursuant to state statutory rules regarding hearsay statements by children. See Myers 5.38. </s> Aside from Lee v. Illinois, supra, discussed infra, at 831-832, the only case cited by the Court for the proposition that corroborative evidence is irrelevant to reliability is State v. Ryan, 103 Wash.2d 165, 174, 691 P.2d 197, [497 U.S. 805, 830] 204 (1984). The Court quotes the opinion out of context. In holding that corroborating evidence could not be used to demonstrate reliability, the Washington Supreme Court was not interpreting the Confrontation Clause; rather, its opinion clearly reveals that the court's holding was an interpretation of a Washington statute, Wash.Rev.Code Ann. 9A.44.120 (1988), which provided that hearsay statements from an unavailable child declarant could be admitted into evidence at trial only if they were reliable and corroborated by other evidence. The portion of the opinion following the sentence quoted by the majority reveals the true nature of its holding: </s> "The trial court was apparently persuaded that the statements of the children must be reliable, if, in hindsight they prove to be true. RCW 9A.44.120 demands more. </s> "The statute requires separate determinations of reliability and corroboration when the child is unavailable. The word "and" is conjunctive. . . . The Legislature would have used the word "or" had they intended the disjunctive. . . . Although defendant's confession was offered as corroboration, wholly absent are the requisite circumstantial guarantees of reliability." State v. Ryan, supra, at 174, 691 P.2d, at 204. (citations omitted; emphasis added). </s> Other States also have expressly recognized the need for and legitimacy of considering corroborating evidence in determining whether a child declarant's statements are trustworthy and should be admitted into evidence. See Ariz.Rev. Stat.Ann. 13-1416 (1989); Ark.Rule Evid. 803(25)(A); Cal.Evid.Code Ann. 1228 (West 1990); Colo.Rev.Stat. 13-25-129 (1987); Fla. Stat. 90.803(23) (1989); Idaho Code 19-3024 (1987); Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 38, § 115-10 (1989); Ind.Code 35-37-4-6 (1988); Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. 9-103.1 (1989); Minn. Stat. 595.02(3) (1988); Miss.Code.Ann. 13-1-403 (Supp. 1989); N.J.R.Evid. 63 (1989); N.D.Rule Evid. 803(24); Okla.Stat.Tit. 12, 2803.1 (1989); Oregon Rev.Stat. 40.460 (1989); 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. 5985.1 (1989); S.D. Codified Laws 19-16-38 (1987); Utah Code Ann. 76-5-411 (1990). </s> [497 U.S. 805, 836]

United States Supreme Court CSC v. LETTER CARRIERS(1973) No. 72-634 Argued: March 26, 1973Decided: June 25, 1973 </s> Some individual federal employees, an employees' union, and certain local Democratic and Republican political committees filed this action challenging as unconstitutional on its face the prohibition in 9 (a) of the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. 7324 (a) (2), against federal employees' taking "an active part in political management or in political campaigns." The section defines the phrase as "those acts of political management or political campaigning which were prohibited on the part of employees in the competitive service before July 19, 1940, by determinations of the Civil Service Commission under the rules prescribed by the President." The three-judge District Court recognized the "well-established governmental interest in restricting political activities by federal employees," but held that the statutory definition of "political activity," the constitutionality of which was left open in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 , was vague and overbroad, and thus unconstitutional. Held: </s> 1. The holding of Mitchell, supra, that federal employees can be prevented from holding a party office, working at the polls, and acting as party paymaster for other party workers is reaffirmed. Congress can also constitutionally forbid federal employees from engaging in plainly identifiable acts of political management and political campaigning, such as organizing a political party or club; actively participating in fund-raising activities for a partisan candidate or political party; becoming a partisan candidate for, or campaigning for, an elective public office; actively managing the campaign of a partisan candidate for public office; initiating or circulating a partisan nominating petition or soliciting votes for a partisan candidate for public office; or serving as a delegate, alternate, or proxy to a political party convention. Pp. 554-567. </s> 2. It is the Civil Service Commission's regulations regarding political activity, the legitimate descendants of the 1940 restatement adopted by the Congress, and, in most respects the reflection [413 U.S. 548, 549] of longstanding interpretations of the statute by the agency charged with its interpretation and enforcement, and the statute itself, that are the bases for rejecting the claim that the Act is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Pp. 568-581. </s> (a) The regulations specifying the various activities deemed prohibited by 7324 (a) (2) are set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and observe, without sacrifice to the public interest, and are not impermissibly vague. Pp. 575-580. </s> (b) There is nothing fatally overbroad about the statute considered in connection with the Civil Service Commission's construction of its terms represented by the current regulations. The restrictions on endorsements in advertisements, broadcasts, and literature, and on speaking at political party meetings in support of partisan candidates for public or party office, the major areas of difficulty, are clearly stated, are normally performed only in the context of partisan campaigns by one taking an active role in them, and are sustainable just as the other acts of political campaigning are constitutionally proscribable. They do not, therefore, render the rest of the statute vulnerable for overbreadth. P. 580. </s> (c) Even if the provisions forbidding partisan campaign endorsements and speechmaking were to be considered in some respects constitutionally overbroad, they would not invalidate the entire statute. Pp. 580-581. </s> 346 F. Supp. 578, reversed. </s> WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 595. </s> Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Wood, Andrew L. Frey, Robert E. Kopp, and Anthony L. Mondello. </s> Thomas C. Matthews, Jr., argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Stephen M. Truitt, Melvin L. Wulf, Ralph J. Temple, and Philip Elman. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Lee Johnson, Attorney General, John W. Osburn, Solicitor General, and A. J. Laue [413 U.S. 548, 550] and Thomas H. Denney, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Oregon; and by Stephen J. Pollak, Richard T. Conway, Leo M. Pellerzi, Donald M. Murtha, Robert H. Chanin, A. L. Zwerdling, and Edward J. Hickey, Jr., for the Coalition of American Public Employees et al. [413 U.S. 548, 550] </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> On December 11, 1972, we noted probable jurisdiction of this appeal, 409 U.S. 1058 , based on a jurisdictional statement presenting the single question whether the prohibition in 9 (a) of the Hatch Act, now codified in 5 U.S.C. 7324 (a) (2), against federal employees taking "an active part in political management or in political campaigns," is unconstitutional on its face. Section 7324 (a) provides: </s> "An employee in an Executive agency or an individual employed by the government of the District of Columbia may not - </s> "(1) use his official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting the result of an election; or </s> "(2) take an active part in political management or in political campaigns. </s> "For the purpose of this subsection, the phrase `an active part in political management or in political campaigns' means those acts of political management or political campaigning which were prohibited on the part of employees in the competitive service before July 19, 1940, by determinations of the Civil Service Commission under the rules prescribed by the President." 1 </s> [413 U.S. 548, 551] </s> A divided three-judge court sitting in the District of Columbia had held the section unconstitutional. 346 F. Supp. 578 (1972). We reverse the judgment of the District Court. </s> I </s> The case began when the National Association of Letter Carriers, six individual federal employees and certain local Democratic and Republican political committees filed a complaint, asserting on behalf of themselves and all federal employees that 5 U.S.C. 7324 (a) (2) was unconstitutional on its face and seeking an injunction against its enforcement. 2 </s> Each of the plaintiffs alleged that the Civil Service Commission was enforcing, or threatening to enforce, the Hatch Act's prohibition against active participation in political management or political campaigns with respect to certain defined activity in which that plaintiff desired to engage. 3 The Union, for example, stated [413 U.S. 548, 552] among other things that its members desired to campaign for candidates for public office. The Democratic and Republican Committees complained of not being able [413 U.S. 548, 553] to get federal employees to run for state and local offices. Plaintiff Hummel stated that he was aware of the provision of the Hatch Act and that the activities he desired to engage in would violate that Act as, for example, his participating as a delegate in a party convention or holding office in a political club. </s> A three-judge court was convened, and the case was tried on both stipulated evidence and oral testimony. The District Court then ruled that 7324 (a) (2) was unconstitutional on its face and enjoined its enforcement. The court recognized the "well-established governmental interest in restricting political activities by federal employees which [had been] asserted long before enactment of the Hatch Act," 346 F. Supp., at 579, as well as the fact that the "appropriateness of this governmental objective was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States when it endorsed the objectives of the Hatch Act. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 . . . (1947) . . . ." Id., at 580. The District Court ruled, however, that United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), left open the constitutionality of the statutory definition of "political activity," 346 F. Supp., at 580, and proceeded to hold that definition to be both vague and overbroad, and therefore unconstitutional and unenforceable against the plaintiffs in any respect. The District Court also added, id., at 585, that even if the Supreme Court in Mitchell could be said to have upheld the definitional section in its entirety, later decisions had so eroded the holding [413 U.S. 548, 554] that it could no longer be considered binding on the District Court. </s> II </s> As the District Court recognized, the constitutionality of the Hatch Act's ban on taking an active part in political management or political campaigns has been here before. This very prohibition was attacked in the Mitchell case by a labor union and various federal employees as being violative of the First, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments and as contrary to the Fifth Amendment by being vague and indefinite, arbitrarily discriminatory, and a deprivation of liberty. The Court there first determined that with respect to all but one of the plaintiffs there was no case or controversy present within the meaning of Art. III because the Court could only speculate as to the type of political activity the appellants there desired to engage in or as to the contents of their proposed public statements or the circumstances of their publication. As to the plaintiff Poole, however, the Court noted that "[h]e was a ward executive committeeman of a political party and was politically active on election day as a worker at the polls and a paymaster for the services of other party workers." 330 U.S., at 94 . Plainly, the Court thought, these activities fell within the prohibition of 9 (a) of the Hatch Act against taking an active part in political management or political campaigning; and "[t]hey [were] also covered by the prior determinations of the [Civil Service] Commission," id., at 103 (footnote omitted), as incorporated by 15 of the Hatch Act, 4 the Court relying on a [413 U.S. 548, 555] Civil Service Commission publication, Political Activity and Political Assessments, Form 1236, Sept. 1939, for the latter conclusion. Id., at 103 n. 38. Poole's complaint thus presented a case or controversy for decision, the question being solely whether the Hatch Act "without violating the Constitution, [could make this conduct] the basis for disciplinary action." Id., at 94. The Court held that it could. "[T]he practice of excluding classified employees from party offices and personal political activity at the polls ha[d] been in effect for several decades," id., at 96; and the Court, over a single dissent, in Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882), had previously upheld the longstanding prohibition forbidding federal employees "from giving or receiving money for political purposes from or to other employees of the government," 330 U.S., at 96 . "The conviction that an actively partisan governmental personnel threatens good administration has deepened since . . . Curtis," id., at 97-98, Congress having recognized the "danger to the service in that political rather than official effort may earn advancement and to the public in that governmental favor may be channeled through political connections." Id., at 98 (footnote omitted). </s> The Government, the Court thought, was empowered to prevent federal employees from contributing energy as well as from collecting money for partisan political ends: "Congress and the President are responsible for an efficient public service. If, in their judgment, efficiency may be best obtained by prohibiting active participation by classified employees in politics as party officers or workers, we see no constitutional objection." Id., at 99 (footnote omitted). Another Congress might determine otherwise, but "[t]he teaching of experience . . . evidently [413 U.S. 548, 556] led Congress to enact the Hatch Act," id., at 99, which the Court refused to invalidate and which it viewed as leaving "untouched full participation by employees in political decisions at the ballot box and forbids only the partisan activity of federal personnel deemed offensive to efficiency." Ibid. The Act did not interfere with a "wide range of public activities." Id., at 100. It was "only partisan political activity that is interdicted. . . . [Only] active participation in political management and political campaigns [is proscribed]. Expressions, public or private, on public affairs, personalities and matters of public interest, not an objective of party action, are unrestricted by law so long as the government employee does not direct his activities toward party success." Ibid. The Court concluded that what Mr. Poole had done was within the power of Congress and the Executive to prevent. </s> We unhesitatingly reaffirm the Mitchell holding that Congress had, and has, the power to prevent Mr. Poole and others like him from holding a party office, working at the polls, and acting as party paymaster for other party workers. An Act of Congress going no farther would in our view unquestionably be valid. So would it be if, in plain and understandable language, the statute forbade activities such as organizing a political party or club; actively participating in fund-raising activities for a partisan candidate or political party; becoming a partisan candidate for, or campaigning for, an elective public office; actively managing the campaign of a partisan candidate for public office; initiating or circulating a partisan nominating petition or soliciting votes for a partisan candidate for public office; or serving as a delegate, alternate or proxy to a political party convention. Our judgment is that neither the First Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution invalidates a law barring this kind of partisan political conduct by federal employees. [413 U.S. 548, 557] </s> A </s> Such decision on our part would no more than confirm the judgment of history, a judgment made by this country over the last century that it is in the best interest of the country, indeed essential, that federal service should depend upon meritorious performance rather than political service, and that the political influence of federal employees on others and on the electoral process should be limited. That this judgment eventuated is indisputable, and the major steps in reaching it may be simply and briefly set down. </s> Early in our history, Thomas Jefferson was disturbed by the political activities of some of those in the Executive Branch of the Government. See 10 J. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents 98 (1899). The heads of the executive departments, in response to his directive, issued an order stating in part that "[t]he right of any officer to give his vote at elections as a qualified citizen is not meant to be restrained, nor, however given, shall it have any effect to his prejudice; but it is expected that he will not attempt to influence the votes of others nor take any part in the business of electioneering, that being deemed inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution and his duties to it." Id., at 98-99. 5 </s> There were other voices raised in the 19th century against the mixing of partisan politics and routine federal service. But until after the Civil War, the spoils system under which federal employees came and went, depending upon party service and changing administrations, rather than meritorious performance, was much the vogue and the prevalent basis for governmental employment [413 U.S. 548, 558] and advancement. 1 Report of Commission on Political Activity of Government Personnel, Findings and Recommendations 7-8 (1968). That system did not survive. Congress authorized the President to prescribe regulations for the creation of a civil service of federal employees in 1871, 16 Stat. 514; but it was the Civil Service Act of 1883, c. 27, 22 Stat. 403, known as the Pendleton Act, H. Kaplan, The Law of Civil Service 9-10 (1958), that declared that "no person in the public service is for that reason under any obligations to contribute to any political fund, or to render any political service" and that "no person in said service has any right to use his official authority or influence to coerce the political action of any person or body." 22 Stat. 404. That Act authorized the President to promulgate rules to carry the Act into effect and created the Civil Service Commission as the agency or administrator of the Act under the rules of the President. </s> The original Civil Service rules were promulgated on May 7, 1883, by President Arthur. Civil Service Rule I repeated the language of the Act that no one in the executive service should use his official authority or influence to coerce any other person or to interfere with an election, but went no further in restricting the political activities of federal employees. 8 J. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents 161 (1899). Problems with political activity continued to arise, Twenty-fourth Annual Report of the Civil Service Commission 7-9 (1908), 6 and one form of remedial action was taken in 1907 when, in accordance with Executive Order 642 issued by President Theodore Roosevelt, 1 Report of Commission [413 U.S. 548, 559] on Political Activity, supra, at 9, 1 of Rule I was amended to read as follows: </s> "No person in the Executive civil service shall use his official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with an election or affecting the result thereof. Persons who, by the provisions of these rules are in the competitive classified service, while retaining the right to vote as they please and to express privately their opinions on all political subjects, shall take no active part in political management or in political campaigns." Twenty-fourth Annual Report of the Civil Service Commission, supra, at 104 (emphasis added). </s> It was under this rule that the Commission thereafter exercised the authority it had to investigate, adjudicate, and recommend sanctions for federal employees thought to have violated the rule. See Howard, Federal Restrictions on the Political Activity of Government Employees, 35 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 470, 475 (1941). In the course of these adjudications, the Commission identified and developed a body of law with respect to the conduct of federal employees that was forbidden by the prohibition against taking an active part in political management or political campaigning. Adjudications under Civil Service Rule I spelled out the scope and meaning of the rule in the mode of the common law, 86 Cong. Rec. 2341-2342; and the rules fashioned in this manner were from time to time stated and restated by the Commission for the guidance of the federal establishment. Civil Service Form 1236 of September 1939, for example, purported to publish and restate the law of "Political Activity and Political Assessments" for federal officeholders and employees. </s> Civil Service Rule I covered only the classified service. The experience of the intervening years, particularly that [413 U.S. 548, 560] of the 1936 and 1938 political campaigns, convinced a majority in Congress that the prohibition against taking an active part in political management and political campaigns should be extended to the entire federal service. 84 Cong. Rec. 4303, 9595, 9604, and 9610. A bill introduced for this purpose, S. 1871, "to prevent pernicious political activities," easily passed the Senate, 84 Cong. Rec. 4191-4192; but both the constitutionality and the advisability of purporting to restrict the political activities of employees were heatedly debated in the House. Id., at 9594-9639. The bill was enacted, however. 53 Stat. 1147. This was the so-called Hatch Act, named after the Senator who was its chief proponent. In its initial provisions, 1 and 2, it forbade anyone from coercing or interfering with the vote of another person and prohibited federal employees from using their official positions to influence or interfere with or affect the election or nomination of certain federal officials. Sections 3 and 4 of the Act prohibited the promise of, or threat of termination of, employment or compensation for the purpose of influencing or securing political activity, or support or opposition for any candidate. </s> Section 9 (a), which provided the prohibition against political activity now found in 5 U.S.C. 7324 (a) (2), with which we are concerned in this case, essentially restated Civil Service Rule I, with an important exception. It made it </s> "unlawful for any person employed in the executive branch of the Federal Government, or any agency or department thereof, to use his official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with an election or affecting the result thereof. No officer or employee in the executive branch of the Federal Government, or any agency or department thereof, shall take any active part in political management or [413 U.S. 548, 561] in political campaigns. All such persons shall retain the right to vote as they may choose and to express their opinions on all political subjects." </s> Excepted from the restriction were the President, Vice President, and specified officials in policy-making positions. Section 9 (b) required immediate removal for violators and forbade the use of appropriated funds thereafter to pay compensation to such persons. </s> Section 9 differed from Civil Service Rule I in important respects. It applied to all persons employed by the Federal Government, with limited exceptions; it made dismissal from office mandatory upon an adjudication of a violation; and, whereas Civil Service Rule I had stated that persons retained the right to express their private opinions on all political subjects, the statute omitted the word "private" and simply privileged all employees "to express their opinions on all political subjects." </s> On the day prior to signing the bill, President Franklin Roosevelt sent a message to Congress stating his conviction that the bill was constitutional and recommending that Congress at its next session consider extending the Act to state and local government employees. 84 Cong. Rec. 10745-10747 and 10875. This, Congress quickly proceeded to do. The Act of July 19, 1940, c. 640, 54 Stat. 767, extended the Hatch Act of officers and employees of state and local agencies "whose principal employment is in connection with any activity which is financed in whole or in part by loans or grants made by the United States . . . ." The Civil Service Commission was empowered under 12 (b) to investigate and adjudicate violations of the Act by state and local employees. Also relevant for present purposes, 9 (a) of the Hatch Act was amended so that all persons covered by the Act were free to "express their opinions on all political subjects and candidates." (Emphasis [413 U.S. 548, 562] added.) Moreover, 15 defined 9 (a)'s prohibition against taking an active part in political management or in political campaigns as proscribing "the same activities on the part of such persons as the United States Civil Service Commission has heretofore determined are at the time this section takes effect prohibited on the part of employees in the classified civil service of the United States by the provisions of the civil-service rules prohibiting such employees from taking any active part in political management or in political campaigns." Under 18, now 5 U.S.C. 7326, the prohibition against political activity was not to be construed to prohibit political activity in nonpartisan elections or in connection with questions not specifically identified with any national or state political party, such as "questions relating to constitutional amendments, referendums, approval of municipal ordinances, and others of a similar character . . . ." 7 </s> In 1950, 9 (b), of the Act, requiring removal from office for violating the Act, was amended by providing that the Commission by unanimous vote could impose a lesser penalty, but in no case less than 90 days' suspension without pay. 64 Stat. 475. The minimum sanction was reduced to 30 days' suspension without pay in 1962. 76 Stat. 750. </s> In 1966, Congress determined to review the restrictions of the Hatch Act on the partisan political activities of public employees. For this purpose, the Commission on Political Activity of Government Personnel was created. [413 U.S. 548, 563] 80 Stat. 868. The Commission reported in 1968, recommending some liberalization of the political-activity restrictions on federal employees, but not abandoning the fundamental decision that partisan political activities by government employees must be limited in major respects. 1 Report of Commission on Political Activity of Government Personnel, supra. Since that time, various bills have been introduced in Congress some following the Commission's recommendations 8 and some proposing much more substantial revisions of the Hatch Act. 9 In 1972, hearings were held on some proposed legislation; but no new legislation has resulted. 10 </s> This account of the efforts by the Federal Government to limit partisan political activities by those covered by the Hatch Act should not obscure the equally relevant fact that all 50 States have restricted the political activities of their own employees. 11 </s> [413 U.S. 548, 564] </s> B </s> Until now, the judgment of Congress, the Executive, and the country appears to have been that partisan political activities by federal employees must be limited if the Government is to operate effectively and fairly, elections are to play their proper part in representative government, and employees themselves are to be sufficiently free from improper influences. E. g., 84 Cong. Rec. 9598, 9603; 86 Cong. Rec. 2360, 2621, 2864, 9376. The restrictions so far imposed on federal employees are not aimed at particular parties, groups, or points of view, but apply equally to all partisan activities of the type described. They discriminate against no racial, ethnic, or religious minorities. Nor do they seek to control political opinions or beliefs, or to interfere with or influence anyone's vote at the polls. </s> But, as the Court held in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), the government has an interest in regulating the conduct and "the speech of its employees that differ[s] significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the [government], as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." Although Congress is free to strike a different balance than it has, if it so chooses, we think the balance it has so far struck is sustainable by the obviously important interests sought to be served by the limitations on partisan political activities now contained in the Hatch Act. </s> It seems fundamental in the first place that employees in the Executive Branch of the Government, or those working for any of its agencies, should administer the law [413 U.S. 548, 565] in accordance with the will of Congress, rather than in accordance with their own or the will of a political party. They are expected to enforce the law and execute the programs of the Government without bias or favoritism for or against any political party or group or the members thereof. A major thesis of the Hatch Act is that to serve this great end of Government - the impartial execution of the laws - it is essential that federal employees, for example, not take formal positions in political parties, not undertake to play substantial roles in partisan political campaigns, and not run for office on partisan political tickets. Forbidding activities like these will reduce the hazards to fair and effective government. See 84 Cong. Rec. 9598; 86 Cong. Rec. 2433-2434, 2864; Hearings on S. 3374 and S. 3417 before the Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 171. </s> There is another consideration in this judgment: it is not only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent. </s> Another major concern of the restriction against partisan activities by federal employees was perhaps the immediate occasion for enactment of the Hatch Act in 1939. That was the conviction that the rapidly expanding Government work force should not be employed to build a powerful, invincible, and perhaps corrupt political machine. The experience of the 1936 and 1938 campaigns convinced Congress that these dangers were sufficiently real that substantial barriers should be raised against the party in power - or the party out of power, for that matter - using the thousands or hundreds of thousands of federal employees, paid for at public expense, to man its [413 U.S. 548, 566] political structure and political campaigns. E. g., 84 Cong. Rec. 9595, 9598, 9604, 9610. </s> A related concern, and this remains as important as any other, was to further serve the goal that employment and advancement in the Government service not depend on political performance, and at the same time to make sure that Government employees would be free from pressure and from express or tacit invitation to vote in a certain way or perform political chores in order to curry favor with their superiors rather than to act out their own beliefs. See, e. g., id., at 9598, 9603; 86 Cong. Rec. 2433-2434; Hearings on S. 3374 and S. 3417, supra, at 171. It may be urged that prohibitions against coercion are sufficient protection; but for many years the joint judgment of the Executive and Congress has been that to protect the rights of federal employees with respect to their jobs and their political acts and beliefs it is not enough merely to forbid one employee to attempt to influence or coerce another. 12 For example, at the hearings in 1972 on proposed legislation for liberalizing the prohibition against political activity, the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission stated that "the prohibitions against active participation in partisan political [413 U.S. 548, 567] management and partisan political campaigns constitute the most significant safeguards against coercion . . . ." Hearings on S. 3374 and S. 3417, supra, at 52. Perhaps Congress at some time will come to a different view of the realities of political life and Government service; but that is its current view of the matter, and we are not now in any position to dispute it. Nor, in our view, does the Constitution forbid it. </s> Neither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute in any event. See, e. g., Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 140 -141 (1972); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 -31 (1968). Nor are the management, financing, and conduct of political campaigns wholly free from governmental regulation. 13 We agree with the basic holding of Mitchell that plainly identifiable acts of political management and political campaigning on the part of federal employees may constitutionally be prohibited. Until now this has been the judgment of the lower federal courts, 14 and we do not understand the District Court in this case to have questioned the constitutionality of a law that was specifically limited to prohibiting the conduct in which Mr. Poole in the Mitchell case admittedly engaged. [413 U.S. 548, 568] </s> III </s> But however constitutional the proscription of identifiable partisan conduct in understandable language may be, the District Court's judgment was that 7324 (a) (2) was both unconstitutionally vague and fatally overbroad. Appellees make the same contentions here, but we cannot agree that the section is unconstitutional on its face for either reason. </s> As an initial matter, we must have clearly in mind the statutory prohibitions that we are examining for impermissible vagueness and overbreadth. </s> Section 7324 (a) (2) provides that an employee in an executive agency must not take "an active part in political management or in political campaigns" and goes on to say that this prohibition refers to "those acts of political management or political campaigning which were prohibited on the part of employees in the competitive service before July 19, 1940, by determinations of the Civil Service Commission under the rules prescribed by the President." Section 7324 (b) privileges an employee to vote as he chooses and to express his opinion on political subjects and candidates, and 7324 (c) and (d), as well as 7326, also limit the applicability of 7324 (a) (2). 15 </s> [413 U.S. 548, 569] The principal issue with respect to this statutory scheme is what Congress intended when it purported to define "an active part in political management or in political campaigns," as meaning the prior interpretations by the Civil Service Commission under Civil Service Rule I which contained the identical prohibition. [413 U.S. 548, 570] </s> Earlier in this opinion it was noted that this definition was contained in 15 of the 1940 Act. As recommended by the Senate Committee, S. Rep. No. 1236, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 2, 4, 15 conferred broad rulemaking authority on the Civil Service Commission to spell out the meaning of "an active part in political management or in political campaigns." 16 There were, in any event, strong objections to extending the Hatch Act to those state employees working in federally financed programs, see, e. g., 86 Cong. Rec. 2486, 2793-2794, 2801-2802, and to 15, in particular, as being an unwise and invalid delegation of legislative power to the Commission. See, e. g., id., at 2352, 2426-2427, 2579, 2794, 2875. The matter was vigorously debated; and ultimately Senator Hatch, the principal proponent and manager of the bill, offered a substitute for 15, id., at 2928 and 2937, limiting the reach of the prohibition to those same activities that the Commission "has heretofore determined are at the time of the passage of this act prohibited on the part of employees" in the classified service by the similar provision in Civil Service Rule I. 17 The matter was further debated, [413 U.S. 548, 571] and the amendment carried. Id., at 2958-2959. </s> The District Court and appellees construe 15, now part of 7324 (a) (2), as incorporating each of the several thousand adjudications of the Civil Service Commission under Civil Service Rule I, many of which are said to be undiscoverable, inconsistent, or incapable of yielding any meaningful rules to govern present or future conduct. In any event, the District Court held the prohibition against taking an active part in political management and political campaigns to be itself an insufficient guide to employee behavior and thought the definitional addendum of 15 only compounded the confusion by referring the concerned employees to an impenetrable jungle of Commission proceedings, orders, and rulings. 346 F. Supp., at 582-583, 585. </s> We take quite a different view of the statute. As we see it, our task is not to destroy the Act if we can, but to construe it, if consistent with the will of Congress, so as to comport with constitutional limitations. With this in mind and having examined with some care the proceedings surrounding the passage of the 1940 Act and adoption of the substitute for 15, we think it appears plainly enough that Congress intended to deprive the Civil Service Commission of rulemaking power in the sense of exercising a subordinate legislative role in fashioning a more expansive definition of the kind of conduct [413 U.S. 548, 572] that would violate the prohibition against taking an active part in political management or political campaigns. But it is equally plain, we think, that Congress accepted the fact that the Commission had been performing its investigative and adjudicative role under Civil Service Rule I since 1907 and that the Commission had, on a case-by-case basis, fleshed out the meaning of Rule I and so developed a body of law with respect to what partisan conduct by federal employees was forbidden by the rule. 86 Cong. Rec. 2342, 2353. It is also apparent, in our view, that the rules that had evolved over the years from repeated adjudications were subject to sufficiently clear and summary statement for the guidance of the classified service. Many times during the debate on the floor of the Senate, Senator Hatch and others referred to a summary list of such prohibitions, see, e. g., id., at 2929, 2937-2938, 2942-2943, 2949, 2952-2953, the Senator's ultimate reference being to Civil Service Form No. 1236 of September 1939, the pertinent portion of which he placed in the Record, id., at 2938-2940, 18 and which was the Commission's then-current effort to restate the prevailing prohibitions of Civil [413 U.S. 548, 573] Service Rule I, as spelled out in its adjudications to that date. It was this administrative restatement of Civil Service Rule I law, modified to the extent necessary to reflect the provisions of the 1939 and 1940 Acts themselves, [413 U.S. 548, 574] that, in our view, Congress intended to serve as its definition of the general proscription against partisan activities. 19 It was within the limits of these rules that the Civil Service Commission was to proceed to perform its role under the statute. </s> Not only did Congress expect the Commission to continue its accustomed role with respect to federal employees, but also in 12 (b) of the 1940 Act Congress expressly assigned the Commission the enforcement task with respect to state employees now covered by the Act. [413 U.S. 548, 575] The Commission was to issue notice, hold hearings, adjudicate, and enforce. This process, inevitably and predictably, would entail further development of the law within the bounds of, and necessarily no more severe than, the 1940 rules and would be productive of a more refined definition of what conduct would or would not violate the statutory prohibition of taking an active part in political management and political campaigns. </s> It is thus not surprising that there were later editions of Form 1236, 20 or that in 1970 the Commission again purported to restate the law of forbidden political activity and, informed by years of intervening adjudications, again sought to define those acts which are forbidden and those which are permitted by the Hatch Act. These regulations, 5 CFR pt. 733, are wholly legitimate descendants of the 1940 restatement adopted by Congress and were arrived at by a process that Congress necessarily anticipated would occur down through the years. We accept them as the current and, in most respects, the longstanding interpretations of the statute by the agency charged with its interpretation and enforcement. It is to these regulations purporting to construe 7324 as actually applied in practice, as well as to the statute itself, with its various exclusions, that we address ourselves in rejecting the claim that the Act is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 162 -163 (1971); cf. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 -521 (1972). </s> Whatever might be the difficulty with a provision against taking "active part in political management or in political campaigns," the Act specifically provides that the employee retains the right to vote as he chooses [413 U.S. 548, 576] and to express his opinion on political subjects and candidates. The Act exempts research and educational activities supported by the District of Columbia or by religious, philanthropic, or cultural organizations, 5 U.S.C. 7324 (c); and 7326 exempts nonpartisan political activity: questions, that is, that are not identified with national or state political parties are not covered by the Act, including issues with respect to constitutional amendments, referendums, approval of municipal ordinances, and the like. Moreover, the plain import of the 1940 amendment to the Hatch Act is that the proscription against taking an active part in the proscribed activities is not open-ended but is limited to those rules and proscriptions that had been developed under Civil Service Rule I up to the date of the passage of the 1940 Act. Those rules, as refined by further adjudications within the outer limits of the 1940 rules, were restated by the Commission in 1970 in the form of regulations specifying the conduct that would be prohibited or permitted by 7324 and its companion sections. </s> We have set out these regulations in the margin. 21 We [413 U.S. 548, 577] see nothing impermissibly vague in 5 CFR 733.122, which specifies in separate paragraphs the various activities deemed to be prohibited by 7324 (a)(2). There [413 U.S. 548, 578] might be quibbles about the meaning of taking an "active part in managing" or about "actively participating in . . . fund-raising" or about the meaning of becoming a "partisan" candidate for office; but there are limitations in the English language with respect to being both specific [413 U.S. 548, 579] and manageably brief, and it seems to us that although the prohibitions may not satisfy those intent on finding fault at any cost, they are set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with, without sacrifice to the public interest. "[T]he general class of offenses to which . . . [the provisions are] directed is plainly within [their] terms, . . . [and they] will not be struck down as vague, even though marginal cases could be put where doubts might arise." United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618 (1954). Surely, there seemed to be little question in the minds of the plaintiffs who brought this lawsuit as to the meaning of the law, or as to whether or not the conduct in which they desire to engage was or was not prohibited by the Act. </s> The Act permits the individual employee to "express his opinion on political subjects and candidates," 5 U.S.C. 7324 (b); and the corresponding regulation, 5 CFR 733.111 (a) (2), privileges the employee to "[e]xpress his opinion as an individual privately and publicly on political subjects and candidates." The section of the regulations which purports to state the partisan acts that are proscribed, id., 733.122, forbids in subparagraph (a) (10) the endorsement of "a partisan candidate for public office or political party office in a political advertisement, a broadcast, campaign literature, or similar material," and in subparagraph (a) (12), prohibits "[a]ddressing a convention, caucus, rally, or similar gathering of a political party in support of or in opposition to a partisan candidate for public office or political party office." Arguably, there are problems in meshing 733.111 (a) (2) with 733.122 (a) (10) and (12), but we think the latter prohibitions sufficiently clearly carve out the prohibited political conduct from the expressive activity permitted by the prior section to survive any [413 U.S. 548, 580] attack on the ground of vagueness or in the name of any of those policies that doctrine may be deemed to further. </s> It is also important in this respect that the Commission has established a procedure by which an employee in doubt about the validity of a proposed course of conduct may seek and obtain advice from the Commission and thereby remove any doubt there may be as to the meaning of the law, at least insofar as the Commission itself is concerned. 22 </s> Neither do we discern anything fatally overboard about the statute when it is considered in connection with the Commission's construction of its terms represented by the 1970 regulations we now have before us. The major difficulties in this respect again relate to the prohibition in 733.122 (a) (10) and (12) on endorsements in advertisements, broadcasts, and literature and on speaking at political party meetings in support of partisan candidates for public or party office. But these restrictions are clearly stated, they are political acts normally performed only in the context of partisan campaigns by one taking an active role in them, and they are sustainable for the same reasons that the other acts of political campaigning are constitutionally proscribable. They do not, therefore, render the remainder of the statute vulnerable by reason of overbreadth. </s> Even if the provisions forbidding partisan campaign endorsements and speechmaking were to be considered in some respects unconstitutionally overbroad, we would not invalidate the entire statute as the District Court did. The remainder of the statute, as we have said, [413 U.S. 548, 581] covers a whole range of easily identifiable and constitutionally proscribable partisan conduct on the part of federal employees, and the extent to which pure expression is impermissibly threatened, if at all, by 733.122 (a) (10) and (12), does not in our view make the statute substantially overbroad and so invalid on its face. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, post, p. 601. </s> For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is reversed. </s> So ordered. </s> APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT </s> That portion of the United States Civil Service Commission Form 1236, Political Activity and Assessments, September 1939, as inserted into the Congressional Record by Senator Hatch, 86 Cong. Rec. 2938-2940, provided: </s> III. PARTICULAR TYPES OF PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES </s> 11. As has been pointed out, it is impossible to make a complete enumeration of all the particular types of political activities in which Government employees may not engage. The general scope of the political-activity rule has been defined in section 2 above. In the following sections some of the types of political activity which occur more frequently are discussed in detail. </s> 12. Activity by indirection: Any political activity which is prohibited in the case of an employee acting independently is also prohibited in the case of an employee acting in open or secret cooperation with others. Whatever the employee may not do directly or personally, he may not do indirectly or through an agent, officer, or employee chosen by him or subject to his control. Employees are therefore accountable for political activity by persons other than themselves, including [413 U.S. 548, 582] wives or husbands, if, in fact, the employees are thus accomplishing by collusion and indirection what they may not lawfully do directly and openly. Political activity in fact, regardless of the methods or means used by the employee, constitutes the violation. </s> This does not mean that an employee's husband or wife may not engage in politics independently, upon his or her own initiative, and in his or her own behalf. Cases have arisen, however, in which the facts showed that the real purpose of a wife's activity was to accomplish a political act prohibited to her husband, the attempt being made for her husband's benefit and at his instigation or even upon his coercion. This may be true of individuals or it may occur among groups of employees' wives, associated for the purpose of securing for their husbands what their husbands may not secure for themselves. In such situations it is obvious that the prohibitions against political activity are being indirectly violated. The collusion or coercion renders the wife's activity imputable to the husband, he being guilty of the same infraction as if he were openly a participant. </s> 13. Conventions: Candidacy for or service as delegate, alternate, or proxy in any political convention or service as an officer or employee thereof is prohibited. Attendance merely as a spectator is permissible, but the employee so attending must not take any part in the convention or in the deliberations or proceedings of any of its committees, and must refrain from any public display of partisanship or obtrusive demonstration or interference. (See secs. 4 and 19.) </s> 14. Primaries - caucuses: An employee may attend a primary meeting, mass convention, beat convention, caucus, and the like, and may cast his vote on any question presented, but he may not pass this point in participating in its deliberations. He may not act as an officer of the meeting, convention, or caucus, may not address it, make [413 U.S. 548, 583] motions, prepare or assist in preparing resolutions, assume to represent others, or take any prominent part therein. </s> 15. Committees: Service on or for any political committee or similar organization is prohibited. An employee may attend as a spectator any meeting of a political committee to which the general public is admitted, but must refrain from activity as indicated in the preceding paragraphs. </s> Whether a committee has an ultimate political purpose determines whether a classified employee may properly serve as a member. Assignment may be to duties which, if considered alone, would seem far removed from active politics, but which, when considered as a part of the whole purpose, assume an active political character. No attempt can be made to differentiate between workers on or under political committees with respect to the degree to which they are politically active. </s> 16. Clubs and organizations: Employees may be members of political clubs, but it is improper for them to be active in organizing such a club, to be officers of the club, or members or officers of any of its committees or to act as such, or to address a political club. Service as a delegate from such a club to a league of political clubs is service as an officer or representative of a political club and is prohibited, as is service as a delegate or representative of such a club to or in any other organization. In other words, an employee may become a member of a political club, but may not take an active part in its management or affairs, and may not represent other members or attempt to influence them by his actions or utterances. (See secs. 4 and 19.) </s> Section 6 of the act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 555), provides in part - </s> "That membership in any society, association, club, or other form of organization of postal employees not affiliated [413 U.S. 548, 584] with any outside organization imposing an obligation or duty upon them to engage in any strike, or proposing to assist them in any strike, against the United States, having for its objects, among other things, improvements in the condition of labor of its members, including hours of labor and compensation therefor and leave of absence, by any person or groups of persons in said Postal Service, or the presenting by any such person or groups of persons of any grievance or grievances to the Congress or any Member thereof, shall not constitute or be cause for reduction in rank or compensation or removal of such person or groups of persons from said service." </s> Section 9A of the act of August 2, 1939 (Public, No. 252, 76th Cong.), provides as follows: </s> "(1) It shall be unlawful for any person employed in any capacity by any agency of the Federal Government, whose compensation, or any part thereof, is paid from funds authorized or appropriated by any act of Congress, to have membership in any political party or organization which advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government in the United States. </s> "(2) Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be immediately removed from the position or office held by him, and thereafter no part of the funds appropriated by any act of Congress for such position or office shall be used to pay the compensation of such person." </s> 17. Contributions: An employee may make political contributions to any committee, organization, or person not employed by the United States, but may not solicit, collect, receive, or otherwise handle or disburse the contributions. (See provisions of the Criminal Code, discussed in secs. 36 to 50.) </s> 18. Meetings: Service in preparing for, organizing, or conducting a political meeting or rally, addressing such [413 U.S. 548, 585] a meeting, or taking any part therein, except as a spectator, is prohibited. </s> 19. Expression of opinions: Although section 9 (a) of the act of August 2, 1939 reserves to Federal officers and employees the right to express their opinions on all political subjects, officers and employees in the competitive classified service are subject also to section 1 of civil-service rule I, under which such employees must confine themselves to a private expression of opinion. Nonclassified and excepted employees may not indulge in such public expression of opinion as constitutes taking part in an organized political campaign. (See foregoing secs. 1 and 4.) </s> 20. Activity at the polls and for candidates: An employee has the right to vote as he pleases, and to exercise this right free from interference, solicitation, or dictation by any fellow employee or superior officer or any other person. It is a violation of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act to pay or offer to pay any person for voting or refraining from voting, or for voting for or against any candidate for Senator or Representative in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, Congress. It is also a violation of the law to solicit, receive, or accept payment for one's vote or for withholding one's vote. (See U.S. Code, title 2, sec. 250.) </s> Under the act of August 2, 1939, it is a criminal offense for any person to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any other person for the purpose of interfering with the right of such other person to vote as he may choose in any election of a national character. It is also a criminal offense to promise any employment, position, work, or compensation, or other benefit made possible by an act of Congress, as a consideration, favor, or reward for political activity or for the support of or opposition to any political candidate or party. (See secs. 48 and 50 herein.) [413 U.S. 548, 586] </s> It is the duty of an employee to avoid any offensive activity at primary and regular elections. He must refrain from soliciting votes, assisting voters to mark ballots, helping to get out the voters on registration and election days, acting as the accredited checker, watcher, or challenger of any party or faction, assisting in counting the vote, or engaging in any other activity at the polls except the marking and depositing of his own ballot. Rendering service, such as transporting voters to and from the polls and candidates on canvassing tours, whether for pay or gratuitously, is held to be within the scope of political activities prohibited by the rule, even if such service is performed without regard to political party. </s> 21. Election officers: Service as judge of election, inspector, checker, teller, or as election officer of any kind is prohibited. </s> 22. Newspapers - publication of letters or articles: A classified employee may not publish or be connected editorially or managerially with any political newspaper, and may not write for publication or publish any letter or article, signed or unsigned, in favor of or against any political party, candidate, faction, or measure. An employee who writes such a letter or article is responsible for any use that may be made of it whether or not he gives consent to such use. (See secs. 4 and 19.) </s> 23. Liquor question: Activity in campaigns concerning the regulation or suppression of the liquor traffic is prohibited. An employee may be a member but not an officer of a club, league, or other organization which takes part in such a campaign. The dissemination of temperance propaganda is permissible, but any endeavor for or against the regulation, control, or suppression of the liquor traffic through political agencies is prohibited. [413 U.S. 548, 587] </s> 24. Betting or wagering on elections: Betting or wagering upon the results of primary and general elections is penalized by the laws of most States and is improper political activity. </s> 25. Activity in civic organizations and citizens' associations: Activity in organizations having for their primary object the promotion of good government or the local civic welfare is not prohibited by the act of August 2, 1939, or civil-service rule I, provided such activities have no connection with the campaigns of particular candidates or parties. </s> 26. Parades: An employee may not march in a political parade, organize, or be an officer or leader of such a parade. </s> A Government employee may not take part in the activities of a musical organization in any parade or other activity of a political party. </s> 27. Signing petitions: The first amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Section 6 of the act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 555), provides that "the right of persons employed in the civil service of the United States, either individually or collectively, to petition Congress, or any Member thereof, or to furnish information to either House of Congress, or to any committee or Member thereof, shall not be denied or interfered with." </s> The right guaranteed by the Constitution and the statute extends only to petitions addressed to the Government, or to Congress or Members thereof. It does not extend to petitions addressed to State, county, or [413 U.S. 548, 588] municipal governments, or to other political units. A classified employee is permitted to sign petitions of the latter class as an individual, without reference to his connection with the Government, but he may not initiate them, circulate them, or canvass for the signatures of others. </s> 28. Applying for Presidential positions not in the classified service: 1a When a classified employee seeks promotion by appointment or transfer to a Presidential office not in the classified service there is no objection to his becoming a candidate for such an office, provided the consent of his department is obtained, and provided he does not violate section 1 of rule I, prohibiting the use of his official authority or influence in political matters, and provided further that he does not neglect his duty and avoids any action that would cause public scandal or semblance of coercion of his fellow employees or of those over whom he desires to be placed in the position he seeks. </s> A classified employee may circulate a petition or seek endorsements for his own appointment to a Presidential position, subject to the qualifications above stated, and he may, as an individual, sign a petition or recommend another person for such an appointment; but he may not circulate a petition or solicit endorsements, recommendations, or support for the appointment of another person to such a position, whether such other person is a fellow employee or one not at the time in the Government service. </s> When an unofficial primary or election is held for the purpose of determining the popular choice for the Presidential office, a classified employee may permit his [413 U.S. 548, 589] name to appear upon the ticket, but he may not solicit votes in his behalf at such a primary or election, or in any manner violate section 1 of rule I. He may vote and express privately his opinions, but may not solicit votes or publicly advocate the candidacy or election of himself or any other person. Although it is permissible for a classified employee, as an individual, to sign a petition or recommend another person for appointment to a nonclassified position, he is not permitted to sign such a petition as a Government employee or in any other way to use his official authority or influence to advance the candidacy of any person for election or appointment to any office. Classified employees are permitted to exercise the right as individuals to sign a petition favoring a candidate for any office, but they may not do so as Government employees or as a group or association of Government employees. </s> 29. Other forms of political activity: Among other forms of political activity which are prohibited are the distribution of campaign literature, badges, or buttons, and assuming general political leadership or becoming prominently identified with any political movement, party, or faction, or with the success or failure of any candidate for election to public office. </s> IV. CANDIDACY FOR OR HOLDING LOCAL OFFICE - CLASSIFIED AND NONCLASSIFIED </s> EMPLOYEES </s> 30. Candidacy for local office: Candidacy for a nomination or for election to any National, State, county, or municipal office is not permissible. The prohibition against political activity extends not merely to formal announcement of candidacy but also to the preliminaries leading to such announcement and to canvassing or soliciting support or doing or permitting to be done any act in furtherance of candidacy. The fact that candidacy, [413 U.S. 548, 590] is merely passive is immaterial; if an employee acquiesces in the efforts of friends in furtherance of such candidacy such acquiescence constitutes an infraction of the prohibitions against political activity. </s> 31. Federal employees holding local office: 2a Persons holding Federal civil office by appointment, whether in the competitive classified service or not, are prohibited from accepting or holding any office under a State, Territorial, or municipal government by an Executive order of January 17, 1873, which is as follows: </s> "Whereas it has been brought to the notice of the President of the United States that many persons holding civil office by appointment from him or otherwise under the Constitution and laws of the United States while holding such Federal positions accept offices under the authority of the States and Territories in which they reside, or of municipal corporations, under the charters and ordinances of such corporations, thereby assuming the duties of the State, Territorial, or municipal office at the same time that they are charged with the duties of the civil office held under Federal authority: </s> "And whereas it is believed that, with but few exceptions, the holding of two such offices by the same person is incompatible with a due and faithful discharge of the duties of either office; that it frequently gives rise to great inconvenience, and often results in detriment to the public service; and, moreover, is not in harmony with the genius of the Government: </s> "In view of the premises, therefore, the President has deemed it proper thus and hereby to give public notice that, from and after the 4th day of March A. D. 1873 (except as herein specified), persons holding any Federal civil office by appointment under the Constitution and laws of the United States will be expected, while holding [413 U.S. 548, 591] such office, not to accept or hold any office under any State or Territorial government, or under the charter or ordinances of any municipal corporation; and, further, that the acceptance or continued holding of any such State, Territorial, or municipal office, whether elective or by appointment, by any person holding civil office as aforesaid under the Government of the United States, other than judicial offices under the Constitution of the United States, will be deemed a vacation of the Federal office held by such person, and will be taken to be and will be treated as a resignation by such Federal officer of his commission or appointment in the service of the United States. </s> "The offices of justices of the peace, of notaries public, and of commissioners to take the acknowledgment of deeds, of bail, or to administer oaths, shall not be deemed within the purview of this order and are excepted from its operation, and may be held by Federal officers. </s> "The appointment of deputy marshals of the United States may be conferred upon sheriffs or deputy sheriffs. Any deputy postmasters, the emoluments of whose office do not exceed $600 per annum, are also excepted from the operation of this order and may accept and hold appointments under State, Territorial, or municipal authority, provided the same be found not to interfere with the discharge of their duties as postmasters. 3a Heads of departments and other officers of the Government who have the appointment of subordinate officers are required to take notice of this order, and to see to the enforcement of its provisions and terms within the sphere of their respective departments or offices and as relates to the several persons holding appointments under them, respectively." 4a </s> [413 U.S. 548, 592] </s> 32. Interpretation of the order of January 17, 1873: An Executive order of January 28, 1873, as amended by Executive order of August 27, 1933, is as follows: </s> "Inquiries having been made from various quarters as to the application of the Executive order issued on the 17th of January relating to the holding of State or municipal offices by persons holding civil offices under the Federal Government, the President directs the following reply to be made: </s> "It has been asked whether the order prohibits a Federal officer from holding also the office of an alderman or of a common councilman in a city, or of a town councilman of a town or village, or of appointments under city, town, or village governments. By some it has been suggested that there may be distinction made in case the office be with or without salary or compensation. The city or town offices of the description referred to, by whatever names they may be locally known, whether held by election or by appointment, and whether with or without salary or compensation, are of the class which the Executive order intends not to be held by persons holding Federal offices. </s> "It has been asked whether the order prohibits Federal officers from holding positions on boards of education, school committees, public libraries, religious or eleemosynary institutions incorporated or established or sustained by State or municipal authority. Positions and service on such boards and committees, and professorships in colleges 5a are not regarded as `offices' within the contemplation of the Executive order, but as employments [413 U.S. 548, 593] or service in which all good citizens may be engaged without incompatibility and in many cases without necessary interference with any position which they may hold under the Federal Government. Officers of the Federal Government may therefore engage in such service, provided the attention required by such employment does not interfere with the regular and efficient discharge of the duties of their office under the Federal Government. The head of the department under whom the Federal office is held will in all cases be the sole judge whether or not the employment does thus interfere. </s> "The question has also been asked with regard to officers of the State militia. Congress having exercised the power conferred by the Constitution to provide for organizing the militia, which is liable to be called forth to be employed in the service of the United States, and is thus, in some sense, under the control of the General Government, and is, moreover, of the greatest value to the public, the Executive order of the 17th January is not considered as prohibiting Federal officers from being officers in the militia in the States and Territories. </s> "It has been asked whether the order prohibits persons holding office under the Federal Government being members of local or municipal fire departments, also whether it applies to mechanics employed by the day in the armories, arsenals, and navy yards, etc., of the United States. Unpaid service in local or municipal fire departments is not regarded as an office within the intent of the Executive order, and may be performed by Federal officers, provided it does not interfere with the regular and efficient discharge of the duties of the Federal office, of which the head of the department under which the office is held will in each case be the judge. </s> "Mechanics and laborers employed by the day in armories, arsenals, navy yards, etc., and master workmen and other who hold appointments from the Government [413 U.S. 548, 594] or from any department, whether for a fixed time or at the pleasure of the appointing power, are embraced within the operation of the order." </s> 33. Eligibles holding local office: Eligibles who are holding a local office not excepted from the prohibitions of the order of January 17, 1873, on selection for and acceptance of any position in the competitive classified service or of unclassified laborer must immediately resign the local office. Such resignation must be effected whether the service in the local office is compensated or uncompensated or whether the employee is on active duty or leave without pay. The holding of a local office not excepted from the prohibitions of the order of January 17, 1873, is an absolute disqualification for appointment, and unless persons otherwise eligible for appointment are willing immediately to resign the local office in the event of selection for appointment, their appointments cannot be approved. </s> 34. Minor local offices which may be held by Government officers and employees: Although the Executive orders of January 17 and January 28, 1873, prohibit generally any person holding Federal civil office by appointment, from accepting or holding an office under a State, Territorial, or municipal government, certain offices of a minor character are excepted from this general prohibition. Among these are positions of justice of the peace; notary public; commissioner to take acknowledgement of deeds, of bail, or to administer oaths; positions on boards of education, school committees, public libraries, and in religious or eleemosynary institutions. In addition, Federal employees are, under certain conditions, permitted to hold other local offices under authority of the Executive orders set forth in section 35. The permission to hold local offices granted by these Executive orders, however, is now subject to the general prohibition of section 9 of the act of August 2, 1939 (see sec. 1), [413 U.S. 548, 595] against participation in political management and in political campaigns by Federal employees. </s> In view of the broad language of section 9 of the act of August 2, 1939, the incumbency by a Federal employee of any elective office whatever under a State, Territorial, or municipal government is prohibited, regardless of whether or not the office is of such character that its incumbency was permitted by Executive order prior to the enactment of the act. The incumbency by a Federal employee of an appointive office under a State, Territorial, or municipal government is permissible, provided such incumbency is specifically authorized by some statute or Executive order. In securing such offices, however, and in the discharge of the duties thereof, Federal employees must not engage in political management. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The Hatch Act is found in Titles 5 and 18 of the United States Code, both of which have been enacted into positive law. 80 Stat. 378, 62 Stat. 683. Section 7324 (a) (2) of Title 5 is derived from two sections in the Act, with the prohibition against certain political [413 U.S. 548, 551] activity being found in 9 (a), 53 Stat. 1148, while the portion defining the proscribed activity stems from 15, 54 Stat. 771. </s> [Footnote 2 The complaint made the same allegations with respect to 5 U.S.C. 1502 (a) (3), the provision taken from 12 (a) of the Hatch Act, 54 Stat. 767, which imposes similar prohibitions on certain state employees working in programs that are federally financed. The District Court, however, while holding the class action was proper with respect to federal employees, held that none of the parties was properly representative of state employees covered by the Act. 346 F. Supp. 578, 579 n. 1. Hence only 7324 (a) (2) with respect to federal employees is before us in this case. </s> [Footnote 3 The Union alleged that its members were desirous of "a. Running in local elections for such offices as school board member, city council member or mayor. "b. Writing letters on political subjects to newspapers. "c. Participating as a delegate in a political convention and running for office in a political party. "d. Campaigning for candidates for political office." App. 6-7. The Democratic and Republican Committees complained that they had been deterred "from seeking desirable candidates who are Federal [413 U.S. 548, 552] or state employees covered by the Hatch Act to run on the Democratic or Republican ticket for state and local offices. In addition, numerous individuals who would otherwise desire and be available to become members of Plaintiff Committees have been and continue to be deterred from doing so by said provisions of the Hatch Act." Id., at 7. Plaintiff Hummel alleged that he desired to engage in a wide variety of political activities including "(1) participation as a delegate in conventions of a political party; (2) public endorsement of candidates of a political party for local, state and national office; (3) work at polling places on behalf of a political party during elections; (4) holding office in a political club. As a result of inquiries of the Civil Service Commission and his knowledge of the Hatch Act, Plaintiff Hummel is aware that such activities violate the Hatch Act." Id., at 7-8. Plaintiff Pinho alleged that she desired to become a precinct Democratic Committee Woman in the Arlington County Democratic Committee and to campaign for certain Democratic candidates for the United States House of Representatives and for the United States Senate. Id., at 8. Plaintiff Mandicino alleged that as an active member and officer of plaintiff Union he "was compelled to engage in political activities prohibited by . . . the Hatch Act in order to carry out the responsibilities of his offices," and that he had engaged in those "activities including house-to-house campaigning for candidates of political parties, participation as a delegate in conventions of a political party, active participation in the affairs of a political party, and fund raising on behalf of political parties and candidates." Ibid. Plaintiff Wylie alleged that he had resigned his position in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, a position in the competitive civil service, to run as a Republican candidate for the Maryland State Senate. During the campaign he was employed as a consultant by the Department on a part-time basis. After his defeat he sought re-employment on a permanent basis but because of the dispute over his political activities while acting as a consultant, his re-employment had been delayed for a period of time, all to his financial loss and mental anguish. Id., at 9. Plaintiff Gee alleged that he desired to, but did not, file as a [413 U.S. 548, 553] candidate for the office of Borough Councilman in his local community for fear that his participation in a partisan election would endanger his job. Ibid. Plaintiff Myers alleged that he desired to run as a Republican candidate in the 1971 partisan election for the mayor of West Lafayette, Indiana, and that he would do so except for fear of losing his job by reason of violation of the Hatch Act. Id., at 10. </s> [Footnote 4 Section 15 of the Hatch Act, now codified in 5 U.S.C. 7324 (a) (2), see n. 1, supra, defined the prohibition against taking "an active part in political management or in political campaigns" as proscribing those activities that the Civil Service Commission had determined up to the time of the passage of the Hatch Act were [413 U.S. 548, 555] prohibited for classified civil service employees. The role and scope of 15 are discussed in the text, infra. </s> [Footnote 5 Senator Hatch quoted from this order in the debate on the 1940 amendments to the Hatch Act, 86 Cong. Rec. 2433-2434. </s> [Footnote 6 In 1886, for example, President Cleveland, through an Executive Order, warned federal employees "against the use of their official positions in attempts to control political movements in their localities." 8 J. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents 494 (1899). </s> [Footnote 7 The 1940 amendments to the Hatch Act, 54 Stat. 767-772, also provided, inter alia, for a limitation on certain campaign contributions, 13; for federal employees in municipalities in the vicinity of the District of Columbia, with the approval of the Commission, to engage in political activity, 16; and for a limitation on receipts and expenditures of political committees, 20. </s> [Footnote 8 H. R. 2372, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 2032, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 3417, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.; S. 235, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. For the legislation recommended by the Commission on Political Activity, see 1 Report of Commission on Political Activity of Government Personnel, Findings and Recommendations 44-60 (1968). </s> [Footnote 9 H. R. 19214, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.; H. R. 914, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 3374, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.; H. R. 668, S. 350, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. </s> [Footnote 10 Hearings on S. 3374 and S. 3417 before the Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. Congress has extended the restrictions on political activity to persons not previously covered. The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 603, 78 Stat. 530, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2943, extended the restrictions to certain employees of private corporations; the Postal Reorganization Act, 84 Stat. 719, 39 U.S.C. 410, made the provisions applicable to the Postal Service; and the Emergency Employment Act of 1971, 12 (h), 85 Stat. 154, 42 U.S.C. 4881 (h) (1970 ed., Supp. I), extended the provisions to personnel employed in the administration of programs established under the Act. </s> [Footnote 11 See generally Broadrick v. Oklahoma, post, p. 601, and id., at 604-605, n. 2. </s> [Footnote 12 In the 1940 debate over amendments to the Hatch Act, it was frequently stated that the only objectionable provisions were those restrictions in 9 and the proposed 12 against voluntary political activity, see, e. g., 86 Cong. Rec. 2626, 2696, 2700, 2708, 2722. In response to the inquiry whether he was condemning those "who, without any coercion, voluntarily desire to take a part in politics," Senator Hatch replied that he "would draw the line if it could be drawn; but I defy . . . [anyone] to draw that line." Id., at 2626. During the 1967 hearings before the Commission on Political Activity the then Chairman of the Civil Service Commission noted that "one man's coercion is another man's persuasion," and that "in an employer/employee relationship, the extent of voluntaryism tends to be rather substantially circumscribed." 3 Report of Commission on Political Activity of Government Personnel, Hearings, 759 (1968). </s> [Footnote 13 See, e. g., 18 U.S.C. 594 (intimidation of voters); 597 (expenditures to influence voting); 602 (solicitation of political contributions); and 612 (publication or distribution of political statements). </s> [Footnote 14 See, e. g., Northern Virginia Regional Park Authority v. U.S. Civil Service Comm'n, 437 F.2d 1346 (CA4), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1971); Fishkin v. U.S. Civil Service Comm'n, 309 F. Supp. 40 (ND Cal. 1969), appeal dismissed as untimely, 396 U.S. 278 (1970); Kearney v. Macy, 409 F.2d 847 (CA9 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 943 (1970); Engelhardt v. U.S. Civil Service Comm'n, 197 F. Supp. 806 (MD Ala. 1961), aff'd per curiam, 304 F.2d 882 (CA5 1962). </s> [Footnote 15 Title 5 U.S.C. 7324 provides: "(a) An employee in an Executive agency or an individual employed by the government of the District of Columbia may not - "(1) use his official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting the result of an election; or "(2) take an active part in political management or in political campaigns. "For the purpose of this subsection, the phrase `an active part in political management or in political campaigns' means those acts of political management or political campaigning which were prohibited on the part of employees in the competitive service before July 19, 1940, by determinations of the Civil Service Commission under the rules prescribed by the President. "(b) An employee or individual to whom subsection (a) of this [413 U.S. 548, 569] section applies retains the right to vote as he chooses and to express his opinion on political subjects and candidates. "(c) Subsection (a) of this section does not apply to an individual employed by an educational or research institution, establishment, agency, or system which is supported in whole or in part by the District of Columbia or by a recognized religious, philanthropic, or cultural organization. "(d) Subsection (a) (2) of this section does not apply to - "(1) an employee paid from the appropriation for the office of the President; "(2) the head or the assistant head of an Executive department or military department; "(3) an employee appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, who determines policies to be pursued by the United States in its relations with foreign powers or in the nationwide administration of Federal laws; "(4) the Commissioners of the District of Columbia; or "(5) the Recorder of Deeds of the District of Columbia." Title 5 U.S.C. 7326 states: "Section 7324 (a) (2) of this title does not prohibit political activity in connection with - "(1) an election and the preceding campaign if none of the candidates is to be nominated or elected at that election as representing a party any of whose candidates for presidential elector received votes in the last preceding election at which presidential electors were selected; or "(2) a question which is not specifically identified with a National or State political party or political party of a territory or possession of the United States. "For the purpose of this section, questions relating to constitutional amendments, referendums, approval of municipal ordinances, and others of a similar character, are deemed not specifically identified with a National or State political party or political party of a territory or possession of the United States." </s> [Footnote 16 Section 15, as reported out of the Senate Committee, provided: "SEC. 15. The United States Civil Service Commission is hereby authorized and directed to promulgate, as soon as practicable, rules or regulations defining, for the purposes of this act, the term `active part in political management or in political campaigns.' After the promulgation of such rules or regulations, the term `active part in political management or in political campaigns,' as used in this act, shall have the meaning ascribed to it by such rules or regulations. The Commission is authorized to amend such rules or regulations from time to time as it deems necessary." 86 Cong. Rec. 2352. </s> [Footnote 17 The substitute for the section recommended by the Committee provided: "SEC. 15. The provisions of this act which prohibit persons to whom such provisions apply from taking any active part in political management or in political campaigns shall be deemed to prohibit [413 U.S. 548, 571] the same activities on the part of such persons as the United States Civil Service Commission has heretofore determined are at the time of the passage of this act prohibited on the part of employees in the classified civil service of the United States by the provisions of the civil-service rules prohibiting such employees from taking any active part in political management or in political campaigns." 86 Cong. Rec. 2937 (emphasis added). After the substitute was introduced, id., at 2928, Senator Hatch made a "slight modification," id., at 2937, and added the phrase in italics above. </s> [Footnote 18 See Appendix to this opinion, infra, p. 581. Senator Hatch did not have Form 1236 with him on the floor during debate on 15 and provided the pertinent portion from the Form for insertion into the Congressional Record after debate had been completed on the section. 86 Cong. Rec. 2938-2940. However, the Senator had provided the Senate with a card listing 18 rules which were described as the Civil Service Commission's construction of Civil Service Rule I, id., at 2937-2938, 2943. The card, prepared by Senator Hatch with assistance from the Commission, was a summary of pertinent portions of Form 1236, id., at 2937-2938, and was inserted into the Congressional Record, id., at 2943. It provided: "The pertinent language in section 9 is practically a duplication of the civil-service rule prohibiting political activity of employees under the classified civil service. "The section provides in substance, among other things, that no [413 U.S. 548, 573] such officer or employee shall take any active part in political management or in political campaigns. "The same language of the civil-service rule has been construed as follows: "1. Rule prohibits participation not only in national politics but also in State, county, and municipal politics. "2. Temporary employees, substitutes, and persons on furlough or leave of absence with or without pay are subject to the regulation. "3. Whatever an official or employee may not do directly he may not do indirectly or through another. "4. Candidacy for or service as delegate, alternate, or proxy in any political convention is prohibited. "5. Service for or on any political committee is prohibited. "6. Organizing or conducting political rallies or meetings or taking any part therein except as a spectator is prohibited. "7. Employees may express their opinions on all subjects, but they may not make political speeches. "8. Employees may vote as they please, but they must not solicit votes; mark ballots for others; help to get out votes; act as checkers. marker, or challenger for any party or engage in other activity at the poles [sic] except the casting of his own ballot. "9. An employee may not serve as election official unless his failure or refusal so to do would be a violation of State laws. "10. It is political activity for an employee to publish or be connected editorially, managerially, or financially with any political newspaper. An employee may not write for publication or publish any letter or article signed or unsigned in favor of or against any political party, candidate, or faction. "11. Betting or wagering upon the results of a primary or general election is political activity. "12. Organization or leadership of political parades is prohibited but marching in such parades is not prohibited. "13. Among other forms of political activity which are prohibited are distribution of campaign literature, assuming political leadership, and becoming prominently identified with political movements, [413 U.S. 548, 574] parties, or factions or with the success or failure of supporting any candidate for public office. "14. Candidacy for nomination or for the election to any National, State, county, or municipal office is within the prohibition. "15. Attending conventions as spectators is permitted. "16. An employee may attend a mass convention or caucus and cast his vote, but he may not pass this point. "17. Membership in a political club is permitted, but employees may not be officers of the club nor act as such. "18. Voluntary contributions to campaign committees and organizations are permitted. An employee may not solicit, collect, or receive contributions. Contributions by persons receiving remuneration from funds appropriated for relief purposes are not permitted." </s> [Footnote 19 That 15's incorporation of the Civil Service Commission restatement was intended to include only those Commission interpretations consistent with the Hatch Act is demonstrated by the following colloquy between Senators Hatch and Minton, 86 Cong. Rec. 2871: "Mr. MINTON. The right to express political opinions has been defined by the Civil Service Commission to mean the private expression of such opinions. "Mr. HATCH: Yes; the word `privately' is in the rule of the Civil Service Commission. It is not in . . . [ 9 of the Hatch Act]. "Mr. MINTON. The Civil Service Commission has defined the right to express political opinions as the right to do so privately. "Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, that is because the word `privately' is included in the rule of the Civil Service Commission. The word `privately' is written into the rule. That is the word which I dropped out. I did it deliberately, intentionally, and I want it to remain out." </s> [Footnote 20 1942, 1944, and 1966, the title being changed in the 1966 edition to Political Activity. </s> [Footnote 21 The pertinent regulations, appearing in 5 CFR pt. 733, provide: "PERMISSIBLE ACTIVITIES " 733.111 Permissible activities. "(a) All employees are free to engage in political activity to the widest extent consistent with the restrictions imposed by law and this subpart. Each employee retains the right to - "(1) Register and vote in any election; "(2) Express his opinion as an individual privately and publicly on political subjects and candidates; "(3) Display a political picture, sticker, badge, or button; "(4) Participate in the nonpartisan activities of a civic, community, social, labor, or professional organization, or of a similar organization; "(5) Be a member of a political party or other political organization [413 U.S. 548, 577] and participate in its activities to the extent consistent with law; "(6) Attend a political convention, rally, fund-raising function; or other political gathering; "(7) Sign a political petition as an individual; "(8) Make a financial contribution to a political party or organization; "(9) Take an active part, as an independent candidate, or in support of an independent candidate, in a partisan election covered by 733.124; "(10) Take an active part, as a candidate or in support of a candidate, in a nonpartisan election; "(11) Be politically active in connection with a question which is not specifically identified with a political party, such as a constitutional amendment, referendum, approval of a municipal ordinance or any other question or issue of a similar character; "(12) Serve as an election judge or clerk, or in a similar position to perform nonpartisan duties as prescribed by State or local law; and "(13) Otherwise participate fully in public affairs, except as prohibited by law, in a manner which does not materially compromise his efficiency or integrity as an employee or the neutrality. efficiency, or integrity of his agency. "(b) Paragraph (a) of this section does not authorize an employee to engage in political activity in violation of law, while on duty, or while in a uniform that identifies him as an employee. The head of an agency may prohibit or limit the participation of an employee or class of employees of his agency in an activity permitted by paragraph (a) of this section, if participation in the activity would interfere with the efficient performance of official duties, or create a conflict or apparent conflict of interests. "PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES " 733.121 Use of official authority; prohibition. "An employee may not use his official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting the result of an election. " 733.122 Political management and political campaigning; prohibitions. "(a) An employee may not take an active part in political management [413 U.S. 548, 578] or in a political campaign, except as permitted by this subpart. "(b) Activities prohibited by paragraph (a) of this section include but are not limited to - "(1) Serving as an officer of a political party, a member of a National, State, or local committee of a political party, an officer or member of a committee of a partisan political club, or being a candidate for any of these positions; "(2) Organizing or reorganizing a political party organization or political club; "(3) Directly or indirectly soliciting, receiving, collecting, handling, disbursing, or accounting for assessments, contributions, or other funds for a partisan political purpose; "(4) Organizing, selling tickets to, promoting, or actively participating in a fund-raising activity of a partisan candidate, political party, or political club; "(5) Taking an active part in managing the political campaign of a partisan candidate for public office or political party office; "(6) Becoming a partisan candidate for, or campaigning for, an elective public office; "(7) Soliciting votes in support of or in opposition to a partisan candidate for public office or political party office; "(8) Acting as recorder, watcher, challenger, or similar officer at the polls on behalf of a political party or partisan candidate; "(9) Driving voters to the polls on behalf of a political party or partisan candidate; "(10) Endorsing or opposing a partisan candidate for public office or political party office in a political advertisement, a broadcast, campaign literature, or similar material; "(11) Serving as a delegate, alternate, or proxy to a political party convention; "(12) Addressing a convention, caucus, rally, or similar gathering of a political party in support of or in opposition to a partisan candidate for public office or political party office; and "(13) Initiating or circulating a partisan nominating petition." </s> [Footnote 22 According to an affidavit filed in District Court by the General Counsel for the Civil Service Commission, App. 54: "The Information Unit [in the Office of General Counsel] answers inquiries, from whatever source, concerning the application of the Hatch Act, Rule, and regulations." </s> [Footnote 1a [413 U.S. 548, 588] Appointment is made by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to postmaster positions of the first, second and third classes, but these positions are in the competitive classified service under the act of June 25, 1938. </s> [Footnote 2a [413 U.S. 548, 590] See sec. 35. </s> [Footnote 3a [413 U.S. 548, 591] See sec. 8. </s> [Footnote 4a [413 U.S. 548, 591] A Federal employee who resigns at the expiration of his accrued [413 U.S. 548, 592] leave may accept a State or municipal position after his last day of active Federal service (16 Comp. Gen. 776, Feb. 19, 1937). </s> [Footnote 5a [413 U.S. 548, 592] Includes assistant professorships in a State college, assistant lectureships in an evening school of a municipal university, instructorships in a State college, and similar positions in State and municipal colleges and universities. (Minutes of Commission, August 7, 1937.) </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL concur, dissenting. </s> The Hatch Act by 9 (a) prohibits federal employees from taking "an active part in political management or in political campaigns." Some of the employees, whose union is speaking for them, want </s> "to run in state and local elections for the school board, for city council, for mayor"; </s> "to write letters on political subjects to newspapers"; </s> "to be a delegate in political convention"; </s> "to run for an office and hold office in a political party or political club"; </s> "to campaign for candidates for political office"; </s> "to work at polling places in behalf of a political party." </s> There is no definition of what "an active part . . . in political campaigns" means. The Act incorporates over 3,000 rulings of the Civil Service Commission between [413 U.S. 548, 596] 1886 and 1940 and many hundreds of rulings since 1940. But even with that gloss on the Act, the critical phrases lack precision. In 1971 the Commission published a three-volume work entitled Political Activities Reporter which contains over 800 of its decision since the enactment of the Hatch Act. One can learn from studying those volumes that it is not "political activity" to march in a band during a political parade or to wear political badges or to "participate fully in public affairs, except as prohibited by law, in a manner which does not materially compromise his efficiency or integrity as an employee or the neutrality, efficiency, or integrity of his agency." 5 CFR 733.111 (a) (13). </s> That is to say, some things, like marching in a band, are clear. Others are pregnant with ambiguity as "participate fully in public affairs, except as prohibited by law, in a manner which does not materially compromise," etc. Permission to "[t]ake an active part . . . in a nonpartisan election," 5 CFR 733.111 (a) (10), also raises large questions of uncertainty because one may be partisan for a person, an issue, a candidate without feeling an identification with one political party or the other. </s> The District Court felt that the prohibitions in the Act are "worded in generalities that lack precision," 346 F. Supp. 578, 582, with the result that it is hazardous for an employee "if he ventures to speak on a political matter since he will not know when his words or acts relating to political subjects will offend." Id., at 582-583. </s> The chilling effect of these vague and generalized prohibitions is so obvious as not to need elaboration. That effect would not be material to the issue of constitutionality if only the normal contours of the police power were involved. On the run of social and economic matters the "rational basis" standard which United Public [413 U.S. 548, 597] Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 , applied would suffice. 1 But what may have been unclear to some in Mitchell should by now be abundantly clear to all. We deal here with a First Amendment right to speak, to propose, to publish, to petition Government, to assemble. Time and place are obvious limitations. Thus no one could object if employees were barred from using office time to engage in outside activities whether political or otherwise. But it is of no concern of Government what an employee does in his spare time, whether religion, recreation, social work, or politics is his hobby - unless what he does impairs efficiency or other facets of the merits of his job. Some things, some activities do affect or may be thought to affect the employee's job performance. But his political creed, like his religion, is irrelevant. In the areas of speech, like religion, it is of no concern what the employee says in private to his wife or to the public in Constitution Hall. If Government employment were only a "privilege," then all sorts of conditions might be attached. But it is now settled that Government employment may not be denied or penalized "on a basis that infringes [the employee's] constitutionally protected interests - especially, his interest in freedom of speech." See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 . If Government, as the majority stated in Mitchell, may not condition public employment on the basis that the employee will not "take any active part in missionary work," 330 U.S., at 100 , it is difficult to see why it may condition employment on the basis that the employee not take "an active part . . . in political campaigns." [413 U.S. 548, 598] For speech, assembly, and petition are as deeply embedded in the First Amendment as proselytizing a religious cause. </s> Free discussion of governmental affairs is basic in our constitutional system. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 ; Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 ; Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 . Laws that trench on that area must be narrowly and precisely drawn to deal with precise ends. Overbreadth in the area of the First Amendment has a peculiar evil, the evil of creating chilling effects which deter the exercise of those freedoms. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 . As we stated in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 , in speaking of First Amendment freedoms and the unconstitutionality of overbroad statutes: "These freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society. The threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions." </s> Mitchell is of a different vintage from the present case. Since its date, a host of decisions have illustrated the need for narrowly drawn statutes that touch First Amendment rights. A teacher was held to be unconstitutionally discharged for sending a letter to a newspaper that criticized the school authorities. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 573 . "In these circumstances we conclude that the interest of the school administration in limiting teachers' opportunities to contribute to public debate is not significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar contribution by any member of the general public." We followed the same course in Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 , when we relieved a sheriff from a contempt conviction for making a public statement in connection with a current political controversy. As in the present case, the sheriff spoke as a [413 U.S. 548, 599] private citizen and what he said did not interfere with his duties as sheriff. Id., at 393-394. </s> The present Act cannot be appropriately narrowed to meet the need for narrowly drawn language not embracing First Amendment speech or writing without substantial revision. That rewriting cannot be done by the Commission because Congress refused to delegate to it authority to regulate First Amendment rights. The proposal to do so aroused a great debate in Congress 2 and Senator Hatch finally submitted a substitute, saying "[i]t does away with the question of the delegation of power." 3 </s> The Commission, on a case-by-case approach, has listed 13 categories of prohibited activities, 5 CFR 733.122 (b), starting with the catch-all "include but are not limited to." So the Commission ends up with open-end discretion to penalize X or not to penalize him. For example, a "permissible" activity is the employee's right to "[e]xpress his opinion as an individual privately and publicly on political subjects and candidates." 5 CFR 733.111 (a) (2). Yet "soliciting votes" is prohibited. 5 CFR 733.122 (b) (7). Is an employee safe from punishment if he expresses his opinion that candidate X is the best [413 U.S. 548, 600] and candidate Y the worst? Is that crossing the forbidden line of soliciting votes? </s> A nursing assistant at a veterans' hospital put an ad in a newspaper reading: </s> "To All My Many Friends of Poplar Bluff and Butler County I want to take this opportunity to ask your vote and support in the election, TUESDAY, AUGUST 7th. A very special person is seeking the Democratic nomination for Sheriff. I do not have to tell you of his qualifications, his past records stand. </s> "This person is my dad, Lester (Less) Massingham. </s> "THANK YOU </s> "WALLACE (WALLY) MASSINGHAM" </s> He was held to have violated the Act. Massingham, 1 Political Activity Reporter 792, 793 (1959). </s> Is a letter a permissible "expression" of views or a prohibited "solicitation?" The Solicitor General says it is a "permissible" expression; but the Commission ruled otherwise. For an employee who does not have the Solicitor General as counsel great consequences flow from an innocent decision. He may lose his job. Therefore the most prudent thing is to do nothing. Thus is self-imposed censorship imposed on many nervous people who live on narrow economic margins. </s> I would strike this provision of the law down as unconstitutional so that a new start may be made on this old problem that confuses and restricts nearly five million federal, state, and local public employees today that live under the present Act. </s> [Footnote 1 "For regulation of employees it is not necessary that the act regulated be anything more than an act reasonably deemed by Congress to interfere with the efficiency of the public service." United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 101 . </s> [Footnote 2 S. 3046, as reported by the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections, authorized "the Civil Service Commission to define the term `active part in political management or in political campaigns' as that term is used in the prohibitions applicable to Federal employees and in the prohibitions applicable to State and local officers and employees." S. Rep. No. 1236, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 2. The Senate was reluctant to leave the task of defining these terms "to some bureaucratic board which has absolutely no knowledge of political conditions and circumstances in any section of the country." 86 Cong. Rec. 2427 (remarks of Sen. Lucas). The section also was challenged as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. Id., at 2579 (remarks of Sen. Brown and Sen. McKellar). Others were concerned with problems of fairness. Id., at 2720 (Sen. Bankhead). </s> [Footnote 3 Id., at 2928. </s> [413 U.S. 548, 601]

United States Supreme Court DEPT. OF TAXATION & FIN. v. MILHELM ATTEA & BROS.(1994) No. 93-377 Argued: March 23, 1994Decided: June 13, 1994 </s> Enrolled tribal members purchasing cigarettes on Indian reservations are exempt from a New York cigarette tax, but non-Indians making such purchases are not. Licensed agents precollect the tax by purchasing stamps and affixing them to cigarette packs in advance of their first sale. Determining that a large volume of unstamped cigarettes was being purchased by non-Indians on reservations, petitioner tax department enacted regulations imposing recordkeeping requirements and quantity limitations on cigarette wholesalers selling untaxed cigarettes to reservation Indians. As relevant here, the regulations set quotas on the quantity of untaxed cigarettes that wholesalers may sell to tribes and tribal retailers, and petitioner must approve each such sale. Wholesalers must also ensure that a buyer holds a valid state tax exemption certificate, and must keep records of their tax-exempt sales, make monthly reports to petitioners, and, as licensed agents, precollect taxes on nonexempt sales. Respondent wholesalers are licensed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to sell cigarettes to reservation Indians. They filed separate suits in state court alleging that the regulations were preempted by the federal Indian Trader Statutes. The trial court issued an injunction. Ultimately, the Appellate Division upheld the regulations, but the Court of Appeals reversed, distinguishing this Court's decisions upholding taxes imposed on non-Indian purchasers of cigarettes, see Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 ; Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 , on the ground that they involved regulating sales to non-Indian consumers whereas New York's regulations applied to Page II sales by non-Indian wholesalers to reservation Indians. The court concluded that the Indian Trader Statutes, as construed in Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 , deprived the States of all power to impose regulatory burdens on licensed Indian traders, and, alternatively, that if States could impose minimal burdens on the traders, the State's regulations were invalid because the burdens were significant. </s> Held: </s> New York's regulations do not, on their face, violate the Indian Trader Statutes. Pp. 6-16. </s> (a) Because respondents have made essentially a facial challenge, this case is confined to those alleged defects that inhere in the regulations as written, and the Court need not assess for all purposes each feature of the tax scheme that might affect tribal self-government or federal authority over Indian affairs. Pp. 6-7. </s> (b) Indian traders are not wholly immune from state regulation that is reasonably necessary to the assessment or collection of lawful state taxes. Although broad language in Warren Trading Post suggests such immunity, that proposition has been undermined by subsequent decisions in Moe (upholding a state law requiring Indian retailers on tribal land to collect a state cigarette tax imposed on sales to non-Indians), Colville (upholding in relevant part a state law requiring tribal retailers on reservations to collect cigarette taxes on sales to nonmembers and to keep extensive records), and Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505 . These cases have made clear that the States have a valid interest in ensuring compliance with lawful taxes that might easily be evaded through purchases of tax-exempt cigarettes on reservations; that interest outweighs tribes' modest interest in offering a tax exemption to customers who would ordinarily shop elsewhere. Thus, there is more room for state regulation in this area. In particular, these cases have decided that States may impose on reservation retailers minimal burdens reasonably tailored to the collection of valid taxes from non-Indians. It would be anomalous to hold that a State could impose tax collection and bookkeeping burdens on reservation retailers who are enrolled tribal members but not on wholesalers, who often are not. Pp. 7-13. </s> (c) New York's scheme does not impose excessive burdens on Indian traders. Respondents' objections to the regulations setting quotas and requiring that petitioner preapprove deliveries provide no basis for a facial challenge, although the possibility of inadequate quotas may provide a basis for a future challenge to the regulations' application. The requirements that wholesalers sell untaxed cigarettes only to persons with valid exemption certificates Page III and keep detailed records are no more demanding than comparable measures approved in Colville. Moreover, the precollection obligation placed on wholesalers is the same as the obligation that, under Moe and Colville, may be imposed on reservation retailers. The United States' arguments supporting its position that the scheme improperly burdens Indian trading are also rejected. Pp. 13-16. </s> 81 N.Y. 2d 417, 615 N.E.2d 994, reversed. </s> STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. </s> [ DEPT. OF TAXATION & FIN. v. MILHELM ATTEA & BROS., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 1] </s> JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Cigarette consumers in New York are subject to a state tax of 56 cents per pack. Enrolled tribal members who purchase cigarettes on Indian reservations are exempt from this tax, but non-Indians making purchases on reservations must pay it. To prevent non-Indians from escaping the tax, New York has enacted a regulatory scheme that imposes recordkeeping requirements and quantity limitations on cigarette wholesalers who sell untaxed cigarettes to reservation Indians. The question presented is whether New York's program is preempted by federal statutes governing trade with Indians. </s> I </s> Article 20 of the New York Tax Law imposes a tax on all cigarettes possessed in the State except those that New York is "without power" to tax. N.Y.Tax Law 471(1) (McKinney 1987 and Supp. 1994). The State collects the cigarette tax through licensed agents who purchase tax stamps and affix them to cigarette packs in advance of the first sale within the State. The full amount of the tax is part of the price of stamped cigarettes at all subsequent steps in the distribution </s> [ DEPT. OF TAXATION & FIN. v. MILHELM ATTEA & BROS., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 2] </s> stream. Accordingly, the "ultimate incidence of and liability for the tax [is] upon the consumer." 471(2). Any person who "willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat" the cigarette tax commits a misdemeanor. N.Y.Tax Law 1814(a) (McKinney 1987). </s> Because New York lacks authority to tax cigarettes sold to tribal members for their own consumption, see Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 475 -481 (1976), cigarettes to be consumed on the reservation by enrolled tribal members are tax-exempt, and need not be stamped. On-reservation cigarette sales to persons other than reservation Indians, however, are legitimately subject to state taxation. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 160 -161 (1980). In 1988, New York's Department of Taxation and Finance 1 determined that a large volume of unstamped cigarettes was being purchased by non-Indians from reservation retailers. According to an affidavit submitted by an official in the Department's Audit Division, the volume of tax-exempt cigarettes sold on New York reservations in 1987-1988 would, if consumed exclusively by tax-immune Indians, correspond to a consumption rate 20 times higher than that of the average New York resident; in 1988-1989, putative reservation consumption was 32 times the statewide average. See Record 244-246 (Affidavit of Jamie Woodward). Because unlawful purchases of unstamped cigarettes deprived New York of substantial tax revenues - now estimated at more than $65 million per </s> [ DEPT. OF TAXATION & FIN. v. MILHELM ATTEA & BROS., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 3] </s> year - the Department adopted the regulations at issue in this case. 2 </s> The regulations recognize the right of "exempt Indian nations or tribes, qualified Indian consumers and registered dealers" to "purchase, on qualified reservations, cigarettes upon which the seller has not prepaid and precollected the cigarette tax imposed pursuant to article 20 of the Tax Law." 20 N.Y.C.R.R. 336.6(a) (1992). To ensure that non-exempt purchasers do not likewise escape taxation, the regulations limit the quantity of untaxed cigarettes that wholesalers may sell to tribes and tribal retailers. The limitations may be established and enforced in alternative ways. A tribe may enter into an agreement with the Department "to regulate, license, or control the sale and distribution within its qualified reservation of an agreed upon amount of [untaxed] cigarettes," in which case wholesalers must obtain the tribe's approval for each delivery of untaxed cigarettes to a reservation retailer. 336.7(c)(1). In the absence of such an agreement - and apparently there have been none to date - the Department itself limits the permitted quantity of untaxed cigarettes based on the "probable demand" of tax-exempt Indian consumers. 336.7(d)(1). </s> The Department calculates "probable demand" in either of two ways. If a tribe "regulates, licenses or controls the sale and distribution of cigarettes within its reservation," the Department will rely upon evidence submitted by that tribe concerning local demand for </s> [ DEPT. OF TAXATION & FIN. v. MILHELM ATTEA & BROS., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 4] </s> cigarettes. 336.7(d)(2)(i). 3 Otherwise, the Department fixes the untaxed cigarette limit for a tribe by multiplying the "New York average [cigarette] consumption per capita" by the number of enrolled members of the affected tribe. 336.7(d)(1), (d)(2)(ii). Each sale of untaxed cigarettes by a wholesaler to a tribe or reservation retailer must be approved by the Department; approval is "based upon evidence of valid purchase orders received by the agent [i.e., wholesaler] of quantities of cigarettes reasonably related to the probable demand of qualified Indian consumers in the trade territory" of the tribe. Ibid. 4 Retailers are sent "Tax Exemption Coupons" entitling them to their monthly allotment of tax-exempt cigarettes. The retailer gives copies of its coupons to the wholesaler upon delivery, and the wholesaler forwards one to the Department. See Brief for Petitioners 12-13; App. 44-45. The Department may withhold approval of deliveries to tribes or retailers who "are or have been" violating the regulations, 336.7(d)(6), and may cancel the exemption certificates of noncomplying tribes or retailers. See 336.6(d)(3), (e)(5). </s> Wholesalers who wish to sell tax-free cigarettes to Indian tribes or reservation retailers must ensure that the buyer intends to distribute the cigarettes to tax-exempt consumers, takes delivery on the reservation, and holds a valid state tax exemption certificate. 5 </s> [ DEPT. OF TAXATION & FIN. v. MILHELM ATTEA & BROS., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 5] </s> Reservation retailers may sell unstamped cigarettes only to "qualified Indian consumers," who, at the time of first purchase, must provide the retailer with a "certificate of individual Indian exemption" and provide written evidence of their identity for subsequent purchases. 336.6(e)(2), (g)(1). 6 </s> Wholesale distributors of tax-exempt cigarettes must hold state licenses authorizing them to purchase and affix New York cigarette tax stamps, and must collect taxes on nonexempt sales. 336.7(b)(2), 336.7(e). They must also keep records reflecting the identity of the buyer in each tax-exempt sale and make monthly reports to the Department on all such sales. 336.6(g)(3-4). New York's regulatory scheme, unsurprisingly, imposes no restrictions on the sale of stamped cigarettes - i.e., those on which taxes have been precollected by wholesalers. </s> II </s> Respondents are wholesalers licensed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the United States Department of the Interior (BIA) to sell cigarettes to reservation Indians. Before New York's cigarette tax enforcement scheme went into effect, they filed separate suits in the Supreme Court in Albany County alleging that the regulations were preempted by the federal Indian Trader Statutes, 25 U.S.C. 261 et seq. The trial court agreed and issued an injunction. After the Appellate Division affirmed, Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc. v. Dept. </s> [ DEPT. OF TAXATION & FIN. v. MILHELM ATTEA & BROS., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 6] </s> of Taxation and Finance of New York, 164 App. Div.2d 300, 564 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1990), and the New York Court of Appeals denied review, we granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Appellate Division, and remanded for further consideration in the light of our decision in Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505 (1991). 502 U.S. ___ (1992). On remand, the Appellate Division upheld the regulations, 181 App. Div.2d 210, 585 N.Y.S. (1992), but the Court of Appeals reversed, 81 N.Y.2d 417, 615 N.E.2d 994 (1993). </s> The Court of Appeals distinguished our decisions holding that a State may require Indian retailers to collect a tax imposed on non-Indian purchasers of cigarettes, see Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976), Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980), on the ground that those cases involved the regulation of sales to non-Indian consumers. 81 N.Y.2d, at 425, 615 N.E.2d, at 997. In the Court of Appeals' view, this case was significantly different, because New York's regulations apply to sales by non-Indian wholesalers to reservation Indians. Ibid. The Court concluded that the Indian Trader Statutes, as construed in Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965), deprived the States of all power to impose regulatory burdens on licensed Indian traders. 81 N.Y.2d, at 426-427, 615 N.E.2d, at 997-998. Even if States could impose minimal burdens on Indian Traders, the Court of Appeals alternatively held, New York's regulations are nevertheless invalid because they "impose significant burdens on the wholesaler." Id., at 427, 615 N.E.2d, at 998. In particular, the regulations "dictate to Indian traders the number of unstamped cigarettes they can sell to reservation Indians and direct with whom they may trade." Ibid. Moreover, New York's scheme </s> [ DEPT. OF TAXATION & FIN. v. MILHELM ATTEA & BROS., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 7] </s> requires wholesale distributors to prepay taxes on all cigarettes delivered on the reservations in excess of the predetermined maximum amount and, with respect to those cigarettes, imposes a sales tax on Indian retailers. Ibid. </s> We granted certiorari, 510 U.S. ___ (1993), and now reverse. </s> III </s> Respondents' challenge to New York's regulatory scheme is essentially a facial one. In reviewing a challenge of this kind, we do not rest our decision on consequences that, while possible, are by no means predictable. For example, respondents do not contest the factual accuracy of the Department's initial calculations of "probable demand" for tax-exempt cigarettes at particular reservations, see Record 244-248; rather, they challenge the Department's authority to impose such limits at all. Therefore, for present purposes we must assume that the allocations for each reservation will be sufficiently generous to satisfy the legitimate demands of those reservation Indians who smoke cigarettes. In other respects as well, we confine ourselves to those alleged defects that inhere in the regulations as written. </s> A second limitation on our review flows from the nature of respondents' challenge. Their claim is that the New York scheme interferes with their federally protected activities as Indian traders who sell goods at wholesale to reservation Indians. While the effect of the New York scheme on Indian retailers and consumers may be relevant to that inquiry, see Warren Trading Post, 380 U.S., at 691 , this case does not require us to assess for all purposes each feature of New York's tax enforcement scheme that might affect tribal self-government or federal authority over Indian affairs. Here, we confront the narrower question whether the New York scheme is inconsistent with the Indian Trader Statutes. </s> [ DEPT. OF TAXATION & FIN. v. MILHELM ATTEA & BROS., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 8] </s> IV </s> Throughout this Nation's history, Congress has authorized "sweeping" and "comprehensive federal regulation" over persons who wish to trade with Indians and Indian tribes. Warren Trading Post, 380 U.S., at 687 -689. An exercise of Congress' power to "regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes," see U.S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 3, the Indian Trader Statutes were enacted to prevent fraud and other abuses by persons trading with Indians. See Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160, 163 -164 (1980). The provision principally relied upon by respondents and by the Court of Appeals, enacted in 1876 and captioned "Power to appoint traders with Indians," states: </s> "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall have the sole power and authority to appoint traders to the Indian tribes and to make such rules and regulations as he may deem just and proper specifying the kind and quantity of goods and the prices at which such goods shall be sold to the Indians." 19 Stat. 200, 25 U.S.C. 261. 7 </s> In Warren Trading Post, we held that this provision prevented Arizona from imposing a tax on the income or gross sales proceeds of licensed Indian traders dealing with reservation Indians. The Indian Trader Statutes and the "apparently all-inclusive regulations" under them, we stated, "would seem in themselves sufficient to show that Congress has taken the business of Indian </s> [ DEPT. OF TAXATION & FIN. v. MILHELM ATTEA & BROS., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 9] </s> trading on reservations so fully in hand that no room remains for state laws imposing additional burdens upon traders." 380 U.S., at 690 . Therefore, Arizona's tax "would to a substantial extent frustrate the evident congressional purpose of ensuring that no burden shall be imposed upon Indian traders for trading with Indians on reservations except as authorized by Acts of Congress or by valid regulations promulgated under those Acts." Id., at 691. See also Central Machinery Co., 448 U.S., at 163 -166 (tax on proceeds of sale of farm machinery to tribe preempted by 261). </s> Although language in Warren Trading Post suggests that no state regulation of Indian traders can be valid, our subsequent decisions have "undermined" that proposition. See Central Machinery, 448 U.S., at 172 (Powell, J., dissenting). Thus, in Moe, we upheld a Montana law that required Indian retailers on tribal land to collect a state cigarette tax imposed on sales to non-Indian consumers. We noted that the Indian smokeshop proprietor's competitive advantage over other retailers depended "on the extent to which the non-Indian purchaser is willing to flout his legal obligation to pay the tax. Without the simple expedient of having the retailer collect the sales tax from non-Indian purchasers, it is clear that wholesale violations of the law by the latter class will go virtually unchecked." 425 U.S., at 482 . In contrast to the tax in Warren Trading Post, which fell directly upon an Indian trader, the cigarette tax in Moe fell upon a class - non-Indians - whom the State had power to tax. 425 U.S., at 483 . We approved Montana's "requirement that the Indian tribal seller collect a tax validly imposed on non-Indians" as a "minimal burden designed to avoid the likelihood that in its absence non-Indians purchasing from the tribal seller will avoid payment of a concededly lawful tax." Ibid. </s> [ DEPT. OF TAXATION & FIN. v. MILHELM ATTEA & BROS., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 10] </s> In Colville, we upheld in relevant part a more comprehensive Washington State cigarette tax enforcement scheme that required tribal retailers selling goods on the reservation to collect taxes on sales to nonmembers and to keep extensive records concerning these transactions. We rejected the proposition that "principles of federal Indian law, whether stated in terms of preemption, tribal self-government, or otherwise, authorize Indian tribes thus to market an exemption from state taxation to persons who would normally do their business elsewhere." 447 U.S., at 155 . Moreover, the Tribes had failed to meet their burden of showing that the recordkeeping requirements imposed on tribal retailers were "not reasonably necessary as a means of preventing fraudulent transactions." Id., at 160. 8 See also California State Bd. of Equalization v. Chemehuevi Tribe, 474 U.S. 9, 11 -12 (1985) (per curiam). </s> In Potawatomi, we held that sovereign immunity barred the State of Oklahoma's suit against a Tribe to recover cigarette taxes owed for sales to non-Indians at a convenience store owned by the Tribe. In response to the State's protest that the Tribe's immunity from suit made the State's recognized authority to tax cigarette sales to non-Indians a "right without any remedy," 498 U.S., at 514 , we explained that alternative remedies existed for state tax collectors, such as damage actions </s> [ DEPT. OF TAXATION & FIN. v. MILHELM ATTEA & BROS., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 11] </s> against individual tribal officers or agreements with the tribes. Ibid. We added that "States may of course collect the sales tax from cigarette wholesalers, either by seizing unstamped cigarettes off the reservation, Colville, [447 U.S.,] at 161-162, or by assessing wholesalers who supplied unstamped cigarettes to the tribal stores." Ibid. </s> V </s> This is another case in which we must "reconcile the plenary power of the States over residents within their borders with the semi-autonomous status of Indians living on tribal reservations." McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973). Resolution of conflicts of this kind does not depend on "rigid rule[s]" or on "mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty," but instead on "a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law." White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 , 145 (1980). See also Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 176 (1989). </s> The specific kind of state tax obligation that New York's regulations are designed to enforce - which falls on non-Indian purchasers of goods that are merely retailed on a reservation - stands on a markedly different footing from a tax imposed directly on Indian traders, on enrolled tribal members or tribal organizations, or on "value generated on the reservation by activities involving the Tribes," Colville, 447 U.S., at 156 -157. Moe, Colville and Potawatomi make clear that the States have a valid interest in ensuring compliance with lawful taxes that might easily be evaded through purchases of tax-exempt cigarettes on reservations; that interest outweighs tribes' modest interest in offering a </s> [ DEPT. OF TAXATION & FIN. v. MILHELM ATTEA & BROS., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 12] </s> tax exemption to customers who would ordinarily shop elsewhere. The "balance of state, federal, and tribal interests," Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 720 (1983), in this area thus leaves more room for state regulation than in others. In particular, these cases have decided that States may impose on reservation retailers minimal burdens reasonably tailored to the collection of valid taxes from non-Indians. </s> Although Moe and Colville dealt most directly with claims of interference with tribal sovereignty, 9 the reasoning of those decisions requires rejection of the submission that 25 U.S.C. 261 bars any and all state-imposed burdens on Indian traders. It would be anomalous to hold that a State could impose tax collection and bookkeeping burdens on reservation retailers who are themselves enrolled tribal members, including stores operated by the tribes themselves, but that similar burdens could not be imposed on wholesalers, who often (as in this case) are not. 10 Such a ruling might well have the perverse consequence of casting greater state tax enforcement burdens on the very reservation Indians whom the Indian Trader Statutes were enacted to protect. Just as tribal sovereignty does not completely preclude States from enlisting tribal retailers to assist enforcement of valid state taxes, the Indian Trader Statutes do not bar the States from imposing reasonable regulatory burdens upon Indian traders for the same purpose. A regulation designed to prevent non-Indians </s> [ DEPT. OF TAXATION & FIN. v. MILHELM ATTEA & BROS., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 13] </s> from evading taxes may well burden Indian traders in the sense that it reduces the competitive advantage offered by trading unlimited quantities of tax-free goods; but that consideration is no more weighty in the case of Indian traders engaged in wholesale transactions than it was in the case of reservation retailers. </s> The state law we found preempted in Warren Trading Post was a tax directly "imposed upon Indian traders for trading with Indians." 380 U.S., at 691 . See also Central Machinery, 448 U.S., at 164 . That characterization does not apply to regulations designed to prevent circumvention of "concededly lawful" taxes owed by non-Indians. See Moe, 425 U.S., at 482 -483. Although broad language in our opinion in Warren Trading Post lends support to a contrary conclusion, we now hold that Indian traders are not wholly immune from state regulation that is reasonably necessary to the assessment or collection of lawful state taxes. That conclusion does not, of course, answer the Court of Appeals' alternative basis for striking down the New York scheme - namely, that it imposes excessive burdens on Indian traders. </s> VI </s> Respondents vigorously object to the limitation of wholesaler's tax-exempt cigarette sales through the "probable demand" mechanism. We are persuaded, however, that New York's decision to stanch the illicit flow of tax-free cigarettes early in the distribution stream is a "reasonably necessary" method of "preventing fraudulent transactions," one that "polices against wholesale evasion of [New York's] own valid taxes without unnecessarily intruding on core tribal interests." Colville, 447 U.S., at 160 , 162. The sole purpose and justification for the quotas on untaxed cigarettes is the State's legitimate interest in avoiding tax evasion by non-Indian consumers. By imposing a quota on tax-free </s> [ DEPT. OF TAXATION & FIN. v. MILHELM ATTEA & BROS., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 14] </s> cigarettes, New York has not sought to dictate "the kind and quantity of goods and the prices at which such goods shall be sold to the Indians." 25 U.S.C. 261. Indian traders remain free to sell Indian tribes and retailers as many cigarettes as they wish, of any kind and at whatever price. If the Department's "probable demand" calculations are adequate, tax-immune Indians will not have to pay New York cigarette taxes and neither wholesalers nor retailers will have to precollect taxes on cigarettes destined for their consumption. While the possibility of an inadequate quota may provide the basis for a future challenge to the application of the regulations, we are unwilling to assume, in the absence of any such showing by respondents, that New York will underestimate the legitimate demand for tax-free cigarettes. The associated requirement that the Department preapprove deliveries of tax-exempt cigarettes in order to ensure compliance with the quotas does not render the scheme facially invalid. This procedure should not prove unduly burdensome absent wrongful withholding or delay of approval-problems that can be addressed if and when they arise. See Colville, 447 U.S., at 160 (burden of showing that tax enforcement scheme imposes excessive regulatory burdens is on challenger). </s> New York's requirements that wholesalers sell untaxed cigarettes only to persons who can produce valid exemption certificates and that wholesalers maintain detailed records on tax-exempt transactions likewise do not unduly interfere with Indian trading. The recordkeeping requirements and eligible buyer restrictions in the New York scheme are no more demanding than the comparable measures we approved in Colville. See n. 8, supra. Indeed, because wholesale trade typically involves a comparatively small number of large-volume sales, the transactional recordkeeping requirements imposed on Indian traders in this case are probably less </s> [ DEPT. OF TAXATION & FIN. v. MILHELM ATTEA & BROS., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 15] </s> onerous than those imposed on retailers in Moe and Colville. By requiring wholesalers to precollect taxes on and affix stamps to cigarettes destined for nonexempt consumers, New York has simply imposed on the wholesaler the same precollection obligation that, under Moe and Colville, may be imposed on reservation retailers. We therefore disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that New York has in this way "impose[d] a sales tax on Indian retailers." 81 N.Y.2d, at 427, 615 N.E.2d, at 998 (emphasis added). Again assuming that the "probable demand" calculations leave ample room for legitimately tax-exempt sales, the precollection regime will not require prepayment of any tax to which New York is not entitled. </s> The United States, as amicus supporting affirmance, agrees with the Court of Appeals' alternative holding that the New York scheme improperly burdens Indian trading. In addition to the provisions disapproved by the Court of Appeals, the United States attacks the requirement that reservation retailers obtain state tax exemption certificates on the ground that it invades the BIA's "sole power and authority" to appoint Indian traders. We do not, however, understand the regulations to do anything more than establish a method of identifying those retailers who are already engaged in the business of selling cigarettes. At this stage, we will not assume that the Department would refuse certification to any federally authorized trader or stultify tribal economies by refusing certification to new reservation retailers. Indeed, the Department assures us that certification is "virtually automatic" upon submission of an application. Reply Brief for Petitioners 5 (citing 20 N.Y.C.R.R. 336.6(f)(1) (1992)). </s> The United States also objects to the provisions for establishing "trade territories" and allocating each reservation's overall quota among its retail outlets. Depending upon how they are applied in particular </s> [ DEPT. OF TAXATION & FIN. v. MILHELM ATTEA & BROS., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 16] </s> circumstances, these provisions may present significant problems to be addressed in some future proceeding. However, the record before us furnishes no basis for identifying or evaluating any such problem. Agreements between the Department and individual tribes might avoid or resolve problems that are now purely hypothetical. 11 Possible problems involving the allocation of cigarettes among reservation retailers would not necessarily threaten any harm to respondent wholesalers, whose main interest lies in selling the maximum number of cigarettes, however ultimately allocated. </s> Because we conclude that New York's cigarette tax enforcement regulations do not, on their face, violate the Indian Trader Statutes, the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is reversed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The petitioners in this case are the Department of Taxation and Finance of the State of New York, its Commissioner James W. Wetzler, and the Tax Appeals Tribunal of the State of New York. For convenience, we refer to petitioners collectively as the Department. </s> [Footnote 2 The cigarette regulations are similar to regulations New York adopted in an effort to prevent sales of untaxed gasoline to non-Indians on reservations. See Herzog Bros. Trucking, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 69 N.Y.2d 536, 508 N.E.2d 914 (1987) (finding regulations preempted by federal law), vacated and remanded, 487 U.S. 1212 (1988), on remand 72 N.Y.2d 720, 533 N.E.2d 255 (1988). </s> [Footnote 3 The regulation cites as examples of such evidence "records of previous sales to qualified Indian consumers, records relating to the average consumption of qualified Indian consumers on and near its reservation, tribal enrollment, or other statistical evidence, etc." 20 N.Y.C.R.R. 336.7(d)(2)(i) (1992). </s> [Footnote 4 The Department determines the "trade territory" in consultation with the tribe if the tribe has undertaken to regulate the sale and distribution of cigarettes; otherwise, the Department determines the trade territory "based upon the information at its disposal." 336.7(d)(3)(ii). </s> [Footnote 5 See 336.6(d)(1), 6(f)(1); 336.7(b)(1). The purchasing tribe or </s> [ DEPT. OF TAXATION & FIN. v. MILHELM ATTEA & BROS., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 5] </s> retailer must display its exemption certificate at the time of first purchase, and must sign an invoice for subsequent purchases. 336.6(g)(1). </s> [Footnote 6 A "qualified Indian consumer" is an enrolled member of one of New York's exempt Indian nations or tribes "who purchases or intends to purchase cigarettes within the boundaries of a qualified reservation for such Indian's own use or consumption (i.e., other than for resale) within such reservation." 336.6(b)(1)(ii). </s> [Footnote 7 The other Indian Trader provisions state that persons who establish their fitness to trade with Indians to the BIA's satisfaction shall be permitted to do so, 25 U.S.C. 262, authorize the President to prohibit the introduction of goods into Indian country and to revoke licenses, 263, and impose penalties for unauthorized trading, 264. BIA regulations under the statutes are codified at 25 CFR 140.1-140.26 (1993). </s> [Footnote 8 We described the recordkeeping requirements as follows: </s> "The state sales tax scheme requires smokeshop operators to keep detailed records of both taxable and nontaxable transactions. The operator must record the number and dollar volume of taxable sales to nonmembers of the Tribe. With respect to nontaxable sales, the operator must record and retain for state inspection the names of all Indian purchasers, their tribal affiliations, the Indian reservations within which sales are made, and the dollar amount and dates of sales. In addition, unless the Indian purchaser is personally known to the operator he must present a tribal identification card." Colville, 447 U.S., at 159 . </s> [Footnote 9 In fact, in Colville, the tribal retailers obligated to collect state taxes on cigarette sales to non-Indians and keep detailed sales records were licensed Indian traders. See Confederated Tribes of Colville v. State of Wash., 446 F.Supp. 1339, 1347 (ED Wash. 1978). </s> [Footnote 10 According to the Federal Government, there are approximately 125 federally licensed Indian traders in New York, of whom the 64 wholesalers are all non-Indians and the 61 retailers are all Indians. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 2, n. 1. </s> [Footnote 11 Amicus the Seneca Nation argues that New York's cigarette tax regulations violate treaties between it and the United States insofar as the regulations allow New York to tax any transactions occurring on Seneca tribal lands. See Brief for Seneca Nation of Indians as Amicus Curiae 18-26; but see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 21-24. We do not address this contention, which differs markedly from respondents' position and which was not addressed by the Court of Appeals. See United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60 , n. 2 (1981). Page I

United States Supreme Court YOUNGER v. GILMORE(1971) No. 70-9 Argued: October 14, 1971Decided: November 8, 1971 </s> 319 F. Supp. 105, affirmed. </s> George R. Nock, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, pro se, Albert W. Harris, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, and Robert R. Granucci, Deputy Attorney General. </s> John Eshleman Wahl, by appointment of the Court, post, p. 814, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was Marshall W. Krause. </s> Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Charles Stephen Ralston, Stanley A. Bass, Anthony G. Amsterdam, William Bennett Turner, and Alice Daniel filed a brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> On this appeal we postponed the question of jurisdiction pending the hearing of the case on the merits. 401 U.S. 906 (1971). </s> Having heard the case on its merits, we find that this Court does have jurisdiction (Alabama Teachers v. Alabama Public School and College Authority, 393 U.S. 400 (1969)) and affirm the judgment of the District Court for the Northern District of California. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). </s> [404 U.S. 15, 16]

United States Supreme Court OSBORNE v. OHIO(1990) No. 88-5986 Argued: December 5, 1989Decided: April 18, 1990 </s> After Ohio police found photographs in petitioner Osborne's home, each of which depicted a nude male adolescent posed in a sexually explicit position, he was convicted of violating a state statute prohibiting any person from possessing or viewing any material or performance showing a minor who is not his child or ward in a state of nudity, unless (a) the material or performance is presented for a bona fide purpose by or to a person having a proper interest therein, or (b) the possessor knows that the minor's parents or guardian has consented in writing to such photographing or use of the minor. An intermediate appellate court and the State Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The latter court rejected Osborne's contention that the First Amendment prohibits the States from proscribing the private possession of child pornography. The court also found that the statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad, since, in light of its specific exceptions, it must be read as only applying to depictions of nudity involving a lewd exhibition or graphic focus on the minor's genitals, and since scienter is an essential element of the offense. In rejecting Osborne's contention that the trial court erred in not requiring the government to prove lewd exhibition and scienter as elements of his crime, the court emphasized that he had not objected to the jury instructions given at his trial and stated that the failures of proof did not amount to plain error. </s> Held: </s> 1. Ohio may constitutionally proscribe the possession and viewing of child pornography. Even assuming that Osborne has a valid First Amendment interest in such activities, this case is distinct from Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 , which struck down a Georgia law outlawing the private possession of obscene material on the ground that the State's justifications for the law - primarily, that obscenity would poison the minds of its viewers - were inadequate. In contrast, Ohio does not rely on a paternalistic interest in regulating Osborne's mind, but has enacted its law on the basis of its compelling interests in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors and in destroying the market for the exploitative use of children by penalizing those who possess and view the offending materials. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 -758, 761-762. Moreover, Ohio's ban encourages possessors to destroy such materials, which permanently record the victim's abuse [495 U.S. 103, 104] and thus may haunt him for years to come, see id., at 759, and which, available evidence suggests, may be used by pedophiles to seduce other children. Pp. 108-111. </s> 2. Osborne's First Amendment overbreadth arguments are unpersuasive. Pp. 111-122. </s> (a) The Ohio statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad. Although, on its face, the statute purports to prohibit constitutionally protected depictions of nudity, it is doubtful that any overbreadth would be "substantial" under this Court's cases, in light of the statutory exemptions and "proper purposes" provisions. In any event, the statute, as construed by the Ohio Supreme Court, plainly survives overbreadth scrutiny. By limiting the statute's operation to nudity that constitutes lewd exhibition or focuses on genitals, that court avoided penalizing persons for viewing or possessing innocuous photographs of naked children and thereby rendered the "nudity" language permissible. See Ferber, supra, at 765. Moreover, the statute's failure, on its face, to provide a mens rea requirement is cured by the court's conclusion that the State must establish scienter under the Ohio default statute specifying that recklessness applies absent a statutory intent provision. Pp. 111-115. </s> (b) It was not impermissible for the State Supreme Court to rely on its narrowed construction of the statute when evaluating Osborne's overbreadth claim. A statute as construed may be applied to conduct occurring before the construction, provided such application affords fair warning to the defendant. See, e. g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491 , n. 7. It is obvious from the face of the child pornography statute, and from its placement within the "Sexual Offenses" chapter of the Ohio Code, that Osborne had notice that his possession of the photographs at issue was proscribed. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 ; Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 ; and Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 , distinguished. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 - which stands for the proposition that where a State Supreme Court narrows an unconstitutionally overbroad statute, the State must ensure that defendants are convicted under the statute as it is subsequently construed and not as it was originally written - does not conflict with the holding in this case. Nor does Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576 - in which five Justices agreed in a separate opinion that a state legislature could not cure a potential overbreadth problem through a postconviction statutory amendment - support Osborne's view that an overbroad statute is void as written, such that a court may not narrow it, affirm a conviction on the basis of the narrowing construction, and leave the statute in full force. Since courts routinely adopt the latter course, acceptance of Osborne's proposition would require a radical reworking of American law. [495 U.S. 103, 105] Moreover, the Oakes approach is based on the fear that legislators who know they can cure their own mistakes by amendment without significant cost may not be careful to avoid drafting overbroad laws in the first place. A similar effect will not be likely if a judicial construction of a statute to eliminate overbreadth is allowed to be applied in the case before the Court, since legislatures cannot be sure that the statute, when examined by a court, will be saved by a narrowing construction rather than invalidated for overbreadth, and since applying even a narrowed statute to pending cases might be barred by the Due Process Clause. Furthermore, requiring that statutes be facially invalidated whenever overbreadth is perceived would very likely invite reconsideration or redefinition of the overbreadth doctrine in a way that would not serve First Amendment interests. Pp. 115-122. </s> 3. Nevertheless, due process requires that Osborne's conviction be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial, since it is unclear whether the conviction was based on a finding that the State had proved each of the elements of the offense. It is true that this Court is precluded from reaching the due process challenge with respect to the scienter element of the crime because counsel's failure to comply with the state procedural rule requiring an objection to faulty jury instructions constitutes an independent state-law ground adequate to support the result below. However, this Court is not so barred with respect to counsel's failure to object to the failure to instruct on lewdness, since, shortly before the brief trial, counsel moved to dismiss on the ground that the statute was overbroad in its failure to allow the viewing of innocent nude photographs. Nothing would be gained by requiring counsel to object a second time, specifically to the jury instructions. The assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, may not be defeated under the name of local practice. Cf. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 421 -422. Pp. 122-125. </s> 37 Ohio St. 3d 249, 525 N. E. 2d 1363, reversed and remanded. </s> WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and BLACKMUN, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 126. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 126. </s> S. Adele Shank argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs were Randall M. Dana, John Quigley, and David Goldberger. [495 U.S. 103, 106] </s> Ronald J. O'Brien argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Attorneys General for the State of Arizona et al. by Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Attorney General of Ohio, Andrew I. Sutter, Assistant Attorney General, and Loren L. Braverman, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Robert K. Corbin of Arizona, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, James T. Jones of Idaho, Linley E. Pearson of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Robert T. Stephan of Kansas, James M. Shannon of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, William L. Webster of Missouri, Brian McKay of Nevada, Roger A. Tellinghuisen of South Dakota, and Kenneth O. Eikenberry of Washington; for the American Family Association, Inc., by Peggy M. Coleman; for the Children's Legal Foundation by Alan E. Sears; for Concerned Women for America et al. by H. Robert Showers, Wendell R. Bird, Jordan W. Lorence, and Cimron Campbell; and for Covenant House et al. by Gregory A. Loken and Judith Drazen Schretter. </s> JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In order to combat child pornography, Ohio enacted Rev. Code Ann. 2907.323(A)(3) (Supp. 1989), which provides in pertinent part: </s> "(A) No person shall do any of the following: </s> . . . . . </s> "(3) Possess or view any material or performance that shows a minor who is not the person's child or ward in a state of nudity, unless one of the following applies: </s> "(a) The material or performance is sold, disseminated, displayed, possessed, controlled, brought or caused to be brought into this state, or presented for a bona fide artistic, medical, scientific, educational, religious, governmental, judicial, or other proper purpose, by or to a physician, psychologist, sociologist, scientist, teacher, person pursuing bona fide studies or research, librarian, clergyman, prosecutor, judge, or other person having a proper interest in the material or performance. </s> "(b) The person knows that the parents, guardian, or custodian has consented in writing to the photographing [495 U.S. 103, 107] or use of the minor in a state of nudity and to the manner in which the material or performance is used or transferred." </s> Petitioner, Clyde Osborne, was convicted of violating this statute and sentenced to six months in prison, after the Columbus, Ohio, police, pursuant to a valid search, found four photographs in Osborne's home. Each photograph depicts a nude male adolescent posed in a sexually explicit position. 1 </s> The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed Osborne's conviction, after an intermediate appellate court did the same. State v. Young, 37 Ohio St. 3d 249, 525 N. E. 2d 1363 (1988). Relying on one of its earlier decisions, the court first rejected Osborne's contention that the First Amendment prohibits the States from proscribing the private possession of child pornography. </s> Next, the court found that 2907.323(A)(3) is not unconstitutionally overbroad. In so doing, the court, relying on the statutory exceptions, read 2907.323(A)(3) as only applying to depictions of nudity involving a lewd exhibition or graphic focus on a minor's genitals. The court also found that scienter is an essential element of a 2907.323(A)(3) offense. Osborne objected that the trial judge had not insisted that the government prove lewd exhibition and scienter as elements of his crime. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected these contentions because Osborne had failed to object to the [495 U.S. 103, 108] jury instructions given at his trial and the court did not believe that the failures of proof amounted to plain error. 2 </s> The Ohio Supreme Court denied a motion for rehearing, and granted a stay pending appeal to this Court. We noted probable jurisdiction last June. 492 U.S. 904 . </s> I </s> The threshold question in this case is whether Ohio may constitutionally proscribe the possession and viewing of child pornography or whether, as Osborne argues, our decision in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), compels the contrary result. In Stanley, we struck down a Georgia law outlawing the private possession of obscene material. We recognized that the statute impinged upon Stanley's right to receive information in the privacy of his home, and we found Georgia's justifications for its law inadequate. Id., at 564-568. 3 </s> Stanley should not be read too broadly. We have previously noted that Stanley was a narrow holding, see United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 127 (1973), and, since the decision in that case, the value of permitting child pornography has been characterized as "exceedingly modest, if not De minimis." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762 (1982). But assuming, for the sake of argument, that Osborne has a First Amendment interests in viewing and possessing child pornography, we nonetheless find this case distinct from Stanley because the interests underlying child pornography prohibitions far exceed the interests justifying the Georgia law at issue in Stanley. Every court to address the issue has so concluded. See, e. g., People v. Geever, 122 Ill. 2d 313, 327-328, 522 N. E. 2d 1200, 1206-1207 (1988); [495 U.S. 103, 109] Felton v. State, 526 So.2d 635, 637 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App.), aff'd sub nom. Ex parte Felton, 526 So.2d 638, 641 (Ala. 1988); State v. Davis, 53 Wash. App. 502, 505, 768 P.2d 499, 501 (1989); Savery v. State, 767 S. W. 2d 242, 245 (Tex. App. 1989); United States v. Boffardi, 684 F. Supp. 1263, 1267 (SDNY 1988). </s> In Stanley, Georgia primarily sought to proscribe the private possession of obscenity because it was concerned that obscenity would poison the minds of its viewers. 394 U.S., at 565 . 4 We responded that "[w]hatever the power of the state to control public dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's private thoughts." Id., at 566. The difference here is obvious: The State does not rely on a paternalistic interest in regulating Osborne's mind. Rather, Ohio has enacted 2907.323(A)(3) in order to protect the victims of child pornography; it hopes to destroy a market for the exploitative use of children. </s> "It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State's interest in `safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor' is `compelling'. . . . The legislative judgment, as well as the judgment found in relevant literature, is that the use of children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child. That judgment, we think, easily passes muster under the First Amendment." Ferber, 458 U.S., at 756 -758 (citations omitted). It is also surely reasonable for the State to conclude that it will decrease the production of child pornography if it penalizes those who possess and view the product, [495 U.S. 103, 110] thereby decreasing demand. In Ferber, where we upheld a New York statute outlawing the distribution of child pornography, we found a similar argument persuasive: "The advertising and selling of child pornography provide an economic motive for and are thus an integral part of the production of such materials, an activity illegal throughout the Nation. `It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.'" Id., at 761-762, quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949). </s> Osborne contends that the State should use other measures, besides penalizing possession, to dry up the child pornography market. Osborne points out that in Stanley we rejected Georgia's argument that its prohibition on obscenity possession was a necessary incident to its proscription on obscenity distribution. 394 U.S., at 567 -568. This holding, however, must be viewed in light of the weak interests asserted by the State in that case. Stanley itself emphasized that we did not "mean to express any opinion on statutes making criminal possession of other types of printed, filmed, or recorded materials . . . In such cases, compelling reasons may exist for overriding the right of the individual to possess those materials." Id., at 568, n. 11. 5 </s> Given the importance of the State's interest in protecting the victims of child pornography, we cannot fault Ohio for attempting to stamp out this vice at all levels in the distribution chain. According to the State, since the time of our decision in Ferber, much of the child pornography market has been driven underground; as a result, it is now difficult, if not impossible, to solve the child pornography problem by only attacking production and distribution. Indeed, 19 States [495 U.S. 103, 111] have found it necessary to proscribe the possession of this material. 6 </s> Other interests also support the Ohio law. First, as Ferber recognized, the materials produced by child pornographers permanently record the victim's abuse. The pornography's continued existence causes the child victims continuing harm by haunting the children in years to come. 458 U.S., at 759 . The State's ban on possession and viewing encourages the possessors of these materials to destroy them. Second, encouraging the destruction of these materials is also desirable because evidence suggests that pedophiles use child pornography to seduce other children into sexual activity. 7 </s> Given the gravity of the State's interests in this context, we find that Ohio may constitutionally proscribe the possession and viewing of child pornography. </s> II </s> Osborne next argues that even if the State may constitutionally ban the possession of child pornography, his conviction [495 U.S. 103, 112] is invalid because 2907.323(A)(3) is unconstitutionally overbroad in that it criminalizes an intolerable range of constitutionally protected conduct. 8 In our previous decisions discussing the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, we have repeatedly emphasized that where a statute regulates expressive conduct, the scope of the statute does not render it unconstitutional unless its overbreadth is not only "real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). Even where a statute at its margins infringes on protected expression, "facial invalidation is inappropriate if the `remainder of the statute . . . covers a whole range of easily identifiable and constitutionally proscribable . . . conduct . . . .'" New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S., at 770 , n. 25. </s> The Ohio statute, on its face, purports to prohibit the possession of "nude" photographs of minors. We have stated that depictions of nudity, without more, constitute protected expression. See Ferber, supra, at 765, n. 18. Relying on this observation, Osborne argues that the statute as written is substantially overbroad. We are skeptical of this claim because, in light of the statute's exemptions and "proper purposes" provisions, the statute may not be substantially overbroad under our cases. 9 However that may be, Osborne's [495 U.S. 103, 113] overbreadth challenge, in any event, fails because the statute, as construed by the Ohio Supreme Court on Osborne's direct appeal, plainly survives overbreadth scrutiny. Under the Ohio Supreme Court reading, the statute prohibits "the possession or viewing of material or performance of a minor who is in a state of nudity, where such nudity constitutes a lewd exhibition or involves a graphic focus on the genitals, and where the person charged." 37 Ohio St. 3d, at 252, 525 N. E. 2d, at 1368. 10 By limiting the statute's operation in [495 U.S. 103, 114] this manner, the Ohio Supreme Court avoided penalizing persons for viewing or possessing innocuous photographs of naked children. We have upheld similar language against overbreadth challenges in the past. In Ferber, we affirmed a conviction under a New York statute that made it a crime to promote the "`lewd exhibition of [a child's] genitals.'" 458 U.S., at 751 . We noted that "[t]he term `lewd exhibition of the genitals' is not unknown in this area and, indeed, was given in Miller [v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973),] as an example of a permissible regulation." Id., at 765. 11 </s> [495 U.S. 103, 115] </s> The Ohio Supreme Court also concluded that the State had to establish scienter in order to prove a violation of 2907.323 (A)(3) based on the Ohio default statute specifying that recklessness applies when another statutory provision lacks an intent specification. See n. 9, supra. The statute on its face lacks a mens rea requirement, but that omission brings into play and is cured by another law that plainly satisfies the requirement laid down in Ferber that prohibitions on child pornography include some element of scienter. 458 U.S., at 765 . </s> Osborne contends that it was impermissible for the Ohio Supreme Court to apply its construction of 2907.323(A)(3) to him - i. e., to rely on the narrowed construction of the statute when evaluating his overbreadth claim. Our cases, however, have long held that a statute as construed "may be applied to conduct occurring prior to the construction, provided such application affords fair warning to the defendan[t]." Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491 , n. 7 (1965) (citations omitted). 12 In Hamling v. United States, [495 U.S. 103, 116] 418 U.S. 87 (1974), for example, we reviewed the petitioners' convictions for mailing and conspiring to mail an obscene advertising brochure under 18 U.S.C. 1461. That statute makes it a crime to mail an "obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device, or substance." In Hamling, for the first time, we construed the term "obscenity" as used in 1461 "to be limited to the sort of `patently offensive representations or depictions of that specific "hard core" sexual conduct given as examples in Miller v. California.'" In light of this construction, we rejected the petitioners' facial challenge to the statute as written, and we affirmed the petitioners' convictions under the section after finding that the petitioners had fair notice that their conduct was criminal. 418 U.S., at 114 -116. </s> Like the Hamling petitioners, Osborne had notice that his conduct was proscribed. It is obvious from the face of 2907.323(A)(3) that the goal of the statute is to eradicate child pornography. The provision criminalizes the viewing and possessing of material depicting children in a state of nudity for other than "proper purposes." The provision appears in the "Sex Offenses" chapter of the Ohio Code. Section 2907.323 is preceded by 2907.322, which proscribes "[p]andering sexually oriented matter involving a minor," and followed by 2907.33, which proscribes "[d]eception to obtain matter harmful to juveniles." That Osborne's photographs of adolescent boys in sexually explicit situations constitute child pornography hardly needs elaboration. Therefore, although 2907.323(A)(3) as written may have been imprecise at its fringes, someone in Osborne's position would not be surprised to learn that his possession of the four photographs at issue in this case constituted a crime. </s> Because Osborne had notice that his conduct was criminal, his case differs from three cases upon which he relies: Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), Rabe v. Washington, [495 U.S. 103, 117] 405 U.S. 313 (1972), and Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977). In Bouie, the petitioners had refused to leave a restaurant after being asked to do so by the restaurant's manager. Although the manager had not objected when the petitioners entered the restaurant, the petitioners were convicted of violating a South Carolina trespass statute proscribing "`entry upon the lands of another . . . after notice from the owner or tenant prohibiting such entry.'" 378 U.S., at 349 . Affirming the convictions, the South Carolina Supreme Court construed the trespass law as also making it a crime for an individual to remain on another's land after being asked to leave. We reversed the convictions on due process grounds because the South Carolina Supreme Court's expansion of the statute was unforseeable and therefore the petitioners had no reason to suspect that their conduct was criminal. Id., at 350-352. </s> Likewise, in Rabe v. Washington, supra, the petitioner had been convicted of violating a Washington obscenity statute that, by its terms, did not proscribe the defendant's conduct. On the petitioner's appeal, the Washington Supreme Court nevertheless affirmed the petitioner's conviction, after construing the Washington obscenity statute to reach the petitioner. We overturned the conviction because the Washington Supreme Court's broadening of the statute was unexpected; therefore the petitioner had no warning that his actions were proscribed. Id., at 315. </s> And, in Marks v. United States, supra, we held that the retroactive application of the obscenity standards announced in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), to the potential detriment of the defendant violated the Due Process Clause because, at the time that the defendant committed the challenged conduct, our decision in Memoirs v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), provided the governing law. The defendant could not suspect that his actions would later become criminal when we expanded the range of constitutionally proscribable conduct in Miller. [495 U.S. 103, 118] </s> Osborne suggests that our decision here is inconsistent with Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965). We disagree. In Shuttlesworth, the defendant had been convicted of violating an Alabama ordinance that, when read literally, provided that "a person may stand on a public sidewalk in Birmingham only at the whim of any police officer of that city." Id., at 90. We stated that "[t]he constitutional vice of so broad a provision needs no demonstration." Ibid. As subsequently construed by the Alabama Supreme Court, however, the ordinance merely made it criminal for an individual who was blocking free passage along a public street to disobey a police officer's order to move. We noted that "[i]t is our duty, of course, to accept this state judicial construction of the ordinance. . . . As so construed, we cannot say that the ordinance is unconstitutional, though it requires no great feat of imagination to envisage situations in which such an ordinance might be unconstitutionally applied." Id., at 91. We nevertheless reversed the defendant's conviction because it was not clear that the State had convicted the defendant under the ordinance as construed rather than as written. Id., at 91-92. 13 Shuttlesworth, then, stands for the proposition that where a State Supreme Court narrows an unconstitutionally overbroad statute, the State must ensure that defendants are convicted under the statute as it is subsequently construed and not as it was originally written; this proposition in no way conflicts with our holding in this case. </s> Finally, despite Osborne's contention to the contrary, we do not believe that Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576 (1989), supports his theory of this case. In Oakes, the petitioner challenged a Massachusetts pornography statute as [495 U.S. 103, 119] overbroad; since the time of the defendant's alleged crime, however, the State had substantially narrowed the statute through a subsequent legislative enactment - an amendment to the statute. In a separate opinion, five Justices agreed that the state legislature could not cure the potential over-breadth problem through the subsequent legislative action; the statute was void as written. Id., at 585-586. </s> Osborne contends that Oakes stands for a similar but distinct proposition that, when faced with a potentially overinclusive statute, a court may not construe the statute to avoid overbreadth problems and then apply the statute, as construed, to past conduct. The implication of this argument is that if a statute is overbroad as written, then the statute is void and incurable. As a result, when reviewing a conviction under a potentially overbroad statute, a court must either affirm or strike down the statute on its face, but the court may not, as the Ohio Supreme Court did in this case, narrow the statute, affirm on the basis of the narrowing construction, and leave the statute in full force. We disagree. </s> First, as indicated by our earlier discussion, if we accepted this proposition, it would require a radical reworking of our law. Courts routinely construe statutes so as to avoid the statutes' potentially overbroad reach, apply the statute in that case, and leave the statute in place. In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), for example, the Court construed the open-ended terms used in 18 U.S.C. 1461, which prohibits the mailing of material that is "obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile." Justice Harlan characterized Roth in this way: </s> "The words of 1461, `obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile,' connote something that is portrayed in a manner so offensive as to make it unacceptable under current community mores. While in common usage the words have different shades of meaning, the statute since its inception has always been taken as aimed at obnoxiously debasing portrayals of sex. Although the [495 U.S. 103, 120] statute condemns such material irrespective of the effect it may have upon those into whose hands it falls, the early case of United States v. Bennet, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093 (No. 14571), put a limiting gloss upon the statutory language: the statute reaches only indecent material which, as now expressed in Roth v. United States, supra, at 489, `taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.'" Manuel Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 482 -484 (1962) (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original). </s> See also, Hamling, 418 U.S., at 112 (quoting the above). The petitioner's conviction was affirmed in Roth, and federal obscenity law was left in force. 354 U.S., at 494 . 14 We, moreover, have long respected the State Supreme Courts' ability to narrow state statutes so as to limit the statute's scope to unprotected conduct. See, e. g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). </s> Second, we do not believe that Oakes compels the proposition that Osborne urges us to accept. In Oakes, JUSTICE SCALIA, writing for himself and four others, reasoned: </s> "The overbreadth doctrine serves to protect constitutionally legitimate speech not merely ex post, that is, after the offending statute is enacted, but also ex ante, that is, when the legislature is contemplating what sort of statute to enact. If the promulgation of overbroad laws affecting speech was cost free. . . that is, if no conviction of constitutionally proscribable conduct would be [495 U.S. 103, 121] lost, so long as the offending statute was narrowed before the final appeal . . . then legislatures would have significantly reduced incentive to stay within constitutional bounds in the first place. When one takes account of those overbroad statutes that are never challenged, and of the time that elapses before the ones that are challenged are amended to come within constitutional bounds, a substantial amount of legitimate speech would be `chilled'. . . ." 491 U.S., at 586 (emphasis in original). </s> In other words, five of the Oakes Justices feared that if we allowed a legislature to correct its mistakes without paying for them (beyond the inconvenience of passing a new law), we would decrease the legislature's incentive to draft a narrowly tailored law in the first place. </s> Legislators who know they can cure their own mistakes by amendment without significant cost may not be as careful to avoid drafting overbroad statutes as they might otherwise be. But a similar effect will not be likely if a judicial construction of a statute to eliminate overbreadth is allowed to be applied in the case before the court. This is so primarily because the legislatures cannot be sure that the statute, when examined by a court, will be saved by a narrowing construction rather than invalidated for overbreadth. In the latter event, there could be no convictions under that law even of those whose own conduct is unprotected by the First Amendment. Even if construed to obviate overbreadth, applying the statute to pending cases might be barred by the Due Process Clause. Thus, careless drafting cannot be considered to be cost free based on the power of the courts to eliminate overbreadth by statutory construction. </s> There are also other considerations. Osborne contends that when courts construe statutes so as to eliminate overbreadth, convictions of those found guilty of unprotected conduct covered by the statute must be reversed and any further [495 U.S. 103, 122] convictions for prior reprehensible conduct are barred. 15 Furthermore, because he contends that overbroad laws implicating First Amendment interests are nullities and incapable of valid application from the outset, this would mean that judicial construction could not save the statute even as applied to subsequent conduct unprotected by the First Amendment. The overbreadth doctrine, as we have recognized, is indeed "strong medicine," Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S., at 613 , and requiring that statutes be facially invalidated whenever overbreadth is perceived would very likely invite reconsideration or redefinition of the doctrine in a way that would not serve First Amendment interests. 16 </s> III </s> Having rejected Osborne's Stanley and overbreadth arguments, we now reach Osborne's final objection to his conviction: his contention that he was denied due process because it is unclear that his conviction was based on a finding that each of the elements of 2907.323(A)(3) was present. 17 According [495 U.S. 103, 123] to the Ohio Supreme Court, in order to secure a conviction under 2907.323(A)(3), the State must prove both scienter and that the defendant possessed material depicting a lewd exhibition or a graphic focus on genitals. The jury in this case was not instructed that it could convict Osborne only for conduct that satisfied these requirements. </s> The State concedes the omissions in the jury instructions, but argues that Osborne waived his right to assert this due process challenge because he failed to object when the instructions were given at his trial. The Ohio Supreme Court so held, citing Ohio law. The question before us now, therefore, is whether we are precluded from reaching Osborne's due process challenge because counsel's failure to comply with the procedural rule constitutes an independent state-law ground adequate to support the result below. We have no difficulty agreeing with the State that Osborne's counsel's failure to urge that the court instruct the jury on scienter constitutes an independent and adequate state-law ground preventing us from reaching Osborne's due process contention on that point. Ohio law states that proof of scienter is required in instances, like the present one, where a criminal statute does not specify the applicable mental state. See n. 9, supra. The state procedural rule, moreover, serves the State's important interest in ensuring that counsel do their part in preventing trial courts from providing juries with erroneous instructions. </s> With respect to the trial court's failure to instruct on lewdness, however, we reach a different conclusion: Based upon our review of the record, we believe that counsel's failure to object on this point does not prevent us from considering Osborne's constitutional claim. Osborne's trial was brief: The State called only the two arresting officers to the stand; the defense summoned only Osborne himself. Right before trial, Osborne's counsel moved to dismiss the case, contending [495 U.S. 103, 124] that 2907.323(A)(3) is unconstitutionally overbroad. Counsel stated: </s> "I'm filing a motion to dismiss based on the fact that [the] statute is void for vagueness, overbroad . . . The statute's overbroad because . . . a person couldn't have pictures of his own grandchildren; probably couldn't even have nude photographs of himself. </s> "Judge, if you had some nude photos of yourself when you were a child, you would probably be violating the law . . . . </s> . . . . . </s> "So grandparents, neighbors, or other people who happen to view the photograph are criminally liable under the statute. And on that basis I'm going to ask the Court to dismiss the case." Tr. 3-4. </s> The prosecutor informed the trial judge that a number of Ohio state courts had recently rejected identical motions challenging 2907.323(A)(3). Tr. 5-6. The court then overruled the motion. Id., at 7. Immediately thereafter, Osborne's counsel proposed various jury instructions. Ibid. </s> Given this sequence of events, we believe that we may reach Osborne's due process claim because we are convinced that Osborne's attorney pressed the issue of the State's failure of proof on lewdness before the trial court and, under the circumstances, nothing would be gained by requiring Osborne's lawyer to object a second time, specifically to the jury instructions. The trial judge, in no uncertain terms, rejected counsel's argument that the statute as written was overbroad. The State contends that counsel should then have insisted that the court instruct the jury on lewdness because, absent a finding that this element existed, a conviction would be unconstitutional. Were we to accept this position, we would "`force resort to an arid ritual of meaningless form,'. . . and would further no perceivable state interest." James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 349 (1984), quoting Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 320 (1958), and citing Henry [495 U.S. 103, 125] v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 448 -449 (1965). As Justice Holmes warned us years ago, "[w]hatever springes the State may set for those who are endeavoring to assert rights that the State confers, the assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name of local practice." Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24 (1923). </s> Our decision here is analogous to our decision in Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). In that case, the Alabama Supreme Court had held that a defendant had waived his Confrontation Clause objection to the reading into evidence of a confession that he had given. Although not following the precise procedure required by Alabama law, 18 the defendant had unsuccessfully objected to the prosecution's use of the confession. We followed "our consistent holdings that the adequacy of state procedural bars to the assertion of federal questions is itself a federal question" and stated that "[i]n determining the sufficiency of objections we have applied the general principle that an objection which is ample and timely to bring the alleged federal error to the attention of the trial court and enable it to take appropriate corrective action is sufficient to serve legitimate state interests, and therefore sufficient to preserve the claim for review here." Id., at 422. Concluding that "[n]o legitimate state interest would have been served by requiring repetition of a patently futile objection," we held that the Alabama procedural ruling did not preclude our consideration of the defendant's constitutional claim. Id., at 421-422. We reach a similar conclusion in this case. </s> IV </s> To conclude, although we find Osborne's First Amendment arguments unpersuasive, we reverse his conviction and remand [495 U.S. 103, 126] for a new trial in order to ensure that Osborne's conviction stemmed from a finding that the State had proved each of the elements of 2907.323(A)(3). </s> So ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Osborne contends that the subject in all of the pictures is the same boy; Osborne testified at trial that he was told that the youth was 14 at the time that the photographs were taken. App. 16. The government maintains that three of the pictures are of one boy and one of the pictures is of another. Three photographs depict the same boy in different positions: sitting with his legs over his head and his anus exposed; lying down with an erect penis and with an electrical object in his hand; and lying down with a plastic object which appears to be inserted in his anus. The fourth photograph depicts a nude standing boy; it is unclear whether this subject is the same boy photographed in the other pictures because the photograph only depicts the boy's torso. </s> [Footnote 2 Osborne also unsuccessfully raised a number of other challenges that are not at issue before this Court. </s> [Footnote 3 We have since indicated that our decision in Stanley was "firmly grounded in the First Amendment." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986). </s> [Footnote 4 Georgia also argued that its ban on possession was a necessary complement to its ban on distribution (see discussion infra, at 110) and that the possession law benefited the public because, according to the State, exposure to obscene material might lead to deviant sexual behavior or crimes of sexual violence. 394 U.S., at 566 . We found a lack of empirical evidence supporting the latter claim and stated that "`[a]mong free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the law . . . .'" Id., at 566-567 (citation omitted). </s> [Footnote 5 As the dissent notes, see post, at 141, n. 16, the Stanley Court cited illicit possession of defense information as an example of the type of offense for which compelling state interests might justify a ban on possession. Stanley, however, did not suggest that this crime exhausted the entire category of proscribable offenses. </s> [Footnote 6 Ala. Code 13A-12-192 (1988); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 13-3553 (1989); Colo. Rev. Stat. 18-6-403 (Supp. 1989); Fla. Stat. 827.071 (1989); Ga. Code Ann. 16-12-100 (1989); Idaho Code 18-1507 (1987); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, § 11-20-.1 (1987); Kans. Stat. Ann. 21-3516 (Supp. 1989); Minn. Stat. 617.247 (1988); Mo. Rev. Stat. 573.037 (Supp. 1989); Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-809 (1989); Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.730 (1987); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2907.322 and 2907.323 (Supp. 1989); Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, 1021.2 (Supp. 1989); S. D. Codified Laws Ann. 22-22-23, 22-22-23.1 (1988); Tex. Penal Code Ann. 43.26 (1989 and Supp. 1989-1990); Utah Code Ann. 76-5a-3(1)(a) (Supp. 1989); Wash. Rev. Code 9.68A.070 (1989); W. Va. Code 61-8C-3 (1989). </s> [Footnote 7 The Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, for example, states: "Child pornography is often used as part of a method of seducing child victims. A child who is reluctant to engage in sexual activity with an adult or to pose for sexually explicit photos can sometimes be convinced by viewing other children having `fun' participating in the activity." 1 Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, Final Report 649 (1986) (footnotes omitted). See also, D. Campagna and D. Poffenberger, Sexual Trafficking in Children 118 (1988); S. O'Brien, Child Pornography 89 (1983). </s> [Footnote 8 In the First Amendment context, we permit defendants to challenge statutes on overbreadth grounds, regardless of whether the individual defendant's conduct is constitutionally protected. "The First Amendment doctrine of substantial overbreadth is an exception to the general rule that a person to whom a statute may be constitutionally applied cannot challenge the statute on the ground that it may be unconstitutionally applied to others." Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 581 (1989). </s> [Footnote 9 The statute applies only where an individual possesses or views the depiction of a minor "who is not the person's child or ward." The State, moreover, does not impose criminal liability if either "[t]he material or performance is sold, disseminated, displayed, possessed, controlled, brought or caused to be brought into this state, or presented for a bona fide artistic, medical, scientific, educational, religious, governmental, [495 U.S. 103, 113] judicial, or other proper purpose, by or to a physician, psychologist, sociologist, scientist, teacher, person pursuing bona fide studies or research, librarian, clergyman, prosecutor, judge, or other person having a proper interest in the material or performance," or "[t]he person knows that the parents, guardian, or custodian has consented in writing to the photographing or use of the minor in a state of nudity and to the manner in which the material or performance is used or transferred." It is true that, despite the statutory exceptions, one might imagine circumstances in which the statute, by its terms, criminalizes constitutionally protected conduct. If, for example, a parent gave a family friend a picture of the parent's infant taken while the infant was unclothed, the statute would apply. But, given the broad statutory exceptions and the prevalence of child pornography, it is far from clear that the instances where the statute applies to constitutionally protected conduct are significant enough to warrant a finding that the statute is overbroad. Cf. Oakes, supra, at 589-590 (opinion of SCALIA, J., joined by BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). </s> Nor do we find very persuasive Osborne's contention that the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad because it applies in instances where viewers or possessors lack scienter. Although 2907.323(A)(3) does not specify a mental state, Ohio law provides that recklessness is the appropriate mens rea where a statute "neither specifies culpability nor plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict liability." Ohio Rev. Stat. Ann. 2901.21(B) (1987). </s> We also do not find any merit to Osborne's claim that 2907.323(A)(3) is unconstitutionally vague because it does not define the term "minor." Under Ohio law, a minor is anyone under 18 years of age. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 3109.01 (1989). </s> [Footnote 10 The Ohio court reached this conclusion because "when the `proper purposes' exceptions set forth in R. C. 2907.323(A)(3)(a) and (b) are considered, the scope of the prohibited conduct narrows significantly. The [495 U.S. 103, 114] clear purpose of these exceptions . . . is to sanction the possession or viewing of material depicting nude minors where that conduct is morally innocent. Thus, the only conduct prohibited by the statute is conduct which is not morally innocent, i. e., the possession or viewing of the described material for prurient purposes. So construed, the statute's proscription is not so broad as to outlaw all depictions of minors in a state of nudity, but rather only those depictions which constitute child pornography." 37 Ohio St. 3d, at 251-252, 525 N. E. 2d, at 1367-1368 (emphasis in original). </s> [Footnote 11 The statute upheld against an overbreadth challenge in Ferber was, moreover, arguably less narrowly tailored than the statute challenged in this case because, unlike 2907.323(A)(3), the New York law did not provide a broad range of exceptions to the general prohibition on lewd exhibition of the genitals. Despite this lack of exceptions, we upheld the New York law, reasoning that "[h]ow often, if ever, it may be necessary to employ children to engage in conduct clearly within the reach of [the statute] in order to produce educational, medical, or artistic works cannot be known with certainty. Yet we seriously doubt, and it has not been suggested, that these arguably impermissible applications of the statute amount to more than a tiny fraction of the materials within the statute's reach." 458 U.S., at 773 . </s> The dissent distinguishes the Ohio statute, as construed, from the statute upheld in Ferber on the ground that the Ohio statute proscribes "`lewd exhibitions of nudity' rather than `lewd exhibitions of the genitals.'" See post, at 129 (emphasis in original). The dissent notes that Ohio defines nudity to include depictions of public areas, buttocks, the female breast, and covered male genitals "in a discernibly turgid state." Post, at 130. We do not agree that this distinction between body areas and specific body parts is constitutionally significant: The crucial question is whether the depiction is lewd, not whether the depiction happens to focus on the genitals or the buttocks. In any event, however, [495 U.S. 103, 115] Osborne would not be entitled to relief. The context of the opinion indicates that the Ohio Supreme Court believed that "the term `nudity' as used in R. C. 2907.323(A)(3) refers to a lewd exhibition of the genitals." State v. Young, 37 Ohio St. 3d 249, 258, 525 N. E. 2d 1363, 1373 (1988). </s> We do not concede, as the dissent suggests, see post, at 131, n. 5, that the statute as construed might proscribe a family friend's possession of an innocuous picture of an unclothed infant. We acknowledge (see n. 9, supra) that the statute as written might reach such conduct, but as construed the statute would surely not apply because the photograph would not involve a "lewd exhibition or graphic focus on the genitals" of the child. </s> [Footnote 12 This principle, of course, accords with the rationale underlying overbreadth challenges. We normally do not allow a defendant to challenge a law as it is applied to others. In the First Amendment context, however, we have said that "[b]ecause of the sensitive nature of constitutionally protected expression, we have not required that all those subject to overbroad regulations risk prosecution to test their rights. For free expression - of transcendent value to all society, and not merely to those exercising their rights - might be the loser." Dombrowski, 380 U.S., at 486 . But once a statute is authoritatively construed, there is no longer any danger that protected speech will be deterred and [495 U.S. 103, 116] therefore no longer any reason to entertain the defendant's challenge to the statute on its face. </s> [Footnote 13 In Shuttlesworth, we also overturned the defendant's conviction for violating another part of the same Alabama ordinance because that provision had been interpreted as criminalizing an individual's failure to follow a policeman's directions when the policeman was directing traffic, and the crime alleged in Shuttlesworth had nothing to do with motor traffic. 382 U.S., at 93 -95. </s> [Footnote 14 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 76 -80 (1976), is another landmark case where a law was construed to avoid potential overbreadth problems and left in place. Section 304(e) of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. 434(e) (1976 ed.), imposed certain reporting requirements on "[e]very person . . . who makes contributions or independent expenditures" exceeding $100 "other than by contribution to a political committee or candidate." We stated that "[t]o insure that the reach of 434(e) is not impermissibly broad, we construe `expenditure' for purposes of that section . . . to reach only funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate." The section was upheld as construed. 424 U.S., at 80 (footnote omitted). </s> [Footnote 15 Under Osborne's submission, even where the construction eliminating overbreadth occurs in a civil case, the statute could not be applied to conduct occurring prior to the decision; for although plainly within reach of the terms of the statute and plainly not otherwise protected by the First Amendment, until the statute was narrowed to comply with the Amendment, the conduct was not illegal. </s> [Footnote 16 In terms of applying a ruling to pending cases, we see no difference of constitutional import between a court affirming a conviction after construing a statute to avoid facial invalidation on the ground of overbreadth, and affirming a conviction after rejecting a claim that the conduct at issue is not within the terms of the statute. In both situations, the Due Process Clause would require fair warning to the defendant that the statutory proscription, as construed, covers his conduct. But even with the due process limitation, courts repeatedly affirm convictions after rejecting nonfrivolous claims that the conduct at issue is not forbidden by the terms of the statute. As argued earlier, there is no doubt whatsoever that Osborne's conduct is proscribed by the terms of the child pornography statute involved here. </s> [Footnote 17 "[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to [495 U.S. 103, 123] constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). </s> [Footnote 18 The Alabama court had stated: "`There must be a ruling sought and acted on before the trial judge can be put in error. Here there was no ruling asked or invoked as to the questions embracing the alleged confession.'" 380 U.S., at 421 (citation omitted). </s> JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring. </s> I join the Court's opinion. I write separately only to express my agreement with JUSTICE BRENNAN, see post, at 146, n. 20, that this Court's ability to entertain Osborne's due process claim premised on the failure of the trial court to charge the "lewd exhibition" and "graphic focus" elements does not depend upon his objection to this failure at trial. </s> JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting. </s> I agree with the Court that appellant's conviction must be reversed. I do not agree, however, that Ohio is free on remand to retry him under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2907.323(A)(3) (Supp. 1989) as it currently exists. In my view, the state law, even as construed authoritatively by the Ohio Supreme Court, is still fatally overbroad, and our decision in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), prevents the State from criminalizing appellant's possession of the photographs at issue in this case. I therefore respectfully dissent. </s> I </s> A </s> As written, the Ohio statute is plainly overbroad. Section 2907.323(A)(3) makes it a crime to "[p]ossess or view any material or performance that shows a minor who is not the person's child or ward in a state of nudity." Another section defines "nudity" as </s> "the showing, representation, or depiction of human male or female genitals, pubic area, or buttocks with less than a full, opaque covering, or of a female breast with less than a full opaque covering of any portion thereof [495 U.S. 103, 127] below the top of the nipple, or of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state." 2907.01(H). </s> In short, 2907.323 and 2907.01(H) use simple nudity, without more, as a way of defining child pornography. 1 But as our prior decisions have made clear, "`nudity alone' does not place otherwise protected material outside the mantle of the First Amendment." Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) (quoting Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974)); see also FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 224 (1990) (plurality opinion); id., at 238, n. 1 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 -933 (1975); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 -558 (1975); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972). In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 (1975), for example, we invalidated an ordinance that "would [have] bar[red] a film containing a picture of a baby's buttocks, the nude body of a war victim, or scenes from a culture in which nudity is indigenous. The ordinance also might [have] prohibit[ed] newsreel scenes of the opening of an art exhibit as well as shots of bathers on a beach." The Ohio law as written has the same broad coverage and is similarly unconstitutional. 2 </s> [495 U.S. 103, 128] </s> B </s> Wary of the statute's use of the "nudity" standard, the Ohio Supreme Court construed 2907.323(A)(3) to apply only "where such nudity constitutes a lewd exhibition or involves a graphic focus on the genitals." State v. Young, 37 Ohio St. 3d 249, 252, 525 N. E. 2d 1363, 1368 (1988). The "lewd exhibition" and "graphic focus" tests not only fail to cure the overbreadth of the statute, but they also create a new problem of vagueness. </s> 1 </s> The Court dismisses appellant's overbreadth contention in a single cursory paragraph. Relying exclusively on our previous decision in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), 3 </s> [495 U.S. 103, 129] the majority reasons that the "lewd exhibition" standard adequately narrows the statute's ambit because "[w]e have upheld similar language against overbreadth challenges in the past." Ante, at 114. The Court's terse explanation is unsatisfactory, since Ferber involved a law that differs in crucial respects from the one here. </s> The New York law at issue in Ferber criminalized the use of a child in a "`[s]exual performance,'" defined as "`any performance or part thereof which includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age.'" 458 U.S., at 751 (quoting N. Y. Penal Law 263.00(1) (McKinney 1980)). "`"Sexual conduct"'" was in turn defined as "`actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals.'" 458 U.S., at 751 (quoting 263.00 (3)). Although we acknowledged that "nudity, without more[,] is protected expression," id., at 765, n. 18, we found that the statute was not overbroad because only "a tiny fraction of materials within the statute's reach" was constitutionally protected. Id., at 773; see also id., at 776 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment). We therefore upheld the conviction of a bookstore proprietor who sold films depicting young boys masturbating. </s> The Ohio law is distinguishable for several reasons. First, the New York statute did not criminalize materials with a "graphic focus" on the genitals, and, as discussed further below, Ohio's "graphic focus" test is impermissibly capacious. Even setting aside the "graphic focus" element, the Ohio Supreme Court's narrowing construction is still overbroad because it focuses on "lewd exhibitions of nudity" rather than "lewd exhibitions of the genitals" in the context of sexual conduct, as in the New York statute at issue in Ferber. 4 </s> [495 U.S. 103, 130] Ohio law defines "nudity" to include depictions of pubic areas, buttocks, the female breast, and covered male genitals "in a discernibly turgid state," as well as depictions of the genitals. On its face, then, the Ohio law is much broader than New York's. </s> In addition, whereas the Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation uses the "lewd exhibition of nudity" test standing alone, the New York law employed the phrase "`lewd exhibition of [495 U.S. 103, 131] the genitals'" in the context of a longer list of examples of sexual conduct: "`actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, [and] sado-masochistic abuse.'" 458 U.S., at 751 . This syntax was important to our decision in Ferber. We recognized the potential for impermissible applications of the New York statute, see id., at 773, but in view of the examples of "sexual conduct" provided by the statute, we were willing to assume that the New York courts would not "widen the possibly invalid reach of the statute by giving an expansive construction to the proscription on `lewd exhibition[s] of the genitals.'" Ibid. (emphasis added). In the Ohio statute, of course, there is no analog to the elaborate definition of "sexual conduct" to serve as a similar limit. Hence, while the New York law could be saved at least in part by the notion of ejusdem generis, see 2A C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Construction 47.17, p. 166 (4th ed. 1984), the Ohio Supreme Court's construction of its law cannot. </s> Indeed, the broad definition of nudity in the Ohio statutory scheme means that "child pornography" could include any photograph depicting a "lewd exhibition" of even a small portion of a minor's buttocks or any part of the female breast below the nipple. Pictures of topless bathers at a Mediterranean beach, of teenagers in revealing dresses, and even of toddlers romping unclothed, all might be prohibited. 5 Furthermore, [495 U.S. 103, 132] the Ohio law forbids not only depictions of nudity per se, but also depictions of the buttocks, breast, or pubic area with less than a "full, opaque covering." Thus, pictures of fashion models wearing semitransparent clothing might be illegal, 6 as might a photograph depicting a fully clad male that nevertheless captured his genitals "in a discernibly turgid state." The Ohio statute thus sweeps in many types of materials that are not "child pornography," as we used that term in Ferber, but rather that enjoy full First Amendment protection. </s> It might be objected that many of these depictions of nudity do not amount to "lewd exhibitions." But in the absence of any authoritative definition of that phrase by the Ohio Supreme Court, we cannot predict which ones. Many would characterize a photograph of a seductive fashion model or alluringly posed adolescent on a topless European beach as "lewd," although such pictures indisputably enjoy constitutional protection. Indeed, some might think that any nudity, especially that involving a minor, is by definition "lewd," yet this Court has clearly established that nudity is not excluded [495 U.S. 103, 133] automatically from the scope of the First Amendment. The Court today is unable even to hazard a guess as to what a "lewd exhibition" might mean; it is forced to rely entirely on an inapposite case - Ferber - that simply did not discuss, let alone decide, the central issue here. </s> The Ohio Supreme Court provided few clues as to the meaning of the phrase "lewd exhibition of nudity." The court distinguished "child pornography" from "obscenity," see 37 Ohio St. 3d, at 257, 525 N. E. 2d, at 1372, thereby implying that it did not believe that an exhibition was required to be "obscene" in order to qualify as "lewd." 7 But it supplied no authoritative definition - a disturbing omission in light of the absence of the phrase "lewd exhibition" from the statutory definition section of the Sex Offenses chapter of the Ohio Revised Code. See 2907.01. 8 In fact, the word [495 U.S. 103, 134] "lewd" does not appear in the statutory definition of any crime involving obscenity or other sexually oriented materials in the Ohio Revised Code. See 2907.31-2907.35. [495 U.S. 103, 135] Thus, when the Ohio Supreme Court grafted the "lewd exhibition" test onto the definition of nudity, it was venturing into uncharted territory. 9 </s> Moreover, there is no longstanding, commonly understood definition of "lewd" upon which the Ohio Supreme Court's construction might be said to draw that can save the "lewd exhibition" standard from impermissible vagueness. 10 At [495 U.S. 103, 136] common law, the term "lewd" included "any gross indecency so notorious as to tend to corrupt community morals," Collins v. State, 160 Ga. App. 680, 682, 288 S. E. 2d 43, 45 (1981), an approach that was "subjective" and dependent entirely on a speaker's "social, moral, and cultural bias." Morgan v. Detroit, 389 F. Supp. 922, 930 (ED Mich. 1975). 11 Not surprisingly, States with long experience in applying indecency laws have learned that the word "lewd" is "too indefinite and uncertain to be enforceable." Courtemanche v. State, 507 S. W. 2d 545, 546 (Tex. Cr. App. 1974). See also Attwood v. Purcell, 402 F. Supp. 231, 235 (Ariz. 1975); District of Columbia v. Walters, 319 A. 2d 332, 335-336 (D.C. 1974). The term is often defined by reference to such pejorative synonyms as "`lustful, lascivious, unchaste, wanton, or loose in morals and conduct.'" People v. Williams, 59 Cal. App. 3d 225, 229, 130 Cal. Rptr. 460, 462 (1976). But "the very phrases and synonyms through which meaning is purportedly ascribed serve to obscure rather than clarify." State v. Kueny, 215 N. W. 2d 215, 217 (Iowa 1974). "To instruct the jury that a `lewd or dissolute' act is one which is morally `loose,' or `lawless,' or `foul' piles additional uncertainty [495 U.S. 103, 137] upon the already vague words of the statute. In short, vague statutory language is not rendered more precise by defining it in terms of synonyms of equal or greater uncertainty." Pryor v. Municipal Court for Los Angeles, 25 Cal. 3d 238, 249, 599 P.2d 636, 642 (1979). </s> The Ohio Supreme Court, moreover, did not specify the perspective from which "lewdness" is to be determined. A "reasonable" person's view of "lewdness"? A reasonable pedophile's? An "average" person applying contemporary local community standards? Statewide standards? Nationwide standards? Cf. Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 133 -134 (1989); Pope v. Ilinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500 -501 (1987); Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 302 -303 (1978); Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 300 , n. 6 (1977); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508 (1966). In sum, the addition of a "lewd exhibition" standard does not narrow adequately the statute's reach. If anything, it creates a new problem of vagueness, affording the public little notice of the statute's ambit and providing an avenue for "`policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.'" Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974)); see also Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 465 , and n. 15 (1987). 12 Given the important First Amendment interests [495 U.S. 103, 138] at issue, the vague, broad sweep of the "lewd exhibition" language means that it cannot cure 2907.323(A)(3)'s overbreadth. </s> 2 </s> The Ohio Supreme Court also added a "graphic focus" element to the nudity definition. This phrase, a stranger to obscenity regulation, suffers from the same vagueness difficulty as "lewd exhibition." Although the Ohio Supreme Court failed to elaborate what a "graphic focus" might be, the test appears to involve nothing more than a subjective estimation of the centrality or prominence of the genitals in a picture or other representation. Not only is this factor dependent on the perspective and idiosyncrasies of the observer, it also is unconnected to whether the material at issue merits constitutional protection. Simple nudity, no matter how prominent or "graphic," is within the bounds of the First Amendment. Michelangelo's "David" might be said to have a "graphic focus" on the genitals, for it plainly portrays them in a manner unavoidable to even a casual observer. Similarly, a painting of a partially clad girl could be said to involve a "graphic focus," depending on the picture's lighting and emphasis, 13 as could the depictions of nude children on the friezes that adorn our courtroom. Even a photograph of a child running naked on the beach or playing in the bathtub might run afoul of the law, depending on the focus and camera angle. </s> In sum, the "lewd exhibition" and "graphic focus" tests are too vague to serve as any workable limit. Because the statute, [495 U.S. 103, 139] even as construed authoritatively by the Ohio Supreme Court, is impermissibly overbroad, I would hold that appellant cannot be retried under it. 14 </s> II </s> Even if the statute was not overbroad, our decision in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), forbids the criminalization of appellant's private possession in his home of the materials at issue. "If the First Amendment means anything, it means that the State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch." Id., at 565. Appellant was convicted for possessing four photographs of nude minors, seized from a desk drawer in the bedroom of his house during a search executed pursuant to a warrant. Appellant testified that he had been given the pictures in his home by a friend. There was no evidence that the photographs had been produced commercially or distributed. All were kept in an album that appellant had assembled for his personal use and had possessed privately for several years. </s> In these circumstances, the Court's focus on Ferber rather than Stanley is misplaced. Ferber held only that child pornography is "a category of material the production and distribution of which is not entitled to First Amendment protection," 458 U.S., at 765 (emphasis added); our decision did not extend to private possession. The authority of a State to regulate the production and distribution of such materials is [495 U.S. 103, 140] not dispositive of its power to penalize possession. 15 Indeed, in Stanley we assumed that the films at issue were obscene and that their production, sale, and distribution thus could have been prohibited under our decisions. See 394 U.S., at 559 , n. 2. Nevertheless, we reasoned that although the States "retain broad power to regulate obscenity" - and child pornography as well - "that power simply does not extend to mere possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home." Id., at 568. Ferber did nothing more than place child pornography on the same level of First Amendment protection as obscene adult pornography, meaning that its production and distribution could be proscribed. The distinction established in Stanley between what materials may be regulated and how they may be regulated still stands. See United States v. Miller, 776 F.2d 978, 980, n. 4 (CA11 1985) (per curiam); People v. Keyes, 135 Misc. 2d 993, 995, 517 N. Y. S. 2d 696, 698 (1987). As JUSTICE WHITE remarked in a different context: "The personal constitutional rights of those like Stanley to possess and read obscenity in their homes and their freedom of mind and thought do not depend on whether the materials are obscene or whether obscenity is constitutionally protected. Their rights to have and view that material in private are independently saved by [495 U.S. 103, 141] the Constitution." United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 356 (1971). </s> The Court today finds Stanley inapposite on the ground that "the interests underlying child pornography prohibitions far exceed the interests justifying the Georgia law at issue in Stanley." Ante, at 108. The majority's analysis does not withstand scrutiny. 16 While the sexual exploitation of children is undoubtedly a serious problem, Ohio may employ other weapons to combat it. Indeed, the State already has enacted a panoply of laws prohibiting the creation, sale, and distribution of child pornography and obscenity involving minors. See n. 1, supra. Ohio has not demonstrated why these laws are inadequate and why the State must forbid mere possession as well. </s> The Court today speculates that Ohio "will decrease the production of child pornography if it penalizes those who [495 U.S. 103, 142] possess and view the product, thereby decreasing demand." Ante, at 109-110. Criminalizing possession is thought necessary because "since the time of our decision in Ferber, much of the child pornography market has been driven underground; as a result, it is now difficult, if not impossible, to solve the child pornography problem by only attacking production and distribution." Ante, at 110-111. As support, the Court notes that 19 States have "found it necessary" to prohibit simple possession. Ibid. Even were I to accept the Court's empirical assumptions, 17 I would find the Court's [495 U.S. 103, 143] approach foreclosed by Stanley, which rejected precisely the same contention Ohio makes today: </s> "[W]e are faced with the argument that prohibition of possession of obscene materials is a necessary incident to statutory schemes prohibiting distribution. That argument is based on alleged difficulties of proving an intent to distribute or in producing evidence of actual distribution. We are not convinced that such difficulties exist, but even if they did we do not think that they would justify infringement of the individual's right to read or observe what he pleases. Because that right is so fundamental to our scheme of individual liberty, its restriction may not be justified by the need to ease the administration of otherwise valid criminal laws." 394 U.S., at 567 -568. </s> At bottom, the Court today is so disquieted by the possible exploitation of children in the production of the pornography that it is willing to tolerate the imposition of criminal penalties for simple possession. 18 While I share the majority's [495 U.S. 103, 144] concerns, I do not believe that it has struck the proper balance between the First Amendment and the State's interests, especially in light of the other means available to Ohio to [495 U.S. 103, 145] protect children from exploitation and the State's failure to demonstrate a causal link between a ban on possession of child pornography and a decrease in its production. 19 "The existence of the State's power to prevent the distribution of obscene matter" - and of child pornography - "does not mean that there can be no constitutional barrier to any form of practical exercise of that power." Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959). </s> III </s> Although I agree with the Court's conclusion that appellant's conviction must be reversed because of a violation of due process, I do not subscribe to the Court's reasoning regarding the adequacy of appellant's objections at trial. See ante, at 122-125. The majority determines that appellant's due process rights were violated because the jury was not instructed according to the interpretation of 2907.323(A)(3) adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court on appeal. That is to say, the jury was not told that "the State must prove both scienter and that the defendant possessed material depicting a lewd exhibition or a graphic focus on genitals." Ante, at 123. The Court finds that appellant's challenge to the trial court's failure to charge the "lewd exhibition" and "graphic focus" elements is properly before us, because appellant objected at trial to the overbreadth of 2907.323(A)(3). See [495 U.S. 103, 146] ante, at 123-124. I agree with the Court's conclusion that we may reach the merits of appellant's claim on this point. 20 </s> But the Court does not rest there. Instead, in what is apparently dictum given its decision to reverse appellant's conviction on the basis of the first due process claim, the Court maintains that a separate due process challenge by appellant arising from the Ohio Supreme Court's addition of a scienter element is procedurally barred because appellant failed to object at trial to the absence of a scienter instruction. The Court maintains that 2907.323(A)(3) must be interpreted in light of 2901.21(B) of the Ohio Revised Code, which provides that recklessness is the appropriate mens rea where a statute "`neither specifies culpability nor plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict liability.'" Ante, at 113, n. 9, and [495 U.S. 103, 147] 122-123. I cannot agree with this gratuitous aspect of the Court's reasoning. </s> First, the overbreadth contention voiced by appellant must be read as fairly encompassing an objection both to the lack of an intent requirement and to the definition of "nudity." Appellant objected to, inter alia, the criminalization of the "mere possession or viewing of a photograph," without the need for the State to show additional elements. Tr. 4. A natural inference from this language is that intent is one of the additional elements that the State should have been required to prove. There is no need to demand any greater precision from a criminal defendant, and in my judgment the overbreadth challenge was sufficient, as a matter of federal law, to preserve the due process claim arising from the addition of a scienter element. As the majority acknowledges, our decision in Ferber mandated that "prohibitions on child pornography include some element of scienter." Ante, at 115 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S., at 765 ). In Ferber we recognized that adding an intent requirement was part of the process of narrowing an otherwise overbroad statute, and appellant's contention that the statute was overbroad should be interpreted in that light. I find the Ohio Supreme Court's logic internally contradictory: In one breath it adopted a scienter requirement of recklessness to narrow the statute in response to appellant's overbreadth challenge, and then, in the next breath, it insisted that appellant had failed to object to the lack of a scienter element. </s> Second, even if appellant had failed to object at trial to the failure of the jury instructions to include a scienter element, I cannot agree with the reasoning of the Ohio Supreme Court, unquestioned by the majority today, that "the omission of the element of recklessness [did] not constitute plain error." 37 Ohio St. 3d, at 254, 525 N. E. 2d, at 1370. To the contrary, a judge's failure to instruct the jury on every element of an offense violates a "`bedrock, "axiomatic and elementary" [constitutional] principle,'" Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 , [495 U.S. 103, 148] 313 (1985) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970)), and is cognizable on appeal as plain error. Cf. Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 268 -269 (1989) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 580 , n. 8 (1986); Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 85 -86 (1983) (plurality opinion); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320 , n. 14 (1979). "[W]here the error is so fundamental as not to submit to the jury the essential ingredients of the only offense on which the conviction could rest, . . . it is necessary to take note of it on our own motion." Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107 (1945) (plurality opinion). </s> Thus, I would find properly before us appellant's due process challenge arising from the addition of the scienter element, as well as his claim stemming from the creation of the "lewd exhibition" and "graphic focus" tests. </s> IV </s> When speech is eloquent and the ideas expressed lofty, it is easy to find restrictions on them invalid. But were the First Amendment limited to such discourse, our freedom would be sterile indeed. Mr. Osborne's pictures may be distasteful, but the Constitution guarantees both his right to possess them privately and his right to avoid punishment under an overbroad law. I respectfully dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 Other provisions of Ohio law relating to child pornography are not phrased in terms of "nudity." For example, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2907.321 (Supp. 1989) prohibits the knowing creation, sale, distribution, or possession of "obscenity involving a minor." Section 2907.322 prohibits the knowing creation, sale, distribution, or possession of materials depicting a minor engaging in "sexual activity" (defined as "sexual conduct or sexual contact," see 2907.01 (A), (B), (C)), masturbation, or bestiality. The documented harm from child pornography arises chiefly from the type of obscene materials that would be punished under these provisions, rather than from the depictions of mere "nudity" that are criminalized in 2907.323. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 779 , n. 4 (1982) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). </s> [Footnote 2 The Court hints that 2907.323's exemptions and "proper purposes" provisions might save it from being overbroad. See ante, at 112. I disagree. The enumerated "proper purposes" (e. g., a "bona fide artistic, medical, scientific, educational . . . or other proper purpose") are [495 U.S. 103, 128] simultaneously too vague and too narrow. What is an acceptable "artistic" purpose? Would erotic art along the lines of Robert Mapplethorpe's qualify? What is a valid "scientific" or "educational" purpose? What about sex manuals? See, e. g., Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 1341 (ND Tex. 1985), aff'd, 799 F.2d 1000 (CA5 1986). What is a permissible "other proper purpose"? What about photos taken for one purpose and recirculated for other, more prurient purposes? The "proper purposes" standard appears to create problems analogous to those this Court has encountered in describing the "redeeming social importance" of obscenity. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500 -501 (1987); id., at 513-519 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 319 -321 (1977) (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 84 -85 (1973) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); Memoirs v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) (plurality opinion); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 -485 (1957). </s> At the same time, however, Ohio's list of "proper purposes" is too limited; it excludes such obviously permissible uses as the commercial distribution of fashion photographs or the simple exchange of pictures among family and friends. Thus, a neighbor or grandparent who receives a photograph of an unclothed toddler might be subject to criminal sanctions. </s> [Footnote 3 Although the phrase "lewd exhibition of the genitals" was offered as an example of a permissible regulation in Miller v. California, 413 U.S., at 25 , it was mentioned in the Court's treatment of a vagueness question. Even then the phrase was prefaced with the words "[p]atently offensive [495 U.S. 103, 129] representations or descriptions," ibid., and included in a list with other types of sexual conduct that served to limit its scope. </s> [Footnote 4 The Court maintains that "[t]he context of the opinion indicates that the Ohio Supreme Court believed that `the term "nudity" as used in R. C. [495 U.S. 103, 130] 2907.323(A)(3) refers to a lewd exhibition of the genitals.' State v. Young, 37 Ohio St. 3d 249, 258, 525 N. E. 2d 1363, 1373 (1988)." Ante, at 115, n. 11. The passage cited (and quoted in part) by the Court, however, is a description of appellant's objections at trial and his argument on appeal, not a precise formulation by the Ohio Supreme Court of the "lewd exhibition" test. Indeed, only two sentences after the quotation cited by the majority, the Ohio court referred to "lewdness [a]s a necessary element of nudity under R. C. 2907.323(A)(3)." 37 Ohio St. 3d, at 258, 525 N. E. 2d, at 1373 (emphasis added). Earlier in its opinion, the Ohio Supreme Court more carefully articulated its construction of the statute and stated that 2907.323(A)(3) criminalizes depictions of nudity "where such nudity constitutes a lewd exhibition or involves a graphic focus on the genitals." Id., at 252, 525 N. E. 2d, at 1368. It is on this portion of the opinion that I rely. </s> The Ohio Supreme Court did not say, "[W]here such nudity constitutes a lewd exhibition of or involves a graphic focus on the genitals." The noun "exhibition" does not take as a modifier the preposition "on," and the court's repeated reference to the "prohibited state of nudity" as "a lewd exhibition or a graphic focus on the genitals," id., at 251, 525 N. E. 2d, at 1367, leaves no doubt that its choice of words was deliberate. The Ohio court clearly meant the "lewd exhibition" standard to pertain only to nudity and not to displays of the genitals. See also ibid. (referring to "morally innocent states of nudity as well as lewd exhibitions"). </s> But were the Court today correct that the Ohio Supreme Court intended to create a "`lewd exhibition' of the genitals" test, I would hardly be reassured. Indeed, such a confused approach by the Ohio Supreme Court, referring in one part of its opinion to "lewd exhibitions of nudity" and in another to "lewd exhibitions of the genitals," would create a great deal of uncertainty regarding the scope of 2907.323(A)(3) and likely would render that statute void for vagueness. We, of course, are powerless to clarify or elaborate on the interpretation of Ohio law provided by the state court. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 60 -61 (1965). </s> [Footnote 5 The majority concedes that "[i]f, for example, a parent gave a family friend a picture of the parent's infant taken while the infant was unclothed, the statute would apply." Ante, at 113, n. 9. To provide another disturbing illustration: A well-known commercial advertisement for a suntan lotion shows a dog pulling down the bottom half of a young girl's bikini, revealing a stark contrast between her suntanned back and pale buttocks. That this advertisement might be illegal in Ohio is an absurd, yet altogether too conceivable, conclusion under the language of the statute. "Many of the world's great artists - Degas, Renoir, Donatello, to name a few - have worked from models under 18 years of age, and many acclaimed photographs and films have included nude or partially clad minors." Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 593 </s> [495 U.S. 103, 132] (1989) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). In addition, there is an "abundance of baby and child photographs taken every day without full frontal covering, not to mention the work of artists and filmmakers and nudist family snapshots." Id., at 598 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); see also State v. Schmakel, No. L-88-300, (Ohio Ct. App., Oct. 13, 1989), pp. 10-11 ("[A] parent photographing his naked toddler on a bear rug would be threatened with a prison term . . . even though parents ostensibly have the same interests in taking those pictures as they do in keeping a journal or gloating about their children's accomplishments"). None of these examples involves "sexual conduct," Ferber, 458 U.S., at 765 , yet all might be unlawful under the Ohio statute. </s> [Footnote 6 Cf. Steffens v. State, 343 So.2d 90, 91 (Fla. App. 1977) (invalidating as impermissibly vague ordinance that prohibited "female waitresses, entertainers or other employees of a public business" from appearing with their breasts "thinly covered by mesh, transparent net or lawn skin tight materials which are flesh colored and worn skin tight, so as to appear uncovered," on the ground that "[i]n view of the scanty female apparel which is now socially acceptable in public particularly on beaches, the description of the type of clothing forbidden by this ordinance is extremely unclear"). </s> [Footnote 7 Other courts have found it necessary to equate "lewd" with "obscene" in order to avoid overbreadth and vagueness problems. See, e. g., United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 , n. 7 (1973); Donnenberg v. State, 1 Md. App. 591, 597, 232 A. 2d 264, 267 (1967) ("lewd" and "indecent" equivalent to "obscene"; "[o]therwise the words would be too vague to constitute a permissible standard in a criminal statute"); State ex rel. Cahalan v. Diversified Theatrical Corp., 59 Mich. App. 223, 232-233, 229 N. W. 2d 389, 393 (1975); Seattle v. Marshall, 83 Wash. 2d 665, 672, 521 P.2d 693, 697 (1974); State v. Voshart, 39 Wis. 2d 419, 429-431, 159 N. W. 2d 1, 6-7 (1968). But the Ohio Supreme Court specifically rejected this path. </s> In my judgment, even equating "lewd" with "obscene" would not adequately clarify matters because "the concept of `obscenity' cannot be defined with sufficient specificity and clarity to provide fair notice to persons who create and distribute sexually oriented materials, to prevent substantial erosion of protected speech as a byproduct of the attempt to suppress unprotected speech, and to avoid very costly institutional harms." Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S., at 103 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); see also Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 133 -134 (1989) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 507 (1987) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); id., at 513-518 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). </s> [Footnote 8 Revised Code 2905.26(B), which was repealed in 1974, defined "lewdness" somewhat unhelpfully as "any indecent or obscene act." As it now [495 U.S. 103, 134] reads, the Sex Offenses chapter of the Ohio Revised Code is remarkably devoid of any use of the term "lewd." The crime of "importuning," for example, is defined as the solicitation to engage in "sexual activity" or "sexual conduct." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2907.07 (1975). "Public indecency" comprises "expos[ing one's] private parts," "engag[ing] in masturbation," "engag[ing] in sexual conduct," or "engag[ing] in conduct which to an ordinary observer would appear to be sexual conduct or masturbation." 2907.09. "Prostitution" is described as engaging in "sexual activity for hire." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2907.21-2907.26 (1975 and Supp. 1989). </s> Currently, several sections of the Ohio Revised Code outside the Sex Offenses chapter contain the term "lewd." See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 715.52 (1976) ("Any municipal corporation may . . . [p]rovide for the punishment of all lewd and lascivious behavior in the streets and other public places"); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 3767.01(C) (1988) (defining public "nuisance" as "that which is defined and declared by statutes to be such and . . . any place in or upon which lewdness, assignation, or prostitution is conducted, permitted, continued, or exists, or any place, in or upon which lewd, indecent, lascivious, or obscene films or plate negatives [and so on, are exhibited]"); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 4715.30(A) (Supp. 1989) (providing that "[t]he holder of a certificate or license issued under this chapter is subject to disciplinary action by the state dental board for . . . [e]ngaging in lewd or immoral conduct in connection with the provision of dental services"); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 4931.31 (1977) ("No person shall, while communicating with any other person any words or language of a lewd, lascivious, or indecent character, nature, or connotation for the sole purpose of annoying such other person"). </s> The Ohio Supreme Court did not refer to any of these provisions in articulating its "lewd exhibition" standard, and they provide little guidance in deciphering the "lewd exhibition of nudity" test. Indeed, although the Ohio public nuisance statute, 3767.01(C), contains the phrase "lewdness, assignation, or prostitution," it has been interpreted to refer only to conduct or behavior and not to photographs and other printed materials. See Ohio v. Pizza, No. L-88-045, 18 (Ohio Ct. App., Mar. 10, 1989), p. 18. Thus, Ohio has followed those States that have determined that "the term `lewdness' does not apply to persons who sell pornography." Chicago v. Geraci, 30 Ill. App. 3d 699, 704, 332 N. E. 2d 487, 492 (1975) [495 U.S. 103, 135] (emphasis added); see also Chicago v. Festival Theatre Corp., 91 Ill. 2d 295, 302, 438 N. E. 2d 159, 161-162 (1982) (noting that various courts have held that "`lewdness, assignation, or prostitution'" abatement statutes are not applicable to obscene films or books). </s> [Footnote 9 Indeed, in other contexts the Ohio Supreme Court has recognized the difficulty of defining the term "lewd." See, e. g., Columbus v. Rogers, 41 Ohio St. 2d 161, 163-165, 324 N. E. 2d 563, 565-566 (1975) (holding void for vagueness city ordinance providing that "`[n]o person shall appear on any public street or other public place in a state of nudity or in a dress not belonging to his or her sex, or in an indecent or lewd dress'"); Columbus v. Schwarzwalder, 39 Ohio St. 2d 61, 62-63, 313 N. E. 2d 798, 800 (1974) (per curiam) (reversing, on grounds of overbreadth, convictions under disorderly conduct ordinance that prohibited "`disturb[ing] the good order and quiet of the city'" and "`otherwise violat[ing] the public peace by indecent and disorderly conduct or by lewd or lascivious behavior'"); see also South Euclid v. Richardson, Nos. 54247, 54248 (Ohio Ct. App., Aug. 18, 1988), pp. 1-2 (invalidating as vague and overbroad municipal ordinance stating that "`no person, organization, club or association shall own, operate, maintain or manage a brothel or solicit, invite or entice another to patronize a brothel or to engage in acts of lewdness or sexual conduct,'" and that defined "`lewdness'" as "`sexual conduct or relations of such gross indecency and so notorious as to corrupt community morals'"). </s> [Footnote 10 Historically, prohibitions on "lewd" acts grew out of "the archaic vagrancy statutes which were designedly drafted to grant police and prosecutors a vague and standardless discretion." Pryor v. Municipal Court for Los Angeles, 25 Cal. 3d 238, 248, 599 P.2d 636, 641 (1979). We held such vagrancy laws unconstitutionally vague in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). Cf. Ohio Rev. Code 715.55 (1976) ("Any municipal corporation may provide for: (A) The punishment of persons disturbing the good order and quiet of the municipal corporation by clamors and noises in the night season, by intoxication, drunkenness, fighting, committing assault, assault and battery, using obscene or profane language in the streets and other public places to the annoyance of the citizens, or otherwise violating the public peace by indecent and disorderly [495 U.S. 103, 136] conduct, or by lewd or lascivious behavior. (B) The punishment of any vagrant, common street beggar, common prostitute, habitual disturber of the peace, known pickpocket, gambler, burglar, thief, watch stuffer, ball game player, a person who practices any trick, game, or device with intent to swindle, a person who abuses his family, and any suspicious person who cannot give a reasonable account of himself") (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 11 Virtually any act running afoul of "conventional" morality can be and has been sanctioned under "lewdness" laws. See, e. g., Jelly v. Dabney, 581 P.2d 622, 626 (Wyo. 1978) (describing, as punishable under "lewdness" prohibition, crime of "illicit cohabitation," i. e., a "dwelling or living together by a man and woman, not legally married to each other, in the manner of husband and wife, and indulgence in acts of sexual intercourse") (quotation omitted); Egal v. State, 469 So.2d 196, 198 (Fla. App. 1985) ("`[I]f forty years ago either a man or a woman had donned the apparel popular on our beaches today . . . such person would probably have been . . . branded as a lewd, lascivious, and indecent person'") (quoting State ex rel. Swanboro v. Mayo, 155 Fla. 330, 332, 19 So.2d 883, 884 (1944)). </s> [Footnote 12 The danger of discriminatory enforcement assumes particular importance of the context of the instant case, which involves child pornography with male homosexual overtones. Sadly, evidence indicates that the overwhelming majority of arrests for violations of "lewdness" laws involve male homosexuals. See Pryor, supra, at 252, n. 8, 599 P.2d, at 644, n. 8. Cf. Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987) (prosecution of male homosexual for interfering with a police officer in the performance of his duties); Developments in the Law - Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1509, 1537-1538, 1542 (1989). "Such uneven application of the law is the natural consequence of a statute which as judicially construed measure[s] the criminality of conduct by community or even individual notions of what is distasteful behavior." Pryor, supra, at 252, [495 U.S. 103, 138] 599 P.2d, at 644. The "lewd exhibition" standard "furnishes a convenient tool for "harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure."'" Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S., at 360 (quoting Papachristou, 405 U.S., at 170 , in turn quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 -98 (1940)). </s> [Footnote 13 Since 2907.323(A)(3) makes it to crime to "view" as well as to possess depictions of nudity, visitors to an art gallery might find themselves in violation of the law. </s> [Footnote 14 The scope of 2907.323(A)(3) is restricted to depictions of "a minor who is not the person's child or ward." This does not cure the overbreadth problem, because many constitutionally protected photographs outlawed by the statute, such as commercial advertisements and works of art, circulate outside of the subject's immediate family. See also ante, at 124 ("Judge, if you had some nude photos of yourself when you were a child, you would probably be violating the law . . . . So grandparents, neighbors, or other people who happen to view the photograph are criminally liable under the statute'") (quoting Tr. 3-4). </s> [Footnote 15 The distinction drawn in Stanley is not an anomaly in the law; to the contrary, we have often protected expression valued by listeners, whether or not the source of the communication was fully entitled to the safeguards of the First Amendment. See, e. g., Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of California, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (plurality opinion); Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 533 -534, and n. 1 (1980); First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 , and n. 13 (1978); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307 -308 (1965) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Just as the right of a listener to receive information does not rest on the right of the producer to disseminate it, so the power to ban the production and distribution of child pornography does not imply a concomitant authority to proscribe mere possession. </s> [Footnote 16 Although we held in Stanley v. Georgia that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making mere private possession of obscene material a crime," 394 U.S., at 568 , we acknowledged that "compelling reasons may exist for overriding the right of the individual to possess" other types of "printed, filmed, or recorded materials." Id., at 568, n. 11. The majority's reference to this language as support for its decision today, see ante, at 110, ignores the fact that footnote 11 in Stanley cited only to 18 U.S.C. 793(d), which criminalizes possession of defense information harmful to U.S. national security. To equate child pornography with state secrets is to read the narrow exception carved in footnote 11 of Stanley as swallowing the general rule that the case established. See State v. Meadows, No. C-850091 (Ohio Ct. App., Dec. 18, 1985) (Doan, J., concurring) ("The reservation [in footnote 11 of Stanley] applies to traitorous or seditious materials, and not to child pornography"), rev'd, 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 503 N. E. 2d 697 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 936 (1987); see also Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d, at 356-357, 503 N. E. 2d, at 716 (Brown, J., concurring). Although our decisions even in the First Amendment area have taken special note of the paramount importance of national security interests, see, e. g., Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931), we nonetheless have required a strong showing of imminent danger before permitting First Amendment freedoms to be sacrificed. See, e. g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 -727 (1971) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). </s> [Footnote 17 That 19 States have prohibited possession of child pornography hardly proves that such an approach is integral to effective enforcement of production and distribution laws. A restriction on speech cannot be justified by such self-referential reasoning. In fact, the difficulty of enforcing possession laws - for example, the requirements of probable cause and a warrant before a search may be undertaken - means that penalties for possession are dubious complements to curbs on production, sale, and distribution. See Note, Private Possession of Child Pornography: The Tensions Between Stanley v. Georgia and New York v. Ferber, 29 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 187, 212 (1987) ("Statutory prohibition of the private possession of child pornography is an inefficient and ineffective means of preventing the serious problem of child sexual abuse"). </s> The federal experience illustrates that possession laws are not an essential element of a successful enforcement strategy. In the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7, Congress prohibited the production, distribution, and sale of material depicting sexually explicit conduct by minors. See 18 U.S.C. 2251-2253 (1982 ed.). Congress also criminalized the mailing, receipt, or trafficking in interstate or foreign commerce of such material for the purpose of sale or distribution for sale. See 18 U.S.C. 2252(a) (1982 ed.). But Congress did not criminalize mere possession. In the Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204, Congress enacted a broad revision of the 1977 law, removing the requirement that trafficking, receipt, and mailing be for the purposes of sale or distribution for sale. See 18 U.S.C. 2252(a). Further, the 1984 Act eliminated a requirement that material be "obscene" before its production, distribution, sale, mailing, trafficking, and receipt could be found criminal, see 2252(a); raised the age limit of protection from 16 to 18 years of age, see 2256(1); and added stiffer penalties, see 2252(b), criminal and civil forfeiture provisions, see 2253, 2254, and a civil remedy for [495 U.S. 103, 143] personal injuries. See 2255. Even in the 1984 amendments, Congress did not find it necessary to ban simple possession. Nevertheless, the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography determined that "the 1977 Act effectively halted the bulk of the commercial child pornography industry, while the 1984 revisions have enabled federal officials to move against the noncommercial, clandestine mutation of that industry." 1 U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, Final Report 607 (1986) (hereafter Attorney General's Report). </s> [Footnote 18 The Court briefly identifies two other interests that it contends justify Ohio's law. First, the majority describes a state interest in destroying the "permanen[t] record" of the victim's abuse. Ante, at 111. I do not believe that the law is narrowly tailored to this end, for there is no requirement that the State show that the child was abused in the production of the materials or even that the child knew that a photograph was taken. Even if the State could recover all copies of the offensive picture, which seems highly unlikely, I do not see how a candid shot taken without the minor's knowledge can "haun[t]" him or her in the years to come, ibid., when there is no indication that the child is even aware of its existence. And if the law's purpose is preventing sexual abuse of children, it is underinclusive to the extent that it does not prevent [495 U.S. 103, 144] parents from photographing their children in a state of nudity, see, e. g., Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576 (1989), or giving others written permission to do so. See, e. g., Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 1341 (ND Tex. 1985). The only restriction on parents is the nebulous "proper purposes" provision, which is really no restriction at all. See n. 2, supra. More fundamentally, even if the State could presume that minors are legally incompetent to consent to sexually explicit photographs, and therefore that all such photographs could be outlawed, it does not follow that the State can prohibit possession of such pictures in addition to their production. In Ferber, the Court was careful to limit its discussion to the "distribution" and "circulation" of photographs taken without a minor's consent. See 458 U.S., at 759 and n. 10; cf. Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 635 -636 (1990); The Florida Star v. B. J. F., 491 U.S. 524, 532 -533 (1989); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975). By analogy, Stanley assuredly protects the private possession of obscene adult pornography, even though an argument could be made that "production of adult pornography can be as harmful to adult actors as the production of child pornography is to child actors." Note, 29 Wm. & Mary L. Rev., supra, at 204, n. 144; see also Attorney General's Report, supra n. 17, at 839-900; Pollard, Regulating Violent Pornography, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 125, 133-134 (1990). </s> Second, the Court maintains that possession of child pornography may be prohibited "because evidence suggests that pedophiles use child pornography to seduce other children into sexual activity." Ante, at 111 (citing, in a footnote, the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography). The Attorney General's Commission, however, determined that pedophiles are likely to use adult as well as child pornography to lower the inhibitions of a child victim. See Attorney General's Report, supra n. 17, at 686; see also Brief for Covenant House et al. as Amici Curiae 8, n. 9 (characterizing the Court's argument on this point as "factual speculation"). Finally, Ohio's solution - prohibiting private possession - ignores fundamental principles of our First Amendment jurisprudence. "Assuming obscene material could be proved to create a . . . danger of illegal behavior, it would not follow that the expression should be suppressed. Rather, the basic principles of a system of freedom of expression would require that society deal directly with the . . . action and leave the expression alone." T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 494 (1970). See also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S., [495 U.S. 103, 145] at 108-110 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). Thus, while acts of sexual abuse themselves may be outlawed, the private possession of photographs, magazines, and other materials may not. </s> [Footnote 19 The notion that possession of pornography may be penalized in order to facilitate a prohibition on its production, whatever the rights of possessors, is not unlike a proposal that newspaper subscribers be held criminally liable for receiving the newspaper if they are aware of the publisher's violations of child labor laws. Cf. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 915 (2d ed. 1988). In both cases, sanctions against possession might increase the effectiveness of concededly permissible regulations on the production process. But although the need to protect children from exploitation may be acute, it cannot override the right to receive the newspaper or to possess sexually explicit materials in the privacy of the home, especially when less restrictive alternatives exist to further the state interests asserted. </s> [Footnote 20 The Court's opinion should not be taken to mean that appellant's due process claim with respect to the "lewd exhibition" and "graphic focus" elements would be procedurally barred now had he failed to object at trial. If appellant's due process contention were nothing more than a complaint concerning the statute's overbreadth, the suggestion that he would be barred from raising it now if he failed to object at trial might be plausible. But that is not appellant's argument. Rather, he maintains that his due process rights were violated because the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed his conviction after adding the elements of "lewd exhibition" and "graphic focus" on appeal, despite the fact that appellant had had no reason to design a defense strategy or introduce evidence with these tests in mind. The jury, moreover, might have convicted appellant purely on the basis of the "nudity" definition, without deciding whether the materials depicted a "lewd exhibition of nudity" or involved a "graphic focus" on the genitals. Thus, appellant's due process claim is separate from his overbreadth challenge, see Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 92 (1965), as even the Court appears to recognize at some places in its opinion. See ante, at 121 ("Even if construed to obviate overbreadth, applying the statute to pending cases might be barred by the Due Process Clause"). The due process violation in this case was not complete until the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed appellant's conviction after reinterpreting the statute. Requiring defendants to object at trial to an error that does not appear until the appellate stage would advance no legitimate state interest regarding finality or compliance with state procedures. </s> [495 U.S. 103, 149]

United States Supreme Court HARTIGAN v. ZBARAZ(1987) No. 85-673 Argued: November 3, 1987Decided: December 14, 1987 </s> 763 F.2d 1532, affirmed by an equally divided Court. </s> Michael J. Hayes, First Assistant Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs for appellant Hartigan were Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, pro se, Roma Jones Stewart, former Solicitor General, Shawn W. Denney, Solicitor General, and Rita M. Novak, Assistant Attorney General. </s> Colleen K. Connell argued the cause for appellees. With her on the briefs were Marc O. Beem and Harvey Grossman. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Nevada by Brian McKay, Attorney General, and Ellen F. Whittemore, Deputy Attorney General; for the State of Ohio et al. by Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Attorney General of Ohio, David J. Kovach, Assistant Attorney General, Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, William L. Webster, Attorney General of Missouri, and David R. Wilkinson, Attorney General of Utah; for Americans United for Life Legal Defense Fund by Dennis J. Horan, Edward R. Grant, Maura K. Quinlan, Clarke D. Forsythe, and Ann-Louise Lohr; for the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights by Steven Frederick McDowell; for the Family Research Council et al. by Lynn D. Wardle; and for the United States Catholic Conference by John A. Liekweg and Mark E. Chopko. </s> Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists et al. by Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr., Carter G. Phillips, Ann E. Allen, Stephan E. Lawton, and Laurie R. Rockett; for the American Psychological Association by Donald N. Bersoff and David W. Ogden; for the American Public Health Association et al. by Patricia Hennessey and Dara Klassel; for the Judicial Consent for Minors Lawyer Referral Panel et al. by Jamie Ann Sabino; for the [484 U.S. 171, 172] National Abortion Rights Action League et al. by Rhonda Copelon, Anne E. Simon, Nadine Taub, and Kathryn Kolbert; and for Pregnant Minors Desiring Confidential Abortions in Minnesota and Massachusetts et al. by Janet Benshoof, Lynn M. Paltrow, Rachael N. Pine, William Z. Pentelovitch, and John H. Henn. </s> Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Life League, Inc., by Thomas Patrick Monaghan; for American Victims of Abortion by James Bopp, Jr.; and for Concerned Women for America by Charles F. Simon and Jordan W. Lorence. [484 U.S. 171, 172] </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The judgment below is affirmed by an equally divided Court. </s> [484 U.S. 171, 173]

United States Supreme Court ASHLAND OIL, INC. v. CARLYL(1990) No. 88-421 Argued: Decided: June 28, 1990 </s> During the years at issue, West Virginia imposed a gross receipts tax on persons selling tangible property wholesale, but exempted local manufacturers. The State Tax Commissioner upheld the tax assessed on sales by appellant Ashland Oil, Inc., a Kentucky corporation, finding that the tax was constitutional. While Ashland's appeal was pending in the State Circuit Court, this Court, in Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 , invalidated the State's tax scheme as discriminatory against interstate commerce. The Circuit Court granted Ashland summary judgment on the basis of Armco, but the State Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Armco did not apply retroactively. On remand, the Circuit Court affirmed the Tax Commissioner's decision. </s> Held: </s> Armco applies retroactively to the taxes assessed against Ashland under the rule advocated by either the dissent or the plurality in American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 . Under the dissent's reasoning, Armco applies retroactively because constitutional decisions apply retroactively to all cases on direct review. Under the plurality's approach, the same result obtains because Armco neither overruled clear past precedent nor decided a wholly new issue of first impression and, thus, fails to meet the first prong of the retroactivity test of Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 -107. </s> Reversed and remanded. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> Appellant Ashland Oil, Inc., a Kentucky corporation, is an integrated oil company that maintains business locations worldwide, including in West Virginia. During the years at issue here, West Virginia imposed a gross receipts tax on persons selling tangible property at wholesale. W.Va.Code 11-13-2c (1983). Local manufacturers were exempt from the tax. 11-13-2. The West Virginia Tax Department conducted a detailed audit of Ashland's tax returns for fiscal years ending September 1975 and 1976 and assessed a [497 U.S. 916, 917] deficiency in tax payments of $181,313.22 for wholesale sales with West Virginia destinations. Ashland filed a timely petition for reassessment, primarily contending that the tax was unconstitutional as applied, because there was an insufficient connection between its in-state activities and the transactions sought to be taxed. Juris. Statement 38a. After the State Tax Commissioner rejected Ashland's petition, Ashland appealed to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. While the appeal was pending, this Court decided Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984), which invalidated the West Virginia tax scheme that had also been applied against Ashland as discriminatory against interstate commerce. The State Circuit Court granted Ashland summary judgment on the basis of our decision in Armco. </s> The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reverse, holding that Armco did not apply retroactively, and remanded for further proceedings. Relying on its state law criteria for retroactivity, see Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W.Va. 332, 256 S.E. 879 (1979), which it considered to "follow closely the analysis employed by the United States Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 -1.07 . . . (1971)," Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Rose, 177 W.Va. 20, 23, n. 6, 350 S.E.2d 531, 534, n. 6 (1986), the court determined that Armco "represented a reversal of prior precedent, and that retroactive application of the Armco rule would cause severe hardship." Id., at 25, 350 S.E.2d at 536. Accordingly, the court held that the State was not precluded from collecting the gross receipts taxes due for the fiscal years preceding the date of decision in Armco. Id., at 25-26, 350 S.E.2d at 536-537. We dismissed Ashland's appeal of this decision for want of a final judgment. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Rose, 481 U.S. 1025 (1987). On remand, the Circuit Court rejected Ashland's remaining claim, and the State Supreme Court of Appeals denied Ashland's request for review. [497 U.S. 916, 918] </s> In its appeal to this Court, Ashland contends, among other claims, that the State Supreme Court of Appeals erred in determining that Armco applied prospectively only. Because "[t]he determination whether a constitutional decision of this Court is retroactive . . . is a matter of federal law," American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 177 (1990), we must examine the state court's determination that Armco is not retroactive in light of our nonretroactivity doctrine. </s> Applying the view of retroactivity delineated by either the dissent or the plurality in American Trucking Assns., we must reverse the state court's decision. Under the reasoning of the dissent in American Trucking Assns., Armco applies retroactively to the taxes assessed against Ashland because constitutional decisions apply retroactively to all cases on direct review. American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, supra, at 212 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Under the approach of the plurality in American Trucking Assns., the same result obtains, because Armco fails to satisfy the first prong of the plurality's test for determining nonretroactivity. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 -107 (1971), quoted in American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, supra, at 179 (plurality opinion). </s> The first prong of the Chevron Oil test requires that "the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed." 404 U.S., at 106 -107 (citation omitted). In Armco, an Ohio corporation contested the applicability of West Virginia's wholesale tax on its in-state sales of steel and wire rope. In ruling that the tax violated the Commerce Clause, the Court relied on Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 332 , n. 12 (1977), which held that a State "may not discriminate between transactions on the basis of some interstate element." On its face, West Virginia's [497 U.S. 916, 919] statutory scheme had just such a discriminatory effect, as it "provides that two companies selling tangible property at wholesale in West Virginia will be treated differently depending on whether the taxpayer conducts manufacturing in the State or out of it." Armco, supra, at 642. </s> The Court next considered the argument that the State's wholesale tax exemption did not discriminate against out-of-state taxpayers because it served as compensation for the imposition of a heavy manufacturing tax on in-state taxpayers. In Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981), we held that a tax on an out-of-state event may be considered a nondiscriminatory compensation for a tax on an in-state event when the State "is attempting to impose a tax on a substantially equivalent event to assure uniform treatment of goods and materials to be consumed in the State." Id., at 759. Applying this test to the West Virginia tax scheme, the Court determined that "manufacturing and wholesaling are not `substantially equivalent events' such that the heavy tax on in-state manufacturers can be said to compensate for the admittedly lighter burden placed on wholesalers from out of State." Armco, at 643. The Court distinguished Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199 (1961), and Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U.S. 117 (1941), two cases that predated the compensatory tax doctrine enunciated in Boston Stock Exchange and Maryland v. Louisiana. Armco, supra, at 643, n. 7. </s> Finally, the Court rejected the argument that Armco should be required to prove the tax had actual discriminatory impact. Instead, the Court asserted that the "internal consistency" test, enunciated in Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983), was applicable "where the allegation is that a tax, on its face, discriminates against interstate commerce." Armco, supra, at 644. </s> Armco unquestionably contributed to the development of our dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., Judson & Duffy, An Opportunity Missed: Armco, Inc. v. [497 U.S. 916, 920] Hardesty, A Retreat from Economic Reality in Analysis of State Taxes, 87 W.Va.L.Rev. 723, 740-743 (1986) (suggesting that Armco's invalidation of a facially discriminatory tax statute signaled a retreat from the economically realistic approach adopted by Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), and a return to a more formalistic analysis); Lathrop, Armco - A Narrow and Puzzling Test for Discriminatory State Taxes Under the Commerce Clause, 63 Taxes 551, 558-559 (1985). In adopting the internal consistency test, Armco extended that doctrine beyond the context in which it had originated. See 467 U.S., at 648 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, Armco neither overturned established precedent * nor decided "an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed." Chevron Oil, supra, at 106. To be sure, Armco paved the way for Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987), which arguably "overturn[ed] a lengthy list of settled decisions" and "revolutionize[d] the law of state taxation," id., at 257 (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), by extending the internal consistency test. Armco itself, however, was not revolutionary. See America Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 303 (1987) (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting) ("At most, Armco may be read for the proposition that a tax that is facially discriminatory is unconstitutional if it is not `internally consistent'"). [497 U.S. 916, 921] </s> Because Armco did not overrule clear past precedent nor decide a wholly new issue of first impression, it does not meet the first prong of the Chevron Oil test. Armco thus applies retroactively under either the rule advocated by the plurality or the rule advocated by the dissent in American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith. Accordingly, the State Supreme Court of Appeals erred in declining to apply Armco retroactively to determine the constitutionality of the State's imposition of taxes on Ashland for the years at issue. The motion of Committee on State Taxation of the Council of State Chambers of Commerce for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae is granted. We reverse the judgment of the State Circuit Court and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> [Footnote * The Court's dismissal for want of a substantial federal question of Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. Corp. v. Rose, 459 U.S. 807 (1982), a case raising a nearly identical challenge to the state tax, see 467 U.S., at 644 , n. 7, a year prior to deciding Armco does not amount to the "overruling [of] clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied." Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971). The Court gives less deference to summary dispositions, see, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 390 , n. 9 (1979), and it is unlikely that West Virginia relied upon the 1982 dismissal of Columbia Gas, given that the statute struck down in Armco had been in effect for more than 50 years. </s> [497 U.S. 916, 922]

United States Supreme Court PRINTZ, SHERIFF/CORONER, RAVALLI COUNTY, MONTANA v. UNITED STATES(1997) No. 95-1478 Argued: December 3, 1996Decided: June 27, 1997 </s> * </s> Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act provisions require the Attorney General to establish a national system for instantly checking prospective handgun purchasers' backgrounds, note following 18 U.S.C. § 922 and command the "chief law enforcement officer" (CLEO) of each local jurisdiction to conduct such checks and perform related tasks on an interim basis until the national system becomes operative, §922(s). Petitioners, the CLEOs for counties in Montana and Arizona, filed separate actions challenging the interim provisions' constitutionality. In each case, the District Court held that the background check provision was unconstitutional, but concluded that it was severable from the remainder of the Act, effectively leaving a voluntary background check system in place. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding none of the interim provisions unconstitutional. </s> Held: </s> 1. The Brady Act's interim provision commanding CLEOs to conduct background checks, §922(s)(2), is unconstitutional. Extinguished with it is the duty implicit in the background check requirement that the CLEO accept completed handgun applicant statements (Brady Forms) from firearms dealers, §§922(s)(1)(A)(i)(III) and (IV). Pp. 4-34. </s> (a) Because there is no constitutional text speaking to the precise question whether congressional action compelling state officers to execute federal laws is unconstitutional, the answer to the CLEOs'challenge must be sought in historical understanding and practice, in the Constitution's structure, and in this Court's jurisprudence. P. 4. </s> (b) Relevant constitutional practice tends to negate the existence of the congressional power asserted here, but is not conclusive. Enactments of the early Congresses seem to contain no evidence of an assumption that the Federal Government may command the States' executive power in the absence of a particularized constitutional authorization. The early enactments establish, at most, that the Constitution was originally understood to permit imposition of an obligation on state judges to enforce federal prescriptions related to matters appropriate for the judicial power. The Government misplaces its reliance on portions of The Federalist suggesting that federal responsibilities could be imposed on state officers. None of these statements necessarily implies--what is the critical point here--that Congress could impose these responsibilities without the States' consent. They appear to rest on the natural assumption that the States would consent, see FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 796 , n. 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). Finally, there is an absence of executive commandeering federal statutes in the country's later history, at least until very recent years. Even assuming that newer laws represent an assertion of the congressional power challenged here, they are of such recent vintage that they are not probative of a constitutional tradition. Pp. 4-18. </s> (c) The Constitution's structure reveals a principle that controls these cases: the system of "dual sovereignty." See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 . Although the States surrendered many of their powers to the new Federal Government, they retained a residuary and inviolable sovereignty that is reflected throughout the Constitution's text. See, e.g., Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76. The Framers rejected the concept of a central government that would act upon and through the States, and instead designed a system in which the State and Federal Governments would exercise concurrent authority over the people. The Federal Government's power would be augmented immeasurably and impermissibly if it were able to impress into its service--and at no cost to itself--the police officers of the 50 States. Pp. 18-22. </s> (d) Federal control of state officers would also have an effect upon the separation and equilibration of powers between the three branches of the Federal Government itself. The Brady Act effectively transfers the President's responsibility to administer the laws enacted by Congress, Art. II, §§2 and 3, to thousands of CLEOs in the 50 States, who are left to implement the program without meaningful Presidential control. The Federal Executive's unity would be shattered, and the power of the President would be subject to reduction, ifCongress could simply require state officers to execute its laws. Pp. 22-23. </s> (e) Contrary to the dissent's contention, the Brady Act's direction of the actions of state executive officials is not constitutionally valid under Art. I, §8, as a law "necessary and proper" to the execution of Congress's Commerce Clause power to regulate handgun sales. Where, as here, a law violates the state sovereignty principle, it is not a law "proper for carrying into Execution" delegated powers within the Necessary and Proper Clause's meaning. Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 . The Supremacy Clause does not help the dissent, since it makes "Law of the Land" only "Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance [of the Constitution.]" Art. VI, cl. 2. Pp. 24-25. </s> (f) Finally, and most conclusively in these cases, the Court's jurisprudence makes clear that the Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program. See, e.g., New York, supra, at 188. The attempts of the Government and the dissent to distinguish New York--on grounds that the Brady Act's background check provision does not require state legislative or executive officials to make policy; that requiring state officers to perform discrete, ministerial federal tasks does not diminish the state or federal officials' accountability; and that the Brady Act is addressed to individual CLEOs while the provisions invalidated in New York were directed to the State itself--are not persuasive. A "balancing" analysis is inappropriate here, since the whole object of the law is to direct the functioning of the state executive, and hence to compromise the structural framework of dual sovereignty; it is the very principle of separate state sovereignty that such a law offends. See e.g., New York, supra, at 187. Pp. 25-34. </s> 2. With the Act's background check and implicit receipt of forms requirements invalidated, the Brady Act requirements that CLEOs destroy all Brady Forms and related records, §922(s)(6)(B)(i), and give would be purchasers written statements of the reasons for determining their ineligibility to receive handguns, §922(s)(6)(C), require no action whatsoever on the part of CLEOs such as petitioners, who are not voluntary participants in administration of the federal scheme. As to them, these provisions are not unconstitutional, but simply inoperative. Pp. 34-36. </s> 3. The Court declines to address the severability question briefed and argued by the parties: whether firearms dealers remain obliged to forward Brady Forms to CLEOs, §§922(s)(1)(A)(i)(III) and (IV), and to wait five business days thereafter before consummating a firearms sale, §922(s)(1)(A)(ii). These provisions burden only dealers andfirearms purchasers, and no plaintiff in either of those categories is before the Court. P. 36. </s> 66 F. 3d 1025, reversed. </s> Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. O'Connor, J., and Thomas, J., filed concurring opinions. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined. </s> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- </s> NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. </s> U.S. Supreme Court </s> Nos. 95-1478 and 95-1503 </s> JAY PRINTZ, SHERIFF/CORONER, RAVALLI COUNTY, MONTANA, PETITIONER 95-1478 v. UNITED STATES RICHARD MACK, PETITIONER 95-1503 </s> on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit [June 27, 1997] </s> Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The question presented in these cases is whether certain interim provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536, commanding state and local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers and to perform certain related tasks, violate the Constitution. </s> The Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA), 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq., establishes a detailed federal scheme governing the distribution of firearms. It prohibits firearms dealers from transferring handguns to any person under 21, not resident in the dealer's State, or prohibited by state or local law from purchasing or possessing firearms, §922(b). It also forbids possession of a firearm by, and transfer of a firearm to, convicted felons, fugitives </s> from justice, unlawful users of controlled substances, persons adjudicated as mentally defective or committed to mental institutions, aliens unlawfully present in the United States, persons dishonorably discharged from the Armed Forces, persons who have renounced their citizenship, and persons who have been subjected to certain restraining orders or been convicted of a misdemeanor offense involving domestic violence. §§922(d) and (g). </s> In 1993, Congress amended the GCA by enacting the Brady Act. The Act requires the Attorney General to establish a national instant background check system by November 30, 1998, Pub. L. 103-159, as amended, Pub. L. 103-322, 103 Stat. 2074, note following 18 U.S.C. § 922 and immediately puts in place certain interim provisions until that system becomes operative. Under the interim provisions, a firearms dealer who proposes to transfer a handgun must first: (1) receive from the transferee a statement (the Brady Form), §922(s)(1)(A) (i)(I), containing the name, address and date of birth of the proposed transferee along with a sworn statement that the transferee is not among any of the classes of prohibited purchasers, §922(s)(3); (2) verify the identity of the transferee by examining an identification document, §922(s)(1)(A)(i)(II); and (3) provide the "chief law enforcement officer" (CLEO) of the transferee's residence with notice of the contents (and a copy) of the Brady Form, §§922(s)(1)(A)(i)(III) and (IV). With some exceptions, the dealer must then wait five business days before consummating the sale, unless the CLEO earlier notifies the dealer that he has no reason to believe the transfer would be illegal. §922(s)(1)(A)(ii). </s> The Brady Act creates two significant alternatives to the foregoing scheme. A dealer may sell a handgun immediately if the purchaser possesses a state handgun permit issued after a background check, §922(s)(1)(C), or if state law provides for an instant background check, §922(s)(1)(D). In States that have not rendered one ofthese alternatives applicable to all gun purchasers, CLEOs are required to perform certain duties. When a CLEO receives the required notice of a proposed transfer from the firearms dealer, the CLEO must "make a reasonable effort to ascertain within 5 business days whether receipt or possession would be in violation of the law, including research in whatever State and local recordkeeping systems are available and in a national system designated by the Attorney General." §922(s)(2). The Act does not require the CLEO to take any particular action if he determines that a pending transaction would be unlawful; he may notify the firearms dealer to that effect, but is not required to do so. If, however, the CLEO notifies a gun dealer that a prospective purchaser is ineligible to receive a handgun, he must, upon request, provide the would be purchaser with a written statement of the reasons for that determination. §922(s)(6)(C). Moreover, if the CLEO does not discover any basis for objecting to the sale, he must destroy any records in his possession relating to the transfer, including his copy of the Brady Form. §922(s)(6)(B)(i). Under a separate provision of the GCA, any person who "knowingly violates [the section of the GCA amended by the Brady Act] shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for no more than 1 year, or both." §924(a)(5). </s> Petitioners Jay Printz and Richard Mack, the CLEOs for Ravalli County, Montana, and Graham County, Arizona, respectively, filed separate actions challenging the constitutionality of the Brady Act's interim provisions. In each case, the District Court held that the provision requiring CLEOs to perform background checks was unconstitutional, but concluded that that provision was severable from the remainder of the Act, effectively leaving a voluntary background check system in place. 856 F. Supp. 1372 (Ariz. 1994); 854 F. Supp. 1503 (Mont. 1994). A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding none of the BradyAct's interim provisions to be unconstitutional. 66 F. 3d 1025 (1995). We granted certiorari. 518 U. S. ___ (1996). </s> From the description set forth above, it is apparent that the Brady Act purports to direct state law enforcement officers to participate, albeit only temporarily, in the administration of a federally enacted regulatory scheme. Regulated firearms dealers are required to forward Brady Forms not to a federal officer or employee, but to the CLEOs, whose obligation to accept those forms is implicit in the duty imposed upon them to make "reasonable efforts" within five days to determine whether the sales reflected in the forms are lawful. While the CLEOs are subjected to no federal requirement that they prevent the sales determined to be unlawful (it is perhaps assumed that their state law duties will require prevention or apprehension), they are empowered to grant, in effect, waivers of the federally prescribed 5 day waiting period for handgun purchases by notifying the gun dealers that they have no reason to believe the transactions would be illegal. </s> The petitioners here object to being pressed into federal service, and contend that congressional action compelling state officers to execute federal laws is unconstitutional. Because there is no constitutional text speaking to this precise question, the answer to the CLEOs' challenge must be sought in historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of this Court. We treat those three sources, in that order, in this and the next two sections of this opinion. </s> Petitioners contend that compelled enlistment of state executive officers for the administration of federal programs is, until very recent years at least, unprecedented. The Government contends, to the contrary, that-the earliest Congresses enacted statutes that required the participation of state officials in the implementation of federal laws," Brief for United States 28. The Government's contention demands our careful consideration, since early congressional enactments "provid[e] `contemporaneous and weighty evidence' of the Constitution's meaning," Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723 -724 (1986) (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983)). Indeed, such "contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution . . . , acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the construction to be given its provisions." Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926) (citing numerous cases). Conversely if, as petitioners contend, earlier Congresses avoided use of this highly attractive power, we would have reason to believe that the power was thought not to exist. </s> The Government observes that statutes enacted by the first Congresses required state courts to record applications for citizenship, Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, §1, 1 Stat. 103, to transmit abstracts of citizenship applications and other naturalization records to the Secretary of State, Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, §2, 1 Stat. 567, and to register aliens seeking naturalization and issue certificates of registry, Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, §2, 2 Stat. 154-155. It may well be, however, that these requirements applied only in States that authorized their courts to conduct naturalization proceedings. See Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, §1, 1 Stat. 103; Holmgren v. United States, 217 U.S. 509, 516 -517 (1910) (explaining that the Act of March 26, 1790 "conferred authority upon state courts to admit aliens to citizenship" and refraining from addressing the question "whether the States can be required to enforce such naturalization laws against their consent"); </s> United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 519 -520 (1883) (stating that these obligations were imposed "with the consent of the States" and-could not be enforced against the consent of the States"). 1 Other statutes of that era apparently or at least arguably required state courts to perform functions unrelated to naturalization, such as resolving controversies between a captain and the crew of his ship concerning the seaworthiness of the vessel, Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, §3, 1 Stat. 132, hearing the claims of slave owners who had apprehended fugitive slaves and issuing certificates authorizing the slave's forced removal to the State from which he had fled, Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, §3, 1 Stat. 302-305, taking proof of the claims of Canadian refugees who had assisted the United States during the Revolutionary War, Act of Apr. 7, 1798, ch. 26, §3, 1 Stat. 548, and ordering the deportation of alien enemies in times of war, Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, §2, 1 Stat. 577-578. </s> These early laws establish, at most, that the Constitution was originally understood to permit imposition of an obligation on state judges to enforce federal prescriptions, insofar as those prescriptions related to matters appropriate for the judicial power. That assumption was perhaps implicit in one of the provisions of the Constitution, and was explicit in another. In accord with the so called Madisonian Compromise, Article III, §1, established only a Supreme Court, and made the creation of lower federal courts optional with the Congress--even though it was obvious that the Supreme Court alone could not hear all federal cases throughout the United States. See C. Warren, The Making of the Constitution 325-327 (1928). And the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, cl. 2, announced that "the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby." It is understandable why courts should have been viewed distinctively in this regard; unlike legislatures and executives, they applied the law of other sovereigns all the time. The principle underlying so called "transitory" causes of action was that laws which operated elsewhere created obligations in justice that courts of the forum state would enforce. See, e.g., McKenna v. Fisk, 1 How. 241, 247-249 (1843). The Constitution itself, in the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Art. IV, §1, generally required such enforcement with respect to obligations arising in other States. See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951). </s> For these reasons, we do not think the early statutes imposing obligations on state courts imply a power of Congress to impress the state executive into its service. Indeed, it can be argued that the numerousness of these statutes, contrasted with the utter lack of statutes imposing obligations on the States' executive (notwithstanding the attractiveness of that course to Congress), suggests an assumed absence of such power. 2 The onlyearly federal law the Government has brought to our attention that imposed duties on state executive officers is the Extradition Act of 1793, which required the "executive authority" of a State to cause the arrest and delivery of a fugitive from justice upon the request of the executive authority of the State from which the fugitive had fled. See Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, §1, 1 Stat. 302. That was in direct implementation, however,of the Extradition Clause of the Constitution itself, see Art. IV, §2. 3 </s> Not only do the enactments of the early Congresses, as far as we are aware, contain no evidence of an assumption that the Federal Government may command the States' executive power in the absence of a particularized constitutional authorization, they contain some indication of precisely the opposite assumption. On September 23, 1789--the day before its proposal of the Bill of Rights, see 1 Annals of Congress 912-913--the First Congress enacted a law aimed at obtaining state assistance of the most rudimentary and necessary sort for the enforcement of the new Government's laws: the holding of federal prisoners in state jails at federal expense. Significantly, the law issued not a command to the States' executive, but a recommendation to their legislatures. Congress "recommended to the legislatures of the several States to pass laws, making it expressly the duty of the keepers of their gaols, to receive and safe keep therein all prisoners committed under the authority of the United States," and offered to pay 50 cents per month for each prisoner. Act of Sept. 23, 1789, 1 Stat. 96. Moreover, when Georgia refused to comply with the request, see L. White, The Federalists402 (1948), Congress's only reaction was a law authorizing the marshal in any State that failed to comply with the Recommendation of September 23, 1789, to rent a temporary jail until provision for a permanent one could be made, see Resolution of Mar. 3, 1791, 1 Stat. 225. </s> In addition to early legislation, the Government also appeals to other sources we have usually regarded as indicative of the original understanding of the Constitution. It points to portions of The Federalist which reply to criticisms that Congress's power to tax will produce two sets of revenue officers--for example, "Brutus's" assertion in his letter to the New York Journal of December 13, 1787, that the Constitution "opens a door to the appointment of a swarm of revenue and excise officers to prey upon the honest and industrious part of the community, eat up their substance, and riot on the spoils of the country," reprinted in 1 Debate on the Constitution 502 (B. Bailyn ed. 1993). "Publius" responded that Congress will probably "make use of the State officers and State regulations, for collecting" federal taxes, The Federalist No. 36, p. 221 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) (hereinafter The Federalist), and predicted that "the eventual collection [of internal revenue] under the immediate authority of the Union, will generally be made by the officers, and according to the rules, appointed by the several States," id., No. 45, at 292 (J. Madison). The Government also invokes the Federalist's more general observations that the Constitution would "enable the [national] government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each [State] in the execution of its laws," id., No. 27, at 176 (A. Hamilton), and that it was "extremely probable that in other instances, particularly in the organization of the judicial power, the officers of the States will be clothed in the correspondent authority of the Union," id., No. 45, at 292 (J. Madison). But none of these statements necessarily implies--what is the critical point here--that Congress could imposethese responsibilities without the consent of the States. They appear to rest on the natural assumption that the States would consent to allowing their officials to assist the Federal Government, see FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 796 , n. 35 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part), an assumption proved correct by the extensive mutual assistance the States and Federal Government voluntarily provided one another in the early days of the Republic, see generally White, supra, at 401-404, including voluntary federal implementation of state law, see, e.g., Act of Apr. 2, 1790, ch. 5, §1, 1 Stat. 106 (directing federal tax collectors and customs officers to assist in enforcing state inspection laws). </s> Another passage of The Federalist reads as follows: </s> "It merits particular attention . . . , that the laws of the Confederacy as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its jurisdiction will become the supreme law of the land; to the observance of which all officers, legislative, executive, and judicial in each State will be bound by the sanctity of an oath. Thus, the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the respective members will be incorporated into the operations of the national government as far as its just and constitutional authority extends; and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws." The Federalist No. 27, at 177 (A. Hamilton) (emphasis in original). </s> The Government does not rely upon this passage, but Justice Souter (with whose conclusions on this point the dissent is in agreement, see post, at 11) makes it the very foundation of his position; so we pause to examine it in some detail. Justice Souter finds "[t]he natural reading" of the phrases "will be incorporated into the operations of the national government" and "will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws" tobe that the National Government will have "authority . . . , when exercising an otherwise legitimate power (the commerce power, say), to require state `auxiliaries' to take appropriate action." Post, at 2. There are several obstacles to such an interpretation. First, the consequences in question ("incorporated into the operations of the national government" and "rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws") are said in the quoted passage to flow automatically from the officers' oath to observe the "the laws of the Confederacy as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its jurisdiction." 4 Thus, if the passage means that state officers must take an active role in the implementation of federal law, it means that they must do so without the necessity for a congressional directive that they implement it. But no one has ever thought, and no one asserts in the present litigation, that that is the law. The second problem with Justice Souter's reading is that it makes state legislatures subject to federal direction. (The passage in question, after all, does not include legislatures merely incidentally, as by referring to "all state officers"; it refers to legislatures specifically and first of all.) We have held, however, that state leglislatures are not subject to federal direction. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 5 </s> These problems are avoided, of course, if the calculatedly vague consequences the passage recites--%incorporated into the operations of the national government" and "rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws"--are taken to refer to nothing more (or less) than the duty owed to the National Government, on the part of all state officials, to enact, enforce, and interpret state law in such fashion as not to obstruct the operation of federal law, and the attendant reality that all state actions constituting such obstruction, even legislative acts, are ipso facto invalid. 6 See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (federal pre-emption of conflicting state law). This meaningaccords well with the context of the passage, which seeks to explain why the new system of federal law directed to individual citizens, unlike the old one of federal law directed to the States, will "bid much fairer to avoid the necessity of using force" against the States, The Federalist No. 27, at 176 . It also reconciles the passage with Hamilton's statement in Federalist No. 36, at 222, that the Federal Government would in some circumstances do well "to employ the state officers as much as possible, and to attach them to the Union by an accumulation of their emoluments"--which surely suggests inducing state officers to come aboard by paying them, rather than merely commandeering their official services. 7 </s> Justice Souter contends that his interpretation of Federalist No. 27 is "supported by No. 44," written by Madison, wherefore he claims that "Madison and Hamilton" together stand opposed to our view. Post, at 4. In fact, Federalist No. 44 quite clearly contradicts Justice Souter's reading. In that Number, Madison justifies the requirement that state officials take an oath to support the Federal Constitution on the ground that they "will have an essential agency in giving effect to the federal Constitution." If the dissent's reading of Federalist No. 27 were correct (and if Madison agreed with it), one would surely have expected that "essential agency" of state executive officers (if described further) to be described as their responsibility to execute the laws enacted under the Constitution. Instead, however, Federalist No. 44 continues with the followingdescription: </s> "The election of the President and Senate will depend, in all cases, on the legislatures of the several States. And the election of the House of Representatives will equally depend on the same authority in the first instance; and will, probably, forever be conducted by the officers and according to the laws of the States." Id., at 287 (emphasis added). </s> It is most implausible that the person who labored for that example of state executive officers' assisting the Federal Government believed, but neglected to mention, that they had a responsibility to execute federal laws. 8 If it was indeed Hamilton's view that the Federal Government could direct the officers of the States, that view has no clear support in Madison's writings, or as far as we are aware, in text, history, or early commentary elsewhere. 9 </s> To complete the historical record, we must note that there is not only an absence of executive commandeering statutes in the early Congresses, but there is an absence of them in our later history as well, at least until very recent years. The Government points to the Act of August 3, 1882, ch. 376, §§2, 4, 22 Stat. 214, which enlisted state officials "to take charge of the local affairs of immigration in the ports within such State, and to provide for the support and relief of such immigrants therein landing as may fall into distress or need ofpublic aid"; to inspect arriving immigrants and exclude any person found to be a "convict, lunatic, idiot," or indigent; and to send convicts back to their country of origin "without compensation." The statute did not, however, mandate those duties, but merely empowered the Secretary of the Treasury "to enter into contracts with such State . . . officers as may be designated for that purpose by the governor of any State." (Emphasis added.) </s> The Government cites the World War I selective draft law that authorized the President "to utilize the service of any or all departments and any or all officers or agents of the United States and of the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia, and subdivisions thereof, in the execution of this Act," and made any person who refused to comply with the President's directions guilty of a misdemeanor. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, §6, 40 Stat. 80-81 (emphasis added). However, it is far from clear that the authorization "to utilize the service" of state officers was an authorization to compel the service of state officers; and the misdemeanor provision surely applied only to refusal to comply with the President's authorized directions, which might not have included directions to officers of States whose governors had not volunteered their services. It is interesting that in implementing the Act President Wilson did not commandeer the services of state officers, but instead requested the assistance of the States' governors, see Proclamation of May 18, 1917, 40 Stat. 1665 ("call[ing] upon the Governor of each of the several States . . . and all officers and agents of the several States . . . to perform certain duties"); Registration Regulations Prescribed by the President Under the Act of Congress Approved May 18, 1917, Part I, §7 ("the governor [of each State] is requested to act under the regulations and rules prescribed by the President or under his direction") (emphasis added), obtained theconsent of each of the governors, see Note, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the Executive Order of May 8, 1926, 21 Ill. L. Rev. 142, 144 (1926), and left it to the governors to issue orders to their subordinate state officers, see Selective Service Regulations Prescribed by the President Under the Act of May 18, 1917, §27 (1918); J. Clark, The Rise of a New Federalism 91 (1965). See generally Note, 21 Ill. L. Rev., at 144. It is impressive that even with respect to a wartime measure the President should have been so solicitous of state independence. </s> The Government points to a number of federal statutes enacted within the past few decades that require the participation of state or local officials in implementing federal regulatory schemes. Some of these are connected to federal funding measures, and can perhaps be more accurately described as conditions upon the grant of federal funding than as mandates to the States; others, which require only the provision of information to the Federal Government, do not involve the precise issue before us here, which is the forced participation of the States' executive in the actual administration of a federal program. We of course do not address these or other currently operative enactments that are not before us; it will be time enough to do so if and when their validity is challenged in a proper case. For deciding the issue before us here, they are of little relevance. Even assuming they represent assertion of the very same congressional power challenged here, they are of such recent vintage that they are no more probative than the statute before us of a constitutional tradition that lends meaning to the text. Their persuasive force is far outweighed by almost two centuries of apparent congressional avoidance of the practice. Compare INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), in which the legislative veto, though enshrined in perhaps hundreds of federal statutes, most of whichwere enacted in the 1970's and the earliest of which was enacted in 1932, see id., at 967-975 (White, J., dissenting), was nonetheless held unconstitutional. </s> The constitutional practice we have examined above tends to negate the existence of the congressional power asserted here, but is not conclusive. We turn next to consideration of the structure of the Constitution, to see if we can discern among its "essential postulate[s]," Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934), a principle that controls the present cases. </s> It is incontestible that the Constitution established a system of "dual sovereignty." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990). Although the States surrendered many of their powers to the new Federal Government, they retained "a residuary and inviolable sovereignty," The Federalist No. 39, at 245 (J. Madison). This is reflected throughout the Constitution's text, Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76 (1869); Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725 (1869), including (to mention only a few examples) the prohibition on any involuntary reduction or combination of a State's territory, Art. IV, §3; the Judicial Power Clause, Art. III, §2, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Art. IV, §2, which speak of the "Citizens" of the States; the amendment provision, Article V, which requires the votes of three fourths of the States to amend the Constitution; and the Guarantee Clause, Art. IV, §4, which "presupposes the continued existence of the states and . . . those means and instrumentalities which are the creation of their sovereign and reserved rights," Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 414 -415 (1938). Residual state sovereignty was also implicit, of course, in the Constitution's conferral upon Congress of not all governmental powers,but only discrete, enumerated ones, Art. I, §8, which implication was rendered express by the Tenth Amendment's assertion that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." </s> The Framers' experience under the Articles of Confederation had persuaded them that using the States as the instruments of federal governance was both ineffectual and provocative of federal state conflict. See The Federalist No. 15. Preservation of the States as independent political entities being the price of union, and "[t]he practicality of making laws, with coercive sanctions, for the States as political bodies" having been, in Madison's words, "exploded on all hands," 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 9 (M. Farrand ed. 1911), the Framers rejected the concept of a central government that would act upon and through the States, and instead designed a system in which the state and federal governments would exercise concurrent authority over the people--who were, in Hamilton's words, "the only proper objects of government," The Federalist No. 15, at 109. We have set forth the historical record in more detail elsewhere, see New York v. United States, 505 U.S., at 161 -166, and need not repeat it here. It suffices to repeat the conclusion: "The Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States." Id., at 166. 10 The great innovation of this design was that-our citizens would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other"--%a legal system unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it." U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). The Constitution thus contemplates that a State's government will represent and remain accountable to its own citizens. See New York, supra, at 168-169; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576 -577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Cf. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982) ("the State has no legitimate interest in protecting nonresident[s]"). As Madison expressed it: "[T]he local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority than the general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere." The Federalist No. 39, at 245. 11 </s> This separation of the two spheres is one of the Constitution's structural protections of liberty. "Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front." Gregory, supra, at 458. To quote Madison once again: </s> "In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself." TheFederalist No. 51, at 323. </s> See also The Federalist No. 28, at 180-181 (A. Hamilton). The power of the Federal Government would be augmented immeasurably if it were able to impress into its service--and at no cost to itself--the police officers of the 50 States. </s> We have thus far discussed the effect that federal control of state officers would have upon the first element of the "double security" alluded to by Madison: the division of power between State and Federal Governments. It would also have an effect upon the second element: the separation and equilibration of powers between the three branches of the Federal Government itself. The Constitution does not leave to speculation who is to administer the laws enacted by Congress; the President, it says, "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," Art. II, §3, personally and through officers whom he appoints (save for such inferior officers as Congress may authorize to be appointed by the "Courts of Law" or by "the Heads of Departments" who are themselves presidential appointees), Art. II, §2. The Brady Act effectively transfers this responsibility to thousands of CLEOs in the 50 States, who are left to implement the program without meaningful Presidential control (if indeed meaningful Presidential control is possible without the power to appoint and remove). The insistence of the Framers upon unity in the Federal Executive--to insure both vigor and accountability--is well known. See The Federalist No. 70 (A. Hamilton); 2 Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 495 (M. Jensen ed. 1976) (statement of James Wilson); see also Calabresi & Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L. J. 541 (1994). That unity would be shattered, and the power of the President would be subject to reduction, if Congresscould act as effectively without the President as with him, by simply requiring state officers to execute its laws. 12 </s> The dissent of course resorts to the last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action, the Necessary and Proper Clause. It reasons, post, at 3-5, that the power to regulate the sale of handguns under the Commerce Clause, coupled with the power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers," Art. I, §8, conclusively establishes the Brady Act's constitutional validity, because the Tenth Amendment imposes no limitations on the exercise of delegated powers but merely prohibits the exercise of powers "not delegated to the United States." What destroys the dissent's Necessary and Proper Clause argument, however, is not the Tenth Amendment but the Necessary and Proper Clause itself. 13 When a "La[w] . . . for carrying into Execution"the Commerce Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty reflected in the various constitutional provisions we mentioned earlier, supra, at 19-20, it is not a "La[w] . . . proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause," and is thus, in the words of The Federalist, "merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation" which "deserve[s] to be treated as such." The Federalist No. 33, at 204 (A. Hamilton). See Lawson & Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L. J. 267, 297-326, 330-333 (1993). We in fact answered the dissent's Necessary and Proper Clause argument in New York: "[E]ven where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts. . . . [T]he Commerce Clause, for example, authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments' regulation of interstate commerce." 505 U.S., at 166 . </s> The dissent perceives a simple answer in that portion of Article VI which requires that "all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution," arguing that by virtue of the Supremacy Clause this makes "not only the Constitution, but every law enacted by Congress as well," binding on state officers, including laws requiring state officer enforcement. Post, at 6. The Supremacy Clause, however, makes "Law of the Land" only "Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance [of the Constitution]"; so the Supremacy Clause merely bringsus back to the question discussed earlier, whether laws conscripting state officers violate state sovereignty and are thus not in accord with the Constitution. </s> Finally, and most conclusively in the present litigation, we turn to the prior jurisprudence of this Court. Federal commandeering of state governments is such a novel phenomenon that this Court's first experience with it did not occur until the 1970's, when the Environmental Protection Agency promulgated regulations requiring States to prescribe auto emissions testing, monitoring and retrofit programs, and to designate preferential bus and carpool lanes. The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Ninth Circuits invalidated the regulations on statutory grounds in order to avoid what they perceived to be grave constitutional issues, see Maryland v. EPA, 530 F. 2d 215, 226 (CA4 1975); Brown v. EPA, 521 F. 2d 827, 838-842 (CA9 1975); and the District of Columbia Circuit invalidated the regulations on both constitutional and statutory grounds, see District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F. 2d 971, 994 (CADC 1975). After we granted certiorari to review the statutory and constitutional validity of the regulations, the Government declined even to defend them, and insteadrescinded some and conceded the invalidity of those that remained, leading us to vacate the opinions below and remand for consideration of mootness. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977). </s> Although we had no occasion to pass upon the subject in Brown, later opinions of ours have made clear that the Federal Government may not compel the States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981), and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), we sustained statutes against constitutional challenge onlyafter assuring ourselves that they did not require the States to enforce federal law. In Hodel we cited the lower court cases in EPA v. Brown, supra, but concluded that the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act did not present the problem they raised because it merely made compliance with federal standards a precondition to continued state regulation in an otherwise pre-empted field, Hodel, supra, at 288. In FERC, we construed the most troubling provisions of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, to contain only the "command" that state agencies "consider" federal standards, and again only as a precondition to continued state regulation of an otherwise pre-empted field. 456 U.S., at 764 -765. We warned that "this Court never has sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations," id., at 761-762. </s> When we were at last confronted squarely with a federal statute that unambiguously required the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program, our decision should have come as no surprise. At issue in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), were the so called "take title" provisions of the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, which required States either to enact legislation providing for the disposal of radioactive waste generated within their borders, or to take title to, and possession of the waste--effectively requiring the States either to legislate pursuant to Congress's directions, or to implement an administrative solution. Id., at 175-176. We concluded that Congress could constitutionally require the States to do neither. Id., at 176. "The Federal Government," we held, "may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program." Id., at 188. </s> The Government contends that New York is distinguishable on the following ground: unlike the "take title"provisions invalidated there, the background check provision of the Brady Act does not require state legislative or executive officials to make policy, but instead issues a final directive to state CLEOs. It is permissible, the Government asserts, for Congress to command state or local officials to assist in the implementation of federal law so long as "Congress itself devises a clear legislative solution that regulates private conduct" and requires state or local officers to provide only "limited, non policymaking help in enforcing that law." "[T]he constitutional line is crossed only when Congress compels the States to make law in their sovereign capacities." Brief for United States 16. </s> The Government's distinction between "making" law and merely "enforcing" it, between "policymaking" and mere "implementation," is an interesting one. It is perhaps not meant to be the same as, but it is surely reminiscent of, the line that separates proper congressional conferral of Executive power from unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority for federal separation of powers purposes. See A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 428 -429 (1935). This Court has not been notably successful in describing the latter line; indeed, some think we have abandoned the effort to do so. See FPC v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 352 -353 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring in result); Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give it Substance? 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1223, 1233 (1985). We are doubtful that the new line the Government proposes would be any more distinct. Executive action that has utterly no policymaking component is rare, particularly at an executive level as high as a jurisdiction's chief law enforcement officer. Is it really true that there is no policymaking involved in deciding, for example, what "reasonable efforts" shall be expended to conduct a backgroundcheck? It may well satisfy the Act for a CLEO to direct that (a) no background checks will be conducted that divert personnel time from pending felony investigations, and (b) no background check will be permitted to consume more than one half hour of an officer's time. But nothing in the Act requires a CLEO to be so parsimonious; diverting at least some felony investigation time, and permitting at least some background checks beyond one half hour would certainly not be unreasonable. Is this decision whether to devote maximum "reasonable efforts" or minimum "reasonable efforts" not preeminently a matter of policy? It is quite impossible, in short, to draw the Government's proposed line at "no policymaking," and we would have to fall back upon a line of "not too much policymaking." How much is too much is not likely to be answered precisely; and an imprecise barrier against federal intrusion upon state authority is not likely to be an effective one. </s> Even assuming, moreover, that the Brady Act leaves no "policymaking" discretion with the States, we fail to see how that improves rather than worsens the intrusion upon state sovereignty. Preservation of the States as independent and autonomous political entities is arguably less undermined by requiring them to make policy in certain fields than (as Judge Sneed aptly described it over two decades ago) by "reduc[ing] [them] to puppets of a ventriloquist Congress," Brown v. EPA, 521 F. 2d, at 839. It is an essential attribute of the States' retained sovereignty that they remain independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of authority. See Texas v. White, 7 Wall, at 725. It is no more compatible with this independence and autonomy that their officers be "dragooned" (as Judge Fernandez put it in his dissent below, 66 F. 3d, at 1035) into administering federal law, than it would be compatible with the independence and autonomy of the United States that its officers be impressed into service for the execution of state laws. </s> The Government purports to find support for its proffered distinction of New York in our decisions in Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982). We find neither case relevant. Testa stands for the proposition that state courts cannot refuse to apply federal law--a conclusion mandated by the terms of the Supremacy Clause ("the Judges in every State shall be bound [by federal law]"). As we have suggested earlier, supra, at 6-7, that says nothing about whether state executive officers must administer federal law. Accord New York, 505 U.S., at 178 -179. As for FERC, it stated (as we have described earlier) that "this Court never has sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations," 456 U.S., at 761 -762, and upheld the statutory provisions at issue precisely because they did not commandeer state government, but merely imposed preconditions to continued state regulation of an otherwise pre-empted field, in accord with Hodel, 452 U.S., at 288 , and required state administrative agencies to apply federal law while acting in a judicial capacity, in accord with Testa, See FERC, supra, at 759-771, andn. 24. 14 </s> The Government also maintains that requiring state officers to perform discrete, ministerial tasks specified by Congress does not violate the principle of New York because it does not diminish the accountability of state or federal officials. This argument fails even on its own terms. By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. And even when the States are not forced to absorb the costs of implementing a federal program, they are still put in the position of taking the blame for its burdensomeness and for its defects. See Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1563, 1580, n. 65 (1994). Under the present law, for example, it will be the CLEO and not some federal official who stands between the gun purchaser and immediate possession of his gun. And it will likely be the CLEO, not some federal official, who will be blamed for any error (even one in the designated federal database) that causes a purchaser to be mistakenly rejected. </s> The dissent makes no attempt to defend the Government's basis for distinguishing New York, but instead advances what seems to us an even more implausible theory. The Brady Act, the dissent asserts, is different from the "take title" provisions invalidatedin New York because the former is addressed to individuals--namely CLEOs--while the latter were directed to the State itself. That is certainly a difference, but it cannot be a constitutionally significant one. While the Brady Act is directed to "individuals," it is directed to them in their official capacities as state officers; it controls their actions, not as private citizens, but as the agents of the State. The distinction between judicial writs and other government action directed against individuals in their personal capacity, on the one hand, and in their official capacity, on the other hand, is an ancient one, principally because it is dictated by common sense. We have observed that "a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office. . . . As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself." Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). And the same must be said of a directive to an official in his or her official capacity. To say that the Federal Government cannot control the State, but can control all of its officers, is to say nothing of significance. 15 Indeed, it merits the description "empty formalistic reasoning of the highest order," post, at 15. By resorting to this, thedissent not so much distinguishes New York as disembowels it. 16 </s> Finally, the Government puts forward a cluster of arguments that can be grouped under the heading: "The Brady Act serves very important purposes, is most efficiently administered by CLEOs during the interim period, and places a minimal and only temporary burden upon state officers." There is considerable disagreement over the extent of the burden, but we need not pause over that detail. Assuming all the mentioned factors were true, they might be relevant if we were evaluating whether the incidental application to the States of a federal law of general applicability excessively interfered with the functioning of state governments. See, e.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 548 (1975); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 853 (1976) (overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985)); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 529 (1988) (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in judgment). But where, as here, it is the whole object of the law to direct the functioning of the state executive, and hence to compromise the structural framework of dual sovereignty, such a "balancing"analysis is inappropriate. 17 It is the very principle of separate state sovereignty that such a law offends, and no comparative assessment of the various interests can overcome that fundamental defect. Cf. Bowsher, 478 U.S., at 736 (declining to subject principle of separation of powers to a balancing test); Chadha, 462 U.S., at 944 -946 (same); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 -240 (1995) (holding legislated invalidation of final judgments to be categorically unconstitutional). We expressly rejected such an approach in New York, and what we said bears repeating: </s> "Much of the Constitution is concerned with setting forth the form of our government, and the courts have traditionally invalidated measures deviating from that form. The result may appear `formalistic' in a given case to partisans of the measure at issue, because such measures are typically the product of the era's perceived necessity. But the Constitution protects us from our own best intentions: It divides power among sovereigns and among branches of government precisely so that we may resist the temptation to concentrate power in one location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the day." Id.,at 187. </s> We adhere to that principle today, and conclude categorically, as we concluded categorically in New York: "The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program." Id., at 188. The mandatory obligation imposed on CLEOs to perform background checks on prospective handgun purchasers plainly runs afoul of that rule. </s> What we have said makes it clear enough that the central obligation imposed upon CLEOs by the interim provisions of the Brady Act--the obligation to "make a reasonable effort to ascertain within 5 business days whether receipt or possession [of a handgun] would be in violation of the law, including research in whatever State and local recordkeeping systems are available and in a national system designated by the Attorney General," 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2)--is unconstitutional. Extinguished with it, of course, is the duty implicit in the background check requirement that the CLEO accept notice of the contents of, and a copy of, the completed Brady Form, which the firearms dealer is required to provide to him, §§922(s)(1)(A)(i)(III) and (IV). </s> Petitioners also challenge, however, two other provisions of the Act: (1) the requirement that any CLEO "to whom a [Brady Form] is transmitted" destroy the form and any record containing information derived from it, §922(s)(6)(B)(i), and (2) the requirement that any CLEO who "determines that an individual is ineligible to receive a handgun" provide the would be purchaser, upon request, a written statement of the reasons for that determination, §922(s)(6)(C). With the background check and implicit receipt of forms requirements invalidated, however, these provisions require no action whatsoever on the part of the CLEO. Quite obviously, the obligation to destroy all Brady Forms that he has receivedwhen he has received none, and the obligation to give reasons for a determination of ineligibility when he never makes a determination of ineligibility, are no obligations at all. These two provisions have conceivable application to a CLEO, in other words, only if he has chosen, voluntarily, to participate in administration of the federal scheme. The present petitioners arenot in that position. 18 As to them, these last two challenged provisions are not unconstitutional, but simply inoperative. </s> There is involved in this Brady Act conundrum a severability question, which the parties have briefed and argued: whether firearms dealers in the jurisdictions at issue here, and in other jurisdictions, remain obliged to forward to the CLEO (even if he will not accept it) the requisite notice of the contents (and a copy) of the Brady Form, §§922(s)(1)(A)(i)(III) and (IV); and to wait five business days before consummating the sale, §922(s)(1)(A)(ii). These are important questions, but we have no business answering them in these cases. These provisions burden only firearms dealers and purchasers, and no plaintiff in either of those categories is before us here. We decline to speculate regarding the rights andobligations of parties not before the Court. Cf., e.g., New York, supra, at 186-187 (addressing severability where remaining provisions at issue affected the plaintiffs). </s> * * * </s> We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the State's officers directly. The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not whether policymaking is involved, and no case by case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit isreversed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- </s> U.S. Supreme Court </s> Nos. 95-1478 and 95-1503 </s> JAY PRINTZ, SHERIFF/CORONER, RAVALLI COUNTY, MONTANA, PETITIONER 95-1478 v. UNITED STATES RICHARD MACK, PETITIONER 95-1503 </s> on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit [June 27, 1997] </s> Justice O'Connor, concurring. </s> Our precedent and our Nation's historical practices support the Court's holding today. The Brady Act violates the Tenth Amendment to the extent it forces States and local law enforcement officers to perform background checks on prospective handgun owners and to accept Brady Forms from firearms dealers. See ante, at 23. Our holding, of course, does not spell theend of the objectives of the Brady Act. States and chief law enforcement officers may voluntarily continue to participate in the federal program. Moreover, the directives to the States are merely interim provisions scheduled to terminate November 30, 1998. Note following 18 U.S.C. § 922. Congress is also free to amend the interim program to provide for its continuance on a contractual basis with the States if it wishes, as it does with a number of other federal programs. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 402 (conditioning States' receipt </s> of federal funds for highway safety program on compliance with federal requirements). </s> In addition, the Court appropriately refrains from deciding whether other purely ministerial reporting requirements imposed by Congress on state and local authorities pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers are similarly invalid. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5779(a) (requiring state and local law enforcement agencies to report cases of missing children to the Department of Justice). The provisions invalidated here, however, which directly compel state officials to administer a federal regulatory program, utterly fail to adhere to the design and structure of our constitutional scheme. </s> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- </s> U.S. Supreme Court </s> Nos. 95-1478 and 95-1503 </s> JAY PRINTZ, SHERIFF/CORONER, RAVALLI COUNTY, MONTANA, PETITIONER 95-1478 v. UNITED STATES RICHARD MACK, PETITIONER 95-1503 </s> on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit [June 27, 1997] </s> Justice Thomas, concurring. </s> The Court today properly holds that the Brady Act violates the Tenth Amendment in that it compels state law enforcement officers to "administer or enforce a federal regulatory program." See ante, at 25. Although I join the Court's opinion in full, I write separately to emphasize that the Tenth Amendment affirms the undeniable notion that under our Constitution, the Federal Government is one of enumerated, hence limited, powers. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405 (1819) ("This government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers"). "[T]hat those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176 (1803). Accordingly, the Federal Government may act only where the Constitution authorizes it to do so. Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). </s> In my "revisionist" view, see post, at 3, the Federal </s> Government's authority under the Commerce Clause, which merely allocates to Congress the power "to regulate Commerce . . . among the several states," does not extend to the regulation of wholly intrastate, point of sale transactions. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (concurring opinion). Absent the underlying authority to regulate the intrastate transfer of firearms, Congress surely lacks the corollary power to impress state law enforcement officers into administering and enforcing such regulations. Although this Court has long interpreted the Constitution as ceding Congress extensive authority to regulate commerce (interstate or otherwise), I continue to believe that we must "temper our Commerce Clause jurisprudence" and return to an interpretation better rooted in the Clause's original understanding. Id., at 601; (concurring opinion); see also Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U. S. ___, (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Even if we construe Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce to encompass those intrastate transactions that "substantially affect" interstate commerce, I question whether Congress can regulate the particular transactions at issue here. The Constitution, in addition to delegating certain enumerated powers to Congress, places whole areas outside the reach of Congress' regulatory authority. The First Amendment, for example, is fittingly celebrated for preventing Congress from "prohibiting the free exercise" of religion or "abridging the freedom of speech." The Second Amendment similarly appears to contain an express limitation on the government's authority. That Amendment provides: "[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed." This Court has not had recent occasion to consider the nature of the substantiveright safeguarded by the Second Amendment. 1 If, however, the Second Amendment is read to confer a personal right to "keep and bear arms," a colorable argument exists that the Federal Government's regulatory scheme, at least as it pertains to the purely intrastate sale or possession of firearms, runs afoul of that Amendment's protections. 2 As the parties did not raisethis argument, however, we need not consider it here. Perhaps, at some future date, this Court will have the opportunity to determine whether Justice Story was correct when he wrote that the right to bear arms "has justly been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic." 3 J. Story, Commentaries §1890, p. 746 (1833). In the meantime, I join the Court's opinion striking down the challenged provisions of the Brady Act as inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment. </s> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- </s> U.S. Supreme Court </s> Nos. 95-1478 and 95-1503 </s> JAY PRINTZ, SHERIFF/CORONER, RAVALLI COUNTY, MONTANA, PETITIONER 95-1478 v. UNITED STATES RICHARD MACK, PETITIONER 95-1503 </s> on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit [June 27, 1997] </s> Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting. </s> When Congress exercises the powers delegated to it by the Constitution, it may impose affirmative obligations on executive and judicial officers of state and local governments as well as ordinary citizens. This conclusion is firmly supported by the text of the Constitution, the early history of the Nation, decisions of this Court, and a correct understanding of the basic structure of the Federal Government. </s> These cases do not implicate the more difficult questions associated with congressional coercion of state legislatures addressed in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). Nor need we consider the wisdom of relying on local officials rather than federal agents to carry out aspects of a federal program, or even the question whether such officials may be required to perform a federal function on a permanent basis. The question is whether Congress, acting on behalf of thepeople of the entire Nation, may require local law enforcement officers to perform certain duties during the interim needed for the development of a federal gun control program. It is remarkably similar to the question, heavily debated by the Framers of the Constitution, whether the Congress could require state agents to collect federal taxes. Or the question whether Congress could impress state judges into federal service to entertain and decide cases that they would prefer to ignore. </s> Indeed, since the ultimate issue is one of power, we must consider its implications in times of national emergency. Matters such as the enlistment of air raid wardens, the administration of a military draft, the mass inoculation of children to forestall an epidemic, or perhaps the threat of an international terrorist, may require a national response before federal personnel can be made available to respond. If the Constitution empowers Congress and the President to make an appropriate response, is there anything in the Tenth Amendment, "in historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, [or] in the jurisprudence of this Court," ante, at 4, that forbids the enlistment of state officers to make that response effective? More narrowly, what basis is there in any of those sources for concluding that it is the Members of this Court, rather than the elected representatives of the people, who should determine whether the Constitution contains the unwritten rule that the Court announces today? </s> Perhaps today's majority would suggest that no such emergency is presented by the facts of these cases. But such a suggestion is itself an expression of a policy judgment. And Congress' view of the matter is quite different from that implied by the Court today. </s> The Brady Act was passed in response to what Congress described as an "epidemic of gun violence." H. R. Rep. No. 103-344, p. 8 (1993). The Act's legislative history notes that 15,377 Americans were murdered with firearms in 1992, and that 12,489 of these deaths were caused by handguns. Ibid. Congress expressed special concern that "[t]he level of firearm violence in this country is, by far, the highest among developed nations." Ibid. The partial solution contained in the Brady Act, a mandatory background check before a handgun may be purchased, has met with remarkable success. Between 1994 and 1996, approximately 6,600 firearm sales each month to potentially dangerous persons were prevented by Brady Act checks; over 70% of the rejected purchasers were convicted or indicted felons. See U. S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, A National Estimate: Presale Firearm Checks 1 (Feb. 1997). Whether or not the evaluation reflected in the enactment of the Brady Act is correct as to the extent of the danger and the efficacy of the legislation, the congressional decision surely warrants more respect than it is accorded in today's unprecedented decision. </s> The text of the Constitution provides a sufficient basis for a correct disposition of this case. </s> Article I, §8, grants the Congress the power to regulate commerce among the States. Putting to one side the revisionist views expressed by Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995), there can be no question that that provision adequately supports the regulation of commerce in handguns effected by the Brady Act. Moreover, the additional grant of authority in that section of the Constitution "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers" is surely adequate to support the temporary enlistment of local police officers in the process ofidentifying persons who should not be entrusted with the possession of handguns. In short, the affirmative delegation of power in Article I provides ample authority for the congressional enactment. </s> Unlike the First Amendment, which prohibits the enactment of a category of laws that would otherwise be authorized by Article I, the Tenth Amendment imposes no restriction on the exercise of delegated powers. Using language that plainly refers only to powers that are "not" delegated to Congress, it provides: </s> "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U. S. Const., Amdt. 10. </s> The Amendment confirms the principle that the powers of the Federal Government are limited to those affirmatively granted by the Constitution, but it does not purport to limit the scope or the effectiveness of the exercise of powers that are delegated to Congress. 1 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) ("[i]n a case . . . involving the division of authority between federal and state governments, the two inquiries are mirror images of each other"). Thus, the Amendment provides no support for a rule that immunizes local officials from obligations that might beimposed on ordinary citizens. 2 Indeed, it would be more reasonable to infer that federal law may impose greater duties on state officials than on private citizens because another provision of the Constitution requires that "all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution." U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 3. </s> It is appropriate for state officials to make an oath or affirmation to support the Federal Constitution because, as explained in The Federalist, they "have an essentialagency in giving effect to the federal Constitution." 3 The Federalist No. 44, p. 312 (E. Bourne ed. 1947) (J. Madison). There can be no conflict between their duties to the State and those owed to the Federal Government because Article VI unambiguously provides that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land," binding in every State. U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. Thus, not only the Constitution, but every law enacted by Congress as well, establishes policy for the States just as firmly as do laws enacted by state legislatures. </s> The reasoning in our unanimous opinion explaining why state tribunals with ordinary jurisdiction over tort litigation can be required to hear cases arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act applies equally to local law enforcement officers whose ordinary duties parallel the modest obligations imposed by the Brady Act: </s> "The suggestion that the act of Congress is not in harmony with the policy of the State, and therefore that the courts of the State are free to decline jurisdiction, is quite inadmissible, because it presupposes what in legal contemplation does not exist. When Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it by the Constitution, adopted that act, it spoke for all the people and all the States, andthereby established a policy for all. That policy is as much the policy of Connecticut as if the act had emanated from its own legislature, and should be respected accordingly in the courts of the State. As was said by this court in Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 , 137: </s> `The laws of the United States are laws in the several States, and just as much binding on the citizens and courts thereof as the State laws are. The United States is not a foreign sovereignty as regards the several States, but is a concurrent, and, within its jurisdiction, paramount sovereignty.' " Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912). </s> See also Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392 (1947). </s> There is not a clause, sentence, or paragraph in the entire text of the Constitution of the United States that supports the proposition that a local police officer can ignore a command contained in a statute enacted by Congress pursuant to an express delegation of power enumerated in Article I. </s> Under the Articles of Confederation the National Government had the power to issue commands to the several sovereign states, but it had no authority to govern individuals directly. Thus, it raised an army and financed its operations by issuing requisitions to the constituent members of the Confederacy, rather than by creating federal agencies to draft soldiers or to impose taxes. </s> That method of governing proved to be unacceptable, not because it demeaned the sovereign character of the several States, but rather because it was cumbersome and inefficient. Indeed, a confederation that allows each of its members to determine the ways and means of complying with an overriding requisition is obviouslymore deferential to state sovereignty concerns than a national government that uses its own agents to impose its will directly on the citizenry. The basic change in the character of the government that the Framers conceived was designed to enhance the power of the national government, not to provide some new, unmentioned immunity for state officers. Because indirect control over individual citizens ("the only proper objects of government") was ineffective under the Articles of Confederation, Alexander Hamilton explained that "we must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens." The Federalist No. 15, at 101 (emphasis added). </s> Indeed, the historical materials strongly suggest that the Founders intended to enhance the capacity of the federal government by empowering it--as a part of the new authority to make demands directly on individual citizens--to act through local officials. Hamilton made clear that the new Constitution, "by extending the authority of the federal head to the individual citizens of the several States, will enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each, in the execution of its laws." The Federalist No. 27, at 180. Hamilton's meaning was unambiguous; the federal government was to have the power to demand that local officials implement national policy programs. As he went on to explain: "It is easy to perceive that this will tend to destroy, in the common apprehension, all distinction between the sources from which [the state and federal governments] might proceed; and will give the federal government the same advantage for securing a due obedience to its authority which is enjoyed by the government of each State." Ibid. 4 </s> More specifically, during the debates concerning the ratification of the Constitution, it was assumed that state agents would act as tax collectors for the federal government. Opponents of the Constitution had repeatedly expressed fears that the new federal government's ability to impose taxes directly on the citizenry would result in an overbearing presence of federal tax collectors in the States. 5 Federalists rejoined that this problem would not arise because, as Hamilton explained, "the United States . . . will make use of the State officers and State regulations for collecting" certain taxes. Id., No. 36, at 235. Similarly, Madison made clear that the new central government's power to raise taxes directly from the citizenry would "not be resorted to, except for supplemental purposes of revenue . . . and that the eventual collection, under the immediate authority of the Union, will generally be made by the officers . . . appointed by the several States." Id.,No. 45, at 318. 6 </s> The Court's response to this powerful historical evidence is weak. The majority suggests that "none of these statements necessarily implies . . . Congress could impose these responsibilities without the consent of the States." Ante, at 10-11 (emphasis omitted). No fair reading of these materials can justify such an interpretation. As Hamilton explained, the power of the government to act on "individual citizens"--including "employ[ing] the ordinary magistracy" of the States--was an answer to the problems faced by a central government that could act only directly "upon the States in their political or collective capacities." The Federalist, No. 27, at 179-180. The new Constitution would avoid this problem, resulting in "a regular and peaceable execution of the law of the Union." Ibid. </s> This point is made especially clear in Hamilton's statement that "the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the respective members, will be incorporated into the operations of the national government as far as its just and constitutional authority extends; and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws." Ibid. (second emphasis added). It is hard to imagine a more unequivocal statement that state judicial and executive branch officials may be required to implement federal law where the National Government acts within the scope of its affirmative powers. 7 </s> The Court makes two unpersuasive attempts to discount the force of this statement. First, according to the majority, because Hamilton mentioned the Supremacy Clause without specifically referring to any "congressional directive," the statement does not mean what it plainly says. Ante, at 12. But the mere fact that the Supremacy Clause is the source of the obligation of state officials to implement congressional directives does not remotely suggest that they might be " `incorporat[ed] into the operations of the national government' " before their obligations have been defined by Congress. Federal law establishes policy for the States just as firmly as laws enacted by state legislatures, but that does not mean that state or federal officials must implement directives that have not been specified in any law. 8 Second, the majority suggests that interpreting this passage to mean what it says would conflict with our decision in New York v. United States. Ante, at 12. But since the New York opinion did not mention Federalist No. 27, it does not affect either the relevance or the weight of the historical evidence provided by No. 27 insofar as it relates to state courts and magistrates. </s> Bereft of support in the history of the founding, the Court rests its conclusion on the claim that there is little evidence the National Government actually exercised such a power in the early years of the Republic. See ante, at 5. This reasoning is misguided in principle and in fact. While we have indicated that the expressconsideration and resolution of difficult constitutional issues by the First Congress in particular "provides `contemporaneous and weighty evidence' of the Constitution's meaning since many of [its] Members . . . `had taken part in framing that instrument,' " Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723 -724 (1986) (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983)), we have never suggested that the failure of the early Congresses to address the scope of federal power in a particular area or to exercise a particular authority was an argument against its existence. That position, if correct, would undermine most of our post-New Deal Commerce Clause jurisprudence. As Justice O'Connor quite properly noted in New York, "[t]he Federal Government undertakes activities today that would have been unimaginable to the Framers." 505 U.S., at 157 . </s> More importantly, the fact that Congress did elect to rely on state judges and the clerks of state courts to perform a variety of executive functions, see ante, at 5-6, is surely evidence of a contemporary understanding that their status as state officials did not immunize them from federal service. The majority's description of these early statutes is both incomplete and at times misleading. </s> For example, statutes of the early Congresses required in mandatory terms that state judges and their clerks perform various executive duties with respect to applications for citizenship. The First Congress enacted a statute requiring that the state courts consider such applications, specifying that the state courts "shall administer" an oath of loyalty to the United States, and that "the clerk of such court shall record such application." Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, §1, 1 Stat. 103 (emphasis added). Early legislation passed by the Fifth Congress also imposed reporting requirements relating to naturalization on court clerks, specifying that failure to perform those duties would result in a fine. Act ofJune 18, 1798, ch. 54, §2, 1 Stat. 567 (specifying that these obligations %shall be the duty of the clerk" (emphasis added)). Not long thereafter, the Seventh Congress mandated that state courts maintain a registry of aliens seeking naturalization. Court clerks were required to receive certain information from aliens, record that data, and provide certificates to the aliens; the statute specified fees to be received by local officials in compensation. Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, §2, 2 Stat. 154-155 (specifying that these burdens "shall be the duty of such clerk" including clerks "of a . . . state" (emphasis added)). 9 </s> Similarly, the First Congress enacted legislation requiring state courts to serve, functionally, like contemporary regulatory agencies in certifying the seaworthiness of vessels. Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, §3, 1 Stat. 132-133. The majority casts this as an adjudicative duty, ante, at 6, but that characterization is misleading. The law provided that upon a complaint raised by a ship's crew members, the state courts were (if no federal court was proximately located) to appoint an investigative committee of three persons "most skilful in maritime affairs" to report back. On this basis, the judge was to determine whether the ship was fit for its intended voyage. The statute sets forth, in essence, procedures for an expert inquisitorial proceeding, supervised by a judge but otherwise more characteristic of executive activity. 10 </s> The Court assumes that the imposition of such essentially executive duties on state judges and their clerks sheds no light on the question whether executive officials might have an immunity from federal obligations. Ante, at 6. Even assuming that the enlistment of state judges in their judicial role for federal purposes is irrelevant to the question whether executive officials may be asked to perform the same function--a claim disputed below, see infra, at 32--the majority's analysisis badly mistaken. </s> We are far truer to the historical record by applying a functional approach in assessing the role played by these early state officials. The use of state judges and their clerks to perform executive functions was, in historical context, hardly unusual. As one scholar has noted, "two centuries ago, state and local judges and associated judicial personnel performed many of the functions today performed by executive officers, including such varied tasks as laying city streets and ensuring the seaworthiness of vessels." Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1045, n. 176 (1995). And, of course, judges today continue to perform a variety of functions that may more properly be described as executive. See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988) (noting "intelligible distinction between judicial acts and the administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned to perform"). The majority's insistence that this evidence of federal enlistment of state officials to serve executive functions is irrelevant simply because the assistance of "judges" was at issue rests on empty formalistic reasoning of the highest order. 11 </s> The Court's evaluation of the historical evidence, furthermore, fails to acknowledge the important difference between policy decisions that may have been influenced by respect for state sovereignty concerns, and decisions that are compelled by the Constitution. 12 Thus, for example, the decision by Congress to give President Wilson the authority to utilize the services of state officers in implementing the World War I draft, see Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, §6, 40 Stat. 80-81, surely indicates that the national legislature saw no constitutional impediment to the enlistment of state assistance during a federal emergency. The fact that the President was able to implement the program by respectfully "request[ing]" state action, rather than bluntly commanding it, is evidence that he was an effective statesman, but surely does not indicate that he doubted either his or Congress' power to use mandatory language if necessary. 13 If there were merit to the Court's appraisal of this incident, one would assume that there would have been some contemporary comment on the supposed constitutional concern that hypothetically might have motivated the President's choice of language. 14 </s> The Court concludes its review of the historical materials with a reference to the fact that our decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), invalidated a large number of statutes enacted in the 1970's, implying that recent enactments by Congress that are similar to the Brady Act are not entitled to any presumption of validity. But in Chadha, unlike this case, our decision rested on the Constitution's express bicameralism and presentment requirements, id., at 946, not on judicial inferences drawn from a silent text and a historical record that surely favors the congressional understanding. Indeed, the majority's opinion consists almost entirely of arguments against the substantial evidenceweighing in opposition to its view; the Court's ruling is strikingly lacking in affirmative support. Absent even a modicum of textual foundation for its judicially crafted constitutional rule, there should be a presumption that if the Framers had actually intended such a rule, at least one of them would have mentioned it. 15 </s> The Court's "structural" arguments are not sufficient to rebut that presumption. The fact that the Framers intended to preserve the sovereignty of the several States simply does not speak to the question whether individual state employees may be required to perform federal obligations, such as registering young adults for the draft, 40 Stat. 80-81, creating state emergency response commissions designed to manage the release of hazardous substances, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001 11003, collecting and reporting data on underground storage tanks that may pose an environmental hazard, §6991a, and reporting traffic fatalities, 23 U.S.C. § 402(a), and missing children, 42 U.S.C. § 5779(a), to a federal agency. 16 </s> As we explained in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985):%[T]he principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself. It is no novelty to observe that the composition of the Federal Government was designed in large part to protect the States from overreaching by Congress." Id., at 550-551. Given the fact that the Members of Congress are electedby the people of the several States, with each State receiving an equivalent number of Senators in order to ensure that even the smallest States have a powerful voice in the legislature, it is quite unrealistic to assume that they will ignore the sovereignty concerns of their constituents. It is far more reasonable to presume that their decisions to impose modest burdens on state officials from time to time reflect a considered judgment that the people in each of the States will benefit therefrom. </s> Indeed, the presumption of validity that supports all congressional enactments 17 has added force with respect to policy judgments concerning the impact of a federal statute upon the respective States. The majority points to nothing suggesting that the political safeguards of federalism identified in Garcia need be supplemented by a rule, grounded in neither constitutional history nor text, flatly prohibiting the National Government from enlisting state and local officials in the implementation of federal law. </s> Recent developments demonstrate that the political safeguards protecting Our Federalism are effective. Themajority expresses special concern that were its rule not adopted the Federal Government would be able to avail itself of the services of state government officials "at no cost to itself." Ante, at 23; see also ante, at 31 (arguing that "Members of Congress can take credit for `solving' problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes"). But this specific problem of federal actions that have the effect of imposing so called "unfunded mandates" on the States has been identified and meaningfully addressed by Congress in recent legislation. 18 See Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48. </s> The statute was designed "to end the imposition, in the absence of full consideration by Congress, of Federal mandates on State . . . governments without adequate Federal funding, in a manner that may displace other essential State . . . governmental priorities." 2 U. S. C. A. §1501(2) (Supp. 1997). It functions, inter alia, by permitting Members of Congress to raise an objection by point of order to a pending bill that contains an "unfunded mandate," as defined by the statute, of over $50 million. 19 The mandate may not then be enacted unless the Members make an explicit decision to proceed anyway. See Recent Legislation, Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1469 (1996) (describing functioning of statute). Whatever the ultimate impact of the new legislation, its passage demonstrates that unelected judges are better off leaving the protection of federalism to the political process in all but the most extraordinary circumstances. 20 </s> Perversely, the majority's rule seems more likely to damage than to preserve the safeguards against tyranny provided by the existence of vital state governments. By limiting the ability of the Federal Government to enlist state officials in the implementation of its programs, the Court creates incentives for the National Government to aggrandize itself. In the name of State's rights, the majority would have the Federal Government create vast national bureaucracies to implement its policies. This is exactly the sort of thing that the early Federalists promised would not occur, in part as a result of the National Government's ability to rely on the magistracy of the states. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 36, at 234-235 (Hamilton); id., No. 45, at 318(Madison). 21 </s> With colorful hyperbole, the Court suggests that the unity in the Executive Branch of the Federal Government "would be shattered, and the power of the President would be subject to reduction, if Congress could . . . require . . . state officers to execute its laws." Ante, at 23-24. Putting to one side the obvious tension between the majority's claim that impressing state police officers will unduly tip the balance of power in favor of the federal sovereign and this suggestion that it will emasculate the Presidency, the Court's reasoningcontradicts New York v. United States. 22 </s> That decision squarely approved of cooperative federalism programs, designed at the national level but implemented principally by state governments. New York disapproved of a particular method of putting such programs into place, not the existence of federal programs implemented locally. See New York, 505 U.S., at 166 ("Our cases have identified a variety of methods . . . by which Congress may urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests"). Indeed, nothing in the majority's holding calls into question the three mechanisms for constructing such programs that New York expressly approved. Congress may require the States to implement its programs as a condition of federal spending, 23 in order to avoid the threat of unilateral federal action in the area, 24 or as a part of a program that affects States and private parties alike. 25 The majority's suggestion in response to this dissent that Congress' ability to create such programs is limited, ante, at 24, n. 12, is belied by the importance and sweep of the federal statutes that meet this description, some of which we described in New York. See id., at 167-168 (mentioning, inter alia, the Clean Water Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, andthe Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976). </s> Nor is there force to the assumption undergirding the Court's entire opinion that if this trivial burden on state sovereignty is permissible, the entire structure of federalism will soon collapse. These cases do not involve any mandate to state legislatures to enact new rules. When legislative action, or even administrative rule making, is at issue, it may be appropriate for Congress either to pre-empt the State's lawmaking power and fashion the federal rule itself, or to respect the State's power to fashion its own rules. But this case, unlike any precedent in which the Court has held that Congress exceeded its powers, merely involves the imposition of modest duties on individual officers. The Court seems to accept the fact that Congress could require private persons, such as hospital executives or school administrators, to provide arms merchants with relevant information about a prospective purchaser's fitness to own a weapon; indeed, the Court does not disturb the conclusion that flows directly from our prior holdings that the burden on police officers would be permissible if a similar burden were also imposed on private parties with access to relevant data. See New York, 505 U.S., at 160 ; Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). A structural problem that vanishes when the statute affects private individuals as well as public officials is not much of a structuralproblem. </s> Far more important than the concerns that the Court musters in support of its new rule is the fact that the Framers entrusted Congress with the task of creating a working structure of intergovernmental relationships around the framework that the Constitution authorized. Neither explicitly nor implicitly did the Framers issue any command that forbids Congress from imposing federal duties on private citizens or on local officials. As a general matter, Congress has followed the soundpolicy of authorizing federal agencies and federal agents to administer federal programs. That general practice, however, does not negate the existence of power to rely on state officials in occasional situations in which such reliance is in the national interest. Rather, the occasional exceptions confirm the wisdom of Justice Holmes' reminder that "the machinery of government would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints." Bain Peanut Co. of Tex. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501 (1931). </s> Finally, the Court advises us that the "prior jurisprudence of this Court" is the most conclusive support for its position. Ante, at 26. That "prior jurisprudence" is New York v. United States. 26 The case involved the validity of a federal statute that provided the States with three types of incentives to encourage them to dispose of radioactive wastes generated within their borders. The Court held that the first two sets of incentives were authorized by affirmative grants of power to Congress, and therefore "not inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment." 505 U.S., at 173 , 174. That holding, of course, sheds no doubt on the validity of the Brady Act. </s> The third so called "incentive" gave the States the option either of adopting regulations dictated by Congress or of taking title to and possession of the low level radioactive waste. The Court concluded that, because Congress had no power to compel the stategovernments to take title to the waste, the "option" really amounted to a simple command to the States to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program. Id., at 176. The Court explained: </s> "A choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at all. Either way, `the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program,' Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., supra, at 288, an outcome that has never been understood to lie within the authority conferred upon Congress by the Constitution." Ibid. </s> After noting that the "take title provision appears to be unique" because no other federal statute had offered "a state government no option other than that of implementing legislation enacted by Congress," the Court concluded that the provision was "inconsistent with the federal structure of our Government established by the Constitution." Id., at 177. </s> Our statements, taken in context, clearly did not decide the question presented here, whether state executive officials--as opposed to state legislators--may in appropriate circumstances be enlisted to implement federal policy. The "take title" provision at issue in New York was beyond Congress' authority to enact because it was "in principle . . . no different than a congressionally compelled subsidy from state governments to radioactive waste producers," 505 U.S., at 175 , almost certainly a legislative act. </s> The majority relies upon dictum in New York to the effect that "[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program." Id., at 188 (emphasis added); see ante, at 35. But that language was wholly unnecessary to the decision of the case. It is, of course, beyond dispute thatwe are not bound by the dicta of our prior opinions. See, e.g., U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 24 (1994) (Scalia, J.) ("invoking our customary refusal to be bound by dicta"). To the extent that it has any substance at all, New York's administration language may have referred to the possibility that the State might have been able to take title to and devise an elaborate scheme for the management of the radioactive waste through purely executive policymaking. But despite the majority's effort to suggest that similar activities are required by the Brady Act, see ante, at 28-29, it is hard to characterize the minimal requirement that CLEOs perform background checks as one involving the exercise of substantial policymaking discretion on that essentially legislative scale. 27 </s> Indeed, Justice Kennedy's recent comment about another case that was distinguishable from New York applies to these cases as well: </s> "This is not a case where the etiquette of federalism has been violated by a formal command from the National Government directing the State to enact a certain policy, cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), or to organize its governmental functions in a certain way, cf. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S., at 781 , (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)." Lopez, 514 U.S., at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring). </s> In response to this dissent, the majority asserts that the difference between a federal command addressed to individuals and one addressed to the State itself "cannot be a constitutionally significant one." Ante, at 32. But as I have already noted, n. 16, supra, there is abundant authority in our Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence recognizing a constitutional distinction between local government officials, such as the CLEO's who brought this action, and State entities that are entitled to sovereign immunity. To my knowledge, no one has previously thought that the distinction "disembowels," ante, at 32-33, the Eleventh Amendment. 28 </s> Importantly, the majority either misconstrues or ignores three cases that are more directly on point. In FERC, we upheld a federal statute requiring state utilities commissions, inter alia, to take the affirmative step of considering federal energy standards in a manner complying with federally specified notice and comment procedures, and to report back to Congress periodically. The state commissions could avoid this obligation only by ceasing regulation in the field, a "choice" that we recognized was realistically foreclosed, since Congress had put forward no alternative regulatory scheme to govern this very important area. 456 U.S., at 764 , 766, 770. The burden on state officials that we approved in FERC was far more extensive than the minimal, temporary imposition posed by the Brady Act. 29 </s> Similarly, in Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987), we overruled our earlier decision in Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (1861), and held that the Extradition Act of 1793 permitted the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to seek extradition of a fugitive from its laws without constitutional barrier. The Extradition Act, as the majority properly concedes, plainly imposes duties on state executive officers. See ante, at 8. The majority suggests that this statute is nevertheless of little importance because it simply constitutes an implementation of the authority granted the National Government by the Constitution's Extradition Clause, Art. IV, §2. But in Branstad we noted ambiguity as to whether Puerto Rico benefits from that Clause, which applies on its face only to "States." Avoiding the question of the Clause's applicability, we held simply that under the Extradition Act Puerto Rico had the power to request that the State of Iowa deliver up the fugitive the Commonwealth sought. 483 U.S., at 229 -230. Although Branstad relied on the authority of the Act alone, without the benefit of the Extradition Clause, we noted no barrier to our decision in the principles of federalism--despite the fact that one Member of the Court brought the issue to our attention, see id., at 231(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 30 </s> Finally, the majority provides an incomplete explana tion of our decision in Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), and demeans its importance. In that case the Court unanimously held that state courts of appropriate jurisdiction must occupy themselves adjudicating claims brought by private litigants under the federal Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, regardless of how otherwise crowded their dockets might be with state law matters. That is a much greater imposition on state sovereignty than the Court's characterization of the case as merely holding that "state courts cannot refuse to apply federal law," ante, at 30. That characterization describes only the narrower duty to apply federal law in cases that the state courts have consented to entertain. </s> The language drawn from the Supremacy Clause upon which the majority relies ("the Judges in every State shall be bound [by federal law], any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding"), expressly embraces that narrower conflict of laws principle. Art. VI, cl. 2. But the Supremacy Clause means far more. As Testa held, because the "Laws of the United States . . . [are] the supreme Law of the Land," state courts of appropriate jurisdiction must hear federal claims whenever a federal statute, such as the Emergency Price Control Act, requires them to do so. Ibid. </s> Hence, the Court's textual argument is quite misguided. The majority focuses on the Clause's specific attention to the point that "Judges in every State shall bebound." Ibid. That language commands state judges to "apply federal law" in cases that they entertain, but it is not the source of their duty to accept jurisdiction of federal claims that they would prefer to ignore. Our opinions in Testa, and earlier the Second Employers' Liability Cases, rested generally on the language of the Supremacy Clause, without any specific focus on the </s> reference to judges. 31 </s> The majority's reinterpretation of Testa also contradicts our decision in FERC. In addition to the holding mentioned earlier, see supra, at 30, we also approved in that case provisions of federal law requiring a state utilities commission to "adjudicate disputes arising under [a federal] statute." FERC, 456 U.S., at 760 . Because the state commission had "jurisdiction to entertain claims analogous to those" put before it under the federal statute, ibid., we held that Testa required it to adjudicate the federal claims. Although the commission was serving an adjudicative function, the commissioners were unquestionably not "judges" within the meaning of Art. VI, cl. 2. It is impossible to reconcile the Court's present view that Testa rested entirely on the specific reference to state judges in the Supremacy Clause with our extension of that early case in FERC. 32 </s> Even if the Court were correct in its suggestion that it was the reference to judges in the Supremacy Clause, rather than the central message of the entire Clause, that dictated the result in Testa, the Court's implied expressio unius argument that the Framers therefore did not intend to permit the enlistment of other state officials is implausible. Throughout our history judges, state as well as federal, have merited as much respect as executive agents. The notion that the Framers would have had no reluctance to "press state judges into federal service" against their will but would have regarded the imposition of a similar--indeed, far lesser-- burden on town constables as an intolerable affront to principles of state sovereignty, can only be considered perverse. If such a distinction had been contemplated by the learned and articulate men who fashioned the basic structure of our government, surely some of them would have said so. 33 </s> * * * </s> The provision of the Brady Act that crosses the Court's newly defined constitutional threshold is more comparable to a statute requiring local police officers to report the identity of missing children to the CrimeControl Center of the Department of Justice than to an offensive federal command to a sovereign state. If Congress believes that such a statute will benefit the people of the Nation, and serve the interests of cooperative federalism better than an enlarged federal bureaucracy, we should respect both its policy judgment and its appraisal of its constitutional power. </s> Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. </s> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- </s> U.S. Supreme Court </s> Nos. 95-1478 and 95-1503 </s> JAY PRINTZ, SHERIFF/CORONER, RAVALLI COUNTY, MONTANA, PETITIONER 95-1478 v. UNITED STATES RICHARD MACK, PETITIONER 95-1503 </s> on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit [June 27, 1997] </s> Justice Souter, dissenting. </s> I join Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion, but subject to the following qualifications. While I do not find anything dispositive in the paucity of early examples of federal employment of state officers for executive purposes, for the reason given by Justice Stevens, ante, at 11-12, neither would I find myself in dissent with no more to go on than those few early instances in the administration of naturalization laws, for example, or such later instances as state support for federal emergency action, see ante, at 12-14; ante, at 5-10, 16-18 (majority opinion). These illustrations of state action implementing congressional statutes are consistent with the Government's positions, but they do not speak to me with much force. </s> In deciding these cases, which I have found closer than I had anticipated, it is The Federalist that finally determines my position. I believe that the most straightforward reading of No. 27 is authority for theGovernment's position here, and that this reading is both supported by No. 44 and consistent with Nos. 36 and 45. </s> Hamilton in No. 27 first notes that because the new Constitution would authorize the National Government to bind individuals directly through national law, it could "employ the ordinary magistracy of each [State] in the execution of its laws." The Federalist No. 27, p. 174 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). Were he to stop here, he would not necessarily be speaking of anything beyond the possibility of cooperative arrangements by agreement. But he then addresses the combined effect of the proposed Supremacy Clause, U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, and state officers's oath requirement, U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 3, and he states that "the Legislatures, Courts and Magistrates of the respective members will be incorporated into the operations of the national government, as far as its just and constitutional authority extends; and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws." The Federalist No. 27, at 174-175 (emphasis in original). The natural reading of this language is not merely that the officers of the various branches of state governments may be employed in the performance of national functions; Hamilton says that the state governmental machinery "will be incorporated" into the Nation's operation, and because the "auxiliary" status of the state officials will occur because they are "bound by the sanctity of an oath," id., at 175, I take him to mean that their auxiliary functions will be the products of their obligations thus undertaken to support federal law, not of their own, or the States', unfettered choices. 1 </s> Madison in No. 44 supports this reading in his commentary on the oath requirement. He asks why state magistrates should have to swear to support the National Constitution, when national officials will not be required to oblige themselves to support the state counterparts. His answer is that national officials "will have no agency in carrying the State Constitutions into effect. The members and officers of the State Governments, on the contrary, will have an essential agency in giving effect to the Federal Constitution." The Federalist No. 44, at 307 (J. Madison). He then describes the state legislative "agency" as action necessary for selecting the President, see U. S. Const., Art. II, §1, and the choice of Senators, see U. S. Const., Art. I, §3 (repealed by Amendment XVII). Ibid. The Supremacy Clause itself, of course, expressly refers to the state judges' obligations under federal law, and other numbers of The Federalist give examples of state executive "agency" in the enforcement of national revenue laws. 2 </s> Two such examples of anticipated state collection of federal revenue are instructive, each of which is put forward to counter fears of a proliferation of tax collectors. In No. 45, Hamilton says that if a State is not given (or declines to exercise) an option to supply its citizens' share of a federal tax, the "eventual collection [of the federal tax] under the immediate authority of the Union, will generally be made by the officers, andaccording to the rules, appointed by the several States." The Federalist No. 45, at 313. And in No. 36, he explains that the National Government would more readily "employ the State officers as much as possible, and to attach them to the Union by an accumulation of their emoluments," The Federalist No. 36, at 228, than by appointing separate federal revenue collectors. </s> In the light of all these passages, I cannot persuade myself that the statements from No. 27 speak of anything less than the authority of the National Government, when exercising an otherwise legitimate power (the commerce power, say), to require state "auxiliaries" to take appropriate action. To be sure, it does not follow that any conceivable requirement may be imposed on any state official. I continue to agree, for example, that Congress may not require a state legislature to enact a regulatory scheme and that New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) was rightly decided (even though I now believe its dicta went too far toward immunizing state administration as well as state enactment of such a scheme from congressional mandate); after all, the essence of legislative power, within the limits of legislative jurisdiction, is a discretion not subject to command. But insofar as national law would require nothing from a state officer inconsistent with the power proper to his branch of tripartite state government (say, by obligating a state judge to exercise law enforcement powers), I suppose that the reach of federal law as Hamilton described it would not be exceeded, cf. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 554 , 556-567 (1985) (without precisely delineating the outer limits of Congress's Commerce Clause power, finding that the statute at issue was not "destructive of state sovereignty"). </s> I should mention two other points. First, I recognize that my reading of The Federalist runs counter to the view of Justice Field, who stated explicitly in United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 519 -520 (1883), that the early examples of state execution of federal law couldnot have been required against a State's will. But that statement, too, was dictum, and as against dictum even from Justice Field, Madison and Hamilton prevail. Second, I do not read any of The Federalist material as requiring the conclusion that Congress could require administrative support without an obligation to pay fair value for it. The quotation from No. 36, for example, describes the United States as paying. If, therefore, my views were prevailing in these cases, I would remand for development and consideration of petitioners' points, that they have no budget provision for work required under the Act and are liable for unauthorized expenditures. Brief for Petitioner in No. 95-1478, pp. 4-5; Brief for Petitioner in No. 95-1503, pp. 6-7. </s> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- </s> U.S. Supreme Court </s> Nos. 95-1478 and 95-1503 </s> JAY PRINTZ, SHERIFF/CORONER, RAVALLI COUNTY, MONTANA, PETITIONER 95-1478 v. UNITED STATES RICHARD MACK, PETITIONER 95-1503 </s> on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit [June 27, 1997] </s> Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens joins, dissenting. </s> I would add to the reasons Justice Stevens sets forth the fact that the United States is not the only nation that seeks to reconcile the practical need for a central authority with the democratic virtues of more local control. At least some other countries, facing the same basic problem, have found that local control is better maintained through application of a principle that is the direct opposite of the principle the majority derives from the silence of our Constitution. The federal systems of Switzerland, Germany, and the European Union, for example, all provide that constituent states, not federal bureaucracies, will themselves implement many of the laws, rules, regulations, or decrees enacted by the central "federal" body. Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 Am. J. Comp. L. 205, 237 (1990); D. Currie, The Constitution of the FederalRepublic of Germany 66, 84 (1994); Mackenzie Stuart, Foreward, Comparative Constitutional Federalism: Europe and America ix (M. Tushnet ed. 1990); Kimber, A Comparison of Environmental Federalism in the United States and the European Union, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1658, 1675-1677 (1995). They do so in part because they believe that such a system interferes less, not more, with the independent authority of the "state," member nation, or other subsidiary government, and helps to safeguard individual liberty as well. See Council of European Communities, European Council in Edinburgh, 11-12 December 1992, Conclusions of the Presidency 20-21 (1993); D. Lasok & K. Bridge, Law and Institutions of the European Union 114 (1994); Currie, supra, at 68, 81-84, 100-101; Frowein, Integration and the Federal Experience in Germany and Switzerland, 1 Integration Through Law 573, 586-587 (M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe, & J. Weiler eds. 1986); Lenaerts, supra, at 232, 263. </s> Of course, we are interpreting our own Constitution, not those of other nations, and there may be relevant political and structural differences between their systems and our own. Cf. The Federalist No. 20, pp. 134-138 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison and A. Hamilton) (rejecting certain aspects of European federalism). But their experience may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem--in this case the problem of reconciling central authority with the need to preserve the liberty enhancing autonomy of a smaller constituent governmental entity. Cf. id., No. 42, p. 268 (J. Madison) (looking to experiences of European countries); id., No. 43, pp. 275, 276 (J. Madison) (same). And that experience here offers empirical confirmation of the implied answer to a question Justice Stevens asks: Why, or how, would what the majority sees as a constitutional alternative--the creation of a new federal gun law bureaucracy,or the expansion of an existing federal bureaucracy-- better promote either state sovereignty or individual liberty? See ante, at 7-8, 23 (Stevens, J., dissenting). </s> As comparative experience suggests, there is no need to interpret the Constitution as containing an absolute principle--forbidding the assignment of virtually any federal duty to any state official. Nor is there a need to read the Brady Act as permitting the Federal Government to overwhelm a state civil service. The statute uses the words "reasonable effort," 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2)--words that easily can encompass the considerations of, say, time or cost, necessary to avoid any such result. </s> Regardless, as Justice Stevens points out, the Constitution itself is silent on the matter. Ante, at 7, 18, 25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Precedent supports the Government's position here. Ante, at 19, 23-25, 26-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting). And the fact that there is not more precedent--that direct federal assignment of duties to state officers is not common--likely reflects, not a widely shared belief that any such assignment is incompatible with basic principles of federalism, but rather a widely shared practice of assigning such duties in other ways. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (spending power); Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70 (1984); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992) (general statutory duty); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (pre emption). See also ante, at 4-5 (Souter, J., dissenting). Thus, there is neither need nor reason to find in the Constitution an absolute principle, the inflexibility of which poses a surprising and technical obstacle to the enactment of a law that Congress believed necessary to solve an important national problem. </s> For these reasons and those set forth in Justice Stevens' opinion, I join his dissent. </s> Footnotes </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 95-1503, Mack v. United States, also on certiorari to the same court. </s> [Footnote 1 The dissent is wrong in suggesting, post, at 13, n. 9, that the Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912), eliminate the possibility that the duties imposed on state courts and their clerks in connection with naturalization proceedings were contingent on the State's voluntary assumption of the task of adjudicating citizenship applications. The Second Employers' Liability Cases stand for the proposition that a state court must entertain a claim arising under federal law "when its ordinary jurisdiction as prescribed by local law is appropriate to the occasion and is invoked in conformity with those laws." Id., at 56-57. This does not necessarily conflict with Holmgren and Jones, as the States obviously regulate the "ordinary jurisdiction" of their courts. (Our references throughout this opinion to "the dissent" are to the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer. The separate dissenting opinions of Justice Breyer and Justice Souter will be referred to as such.) </s> [Footnote 2 Bereft of even a single early, or indeed even pre-20th century, statute compelling state executive officers to administer federal laws, the dissent is driven to claim that early federal statutes compelled state judges to perform executive functions, which implies a power to compel state executive officers to do so as well. Assuming that this implication wouldfollow (which is doubtful), the premise of the argument is in any case wrong. None of the early statutes directed to state judges or court clerks required the performance of functions more appropriately characterized as executive than judicial (bearing in mind that the line between the two for present purposes is not necessarily identical with the line established by the Constitution for federal separation of powers purposes, see Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957)). Given that state courts were entrusted with the quintessentially adjudicative task of determining whether applicants for citizenship met the requisite qualifications, see Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, §1, 1 Stat. 103, it is unreasonable to maintain that the ancillary functions of recording, registering, and certifying the citizenship applications were unalterably executive rather than judicial in nature. The dissent's assertion that the Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, §3, 1 Stat. 132-133, which required state courts to resolve controversies between captain and crew regarding seaworthiness of a vessel, caused state courts to act "like contemporary regulatory agencies," post, at 14, is cleverly true--because contemporary regulatory agencies have been allowed to perform adjudicative ("quasi judicial") functions. See 5 U.S.C. § 554; Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). It is foolish, however, to mistake the copy for the original, and to believe that 18th century courts were imitating agencies, rather than 20th century agencies imitating courts. The Act's requirement that the court appoint "three persons in the neighbourhood . . . most skilful in maritime affairs" to examine the ship and report on its condition certainly does not change the proceeding into one "supervised by a judge but otherwise more characteristic of executive activity," post, at 14; that requirement is not significantly different from the contemporary judicial practice of appointing expert witnesses, see e.g., Fed. Rule Evid. 706. The ultimate function of the judge under the Act was purely adjudicative; he was, after receiving the report, to "adjudge and determine . . . whether said ship or vessel is fit to proceed on the intended voyage . . . ." 1 Stat. 132. </s> [Footnote 3 Article IV, §2, cl. 2 provides: "A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime." To the extent the legislation went beyond the substantive requirement of this provision and specified procedures to be followed in complying with the constitutional obligation, we have found that that was an exercise of the congressional power to "prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings, shall be proved, and the Effect thereof," Art. IV, §1. See California v. Superior Court of Cal., San Bernardino Cty., 482 U.S. 400, 407 (1987). </s> [Footnote 4 Both the dissent and Justice Souter dispute that the consequences are said to flow automatically. They are wrong. The passage says that (1) federal laws will be supreme, and (2) all state officers will be oath bound to observe those laws, and thus (3) state officers will be "incorporated" and "rendered auxiliary." The reason the progression is automatic is that there is not included between (2) and (3): "(2a) those laws will include laws compelling action by state officers." It is the mere existence of all federal laws that is said to make state officers "incorporated" and "auxiliary." </s> [Footnote 5 Justice Souter seeks to avoid incompatibility with New York (a decision which he joined and purports to adhere to), by saying, post, at 3-4, that the passage does not mean "any conceivable requirement maybe imposed on any state official," and that "the essence of legislative power . . . is a discretion not subject to command," so that legislatures, at least, cannot be commanded. But then why were legislatures mentioned in the passage? It seems to us assuredly not a "natural reading" that being "rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of [the national government's] laws" means impressibility into federal service for "courts and magistrates" but something quite different for "legislatures." Moreover, the novel principle of political science that Justice Souter invokes in order to bring forth disparity of outcome from parity of language--namely, that "[t]he essence of legislative power . . . is a discretion not subject to command"--seems to us untrue. Perhaps legislatures are inherently uncommandable as to the outcome of their legislation, but they are commanded all the time as to what subjects they shall legislate upon--commanded, that is, by the people, in constitutional provisions that require, for example, the enactment of annual budgets or forbid the enactment of laws permitting gambling. We do not think that state legislatures would be betraying their very "essence" as legislatures (as opposed to their nature as sovereigns, a nature they share with the other two branches of government) if they obeyed a federal command to enact laws, for example, criminalizing the sale of marijuana. </s> [Footnote 6 If Justice Souter finds these obligations too insignificant, see post, at 3, n. 1, then perhaps he should subscribe to the interpretations of "essential agency" given by Madison, see infra, at 15 andn. 8, or by Story, see infra, n. 9. The point is that there is no necessity to give the phrase the problematic meaning which alone enables him to use it as a basis for deciding this case. </s> [Footnote 7 Justice Souter deduces from this passage in No. 36 that although the Federal Government may commandeer state officers, it must compensate them for their services. This is a mighty leap, which would create a constitutional jurisprudence (for determining when the compensation was adequate) that would make takings cases appear clear and simple. </s> [Footnote 8 Justice Souter's discussion of this passage omits to mention that it contains an example of state executives' "essential agency"--and indeed implies the opposite by observing that "other numbers of the Federalist give examples" of the "essential agency" of state executive officers. Post, at 4 (emphasis added). In seeking to explain the curiousness of Madison's not mentioning the state executives' obligation to administer federal law, Justice Souter says that in speaking of "an essential agency in giving effect to the Federal Constitution," Federalist No. 44, Madison "was not talking about executing congressional statutes; he was talking about putting the National Constitution into effect," post, at 4, n. 2. Quite so, which is our very point. It is interesting to observe that Story's Commentaries on the Constitution, commenting upon the same issue of why state officials are required by oath to support the Constitution, uses the same "essential agency" language as Madison did in Federalist No. 44, and goes on to give more numerous examples of state executive agency than Madison did; all of them, however, involve not state administration of federal law, but merely the implementation of duties imposed on state officers by the Constitution itself: "The executive authority of the several states may be often called upon to exert Powers or allow Rights given by the Constitution, as in filling vacancies in the senate during the recess of the leislature; in issuing writs of election to fill vacancies in the house of representatives; in officering the militia, and giving effect to laws for calling them; andin the surrender of fugitives from justice." 2 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 577 (1851). </s> [Footnote 9 Even if we agreed with Justice Souter's reading of the Federalist No. 27, it would still seem to us most peculiar to give the view expressed in that one piece, not clearly confirmed by any other writer, the determinative weight he does. That would be crediting the most expansive view of federal authority ever expressed, and from the pen of the most expansive expositor of federal power. Hamilton was "from first to last the most nationalistic of all nationalists in his interpretation of the clauses of our federal Constitution." C. Rossiter, Alexander Hamilton and the Constitution 199 (1964). More specifically, it is widely recognized that "The Federalist reads with a split personality" on matters of federalism. See D. Braveman, W. Banks, & R. Smolla, Constitutional Law: Structure and Rights in Our Federal System 198-199 (3d ed. 1996). While overall The Federalist reflects a "large area of agreement between Hamilton and Madison," Rossiter, supra, at 58, that is not the case with respect to the subject at hand, see Braveman, supra, at 198-199. To choose Hamilton's view, as Justice Souter would, is to turn a blind eye to the fact that it was Madison's--not Hamilton's--that prevailed, not only at the Constitutional Convention and in popular sentiment, see Rossiter, supra, at 44-47, 194, 196; 1 Records of the Federal Convention (M. Farrand ed. 1911) 366, but in the subsequent struggle to fix the meaning of the Constitution by early congressional practice, see supra, at 5-10. </s> [Footnote 10 The dissent, reiterating Justice Stevens' dissent in New York, 505 U.S., at 210 -213, maintains that the Constitution merely augmented the pre-existing power under the Articles to issue commands to the States with the additional power to make demands directly on individuals. See post, at 7-8. That argument, however, was squarely rejected by the Court in New York, supra, at 161-166, and with good reason. Many of Congress's powers under Art. I, § 8, were copied almost verbatim fromthe Articles of Confederation, indicating quite clearly that "[w]here the Constitution intends that our Congress enjoy a power once vested in the Continental Congress, it specifically grants it." Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1957, 1972 (1993). </s> [Footnote 11 Justice Breyer's dissent would have us consider the benefits that other countries, and the European Union, believe they have derived from federal systems that are different from ours. We think such comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite relevant to the task of writing one. The Framers were familiar with many federal systems, from classical antiquity down to their own time; they are discussed in Nos. 18-20 of The Federalist. Some were (for the purpose here under discussion) quite similar to the modern "federal" systems thatJustice Breyer favors. Madison's and Hamilton's opinion of such systems could not be clearer. Federalist No. 20, after an extended critique of the system of government established by the Union of Utrecht for the United Netherlands, concludes: "I make no apology for having dwelt so long on the contemplation of these federal precedents. Experience is the oracle of truth; and where its responses are unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred. The important truth, which it unequivocally pronounces in the present case, is that a sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over governments, a legislation for communities, as contradistinguished from individuals, as it is a solecism in theory, so in practice it is subversive of the order and ends of civil polity . . . ." Id., at 138. Antifederalists, on the other hand, pointed specifically to Switzerland--and its then 400 years of success as a "confederate republic"--as proof that the proposed Constitution and its federal structure was unnecessary. See Patrick Henry, Speeches given before the Virginia Ratifying Convention, 4 and 5 June, 1788, reprinted in The Essential Antifederalist 123, 135-136 (W. Allen & G. Lloyd ed. 1985). The fact is that our federalism is not Europe's. It is "the unique contribution of the Framers to political science and political theory." United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Friendly, Federalism: A Forward, 86 Yale L. J. 1019 (1977)). </s> [Footnote 12 There is not, as the dissent believes, post, at 23, "tension" between the proposition that impressing state police officers into federal service will massively augment federal power, and the proposition that it will also sap the power of the Federal Presidency. It is quite possible to have a more powerful Federal Government that is, by reason of the destruction of its Executive unity, a less efficient one. The dissent is correct, post, at 24, that control by the unitary Federal Executive is also sacrificed when States voluntarily administer federal programs, but the condition of voluntary state participation significantly reduces the ability of Congress to use this device as a means of reducing the power of the Presidency. </s> [Footnote 13 This argument also falsely presumes that the the Tenth Amendment is the exclusive textual source of protection for principles of federalism. Our system of dual sovereignty is reflected in numerous constitutional provisions, see supra, at 19-20, and not only those, like the Tenth Amendment, that speak to the point explicitely. It is not at all unusual for our resolution of a significant constitutional question to rest upon reasonable implications. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (finding by implication from Art. II, §§1, 2, that the President has the exclusive power to remove executive officers); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (finding that Article III implies a lack of congressional power to set aside final judgments). </s> [Footnote 14 The dissent points out that FERC cannot be construed as merely following the principle recognized in Testa that state courts must apply relevant federal law because "[a]lthough the commission was serving an adjudicative function, the commissioners were unquestionably not `judges' within the meaning of [the Supremacy Clause]." Post, at 33. That is true enough. But the answer to the question of which state officers must apply federal law (only " `judges' within the meaning of [the Supremacy Clause]") is different from the answer to the question of which state officers may be required by statute to apply federal law (officers who conduct adjudications similar to those traditionally performed by judges). It is within the power of the States, as it is within the power of the Federal Government, see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), to transfer some adjudicatory functions to administrative agencies, with opportunity for subsequent judicial review. But it is alsowithin the power of Congress to prescribe, explicitly or by implication (as in the legislation at issue in FERC), that those adjudications must take account of federal law. The existence of this latter power should not be unacceptable to a dissent that believes distinguishing among officers on the basis of their title rather than the function they perform is "empty formalistic reasoning of the highest order," post, at 15. We have no doubt that FERC would not have been decided the way it was if nonadjudicative responsibilities of the state agency were at issue. </s> [Footnote 15 Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, post, at 18-19, n. 16, and 29, the distinction in our Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence between States and municipalities is of no relevance here. We long ago made clear that the distinction is peculiar to the question of whether a governmental entity is entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, see Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 , n. 55 (1978); we have refused to apply it to the question of whether a governmental entity is protected by the Constitution's guarantees of federalism, including the Tenth Amendment, see National League of Cities v. Ursery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 -856, n. 20 (1976) (overruled on other grounds by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985)); see also Garcia, supra (resolving Tenth Amendment issues in suit brought by local transit authority). </s> [Footnote 16 The dissent's suggestion, post, at 28-29, n. 27, that New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), itself embraced the distinction between congressional control of States (impermissible) and congressional control of state officers (permissible) is based upon the most egregious wrenching of statements out of context. It would take too much to reconstruct the context here, but by examining the entire passage cited, id., at 178-179, the reader will readily perceive the distortion. The passage includes, for example, the following: "Additional cases cited by the United States discuss the power of federal courts to order state officials to comply with federal law. . . . Again, however, the text of the Constitution plainly confers this authority on the federal courts . . . . The Constitution contains no analogous grant of authority to Congress." Id., at 179. </s> [Footnote 17 The dissent observes that "Congress could require private persons, such as hospital executives or school administrators, to provide arms merchants with relevant information about a prospective purchaser's fitness to own a weapon," and that "the burden on police officers [imposed by the Brady Act] would be permissible if a similar burden were also imposed on private parties with access to relevant data." Post, at 25. That is undoubtedly true, but it does not advance the dissent's case. The Brady Act does not merely require CLEOs to report information in their private possession. It requires them to provide information that belongs to the State and is available to them only in their official capacity; and to conduct investigation in their official capacity, by examining databases and records that only state officials have access to. In other words, the suggestion that extension of this statute to private citizens would eliminate the constitutional problem posits the impossible. </s> [Footnote 18 We note, in this regard, that both CLEOs before us here assert that they are prohibited from taking on these federal responsibilities under state law. That assertion is clearly correct with regard to Montana law, which expressly enjoins any "county . . . or other local government unit" from "prohibit[ing] . . . or regulat[ing] the purchase, sale or other transfer (including delay in purchase, sale, or other transfer), ownership, [or] possession . . . of any . . . handgun," Mont. Code §45-8-351(1) (1995). It is arguably correct with regard to Arizona law as well, which states that "[a] political subdivision of this state shall not . . . prohibit the ownership, purchase, sale or transfer of firearms," Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13-3108(B) (1989). We need not resolve that question today; it is at least clear that Montana and Arizona do not require their CLEOs to implement the Brady Act, and CLEOs Printz and Mack have chosen not to do so. </s> [Footnote 1 Our most recent treatment of the Second Amendment occurred in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), in which we reversed the District Court's invalidation of the National Firearms Act, enacted in 1934. In Miller, we determined that the Second Amendment did not guarantee a citizen's right to possess a sawed off shotgun because that weapon had not been shown to be "ordinary military equipment" that could "contribute to the common defense." Id., at 178. The Court did not, however, attempt to define, or otherwise construe, the substantive right protected by the Second Amendment. </s> [Footnote 2 Marshaling an impressive array of historical evidence, a growing body of scholarly commentary indicates that the "right to keep and bear arms" is, as the Amendment's text suggests, a personal right. See, e.g., J. Malcolm, To Keep and Bear Arms: The Origins of an Anglo American Right 162 (1994); S. Halbrook, That Every Man Be Armed, The Evolution of a Constitutional Right (1984); Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 Duke L. J. 1236 (1994); Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 Yale L. J. 1193 (1992); Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro Americanist Reconsideration, 80 Geo. L. J. 309 (1991); Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L. J. 637 (1989); Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 204 (1983). Other scholars, however, argue that the Second Amendment does not secure a personal right to keep or to bear arms. See, e.g., Bogus, Race, Riots, and Guns, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1365 (1993); Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 Yale L. J. 551 (1991); Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic Republicanism: On Sanford Levinson's The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L. J. 661 (1989); Cress, An Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning of the Right to Bear Arms, 71 J. Am. Hist. 22 (1984). Although somewhat overlooked in our jurisprudence, the Amendment hascertainly engendered considerable academic, as well as public, debate. </s> [Footnote 1 Indeed, the Framers repeatedly rejected proposed changes to the Tenth Amendment that would have altered the text to refer to "powers not expressly delegated to the United States." 3 W. Crosskey & W. Jeffrey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States 36 (1980). This was done, as Madison explained, because "it was impossible to confine a Government to the exercise of express powers; there must necessarily be admitted powers by implication, unless the constitution descended to recount every minutia." 1 Annals of Cong. 790 (Aug. 18, 1789); see McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 406-407 (1819). </s> [Footnote 2 Recognizing the force of the argument, the Court suggests that this reasoning is in error because--even if it is responsive to the submission that the Tenth Amendment roots the principle set forth by the majority today--it does not answer the possibility that the Court's holding can be rooted in a "principle of state sovereignty" mentioned nowhere in the constitutional text. See ante, at 24. As a ground for invalidating important federal legislation, this argument is remarkably weak. The majority's further claim that, while the Brady Act may be legislation "necessary" to Congress' execution of its undisputed Commerce Clause authority to regulate firearms sales, it is nevertheless not "proper" because it violates state sovereignty, see ibid., is wholly circular and provides no traction for its argument. Moreover, this reading of the term "proper" gives it a meaning directly contradicted by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). As the Chief Justice explained, the Necessary and Proper Clause by "[i]ts terms purport[s] to enlarge, not to diminish the powers vested in the government. It purports to be an additional power, not a restriction on those already granted." Id., at 420; see also id., at 418-419(explaining that "the only possible effect" of the use of the term "proper" was "to present to the mind the idea of some choice of means of legislation not straitened and compressed within . . . narrow limits"). Our ruling in New York that the Commerce Clause does not provide Congress the authority to require States to enact legislation--a power that affects States far closer to the core of their sovereign authority--does nothing to support the majority's unwarranted extension of that reasoning today. </s> [Footnote 3 "It has been asked why it was thought necessary, that the State magistracy should be bound to support the federal Constitution, and unnecessary that a like oath should be imposed on the officers of the United States, in favor of the State constitutions. "Several reasons might be assigned for the distinction. I content myself with one, which is obvious and conclusive. The members of the federal government will have no agency in carrying the State constitutions into effect. The members and officers of the State governments, on the contrary, will have an essential agency in giving effect to the federal Constitution." The Federalist No. 44, at 312 (J. Madison). </s> [Footnote 4 The notion that central government would rule by directing the actions of local magistrates was scarcely a novel conception at the time of the founding. Indeed, as an eminent scholar recentlyobserved: "At the time the Constitution was being framed . . . Massachusetts had virtually no administrative apparatus of its own but used the towns for such purposes as tax gathering. In the 1830s Tocqueville observed this feature of government in New England and praised it for its ideal combination of centralized legislation and decentralized administration." S. Beer, To Make a Nation: The Rediscovery of American Federalism 252 (1993). This may have provided a model for the expectation of "Madison himself . . . [that] the new federal government [would] govern through the state governments, rather in the manner of the New England states in relation to their local governments." Ibid. </s> [Footnote 5 See, e.g., 1 Debate on the Constitution 502 (B. Bailyn ed. 1993) (statement of "Brutus" that the new Constitution would "ope[n] a door to the appointment of a swarm of revenue and excise officers to prey upon the honest and industrious part of the community"); 2 id., at 633 (statement of Patrick Henry at the Virginia Convention that "the salaries and fees of the swarm of officers and dependants on the Government will cost this Continent immense sums" and noting that "[d]ouble sets of [tax] collectors will double the expence"). </s> [Footnote 6 Antifederalists acknowledged this response, and recognized the likelihood that the federal government would rely on state officials to collect its taxes. See, e.g., 3 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 167-168 (2d ed. 1891) (statement of Patrick Henry). The wide acceptance of this point by all participants in the framing casts serious doubt on the majority's efforts, see ante, at 16, n. 9, to suggest that the view that state officials could be called upon toimplement federal programs was somehow an unusual or peculiar position. </s> [Footnote 7 Hamilton recognized the force of his comments, acknowledgingbut rejecting opponents' "sophist[ic]" arguments to the effect that this position would "tend to the destruction of the State governments." The Federalist No. 27, at 180, *. </s> [Footnote 8 Indeed, the majority's suggestion that this consequence flows "automatically" from the officers' oath, ante, at 12 (emphasis omitted), is entirely without foundation in the quoted text. Although the fact that the Court has italicized the word "automatically" may give the reader the impression that it is a word Hamilton used, that is not so. </s> [Footnote 9 The majority asserts that these statutes relating to the administration of the federal naturalization scheme are not proper evidence of the original understanding because over a century later, in Holmgren v. United States, 217 U.S. 509 (1910), this Court observed that that case did not present the question whether the States can be required to enforce federal laws "against their consent," id., at 517. The majority points to similar comments in United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 519 -520 (1883). See ante, at 5-6. Those cases are unpersuasive authority. First, whatever their statements in dicta, the naturalization statutes at issue here, as made clear in the text, were framed in quite mandatory terms. Even the majority only goes so far as to say that "[i]t may well be" that these facially mandatory statutes in fact rested on voluntary state participation. Ante, at 5. Any suggestion to the contrary is belied by the language of the statutes themselves. Second, both of the cases relied upon by the majority rest on now rejected doctrine. In Jones, the Court indicated that various duties, including the requirement that state courts of appropriate jurisdiction hear federal questions, "could not be enforced against the consent of the States." 109 U.S., at 520 . That view was unanimously resolved to the contrary thereafter in the Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912), and in Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). Finally, the Court suggests that the obligation set forth in the latter two cases that state courts hear federal claims is "voluntary" in that States need not create courts of ordinary jurisdiction. That is true, but unhelpful to the majority. If a State chooses to have no local law enforcement officials it may avoid the Brady Act's requirements, and if it chooses to have no courts it may avoid Testa. Butneither seems likely. </s> [Footnote 10 Other statutes mentioned by the majority are also wrongly miscategorized as involving essentially judicial matters. For example, the Fifth Congress enacted legislation requiring state courts to serve as repositories for reporting what amounted to administrative claims against the United States Government, under a statute providing compensation in land to Canadian refugees who had supported the United States during the Revolutionary War. Contrary to the majority's suggestion, that statute did not amount to a requirement that state courts adjudicate claims, see ante, at 8, n. 2; final decisions as to appropriate compensation were made by federal authorities, see Act of Apr. 7, 1798, ch. 26, § 3, 1 Stat. 548. </s> [Footnote 11 Able to muster little response other than the bald claim that this argument strikes the majority as "doubtful," ante, at 8, n. 2, the Court proceeds to attack the basic point that the statutes discussed above called state judges to serve what were substantially executive functions. The argument has little force. The majority's view that none of the statutes referred to in the text required judges to perform anything other than "quintessentially adjudicative tasks[s]," ibid., is quite wrong. The evaluation of applications for citizenship and the acceptance of Revolutionary War claims for example, both discussed above, are hard to characterize as the sort of adversarial proceedings to which common law courts are accustomed. As for the majority's suggestion that the substantial administrative requirements imposed on state court clerks under the naturalization statutes are merely "ancillary" and therefore irrelevant, this conclusion is in considerable tension with the Court's holding that the minor burden imposed by the Brady Act violates the Constitution. Finally, the majority's suggestion that the early statute requiring federal courts to assess the seaworthiness of vessels is essentially adjudicative in nature is not compelling. Activities of this sort, although they may bear some resemblance to traditional common law adjudication, are far afield from the classical model of adversarial litigation. </s> [Footnote 12 Indeed, an entirely appropriate concern for the prerogatives of state government readily explains Congress' sparing use of this otherwise "highly attractive," ante, at 5, 7, power. Congress' discretion, contrary to the majority's suggestion, indicates not that the power does not exist, but rather that the interests of the States are more than sufficiently protected by their participation in the National Government. See infra, at 19-20. </s> [Footnote 13 Indeed, the very commentator upon whom the majority relies noted that the "President might, under the act, have issued orders directly to every state officer, and this would have been, for warpurposes, a justifiable Congressional grant of all state powers into the President's hands." Note, The President, The Senate, The Constitution, and the Executive Order of May 8, 1926, 21 U. Ill. L. Rev. 142, 144 (1926). </s> [Footnote 14 Even less probative is the Court's reliance on the decision by Congress to authorize federal marshalls to rent temporary jail facilities instead of insisting that state jailkeepers house federal prisoners at federal expense. See ante, at 9. The majority finds constitutional significance in the fact that the First Congress (apparently following practice appropriate under the Articles of Confederation) had issued a request to state legislatures rather than a command to state jailkeepers, see Resolution of Sept. 29, 1789, 1 Stat. 96, and the further fact that it chose not to change that request to a command 18 months later, see Resolution of Mar. 3, 1791, 1 Stat. 225. The Court does not point us to a single comment by any Member of Congress suggesting that either decision was motivated in the slightest by constitutional doubts. If this sort of unexplained congressional action provides sufficient historical evidence to support the fashioning of judge made rules of constitutional law, the doctrine of judicial restraint has a brief, though probably colorful, life expectancy. </s> [Footnote 15 Indeed, despite the exhaustive character of the Court's response to this dissent, it has failed to find even an iota of evidence that any of the Framers of the Constitution or any Member of Congress who supported or opposed the statutes discussed in the text ever expressed doubt as to the power of Congress to impose federal responsibilities on local judges or police officers. Even plausible rebuttals of evidence consistently pointing in the other direction are no substitute for affirmative evidence. In short, a neutral historian would have to conclude that the Court's discussion of history does not even begin to establish a prima facie case. </s> [Footnote 16 The majority's argument is particularly peculiar because these cases do not involve the enlistment of state officials at all, but only an effort to have federal policy implemented by officials of local government. Both Sheriffs Printz and Mack are county officials. Given that the Brady Act places its interim obligations on Chief law enforcement officers (CLEOs), who are defined as "the chief ofpolice, the sheriff, or an equivalent officer," 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(8), it seems likely that most cases would similarly involve local government officials. This Court has not had cause in its recent federalism jurisprudence to address the constitutional implications of enlisting non state officials for federal purposes. (We did pass briefly on the issue in a footnote in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 , n. 20 (1976), but that case was overruled in its entirety by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). The question was not called to our attention in Garcia itself.) It is therefore worth noting that the majority's decision is in considerable tension with our Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity cases. Those decisions were designed to "accor[d] the States the respect owed them as members of the federation." Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993). But despite the fact that "political subdivisions exist solely at the whim and behest of their State," Port Authority Trans Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 313 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), we have "consistently refused to construe the Amendment to afford protection to political subdivisions such as counties and municipalities." Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401 (1979); see also Hess v. Port Authority Trans Hudson Corporation, 513 U.S. 30, 47 (1994). Even if the protections that the majority describes as rooted in the Tenth Amendment ought to benefit state officials, it is difficult to reconcile the decision to extend these principles to local officials with our refusal to do so in the Eleventh Amendment context. If the federal judicial power may be exercised over local government officials, it is hard to see why they are not subject to the legislative power as well. </s> [Footnote 17 "Whenever called upon to judge the constitutionality of an Act of Congress--`the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called upon to perform,' Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J.)--the Court accords `great weight to the decisions of Congress.' Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973). The Congress is a coequal branch of government whose Members take the same oath we do to uphold the Constitution of the United States. As Justice Frankfurter noted in Joint Anti Fascist Refugee Committee v.McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 164 (1951) (concurring opinion), we must have `due regard to the fact that this Court is not exercising a primary judgment but is sitting in judgment upon those who also have taken the oath to observe the Constitution and who have the responsibility for carrying on government.' " Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981). </s> [Footnote 18 The majority also makes the more general claim that requiring state officials to carry out federal policy causes states to "tak[e] the blame" for failed programs. Ante, at 31. The Court cites no empirical authority to support the proposition, relying entirely on the speculations of a law review article. This concern is vastly overstated. Unlike state legislators, local government executive officials routinely take action in response to a variety of sources of authority: local ordinance, state law, and federal law. It doubtless may therefore require some sophistication to discern under which authority an executive official is acting, just as it may not always be immediately obvious what legal source of authority underlies a judicial decision. In both cases, affected citizens must look past the official before them to find the true cause of their grievance. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 785 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (legislators differ from judges because legislators have "the power to choose subjects for legislation"). But the majority's rule neither creates nor alters this basic truth. The problem is of little real consequence in any event, because to the extent that a particular action proves politically unpopular, we may be confident that elected officials charged with implementing it will be quite clear to their constituents where the source of the misfortune lies. These cases demonstrate the point. Sheriffs Printz and Mack have made public statements, including their decisions to serve as plaintiffs in these actions, denouncing the Brady Act. See, e.g., Shaffer, Gun Suit Shoots Sheriff into Spotlight, ArizonaRepublic, July 5, 1994, p. B1; Downs, Most Gun Dealers Shrug off Proposal to Raise License Fee, Missoulian, Jan. 5, 1994. Indeed, Sheriff Mack has written a book discussing his views on theissue. See R. Mack & T. Walters, From My Cold Dead Fingers: Why America Needs Guns (1994). Moreover, we can be sure that CLEOs will inform disgruntled constituents who have been denied permission to purchase a handgun about the origins of the Brady Act requirements. The Court's suggestion that voters will be confused over who is to "blame" for the statute reflects a gross lack of confidence in the electorate that is at war with the basic assumptions underlying any democratic government. </s> [Footnote 19 Unlike the majority's judicially crafted rule, the statute excludes from its coverage bills in certain subject areas, such as emergency matters, legislation prohibiting discrimination, and national security measures. See 2 U. S. C. A. §1503 (Supp. 1997). </s> [Footnote 20 The initial signs are that the Act will play an important role in curbing the behavior about which the majority expresses concern. In the law's first year, the Congressional Budget Office identified only five bills containing unfunded mandates over the statutory threshold. Of these, one was not enacted into law, and three were modified to limit their effect on the States. The fifth, which was enacted, was scarcely a program of the sort described by the majority at all; it was a generally applicable increase in the minimum wage. See Congressional Budget Office, The Experience of the Congressional Budget Office During the First Year of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 13-15 (Jan. 1997). </s> [Footnote 21 The Court raises the specter that the National Government seeks the authority "to impress into its service . . . the police officers of the 50 States." Ante, at 23. But it is difficult to see how state sovereignty and individual liberty are more seriously threatened by federal reliance on state police officers to fulfill this minimal request than by the aggrandizement of a national police force. The Court's alarmist hypothetical is no more persuasive than the likelihood that Congress would actually enact any such program. </s> [Footnote 22 Moreover, with respect to programs that directly enlist the local government officials, the majority's position rests on nothing more than a fanciful hypothetical. The enactment of statutes that merely involve the gathering of information, or the use of state officials on an interim basis, do not raise even arguable separation of powers concerns. </s> [Footnote 23 See New York, 505 U.S., at 167 ; see, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); see also ante, at 1-2 (O'Connor, J., concurring). </s> [Footnote 24 New York, 505 U.S., at 167 ; see, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981). </s> [Footnote 25 New York, 505 U.S., at 160 ; see, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). </s> [Footnote 26 The majority also cites to FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), and Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981). See ante, at 26-27. Neither case addressed the issue presented here. Hodel simply reserved the question. See 452 U.S., at 288 . The Court's subsequent opinion in FERC did the same, see 456 U.S., at 764 -765; and, both its holding and reasoning cut against the majority's view in this case. </s> [Footnote 27 Indeed, this distinction is made in the New York opinion itself. In that case, the Court rejected the Government's argument that earlier decisions supported the proposition that "the Constitution does, in some circumstances, permit federal directives to state governments." New York, 505 U.S., at 178 . But in doing so, it distinguished those cases on a ground that applies to the federal directive in the Brady Act: "[A]ll involve congressional regulation of individuals, not congressional requirements that States regulate. . . . . . "[T]he cases relied upon by the United States hold only that federal law is enforceable in state courts and that federal courts may in proper circumstances order state officials to comply with federal law, propositions that by no means imply any authority on the part of Congress to mandate state regulation." Id., at 178-179. The Brady Act contains no command directed to a sovereign State or to a state legislature. It does not require any state entity to promulgate any federal rule. In this case, the federal statute is not even being applied to any state official. See n. 16, supra. It is a "congressional regulation of individuals," New York, 505 U.S., at 178 , including gun retailers and local police officials. Those officials, like the judges referred to in the New York opinion, are bound by the Supremacy Clause to comply with federal law. Thus if we accept the distinction identified in the New York opinion itself, thatdecision does not control the disposition of these cases. </s> [Footnote 28 Ironically, the distinction that the Court now finds so preposterous can be traced to the majority opinion in National League of Cities. See 426 U.S., at 854 ("the States as States stand on a quite different footing from an individual or a corporation when challenging the exercise of Congress' power to regulate commerce"). The fact that the distinction did not provide an adequate basis for curtailing the power of Congress to extend the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state employees does not speak to the question whether it may identify a legitimate difference between a directive to local officers to provide information or assistance to the Federal Government and a directive to a State to enact legislation. </s> [Footnote 29 The majority correctly notes the opinion's statement that "this Court never has sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations . . . ." FERC, 456 U.S., at 761 -762. But the Court truncates this quotation in a grossly misleading fashion. We continued by noting in that very sentence that "there are instances where the Court has upheld federal statutory structures that in effect directed state decisionmakers to take or to refrain from taking certain actions." Ibid. Indeed, the Court expressly rejected as "rigid and isolated," id., at 761, our suggestion long ago in Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 107 (1861), that Congress "has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever." </s> [Footnote 30 Moreover, Branstad unequivocally rejected an important premise that resonates throughout the majority opinion: namely, that because the States retain their sovereignty in areas that are unregulated by federal law, notions of comity rather than constitutional power govern any direction by the National Government to state executive or judicial officers. That construct was the product of the ill starred opinion of Chief Justice Taney in Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (1861), announced at a time when "the practical power of the Federal Government [was] at its lowest ebb," Branstad, 483 U.S., at 225 . As we explained: %If it seemed clear to the Court in 1861, facing the looming shadow of a Civil War, that `the Federal Government, under the Constitution, has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it,' 24 How., at 107, basic constitutional principles now point as clearly the other way." Id., at 227. %Kentucky v. Dennison is the product of another time. The conception of the relation between the States and the Federal Government there announced is fundamentally incompatible with more than a century of constitutional development. Yet this decision has stood while the world of which it was a part has passed away. We conclude that it may stand no longer." Id., at 230. </s> [Footnote 31 As the discussion above suggests, the Clause's mention of judges was almost certainly meant as nothing more than a choice of law rule, informing the state courts that they were to apply federal law in the event of a conflict with state authority. The majority's quotation of this language, ante, at 30, is quite misleading because it omits a crucial phrase that follows the mention of state judges. In its entirety, the Supremacy Clause reads: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding." Art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added). The omitted language, in my view, makes clear that the specific reference to judges was designed to do nothing more than state a choice of law principle. The fact that our earliest opinions in this area, see Testa; Second Employers' Liability Cases, written at a time when the question was far more hotly contested than it is today, did not rely upon that language lends considerable support to this reading. </s> [Footnote 32 The Court's suggestion that these officials ought to be treated as "judges" for constitutional purposes because that is, functionally, what they are, is divorced from the constitutional text upon whichthe majority relies, which refers quite explicitly to "Judges" and not administrative officials. In addition, it directly contradicts the majority's position that early statutes requiring state courts to perform executive functions are irrelevant to our assessment of the original understanding because "Judges" were at issue. In short, the majority's adoption of a proper functional analysis gives away important ground elsewhere without shoring up its argument here. </s> [Footnote 33 Indeed, presuming that the majority has correctly read the Supremacy Clause, it is far more likely that the founders had a special respect for the independence of judges, and so thought it particularly important to emphasize that state judges were bound to apply federal law. The Framers would hardly have felt any equivalent need to state the then well accepted point, see supra, at 8-10, that the enlistment of state executive officials was entirely proper. </s> [Footnote 1 The Court offers two criticisms of this analysis. First, as the Court puts it, the consequences set forth in this passage (that is, rendering state officials "auxiliary" and "incorporat[ing]" them into the operations of the Federal Government) "are said . . . to flowautomatically from the officers' oath," ante, at 12; from this, the Court infers that on my reading, state officers' obligations to execute federal law must follow "without the necessity for a congressional directive that they implement it," ibid. But neither Hamilton nor I use the word "automatically"; consequently, there is no reason on Hamilton's view to infer a state officer's affirmative obligation without a textual indication to that effect. This is just whatJustice Stevens says, ante at 11, and n. 8. Second, the Court reads Federalist No. 27 as incompatible with our decision in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and credits me with the imagination to devise a "novel principle of political science," ante at 12-13, n. 5, "in order to bring forth disparity of outcome from parity of language," ibid.; in order, that is, to salvage New York, by concluding that Congress can tell state executive officers what to execute without at the same time having the power to tell state legislators what to legislate. But the Court is too generous. I simply realize that "parity of language" (i.e., all state officials who take the oath are "incorporated" or are "auxiliar[ies]") operates on officers of the three branches in accordance with the quite different powers of their respective branches. The core power of an executive officer is to enforce a law in accordance with its terms; that is why a state executive "auxiliary" may be told what result to bring about. The core power of a legislator acting within the legislature's subject matter jurisdiction is to make a discretionary decision on what the law should be; that is why a legislator may not be legally ordered to exercise discretion a particular way without damaging the legislative power as such. The discretionary nature of the authorized legislative Act is probably why Madison's two examples of legislative "auxiliary" obligation address the elections of the President and Senators, see infra, at 4 (discussing the Federalist No. 44, p. 307 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison), not the passage of legislation to please Congress. The Court reads Hamilton's description of state officers' role in carrying out federal law as nothing more than a way of describing the duty of state officials "not to obstruct the operation of federal law," with the consequence that any obstruction is invalid. Ante, at 13. But I doubt that Hamilton's English was quite as bad as all that. Someone whose virtue consists of not obstructing administration of the law is not described as "incorporated into the operations" of a government or as an "auxiliary" to its law enforcement. One simply cannot escape from Hamilton by reducing his prose to inapposite figures of speech. </s> [Footnote 2 The Court reads Madison's No. 44 as supporting its view that Hamilton meant "auxiliaries" to mean merely "nonobstructors." It defends its position in what seems like a very sensible argument, so long as one does not go beyond the terms set by the Court: if Madison really thought state executive officials could be required to enforce federal law, one would have expected him to say so, instead of giving examples of how state officials (legislative and executive, the Court points out) have roles in the election of national officials. See ante, at 14-16, and n. 8. One might indeed have expected that, save for one remark of Madison's, and a detail of his language, that the Court ignores. When he asked why state officers should have to take an oath to support the National Constitution, he said that "several reasons might be assigned," but that he would "content [himself] with one which is obvious & conclusive." The Federalist No. 44, at 307. The one example he gives describes how state officials will have "an essential agency in giving effect to the Federal Constitution." He was not talking about executing congressional statutes; he was talking about putting the National Constitution into effect by selecting the executive and legislative members whowould exercise its powers. The answer to the Court's question (and objection), then, is that Madison was expressly choosing one example of state officer agency, not purporting to exhaust the examples possible. There is, therefore, support in Madison's No. 44 for the straightforward reading of Hamilton's No. 27 and, so, no occasion to discount the authority of Hamilton's views as expressed in The Federalist as somehow reflecting the weaker side of a split constitutional personality. Ante, at 16, n. 9. This, indeed, should not surprise us, for one of the Court's own authorities rejects the "split personality" notion of Hamilton and Madison as being at odds in The Federalist, in favor of a view of all three Federalist writers as constituting a single personality notable for its integration: "In recent years it has been popular to describe Publius [the nominal author of the Federalist] as a `split personality' who spoke through Madison as a federalist and an exponent of limited government, [but]through Hamilton as a nationalist and an admirer of energetic government. . . . Neither the diagnosis of tension between Hamilton and Madison nor the indictment of each man for self contradiction strikes me as a useful of perhaps even fair minded exercise. Publius was, on any large view--the only correct view to take of an effort so sprawling in size and concentrated in time--a remarkably `whole personality,' and I am far more impressed by the large area of agreement between Hamilton and Madison than by the differences in emphasis that have been read into rather than in their papers. . . . The intellectual tensions of The Federalist and its creators are in fact an honest reflection of those built into the Constitution it expounds and the polity it celebrates." C. Rossiter, Alexander Hamilton and the Constitution 58 (1964). While Hamilton and Madison went their separate ways in later years, see id., at 78, and may have had differing personal views, the passages from The Federalist discussed here show no sign of strain.

United States Supreme Court EDWARDS v. ARIZONA(1981) No. 79-5269 Argued: November 5, 1980Decided: May 18, 1981 </s> After being arrested on a state criminal charge, and after being informed of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , petitioner was questioned by the police on January 19, 1976, until he said that he wanted an attorney. Questioning then ceased, but on January 20 police officers came to the jail and, after stating that they wanted to talk to him and again informing petitioner of his Miranda rights, obtained his confession when he said that he was willing to talk. The trial court ultimately denied petitioner's motion to suppress his confession, finding the statement to be voluntary, and he was thereafter convicted. The Arizona Supreme Court held that during the January 20 meeting he waived his right to remain silent and his right to counsel when he voluntarily gave his statement after again being informed of his rights. </s> Held: </s> The use of petitioner's confession against him at his trial violated his right under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, as declared in Miranda, supra. Having exercised his right on January 19 to have counsel present during interrogation, petitioner did not validly waive that right on the 20th. Pp. 481-487. </s> (a) A waiver of the right to counsel, once invoked, not only must be voluntary, but also must constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of a known right or privilege. Here, however, the state courts applied an erroneous standard for determining waiver by focusing on the voluntariness of petitioner's confession rather than on whether he understood his right to counsel and intelligently and knowingly relinquished it. Pp. 482-484. </s> (b) When an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to police-initiated interrogation after being again advised of his rights. An accused, such as petitioner, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused has himself initiated further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Here, the interrogation of petitioner on January 20 was at the instance [451 U.S. 477, 478] of the authorities, and his confession, made without having had access to counsel, did not amount to a valid waiver and hence was inadmissible. Pp. 484-487. </s> 122 Ariz. 206, 594 P.2d 72, reversed. </s> WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, STEWART, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BURGER, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 487. POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, in which REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 488. </s> Michael J. Meehan, by appointment of the Court, 447 U.S. 903 , argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. </s> Crane McClennen, Assistant Attorney General of Arizona, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General, and William J. Schafer III. </s> JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> We granted certiorari in this case, 446 U.S. 950 (1980), limited to Question 1 presented in the petition, which in relevant part was "whether the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments require suppression of a post-arrest confession, which was obtained after Edwards had invoked his right to consult counsel before further interrogation . . . ." </s> I </s> On January 19, 1976, a sworn complaint was filed against Edwards in Arizona state court charging him with robbery, burglary, and first-degree murder. 1 An arrest warrant was issued pursuant to the complaint, and Edwards was arrested at his home later that same day. At the police station, he was informed of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Petitioner stated that he understood his rights, and was willing to submit to questioning. After [451 U.S. 477, 479] being told that another suspect already in custody had implicated him in the crime, Edwards denied involvement and gave a taped statement presenting an alibi defense. He then sought to "make a deal." The interrogating officer told him that he wanted a statement, but that he did not have the authority to negotiate a deal. The officer provided Edwards with the telephone number of a county attorney. Petitioner made the call, but hung up after a few moments. Edwards then said: "I want an attorney before making a deal." At that point, questioning ceased and Edwards was taken to county jail. </s> At 9:15 the next morning, two detectives, colleagues of the officer who had interrogated Edwards the previous night, came to the jail and asked to see Edwards. When the detention officer informed Edwards that the detectives wished to speak with him, he replied that he did not want to talk to anyone. The guard told him that "he had" to talk and then took him to meet with the detectives. The officers identified themselves, stated they wanted to talk to him, and informed him of his Miranda rights. Edwards was willing to talk, but he first wanted to hear the taped statement of the alleged accomplice who had implicated him. 2 After listening to the tape for several minutes, petitioner said that he would make a statement so long as it was not tape-recorded. The detectives informed him that the recording was irrelevant since they could testify in court concerning whatever he said. Edwards replied: "I'll tell you anything you want to know, but I don't want it on tape." He thereupon implicated himself in the crime. </s> Prior to trial, Edwards moved to suppress his confession on the ground that his Miranda rights had been violated when the officers returned to question him after he had invoked his right to counsel. The trial court initially granted [451 U.S. 477, 480] the motion to suppress, 3 but reversed its ruling when presented with a supposedly controlling decision of a higher Arizona court. 4 The court stated without explanation that it found Edwards' statement to be voluntary. Edwards was tried twice and convicted. 5 Evidence concerning his confession was admitted at both trials. </s> On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court held that Edwards had invoked both his right to remain silent and his right to counsel during the interrogation conducted on the night of January 19. 6 122 Ariz. 206, 594 P.2d 72. The court then went on to determine, however, that Edwards had waived both rights during the January 20 meeting when he voluntarily gave his statement to the detectives after again being informed that he need not answer questions and that he need not answer without the advice of counsel: "The trial court's finding that the waiver and confession were voluntarily and knowingly made is upheld." Id., at 212, 594 P.2d, at 78. </s> Because the use of Edward's confession against him at his trial violated his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as construed in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, we reverse the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court. 7 </s> [451 U.S. 477, 481] </s> II </s> In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court determined that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' prohibition against compelled self-incrimination required that custodial interrogation be [451 U.S. 477, 482] preceded by advice to the putative defendant that he has the right to remain silent and also the right to the presence of an attorney. 384 U.S., at 479 . The Court also indicated the procedures to be followed subsequent to the warnings. If the accused indicates that he wishes to remain silent, "the interrogation must cease." If he requests counsel, "the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." Id., at 474. </s> Miranda thus declared that an accused has a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation. Here, the critical facts as found by the Arizona Supreme Court are that Edwards asserted his right to counsel and his right to remain silent on January 19, but that the police, without furnishing him counsel, returned the next morning to confront him and as a result of the meeting secured incriminating oral admissions. Contrary to the holdings of the state courts, Edwards insists that having exercised his right on the 19th to have counsel present during interrogation, he did not validly waive that right on the 20th. For the following reasons, we agree. </s> First, the Arizona Supreme Court applied an erroneous standard for determining waiver where the accused has specifically invoked his right to counsel. It is reasonably clear under our cases that waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case "upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374 -375 (1979); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 , [451 U.S. 477, 483] 404 (1977); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724 -725 (1979). </s> Considering the proceedings in the state courts in the light of this standard, we note that in denying petitioner's motion to suppress, the trial court found the admission to have been "voluntary," App. 3, 95, without separately focusing on whether Edwards had knowingly and intelligently relinquished his right to counsel. The Arizona Supreme Court, in a section of its opinion entitled "Voluntariness of Waiver," stated that in Arizona, confessions are prima facie involuntary and that the State had the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was freely and voluntarily made. The court stated that the issue of voluntariness should be determined based on the totality of the circumstances as it related to whether an accused's action was "knowing and intelligent and whether his will [was] overborne." 122 Ariz., at 212, 594 P.2d, at 78. Once the trial court determines that "the confession is voluntary, the finding will not be upset on appeal absent clear and manifest error." Ibid. The court then upheld the trial court's finding that the "waiver and confession were voluntarily and knowingly made." Ibid. </s> In referring to the necessity to find Edwards' confession knowing and intelligent, the State Supreme Court cited Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973). Yet, it is clear that Schneckloth does not control the issue presented in this case. The issue in Schneckloth was under what conditions an individual could be found to have consented to a search and thereby waived his Fourth Amendment rights. The Court declined to impose the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege" standard and required only that the consent be voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. The Court specifically noted that the right to counsel was a prime example of those rights requiring the special protection of the knowing and intelligent waiver standard, id., at 241, but held that "[t]he considerations [451 U.S. 477, 484] that informed the Court's holding in Miranda are simply inapplicable in the present case." Id., at 246. Schneckloth itself thus emphasized that the voluntariness of a consent or an admission on the one hand, and a knowing and intelligent waiver on the other, are discrete inquiries. Here, however sound the conclusion of the state courts as to the voluntariness of Edwards' admission may be, neither the trial court nor the Arizona Supreme Court undertook to focus on whether Edwards understood his right to counsel and intelligently and knowingly relinquished it. It is thus apparent that the decision below misunderstood the requirement for finding a valid waiver of the right to counsel, once invoked. </s> Second, although we have held that after initially being advised of his Miranda rights, the accused may himself validly waive his rights and respond to interrogation, see North Carolina v. Butler, supra, at 372-376, the Court has strongly indicated that additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel; and we now hold that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. 8 We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available [451 U.S. 477, 485] to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. </s> Miranda itself indicated that the assertion of the right to counsel was a significant event and that once exercised by the accused, "the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." 384 U.S., at 474 . Our later cases have not abandoned that view. In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), the Court noted that Miranda had distinguished between the procedural safeguards triggered by a request to remain silent and a request for an attorney and had required that interrogation cease until an attorney was present only if the individual stated that he wanted counsel. 423 U.S., at 104 , n. 10; see also id., at 109-111 (WHITE, J., concurring). In Fare v. Michael C., supra, at 719, the Court referred to Miranda's "rigid rule that an accused's request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights, requiring that all interrogation cease." And just last Term, in a case where a suspect in custody had invoked his Miranda right to counsel, the Court again referred to the "undisputed right" under Miranda to remain silent and to be free of interrogation "until he had consulted with a lawyer." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298 (1980). We reconfirm these views and, to lend them substance, emphasize that it is inconsistent with Miranda and its progeny for the authorities, at their instance, to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to counsel. </s> In concluding that the fruits of the interrogation initiated by the police on January 20 could not be used against Edwards, we do not hold or imply that Edwards was powerless to countermand his election or that the authorities could in no event use any incriminating statements made by Edwards prior to his having access to counsel. Had Edwards initiated the meeting on January 20, nothing in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments would prohibit the police from merely listening to his voluntary, volunteered statements and using them against him at the trial. The Fifth Amendment right [451 U.S. 477, 486] identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation. Absent such interrogation, there would have been no infringement of the right that Edwards invoked and there would be no occasion to determine whether there had been a valid waiver. Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, makes this sufficiently clear. 446 U.S., at 298 , n. 2. 9 </s> But this is not what the facts of this case show. Here, the officers conducting the interrogation on the evening of January [451 U.S. 477, 487] 19 ceased interrogation when Edwards requested counsel as he had been advised he had the right to do. The Arizona Supreme Court was of the opinion that this was a sufficient invocation of his Miranda rights, and we are in accord. It is also clear that without making counsel available to Edwards, the police returned to him the next day. This was not at his suggestion or request. Indeed, Edwards informed the detention officer that he did not want to talk to anyone. At the meeting, the detectives told Edwards that they wanted to talk to him and again advised him of his Miranda rights. Edwards stated that he would talk, but what prompted this action does not appear. He listened at his own request to part of the taped statement made by one of his alleged accomplices and then made an incriminating statement, which was used against him at his trial. We think it is clear that Edwards was subjected to custodial interrogation on January 20 within the meaning of Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, and that this occurred at the instance of the authorities. His statement, made without having had access to counsel, did not amount to a valid waiver and hence was inadmissible. 10 </s> Accordingly, the holding of the Arizona Supreme Court that Edwards had waived his right to counsel was infirm, and the judgment of that court is reversed. </s> So ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The facts stated in text are for the most part taken from the opinion of the Supreme Court of Arizona. </s> [Footnote 2 It appears from the record that the detectives had brought the tape-recording with them. </s> [Footnote 3 The trial judge emphasized that the detectives had met with Edwards on January 20, without being requested by Edwards to do so, and concluded that they had ignored his request for counsel made the previous evening. App. 91-93. </s> [Footnote 4 The case was State v. Travis, 26 Ariz. App. 24, 545 P.2d 986 (1976). </s> [Footnote 5 The jury in the first trial was unable to reach a verdict. </s> [Footnote 6 This issue was disputed by the State. The court, while finding that the question was arguable, held that Edwards' request for an attorney to assist him in negotiating a deal was "sufficiently clear" within the context of the interrogation that it "must be interpreted as a request for counsel and as a request to remain silent until counsel was present." 122 Ariz., at 211, 594 P.2d, at 77. </s> [Footnote 7 We thus need not decide Edwards' claim that the State deprived him of his right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as construed and applied in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). In that case, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel arises whenever an accused has been indicted or adversary criminal proceedings [451 U.S. 477, 481] have otherwise begun and that this right is violated when admissions are subsequently elicited from the accused in the absence of counsel. While initially conceding in its opening brief on the merits that Edwards' right to counsel under Massiah attached immediately after he was formally charged, the State in its supplemental brief and during oral argument took the position that under Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 -690 (1972), and Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 226 -227 (1977), the filing of the formal complaint did not constitute the "adversary judicial criminal proceedings" necessary to trigger the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Under the State Constitution, "[n]o person shall be prosecuted criminally in any court of record for felony or misdemeanor, otherwise than by information or indictment; no person shall be prosecuted for felony by information without having had a preliminary examination before a magistrate or having waived such preliminary examination." Ariz. Const., Art. 2, 30. The State contends that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until either the constitutionally required indictment or information is filed or at least no earlier than the preliminary hearing to which a defendant is entitled if the matter proceeds by complaint. Under Arizona law, a felony prosecution may be commenced by way of a complaint, Ariz. Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.2. The complaint is a "written statement of the essential facts constituting a public offense, made upon oath before a magistrate," Rule 2.3, upon which the magistrate either issues an arrest warrant or dismisses the complaint. Rule 2.4. Once arrested, the accused must be taken before the magistrate for a hearing. Rule 4.1. At that hearing, the magistrate ascertains the accused's true name and address, and informs him of the charges against him, his right to counsel, his right to remain silent, and his right to a preliminary hearing if charged via complaint. Rule 4.2. Unless waived, the preliminary hearing must take place no later than 10 days after the defendant is placed in custody. Rule 5.1. The purpose of the hearing is to determine whether probable cause exists to hold the defendant for trial. Rule 5.3. Against this background and in support of its position, the State relies on Moore v. Illinois, supra, where after recognizing that under Illinois law "[t]he prosecution in this case was commenced . . . when the victim's complaint was filed in court," we noted that "adversary judicial criminal proceedings" were initiated when the ensuing preliminary hearing occurred. Moore, supra, at 228. Cf. United States v. Duvall, 537 F.2d 15, 20-22 (CA2) (the filing of [451 U.S. 477, 482] a complaint and the issuance of an arrest warrant does not trigger the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, that right accruing only upon further proceedings), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976). The Arizona Supreme Court did not address the Sixth Amendment question, nor do we. </s> [Footnote 8 In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), where, as in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had accrued, the Court held that a valid waiver of counsel right should not be inferred from the mere response by the accused to overt or more subtle forms of interrogation or other efforts to elicit incriminating information. In Massiah and Brewer, counsel had been engaged or appointed and the admissions in question were elicited in his absence. But in McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U.S. 356 (1965), we summarily reversed a decision that the police could elicit information after indictment even though counsel had not yet been appointed. </s> [Footnote 9 If, as frequently would occur in the course of a meeting initiated by the accused, the conversation is not wholly one-sided, it is likely that the officers will say or do something that clearly would be "interrogation." In that event, the question would be whether a valid waiver of the right to counsel and the right to silence had occurred, that is, whether the purported waiver was knowing and intelligent and found to be so under the totality of the circumstances, including the necessary fact that the accused, not the police, reopened the dialogue with the authorities. </s> Various decisions of the Courts of Appeals are to the effect that a valid waiver of an accused's previously invoked Fifth Amendment right to counsel is possible. See, e. g., White v. Finkbeiner, 611 F.2d 186, 191 (CA7 1979) ("in certain instances, for various reasons, a person in custody who has previously requested counsel may knowingly and voluntarily decide that he no longer wishes to be represented by counsel"), cert. pending, No. 79-6601; Kennedy v. Fairman, 618 F.2d 1242 (CA7 1980); United States v. Rodriguez-Gastelum, 569 F.2d 482, 486 (CA9) (en banc) (stating that it makes no sense to hold that once an accused has requested counsel, "[he] may never, until he has actually talked with counsel, change his mind and decide to speak with the police without an attorney being present"), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978). See generally Cobbs v. Robinson, 528 F.2d 1331, 1342 (CA2 1975); United States v. Grant, 549 F.2d 942 (CA4 1977), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Whitehead v. United States, 435 U.S. 912 (1978); United States v. Hart, 619 F.2d 325 (CA4 1980); United States v. Hauck, 586 F.2d 1296 (CA8 1978). The rule in the Fifth Circuit is that a knowing and intelligent waiver cannot be found once the Fifth Amendment right to counsel has been clearly invoked unless the accused initiates the renewed contact. See, e. g., United States v. Massey, 550 F.2d 300 (1977); United States v. Priest, 409 F.2d 491 (1969). Waiver is possible, however, when the request for counsel is equivocal. Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513 (CA5 1979) (en banc). See Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768 (CA5 1979). </s> [Footnote 10 We need not decide whether there would have been a valid waiver of counsel had the events of January 20 been the first and only interrogation to which Edwards had been subjected. Cf. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979). </s> CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring in the judgment. </s> I concur only in the judgment because I do not agree that either any constitutional standard or the holding of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) - as distinguished from its dicta - calls for a special rule as to how an accused in custody may waive the right to be free from interrogation. The extraordinary protections afforded a person in custody suspected of criminal conduct are not without a valid basis, but [451 U.S. 477, 488] as with all "good" things they can be carried too far. The notion that any "prompting" of a person in custody is somehow evil per se has been rejected. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). For me, the inquiry in this setting is whether resumption of interrogation is a result of a voluntary waiver, and that inquiry should be resolved under the traditional standards established in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938): </s> "A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver . . . must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused." </s> Accord, e. g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979). In this case, the Supreme Court of Arizona described the situation as follows: </s> "When the detention officer told Edwards that the detectives were there to see him, he told the officer that he did not wish to speak to anyone. The officer told him that he had to." 122 Ariz. 206, 209, 594 P.2d 72, 75 (1979) (emphasis added). </s> This is enough for me, and on this record the Supreme Court of Arizona erred in holding that the resumption of interrogation was the product of a voluntary waiver, such as I found to be the situation in both Innis, supra, at 304 (concurring opinion), and Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 417 -418 (1977) (dissenting opinion). </s> JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, concurring in the result. </s> Although I agree that the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court must be reversed, I do not join the Court's opinion because I am not sure what it means. [451 U.S. 477, 489] </s> I can agree with much of the opinion. It states the settled rule: </s> "It is reasonably clear under our cases that waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case `upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience and conduct of the accused.' Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374 -375 (1979); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724 -725 (1979)." Ante, at 482-483. </s> I have thought it settled law, as these cases tell us, that one accused of crime may waive any of the constitutional safeguards - including the right to remain silent, to jury trial, to call witnesses, to cross-examine one's accusers, to testify in one's own behalf, and - of course - to have counsel. Whatever the right, the standard for waiver is whether the actor fully understands the right in question and voluntarily intends to relinquish it. </s> In its opinion today, however, the Court - after reiterating the familiar principles of waiver - goes on to say: </s> "We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused [has] himself initiate[d] further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." Ante, at 484-485 (emphasis added). </s> In view of the emphasis placed on "initiation," see also ante, at 485-486, and n. 9, I find the Court's opinion unclear. If read to create a new per se rule, requiring a threshold inquiry [451 U.S. 477, 490] as to precisely who opened any conversation between an accused and state officials, I cannot agree. I would not superimpose a new element of proof on the established doctrine of waiver of counsel. </s> Perhaps the Court's opinion can be read as not departing from established doctrine. Accepting the formulation quoted above, two questions are identifiable: (i) was there in fact "interrogation," see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), and (ii) did the police "initiate" it? Each of these questions is, of course, relevant to the admissibility of a confession. In this case, for example, it is clear that Edwards was taken from his cell against his will and subjected to renewed interrogation. Whether this is described as police-"initiated" interrogation or in some other way, it clearly was questioning under circumstances incompatible with a voluntary waiver of the fundamental right to counsel. </s> But few cases will be as clear as this one. Communications between police and a suspect in custody are commonplace. It is useful to contrast the circumstances of this case with typical, and permissible, custodial communications between police and a suspect who has asked for counsel. For example, police do not impermissibly "initiate" renewed interrogation by engaging in routine conversations with suspects about unrelated matters. And police legitimately may inquire whether a suspect has changed his mind about speaking to them without an attorney. E. g., State v. Turner, 32 Ore. App. 61, 65, 573 P.2d 326, 327 (1978); see State v. Crisler, 285 N. W. 2d 679, 682 (Minn. 1979); State v. Marcum, 24 Wash. App. 441, 445-446, 601 P.2d 975, 978 (1979). It is not unusual for a person in custody who previously has expressed an unwillingness to talk or a desire to have a lawyer, to change his mind and even welcome an opportunity to talk. Nothing in the Constitution erects obstacles that preclude police from ascertaining whether a suspect has reconsidered his original decision. As JUSTICE WHITE has observed, this Court consistently has "rejected any paternalistic [451 U.S. 477, 491] rule protecting a defendant from his intelligent and voluntary decisions about his own criminal case." Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 109 (1975) (WHITE, J., concurring in result). 1 </s> In sum, once warnings have been given and the right to counsel has been invoked, the relevant inquiry - whether the suspect now desires to talk to police without counsel - is a question of fact to be determined in light of all of the circumstances. Who "initiated" a conversation may be relevant to the question of waiver, but it is not the sine qua non to the inquiry. The ultimate question is whether there was a free and knowing waiver of counsel before interrogation commenced. </s> If the Court's opinion does nothing more than restate these principles, I am in agreement with it. I hesitate to join the opinion only because of what appears to be an undue, and undefined, emphasis on a single element: "initiation." As JUSTICE WHITE has noted, the Court in Miranda v. Arizona, [451 U.S. 477, 492] 384 U.S. 436 (1965), imposed a general prophylactic rule that is not manifestly required by anything in the text of the Constitution. Id., at 526 (WHITE, J., dissenting); see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443 -444 (1974). Miranda itself recognized, moreover, that counsel's assistance can be waived. 384 U.S., at 475 (opinion of Warren, C. J.). Waiver always has been evaluated under the general formulation of the Zerbst standard quoted above. My concern is that the Court's opinion today may be read as "constitutionalizing" not the generalized Zerbst standard but a single element of fact among the various facts that may be relevant to determining whether there has been a valid waiver. 2 </s> [Footnote 1 JUSTICE WHITE noted in Michigan v. Mosley: </s> "Although a recently arrested individual may have indicated an initial desire not to answer questions, he would nonetheless want to know immediately - if it were true - that his ability to explain a particular incriminating fact or to supply an alibi for a particular time period would result in his immediate release. Similarly, he might wish to know - if it were true - that (1) the case against him was unusually strong and that (2) his immediate cooperation with the authorities in the apprehension and conviction of others or in the recovery of property would redound to his benefit in the form of a reduced charge." 423 U.S., at 109 , n. 1. </s> In Michigan v. Mosley, of course, the question was whether a suspect who had invoked his right to remain silent later could change his mind and speak to police. The facts of Mosley differ somewhat from the present case because here petitioner had requested counsel. It is nevertheless true in both cases that "a blanket prohibition against the taking of voluntary statements or a permanent immunity from further interrogation, regardless of the circumstances, would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity, and deprive suspects of an opportunity to make informed and intelligent assessments of their interests." Id., at 102 (opinion of STEWART, J.). </s> [Footnote 2 Such a step should be taken only if it is demonstrably clear that the traditional waiver standard is ineffective. There is no indication, in the multitude of cases that come to us each Term, that Zerbst and its progeny have failed to protect constitutional rights. </s> [451 U.S. 477, 493]