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AUTOMOBILE CLUB OF MICHIGAN v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. No. 89. Argued March 6-7, 1957. Decided April 22, 1957. Ellsworth C. Alvord and Raymond H. Berry argued the cause for petitioner. With them on the brief were A. H. Moorman and Lincoln Arnold. John N. Stull argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Rice, I. Henry Kutz and Joseph F. Goetten. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1945, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue revoked his 1984 and 1938 rulings exempting the petitioner from federal income taxes, and retroactively applied the revocation to 1943 and 1944. The Commissioner also determined that prepaid membership dues received by the petitioner should be taken into income in the year received, rejecting the petitioner’s method of reporting as income only that part of the dues as was recorded on petitioner’s books as earned in the tax year. The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner’s determinations, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. This Court granted certiorari. The Commissioner had determined in 1934 that the petitioner was a “club” entitled to exemption under provisions of the internal revenue laws corresponding to § 101 (9) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, notifying the petitioner that “. . . future returns, under the provisions of section 101 (9) . . . will not be required so long as there is no change in your organization, your purposes or methods of doing business.” In 1938, the Commissioner confirmed this ruling in a letter stating: “. . . as it appears that there has been no change in your form of organization or activities which would affect your status the previous ruling of the Bureau holding you to be exempt from filing returns of income is affirmed . . . .” Accordingly the petitioner did not pay federal taxes from 1933 to 1945. The Commissioner revoked these rulings in 1945, however, and directed the petitioner to file returns for 1943 and subsequent years. Pursuant to this direction, the petitioner filed, under protest, corporate income and excess profits tax returns for 1943, 1944 and 1945. The Commissioner’s earlier rulings were grounded upon an erroneous interpretation of the term “club” in § 101 (9) and thus were based upon a mistake of law. It is conceded that in 1943 and 1944 petitioner was not, in fact or in law, a “club” entitled to exemption within the meaning of § 101 (9), and also that petitioner is subject to taxation for 1945 and subsequent years. It is nevertheless contended that the Commissioner had no power to apply the revocation retroactively to 1943 and 1944, and that, in any event, the assessment of taxes against petitioner for 1943 and 1944 was barred by the statute of limitations. The petitioner argues that, in light of the 1934 and 1938 rulings, the Commissioner was equitably estopped from applying the revocation retroactively. This argument is without merit. The doctrine of equitable estoppel is not a bar to the correction by the Commissioner of a mistake of law. The decision in Stockstrom v. Commis sioner, 88 U. S. App. D. C. 286, 190 F. 2d 283, to the extent that it holds to the contrary, is disapproved. Petitioner’s reliance on H. S. D. Co. v. Kavanagh, 191 F. 2d 831, and Woodworth v. Kales, 26 F. 2d 178, is misplaced because those cases did not involve correction of an erroneous ruling of law. Reliance on Lesavoy Foundation v. Commissioner, 238 F. 2d 589, is also misplaced because there the court recognized the power in the Commissioner to correct a mistake of law, but held that in the circumstances of the case the Commissioner had exceeded the bounds of the discretion vested in him under § 3791 (b) of the 1939 Code. The Commissioner’s action may not be disturbed unless, in the circumstances of this case, the Commissioner abused the discretion vested in him by § 3791 (b) of the 1939 Code. That section provides: “Retroactivity op Regulations or Rulings.— The Secretary, or the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe the extent, if any, to which any ruling, regulation, or Treasury Decision, relating to the internal revenue laws, shall be applied without retroactive effect.” The petitioner contends that this section forbids the Commissioner taking retroactive action. On the contrary, it is clear from the language of the section and its legislative history that Congress thereby confirmed the authority of the Commissioner to correct any ruling, regulation or Treasury decision retroactively, but empowered him, in his discretion, to limit retroactive application to the extent necessary to avoid inequitable results. The petitioner, citing Helvering v. Reynolds Co., 306 U. S. 110, argues that resort by the Commissioner to § 3791 (b) was precluded in this case because the repeated re-enactments of § 101 (9) gave the force of law to the provision of the Treasury regulations relating to that section. These regulations provided that when an organization had established its right to exemption it need not thereafter make a return of income or any further showing with respect to its status unless it changed the character of its operations or the purpose for which it was originally created. Helvering v. Reynolds Co. is inapplicable to this case. As stated by the Tax Court: “The regulations involved there [Helvering v. Reynolds Co.] . . . purported to determine what did or did not constitute gain or loss. The regulations here ... in nowise purported to determine whether any organization was or was not exempt.” These regulations did not provide the exemption or interpret § 101 (9), but merely specified the necessary information required to be filed in order that the Commissioner might rule whether or not the taxpayer was entitled to exemption. This is thus not a case of . . administrative construction embodied in the regulation [s] . . .” which, by repeated re-enactment of § 101 (9), “. . . Congress must be taken to have approved . . . and thereby to have given . . . the force of law.” Helvering v. Reynolds Co., 306 U. S., at 114, 115. We must, then, determine whether the retroactive action of the Commissioner was an abuse of discretion in the circumstances of this case. The action was the consequence of the reconsideration by the Commissioner, in 1943, of the correctness of the prior rulings exempting automobile clubs, initiated by a General Counsel Memorandum interpreting § 101 (9) to be inapplicable to such organizations. The Commissioner adopted the General Counsel’s interpretation and proceeded to apply it, effective from 1943, indiscriminately to automobile clubs. We thus find no basis for disagreeing with the conclusion, reached by both the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals, that the Commissioner, having dealt with petitioner upon the same basis as other automobile clubs, did not abuse his discretion. Nor did the two-year delay in proceeding with the petitioner’s case, in these circumstances, vitiate the Commissioner’s action. The petitioner’s contention that the statute of limitations barred the assessment of deficiencies for 1943 and 1944 is also without merit. Its returns for those years were not filed until October 22, 1945. Within three years, on August 25, 1948, the petitioner and the Commissioner signed consents extending the period to June 30,1949. The period was later extended to June 20,1950. Notice of deficiencies was mailed to petitioner on February 20, 1950. The assessments were therefore within time under §§ 275 (a) and 276 (b) unless, as the petitioner asserts, the statute of limitations began to run from the dates when, if there was a duty to file, the statute required filing. The petitioner argues that because its omission to file on March 15, 1944, and March 15, 1945, was induced by the Commissioner’s 1934 and 1938 rulings, it is only equitable to interpret the statute of limitations as running from those dates in the circumstances of this case. But the express condition prescribed by the Congress was that the statute was to run against the United States from the date of the actual filing of the return, and no action of the Commissioner can change or modify the conditions under which the United States consents to the running of the statute of limitations against it. In Lucas v. Pilliod Lumber Co., 281 U. S. 245, 249, this Court held: “Under the established general rule a statute of limitation runs against the United States only when they assent and upon the conditions prescribed. Here assent that the statute might begin to run was conditioned upon the presentation of a return duly sworn to. No officer had power to substitute something else for the thing specified. . . .” It is also argued that the Form 990 returns filed by the petitioner in compliance with § 54 (f) of the 1939 Code, as amended, constituted the filing of returns for the purposes of § 275 (a). But the Form 990 returns are merely information returns in furtherance of a congressional program to secure information useful in a determination whether legislation should be enacted to subject to taxation certain tax-exempt corporations competing with taxable corporations. Those returns lack the data necessary for the computation and assessment of deficiencies and are not therefore tax returns within the contemplation of § 275 (a). Cf. Commissioner v. Lane-Wells Co., 321 U. S. 219. The final issue argued concerns the treatment of membership dues and arises because such dues are paid in advance for one year. The dues upon collection are deposited in a general bank account and are not segregated from general funds but are available and are used for general corporate purposes. For bookkeeping purposes, however, the dues upon receipt are credited to an account carried as a liability account and designated “Unearned Membership Dues.” During the first month of membership and each of the following eleven months one-twelfth of the amount paid is credited to an account designated “Membership Income.” This method of accounting was followed by petitioner from 1934. The income from such dues reported by petitioner in each of its tax returns for 1943 through 1947 was the amount credited in the year to the “Membership Income” account. The Commissioner determined that the petitioner received the prepaid dues under a claim of right, without restriction as to their disposition, and therefore the entire amount received in each year should be reported as income. The Commissioner relies upon North American Oil v. Burnet, 286 U. S. 417, 424, where this Court said: “If a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of right and without restriction as to its disposition, . . . [it] has received income which . . . [it] is required to return . . . .” The petitioner does not deny that it has the unrestricted use of the dues income in the year of receipt, but contends that its accrual method of accounting clearly reflects its income, and that the Commissioner is therefore bound to accept its method of reporting membership dues. We do not agree. Section 41 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 required that “ [t] he net income shall be computed ... in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the books . . . but ... if the method employed does not clearly reflect the income, the computation shall be made in accordance with such method as in the opinion of the Commissioner does clearly reflect the income. . . .” The pro rata allocation of the membership dues in monthly amounts is purely artificial and bears no relation to the services which petitioner may in fact be called upon to render for the member. Section 41 vests the Commissioner with discretion to determine whether the petitioner’s method of accounting clearly reflects income. We cannot say, in the circumstances here, that the discretionary action of the Commissioner, sustained by both the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals, exceeded permissible limits. See Brown v. Helvering, 291 U. S. 193, 204-205. Affirmed. Mr. Justice Whittaker took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 20 T. C. 1033. 230 F. 2d 585. 352 U. S. 817. Section 101 (9) provided as follows: “The following organizations shall be exempt from taxation under this chapter— “(9) Clubs organized and operated exclusively for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable purposes, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder . . . .” 53 Stat. 33, 26 U. S. C. (1934 ed., Supp. V) § 101 (9). The earlier statute sections were identical to the 1939 section. 52 Stat. 480 (1938); 49 Stat. 1673 (1936); 48 Stat. 700 (1934); 47 Stat. 193 (1932). The letter of revocation stated that in order to qualify as á club under § 101 (9), the “. . . organization should be so composed and its activities be such that fellowship among the members plays a material part in the life of the organization . . . .” It was then stated that the previous rulings were revoked because “[t]he evidence submitted shows that fellowship does not constitute a material part of the life of . . . [petitioner’s] organization and that . . . [petitioner’s] principal activity is the rendering of commercial services to . . . [its] members.” Petitioner renders various services for its members. Among these are emergency road service when a car is disabled; furnishing maps, road and other travel information; and publishing a monthly magazine containing news of travel and of laws pertaining to the use of automobiles. Keystone Auto. Club v. Commissioner, 181 F. 2d 402; Schafer v. Helvering, 65 App. D. C. 292, 83 F. 2d 317, aff’d, 299 U. S. 171; John M. Parker Co. v. Commissioner, 49 F. 2d 254; Southern Maryland Agricultural Fair Assn. v. Commissioner, 40 B. T. A. 549; Yokohama Ki-Ito Kwaisha, Ltd., 5 B. T. A. 1248; see also, Chattanooga Auto. Club v. Commissioner, 182 F. 2d 551 (by implication); Warren Auto. Club v. Commissioner, 182 F. 2d 551 (by implication); Smyth v. California State Auto. Assn., 175 F. 2d 752 (by implication); Automobile Club of St. Paul v. Commissioner, 12 T. C. 1152 (by implication). 53 Stat. 467, 26 U. S. C. § 3791 (b). H. R. Rep. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 38; S. Rep. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 48. Treas. Reg. 86, Art. 101-1 (1934); Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 101-1 (1936); Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.101-1 (1939). 20 T. C., at 1041. G. C. M. 23688, 1943 Cum. Bull. 283. See, e. g., Chattanooga Auto. Club v. Commissioner, 182 F. 2d 551; Warren Auto. Club v. Commissioner, 182 F. 2d 551; Keystone Auto. Club v. Commissioner, 181 F. 2d 402; Smyth v. California State Auto. Assn., 175 F. 2d 752; Automobile Club of St. Paul v. Commissioner, 12 T. C. 1152. Section 275 (a) provides as follows: “Except as provided in section 276— “(a) General Rule. — The amount of income taxes imposed by this chapter shall be assessed within three years after the return was filed, and no proceeding in court without assessment for the collection of such taxes shall be begun after the expiration of such period.” 53 Stat. 86, 26 ü. S. C. § 275 (a). Section 276 (b) provides as follows: “(b) Waiver. — Where before the expiration of the time prescribed in section 275 for the assessment of the tax, both the Commissioner and the taxpayer have consented in writing to its assessment after such time, the tax may be assessed at any time prior to the expiration of the period agreed upon. The period so agreed upon may be extended by subsequent agreements in writing made before the expiration of the period previously agreed upon.” 53 Stat. 87, 26 ü. S. C. §276 (b). The 1943 tax return was due on March 15, 1944. The 1944 tax return was due on March 15, 1945. To the extent that the decision in Balkan Nat. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 101 F. 2d 75, is to the contrary, it is disapproved. 53 Stat. 28, as amended, 58 Stat. 36, 26 U. S. C. § 54 (f). H. R. Rep. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25; S. Rep. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 21. 53 Stat. 24, 26 U. S. C. § 41. Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F. 2d 697, and Schuessler v. Commissioner, 230 F. 2d 722, are distinguishable on their facts. In Beacon, performance of the subscription, in most instances, was, in part, necessarily deferred until the publication dates after the tax year. In Schuessler, performance of the service agreement required the taxpayer to furnish services at specified times in years subsequent to the tax year. In this case, substantially all services are performed only upon a member’s demand and the taxpayer’s performance was not related to fixed dates after the tax year. We express no opinion upon the correctness of the decisions in Beacon or Schuessler.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.
Did administrative action occur in the context of the case?
[ "No", "Yes" ]
[ 1 ]
sc
AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES CORPORATION, Petitioner v. WILLIAM L. HOEPER. No. 12-315 Supreme Court of the United States Argued Dec. 9, 2013. Decided Jan. 27, 2014. Syllabus* Respondent Hoeper was a pilot for petitioner Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. When Air Wisconsin stopped flying from Hoeper's home base on aircraft that he was certified to fly, he needed to become certified on a different type of aircraft to keep his job. After Hoeper failed in his first three attempts to gain certification, Air Wisconsin agreed to give him a fourth and final chance. But he performed poorly during a required training session in a simulator. Hoeper responded angrily to this failure-raising his voice, tossing his headset, using profanity, and accusing the instructor of "railroading the situation." The instructor called an Air Wisconsin manager, who booked Hoeper on a flight from the test location to Hoeper's home in Denver. Several hours later, the manager discussed Hoeper's behavior with other airline officials. The officials discussed Hoeper's outburst, his impending termination, the history of assaults by disgruntled airline employees, and the chance that-because Hoeper was a Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO), permitted "to carry a firearm while engaged in providing air transportation," 49 U.S.C. § 44921(f)(1)-he might be armed. At the end of the meeting, an airline executive made the decision to notify the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) of the situation. The manager who had received the initial report from Hoeper's instructor made the call to the TSA. During that call, according to the jury, he made two statements: first, that Hoeper "was an FFDO who may be armed" and that the airline was "concerned about his mental stability and the whereabouts of his firearm"; and second, that an "[u]nstable pilot in [the] FFDO program was terminated today." In response, the TSA removed Hoeper from his plane, searched him, and questioned him about the location of his gun. Hoeper eventually boarded a later flight to Denver, and Air Wisconsin fired him the next day. Hoeper sued for defamation in Colorado state court. Air Wisconsin moved for summary judgment and later for a directed verdict, relying on the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), which grants airlines and their employees immunity against civil liability for reporting suspicious behavior, 49 U.S.C. § 44941(a), except where such disclosure is "made with actual knowledge that the disclosure was false, inaccurate, or misleading" or "made with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of that disclosure," § 44941(b). The trial court denied the motions and submitted the ATSA immunity question to the jury. The jury found for Hoeper on the defamation claim. The State Supreme Court affirmed. It held that the trial court erred in submitting the immunity question to the jury but that the error was harmless. Laboring under the assumption that even true statements do not qualify for ATSA immunity if they are made recklessly, the court held that Air Wisconsin was not entitled to immunity because its statements to the TSA were made with reckless disregard of their truth or falsity. Held : 1. ATSA immunity may not be denied to materially true statements. Pp. 860 - 863. (a) The ATSA immunity exception is patterned after the actual malice standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, which requires material falsity. See, e.g.,Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 115 L.Ed.2d 447. Because the material falsity requirement was settled when the ATSA was enacted, Congress presumably meant to incorporate it into the ATSA's immunity exception and did not mean to deny ATSA immunity to true statements made recklessly. This presumption is not rebutted by other indicia of statutory meaning. Section 44941(b)(1) requires falsity, and § 44941(b)(2) simply extends the immunity exception from knowing falsehoods to reckless ones. Denying immunity for substantially true reports, on the theory that the person making the report had not yet gathered enough information to be certain of its truth, would defeat the purpose of ATSA immunity: to ensure that air carriers and their employees do not hesitate to provide the TSA with needed information. Pp. 860 - 863. (b) Hoeper's arguments that the State Supreme Court's judgment should be affirmed notwithstanding its misapprehension of ATSA's immunity standard are unpersuasive. Hoeper claims that Air Wisconsin did not argue the truth of its statements in asserting immunity, but Air Wisconsin contended in the state court that ATSA's immunity exception incorporates the New York Times actual malice standard, which requires material falsity. And the State Supreme Court did not perform the requisite analysis of material falsity in finding the record sufficient to support the defamation verdict. A court's deferential review of jury findings cannot substitute for its own analysis of the record; the jury was instructed only to determine falsity, not materiality; and applying the material falsity standard to a defamation claim is quite different from applying it to ATSA immunity. Pp. 862 - 863. 2. Under the correct material falsity analysis, Air Wisconsin is entitled to immunity as a matter of law. Pp. 863 - 867. (a) In the defamation context, a materially false statement is one that " 'would have a different effect on the mind of the reader [or listener] from that which the ... truth would have produced.' " Masson, 501 U.S., at 517, 111 S.Ct. 2419. This standard suffices in the ATSA context as well, so long as the hypothetical reader or listener is a security officer. For purposes of ATSA immunity, a falsehood cannot be material absent a substantial likelihood that a reasonable security officer would consider it important in determining a response to the supposed threat. Pp. 863 - 864. (b) Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Hoeper, the Court concludes as a matter of law that any falsehoods in Air Wisconsin's statement to the TSA were not material. First, the Court rejects Hoeper's argument that Air Wisconsin should have qualified its statement that Hoeper "was an FFDO who may be armed" by noting that it had no reason to think he actually was armed. To the extent that Air Wisconsin's statement could have been confusing, any such confusion is immaterial, as a reasonable TSA officer-having been told that Hoeper was an FFDO who was upset about losing his job-would have wanted to investigate whether he was armed. To demand more precise wording would vitiate the purpose of ATSA immunity: to encourage air carriers and their employees, often in fast-moving situations and with little time to fine-tune their diction, to provide the TSA immediately with information about potential threats. Second, Air Wisconsin's statement that Hoeper "was terminated today" was not materially false. While Hoeper had not actually been fired at the time of the statement, everyone involved knew that his firing was imminent. No reasonable TSA officer would care whether an angry, potentially armed airline employee had just been fired or merely knew he was about to meet that fate. Finally, although the details of Hoeper's behavior during the simulator session may be disputed, it would have been correct even under Hoeper's version of the facts for Air Wisconsin to report that Hoeper "blew up" during the test. From a reasonable security officer's perspective, there is no material difference between a statement that Hoeper had "blown up" in a professional setting and a statement that he was unstable. Air Wisconsin's related statement that it was "concerned about [Hoeper's] mental stability" is no more troubling. Many of the officials who attended the meeting at airline headquarters might not have framed their concerns in terms of "mental stability," but it would be inconsistent with the ATSA's text and purpose to expose Air Wisconsin to liability because the manager who placed the call to the TSA could have chosen a slightly better phrase to articulate the airline's concern. A statement that would otherwise qualify for ATSA immunity cannot lose that immunity because of some minor imprecision, so long as "the gist" of the statement is accurate, Masson, 501 U.S., at 517, 111 S.Ct. 2419. Pp. 864 - 867. Reversed and remanded. SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C.J., and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and ALITO, JJ., joined, and in which SCALIA, THOMAS, and KAGAN, JJ., joined as to Parts I, II, and III-A. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which THOMAS and KAGAN, JJ., joined. Jonathan F. Cohn, Washington, DC, for Petitioner. Eric J. Feigin, for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the Petitioner. Kevin K. Russell, Washington, DC, for Respondent. Donald Chance Mark, Jr., Fafinski Mark & Johnson, P.A., Eden Prairie, MN, David H. Yun, Jared R. Ellis, Jaudon & Avery LLP, Denver, CO, Peter D. Keisler, Counsel of Record, Jonathan F. Cohn, Eric D. McArthur, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioner. Kevin K. Russell, Thomas C. Goldstein, Goldstein & Russell, P.C., Washington, DC, Pamela S. Karlan, Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, CA, Scott A. McGath, Counsel of Record, Jason P. Rietz, Overturf McGath Hull & Doherty, P.C., Denver, CO, for Respondent. Donald Chance Mark, Jr., Fafinski Mark & Johnson, P.A., Eden Prairie, MN, David H. Yun, Jaudon & Avery LLP, Denver, CO, Peter D. Keisler, Counsel of Record, Jonathan F. Cohn, Eric D. McArthur, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioner. Justice SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court. In 2001, Congress created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to assess and manage threats against air travel. Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 49 U.S.C. § 44901 et seq. To ensure that the TSA would be informed of potential threats, Congress gave airlines and their employees immunity against civil liability for reporting suspicious behavior. § 44941(a). But this immunity does not attach to "any disclosure made with actual knowledge that the disclosure was false, inaccurate, or misleading" or "any disclosure made with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of that disclosure." § 44941(b). The question before us is whether ATSA immunity may be denied under § 44941(b) without a determination that a disclosure was materially false. We hold that it may not. Because the state courts made no such determination, and because any falsehood in the disclosure here would not have affected a reasonable security officer's assessment of the supposed threat, we reverse the judgment of the Colorado Supreme Court. I A William Hoeper joined Air Wisconsin Airlines Corporation as a pilot in 1998. But by late 2004, Air Wisconsin had stopped operating flights from Denver, Hoeper's home base, on any type of aircraft for which he was certified. To continue flying for Air Wisconsin out of Denver, Hoeper needed to gain certification on the British Aerospace 146 (BAe-146), an aircraft he had not flown. Hoeper failed in his first three attempts to pass a proficiency test. After the third failure, as he later acknowledged at trial, his employment was "at [Air Wisconsin's] discretion." App. 193. But he and Air Wisconsin entered into an agreement to afford him "one more opportunity to pass [the] proficiency check." Id., at 426. The agreement left little doubt that Hoeper would lose his job if he failed again. In December 2004, Hoeper flew from Denver to Virginia for simulator training as part of this final test. During the training, Hoeper failed to cope with a challenging scenario created by the instructor, Mark Schuerman, and the simulator showed the engines "flam[ing] out" due to a loss of fuel. App. 203. As Schuerman began to tell Hoeper that he "should know better," ibid., Hoeper responded angrily. He later described what happened: "At this point, that's it. I take my headset off and I toss it up on the glare shield.... [Schuerman] and I exchanged words at the same elevated decibel level. Mine went something like this: This is a bunch of shit. I'm sorry. You are railroading the situation and it's not realistic." Id., at 203-204. When Hoeper announced that he wanted to call the legal department of the pilots' union, Schuerman ended the session so that Hoeper could do so. Schuerman then reported Hoeper's behavior to Patrick Doyle, the Wisconsin-based manager of the BAe-146 fleet. Doyle booked Hoeper on a United Airlines flight back to Denver. Several hours after Schuerman's report, Doyle discussed the situation at Air Wisconsin's headquarters with the airline's Vice President of Operations, Kevin LaWare; its Managing Director of Flight Operations, Scott Orozco; and its Assistant Chief Pilot, Robert Frisch. LaWare later explained the accretion of his concerns about what Hoeper might do next. He regarded Hoeper's behavior in the simulator as "a fairly significant outburst," of a sort that he "hadn't seen ... before." Id., at 276. And he knew "it was a given that ... Hoeper's employment was ... going to be terminated" as a result of his failure to complete the simulator training. Id., at 278. Then, LaWare testified, Orozco mentioned that Hoeper was a Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO). The FFDO program allows the Government to "deputize volunteer pilots of air carriers ... to defend the flight decks of aircraft ... against acts of criminal violence or air piracy." § 44921(a). FFDOs are permitted "to carry a firearm while engaged in providing air transportation." § 44921(f)(1). Hoeper had become an FFDO earlier in 2004 and had been issued a firearm. He was not allowed to carry the firearm during his trip to the training facility, because he was not "engaged in providing air transportation," ibid. But according to one official at the meeting, the Denver airport's security procedures made it possible for crew members to bypass screening, so that Hoeper could have carried his gun despite the rule. Indeed, Frisch later testified that he was "aware of one" incident in which an Air Wisconsin pilot had come to training with his FFDO weapon. App. 292. On the basis of this information, LaWare concluded, there was "no way ... to confirm" whether "Hoeper had his weapon with him, even though ... by policy, [he was] not supposed to have it with him." Id., at 279. Finally, LaWare testified, he and the other Air Wisconsin officials discussed two prior episodes in which disgruntled airline employees had lashed out violently. Id., at 280. In one incident, a FedEx flight engineer under investigation for misconduct "entered the cockpit" of a FedEx flight "and began attacking the crew with a hammer" before being subdued. United States v. Calloway, 116 F.3d 1129, 1131 (C.A.6 1997). In another, a recently fired ticket agent brought a gun onto a Pacific Southwest Airlines flight and shot his former supervisor and the crew, leading to a fatal crash. Malnic, Report Confirms That Gunman Caused 1987 Crash of PSA Jet, L.A. Times, Jan. 6, 1989, p. 29. In light of all this-Hoeper's anger, his impending termination, the chance that he might be armed, and the history of assaults by disgruntled airline employees-LaWare decided that the airline "need[ed] to make a call to the TSA," to let the authorities know "the status" of the situation. App. 282. Doyle offered to make the call. According to the jury, he made two statements to the TSA: first, that Hoeper "was an FFDO who may be armed" and that the airline was "concerned about his mental stability and the whereabouts of his firearm"; and second, that an "[u]nstable pilot in [the] FFDO program was terminated today." App. to Pet. for Cert. 111a. (The latter statement appears in the record as the subject line of an internal TSA e-mail, summarizing the call from Doyle. App. 414.) The TSA responded to the call by ordering that Hoeper's plane return to the gate. Officers boarded the plane, removed Hoeper, searched him, and questioned him about the location of his gun. When Hoeper stated that the gun was at his home in Denver, a Denver-based federal agent went there to retrieve it. Later that day, Hoeper boarded a return flight to Denver. Air Wisconsin fired him the following day. B Hoeper sued Air Wisconsin in Colorado state court on several claims, including defamation.1 Air Wisconsin moved for summary judgment on the basis of ATSA immunity,2 but the trial court denied it, ruling that the jury was entitled to find the facts pertinent to immunity. The case went to trial, and the court denied Air Wisconsin's motion for a directed verdict on the same basis. It submitted the question of ATSA immunity to the jury, with the instruction-following the language of § 44941(b)-that immunity would not apply if Hoeper had proved that Air Wisconsin "made the disclosure [to the TSA] with actual knowledge that the disclosure was false, inaccurate, or misleading" or "with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity." App. 582. The jury instructions did not state that ATSA immunity protects materially true statements. The jury found for Hoeper on the defamation claim and awarded him $849,625 in compensatory damages and $391,875 in punitive damages. The court reduced the latter award to $350,000, for a total judgment of just under $1.2 million, plus costs. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed. 232 P.3d 230 (2009). It held "that the trial court properly submitted the ATSA immunity issue to the jury," that "the record supports the jury's rejection of immunity," and that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's defamation verdict. Id., at 233. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. --- P.3d ----, 2012 WL 907764 (Mar. 19, 2012). It began by holding, contrary to the lower courts, "that immunity under the ATSA is a question of law to be determined by the trial court before trial." Id., at ----, 2012 WL 907764, at *4. But it concluded that the trial court's error in submitting immunity to the jury was "harmless because Air Wisconsin is not entitled to immunity." Id., at ----, 2012 WL 907764, at *6. In a key footnote, the court stated: "In our determination of immunity under the ATSA, we need not, and therefore do not, decide whether the statements were true or false. Rather, we conclude that Air Wisconsin made the statements with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity." Id., at ----, n. 6, 2012 WL 907764, at *16, n. 6. The court thus appears to have labored under the assumption that even true statements do not qualify for ATSA immunity if they are made recklessly. Applying this standard, and giving "no weight to the jury's finding[s]," ibid., n. 5, the court held that "[a]lthough the events at the training may have warranted a report to TSA," Air Wisconsin's statements "overstated those events to such a degree that they were made with reckless disregard of their truth or falsity." Id., at ----, 2012 WL 907764, at *7. The court opined that Air Wisconsin "would likely be immune under the ATSA if Doyle had reported that Hoeper was an Air Wisconsin employee, that he knew he would be terminated soon, that he had acted irrationally at the training three hours earlier and 'blew up' at test administrators, and that he was an FFDO pilot." Id., at ----, 2012 WL 907764, at *8. But because Doyle actually told TSA "(1) that he believed Hoeper to be mentally unstable; (2) that Hoeper had been terminated earlier that day; and (3) that Hoeper may have been armed," id., at ----, 2012 WL 907764, at *7, the court determined that his statements "went well beyond" the facts and did not qualify for immunity, id., at ----, 2012 WL 907764, at *8. The court went on to conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's defamation verdict. Justice Eid, joined by two others, dissented in part. She agreed with the majority's holding that immunity is an issue for the court, not the jury. But she reasoned that Air Wisconsin was entitled to immunity "because [its] statements to the TSA were substantially true." Id., at ----, 2012 WL 907764, at *11. We granted certiorari to decide "[w]hether ATSA immunity may be denied without a determination that the air carrier's disclosure was materially false." 570 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 2824, 186 L.Ed.2d 883 (2013). II A Congress patterned the exception to ATSA immunity after the actual malice standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), and we have long held that actual malice requires material falsity. Because we presume that Congress meant to incorporate the settled meaning of actual malice when it incorporated the language of that standard, we hold that a statement otherwise eligible for ATSA immunity may not be denied immunity unless the statement is materially false. In New York Times, we held that under the First Amendment, a public official cannot recover "for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id., at 279-280, 84 S.Ct. 710. Congress borrowed this exact language in denying ATSA immunity to "(1) any disclosure made with actual knowledge that the disclosure was false, inaccurate, or misleading; or (2) any disclosure made with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of that disclosure." § 44941(b). One could in principle construe the language of the actual malice standard to cover true statements made recklessly. But we have long held, to the contrary, that actual malice entails falsity. See, e.g.,Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775, 106 S.Ct. 1558, 89 L.Ed.2d 783 (1986) ("[A]s one might expect given the language of the Court in New York Times, a public-figure plaintiff must show the falsity of the statements at issue in order to prevail in a suit for defamation" (citation omitted)); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964) ("We held in New York Times that a public official might be allowed the civil remedy only if he establishes that the utterance was false"). Indeed, we have required more than mere falsity to establish actual malice: The falsity must be "material." Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 115 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991). As we explained in Masson, "[m]inor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity so long as 'the substance, the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge be justified.' " Ibid. A "statement is not considered false unless it 'would have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced.' " Ibid. (quoting R. Sack, Libel, Slander, and Related Problems 138 (1980)). These holdings were settled when Congress enacted the ATSA, and we therefore presume that Congress meant to adopt the material falsity requirement when it incorporated the actual malice standard into the ATSA immunity exception. "[I]t is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that, when Congress employs a term of art, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it is taken." FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. ----, ----, 132 S.Ct. 1441, 1449, 182 L.Ed.2d 497 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). The actual malice standard does not cover materially true statements made recklessly, so we presume that Congress did not mean to deny ATSA immunity to such statements. Other indicia of statutory meaning could rebut this presumption, but here, they do not. First, the ATSA's text favors a falsity requirement. The first subsection of § 44941(b) requires falsity, as a true disclosure cannot have been made "with actual knowledge" that it "was false." The only question is whether the second subsection-which denies immunity to "any disclosure made with reckless disregard as to [its] truth or falsity"-similarly requires falsity. We conclude that it does. The second subsection simply extends the immunity exception from knowing falsehoods to reckless ones, ensuring that an air carrier cannot avoid liability for a baseless report by sticking its head in the sand to avoid "actual knowledge" that its statements are false. "[T]he defense of truth ..., even if not explicitly recognized, ... is implicit in ... a standard of recovery that rests on knowing or reckless disregard of the truth." Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 498-499, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring). A material falsity requirement also serves the purpose of ATSA immunity. The ATSA shifted from airlines to the TSA the responsibility "for assessing and investigating possible threats to airline security." --- P.3d, at ----, 2012 WL 907764, *14 (Eid, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In directing the TSA to "receive, assess, and distribute intelligence information related to transportation security," 49 U.S.C. § 114(f)(1), Congress wanted to ensure that air carriers and their employees would not hesitate to provide the TSA with the information it needed. This is the purpose of the immunity provision, evident both from its context and from the title of the statutory section that contained it: "encouraging airline employees to report suspicious activities." ATSA § 125, 115 Stat. 631 (capitalization and boldface type omitted). It would defeat this purpose to deny immunity for substantially true reports, on the theory that the person making the report had not yet gathered enough information to be certain of its truth. Such a rule would restore the pre-ATSA state of affairs, in which air carriers bore the responsibility to investigate and verify potential threats. We therefore hold that ATSA immunity may not be denied under § 44941(b) to materially true statements. This interpretation of the statute is clear enough that Hoeper effectively concedes it. See Brief for Respondent 30 (acknowledging that if the Colorado Supreme Court actually said " 'an airline may be denied ATSA immunity ... for reporting true information,' " then "the court was likely wrong"). Hoeper does point out in a footnote that given Congress' desire to deny immunity to " 'bad actors,' " and "given that the vast majority of reckless statements will not turn out to be true[,] ... Congress could have quite reasonably chosen to deny the special privilege of ATSA immunity to all reckless speakers," even those whose statements turned out to be true. Id., at 30, n. 12. But although Congress could have made this choice, nothing about the statute's text or purpose suggests that it actually did. Instead, Congress chose to model the exception to ATSA immunity after a standard we have long construed to require material falsity. B We are not persuaded by Hoeper's arguments that we should affirm the judgment of the Colorado Supreme Court notwithstanding its misapprehension of the ATSA immunity standard. Hoeper first argues that Air Wisconsin forfeited the claim that it is entitled to immunity because its statements were materially true. His premise is that Air Wisconsin argued the truth of its statements only in challenging the evidentiary basis for the defamation verdict, not in asserting immunity. But Air Wisconsin's brief before the Colorado Supreme Court argued that the exception to ATSA immunity "appears to incorporate the New York Times actual malice standard," which-as we have explained-requires material falsity. Petitioner's Opening Brief in No. 09SC1050, p. 24. Hoeper next argues that the Colorado Supreme Court performed the requisite analysis of material falsity, albeit in the context of finding the record sufficient to support the jury's defamation verdict. For several reasons, however, this analysis does not suffice for us to affirm the denial of ATSA immunity. First, to the extent that the immunity determination belongs to the court-as the Colorado Supreme Court held-a court's deferential review of jury findings cannot substitute for its own analysis of the record. Second, the jury here did not find that any falsity in Air Wisconsin's statements was material, because the trial court instructed it only to determine whether "[o]ne or more of th[e] statements was false," App. 580, without addressing materiality. Third, applying the material falsity standard to a defamation claim is quite different from applying it to ATSA immunity. In both contexts, a materially false statement is one that " 'would have a different effect on the mind of the reader [or listener] from that which the ... truth would have produced.' " Masson, 501 U.S., at 517, 111 S.Ct. 2419 .But the identity of the relevant reader or listener varies according to the context. In determining whether a falsehood is material to a defamation claim, we care whether it affects the subject's reputation in the community. In the context of determining ATSA immunity, by contrast, we care whether a falsehood affects the authorities' perception of and response to a given threat.3 III Finally, the Colorado Supreme Court's analysis of material falsity was erroneous. We turn next to explaining why, by applying the ATSA immunity standard to the facts of this case.4 A We begin by addressing how to determine the materiality of a false statement in the ATSA context. As we noted earlier, a materially false statement is generally one that " 'would have a different effect on the mind of the reader [or listener] from that which the ... truth would have produced.' " Ibid. The parties quibble over whether ATSA immunity requires some special version of this standard, but they more or less agree-as do we-that the usual standard suffices as long as the hypothetical reader or listener is a security officer. A further question is what it means for a statement to produce " 'a different effect on the mind of' " a security officer from that which the truth would have produced. In defamation law, the reputational harm caused by a false statement is its effect on a reader's or listener's mind. But contrary to the position of Hoeper's counsel at oral argument, Tr. of Oral Arg. 32-33, courts cannot decide whether a false statement produced " 'a different effect on the mind of' " a hypothetical TSA officer without considering the effect of that statement on TSA's behavior. After all, the whole reason the TSA considers threat reports is to determine and execute a response. A plaintiff seeking to defeat ATSA immunity need not show "precisely what a particular official or federal agency would have done in a counterfactual scenario." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27. Such a showing would be "impossible ... given the need to maintain secrecy regarding airline security operations." Brief for Respondent 42. But any falsehood cannot be material, for purposes of ATSA immunity, absent a substantial likelihood that a reasonable security officer would consider it important in determining a response to the supposed threat. Cf. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449, 96 S.Ct. 2126, 48 L.Ed.2d 757 (1976) (an omission in a proxy solicitation "is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote"). This standard "is an objective one, involving the [hypothetical] significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to a reasonable" security official, rather than the actual significance of that fact to a particular security official. Id., at 445, 96 S.Ct. 2126. B We apply the material falsity standard to the facts of this case. In doing so, we neither embrace nor reject the Colorado Supreme Court's unanimous holding "that immunity under the ATSA is a question of law to be determined by the trial court before trial." --- P.3d, at ----, 2012 WL 907764, *4; see id., at ----, 2012 WL 907764, at *11 (Eid, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing with majority). Rather, we conclude that even if a jury were to find the historical facts in the manner most favorable to Hoeper, Air Wisconsin is entitled to ATSA immunity as a matter of law. We begin with Air Wisconsin's statement that Hoeper "was an FFDO who may be armed." App. to Pet. for Cert. 111a. Hoeper cannot dispute the literal truth of this statement: He was an FFDO, and because FFDOs possess weapons, any FFDO "may be armed." Hoeper argues only that to avoid any misinterpretation, Air Wisconsin should have qualified the statement by adding that it had no reason to think he was actually carrying his gun during the trip to Virginia, especially because he was not allowed to do so under § 44921(f)(1).5 We agree that Air Wisconsin's statement could have been misinterpreted by some, but we reject Hoeper's argument for two reasons. First, any confusion of the nature that Hoeper suggests would have been immaterial: A reasonable TSA officer, having been told only that Hoeper was an FFDO and that he was upset about losing his job, would have wanted to investigate whether Hoeper was carrying his gun. Second, to accept Hoeper's demand for such precise wording would vitiate the purpose of ATSA immunity: to encourage air carriers and their employees, often in fast-moving situations and with little time to fine-tune their diction, to provide the TSA immediately with information about potential threats. Baggage handlers, flight attendants, gate agents, and other airline employees who report suspicious behavior to the TSA should not face financial ruin if, in the heat of a potential threat, they fail to choose their words with exacting care.6 We next consider Air Wisconsin's statement that Hoeper "was terminated today." App. to Pet. for Cert. 111a. When Air Wisconsin made that statement, Hoeper had not yet been fired. But everyone knew the firing was almost certainly imminent. Hoeper acknowledged that his employment was "at [Air Wisconsin's] discretion" after his third failed test, App. 193, and the agreement between him and Air Wisconsin stated that his "fourth ... attempt" to pass the test would be his "final" one, id., at 426. No reasonable TSA officer would care whether an angry, potentially armed airline employee had just been fired or merely knew he was about to meet that fate. Finally, we consider Air Wisconsin's statements that Hoeper was "[u]nstable" and that it was "concerned about his mental stability." App. to Pet. for Cert. 111a. Although the details of Hoeper's behavior during the simulator session may be disputed, Hoeper himself testified that he had become visibly angry: He decided "that's it," he removed his headset and "toss[ed] it," and he accused the instructor-at an "elevated decibel level," and with an expletive-of "railroading the situation." App. 203-204. It would surely have been correct, then, for Air Wisconsin to report that Hoeper " 'blew up' " during the test. --- P.3d, at ----, 2012 WL 907764, *8. The question is whether, from the perspective of a reasonable security officer, there is any material difference between a statement that Hoeper had just "blown up" in a professional setting and a statement that he was "[u]nstable." We think not. We are no more troubled by Air Wisconsin's related statement that it was "concerned about [Hoeper's] mental stability." Hoeper is correct that many of the Air Wisconsin officials who attended the meeting at headquarters might not have framed their concerns in terms of "mental stability." LaWare, for instance, testified that "[t]hose weren't the words that [he] would have anticipated" when he directed Doyle to call the TSA. App. 272. But the officials who attended the meeting did harbor concerns about Hoeper's mental state: They knew he had just "blown up," and they worried about what he might do next. It would be inconsistent with the ATSA's text and purpose to expose Air Wisconsin to liability because its employee could have chosen a slightly better phrase than "mental stability" to articulate its concern. Just as "[m]inor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity" in the defamation context, "so long as 'the substance, the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge be justified,' " Masson, 501 U.S., at 517, 111 S.Ct. 2419, a statement that would otherwise qualify for ATSA immunity cannot lose that immunity because of some minor imprecision, so long as "the gist" of the statement is accurate. Doyle's statements to the TSA accurately conveyed "the gist" of the situation; it is irrelevant whether trained lawyers or judges might with the luxury of time have chosen more precise words. Hoeper's overarching factual theory appears to be that members of the BAe-146 team, including Doyle and Schuerman, harbored personal animosity toward him, which caused them to manipulate the proficiency tests in order to fail him. But even if Hoeper were correct about all this (and we express no view on that question), we do not see why it would have made him any less a threat in the eyes of a reasonable security officer. As between two employees-one who thinks he is being fired because of his inadequate skills, another who thinks he is being fired because his employer hates him-the latter is presumably more, not less, likely to lash out in anger. The partial dissent argues that Doyle's reference to Hoeper's "mental stability" was so egregious as to make his report to the TSA the basis of a $1.2 million defamation judgment. We disagree. While lawyers and judges may in some contexts apply the label "mentally unstable" to people suffering from serious mental illnesses, see post, at 869 (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), that is hardly the only manner in which the label is used. A holding that Air Wisconsin lost its ATSA immunity by virtue of Doyle's failure to be aware of every connotation of the phrase "mental stability" would eviscerate the immunity provision. All of us from time to time use words that, on reflection, we might modify. If such slips of the tongue could give rise to major financial liability, no airline would contact the TSA (or permit its employees to do so) without running by its lawyers the text of its proposed disclosure-exactly the kind of hesitation that Congress aimed to avoid. The partial dissent further argues that Hoeper's "display of anger" made him no more a threat than "millions of perfectly harmless air travelers." Post, at 869. But Hoeper did not just lose his temper; he lost it in circumstances that he knew would lead to his firing, which he regarded as the culmination of a vendetta against him. And he was not just any passenger; he was an FFDO, which meant that he could plausibly have been carrying a firearm. In short, Hoeper was not some traveling businessman who yelled at a barista in a fit of pique over a badly brewed cup of coffee. Finally, the partial dissent relies on an expert's testimony "that Hoeper's behavior did not warrant any report to the TSA." Post, at 869 (citing App. 356). But the expert appears to have based that statement on an outdated understanding of reporting obligations that is flatly at odds with the ATSA. Prior to the ATSA, "airlines were responsible for assessing and investigating possible threats to airline security." --- P.3d, at ----, 2012 WL 907764, *14 (Eid, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But the ATSA shifted that responsibility to the TSA, creating a policy "known as 'when in doubt, report.' " Ibid.; see supra, at 862. The expert who believed that Hoeper's conduct did not warrant a report to the TSA also believed that airlines have "an obligation ... to filter out ... the low noise from ... what's significant" in reporting threats. App. 356. That understanding does not comport with the policy that Congress chose to enact. The Colorado Supreme Court recognized that even if the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Hoeper, Air Wisconsin "would likely be immune" had it "reported that Hoeper ... knew he would be terminated soon, that he had acted irrationally at the training three hours earlier and 'blew up' at test administrators, and that he was an FFDO pilot." --- P.3d, at ----, 2012 WL 907764, *8. But the court erred in parsing so finely the distinctions between these hypothetical statements and the ones that Air Wisconsin actually made. The minor differences are, for the reasons we have explained, immaterial as a matter of law in determining Air Wisconsin's ATSA immunity. By incorporating the actual malice standard into § 44941(b), Congress meant to give air carriers the " 'breathing space' " to report potential threats to security officials without fear of civil liability for a few inaptly chosen words. New York Times, 376 U.S., at 272, 84 S.Ct. 710. To hold Air Wisconsin liable for minor misstatements or loose wording would undermine that purpose and disregard the statutory text. * * * The judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice SCALIA, with whom Justice THOMAS and Justice KAGAN join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with the Court that under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 49 U.S.C. § 44901 et seq., an airline may not be denied immunity for a report it made to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) absent a finding that the report was materially false. I also agree that, in this context, materiality means that the falsehood had a natural tendency to influence a reasonable TSA officer's determination of an appropriate response to the report; and that neither the jury nor the courts below considered material falsity in this ATSA-specific way. I therefore join Parts I, II, and III-A of the Court's opinion. Having answered the question we granted certiorari to decide, see 570 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 2824, 186 L.Ed.2d 883 (2013), I would stop there and remand the case for further proceedings. Instead, the Court proceeds to "apply the [ATSA] material falsity standard to the facts of this case" in the first instance, ante, at 864, and concludes as a matter of law that Air Wisconsin's report to the TSA about William Hoeper was not materially false. In so holding, the Court in my view reaches out to decide a factbound question better left to the lower courts, and then proceeds to give the wrong answer. I therefore respectfully dissent from Part III-B and the disposition. We have held that under the First Amendment, a court's role is to determine whether "[a] reasonable jury could find a material difference between" the defendant's statement and the truth. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 522, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 115 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991). That makes sense, since materiality is the sort of " 'mixed question of law and fact' " that "has typically been resolved by juries." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 512, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995). The jury has a vital role to play in the materiality inquiry, which entails " 'delicate assessments of the inferences a "reasonable decisionmaker" would draw from a given set of facts and the significance of those inferences to him' " and is therefore " 'peculiarly one for the trier of fact.' " Ibid. (quoting TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450, 96 S.Ct. 2126, 48 L.Ed.2d 757 (1976); brackets omitted). Such a question cannot be withdrawn from the jury unless "the facts and the law will reasonably support only one conclusion" on which "reasonable persons ... could [not] differ." McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 356, 111 S.Ct. 807, 112 L.Ed.2d 866 (1991). The same rule applies to a determination of immunity from suit: When a defendant raises qualified immunity on summary judgment, the court must "adop [t] ... the plaintiff's version of the facts" unless "no reasonable jury could believe it." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378-380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). Therefore, if we are to apply the ATSA materiality standard to the complex record in this case in the first instance, it is proper to view "the historical facts in the manner most favorable to Hoeper," as the Court purports to do. Ante, at 864. We must of course begin by taking as given the findings that we know the jury already made, including that Air Wisconsin told the TSA that the airline was "concerned about [Hoeper's] mental stability" and that he was an "[u]nstable pilot," App. to Pet. for Cert. 111a (special verdict form), and that those statements were false, --- P.3d ----, ----, 2012 WL 907764, *10 (Colo., Mar. 19, 2012). Next, we must ask whether a reasonable jury could find the remaining historical facts to be such that those statements were not only false, but materially false from the perspective of a reasonable TSA agent. If not, judgment for Air Wisconsin is proper; but if so, the ATSA materiality question should be tried to a (properly instructed) jury. (Unless, of course, a reasonable jury would be compelled to find facts that would render the statements materially false, in which case judgment for Hoeper would be proper; but that is assuredly not the case here.) Applying that reasonable-jury standard, I do not see how we can possibly hold as a matter of law that Air Wisconsin's report was not materially false. The Court acknowledges Hoeper's description of the confrontation that spawned the airline's threat report: After failing a flight simulator test, Hoeper "decided 'that's it,' he removed his headset and 'toss[ed] it,' and he accused the instructor-at an 'elevated decibel level,' and with an expletive-of 'railroading the situation.' " Ante, at 865 (quoting App. 203-204). A jury could credit Hoeper's account. It could also believe his "overarching factual theory" that his anger was reasonable because the instructor had "manipulate[d]" the test to cause him to fail out of "personal animosity," ante, at 866-a theory that was not without supporting evidence, see, e.g., App. 259-260 (pilot testifying as expert witness that Hoeper's testing was "absolutely unfair" and "biased"). Moreover, there was evidence from which a jury could conclude that no one who interacted with Hoeper during or after the confrontation-including the instructor-viewed him as either unstable or threatening. See, e.g., id., at ---- - ---- (instructor acknowledging that he " 'quickly realized it wasn't a threatening situation' "); id., at ---- - ---- (instructor testifying he " 'never felt that [Hoeper] was going to go do something stupid,' " " 'didn't believe that Mr. Hoeper posed a threat in any way to anybody else at all,' " " 'did not believe that Mr. Hoeper was engaging in irrational behavior,' " and " 'deem[ed] him perfectly safe to get on an airplane' "); id., at 462 (airline representative who gave Hoeper permission to fly home testifying he "had no concern that [Hoeper] was a physical threat to anybody" and "didn't believe he was mentally unstable"). In short, a jury could find that Hoeper did nothing more than engage in a brief, run-of-the-mill, and arguably justified display of anger that included raising his voice and swearing, but that did not cause anyone, including the person on the receiving end of the outburst, to view him as either irrational or a potential source of violence. Viewing the facts in that light, I cannot agree with the Court that a reasonable TSA official would not "consider ... important," ante, at 864, the difference between an individual who engaged in this sort of heated but commonplace display of anger, on the one hand, and on the other, an individual whose colleagues regard him as "mentally unstable." It is the difference between a category that no doubt includes millions of perfectly harmless air travelers and one that, in ordinary parlance, connotes an alarming degree of unpredictability and aggressiveness. Indeed, we have used that term in connection with individuals so "dangerously mentally ill" that they may be subject to civil confinement. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997). The importance of that difference was highlighted by the expert testimony in this case of a former TSA Federal Security Director, who stated-based on a version of the underlying facts the jury was entitled to accept-that Hoeper's behavior did not warrant any report to the TSA. App. 356.* The association with dangerous mental illness is not, as the Court suggests, merely one "connotation of the phrase 'mental [in]stability' " among many, ante, at 866 - 867; it is the everyday understanding of that phrase. The Court says that this is "hardly the only manner in which the label is used," ibid., but it does not even attempt to describe another usage, let alone one that would be a materially accurate description of the facts of this case as a jury might find them. The Court also suggests that the circumstances of this case-particularly the fact that Hoeper knew his firing was imminent, had reason to be angry with the airline, and was authorized to carry a firearm-distinguish Hoeper's confrontation with the instructor from an ordinary "fit of pique." Ibid. But if so, it was all the more important for the airline to make an accurate report to the TSA, so that the agency could assess the possible danger and determine an appropriate response. Falsely reporting to the TSA that a young Irishman is an IRA terrorist is much more likely to produce a prompt and erroneous response than reporting that a 70-year-old English grandmother is. The circumstances the Court identifies enhanced, rather than diminished, the likelihood that the false "mentally unstable" designation would have a material effect on the TSA's response. In sum, it is simply implausible that, taking the facts of this case in the light most favorable to Hoeper, a reasonable jury would have to find that the report of mental instability would have no effect upon the course of action determined by the TSA. The Court's holding to the contrary demonstrates the wisdom of preserving the jury's role in this inquiry, designed to inject a practical sense that judges sometimes lack. I respectfully dissent from that holding. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50 L.Ed. 499. Air Wisconsin agrees that it bears responsibility for Doyle's statements. --- P.3d ----, ----, ----, n. 2, 2012 WL 907764, *2, *16, n. 2 (Colo., Mar. 19, 2012). The ATSA immunity provision specifies that "[a]ny air carrier ... or any employee of an air carrier ... who makes a voluntary disclosure of any suspicious transaction relevant to a possible violation of law or regulation, relating to air piracy, a threat to aircraft or passenger safety, or terrorism, ... to any employee or agent of the Department of Transportation, the Department of Justice, any Federal, State, or local law enforcement officer, or any airport or airline security officer shall not be civilly liable to any person under any law or regulation of the United States, any constitution, law, or regulation of any State or political subdivision of any State, for such disclosure." 49 U.S.C. § 44941(a). These are very different inquiries. Suppose the TSA receives the following tip: "My adulterous husband is carrying a gun onto a flight." Whether the husband is adulterous will presumably have no effect on the TSA's assessment of any security risk that he poses. So if the word "adulterous" is false, the caller may still be entitled to ATSA immunity. But any falsity as to that word obviously would affect the husband's reputation in the community, so it would be material in the context of a defamation claim. We "recognize the prudence ... of allowing the lower courts 'to undertake [a fact-intensive inquiry] in the first instance.' " Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 654, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010). Here, however, we conclude that another prudential consideration-the need for clear guidance on a novel but important question of federal law-weighs in favor of our applying the ATSA immunity standard. Cf. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984) ("[T]his Court's role in marking out the limits of [a First Amendment] standard through the process of case-by-case adjudication is of special importance"). See Tr. of Oral Arg. 42-43 (concession by Hoeper's counsel that "it would have been true for [Air Wisconsin] to say, look, we're calling to let you know, because Mr. Hoeper's an FFDO, we don't have any reason to believe that he has gun with him, but we can't tell for sure, so we just thought we would tell you, in case you have any questions and want to investigate further"). While we take the jury's findings at face value, we note that the record suggests Air Wisconsin may well have added the qualifier that Hoeper argues was necessary. An internal TSA e-mail summarizing Doyle's call concludes by stating: "[Redacted] does not believe [redacted] is in possession of a firearm at this time." App. 414. Hoeper also takes issue with Air Wisconsin's statement that it was "concerned about ... the whereabouts of his firearm," App. to Pet. for Cert. 111a. But his arguments concerning this statement are the same as those concerning the statement that he "may [have] been armed," ibid., and we reject them for the same reasons. The Court dismisses the former Director's testimony because he testified that in making threat reports to the TSA, airline officials should use "common sense" to "filter out the garbage and report [only] really suspicious incidents," App. 356, a view the Court deems "flatly at odds with the ATSA," ante, at 866 - 867. The ATSA, however, simply requires airlines to report "threat[s] to civil aviation," 49 U.S.C. § 44905(a). The statute surely places a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of reporting, but it certainly does not preclude the exercise of reasonable judgment in deciding what rises to the level of a "threat" and what constitutes, as the former Director put it, irrelevant "garbage." And even if one disagrees with the former Director that no report should have been made at all, the point is that a reasonable jury could have considered his testimony relevant to establishing that falsely expressing concerns about an individual's "mental stability" in the circumstances of this case would have a material effect on the TSA's decisionmaking process.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. If the case arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, note the source as "United States Supreme Court". If the case arose in a state court, note the source as "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", or "State Trial Court". Do not code the name of the state.
What is the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed?
[ "U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals", "U.S. Court of International Trade", "U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims", "U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces", "U.S. Court of Military Review", "U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals", "U.S. Customs Court", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit", "U.S. Tax Court", "Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals", "U.S. Court for China", "U.S. Consular Courts", "U.S. Commerce Court", "Territorial Supreme Court", "Territorial Appellate Court", "Territorial Trial Court", "Emergency Court of Appeals", "Supreme Court of the District of Columbia", "Bankruptcy Court", "U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)", "Alabama Middle U.S. District Court", "Alabama Northern U.S. District Court", "Alabama Southern U.S. District Court", "Alaska U.S. District Court", "Arizona U.S. District Court", "Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court", "Arkansas Western U.S. District Court", "California Central U.S. District Court", "California Eastern U.S. District Court", "California Northern U.S. District Court", "California Southern U.S. District Court", "Colorado U.S. District Court", "Connecticut U.S. District Court", "Delaware U.S. District Court", "District Of Columbia U.S. District Court", "Florida Middle U.S. District Court", "Florida Northern U.S. District Court", "Florida Southern U.S. District Court", "Georgia Middle U.S. District Court", "Georgia Northern U.S. District Court", "Georgia Southern U.S. District Court", "Guam U.S. District Court", "Hawaii U.S. District Court", "Idaho U.S. District Court", "Illinois Central U.S. District Court", "Illinois Northern U.S. District Court", "Illinois Southern U.S. District Court", "Indiana Northern U.S. District Court", "Indiana Southern U.S. District Court", "Iowa Northern U.S. District Court", "Iowa Southern U.S. District Court", "Kansas U.S. District Court", "Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court", "Kentucky Western U.S. District Court", "Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court", "Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court", "Louisiana Western U.S. District Court", "Maine U.S. District Court", "Maryland U.S. District Court", "Massachusetts U.S. District Court", "Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court", "Michigan Western U.S. District Court", "Minnesota U.S. District Court", "Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court", "Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court", "Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court", "Missouri Western U.S. District Court", "Montana U.S. District Court", "Nebraska U.S. District Court", "Nevada U.S. District Court", "New Hampshire U.S. District Court", "New Jersey U.S. District Court", "New Mexico U.S. District Court", "New York Eastern U.S. District Court", "New York Northern U.S. District Court", "New York Southern U.S. District Court", "New York Western U.S. District Court", "North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court", "North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court", "North Carolina Western U.S. District Court", "North Dakota U.S. District Court", "Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court", "Ohio Northern U.S. District Court", "Ohio Southern U.S. District Court", "Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court", "Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court", "Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court", "Oregon U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court", "Puerto Rico U.S. District Court", "Rhode Island U.S. District Court", "South Carolina U.S. District Court", "South Dakota U.S. District Court", "Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court", "Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court", "Tennessee Western U.S. District Court", "Texas Eastern U.S. District Court", "Texas Northern U.S. District Court", "Texas Southern U.S. District Court", "Texas Western U.S. District Court", "Utah U.S. District Court", "Vermont U.S. District Court", "Virgin Islands U.S. District Court", "Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court", "Virginia Western U.S. District Court", "Washington Eastern U.S. District Court", "Washington Western U.S. District Court", "West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court", "West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court", "Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court", "Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court", "Wyoming U.S. District Court", "Louisiana U.S. District Court", "Washington U.S. District Court", "West Virginia U.S. District Court", "Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court", "South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court", "South Carolina Western U.S. District Court", "Alabama U.S. District Court", "U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone", "Georgia U.S. District Court", "Illinois U.S. District Court", "Indiana U.S. District Court", "Iowa U.S. District Court", "Michigan U.S. District Court", "Mississippi U.S. District Court", "Missouri U.S. District Court", "New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)", "New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)", "New York U.S. District Court", "North Carolina U.S. District Court", "Ohio U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania U.S. District Court", "Tennessee U.S. District Court", "Texas U.S. District Court", "Virginia U.S. District Court", "Norfolk U.S. District Court", "Wisconsin U.S. District Court", "Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court", "New Jersey U.S. District Court", "California U.S. District Court", "Florida U.S. District Court", "Arkansas U.S. District Court", "District of Orleans U.S. District Court", "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", "State Trial Court", "Eastern Circuit (of the United States)", "Middle Circuit (of the United States)", "Southern Circuit (of the United States)", "Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama", "Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas", "California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California", "Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut", "Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware", "Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida", "Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia", "Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois", "Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana", "Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa", "Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas", "Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky", "Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana", "Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine", "Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland", "Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts", "Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan", "Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota", "Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi", "Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri", "Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada", "New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire", "New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey", "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York", "North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina", "Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio", "Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon", "Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania", "Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island", "South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina", "Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee", "Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas", "Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont", "Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia", "West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia", "Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin", "Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming", "Circuit Court of the District of Columbia", "Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska", "Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado", "Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington", "Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho", "Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana", "Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah", "South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota", "North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota", "Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma", "Court of Private Land Claims" ]
[ 157 ]
sc
GOLDBERG, SECRETARY OF LABOR, v. WHITAKER HOUSE COOPERATIVE, INC., et al. No. 274. Argued March 30, 1961. Decided April 24, 1961. Bessie Margolin argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were former Solicitor General Rankin, Solicitor General Cox, Harold C. Nystrom, Charles Donahue and Sylvia S. Ellison. Philip S. Bird argued the cause for respondents. With . him on the brief was Cyril M. Joly. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent- cooperative was organized in 1957 under the laws of Maine; and we assume it was legally organized. The question is whether it is an “employer” and its members are “employees” within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 3, 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 203. The question is raised by a suit filed under § 17 of the Act by petitioner to enjoin respondent from violating the provisions of the Act concerning minimum wages (§6), record-keeping (§ 11 (c)) and the regulation of industrial homework (§ 11 (d)). And see § 15 (a)(5). The District Court denied relief. 170 F. Supp. 743. The Court of Appeals affirmed by a divided vote. 275 F. 2d 362. The case is here on a petition for certiorari which we granted (364 U. S. 861) because of the importance of the problem in the administration of the Act. The corporate purpose of the respondent as stated in its articles is to manufacture, sell, and deal in “knitted, crocheted, and embroidered goods of all kinds.” It has a general manager and a few employees who engage in finishing work, i. e., trimming and packaging. There are some 200 members who work in their homes. A homeworker who desires to become a member buys from respondent a sample of the work she is supposed to do, copies the sample, and submits it to respondent. If the work is found to be satisfactory, the applicant can become a member by paying $3 and agreeing to the provisions of the articles and bylaws. Members were prohibited from furnishing others with articles of the kind dealt in by respondent. They are required to remain members at least a year. They may, however, be expelled at any time by the board of directors if they violate any rules or regulations or if their work is substandard. Members are not liable for respondent’s debts; they may not be assessed; each has one vote; their certificates are not transferrable; each member can own only one membership; no dividends or interest is payable on the certificate “except in the manner and limited amount” provided in the bylaws. The bylaws provide that “excess receipts” are to be applied (1) to writing off “preliminary expenses”; (2) to “necessary depreciation reserves”; (3) to the establishment of a “capital reserve.” The balance may be used in the discretion of the board of directors “for patronage refunds which shall be distributed according to the percentage of work submitted to the Cooperative for sale.” Members are paid every month or every other month for work submitted for. sale on a rate-per-dozen basis. This payment is considered to be “an advance allowance” until there is a distribution of “excess receipts” to the members “on the basis of the amount of goods which each member has submitted to [respondent] for sale.” By § 11 (d) of the Act the Administrator is authorized to make “such regulations and orders regulating, restricting, or prohibiting industrial homework as are necessary or appropriate to prevent the circumvention or evasion of and to safeguard the minimum wage rate prescribed in this Act.” Section 11 (d) was added in 1949 and provides that “all existing regulations or orders of the Administrator relating to industrial homework are hereby continued in full force and effect.” These Regulations provide that no industrial homework, such as respondent’s members do, shall be done “in or about a home, apartment, tenement, or room in a residential establishment unless a special homework certificate” has been issued. Respondent’s members have no such certificates; and the question for us is whether its operations are lawful without them and without compliance by respondent with the other provisions of the Act. These Regulations have a long history. In 1939, shortly after the Act was passed, bills were introduced in the House to permit homeworkers to be employed at rates lower than the statutory minimum. These amendments were rejected. Thereupon the Administrator issued regulations governing homeworkers; and we sustained some of them in Gemsco, Inc., v. Walling, 324 U. S. 244, decided in 1945. In 1949 the House adopted an amendment which would have exempted from the Act a large group of homeworkers. The Senate bill contained no such exemption; and the Conference Report rejected the exemption. Instead, § 11 (d) was added, strengthening the authority of the Administrator to restrict or prohibit homework. Still later respondent was organized ; and, as we have said, it made no attempt to comply with these homework regulations. We think we would be remiss, in light of this history, if we construed the Act loosely so as to permit this homework to be done in ways not permissible under the Regulations. By § 3 (d) of the Act an “employer” is any person acting “in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” By § 3 (e) an “employee” is one “employed” by an employer. By § 3 (g) the term employ “includes to suffer or permit to work.” We conclude that the members of this cooperative are employees within the meaning of the Act. There is no reason in logic why these members may not be employees. There is nothing inherently inconsistent between the coexistence of a proprietary and an employment relationship. If members of a trade union bought stock in their corporate employer, they would not cease to be employees within the conception of this Act. For the corporation would “suffer or permit” them to work whether or not they owned one share of stock or none or many. We fail to see why a member of a cooperative may not also be an employee of the cooperative. In this case the members seem to us to be both “members” and “employees.” It is the cooperative that is affording them “the opportunity to work, and paying them for it,” to use the words of Judge Aldrich, dissenting below. 275 F. 2d, at 366. However immediate or remote their right to “excess receipts” may be, they work in the same way as they would if they had an individual proprietor as their employer. The members are not self-employed; nor are they independent, selling their products on the market for whatever price they can command. They are regimented under one organization, manufacturing what the organization desires and receiving the compensation the organization dictates. Apart from formal differences, they are engaged in the same work they would be doing whatever the outlet for their products. The management fixes the piece rates at which they work; the management can expel them for substandard work or for failure to obey the regulations. The management, in other words, can hire or fire the homeworkers. Apart from the other considerations we have mentioned, these powers make the device of the cooperative too transparent to survive the statutory definition of “employ” and the Regulations governing homework. In short, if the “economic reality” rather than “technical concepts” is to be the test of employment (United States v. Silk, 331 U. S. 704, 713; Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U. S. 722, 729), these homeworkers are employees. Reversed. This provision of the bylaws was purportedly removed by a vote at the annual meeting of June 26, 1958, though a quorum was not present at the meeting. See Mitchell v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc., 170 F. Supp., at 749, n. 7, 8; 751. An expulsion may be appealed by filing a petition “to be acted upon by the members at the next meeting.” Cf. Me. Rev. Stat., c. 56, § 16. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, § 9, 63 Stat. 910, 916. See 29 CFR §§ 530.1-530.12. Id., § 530.2. See H. R. Rep. No. 522, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 10; 86 Cong. Rec. 4924, 5122. 86 Cong. Rec. 5499; see also the remarks of Mr. Zimmerman, id., at 5136, and of Mr. Hook, id., at 5224-5225. The Knitted Outerwear Wage Order, which covers the industry in which respondent is engaged, was issued April 4, 1942. See 7 Fed. Reg. 2592. 95 Cong. Rec. 11209-11210. H. R. Rep. No. 1453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 95 Cong. Rec. 14927. There has been no distribution of “excess receipts” to the members. The evidence is that respondent could survive “as a financially solvent enterprise only by doubling its present gross income.” As of the date of the trial, respondent was in arrears even as respects what it owed its managerial employees. See 170 F. Supp., at 751. See Mitchell v. Law, 161 F. Supp. 795. When the cooperative desired to reduce its inventory and the rate of production of its members, it withheld the “advance allowances.”
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.
Did administrative action occur in the context of the case?
[ "No", "Yes" ]
[ 0 ]
sc
SIMS v. GEORGIA. No. 678. Decided December 18, 1967. Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Anthony G. Amsterdam and Howard Moore, Jr., for petitioner. Per Curiam. This case is before us for the second time. Last Term we granted certiorari to consider five constitutional questions raised by petitioner in challenging his conviction for rape and his accompanying death sentence. 384 U. S. 998 (1966). Because we decided the case on the ground that petitioner had not received the hearing on the vol-untariness of a confession introduced against him required by our decision in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964), we did not reach the other issues argued by the parties. 385 U. S. 538 (1967). On remand the case was submitted to the judge who had presided at petitioner’s original trial on the basis of the printed record previously before this Court. On that record alone the trial judge determined that petitioner’s confession had been voluntary and denied a new trial. The trial court specifically refused to pass on any of the other questions previously briefed and argued here, holding that the prior rulings on these issues by the Georgia Supreme Court constituted the law of the case. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, upholding the trial court on all points. In his present application petitioner raises again two of the four issues not reached in our previous decision in this case: the voluntariness of his confession and the composition of the juries by which he was indicted and tried. In response to the State’s previous argument that “there was no evidence to make any issue of voluntariness” and therefore there was no need to apply Jackson v. Denno, Mr. Justice Clark stated: “We cannot agree. There was a definite, clear-cut issue here. Petitioner testified that Doctor Jackson physically abused him while he was in his office and that he was suffering from that abuse when he made the statement, thereby rendering such confession involuntary and the result of coercion. The doctor admitted that he saw petitioner on the floor of his office; that he helped him disrobe and that he knew that petitioner required hospital treatment because of the laceration over his eye but he denied that petitioner was actually abused in his presence. He was unable to state, however, that the state patrolmen did not commit the alleged offenses against petitioner’s person because he was not in the room during the entire time in which the petitioner and the patrolmen were there. In fact, the doctor was quite evasive in his testimony and none of the officers present during the incident were produced as witnesses. Petitioner’s claim of mistreatment, therefore, went uncontradicted as to the officers and was in conflict with the testimony of the physician.” 385 U. S., at 543. Thus in remanding the case for a hearing on volun-tariness we indicated to the State that as the evidence then stood it had failed adequately to rebut petitioner’s testimony that he had been subjected to physical violence prior to his confession. The State had every opportunity to offer the police officers, whose failure to testify had already been commented upon here, to contradict petitioner’s version of the events. Its failure to do so when given a second chance lends support to the conclusion that their testimony would not, in fact, have rebutted petitioner’s. It needs no extended citation of cases to show that a confession produced by violence or threats of violence is involuntary and cannot constitutionally be used against the person giving it. Beecher v. Alabama, ante, p. 35. The reliance by the State on subsequent warnings made to petitioner prior to his confessing is misplaced. Petitioner had been in the continuous custody of the police for over eight hours and had not been fed at all during that time. He had not been given access to family, friends, or counsel at any point. He is an illiterate, with only a third grade education, whose mental capacity is decidedly limited. Under such circumstances the fact that the police may have warned petitioner of his right not to speak is of little significance. See Beecher v. Alabama, supra, at 37, n. 4. Compare Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U. S. 191 (1957). Petitioner also contends that he was indicted and tried by juries from which members of his race had been unconstitutionally excluded. The facts reveal that the grand and petit jury lists were drawn from the county tax digests which separately listed taxpayers by race in conformity with then existing Georgia law. Negroes constituted 24.4% of the individual taxpayers in the county. However, they amounted to only 4.7% of the names on the grand jury list and 9.8% of the names on the traverse jury list from which petitioner’s grand and petit juries were selected. The State’s only response to that showing was to call one of the jury commissioners as a witness; the jury commissioner testified that he or one of the other commissioners knew personally every qualified person in the county and did not discriminate in selecting names for the jury lists. The facts in this case make it virtually indistinguishable from Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545 (1967). Accordingly, it is clear that the juries by which petitioner was indicted and tried were selected in a manner that does not comport with constitutional requirements. See also Jones v. Georgia, ante, p. 24. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The State has not filed a response. While ordinarily we would call for a response before deciding a case summarily, the exact issues presented now were briefed and argued fully by the State and petitioner last Term. Since the proceedings below on remand consisted -olely of a reconsideration of the printed record previously before us, we see no need for another presentation of the arguments already presented to us by the State.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the treatment the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed, that is, whether the court below the Supreme Court (typically a federal court of appeals or a state supreme court) affirmed, reversed, remanded, denied or dismissed the decision of the court it reviewed (typically a trial court). Adhere to the language used in the "holding" in the summary of the case on the title page or prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. Exceptions to the literal language are the following: where the Court overrules the lower court, treat this a petition or motion granted; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing refuses to enforce or enjoins the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as reversed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing enforces the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as affirmed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing sets aside the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as vacated; if the decision is set aside and remanded, treat it as vacated and remanded.
What treatment did the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed?
[ "stay, petition, or motion granted", "affirmed", "reversed", "reversed and remanded", "vacated and remanded", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded", "vacated", "petition denied or appeal dismissed", "modify", "remand", "unusual disposition" ]
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GORDON v. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., et al. No. 74-304. Argued March 25-26, 1975 — Decided June 26, 1975 I. Walton Bader argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Maximilian Bader. William Eldred Jackson argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Isaac Shapiro, Mark L. Davidson, John J. Loflin, Jr., and James Brendan May. Howard E. Shapiro argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork and Assistant Attorney General Kauper. Lawrence E. Nerheim argued the cause for the Securities and Exchange Commission as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Walter P. North and Frederic T. Spindel. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the problem of reconciliation of the antitrust laws with a federal regulatory scheme in the particular context of the practice of the securities exchanges and their members of using fixed rates of commission. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that fixed commission rates were immunized from antitrust attack because of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s authority to approve or disapprove exchange commission rates and its exercise of that power. I In early 1971 petitioner Richard A. Gordon, individually and on behalf of an asserted class of small investors, filed this suit against the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange, Inc. (Amex), and two member firms of the Exchanges. The complaint challenged a variety of exchange rules and practices and, in particular, claimed that the system of fixed commission rates, utilized by the Exchanges at that time for transactions less than $500,000, violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1 and 2. Other challenges in the complaint focused on (1) the volume discount on trades of over 1,000 shares, and the presence of negotiated rather than fixed rates for transactions in excess of $500,000; (2) the rules limiting the number of exchange memberships; and (3) the rules denying discounted commission rates to nonmembers using exchange facilities. Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground that the challenged actions were subject to the overriding supervision of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under § 19 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 898, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 78s (b), and, therefore, were not subject to the strictures of the antitrust laws. The District Court granted respondents’ motion as to all claims. 366 F. Supp. 1261 (1973). Dismissing the exchange membership limitation and the Robinson-Patman Act contentions as without merit, the court focused on the relationship between the fixed commission rates and the Sherman Act mandates. It utilized the framework for analysis of antitrust immunity in the regulated securities area that was established a decade ago in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U. S. 341 (1963). Since § 19 (b) (9) of the Exchange Act authorized the SEC to supervise the Exchanges “in respect of such matters as . . . the fixing of reasonable rates of commission,” the court held applicable the antitrust immunity reserved in Silver for those cases where “review of exchange self-regulation [is] provided through a vehicle other than the antitrust laws.” 373 U. S., at 360. It further noted that the practice of fixed commission rates had continued without substantial challenge after the enactment of the 1934 Act, and that the SEC had been engaged in detailed study of the rate structure for a decade, culminating in the requirement for abolition of fixed rates as of May 1, 1975. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed. 498 F. 2d 1303 (1974). Characterizing petitioner’s other challenges as frivolous, the appellate court devoted its opinion to the problem.of antitrust immunity. It, too, used Silver as a basis for its analysis. Because the SEC, by § 19 (b)(9), was given specific review power over the fixing of commission rates, because of the language, legislative history, and policy of the Exchange Act, and because of the SEC’s actual exercise of its supervisory power, the Court of Appeals determined that this case differed from Silver, and that antitrust immunity was proper. By his petition for certiorari, petitioner sought review only of the determination that fixed commission rates are beyond the reach of the antitrust laws. Because of the vital importance of the question, and at the urging of all the parties, we granted certiorari. 419 U. S. 1018 (1974). II Resolution of the issue of antitrust immunity for fixed commission rates may be made adequately only upon a thorough investigation of the practice in the light of statutory restrictions and decided cases. We begin with a brief review of the history of commission rates in the securities industry. Commission rates for transactions on the stock exchanges have been set by agreement since the establishment of the first exchange in this country. The New York Stock Exchange was formed with the Buttonwood Tree Agreement of 1792, and from the beginning minimum fees were set and observed by the members. That Agreement itself stated: “ We the Subscribers, Brokers for the Purchase and Sale of Public Stock, do hereby solemnly promise and pledge ourselves to each other, that we will not buy or sell from this day for any person whatsoever, any kind of Public Stock at a less rate than one-quarter per cent. Commission on the Specie value, and that we will give a preference to each other in our Negotiations.’ ” F. Eames, The New York Stock Exchange 14 (1968 ed). See generally, R. Doede, The Monopoly Power of the New York Stock Exchange, reprinted in Hearings on S. 3169 before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 405,412--127 (1972). Successive constitutions of the NYSE have carried forward this basic provision. Similarly, when Amex emerged in 1908-1910, a pattern of fixed commission rates was adopted there. These fixed rate policies were not unnoticed by responsible congressional bodies. For example, the House Committee on Banking and Currency, in a general review of the stock exchanges undertaken in 1913, reported that the fixed commission rate rules were “rigidly enforced” in order “to prevent competition amongst the members.” H. R. Rep. No. 1593, 62d Cong., 3d Sess., 39 (1913). The report, known as the Pujo Report, did not recommend any change in this policy, for the Committee believed “the present rates to be reasonable, except as to stocks,' say, of $25 or less in value, and that the exchange should be protected in this respect by the law under which it shall be incorporated against a kind of competition between members that would lower the service and threaten the responsibility of members. A very low or competitive commission rate would also promote speculation and destroy the value of membership.” Id., at 115-116. Despite the monopoly power of the few exchanges, exhibited not only in the area of commission rates but in a wide variety of other aspects, the exchanges remained essentially self-regulating and without significant supervision until the adoption of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 78a et seq. At the lengthy hearings before adoption of that Act, some attention was given to the fixed commission rate practice and to its anticompetitive features. See Hearings on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.) and S. Res. 56 and 97 (73d Cong.) before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., pts. 13, 15, and 16, pp. 6075, 6080, 6868, and 7705 (1934) (hereafter Senate Hearings). See also Hearings on S. Res. 84 before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 85 (1932); Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 320-321, 423 (1934). Perhaps the most pertinent testimony in the hearings preparatory to enactment of the Exchange Act was proffered by Samuel Untermyer, formerly chief counsel to the committee that drafted the Pujo Report. In commenting on proposed S. 2693, Mr. Untermyer noted that although the bill would provide the federal supervisory commission with “the right to prescribe uniform rates of commission, it does not otherwise authorize the Commission to fix rates, which it seems to me it should do and would do by striking out the word 'uniform.' That would permit the Commission to fix rates. "The volume of the business transacted on the exchange has increased manyfold. Great fortunes have been made by brokers through this monopoly. The public has no access to the exchange by way of membership except by buying a seat and paying a very large sum for it. Therefore it is a monopoly. Probably it has to be something of a monopoly. But after all it is essentially a public institution. It is the greatest financial agency in the world, and should be not only controlled by the public but it seems to me its membership and the commissions charged should either be fixed by some governmental authority or be supervised by such authority. As matters now stand, the exchange can charge all that the traffic will bear, and that is a burden upon commerce.” Senate Hearings 7705. As finally enacted, the Exchange Act apparently reflected the Untermyer suggestion, for it gave the SEC the power to fix and insure “reasonable” rates. Section 19 (b) provided: "(b) The Commission is further authorized, if after making appropriate request in writing to a national securities exchange that such exchange effect on its own behalf specified changes in its rules and practices, and after appropriate notice and opportunity for hearing, the Commission determines that such exchange has not made the changes so requested, and that such changes are necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors or to insure fair dealing in securities traded in upon such exchange or to insure fair administration of such exchange, by rules or regulations or by order to alter or supplement the rules of such exchange (insofar as necessary or appropriate to effect such changes) in respect of such matters as . . . (9) the fixing of reasonable rafes of commission, interest, listing, and other charges.” (Emphasis added.) This provision conformed to the Act’s general policy of self-regulation by the exchanges coupled with oversight by the SEC. It is to be noted that the ninth category is one of 12 specifically enumerated. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U. S. 117, 127-128 (1973), we observed: “Two types of regulation are reflected in the Act. Some provisions impose direct requirements and prohibitions. Among these are mandatory exchange registration, restrictions on broker and dealer borrowing, and the prohibition of manipulative or deceptive practices. Other provisions are flexible and rely on the technique of self-regulation to achieve their objectives. '. . . Supervised self-regulation, although consonant with the traditional private governance of exchanges, allows the Government to monitor exchange business in the public interest.” The congressional reports confirm that while the development of rules for the governing of exchanges, as enumerated in § 19 (b), was left to the exchanges themselves in the first instance, the SEC could compel adoption of those changes it felt were necessary to insure fair dealing and protection of the public. See H. R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 15 (1934); S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (1934). The latter report, id., at 15, noted that registered exchanges were required to provide the SEC with “complete information” regarding its rules. Ill With this legislative history in mind, we turn to the actual post-1934 experience of commission rates on the NYSE and Amex. After these two Exchanges had registered in 1934 under § 6 of the Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78f, both proceeded to prescribe minimum commission rates just as they had prior to the Act. App. A42, A216. These rates were changed periodically by the Exchanges, after their submission to the SEC pursuant to §6 (a)(4), 15 TJ. S. C. § 78f (a)(4), and SEC Rule 17a-8, 17 CPR § 240.17a-8. Although several rate changes appear to have been effectuated without comment by the SEC, in other instances the SEC thoroughly exercised its supervisory powers. Thus, for example, as early as 1958 a study of the NYSE commission rates to determine whether the rates were “reasonable and in accordance with the standards contemplated by applicable provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,” was announced by the SEC. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 5678, Apr. 14, 1958, App. A240. This study resulted in an agreement by the NYSE to reduce commission rates in certain transactions, to engage in further study of the rate structure by the NYSE in collaboration with the SEC, and to provide the SEC with greater advance notice of proposed rate changes. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 5889, Feb. 20, 1959, App. A247. The SEC specifically stated that it had undertaken the study “in view of the responsibilities and duties imposed upon the Commission by Section 19 (b) . . . with respect to the rules of national securities exchanges, including rules relating to the fixing of commission rates.” Ibid. Under subsection (d) of § 19 of the Act (which subsection was added in 1961, 75 Stat. 465), the SEC was directed to investigate the adequacy of exchange rules for the protection of investors. Accordingly, the SEC began a detailed study of exchange rules in that year. In 1963 it released its conclusions in a six-volume study. SEC Report of Special Study of Securities Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. The study, among other things, focused on problems of the structure of commission rates and procedures, and standards for setting and reviewing rate levels. Id., pt. 5, p. 102. The SEC found that the rigid commission rate structure based on value of the round lot was causing a variety of “questionable consequences,” such as “give-ups” and the providing of special services for certain large, usually institutional, customers. These attempts indirectly to achieve rate alterations made more difficult the administration of the rate structure and clouded the cost data used as the basis for determination of rates. These effects were believed by the SEC to necessitate a complete study of the structure. Moreover, the SEC concluded that methods for determining the reasonableness of rates were in need of overhaul. Not only was there a need for more complete information about the economics of the securities business and commission rates in particular, but also for a determination and articulation of the criteria important in arriving at a reasonable rate structure. Hence, while the study did not produce any major immediate changes in commission rate structure or levels, it did constitute a careful articulation of the problems in the structure and of the need for further studies that would be essential as a basis for future changes. Meanwhile, the NYSE began an investigation of its own into the particular aspect of volume discounts from the fixed commission rates. App. A219-A220. This study determined that a volume discount and various other changes were needed, and so recommended to the SEC. The Commission responded in basic agreement. Letter dated Dec. 22, 1965, from SEC Chairman Cohen to NYSE President Funston, App. A249. The NYSE study continued over the next few years and final conclusions were presented to the SEC in early 1968. Id., at A253. In 1968, the SEC, while continuing the study started earlier in the decade, began to submit a series of specific proposals for change and to require their implementation by the exchanges. Through its Exchange Act Release No. 8324, May 28, 1968, App. A286, the SEC requested the NYSE to revise its commission rate schedule, including a reduction of rates for orders for round lots in excess of 400 shares or, alternatively, the elimination of minimum rate requirements for orders in excess of $50,-000. These changes were viewed by the SEC as interim measures, pending further consideration “in the context of the Commission's responsibilities to consider the national policies embodied both in the securities laws and in the antitrust laws.” Letter dated May 28, 1968, from SEC Chairman Cohen to NYSE President Haack, App. A285. In response to these communications, the NYSE (and Amex) eventually adopted a volume discount for orders exceeding 1,000 shares, as well as other alterations in rates, all approved by the SEC. See, e. g., letter dated Aug. 30, 1968, from Chairman Cohen to President Haack, App. A310; memorandum dated Sept. 20, 1968, Amex Subcommittee on Commission Structure, App. A104. Members of the securities exchanges faced substantial declines in profits in the late 1960's and early 1970. These were attributed by the NYSE to be due, at least in part, to the fact that general commission rates had not been increased since 1958. Statement of Feb. 13, 1970, by President Haack to the SEC, App. A313. The NYSE determined that a service charge of at least the lesser of $15 or 50% of the required minimum commission on orders of fewer than 1,000 shares should be imposed as an interim measure to restore financial health by bringing rates in line with costs. NYSE Proposed Rule 383, App. A331. See also letter dated Mar. 19, 1970, from President Haack to members of the NYSE, App. A327. This proposal, submitted to the SEC pursuant to its Rule 17a-8, was permitted by the SEC to be placed into operation on a 90-day interim basis. Letter dated Apr. 2, 1970, from SEC Chairman Budge to President Haack, App. A333. Continuation of the interim measure was thereafter permitted pending further rate structure hearings undertaken by the SEC. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8923, July 2, 1970, App. A336. The interim rates remained in effect until the rate structure change in March 1972. In 1971 the SEC concluded its hearings begun in 1968. Finding that “minimum commissions on institutional size orders are neither necessary nor appropriate,” the SEC announced that it would not object to competitive rates on portions of orders above a stated level. Letter dated Feb. 3, 1971, from SEC Commissioner Smith to President Haack, App. A353. See also SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9007, Oct. 22, 1970, App. A348. Although at first supporting a $100,000 order as the cutoff below which fixed rates would be allowed, ibid., the SEC later decided to permit use of $500,000 as the breakpoint. After a year’s use of this figure, the SEC required the exchanges to reduce the cutoff point to $300,000 in April 1972. Statement of the SEC on the Future Structure of the Securities Markets, Feb. 2, 1972, App. A369, A387, A388 (Policy Study). The 1972 Policy Study emphasized the problems of the securities markets, and attributed as a major cause of those problems the prevailing commission rate structure. The Policy Study noted: “Our concern with the fixed minimum commission ... is not only with the level of the rate structure but with its side effects as well. Of these, perhaps the most important are the following: “(a) Dispersion of trading in listed securities. “(b) Reciprocal practices of various kinds. “(c) Increasing pressure for exchange membership by institutions.” Id., at A385. Since commission rates had been fixed for a long period of time, however, and since it was possible that revenue would decline if hasty changes were made, the SEC believed that there should be no rush to impose competitive rates. Rather, the effect of switching to competition should be gauged on a step-by-step basis, and changes should be made “at a measured, deliberate pace.” Id., at A387. The result of the introduction of competitive rates for orders exceeding $500,000 was found to be a substantial reduction in commissions, with the rate depending on the size of the order. In view of this result, the SEC determined to institute competition in the $300,000-$500,000 range as well. Further reduction followed relatively quickly. By March 29,1973, the SEC was considering requiring the reduction of the breakpoint on competitive rates to orders in excess of $100,000. SEC Policy Statement on the Structure of a Central Market System 3. In June, the SEC began hearings on the rate schedules, stimulated in part by a request by the NYSE to permit an increase of 15% of the current rate on all orders from $5,000 to $300,-000, and to permit a minimum commission on small orders (below $5,000) as well. SEC .Exchange Act Release No. 10206, June 6, 1973, Documentary Appendix to Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae 24 (Doc. App.). Three months later, after completion of the hearings, the SEC determined that it would allow the increases. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 10383, Sept. 11, 1973, Doc. App. 27. The SEC also announced, however, that “[i]t will act promptly to terminate the fixing of commission rates by stock exchanges after April 30, 1975, if the stock exchanges do not adopt rule changes achieving that result.” Id., at 28. Elaboration of the SEC’s rationale for this phasing out of fixed commission rates was soon forthcoming. In December 1973, SEC Chairman Garrett noted that the temporary increase in fixed rates (through April 1975) was permitted because of the inflation in the cost of operating the exchanges, the decline in the volume of transactions on the exchanges, and the consequently severe financial losses for the members. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 10560, Dec. 14, 1973, Doc. App. 29. Indeed, without the rate increase, “the continued deterioration in the capital positions of many member firms was foreseeable, with significant capital impairment and indirect, but consequential, harm to investors the likely result.” Id., at 36. The rate increase also would forestall the possibility that the industry would be impaired during transition to competitive rates and other requirements. This view conformed to the suggestion of Senator Williams, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. See statement dated July 27, 1973, of Senator Williams submitted to the SEC, cited in Exchange Act Release No. 10560 n. 12, Doc. App. 37. Although not purporting to elucidate fully its reasons for abolishing fixed rates, the SEC did suggest several considerations basic to its decision: the heterogeneous nature of the brokerage industry; the desirability of insuring trading on, rather than off, the exchanges; doubt that small investors are subsidized by large institutional investors under the fixed rate system; and doubt that small firms would be forced out of business if competitive rates were required. In response to a request by the NYSE, the SEC permitted amendment to allow competitive rates on nonmember orders below $2,000. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 10670, Mar. 7, 1974, Doc. App. 42. Hearings on intramember commission rates were announced in April 1974. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 10751, Apr. 23, 1974, Doc. App. 45. The SEC concluded that intramember rates should not be fixed beyond April 30, 1975. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11019, Sept. 19, 1974, Doc. App. 60. At this time the SEC stated: “[I]t presently appears to the Commission that it is necessary and appropriate (1) for the protection of investors, (2) to insure fair dealing in securities traded in upon national securities exchanges, and (3) to insure the fair administration of such exchanges, that the rules and practices of such exchanges that require, or have the effect of requiring, exchange members to charge any person fixed minimum rates of commission, should be eliminated.” Id., at 63. The SEC formally requested the exchanges to make the appropriate changes in their rules. When negative responses were received from the NYSE and others, the SEC released for public comment proposed Securities Exchange Act Rules 19b-3 and 10b-22. Proposed Rule 19b-3, applicable to intramember and nonmember rates effective May 1, 1975, would prohibit the exchanges from using or compelling their members to use fixed rates of commission. It also would require the exchanges to provide explicitly in their rules that nothing therein require or permit arrangements or agreements to fix rates. Proposed Rule 1 Ob-22 would prohibit agreements with respect to the fixing of commission rates by brokers, dealers, or members of the exchanges. See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11073, Oct. 24, 1974, Doc. App. 65. Upon the conclusion of hearings on the proposed rules, the SEC determined to adopt Rule 19b-3, but not Rule 10b-22. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11203, Jan. 23, 1975, Doc. App. 109. Effective May 1, 1975, competitive rates were to be utilized by exchange members in transactions of all sizes for persons other than members of the exchanges. Effective May 1, 1976, competitive rates were to be mandatory in transactions for members as well, i. e., floor brokerage rates. Competition in floor brokerage rates was so deferred until 1976 in order to permit an orderly transition. The required transition to competitive rates was based on the SEC’s conclusion that competition, rather than fixed rates, would be in the best interests of the securities industry and markets, as well as in the best interests of the investing public and the national economy. Ibid. This determination was not based on a simplistic notion in favor of competition, but rather on demonstrated deficiencies of the fixed commission rate structure. Specifically mentioned by the SEC were factors such as the rigidity and delay inherent in the fixed rate system, the potential for distortion, evasion, and conflicts of interest, and fragmentation of markets caused by the fixed rate system. Acknowledging that the fixed rate system perhaps was not all bad in all periods of its use, the SEC explicitly declined to commit itself to permanent abolition of fixed rates in all cases: in the future circumstances might arise that would indicate that reinstitution of fixed rates in certain areas would be appropriate. The SEC dismissed the arguments against competitive rates that had been raised by various proponents of the status quo. First, the SEC deemed the possibility of destructive competition to be slim, because of the nature of the cost curve in the industry. Second, there was substantial doubt whether maintenance of fixed rates, in fact, provided various subsidies that would be beneficial to the operation of the securities markets. For example, it was unlikely that small investors reaped a subsidy from higher rates charged larger investors, because of separation of the business between large and small investors. Nor did the SEC believe that regional brokers were substantially benefited by maintenance of fixed rates. Third, the possibility of an exodus from membership on the exchanges was unlikely, and should be dealt with only as it occurred. In any event, inasmuch as the SEC anticipated that there would be detailed studies of the operation of the competitive rates effectuated by its orders, any problems that arose could be effectively resolved upon further consideration. During this period of concentrated study and action by the SEC, lasting more than a decade, various congressional committees undertook their own consideration of the matter of commission rates. Early in 1972, the Senate Subcommittee on Securities concluded that fixed commission rates must be eliminated on institution-size transactions, and that lower fees should be permitted for small transactions with “unbundled” services than for those having the full range of brokerage services. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., Securities Industry Study (For the Period Ended Feb. 4, 1972), 4 (1972) (containing a report of the Subcommittee on Securities). The Subcommittee objected particularly to the failure of the fixed rate system to produce “fair and economic” rates, id., at 59, and to distortion in the rate structure in favor of the institutionally oriented firms. The Subcommittee was perturbed at the SEC’s actions regarding fixed commission rates for several reasons. First, the Subcommittee noted that in litigation the SEC had taken the position that it had not approved NYSE rate changes in 1971, but had merely failed to object to the introduction of the new rates, id., at 58, referring to the SEC position in Independent Investor Protective League v. SEC (SDNY No. 71-1924), dismissed without opinion (CA2 1971). This posture precluded review of the SEC action in the Court of Appeals. Second, the Subcommittee was displeased with the length of time the SEC took in arriving at its decisions regarding commission rate structure and level. Third, the Subcommittee feared that statements of the SEC lacked clarity and perpetuated uncertainty as to the status of fixed rates on transactions exceeding $100,000. Therefore, the Subcommittee report stressed: “[I]t is essential that fixed commission rates be phased out in an orderly and systematic manner, and that a date certain be set promptly for elimination of fixed commissions on institutional-size transactions, which have resulted in the most serious distortions. Based on the SEC’s conclusions and on testimony submitted to the SEC and to this Subcommittee, this could best be achieved by eliminating fixed rates on orders in excess of $100,000.” Securities Industry Study, supra, at 60. The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, in a report issued only six months after the Senate Report, supra, concluded that fixed rates of commission were not in the public interest and should be replaced by competitively determined rates for transactions of all sizes. Such action should occur “without excessive delay.” H. R. Rep. No. 92-1519, pp. xiv, 141, 144^145, 146 (1972). Although prodding the SEC to take quick measures to introduce competitive rates for transactions of all sizes, the House Committee determined to defer enacting legislation so long as reasonable progress was being made. These conclusions resulted from a detailed study, by the Subcommittee, of asserted costs and benefits of competitive versus fixed rates, and reflected information gained through lengthy hearings. Id., at 131-146, and related Study of the Securities Industry, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., serials 92-37 to 92-37h (1971-1972). Similarly, after lengthy analysis, the Senate Subcommittee on Securities concluded both that competitive rates must be introduced at all transaction levels, and that legislation was not required at that time in view of the progress made by the SEC. Securities Industry Study Report of the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, S. Doc. No. 93-13, pp. 5-7, 43-63 (1973), and Hearings on S. 3169 before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). In 1975 both Houses of Congress did in fact enact legislation dealing directly with commission rates. Although the bills initially passed by each chamber differed somewhat, the Conference Committee compromised the differences. Compare H. R. 4111, § 6 (p), as discussed in H. R. Rep. No. 94-123, pp. 51-53, 67-68 (1975), with S. 249, § 6 (e), as discussed in S. Rep. No. 94^75, pp. 71-72, 98 (1975). The measure, as so compromised, was signed by the President on June 4, 1975, 89 Stat. 97. The new legislation amends § 19 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act to substitute for the heretofore existing provision a scheme for SEC review of proposed rules and rule changes of the various self-regulatory organizations. Reference to commission rates is now found in the newly amended § 6 (e), generally providing that after the date of enactment “no national securities exchange may impose any schedule or fix rates of commissions, allowances, discounts, or other fees to be charged by its members.” 89 Stat. 107. An exception is made for floor brokerage rates which may be fixed by the exchanges until May 1, 1976. Further exceptions from the ban against fixed commissions are provided if approved by the SEC after certain findings: prior to and including November 1, 1976, the Commission may allow the exchanges to fix commissions if it finds this to be “in the public .interest,” 16(e)(1)(A); after November 1, 1976, the exchanges may be permitted by the SEC to fix rates of commission if the SEC finds (1) the rates are reasonable in relation to costs of service (to be determined pursuant to standards of reasonableness published by the SEC), and (2) if the rates “do not impose any burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of this title, taking into consideration the competitive effects of permitting such schedule or fixed rates weighed against the competitive effects of other lawful actions which the Commission is authorized to take under this title.” § 6 (e) (1) (B) (ii). The statute specifically provides that even if the SEC does permit the fixing of rates pursuant to one of these exceptions, the SEC by rule may abrogate such practice if it finds that the fixed rates “are no longer reasonable, in the public interest, or necessary to accomplish the purposes of this title.” § 6 (e)(2). The new section also provides a detailed procedure which the SEC must follow in arriving at its decision to permit fixed commission rates. §6 (e)(4). This procedure was described in the Conference Report as “comparable to that provided for in Section 18 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U. S. C. [§] 58, which is more formal than normal notice and comment rulemaking under Section 553 of title 5 U. S. C. but less formal than ‘on the record' procedure under Section [s] 556 and 557 of title 5 U. S. C." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-229, p. 108 (1975). Finally, the amendments require the SEC to file regularly until December 31, 1976, with both branches of Congress, reports concerning the effect of competitive rates on the public interest, investors, and the securities markets. § 6 (e)(3). As of May 1, 1975, pursuant to order of the SEC,, fixed commission rates were eliminated and competitive rates effectuated. Although it is still too soon to determine the total effect of this alteration, there have been no reports of disastrous effects for the public, investors, the industry, or the markets. This lengthy history can be summarized briefly: In enacting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Congress gave clear authority to the SEC to supervise exchange self-regulation with respect to the “fixing of reasonable rates of commission.” Upon SEC determination that exchange rules or practices regarding commission rates required change in order to protect investors or to insure fair dealing, the SEC was authorized to require adoption of such changes as were deemed necessary or appropriate. This legislative permission for the fixing of commission rates under the supervision of the SEC occurred seven years after this Court’s decision in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392 (1927), to the effect that price fixing was a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Since the Exchange Act’s adoption, and primarily in the last 15 years, the SEC has been engaged in thorough review of exchange commission rate practices. The committees of the Congress, while recently expressing some dissatisfaction with the progress of the SEC in implementing competitive rates, have generally been content to allow the SEC to proceed without new legislation. As of May 1, 1975, the SEC, by order, has abolished fixed rates. And new legislation, enacted into law June 5, 1975, codifies this result, although still permitting the SEC some discretion to reimpose fixed rates if warranted. IV This Court has considered the issue of implied repeal of the antitrust laws in the context of a variety of regulatory schemes and procedures. Certain axioms of construction are now clearly established. Repeal of the antitrust laws by implication is not favored and not casually to be allowed. Only where there is a “plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions” will repeal be implied. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 350-351 (1963). See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U. S., at 126; Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U. S. 363, 385-389 (1973); Carnation Co. v. Pacific Conference, 383 U. S. 213, 217-218 (1966); Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U. S., at 357-358; United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 198-199 (1939). See United States v. National Assn. of Securities Dealers, post, at 719-720, 729-730. The starting point for our consideration of the particular issue presented by this case, viz., whether the antitrust laws are impliedly repealed or replaced as a result of the statutory provisions and administrative and congressional experience concerning fixed commission rates, of course, is our decision in Silver. There the Court considered the relationship between the antitrust laws and the Securities Exchange Act, and did so specifically with respect to the action of an exchange in ordering its members to remove private direct telephone connections with the offices of nonmembers. Such action, absent any immunity derived from the regulatory laws, would be a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. 373 U. S., at 347. Concluding that the proper approach to the problem was to reconcile the operation of the antitrust laws with a regulatory scheme, the Court established a “guiding principle” for the achievement of this reconciliation. Under this principle, “[rjepeal is to be regarded as implied only if necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and even then only to the minimum extent necessary.” Id., at 357. In Silver, the Court concluded that there was no implied repeal of the antitrust laws in that factual context because the Exchange Act did not provide for SEC jurisdiction or review of particular applications of rules enacted by the exchanges. It noted: “Although the Act gives to the Securities and Exchange Commission the power to request exchanges to make changes in their rules, § 19 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 78s (b), and impliedly, therefore, to disapprove any rules adopted by an exchange, see also § 6 (a) (4), 15 U. S. C. § 78f (a) (4), it does not give the Commission jurisdiction to review particular instances of enforcement of exchange rules.” Ibid. At the time Silver was decided, both the rules and constitution of the NYSE provided that the Exchange could require discontinuance of wire service between the office of a member and a nonmember at any time. There was no provision for notice or statement of reasons. While these rules were permissible under the general power of the exchanges to adopt rules regulating relationships between members and nonmembers, and the SEC could disapprove the rules, the SEC could not forbid or regulate any particular application of the rules. Hence, the regulatory agency could not prevent application of the rules that would have undesirable anticompetitive effects; there was no governmental oversight of the exchange’s self-regulatory action, and no method of insuring that some attention at least was given to the public interest in competition. The Court, therefore, concluded that the absence in Silver of regulatory supervision over the application of the exchange rules prevented any conflict arising between the regulatory scheme and the antitrust laws. See also Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U. S. 439, 455-457 (1945), where the Court found no conflict because the regulatory agency (the Interstate Commerce Commission) had no jurisdiction over the rate-fixing combination involved. The Court in Silver cautioned, however, that “[sjhould review of exchange self-regulation be provided through a vehicle other than the antitrust laws, a different case as to antitrust exemption would be presented.” 373 U. S., at 360. It amplified this statement in a footnote: “Were there Commission jurisdiction and ensuing judicial review for scrutiny of a particular exchange ruling ... a different case would arise concerning exemption from the operation of laws designed to prevent anticompetitive activity, an issue we do not decide today.” Id., at 358 n. 12. It is patent that the case presently at bar is, indeed, that “different case” to which the Court in Silver referred. In contrast to the circumstances of Silver, § 19 (b) gave the SEC direct regulatory power over exchange rules and practices with respect to “the fixing of reasonable rates of commission.” Not only was the SEC authorized to disapprove rules and practices concerning commission rates, but the agency also was permitted to require alteration or supplementation of the rules and practices when “necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors or to insure fair dealings in securities traded in upon such exchange.” Since 1934 all rate changes have been brought to the attention of the SEC, and it has taken an active role in review of proposed rate changes during the last 15 years. Thus, rather than presenting a case of SEC impotence to affect application of exchange rules in particular circumstances, this case involves explicit statutory authorization for SEC review of all exchange rules and practices dealing with rates of commission and resultant SEC continuing activity. Having determined that this case is, in fact, the “different case,” we must then make inquiry as to the proper reconciliation of the regulatory and antitrust statutes involved here, keeping in mind the principle that repeal of the antitrust laws will be “implied only if necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and even then only to the minimum extent necessary.” 373 U. S., at 357. We hold that these requirements for implied repeal are clearly satisfied here. To permit operation of the antitrust laws with respect to commission rates, as urged by petitioner Gordon and the United States as amicus curiae, would unduly interfere, in our view, with the operation of the Securities Exchange Act. As a threshold matter, we believe that the determination of whether implied repeal of the antitrust laws is necessary to make the Exchange Act provisions work is a matter for the courts, and in particular, for the courts in which the antitrust claims are raised. Silver exemplifies this responsibility. In some cases, however, the courts may defer to the regulatory agency involved, in order to take advantage of its special expertise. The decision in the end, however, is for the courts. Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U. S. 289, 306-308 (1973). The United States, as amicus curiae, suggests not only that the immunity issue is ultimately for the courts to decide, but also that the courts may reach the decision only on a full record. A summary record, as compiled in this case on motions for summary judgment, though voluminous, is said to be an inadequate basis for resolution of the question. We disagree. In this case nothing is to be gained from any further factual development that might be possible with a trial on the merits. We have before us the detailed experience of the SEC regulatory activities, and we have the debates in the Congress culminating in the 1975 legislation. This information is sufficient to permit an informed decision as to the existence of an implied repeal. Our disposition of this case differs from that of the Seventh Circuit in Thill Securities Corp. v. New York Stock Exchange, 433 F. 2d 264 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 994 (1971), where antitrust immunity for the NYSE’s antirebate rule was claimed and denied. The Court of Appeals reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the NYSE, and remanded for further evidence regarding the effects of the antirebate rule on competition, the degree of actual review by the SEC, and the extent to which the rule was necessary to make the Exchange Act work. 433 F. 2d, at 270. This ruling is persuasively distinguishable on at least two grounds from the case at bar: First, there was no evidence presented regarding the extent of SEC review of the challenged rule. Second, the antirebate practice differs from fixed commission rates in that (1) it was not among the items specifically listed in § 19 (b), although the practice might reasonably be thought to be related to the fixing of-commission rates, and (2) it does not necessarily apply uniformly, and may be applied in a discriminatory manner. We do not believe it necessary, in the circumstances of this case, to take further evidence concerning the competitive effects of fixed rates, or the necessity of fixed rates as a keystone of the operation of exchanges under the Exchange Act. To the extent that the Court of Appeals in Thill viewed the question of implied repeal as a question of fact, concerning whether the particular rule itself is necessary to make the Act work, we decline to follow that lead. We also regard our specific disposition in Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, supra, as inapposite for this case. In Ricci, an antitrust complaint charged that the Chicago Mercantile Exchange arbitrarily transferred a membership, in violation of both the Commodity Exchange Act, 42 Stat. 998, as amended, 7 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., and the exchange rules. We held that consideration of the antitrust claims should be stayed pending determination by the Commodity Exchange Commission as to whether the actions taken were in violation of the Act. or the rules. Although we noted that the Act did not confer a general antitrust immunity, we stated that if the actions complained of were in conformity with the Act and exchange rules, a substantial question would be presented concerning whether the actions were insulated from antitrust attack. It is manifest, then, that Ricci involved a deference to the expertise of a regulatory agency in determining if the activities violated the Act or rules, and did not represent a decision on antitrust immunity where the conduct charged was clearly encompassed by the legislation or rules and where there was no factual dispute. We believe that the United States, as amicus, has confused two questions. On the one hand, there is a factual question as to whether fixed commission rates are actually necessary to the operation of the exchanges as contemplated under the Securities Exchange Act. On the other hand, there is a legal question as to whether allowance of an antitrust suit would conflict with the operation of the regulatory scheme which specifically authorizes, the SEC to oversee the fixing of commission rates. The factual question is not before us in this case. Rather, we are concerned with whether antitrust immunity, as a matter of law, must be implied in order to permit the Exchange Act to function as envisioned by the Congress. The issue of the wisdom of fixed rates becomes relevant only when it is determined that there is no antitrust immunity. The United States appears to suggest that only if there is a pervasive regulatory scheme, as in the public utility area, can it be concluded that the regulatory scheme ousts the antitrust laws. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16, 35. It is true that in some prior cases we have been concerned with the question of the pervasiveness of the regulatory scheme as a factor in determining whether there is an implied repeal of the antitrust laws. See, e. g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U. S. 366, 373-375 (1973). In the present case, however, respondents do not claim that repeal should be implied because of a pervasive regulatory scheme, but because of the specific provision of § 19 (b)(9) and the regulatory action thereunder. Brief for Respondents 35. Hence, whether the Exchange Act amounts to pervasive legislation ousting the antitrust acts is not a question before us. We agree with the District Court and the Court of Appeals, and with respondents, that to deny antitrust immunity with respect to commission rates would be to subject the exchanges and their members to conflicting standards. It is clear from our discussion in Part III, supra, that the commission rate practices of the exchanges have been subjected to the scrutiny and approval of the SEC. If antitrust courts were to impose different standards or requirements, the exchanges might find themselves unable to proceed without violation of the mandate of the courts or of the SEC. Such different standards are likely to result because the sole aim of antitrust legislation is to protect competition, whereas the SEC must consider, in addition, the economic health of the investors, the exchanges, and the securities industry. Given the expertise of the SEC, the confidence the Congress has placed in the agency, and the active roles the SEC and the Congress have taken, permitting courts throughout the country to conduct their own antitrust proceedings would conflict with the regulatory scheme authorized by Congress rather than supplement that scheme. In Part III, supra, we outlined the legislative and regulatory agency concern with the fixing of commission rates. Beginning with the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act in 1934, the Congress persistently has provided for SEC authority to regulate commission rates. Although SEC action in the early years appears to have been minimal, it is clear that since 1959 the SEC has been engaged in deep and serious study of the commission rate practices of the exchanges and of their members, and has required major changes in those practices. The ultimate result of this long-term study has been a regulatory decree requiring abolition of the practice of fixed rates of commission as of May 1, 1975, and the institution of full and complete competition. Significantly, in the new legislation enacted subsequent to the SEC’s abolition of commission rate fixing, the Congress has indicated its continued approval of SEC review of the commission rate structure. Although legislatively enacting the SEC regulatory provision banning fixed rates, the Congress has explicitly provided that the SEC, under certain circumstances and upon the making of specified findings, may allow reintroduction of fixed rates. In sum, the statutory provision authorizing regulation, § 19 (b)(9), the long regulatory practice, and the continued congressional approval illustrated by the new legislation, point to one, and only one, conclusion. The Securities Exchange Act was intended by the Congress to leave the supervision of the fixing of reasonable rates of commission to the SEC. Interposition of the antitrust laws, which would bar fixed commission rates as per se violations of the Sherman Act, in the face of positive SEC action, would preclude and prevent the operation of the Exchange Act as intended by Congress and as effectuated through SEC regulatory activity. Implied repeal of the antitrust laws is, in fact, necessary to make the Exchange Act work as it was intended; failure to imply repeal would render nugatory the legislative provision for regulatory agency supervision of exchange commission rates. Affirmed. The member firms are Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., and Bache & Company, Inc. Petitioner urged that these practices were in violation of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 49 Stat. 1528, 15 U. S. C. § 13a. The relief requested included an injunction prohibiting the implementation of certain negotiated commission rates that were to be placed in effect on April 5, 1971, or, alternatively, requiring that negotiated rates be available for transactions of any size. Petitioner also requested treble damages amounting to $1.5 billion and an award of attorneys’ fees of $10 million plus interest and costs. In short, the District Court concluded that (1) since petitioner had never applied for exchange membership, he was not in a position to complain that he was arbitrarily precluded from membership; (2) the Exchange Act’s § 3 (a) (3), 16 U. S. C. § 78c (a) (3), by its definition of “member,” specifically limited access of nonmembers to the Exchanges; and (3) the Robinson-Patman Act did not apply to services or intangibles, but only to commodities or goods, and the latter were not involved in this litigation. See, for example, the comments of the report in reviewing evidence on fixed commissions: “As stated by Mr. Sturgis, a former president of the exchange, since 1876 a governor, and now the chairman of the law committee . . . : “ ‘The violation of the commission law we regard as one of the most infamous crimes that a man can commit against his fellow members in the exchange, and as a gross breach of good faith and wrongdoing of the most serious nature, and we consider it a crime that we should punish as severely as, in the judgment of the governing committee, the constitution permits. “ ‘Q. . . . But the breach of that rule (referring to the rule for uniform commissions) by a broker you consider the most heinous crime he can commit? “ ‘A. It is absolute bad faith to his fellow men.’ “The rule is rigidly enforced by suspension from one to five years for a first violation and expulsion for a second. . . . The acknowledged object is to prevent competition amongst the members.” H. R. Rep. No. 1593, 62d Cong., 3d Sess., 39 (1913). Since 1947, rates generally have been based on the value of stock in a round lot, SEC Report of Special Study of Securities Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 96, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, p. 103 (1963). There was no volume discount at the time of this SEC report. The basic NYSE proposal included some volume discounts, continuation of limited give-ups if directed by the customers, termination of “rebative” reciprocal practices, discounts for certain nonmembers, and limitation of membership and discounts to “bona fide broker-dealers.” App. A255. The increases were permitted through March 31, 1974, without restriction. Such increases could continue from April 1, 1974, through April 30, 1975, if the (NYSE permitted its members to charge in excess of the old rate and also permitted reductions in brokerage services in return for discounts from the rate. It was also believed that members of the exchanges had not expected that floor brokerage rates would be included among those required to be made competitive, and that extra time for planning and adjustment would be needed. The SEC noted, additionally, that the impact of floor brokerage rates on public investors was significantly less than the impact of public rates, i. e., the rates on transactions for nonmembers. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11203, Jan. 23, 1975, Doc. App. 109, 110. In order for destructive competition to occur on a large scale, fixed costs must be a high percentage of total costs, and there must be economies of scale in a wide range of production. Neither of these factors was found to be present in the brokerage industry. Id., at 138-139. This view has been rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Independent Broker-Dealers’ Trade Assn. v. SEC, 142 U. S. App. D. C. 384, 442 F. 2d 132, cert. denied, 404 U. S. 828 (1971). The SEC appears no longer to take this position. See Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae 38-39, n. 45. One further change in the 1975 amendments should be noted. The 1934 Act defined the term “member” of an exchange as any person who, among other things, is permitted “to make use of the facilities of an exchange for transactions thereon . . . with the payment of a commission or fee which is less than that charged the general public.” § 3 (a) (3), 48 Stat. 883. This implied a likelihood of fixed rates for the general public, for otherwise it would have been difficult to determine that a member, in fact, was given lower rates. This definition was deleted in the 1975 amendments and has been replaced with a general definition of a member of an exchange. §3 (a) (3) (A), 89 Stat. 97. We believe that this degree of scrutiny and approval by the SEC is not significantly different for our purposes here than an affirmative order to the exchanges to follow fixed rates. The United States, as amicus curiae, agrees that if the SEC “were to order the exchanges to adhere to a fixed commission rate system of some kind, no antitrust liability could arise.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 48. We conclude that immunity should not rest on the existence of a formal order by the SEC, but that the actions taken by the SEC pursuant to § 19 (b) (9), as outlined in Part III, supra, are to be viewed as having an effect equivalent to that of a formal order. Compare Pan American World Airways v. United States, 371 U. S. 296, 305-310 (1963), with United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 350-352 (1963). In the latter case two factors pointed against antitrust immunity: (1) congressional intent in the Bank Merger Act not to immunize activities from antitrust legislation, and (2) the lack of conflict between the Bank Merger Act and Clayton Act standards. Also, there was an absence of continuing oversight by the Comptroller General of the Currency. These factors are not present in, and are inapplicable to, the case at bar. We note, of course, that judicial review of SEC action is available under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §§ 702 and 704, or under § 25 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78y. See also Independent Broker-Dealers’ Trade Assn. v. SEC, 142 U. S. App. D. C. 384, 442 F. 2d 132, cert. denied, 404 U. S. 828 (1971).
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the reason, if any, given by the court for granting the petition for certiorari.
What reason, if any, does the court give for granting the petition for certiorari?
[ "case did not arise on cert or cert not granted", "federal court conflict", "federal court conflict and to resolve important or significant question", "putative conflict", "conflict between federal court and state court", "state court conflict", "federal court confusion or uncertainty", "state court confusion or uncertainty", "federal court and state court confusion or uncertainty", "to resolve important or significant question", "to resolve question presented", "no reason given", "other reason" ]
[ 9 ]
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BURNS et al. v. WILSON, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, et al. No. 422. Argued February 5, 1953. Decided June 15, 1953. Robert L. Carter and Frank D. Reeves argued the cause for petitioners. With them on the brief were Thurgood Marshall, Charles W. Quick and Herbert O. Reid. Solicitor General Cummings argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Murray, Oscar H. Davis, Beatrice Rosenberg and Walter Kiechel, Jr. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson announced the judgment of the Court in an opinion in which Mr. Justice Reed, Mr. Justice Burton and Mr. Justice Clark join. Tried separately by Air Force courts-martial on the Island of Guam, petitioners were found guilty of murder and rape and sentenced to death. The sentences were confirmed by the President, and petitioners exhausted all remedies available to them under the Articles of War for review of their convictions by the military tribunals. They then filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. In these applications petitioners alleged that they had been denied due process of law in the proceedings which led to their conviction by the courts-martial. They charged that they had been subjected to illegal detention; that coerced confessions had been extorted from them; that they had been denied counsel of their choice and denied effective representation; that the military authorities on Guam had suppressed evidence favorable to them, procured perjured testimony against them and otherwise interfered with the preparation of their defenses. Finally, petitioners charged that their trials were conducted in an atmosphere of terror and vengeance, conducive to mob violence instead of fair play. The District Court dismissed the applications without hearing evidence, and without further review, after satisfying itself that the courts-martial which tried petitioners had jurisdiction over their persons at the time of the trial and jurisdiction over the crimes with which they were charged as well as jurisdiction to impose the sentences which petitioners received. 104 F. Supp. 310, 312. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s judgment, after expanding the scope of review by giving petitioners’ allegations full consideration on their merits, reviewing in detail the mass of evidence to be found in the transcripts of the trial and other proceedings before the military court. 91 U. S. App. D. C. 208, 202 F. 2d 335. We granted certiorari, 344 U. S. 903. Petitioners’ allegations are serious, and, as reflected by the divergent bases for decision in the two courts below, the case poses important problems concerning the proper administration of the power of a civil court to review the judgment of a court-martial in a habeas corpus proceeding. In this case, we are dealing with habeas corpus applicants who assert — rightly or wrongly — that they have been imprisoned and sentenced to death as a result of proceedings which denied them basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The federal civil courts have jurisdiction over such applications. By statute, Congress has charged them with the exercise of that power. Accordingly, our initial concern is not whether the District Court has any power at all to consider petitioners’ applications; rather our concern is with the manner in which the Court should proceed to exercise its power. The statute which vests federal courts with jurisdiction over applications for habeas corpus from persons confined by the military courts is the same statute which vests them with jurisdiction over the applications of persons confined by the civil courts. But in military habeas corpus the inquiry, the scope of matters open for review, has always been more narrow than in civil cases. Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U. S. 103 (1950). Thus the law which governs a civil court in the exercise of its jurisdiction over military habeas corpus applications cannot simply be assimilated to the law which governs the exercise of that power in other instances. It is sui generis; it must be so, because of the peculiar relationship between the civil and military law. Military law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment. This Court has played no role in its development; we have exerted no supervisory power over the courts which enforce it; the rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty, and the civil courts are not the agencies which must determine the precise balance to be struck in this adjustment. The Framers expressly entrusted that task to Congress. Indeed, Congress has taken great care both to define the rights of those subject to military law, and provide a complete system of review within the military system to secure those rights. Only recently the Articles of War were completely revised, and thereafter, in conformity with its purpose to integrate the armed services, Congress established a Uniform Code of Military Justice applicable to all members of the military establishment. These enactments were prompted by a desire to meet objections and criticisms lodged against court-martial procedures in the aftermath of World War II. Nor was this a patchwork effort to plug loopholes in the old system of military justice. The revised Articles and the new Code are the result of painstaking study; they reflect an effort to reform and modernize the system — from top to bottom. Rigorous provisions guarantee a trial as free as possible from command influence, the right to prompt arraignment, the right to counsel of the accused’s own choosing, and the right to secure witnesses and prepare an adequate defense. The revised Articles, and their successor — the new Code — also establish a hierarchy within the military establishment to review the convictions of courts-martial, to ferret out irregularities in the trial, and to enforce the procedural safeguards which Congress determined to guarantee to those in the Nation’s armed services. And finally Congress has provided a special post-conviction remedy within the military establishment, apart from ordinary appellate review, whereby one convicted by a court-martial may attack collaterally the judgment under which he stands convicted. The military courts, like the state courts, have the same responsibilities as do the federal courts to protect a person from a violation of his constitutional rights. In military habeas corpus cases, even more than in state habeas corpus cases, it would be in disregard of the statutory scheme if the federal civil courts failed to take account of the prior proceedings — of the fair determinations of the military tribunals after all military remedies have been exhausted. Congress has provided that these determinations are “final” and “binding” upon all courts. We have held before that this does not displace the civil courts’ jurisdiction over an application for habeas corpus from the military prisoner. Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U. S. 128 (1950). But these provisions do mean that when a military decision has dealt fully and fairly with an allegation raised in that application, it is not open to a federal civil court to grant the writ simply to re-evaluate the evidence. Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U. S. 122 (1950). We turn, then, to this case. Petitioners’ applications, as has been noted, set forth serious charges — allegations which, in their cumulative effect, were sufficient to depict fundamental unfairness in the process whereby their guilt was determined and their death sentences rendered. Had the military courts manifestly refused to consider those claims, the District Court was empowered to review them de novo. For the constitutional guarantee of due process is meaningful enough, and sufficiently adaptable, to protect soldiers— as well as civilians — from the crude injustices of a trial so conducted that it becomes bent on fixing guilt by dispensing with rudimentary fairness rather than finding truth through adherence to those basic guarantees which have long been recognized and honored by the military courts as well as the civil courts. Petitioners asserted: they had been arrested and confined incommunicado by officers of the military government of Guam; they were mistreated and subjected to continuous questioning without being informed of their rights; petitioner Dennis finally confessed, after police officers confronted him with the confession of Calvin Dennis — an alleged accomplice in the crime; after a period of about three weeks of this confinement, the petitioners were turned over to the Air Force; the military authorities “planted” real evidence — the victim’s smock with hairs from petitioner Dennis’ body attached — in a truck which petitioners had driven on the night of the crime; they further sought to “contrive” a conviction by coercing various witnesses to testify against petitioners; both petitioners were denied the benefit of counsel until a short while before trial, and petitioner Dennis was denied representation of his choice when counsel he sought was removed from the case by the commanding officer of his unit; the trial was conducted in an atmosphere of “hysteria” because the crime had been particularly brutal and the authorities had “created” a demand for vengeance; the “coerced” confessions were admitted at the trial and so was the incriminating confession of Calvin Dennis— which had been procured by threats and deceit. Answering the habeas corpus applications, respondents denied that there had been any violation of petitioners’ rights and attached to their answer copies of the record of each trial, the review of the Staff Judge Advocate, the decision of the Board of Review in the office of the Judge Advocate General, the decision (after briefs and oral argument) of the Judicial Council in the Judge Advocate General’s office, the recommendation of the Judge Advocate General, the action of the President confirming the sentences, and also the decision of the Judge Advocate General denying petitions for new trials under Article 53 of the Articles of War. These records make it plain that the military courts have heard petitioners out on every significant allegation which they now urge. Accordingly, it is not the duty of the civil courts simply to repeat that process — to reexamine and reweigh each item of evidence of the occurrence of events which tend to prove or disprove one of the allegations in the applications for habeas corpus. It is the limited function of the civil courts to determine whether the military have given fair consideration to each of these claims. Whelchel v. McDonald, supra. We think they have. The military reviewing courts scrutinized the trial records before rejecting petitioners’ contentions. In lengthy opinions, they concluded that petitioners had been accorded a complete opportunity to establish the authenticity of their allegations, and had failed. Thus, the trial records were analyzed to show that the circumstances fully justified the decision to remove Dennis’ original choice of defense counsel that each petitioner had declared, at the beginning of his trial, that he was ready to proceed; that each was ably represented; that the trials proceeded in an orderly fashion — with that calm degree of dispassion essential to a fair hearing on the question of guilt; that there was exhaustive inquiry into the background of the confessions — with the taking of testimony from the persons most concerned with the making of these statements, including petitioner Dennis who elected to take the stand. And finally it was demonstrated that the issues arising from the charges relating to the use of perjured testimony and planted evidence were either explored or were available for exploration at the trial. Petitioners have failed to show that this military review was legally inadequate to resolve the claims which they have urged upon the civil courts. They simply demand an opportunity to make a new record, to prove de novo in the District Court precisely the case which they failed to prove in the military courts. We think, under the circumstances, that due regard for the limitations on a civil court’s power to grant such relief precludes such action. We think that although the Court of Appeals may have erred in reweighing each item of relevant evidence in the trial record, it certainly did not err in holding that there was no need for a further hearing in the District Court. Accordingly its judgment must be Affirmed. Mr. Justice Jackson concurs in the result. 28 U. S. C. § 2241. See In re Yamashita, 327 U. S. 1, 8 (1946). See Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65, 82 (1858); cf. In re Vidal, 179 U. S. 126 (1900); Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U. S. 296 (1911); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1 (1942). See, e. g., In re Grimley, 137 U. S. 147 (1890); Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U. S. 103 (1950). See 62 Stat. 627 (revised Articles of War), 64 Stat. 107 (the Uniform Code of Military Justice). For history of the evolution and purpose behind these enactments, see, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 1034, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.; Report of the War Department Advisory Committee on Military Justice (1946); H. R. Rep. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. Ibid. See Holtzoff, Administration of Justice in the United States Army, 22 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 1 (1947); Morgan, The Background of The Uniform Code of Military Justice, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 169 (1953). For provisions to this effect in the revised Articles of War, see, e. g., 10 U. S. C. (Supp. II) §§ 1482, 1493, 1495, 1542, 1560. For provisions in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, see, e. g., 50 U. S. C. (Supp. V) §§ 564, 567, 591, 602, 612, 621. 10 U. S. C. (Supp. II) § 1521. The Uniform Code of Military Justice established the Court of Military Appeals, which is composed of civilians. It automatically reviews all capital cases and has discretionary jurisdiction over other cases. It is the highest court in the military system. 50 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 654. See Walker and Niebank, The Court of Military Appeals — Its History, Organization and Operation, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 228 (1953). 62 Stat. 639, 10 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 1525. See Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U. S. 128 (1950). This provision was also made a part of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 64 Stat. 132, 50 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 660; 64 Stat. 147, 50 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 740. The revisions of the Articles of War, 10 U. S. C. (Supp. II) § 1521 (h), and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 50 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 663, both provided that the decisions of the appellate military tribunals should be "final” and should be "binding” upon the courts. Petitioners submitted the affidavits of petitioner Dennis, an Air Force chaplain, a former federal civilian employee on Guam and Col. Daly, a former Air Force officer who had been attached to the Judge Advocate’s staff on Guam, and who was, apparently, originally to have been defense counsel to the accused. These affidavits tended to back up the general allegations set forth in the applications for habeas corpus. See Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U. S. 103 (1950). Dennis asked to be represented by one Lt. Col. Daly. This officer, prior to the trial, was charged with serious misconduct and moral turpitude. When informed of this, Dennis announced his satisfaction with the “regularly appointed defense counsel.” At his trial, however, Dennis again asked if Daly could assist in his defense. The court was then fully informed concerning Daly’s arrest and his dubious status, and it sustained the commanding officer’s determination that Daly was not “available” to participate in the trial. Dennis was represented by another officer who had been appointed a full month before. Defense counsel was assisted by two other legal officers who had also participated in the pretrial investigation of the case. We reject petitioners’ contentions that the rule of McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332 (1943), renders the confessions inadmissible and requires the civil courts to hold that the courts-martial were void. The McNabb rule is a rule of evidence in the federal civil courts; its source is not “due process of law,” but this Court’s power of “supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts.” See 318 U. S., at 340; cf. Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U. S. 55 (1951). We have of course no such supervisory power over the admissibility of evidence in courts-martial. The allegations in the applications for habeas corpus relating to perjured and “planted” evidence were supported by the affidavits of Col. Daly and Mrs. Hill, the federal civilian employee. But they were both witnesses for the defense at the Dennis trial, and Daly was a witness for the prosecution in the Burns trial. Many of the matters covered in the Daly and Hill affidavits were covered at the trial; opportunity was available to question each witness about his or her relationship with the investigation of the case. Moreover we note that the Judge Advocate General, during review of this case under former Article of War 53 (now 50 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 740), ordered a special investigation by the office of the Inspector General of some of the Daly and Hill charges, and concluded that they were unfounded. This report is not a part of the record, and we cannot rely upon it to sustain our conclusions, but we can cite it as an example of the efforts of the military to resolve and not ignore petitioners’ charges.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
What is the issue of the decision?
[ "involuntary confession", "habeas corpus", "plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise", "retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)", "search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)", "search and seizure, vehicles", "search and seizure, Crime Control Act", "contempt of court or congress", "self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)", "Miranda warnings", "self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution", "right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)", "cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)", "cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)", "line-up", "discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)", "double jeopardy", "ex post facto (state)", "extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous", "extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence", "extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom", "extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)", "extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)", "extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance", "extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)", "extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity", "confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)", "subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error", "subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)", "subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment", "subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies", "subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice", "subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)", "subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution", "subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness", "subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous", "Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure", "statutory construction of criminal laws: assault", "statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery", "statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)", "statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody", "statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)", "statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)", "statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms", "statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud", "statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling", "statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951", "statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)", "statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)", "statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes", "statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol", "statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice", "statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)", "statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952", "statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes", "statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines", "statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous", "jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)", "speedy trial", "miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)" ]
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TOILET GOODS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al. v. GARDNER, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, et al. No. 336. Argued January 16, 1967. Decided May 22, 1967. Edward J. Boss argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. Nathan Lewin argued the cause for respondents. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg, Jerome M. Feit and William W. Goodrich. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioners in this case are the Toilet Goods Association, an organization of cosmetics manufacturers accounting for some 90% of annual American sales in this field, and 39 individual cosmetics manufacturers and distributors. They brought this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, on the ground that certain regulations promulgated by the Commissioner exceeded his statutory authority under the Color Additive Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 74 Stat. 397, 21 U. S. C. §§ 321-376. The District Court held that the Act did not prohibit this type of pre-enforcement suit, that a case and controversy existed, that the issues presented were justiciable, and that no reasons had been presented by the Government to warrant declining jurisdiction on discretionary grounds. 235 F. Supp. 648. Recognizing that the subsequent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Abbott Laboratories v. Celebrezze, 352 F. 2d 286, appeared to conflict with its holding, the District Court reaffirmed its earlier rulings but certified the question of jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit under 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b). The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court that jurisdiction to hear the suit existed as to three of the challenged regulations, but sustained the Government’s contention that judicial review was improper as to a fourth. 360 F. 2d 677. Each side below sought review here from the portions of the Court of Appeals’ decision adverse to it, the Government as petitioner in Gardner v. Toilet Goods Assn., No. 438, and the Toilet Goods Association and other plaintiffs in the present case. We granted certiorari in both instances, 385 U. S. 813, as we did in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, No. 39, 383 U. S. 924, because of the apparent conflict between the Second and Third Circuits. The two Toilet Goods cases were set and argued together with Abbott Laboratories. In our decisions reversing the judgment in Abbott Laboratories, ante, p. 136, and affirming the judgment in Gardner v. Toilet Goods Assn., post, p. 167, both decided today, we hold that nothing in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 1040, as amended, bars a pre-enforcement suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §§ 701-704 (1964 ed., Supp. II), and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2201. We nevertheless agree with the Court of Appeals that judicial review of this particular regulation in this particular context is inappropriate at this stage because, applying the standards set forth in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, the controversy is not presently ripe for adjudication. The regulation in issue here was promulgated under the Color Additive Amendments of 1960, 74 Stat. 397, 21 U. S. C. §§ 321-376, a statute that revised and somewhat broadened the authority of the Commissioner to control the ingredients added to foods, drugs, and cosmetics that impart color to them. The Commissioner of Food and Drugs, exercising power delegated by the Secretary, 22 Fed. Reg. 1051, 25 Fed. Reg. 8625, under statutory authority “to promulgate regulations for the efficient enforcement” of the Act, § 701 (a), 21 U. S. C. § 371 (a), issued the following regulation after due public notice, 26 Fed. Reg. 679, and consideration of comments submitted by interested parties: “(a) When it appears to the Commissioner that a person has: “(4) Refused to permit duly authorized employees of the Food and Drug Administration free access to all manufacturing facilities, processes, and formulae involved in the manufacture of color additives and intermediates from which such color additives are derived; “he may immediately suspend certification service to such person and may continue such suspension until adequate corrective action has been taken.” 28 Fed. Reg. 6445-6446; 21 CFR § 8.28. The petitioners maintain that this regulation is an impermissible exercise of authority, that the FDA has long sought congressional authorization for free access to facilities, processes, and formulae (see, e. g., the proposed “Drug and Factory Inspection Amendments of 1962,” H. R. 11581, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.; Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 11581 and H. R. 11582, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 67-74; H. R. 6788, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.), but that Congress has always denied the agency this power except for prescription drugs. § 704, 21 U. S. C. § 374. Framed in this way, we agree with petitioners that a “legal” issue is raised, but nevertheless we are not persuaded that the present suit is properly maintainable. In determining whether a challenge to an administrative regulation is ripe for review a twofold inquiry must be made: first to determine whether the issues tendered are appropriate for judicial resolution, and second to assess the hardship to the parties if judicial relief is denied at that stage. As to the first of these factors, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the legal issue as presently framed is not appropriate for judicial resolution. This is not because the regulation is not the agency’s considered and formalized determination, for we are in agreement with petitioners that under this Court’s decisions in Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U. S. 40, and United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U. S. 192, there can be no question that this regulation — promulgated in a formal manner after notice and evaluation of submitted comments — is a “final agency action” under § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 704. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, ante, p. 136. Also, we recognize the force of petitioners’ contention that the issue as they have framed it presents a purely legal question : whether the regulation is totally beyond the agency’s power under the statute, the type of legal issue that courts have occasionally dealt-with without requiring a specific attempt at enforcement, Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U. S. 407; cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, or exhaustion of administrative remedies, Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft Co., 347 U. S. 535; Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U. S. 557. These points which support the appropriateness of judicial resolution are, however, outweighed by other considerations. The regulation serves notice only that the Commissioner may under certain circumstances order inspection of certain facilities and data, and that further certification of additives may be refused to those who decline to permit a duly authorized inspection until they have complied in that regard. At this juncture we have no idea whether or when such an inspection will be ordered and what reasons the Commissioner will give to justify his order. The statutory authority asserted for the regulation is the power to promulgate regulations “for the efficient enforcement” of the Act, § 701 (a). Whether the regulation is justified thus depends not only, as petitioners appear to suggest, on whether Congress refused to include a specific section of the Act authorizing such inspections, although this factor is to be sure a highly relevant one, but also on whether the statutory scheme as a whole justified promulgation of the regulation. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 47. This will depend not merely on an inquiry into statutory purpose, but concurrently on an understanding of what types of enforcement problems are encountered by the FDA, the need for various sorts of supervision in order to effectuate the goals of the Act, and the safeguards devised to protect legitimate trade secrets (see 21 CFR § 130.14 (c)). We believe that judicial appraisal of these factors is likely to stand on a much surer footing in the context of a specific application of this regulation than could be the case in the framework of the generalized challenge made here. We are also led to this result by considerations of the effect on the petitioners of the regulation, for the test of ripeness, as we have noted, depends not only on how adequately a court can deal with the legal issue presented, but also on the degree and nature of the regulation's present effect on those seeking relief. The regulation challenged here is not, analogous to those that were involved in Columbia Broadcasting System, supra, and Storer, supra, and those other color additive regulations with which we deal in Gardner v. Toilet Goods Assn., post, p. 167, where the impact of the administrative action could be said to be felt immediately by those subject to it in conducting their day-to-day affairs. See also Federal Communications Comm’n v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U. S. 284. This is not a situation in which primary conduct is affected — when contracts must be negotiated, ingredients tested or substituted, or special records compiled. This regulation merely states that the Commissioner may authorize inspectors to examine certain processes or formulae; no advance action is required of cosmetics manufacturers, who since the enactment of the 1938 Act have been under a statutory duty to permit reasonable inspection of a “factory, warehouse, establishment, or vehicle and all pertinent equipment, finished and unfinished materials; containers, and labeling therein.” § 704 (a). Moreover, no irremediable adverse consequences flow from requiring a later challenge to this regulation by a manufacturer who refuses to allow this type of inspection. Unlike the other regulations challenged in this action, in which seizure of goods, heavy fines, adverse publicity for distributing “adulterated” goods, and possible criminal liability might penalize failure to comply, see Gardner v. Toilet Goods Assn., post, p. 167, a refusal to admit an inspector here would at most lead only to a suspension of certification services to the particular party, a determination that can then be promptly challenged through an administrative procedure, which in turn is reviewable by a court. Such review will provide an adequate forum for testing the regulation in a concrete situation. It is true that the administrative hearing will deal with the “factual basis” of the suspension, from which petitioners infer that the Commissioner will not entertain and consider a challenge to his statutory authority to promulgate the regulation. Whether or not this assumption is correct, given the fact that only minimal, if any, adverse consequences will face petitioners if they challenge the regulation in this manner, we think it wiser to require them to exhaust this administrative process through which the factual basis of the inspection order will certainly be aired and where more light may be thrown on the Commissioner’s statutory and practical justifications for the regulation. Compare Federal Security Adm’r v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U. S. 218. Judicial review will then be available, and a court at that juncture will be in a better position to deal with the question of statutory authority. Administrative Procedure Act § 10 (e) (B)(3), 5 U. S. C. § 706 (2)(C). For these reasons the judgment of the Court of Appettls is Affirmed. Mr. Justice Douglas dissents for the reasons stated by Judge Tyler of the District Court, 235 F. Supp. 648, 651-652. Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. [For concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Fortas, see post, p. 174.] The Color Additive Amendments provide for listings of color additives by the Secretary “if and to the extent that such additives are suitable and safe . . . .” § 706 (b) (1), 21 U. S. C. § 376 (b)(1). The Secretary is further authorized to provide “for the certification, with safe diluents or without diluents, of batches of color additives . . . §706 (c), 21 U. S. C. §376 (c). A color additive is “deemed unsafe” unless it is either from a certified batch or exempted from the certification requirement, §706 (a), 21 U. S. C. §376 (a). A cosmetic containing such an “unsafe” additive is deemed to be adulterated, §601 (e), 21 U. S. C. §361 (e), and is prohibited from interstate commerce. § 301 (a), 21 U. S. C. § 331 (a). See 21 CFR §§ 8.28(b), 130.14r-130.26. We recognize that a denial of certification might under certain circumstances cause inconvenience and possibly hardship, depending upon such factors as how large a supply of certified additives the particular manufacturer may have, how rapidly the administrative hearing and judicial review are conducted, and what temporary remedial or protective provisions, such as compliance with a reservation pending litigation, might be available to a manufacturer testing the regulation. In the context of the present case we need only say that such inconvenience is speculative and we have been provided with no information that would support an assumption that much weight should be attached to this possibility. The statute and regulations are not explicit as to whether review would lie, as Judge Friendly suggested, 360 F. 2d, at 687, to a court of appeals under §§ 701 (f) and 706 (d) of the Act, or to a district court as an appeal from the Commissioner’s “final order,” 21 CFR § 130.26, under § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act. See 21 CFR § 130.31; compare §505, 21 U. S. C. §355. For purposes of this ease it is only necessary to ascertain that judicial review would be available to challenge any specific order of the Commisioner denying certification services to a particular drug manufacturer, and we therefore need not decide the statutory question of which forum would be appropriate for such review. Petitioners also cite the Commissioner’s refusal, in the context of a public hearing on certain drug regulations, to entertain objections to his statutory authority to promulgate them on the ground that “This is a question of law and cannot be resolved by the taking of evidence at a public hearing.” 31 Fed. Reg. 7174. See 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §20.03, at 69 (1958).
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the treatment the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed, that is, whether the court below the Supreme Court (typically a federal court of appeals or a state supreme court) affirmed, reversed, remanded, denied or dismissed the decision of the court it reviewed (typically a trial court). Adhere to the language used in the "holding" in the summary of the case on the title page or prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. Exceptions to the literal language are the following: where the Court overrules the lower court, treat this a petition or motion granted; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing refuses to enforce or enjoins the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as reversed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing enforces the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as affirmed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing sets aside the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as vacated; if the decision is set aside and remanded, treat it as vacated and remanded.
What treatment did the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed?
[ "stay, petition, or motion granted", "affirmed", "reversed", "reversed and remanded", "vacated and remanded", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded", "vacated", "petition denied or appeal dismissed", "modify", "remand", "unusual disposition" ]
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ERLENBAUGH et al. v. UNITED STATES No. 71-839. Argued November 13, 1972 Decided December 12, 1972 MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined except White, J., who took no part in the decision of the case. Charles W. Grubb argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. Allan A. Tuttle argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Petersen, and Roger A. Pauley. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. The petitioners in this case attack their convictions under the Travel Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1952, which makes it unlawful to use a facility of interstate commerce in furtherance of certain criminal activity. Petitioners were tried in five separate trials. The cases were consolidated for purposes of appeal since each raised the question whether causing a publication to be carried by a facility of interstate commerce with an intent to facilitate the operation of a gambling business illegal under state law violated § 1952. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, finding no exception in § 1952 for the transmittal of publications. 452 F. 2d 967 (1971). We granted certiorari for the limited purpose of resolving the conflict between this decision and a previous ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 405 U. S. 973 (1972). For reasons stated below, we affirm. In all respects here relevant, the facts of the five cases are identical. Each involves the operation in Hammond, Indiana, of a bookmaking business. A publication known as the Illinois Sports News was important to the functioning of each bookmaking operation. The News, a publication of the type generally referred to as a “scratch sheet,” contains more complete and detailed horse racing information than is found in regular newspapers, and was used extensively by the customers of the five bookmaking operations in placing their bets. Because the News, which appears daily except Sunday, is published in Chicago, Illinois, it was necessary to make arrangements for prompt daily delivery from Chicago to Hammond and the bookmaking establishments. This was accomplished by causing copies of the News to be placed on board an early morning train of the Chicago, South Shore, & South Bend Railroad in Chicago for delivery to the railroad station in Hammond, where copies were picked up for each of the bookmaking operations. In each case the petitioners assumed various roles in this scheme, but the pattern of the scheme for securing the prompt daily delivery of the News was the same in all cases. Section 1952 (a) subjects to criminal liability anyone who “uses any facility in interstate . . . commerce . . . with intent to . . . promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity, and thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of [these] acts . . . .” Unlawful activity includes “any business enterprise involving gambling . . . offenses in violation of the laws of the State in which they are committed . . . See 18 U. S. C. § 1952 (b). For our limited purposes it is not open to dispute that in each case petitioners were involved in bookmaking businesses which violated Indiana law; that the Illinois Sports News was important to the operation of those bookmaking businesses; that the scheme for delivery of the News — a scheme which involved the use of a facility of interstate commerce, the railroad — was intended to facilitate the operation of the bookmaking businesses; or that the requisite overt acts occurred following the use of the interstate facility. The only question here is whether these cases fall outside the ambit of § 1952 because the use of the interstate facility was to secure delivery of a news publication. The basis of petitioners’ challenge to the legality of their convictions under § 1952 — and of the conflict between the courts of appeals — is to be found in 18 U. S. C. § 1953. Section 1953 (a) makes it unlawful for anyone, “except a common carrier in the usual course of its business, knowingly [to] carr'fy] or [to send] in interstate . . . commerce any . . . paraphernalia, . . . paper, writing, or other device used, or to be used . . . in (a) bookmaking; or (b) wagering pools . . . ; or (c) in a numbers, policy, bolita, or similar game . . . .” The broad sweep of subsection (a) in terms of paraphernalia covered is limited to some extent by § 1953 (b) (3) which makes the section inapplicable to “the carriage or transportation in interstate . . . commerce of any newspaper or similar publication.” Petitioners’ argument starts from the premise that they could not have been prosecuted under § 1953 (a) because the Illinois Sports News falls within the newspaper exception contained in § 1953 (b)(3). Petitioners recognize that § 1952 contains no express exception for newspapers comparable to § 1953 (b)(3), but contend that § 1952 and § 1953 are in pari materia — that is, pertain to the same subject — and, under settled principles of statutory construction, should therefore be construed “as if they were one law,” United States v. Freeman, 3 How. 556, 564 (1845); see, e. g., United States v. Stewart, 311 U. S. 60, 64 (1940); Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39, 44 (1939). Thus, petitioners would have us read the exception contained in § 1953 (b) (3) as applicable to not only § 1953 (a) but also § 1952 (a), thereby barring their prosecution under the latter as well as the former. This we cannot do. The rule of in pari materia — like any canon of statutory construction — is a reflection of practical experience in the interpretation of statutes: a legislative body generally uses a particular word with a consistent meaning in a given context. Thus, for example, a “later act can ... be regarded as a legislative interpretation of [an] earlier act . . . in the sense that it aids in ascertaining the meaning of the words as used in their contemporary setting,” and “is therefore entitled to great weight in resolving any ambiguities and doubts.” United States v. Stewart, supra, at 64-65. See also, e. g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S. 385, 388 (1969); United States v.Freeman, supra, at 565. The rule is but a logical extension of the principle that individual sections of a single statute should be construed together, for it necessarily assumes that whenever Congress passes a new statute, it acts aware of all previous statutes on the same subject, cf. Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft Co., 347 U. S. 535, 541-552 (1954). Given this underlying assumption, the rule’s application certainly makes the most sense when the statutes were enacted by the same legislative body at the same time. Such was indeed the case here. Yet petitioners would have us resort to the exception contained in § 1953 (b) (3) not simply to resolve any “ambiguities [or] doubts” in .the language in § 1952 but to introduce an exception to the coverage of the latter where none is now apparent. This might be a sensible construction of the two statutes if they were intended to serve the same function, but plainly they were not. True, § 1952 and § 1953 were both parts of a comprehensive federal legislative effort to assist local authorities in dealing with organized criminal activity which, in many instances, had assumed interstate proportions and which in all cases was materially assisted in its operations by the availability of facilities of interstate commerce. The two statutes, however, play different roles in achieving these broad, common goals. Section 1953 has a narrow, specific function. It erects a substantial barrier to the distribution of certain materials used in the conduct of various forms of illegal gambling. By interdicting the flow of these materials to and between illegal gambling businesses, the statute purposefully seeks to impede the operation of such businesses. Section 1952, by contrast, does not apply just to illegal gambling; rather, it is concerned with a broad spectrum of "unlawful activity,” illegal gambling businesses being only one element. Moreover, the statute does not focus upon any particular materials, but upon the use of the facilities of interstate commerce with the intent of furthering an unlawful “business enterprise.” It is, in short, an effort to deny individuals who act for such a criminal purpose access to the channels of commerce. Thus, while § 1952 ultimately seeks, like § 1953, to inhibit organized criminal activity, it takes a very different approach to doing so. To introduce into § 1952 an exception based upon the nature of the material transported in interstate commerce would carve a substantial slice from the intended coverage of the statute. This we will not do without an affirmative indication— which is lacking here- — that Congress so intended. Our conclusion here is bolstered by the fact that the reason for the newspaper exception to § 1953 is absent in the context of § 1952. The original version of § 1953 introduced in the Senate contained none of the exceptions set forth in subsection (b). It was quickly realized that the bill, as introduced, bore the potential for unreasonably broad application, since it would have imposed absolute criminal liability on anyone, except a common carrier, who “knowingly carries or sends in interstate . . . commerce” any gambling paraphernalia used in an illegal gambling business. Were “knowingly” construed as modifying only the phrase “carries or sends,” the statute might have been applied to a wholly innocent person who knowingly carried a newspaper in interstate commerce unaware that it contained racing information. It was to avoid this problem that the newspaper exception was added to § 1953. But § 1952 obviously poses no threat to innocent citizens. Its application is limited to those who act with an intent to further unlawful activity — as was clearly true of these petitioners. There is, then, no reason for carrying the newspaper exception of § 1953 (b) (3) over to § 1952. The judgment is Affirmed. MR. Justice White took no part in the decision of this case. Petitioners Erlenbaugh, Mitchell, and Hintz were tried together. Petitioner Erlenbaugh was convicted of conspiracy to violate § 1952. Petitioners Mitchell and Hintz were each convicted of two counts of violating § 1952 and of conspiracy to violate the section. Petitioners White and Lloyd were tried together with petitioner Hintz in a second trial. Each was convicted of conspiracy to violate § 1952, and petitioner White was convicted of three counts, petitioner Hintz of two counts, and petitioner Lloyd of one count of violating § 1952. Petitioner Kelly was tried alone and convicted of one count of violating § 1952 and of conspiracy to violate the section. Petitioners Kulik and Dobrowski were tried together and convicted of conspiracy to violate § 1952 and of three counts and two counts, respectively, of violating the section. Petitioners Misiolek, Tumlin, and Strosky were tried together, and convicted of conspiracy to violate § 1952. Petitioner Misiolek was also convicted of three counts of violating § 1952, while petitioners Tumlin and Strosky were convicted of four counts of violating the section. In United States v. Arnold, 380 F. 2d 366, 368 (1967), the Fourth Circuit reversed a conviction under § 1952 because, in its view, “the use of the telephone to order . . . transmittal through the mail [of a sports publication intended to be used to facilitate the operation of a football betting pool] is not the use of a 'facility ... to .. . promote . . . any unlawful activity’, as contemplated by ... § 1952.” The Seventh Circuit in this case specifically declined to follow the decision in Arnold. See 452 F. 2d, at 973. A “scratch” is a horse that has been withdrawn from a race in which it was entered. The withdrawal of a good horse obviously affects the odds in a race, and is therefore of great interest to bettors. The Court of Appeals described each operation and the respective roles of the petitioners in detail, see 452 F. 2d, at 969-970. See n. 19, infra. See Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 10-2304, 10-2307, 10-2331 (1956). The question presented in this case is solely one of statutory construction. There is no issue here as to the constitutionality of § 1952. Subsection (b) also makes the section inapplicable to: “(1) parimutuel betting equipment, parimutuel tickets where legally acquired, or parimutuel materials used or designed for use at racetracks or other sporting events in connection with which betting is legal under applicable State law, or (2) the transportation of betting materials to be used in the placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event into a State in which such betting is legal under the statutes of that State . . . .” Whether publications such as the “scratch sheet” here at issue are in fact within the “newspaper or similar publication” exception contained in § 1953 (b) (3) is a question that has arisen on a number of occasions in the lower courts. See United States v. Kelly, 328 F. 2d 227, 229-236 (CA6 1964); United States v. Arnold, 380 F. 2d 366, 368 (CA4 1967); United States v. Kish, 303 F. Supp. 1212 (ND Ind. 1969); United States v. Azar, 243 F. Supp. 345, 346-347 (ED Mich. 1964). The Government here concedes that the Illinois Sports News is within § 1953 (b)(3). See Brief for United States 9 n. 3. See, e. g., Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korporation, A. G., 332 U. S. 480, 488 (1947); Markham v. Cabell, 326 U. S. 404, 410-411 (1945); Ex parte Public National Bank, 278 U. S. 101, 104 (1928). Section 1952 was added to Title 18 of the United States Code by the Act of Sept. 13, 1961, Pub. L. 87-228, § 1 (a), 75 Stat. 498, amended, Act of July 7, 1965, Pub. L. 89-68, 79 Stat. 212; Act of Oct. 27, 1970, Tit. II, § 701 (i) (2), 84 Stat. 1282. Section 1953 was added to Title 18 of the United States Code by the Act of Sept. 13, 1961, Pub. L. 87-218, 75 Stat. 492. Indeed, both statutes were a part of Attorney General Kennedy’s legislative program to combat organized crime and racketeering, and were considered simultaneously by committees of the House and Senate. See Hearings on S. 1653, S. 1654, S. 1655, S. 1656, S. 1657, S. 1658, S. 1665 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) (hereinafter Senate Hearings); Hearings on H. R. 468, H. R. 1246, H. R. 3021, H. R. 3022, H. R. 3023, H. R. 3246, H. R. 5230, H. R. 6571, H. R. 6572, H. R. 6909, H. R. 7039 before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) (hereinafter House Hearings). Cf. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U. S. 755, 764 (1949); Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84, 87-88 (1934); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 433 (1932). See n. 11, supra. Attorney General Kennedy, who recommended the legislation to Congress, testified before the Senate and House Committees that “the extent to which organized crime and racketeering have developed on an interstate basis convincingly [demonstrates] the need for new Federal laws.” Senate Hearings 10-11; see House Hearings 19-20. See also H. R. Rep. No. 966, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1961) (§ 1952). Attorney General Kennedy observed before the Senate Committee that racketeers “use interstate commerce and interstate communications with impunity in the conduct of their unlawful activities. If we could curtail their use of interstate communications and facilities, we could inflict a telling blow to their operations. We could cut them down to size.” Senate Hearings 11. Previously, before the House Subcommittee, the Attorney General had described the legislative package as “designed to prohibit the use of interstate facilities for the conduct of the many unlawful enterprises which make up organized crime today.” House Hearings 20. See also H. R. Rep. No. 966, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1961) (§ 1952); H. R. Rep. No. 968, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1961) (§ 1953). Only common carriers acting in the usual course of their business, plus those materials specified in § 1953 (b), see n. 8, supra, are excluded from the statute’s prohibition. See also 18 U. S. C. § 1084. Representative Celler, who introduced the statute in the House, described its purposes as follows: “The primary purpose is to prevent the transportation in interstate commerce of wagering material. The purpose actually is to cutoff and shutoff gambling supplies, in reality to prevent these lotteries and kindred illegal diversions.” 107 Cong. Rec. 16537. See also S. Rep. No. 589, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1961); H. R. Rep. No. 968, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1961). “As used in this section ‘unlawful activity’ means (1) any business enterprise involving gambling, liquor on which the Federal excise tax has not been paid, narcotics, or controlled substances . . . or prostitution offenses in violation of the laws of the State in which they are committed or of the United States, or (2) extortion, bribery, or arson in violation of the laws of the State in which committed or of the United States.” “This bill will assist local law enforcement by denying interstate facilities to individuals engaged in illegal gambling, liquor, narcotics or prostitution business enterprises.” H. R. Rep. No. 966, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1961). See also 107 Cong. Rec. 13943 (remarks of Sen. Eastland). In Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 811 (1971), we observed that “§ 1962 was aimed primarily at organized crime and, more specifically, at persons who reside in one State while operating or managing illegal activities located in another.” We, of course, adhere to this view of the statute for “Congress would certainly recognize that an expansive Travel Act would alter sensitive federal-state relationships, could overextend limited federal police resources, and might well produce situations in which . . . relatively minor state offenses [would be transformed] into federal felonies.” Id., at 812. See also United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 349-350 (1971). Petitioners contend that there was no proof in these cases that they were involved in organized criminal activity and that such activity was being directed from another State. Given the limited nature of our grant of certiorari, it is not open to question here that the five illegal bookmaking businesses were elements of organized criminal activity of the type contemplated by § 1952 — though we do note that the reach of the statute clearly was not limited to instances in which organized criminal activity in one State is managed from another State, see n. 15, supra. But cf. United States v. Chase, 372 F. 2d 453, 460 (CA4), cert. denied, 387 U. S. 907 (1967) (“[KJnowledge and intent to transmit gambling paraphernalia in interstate commerce are elements of the crime created by” § 1953). “The committee . . . felt that the bill, as introduced, might be so interpreted as to bring within its criminal penalties a person who carried a newspaper or other publication containing racing results or predictions.” S. Rep. No. 589, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1961). See ibid.; H. R. Rep. No. 968, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1961).
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the type of decision made by the court among the following: Consider "opinion of the court (orally argued)" if the court decided the case by a signed opinion and the case was orally argued. For the 1791-1945 terms, the case need not be orally argued, but a justice must be listed as delivering the opinion of the Court. Consider "per curiam (no oral argument)" if the court decided the case with an opinion but without hearing oral arguments. For the 1791-1945 terms, the Court (or reporter) need not use the term "per curiam" but rather "The Court [said],""By the Court," or "By direction of the Court." Consider "decrees" in the infrequent type of decisions where the justices will typically appoint a special master to take testimony and render a report, the bulk of which generally becomes the Court's decision. This type of decision usually arises under the Court's original jurisdiction and involves state boundary disputes. Consider "equally divided vote" for cases decided by an equally divided vote, for example when a justice fails to participate in a case or when the Court has a vacancy. Consider "per curiam (orally argued)" if no individual justice's name appears as author of the Court's opinion and the case was orally argued. Consider "judgment of the Court (orally argued)" for formally decided cases (decided the case by a signed opinion) where less than a majority of the participating justices agree with the opinion produced by the justice assigned to write the Court's opinion.
What type of decision did the court make?
[ "opinion of the court (orally argued)", "per curiam (no oral argument)", "decrees", "equally divided vote", "per curiam (orally argued)", "judgment of the Court (orally argued)", "seriatim" ]
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UNITED STATES v. O’BRIEN. No. 232. Argued January 24, 1968. Decided May 27, 1968. Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Francis X. Beytagh, Jr., Beatrice Rosenberg, and Jerome M. Feit. Marvin M. Karpatkin argued the cause for respondent in No. 232 and petitioner in No. 233. With him on the brief were Howard S. Whiteside, Melvin L. Wulf, and Rhoda H. Karpatkin. Together with No. 233, O’Brien v. United States, also on certiorari to the same court. Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. On the morning of March 31,1966, David Paul O’Brien and three companions burned their Selective Service registration certificates on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse. A sizable crowd, including several agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, witnessed the event. Immediately after the burning, members of the crowd began attacking O’Brien and his companions. An FBI agent ushered O’Brien to safety inside the courthouse. After he was advised of his right to counsel and to silence, O’Brien stated to FBI agents that he had burned his registration certificate because of his beliefs, knowing that he was violating federal law. He produced the charred remains of the certificate, which, with his consent, were photographed. For this act, O’Brien was indicted, tried, convicted, and sentenced in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. He did not contest the fact that he had burned the certificate. He stated in argument to the jury that he burned the certificate publicly to influence others to adopt his antiwar beliefs, as he put it, “so that other people would reevaluate their positions with Selective Service, with the armed forces, and reevaluate their place in the culture of today, to hopefully consider my position.” The indictment upon which he was tried charged that he “willfully and knowingly did mutilate, destroy, and change by burning . . . [his] Registration Certificate (Selective Service System Form No. 2); in violation of Title 50, App., United States Code, Section 462 (b).” Section 462 (b) is part of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948. Section 462 (b)(3), one of six numbered subdivisions of § 462 (b), was amended by Congress in 1965, 79 Stat. 586 (adding the words italicized below), so that at the time O’Brien burned his certificate an offense was commited by any person, “who forges, alters, knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner changes any such certificate . . . .” (Italics supplied.) In the District Court, O’Brien argued that the 1965 Amendment prohibiting the knowing destruction or mutilation of certificates was unconstitutional because it was enacted to abridge free speech, and because it served no legitimate legislative purpose. The District Court rejected these arguments, holding that the statute on its face did not abridge First Amendment rights, that the court was not competent to inquire into the motives of Congress in enacting the 1965 Amendment, and that the Amendment was a reasonable exercise of the power of Congress to raise armies. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held the 1965 Amendment unconstitutional as a law abridging freedom of speech. At the time the Amendment was enacted, a regulation of the Selective Service System required registrants to keep their registration certificates in their “personal possession at all times.” 32 CFR § 1617.1 (1962). Wilful violations of regulations promulgated pursuant to the Universal Military Training and Service Act were made criminal by statute. 50 U. S. C. App. §462 (b)(6). The Court of Appeals, therefore, was of the opinion that conduct punishable under the 1965 Amendment was already punishable under the nonpossession regulation, and consequently that the Amendment served no valid purpose; further, that in light of the prior regulation, the Amendment must have been “directed at public as distinguished from private destruction.” On this basis, the court concluded that the 1965 Amendment ran afoul of the First Amendment by singling out persons engaged in protests for special treatment. The court ruled, however, that O’Brien’s conviction should be affirmed under the statutory provision, 50 U. S. C. App. § 462 (b)(6), which in its view made violation of the nonpossession regulation a crime, because it regarded such violation to be a lesser included offense of the crime defined by the 1965 Amendment. The Government petitioned for certiorari in No. 232, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in holding the statute unconstitutional, and that its decision conflicted with decisions by the Courts of Appeals for the Second and Eighth Circuits upholding the 1965 Amendment against identical constitutional challenges. O’Brien cross-petitioned for certiorari in No. 233, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining his conviction on the basis of a crime of which he was neither charged nor tried. We granted the Government’s petition to resolve the conflict in the circuits, and we also granted O’Brien’s cross-petition. We hold that the 1965 Amendment is constitutional both as enacted and as applied. We therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment and sentence of the District Court without reaching the issue raised by O’Brien in No. 233. I. When a male reaches the age of 18, he is required by the Universal Military Training and Service Act to register with a local draft board. He is assigned a Selective Service number, and within five days he is issued a registration certificate (SSS Form No. 2). Subsequently, and based on a questionnaire completed by the registrant, he is assigned a classification denoting his eligibility for induction, and “[a]s soon as practicable” thereafter he is issued a Notice of Classification (SSS Form No. 110). This initial classification is not necessarily permanent, and if in the interim before induction the registrant’s status changes in some relevant way, he may be reclassified. After such a reclassification, the local board “as soon as practicable” issues to the registrant a new Notice of Classification. Both the registration and classification certificates are small white cards, approximately 2 by 3 inches. The registration certificate specifies the name of the registrant, the date of registration, and the number and address of the local board with which he is registered. Also inscribed upon it are the date and place of the registrant’s birth, his residence at registration, his physical description, his signature, and his Selective Service number. The Selective Service number itself indicates his State of registration, his local board, his year of birth, and his chronological position in the local board’s classification record. The classification certificate shows the registrant’s name, Selective Service number, signature, and eligibility classification. It specifies whether he was so classified by his local board, an appeal board, or the President. It contains the address of his local board and the date the certificate was mailed. Both the registration and classification certificates bear notices that the registrant must notify his local board in writing of every change in address, physical condition, and occupational, marital, family, dependency, and military status, and of any other fact which might change his classification. Both also contain a notice that the registrant’s Selective Service number should appear on all communications to his local board. Congress demonstrated its concern that certificates issued by the Selective Service System might be abused well before the 1965 Amendment here challenged. The 1948 Act, 62 Stat. 604, itself prohibited many different abuses involving “any registration certificate, ... or any other certificate issued pursuant to or prescribed by the provisions of this title, or rules or regulations promulgated hereunder . . . .” 62 Stat. 622. Under §§ 12 (b)(l)-(5) of the 1948 Act, it was unlawful (1) to transfer a certificate to aid a person in making false identification; (2) to possess a certificate not duly issued with the intent of using it for false identification; (3) to forge, alter, “or in any manner” change a certificate or any notation validly inscribed thereon; (4) to photograph or make an imitation of a certificate for the purpose of false identification; and (5) to possess a counterfeited or altered certificate. 62 Stat. 622. In addition, as previously mentioned, regulations of the Selective Service System required registrants to keep both their registration and classification certificates in their personal possession at all times. 32 CFR § 1617.1 (1962) (Registration Certificates); 32 CFR § 1623.5 (1962) (Classification Certificates). And §12 (b)(6) of the Act, 62 Stat. 622, made knowing violation of any provision of the Act or rules and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto a felony. By the 1965 Amendment, Congress added to § 12 (b)(3) of the 1948 Act the provision here at issue, subjecting to criminal liability not only one who “forges, alters, or in any manner changes” but also one who “knowingly destroys, [or] knowingly mutilates” a certificate. We note at the outset that the 1965 Amendment plainly does not abridge free speech on its face, and we do not understand O’Brien to argue otherwise. Amended § 12 (b)(3) on its face deals with conduct having no connection with speech. It prohibits the knowing destruction of certificates issued by the Selective Service System, and there is nothing necessarily expressive about such conduct. The Amendment does not distinguish between public and private destruction, and it does not punish only destruction engaged in for the purpose of expressing views. Compare Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931). A law prohibiting destruction of Selective Service certificates no more abridges free speech on its face than a motor vehicle law prohibiting the destruction of drivers’ licenses, or a tax law prohibiting the destruction of books and records. O’Brien nonetheless argues that the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional in its application to him, and is unconstitutional as enacted because what he calls the “purpose” of Congress was “to suppress freedom of speech.” We consider these arguments separately. II. O’Brien first argues that the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as applied to him because his act of burning his registration certificate was protected “symbolic speech” within the First Amendment. His argument is that the freedom of expression which the First Amendment guarantees includes all modes of “communication of ideas by conduct,” and that his conduct is within this definition because he did it in “demonstration against the war and against the draft.” We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled “speech” whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea. However, even on the assumption that the alleged communicative element in O’Brien’s conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that the destruction of a registration certificate is constitutionally protected activity. This Court has held that when “speech” and “nonspeech” elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must appear, the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. We find that the 1965 Amendment to § 12 (b)(3) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act meets all of these requirements, and consequently that O’Brien can be constitutionally convicted for violating it. The constitutional power of Congress to raise and support armies and to make all laws necessary and proper to that end is broad and sweeping. Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742, 755-758 (1948); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 (1918); see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, 25-26 (1942). The power of Congress to classify and conscript manpower for military service is “beyond question.” Lichter v. United States, supra, at 756; Selective Draft Law Cases, supra. Pursuant to this power, Congress may establish a system of registration for individuals liable for training and service, and may require such individuals within reason to cooperate in the registration system. The issuance of certificates indicating the registration and eligibility classification of individuals is a legitimate and substantial administrative aid in the functioning of this system. And legislation to insure the continuing availability of issued certificates serves a legitimate and substantial purpose in the system’s administration. O’Brien’s argument to the contrary is necessarily premised upon his unrealistic characterization of Selective Service certificates. He essentially adopts the position that such certificates are so many pieces of paper designed to notify registrants of their registration or classification, to be retained or tossed in the wastebasket according to the convenience or taste of the registrant. Once the registrant has received notification, according to this view, there is no reason for him to retain the certificates. O’Brien notes that most of the information on a registration certificate serves no notification purpose at all; the registrant hardly needs to be told his address and physical characteristics. We agree that the registration certificate contains much information of which the registrant needs no notification. This circumstance, however, does not lead to the conclusion that the certificate serves no purpose, but that, like the classification certificate, it serves purposes in addition to initial notification. Many of these purposes would be defeated by the certificates’ destruction or mutilation. Among these are: 1. The registration certificate serves as proof that the individual described thereon has registered for the draft. The classification certificate shows the eligibility classification of a named but undescribed individual. Voluntarily displaying the two certificates is an easy and painless way for a young man to dispel a question as to whether he might be delinquent in his Selective Service obligations. Correspondingly, the availability of the certificates for such display relieves the Selective Service System of the administrative burden it would otherwise have in verifying the registration and classification of all suspected delinquents. Further, since both certificates are in the nature of “receipts” attesting that the registrant has done what the law requires, it is in the interest of the just and efficient administration of the system that they be continually available, in the event, for example, of a mix-up in the registrant’s file.. Additionally, in a time of national crisis, reasonable availability to each registrant of the two small cards assures a rapid and uncomplicated means for determining his fitness for immediate induction, no matter how distant in our mobile society he may be from his local board. 2. The information supplied on the certificates facilitates communication between registrants and local boards, simplifying the system and benefiting all concerned. To begin with, each certificate bears the address of the registrant’s local board, an item unlikely to be committed to memory. Further, each card bears the registrant’s Selective Service number, and a registrant who has his number readily available so that he can communicate it to his local board when he supplies or requests information can make simpler the board’s task in locating his file. Finally, a registrant’s inquiry, particularly through a local board other than his own, concerning his eligibility status is frequently answerable simply on the basis of his classification certificate; whereas, if the certificate were not reasonably available and the registrant were uncertain of his classification, the task of answering his questions would be considerably complicated. 3. Both certificates carry continual reminders that the registrant must notify his local board of any change of address, and other specified changes in his status. The smooth functioning of the system requires that local boards be continually aware of the status and whereabouts of registrants, and the destruction of certificates deprives the system of a potentially useful notice device. 4. The regulatory scheme involving Selective Service certificates includes clearly valid prohibitions against the alteration, forgery, or similar deceptive misuse of certificates. The destruction or mutilation of certificates obviously increases the difficulty of detecting and tracing abuses such as these. Further, a mutilated certificate might itself be used for deceptive purposes. The many functions performed by Selective Service certificates establish beyond doubt that Congress has a legitimate and substantial interest in preventing their wanton and unrestrained destruction and assuring their continuing availability by punishing people who knowingly and wilfully destroy or mutilate them. And we are unpersuaded that the pre-existence of the nonpossession regulations in any way negates this interest. In the absence of a question as to multiple punishment, it has never been suggested that there is anything improper in Congress’ providing alternative statutory avenues of prosecution to assure the effective protection of one and the same interest. Compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Gore v. United States, 357 U. S. 386 (1958). Here, the pre-existing avenue of prosecution was not even statutory. Regulations may be modified or revoked from time to time by administrative discretion. Certainly, the Congress may change or supplement a regulation. Equally important, a comparison of the regulations with the 1965 Amendment indicates that they protect overlapping but not identical governmental interests, and that they reach somewhat different classes of wrongdoers. The gravamen of the offense defined by the statute is the deliberate rendering of certificates unavailable for the various purposes which they may serve. Whether registrants keep their certificates in their personal possession at all times, as required by the regulations, is of no particular concern under the 1965 Amendment, as long as they do not mutilate or destroy the certificates so as to render them unavailable. Although as we note below we are not concerned here with the nonpossession regulations, it is not inappropriate to observe that the essential elements of nonpossession are not identical with those of mutilation or destruction. Finally, the 1965 Amendment, like § 12 (b) which it amended, is concerned with abuses involving any issued Selective Service certificates, not only with the registrant’s own certificates. The knowing destruction or mutilation of someone else’s certificates would therefore violate the statute but not the nonpossession regulations. We think it apparent that the continuing availability to each registrant of his Selective Service certificates substantially furthers the smooth and proper functioning of the system that Congress has established to raise armies. We think it also apparent that the Nation has a vital interest in having a system for raising armies that functions with maximum efficiency and is capable of easily and quickly responding to continually changing- circumstances. For these reasons,- the Government has a substantial interest in assuring the continuing availability of issued Selective Service certificates. It is equally clear that the 1965 Amendment specifically protects this substantial governmental interest. We perceive no alternative means that would more precisely and narrowly assure the continuing availability of issued Selective Service certificates than a law which prohibits their wilful mutilation or destruction. Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 407-408 (1963), and the cases cited therein, The 1965 Amendment prohibits such conduct and does nothing more. In other words, both the governmental interest and the operation of the 1965 Amendment are limited to the noncommuni-cative aspect of O’Brien’s conduct. The governmental interest and the scope of the 1965 Amendment are limited to preventing harm to the smooth and efficient functioning of the Selective Service System. When O’Brien deliberately rendered unavailable his registration certificate, he wilfully frustrated this governmental interest. For this noncommunicative impact of his conduct, and for nothing else, he was convicted. The case at bar is therefore unlike one where the alleged governmental interest in regulating conduct arises in some measure because the communication allegedly integral to the conduct is itself thought to be harmful. In Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931), for example, this Court struck down a statutory phrase which punished people who expressed their “opposition to organized government” by displaying “any flag, badge, banner, or device.” Since the statute there was aimed at suppressing communication it could not be sustained as a regulation of noncommunicative conduct. See also, NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Union, 377 U. S. 58, 79 (1964) (concurring opinion). In conclusion, we find that because of the Government’s substantial interest in assuring the continuing availability of issued Selective Service certificates, because amended § 462 (b) is an appropriately narrow means of protecting this interest and condemns only the independent noncommunicative impact of conduct within its reach, and because the noncommunicative impact of O’Brien’s act of burning his registration certificate frustrated the Government’s interest, a sufficient governmental interest has been shown to justify O’Brien’s conviction. III. O’Brien finally argues that the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as enacted because what he calls the “purpose” of Congress was “to suppress freedom of speech.” We reject this argument because under settled principles the purpose of Congress, as O’Brien uses that term, is not a basis for declaring this legislation unconstitutional. It is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive. As the Court long ago stated: “The decisions of this court from the beginning lend no support whatever to the assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be exerted.” McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 56 (1904). This fundamental principle of constitutional adjudication was reaffirmed and the many cases were collected by Mr. Justice Brandéis for the Court in Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423, 455 (1931). Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter. When the issue is simply the interpretation of legislation, the Court will look to statements by legislators for guidance as to the purpose of the legislature, because the benefit to sound decision-making in this circumstance is thought sufficient to risk the possibility of misreading Congress’ purpose. It is entirely a different matter when we are asked to void a statute that is, under well-settled criteria, constitutional on its face, on the basis of what fewer than a handful of Congressmen said about it. What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork. We decline to void essentially on the ground that it is unwise legislation which Congress had the undoubted power to enact and which could be reenacted in its exact form if the same or another legislator made a “wiser” speech about it. O’Brien’s position, and to some extent that of the court below, rest upon a misunderstanding of Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 (1936), and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). These cases stand, not for the proposition that legislative motive is a proper basis for declaring a statute unconstitutional, but that the inevitable effect of a statute on its face may render it unconstitutional. Thus, in Orosjean the Court, having concluded that the right of publications to be free from certain kinds of taxes was a freedom of the press protected by the First Amendment, struck down a statute which on its face did nothing other than impose just such a tax. Similarly, in Gomillion, the Court sustained a complaint which, if true, established that the “inevitable effect,” 364 U. S., at 341, of the redrawing of municipal boundaries was to deprive the petitioners of their right to vote for no reason other than that they were Negro. In these cases, the purpose of the legislation was irrelevant, because the inevitable effect — the “necessary scope and operation,” McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 59 (1904) — abridged constitutional rights. The statute attacked in the instant case has no such inevitable unconstitutional effect, since the destruction of Selective Service certificates is in no respect inevitably or necessarily expressive. Accordingly, the statute itself is constitutional. We think it not amiss, in passing, to comment upon O’Brien’s legislative-purpose argument. There was little floor debate on this legislation in either House. Only Senator Thurmond commented on its substantive features in the Senate. 111 Cong. Rec. 19746, 20433. After his brief statement, and without any additional substantive comments, the bill, H. R. 10306, passed the Senate. Ill Cong. Rec. 20434. In the House debate only two Congressmen addressed themselves to the Amendment— Congressmen Rivers and Bray. Ill Cong. Rec. 19871, 19872. The bill was passed after their statements without any further debate by a vote of 393 to 1. It is principally on the basis of the statements by these three Congressmen that O’Brien makes his congressional-“purpose” argument. We note that if we were to examine legislative purpose in the instant case, we would be obliged to consider not only these statements but also the more authoritative reports of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees. The portions of those reports explaining the purpose of the Amendment are reproduced in the Appendix in their entirety. While both reports make clear a concern with the “defiant” destruction of so-called “draft cards” and with “open” encouragement to others to destroy their cards, both reports also indicate that this concern stemmed from an apprehension that unrestrained destruction of cards would disrupt the smooth functioning of the Selective Service System. IV. Since the 1965 Amendment to § 12 (b) (3) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act is constitutional as enacted and as applied, the Court of Appeals should have affirmed the judgment of conviction entered by the District Court. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and reinstate the judgment and sentence of the District Court. This disposition makes unnecessary consideration of O'Brien’s claim that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming his conviction on the basis of the nonpossession regulation. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT. Portions op the Reports op the Committees on Armed Services op the Senate and House Explaining the 1965 Amendment. The “Explanation of the Bill” in the Senate Report is as follows: “Section 12 (b) (3) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, as amended, provides, among other things, that a person who forges, alters, or changes a draft registration certificate is subject to a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. There is no explicit prohibition in this section against the knowing destruction or mutilation of such cards. “The committee has taken notice of the defiant destruction and mutilation of draft cards by dissident persons who disapprove of national policy. If allowed to continue unchecked this contumacious conduct represents a potential threat to the exercise of the power to raise and support armies. “For a person to be subject to fine or imprisonment the destruction or mutilation of the draft card must be ‘knowingly’ done. This qualification is intended to protect persons who lose or mutilate draft cards accidentally.” S. Rep. No. 589, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). And the House Report explained: “Section 12 (b)(3) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, as amended, provides that a person who forges, alters, or in any manner changes his draft registration card, or any notation duly and validly inscribed thereon, will be subject to a fine of $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years. H. R. 10306 would amend this provision to make it apply also to those persons who knowingly destroy or knowingly mutilate a draft registration card. “The House Committee on Armed Services is fully aware of, and shares in, the deep concern expressed throughout the Nation over the increasing incidences in which individuals and large groups of individuals openly defy and encourage others to defy the authority of their Government by destroying or mutilating their draft cards. “While the present provisions of the Criminal Code with respect to the destruction of Government property may appear broad enough to cover all acts having to do with the mistreatment of draft cards in the possession of individuals, the committee feels that in the present critical situation of the country, the acts of destroying or mutilating these cards are offenses which pose such a grave threat to the security of the Nation that no question whatsoever should be left as to the intention of the Congress that such wanton and irresponsible acts should be punished. “To this end, H. R. 10306 makes specific that knowingly mutilating or knowingly destroying a draft card constitutes a violation of the Universal Military Training and Service Act and is punishable thereunder; and that a person who does so destroy or mutilate a draft card will be subject to a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years.” H. R. Rep. No. 747, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). At the time of the burning, the agents knew only that O'Brien and his three companions had burned small white cards. They later discovered that the card O'Brien burned was his registration certificate, and the undisputed assumption is that the same is true of his companions. He was sentenced under the Youth Corrections Act, 18 U. S. C. §5010 (b), to the custody of the Attorney General for a maximum period of six years for supervision and treatment. The issue of the constitutionality of the 1965 Amendment was raised by counsel representing O’Brien in a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment. At trial and upon sentencing, O’Brien chose to represent himself. He was represented by counsel on his appeal to the Court of Appeals. O’Brien v. United States, 376 F. 2d 538 (C. A. 1st Cir. 1967). The portion of 32 CFR relevant to the instant case was revised as of January 1, 1967. Citations in this opinion are to the 1962 edition which was in effect when O’Brien committed the crime, and when Congress enacted the 1965 Amendment. The Court of Appeals nevertheless remanded the ease to the District Court to vacate the sentence and resentence O’Brien. In the court's view, the district judge .might have considered the violation of the 1965 Amendment as an aggravating circumstance in imposing sentence. The Court of Appeals subsequently denied O’Brien’s petition for a rehearing, in which he argued that he had not been charged, tried, or convicted for nonpossession, and that nonpossession was not a lesser included offense of mutilation or destruction. O’Brien v. United States, 376 F. 2d 538, 542 (C. A. 1st Cir. 1967). United States v. Miller, 367 F. 2d 72 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 911 (1967). Smith v. United States, 368 F. 2d 529 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1966). See 62 Stat. 605, as amended, 65 Stat. 76, 50 U. S. C. App. § 453; 32 CFR § 1613.1 (1962). 32 CFR § 1621.2 (1962). 32 CFR § 1613.43a (1962). 32 CFR §§ 1621.9, 1623.1 (1962). 32 CFR §§ 1623.1, 1623.2 (1962). 32 CFR § 1623.4 (1962). 32 CFR § 1625.1 (1962). 32 CFR §§ 1625.1, 1625.2, 1625.3, 1625.4, and 1625.11 (1962). 32 CFR §1625.12 (1962). 32 CFR §1621.2 (1962). 32 CFR § 1617.1 (1962), provides, in relevant part: “Every person required to present himself for and submit to registration must, after he is registered, have in his personal possession at all times his Registration Certificate (SSS Form No. 2) prepared by his local board which has not been altered and on which no notation duly and validly inscribed thereon has been changed in any manner after its preparation by the local board. The failure of any person to have his Registration Certificate (SSS Form No. 2) in his personal possession shall be prima facie evidence of his failure to register.” 32 CFR § 1623.5 (1962), provides, in relevant part: “Every person who has been classified by a local board must have in his personal possession at all times, in addition to his Registration Certificate (SSS Form No. 2), a valid Notice of Classification (SSS Form No. 110) issued to him showing his current classification.” See text, infra, at 382. NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 403 (1963). NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 444 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 464 (1958). Bates v. Little Bock, 361 U. S. 516, 524 (1960). Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 530 (1945); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 406 (1963). Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 524 (1960). Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 408 (1963). Cf. Milanovich v. United States, 365 U. S. 551 (1961); Heflin v. United States, 358 U. S. 415 (1959); Prince v. United States, 352 U. S. 322 (1957). Cf. Milanovich v. United States, 365 U. S. 551 (1961); Heflin v. United States, 358 U. S. 415 (1959); Prince v. United States, 352 U. S. 322 (1957). The Court may make the same assumption in a very limited and well-defined class of cases where the very nature of the constitutional question requires an inquiry into legislative purpose. The principal class of cases is readily apparent — those in which statutes have been challenged as bills of attainder. This Court’s decisions have defined a bill of attainder as a legislative Act which inflicts punishment on named individuals or members of an easily ascertainable group without a judicial trial. In determining whether a particular statute is a bill of attainder, the analysis necessarily requires an inquiry into whether the three definitional elements— specificity in identification, punishment, and lack of a judicial trial— are contained in the statute. The inquiry into whether the challenged statute contains the necessary element of punishment has on occasion led the Court to examine the legislative motive in enacting the statute. See, e. g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 (1946). Two other decisions not involving a bill of attainder analysis contain an inquiry into legislative purpose or motive of the type that O’Brien suggests we engage in in this case. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 169-184 (1963); Troy v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 95-97 (1958). The inquiry into legislative purpose or motive in Kennedy and Troy, however, was for the same limited purpose as in the bill of attainder decisions — i. e., to determine whether the statutes under review were punitive in nature. We face no such hiquiry in this case. The 4965 Amendment to § 462 (b) was clearly penal in nature, designed to impose criminal punishment for designated acts. The other issues briefed by O’Brien were not raised in the petition for certiorari in No. 232 or in the cross-petition in No. 233. Accordingly, those issues are not before the Court.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them. Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer. Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.
Who is the respondent of the case?
[ "attorney general of the United States, or his office", "specified state board or department of education", "city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit", "state commission, board, committee, or authority", "county government or county governmental unit, except school district", "court or judicial district", "state department or agency", "governmental employee or job applicant", "female governmental employee or job applicant", "minority governmental employee or job applicant", "minority female governmental employee or job applicant", "not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable", "retired or former governmental employee", "U.S. House of Representatives", "interstate compact", "judge", "state legislature, house, or committee", "local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough", "governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact", "state or U.S. supreme court", "local school district or board of education", "U.S. Senate", "U.S. senator", "foreign nation or instrumentality", "state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of", "state college or university", "United States", "State", "person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime", "advertising business or agency", "agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor", "airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes", "airline", "distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages", "alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked", "American Medical Association", "National Railroad Passenger Corp.", "amusement establishment, or recreational facility", "arrested person, or pretrial detainee", "attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association", "author, copyright holder", "bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company", "bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization", "establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store", "water transportation, stevedore", "bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines", "brewery, distillery", "broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm", "construction industry", "bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle", "business, corporation", "buyer, purchaser", "cable TV", "car dealer", "person convicted of crime", "tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband", "chemical company", "child, children, including adopted or illegitimate", "religious organization, institution, or person", "private club or facility", "coal company or coal mine operator", "computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software", "consumer, consumer organization", "creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company", "person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial", "defendant", "debtor", "real estate developer", "disabled person or disability benefit claimant", "distributor", "person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector", "drug manufacturer", "druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy", "employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of", "employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan", "electric equipment manufacturer", "electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company", "eleemosynary institution or person", "environmental organization", "employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.", "farmer, farm worker, or farm organization", "father", "female employee or job applicant", "female", "movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of", "fisherman or fishing company", "food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard", "foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity", "franchiser", "franchisee", "lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization", "person who guarantees another's obligations", "handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to", "health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor", "heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be", "hospital, medical center", "husband, or ex-husband", "involuntarily committed mental patient", "Indian, including Indian tribe or nation", "insurance company, or surety", "inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder", "investor", "injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related", "juvenile", "government contractor", "holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor", "magazine", "male", "medical or Medicaid claimant", "medical supply or manufacturing co.", "racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant", "minority female employee or job applicant", "manufacturer", "management, executive officer, or director, of business entity", "military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist", "mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company", "mother", "auto manufacturer", "newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service", "radio and television network, except cable tv", "nonprofit organization or business", "nonresident", "nuclear power plant or facility", "owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels", "shareholders to whom a tender offer is made", "tender offer", "oil company, or natural gas producer", "elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly", "out of state noncriminal defendant", "political action committee", "parent or parents", "parking lot or service", "patient of a health professional", "telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company", "physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society", "public interest organization", "physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee", "pipe line company", "package, luggage, container", "political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official", "indigent, needy, welfare recipient", "indigent defendant", "private person", "prisoner, inmate of penal institution", "professional organization, business, or person", "probationer, or parolee", "protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer", "public utility", "publisher, publishing company", "radio station", "racial or ethnic minority", "person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination", "racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "realtor", "journalist, columnist, member of the news media", "resident", "restaurant, food vendor", "retarded person, or mental incompetent", "retired or former employee", "railroad", "private school, college, or university", "seller or vendor", "shipper, including importer and exporter", "shopping center, mall", "spouse, or former spouse", "stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder", "retail business or outlet", "student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only", "tenant or lessee", "theater, studio", "forest products, lumber, or logging company", "person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent", "trucking company, or motor carrier", "television station", "union member", "unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant", "union, labor organization, or official of", "veteran", "voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)", "wholesale trade", "wife, or ex-wife", "witness, or person under subpoena", "network", "slave", "slave-owner", "bank of the united states", "timber company", "u.s. job applicants or employees", "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "General Land Office of Commissioners", "Transportation Security Administration", "Surface Transportation Board", "U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.", "Reconstruction Finance Corp.", "Department or Secretary of Homeland Security", "Unidentifiable", "International Entity" ]
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PALMER v. CITY OF EUCLID, OHIO No. 143. Argued January 11, 1971 Decided May 24, 1971 Niki Z. Schwartz argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Joshua J. Kancelbaum. David J. Lombardo argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was William T. Monroe. Per Curiam. Appellant Palmer was convicted by a jury of violating the City of Euclid’s “suspicious person ordinance,” that is, of being “[a]ny person who wanders about the streets or other public ways or who is found abroad at late or unusual hours in the night without any visible or lawful business and who does not give satisfactory account of himself.” He was fined $50 and sentenced to 30 days in jail. The County Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio was dismissed “for the reason that no substantial constitutional question exists herein.” We noted probable jurisdiction. 397 U. S. 1073 (1970). We reverse the judgment against Palmer because the ordinance is so vague and lacking in ascertainable standards of guilt that, as applied to Palmer, it failed to give “a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden . . . United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 617 (1954). The elements of the crime defined by the ordinance apparently are (1) wandering about the streets or being abroad at late or unusual hours; (2) being at the time without visible or lawful business; and (3) failing to give a satisfactory explanation for his presence on the streets. Palmer, in his car, was seen late at night in a parking lot. A female left his car and entered by the front door an adjoining apartment house. Palmer then pulled onto the street, parked with his lights on, and used a two-way radio. He was not armed. He said he had just let off a friend. He was then arrested. At the station he gave three different addresses for himself and said he did not know his friend’s name or where she was going when she left his car. Palmer could reasonably be charged with knowing that he was on the streets at a late or unusual hour and that denying knowledge of his friend’s identity and claiming multiple addresses amounted to an unsatisfactory explanation under the ordinance. But in our view the ordinance gave insufficient notice to the average person that discharging a friend at an apartment house and then talking on a car radio while parked on the street was enough to show him to be “without any visible or lawful business.” Insofar as this record reveals, everything appellant did was quite visible and there is no suggestion whatsoever that what he did was unlawful under local, state, or federal law. If his conduct nevertheless satisfied the being-without-visible-or-lawful-business element of the ordinance, as the state courts must have held, it is quite unreasonable in our view to charge him with notice that such would be the construction of the ordinance. “The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.” United States v. Harriss, supra, at 617; Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U. S. 347 (1964); Wright v. Georgia, 373 U. S. 284 (1963). The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is reversed. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Harlan concurs in the result. The ordinance seemingly requires a “business” purpose to be on the streets. But it seems irrational to construe the ordinance as permitting only visible and lawful commercial activities on the streets, thus in effect converting the ordinance into a curfew with exceptions for lawful commercial conduct. Neither the lower court nor appellee city suggests that the ordinance should be construed in this manner or that anyone would expect that it would be so construed.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the reason, if any, given by the court for granting the petition for certiorari.
What reason, if any, does the court give for granting the petition for certiorari?
[ "case did not arise on cert or cert not granted", "federal court conflict", "federal court conflict and to resolve important or significant question", "putative conflict", "conflict between federal court and state court", "state court conflict", "federal court confusion or uncertainty", "state court confusion or uncertainty", "federal court and state court confusion or uncertainty", "to resolve important or significant question", "to resolve question presented", "no reason given", "other reason" ]
[ 0 ]
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HENRY v. UNITED STATES. No. 17. Argued October 20-21, 1959. Decided November 23, 1959. Edward J. Calihan, Jr. argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Kirby W. Patterson argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Wilkey and Beatrice Rosenberg. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner stands convicted of unlawfully possessing three cartons of radios valued at more than $100 which had been stolen from an interstate shipment. See 18 U. S. C. § 659. The issue in the ease is whether there was probable cause for the arrest leading to the search that produced the evidence on which the conviction rests. A timely motion to suppress the evidence was made by petitioner and overruled by the District Court; and the judgment of.conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on a divided vote. 259 F. 2d 725. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari, 359 U. S. 904. There was. a theft from an interstate shipment, of whisky at a terminal in Chicago. The next day two FBI agents were in the neighborhood investigating it. They saw petitioner and one Pierotti walk across a street from a tavern and get into an automobile. The agents had been given, by the employer of Pierotti, information of an undisclosed nature “concerning the implication of the defendant Pierotti with interstate shipments.” But, so far as the record shows, he never went so far as to tell the agents he suspected Pierotti of any such thefts. The agents followed the car and-saw it enter an alley and stop. Petitioner got but of the car, entered a gangway leading to residential premises and returned in a few minutes with some cartons.. He placed them in the car and he and Pierotti drove off. . The agents were unable to follow the car. But later they found it parked at the same place near the tavern. Shortly they saw petitioner and Pierotti leave the tavern, get into the car, and drive off.- The car stopped in the same alley as before; petitioner entered the same gangway and returned with more cartons. The agents observed this transaction-from a distance of some 300 feet and could not determine the size, number or contents of the cartons. As the car drove off the agents followed it and finally, when they met it, waved it to a stop. As he. got out of the car, petitioner was heard to say, “Hold it; it is-the G’s.” This was followed by, “Tell him he [you] just picked me up.” The agents searched the car, placed the cartons (which bore the name “Admiral” and were addressed to an out-of-state company) in their car, took the merchandise and petitioner and Pierotti to their office and held them for about two hours when the agents learned that the cartons contained stolen radios. They then placed the men under formal arrest. The statutory authority of FBI officers and agents to make felony arrests without a warrant is restricted to offenses committed “in their presence” or to instances where they have “reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing” a felony. 18 U. S. C.' § 3052. The statute states the constitutional standard, for it is the command of the Fourth Amendment that no warrants for either searches or arrests shall issue except “upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be .seized.” The requirement of probable cause has roots that are deep in our history. The general warrant, in which the name of the person to be arrested was left blank, and the writs of assistance, against which James Otis inveighed, both perpetuated the oppressive practice of allowing the police to arrest and search on suspicion. Police control took the place of judicial control, since no showing of “probable cause” before' a magistrate was required. The Virginia Declaration of Rights, adopted June 12, 1776, rebelled against that practice: “That general warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be. commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose offence is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted.” The Maryland Declaration of Rights (1776), Art. XXIII, was equally emphatic: “That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or to seize any person or property, are grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants — to search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without naming or describing the place, or the person in special — are illegal, and ought not to be granted.” And see North Carolina Declaration of Rights (1776), Art. XI; Pennsylvania Constitution (1776), Art. X; Massachusetts Constitution (1780), Pt. I, Art. XIV. That philosophy later was reflected in the Fourth Amendment. And as the early American decisions both before and immediately after its adoption show, common rumor or report, suspicion, or even “strong reason to suspect” was not adequate to support a warrant for arrest. And that principle has survived to this day. See United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, 593-595; Johnson v. Unitéd States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-15; Giordenello v. United States, 357 U. S. 480, 486. Its high water was Johnson v. United States, supra, where the smell of opium coming from a closed room was not enough to support an arrest and search without a warrant.’ It was against this background that two scholars recently wrote, “Arrest on mere suspicion collides violently with the basic human right of liberty.” Evidence required to establish guilt is not necessary. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160; Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307. On the other hand, good faith on the part-of the arresting officers is not enough. Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known, to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been committed. Stacey v. Emery, 97 U. S. 642, 645. And see Director General v. Kastenbaum, 263 U. S. 25, 28; United States v. Di Re, supra, at 592; Giordenello v. United States, supra, at 486. It is important, we think, that this requirement be strictly enforced, for the standard set by the Constitution protects both the officer and the citizen. If the officer acts with probable cause, he is protected even though it turns out that the citizen is innocent. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 156. And while a search without a warrant is, within limits, permissible if incident to a lawful arrest, if an arrest without a warrant is to support an incidental search, it must be made ■ with probable cause. Carroll v. United States, supra, at 155-156. This immunity of officers cannot fairly be enlarged without jeopardizing the privacy or security of the citizen. We turn then to the question whether prudent men in the shoes of these officers (Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 175) would have seen enough to permit them to believe that petitioner was violating, or had violated the law. We think not. The prosecution conceded below, and adheres to the concession here, that the arrest took place when the federal agents stopped the car. That is our view on the facts of this particular case.- When the officers interrupted the two men and restricted their liberty of movement, the arrest, for purposes of this case, was complete. It is, therefore, necessary to determine whether at or before that time they had reasonable cause to believe that a crime had been committed. The fact that afterwards contraband was discovered is not enough. An arrest is not justified by what the subsequent search discloses, as Johnson v. United States, supra, holds. It is true that a federal crime had been committed at a terminal in the neighborhood, whisky having been stolen from an interstate shipment. Petitioner’s friend, Pierotti, had been suspected of some implication in some interstate shipments, as we have said. But as this record stands, what those shipments were and the manner in which he was implicated remain unexplained and undefined. The rumor about him is therefore practically meaningless.- On the record there was far from enough evidence against him to justify a magistrate in issuing a warrant. So far as the record shows, petitioner had not even been suspected of criminal activity prior to this time. Riding in the car, stopping in an alley, picking up packages, driving away — these were all acts that- were outwardly innocent. Their movements in the car had-.no tnarkof fleeing men or men acting furtively. The case might bé different if the packages had been taken from a terminal or from an interstate trucking platforim’. But they were not. As we have said, the alley where the packages were picked up was in a residential section. The fact that packages have been stolen does not make every man who carries a package subject to arrest nor the package subject to seizure. The police must, have reasonable' grounds to believe that the particular' package carried by the citizen is contraband'. Its shape and design might-at times be adequate. The weight of it and the manner in which it is carried' might at times be enough. But there was nothing to indicate that the cartons here in issue probably contained liquor. The fact that, they contained other contraband appeared only some hours after the arrest. What transpired at or after the time the car was stopped- by the- officers is, as. we have said, irrelevant to the narrow issue before us. To repeat, • an. arrest is not justified by what the. subsequent search discloses. Under our system suspicion is not enough for an officer to lay hands on a citizen. It is better, so the Fourth Amendment- teaches, that the guilty sometimes go free than that citizens be subject to easy arrest. The faict that the suspects were in an automobile is not enough. Carroll v. United States, supra, liberalized the rule governing searches when a moving vehicle is involved. But that decision merely relaxed the requirements for a warrant on- grounds of practicality. It did not dispense with the need for probable caüse. Reversed. Mr. Justice Black concurs in the result. Declared illegal by the House of Commons in 1766. 16 Hansard, Parl. Hist. Eng. 207. Quincy’s Mass. Rep. 1761-1772, Appendix, p. 469. Frisbie v. Butler, Kirby’s Rep. (Conn.) 1785-1788, p. 213. Conner v. Commonwealth, 3 Binn (Pa.) 38; Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40; Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Met. (Mass.) 329. Conner v. Commonwealth, supra, note 4, at 43. Hogan and Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale - and Rescue, 47 Geo. L. J. 1, 22. Uniform Crime Reports for the United States, compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Vol. XXVIII, No. 1, Semiannual Bull., 1957), pp. 64, 65, shows 1956 arrest statistics for 1,025 cities in the United States, including 26 cities over 250,000 .population/and 458 cities under 10,000 population. The report states that 111,274 were arrested on suspicion (but not in connection with any specific offense) and subsequently released without prosecution. This was at the rate of 280.4 per 100,000 inhabitants. The grand total of persons arrested — both for a specific offense (but excluding traffic offenses) and on suspicion alone — and released without being held for prosecution was 264,601. This was at the rate of 666.7 per 100,000 inhabitants. An alternative theory that the arrest took place at a subsequent time was discussed by the Government only to make clear that it would press that position on the facts of another case now pending here, No. 52, Rios v. United States.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations
What is the ideological direction of the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court?
[ "Conservative", "Liberal", "Unspecifiable" ]
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AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION et al. v. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION No. 80-1690. Argued January 11, 1982 Decided March 23, 1982 Newton N. Minow argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Jack R. Bierig, David W. Carpenter, William J. Doyle, and Linda L. Randell. Howard E. Shapiro argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Baxter, Deputy Solicitor General Shapiro, Elliott Schulder, March Coleman, and L. Barry Costilo Peter M. Sfikas filed a brief for the American Dental Association as amicus curiae urging reversal. A brief for the’ State of Ohio et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance was. filed by William J. Brown, Attorney General of Ohio, and Eugene F. McShane, Charles.D. Weller, and Clifton E. Johnson, Assistant Attorneys General; Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona; J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General of Colorado, and Thomas P. McMahon, Assistant Attorney General; Carl R. Ajello, Attorney General of Connecticut, and Robert M. Larger and John R. Lacey, Assistant Attorneys General; Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, and John R. Perkins, Assistant Attorney General; Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General of Maryland, and Charles 0. Monk II and Naomi F. Samet, Assistant Attorneys General; Warren Spannaus, Attorney General of Minnesota, and Stephen P. Kilgrijf, Special Assistant Attorney General; Paul L. Douglas, Attorney General of Nebraska, and Dale A. Comer, Assistant Attorney General; JejfBingaman, Attorney General of New Mexico, and James J. Wechsler and Richard H. Levin, Assistant Attorneys General; Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, and Lloyd Constantine, Assistant Attorney General; Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General of North Carolina, H. A. Cole, Jr., Special Deputy Attorney General, and Fred R. Gamin, Assistant Attorney General; Leroy S. Zimmerman, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, and Carl S. Hisiro, Deputy Attorney General; Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General of Rhode Island, and Patrick J. Quinlan, Special Assistant Attorney General; and Chauncey H. Browning, Attorney General of West Virginia, and Charles G. Brown, Deputy Attorney General. Per Curiam. The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them. Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer. Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.
Who is the petitioner of the case?
[ "attorney general of the United States, or his office", "specified state board or department of education", "city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit", "state commission, board, committee, or authority", "county government or county governmental unit, except school district", "court or judicial district", "state department or agency", "governmental employee or job applicant", "female governmental employee or job applicant", "minority governmental employee or job applicant", "minority female governmental employee or job applicant", "not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable", "retired or former governmental employee", "U.S. House of Representatives", "interstate compact", "judge", "state legislature, house, or committee", "local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough", "governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact", "state or U.S. supreme court", "local school district or board of education", "U.S. Senate", "U.S. senator", "foreign nation or instrumentality", "state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of", "state college or university", "United States", "State", "person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime", "advertising business or agency", "agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor", "airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes", "airline", "distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages", "alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked", "American Medical Association", "National Railroad Passenger Corp.", "amusement establishment, or recreational facility", "arrested person, or pretrial detainee", "attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association", "author, copyright holder", "bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company", "bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization", "establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store", "water transportation, stevedore", "bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines", "brewery, distillery", "broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm", "construction industry", "bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle", "business, corporation", "buyer, purchaser", "cable TV", "car dealer", "person convicted of crime", "tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband", "chemical company", "child, children, including adopted or illegitimate", "religious organization, institution, or person", "private club or facility", "coal company or coal mine operator", "computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software", "consumer, consumer organization", "creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company", "person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial", "defendant", "debtor", "real estate developer", "disabled person or disability benefit claimant", "distributor", "person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector", "drug manufacturer", "druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy", "employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of", "employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan", "electric equipment manufacturer", "electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company", "eleemosynary institution or person", "environmental organization", "employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.", "farmer, farm worker, or farm organization", "father", "female employee or job applicant", "female", "movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of", "fisherman or fishing company", "food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard", "foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity", "franchiser", "franchisee", "lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization", "person who guarantees another's obligations", "handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to", "health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor", "heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be", "hospital, medical center", "husband, or ex-husband", "involuntarily committed mental patient", "Indian, including Indian tribe or nation", "insurance company, or surety", "inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder", "investor", "injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related", "juvenile", "government contractor", "holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor", "magazine", "male", "medical or Medicaid claimant", "medical supply or manufacturing co.", "racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant", "minority female employee or job applicant", "manufacturer", "management, executive officer, or director, of business entity", "military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist", "mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company", "mother", "auto manufacturer", "newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service", "radio and television network, except cable tv", "nonprofit organization or business", "nonresident", "nuclear power plant or facility", "owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels", "shareholders to whom a tender offer is made", "tender offer", "oil company, or natural gas producer", "elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly", "out of state noncriminal defendant", "political action committee", "parent or parents", "parking lot or service", "patient of a health professional", "telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company", "physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society", "public interest organization", "physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee", "pipe line company", "package, luggage, container", "political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official", "indigent, needy, welfare recipient", "indigent defendant", "private person", "prisoner, inmate of penal institution", "professional organization, business, or person", "probationer, or parolee", "protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer", "public utility", "publisher, publishing company", "radio station", "racial or ethnic minority", "person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination", "racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "realtor", "journalist, columnist, member of the news media", "resident", "restaurant, food vendor", "retarded person, or mental incompetent", "retired or former employee", "railroad", "private school, college, or university", "seller or vendor", "shipper, including importer and exporter", "shopping center, mall", "spouse, or former spouse", "stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder", "retail business or outlet", "student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only", "tenant or lessee", "theater, studio", "forest products, lumber, or logging company", "person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent", "trucking company, or motor carrier", "television station", "union member", "unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant", "union, labor organization, or official of", "veteran", "voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)", "wholesale trade", "wife, or ex-wife", "witness, or person under subpoena", "network", "slave", "slave-owner", "bank of the united states", "timber company", "u.s. job applicants or employees", "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "General Land Office of Commissioners", "Transportation Security Administration", "Surface Transportation Board", "U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.", "Reconstruction Finance Corp.", "Department or Secretary of Homeland Security", "Unidentifiable", "International Entity" ]
[ 35 ]
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HORTON v. CALIFORNIA No. 88-7164. Argued February 21, 1990 Decided June 4, 1990 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Blackmun, O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 142. Juliana Drous, by appointment of the Court, 493 U. S. 952, argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Martin S. Kaye, Supervising Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, Richard B. Iglehart, Chief Assistant Attorney General, John H. Sugiyama, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Clifford K. Thompson, Jr., Deputy Attorney General. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Dennis, Deputy Solicitor General Bryson, and Brian J. Martin; and for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. by Gregory U. Evans, Daniel B. Hales, George D. Webster, Jack E. Yelverton, Fred E. Inbau, Wayne W. Schmidt, Bernard J. Farber, and James P. Manak. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we revisit an issue that was considered, but not conclusively resolved, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971): Whether the warrantless seizure of evidence of crime in plain view is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment if the discovery of the evidence was not inadvertent. We conclude that even though inadvertence is a characteristic of most legitimate “plain-view” seizures, it is not a necessary condition. I Petitioner was convicted of the armed robbery of Erwin Wallaker, the treasurer of the San Jose Coin Club. When Wallaker returned to his home after the Club’s annual show, he entered his garage and was accosted by two masked men, one armed with a machine gun and the other with an electrical shocking device, sometimes referred to as a “stun gun.” The two men shocked Wallaker, bound and handcuffed him, and robbed him of jewelry and cash. During the encounter sufficient conversation took place to enable Wallaker subsequently to identify petitioner’s distinctive voice. His identification was partially corroborated by a witness who saw the robbers leaving the scene and by evidence that petitioner had attended the coin show. Sergeant LaRault, an experienced police officer, investigated the crime and determined that there was probable cause to search petitioner’s home for the proceeds of the robbery and for the weapons used by the robbers. His affidavit for a search warrant referred to police reports that described the weapons as well as the proceeds, but the warrant issued by the Magistrate only authorized a search for the proceeds, including three specifically described rings. Pursuant to the warrant, LaRault searched petitioner’s residence, but he did not find the stolen property. During the course of the search, however, he discovered the weapons in plain view and seized them. Specifically, he seized an Uzi machine gun, a .38-caliber revolver, two stun guns, a handcuff key, a San Jose Coin Club advertising brochure, and a few items of clothing identified by the victim. LaRault testified that while he was searching for the rings, he also was interested in finding other evidence connecting petitioner to the robbery. Thus, the seized evidence was not discovered “inadvertently.” The trial court refused to suppress the evidence found in petitioner’s home and, after a jury trial, petitioner was found guilty and sentenced to prison. The California Court of Appeal affirmed. App. 43. It rejected petitioner’s argument that our decision in Coolidge required suppression of the seized evidence that had not been listed in the warrant because its discovery was not inadvertent. App. 52-53. The court relied on the California Supreme Court’s decision in North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 502 P. 2d 1305 (1972). In that case the court noted that the discussion of the inadvertence limitation on the “plain-view” doctrine in Justice Stewart’s opinion in Coolidge had been joined by only three other Members of this Court and therefore was not binding on it. The California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s request for review. App. 78. Because the California courts’ interpretation of the “plain-view” doctrine conflicts with the view of other courts, and because the unresolved issue is important, we granted certiorari, 493 U. S. 889 (1989). II The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The right to security in person and property protected by the Fourth Amendment may be invaded in quite different ways by searches and seizures. A search compromises the individual interest in privacy; a seizure deprives the individual of dominion over his or her person or property. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U. S. 109, 113 (1984). The “plain-view” doctrine is often considered an exception to the general rule that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, but this characterization overlooks the important difference between searches and seizures. If an article is already in plain view, neither its observation nor its seizure would involve any invasion of privacy. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U. S. 321, 325 (1987); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U. S. 765, 771 (1983). A seizure of the article, however, would obviously invade the owner’s possessory interest. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U. S. 463, 469 (1985); Jacobsen, 466 U. S., at 113. If “plain view” justifies an exception from an otherwise applicable warrant requirement, therefore, it must be an exception that is addressed to the concerns that are implicated by seizures rather than by searches. The criteria that generally guide “plain-view” seizures were set forth in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971). The Court held that the police, in seizing two automobiles parked in plain view on the defendant’s driveway in the course of arresting the defendant, violated the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, particles of gunpowder that had been subsequently found in vacuum sweepings from one of the cars could not be introduced in evidence against the defendant. The State endeavored to justify the seizure of the automobiles, and their subsequent search at the police station, on four different grounds, including the “plain-view” doctrine. The scope of that doctrine as it had developed in earlier cases was fairly summarized in these three paragraphs from Justice Stewart’s opinion: “It is well established that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant. But it is important to keep in mind that, in the vast majority of cases, any evidence seized by the police will be in plain view, at least at the moment of seizure. The problem with the ‘plain-view’ doctrine has been to identify the circumstances in which plain view has legal significance rather than being simply the normal concomitant of any search, legal or illegal. “An example of the applicability of the ‘plain-view’ doctrine is the situation in which the police have a warrant to search a given area for specified objects, and in the course of the search come across some other article of incriminating character. Cf. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 358 [(1931)]; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 465 [(1932)]; Steele v. United States, 267 U. S. 498 [(1925)]; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 571 [(1969)] (Stewart, J., concurring in result). Where the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain view of such an article is supported, not by a warrant, but by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, the seizure is also legitimate. Thus the police may inadvertently come across evidence while in ‘hot pursuit’ of a fleeing suspect. Warden v. Hayden, [387 U. S. 294 (1967)]; cf. Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57 [(1924)]. And an object that comes into view during a search incident to arrest that is appropriately limited in scope under existing law may be seized without a warrant. Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. [752,] 762-763 [(1969)]. Finally, the ‘plain-view’ doctrine has been applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Harris v. United States, 390 U. S. 234 [(1968)]; Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U. S. 731 [(1969)]; Ker v. California, 374 U. S. [23,] 43 [(1963)]. Cf. Lewis v. United States, 385 U. S. 206 [(1966)]. “What the ‘plain-view’ cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification—whether it be a warrant for- another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused—and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the ‘plain-view’ doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.” Id., at 465-466 (footnote omitted). Justice Stewart then described the two limitations on the doctrine that he found implicit in its rationale: First, that “plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence,” id., at 468; and second, that “the discovery of evidence in plain view must be inadvertent.” Id., at 469. Justice Stewart’s analysis of the “plain-view” doctrine did not command a majority, and a plurality of the Court has since made clear that the discussion is “not a binding precedent.” Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730, 737 (1983) (opinion of Rehnquist, J.). Justice Harlan, who concurred in the Court’s judgment and in its response to the dissenting opinions, 403 U. S., at 473-484, 490-493, did not join the plurality’s discussion of the “plain-view” doctrine. See id., at 464-473. The decision nonetheless is a binding precedent. Before discussing the second limitation, which is implicated in this case, it is therefore necessary to explain why the first adequately supports the Court’s judgment. It is, of course, an essential predicate to any valid warrantless seizure of incriminating evidence that the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed. There are, moreover, two additional conditions that must be satisfied to justify the warrantless seizure. First, not only must the item be in plain view; its incriminating character must also be “immediately apparent.” Id., at 466; see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U. S., at 326-327. Thus, in Coolidge, the cars were obviously in plain view, but their probative value remained uncertain until after the interiors were swept and examined microscopically. Second, not only must the officer be lawfully located in a place from which the object can be plainly seen, but he or she must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself. As the United States has suggested, Justice Harlan’s vote in Coolidge may have rested on the fact that the seizure of the cars was accomplished by means of a warrantless trespass on the defendant’s property. In all events, we are satisfied that the absence of inadvertence was not essential to the Court’s rejection of the State’s “plain-view” argument in Coolidge. III Justice Stewart concluded that the inadvertence requirement was necessary to avoid a violation of the express constitutional requirement that a valid warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. He explained: “The rationale of the exception to the warrant requirement, as just stated, is that a plain-view seizure will not turn an initially valid (and therefore limited) search into a ‘general’ one, while the inconvenience of procuring a warrant to cover an inadvertent discovery is great. But where the discovery is anticipated, where the police know in advance the location of the evidence and intend to seize it, the situation is altogether different. The requirement of a warrant to seize imposes no inconvenience whatever, or at least none which is constitutionally cognizable in a legal system that regards warrantless searches as ‘per se unreasonable’ in the absence of ‘exigent circumstances.’ “If the initial intrusion is bottomed upon a warrant that fails to mention a particular object, though the police know its location and intend to seize it, then there is a violation of the express constitutional requirement of ‘Warrants . . . particularly describing . . . [the] things to be seized.’” 403 U. S., at 469-471. We find two flaws in this reasoning. First, evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer. The fact that an officer is interested in an item of evidence and fully expects to find it in the course of a search should not invalidate its seizure if the search is confined in area and duration by the terms of a warrant or a valid exception to the warrant requirement. If the officer has knowledge approaching certainty that the item will be found, we see no reason why he or she would deliberately omit a particular description of the item to be seized from the application for a search warrant. Specification of the additional item could only permit the officer to expand the scope of the search. On the other hand, if he or she has a valid warrant to search for one item and merely a suspicion concerning the second, whether or not it amounts to probable cause, we fail to see why that suspicion should immunize the second item from seizure if it is found during a lawful search for the first. The hypothetical case put by Justice White in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Coolidge is instructive: “Let us suppose officers secure a warrant to search a house for a rifle. While staying well within the range of a rifle search, they discover two photographs of the murder victim, both in plain sight in the bedroom. Assume also that the discovery of the one photograph was inadvertent but finding the other was anticipated. The Court would permit the seizure of only one of the photographs. But in terms of the ‘minor’ peril to Fourth Amendment values there is surely no difference between these two photographs: the interference with possession is the same in each case and the officers’ appraisal of the photograph they expected to see is no less reliable than their judgment about the other. And in both situations the actual inconvenience and danger to evidence remain identical if the officers must depart and secure a warrant.” Id., at 516. Second, the suggestion that the inadvertence requirement is necessary to prevent the police from conducting general searches, or from converting specific warrants into general warrants, is not persuasive because that interest is already served by the requirements that no warrant issue unless it “particularly describ[es] the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized,” see Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U. S. 79, 84 (1987); Steele v. United States No. 1, 267 U. S. 498, 503 (1925), and that a warrantless search be circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation. See, e. g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U. S. 325, 332-334 (1990); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 393 (1978). Scrupulous adherence to these requirements serves the interests in limiting the area and duration of the search that the inadvertence requirement inadequately protects. Once those commands have been satisfied and the officer has a lawful right of access, however, no additional Fourth Amendment interest is furthered by requiring that the discovery of evidence be inadvertent. If the scope of the search exceeds that permitted by the terms of a validly issued warrant or the character of the relevant exception from the warrant requirement, the subsequent seizure is unconstitutional without more. Thus, in the case of a search incident to a lawful arrest, “[i]f the police stray outside the scope of an authorized Chimel search they are already in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and evidence so seized will be excluded; adding a second reason for excluding evidence hardly seems worth the candle.” Coolidge, 403 U. S., at 517 (White, J., concurring and dissenting). Similarly, the object of a warrantless search of an automobile also defines its scope: “The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is not defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found. Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a garage will not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, probable cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being transported in a van will not justify a warrantless search of a suitcase. Probable cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does not justify a search of the entire cab.” United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 824 (1982). In this case, the scope of the search was not enlarged in the slightest by the omission of any reference to the weapons in the warrant. Indeed, if the three rings and other items named in the warrant had been found at the outset—or if petitioner had them in his possession and had responded to the warrant by producing them immediately—no search for weapons could have taken place. Again, Justice White’s concurring and dissenting opinion in Coolidge is instructive: “Police with a warrant for a rifle may search only places where rifles might be and must terminate the search once the rifle is found; the inadvertence rule will in no way reduce the number of places into which they may lawfully look.” 403 U. S., at 517. As we have already suggested, by hypothesis the seizure of an object in plain view does not involve an intrusion on privacy. If the interest in privacy has been invaded, the violation must have occurred before the object came into plain view and there is no need for an inadvertence limitation on seizures to condemn it. The prohibition against general searches and general warrants serves primarily as a protection against unjustified intrusions on privacy. But reliance on privacy concerns that support that prohibition is misplaced when the inquiry concerns the scope of an exception that merely authorizes an officer with a lawful right of access to an item to seize it without a warrant. In this case the items seized from petitioner’s home were discovered during a lawful search authorized by a valid warrant. When they were discovered, it was immediately apparent to the officer that they constituted incriminating evidence. He had probable cause, not only to obtain a warrant to search for the stolen property, but also to believe that the weapons and handguns had been used in the crime he was investigating. The search was authorized by the warrant; the seizure was authorized by the “plain-view” doctrine. The judgment is affirmed. It is so ordered. Although the officer viewed other handguns and rifles, he did not seize them because there was no probable cause to believe they were associated with criminal activity. App. 30; see Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U. S. 321, 327 (1987). “In Coolidge, the police arrested a murder suspect in his house and thereupon seized his automobile and searched it later at the police station, finding physical evidence that the victim had been inside the vehicle. The record disclosed that the police had known for some time of the probable role of the car in the crime, and there were no ‘exigent circumstances’ to justify a warrantless search. Accordingly, the plurality opinion of Justice Stewart concluded that the seizure could not be justified on the theory that the vehicle was itself the ‘instrumentality’ of the crime and was discovered ‘in plain view’ of the officers. Justice Stewart was of the opinion that the ‘plain-view’ doctrine is applicable only to the inadvertent discovery of incriminating evidence. “If the plurality opinion in Coolidge were entitled to binding effect as precedent, we would have difficulty distinguishing its holding from the instant case, for the discovery of petitioner’s car was no more ‘inadvertent’ than in Coolidge. However, that portion of Justice Stewart’s plurality opinion which proposed the adoption of new restrictions to the ‘plain-view’ rule was signed by only four members of the court (Stewart, J., Douglas, J., Brennan, J., and Marshall, J.). Although concurring in the judgment, Justice Harlan declined to join in that portion of the opinion, and the four remaining justices expressly disagreed with Justice Stewart on this point.” North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d, at 307-308, 502 P. 2d, at 1308 (citations omitted). See, e. g., Wolfenbarger v. Williams, 826 F. 2d 930 (CA10 1987); United States v. $10,000 in United States Currency, 780 F. 2d 213 (CA2 1986); United States v. Roberts, 644 F. 2d 683 (CA8), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 821 (1980); United States v. Antill, 615 F. 2d 648 (CA5 1980); Terry v. State, 271 Ark. 715, 610 S. W. 2d 272 (App. 1981); State v. Johnson, 17 Wash. App. 153, 561 P. 2d 701 (1977); Commonwealth v. Cefalo, 381 Mass. 319, 409 N. E. 2d 719 (1980); State v. Sanders, 431 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. App. 1983); State v. Galloway, 232 Kan. 87, 652 P. 2d 673 (1982); Clark v. State, 498 N. E. 2d 918 (Ind. 1986); State v. Eiseman, 461 A. 2d 369, 380 (R. I. 1983); State v. McColgan, 631 S. W. 2d 151 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981); Tucker v. State, 620 P. 2d 1314 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980); State v. Dingle, 279 S. C. 278, 306 S. E. 2d 223 (1983). See also the cases cited in the Appendices to Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion, post, at 149-153. At least two other state courts have agreed with the California Supreme Court. See State v. Pontier, 95 Idaho 707, 712, 518 P. 2d 969, 974 (1974); State v. Romero, 660 P. 2d 715 (Utah 1983). “We reaffirm the basic rule of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence stated by Justice Stewart for a unanimous Court in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 390 [(1978)]: “‘The Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 [(1967)] (footnotes omitted).’” United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 824-825 (1982). “It is important to distinguish ‘plain view,’ as used in Coolidge to justify seizure of an object, from an officer’s mere observation of an item left in plain view. Whereas the latter generally involves no Fourth Amendment search, see infra, at 740; Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), the former generally does implicate the Amendment’s limitations upon seizures of personal property.” Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730, 738, n. 4 (1983) (opinion of Rehnquist, J.). The State primarily contended that the seizures were authorized by a warrant issued by the attorney general, but the Court held the warrant invalid because it had not been issued by “a neutral and detached magistrate.” 403 U. S., at 449-453. In addition, the State relied on three exceptions from the warrant requirement: (1) search incident to arrest; (2) the automobile exception; and (3) the “plain-view” doctrine. Id., at 453-473. “This is simply a corollary of the familiar principle discussed above, that no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent ‘exigent circumstances.’ Incontrovertible testimony of the senses that an incriminating object is on premises belonging to a criminal suspect may establish the fullest possible measure of probable cause. But even where the object is contraband, this Court has repeatedly stated and enforced the basic rule that the police may not enter and make a warrantless seizure. Taylor v. United States, 286 U. S. 1 [(1932)]; Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 [(1948)]; McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 [(1948)]; Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 497-498 [(1958)]; Chapman v. United States, 365 U. S. 610 [(1961)]; Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699 [(1948)].” Coolidge, 403 U. S., at 468. We have since applied the same rule to the arrest of a person in his home. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U. S. 91 (1990); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980). See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 7, n. 4. “If the police have probable cause to search for a photograph as well as a rifle and they proceed to seek a warrant, they could have no possible motive for deliberately including the rifle but omitting the photograph. Quite the contrary is true. Only oversight or careless mistake would explain the omission in the warrant application if the police were convinced they had probable cause to search for the photograph.” Coolidge, 403 U. S., at 517 (White, J., concurring and dissenting). “The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment categorically prohibits the issuance of any warrant except one ‘particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.’ The manifest purpose of this particularity requirement was to prevent general searches. By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.” Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U. S., at 84. Even if the item is a container, its seizure does not compromise the interest in preserving the privacy of its contents because it may only be opened pursuant to either a search warrant, see Smith v. Ohio, 494 U. S. 541 (1990); United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 701 (1983); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977); United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249 (1970); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 733 (1878), or one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U. S. 367 (1987); United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 (1982).
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
What is the issue area of the decision?
[ "Criminal Procedure", "Civil Rights", "First Amendment", "Due Process", "Privacy", "Attorneys", "Unions", "Economic Activity", "Judicial Power", "Federalism", "Interstate Relations", "Federal Taxation", "Miscellaneous", "Private Action" ]
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FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION v. MALLEN et al. No. 87-82. Argued March 22, 1988 Decided May 31, 1988 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. John Harrison argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Cohen, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, Michael Kimmel, Ronald R. Glancz, and James A. Clark. Mary E. Curtin, by appointment of the Court, 484 U. S. 1055, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief was David J. Siegrist. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented by this appeal concerns the constitutionality of a statutory provision that authorizes the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to suspend from office an indicted official of a federally insured bank. The District Court concluded that the statutory post-suspension procedure is unconstitutional because it does not guarantee the suspended officer a sufficiently prompt decision or an unqualified right to present oral testimony. The District Court therefore enjoined the FDIC from enforcing an order suspending appellee from serving as the president and as a director of the Farmers State Bank in Kanawha, Iowa, and from otherwise participating in the conduct of the affairs of any FDIC-insured bank. 667 F. Supp. 652, 662, 664 (1987). We noted probable jurisdiction. 484 U. S. 911 (1987). We reverse. J — l In 1966 Congress adopted several amendments to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to give federal banking agencies more effective regulatory powers to deal with crises in financial institutions. The amendments were designed to protect the interests of depositors and to prevent the potentially debilitating effect of public loss of confidence in the banking industry. See S. Rep. No. 1482, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 4-5 (1966) (S. Rep.); 112 Cong. Rec. 20080 (1966) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire). Congress therefore enacted 12 U. S. C. § 1818(g)(1) to give the appropriate federal banking agency the authority to take immediate action to suspend an officer or director of an insured bank if he or she is formally charged with a felony involving dishonesty or breach of trust. As originally enacted, § 1818(g)(1) permitted the appropriate banking agency to suspend an indicted bank officer without providing an opportunity to be heard either before or after issuance of the order of suspension. In 1974, the FDIC invoked its § 1818(g)(1) authority to suspend the president of an Illinois bank who had been indicted for conspiracy to commit mail fraud. That officer successfully challenged the constitutionality of the suspension on the ground that it had deprived him of property without due process of law. The three-judge District Court, in Feinberg v. FDIC, 420 F. Supp. 109 (DC 1976), found that the public interest in prompt action justified a suspension without a prior hearing, but concluded that the officer was constitutionally entitled to a prompt and meaningful post-suspension hearing in which he could attempt to persuade the FDIC to exercise its discretion to revoke the suspension. In its opinion, the District Court emphasized that the 1966 statute had given the FDIC standardless discretion to suspend or not to suspend an indicted bank official. In response to the Feinberg decision, in 1978 Congress amended § 1818(g) by incorporating standards in subsection (1) to guide the FDIC in the exercise of its discretion, and by enacting a new subsection (3) to give the suspended officer the right to a post-suspension hearing before the agency to demonstrate that his or her continued service would not jeopardize the interests of depositors or impair public confidence in the bank. It is the adequacy of the post-suspension procedure authorized by subsection (3) that is at issue in this appeal. II On December 10, 1986, appellee was indicted by a federal grand jury in the Northern District of Iowa. He was charged with making false statements to the FDIC in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001 and with making false statements to the Farmers State Bank with the purpose of influencing the actions of the FDIC in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1014, offenses that are punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, and that unquestionably involve dishonesty or breach of trust. At the time of the indictment, appellee was the president and a director of a federally insured bank. Thus, if the FDIC found that his continued service “[might] pose a threat to the interests of the bank’s depositors or [might] threaten to impair public confidence in the bank,” the requirements specified in § 1818(g)(1) for a suspension order would be satisfied. On January 20, 1987, the FDIC issued an ex parte order containing the necessary findings, suspending appellee as the president and as a director of the bank and prohibiting him “from further participation in any manner in the conduct of the affairs of the Bank, or any other bank insured by the FDIC.” App. to Juris. Statement 28a. A copy of the order was served on appellee on January 26, 1987. Four days later, appellee’s attorney made a written request for “an immediate administrative hearing” at which he proposed to offer “both oral testimony and written evidence” to establish that appellee’s continued service was not likely to pose a threat to the interests of the bank’s depositors or to threaten public confidence in the bank. App. 26. The letter requested that the hearing be expedited and commence no later than February 9, 1987. After various communications with appellee’s counsel, the FDIC’s regional counsel, and the Administrative Law Judge who was selected to conduct the hearing, it was decided that a hearing would be held on February 18, 1987. 667 F. Supp., at 655. In those communications, the FDIC’s regional counsel took the position that oral testimony would not be necessary. App. 28-30. The hearing officer, however, never had an opportunity to decide whether to receive such testimony because the administrative proceedings were interrupted by this litigation. On February 6, 1987, appellee filed his complaint against the FDIC in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Iowa and promptly moved for a preliminary injunction. After receiving evidence in the form of affidavits and exhibits, and after hearing oral argument — but no oral testimony — the District Court entered an order declaring the suspension “null and void” and enjoining the FDIC from enforcing it. The District Court rejected appellee’s argument that the order was invalid because it was not preceded by a hearing, 667 F. Supp., at 658, but held that the post-suspension process was “constitutionally inadequate because it does not contemplate a ‘prompt’ disposition,” id., at 659, and also “because it fails to provide for a hearing at which oral evidence can be presented,” id., at 660. The District Court made it clear that it was expressing no opinion on the merits of the suspension; its decision rested entirely on the perceived procedural shortcomings in the post-suspension process. f — H I — I Í-H It is undisputed that appellee’s interest in the right to continue to serve as president of the bank and to participate in the conduct of its affairs is a property right protected by the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. The District Court and the parties correctly recognized that the FDIC cannot arbitrarily interfere with appellee’s continuing employment relationship with the bank, nor with his interest as a substantial stockholder in the bank’s holding company. See Feinberg v. FDIC, 173 U. S. App. D. C. 120, 125, 522 F. 2d 1335, 1340 (1975); cf. Cleveland Bd. of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U. S. 532, 538-541 (1985). It is also undisputed that the FDIC’s order of suspension affected a deprivation of this property interest. Accordingly, appellee is entitled to the protection of due process of law. “Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is due.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972). Here again, we at least start with substantial agreement. Appellee does not contend that he was entitled to an opportunity to be heard prior to the order of suspension. An important government interest, accompanied by a substantial assurance that the deprivation is not baseless or unwarranted, may in limited cases demanding prompt action justify postponing the opportunity to be heard until after the initial deprivation. See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U. S. 55, 64-66 (1979); Dixon v. Love, 431 U. S. 105, 112-115 (1977); North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306, 314-321 (1908). In this case, the postponement of the hearing is supported by such an interest. The legislation under scrutiny is premised on the congressional finding that prompt suspension of indicted bank officers may be necessary to protect the interests of depositors and to maintain public confidence in our banking institutions. See S. Rep., at 4-5; 112 Cong. Rec. 20080 (1966) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire). This interest is certainly as significant as the State’s interest in preserving the integrity of the sport of horse racing, an interest that we deemed sufficiently important in Barry v. Barchi, supra, at 64-65, to justify a brief period of suspension prior to affording the suspended trainer a hearing. Moreover, as in Barchi, appellee’s suspension was supported by findings that assure that the suspension was not baseless. A grand jury had determined that there was probable cause to believe that appellee had committed a felony. Such an ex parte finding of probable cause provides a sufficient basis for an arrest, which of course constitutes a temporary deprivation of liberty. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 142, 143 (1979). It should certainly be sufficient, when coupled with the congressional finding that a prompt suspension is important to the integrity of our banking institutions, to support the order entered in this case on January 20, 1987, even though the FDIC did not provide appellee with a separate pre-suspension hearing. The three-judge District Court in the Feinberg case, the District Court in this case, and this Court are all in accord on that proposition. We cannot agree with the District Court, however, that appellee was denied a sufficiently prompt post-deprivation hearing. As our cases indicate, the District Court was properly concerned about the importance of providing prompt post-deprivation procedures in situations in which an agency’s discretionary impairment of an individual’s property is not preceded by any opportunity for a pre-deprivation hearing. See Barchi, supra, at 66.. However, the District Court seems to have been improperly concerned with the danger of an interminable delay by the agency, rather than by what would have happened in this case if the proceedings had not been interrupted, or indeed, what might have happened if the FDIC had been as dilatory as the statute permits. For even though there is a point at which an unjustified delay in completing a post-deprivation proceeding “would become a constitutional violation,” Cleveland Bd. of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U. S., at 547, the significance of such a delay cannot be evaluated in a vacuum. In determining how long a delay is justified in affording a post-suspension hearing and decision, it is appropriate to examine the importance of the private interest and the harm to this interest occasioned by delay; the justification offered by the Government for delay and its relation to the underlying governmental interest; and the likelihood that the interim decision may have been mistaken. Cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422, 434 (1982); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 334-335 (1976). Section 1818(g)(3) requires the FDIC to hold a hearing within 30 days of a written request for an opportunity to appear before the agency to contest a suspension and requires that it notify the suspended officer of its decision within 60 days of the hearing. Thus, at maximum, the suspended officer receives a decision within 90 days of his or her request for a hearing. In this case, the agency reported that it would have been able to issue a written decision within 30 days after the hearing. In addition, the initial hearing was scheduled to take place — had it not been interrupted by the preliminary injunction — 19 days after it was formally requested. Appellee’s interest in continued employment is without doubt an important interest that ought not be interrupted without substantial justification. We have repeatedly recognized the severity of depriving someone of his or her livelihood. See Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U. S. 252, 263 (1987); Loudermill, 470 U. S., at 543. Yet, even assuming that the FDIC required the complete 90 days to hear the case and reach its decision, we are not persuaded that this exceeds permissible limits. In fact, a suspended bank officer has an interest in seeing that a decision concerning his or her continued suspension is not made with excessive haste. The statute imposes a permissive standard for continuing a suspension, and presumably, when in doubt, the agency may give greater weight to the public interest and leave the suspension in place, particularly when the suspension does not impose the additional harm of a significant, incremental injury to reputation. Through the return of the indictment, the Government has already accused the appellee of serious wrongdoing. The incidental suspension is not likely to augment this injury to the officer’s reputation. We thus conclude that the 90-day period is not so long that it will always violate due process. In many cases, perhaps most, it will be justified by an important government interest coupled with factors minimizing the risk of an erroneous deprivation. Cf. id., at 546-547 (9-month delay in final decision not “unconstitutionally lengthy per se”). The magnitude of the public interest in a correct decision counsels strongly against any constitutional imperative that might require overly hasty decisionmaking. The same governmental interest that justifies permitting suspension prior to the opportunity to be heard extends to this analysis as well. Congress has determined that the integrity of the banking industry requires that indicted bank officers be suspended until it is determined that they do not pose a threat to the interests of the bank’s depositors or threaten to undermine public confidence in the bank. To return these officers to a position of influence in the conduct of the bank’s affairs prior to an opportunity to weigh the evidence carefully would threaten these interests in the same way as allowing them to remain in office from the start. Thus, the public has a strong interest in seeing the ultimate decision made in a considered and deliberate manner. Congress certainly acted within constitutional bounds in determining that 30 days might be required to set and prepare for the hearing and that in some cases another 60 days may be needed to reach a decision. The decision is a serious one and may involve complex issues and an extensive evidentiary record. See Feinberg, 420 F. Supp., at 120 (hearing would involve a “complex legal question” and “subtle interrelation of fact and policy”). Moreover, and perhaps most significantly, there is little likelihood that the deprivation is without basis. The returning of the indictment establishes that an independent body has determined that there is probable cause to believe that the officer has committed a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term in excess of one year. This finding is relevant in at least two important ways. First, the finding of probable cause by an independent body demonstrates that the suspension is not arbitrary. Second, the return of the indictment itself is an objective fact that will in most cases raise serious public concern that the bank is not being managed in a responsible manner. In addition, when § 1818(g) was initially enacted, Congress indicated that suspensions would be “virtually routine.” S. Rep., at 2. The later amendments prompted by the Feinberg decision do not suggest that Congress has disavowed this expectation; rather, the standard adopted by Congress — “may pose a threat to the bank’s depositors or may threaten to impair public confidence in the bank” — would appear to be easily satisfied in the case of bank officials charged with crimes involving dishonesty. One would expect that a decision not to suspend would be the exception. It is thus unlikely that any particular suspension would be erroneously imposed. We are therefore persuaded that the congressionally recognized interest in maintaining confidence in our banking institutions, coupled with the finding of probable cause that the officer has committed a felony involving dishonesty, is sufficient ground for a regulatory suspension of up to 90 days without the benefit of a post-suspension ruling. In reaching a contrary result, the District Court attached importance to the fact that the criminal proceedings might be concluded more promptly than the FDIC proceeding. The Court reasoned that because the Speedy Trial Act requires that a federal criminal trial take place within 70 days of indictment — plus, of course, time properly excluded under the Act — the criminal trial might well take place before the FDIC need reach a decision. See 18 U. S. C. §3161. The Court accordingly concluded that the statutorily required hearing is • “a toothless remedy for the plaintiffs since the agency can postpone a disposition until after the criminal trial has concluded.’’,. 667 F. Supp., at 659. “It is a remedy only if the agency chooses for it to be a remedy.” Ibid. We find the possibility that a suspended officer’s criminal trial may conclude before expiration of the 90-day period from request for a hearing to decision quite irrelevant. If appellee had been promptly acquitted, the basis for the suspension would have disappeared and the order would have been vacated. On the other hand, a conviction merely strengthens the case for maintaining the suspension and provides grounds for suspension under § 1829 as well. The criminal trial merely constitutes a potentially intervening factor that may require that the suspension be promptly vacated; it is difficult to conceive of how this intervening factor interferes with appellee’s due process rights. Nor is this case controlled by our decision in Barry v. Barchi, 443 U. S. 55 (1979). In Barchi, a horse trainer’s license was suspended for 15 days after a horse he trained was discovered to have had drugs in its system during a race. The state regulatory scheme raised a rebuttable presumption that the trainer either administered the drug or was negligent in protecting against such an occurrence. The trainer claimed that he neither administered the drug nor was negligent. In considering the administrative scheme, we first concluded that the State acted within the bounds of due process in suspending the trainer without a pre-suspension hearing. However, we concluded that the scheme violated due process because “it [was] as likely as not” that the trainer would irretrievably suffer the full penalty before the State would be put to its proof at a post-suspension hearing. Id., at 66. In such situations, the State must assure a prompt post-suspension hearing, “without appreciable delay.” Ibid. In this case by contrast, the appellee is not denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Rather than closing the door to the benefit of an opportunity to be heard, the possibility that the criminal trial may precede the FDIC hearing simply provides an additional forum at which to demonstrate that the suspension was unjustified. If the official is successful in the criminal proceeding, then due process has prevailed and the order of suspension must be vacated. . If he or she is convicted, the order of suspension is further supported. We also reject appellee’s contention that § 1818(g) violates due process because it does not guarantee an opportunity to present oral testimony. The statute provides that the suspended officer may “submit written materials (or, at the discretion of the agency, oral testimony)” and present oral argument. § 1818(g)(3). The- relevant regulation, in turn, delegates the decision whether to accept oral testimony to the hearing officer. See 12 CFR § 308.61(e) (1987). In rejecting appellee’s contention we may assume that there are post-suspension proceedings under § 1818(g) in which oral testimony is essential to enable the hearing officer to make a fair appraisal of the impact of a suspended officer’s continued service on the bank’s security and reputation. Indeed, we may assume that this is such a ease. The problem with ap-pellee’s position, however, is that he did not give the hearing officer an opportunity to decide whether to hear whatever testimony he might have adduced. No offer of proof was ever made, and thus certainly was not rejected^ For all we know, the hearing officer might have accepted such evidence; or if he rejected it, he might have been entirely correct in deciding that it was merely cumulative to material that was adequately covered by written submissions or that it was otherwise unnecessary or improper. A statute such as this is not to be held unconstitutional simply because it may be applied in an arbitrary or unfair way in some hypothetical case not before the Court. There is no inexorable requirement that oral testimony must be heard in every administrative proceeding in which it is tendered. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 696 (1979). The District Court’s reliance on the absence of such a guarantee in this case was therefore misplaced. IV The post-suspension procedure authorized by § 1818(g)(3) is not unconstitutional on its face; nor do we find any unfairness in the FDIC’s use of that procedure in this case. The District Court’s preliminary injunction is accordingly reversed. It is so ordered. See Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, Pub. L. 89-695, Title II, 80 Stat. 1046-1055, 12 U. S. C. § 1818. The statute defines “appropriate Federal banking agency” by reference to the type of bank subject to regulation. See 12 U. S. C. § 1813(q). For example, “in the case of a national banking association, a District bank, or a Federal branch or agency of a foreign bank,” the Comptroller of the Currency is the “appropriate Federal banking agency.” § 1813(q)(1). Section 1813(q)(3) provides that “in the case of a State nonmember insured Bank ... or a foreign bank having an insured branch,” the FDIC is the “appropriate Federal banking agency.” It is undisputed that in this case the FDIC is the appropriate federal banking agency. As enacted in 1966, 12 U. S. C. § 1818(g)(1) provided: “Whenever any director or officer of an insured bank, or other person participating in the conduct of the affairs of such bank, is charged in any information, indictment, or complaint authorized by a United States attorney, with the commission of or participation in a felony involving dishonesty or breach of trust, the appropriate Federal banking agency may, by written notice served upon such director, officer, or other person suspend him from office and/or prohibit him from further participation in any manner in the conduct of the affairs of the bank. A copy of such notice shall also be served upon the bank. Such suspension and/or prohibition shall remain in effect until such information, indictment, or complaint is finally disposed of or until terminated by the agency. In the event that a judgment of conviction with respect to such offense is entered against such director, officer, or other person, and at such time as such judgment is not subject to further appellate review, the agency may issue and serve upon such director, officer, or other person' an order removing him from office and/or prohibiting him from further participation in any manner in the conduct of the affairs of the bank except with the consent of the appropriate agency. A copy of such order shall also be served upon such bank, whereupon such director or officer shall cease to be a director or officer of such bank. A finding of not guilty or other disposition of the charge shall not preclude the agency from thereafter instituting proceedings to remove such director, officer, or other person from office and/or to prohibit further participation in bank affairs, pursuant to paragraph (1), (2), (3), (4), or (7) of subsection (e) of this section.” 80 Stat. 1050. The court noted the breadth of discretion afforded the agency and intimated that if suspension was mandatory upon indictment, no pre- or post-suspension hearing would be required: “It appears arguable that if the issuance of a Notice and Order of Suspension were automatic upon the return of an indictment or the filing of an information or complaint, then there might not be a need for a hearing or other incidents of due process. Such an argument could only retain its vitality though if there were no agency determination required prior to the issuance of the Notice and Order of Suspension. But this is not the case. Section 1818(g)(1), by its very language, requires that the agency decide whether the crime charged is one ‘involving dishonesty or breach of trust.’ Given the variety and nature of state offenses, it is apparent that the agency must exercise discretion as to this issue. This discretion, in fact, is enhanced by the lack in the statute of a definition of a crime of ‘dishonesty or breach of trust.’ But this is not the only discretionary question posed by the statute. The statute interjects an added element of discretion by providing that the agency ‘may’ issue a Notice and Order of Suspension; it is not required to do so. Furthermore, when the statute is construed it appears clear that even if the agency determines that the crime charged is one involving dishonesty or a breach of trust, the agency is still given — and in fact has exercised — the discretion not to issue a Notice and Order of Suspension. In addition, it is significant for purposes of due process that no specific guidelines are provided in the statute for the exercise of this discretion. The only ascertainable guidance is the general purpose of the statute: to insure the public’s confidence in the stability of the financial institution.” 420 F. Supp., at 116-117 (footnotes omitted). As amended in 1978, 12 U. S. C. § 1818(g)(1) provided: “Whenever any director or officer of an insured bank, or other person participating in the conduct of the affairs of such bank, is charged in any information, indictment, or complaint authorized by a United States attorney, with the commission of or participation in a crime involving dishonesty or breach of trust which is punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year under State or Federal law, the appropriate Federal banking agency may, if continued service or participation by the individual may pose a threat to the interests of the bank’s depositors or may threaten to impair public confidence in the bank, by written notice served upon such director, officer, or other person, suspend him from office or prohibit him from further participation in any manner in the conduct of the affairs of the bank. A copy of such notice shall also be served upon the bank. Such suspension or prohibition shall remain in effect until such information, indictment, or complaint is finally disposed of or until terminated by the agency. In the event that a judgment of conviction with respect to such crime is entered against such director, officer, or other person, and at such time as such judgment is not subject to further appellate review, the agency may, if continued service or participation by the individual may pose a threat to the interests of the bank’s depositors or may threaten to impair public confidence in the bank, issue and serve upon such director, officer, or other person an order removing him from office or prohibiting him from further participation in any manner in the conduct of the affairs of the bank except with the consent of the appropriate agency. A copy of such order shall also be served upon such bank, whereupon such director or officer shall cease to be a director or officer of such bank. A finding of not guilty or other disposition of the charge shall not preclude the agency from thereafter instituting proceedings to remove such director, officer, or other person from office or to prohibit further participation in bank affairs, pursuant to paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (e) of this section. Any notice of suspension or order of removal issued under this paragraph shall remain effective and outstanding until the completion of any hearing or appeal authorized under paragraph (S) hereof unless terminated by the agency.” 92 Stat. 3665-3666 (the language emphasized was added in 1978). Title 12 U. S. C. § 1818(g)(3) reads as follows: “Within thirty days from service of any notice of suspension or order of removal issued pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, the director, officer, or other person concerned may request in writing an opportunity to appear before the agency to show that the continued service to or participation in the conduct of the affairs of the bank by such individual does not, or is not likely to, pose a threat to the interests of the bank’s depositors or threaten to impair public confidence in the bank. Upon receipt of any such request, the appropriate Federal banking agency shall fix a time (not more than thirty days after receipt of such request, unless extended at the request of the concerned director, officer, or other person) and place at which the director, officer, or other person may appear, personally or through counsel, before one or more members of the agency or designated employees of the agency to submit written materials (or, at the discretion of the agency, oral testimony) and oral argument. Within sixty days of such hearing, the agency shall notify the director, officer, or other person whether the suspension or prohibition from participation in any manner in the conduct of the affairs of the bank will be continued, terminated, or otherwise modified, or whether the order removing said director, officer or other person from office or prohibiting such individual from further participation in any manner in the conduct of the affairs of the bank will be rescinded or otherwise modified. Such notification shall contain a statement of the basis for the agency’s decision, if adverse to the director, officer or other person. The Federal banking agencies are authorized to prescribe such rules as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of this subsection.” 92 Stat. 3666. Appellee was convicted on both counts. The District Court, however, set aside the 18 U. S. C. § 1014 .conviction on the ground that the indictment failed to allege the essential elements of the crime. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the 'conviction under 18 U. S. C. § 1001 and reversed the District Court’s decision setting aside the conviction under § 1014. United States v. Mallen, 843 F. 2d 1096 (1988). Appellee’s conviction does not moot this case. A § 1818(g) suspension remains in effect until the charge against the bank official “is finally disposed of or until terminated by the agency.” § 1818(g)(1). The structure of the statute makes clear that a charge is not “finally disposed of” until the opportunity for appellate review is exhausted. Section 1818(g)(1) provides that if a suspended official is convicted, the agency may remove that individual from office once the judgment is no longer “subject to further appellate review.” It is unlikely that Congress intended to create a window between suspension and removal for convicted bank officials. Because appellee has not yet exhausted his opportunity for appellate review, the § 1818(g) suspension remains in effect. On May 10, 1988, the Eighth Circuit denied appellee’s petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en bane. He has 60 days from that date to file a petition for certiorari. See this Court’s Rule 20.1. Nor is the action mooted by appellee’s suspension under 12 U. S. C. § 1829. That section provides: “Except with the written consent of the [FDIC], no person shall serve as a director, officer, or employee of an insured bank who has been convicted ... of any criminal offense involving dishonesty or a breach of trust. . . .” On May 29, 1987, the judge presiding over appellee’s criminal trial granted the FDIC’s motion for a preliminary injunction pursuant to § 1829, prohibiting appellee from serving “as a director, officer or employee of the Farmers State Bank, Kanawha, Iowa.” FDIC v. Mallen, 661 F. Supp. 1003, 1011 (ND Iowa 1987). In certain respects, the § 1818(g) suspension is broader in scope than the § 1829 suspension, thus giving reinstatement of the § 1818(g) suspension at least a marginal effect. For example, § 1818(j) imposes criminal penalties upon anyone subject to a § 1818(g) suspension who “votes for a director ... of any bank.” Section 1829 does not impose a similar prohibition. Finally, counsel informs us that after the jurisdictional statement was filed in this case, the Iowa Superintendent of Banking placed the Farmers State Bank in receivership. The FDIC, which was appointed receiver, executed a “purchase and assumption” transaction, whereby the deposit liabilities of the Farmers State Bank were assumed by another bank. The building that once housed the Farmers State Bank now serves as a branch for the assuming bank. Yet, even though § 1818(g) simply authorizes the suspension of an indicted official as to a specified bank — a bank that in this case at least arguably no longer exists — we are persuaded that the order of suspension and the District Court’s nullification of that order are not moot. The Farmers State Bank has challenged the order of receivership and the “purchase and assumption” transaction. Brief for Appellant 13, n. 11. That challenge is currently before the Supreme Court of Iowa. In the matter of the Receivership of Farmers State Bank, Kanawha, Iowa v. Bernau, No. 87-1199. Because the Farmers State Bank has not yet been finally dissolved as a corporate entity and because the State Supreme Court might invalidate the receivership, we conclude that the order of suspension is not meaningless and thus further conclude that it forms an adequate prerequisite for coverage under § 1818(j). Moreover, we note that even confirmation of the receivership might not moot the order entered pursuant to § 1818(g). Mere changes in corporate structure would not necessarily terminate an otherwise effective order. In September and October 1986, extensive hearings were held to determine whether to suspend appellee from office pursuant to §§ 1818(e)(1), (e)(5). Those subsections permit the appropriate federal banking agency, after conducting a hearing, to remove or suspend a director or officer of an insured bank from office for various forms of misconduct. However, because the presiding Administrative Law Judge recused himself before rendering a decision, the proceedings were never completed. 667 F. Supp. 652, 655, n. 1 (1987). Although the District Court assumed that appellee had an unqualified right to offer oral testimony at some stage of the administrative proceeding, it expressed the opinion that such testimony could be deferred until after an adverse ruling on appellee’s challenge to the suspension order. It stated: “A hearing limited to written submissions and oral argument as described in 12 CFR Section 308.61 could pass constitutional muster if it provided for a sufficiently prompt resolution and if an adverse ruling was followed by a hearing at which oral evidence could be presented. However, neither the Code of Federal Regulations, nor the statute provide for a prompt resolution of such a hearing, nor do they provide for a later opportunity to present live testimony.” Id., at 661. Section 1818(g)(1) authorizes the suspension of a bank officer “charged in any information, indictment, or complaint authorized by a United States attorney, with the commission of or participation in a crime involving dishonesty or breach of trust which is punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year under State or Federal law . . . .” Federal crimes punishable by imprisonment for a term in excess of one year must be prosecuted by indictment, unless the defendant waives this right. Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 7(a) and (b). In its order denying the FDIC’s motion to alter or amend its injunction, the District Court wrote: “The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) now requests that this Court alter the relief that it ordered. The FDIC proposed that it could hold a post-suspension hearing under 12 U. S. C. Section 1818(g) on March 9,1987; with an oral disposition within 15 days (March 26,1987); and written disposition within 30 days (April 8, 1987). The Court finds that this proposed schedule suffers from the same difficulties that prompted this Court’s decision of February 17,1987. Mallen’s criminal trial is set for March 16, 1987, and it is estimated that it will last one week. The FDIC’s disposition concerning the suspension under this proposed schedule would be entered only after Mallen has ‘suffered the full penalty imposed’ by the suspension. This procedure does not offer a sufficiently prompt process as required under Barry v. Barchi, 443 U. S. 55, 66 . . . (1979).” 667 F. Supp., at 662-663. Section 1829 provides: “Except with the written consent of the Corporation, no person shall serve as a director, officer, or employee of an insured bank who has been convicted, or who is hereafter convicted, of any criminal offense involving dishonesty or a breach of trust. For each willful violation of this prohibition, the bank involved shall be subject to a penalty of not more than $100 for each day this prohibition is violated, which the Corporation may recover for its use.” Imposition of a § 1829 suspension or removal does not moot a § 1818(g) suspension. See n. 7, supra. The three-judge District Court in Feinberg concluded that oral testimony is not constitutionally required in FDIC § 1818(g) suspension hearings: “While the hearing need not be a trial-type hearing, notice, the opportunity to be represented by counsel, for written submissions, and for oral argument, appear mandated by the circumstances. , Certainly notice of the right to be heard is essential. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306 . . . (1950). The assistance of counsel is also needed in these cases, particularly since the hearing will involve a complex legal question: whether the crime charged is one involving dishonesty or breach of trust, as well as a question requiring the subtle interrelation of fact and policy: the effect upon the public of the indictees holding office and participating in the affairs of the bank. As to the presentation of live evidence, the ‘nature of the relevant inquiry,’ 424 U. S. 343, . . . does not seem to require any more than written submission. However, oral argument would be necessary.” 420 F. Supp., at 120 (footnotes omitted).
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed. The information relevant to this variable may be found near the end of the summary that begins on the title page of each case, or preferably at the very end of the opinion of the Court. For cases in which the Court granted a motion to dismiss, consider "petition denied or appeal dismissed". There is "no disposition" if the Court denied a motion to dismiss.
What is the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed?
[ "stay, petition, or motion granted", "affirmed (includes modified)", "reversed", "reversed and remanded", "vacated and remanded", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded", "vacated", "petition denied or appeal dismissed", "certification to or from a lower court", "no disposition" ]
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FRANK LYON CO. v. UNITED STATES No. 76-624. Argued November 2, 1977 Decided April 18, 1978 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a dissenting statement, post, p. 584. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 584. Erwin N. Griswold argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was /. Gaston Williamson. Stuart A. Smith argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Ferguson, and John A. Dudeck, Jr. George G. Gallantz filed a brief for the National Realty Committee as amicus curiae urging reversal. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the federal income tax consequences of a sale-and-leaseback in which petitioner Frank Lyon Company (Lyon) took title to a building under construction by Worthen Bank & Trust Company (Worthen) of Little Rock, Ark., and simultaneously leased the building back to Worthen for long-term use as its headquarters and principal banking facility. I The underlying pertinent facts are undisputed. They are established by stipulations, App. 9, 14, the trial testimony, and the documentary evidence, and are reflected in the District Court’s findings. A ■ Lyon is a closely held Arkansas corporation engaged in the distribution of home furnishings, primarily Whirlpool and RCA electrical products. Worthen in 1965 was an Arkansas-chartered bank and a member of the Federal Reserve System. Frank Lyon was Lyon’s majority shareholder and board chairman; he also served on Worthen’s board. Worthen at that time began to plan the construction of a multistory bank and office building to replace its existing facility in Little Rock. About the same time Worthen’s competitor, Union National Bank of Little Rock, also began to plan a new bank and office building. Adjacent sites on Capitol Avenue, separated only by Spring Street, were acquired by the two banks. It became a matter of competition, for both banking business and tenants, and prestige as to which bank would start and complete its building first. Worthen initially hoped to finance, to build, and to own the proposed facility at a total cost of $9 million for the site, building, and adjoining parking deck. This was to be accomplished by selling $4 million in debentures and using the proceeds in the acquisition of the capital stock of a wholly owned real estate subsidiary. This subsidiary would have formal title and would raise the remaining $5 million by a conventional mortgage loan on the new premises. Worthen’s plan, however, had to be abandoned for two significant reasons: 1. As a bank chartered under Arkansas law, Worthen legally could not pay more interest on any debentures it might issue than that then specified by Arkansas law. But the proposed obligations would not be marketable at that rate. 2. Applicable statutes or regulations of the Arkansas State Bank Department and the Federal Reserve System required Worthen, as a state bank subject to their supervision, to obtain prior permission for the investment in banking premises of any amount (including that placed in a real estate subsidiary) in excess of the bank’s capital stock or of 40% of its capital stock and surplus. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 67-547.1 (Supp. 1977) ; 12 U. S. C. § 371d (1976 ed.); 12 CFR § 265.2 (f) (7) (1977). Worthen, accordingly, was advised by staff employees of the Federal Reserve System that they would not recommend approval of the plan by the System’s Board of Governors. Worthen therefore was forced to seek an alternative solution that would provide it with the use of the building, satisfy the state and federal regulators, and attract the necessary capital. In September 1967 it proposed a sale-and-leaseback arrangement. The State Bank Department and the Federal Reserve System approved this approach, but the Department required that Worthen possess an option to purchase the leased property at the end of the 15th year of the lease at a set price, and the federal regulator required that the building be owned by an independent third party. Detailed negotiations ensued with investors that had indicated interest, namely, Goldman, Sachs & Company; White, Weld & Co.; Eastman Dillon, Union Securities & Company; and Stephens, Inc. Certain of these firms made specific proposals. Worthen then obtained a commitment from New York Life Insurance Company to provide $7,140,000 in permanent mortgage financing on the building, conditioned upon its approval of the titleholder. At this point Lyon entered the negotiations and it, too, made a proposal. Worthen submitted a counterproposal that incorporated the best features, from its point of view, of the several offers. Lyon accepted the counterproposal, suggesting, by way of further inducement, a $21,000 reduction in the annual rent for the first five years of the building lease. Worthen selected Lyon as the investor. After further negotiations, resulting in the elimination of that rent reduction (offset, however, by higher interest Lyon was to pay Worthen on a subsequent unrelated loan), Lyon in November 1967 was approved as an acceptable borrower by First National City Bank for the construction financing, and by New York Life, as the permanent lender. In April 1968 the approvals of the state and federal regulators were received. In the meantime, on September 15, before Lyon was selected, Worthen itself began construction. B In May 1968 Worthen, Lyon, City Bank, and New York Life executed complementary and interlocking agreements under which the building was sold by Worthen to Lyon as it was constructed, and Worthen leased the completed building back from Lyon. 1. Agreements between Worthen and Lyon. Worthen and Lyon executed a ground lease, a sales agreement, and a building lease. Under the ground lease dated May 1, 1968, App. 366, Worthen leased the site to Lyon for 76 years and 7 months through November 30, 2044. The first 19 months were the estimated construction period. The ground rents payable by Lyon to Worthen were $50 for the first 26 years and 7 months and thereafter in quarterly payments: 12/1/94 through 11/30/99 (5 years) — $100,000 annually 12/1/99 through 11/30/04 (5 years) — $150,000 annually 12/1/04 through 11/30/09 (5 years) — $200,000 annually 12/1/09 through 11/30/34 (25 years) — $250,000 annually 12/1/34 through 11/30/44 (10 years) — $10,000 annually. Under the sales agreement dated May 19, 1968, id., at 508, Worthen agreed to sell the building to Lyon, and Lyon agreed to buy it, piece by piece as it was constructed, for a total price not to exceed $7,640,000, in reimbursements to Worthen for its expenditures for the construction of the building. Under the building lease dated May 1, 1968, id., at 376, Lyon leased the building back to Worthen for a primary term of 25 years from December 1, 1969, with options in Worthen to extend the lease for eight additional 5-year terms, a total of 65 years. During the period between the expiration of the building lease (at the latest, November 30, 2034, if fully extended) and the end of the ground lease on November 30, 2044, full ownership, use, and control of the building were Lyon’s, unless, of course, the building had been repurchased by Worthen. Id., at 369. Worthen was not obligated to pay rent under the building lease until completion of the building. For the first 11 years of the lease, that is, until November 30, 1980, the stated quarterly rent was $145,581.03 ($582,324.12 for the year). For the next 14 years, the quarterly rent was $153,289.32 ($613,157.28 for the year), and for the option periods the rent was $300,000 a year, payable quarterly. Id., at 378-379. The total rent for the building over the 25-year primary term of the lease thus was $14,989,767.24. That rent equaled the principal and interest payments that would amortize the $7,140,000 New York Life mortgage loan over the same period. When the mortgage was paid off at the end of the primary term, the annual building rent, if Worthen extended the lease, came down to the stated $300,000. Lyon’s net rentals from the building would be further reduced by the increase in ground rent Worthen would receive from Lyon during the extension. The building lease was a “net lease,” under which Worthen was responsible for all expenses usually associated with the maintenance of an office building, including repairs, taxes, utility charges, and insurance, and was to keep the premises in good condition, excluding, however, reasonable wear and tear. Finally, under the lease, Worthen had the option to repurchase the building at the following times and prices: 11/30/80 (after 11 years) — $6,325,169.85 11/30/84 (after 15 years) — $5,432,607.32 11/30/89 (after 20 years) — $4,187,328.04 11/30/94 (after 25 years) — $2,145,935.00 These repurchase option prices were the sum of the unpaid balance of the New York Life mortgage, Lyon’s $500,000 investment, and 6% interest compounded on that investment. 2. Construction financing agreement. By agreement dated May 14, 1968, id., at 462, City Bank agreed to lend Lyon $7,000,000 for the construction of the building. This loan was secured by a mortgage on the building and the parking deck, executed by Worthen as well as by Lyon, and an assignment by Lyon of its interests in the building lease and in the ground lease. 3. Permanent financing agreement. By Note Purchase Agreement dated May 1, 1968, id., at 443, New York Life agreed' to purchase Lyon’s $7,140,000 6%% 25-year secured note to be issued upon completion of the building. Under this agreement Lyon warranted that it would lease the building to Worthen for a noncancelable term of at least 25 years under a net lease at a rent at least equal to the mortgage payments on the note. Lyon agreed to make quarterly payments of principal and interest equal to the rentals payable by Worthen during the corresponding primary term of the lease. Id., at 523. The security for the note was a first deed of trust and Lyon’s assignment of its interests in the building lease and in the ground lease. Id., at 527, 571. Worthen joined in the deed of trust as the owner of the fee and the parking deck. In December 1969 the building was completed and Worthen took possession. At that time Lyon received the permanent loan from New York Life, and it discharged the interim loan from City Bank. The actual cost of constructing the office building and parking complex (excluding the cost of the land) exceeded $10,000,000. C Lyon filed its federal income tax returns on the accrual and calendar year basis. On its 1969 return, Lyon accrued rent from Worthen for December. It asserted as deductions one month’s interest to New York Life; one month’s depreciation on the building; interest on the construction loan from City Bank; and sums for legal and other expenses incurred in connection with the transaction. On audit of Lyon’s 1969 return, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that Lyon was “not the owner for tax purposes of any portion of the Worthen Building,” and ruled that “the income and expenses related to this building are not allowable ... for Federal income tax purposes.” App. 304-305, 299. He also added $2,298.15 to Lyon’s 1969 income as “accrued interest income.” This was the computed 1969 portion of a gain, considered the equivalent of interest income, the realization of which was based on the assumption that Worthen would exercise its option to buy the building after 11 years, on November 30, 1980, at the price stated in the lease, and on the additional determination that Lyon had “loaned” $500,000 to Worthen. In other words, the Commissioner determined that the sale-and-leaseback arrangement was a financing transaction in which Lyon loaned Worthen $500,000 and acted as a conduit for the transmission of principal and interest from Worthen to New York Life. All this resulted in a total increase of $497,219.18 over Lyon’s reported income for 1969, and a deficiency in Lyon’s federal income tax for that year in the amount of $236,596.36. The Commissioner assessed that amount, together with interest of $43,790.84, for a total of $280,387.20 Lyon paid the assessment and filed a timely claim for its refund. The claim was denied, and this suit, to recover the amount so paid, was instituted in the United States District Court, for the Eastern District of Arkansas within the time allowed by 26 U. S. C. § 6532 (a) (1). After trial without a jury, the District Court, in a memorandum letter-opinion setting forth findings and conclusions, ruled in Lyon’s favor and held that its claimed deductions were allowable. 75-2 USTC ¶[ 9545 (1975), 36 AFTR 2d ¶ 75-5059 (1975); App. 296-311. It concluded that the legal intent of the parties had been to create a bona fide sale- and-leaseback in accordance with the form and language of the documents evidencing the transactions. It rejected the argument that Worthen was acquiring an equity in the building through its rental payments. It found that the rents were unchallenged and were reasonable throughout the period of the lease, and that the option prices, negotiated at arm’s length between the parties, represented fair estimates of market value on the applicable dates. It rejected any negative inference from the fact that the rentals, combined with the options, were sufficient to amortize the New York Life loan and to pay Lyon a 6% return on its equity investment. It found that Worthen would acquire an equity in the building only if it exercised one of its options to purchase, and that it was highly unlikely, as a practical matter, that any purchase option would ever be exercised. It rejected any inference to be drawn from the fact that the lease was a “net lease.” It found that Lyon had mixed motivations for entering into the transaction, including the need to diversify as well as the desire to have the benefits of a “tax shelter.” App. 296, 299. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 536 F. 2d 746 (1976). It held that the Commissioner correctly determined that Lyon was not the true owner of the building and therefore was not entitled to the claimed deductions. It likened ownership for tax purposes to a “bundle of sticks” and undertook its own evaluation of the facts. It concluded, in agreement with the Government’s contention, that Lyon “totes an empty bundle” of ownership sticks. Id., at 751. It stressed the following: (a) The lease agreements circumscribed Lyon’s right to profit from its investment in the building by giving Worthen the option to purchase for an amount equal to Lyon’s $500,000 equity plus 6% compound interest and the assumption of the unpaid balance of the New York Life mortgage. (b) The option prices did not take into account possible appreciation of the value of the building or inflation. (c) Any award realized as a result of destruction or condemnation of the building in excess of the mortgage balance and the $500,000 would be paid to Worthen and not Lyon. (d) The building rental payments during the primary term were exactly equal to the mortgage payments. (e) Worthen retained control over the ultimate disposition of the building through its various options to repurchase and to renew the lease plus its ownership of the site. (f) Worthen enjoyed all benefits and bore all burdens incident to the operation and ownership of the building so that, in the Court of Appeals’ view, the only economic advantages accruing to Lyon, in the event it were considered to be the true owner of the property, were income tax savings of approximately $1.5 million during the first 11 years of the arrangement. Id., at 752-753. The court concluded, id., at 753, that the transaction was “closely akin” to that in Helvering v. Lazarus & Co., 308 U. S. 252 (1939). “In sum, the benefits, risks, and burdens which [Lyon] has incurred with respect to the Worthen building are simply too insubstantial to establish a claim to the status of owner for tax purposes. . . . The vice of the present lease is that all of [its] features have been employed in the same transaction with the cumulative effect of depriving [Lyon] of any significant ownership interest.” 536 F. 2d, at 754. We granted certiorari, 429 U. S. 1089 (1977), because of an indicated conflict with American Realty Trust v. United States, 498 F. 2d 1194 (CA4 1974). II This Court, almost 50 years ago, observed that “taxation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with actual command over the property taxed- — the actual benefit for which the tax is paid.” Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376, 378 (1930). In a number of cases, the Court has refused to permit the transfer of formal legal title to shift the incidence of taxation attributable to ownership- of property where the transferor continues to retain significant control over the property transferred. E. g., Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591 (1948); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940). In applying this doctrine of substance over form, the Court has looked to the objective economic realities of a transaction rather than to the particular form the parties employed. The Court has never regarded “the simple expedient of drawing up papers,” Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U. S. 280, 291 (1946), as controlling for tax purposes when the objective economic realities are to the contrary. “In the field of taxation, administrators of the laws, and the courts, are concerned with substance and realities, and formal written documents are not rigidly binding.” Helvering v. Lazarus & Co., 308 U. S., at 255. See also Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U. S. 260, 266-267 (1958); Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U. S. 331, 334 (1945). Nor is the parties’ desire to achieve a particular tax result necessarily relevant. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U. S. 278, 286 (1960). In the light of these general and established principles, the Government takes the position that the Worthen-Lyon transaction in its entirety should be regarded as a sham. The agreement as a whole, it is said, was only an elaborate financing scheme designed to provide economic benefits to Worthen and a guaranteed return to Lyon. The latter was but a conduit used to forward the mortgage payments, made under the guise of rent paid by Worthen to Lyon, on to- New York Life as mortgagee. This, the Government claims, is the true substance of the transaction as viewed under the microscope of the tax laws. Although the arrangement was cast in sale-and-leaseback form, in substance it was only a financing transaction, and the terms of the repurchase options and lease renewals so indicate. It is said that Worthen co-uld reacquire the building simply by satisfying the mortgage debt and paying Lyon its $500,000 advance plus interest, regardless of the fair market value of the building at the time; similarly, when the mortgage was paid off, Worthen could extend the- lease at drastically reduced bargain rentals that likewise bore relation to fair rental value but were simply calculated to pay Lyon its $500,000 plus interest over the extended term. Lyon’s return on the arrangement in no' event could exceed 6% compound interest (although the Government conceded it might well be less, Tr. of Oral Arg. 32). Furthermore, the favorable option and lease renewal ternls made it highly unlikely that Worthen would abandon the building after it in effect had “paid off” the mortgage. The Government implies that the arrangement was one of convenience which, if accepted on its face, would enable Worthen to deduct its payments to Lyon as rent and would allow Lyon to claim a deduction for depreciation, based on the cost of construction ultimately borne by Worthen, which Lyon could offset against other income, and to deduct mortgage interest that roughly would offset the inclusion of Worthen’s rental payments in Lyon’s income. If, however, the Government argues, the arrangement was only a financing transaction under which Worthen was the owner of the building, Worthen’s payments would be deductible only to the extent that they represented mortgage interest, and Worthen would be entitled to’ claim depreciation; Lyon would not be entitled to deductions for either mortgage interest or depreciation and it would not have to include Worthen’s “rent” payments in its income because its function with respect to those payments was that of a conduit between Worthen and New York Life. The Government places great reliance on Helvering v. Lazarus & Co., supra, and claims it to' be precedent that controls this case. The taxpayer there was a department store. The legal title of its three buildings was in a bank as trustee for land-trust certificate holders. When the transfer to the trustee was made, the trustee at the same time leased the buildings back to the taxpayer for 99 years, with option to renew and purchase. The Commissioner, in stark contrast to his posture in the present case, took the position that the statutory right to depreciation followed legal title. The Board of Tax Appeals, however, concluded that the transaction between the taxpayer and the bank in reality was a mortgage loan and allowed the taxpayer depreciation on the buildings. This Court, as had the Court of Appeals, agreed with that conclusion and affirmed. It regarded the “rent” stipulated in the leaseback as a promise to pay interest on the loan, and a “depreciation fund” required by the lease as an amortization fund designed to pay off the loan in the stated period. Thus, said the Court, the Board justifiably concluded that the transaction, although in written form a transfer of ownership with a leaseback, was actually a loan secured by the property involved. The Lazarus case, we feel, is to be distinguished from the present one and is not controlling here. Its transaction was one involving only two (and not multiple) parties, the taxpayer-department store and the trustee-bank. The Court looked closely at the substance of the agreement between those two parties and rightly concluded that depreciation was deductible by the taxpayer despite the nomenclature of the instrument of conveyance and the leaseback. See also Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 562 F. 2d 258 (CA3 1977) (a two-party case with the added feature that the second party was a tax-exempt pension trust). The present case, in contrast, involves three parties, Worthen, Lyon, and the finance agency. The usual simple two-party arrangement was legally unavailable to Worthen. Independent investors were interested in participating in the alternative available to Worthen, and Lyon itself (also independent from Worthen) won the privilege. Despite Frank Lyon’s presence on Worthen’s board of directors, the transaction, as it ultimately developed, was not a familial one arranged by Worthen, but one compelled by the realities of the restrictions imposed upon the bank. Had Lyon not appeared, another interested investor would have been selected. The ultimate solution would have been essentially the same. Thus, the presence of the third party, in our view, significantly distinguishes this case from Lazarus and removes the latter as controlling authority. Ill It is true, of course, that the transaction took shape according to Worthen’s needs. As the Government points out, Worthen throughout the negotiations regarded the respective proposals of the independent investors in terms of its own cost of funds. B. g., App. 355. It is also true that both Worthen and the prospective investors compared the various proposals in terms of the return anticipated on the investor’s equity. But all this is natural for parties contemplating entering into a transaction of this kind. Worthen needed a building for its banking operations and other purposes and necessarily had to know what its cost would be. The investors were in business to employ their funds in the most remunerative way possible. And, as the Court has said in the past, a transaction must be given its effect in accord with what actually occurred and not in accord with what might have occurred. Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U. S. 134, 148-149 (1974); Central Tablet Mfg. Co. v. United States, 417 U. S. 673, 690 (1974). There is no simple device available to' peel away the form of this transaction and to reveal its substance. The effects of the transaction on all the parties were obviously different from those that would have resulted had Worthen been able simply to make a mortgage agreement with New York Life and to receive a $500,000 loan from Lyon. Then Lazarus would apply. Here, however, and most significantly, it was Lyon alone, and not Worthen, who was liable on the notes, first to City Bank, and then to New York Life. Despite the facts that Worthen had agreed to pay rent and that this rent equaled the amounts due from Lyon to New York Life, should anything go awry in the later years of the lease, Lyon was primarily liable. No matter how the transaction could have been devised otherwise, it remains a fact that as the agreements were placed in final form, the obligation on the notes fell squarely on Lyon. Lyon, an ongoing enterprise, exposed its very business well-being to this real and substantial risk. The effect of this liability on Lyon is not just the abstract possibility that something will go wrong and that Worthen will not be able to make its payments. Lyon has disclosed this liability on its balance sheet for all the world to- see. Its financial position was affected substantially by the presence of this long-term debt, despite the offsetting presence of the building as an asset. To the extent that Lyon has used its capital in this transaction, it is less able to obtain financing for other business needs. In concluding that there is this distinct element of economic reality in Lyon’s assumption of liability, we are mindful that the characterization of a transaction for financial accounting purposes, on the one hand, and for tax purposes, on the other, need not necessarily be the same. Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Assn., 403 U. S. 345, 355 (1971); Old Colony R. Co. v. Commissioner, 284 U. S. 552, 562 (1932). Accounting methods or descriptions, without more, do not lend substance to that which has no substance. But in this case accepted accounting methods, as understood by the several parties to the respective agreements and as applied to the transaction by others, gave the transaction a meaningful character consonant with the form it was given. Worthen was not allowed to enter into the type of transaction which the Government now urges to be the true substance of the arrangement. Lyon and Worthen cannot be said to have entered into the transaction intending that the interests involved were allocated in a way other than that associated with a sale-and-leaseback. Other factors also reveal that the transaction cannot be viewed as anything more than a mortgage agreement between Worthen and New York Life and a loan from Lyon to Worthen. There is no legal obligation between Lyon and Worthen representing the $500,000 “loan” extended under the Government’s theory. And the assumed 6% return on this putative loan — required by the audit to be recognized in the taxable year in question — will be realized only when and if Worthen exercises its options. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the rents alone, due after the primary term of the lease and after the mortgage has been paid, do not provide the simple 6% return which, the Government urges, Lyon is guaranteed, 536 F. 2d, at 752. Thus, if Worthen chooses not to exercise its options, Lyon is gambling that the rental value of the building during the last 10 years of the ground lease, during which the ground rent is minimal, will be sufficient to recoup its investment before it must negotiate again with Worthen regarding the ground lease. There are simply too many contingencies, including variations in the value of real estate, in the cost of money, and in the capital structure of Worthen, to permit the conclusion that the parties intended to enter into the transaction as structured in, the audit and according to- which the Government now urges they be taxed. It is not inappropriate to note that the Government is likely to lose little revenue, if any, as a result of the shape given the transaction by the parties. No deduction was created that is not either matched by an item of income or that would not have been available to one of the parties if the transaction had been arranged differently. While it is true that Worthen paid Lyon less to induce it to enter into the transaction because Lyon anticipated the benefit of the' depreciation deductions it would have as the owner of the building, those deductions would have been equally available to Worthen had it retained title to the building. The Government so concedes. Tr. of Oral Arg. 22-23. The fact that favorable tax consequences were taken into account by Lyon on entering into the transaction is no reason for disallowing those consequences. We cannot ignore the reality that the tax laws affect the shape of nearly every business transaction. See Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U. S. 563, 579-580 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). Lyon is not a corporation with no-purpose other than to hold title to the bank building. It was not created by Worthen or even financed to any degree by Worthen. The conclusion that the transaction is not a simple sham to-be ignored does not, of course, automatically compel the further conclusion that Lyon is entitled to the items claimed as deductions. Nevertheless, on the facts, this readily follows. As has been noted, the obligations on which Lyon paid interest were its obligations alone, and it is entitled to claim deductions therefor under § 163 (a) of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 163 (a). As is clear from the facts, none of the parties to this sale- and-leaseback was the owner of the building in any simple sense. But it is equally clear that the facts focus upon Lyon as the one whose capital was committed to the building and as the party, therefore, that was entitled to claim depreciation for the consumption of that capital. The Government has based its contention that Worthen should be treated as the owner on the assumption that throughout the term of the lease Worthen was acquiring an equity in the property. In order to establish the presence of that growing equity, however, the Government is forced to speculate that one of the options will be exercised and that, if it is not, this is only because the rentals for the extended term are a bargain. We cannot indulge in such speculation in view of the District Court’s clear finding to' the contrary. We therefore conclude that it is Lyon’s capital that is invested in the building according to the agreement of the parties, and it is Lyon that is entitled to depreciation deductions, under § 167 of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 167. Cf. United States v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 412 U. S. 401 (1973). IY We recognize that the Government’s position, and that taken by the Court of Appeals, is not without superficial appeal. One, indeed, may theorize that Frank Lyon’s presence on the Worthen board of directors; Lyon’s departure from its principal corporate activity into this unusual venture; the parallel between the payments under the building lease and the amounts due from Lyon on the New York Life mortgage; the provisions relating to condemnation or destruction of the property; the nature and presence of the several, options available to Worthen; and the tax benefits, such as the use of double declining balance depreciation, that accrue to Lyon during the initial years of the arrangement, form the basis of an argument that Worthen should be regarded as the owner of the building and as the recipient of nothing more from Lyon than a $500,000 loan. We, however, as did the District Court, find this theorizing incompatible with the substance and economic realities of the transaction: the competitive situation as it existed between Worthen and Union National Bank in 1965 and the years immediately following; Worthen’s undercapitalization; Worth-en’s consequent inability, as a matter of legal restraint, to carry its building plans into effect by a conventional mortgage and other borrowing; the additional barriers imposed by the state and federal regulators; the suggestion, forthcoming from the state regulator, that Worthen possess an option to purchase; the requirement, from the federal regulator, that the building be owned by an independent third party; the presence of several finance organizations seriously interested in participating in the transaction and in the resolution of Worthen’s problem; the submission of formal proposals by several of those organizations; the bargaining process and period that ensued; the competitiveness of the bidding; the bona fide character of the negotiations; the three-party aspect of the transaction; Lyon’s substantiality and its independence from Worthen; the fact that diversification was Lyon’s principal motivation; Lyon’s being liable alone on the successive notes to City Bank and New York Life; the reasonableness, as the District Court found, of the rentals and of the option prices; the substantiality of the purchase prices; Lyon’s not being engaged generally in the business of financing; the presence of all building depreciation risks on Lyon; the risk, borne by Lyon, that Worthen might default or fail, as other banks have failed; the facts that Worthen could “walk away” from the relationship at the end of the 25-year primary term, and probably would do so if the option price were more than the then-current worth of the building to Worthen; the inescapable fact that if the building lease Were not extended, Lyon would be the full owner of the building, free to do with it as it chose; Lyon’s liability for the substantial ground rent if Worthen decides not to exercise any of its options to extend; the absence of any understanding between Lyon and Worthen that Worthen would exercise any of the purchase options; the nonfamily and nonprivate nature of the entire transaction; and the absence of any differential in tax rates and of special tax circumstances for one of the parties— all convince us that Lyon has far the better of the case. In so concluding, we emphasize that we are not condoning manipulation by a taxpayer through arbitrary labels and dealings that have no economic significance. Such, however, has not happened in this case. In short, we hold that where, as here, there is a genuine multiple-party transaction with economic substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory realities, is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features that have meaningless labels attached, the Government should honor the allocation of rights and duties effectuated by the parties. Expressed another way, so long as the lessor retains significant and genuine attributes of the traditional lessor status, the form of the transaction adopted by the parties governs for tax purposes. What those attributes are in any particular case will necessarily depend upon its facts. It suffices to say that, as here, a sale-and-leaseback, in and of itself, does not necessarily operate to deny a taxpayer’s claim for deductions. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is reversed. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice White dissents and would affirm the judgment substantially for the reasons stated in the opinion in the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 536 F. 2d 746 (1976). Worthen, as of June 30, 1967, had capital stock of $4 million and surplus of $5 million. During the period the building was under construction Worthen became a national bank subject to the supervision and control of the Comptroller of the Currency. This arrangement appeared advisable and was made because purchases of materials by Worthen (which then had become a national bank) were not subject to Arkansas sales tax. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 84-1904 (1) (1960); First Agricultural Nat. Bank v. Tax Comm’n, 392 U. S. 339 (1968). Sales of the building elements to Lyon also were not subject to state sales tax, since they were sales of real estate. See Ark. Stat. Ann. §84r-1902 (c) (Supp. 1977). This, of course, is on the assumption that Worthen exercises its option to extend the building lease. If it does not, Lyon remains liable for the substantial rents prescribed by the ground lease. This possibility brings into sharp focus the fact that Lyon, in a very practical sense, is at least the ultimate owner of the building. If Worthen does not extend, the building lease expires and Lyon may do with the building as it chooses. The Government would point out, however, that the net amounts payable by Worthen to Lyon during the building lease’s extended terms, if all are claimed, would approximate the amount required to repay Lyon’s $500,000 investment at 6% compound interest. Brief for United States 14. These figures do not include uncontested adjustments not involved in this litigation. Lyon here challenges this assertion on the grounds that it had the right and opportunities to sell the building at a greater profit at any time; the return to Lyon was not insubstantial and was attractive to a true investor in real estate; the 6% return was the minimum Lyon would realize if Worthen exercised one of its options, an event the District Court found highly unlikely; and Lyon would own the building and realize a greater return than 6% if Worthen did not exercise an option to purchase. Lyon challenges this observation by pointing out that the District Court found the option prices to be the negotiated estimate of the parties of the fair market value of the building on the option dates and to be reasonable. App. 303, 299. Lyon asserts that this statement is true only with respect to the total destruction or taking of the building on or after December 1, 1980. Lyon asserts that it, not Worthen, would receive the excess above the mortgage balance in the event of total destruction or taking before December 1,1980, or in the event of partial damage or taking at any time. Id., at 408-410, 411. Lyon concedes the accuracy of this statement, but asserts that it does not justify the conclusion that Lyon served merely as a conduit by which mortgage payments would be transmitted to New York Life. It asserts that Lyon was the sole obligor on the New York Life note and would remain liable in the event of default by Worthen. It also asserts that the fact the rent was sufficient to amortize the loan during the primary term of the lease was a requirement imposed by New York Life, and is a usual requirement in most long-term loans secured by a long-term lease. As to this statement,, Lyon asserts that the Court of Appeals ignored Lyon’s right to sell the building to another at any time; the District Court’s finding that the options to purchase were not likely to be exercised; the uncertainty that Worthen would renew the lease for 40 years; Lyon’s right to lease to anyone at any price during the last 10 years of the ground lease; and Lyon’s continuing ownership of the building after the expiration of the ground lease. In response to this, Lyon asserts that the District Court found that the benefits of occupancy Worthen will enjoy are common in most long-term real estate leases, and that the District Court found that Lyon had motives other than tax savings in entering into the transaction. It also asserts that the net cash after-tax benefit would be $312,220, not $1.5 million. Other factors relied on by the Court of Appeals, 536 F. 2d, at 752, were the allocation of the investment credit to Worthen,, and a claim that Lyon’s ability to sell the building to a third party was “carefully circumscribed" by the lease agreements. The investment credit by statute is freely allocable between the parties, § 48 (d) of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. §48 (d), and the Government has not pressed either of these factors before this Court. New York Life required Lyon, not Worthen, to submit financial statements periodically. See Note Purchase Agreement, App. 453-454, 458-459. It may well be that the remedies available to New York Life against Lyon would be far greater than any remedy available to it against Worthen, which, as lessee, is liable to New York Life only through Lyon’s assignment of its interest as lessor. We are aware that accounting standards have changed significantly since 1968 and that the propriety of Worthen’s and Lyon’s methods of disclosing the transaction in question may be a matter for debate under these new standards. Compare Acccounting Principles Bd. Opinion No. 5, Reporting of Leases in Financial Statements of Lessee (1964), and Accounting Principles Bd. Opinion No. 7, Accounting for Leases in Financial Statements of Lessors (1966), with Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 13, Accounting for Leases (1976). See also Comptroller of the Currency, Banking Circular No. 95 (Nov. 11, 1977), instructing that national banks revise their financial statements in accord with FASB Standard No. 13. Standard No. 13, however, by its terms, states, ¶ 78, that there are many instances where tax and financial accounting treatments diverge. Further, Standard No. 13 is nonapplicable with respect to a lease executed prior to January 1, 1977 (as was the Lyon-Worthen lease), until January 1, 1981. Obviously, Banking Circular No. 95 was not in effect in 1968 when the Lyon-Worthen lease was executed. Then-existing pronouncements of the Internal Revenue Service gave Lyon very little against which to measure the transaction. The most complete statement on the general question of characterization of leases as sales, Rev. Rui. 55-540, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 39, by its terms dealt only with equipment leases. In that ruling it was stated that the Service will look at the intent of the parties at the time the agreement was executed to determine the proper characterization of the transaction. Generally, an intent to enter into a conditional sales agreement will be found to be present if (a) portions of the rental payments are made specifically applicable to an equity acquired by the lessee, (b) the lessee will acquire a title automatically after certain payments have been made, (c) the rental payments are a disproportionately large amount in relation to the sum necessary to complete the sale, (d) the rental payments are above fair rental value, (e) title can be acquired at a nominal option price, or (f) some portion of the rental payments are identifiable as interest. See also Rev. Rui. 60-122,1960-1 Cum. Bull. 56; Rev. Rul. 72-543,1972-2 Cum. Bull. 87. The Service announced more specific guidelines, indicating under what circumstances it would answer requests for rulings on leverage leasing transactions, in Rev. Proc. 75-21, 1975-1 Cum. Bull. 715. In general, “[u]nless other facts and circumstances indicate a contrary intent,” the Service will not rule that a lessor in a leveraged lease transaction is to be treated as the owner of the property in question unless (a) the lessor has incurred and maintains a minimal investment equal to 20% of the cost of the property, (b) the lessee has no right to purchase except at fair market value, (c) no part of the cost of the property is furnished by the lessee, (d) the lessee has not lent to the lessor or guaranteed any indebtedness of the lessor, and (e) the lessor must demonstrate that it expects to receive a profit on the transaction other than the benefits received solely from the tax treatment. These guidelines are not intended to be definitive, and it is not clear that they provide much guidance in assessing real estate transactions. See Rosenberg & Weinstein, Sale-leasebacks: An analysis of these transactions after the Lyon decision, 45 J. Tax. 146, 147 n. 1 (1976). Indeed, it is not inevitable that the transaction, as treated by Lyon and Worthen, will not result in more revenues to the Government rather than. less. Lyon is gambling that in the first 11 years of the lease it will have income that will be sheltered by the depreciation deductions, and that it will be able to make sufficiently good use of the tax dollars preserved thereby to malee up for the income it will recognize and pay taxes on during the last 14 years of the initial term of the lease and against which it will enjoy no- sheltering deduction. The general characterization of a transaction, for tax purposes is a question of law subject to review. The particular facts from which the characterization is to be made are not so subject. See American Realty Trust v. United States, 498 F. 2d 1194, 1198 (CA4 1974). Lyon’s consolidated balance sheet on December 31, 1968, showed assets of $12,225,612, and total stockholders’ equity of $3,818,671 Of the assets, the sum of $2,674,290 represented its then investment in the Worthen building. App. 587-588. Thus, the facts of this case stand in contrast to many others in which the form of the transaction actually created tax advantages that, for one reason or another, could not have been enjoyed had the transaction taken another form. See, e. g., Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 562 F. 2d 258 (CA3 1977) (sale-and-leaseback of land between taxpayer and tax-exempt trust enabled the taxpayer to amortize, through its rental deductions, the cost of acquiring land not otherwise depreciable). Indeed, the arrangements in this case can hardly be labeled as tax-avoidance techniques in light of the other arrangments being promoted at the time. See, e. g., Zeitlin, Tax Planning in Equipment-Leasing Shelters, 1969 So. Cal. Tax Inst. 621; Marcus, Real Estate Purchase-Leasebacks as Secured Loans, 2 Real Estate L. J. 664 (1974). See generally Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F. 2d 771 (CA3), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 858 (1967), on remand, 50 T. C. 782 (1968); Levinson v. Commissioner, 45 T. C. 380 (1966); World Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F. 2d 614 (CA8 1962); Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Commissioner, 58 T. C. 836 (1972), aff’d, 500 F. 2d 1222 (CA9 1974); Cubic Corp. v. United States, 541 F. 2d 829 (CA9 1976).
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them. Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer. Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.
Who is the respondent of the case?
[ "attorney general of the United States, or his office", "specified state board or department of education", "city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit", "state commission, board, committee, or authority", "county government or county governmental unit, except school district", "court or judicial district", "state department or agency", "governmental employee or job applicant", "female governmental employee or job applicant", "minority governmental employee or job applicant", "minority female governmental employee or job applicant", "not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable", "retired or former governmental employee", "U.S. House of Representatives", "interstate compact", "judge", "state legislature, house, or committee", "local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough", "governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact", "state or U.S. supreme court", "local school district or board of education", "U.S. Senate", "U.S. senator", "foreign nation or instrumentality", "state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of", "state college or university", "United States", "State", "person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime", "advertising business or agency", "agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor", "airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes", "airline", "distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages", "alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked", "American Medical Association", "National Railroad Passenger Corp.", "amusement establishment, or recreational facility", "arrested person, or pretrial detainee", "attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association", "author, copyright holder", "bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company", "bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization", "establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store", "water transportation, stevedore", "bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines", "brewery, distillery", "broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm", "construction industry", "bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle", "business, corporation", "buyer, purchaser", "cable TV", "car dealer", "person convicted of crime", "tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband", "chemical company", "child, children, including adopted or illegitimate", "religious organization, institution, or person", "private club or facility", "coal company or coal mine operator", "computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software", "consumer, consumer organization", "creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company", "person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial", "defendant", "debtor", "real estate developer", "disabled person or disability benefit claimant", "distributor", "person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector", "drug manufacturer", "druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy", "employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of", "employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan", "electric equipment manufacturer", "electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company", "eleemosynary institution or person", "environmental organization", "employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.", "farmer, farm worker, or farm organization", "father", "female employee or job applicant", "female", "movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of", "fisherman or fishing company", "food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard", "foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity", "franchiser", "franchisee", "lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization", "person who guarantees another's obligations", "handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to", "health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor", "heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be", "hospital, medical center", "husband, or ex-husband", "involuntarily committed mental patient", "Indian, including Indian tribe or nation", "insurance company, or surety", "inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder", "investor", "injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related", "juvenile", "government contractor", "holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor", "magazine", "male", "medical or Medicaid claimant", "medical supply or manufacturing co.", "racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant", "minority female employee or job applicant", "manufacturer", "management, executive officer, or director, of business entity", "military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist", "mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company", "mother", "auto manufacturer", "newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service", "radio and television network, except cable tv", "nonprofit organization or business", "nonresident", "nuclear power plant or facility", "owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels", "shareholders to whom a tender offer is made", "tender offer", "oil company, or natural gas producer", "elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly", "out of state noncriminal defendant", "political action committee", "parent or parents", "parking lot or service", "patient of a health professional", "telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company", "physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society", "public interest organization", "physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee", "pipe line company", "package, luggage, container", "political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official", "indigent, needy, welfare recipient", "indigent defendant", "private person", "prisoner, inmate of penal institution", "professional organization, business, or person", "probationer, or parolee", "protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer", "public utility", "publisher, publishing company", "radio station", "racial or ethnic minority", "person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination", "racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "realtor", "journalist, columnist, member of the news media", "resident", "restaurant, food vendor", "retarded person, or mental incompetent", "retired or former employee", "railroad", "private school, college, or university", "seller or vendor", "shipper, including importer and exporter", "shopping center, mall", "spouse, or former spouse", "stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder", "retail business or outlet", "student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only", "tenant or lessee", "theater, studio", "forest products, lumber, or logging company", "person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent", "trucking company, or motor carrier", "television station", "union member", "unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant", "union, labor organization, or official of", "veteran", "voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)", "wholesale trade", "wife, or ex-wife", "witness, or person under subpoena", "network", "slave", "slave-owner", "bank of the united states", "timber company", "u.s. job applicants or employees", "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "General Land Office of Commissioners", "Transportation Security Administration", "Surface Transportation Board", "U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.", "Reconstruction Finance Corp.", "Department or Secretary of Homeland Security", "Unidentifiable", "International Entity" ]
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ILLINOIS v. CITY OF MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN, et al. No. 49, Orig. Argued February 29, 1972 Decided April 24, 1972 Douglas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Fred F. Herzog argued the cause for plaintiff. With him on the briefs was William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois. Harry O. Slater argued the cause for defendants. With him on the brief for defendant City of Milwaukee were John J. Fleming and Richard F. Maruszewski. Michael S. Fisher and Burton A. Scott filed a brief for defendant City of Kenosha. Jack Harvey, Edward A. Krenzke, and Louis J. Roshar filed a brief for defendant City of Racine. Mr. Fleming and Harvey G. Odenbrett filed a brief for defendant Sewerage Commission of the City of Milwaukee. Ewald L. Moerke, Jr., filed a brief for defendant Metropolitan Sewerage Commission of the County of Milwaukee. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a motion by Illinois to file a bill of complaint under our original jurisdiction against four cities of Wisconsin, the Sewerage Commission of the City of Milwaukee, and the Metropolitan Sewerage Commission of the County of Milwaukee. The cause of action alleged is pollution by the defendants of Lake Michigan, a body of interstate water. According to plaintiff, some 200 million gallons of raw or inadequately treated sewage and other waste materials are discharged daily into the lake in the Milwaukee area alone. Plaintiff alleges that it and its subdivisions prohibit and prevent such discharges, but that the defendants do not take such actions. Plaintiff asks that we abate this public nuisance. I Article III, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution provides: “In all Cases ... in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.” Congress has provided in 28 U. S. C. § 1251 that “(a) the Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of: (1) All controversies between two or more States.” It has long been this Court’s philosophy that “our original jurisdiction should be invoked sparingly.” Utah v. United States, 394 U. S. 89, 95. We construe 28 U. S. C. § 1251 (a) (1), as we do Art. Ill, § 2, cl. 2, to honor our original jurisdiction but to make it obligatory only in appropriate cases. And the question of what is appropriate concerns, of course, the seriousness and dignity of the claim; yet beyond that it necessarily involves the availability of another forum where there is jurisdiction over the named parties, where the issues tendered may be litigated, and where appropriate relief may be had. We incline to a sparing use of our original jurisdiction so that our increasing duties with the appellate docket will not suffer. Washington v. General Motors Corp., post, p. 109. Illinois presses its request for leave to file saying that the agencies named as defendants are instrumentalities of Wisconsin and therefore that this is a suit against Wisconsin which could not be brought in any other forum. Under our decisions there is no doubt that the actions of public entities might, under appropriate pleadings, be attributed to a State so as to warrant a joinder of the State as party defendant. In Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208, Missouri invoked our original jurisdiction by an action against the State of Illinois and the Sanitary District of the City of Chicago, seeking an injunction to restrain the discharge of raw sewage into the Mississippi River. On a demurrer to the motion for leave to file a bill of complaint, Illinois argued that the Sanitary District was the proper defendant and that Illinois should not have been made a party. That argument was rejected: “The contention . . . seems to be that, because the matters complained of in the bill proceed and will continue to proceed from the acts of the Sanitary District of Chicago, a corporation of the State of Illinois, it therefore follows that the State, as such, is not interested in the question, and is improperly made a party. “We are unable to see the force of this suggestion. The bill does not allege that the Sanitary District is acting without or in excess of lawful authority. The averment and the conceded facts are that the corporation is an agency of the State to do the very things which, according to the theory of the complainant’s case, will result in the mischief to be apprehended. It is state action and its results that are complained of — thus distinguishing this case from that of Louisiana v. Texas [176 U. S. 1], where the' acts sought to be restrained were alleged to be those of officers or functionaries proceeding in a wrongful and malevolent misapplication of the quarantine laws of Texas. The Sanitary District of Chicago is not a private corporation, formed for purposes of private gain, but a public corporation, whose existence and operations are wholly within the control of the State. “The object of the bill is to subject this public work to judicial supervision, upon the allegation that the method of its construction and maintenance will create a continuing nuisance, dangerous to the health of a neighboring State and its inhabitants. Surely, in such a case, the State of Illinois would have a right to appear and traverse the allegations of the bill, and, having such a right, might properly be made a party defendant.” 180 U. S., at 242. In New York v. New Jersey, 256 U. S. 296, the State of New York brought an original action against the State of New Jersey and the Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners, seeking an injunction against the discharge of sewage into Upper New York Bay. The question was whether the actions of the sewage agency could be attributed to New Jersey so as to make that State responsible for them. The Court said: “Also, for the purpose of showing the responsibility of the State of New Jersey for the proposed action of the defendant, the Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners, the bill sets out, with much detail, the acts of the legislature of that State authorizing and directing such action on their part. “Of this it is sufficient to say that the averments of the bill, quite undenied, show that the defendant sewerage commissioners constitute such a statutory, corporate agency of the State that their action, actual or intended, must be treated as that of the State itself, and we shall so regard it.” 256 U. S., at 302. The most recent case is New Jersey v. New York, 345 U. S. 369. The action was originally brought by the State of New Jersey against the City and State of New York for injunctive relief against the diversion of waters from Delaware River tributaries lying within New York State. Pennsylvania was subsequently allowed to intervene. The question presented by this decision was the right of the City of Philadelphia also to intervene in the proceedings as a party plaintiff. The issues raised were broad: “All of the present parties to the litigation have formally opposed the motion to intervene on grounds (1) that the intervention would permit a suit against a state by a citizen of another state in contravention of the Eleventh Amendment; (2) that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has the exclusive right to represent the interest of Philadelphia as parens pa-triae; and (3) that intervention should be denied, in any event, as a matter of sound discretion.” 345 U. S., at 372. We denied the City of Philadelphia’s motion to intervene, saying: “The City of Philadelphia represents only a part of the citizens of Pennsylvania who reside in the watershed area of the Delaware River and its tributaries and depend upon those waters. If we undertook to evaluate all the separate interests within Pennsylvania, we could, in effect, be drawn into an intramural dispute over the distribution of water within the Commonwealth. . . . “Our original jurisdiction should not be thus expanded to the dimensions of ordinary class actions. An intervenor whose state is already a party should have the burden of showing some compelling interest in his own right, apart from his interest in a class with all other citizens and creatures of the state, which interest is not properly represented by the state.” 345 U. S., at 373. We added: “The presence of New York City in this litigation is urged as a reason for permitting Philadelphia to intervene. But the argument misconstrues New York City’s position in the case. New York City was not admitted into this litigation as a matter of discretion at her request. She was forcibly joined as a defendant to the original action since she was the authorized agent for the execution of the sovereign policy which threatened injury to the citizens of New Jersey. Because of this position as a defendant, subordinate to the parent state as the primary defendant, New York City’s position in the case raises no problems under the Eleventh Amendment.” 345 U. S., at 374-375. We conclude that while, under appropriate pleadings, Wisconsin could be joined as a defendant in the present controversy, it is not mandatory that it be made one. It is well settled that for the purposes of diversity of citizenship, political subdivisions are citizens of their respective States. Bullard v. City of Cisco, 290 U. S. 179; Cowles v. Mercer County, 7 Wall. 118, 122. If a political subdivision is a citizen for diversity purposes, then it would make no jurisdictional difference whether it was the plaintiff or defendant in such an action. That being the case, a political subdivision in one State would be able to bring an action founded upon diversity jurisdiction against a political subdivision of another State. We therefore conclude that the term “States” as used in 28 U. S. C. § 1251 (a)(1) should not be read to include their political subdivisions. That, of course, does not mean that political subdivisions of a State may not be sued under the head of our original jurisdiction, for 28 U. S. C. § 1251 provides that “(b) the Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of: (3) all actions or proceedings by a State against the citizens of another State . . . If the named public entities of Wisconsin may, however, be sued by Illinois in a federal district court, our original jurisdiction is not mandatory. It is to that aspect of the case that we now turn. II Title 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (a) provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” The considerable interests involved in the purity of interstate waters would seem to put beyond question the jurisdictional amount provided in § 1331 (a). See Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light, Heat & Power Co., 239 U. S. 121; Mississippi & Missouri R. Co. v. Ward, 2 Black 485, 492; Ronzio v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 116 F. 2d 604, 606; C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts 117-119 (2d ed. 1970); Note, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1369. The question is whether pollution of interstate or navigable waters creates actions arising under the “laws” of the United States within the meaning of § 1331(a). We hold that it does; and we also hold that § 1331 (á) includes suits brought by a State. Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the four members of this Court in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U. S. 354, 393 (dissenting and concurring), who reached the issue, concluded that “laws,” within the meaning of § 1331 (a), embraced claims founded on federal common law: “The contention cannot be accepted that since petitioner’s rights are judicially defined, they are not created by 'the laws ... of the United States’ within the meaning of § 1331 .... In another context, that of state law, this Court has recognized that the statutory word 'laws’ includes court decisions. The converse situation is presented here in that federal courts have an extensive responsibility of fashioning rules of substantive law .... These rules are as fully ‘laws’ of the United States as if they had been enacted by Congress.” (Citations omitted.) Lower courts have reached the same conclusion. See, e. g., Murphy v. Colonial Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 388 F. 2d 609, 611-612 (CA2 1967); Stokes v. Adair, 265 F. 2d 662 (CA4 1959); Mater v. Holley, 200 F. 2d 123 (CA5 1952); American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts 180-182 (1969). Judge Harvey M. Johnsen in Texas v. Pankey, 441 F. 2d 236, 240, stated the controlling principle: “As the field of federal common law has been given necessary expansion into matters of federal concern and relationship (where no applicable federal statute exists, as there does not here), the ecological rights of a State in the improper impairment of them from sources outside the State’s own territory, now would and should, we think, be held to be a matter having basis and standard in federal common law and so directly constituting a question arising under the laws of the United States.” Chief Judge Lumbard, speaking for the panel in Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F. 2d 486, 492, expressed the same view as follows: “We believe that a cause of action similarly ‘arises under’ federal law if the dispositive issues stated in the complaint require the application of federal common law .... The word ‘laws’ in § 1331 should be construed to include laws created by federal judicial decisions as well as by congressional legislation. The rationale of the 1875 grant of federal question jurisdiction — to insure the availability of a forum designed to minimize the danger of hostility toward, and specially suited to the vindication of, federally created rights — is as applicable to judicially created rights as to rights created by statute.” (Citations omitted.) We see no reason not to give “laws” its natural meaning, see Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., supra, at 393 n. 5 (Brennan, J., dissenting and concurring), and therefore conclude that § 1331 jurisdiction will support claims founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory origin. As respects the power of a State to bring an action under § 1331 (a), Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449, 470-472, is controlling. There Kansas had sued a number of corporations in its own courts and, since federal rights were involved, the defendants had the cases removed to the federal court. Kansas resisted, saying that the federal court lacked jurisdiction because of Art. Ill, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution, which gives this Court "original Jurisdiction” in "all Cases ... in which a State shall be Party.” The Court held that where a State is suing parties who are not other States, the original jurisdiction of this Court is not exclusive (id., at 470) and that those suits “may now be brought in or removed to the Circuit Courts [now the District Courts] without regard to the character of the parties.” Ibid. We adhere to that ruling. Ill Congress has enacted numerous laws touching interstate waters. In 1899 it established some surveillance by the Army Corps of Engineers over industrial pollution, not including sewage, Rivers and Harbors Act of March 3, 1899, 30 Stat. 1121, a grant of power which we construed in United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U. S. 482, and in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U. S. 224. The 1899 Act has been reinforced and broadened by a complex of laws recently enacted. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 62 Stat. 1155, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1151, tightens control over discharges into navigable waters so as not to lower applicable water quality standards. By the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 852, 42 U. S. C. § 4321 et seq., Congress “authorizes and directs” that “the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this Act” and that “all agencies of the Federal Government shall. .. identify and develop methods and procedures . . . which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmak-ing along with economic and technical considerations.” Sec. 102, 42 U. S. C. § 4332. Congress has evinced increasing concern with the quality of the aquatic environment as it affects the conservation and safeguarding of fish and wildlife resources. See, e. g., Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 1119, 16 U. S. C. § 742a; the Act of Sept. 22, 1959, 73 Stat. 642, authorizing research in migratory marine game fish, 16 U. S. C. §760e; and the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 48 Stat. 401, as amended, 16 U. S. C. § 661. Buttressed by these new and expanding policies, the Corps of Engineers has issued new Rules and Regulations governing permits for discharges or deposits into navigable waters. 36 Fed. Reg. 6564 et seq. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act in § 1 (b) declares that it is federal policy “to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the States in preventing and controlling water pollution.” But the Act makes clear that it is federal, not state, law that in the end controls the pollution of interstate or navigable waters. While the States are given time to establish water quality standards, § 10 (c)(1), if a State fails to do so the federal administrator promulgates one. §10 (c)(2). Section 10(a) makes pollution of interstate or navigable waters subject “to abatement” when it “endangers the health or welfare of any persons.” The abatement that is authorized follows a long-drawn-out procedure unnecessary to relate here. It uses the conference procedure, hoping for amicable settlements. But if none is reached, the federal administrator may request the Attorney General to bring suit on behalf of the United States for abatement of the pollution. §10 (g). The remedy sought by Illinois is not within the precise scope of remedies prescribed by Congress. Yet the remedies which Congress provides are not necessarily the only federal remedies available. “It is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion federal law where federal rights are concerned.” Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448, 457. When we deal with air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal common law, as Texas v. Pankey, 441 F. 2d 236, recently held. The application of federal common law to abate a public nuisance in interstate or navigable waters is not inconsistent with the Water Pollution Control Act. Congress provided in § 10 (b) of that Act that, save as a court may decree otherwise in an enforcement action, “[s]tate and interstate action to abate pollution of interstate or navigable waters shall be encouraged and shall not ... be displaced by Federal enforcement action.” The leading air case is Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230, where Georgia filed an original suit in this Court against a Tennessee company whose noxious gases were causing a wholesale destruction of forests, orchards, and crops in Georgia. The Court said: “The caution with which demands of this sort, on the part of a State, for relief from injuries analogous to torts, must be examined, is dwelt upon in Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496, 520, 521. But it is plain that some such demands must be recognized, if the grounds alleged are proved. When the States by their union made the forcible abatement of outside nuisances impossible to each, they did not thereby agree to submit to whatever might be done. They did not renounce the possibility of making reasonable demands on the ground of their still remaining quasi-sovereign interests; and the alternative to force is a suit in this court. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208, 241.” 206 U. S., at 237. The nature of the nuisance was described as follows: “It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that the air over its territory should not be polluted on a great scale by sulphurous acid gas, that the forests on its mountains, be they better or worse, and whatever domestic destruction they have suffered, should not be further destroyed or threatened by the act of persons beyond its control, that the crops and orchards on its hills should not be endangered from the same source. If any such demand is to be enforced this must be, notwithstanding the hesitation that we might feel if the suit were between private parties, and the doubt whether for the injuries which they might be suffering to their property they should not be left to an action at law.” Id., at 238. Our decisions concerning interstate waters contain the same theme. Rights in interstate streams, like questions of boundaries, “have been recognized as presenting federal questions.” Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U. S. 92, 110. The question of apportionment of interstate waters is a question of “federal common law” upon which state statutes or decisions are not conclusive. Ibid. In speaking of the problem of apportioning the waters of an interstate stream, the Court said in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 98, that “through these successive disputes and decisions this court is practically building up what may not improperly be called interstate common law.” And see Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U. S. 674 (escheat of intangible personal property), Texas v. Florida, 306 U. S. 398, 405 (suit by bill in the nature of interpleader to determine the true domicile of a decedent as the basis of death taxes). Equitable apportionment of the waters of an interstate stream has often been made under the head of our original jurisdiction. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589; Kansas v. Colorado, supra; cf. Arizona v. California, 373 U. S. 546, 562. The applicable federal common law depends on the facts peculiar to the particular case. “Priority of appropriation is the guiding principle. But physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water in the several sections of the river, the character and rate of return flows, the extent of established uses, the availability of storage water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, the damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former — these are all relevant factors. They are merely an illustrative, not an exhaustive catalogue. They indicate the nature of the problem of apportionment and the delicate adjustment of interests which must be made.” 325 U. S., at 618. When it comes to water pollution this Court has spoken in terms of “a public nuisance,” New York v. New Jer sey,, 256 U. S., at 313; New Jersey v. New York City, 283 U. S. 473, 481, 482. In Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496, 520-521, the Court said, “It may be imagined that a nuisance might be created by a State upon a navigable river like the Danube, which would amount to a casus belli for a State lower down, unless removed. If such a nuisance were created by a State upon the Mississippi the controversy would be resolved by the more peaceful means of a suit in this court.” It may happen that new federal laws and new federal regulations may in time pre-empt the field of federal common law of nuisance. But until that comes to pass, federal courts will be empowered to appraise the equities of the suits alleging creation of a public nuisance by water pollution. While federal law governs, consideration of state standards may be relevant. Cf. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U. S. 660, 670; Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125, 146-147. Thus, a State with high water-quality standards may well ask that its strict standards be honored and that it not be compelled to lower itself to the more degrading standards of a neighbor. There are no fixed rules that govern; these will be equity suits in which the informed judgment of the chancellor will largely govern. We deny, without prejudice, the motion for leave to file. While this original suit normally might be the appropriate vehicle for resolving this controversy, we exercise our discretion to remit the parties to an appropriate district court whose powers are adequate to resolve the issues- So ordered. It is equally well settled that a suit between a State and a citizen of another State is not a suit between citizens of different States for the purposes of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U. S. 482, 487. See also H. R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A 104 (1947): “The original jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 3, section 2, of the Constitution is not exclusive by virtue of that provision alone. Congress may provide for or deny exclusiveness.” The contrary indication in Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U. S. 493, 498 n. 3, was based on the preoccupation of that litigation with public nuisance under Ohio law, not the federal common law which we now hold is ample basis for federal jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (a). The powers granted the Secretary of the Interior under the Eederal Water Quality Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 903, were assigned by the President to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970. See 35 Fed. Reg. 15623. While the various federal environmental protection statutes will not necessarily mark the outer bounds of the federal common law, they may provide useful guidelines in fashioning such rules of decision. What we said in another connection in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448, 456-457, is relevent here: “The question then is, what is the substantive law to be applied in suits under § 301 (a) ? We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301 (a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws. The Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some substantive law. It points out what the parties may or may not do in certain situations. Other problems will lie in the penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem. Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state law. But state law, if compatible with the purpose of § 301, may be resorted to in order to find the rule that will best effectuate the federal policy. Any state law applied, however, will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an independent source of private rights.” (Citations omitted.) See also Woods & Reed, The Supreme Court and Interstate Environmental Quality: Some Notes on the Wyandotte Case, 12 Ariz. L. Rev. 691, 713-714; Note, 56 Va. L. Rev. 458. Thus, it is not only the character of the parties that requires us to apply federal law. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230, 237; cf. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 289; The Federalist No. 80 (A. Hamilton). As Mr. Justice Harlan indicated for the Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398, 421-427, where there is an overriding federal interest in the need for a uniform rule of decision or where the controversy touches basic interests of federalism, we have fashioned federal common law. See also Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363; D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U. S. 447; C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts 249 (2d ed, 1970); Woods & Reed, supra, n. 5, at 703-713; Note, 50 Texas L. Rev. 183. Certainly these same demands for applying federal law are present in the pollution of a body of water such as Lake Michigan bounded, as it is, by four States. Those who maintain that state law governs overlook the fact that the Hinderlider case was written by Mr. Justice Brandéis who also wrote for the Court in Erie B. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, the two cases being decided the same day. In North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U. S. 365, 374, the Court said: “[W]here one State, by a change in its method of draining water from lands within its border, increases the flow into an interstate stream, so that its natural capacity is greatly exceeded and the water is thrown upon the farms of another State, the latter State has such an interest as quasi-sovereign in the comfort, health and prosperity of its farm owners that resort may be had to this Court for relief. It is the creation of a public nuisance of simple type for which a State may properly ask an injunction.” “Federal common law and not the varying common law of the individual States is, we think, entitled and necessary to be recognized as a basis for dealing in uniform standard with the environmental rights of a State against improper impairment by sources outside its domain. The more would this seem to be imperative in the present era of growing concern on the part of a State about its ecological conditions and impairments of them. In the outside sources of such impairment, more conflicting disputes, increasing assertions and proliferating contentions would seem to be inevitable. Until the field has been made the subject of comprehensive legislation or authorized administrative standards, only a federal common law basis can provide an adequate means for dealing with such claims as alleged federal rights. And the logic and practicality of regarding such claims as being entitled to be asserted within the federal-question jurisdiction of § 1331 (a) would seem to be self-evident.” Texas v. Pankey, 441 F. 2d 236, 241-242. The rule of decision being federal, the “action . . . may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose,” 28 U. S. C. §1391 (b), thereby giving flexibility to the choice of venue. See also 28 U. S. C. § 1407. Whatever may be a municipality’s sovereign immunity in actions for damages, see Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. Ill. L. F. 919,94L-948; Note, 4 Suffolk L. Rev. 832 (1970), actions seeking injunctive relief stand on a different footing. The cases are virtually unanimous in holding that municipalities are subject to injunctions to abate nuisances. See cases collected in 17 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations §49.51 et seq. (3d rev. ed. 1968). See also Wis. Stat. Ann. §59.96 (6) (b) (1957) as respects the suability of metropolitan sewerage commissions. While the kind of equitable relief to be accorded lies in the discretion of the chancellor (Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U. S. 334), a State that causes a public nuisance is suable in this Court and any of its public entities is suable in a federal district court having jurisdiction: “[I]t is generally held that a municipality, like a private individual, may be enjoined from maintaining a nuisance. Thus in a proper case a municipal corporation will be restrained by injunction from creating a nuisance on private property, as by the discharge of sewage or poisonous gases thereon, or, in some jurisdictions, by the obstruction of drainage of waters, or by discharging sewage or filth into a stream and polluting the water to the damage of lower riparian owners, or by dumping garbage or refuse, or by other acts. Likewise, a municipality may be enjoined from creating or operating a nuisance, whether the municipality is acting in a governmental or proprietary capacity, impairing property rights. And, if a nuisance is established causing irreparable injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law it may be enjoined irrespective of the resulting damage or injury to the municipality.” 17 McQuil-lin, supra, § 49.55.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the opinion effectively says that the decision in this case "overruled" one or more of the Court's own precedents. Alteration also extends to language in the majority opinion that states that a precedent of the Supreme Court has been "disapproved," or is "no longer good law". Note, however, that alteration does not apply to cases in which the Court "distinguishes" a precedent.
Did the the decision of the court overrule one or more of the Court's own precedents?
[ "Yes", "No" ]
[ 0 ]
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SAKRAIDA v. AG PRO, INC. No. 75-110. Argued March 3, 1976 Decided April 20, 1976 BreNNAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Stephen B. Tatem, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was James F. Hulse. J. Pierre Kolisch argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was John W. Stuart. Mary Helen Sears filed a brief for the Texas Farmers Union as amicus curiae urging reversal. Helen W. Nies, Donald R. Dunner, and David N. Webster filed a brief for the Bar Association of the District of Columbia as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent Ag Pro, Inc., filed this action against petitioner Sakraida on October 8, 1968, in the District Court for the Western District of Texas for infringement of United States Letters Patent 3,223,070, entitled “Dairy Establishment,” covering a water flush system to remove cow manure from the floor of a dairy barn. The patent was issued December 14, 1965, to Gribble and Bennett, who later assigned it to respondent. The District Court's initial grant of summary judgment for petitioner was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 437 F. 2d 99 (1971). After a trial on remand, the District Court again entered a judgment for petitioner. The District Court held that the patent “does not constitute invention, is not patentable, and is not a valid patent, it being a combination patent, all of the elements of which are old in the dairy business, long prior to 1963, and the combination of them as described in the said patent being neither new nor meeting the test of non-obviousness.” The Court of Appeals again reversed and held the patent valid. 474 F. 2d 167 (1973). On rehearing, the court remanded “with directions to enter a judgment holding the patent valid, subject, however, to . . . consideration of a motion under Rule 60 (b)(2), F. R. Civ. P., to be filed in the District Court by the [petitioner] Sakraida on the issue of patent validity based on newly discovered evidence.” 481 F. 2d 668, 669 (1973). The District Court granted the motion and ordered a new trial. The Court of Appeals again reversed, holding that the grant of the motion was error, because “the record on the motion establishes that [petitioner] failed to exercise due diligence to discover the new evidence prior to entry of the former judgment.” 512 F. 2d 141, 142 (1975). The Court of Appeals further held that “[o]ur prior determination of patent validity is reaffirmed.” Id., at 144. We granted certio-rari. 423 U. S. 891 (1975). We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in holding the patent valid and also in reaffirming its determination of patent validity. We therefore reverse and direct the reinstatement of the District Court’s judgment for petitioner, and thus we have no occasion to decide whether the Court of Appeals properly found that petitioner had not established a case for a new trial under Rule 60 (b)(2). Systems using flowing water to clean animal wastes from barn floors have been familiar on dairy farms since ancient times. The District Court found, and respondent concedes, that none of the 13 elements of the Dairy Establishment combination is new, and many of those elements, including storage of the water in tanks or pools, appear in at least six prior patented systems. The prior art involved spot delivery of water from tanks or pools to the barn floor by means of high pressure hoses or pipes. That system required supplemental hand labor, using tractor blades, shovels, and brooms, and cleaning by these methods took several hours. The only claimed inventive feature of the Dairy Establishment combination of old elements is the provision for abrupt release of the water from the tanks or pools directly onto the barn floor, which causes the flow of a sheet of water that washes all animal waste into drains within minutes and requires no supplemental hand labor. As an expert witness for respondent testified concerning the effect of Dairy Establishment’s combination: “[W]ater at the bottom has more friction than this water on the top and it keeps moving ahead and as this water keeps moving ahead^we get a rolling action of this water which produced the cleaning action. ... You do not get this in a hose. . . . [UJnless that water is continuously directed toward the cleaning area the cleaning action almost ceases instantaneously. ...” The District Court found that “[n] either the tank which holds the water, nor the means of releasing the water quickly is new, but embrace [s] tanks and doors which have long been known,” and further that “their use in this connection is one that is obvious, and the patent in that respect is lacking in novelty. The patent does not meet the non-obvious requirements of the law.” The District Court therefore held that Dairy Establishment “may be relevant to commercial success, but not to invention,” because the combination “was reasonably obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art.” Moreover, even if the combination filled a “long-felt want and . . . has enjoyed commercial success, those matters, without invention, will not make patentability.” Finally, the District Court concluded: “[T]o those skilled in the art, the use of the old elements in combination was not an invention by the obvious-nonobvious standard. Even though the dairy barn in question attains the posture of a successful venture, more than that is needed for invention.” The Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court’s conclusion on the crucial issue of obviousness. It has long been clear that the Constitution requires that there be some “invention” to be entitled to patent protection. Dann v. Johnston, ante, p. 219. As we explained in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. 248, 267 (1851): “[U]nless more ingenuity and skill . . . were required . . . than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.” This standard was enacted in 1952 by Congress in 35 U. S. C. § 103 “as a codification of judicial precedents . . . with congressional directions that inquiries into the obviousness of the subject matter sought to be patented are a prerequisite to patentability.” Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U. S. 1, 17 (1966). Section 103 provides: “A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.” The ultimate test of patent validity is one of law, Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U. S. 147, 155 (1950), but resolution of the obviousness issue necessarily entails several basic factual inquiries, Graham v. John Deere Co., supra, at 17. “Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals concluded that “the facts presented at trial clearly do not support [the District Court’s] finding of obviousness under the three-pronged Graham test . . . .” 474 F. 2d, at 172. We disagree and hold that the Court of Appeals erroneously set aside the District Court’s findings. The scope of the prior art was shown by prior patents, prior art publications, affidavits of people having knowledge of prior flush systems analogous to respondent’s, and the testimony of a dairy operator with 22 years of experience who described flush systems he had seen on visits to dairy farms throughout the country. Our independent examination of that evidence persuades us of its sufficiency to support the District Court's finding “as a fact that each and all of the component parts of this patent . . . were old and well-known throughout the dairy industry long prior to the date of the filing of the application for the Gribble patent .... What Mr. Gribble referred to ... as the essence of the patent, to-wit, the manure flush system, was old, various means for flushing manure from dairy barns having been used long before the filing of the application . Indeed, respondent admitted at trial “that the patent is made up of a combination of old elements” and “that all elements are individually old . . . Accordingly, the District Court properly followed our admonition in Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., supra, at 152: “Courts should scrutinize combination patent claims with a care proportioned to the difficulty and improbability of finding invention in an assembly of old elements.... A patent for a combination which only unites old elements with no change in their respective functions ... obviously withdraws what already is known into the field of its monopoly and diminishes the resources available to skillful men. ...” The Court of Appeals recognized that the patent combined old elements for applying water to a conventional sloped floor in a dairy barn equipped with drains at the bottom of the slope and that the purpose of the storage tank — to accumulate a large volume of water capable of being released in a cascade or surge — was equally conventional. 474 F. 2d, at 169. It concluded, however, that the element lacking in the prior art was any evidence of an arrangement of the old elements to effect the abrupt release of a flow of water to wash animal wastes from the floor of a dairy barn. Ibid. Therefore, “although the [respondent’s] flush system does not embrace a complicated technical improvement, it does achieve a synergistic result through a novel combination.” Id., at 173. We cannot agree that the combination of these old elements to produce an abrupt release of water directly on the barn floor from storage tanks or pools can properly be characterized as synergistic, that is, “result [ing] in an effect greater than the sum of the several effects taken separately.” Anderson’s-Black Rock v. Pavement Co., 396 U. S. 57, 61 (1969). Rather, this patent simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform, although perhaps producing a more striking result than in previous combinations. Such combinations are not patentable under standards appropriate for a combination patent. Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., supra; Anderson’s-Black Rock v. Pavement Co., supra. Under those authorities this assembly of old elements that delivers water directly rather than through pipes or hoses to the barn floor falls under the head of “the work of the skilful mechanic, not that of the inventor.” Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How., at 267. Exploitation of the principle of gravity adds nothing to the sum of useful knowledge where there is no change in the respective functions of the elements of the combination; this particular use of the assembly of old elements would be obvious to any person skilled in the art of mechanical application. See Dann v. Johnston, ante, at 229-230. Though doubtless a matter of great convenience, producing a desired result in a cheaper and faster way, and enjoying commercial success, Dairy Establishment “did not produce a 'new or different function’ . . . within the test of validity of combination patents.” Anderson’s-Black Rock v. Pavement Co., supra, at 60. These desirable benefits “without invention will not make patentability.” Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U. S., at 153. See Dann v. Johnston, ante, at 230 n. 4. Reversed. Among the labors of Hercules is the following: “Heracles now set out to perform his fifth Labour, and this time his task was- to cleanse the stables of Augeas in a single day. Augeas was a rich king of Elis, who had three thousand cattle. At night the cattle always stood in a great court surrounded with walls, close to the king’s palace, and as it was quite ten years since the servants had cleaned it out, there was enough refuse in the court to build up a high mountain. Heracles went to Augeas and asked if he would give him the tenth part of his flocks if he thoroughly cleansed his stables in a single day. The king looked upon this as such an absolutely impossible feat that he would not have minded promising his kingdom as a reward for it, so he laughed and said, 'Set to work, we shall not quarrel about the wages,' and he further promised distinctly to give Heracles what he asked, and this he did in the presence of Phyleus, his eldest son, who happened to be there. The next morning Heracles set to work, but even his strong arms would have failed to accomplish the task if they had not been aided by his mother-wit. He compelled a mighty torrent to work for him, but you would hardly guess how he did it. First he opened great gates on two opposite sides of the court, and then he went to the stream, and when he had blocked up its regular course with great stones, he conducted it to the court that required to be cleansed, so that the water streamed in at one end and streamed out at the other, carrying away all the dirt with it. Before evening the stream had done its work and was restored to its usual course.” C. Witt, Classic Mythology 119-120 (1883). The District Court found as follows respecting Claims 1 and 3, the only claims involved in the case: “1. I find that the 'dairy establishment’ as described in United States Letters Patent 3,223,070 is composed of 13 separate items, as follows: “(a) . a smooth, evenly contoured, paved surface forming a floor providing a walking surface. . . "(b) . . drain means for draining wash water from such floor opening to the top of the floor.’ “(e) '. . . said smooth, evenly contoured surface which forms such floor sloping toward said drain. . . .’ “(d) ‘. . . multiple rest areas with individual stalls for each cow and with each of said stalls having a bottom which is also a smooth pavement. . . .’ “(e) ‘. . . which is disposed at an elevation above the paved surface forming the floor. .. .’ “(f) r. . . said stalls being dimensioned so that a cow can comfortably stand or lie in the stall, but offal from the cow falls outside the stall bottom and onto the floor providing the walking surface in the bam. . . .’ “(g) . . said bam further including defined feeding areas having feeding troughs. . . / “(h) ‘. . . a cow-holding area.’ “(i) ‘. . . a milking area.’ “(j) ‘. . .a transfer area all bottomed with the walking surface forming said floor in the bam.. ..’ "(k) '. . . and floor washing means for washing the floor providing the walking surface in the bam where said floor bottom, said feeding, holding, milking and transfer areas operable to send wash water flowing over the floor with such water washing any cow offal thereon into the said drain means, said floor washing means including means located over a region of said floor which is uphill from said drain means constructed to collect water as a pool above said floor and operable after such collection of water as a pool to dispense the water as a sheet of water over said floor.’ “(1) A tank on a mounting, so that it can be tilted, and the water poured out to cascade on the floor to form a sheet. “(m) A floor-washing means comprising a dam for damming or collecting water as a pool directly on the floor, which such dam abruptly openable to send water cascading as a sheet over the floor towards the drain. “2. I further find that each of the items above-described were not new, but had been used in the dairy business prior to the time the application for the said Gribble patent, made the subject of this action, had been filed in the Patent Office of the United States on November 5, 1963.” The District Court found: “[M]any of the items going to make up Plaintiff’s claim for a patent were disclosed in prior patents, known respectively as the McCornack patent, the Holz patent, the Ingraham patent, the Kreutzer patent, the Bogert patent, and the Luks patent; and that the statements of the Examiner’s opinions refusing to issue a patent are true as to all items there stated to be'covered in prior patents or publications.” This witness further testified: “[W]ater has energy and it can be used in many different ways. In a hose the energy is used by impact, under pressure, external force that is applied to this pressure — to this water, whereas the water that comes down as a sheet or wall of water has built in energy because of its elevation and as this water is released it does the same thing water does in a flooded stream. As this water — I will try to malee this clear, and I hope I can, on the surface of this pavement there are these piles of manure droppings. This pavement is smooth and this water moves down over this manure. The water at the bottom has more friction than this water on the top and it keeps moving ahead and as this water keeps moving ahead we get a rolling action of this water which produced the cleaning action. That is the key to this method of cleaning. You do not get this in a hose. You do not get it in a gutter as has been used in the past. I might just mention a little bit about the hose. This squirting water on a floor — probably have done it on our own sidewalks or walkways, and I just mention that, that unless that water is continuously directed towards the cleaning area the cleaning action almost ceases instantaneously. Now the movie that was shown earlier very dramatically illustrated that point. The cleaning action — as soon as the hoses moved to one side the cleaning action ceased here and that is why this hose was moved back and forth, to drive this stuff on down to where we want it.” The court also concluded that “while the combination of old elements may have performed a useful function, it added nothing to the nature and quality of dairy bams theretofore used.” The court stated: “I therefore find as a fact that each and all of the component parts of this patent as listed under the applicant’s claims set out in said patent, were old and well-known throughout the dairy-industry tong prior to the date of the filing of the application for the Gribble patent. I further find that what Mr. Gribble referred to in his deposition as the essence of the patent, to-wit, the manure flush system, was old, various means for flushing manure from dairy barns having been used tong before the filing of the applies^ tion for the Gribble patent, the general idea in that connection being a hard surfaced sloping floor onto which the cows’ offal was dropped, and some system of introducing water in sufficient quantities and force onto said floor to wash the offal therefrom, with a ditch or drain to carry the offal so washed away from the barn, either into a manure container or otherwise.”
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
What is the ideological direction of the decision?
[ "Conservative", "Liberal", "Unspecifiable" ]
[ 1 ]
sc
BOBBY, WARDEN v. MITTS No. 10-1000. Decided May 2, 2011 Per Curiam. An Ohio jury convicted respondent Harry Mitts on two counts of aggravated murder and two counts of attempted murder. He was sentenced to death. At issue here is part of the jury instructions given during the penalty phase of Mitts’s trial. The instructions, in pertinent part, were as follows: “[Y]ou must determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the aggravating circumstances, which [Mitts] was found guilty of committing in the separate counts, are sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors you find are present in this case. “When all 12 members of the jury find by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances in each separate count with which [Mitts] has been found guilty of committing outweigh the mitigating factors, if any, then you must return such finding to the Court. “I instruct you as a matter of law that if you make such a finding, then you must recommend to the Court that the sentence of death be imposed on [Mitts], “On the other hand, [if] after considering all the relevant evidence raised at trial, the evidence and testimony received at this hearing and the arguments of counsel, you find that the state of Ohio failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances with which [Mitts] was found guilty of committing outweigh the mitigating factors, you will then proceed to determine which of two possible life imprisonment sentences to recommend to the Court.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 352a-353a. We considered virtually the same Ohio jury instructions last Term in Smith v. Spisak, 558 U. S. 139, 147 (2010). See Mitts v. Bagley, 620 F. 3d 650, 652 (CA6 2010) (noting that the “instructions in this case are the same Ohio instructions that were given in” Spisak). That case, like this one, involved review of a federal habeas petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). AEDPA provides, as relevant here, that relief may not be granted unless the state court adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). In Spisak, we reversed a Court of Appeals decision that had found these instructions invalid under our decision in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U. S. 367 (1988). See 558 U. S., at 148-149. Up until our decision in Spisak, Mitts had also pressed the claim that the instructions were invalid under Mills. After Spisak rejected that claim, the Court of Appeals in this case determined that the instructions were contrary to our decision in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625 (1980), and accordingly vacated Mitts’s death sentence. See 620 F. 3d, at 658. In Beck, we held that the death penalty may not be imposed “when the jury was not permitted to consider a verdict of guilt of a lesser included non-eapital offense, and when the evidence would have supported such a verdict.” 447 U. S., at 627 (internal quotation marks omitted). We explained that such a scheme intolerably enhances the “risk of an unwarranted conviction” because it “interjects irrelevant considerations into the factfinding process, diverting the jury’s attention from the central issue of whether the State has satisfied its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of a capital crime.” Id., at 638, 642. “[FJorcing the jury to choose between conviction on the capital offense and acquittal,” we observed, “may encourage the jury to convict for an impermissible reason — its belief that the defendant is guilty of some serious crime and should be punished,” even when there is “some doubt with respect to an element” of the capital offense. Id., at 632, 642, 637. Because the scheme in Beck created a danger that the jury would resolve any doubts in favor of conviction, we concluded that it violated due process. See id., at 638, 643. According to the Court of Appeals below, the penalty phase instructions given at Mitts’s trial — and the Supreme Court of Ohio decision upholding their use — were “contrary to” Beck, because they “interposed before the jury the same false choice” that our holding in Beck prohibits. 620 F. 3d, at 658,657 (some internal quotation marks omitted). Referring to the instructions as “acquittal-first,” the Court of Appeals stated that they impermissibly required the jury to first decide whether to “acquit” Mitts of the death penalty before considering “mercy and some form of life imprisonment.” Id., at 656-657. Interpreting Beck to stand for the proposition that “a jury instruction violates due process if it requires a mandatory death penalty sentence that can only be avoided by an acquittal before the jury has an opportunity to consider life imprisonment,” the Court of Appeals concluded that the instructions given during the penalty phase of Mitts's trial unconstitutionally “deprived the jury of a meaningful opportunity to consider” a life sentence. 620 F. 3d, at 658, 657 (some internal quotation marks omitted). The instructions here are surely not invalid under our decision in Beck. The concern addressed in Beck was “the risk of an unwarranted conviction” created when the jury is forced to choose between finding the defendant guilty of a capital offense and declaring him innocent of any wrongdoing. 447 U. S., at 637 (emphasis added); id., at 638; see also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U. S. 447, 455 (1984) (explaining that the “goal of the Beck rule” is “to eliminate the distortion of the factfinding process that is created when the jury is forced into an all-or-nothing choice between capital murder and innocence”); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U. S. 624, 646 (1991) (“Our fundamental concern in Beck was that a jury convinced that the defendant had committed some violent crime but not convinced that he was guilty of a capital crime might nonetheless vote for a capital conviction if the only alternative was to set the defendant free with no punishment at all”). The question here, however, concerns the penalty phase, not the guilt phase, and we have already concluded that the logic of Beck is not directly applicable to penalty phase proceedings. In California v. Ramos, 463 U. S. 992 (1983), we rejected an argument that Beck prohibited an instruction to “a capital sentencing jury regarding the Governor’s power to commute a sentence of life without possibility of parole.” 463 U. S., at 994, 1006-1009. In so doing, we noted the “fundamental difference between the nature of the guilt/innocence determination at issue in Beck and the nature of the life/death choice at the penalty phase.” Id., at 1007. In light of that critical distinction, we observed that “the concern of Beck regarding the risk of an unwarranted conviction is simply not directly translatable to the deliberative process in which the capital jury engages in determining the appropriate penalty.” Id., at 1009; see also Schad, supra, at 647 (stating that the “central concern of Beck simply is not implicated” when the “jury was not faced with an all-or-nothing choice between the offense of conviction (capital murder) and innocence”). The jurors in Mitts’s case could not have plausibly thought that if they declined to recommend the death penalty Mitts would “escape all penalties for his alleged participation in the crime.” Beck, supra, at 629. They had just convicted him on two counts of aggravated murder and two counts of attempted murder. They were specifically instructed that if they did not find that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors — and therefore did not recommend the death penalty — they would choose from two life sentence options. There is accordingly no reason to believe that the jurors in this case, unlike the jurors in Beck, could have been improperly influenced by a fear that a decision short of death would have resulted in Mitts walking free. We all but decided the question presented here in Spisak itself. After rejecting the contention that the Ohio instructions were contrary to Mills, we noted that “the Court of Appeals found the jury instructions unconstitutional for an additional reason, that the instructions ‘require[d] the jury to unanimously reject a death sentence before considering other sentencing alternatives.’” 558 U. S., at 149 (quoting Spisak v. Mitchell, 465 F. 3d 684, 709 (CA6 2006)). That is essentially the Beck claim presented here. See 620 F. 3d, at 658 (holding that a “jury instruction violates due process if it requires a mandatory death penalty sentence that can only be avoided by an acquittal before the jury has an opportunity to consider life imprisonment”). We rejected that claim in Spisak under AEDPA, noting that “[w]e have not . . . previously held jury instructions unconstitutional for this reason.” 558 U. S., at 149. Although neither the parties nor the courts below in Spisak had cited Beck, a separate concurrence in Spisak would have struck down the instructions in reliance on that decision. See 558 U. S., at 158-161 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The Court nonetheless concluded that whatever the merits of that argument on direct review, “the jury instructions at Spisak's trial were not contrary to 'clearly established Federal law’ ” under AEDPA. Id., at 149. The same conclusion applies here. The petition for certiorari and the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is Reversed.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
What is the ideological direction of the decision?
[ "Conservative", "Liberal", "Unspecifiable" ]
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CHAPPELLE v. GREATER BATON ROUGE AIRPORT DISTRICT et al. No. 76-352. Argued April 25, 1977 Decided May 16, 1977 Herschel C. Adcock argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant. Joseph F. Keogh argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees. Per Curiam. The judgment is reversed. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346, 361-364 (1970).
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court in which the case originated. Focus on the court in which the case originated, not the administrative agency. For this reason, if appropiate note the origin court to be a state or federal appellate court rather than a court of first instance (trial court). If the case originated in the United States Supreme Court (arose under its original jurisdiction or no other court was involved), note the origin as "United States Supreme Court". If the case originated in a state court, note the origin as "State Court". Do not code the name of the state. The courts in the District of Columbia present a special case in part because of their complex history. Treat local trial (including today's superior court) and appellate courts (including today's DC Court of Appeals) as state courts. Consider cases that arise on a petition of habeas corpus and those removed to the federal courts from a state court as originating in the federal, rather than a state, court system. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus begins in the federal district court, not the state trial court. Identify courts based on the naming conventions of the day. Do not differentiate among districts in a state. For example, use "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York" for all the districts in New York.
What is the court in which the case originated?
[ "U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals", "U.S. Court of International Trade", "U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims", "U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces", "U.S. Court of Military Review", "U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals", "U.S. Customs Court", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit", "U.S. Tax Court", "Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals", "U.S. Court for China", "U.S. Consular Courts", "U.S. Commerce Court", "Territorial Supreme Court", "Territorial Appellate Court", "Territorial Trial Court", "Emergency Court of Appeals", "Supreme Court of the District of Columbia", "Bankruptcy Court", "U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)", "Alabama Middle U.S. District Court", "Alabama Northern U.S. District Court", "Alabama Southern U.S. District Court", "Alaska U.S. District Court", "Arizona U.S. District Court", "Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court", "Arkansas Western U.S. District Court", "California Central U.S. District Court", "California Eastern U.S. District Court", "California Northern U.S. District Court", "California Southern U.S. District Court", "Colorado U.S. District Court", "Connecticut U.S. District Court", "Delaware U.S. District Court", "District Of Columbia U.S. District Court", "Florida Middle U.S. District Court", "Florida Northern U.S. District Court", "Florida Southern U.S. District Court", "Georgia Middle U.S. District Court", "Georgia Northern U.S. District Court", "Georgia Southern U.S. District Court", "Guam U.S. District Court", "Hawaii U.S. District Court", "Idaho U.S. District Court", "Illinois Central U.S. District Court", "Illinois Northern U.S. District Court", "Illinois Southern U.S. District Court", "Indiana Northern U.S. District Court", "Indiana Southern U.S. District Court", "Iowa Northern U.S. District Court", "Iowa Southern U.S. District Court", "Kansas U.S. District Court", "Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court", "Kentucky Western U.S. District Court", "Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court", "Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court", "Louisiana Western U.S. District Court", "Maine U.S. District Court", "Maryland U.S. District Court", "Massachusetts U.S. District Court", "Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court", "Michigan Western U.S. District Court", "Minnesota U.S. District Court", "Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court", "Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court", "Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court", "Missouri Western U.S. District Court", "Montana U.S. District Court", "Nebraska U.S. District Court", "Nevada U.S. District Court", "New Hampshire U.S. District Court", "New Jersey U.S. District Court", "New Mexico U.S. District Court", "New York Eastern U.S. District Court", "New York Northern U.S. District Court", "New York Southern U.S. District Court", "New York Western U.S. District Court", "North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court", "North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court", "North Carolina Western U.S. District Court", "North Dakota U.S. District Court", "Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court", "Ohio Northern U.S. District Court", "Ohio Southern U.S. District Court", "Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court", "Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court", "Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court", "Oregon U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court", "Puerto Rico U.S. District Court", "Rhode Island U.S. District Court", "South Carolina U.S. District Court", "South Dakota U.S. District Court", "Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court", "Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court", "Tennessee Western U.S. District Court", "Texas Eastern U.S. District Court", "Texas Northern U.S. District Court", "Texas Southern U.S. District Court", "Texas Western U.S. District Court", "Utah U.S. District Court", "Vermont U.S. District Court", "Virgin Islands U.S. District Court", "Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court", "Virginia Western U.S. District Court", "Washington Eastern U.S. District Court", "Washington Western U.S. District Court", "West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court", "West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court", "Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court", "Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court", "Wyoming U.S. District Court", "Louisiana U.S. District Court", "Washington U.S. District Court", "West Virginia U.S. District Court", "Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court", "South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court", "South Carolina Western U.S. District Court", "Alabama U.S. District Court", "U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone", "Georgia U.S. District Court", "Illinois U.S. District Court", "Indiana U.S. District Court", "Iowa U.S. District Court", "Michigan U.S. District Court", "Mississippi U.S. District Court", "Missouri U.S. District Court", "New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)", "New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)", "New York U.S. District Court", "North Carolina U.S. District Court", "Ohio U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania U.S. District Court", "Tennessee U.S. District Court", "Texas U.S. District Court", "Virginia U.S. District Court", "Norfolk U.S. District Court", "Wisconsin U.S. District Court", "Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court", "New Jersey U.S. District Court", "California U.S. District Court", "Florida U.S. District Court", "Arkansas U.S. District Court", "District of Orleans U.S. District Court", "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", "State Trial Court", "Eastern Circuit (of the United States)", "Middle Circuit (of the United States)", "Southern Circuit (of the United States)", "Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama", "Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas", "California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California", "Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut", "Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware", "Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida", "Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia", "Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois", "Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana", "Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa", "Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas", "Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky", "Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana", "Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine", "Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland", "Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts", "Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan", "Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota", "Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi", "Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri", "Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada", "New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire", "New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey", "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York", "North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina", "Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio", "Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon", "Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania", "Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island", "South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina", "Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee", "Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas", "Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont", "Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia", "West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia", "Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin", "Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming", "Circuit Court of the District of Columbia", "Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska", "Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado", "Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington", "Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho", "Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana", "Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah", "South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota", "North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota", "Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma", "Court of Private Land Claims", "United States Supreme Court" ]
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BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE VILLAGE OF SCARSDALE et al. v. McCREARY et al. No. 84-277. Argued February 20, 1985 Decided March 27, 1985 Marvin E. Frankel argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Marc D. Stern. Marvin Schwartz argued the cause for respondents and filed a brief for respondents Scarsdale Creche Committee et al. Vincent K. Gilmore filed a brief for respondents McCreary et al. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Burt Neubome, Charles S. Sims, Norman Dorsen, and Steven R. Shapiro; for the American Jewish Committee et al. by Samuel Rabinove; and for the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith et al. by Ruti G. Teitel, Meyer Eisenberg, Justin J. Finger, and Jeffrey P. Sinensky. Solicitor General Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General Willard, and Deputy Solicitor General Bator filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Steven Frederick McDowell filed a brief for the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights as amicus curiae. Per Curiam. The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court. Justice Powell took no part in the decision of this case.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them. Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer. Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.
Who is the petitioner of the case?
[ "attorney general of the United States, or his office", "specified state board or department of education", "city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit", "state commission, board, committee, or authority", "county government or county governmental unit, except school district", "court or judicial district", "state department or agency", "governmental employee or job applicant", "female governmental employee or job applicant", "minority governmental employee or job applicant", "minority female governmental employee or job applicant", "not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable", "retired or former governmental employee", "U.S. House of Representatives", "interstate compact", "judge", "state legislature, house, or committee", "local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough", "governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact", "state or U.S. supreme court", "local school district or board of education", "U.S. Senate", "U.S. senator", "foreign nation or instrumentality", "state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of", "state college or university", "United States", "State", "person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime", "advertising business or agency", "agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor", "airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes", "airline", "distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages", "alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked", "American Medical Association", "National Railroad Passenger Corp.", "amusement establishment, or recreational facility", "arrested person, or pretrial detainee", "attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association", "author, copyright holder", "bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company", "bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization", "establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store", "water transportation, stevedore", "bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines", "brewery, distillery", "broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm", "construction industry", "bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle", "business, corporation", "buyer, purchaser", "cable TV", "car dealer", "person convicted of crime", "tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband", "chemical company", "child, children, including adopted or illegitimate", "religious organization, institution, or person", "private club or facility", "coal company or coal mine operator", "computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software", "consumer, consumer organization", "creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company", "person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial", "defendant", "debtor", "real estate developer", "disabled person or disability benefit claimant", "distributor", "person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector", "drug manufacturer", "druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy", "employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of", "employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan", "electric equipment manufacturer", "electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company", "eleemosynary institution or person", "environmental organization", "employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.", "farmer, farm worker, or farm organization", "father", "female employee or job applicant", "female", "movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of", "fisherman or fishing company", "food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard", "foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity", "franchiser", "franchisee", "lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization", "person who guarantees another's obligations", "handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to", "health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor", "heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be", "hospital, medical center", "husband, or ex-husband", "involuntarily committed mental patient", "Indian, including Indian tribe or nation", "insurance company, or surety", "inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder", "investor", "injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related", "juvenile", "government contractor", "holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor", "magazine", "male", "medical or Medicaid claimant", "medical supply or manufacturing co.", "racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant", "minority female employee or job applicant", "manufacturer", "management, executive officer, or director, of business entity", "military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist", "mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company", "mother", "auto manufacturer", "newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service", "radio and television network, except cable tv", "nonprofit organization or business", "nonresident", "nuclear power plant or facility", "owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels", "shareholders to whom a tender offer is made", "tender offer", "oil company, or natural gas producer", "elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly", "out of state noncriminal defendant", "political action committee", "parent or parents", "parking lot or service", "patient of a health professional", "telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company", "physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society", "public interest organization", "physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee", "pipe line company", "package, luggage, container", "political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official", "indigent, needy, welfare recipient", "indigent defendant", "private person", "prisoner, inmate of penal institution", "professional organization, business, or person", "probationer, or parolee", "protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer", "public utility", "publisher, publishing company", "radio station", "racial or ethnic minority", "person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination", "racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "realtor", "journalist, columnist, member of the news media", "resident", "restaurant, food vendor", "retarded person, or mental incompetent", "retired or former employee", "railroad", "private school, college, or university", "seller or vendor", "shipper, including importer and exporter", "shopping center, mall", "spouse, or former spouse", "stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder", "retail business or outlet", "student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only", "tenant or lessee", "theater, studio", "forest products, lumber, or logging company", "person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent", "trucking company, or motor carrier", "television station", "union member", "unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant", "union, labor organization, or official of", "veteran", "voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)", "wholesale trade", "wife, or ex-wife", "witness, or person under subpoena", "network", "slave", "slave-owner", "bank of the united states", "timber company", "u.s. job applicants or employees", "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "General Land Office of Commissioners", "Transportation Security Administration", "Surface Transportation Board", "U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.", "Reconstruction Finance Corp.", "Department or Secretary of Homeland Security", "Unidentifiable", "International Entity" ]
[ 2 ]
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WHISMAN v. GEORGIA. No. 1381, Misc. Decided June 20, 1966. Reuben A. Garland and Beryl H. Weiner for appellant. Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General of Georgia, and Alfred L. Evans, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and the judgment reversed. He would remand the case for a new trial, it being clear from the record that the principles announced in Miranda v. Arizona, ante, p. 436, were not applied. He sees no reason for discriminating against this petitioner, the case having come here on direct review and being of the same vintage as Miranda v. Arizona. See dissenting opinion in Johnson v. New Jersey, ante, at 736.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.
What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?
[ "judicial review (national level)", "judicial review (state level)", "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction", "statutory construction", "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order", "diversity jurisdiction", "federal common law" ]
[ 2 ]
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GURLEY, dba GURLEY OIL CO. v. RHODEN, CHAIRMAN, TAX COMMISSION OF MISSISSIPPI No. 73-1734. Argued March 18, 1975 Decided May 12, 1975 BrennaN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined except Douglas, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Charles R. Davis argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Walter A. Armstrong, Jr. Hunter M. Gholson argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was William G. Bur gin, Jr. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Mississippi imposes a 5% sales tax upon the “gross proceeds of the retail sales” of tangible personal property, including gasoline. Miss. Code Ann. §27-65-17 (Supp. 1974), Petitioner operates as a sole proprietorship from West Memphis, Ark. He owns and operates five gasoline service stations in Mississippi and also sells gasoline at four other stations in Mississippi on a consignment basis. He purchases his gasoline tax free from sources in Tennessee and Arkansas. He transports the gasoline to his Mississippi stations in his own trucks. He holds a Mississippi distributor’s permit and is also federally licensed because he is a “producer” within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code as one who sells gasoline bought tax free from other “producers.” He adds to his pump prices the amount of a Mississippi gasoline excise tax, now nine cents per gallon, Miss. Code Ann. § 27-55-11 (Supp. 1974), and a federal gasoline excise tax of four cents per gallon, 26 U. S. C. § 4081 (a). The State computes his gross proceeds of retail sales “without any deduction for . . . taxes of any kind . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 27-65-3 (h) (Supp. 1974). Petitioner contends that the denial of a deduction of the amount of the excise taxes added to his pump prices in the computation of his “gross proceeds of the retail sales” of gasoline, and the resultant application of the 5% sales tax to so much of his pump prices as reflects the amount of the taxes, are unconstitutional. He therefore paid the sales taxes to that extent under protest, and sued for a refund in Mississippi Chancery Court, Hinds County. Respondent cross-claimed for unpaid sales taxes accruing after the filing of the suit. After trial, the Chancery Court dismissed petitioner’s suit and entered judgment for respondent on the cross-claim. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed. 288 So. 2d 868. We granted certiorari, 419 U. S. 1018 (1974). We affirm. I Petitioner’s principal argument is that he acts as a mere collector of the taxes for the two governments because the legal incidence of both excise taxes is upon the purchaser-consumer. Upon that premise, he argues: “Consequently, to impose the Mississippi sales tax upon amounts so received by [petitioner] would be to tax him upon gross receipts which are not his gross receipts, but rather the gross receipts of [the two governments]. This would not only violate the fundamental conception of right and justice, but it would be taking [petitioner’s] property without due process of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .” Brief for Petitioner 37. He cites in support the statement in Hoeper v. Tax Comm’n, 284 U. S. 206, 215 (1931), that “any attempt by a state to measure the tax on one person’s property or income by reference to the property or income of another is contrary to due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Also, petitioner advances an alternative argument limited to the denial of the deduction of the amount of the federal excise tax. He contends that the denial results to that extent in “a state tax on . . . monies held in trust by [petitioner] as agent for the United States [and] is, in essence, a tax upon the United States . . . [that] ... is clearly unconstitutional” as violating the constitutional immunity of the United States and its property from taxation by the States. M‘Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). Brief for Petitioner 48. Petitioner’s arguments can prevail, as he apparently concedes, only if the legal incidence of the excise taxes is not upon petitioner, but upon the purchaser-consumer. Our task therefore is to determine upon whom the legal incidence of each tax rests. II The economic burden of taxes incident to the sale of merchandise is traditionally passed on to the purchasers of the merchandise. Therefore, the decision as to where the legal incidence of either tax falls is not determined by the fact that petitioner, by increasing his pump prices in the amounts of the taxes, shifted the economic burden of the taxes from himself to the purchaser-consumer. The Court has laid to rest doubts on that score raised by such decisions as Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U. S. 218 (1928); Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 570 (1931); and Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U. S. 110 (1954), at least under taxing schemes, as here, where neither statute required petitioner to pass the tax on to the purchaser-consumer. See Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1 (1941); Lash’s Products Co. v. United States, 278 U. S. 175 (1929); Wheeler Lumber Co. v. United States, 281 U. S. 572 (1930); First Agricultural Nat. Bank v. Tax Comm’n, 392 U. S. 339 (1968); American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U. S. 451 (1965). A majority of courts that have considered the question have held, in agreement with the Mississippi Supreme Court in this case, that the legal incidence of the federal excise tax is upon the statutory “producer” such as petitioner and not upon his purchaser-consumer. Martin Oil Service, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 49 Ill. 2d 260, 273 N. E. 2d 823 (1971); People v. Werner, 364 Ill. 594, 5 N. E. 2d 238 (1936); Sun Oil Co. v. Gross Income Tax Division, 238 Ind. Ill, 149 N. E. 2d 115 (1958); State v. Thoni Oil Magic Benzol Gas Stations, Inc., 121 Ga. App. 454, 174 S. E. 2d 224, aff’d, 226 Ga. 883, 178 S. E. 2d 173 (1970). Contra, see Tax Review Board v. Esso Standard Division, 424 Pa. 355, 227 A. 2d 657 (1967); cf. Standard Oil Co. v. State, 283 Mich. 85, 276 N. W. 908 (1937); Standard Oil Co. v. State Tax Comm’r, 71 N. D. 146, 299 N. W. 447 (1941). Our independent examination of the federal statute and its legislative history persuades us also that the legal incidence of the federal tax falls upon the statutory “producer” such as petitioner. The wording of the federal statute plainly places the incidence of the tax upon the “producer,” that is, by definition, upon federally licensed distributors of gasoline such as petitioner. Section 4082 (a) provides that “[a]ny person to whom gasoline is sold tax-free . . . shall be considered the producer of such gasoline,” and § 4081 (a) expressly imposes the tax “on gasoline sold by the producer ....’’ (Emphasis added.) The congressional purpose to lay the tax on the “producer” and only upon the “producer” could not be more plainly revealed. Persuasive also that such wTas Congress’ purpose is the fact that, if the producer does not pay the tax, the Government cannot collect it from his vendees; the statute has no provision making the vendee liable for its payment. First Agricultural Nat. Bank v. Tax Comm’n, supra, at 347. It is true that the purchaser-consumer who buys gasoline for use on his farm, 26 U. S. C. § 6420 (a), or for other nonhighway purposes, § 6421 (a), or for a local transit system, § 6421 (b), can recover payment of all or part of the amount of the tax passed on by the “producer.” But this is not proof that Congress laid the tax upon the purchaser-consumer. Rather, since the proceeds of this tax go not into the general treasury, but into a special fund used to defray the cost of the federal highway system, S. Rep. No. 367, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), the refunds authorized simply reflect a congressional determination that, because the economic burden of such taxes is traditionally passed on to the purchaser-consumer in the form of increased pump prices, farmers and other off-highway users should be relieved of the economic burden of the cost of the highway program, and that the cost should be borne entirely by motorists who use gasoline to drive on the highways. Martin Oil Service, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, supra, at 265, 273 N. E. 2d, at 827. Petitioner cites references by President Johnson to the tax as a “user tax” as proving that it is not and never was intended that the tax be imposed upon the “producer,” but rather upon the purchaser-consumer. President Johnson’s message to Congress of May 17, 1965, on the subject of reform of the excise tax structure stated that such “reform . . . will. . . leave . . . excises on alcoholic beverages, tobacco, gasoline, tires, trucks, air transportation (and a few other user-charge and special excises) . . . H. R. Doc. No. 173, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965). (Emphasis added.) Petitioner relies also on the report of the House Committee on Ways and Means accompanying H. R. 8371, H. R. Rep. No. 433, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 12-13 (1965). It states: “Taxes such as those on gasoline . . . are user taxes. ... A tax on. gasoline taxes users of the highways in rough proportion to their use of the service.” (Emphasis added.) These references obviously were not made in the context of consideration of the legal incidence of the gasoline, tax but merely as recognition that the reality is that users bear the economic burden of the tax. These references were rejected in Martin Oil Service, Inc., supra, by the Illinois Supreme Court as irrelevant to the question whether the tax must be considered as one whose incidence rests on the purchaser-consumer. We agree with, and adopt, that court’s analysis: “We consider the references to the tax as a ‘user tax’ were not intended to be descriptive of the legal incidence of the gasoline tax. It is not disputed that the ultimate economic burden of the tax rests upon the purchaser-consumer. A practical nontechnical description of the tax as a ‘user tax’ is explainable, consistently with the legal incidence of the tax being on the producer. The economic burden of the tax has no relevance to the issue before us.” 49 Ill. 2d, at 264, 273 N. E. 2d, at 826. We therefore hold that the Mississippi Supreme Court, which relied upon Martin Oil Service, Inc., see 288 So. 2d, at 873, properly concluded that the federal excise tax is imposed solely on statutory “producers” such as petitioner and not on the purchaser. Ill The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the legal incidence of the Mississippi excise tax also falls upon petitioner. It is true of course that this Court is the final judicial arbiter of the question where the legal incidence of the federal excise tax falls. But a State’s highest court is the final judicial arbiter of the meaning of state statutes, Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S., at, 9-10, and therefore our review of the holding of a state court respecting the legal incidence of a state excise tax is guided by the following: “When a state court has made its own definitive determination as to the operating incidence, our task is simplified. We give this finding great weight in determining the natural effect of a statute, and if it is consistent with the statute’s reasonable interpretation it will be deemed conclusive.” American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U. S., at 455-456. This is manifestly a case in which the holding of the Mississippi Supreme Court that the legal incidence of the state excise tax falls upon petitioner should be “deemed conclusive.” Mississippi Code Ann. § 27-55-11 (Supp. 1974), provides that the tax “attaches on the distributor or other person for each gallon of gasoline brought into the state . . .” in the case of distribution of gasoline by distributors, such as petitioner, who bring gasoline into Mississippi “by means other than through a common carrier.” The Mississippi Supreme Court relied primarily upon this provision in reaching its conclusion, and we cannot say that its conclusion is not “consistent with the statute’s reasonable interpretation.” Our determination is buttressed by the holding of a three-judge District Court in United States v. Sharp, 302 F. Supp. 668 (SD Miss. 1969). The United States sought a declaratory judgment that the Mississippi tax was invalid with respect to gasoline purchased by the Federal Government, its agencies, and personnel when used on Mississippi highways on Government business. The three-judge court held that the legal incidence of the state tax was upon the distributor-vendor and not upon the purchaser United States, and dismissed the action. The court stated: “We do not quarrel with the contention that a statute’s practical operation and effect determines where the legal incidence of the tax falls. We simply agree that the tax burden in the Mississippi statute falls plainly and squarely on the distributor to whom the state looks for the payment of the tax, albeit the amount of the tax may ultimately be borne by the vendee, in this case the federal government.” Id., at 671. Petitioner argues, however, that the decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court is foreclosed by this Court’s decision in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U. S. 218 (1928). The argument is without merit. In that case Mississippi sued Panhandle Oil Co. to recover gasoline excise taxes imposed by Chapter 116 of the 1922 Laws of Mississippi, as amended, a predecessor to the present Miss. Code Ann. § 27-55-11. The taxes claimed were on account of sales madé by Panhandle to the United States for the use of its Coast Guard Fleet in service in the Gulf of Mexico, and of its Veterans’ Hospital at Gulfport, Miss.' The Court, over the dissents of Justices Holmes, Brandéis, Stone, and McReynolds, held that the tax as applied was invalid as a tax upon the means used by the United States for governmental purposes. The dissenters’ view was that it was not a tax upon means used by the United States, but that Panhandle merely shifted the economic burden of the tax to its vendees by adding it to the price of the gasoline. The Court’s Panhandle opinion did not focus upon whether the Mississippi statute laid the legal incidence of the tax upon the distributor. Rather, the rationale was that the tax was bad because, if laid upon distributors, the distributors were able to shift its burden to the purchaser. The Court has since expressly abandoned that view, and has accepted the analysis of the dissent. In Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S., at 9, the Court held: “So far as a different view has prevailed, see Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox ... , we think it no longer tenable.” IV Finally, petitioner argues that even if the legal incidence of the two taxes is on him rather than on the consumer, the provision of § 27-65-17 denying the deduction of the taxes in the computation of his “gross proceeds of . . . retail sales” is invalid for two reasons. First, he argues: “Since [petitioner] sells only to the ultimate consumer, the excise tax attaches simultaneously with the sale and with the sales tax; therefore, there can be no sales tax upon the excise tax.” Brief for Petitioner 47. In other words, his argument is that the liability for the excise taxes, state and federal, and the liability for the sales tax arise simultaneously, and in that circumstance, one should not be included in computing the other. We read the opinion of the Mississippi Supreme Court to reject this argument and to hold that the taxes fall on the “producer at a time prior to the point of retail sale or other consumer transaction . . . .” 288 So. 2d, at 870. That interpretation of the Mississippi statutes is, of course, binding on us as respects the state excise tax; indeed, the interpretation is not merely “reasonable,” but seems obvious in light of the express provision of § 27-55-11 that in cases of distributors, like petitioner, bringing gasoline into Mississippi in their own trucks the tax “attaches... at the time when and at the point where such gasoline is brought into the state.” Further, we agree with the Mississippi court that the federal tax also attaches prior to the point of the retail sale. However, even if the liability for the excise taxes did arise simultaneously with the sales tax, we cannot see any legal distinction, constitutional or otherwise, arising from that circumstance. The Illinois Supreme Court also addressed this contention when made in Martin Oil Service, Inc., supra, as to the federal excise tax, and rejected it for the following reasons, with which we agree. “The legal incidence of the Federal gasoline tax is on the producer, who is under no legal duty to pass the burden of the tax on to the consumer. If he does pass on the burden of the tax it is simply done by charging the consumer a higher price. This higher price is the result of the added cost, because of the burden of the Federal tax, to the producer in selling his gasoline. It is no different from other costs he incurs in bringing his product to market, including the costs of raw material, its processing and its delivery. All these costs are includable in his ‘gross receipts’ or the ‘consideration’ he receives for his gasoline. No reason has been given... why the cost of the gasoline tax should be regarded differently from the other costs of the producer-retailer and we perceive none.” 49 Ill. 2d, at 268, 273 N. E. 2d, at 828. Second, petitioner argues that “since other independent oil dealers in those states which do not include the federal excise tax as a part of the sales tax base would not be forced to pay such tax [e. g., Pennsylvania, see Tax Review Board v. Esso Standard, supra], then the arbitrary imposition of such tax upon [petitioner] and those other independent oil dealers in his class (who have to pay a sales tax on federal excise tax) would deprive [petitioner] of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee to equal protection of the laws.” Brief for Petitioner 21. The contention is patently frivolous. The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause is against denial by the State, here Mississippi, as between taxpayers subject to its laws. Petitioner makes no claim of unconstitutional discrimination by Mississippi in the application of its sales tax Act to taxpayers subject to that tax. Affirmed. Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Section 27-65-17 provides in pertinent part: “Upon every person engaging or continuing within this state in the business of selling any tangible personal property whatsoever, there is hereby levied, assessed and shall be collected a tax equal to five percent (5%) of the gross proceeds of the retail sales of the business, except as otherwise provided herein. . . .” 26 ü. S. C. §4082 (a), n. 3, infra. Mississippi Code Ann. §27-55-11 provides: “Any person in business as a distributor of gasoline . . . shall pay for the privilege of engaging in such business ... an excise tax equal to [specified] cents per gallon on all gasoline . . . sold ... in this state for sale [or] use on the highways .... “With respect to distributors . . . who bring . . . into this state gasoline by means other than through a common carrier, the tax accrues and the tax liability attaches on the distributor ... at the time when and at the point where such gasoline is brought into the state.” Title 26 TJ. S. C. §4081 (a) provides: “In general. There is hereby imposed on gasoline sold by the producer or importer thereof, or by any producer of gasoline, a tax of 4 cents a gallon.” Title 26 U. S. C. §4082 (a) provides in pertinent part: “Producer. . . . Any person to whom gasoline is sold tax-free under this subpart shall be considered the producer of such gasoline.” Section 27-65-3 (h) provides in pertinent part: “ ‘Gross proceeds of sales’ means the value proceeding or accruing from the full sale price of tangible personal property . .. without any deduction for . . . taxes of any kind except those expressly exempt....” Petitioner sought refunds of $62,782.57, and respondent cross-claimed for $29,131.19. Act of June 8, 1966, e. 645, Miss. Gen. Laws 1343, 1347, in effect during some of the tax years involved, but since repealed, provided only that the excise tax “may be passed on to the ultimate consumer . . . .” (Emphasis added.) In contrast, the Massachusetts sales tax law before us in First Agricultural Nat. Bank. v. Tax Comm’n, 392 U. S. 339 (1968), expressly provided that the tax “ ‘shall be paid by the purchaser/ ” and that the vendor “ ‘shall add to the sales price and shall collect from the purchaser the full amount of the tax imposed.’ ” Id., at 347.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the court opinion mentions that one or more of the members of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed dissented. Focus on whether there exists any statement to this effect in the opinion, for example "divided," "dissented," "disagreed," "split.". A reference, without more, to the "majority" or "plurality" does not necessarily evidence dissent (the other judges may have concurred). If a case arose on habeas corpus, indicate dissent if either the last federal court or the last state court to review the case contained one. If the highest court with jurisdiction to hear the case declines to do so by a divided vote, indicate dissent. If the lower court denies an en banc petition by a divided vote and the Supreme Court discusses same, indicate dissent.
Does the court opinion mention that one or more of the members of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed dissented?
[ "Yes", "No" ]
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MARTINEZ et al. v. CALIFORNIA et al. No. 78-1268. Argued November 5, 1979 Decided January 15, 1980 SteveNS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Donald McGrath II argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief was Walter P. Christensen. Jeffrey T. Miller, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were George Deukmejian, Attorney General, and Robert L. Bergman, Assistant Attorney General. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Frank Carrington for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc.; and by Ronald A. Zumbrun and John H. Findley for the Pacific Legal Foundation. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Solicitor General McCree, Acting Assistant Attorney General Daniel, Robert E. Kopp, and Barbara L. Herwig for the United States; by John J. Degnan, Attorney General, and Erminie L. Conley, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of New Jersey; and by William J. Brown, Attorney General, and Simon B. Karas, George Strieker, Jr., and Dennis L. Sipe, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Ohio. Mr. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The two federal questions that appellants ask us to decide are (1) whether the Fourteenth Amendment invalidates a California statute granting absolute immunity to public employees who make parole-release determinations, and (2) whether such officials are absolutely immune from liability in an action brought under the federal Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U. S. C. § 1983. We agree with the California Court of Appeal that the state statute is valid when applied to claims arising under state law, and we conclude that appellants have not alleged a claim for relief under federal law. The case arises out of the murder of a 15-year-old girl by a parolee. Her survivors brought this action in a California court claiming that the state officials responsible for the parole-release decision are liable in damages for the harm caused by the parolee. The complaint alleged that the parolee, one Thomas, was convicted of attempted rape in December 1969. He was first committed to a state mental hospital as a “Mentally Disordered Sex Offender not amenable to treatment” and thereafter sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 1 to 20 years, with a recommendation that he not be paroled. Nevertheless, five years later, appellees decided to parole Thomas to the care of his mother. They were fully informed about his history, his propensities, and the likelihood that he would commit another violent crime. Moreover, in making their release determination they failed to observe certain “requisite formalities.” Five months after his release Thomas tortured and killed appellants’ decedent. We assume, as the complaint alleges, that appellees knew, or should have known, that the release of Thomas created a clear and present danger that such an incident would occur. Their action is characterized not only as negligent, but also as reckless, willful, wanton and malicious. Appellants prayed for actual and punitive damages of $2 million. The trial judge sustained a demurrer to the complaint and his order was upheld on appeal. 85 Cal. App. 3d 430, 149 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1978). After the California Supreme Court denied appellants’ petition for a hearing, we noted probable jurisdiction. 441 U. S. 960. I Section 845.8 (a) of the Cal. Gov’t Code Ann. (West Supp. 1979) provides: “Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for: (a) Any injury resulting from determining whether to parole or release a prisoner or from determining the terms and conditions of his parole or release or from determining whether to revoke his parole or release.” The California courts held that this statute provided appel-lees with a complete defense to appellants’ state-law claims. They considered and rejected the contention that the immunity statute as so construed violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Like the California courts, we cannot accept the contention that this statute deprived Thomas’ victim of her life without due process of law because it condoned a parole decision that led indirectly to her death. The statute neither authorized nor immunized the deliberate killing of any human being. It is not the equivalent of a death penalty statute which expressly authorizes state agents to take a person’s life after prescribed procedures have been observed. This statute merely provides a defense to potential state tort-law liability. At most, the availability of such a defense may have encouraged members of the parole board to take somewhat greater risks of recidivism in exercising their authority to release prisoners than they otherwise might. But the basic risk that repeat offenses may occur is always present in any parole system. A legislative decision that has an incremental impact on the probability that death will result in any given situation — such as setting the speed limit at 55-miles-per-hour instead of 45 — cannot be characterized as state action depriving a person of life just because it may set in motion a chain of events that ultimately leads to the random death of an innocent bystander. Nor can the statute be characterized as an invalid deprivation of property. Arguably, the cause of action for wrongful death that the State has created is a species of “property” protected by the Due Process Clause. On that hypothesis, the immunity statute could be viewed as depriving the plaintiffs of that property interest insofar as they seek to assert a claim against parole officials. But even if one characterizes the immunity defense as a statutory deprivation, it would remain true that the State’s interest in fashioning its own rules of tort law is paramount to any discernible federal interest, except perhaps an interest in protecting the individual citizen from state action that is wholly arbitrary or irrational. We have no difficulty in accepting California’s conclusion that there “is a rational relationship between the state’s purposes and the statute.” In fashioning state policy in a “practical and troublesome area” like this, see McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263, 270, the California Legislature could reasonably conclude that judicial review of a parole officer’s decisions “would inevitably inhibit the exercise of discretion,” United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F. 2d 701, 721 (CA7 1973), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1146. That inhibiting effect could impair the State’s ability to implement a parole program designed to promote rehabilitation of inmates as well as security within prison walls by holding out a promise of potential rewards. Whether one agrees or disagrees with California’s decision to provide absolute immunity for parole officials in a case of this kind, one cannot deny that it rationally furthers a policy that reasonable lawmakers may favor. As federal judges, we have no authority to pass judgment on the wisdom of the underlying policy determination. We therefore find no merit in the contention that the State’s immunity statute is unconstitutional when applied to defeat a tort claim arising under state law. II We turn then to appellants’ § 1983 claim that appellees, by their action in releasing Thomas, subjected appellants’ decedent to a deprivation of her life without due process of law. It is clear that the California immunity statute does not control this claim even though the federal cause of action is being asserted in the state courts. We also conclude that it is not necessary for us to decide any question concerning the immunity of state parole officials as a matter of federal law because, as we recently held in Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, “[t]he first inquiry in any § 1983 suit ... is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right 'secured by the Constitution and laws’ ” of the United States. The answer to that inquiry disposes of this case. Appellants contend that the decedent’s right to life is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. But the Fourteenth Amendment protected her only from deprivation by the “State ... of life . . . without due process of law.” Although the decision to release Thomas from prison was action by the State, the action of Thomas five months later cannot be fairly characterized as state action. Regardless of whether, as a matter of state tort law, the parole board could be said either to have had a “duty” to avoid harm to his victim or to have proximately caused her death, see Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 564 P. 2d 1227 (1977); Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928), we hold that, taking these particular allegations as true, appellees did not “deprive” appellants’ decedent of life within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Her life was taken by the parolee five months after his release. He was in no sense an agent of the parole board. Cf. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232. Further, the parole board was not aware that appellants’ decedent, as distinguished from the public at large, faced any special danger. We need not and do not decide that a parole officer could never be deemed to “deprive” someone of life by action taken in connection with the release of a prisoner on parole. But we do hold that at least under the particular circumstances of this parole decision, appellants’ decedent’s death is too remote a consequence of the parole officers’ action to hold them responsible under the federal civil rights law. Although a § 1983 claim has been described as “a species of tort liability,” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 417, it is perfectly clear that not every injury in which a state official has played some part is actionable under that statute. The judgment is affirmed. So ordered. “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” Although the complaint refers to the failure to supervise Thomas after his release, a failure to warn females in the area of potential danger, and a failure to revoke the original parole decision, the litigation has focused entirely on the original decision. The individual appellees are not alleged to have responsibility for postrelease supervision of Thomas. The dismissal of appellants’ cause of action charging negligent failure to warn females in the area of danger was predicated on appellants’ concession that there was no “continuing relationship between the state and the victim,” 85 Cal. App. 3d 430, 435, 149 Cal. Rptr. 519, 523 (1978), a requirement of state law. “. . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U. S. Const., Arndt. 14, § 1. Although the question presented in the jurisdictional statement posits an Equal Protection Clause challenge to the statute, that point was not actually briefed in this Court. It was also neither raised in nor treated by the courts below. We therefore make no further reference to that challenge. It is arguable, however, that the immunity defense, like an element of the tort claim itself, is merely one aspect of the State’s definition of that property interest. Recently, in considering a lawyer’s claim of immunity in a state malpractice action, we noted that “when state law creates a cause of action, the State is free to define the defenses to that claim, including the defense of immunity, unless, of course, the state rule is in conflict with federal law.” Ferri v. Ackerman, ante, at 198. “Martinez says the statute, Government Code section 845.8, subdivision (a), is unconstitutional because it permits the deprivation of life, a fundamental right, without due process. He suggests the statute, if it confers absolute immunity, encouraged the actions resulting in Mary Ellen’s death and, thus, requires a compelling state interest. However, the Legislature has broad powers to control governmental tort liability limited only by the rule it not act arbitrarily (Reed v. City & County of San Francisco, 237 Cal. App. 2d 23, 24 . . .). The California Tort Claims Act as a whole (Gov. Code § 810 et seq.) has been found constitutional (Datil v. City of Los Angeles, 263 Cal. App. 2d 655, 660-661 . . .). The stated purpose of section 845.8, subdivision (a), is to allow correctional personnel to make determinations of release or parole unfettered by any fear of tort liability (Law Revision Com. com.). To impose tort liability would have a chilling effect on the decision-making process, impede implementation of trial release programs and prolong incarceration unjustifiably for many prisoners. There is a rational relationship between the state’s purposes and the statute.” 85 Cal. App. 3d, at 437, 149 Cal. Rptr., at 524. The opinion of the California Court of Appeal does not expressly mention the Federal Constitution. But it is clear from appellants’ response to the demurrer that they were relying on “a federally protected right to life under the Constitution of the United States.” Record 59. We note that the California courts accepted jurisdiction of this federal claim. That exercise of jurisdiction appears to be consistent with the general rule that where “ 'an act of Congress gives a penalty to a party aggrieved, without specifying a remedy for its enforcement, there is no reason why it should not be enforced, if not provided otherwise by some act of Congress, by a proper action in a State court.’ ” Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386, 391, quoting Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, 137. See also Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 36, n. 17 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ; Grubb v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 281 U. S. 470, 476. We have never considered, however, the question whether a State must entertain a claim under § 1983. We note that where the same type of claim, if arising under state law, would be enforced in the state courts, the state courts are generally not free to refuse enforcement of the federal claim. Testa v. Katt, supra, at 394. But see Chamberlain v. Brown, 223 Tenn. 25, 442 S. W. 2d 248 (1969). “Conduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 or § 1985 (3) cannot be immunized by state law. A construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the Constitution insures that the proper construction may be enforced. See McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F. 2d 287, 290 (7th Cir. 1968). The immunity claim raises a question of federal law.” Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F. 2d 602, 607 (CA7 1973), cert. denied, 415 U. S. 917. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S., at 140. Although there was a dissent in that case, the issue that divided the Court was, assuming the plaintiff had been deprived of constitutionally protected liberty, what process was due. There was no disagreement with the majority’s methodology of isolating the particular constitutional infringement complained of. Since we decide here that the State did not “deprive” appellants’ decedent of a constitutionally protected right, we need not reach the question whether a lack of “due process” was adequately alleged by the reference to a failure to observe “requisite formalities.” It must be remembered that even if a state decision does deprive an individual of life or property, and even if that decision is erroneous, it does not necessarily follow that the decision violated that individual’s right to due process. Compare the facts in Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, where local law enforcement officials themselves beat a citizen to death. We reserve the question of what immunity, if any, a state parole officer has in a § 1983 action where a constitutional violation is made out by the allegations.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations
What is the ideological direction of the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court?
[ "Conservative", "Liberal", "Unspecifiable" ]
[ 0 ]
sc
SIXTY-SEVENTH MINNESOTA STATE SENATE v. BEENS et al. No. 71-1024. Decided April 29, 1972 Together with No. 71-1145, Sixty-seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Beens et al., on appeal from the same court. Per Curiam. These two appeals are taken by the Minnesota State Senate from orders of a three-judge Federal District Court reapportioning the Minnesota Legislature. The appeals do not challenge the District Court’s conclusion that the legislature is now malapportioned. And at this point they are not concerned with population variances or with other issues of the type customarily presented in reapportionment litigation. The controversy focuses, instead, on (a) the District Court’s refusal to honor the Minnesota statute fixing the number of the State’s legislative districts at 67 and (b) the court’s proceeding, over the initial opposition of all parties (but upon the suggestion of two amici, the Lieutenant Governor and a representative), to reduce the number of legislative districts to 35, the number of senators by almost 50%, and the number of representatives by nearly 25%. We conclude that the District Court erred in its rulings. Accordingly, we summarily vacate the court’s orders and remand the cases for further proceedings promptly to be pursued. I The Minnesota Bicameral Legislature was last effectively apportioned in 1966. Ex. Sess. Laws 1966, c. I. Section 2.021 of Minn. Stat. (1969), the very first section of the 1966 Act, states that, “until a new apportionment shall have been made,” the State’s senate shall consist of 67 members and its house of representatives of 135 members. Section 2.031, subd. 1, from the second section of the 1966 Act, prescribes 67 legislative districts for both the senate and the house. Sections 2.041-2.711, inclusive, then delineate these 67 districts. The State’s Constitution, Art. IV, § 2, provides a legislator-population minimum ratio (one senator for every 5,000 inhabitants and one representative for every 2,000 inhabitants) and states, “The representation in both houses shall be apportioned equally throughout the different sections of the state, in proportion to the population thereof.” The 1970 federal census took place in due course. The Minnesota Legislature did not produce a reapportionment act during its regular session in 1971. One was passed on October 29, 1971, during the reconvening of an extra session called that year. The lawmakers adjourned sine die on October 30. The Governor, however, vetoed the act on November 1 and this 1971 reapportionment endeavor failed to become law. The Governor has not cálled the legislature to another extra session for more work on reapportionment, and it is not scheduled to meet again in regular session until January 1973. Minn. Const., Art. IV, § 1; Minn. Stat. § 3.01 (1969). The 1972 primary and general elections will take place in the interim. Minn. Stat. §§ 202.02 and 203.02 (1969). Thus, the 1966 statute remains as the State’s last effective legislative apportionment. II The original plaintiffs, who are among the appellees here, are three qualified voters of the State. By their complaint, filed in April 1971 and asserting jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §§ 1343 (3) and (4) and 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983 and 1988, they sought (a) a declaratory judgment that the 1966 Act apportioning the legislature violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, (b) an injunction restraining the Minnesota Secretary of State and all county auditors from conducting future elections for legislators pursuant to that Act, and (c) reapportionment of the legislature by the federal court itself. The three-judge court was convened. The appellant, the Sixty-seventh Minnesota State Senate, intervened as a party defendant under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24 (a). The District Court, after hearings and with the assistance of stipulations, issued three significant orders: A. On November 15, 1971, it made appropriate findings, not challenged here as to their basic provisions, and declared the 1966 Act in its entirety, Minn. Stat. §§ 2.021-2.712 (1969), inclusive, violative of the Federal Constitution, enjoined the Secretary of State and the county auditors from conducting future elections under the Act, and appointed two Special Masters (a third was named later) to aid the court in formulating a new apportionment plan. See 336 F. Supp. 715, 718-719. B. On December 3 it found “that it best can fulfill its duty of apportioning the Minnesota Legislature in accordance with the Constitution of the United States and with due regard for State policy” by dividing the State into 35 senatorial districts and dividing each senatorial district into three house districts, and ordered that the parties, intervenors, and amici could present plans for apportioning the legislature accordingly. In an accompanying memorandum the court said, “The only serious questions . . . are whether we have the authority to change the size of the Legislature; and if so, to what extent.” It answered the first of these questions ip the affirmative, quoting the following sentence from Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971): “Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.” 402 U. S., at 15. The court stated that the legislature could not be apportioned into 67 senate districts and 135 house districts without violating either the Federal Constitution or the Minnesota Constitution; that the existing practice of dividing one senate district into three house districts and all others into two cannot be continued without violating the requirements of equal protection; that the greater the population of each district, the more closely can the one man, one vote standard be met and still give effect to the state policy of adhering to the boundaries of political subdivisions; that state policy with respect to the legislature’s size “is difficult to discern”; that the Governor had recommended a reduction in size; that there is merit in having an odd-numbered senate and house where, as in Minnesota, the State has “two strong and rather evenly divided political parties”; that federal constitutional and state policy requirements can best be harmonized by having 35 senate districts and by dividing each senate district into three house districts; that there are persuasive arguments that “positive benefits to the State will accrue by substantially reducing the size of the Senate and moderately reducing the size of the House”; and that “it is not our desire to fix for the future the size of the Senate and the House in Minnesota,” for the legislature, if it wishes, may appropriately reapportion. See 336 F. Supp., at 720-721. C. On January 25, 1972, it entered its “Final Order and Plan of Apportionment” by which it adopted a plan therein described. The court also modified its injunction of November 15 so as to enjoin the state secretary and county auditors from conducting any future elections for the legislature under any plan other than the one adopted by the court “or a constitutional plan adopted after this date by the State of Minnesota.” In accord with Minn. Const., Art. IV, § 24, 1972 elections under the new plan for all positions in the senate and house were ordered. 336 F. Supp. 715, 732. The senate, as intervenor, first appealed from the orders of November 15, 1971, and December 3, 1971 (case No. 71-1024), and then from the order of January 25, 1972 (case No. 71-1145). Both appeals are under 28 U. S. C. § 1253. We denied the senate’s motion to expedite the appeals, but granted its motion to consolidate them. 405 U. S. 985 (1972). We then granted its application for a temporary stay pending further order of the Court. Post, p. 905. Ill The appellees have moved to dismiss. Two grounds are asserted: A. That the senate lacks authority and standing to prosecute the appeals. It is said that the senate’s authorizing resolution does not entitle its counsel to take the appeals; that the resolution relates only to legislative district boundaries and not to their number; that the Office of Senate Counsel speaks only for certain members of the senate and not for the whole; that it is the legislature, and not just the senate, that is the legal entity concerned for purposes of the appeals; and that only the legislature has standing. The authorizing senate resolution, however, is in broad terms: “BE IT RESOLVED, by the Senate of the State of Minnesota, that the Office of Senate Counsel be and it is hereby authorized and directed to take such steps as may be necessary to represent the interests and will of this body to the extent deemed necessary in both state and federal court actions involving the prescription of the bounds of senatorial and representative districts, the apportionment of senators and representatives among those districts, and the orderly process of elections therefrom . . . .” Journal of the Minnesota Senate 1971, 39th Day, p. 460. The resolution was adopted July 31, 1971, by a 56-to-0 vote. A motion to reconsider made two and a half months later failed by a vote of 33-31. Id., 40th day, at 492. We are not inclined to read this authorizing resolution restrictively, as the appellees suggest. Certainly the present appeals are in a federal court action that concerns apportionment “and the orderly process of elections therefrom.” And certainly the senate is directly affected by the District Court’s orders. That the senate is an appropriate legal entity for purpose of intervention and, as a consequence, of an appeal in a case of this kind is settled by our affirmance of Silver v. Jordan, 241 F. Supp. 576 (SD Cal. 1964), aff’d, 381 U. S. 415 (1965), where it was said: “The California State Senate’s motion to intervene as a substantially interested party was granted because it would be directly affected by the decree of this court.” 241 F. Supp., at 579. A group of senators thus had the right to intervene. The concurrence of the house was not necessary as it would have been to enact legislation. B. That the appeals are not from orders granting or denying injunctive relief, within the requirement of 28 U. S. C. § 1253. Although the orders of November 15, 1971, and January 25, 1972, specifically enjoin state and county officers, the appellees assert that the restraining portions of those orders are not now attacked and are conceded by the appellant. This, in our view, is too narrow an analysis. The order of November 15 clearly enjoins the state and county officers “from holding or conducting any future elections under the present Apportionment Statutes.” That of January 25 does the same except with respect to the plan then adopted by the court or one thereafter validly adopted by the State. The court’s injunctive holding applies to §§2.031 and 2.021, respectively fixing the number of legislative districts and the number of senators and representatives, as well as to the succeeding sections determining the boundaries of the 67 districts. The appellant’s appeal relates to §§ 2.031 and 2.021. The court’s injunction with respect to those sections is sufficient to justify a direct appeal under § 1253. Gunn v. University Committee, 399 U. S. 383 (1970), cited by the appellees, is inapposite. IV That the three-judge federal court possesses the power to reapportion the State’s legislature when the applicable state statutes fall short of constitutional requirements is not questioned. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 586-587 (1964). The 1966 Minnesota apportionment legislation, the court found, in the light of the 1970 census figures no longer provided a constitutionally acceptable apportionment of either house. No one challenges that basic finding here, and we have no reason to rule otherwise. The 1971 legislature had endeavored to reapportion and, thus, to fulfill the requirement imposed upon it by Art. IV, § 23, of the State’s Constitution. See Magraw v. Donovan, 163 F. Supp. 184, 187-188 (Minn. 1958), and Honsey v. Donovan, 236 F. Supp. 8 (Minn. 1964). The legislature’s efforts in that direction, however, were nullified by the Governor’s veto of the Act it passed, an action the executive had the power to take. Duxbury v. Donovan, 272 Minn. 424, 138 N. W. 2d 692 (1965). The net result was the continuing applicability of the 1966 act. Under these circumstances judicial relief was appropriate. The three-judge court, however, was not content with devising judicial apportionment within the framework of the existing and otherwise valid statutory structure. Instead of recognizing the provision in Minn. Stat. § 2.021 (I960), that the state senate “is composed of 67 members and the house of representatives is composed of 135 members,” and the further provision in § 2.031 that the senators and representatives “are apportioned throughout the state in 67 legislative districts,” the court declared those sections invalid along with §§ 2.041-2.711, the provisions that delineate the boundaries of the specified 67 legislative districts. We need not review at length the several pronouncements of this Court relating to state legislative reapportionment. The pertinent cases, particularly those of June 15, 1964, and the guidelines they provide are well-known. It suffices to note that in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, the Court stated that apportionment “is primarily a matter for legislative consideration and determination, and . . . judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional requisites . . . .” 377 U. S., at 586. But we also stated, “With respect to the operation of the Equal Protection Clause, it makes no difference whether a State’s apportionment scheme is embodied in its constitution or in statutory provisions,” and, then, “Clearly, courts should attempt to accommodate the relief ordered to the apportionment provisions of state constitutions insofar as is possible.” 377 U. S., at 584. And the Minnesota Constitution, Art. IV, § 23, vests the legislature with power to reapportion. It follows from this that a federal reapportionment court should accommodate the relief ordered to the appropriate provisions of state statutes relating to the legislature’s size insofar as is possible. We do not have difficulty, as the District Court professed to have, in discerning the State’s policy as to the legislature’s size. That policy, long in effect in Minnesota and restated no longer than six years ago in § 2.021, is for 67 senators and 135 representatives, and, in § 2.031, is for 67 legislative districts. These are figures that have been determined by the legislature and approved by the Governor of the State. The present Governor’s contrary recommendation, although certainly entitled to thoughtful consideration, represents only the executive’s proffered current policy, just as the reapportionment plan he vetoed on November 1, 1971, represented only the legislature’s proffered current policy. We note, in repetition, that the District Court invalidated the entire 1966 Act, §§ 2.021-2.712, despite the fact that the details of the legislative districts’ configurations are included only in §§ 2.041-2.711. Section 2.021 merely specifies the number of senators and representatives; § 2.031 calls for the apportionment of those legislators throughout the State in 67 districts; and §2.712 provided the effective date of the 1966 act, the efficacy of which, for the period prior to the 1970 census, is not at issue here. In the light of the State’s policy of statutory severability, Minn. Stat. §645.20 (1969), and recognizing that this specific number of legislative districts has been in effect in Minnesota since 1913 and through two succeeding reapportionments, we necessarily conclude that the District Court’s invalidation of the six-year-old reapportionment law swept too broadly in nullifying statutory sections that are capable of standing alone. We know of no federal constitutional principle or requirement that authorizes a federal reapportioning court to go as far as the District Court did and, thus, to bypass the State’s formal judgment as to the proper size of its legislative bodies. No case decided by this Court has gone that far and we have found no district court decision that has employed such radical surgery in reapportionment. There are cases where judicial reapportionment has effectuated minor changes in a legislature’s size. Nearly all those cases reflect an increase or decrease of only a few seats and most appear to have been justified by a state constitutional demand, agreement of the parties, the observance of geographical boundaries, or mathematical convenience. We do not disapprove a court-imposed minor variation from a State’s prescribed figure when that change is shown to be necessary to meet constitutional requirements. And we would not oppose the District Court’s reducing, in this case, the number of representatives in the Minnesota house from 135 to 134, as the parties apparently have been willing to concede. That action would fit exactly the 67-district pattern. But to slash a state senate’s size almost in half and a state house’s size by nearly one-fourth is to make more than a mere minor variation. If a change of that extent were acceptable, so, too, would be a federal court’s cutting or increasing size by 75% or 90% or, indeed, by prescribing a unicameral legislature for a State-that has always followed the bicameral precedent. We repeat what was said recently in another legislative apportionment case: “The remedial powers of an equity court must be adequate to the task, but they are not unlimited.” Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 161 (1971). In summary, the number of a State’s legislative districts or the number of members in each house of its legislature raises no issue of equal protection unless the number so prescribed occasions significant and invalidating population deviations. “Determining the size of its legislative bodies is of course a matter within the discretion of each individual State. Nothing in this opinion should be read as indicating that there are any federal constitutional máximums or mínimums on the size of state legislative bodies.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S., at 581 n. 63. See also Connor v. Johnson, 330 F. Supp. 506, 507 (SD Miss.), order stayed on other grounds, 402 U. S. 690, opinion on remand, 330 F. Supp. 521 (SD Miss. 1971) ; Bannister v. Davis, 263 F. Supp. 202, 208 (ED La. 1966) ; Dungan v. Sawyer, 250 F. Supp. 480, 489 (Nev. 1965). We conclude that the action of the three-judge court in so drastically changing the number of legislative districts and the size of the respective houses of the Minnesota Legislature is not required by the Federal Constitution and is not justified as an exercise of federal judicial power. Our ruling here, of course, is no expression of opinion on our part as to what is desirable by way of legislative size for the State of Minnesota or for any other State. It may well be that 67 senators and 135 representatives make a legislature of unwieldy size. That is a matter of state policy. We certainly are not equipped — and it is not our function and task — to effectuate policy of that kind or to evaluate it once it has been determined by the State. Neither is it the function and task of the Federal District Court. Size is for the State to determine in the exercise of its wisdom and in the light of its awareness of the needs and desires of its people. The orders of the District Court are vacated and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The District Court is instructed to give this matter priority and to act promptly and forthwith so that the State's 1972 electoral process may get under way with assurance as soon as possible. It is already late in the day, but the maintenance of legislative districts long in effect provides a minimum of disruption even now. The judgment in these cases shall issue forthwith. It is so ordered. This was the ninth general reapportionment in Minnesota since the adoption of the State’s Constitution in 1857. Initially there were 26 districts, 37 senators, and 80 representatives. Minn. Const. 1857, Schedule § 12 (both versions). The succeeding plans, and the number of districts and legislators they specified, were Districts Senators Representatives Laws 1860, c. 73 21 21 42 Laws 1866, c. 4 22 22 47 Laws 1871, c. 20 41 41 106 Laws 1881, c. 128 47 47 103 Laws 1889, c. 2 54 54 114 Laws 1897, c. 120 63 63 119 Laws 1913, c. 91 67 67 130 Ex. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 45 67 67 135 By Laws 1917, c. 217, the number of representatives was increased by one (the 65th district), but there was no accompanying general reapportionment. Throughout this entire period of more than a century, the Minnesota Constitution, Art. IV, §23, has called for reapportionment at the first legislative session after each federal census. See also Magraw v. Donovan, 163 F. Supp. 184 (Minn. 1958), and Honsey v. Donovan, 236 F. Supp. 8 (Minn. 1964). “2.021 NUMBER OF MEMBERS. For each legislature, until a new apportionment shall have been made, the senate is composed of 67 members and the house of representatives is composed of 135 members.” “2.031 APPORTIONMENT. Subdivision 1. The representatives in the senate and house of representatives are apportioned throughout the state in 67 legislative districts.” Sections 2.041-2.711 were §§ 3-70, inclusive, of the 1966 act. A legislative reapportionment act is subject to executive veto under Minn. Const., Art. IV, §§ 11 and 12, and Art. V, § 4. Duxbury v. Donovan, 272 Minn. 424, 138 N. W. 2d 692 (1965). Power is vested in the Governor to convene both houses of the legislature “on extraordinary occasions.” Minn. Const., Art. V, § 4. This power is also recognized by Art. IV, § 1, of the Constitution. Art. IV, § 23. “The legislature shall have the power to provide by law for an enumeration of the inhabitants of this State, and also have the power at their first session after each enumeration of the inhabitants of this state made by the authority of the United States, to prescribe the bounds of congressional, senatorial and representative districts, and to apportion anew the senators and representatives among the several districts according to the provisions of section second of this article.” In the companion case of Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 377 U. S. 656, 676, the Court observed again that “primary responsibility for legislative apportionment rests with the legislature itself.” “645.20 CONSTRUCTION OF SEVERABLE PROVISIONS. Unless there is a provision in the law that the provisions shall not be severable, the provisions of all laws shall be severable. If any provision of a law is found to be unconstitutional and void, the remaining provisions of the law shall remain valid, unless the court finds the valid provisions of the law are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon, the void provisions that the court cannot presume the legislature would have enacted the remaining valid provisions without the void one; or unless the court finds the remaining valid provisions, standing alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance with the legislative intent.” The 1966 act did not state that its provisions shall not be severable. In contrast, Minnesota’s immediately preceding apportionment act, Ex. Sess. Laws 1969, c. 45, did contain in its § 72 an express non-severability provision; that provision was repealed by c. 1, § 71, of the 1966 act. The legislative intent in 1966 is thus apparent. Sims v. Amos, 336 F. Supp. 924, 936, 937 (MD Ala. 1972) (house reduced from 106 to 105 so as to have three times the number of senate seats); Schaefer v. Thomson, 251 F. Supp. 450 (Wyo. 1965), aff’d, 383 U. S. 269 (1966) (senate increased from 25 to 30 on agreement of the parties and in accord with the state constitution) ; Klahr v. Goddard, 250 F. Supp. 537 (Ariz. 1966) (senate reduced from 31 to 30 and house from 80 to 60. The preservation of county lines, as prescribed by the State’s constitution, Art. 4, pt. 2, § 1, was an announced consideration in this substantial house reduction which no one opposed. No appeal was taken); Herweg v. Thirty Ninth Legislative Assembly, 246 F. Supp. 454 (Mont. 1965) (senate reduced from 56 to 55 and house increased from 94 to 104. A constitutional provision, Art. VI, § 3, prohibiting the division of counties, was thereby observed); Paulson v. Meier, 246 E. Supp. 36 (ND 1965) (senate reduced from 53 to 49 and house from 106 to 98. The State’s constitution, Art. II, § 26, mandated a senate of 49 members). In other cases federal courts have altered the size of existing legislatures by approximating the number of legislators specified in new plans that the courts were nullifying. Swann v. Adams, 263 F. Supp. 225 (SD Fla. 1967); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916 (SDNY 1965), aff’d, 382 U. S. 4 (1965). The state policy thus has been effectuated despite the invalidity of the legislature’s proposed plan. The 1972 general election in Minnesota will take place November 7. The primaries are scheduled for September 12. Candidates may file between July 5 and July 18. A legislative candidate must establish residence in his district by May 7. Minn. Stat. §§203.02, 202.02, 202.04; Minn. Const., Art. IV, §25. Inasmuch as the Minnesota Legislature is nonpartisan, Minn. Stat. §202.03, subd- 1, the earlier dates for political party precinct caucuses and party conventions have no relevance in these cases. If time presses too seriously, the District Court has the power appropriately to extend the time limitations imposed by state law. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 15 (1971).
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the reason, if any, given by the court for granting the petition for certiorari.
What reason, if any, does the court give for granting the petition for certiorari?
[ "case did not arise on cert or cert not granted", "federal court conflict", "federal court conflict and to resolve important or significant question", "putative conflict", "conflict between federal court and state court", "state court conflict", "federal court confusion or uncertainty", "state court confusion or uncertainty", "federal court and state court confusion or uncertainty", "to resolve important or significant question", "to resolve question presented", "no reason given", "other reason" ]
[ 0 ]
sc
DAVIS v. UNITED STATES No. 72-1454. Argued February 26, 1974 Decided June 10, 1974 Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Douglas, BreNNAN, White, Marshall, and BlackmuN, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 347. RehNquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 350. Marvin M. Karpatkin argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Melvin L. Wulf. Edmund W. Kitch argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Petersen, Deputy Solicitor General Frey, Jerome M. Feit, and Frederick W. Bead III. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves the availability of collateral relief from a federal criminal conviction based upon an intervening change in substantive law. While the question presented is a relatively narrow one, it arises as the result of a rather complicated chain of events. I In February 1965, the petitioner, Joseph Anthony Davis, was classified I-A by his draft board and ordered to report for a pre-induction physical examination. Davis failed to appear on the appointed date. He later informed his local board that his failure to report was due to illness. Although the board attempted to arrange a second date for the pre-induction physical, its attempts to communicate with the petitioner were frustrated by his failure to keep the board apprised of his correct mailing addresses. As a result, the local board’s communications to the petitioner were returned to the board stamped “addressee unknown,” and Davis again failed to report for the physical. In December 1965, the board sent the petitioner a warning that it was considering declaring him a delinquent because of his failure to report for the second pre-induction physical. This communication was also returned to the board stamped “addressee unknown.” After another unsuccessful attempt to communicate with the petitioner, the local board declared him a delinquent, pursuant to 32 CFR § 1642.4 (a) (1967), both because of his failure to report for the second pre-induction physical and because of his failure to keep the local board informed of his current address. At the same time the board mailed the petitioner a delinquency notice. Shortly after the delinquency declaration, the board sent the petitioner an order directing him to report for induction into the Armed Forces. Once again, the order was returned to the board stamped “addressee unknown.” Several months later, the board sent the petitioner a second order to report for induction. This time the order was mailed to a St. Paul, Minnesota, address that Davis had used when requesting a duplicate draft card. Although there was no indication that Davis did not receive the induction order, he once again failed to report as ordered. This second failure to report for induction resulted in the petitioner's prosecution and conviction under 50 U. S. C. App. §462 (a). At the time that the local board issued the second induction order, 32 CFR § 1631.7 (a) (1967) provided that registrants could be ordered to report for induction only after they “[had] been found acceptable for service in the Armed Forces and . . . the local board [had] mailed [them] a Statement of Acceptability . . . at least 21 days before the date fixed for induction.” Since, at the time of his induction order, Davis had not yet appeared for a physical examination to determine his acceptability, quite obviously neither one of these requirements was satisfied. The regulation, however, went on to provide that “a registrant classified in Class I-A or Class I-A-0 who is a delinquent may be selected and ordered to report for induction to fill an induction call notwithstanding the fact that he has not been found acceptable for service in the Armed Forces and has not been mailed a Statement of Acceptability ... The only other registrants similarly excepted from these prerequisites were those who had volunteered for induction. In light of this proviso, the local board evidently concluded that the preconditions to induction stated in § 1631.7 (a) were inapplicable to the petitioner, whom it had earlier declared to be a delinquent, and that it was thus free to issue an induction order to the petitioner. Davis appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. While that appeal was pending, this Court announced its decision in Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U. S. 295 (1970). In Gutknecht a Selective Service registrant’s induction had been accelerated because his local board had declared him a delinquent. When he failed to report for induction as ordered, he was prosecuted and convicted under 50 U. S. C. App. § 462. The delinquent registrant’s accelerated induction was ordered in accordance with another portion of 32 CFR § 1631.7 (a) that, like the provision applicable to Davis, called for exceptional treatment for registrants whom a local board had declared delinquent. Local boards were authorized by 32 CFR § 1642.4 to issue a declaration of delinquency “ [wjhenever a registrant . . . failed to perform any duty or duties required of him under the selective service law,” other than to report as ordered for induction or for civilian work. Both Davis and Gutknecht were declared delinquent on the authority of § 1642.4. In Gutknecht, the Court held that the Selective Service regulations that accelerated the induction of delinquent registrants by shifting them to the first priority in the order of call were punitive in nature and, as such, were without legislative sanction. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the registrant could not be prosecuted for failure to comply with an induction order issued pursuant to these regulations. After Gutknecht, the Court of Appeals remanded the petitioner’s case to the District Court “without limitation of scope but especially for consideration ... in the light of the intervening decision of Gutknecht v. United States.” 432 F. 2d 1009, 1010 (1970). On remand, the District Court, after conducting a hearing, concluded that the petitioner’s induction had not been accelerated because of his delinquency status and that Gutknecht therefore did not affect his conviction. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. 447 F. 2d 1376. While Davis’ subsequent petition for certiorari was pending in this Court, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided United States v. Fox, 454 F. 2d 593. The circumstances leading to Fox’s induction order were virtually identical to those in the petitioner’s case. Like Davis, “Fox was declared delinquent by his Selective Service Board ... for his failure to appear for pre-induction physical examinations as ordered .'. . .” Ibid. Prior to receiving his induction order, “Fox . . . was never found to be ‘acceptable for service’ and he was [not] mailed a Statement of Acceptability ... at least 21 days before his induction date . . . .” “[T]hus the only authority the Local Board had for its order to Fox to report for induction was the provision of § 1631.7. (b) for delinquents to be called without a previous finding of acceptability or the mailing of a Statement of Acceptability 21 days before induction.” Id., at 595. This was the same regulation on which the board's induction order to Davis had been predicated. At Fox's post-Outknecht trial for failure to report for induction, “the government offered evidence ... to show that Fox’s induction order was not accelerated by the declaration of delinquency.” “The trial judge found no acceleration and convicted.” Id., at 593-594. The Court of Appeals reversed Fox's conviction on the authority of Gutknecht. The court held that “Fox’s induction was accelerated by the declaration of delinquency as a matter of law [because] [wjithout the declaration, the Board could not have ordered him to report for induction.” Id., at 594. Thus, the court concluded “that the [induction] order . . . was illegal and created no duty on Fox’s part to report for induction.” Id., at 595. In opposing Davis’ petition for certiorari, the Solicitor General conceded that “the holdings in Fox and in [Davis] are inconsistent,” but nevertheless urged the Court to deny certiorari in that “the conflict is an intra-circuit one . . . [to] be resolved by the Ninth Circuit itself . . . .” Supplemental Memorandum for the United States in Opposition 2 (No. 71-661, O. T. 1971). We denied Davis’ petition for certiorari. 405 U. S. 933. After an unsuccessful attempt to secure a rehearing in the Court of Appeals, Davis was remitted to federal custody to commence serving his three-year sentence. He then instituted the present collateral proceeding under 28 U. S. C. §2255, which permits “[a] prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . [to] move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” In his § 2255 motion, Davis asserted that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had in the Fox case effected a change in the law of that Circuit after the affirmance of his conviction, and that its holding in Fox required his conviction to be set aside. The District Court summarily denied the petitioner’s motion. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed without considering the merits of the petitioner’s claim on the ground that “[t]he decision on the direct appeal is the law of the case,” and that therefore any “new law, or change in law” resulting from its decision in United States v. Fox would “not [be] applied in this circuit under circumstances such as here presented.” 472 F. 2d 596. Because the case presents a seemingly important question concerning the extent to which relief under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 is available by reason of an intervening change in law, we granted certiorari. 414 U. S. 999 II The sole issue before the Court in the present posture of this case is the propriety of the Court of Appeals’ judgment that a change in the law of that Circuit after the petitioner’s conviction may not be successfully asserted by him in a § 2255 proceeding. Thus, our inquiry is confined to the availability of a § 2255 proceeding for the resolution of Davis’ claim to relief from his conviction. Because the petitioner had unsuccessfully litigated the Gutknecht issue on direct review, the Court of Appeals held that its earlier affirmance was “the law of the case” and precluded the petitioner from asserting on collateral attack his claim that its Fox decision had subsequently changed the law of the Ninth Circuit on that issue. In • this Court, the Solicitor General’s brief concedes that the opinion of the Court of Appeals in this regard “is not consonant with this Court’s holding in Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1.” In Sanders, the Court held, inter alia, that even though the legal issue raised in a § 2255 motion “was determined against [the applicant] on the merits on a prior application,” “the applicant may [nevertheless] be entitled to a new hearing upon showing an intervening change in the law Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 17. The same rule applies when the prior determination was made on direct appeal from the applicant’s conviction, instead of in an earlier § 2255 proceeding, “if new law has been made . . . since the trial and appeal.” Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217, 230 (1969). Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that “the law of the case,” as determined in the earlier appeal from the petitioner’s conviction, precluded him from securing relief under § 2255 on the basis of an intervening change in law. Nevertheless, the Solicitor General contends that we should affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals because the petitioner’s claim is not “of constitutional dimension” (Brief for United States 34) and thus is not cognizable in a § 2255 collateral proceeding. At the outset, we note that the Government’s position finds scant support in the text of § 2255, which permits a federal prisoner to assert a claim that his confinement is “in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.” (Emphasis added.) It is argued forcefully in a dissenting opinion today that this language, which appears in the first paragraph of § 2255, is somehow qualified by the third paragraph of the statute, which provides: “If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.” The dissent of Mr. Justice Rehnquist rejects any suggestion that the language concerning “sentence[s] . . . otherwise open to collateral attack” can encompass a claim that a confinement under that sentence violates the “laws of the United States,” contending that this would reduce the remaining language regarding “a denial or infringement of constitutional rights” to surplusage. Indeed, the nub of the dissent is that § 2255 “does not speak of an illegal ‘confinement’ ... or even of an illegal conviction, but rather of illegal sentences.” Post, at 356. (Emphasis in original.) Although this microscopic analysis of § 2255 surely shows that the statutory language is somewhat lacking in precision, the resulting shadow that the dissenting opinion would cast over the statute totally disappears in the light of its legislative history. That history makes clear that § 2255 was intended to afford federal prisoners a remedy identical in scope to federal habeas corpus. As the Court pointed out in United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, 219 (1952), the “history of Section 2255 shows that it was passed at the instance of the Judicial Conference to meet practical difficulties that had arisen in administering the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts. Nowhere in the history of Section 2255 do we find any purpose to impinge upon prisoners’ rights of collateral attack upon their convictions. On the contrary, the sole purpose was to minimize the difficulties encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the same rights in another and more convenient forum.” Thus, there can be no doubt that the grounds for relief under § 2255 are equivalent to those encompassed by § 2254, the general federal habeas corpus statute, under which relief is available on the ground that “[a person] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” (Emphasis added.) Furthermore, although the dissent of Mr. Justice Rehnquist derides the view that the words “otherwise open to collateral attack” are intended to be “a catch-all phrase,” post, at 358, the legislative history fully supports that view. In recommending to Congress what eventually became § 2255, the Judicial Conference Committee on Habeas Corpus Procedure stated that “[t]he motion remedy broadly covers all situations where the sentence is 'open to collateral attack.’ As a remedy, it is intended to be as broad as habeas corpus.” No microscopic reading of § 2255 can escape either the clear and simple language of § 2254 authorizing habeas corpus relief “on the ground that [the prisoner] is in custody in violation of the . . . laws ... of the United States” or the unambiguous legislative history showing that § 2255 was intended to mirror § 2254 in operative effect. Thus, we cannot agree that the third paragraph of § 2255 was in any fashion designed to mark a retreat from the clear statement that § 2255 encompasses a prisoner’s claim of “the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Accordingly, we conclude that the text of the statute cannot sustain the Government’s position that only claims “of constitutional dimension” are cognizable under § 2255. Moreover, there is no support in the prior holdings of this Court for the proposition that a claim is not cognizable under § 2255 merely because it is grounded in the “laws of the United States” rather than the Constitution. It is true, of course, that in Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174 (1947), the Court held that the nonconstitutional claim in that case could not be asserted to set aside a conviction on collateral attack. But Sunal was merely an example of “the general rule . . . that the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed to do service for an appeal.” Id., at 178. “Appeals could have been taken in these cases, but they were not.” Id., at 177. The Court was careful to point out that “if Sunal and Kulick had pursued the appellate course and failed, their cases would be quite different. But since they chose not to pursue the remedy which they had, we do not think they should now be allowed to justify their failure by saying they deemed any appeal futile.” Id., at 181. Moreover, “[t]he case [was] not one where the law was changed after the time for appeal had expired.” Ibid. Thus, Sunal cannot be read to stand for the broad proposition that nonconstitutional claims can never be asserted in collateral attacks upon criminal convictions. Rather, the implication would seem to be that, absent the particular considerations regarded as dispositive in that case, the fact that a contention is grounded not in the Constitution, but in the “laws of the United States” would not preclude its assertion in a § 2255 proceeding. This is not to say, however, that every asserted error of law can be raised on a § 2255 motion. In Hill v. United States, 368 U. S. 424, 429 (1962), for example, we held that “collateral relief is not available when all that is shown is a failure to comply with the formal requirements” of a rule of criminal procedure in the absence of any indication that the defendant was prejudiced by the asserted technical error. We suggested that the appropriate inquiry was whether the claimed error of law was “a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice,” and whether “[i]t . . . present[s] exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent.” Id., at 428 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court did not suggest that any line could be drawn on the basis of whether the claim had its source in the Constitution or in the “laws of the United States.” In this case, the petitioner’s contention is that the decision in Gutknecht v. United States, as interpreted and applied by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the Fox case after his conviction was affirmed, establishes that his induction order was invalid under the Selective Service Act and that he could not be lawfully convicted for failure to comply with that order. If this contention is well taken, then Davis’ conviction and punishment are for an act that the law does not make criminal. There can be no room for doubt that such a circumstance “inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice” and “presents] exceptional circumstances” that justify collateral relief under § 2255. Therefore, although we express no view on the merits of the petitioner’s claim, we hold that the issue he raises is cognizable in a § 2255 proceeding. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The notice further stated that “[a] delinquent registrant loses his eligibility for deferment and may be placed in a class immediately available for service. He is ordered for induction ahead of other registrants.” Pet. for Cert. 21a. This regulation, which was rescinded shortly after our decision in Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U. S. 295 (1970), provided in pertinent part: “(a) Whenever a registrant has failed to perform any duty or duties required of him under the selective service law other than the duty to comply with an Order to Report for Induction . , . or the duty to comply with an Order to Report for Civilian Work . . . , the local board may declare him to be a delinquent.” Title 32 CFR §1641.4 imposes a duty on every registrant to report for an Armed Forces physical examination at the time and place fixed in the order mailed to the registrant by the board. Title 32 CFR § 1641.1 imposes a duty on every registrant “to keep his local board currently informed in writing of . . . the address where mail will reach him .. . .” Title 50 U. S. C. App. § 462 (a) provides, in pertinent part, that “any person . . . who in any manner shall knowingly fail or neglect or refuse to perform any duty required of him under or in the execution of this title, or rules, regulations, or directions made pursuant to this title . . . shall, upon conviction in any district court of the United States of competent jurisdiction, be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more than $10,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment.” Title 32 CFR § 1641.5 imposes a duty on every registrant “to report for induction at the time and place ordered by the local board.” Both induction orders sent to the petitioner had the word “Delinquent” typed on the face. The local board's “Minutes of Action” also reflect that the petitioner was ordered to report “as Del.” Title 32 CFR § 1631.7 (1967) established an order in which registrants who were eligible would be called for induction. A registrant’s place in this order of call was determined by several factors, including age and marital status. If a registrant were declared a delinquent under 32 CFR § 1642.4 (1967), he immediately entered the first priority in the order of call and was ordered to report for induction even ahead of volunteers for induction. In this sense, the registrant’s induction was “accelerated” as a result of the local board’s delinquency declaration. Gutknecht had been declared a delinquent for failing to have his registration certificate and current classification notice in his possession at all times, as required by 32 CFR §§ 1617.1 and 1623.5, respectively. In this regard, the Court said: “The power under the regulations to declare a registrant 'delinquent’ has no statutory standard or even guidelines. The power is exercised entirely at the discretion of the local board. It is a broad, roving authority, a type of administrative absolutism not congenial to our law-making traditions. . . . We search the Act in vain for any clues that Congress desired the Act to have punitive sanctions apart from the criminal prosecutions specifically authorized .... If federal or state laws are violated by registrants, they can be prosecuted. If induction is to be substituted for these prosecutions, a vast rewriting of the Act is needed.” 396 U. S., at 306-307. At the hearing in the District Court, the executive secretary of the local board testified that the petitioner would have been inducted earlier if he had not failed to appear for the physical. In corroboration, the Government introduced the local board’s “delivery lists” showing the induction dates of other registrants at the local board. The District Court found that if the petitioner had complied with the local board’s procedures and “[h]ad . . . not been declared a Delinquent, he would have been ordered to report for induction on or before November 15, 1966,” which would have been nearly eight months before he finally failed to report (July 11, 1967). Between the dates of the induction orders of Davis and Fox, the provisions of 32 CFR § 1631.7 (a) (1967) were incorporated into 32 CFR § 1631.7 (b) (1969). At the time of his § 2255 motion in the District Court, Davis also moved under Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 35 for reduction or modification of his sentence. This motion was taken under advisement by the District Court and was thereafter granted in part. As a result, the petitioner was released from incarceration after having served four months of his three-year sentence, and he was placed on probation for the remainder of the original term. In the absence of a decision by the Court of Appeals on me merits of the petitioner’s contentions, this case is not an appropriate vehicle to consider whether the Gutknecht decision has retroactive application or whether the Fox case was correctly decided by the Court of Appeals. Brief for United States 25 n. 11. United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, 217 (1952). Although Sunal held that a federal prisoner could not assert a noneonstitutional claim on collateral attack if he had not raised it on appeal, the Court there recognized that this rule would not bar the assertion of constitutional claims in collateral proceedings even if the applicant had failed to pursue them on appeal. 332 U. S. 174, 178-179, 182. Cf. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217, 223 (1969).
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the petitioning party (i.e., the plaintiff or the appellant) emerged victorious. The victory the Supreme Court provided the petitioning party may not have been total and complete (e.g., by vacating and remanding the matter rather than an unequivocal reversal), but the disposition is nonetheless a favorable one. Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case.
Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. Did the petitioning win the case?
[ "Yes", "No" ]
[ 0 ]
sc
GENERAL STORES CORP. v. SHLENSKY et al. No. 170. Argued January 18, 1956. Decided March 26, 1956. Aaron Rosen and Frederic P. Houston argued the cause for petitioner. With them on the brief was Marks F. Paskes. William, H. Timbers argued the cause for the Securities and Exchange Commission, respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobelofi, Thomas G. Meeker, David Ferber and Aaron Levy. A. Alan Reich argued the cause for Shlensky, respondent. With him on the brief was Michael Gesas. Max Goldweber argued the cause for the Wage Claimants, respondents. With him on the brief was Louis J. Weinshenker. Leon Singer argued the cause for the Creditors Committee, respondent. With him on the brief was Samuel Blumberg. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner instituted proceedings under c. XI of the Bankruptcy Act (52 Stat. 905, as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 701 et seq.) alleging it was unable to pay its debts as they matured. It proposed an arrangement of its general unsecured trade and commercial debts, none of which is evidenced by any publicly held security. Petitioner has indeed no debts of any nature by way of bonds, mortgage certificates, notes, debentures, or obligations of like character, publicly held. It does, however, have over 2,000,000 shares of $1 par value common stock listed on the American Stock Exchange and held by over 7,000 shareholders. One of these — an owner of 3,000 shares— and the Securities and Exchange Commission moved that the proceedings be dismissed unless, within a time fixed by the court, the petition be amended to comply with the requirements of c. X of the Bankruptcy Act (52 Stat. 883, as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 501 et seq.) for a corporate reorganization. The District Court granted the motions. 129 F. Supp. 801. The Court of Appeals affirmed by a divided vote. 222 F. 2d 234. The case is here on certiorari. 350 U. S. 809. Petitioner, formerly known as D. A. Schulte, Inc., has operated for some years a chain of stores for the sale of tobacco and accessory products. Petitioner has also had a chain of difficulties. Its financial problems go back at least to 1936 when it filed a petition for reorganization under former § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act. After its reorganization was completed in 1940, it had a few years of prosperity followed by a postwar decline in volume of business, a rise in costs, and substantial losses. During these years $600,000 cash was raised by the sale of stock and a new management installed with a view to converting some existing stores into candy, food, and drink establishments. That idea was abandoned and the proceeds of the stock sale were used for general corporate purposes. It was then decided to liquidate the existing specialty stores and to have petitioner acquire the stock of two existing retail drugstore chains — Stineway Drug Company and Ford Hopkins Company. The Stineway stock was acquired for $1,220,320, petitioner borrowing $870,-000 from Stineway for the purpose. Later petitioner borrowed an additional $440,000 from Stineway to help make the down payment on the Ford Hopkins stock, making a total indebtedness to Stineway of $1,310,000, represented by two non-interest-bearing notes. The Ford Hopkins stock was acquired for $2,800,000, the down payment being $735,000, the balance being payable in a yearly amount of $200,000 with 4 per cent interest and secured by the Stineway and Ford Hopkins stock. While the two drug chains were being acquired, petitioner started the liquidation of its own stores, a process that was completed under c. XI of the Bankruptcy Act. The disposition of those stores involved the rejection of numerous leases and the creation of claims of landlords against petitioner. The arrangement proposed by petitioner under c. XI would extend its unsecured-obligations and provide for a 20 per cent payment on confirmation of the plan and 20 per cent annually for 4 years thereafter. The claims listed were the $1,310,000 debt to Stineway and $525,000 unsecured claims, exclusive of claims by landlords. We were advised on oral argument that during the course of the c. XI proceedings it was decided that this offer was not feasible and that the unsecured creditors are now offered the equivalent of 40 per cent of their claims in full satisfaction. Much of the argument has been devoted to the meaning of Securities and Exchange Commission v. United States Realty Co., 310 U. S. 434. In that case we held that relief was not properly sought under c. XI but that c. X offered the appropriate relief. That was a case of a debtor with publicly owned debentures, publicly owned mortgage certificates, and publicly owned stock. An arrangement was proposed that would leave the debentures and stock unaffected and extend the certificates and reduce the interest. It was argued in that case, as it has been in the instant one, that c. X affords the relief for corporations whose securities are publicly owned, while c. XI is available to debtors whose stock is closely held; that c. X is designed for the large corporations, c. XI for the smaller ones; that it is the character of the debtor that determines whether c. X or c. XI affords the appropriate remedy. We did not adopt that distinction in the United States Realty case. Rather we emphasized the need to determine on the facts of the case whether the formulation of a plan under the control of the debtor, as provided by c. XI, or the formulation of a plan under the auspices of disinterested trustees, as assured by c. X and the other protective provisions of that chapter, would better serve “the public and private interests concerned including those of the debtor.” 310 U. S., at 455. The United States Realty case presented a rather simple problem. There one class of creditors was being asked to make sacrifices, while the position of the stockholders remained unimpaired (id., 453-454, 456), contrary to the teachings of Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S. 106. Moreover, the history of the company raised a serious question “whether any fair and equitable arrangement in the best interest of creditors” could be effected “without some re-arrangement of its capital structure.” Id., 456. For those reasons c. X was held to offer the appropriate relief. The character of the debtor is not the controlling consideration in a choice between c. X and c. XI. Nor is the nature of the capital structure. It may well be that in most cases where the debtor’s securities are publicly held c. X will afford the more appropriate remedy. But that is not necessarily so. A large company with publicly held securities may have as much need for a simple composition of unsecured debts as a smaller company. And there is no reason we can see why c. XI may not serve that end. The essential difference is not between the small company and the large company but between the needs to be served. Readjustment of all or a part of the debts of an insolvent company without sacrifice by the stockholders may violate the fundamental principle of a fair and equitable plan (see Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., supra), as the United States Realty Co. case emphasizes. Readjustment of the debt structure of a company, without more, may be inadequate unless there is also an accounting by the management for misdeeds which caused the debacle. Readjustment of the debts may be a minor problem compared with the need for new management. Without a new management today’s readjustment may be a temporary moratorium before a major collapse. These are typical instances where c. X affords a more adequate remedy than c. XI. The appointment of a disinterested trustee (§ 156), his broad powers of investigation (§ 167), the role of the trustee in preparing a plan (§ 169), the duty of the Securities and Exchange Commission to render an advisory report on the plan (§ 172), the requirement that the plan be “fair and equitable, and feasible” (§§ 174, 221), the power to include the subsidiaries, Stineway and Ford Hopkins, in the reorganization of petitioner (§ 129) — these are controls which c. X gives to the entire community of interests in the company being reorganized and which are lacking under c. XI. These controls are essential both where a complicated debt structure must be readjusted and where a sound discretion indicates either that there must be an accounting from the management or that a new management is necessary. Those conditions only illustrate the need for c. X. There may be others equally compelling. The history of this debtor indicates not fraud but either an improvident overextension or a business that has been out of step with modern trends. One corporate reorganization has already been suffered. Heavy short-term loans hang ominously over the company; and it has been converted from an operating company to a holding company with the shares of the subsidiaries pledged to creditors. It is argued that only a short moratorium is needed. There are, however, fears that a short moratorium may be merely a prelude to new disasters, that what the company needs is a fundamental reorganization of its capital structure, so that its limited cash resources will not be dissipated in an effort to meet the demands for debt reduction. A question as to what is “fair and equitable” between creditors and stockholders may eventually be reached in the reorganization. But the paramount issue at present concerns what is “feasible.” A “feasible” plan within the meaning of c. X, §§ 174, 221, might mean, first, a merger of the subsidiaries with the holding company, and, second, a funding of the unsecured debt and a realignment of debt and stock so as to give a balanced capital structure. The old business has been liquidated and the new one launched with heavy borrowings on a short-term basis. If the new one is to succeed, it may well need a more thoroughgoing capital readjustment than is possible under c. XI. That was the view of two lower courts. We could reverse them only if their exercise of discretion transcended the allowable bounds. We cannot say that it does. Rather we think that the lower courts took a fair reading of c. X and the functions it serves and reasonably concluded that this business needed a more pervasive reorganization than is available under c. XI. Affirmed. Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them. Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer. Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.
Who is the petitioner of the case?
[ "attorney general of the United States, or his office", "specified state board or department of education", "city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit", "state commission, board, committee, or authority", "county government or county governmental unit, except school district", "court or judicial district", "state department or agency", "governmental employee or job applicant", "female governmental employee or job applicant", "minority governmental employee or job applicant", "minority female governmental employee or job applicant", "not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable", "retired or former governmental employee", "U.S. House of Representatives", "interstate compact", "judge", "state legislature, house, or committee", "local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough", "governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact", "state or U.S. supreme court", "local school district or board of education", "U.S. Senate", "U.S. senator", "foreign nation or instrumentality", "state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of", "state college or university", "United States", "State", "person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime", "advertising business or agency", "agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor", "airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes", "airline", "distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages", "alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked", "American Medical Association", "National Railroad Passenger Corp.", "amusement establishment, or recreational facility", "arrested person, or pretrial detainee", "attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association", "author, copyright holder", "bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company", "bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization", "establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store", "water transportation, stevedore", "bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines", "brewery, distillery", "broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm", "construction industry", "bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle", "business, corporation", "buyer, purchaser", "cable TV", "car dealer", "person convicted of crime", "tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband", "chemical company", "child, children, including adopted or illegitimate", "religious organization, institution, or person", "private club or facility", "coal company or coal mine operator", "computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software", "consumer, consumer organization", "creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company", "person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial", "defendant", "debtor", "real estate developer", "disabled person or disability benefit claimant", "distributor", "person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector", "drug manufacturer", "druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy", "employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of", "employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan", "electric equipment manufacturer", "electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company", "eleemosynary institution or person", "environmental organization", "employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.", "farmer, farm worker, or farm organization", "father", "female employee or job applicant", "female", "movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of", "fisherman or fishing company", "food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard", "foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity", "franchiser", "franchisee", "lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization", "person who guarantees another's obligations", "handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to", "health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor", "heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be", "hospital, medical center", "husband, or ex-husband", "involuntarily committed mental patient", "Indian, including Indian tribe or nation", "insurance company, or surety", "inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder", "investor", "injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related", "juvenile", "government contractor", "holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor", "magazine", "male", "medical or Medicaid claimant", "medical supply or manufacturing co.", "racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant", "minority female employee or job applicant", "manufacturer", "management, executive officer, or director, of business entity", "military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist", "mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company", "mother", "auto manufacturer", "newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service", "radio and television network, except cable tv", "nonprofit organization or business", "nonresident", "nuclear power plant or facility", "owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels", "shareholders to whom a tender offer is made", "tender offer", "oil company, or natural gas producer", "elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly", "out of state noncriminal defendant", "political action committee", "parent or parents", "parking lot or service", "patient of a health professional", "telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company", "physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society", "public interest organization", "physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee", "pipe line company", "package, luggage, container", "political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official", "indigent, needy, welfare recipient", "indigent defendant", "private person", "prisoner, inmate of penal institution", "professional organization, business, or person", "probationer, or parolee", "protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer", "public utility", "publisher, publishing company", "radio station", "racial or ethnic minority", "person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination", "racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "realtor", "journalist, columnist, member of the news media", "resident", "restaurant, food vendor", "retarded person, or mental incompetent", "retired or former employee", "railroad", "private school, college, or university", "seller or vendor", "shipper, including importer and exporter", "shopping center, mall", "spouse, or former spouse", "stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder", "retail business or outlet", "student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only", "tenant or lessee", "theater, studio", "forest products, lumber, or logging company", "person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent", "trucking company, or motor carrier", "television station", "union member", "unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant", "union, labor organization, or official of", "veteran", "voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)", "wholesale trade", "wife, or ex-wife", "witness, or person under subpoena", "network", "slave", "slave-owner", "bank of the united states", "timber company", "u.s. job applicants or employees", "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "General Land Office of Commissioners", "Transportation Security Administration", "Surface Transportation Board", "U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.", "Reconstruction Finance Corp.", "Department or Secretary of Homeland Security", "Unidentifiable", "International Entity" ]
[ 42 ]
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MONTGOMERY BUILDING & CONSTRUCTION TRADES COUNCIL et al. v. LEDBETTER ERECTION CO., INC. No. 43. Argued November 13, 1952. Decided December 8, 1952. Herbert S. Thatcher argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were J. Albert Woll, James A. Glenn, Joseph E. Finley and Earl McBee. By special leave of Court, Mozart G. Ratner argued the cause for the National Labor Relations Board, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Stern, Marvin E. Frankel, George J. Bott, David P. Findling and Bernard Dunau. Jack Crenshaw argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Files Crenshaw. Arthur J. Goldberg filed a brief for the Congress of Industrial Organizations, as amicus curiae, supporting petitioners. Mr. Justice Minton delivered the opinion of the Court. The respondent filed a bill in equity in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama, to enjoin certain picketing activities, wholly peaceful, carried on by the petitioners, labor organizations. Upon the sworn bill and without notice, the court issued forthwith a “Temporary Writ of Injunction.” The petitioners appeared and filed an answer and a motion to dissolve the injunction on numerous grounds. Subsequently, the petitioners withdrew their answer and most of the grounds assigned for dissolution of the injunction and filed new grounds therefor. The motion to dissolve was denied, and from this order of the court the petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court of Alabama, which affirmed the order of the trial court. 256 Ala. 678, 57 So. 2d 112, rehearing denied, 256 Ala. 689, 57 So. 2d 121. Certiorari was sought here and granted, 343 U. S. 962. At the very threshold, we are presented with a question of jurisdiction. This Court may grant certiorari from a judgment or decree of the Supreme Court of Alabama, the highest court in the State, only if the judgment or decree is final. 28 U. S. C. § 1257. Was this a final judgment or decree? From the earliest days, this Court has refused to accept jurisdiction of interlocutory decrees, such as is involved in this case. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 6 Wheat. 448, the first case presenting this issue to this Court, an injunction had been granted by a Chancery Court of the State of New York. The defendant answered and moved to dissolve the injunction. The court denied the motion to dissolve, and the defendant appealed to the Court for the Trial of Impeachments and Correction of Errors which affirmed. The appeal to this Court was dismissed because there was no final decree in the court of last resort for this Court to review. The provision of § 1257 that only “Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court . . has been carried in almost identical language since the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 85, § 25. “This requirement is not one of those technicalities to be easily scorned. It is an important factor in the smooth working of our federal system.” Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 124. The distinction between a preliminary or temporary injunction and a final or permanent injunction was elementary in the law of equity. The classical concept was at once recognized and applied in Gibbons v. Ogden, supra. There is no room here for interpretation. The rule remains unchanged. True, as long as a temporary injunction is in force it may be as effective as a permanent injunction, and for that reason appeals from interlocutory judgments have been authorized by state legislatures and Congress. But such authorization does not give interlocutory judgments the aspect of finality here, even though we may have inadvertently granted certiorari. Baldwin Co. v. Howard Co., 256 U. S. 35, 40. It is argued that if this is not held to be a final decree or judgment and decided now, it may never be decided, because to await the outcome of the final hearing is to moot the question and to frustrate the picketing. However appealing such argument may be, it does not warrant us in enlarging our jurisdiction. Only Congress may do that. Furthermore, the interlocutory decree could have been readily converted into a final decree, and the appeal could have proceeded without question as to jurisdiction just as effectively and expeditiously as the appeal from the interlocutory injunction was pursued in this case. Since there was no final judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama for review, the writ of certiorari must be dismissed as improvidently granted. It is so ordered.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed. The information relevant to this variable may be found near the end of the summary that begins on the title page of each case, or preferably at the very end of the opinion of the Court. For cases in which the Court granted a motion to dismiss, consider "petition denied or appeal dismissed". There is "no disposition" if the Court denied a motion to dismiss.
What is the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed?
[ "stay, petition, or motion granted", "affirmed (includes modified)", "reversed", "reversed and remanded", "vacated and remanded", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded", "vacated", "petition denied or appeal dismissed", "certification to or from a lower court", "no disposition" ]
[ 8 ]
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NEW JERSEY v. T. L. O. No. 83-712. Argued March 28, 1984 Reargued October 2, 1984 Decided January 15, 1985 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined, and in Part II of which Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which O’Connor, J., joined, post, p. 348. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 351. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 353. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Marshall, J., joined, and in Part I of which Brennan, J., joined, post, p. 370. Allan J. Nodes, Deputy Attorney General of New Jersey, reargued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief on reargument were Irwin J. Kimmelman, Attorney General, and Victoria Curtis Bramson, Linda L. Yoder, and Gilbert G. Miller, Deputy Attorneys General. With him on the briefs on the original argument were Mr. Kimmelman and Ms. Bramson. Lois De Julio reargued the cause for respondent. With her on the briefs were Joseph H. Rodriguez and Andrew Dillmann. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Frey, and Kathryn'A. Oberly; for the National Association of Secondary School Principals et al. by Ivan B. Gluckman; for the National School Boards Association by Gwendolyn H. Gregory, August W. Steinhilber, and Thomas A. Shannon; for the Washington Legal Foundation by Daniel J. Popeo and Paul D. Kamenar; and for the New Jersey School Boards Association by Paula A. Mullaly and Thomas F. Scully. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Mary L. Heen, Burt Neubome, E. Richard Larson, Barry S. Goodman, and Charles S. Sims; and for the Legal Aid Society of the City of New York et al. by Janet Fink and Henry Weintraub. Julia Penny Clark and Robert Chanin filed a brief for the National Education Association as amicus curiae. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari in this case to examine the appropriateness of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for searches carried out in violation of the Fourth Amendment by public school authorities. Our consideration of the proper application of the Fourth Amendment to the public schools, however, has led us to conclude that the search that gave rise to the case now before us did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we here address only the questions of the proper standard for assessing the legality of searches conducted by public school officials and the application of that standard to the facts of this case. I On March 7, 1980, a teacher at Piscataway High School in Middlesex County, N. J., discovered two girls smoking in a lavatory. One of the two girls was the respondent T. L. 0., who at that time was a 14-year-old high school freshman. Because smoking in the lavatory was a violation of a school rule, the teacher took the two girls to the Principal’s office, where they met with Assistant Vice Principal Theodore Choplick. In response to questioning by Mr. Choplick, T. L. O.’s companion admitted that she had violated the rule. T. L. 0., however, denied that she had been smoking in the lavatory and claimed that she did not smoke at all. Mr. Choplick asked T. L. O. to come into his private office and demanded to see her purse. Opening the purse, he found a pack of cigarettes, which he removed from the purse and held before T. L. O. as he accused her of having lied to him. As he reached into the purse for the cigarettes, Mr. Choplick also noticed a package of cigarette rolling papers. In his experience, possession of rolling papers by high school students was closely associated with the use of marihuana. Suspecting that a closer examination of the purse might yield further evidence of drug use, Mr. Choplick proceeded to search the purse thoroughly. The search revealed a smáll amount of marihuana, a pipe, a number of empty plastic bags, a substantial quantity of money in one-dollar bills, an index card that appeared to be a list of students who owed T. L. O. money, and two letters that implicated T. L. O. in marihuana dealing. Mr. Choplick notified T. L. O.’s mother and the police, and turned the evidence of drug dealing over to the police. At the request of the police, T. L. O.’s mother took her daughter to police headquarters, where T. L. O. confessed that she had been selling marihuana at the high school. On the basis of the confession and the evidence seized by Mr. Choplick, the State brought delinquency charges against T. L. O. in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Middlesex County. Contending that Mr. Choplick’s search of her purse violated the Fourth Amendment, T. L. O. moved to suppress the evidence found in her purse as well as her confession, which, she argued, was tainted by the allegedly unlawful search. The Juvenile Court denied the motion to suppress. State ex rel. T. L. O., 178 N. J. Super. 329, 428 A. 2d 1327 (1980). Although the court concluded that the Fourth Amendment did apply to searches carried out by school officials, it held that “a school official may properly conduct a search of a student’s person if the official has a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is in the process of being committed, or reasonable cause to believe that the search is necessary to maintain school discipline or enforce school policies.” Id., at 341, 428 A. 2d, at 1333 (emphasis in original). Applying this standard, the court concluded that the search conducted by Mr. Choplick was a reasonable one. The initial decision to open the purse was justified by Mr. Choplick’s well-founded suspicion that T. L. O. had violated the rule forbidding smoking in the lavatory. Once the purse was open, evidence of marihuana violations was in plain view, and Mr. Choplick was entitled to conduct a thorough search to determine the nature and extent of T. L. O.’s drug-related activities. Id., at 343, 428 A. 2d, at 1334. Having denied the motion to suppress, the court on March 23, 1981, found T. L. O. to be a delinquent and on January 8, 1982, sentenced her to a year’s probation. On appeal from the final judgment of the Juvenile Court, a divided Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s finding that there had been no Fourth Amendment violation, but vacated the adjudication of delinquency and remanded for a determination whether T. L. O. had knowingly and voluntarily waived her Fifth Amendment rights before confessing. State ex rel. T. L. O., 185 N. J. Super. 279, 448 A. 2d 493 (1982). T. L. O. appealed the Fourth Amendment ruling, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and ordered the suppression of the evidence found in T. L. O.’s purse. State ex rel. T. L. O., 94 N. J. 331, 463 A. 2d 934 (1983). The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by school officials. The court also rejected the State of New Jersey’s argument that the exclusionary rule should not be employed to prevent the use in juvenile proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by school officials. Declining to consider whether applying the rule to the fruits of searches by school officials would have any deterrent value, the court held simply that the precedents of this Court establish that “if an official search violates constitutional rights, the evidence is not admissible in criminal proceedings.” Id., at 341, 463 A. 2d, at 939 (footnote omitted). With respect to the question of the legality of the search before it, the court agreed with the Juvenile Court that a warrantless search by a school official does not violate the Fourth Amendment so long as the official “has reasonable grounds to believe that a student possesses evidence of illegal activity or activity that would interfere with school discipline and order.” Id., at 346, 463 A. 2d, at 941-942. However, the court, with two justices dissenting, sharply disagreed with the Juvenile Court’s conclusion that the search of the purse was reasonable. According to the majority, the contents of T. L. O.’s purse had no bearing on the accusation against T. L. 0., for possession of cigarettes (as opposed to smoking them in the lavatory) did not violate school rules, and a mere desire for evidence that would impeach T. L. O.’s claim that she did not smoke cigarettes could not justify the search. Moreover, even if a reasonable suspicion that T. L. O. had cigarettes in her purse would justify a search, Mr. Choplick had no such suspicion, as no one had furnished him with any specific information that there were cigarettes in the purse. Finally, leaving aside the question whether Mr. Choplick was justified in opening the purse, the court held that the evidence of drug use that he saw inside did not justify the extensive “rummaging” through T. L. O.’s papers and effects that followed. Id., at 347, 463 A. 2d, at 942-943. We granted the State of New Jersey’s petition for certio-rari. 464 U. S. 991 (1983). Although the State had argued in the Supreme Court of New Jersey that the search of T. L. O.’s purse did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the petition for certiorari raised only the question whether the exclusionary rule should operate to bar consideration in juvenile delinquency proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by a school official without the involvement of law enforcement officers. When this case was first argued last Term, the State conceded for the purpose of argument that the standard devised by the New Jersey Supreme Court for determining the legality of school searches was appropriate and that the court had correctly applied that standard; the State contended only that the remedial purposes of the exclusionary rule were not well served by applying it to searches conducted by public authorities not primarily engaged in law enforcement. Although we originally granted certiorari to decide the issue of the appropriate remedy in juvenile court proceedings for unlawful school searches, our doubts regarding the wisdom of deciding that question in isolation from the broader question of what limits, if any, the Fourth Amendment places on the activities of school authorities prompted us to order reargument on that question. Having heard argument on the legality of the search of T. L. O.’s purse, we are satisfied that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. II In determining whether the search at issue in this case violated the Fourth Amendment, we are faced initially with the question whether that Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by public school officials. We hold that it does. It is now beyond dispute that “the Federal Constitution, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers.” Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 213 (1960); accord, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949). Equally indisputable is the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the rights of students against encroachment by public school officials: “The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures — Boards of Education not excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.” West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 637 (1943). These two propositions — that the Fourth Amendment applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the actions of public school officials are subject to the limits placed on state action by the Fourteenth Amendment — might appear sufficient to answer the suggestion that the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe unreasonable searches by school officials. On reargument, however, the State of New Jersey has argued that the history of the Fourth Amendment indicates that the Amendment was intended to regulate only searches and seizures carried out by law enforcement officers; accordingly, although public school officials are concededly state agents for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment creates no rights enforceable against them. It may well be true that the evil toward which the Fourth Amendment was primarily directed was the resurrection of the pre-Revolutionary practice of using general warrants or “writs of assistance” to authorize searches for contraband by officers of the Crown. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 7-8 (1977); Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 624-629 (1886). But this Court has never limited the Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures to operations conducted by the police. Rather, the Court has long spoken of the Fourth Amendment’s strictures as restraints imposed upon “governmental action” — that is, “upon the activities of sovereign authority.” Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 475 (1921). Accordingly, we have held the Fourth Amendment applicable to the activities of civil as well as criminal authorities: building inspectors, see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528 (1967), Occupational Safety and Health Act inspectors, see Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 312-313 (1978), and even firemen entering privately owned premises to battle a fire, see Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 506 (1978), are all subject to the restraints imposed by the Fourth Amendment. As we observed in Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, “[t]he basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.” 387 U. S., at 528. Because the individual’s interest in privacy and personal security “suffers whether the government’s motivation is to investigate violations of criminal laws or breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards,” Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., supra, at 312-313, it would be “anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.” Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 530. Notwithstanding the general applicability of the Fourth Amendment to the activities of civil authorities, a few courts have concluded that school officials are exempt from the dictates of the Fourth Amendment by virtue of the special nature of their authority over schoolchildren. See, e. g., R. C. M. v. State, 660 S. W. 2d 552 (Tex. App. 1983). Teachers and school administrators, it is said, act in loco parentis in their dealings with students: their authority is that of the parent, not the State, and is therefore not subject to the limits of the Fourth Amendment. Ibid. Such reasoning is in tension with contemporary reality and the teachings of this Court. We have held school officials subject to the commands of the First Amendment, see Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U. S. 503 (1969), and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975). If school authorities are state actors for purposes of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and due process, it is difficult to understand why they should be deemed to be exercising parental rather than public authority when conducting searches of their students. More generally, the Court has recognized that “the concept of parental delegation” as a source of school authority is not entirely “consonant with compulsory education laws.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 662 (1977). Today’s public school officials do not merely exercise authority voluntarily conferred on them by individual parents; rather, they act in furtherance of publicly mandated educational and disciplinary policies. See, e. g., the opinion in State ex rel. T. L. O., 94 N. J., at 343, 463 A. 2d, at 934, 940, describing the New Jersey statutes regulating school disciplinary policies and establishing the authority of school officials over their students. In carrying out searches and other disciplinary functions pursuant to such policies, school officials act as representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for the parents, and they cannot claim the parents’ immunity from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. Ill To hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by school authorities is only to begin the inquiry into the standards governing such searches. Although the underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and seizures be reasonable, what is reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes place. The determination of the standard of reasonableness governing any specific class of searches requires “balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.” Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 536-537. On one side of the balance are arrayed the individual’s legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security; on the other, the government’s need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public order. We have recognized that even a limited search of the person is a substantial invasion of privacy. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 24-25 (1967). We have also recognized that searches of closed items of personal luggage are intrusions on protected privacy interests, for “the Fourth Amendment pro-' vides protection to the owner of every container that conceals" its contents from plain view.” United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 822-823 (1982). A search of a child’s person or of' a closed purse or other bag carried on her person, no less than a similar search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective expectations of privacy. . Of course, the Fourth Amendment does not protect subjective expectations of privacy that are unreasonable or otherwise “illegitimate.” See, e. g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517 (1984); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U. S. 98 (1980). To receive the protection of the Fourth Amendment, an expectation of privacy must be one that society is “prepared to recognize as legitimate.” Hudson v. Palmer, supra, at 526. The State of New Jersey has argued that because of the pervasive supervision to which children in the schools are necessarily subject, a child has virtually no legitimate expectation of privacy in articles of personal property “unnecessarily” carried into a school. This argument has two factual premises: (1) the fundamental incompatibility of expectations of privacy with the maintenance of a sound educational environment; and (2) the minimal interest of the child in bringing any items of personal property into the school. Both premises are severely flawed. Although this Court may take notice of the difficulty of maintaining discipline in the public schools today, the situation is not so dire that students in the schools may claim no legitimate expectations of privacy. We have recently recognized that the need to maintain order in a prison is such that prisoners retain no legitimate expectations of privacy in their cells, but it goes almost without saying that “[tjhe prisoner and the schoolchild stand in wholly different circumstances, separated by the harsh facts of criminal conviction and incarceration.” Ingraham v. Wright, supra, at 669. We are not yet ready to hold that the schools and the prisons need be equated for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Nor does the State’s suggestion that children have no legitimate need to bring personal property into the schools seem well anchored in reality. Students at a minimum must bring to school not only the supplies needed for their studies, but also keys, money, and the necessaries of personal hygiene and grooming. In addition, students may carry on their persons or in purses or wallets such nondisruptive yet highly personal items as photographs, letters, and diaries. Finally, students may have perfectly legitimate reasons to carry with them articles of property needed in connection with extracurricular or recreational activities. In short, schoolchildren may find it necessary to carry with them a variety of legitimate, noncontraband items, and there is no reason to conclude that they have necessarily waived all rights to privacy in such items merely by bringing them onto school grounds. Against the child’s interest in privacy must be set the substantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school grounds. Maintaining order in the classroom has never been easy, but in recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms: drug use and violent crime in the schools have become major social problems. See generally 1 NIE, U. S. Dept, of Health, Education and Welfare, Violent Schools— Safe Schools: The Safe School Study Report to the Congress (1978). Even in schools that have been spared the most severe disciplinary problems, the preservation of order and a proper educational environment requires close supervision of schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult. “Events calling for discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes require immediate, effective action.” Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S., at 580. Accordingly, we have recognized that maintaining security and order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures, and we have respected the value of preserving the informality of the student-teacher relationship. See id., at 582-583; Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S., at 680-682. How, then, should we strike the balance between the schoolchild’s legitimate expectations of privacy and the school’s equally legitimate need to maintain an environment in which learning can take place? It is evident that the school setting requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject. The warrant requirement, in particular, is unsuited to the school environment: requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools. Just as we have in other cases dispensed with the warrant requirement when “the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search,” Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 532-533, we hold today that school officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their authority. The school setting also requires some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search. Ordinarily, a search — even one that may permissibly be carried out without a warrant — must be based upon “probable cause” to believe that a violation of the law has occurred. See, e. g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 273 (1973); Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 62-66 (1968). However, “probable cause” is not an irreducible requirement of a valid search. The fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures be reasonable, and although “both the concept of probable cause and the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search, . . . in certain limited circumstances neither is required.” Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, at 277 (Powell, J., concurring). Thus, we have in a number of cases recognized the legality of searches and seizures based on suspicions that, although “reasonable,” do not rise to the level of probable cause. See, e. g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 881 (1975); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654-655 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543 (1976); cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 534-539. Where a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard. We join the majority of courts that have examined this issue in concluding that the accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause to believe that the subject of the search has violated or is violating the law. Rather, the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search. Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider “whether the . . . action was justified at its inception,” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S., at 20; second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted “was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place,” ibid. Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other school official will be “justified at its inception” when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. This standard will, we trust, neither unduly burden the efforts of school authorities to maintain order in their schools nor authorize unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy of schoolchildren. By focusing attention on the question of reasonableness, the standard will spare teachers and school administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause and permit them to regulate their conduct according to the dictates of reason and common sense. At the same time, the reasonableness standard should ensure that the interests of students will be invaded no more than is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of preserving order in the schools. IV There remains the question of the legality of the search in this case. We recognize that the “reasonable grounds” standard applied by the New Jersey Supreme Court in its consideration of this question is not substantially different from the standard that we have adopted today. Nonetheless, we believe that the New Jersey court’s application of that standard to strike down the search of T. L. O.’s purse reflects a somewhat crabbed notion of reasonableness. Our review of the facts surrounding the search leads us to conclude that the search was in no sense unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes. The incident that gave rise to this case actually involved two separate searches, with the first — the search for cigarettes — providing the suspicion that gave rise to the second — the search for marihuana. Although it is the fruits of the second search that are at issue here, the validity of the search for marihuana must depend on the reasonableness of the initial search for cigarettes, as there would have been no reason to suspect that T. L. O. possessed marihuana had the first search not taken place. Accordingly, it is to the search for cigarettes that we first turn our attention. The New Jersey Supreme Court pointed to two grounds for its holding that the search for cigarettes was unreasonable. First, the court observed that possession of cigarettes was not in itself illegal or a violation of school rules. Because the contents of T. L. O.’s purse would therefore have “no direct bearing on the infraction” of which she was accused (smoking in a lavatory where smoking was prohibited), there was no reason to search her purse. Second, even assuming that a search of T. L. O.’s purse might under some circumstances be reasonable in light of the accusation made against T. L. 0., the New Jersey court concluded that Mr. Choplick in this particular case had no reasonable grounds to suspect that T. L. O. had cigarettes in her purse. At best, according to the court, Mr. Chopliek had “a good hunch.” 94 N. J., at 347, 463 A. 2d, at 942. Both these conclusions are implausible. T. L. O. had been accused of smoking, and had denied the accusation in the strongest possible terms when she stated that she did not smoke at all. Surely it cannot be said that under these circumstances, T. L. O.’s possession of cigarettes would be irrelevant to the charges against her or to her response to those charges. T. L. O.’s possession of cigarettes, once it was discovered, would both corroborate the report that she had been smoking and undermine the credibility of her defense to the charge of smoking. To be sure, the discovery of the cigarettes would not prove that T. L. O. had been smoking in the lavatory; nor would it, strictly speaking, necessarily be inconsistent with her claim that she did not smoke at all. But it is universally recognized that evidence, to be relevant to an inquiry, need not conclusively prove the ultimate fact in issue, but only have “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. Rule Evid. 401. The relevance of T. L. O.’s possession of cigarettes to the question whether she had been smoking and to the credibility of her denial that she smoked supplied the necessary “nexus” between the item searched for and the infraction under investigation. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 306-307 (1967). Thus, if Mr. Chopliek in fact had a reasonable suspicion that T. L. O. had cigarettes in her purse, the search was justified despite the fact that the cigarettes, if found, would constitute “mere evidence” of a violation. Ibid. Of course, the New Jersey Supreme Court also held that Mr. Chopliek had no reasonable suspicion that the purse would contain cigarettes. This conclusion is puzzling. A teacher had reported that T. L. O. was smoking in the lavatory. Certainly this report gave Mr. Chopliek reason to suspect that T. L. O. was carrying cigarettes with her; and if she did have cigarettes, her purse was the obvious place in which to find them. Mr. Choplick’s suspicion that there were cigarettes in the purse was not an “inchoate and un-particularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S., at 27; rather, it was the sort of “common-sense conclusio[n] about human behavior” upon which “practical people” — including government officials — are entitled to rely. United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981). Of course, even if the teacher’s report were true, T. L. O. might not have had a pack of cigarettes with her; she might have borrowed a cigarette from someone else or have been sharing a cigarette with another student. But the requirement of reasonable suspicion is not a requirement of absolute certainty: “sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. ...” Hill v. California, 401 U. S. 797, 804 (1971). Because the hypothesis that T. L. O. was carrying cigarettes in her purse was itself not unreasonable, it is irrelevant that other hypotheses were also consistent with the teacher’s accusation. Accordingly, it cannot be said that Mr. Choplick acted unreasonably when he examined T. L. O.’s purse to see if it contained cigarettes. Our conclusion that Mr. Choplick’s decision to open T. L. O.’s purse was reasonable brings us to the question of the further search for marihuana once the pack of cigarettes was located. The suspicion upon which the search for marihuana was founded was provided when Mr. Choplick observed a package of rolling papers in the purse as he removed the pack of cigarettes. Although T. L. O. does not dispute the reasonableness of Mr. Choplick’s belief that the rolling papers indicated the presence of marihuana, she does contend that the scope of the search Mr. Choplick conducted exceeded permissible bounds when he seized and read certain letters that implicated T. L. O. in drug dealing. This argument, too, is unpersuasive. The discovery of the rolling papers concededly gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that T. L. O. was carrying marihuana as well as cigarettes in her purse. This suspicion justified further exploration of T. L. O.’s purse, which turned up more evidence of drug-related activities: a pipe, a number of plastic bags of the type commonly used to store marihuana, a small quantity of marihuana, and a fairly substantial amount of money. Under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable to extend the search to a separate zippered compartment of the purse; and when a search of that compartment revealed an index card containing a list of “people who owe me money” as well as two letters, the inference that T. L. O. was involved in marihuana trafficking was substantial enough to justify Mr. Choplick in examining the letters to determine whether they contained any further evidence. In short, we cannot conclude that the search for marihuana was unreasonable in any respect. Because the search resulting in the discovery of the evidence of marihuana dealing by T. L. O. was reasonable, the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision to exclude that evidence from T. L. O.’s juvenile delinquency proceedings on Fourth Amendment grounds was erroneous. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of New Jersey is Reversed. T. L. O. also received a 3-day suspension from school for smoking cigarettes in a nonsmoking area and a 7-day suspension for possession of marihuana. On T. L. O.’s motion, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, set aside the 7-day suspension on the ground that it was based on evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (T. L. O.) v. Piscataway Bd. of Ed., No. C.2865-79 (Super. Ct. N. J., Ch. Div., Mar. 31, 1980). The Board of Education apparently did not appeal the decision of the Chancery Division. State and federal courts considering these questions have struggled to accommodate the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment and the interest of the States in providing a safe environment conducive to education in the public schools. Some courts have resolved the tension between these interests by giving full force to one or the other side of the balance. Thus, in a number of cases courts have held that school officials conducting in-school searches of students are private parties acting in loco parentis and are therefore not subject to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. See, e. g., D. R. C. v. State, 646 P. 2d 252 (Alaska App. 1982); In re G., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969); R. C. M. v. State, 660 S. W. 2d 552 (Tex. App. 1983); Mercer v. State, 450 S. W. 2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). At least one court has held, on the other hand, that the Fourth Amendment applies in full to in-school searches by school officials and that a search conducted without probable cause is unreasonable, see State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La.), vacated, 423 U. S. 809 (1975), on remand, 330 So. 2d 900 (La. 1976); others have held or suggested that the probable-cause standard is applicable at least where the police are involved in a search, see M. v. Board of Ed. Ball-Chatham Community Unit School Dist. No. 5, 429 F. Supp. 288, 292 (SD Ill. 1977); Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-1221 (ND Ill. 1976); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 498, 216 S. E. 2d 586, 594 (1975); or where the search is highly intrusive, see M. M. v. Anker, 607 F. 2d 588, 589 (CA2 1979). The majority of courts that have addressed the issue of the Fourth Amendment in the schools have, like the Supreme Court of New Jersey in this case, reached a middle position: the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by school authorities, but the special needs of the school environment require assessment of the legality of such searches against a standard less exacting than that of probable cause. These courts have, by and large, upheld warrantless searches by school authorities provided that they are supported by a reasonable suspicion that the search will uncover evidence of an infraction of school disciplinary rules or a violation of the law. See, e. g., Tarter v. Baybuck, No. 83-3174 (CA6, Aug. 31, 1984); Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F. 2d 1462 (CA91984); Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School Dist., 690 F. 2d 470 (CA5 1982); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (NDNY 1977); M. v. Board of Ed. Ball-Chatham Community Unit School Dist. No. 5, supra; In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973); State v. Baccino, 282 A. 2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971); State v. D. T. W., 425 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. App. 1983); State v. Young, supra; In re J. A., 85 Ill. App. 3d 567, 406 N. E. 2d 958 (1980); People v. Ward, 62 Mich. App. 46, 233 N. W. 2d 180 (1975); Doe v. State, 88 N. M. 347, 540 P. 2d 827 (App. 1975); People v. D., 34 N. Y. 2d 483, 315 N. E. 2d 466 (1974); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P. 2d 781 (1977); In re L. L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N. W. 2d 343 (App. 1979). Although few have considered the matter, courts have also split over whether the exclusionary rule is an appropriate remedy for Fourth Amendment violations committed by school authorities. The Georgia courts have held that although the Fourth Amendment applies to the schools, the exclusionary rule does not. See, e. g., State v. Young, supra; State v. Lamb, 137 Ga. App. 437, 224 S. E. 2d 51 (1976). Other jurisdictions have applied the rule to exclude the fruits of unlawful school searches from criminal trials and delinquency proceedings. See State v. Mora, supra; People v. D., supra. In holding that the search of T. L. O.’s purse did not violate the Fourth Amendment, we do not implicitly determine that the exclusionary rule applies to the fruits of unlawful searches conducted by school authorities. . The question whether evidence should be excluded from a criminal proceeding involves two discrete inquiries: whether the evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and whether the exclusionary rule is the appropriate remedy for the violation. Neither question'is logically antecedent to the other, for a negative answer to either question is sufficient to dispose of the case. Thus, our determination that the search at issue in this case did not violate the Fourth Amendment implies no particular resolution of the question of the applicability of the exclusionary rule. Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977) (holding that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment applies only to punishments imposed after criminal convictions and hence does not apply to the punishment of schoolchildren by public school officials). We do not address the question, not presented by this case, whether a schoolchild has a legitimate expectation of privacy in lockers, desks, or other school property provided for the storage of school supplies. Nor do we express any opinion on the standards (if any) governing searches of such areas by school officials or by other public authorities acting at the request of school officials. Compare Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F. 2d 662, 670 (CA10 1981) (“Inasmuch as the school had assumed joint control of the locker it cannot be successfully maintained that the school did not have a right to inspect it”), and People v. Overton, 24 N. Y. 2d 522, 249 N. E. 2d 366 (1969) (school administrators have power to consent to search of a student’s locker), with State v. Engerud, 94 N. J. 331, 348, 463 A. 2d 934, 943 (1983) (“We are satisfied that in the context of this case the student had an expectation of privacy in the contents of his locker. . . . For the four years of high school, the school locker is a home away from home. In it the student stores the kind of personal ‘effects’ protected by the Fourth Amendment”). See eases cited in n. 2, supra. We here consider only searches carried out by school authorities acting alone and on their own authority. This case does not present the question of the appropriate standard for assessing the legality of searches conducted by school officials in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies, and we express no opinion on that question. Cf. Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-1221 (ND Ill. 1976) (holding probable-cause standard applicable to searches involving the police). We do not decide whether individualized suspicion is an essential element of the reasonableness standard we adopt for searches by school authorities. In other contexts, however, we have held that although “some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure[,]. . . the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion.” United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 560-561 (1976). See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967). Exceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion are generally appropriate only where the privacy interests implicated by a search are minimal and where “other safeguards” are available “to assure that the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not ‘subject to the discretion of the official in the field.’” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654-655 (1979) (citation omitted). Because the search of T. L. O.’s purse was based upon an individualized suspicion that she had violated school rules, see infra, at 343-347, we need not consider the circumstances that might justify school authorities in conducting searches unsupported by individualized suspicion. Our reference to the nature of the infraction is not intended as an endorsement of Justice Stevens’ suggestion that some rules regarding student conduct are by nature too “trivial” to justify a search based upon reasonable suspicion. See post, at 377-382. We are unwilling to adopt a standard under which the legality of a search is dependent upon a judge’s evaluation of the relative importance of various school rules. The maintenance of discipline in the schools requires not only that students be restrained from assaulting one another, abusing drugs and alcohol, and committing other crimes, but also that students conform themselves to the standards of conduct prescribed by school authorities. We have “repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U. S. 503, 507 (1969). The promulgation of a rule forbidding specified conduct presumably reflects a judgment on the part of school officials that such conduct is destructive of school order or of a proper educational environment. Absent any suggestion that the rule violates some substantive constitutional guarantee, the courts should, as a general matter, defer to that judgment and refrain from attempting to distinguish between rules that are important to the preservation of order in the schools and rules that are not. Of course, New Jersey may insist on a more demanding standard under its own Constitution or statutes. In that case, its courts would not purport to be applying the Fourth Amendment when they invalidate a search. Justice Stevens interprets these statements as a holding that enforcement of the school’s smoking regulations was not sufficiently related to the goal of maintaining discipline or order in the school to justify a search under the standard adopted by the New Jersey court. See post, at 382-384. We do not agree that this is an accurate characterization of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s opinion. The New Jersey court did not hold that the school’s smoking rules were unrelated to the goal of maintaining discipline or order, nor did it suggest that a search that would produce evidence bearing directly on an accusation that a student had violated the smoking rules would be impermissible under the court’s reasonable-suspicion standard; rather, the court concluded that any evidence a search of T. L. O.’s purse was likely to produce would not have a sufficiently direct bearing on the infraction to justify a search — a conclusion with which we cannot agree for the reasons set forth infra, at 345. Justice Stevens’ suggestion that the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision rested on the perceived triviality of the smoking infraction appears to be a reflection of his own views rather than those of the New Jersey court. T. L. O. contends that even if it was reasonable for Mr. Choplick to open her purse to look for cigarettes, it was not reasonable for him to reach in and take the cigarettes out of her purse once he found them. Had he not removed the cigarettes from the purse, she asserts, he would not have observed the rolling papers that suggested the presence of marihuana, and the search for marihuana could not have taken place. T. L. O.’s argument is based on the fact that the cigarettes were not “contraband,” as no school rule forbade her to have them. Thus, according to T. L. 0., the cigarettes were not subject to seizure or confiscation by school authorities, and Mr. Choplick was not entitled to take them out of T. L. O.’s purse regardless of whether he was entitled to peer into the purse to see if they were there. Such hairsplitting argumentation has no place in an inquiry addressed to the issue of reasonableness. If Mr. Choplick could permissibly search T. L. O.’s purse for cigarettes, it hardly seems reasonable to suggest that his natural reaction to finding them — picking them up — could be a constitutional violation. We find that neither in opening the purse nor in reaching into it to remove the cigarettes did Mr. Choplick violate the Fourth Amendment.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
What is the issue area of the decision?
[ "Criminal Procedure", "Civil Rights", "First Amendment", "Due Process", "Privacy", "Attorneys", "Unions", "Economic Activity", "Judicial Power", "Federalism", "Interstate Relations", "Federal Taxation", "Miscellaneous", "Private Action" ]
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BOWMAN TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. ARKANSAS-BEST FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC., et al. No. 73-1055. Argued November 20, 1974— Decided December 23, 1974 Douglas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Charles S. Rhyne argued the cause for appellants in Nos. 73-1055, 73-1069, 73-1070, and 73-1071. With him on the briefs were Bryce Rea, Jr., Donald E. Cross, Courts Oulahan, Robert L. Jones, Jr., Maurice F. Bishop, Sander W. Shapiro, and Jerry C. Prestridge. William L. Patton argued the cause for the United States et al. in No. 73-1072. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Kauper, Carl D. Lawson, Fritz R. Kahn, Betty Jo Christian, and Richard H. Streeter. Phineas Stevens argued the cause for appellees in all cases. With him on the brief were Drew L. Carraway, Phillip Robinson, M. Ward Bailey, Don A. Smith, Thomas Harper, Wentworth E. Griffin, Frank W. Taylor, Jr., William 0. Turney, and J. William Cain, Jr. Together with No. 73-1069, Johnson Motor Lines, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., et al.; No. 73-1070, Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., et al.; No. 73-1071, Lorch-Westway Corp. et al. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., et al.; and No. 73-1072, United States et al. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., et al., also on appeal to the same court. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a direct appeal from a final judgment of a three-judge District Court, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1253, 2101, invalidating an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Ten applications of motor carriers to conduct general commodities operations between points in the Southwest and Southeast were consolidated in one proceeding. Three additional applicants were allowed to intervene. The hearing examiners, after extensive hearings, rejected each application. The Commission granted three of the applications of appellant carriers. Appel-lees, competing carriers, brought an action in the District Court, 28 U. S. C. § 1336, to suspend, enjoin, and annul that portion of the order of the Commission that authorizes issuance of certificates of public convenience and necessity to Red Ball, Bowman, and Johnson. The District Court refused to enforce the Commission’s order because its findings and conclusions were arbitrary, capricious, and without rational basis within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 706, and likewise refused to remand the case believing that no useful purpose would be served, 364 F. Supp. 1239, 1264. The Administrative Procedure Act in 5 U. S. C. § 706 provides that: “The reviewing court shall... (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be— “(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law [or] ... “(E) unsupported by substantial evidence . . . .” These two provisions of 5 U. S. C. § 706 (2) are part of six which are “separate standards.” See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 413 (1971). The District Court properly concluded that, though an agency’s finding may be supported by substantial evidence, based on the definition in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U. S. 474 (1951), it may nonetheless reflect arbitrary and capricious action. There seems, however, to be agreement that the findings and conclusions of the Commission are supported by substantial evidence. The question remains whether, as the District Court held, the Commission’s action was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” as provided in 5 U. S. C. § 706 (2) (A). We disagree, with the District Court and accordingly reverse its judgment and remand the cases for consideration of one issue not reached by the District Court or by this Court. I The Motor Carrier provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 Stat. 551, 49 U. S. C. § 307, empower the Commission to grant an application for a certificate if it finds (1) that the applicant is “fit, willing, and able properly to perform the service proposed”; and (2) that the service proposed “is or will be required by the present or future public convenience and necessity.” The Commission made both findings, relying upon the applicants’ general service record in support of a finding of fitness, and upon expressions of customer dissatisfaction with the existing service in support of its conclusion that the service proposed was consistent with the public convenience and necessity. The competing appellee carriers made presentations designed to show that their existing service was satisfactory and that the applicants would not offer measurably superior performance. The District Court concluded that the Commission had acted arbitrarily in its treatment of the presentations made by the protesting carriers. While the Commission had acknowledged the appellees’ evidence, its reasons for refusing to credit it would not, in the District Court’s view, withstand scrutiny, making its action tantamount to an arbitrary refusal to consider matters in the record. Under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard the scope of review is a narrow one. A reviewing court must “consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.... Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, supra, at 416. The agency must articulate a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 168 (1962). While we may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given, SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196 (1947), we will uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U. S. 581, 595 (1945). Having summarized the appropriate scope of review, we proceed to consider the District Court’s objections seriatim. A. Evidence as to Existing Service The applicant carriers presented exhibits showing the time in transit of selected shipments that had been consigned to appellee carriers by particular shippers during a designated study period. As the Commission acknowledged, the selection of particular shipménts from those occurring during the study period had been made with an eye toward demonstrating service inadequacies. These “worst case” studies figured in the Commission’s finding that service would be improved by the entry of new carriers to the routes at issue. The appellee carriers offered studies of their own. These covered the same period and the same shippers as the applicants’ presentations, but whereas the applicants had selected particular shipments to emphasize inadequacies, the appellee carriers included in their presentations all of the shipments consigned during the study period. These exhibits, argued the protesting carriers, placed the incidents cited by the applicants in perspective and demonstrated that the existing service was generally acceptable. The Commission acknowledged the appel-lees’ presentations but concluded that they offered an inadequate rebuttal to the applicants’ exhibits because (1) they “relate to short periods of time or cover traffic handled for specified shippers”; and (2) the studies represented service provided by appellees after the Commission had designated the applications for hearing. Herrin Transportation Co., 114 M. C. C. 571, 599 (1971). The District Court ruled that the Commission had applied inconsistent standards in reviewing the evidence of the parties, since the appellees’ exhibits were based upon the same study periods and the same shippers as the applicants’ exhibits. 364 F. Supp., at 1259-1260. We agree with the District Court that the first reason assigned by the Commission — that the appellees’ exhibits were based only upon short periods and particular shippers — failed to distinguish the presentations of applicants and opponents. To counter the applicants’ presentations, the protesting carriers chose the identical study periods and shippers but expanded the presentation to show all the shipments consigned. Since the protesters confined themselves to the periods and shippers the applicants had selected, there was no basis for an inference that the former had chosen so as to make the exhibits unrepresentative in their favor. The Commission’s second reason, however — that the appellees’ studies covered periods subsequent to a notice of hearing — provides support for the Commission’s assessment of the evidence. The Commission recognized that protesting carriers might have been spurred to improve their service by the threat of competition raised by the designation of applicants for hearing. Therefore, reasoned the Commission, the protesting carriers’ performance subsequent to the notice of hearing might be superior to the service they normally offered, and their exhibits, covering those periods, had to be read in light of that possibility. But the Commission was not precluded from relying upon the demonstrated shortcomings of the protesters’ service during that period, for the incentive effect the Commission identified would have, if anything, distorted the performance studies in the protesters’ favor. The issue before the Commission was not whether the appellees’ service met some absolute standard of performance but whether the “public convenience and necessity” would be served by the entry of new carriers into the markets served by appellees. United States v. Dixie Express, 389 U. S. 409, 411-412 (1967). Even if the Commission had accepted appellees’ exhibits at face value, it could still have concluded that the deficiencies were sufficient to justify the admission of additional carriers. Certainly the Commission was entitled to regard the appellees’ studies as possibly nonrepresentative of the usual service afforded, to reason that the shortcomings were probably greater than these studies showed, and to conclude that service would be improved by granting the applications. B. Evidence of Applicants’ Fitness The applicants supported their service proposals with exhibits showing transit times over comparable distances on other routes. The appellees once again pointed out that the applicants had been selective and offered transit times on different routes- served by the applicants that were substantially longer than- those applicants proposed to provide on the routes at issue. Appellees thus argued that the applicants could not reasonably be expected to live up to their service proposals. In addition, the appel-lees cited service restrictions that the applicants practiced on other routes — refusal to make scheduled pickup of merchandise, refusal to handle shipments less than a certain weight, refusal to transport goods to certain destinations, and the like. The Commission attributed little significance to the appellees’ rebuttal. With respect to transit times, the Commission noted that different highway conditions might make transit times over identical distances totally incomparable. 114 M. C. C., at 611. The District Court held that the Commission had acted arbitrarily in so treating the evidence, for it had apparently relied on the applicants’ transit-time evidence (id., at 586, 600) to support its finding of fitness. 364 F. Supp., at 1260-1261. Similarly, the District Court viewed as arbitrary the Commission’s failure to mention in its opinion the service restrictions by applicants that appel-lees’ had cited, since the Commission had relied upon identical restrictions practiced by appellees to support its finding that existing service was not satisfactory. 114 M. C. C., at 600. The Commission’s treatment of the evidence of the applicants’ performance on other routes is not a paragon of clarity. Had the Commission responded in a more considered manner to the evidence appellees presented, review would have been greatly facilitated, and further review by this Court perhaps avoided entirely. But we can discern in the Commission’s opinion a rational basis for its treatment of the evidence, and the “arbitrary and capricious” test does not require more. The question before the Commission was whether service on the routes at issue would be enhanced by permitting new entry, and as to this the performance by prospective entrants on new routes was of limited relevance. The Commission noted with respect to transit times that different highway conditions might make experience there a poor indication of the times applicants could provide on the routes they sought to enter. More generally, the applicants’ performance on other routes might, because of market conditions peculiar to that route (e. g., the nature of demand for service, or the number of competing carriers), offer an inaccurate basis for predicting what the applicants would do if admitted to the routes they sought in competition with the carriers already there. A carrier performing lethargically on a route where it was the sole provider of motor transportation, for example, could ill afford to continue the same practice where the situation was more competitive. The particular features of the applicants’ performance elsewhere that the appellees cited were not shown by the Commission to be explainable by special market conditions on the routes where they occurred. It is said that the Commission could conclude that the evidence of performance elsewhere would be unlikely to prove disposi-tive, and that accordingly, absent some compelling demonstration by a proponent of a “performance elsewhere” study that it offered important predictive value, the Commission should disregard such evidence. Of course, evidence of especially egregious performance elsewhere might have been viewed as an exception; a general assumption that competition would force new entrants to exceed the pre-existing quality of service in an effort to attract business might have to yield in the face of an applicant whose shortcomings elsewhere were many and flagrant. But no such evidence was offered here, and none of the applicants was so characterized. Indeed the examiners found that “in the main the carriers participating in these proceedings are substantial and responsible carriers” (2 App. 878), and no party has disputed this finding. We do not find the Commission’s treatment of the evidence arbitrary. II Having found that the admission of the applicant carriers to the routes they sought would produce benefits to the consumers served, the Commission proceeded to consider the effect of new entry upon the appellees. ■While the Commission acknowledged that competition from new entrants might cause at least short-run business losses for existing carriers, it found that, with the exception of one carrier, none would be “seriously adversely affected.” Further, the Commission concluded that in any event, “the gains to be derived by the shipping public in general far outweigh any adverse effect this carrier or any other protestant may experience.” 114 M. C. C., at 611. . The District Court thought the Commission’s treatment unsupportable, in view of the findings by the hearing examiners as to adverse impacts if the applications were granted. 364 F. Supp., at 1262-1263. Insofar as the District Court’s comments express the view that the Commission failed to consider the examiners’ findings or the appellees’ interests, the record shows otherwise. The Commission stated in its opinion that “grants of authority will subject some of protestants’ traffic to the possibility of diversion,” but went on to make findings that there would be no “serious adverse impact.” 114 M. C. C., at 610-611. The evidence that moved the examiners to a contrary view consisted of testimony by appellees’ witnesses about the volume of shipments for which new entrants would compete if allowed to enter the market. The testimony thus presented the carriers’ maximum potential exposure, leaving considerable leeway for predicting what was likely if applications were granted. Cf. Market Street R. Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 324 U. S. 548 (1945). The examiners emphasized the magnitude of potential harm; the Commission took a more optimistic view. We see nothing arbitrary in this posture. That a carrier’s entire business will be subject to competition hardly compels the conclusion that its operations will show no profit. It was rational for the Commission so to conclude that the new entrant may be expected not to swallow up existing carriers, especially if the latter make efforts to attract business. Moreover, the testimony offered by appellees’ witnesses gave the carriers’ exposure to competition if every new application sought by appellees were granted. Thus, the examiners were reporting upon potential diversions of traffic under conditions that were never realized. Since the Commission granted only three of the 10 pending applications, much of the testimony on this matter had to be regarded with qualification, and some of it disregarded entirely. The Commission’s conclusion that consumer benefits outweighed any adverse impact upon the existing carriers reflects the kind of judgment that is entrusted to it, a power to weigh the competing interests and arrive at a balance that is deemed “the public convenience and necessity.” United States v. Pierce Auto Lines, 327 U. S. 515, 535-536 (1946). If the Commission has “drawn out and crystallized these competing interests [and] attempted to judge them with as much delicacy as the prospective nature of the inquiry permits,” ICC v. J-T Transport Co., 368 U. S. 81, 89 (1961), we can require no more. Here the Commission identified the competing interests. We cannot say that the balance it struck was arbitrary or contrary to law. Ill The District Court expressed concern about the considerable lapse of time between the conclusion of eviden-tiary hearings and the Commission’s decision. 364 F. Supp., at 1261-1262. While it is unclear whether this was an independent ground for setting aside the Commission’s order, we deem it advisable to deal directly with the suggestion that the record has grown too stale to support the order. Hearings on the applications in these cases began in 1966 and concluded in 1967. Thereafter, the parties prepared extensive briefs for the examiners, who rendered their decision in November 1969. The decision of the Commission was handed down on December 30, 1971. Thus, the evidentiary material pertained to service conditions which were dated by five years at the time the Commission rendered its decision. We appreciate the difficulties that arise when the lapse between hearing and ultimate decision is so long. Undoubtedly economic changes dated the 1966 studies that the parties, both applicants and appellees, had placed in the record. Nevertheless, we have always been loath to require that factfinding begin anew merely because of delay in proceedings of such magnitude and complexity. To repeat what was said in ICC v. Jersey City, 322 U. S. 503, 514-515 (1944): “Administrative consideration of evidence — particularly where the evidence is taken by an examiner, his report submitted to the parties, and a hearing held on their exceptions to it — always creates a gap between the time the record is closed and the time the administrative decision is promulgated. This is especially true if the issues are difficult, the evidence intricate, and the consideration of the case deliberate and careful. If upon the coming down of the order litigants might demand rehearings as a matter of law because some new circumstance has arisen, some new trend has been observed, or some new fact discovered, there would be little hope that the administrative process could ever be consummated in an order that would not be subject to reopening. It has been almost a rule of necessity that rehearings were not matters of right, but were pleas to discretion. And likewise it has been considered that the discretion to be invoked was that of the body making the order, and not that of a reviewing body.” Only in Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. United States, 284 U. S. 248 (1932), did we remand a case for reopening of evidentiary proceedings; there the Commission’s refusal to reopen in light of the economic metamorphosis brought on by the Great Depression led the Court to find an abuse of discretion. The same exceptional circumstances that compelled that disposition, however, have been found lacking in more recent cases. See United States v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 288 U. S. 490 (1933); Illinois Commerce Comm’n v. United States, 292 U. S. 474 (1934); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38 (1936); ICC v. Jersey City, supra; United States v. Pierce Auto Lines, supra; Northern Lines Merger Cases, 396 U. S. 491 (1970). Illinois Commerce Comm’n v. United States, supra, is of particular relevance, for there the Court refused to compel the Interstate Commerce Commission to reopen for the inclusion of new economic studies a record already closed for a comparable period. We believe appellees failed to meet the heavy burden thrust upon them by our cases. The protracted character of the proceedings resulted, not from bureaucratic inertia, but from the number and complexity of the issues and from the agency procedures that extended to the parties, in an effort to insure fairness in appearance as well as reality, and an opportunity to comment upon the proceedings at every stage. More than 900 witnesses testified in the original hearings, which consumed 150 days. At the conclusion the parties submitted briefs requiring seven months to prepare. The examiners’ decision did not issue until nearly two years later. It is doubtful that the Commission could have made the record more current by judicial notice alone; while live testimony might not have been required, the Commission would at least have had to entertain evidence in affidavit form. Yet there would have been little assurance that at the conclusion of such a reopening, and the time required to digest the new material, the record would not again have become “stale.” Accordingly, we conclude that there is sound basis for adhering to our practice of declining to require reopening of the record, except in the most extraordinary circumstances. IV We conclude by addressing a concern voiced by the District Court, that the Commission’s decision “indicates a predilection to grant these particular applications, followed by a strained attempt to marshal findings to support such conclusion.” 364 F. Supp., at 1264. We disagree with the District Court insofar as its remarks charge the Commission with prejudging the issue and deciding without giving consideration to the evidence. But we think the approach adopted by the Commission does differ from that taken by the examiners in significant respects that are important to identify. The examiners viewed the evidence against a backdrop of assumptions about the relationship between consumer needs and carrier responsibilities. The examiners ruled, for example, that all shippers were not entitled to “single-line service” and that the shippers’ difficulties were attributable, in part, to lack of diligence. The examiners put it that “[n]ormally existing carriers should have an opportunity . .. . to transport all of the traffic they can handle adequately and efficiently in the territory they are authorized to serve without the competition of new operations.” And to the extent that service inadequacies were demonstrated, the examiners viewed complaints to force compliance with certificates held by existing carriers as a preferred mode of relief. The Commission’s approach, on the other hand, was more congenial to new entry and the resulting competition. This is the Commission’s prerogative in carrying out its mandate to insure “safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service,” National Transportation Policy, preceding 49 U. S. C. § 1. The Commission was not compelled to adopt the same approach as the examiners. It could conclude that the benefits of competitive service to consumers might outweigh the discomforts existing certificated carriers could feel as a result of new entry. Our decisions have dispelled any notion that the Commission’s primary obligation is the protection of firms holding existing certificates. ICC v. J-T Transport Co., supra, disapproved the proposition that shippers must take their grievances through complaint procedures before improvement through new entry is permitted. 368 U. S., at 91. And in United States v. Dixie Express, 389 U. S. 409 (1967), we rejected the suggestion by a reviewing court that existing carriers have “a property right” to an opportunity to make amends before new certificates issue. Id., at 411. A policy in favor of competition embodied in the laws has application in a variety of economic affairs. Even where Congress has chosen Government regulation as the primary device for protecting the public interest, a policy of facilitating competitive market structure and performance is entitled to consideration. McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U. S. 67 (1944); FMC v. Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U. S. 238 (1968); Gulf States Utilities Co. v. FPC, 411 U. S. 747 (1973); Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. United States, 387 U. S. 485 (1967). The Commission, of course, is entitled to conclude that preservation of a competitive structure in a given case is overridden by other interests, United States v. Drum, 368 U. S. 370, 374-375 (1962), but where, as here, the Commission concludes that competition “aids in the attainment of the objectives of the national transportation policy,” McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, supra, at 85-86, we have no basis for disturbing the Commission’s accommodation. y Our opinion disposes of appellees’ objections to the Commission’s order insofar as it granted the applications of Johnson and Red Ball. As to appellant Bowman, however, án issue remains. In granting Bowman a certificate the Commission noted that the authority sought by Bowman exceeded that set forth in Bowman’s application. The “excess” was granted, subject to a condition precedent of publication in the Federal Register of Bowman’s request for the excess authority. Various appel-lees filed, objections to the augmented authority sought by Bowman, which the Commission overruled. Appel-lees challenged the Commission’s procedure in the District Court on a variety of grounds, and though the District Court indicated disapproval of the Commission’s action, the court did not have to rule on the merits of appellees’ objections since it set aside the Commission’s approval of all the applications. While we have on occasion decided residual issues in the interest of an expeditious conclusion of protracted litigation, see Consolo v. FMC, 383 U. S. 607, 621 (1966), we believe that the issue of conformity of the Bowman certificate to its application is one for the District Court. The issue was not briefed or argued here, owing to the limitations set forth in our order noting probable jurisdiction. And while the District Court spoke of the Commission’s action in this regard, we do not construe its expressions as a final ruling, since they were unnecessary to the District Court’s disposition of the case. Accordingly, the issue remains open on remand. We hasten to add, however, that our remand provides no basis for depriving Bowman of authority conferred by the Commission that was within its original application. Reversed and remanded. The hearings lasted over 18 months; this transcript covers 23,423 pages; there are 1,989 exhibits; a total of 950 witnesses testified on behalf of 10 applicants; 66 rail and motor carriers entered appearances in opposition to the applications; 48 of the protestants offered evidence through 62 witnesses and numerous exhibits. “The substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight." 340 U. S., at 488. And see 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 29.03, p. 129 (1958); L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 601 (1965). The Commission stated: “Many of the service exhibits do not cover all of the shipper’s pertinent traffic during the study period and some include shipments which were listed because complaints were received on this traffic.” Herrin Transportation Co., 114 M. C. C. 571, 596 (1971). The District Court also ruled that since there had been no suggestion during the evidentiary hearings that performance studies subsequent to notice of hearing might not be viewed as representative, the appellees had been denied fair notice of the standards by which their evidence would be judged. 364 F. Supp. 1239, 1260. We disagree. A party is entitled, of course, to know the issues on which decision will turn and to be apprised of the factual material on which the agency relies for decision so that he may rebut it. Indeed, the Due Process Clause forbids an agency to use evidence in a way that forecloses an opportunity to offer a contrary presentation. Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 301 U. S. 292 (1937); United States v. Abilene & S. R. Co., 265 U. S. 274 (1924). But these salutary principles do not preclude a factfinder from observing strengths and weaknesses in the evidence that no party identified. If the examiners had raised the qualifications to appellees’ evidence the Commission later interposed, there would have been no basis for suggesting unfairness. See American Trucking Assns. v. Frisco Transportation Co., 358 U. S. 133, 144 (1958). The situation is not altered by the fact that the Commission parted company with the examiners. Even as to matters such as the credibility of witnesses, where the examiner is thought to have an advantage, the reviewing agency is not rigidly barred from taking a contrary position. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U. S. 474 (1951). We perceive no reason for binding an agency to the experience and viewpoint of the examiner in the interpretation of studies in the record. Ap-pellees are not in a position to claim unfair surprise. The Commission offered the identical rationale in interpreting transit-time studies in a case decided just as hearings in this case began. See Braswell Freight Lines, 100 M. C. C. 482, 493-494 (1966). Appellees offered their studies knowing that the Commission might interpose qualifications. We thus distinguish the case where a firm already in possession of a franchise that offers a high degree of protection from competítion seeks its renewal. Cf. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 123 U. S. App. D. C. 328, 341, 359 F. 2d 994, 1007 (1966) (“history of programming misconduct.. . would preclude .. . the required finding that renewal of the license would serve the public interest”). Fairness as well as rationality, however, command evenhanded application of such a rule. The Commission should not have cited applicants’ “performance elsewhere” presentations without noting appropriate qualifications. Compare 114 M. C. C., at 586, with id., at 611. Yet in view of the examiners’ undisputed conclusion that all the carriers were “substantial and responsible,” there was adequate remaining basis for the Commission’s finding of the applicants’ fitness. And the service benefits the Commission anticipated from new entry included, not merely a possibility of improved transit times, but many other improvements in service quality. The Commission .identified as service deficiencies that would be removed by new entry the following: “restrictions or embargoes [or] outright refusals by existing carriers to handle . . . traffic”; “pickup and delivery problems; interline difficulties relating to loss, damage, tracing, shortages, and misrouting . ...” Id., at 600. Each carrier presented the possible diversion of traffic that would result if the applications it was opposing were granted. In many cases, the protesting carrier was opposing applications not ultimately granted by the Commission. See, e. g., Examiners’ Decision, App. D, a.t 6, 13, 14, 19, 24, 25, 34, 35, and 48 (reproduced in 2 App. 864, 1191). The same must be said of the examiners’ concern that service to 'small communities might be adversely affected by granting all the applications, since these fears derived from those about impact upon protesting carriers. Much is made, for example, of the Commission’s failure to notice a number of terminal closings by appellant Red Ball that had occurred since evidentiary proceedings had concluded. 364 F. Supp., at 1261. The Commission, however, cited the number of Red Ball terminals — reduced by intervening events — only in support of its conclusion that Red Ball, rather than three other carriers, should be certificated to offer new service. 114 M. C. C., at 603. Since these three carriers are not among appellees, we have doubt that appellees can show substantial prejudice from the Commission’s failure to update the information. In commenting upon the perceived lack of diligence by the shippers in seeking out service, the examiners rejected the notion that “the burden is upon carriers to inform shippers of their services through personal, solicitation.” The Commission, however, would have been free to conclude that greater promotional effort by carriers, brought about through competition, might most economically facilitate the matching of services to needs. At oral argument counsel for appellees disposed of any “substantial evidence” objections to the Commission’s order by conceding that “we did not allege that any finding of faet itself was not supported by substantial evidence.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 25.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed. The information relevant to this variable may be found near the end of the summary that begins on the title page of each case, or preferably at the very end of the opinion of the Court. For cases in which the Court granted a motion to dismiss, consider "petition denied or appeal dismissed". There is "no disposition" if the Court denied a motion to dismiss.
What is the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed?
[ "stay, petition, or motion granted", "affirmed (includes modified)", "reversed", "reversed and remanded", "vacated and remanded", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded", "vacated", "petition denied or appeal dismissed", "certification to or from a lower court", "no disposition" ]
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NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. J. H. RUTTER-REX MANUFACTURING CO., INC., et al. No. 32. Argued October 22, 1969 Decided December 15, 1969 Arnold Ordman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Peter L. Strauss, Dominick L. Manoli, Norton J. Gome, and Allison W. Brown, Jr. Henry J. Read argued the cause for respondent J. H. Rutter-Rex Manufacturing Co., Inc. With him on the briefs were Peter H. Beer and Daniel Lund. Jacob Sheinkman, Ralph N. Jackson, and James J. Graham filed a brief for respondent Amalgamated Clothing Workers’ of America, AFL-CIO. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether, when an employer has improperly failed to reinstate striking employees, and the National Labor Relations Board has after considerable delay ordered back pay for those employees, a court of appeals may, on account of the delay, modify the Board’s order to provide an early cutoff date for back pay. In the circumstances of this case, we hold such a modification to be an unwarranted interference with the Board’s remedial power to implement the policies of the National Labor Relations Act. I The employees in question chose the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, as their bargaining representative in January 1954. After three bargaining' sessions between the union and the company, the employees went out on strike in April 1954. At that point and thereafter the company refused to bargain further with the union representatives. Charges of unfair labor practices, including a refusal to bargain in good faith, were filed against the company. In April 1955, while these charges were pending, the union terminated the strike and applied for the reinstatement of many of the strikers. The company reinstated some of these employees and failed to reinstate others. In February 1956 the Board found that the company had indeed been guilty of an unlawful refusal to bargain. It ordered the company to offer reinstatement to all strikers who applied, and to “make such applicants whole for any loss of pay suffered by reason of the ... refusal, if any, to reinstate them.” J. H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 115 N. L. R. B. 388, 391 (1956). As is apparently the Board’s practice in reinstatement cases involving strikers, the order did not name the individuals covered, but left disputes over the details of reinstatement and back pay to the compliance stage of the proceedings. The Court of Appeals enforced the Board’s order, NLRB v. J. H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 245 F. 2d 594 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1957), and entered its decree on August 19, 1957. On August 21, 1957, the Board’s regional office sent the company the standard letter describing compliance procedures, which included the following: “When you have fully complied with the affirmative terms of the Decree and there are no violations of its negative provisions, you will be notified that the case has been closed. Until you receive such notice you will know that the case still remains open for all purposes as awaiting compliance.” On November 7, 1957, the company wrote to the regional office stating that it had complied with “some of the provisions of the decree,” and asking that the regional office bring “any instance of a failure to fully comply with the order” to the company’s attention. The regional office did not answer this letter, and the company heard nothing until March 22, 1960, when a Board compliance officer notified the company that the case had been assigned to him, and requested payroll and other records necessary to determine the employment and back-pay rights of employees. On November 16, 1961, the regional office filed a 428-page back-pay specification, alleging that the company owed more than $342,000 to some 207 strikers who had either not been reinstated within five days after applying, or who had never been reinstated, in violation of the Board and court orders. The company applied to the Court of Appeals for a permanent stay of further action in the back-pay proceedings, alleging that the Board had delayed improperly in issuing the specification. By affidavit, the Board explained that the delay was caused in part by the great complexity of the task of processing the claims of approximately 600 strikers, and in part by the extremely heavy caseload and severe limitations in staff that the New Orleans regional office experienced during the late 1950’s. The Court of Appeals noted that the delay was regrettable, but denied the requested stay. NLRB v. J. H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 305 F. 2d 242 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1962). After a lengthy hearing, a Trial Examiner denied back pay to 35 of the 207 claimants, and reduced the amount due to just over $160,000. He determined that each employee should receive net back pay, computed according to the Board’s usual formula, for the period running from five days after his application for reinstatement until the company made a complying offer. Where no offer was made, the back pay was to accrue through the last quarter of 1961, the quarter in which the specification was filed. His findings and recommendations were adopted with minor modifications by the Board on June 6, 1966. J. H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 168 N. L. R. B. 1414 (1966). Both the Examiner and the Board considered and rejected the company’s contention that the delay in issuing the specification should bar the back-pay award, either in whole or in part. On review, the Court of Appeals found that the Board had been guilty of “inordinate” delay, in violation of § 6 (a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 240, 5 U. S. C. § 1005 (a), now 5 U. S. C. § 555 (b) (1964 ed., Supp. IV), and to the prejudice of the company, which had been “lulled into the belief that the Board was satisfied and that no further action was to be expected.” J. H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 399 F. 2d 356, 363 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1968). Arguing that the purpose of back-pay awards is to “deter unfair labor practices,” id., at 364, and believing that a substantial award of back pay would be sufficient to achieve such deterrent effect, the court modified the Board order to eliminate all back pay accruing after July 1, 1959, thus reducing the awards of some 37 strikers who had not yet received complying offers of reinstatement by that date. We granted certiorari to consider the propriety of this modification, 393 U. S. 1116 (1969), and we reverse the judgment below. II We start with the broad command of § 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 147, 29 U. S. C. § 160 (c), that upon finding that an unfair labor practice has been committed, the Board shall order the violator “to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies” of the Act. This Court has stated that the remedial power of the Board is “a broad discretionary one, subject to limited judicial review.” Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U. S. 203, 216 (1964). The legitimacy of back pay as a remedy for unlawful discharge or unlawful failure to reinstate is beyond dispute, Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U. S. 270, 278 (1956), and the purpose of the remedy is clear. “A back pay order is a reparation order designed to vindicate the public policy of the statute by making the employees whole for losses suffered on account of an unfair labor practice.” Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U. S. 25, 27 (1952). As with the Board’s other remedies, the power to order back pay “is for the Board to wield, not for the courts.” NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U. S. 344, 346 (1953). “When the Board, ‘in the exercise of its informed discretion,’ makes an order of restoration by way of back pay, the order ‘should stand unless it can be shown that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act.’ ” Id., at 346-347. Here the Board ordered back pay through December 1961 for employees who had not yet received complying offers of reinstatement by that date. That order clearly falls within the general purpose of making the employees whole, and thus restoring the economic status quo that would have obtained but for the company’s wrongful refusal to reinstate them. The employees encompassed by the order earned less during the relevant quarterly periods than they would have, had they been reinstated in their old or substantially equivalent jobs with the company. Thus the Court of Appeals’ modification, cutting off the accrual of back pay at the arbitrary date of July 1, 1959, left the employees who had not been reinstated by that date worse off than they would have been but for the company’s wrongful action in refusing reinstatement. Either the company or the employees had to bear the cost of the Board’s delay. The Board placed that cost upon the company, which had wrongfully failed to reinstate the employees. In an effort to discipline the Board for its delay, the court shifted part of that cost from the wrongdoing company to the innocent employees. The Court of Appeals justified the modification as a proper balancing of the interests of the company, which it found was prejudiced in litigating the back-pay claims by the Board’s delay, and the interests of the employees in full restitution. It found statutory support for the company’s position in what it took to be the Board’s violation of its duty under the Administrative Procedure Act to “proceed with reasonable dispatch to conclude any matter presented to it.” 5 U. S. C. § 1005 (a). Thus, the Court of Appeals reasoned, the case fell within the admonition that reviewing courts in labor cases not “rubber-stamp their affirmance of administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute.” NLRB v. Brown, 380 U. S. 278, 291 (1965). Assuming without deciding that the delay in issuing the specification did violate the Board’s duty of prompt action under the Administrative Procedure Act, it does not follow that enforcement of the full back-pay remedy was an abuse of the Board’s discretion. Wronged employees are at least as much injured by the Board’s delay in collecting their back pay as is the wrongdoing employer. In view of “the economic hardship caused by many years of undeservedly substandard earnings,” lengthy delays “must render the back pay award a wholly inadequate and unsatisfactory remedy” to the employees for the company’s refusal to reinstate them. NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 E. 2d 170, 180 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1965). This Court has held before that the Board is not required to place the consequences of its own delay, even if inordinate, upon wronged employees to the benefit of wrongdoing employers. NLRB v. Electric Cleaner Co., 315 U. S. 685, 698 (1942); Labor Board v. Katz, 369 U. S. 736, 748 n. 16 (1962). The Court of Appeals reasoned further that the purpose of the back-pay remedy is deterrence of unfair labor practices, and that the substantial back-pay award that it enforced would sufficiently serve that deterrent purpose. But the Board could properly conclude that back pay is not only punishment for an unfair labor practice, but is also a remedy designed to restore, so far as possible, the status quo that would have obtained but for the wrongful act. Cf. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 194 (1941). Finally, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the company was “lulled into the belief that the Board was satisfied and that no further action was to be expected.” 399 F. 2d, at 363. We need not decide whether this sort of estoppel argument would justify a court in reducing a back-pay award, for no estoppel appears in this case. The Board clearly informed the company that this case would remain open as awaiting compliance until the company received a notice that the case was closed. No such closing notice was ever given. As the Court of Appeals itself stated, the company’s subsequent letter asking that violations of the order be called to its attention “could not shift or avoid its duty of compliance.” Ibid. We do not mean that delay in the administrative process is other than deplorable. It is deplorable if, as the Court of Appeals thought, the company was hampered in the presentation of its defenses to the back-pay specification by the delay. It is even more deplorable if, as seems clear, innocent employees had to live for some years on reduced incomes as a combined result of the delay and the company’s illegal failure to reinstate them. It may be that the company could have, through the courts, compelled earlier Board action. But the Court of Appeals exceeded the narrow scope of review provided for the Board’s remedial orders when it shifted the cost of the delay from the company to the employees in this case. Reversed. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U. S. 344, 345 (1953). The Court of Appeals also reversed back-pay awards as to 10 strikers in their entirety, finding the awards not supported by substantial evidence. 399 F. 2d, at 365. Certiorari was not sought as to this modification of the Board’s order. Section 10 (e) (A) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 1009 (e) (A), now 5 II. S. C. § 706 (1) (1964 ed., Supp. IV), provides that courts shall “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them. Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer. Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.
Who is the respondent of the case?
[ "attorney general of the United States, or his office", "specified state board or department of education", "city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit", "state commission, board, committee, or authority", "county government or county governmental unit, except school district", "court or judicial district", "state department or agency", "governmental employee or job applicant", "female governmental employee or job applicant", "minority governmental employee or job applicant", "minority female governmental employee or job applicant", "not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable", "retired or former governmental employee", "U.S. House of Representatives", "interstate compact", "judge", "state legislature, house, or committee", "local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough", "governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact", "state or U.S. supreme court", "local school district or board of education", "U.S. Senate", "U.S. senator", "foreign nation or instrumentality", "state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of", "state college or university", "United States", "State", "person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime", "advertising business or agency", "agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor", "airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes", "airline", "distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages", "alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked", "American Medical Association", "National Railroad Passenger Corp.", "amusement establishment, or recreational facility", "arrested person, or pretrial detainee", "attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association", "author, copyright holder", "bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company", "bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization", "establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store", "water transportation, stevedore", "bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines", "brewery, distillery", "broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm", "construction industry", "bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle", "business, corporation", "buyer, purchaser", "cable TV", "car dealer", "person convicted of crime", "tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband", "chemical company", "child, children, including adopted or illegitimate", "religious organization, institution, or person", "private club or facility", "coal company or coal mine operator", "computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software", "consumer, consumer organization", "creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company", "person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial", "defendant", "debtor", "real estate developer", "disabled person or disability benefit claimant", "distributor", "person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector", "drug manufacturer", "druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy", "employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of", "employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan", "electric equipment manufacturer", "electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company", "eleemosynary institution or person", "environmental organization", "employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.", "farmer, farm worker, or farm organization", "father", "female employee or job applicant", "female", "movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of", "fisherman or fishing company", "food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard", "foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity", "franchiser", "franchisee", "lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization", "person who guarantees another's obligations", "handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to", "health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor", "heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be", "hospital, medical center", "husband, or ex-husband", "involuntarily committed mental patient", "Indian, including Indian tribe or nation", "insurance company, or surety", "inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder", "investor", "injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related", "juvenile", "government contractor", "holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor", "magazine", "male", "medical or Medicaid claimant", "medical supply or manufacturing co.", "racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant", "minority female employee or job applicant", "manufacturer", "management, executive officer, or director, of business entity", "military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist", "mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company", "mother", "auto manufacturer", "newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service", "radio and television network, except cable tv", "nonprofit organization or business", "nonresident", "nuclear power plant or facility", "owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels", "shareholders to whom a tender offer is made", "tender offer", "oil company, or natural gas producer", "elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly", "out of state noncriminal defendant", "political action committee", "parent or parents", "parking lot or service", "patient of a health professional", "telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company", "physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society", "public interest organization", "physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee", "pipe line company", "package, luggage, container", "political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official", "indigent, needy, welfare recipient", "indigent defendant", "private person", "prisoner, inmate of penal institution", "professional organization, business, or person", "probationer, or parolee", "protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer", "public utility", "publisher, publishing company", "radio station", "racial or ethnic minority", "person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination", "racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "realtor", "journalist, columnist, member of the news media", "resident", "restaurant, food vendor", "retarded person, or mental incompetent", "retired or former employee", "railroad", "private school, college, or university", "seller or vendor", "shipper, including importer and exporter", "shopping center, mall", "spouse, or former spouse", "stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder", "retail business or outlet", "student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only", "tenant or lessee", "theater, studio", "forest products, lumber, or logging company", "person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent", "trucking company, or motor carrier", "television station", "union member", "unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant", "union, labor organization, or official of", "veteran", "voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)", "wholesale trade", "wife, or ex-wife", "witness, or person under subpoena", "network", "slave", "slave-owner", "bank of the united states", "timber company", "u.s. job applicants or employees", "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "General Land Office of Commissioners", "Transportation Security Administration", "Surface Transportation Board", "U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.", "Reconstruction Finance Corp.", "Department or Secretary of Homeland Security", "Unidentifiable", "International Entity" ]
[ 79 ]
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ALLEGHANY CORPORATION et al. v. BRESWICK & CO. et al. NO. 36. Argued January 23-24, 1957. Decided April 22, 1957. Whitney North Seymour argued the cause for the Al-leghany Corporation, appellant in No. 36. With him on the brief were David Hartfield, Jr., Edward K. Wheeler, Robert G. Seaks and Morton Moskin. Harold H. Levin argued the cause for Gruss et al., appellants in No. 36. With him on the brief were Joseph M. Proskauer and Allen L. Feinstein. Alexander Kahan argued the cause for Neuwirth, appellant in No. 36. With him on the brief was Arthur W. Lichtenstein. Robert W. Oinnane argued the cause for the Interstate Commerce Commission, appellant in No. 114. With him on the brief was B. Franklin Taylor, Jr. George Brussel, Jr. argued the cause for Breswick & Co. et al., appellees. Randolph Phillips, appellee, argued the cause pro se. They filed a brief in Nos. 36 and 114. Edward M. Garlock filed a Statement in Opposition to Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss for Baker, Weeks & Co. et al., appellants in No. 82. Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Hansen and Daniel M. Friedman filed a brief for the United States. Thomas G. Meeker, Joseph B. Levin and Aaron Levy filed a brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission, as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the Court. These are direct appeals under 28 U. S. C. § 1253 from a final judgment of a three-judge District Court for the Southern District of New York setting aside orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission and restraining appellant Alleghany Corporation from issuing a new class of preferred stock that had been approved by the Commission. The case raises numerous questions regarding the jurisdiction and powers of the Commission, especially under § 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, for the understanding of which a rather detailed statement of the facts is necessary. Section 5 (2)(a), in its pertinent portions, provides: “It shall be lawful, with the approval and authorization of the Commission ... (i) ... for a person which is not a carrier to acquire control of two or more carriers through ownership of their stock or otherwise; or for a person which is not a carrier and which has control of one or more carriers to acquire control of another carrier through ownership of its stock or otherwise . . . 54 Stat. 899, 905, 49 U. S. C. § 5 (2) (a). Appellant Alleghany Corporation is a Maryland corporation whose charter provides for extensive powers of investment under no express limitation. After the passage of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-l et seq., Alleghany registered as an investment company with the Securities and Exchange Commission. In 1944, in connection with an application by the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad for approval by the Interstate Commerce Commission of acquisition of the property of the Norfolk Terminal & Transportation Company, Alleghany, alleging that it controlled the Chesapeake & Ohio, filed a supplementary application with the Commission joining the Chesapeake & Ohio’s application and seeking approval of its own acquisition of control of the Terminal Company through the action of the Chesapeake & Ohio. In 1945, the Commission approved “acquisition of control” of the Terminal Company by the Chesapeake & Ohio and Alleghany as a transaction within § 5 (2) and further found that Alleghany “shall be considered as a carrier subject to the [reporting and securities] provisions of section 20 (1) to (10) and section 20a (2) to (11) of the act.” 261 I. C. C. 239, 262. Shortly thereafter, under the provisions of § 3 (c)(9) of the Investment Company Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission held that Alleghany was no longer an investment company within the meaning of the Investment Company Act. 20 S. E. C. 731. In March, April, and May 1954, several petitions and complaints were filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission by the New York Central Railroad, a stockholder, a protective committee, and bondholder creditors of the Central, asserting violations of the law in Alleghany’s purchases of New York Central stock. In view of statements by Alleghany and Chesapeake & Ohio officials that Alleghany had disposed of its holdings of Chesapeake stock, that Commission, in June, ordered Alleghany to show cause why the 1945 order providing that Alleghany should be “considered as a carrier” should not be set aside. Alleghany replied that it would accept an order terminating its control of the Chesapeake & Ohio but requested delay until it could file a new application which, it alleged, would require the Commission’s approval and continuance of its status as a non-carrier to be “considered as a carrier” under the Interstate Commerce Act. The present proceedings were commenced by the filing of such an application by Alleghany and Central — after the ousting of the old Central management in May in a proxy fight. The contents of the application were described fully in the Report of Division 4 of the Commission: “The Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Company [the Big Four], the Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge and Railroad Company [the Bridge Company or the Jeffersonville], The New York Central Railroad Company, and the Alleghany Corporation ... on September 20, 1954, jointly applied under section 5 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act ... for approval and authorization of (1) (a) merger of the properties and franchises of the Jeffersonville into the Big Four for ownership, management, and operation; and (b) modification of the lease of January 2, 1930, under which Central, as lessee, operates the property of Big Four, lessor, to give effect to the acquisition of additional property pursuant to the proposed merger of Jefferson-ville into Big Four; (2) acquisition by Central and Alleghany, by virtue of their control of Big Four, of control of the properties of Jeffersonville; and (3) continuation of Alleghany’s status as a carrier subject to the provisions of section 20 (1) to (10), inclusive, and 20a (2) to (11), inclusive, of the act, as provided by section 5 (3) - thereof.” 290 I. C. C. 725-726. The Big Four already owned all the capital stock of the Jeffersonville. The Big Four itself had ceased to be an operating carrier in 1930; since then the New York Central has operated it as lessee. In addition, the New York Central owns 98.98% of the common, and 86.45% of the preferred, stock of the Big Four. On March 2, 1955, Division 4 of the Commission approved and authorized the merger of the Jeffersonville into the Big Four; approved continued control of the properties and franchises of the Jeffersonville by the Central and Alleghany; modified the lease between the Big Four and the Central; continued Alleghany as a non-carrier to be “considered as a carrier” subject to the reporting and securities provisions of the Act; and terminated the effective portions of the 1945 order in the Chesapeake & Ohio proceeding. 290 I. C. C. 725. On reconsideration, the whole Commission on May 24, 1955, affirmed the conclusions of Division 4. It held that Alleghany had acquired control over Central; that at the time the present application was filed, Alleghany was in fact “a person not a carrier which controlled an established system”; that the acquisition of control over the Central was not within § 5 (2)’s requirement of Commission approval; that the rearrangement by Central of its ownership or control of its subsidiaries was within § 5 (2)’s requirement of approval by the Commission and that Alleghany as the controlling party was a necessary party; and that the terms and conditions of the transactions were fair and reasonable. Rejecting the suggestion of the Securities and Exchange Commission, which had intervened, the whole Commission also held that it had no discretion to yield jurisdiction over Alleghany to the former agency. 295 I. C. C. 11. Subsequent to their application with respect to the Jeffersonville, Alleghany and Central, on December 17, 1954, filed an application under § 5 (2) to “acquire control” of the Boston & Albany Railroad Company, the Pittsfield and North Adams Railroad Corporation, and the Ware River Railroad Company thrpugh purchase by Central of their capital stock. The Central owned a little more than 16% of the Pittsfield’s capital stock and none of the capital stock of the other two railroads. It operated the properties of the Boston & Albany, the Pitts-field, and the Ware River under leases due to expire in 1999, 1975, and 2873 respectively. On March 22, 1955, less than three weeks after it had approved the application in the Jeffersonville proceeding, Division 4 of the Commission approved the acquisition of such control by Alleghany and Central. (Opinion not reported.) A third application filed by Alleghany, on February 18, 1955, sought permission from the Commission to issue a new 6% convertible preferred stock pursuant to a charter amendment, approved by all classes of Alleghany’s stockholders, that permitted consummation of Alleghany’s proposed plan of allowing its outstanding cumulative 5%% preferred stock to be exchanged for the new stock. On May 26, 1955, two days after the whole Commission affirmed Division 4’s orders in the Jeffersonville proceeding, Division 4 approved the new stock issue (conditioning its approval on modification of one term), and on June 22, the full Commission denied reconsideration. An action was then brought before a three-judge District Court by minority common stockholders of Alle-ghany to require the Commission to set aside its order granting Alleghany the status of a non-carrier to be “considered as a carrier” and its subsequent order approving the new class of preferred stock and to restrain Alleghany from issuing the new preferred stock. The three-judge District Court, convened under the Urgent Deficiencies Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1336, 1337, 2321-2325, granted first a preliminary injunction, 134 F. Supp. 132 (Circuit Judge Hincks, dissenting), and then a permanent injunction setting aside the Commission’s order designating Alle-ghany as a “carrier” and also its order approving Alleghany’s new class of preferred stock, restraining its issue. 138 F. Supp. 123. Alleghany moved for a new trial based on the “acquisition of control” involved in the Boston & Albany proceeding. The District Court held that the Commission’s order in that proceeding gave no validity to the orders in the Jeffersonville proceeding because of the Commission’s failure to provide specifically in its Boston & Albany order that Alleghany should be “considered as a carrier.” 138 F. Supp., at 138. On appeal here from the final judgment below, we noted probable jurisdiction. 351 U. S. 903, 352 U. S.- 816. Alleghany urges initially that the Commission’s orders dealing with its status under the Interstate Commerce Act and dealing with its new preferred stock were not reviewable at the suit of appellees, that appellees had no standing. We find that appellees do have standing to challenge these orders. This is not a case where “the order under attack does not deal with the interests of investors,” or where the “injury feared is the indirect harm which may result to every stockholder from harm to the corporation.” Pittsburgh & W. Va. R. Co. v. United States, 281 U. S. 479, 487. The appellees are common stockholders of Alleghany. The new preferred stock issue approved by the Commission is convertible, and under relevant notions of standing, the threatened “dilution” of the equity of the common stockholders provided sufficient financial interest to give them standing. See American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 325 U. S. 385, 388-389. Having acquired standing to institute proceedings in the District Court by virtue of the threatened financial injury, appellees could also attack the order of the Commission conferring on Alleghany the status of a person not a carrier but to be “considered as a carrier.” The status order was a source of the threatened financial injury. If the Commission acted out of bounds in decreeing its status order, it had no power to approve the new preferred stock issue and the plaintiffs would be entitled to relief. This brings us to the substantive issues in the litigation. In the main, these involve the jurisdiction of the Commission under §§ 5 (2) and 5 (3) of the Act, defining its powers. The validity of the status order under § 5 (3) turns on compliance with the statutory requirement of § 5 (2) of Commission approval “for a person which is not a carrier and which has control of one or more carriers to acquire control of another carrier through ownership of its stock or otherwise . . . .” Appellants Alleghany and the Commission contend that the Jeffersonville and the Boston & Albany transactions both support the Commission’s assertion of jurisdiction. The District Court disagreed with respect to the former and, as we have seen, p. 159, supra, found it unnecessary to pass on the latter. Whether the Jeffersonville transaction met the statutory requirement of § 5 (2) raises three questions. (1) Was Commission approval of Alleghany’s acquisition of control over Central required? (2) Did Alleghany in fact control Central? (3) Did the Jeffersonville transaction involve an acquisition of control by Alleghany over the properties of the Jeffersonville? The District Court held that whatever control Alle-ghany had over Central did not fit within the statutory requirement of “a person which is not a carrier and which has control of one or more carriers” because the Commission had not given the approval necessary for acquisition of control of Central and its subsidiaries, “two or more carriers.” The Commission and Alleghany contend that Commission approval of the acquisition of a single, integrated system is not necessary. We need not decide this question, however, and intimate no opinion on it, for even if such approval is necessary, the statutory requirement of “a person which is not a carrier and which has control of one or more carriers” refers to “control” and not to “approved control.” There seems to be no reason to read in the word “approved.” Such a holding would mean that the failure of a company engaging in a transaction requiring Commission approval to apply for that approval would deprive the Commission of jurisdiction. Remedies against a violator are provided by §5 (7), (8), and (9) of the Act. To punish a violator by depriving the Commission of jurisdiction over it would be indeed quixotic. As the Commission points out, the problem would appear clearer were Alleghany contesting, rather than acquiescing in, its jurisdiction. Control in fact then is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of § 5 (2). Division 4 of the Commission reported the following: “The capital stock of Central is widely held by the public, but control of its functions reposes in Alle-ghany and its officers as a result of a proxy contest preceding a stockholders’ meeting of May 26, 1954, at which the nominees chosen by Alleghany were elected as Central’s board of directors. Alleghany has an undivided half interest in 600,000 shares of Central stock with voting rights to the 600,000 shares under joint-ven ture agreements, and in addition, owns 15,500 shares. The voting rights of Alle-ghany represent almost 10 percent of the total shares of Central stock outstanding. The chairman of the board of directors of Alleghany, who holds the same position with Central, beneficially owns 100,200 shares of the latter’s stock. The president of Alle-ghany is a director of Central, and beneficially owns 300,100 shares of the latter’s stock. A vice president of Alleghany holds a similar position with Central.” 290 I. C. C., at 727. Division 4 recognized that “the present control of the Central system has passed to Alleghany by regular corporate procedures . . . .” Id., at 741. The full Commission reached this conclusion: “The contention that Alleghany does not control the individual directors on Central's board ignores the realities of the situation. Alleghany and its allied interests have succeeded in electing sufficient members of the board to permit them to organize and elect their own officers. Clearly the tenure in office of such directors who permitted this action depends upon their conformance to the views of the stockholders who elected them. In our opinion the power thus reposing in Alleghany constitutes control of Central.” 295 I. C. C. 11, 16. The District Court, however, held that “if the Commission’s opinions contain a conclusion that Alleghany is in control of New York Central, those opinions lack sufficient findings to support that conclusion.” 134 F. Supp., at 147. It noted that the order of Division 4 “discloses the fact that Alleghany’s beneficial holdings of the Central stock are less than the combined individual holdings of Kirby, Young, Richardson and the Murchison group,” and concluded that “the findings do no more than say that Alleghany, with someone else, controls New York Central. They do not even say whether the someone else, alone, has control.” Ibid. We think that the District Court took too restricted a view of what constitutes “control.” In 1939, in Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, 145-146, arising under the Federal Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1064, 1065, 47 U. S. C. § 152 (b), this Court rejected artificial tests for “control,” and left its determination in a particular case as a practical concept to the agency charged with enforcement. This was the broad scope designed for "control” as employed by Congress in the Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 899-900, 49 U. S. C. § 1 (3)(b). See United States v. Marshall Transport Co., 322 U. S. 31, 38. That Act also added § 1 (3) (b) to the Interstate Commerce Act, providing: “For the purposes of [section] 5 ... of this Act, where reference is made to control (in referring to a relationship between any person or persons and another person or persons), such reference shall be construed to include actual as well as legal control, whether maintained or exercised through or by reason of the method of or circumstances surrounding organization or operation, through or by common directors, officers, or stockholders, a voting trust or trusts, a holding or investment company or companies, or through or by any other direct or indirect means; and to include the power to exercise control.” 54 Stat. 899-900, 49 U. S. C. § 1 (3) (b). Section 1 (3)(a) provides: “The term ‘person’ as used in this part includes an individual, firm, copartnership, corporation, company, association, or joint-stock association; and includes a trustee, receiver, assignee, or personal representative thereof.” 54 Stat. 899, 49 U. S. C. §1(3) (a). The Commission’s findings, setting forth the events surrounding the proxy fight for control of Central, the common directors in both, the stockholdings of Alleghany’s officers and stockholders in Central, and the sworn statement of Central in the Central-Alleghany application that Central is controlled by Alleghany amply support its conclusion that “control” of Central was in Alleghany. See footnote 7, supra. The question remains whether the second portion of the statutory requirement of Commission approval “for a person which is not a carrier and which has control of one or more carriers to acquire control of another carrier through ownership of its stock or otherwise ...” has been met. What constitutes an acquisition of control? The District Court gave this restricted interpretation: “A merger of carriers may involve an acquisition of control by a non-carrier, where, through the merger, the non-carrier acquires control (direct or indirect) of a carrier or carrier property which the non-carrier had previously not controlled; United States v. Marshall Transport Co., 322 U. S. 31 . . . . But where, as in the instant case, the non-carrier (Alleghany) is (according to our assumption, argu-endo) already in indirect control of a carrier (Bridge Company), and the merger still leaves the non-carrier in indirect control of such property, no acquisition by the non-carrier results from the merger. . . .” 138 F. Supp., at 127-128. We think that this is too narrow a reading of the statute. Not labels but the nature of the changed relation is crucial in determining whether a rearrangement within a railroad system constitutes an “acquisition of control” under §5(2). The Court has already considered twice what constitutes an “acquisition of control” under the Interstate Commerce Act. In New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U. S. 12, the Court interpreted § 5 (2) as it read in the Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 456, 481: “Whenever the Commission is of opinion . . . that the acquisition, to the extent indicated by the Commission, by one of such carriers of the control of any other such carrier or carriers either under a lease or by the purchase of stock or in any other manner not involving the consolidation of such carriers into a single system for ownership and operation, will be in the public interest, the Commission shall have authority by order to approve and authorize such acquisition, under such rules and regulations and for such consideration and on such terms and conditions as shall be found by the Commission to be just and reasonable in the premises.” In that ease the order of the Commission permitting the New York Central Railroad to acquire control, by lease, of the railroad systems of the Big Four and the Michigan Central Railroad Companies, was under review. Minority stockholders contended, inter alia, that the Commission could not authorize “acquisition of control” by lease since the Central had already acquired control of both railroads by stock ownership. The Court held that the “disjunctive phrasing of the statute ‘either under a lease or by the purchase of stock’ must be read in the light of its obvious purpose and cannot be taken to mean that one method must be exclusive of the other.” 287 U. S., at 23. Nowhere did it intimate that the lease was not an “acquisition of control,” even though the Central already had stock ownership control of both railroads. In fact, the refusal to set aside the Commission’s order necessarily involved approval of the Commission’s finding of an “acquisition of control,” and the Court further stated: “The public interest is served by economy and efficiency in operation. If the expected advantages are inadequately secured by stock ownership and would be better secured by lease, the statute affords no basis for the contention that the latter may not be authorized although the former exists. The fact that one precedes the other cannot be regarded as determinative if the desired coordination is not otherwise obtainable.” Ibid. The Transportation Acts of 1933, 48 Stat. 211, and 1940, 54 Stat. 898, rewrote § 5 but retained the “acquisition of control” language, except that the phrase relating to method of acquisition — “under a lease or by the purchase of stock or in any other manner not involving the consolidation of such carriers into a single system”— became, for acquisitions by both carriers and non-carriers, an all-inclusive phrase in the 1940 Act — “through ownership of their stock or otherwise.” These changes do not lessen the authority of the New York Central Securities case in the scope to be given to an “acquisition of control.” In United States v. Marshall Transport Co., 322 U. S. 31, the Court interpreted § 5, as amended by the 1940 Act, 54 Stat. 899, 905, 49 U. S. C. § 5. The Court held that the non-carrier parent (Union) of a carrier (Refiners) that proposed to purchase the property and franchises of another carrier (Marshall) “acquired control” of the property and franchises of the vendor and was therefore subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction. The substantive issues in that case were of course different from those of the present case, since there had been no prior relation between the non-carrier parent and the vendor-carrier. In reaching its decision, however, the Court was explicit regarding the purpose of § 5: “It is not doubted that if Union, having control of Refiners, sought to acquire stock control of Marshall, Union would be required by § 5 (2) (b) to apply for the Commission’s authority to do so. But it is said that having control of Refiners, Union may, by procuring Refiners’ compliance with the purchase provisions of the statute alone, extend its control indefinitely to other carriers merely by directing the purchase of their property and business by Refiners, without subjecting itself to the jurisdiction of the Commission as provided in § 5 (3), so long as Union does not act directly as the purchaser of the property or of a controlling stock interest in such other carriers. “We think that neither the language nor the legislative history of the statute admits of so narrow a construction. Section 5 (4) makes it unlawful, without the approval of the Commission as provided by § 5 (2) (a), for a person which is not a carrier and which has control of one or more carriers to acquire control of another carrier through ownership of its stock or otherwise. Not only is- this language broad enough in terms to embrace the acquisition of control by a non-carrier through the purchase, by a controlled carrier, of the property and business of another carrier, but the legislative history indicates that such was its purpose.” Id., at 36-37. See also id., at 37-40. In other words, a non-carrier may not gain “control” over carriers free of Commission regulation merely by operating through subsidiaries. The crux of each inquiry to determine whether there has been an “acquisition of control” is the nature of the change in relations between the companies whose proposed transaction is before the Commission for approval. Does the transaction accomplish a significant increase in the power of one over the other, for example, an increased voice in management or operation, or the ability to accomplish financial transactions or operational changes with greater legal ease? This is the issue, and not the immediacy or remoteness of the parent from the proposed transaction, for, as we said in the Marshall Transport case, the parent can always, by operating through subsidiaries, make itself more remote. In deciding this type of issue, of course, the finding of the Commission that a given transaction does or does not constitute a significant increase in the power of one company over another is not to be overruled so long as “there is warrant in the record for the judgment of the expert body . . . .” Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, 146. The principal issue, therefore, in the Jeffersonville proceeding is not Alleghany’s remoteness from, or closeness to, the proposed transaction but rather the nature of the proposed transaction itself. The Big Four, whose stock was largely owned by Central, owned all the stock of the Jeffersonville. (By agreement between the Big Four and the Central, this stock was held by the Central.) The proposal was to merge the Jeffersonville into the Big Four. While the immediate practical effects of the merger on the operation of the Jeffersonville might be small, even minimal, a merger is the ultimate in one company obtaining control over another. So long as the Jeffersonville existed as a separate company, there was always the possibility that the Big Four, through the Central, might sell, or be forced to divest itself of, the Jeffersonville stock, and that the control of the Jeffersonville might thus pass to another railroad. In considering this possibility, it is important to note that the Jeffersonville does not connect physically with the Big Four but connects with it only by virtue of the Big Four’s trackage rights over the Baltimore & Ohio, and that the Jeffersonville, with its few miles of track, also connects with the Pennsylvania, Baltimore & Ohio, Louisville & Nashville, Illinois Central, and Chesapeake & Ohio Railroads. The merger of the Jeffersonville into the Big Four virtually precludes any change in the relation of the Jeffer-sonville lines to the Central system. The Jeffersonville will be no more. In view of this, it cannot reasonably be said that there has been no increase in the power of the Big Four, the Central, and, through its relation with them, Alleghany over the Jeffersonville. While it is not always profitable to analogize “fact” to “fiction,” La Fontaine’s fable of the crow, the cheese, and the fox demonstrates that there is a substantial difference between holding a piece of cheese in the beak and putting it in the stomach. Denial of power to the Commission to regulate the elimination of the Jeffersonville from the national transportation scene would be a disregard of the responsibility placed on it by Congress to oversee combinations and consolidations of carriers and “to promote safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service and foster sound economic conditions in transportation and among the several carriers . . .” and the further requirement that “All of the provisions of this Act shall be administered and enforced with a view to carrying out the above declaration of policy.” National Transportation Policy, 54 Stat. 899, 49 U. S. C., preceding § 1. We hold that the Commission was justified in finding that the merger of the Jeffersonville into the Big Four involved an “acquisition of control” of the Jeffersonville by Central and Alleghany within the meaning of § 5 (2) of the Act. Since the status order of the Commission is supportable by virtue of the Jeffersonville proceeding, we need not consider the District Court’s denial of Alleghany’s motion, based on the Boston & Albany proceeding, for a new trial. Several other matters urged by appellees remain to be considered. Appellees contend that Alleghany did not acquire control of any carrier in the Jeffersonville proceeding since the application was made by the Big Four as lessor and the Central as lessee and that therefore the Big Four was a statutory lessor and not a carrier within § 5. We need not discuss the distinction that appellees seek to assert between lessors and carriers, for the Jeffer-sonville, the railroad whose control we have held was acquired by Alleghany, was an operating carrier. Appellees also urge that the Marshall Transport case, 322 U. S. 31, requires dismissal of Alleghany’s application because two stockholders, alleged to dominate Alleghany, did not join in the application and therefore in the absence of those two indispensable parties, the Commission had no jurisdiction to proceed. But in the Marshall Transport case, the Commission was refusing to approve a subsidiary’s application to acquire control of the property and operating rights of another carrier unless the non-carrier parent submitted itself to the Commission’s jurisdiction, and the Court upheld the Commission’s power to refuse to approve the application. Although the Court in that case used language of “jurisdiction,” the problem is not strictly jurisdictional in the sense that if the Commission wrongly decides that corporation or person A does not “control” non-carrier B (which is “considered as a carrier”) and therefore that A need not join B’s application to acquire control of C, the Commission loses jurisdiction over B, the power to regulate B. The Commission’s jurisdiction over a non-carrier depends on whether the activities of the non-carrier fall within § 5 (2) and (3) and does not depend on the action of the parent. For example, if Alleghany were contending that it could reshuffle the whole Central system without Commission approval, alleging that the Commission had no jurisdiction over it through failure to join two stockholders controlling it in the original status order proceedings, this whole problem would appear in a clearer context. The basis of the Commission’s jurisdiction in the present case is Alleghany’s status as “a person which is not a carrier and which has control of one or more carriers,” seeking permission “to acquire control of another carrier through ownership of its stock or otherwise . . . .” The failure to join two stockholders alleged to control Alleghany does not oust the Commission of jurisdiction. Since that is so, the status order submitting Alleghany to the Commission’s jurisdiction cannot be attacked on that basis. Appellees further argue, and the District Court held, 134 F. Supp., at 147-149 and 138 F. Supp., at 136-137, that under §§ 5 (2) (b) and 17 (3), appellees were entitled to an evidentiary hearing of some sort in the merger-status order proceeding (as distinguished from the subsequent preferred stock proceeding) even though the Commission had discretion to dispense with a “public hearing.” Section 5(2)(b), in its relevant portion, provides: “Whenever a transaction is proposed under sub-paragraph (a) . . . the Commission shall notify the Governor of each State in which any part of the properties of the carriers involved in the proposed transaction is situated, and also such carriers and the applicant or applicants . . . and shall afford reasonable opportunity for interested parties to be heard. ... a public hearing shall be held in all cases where carriers by railroad are involved unless the Commission determines that a public hearing is not necessary in the public interest. . . .” 54 Stat. 906, as amended, 63 Stat. 485-486, 49 U. S. C. § 5 (2) (b). Section 17 (3) provides, in part, that “All hearings before the Commission, a division, individual Commissioner, or board shall be public upon the request of any party interested.” 54 Stat. 914, 49 U. S. C. § 17 (3). We need not determine the bounds of the Commission’s power to dispense with, or limit, hearings under § 5 (2) (b), for appellees’ claim of a right to a hearing in the merger-status order proceeding must fail for another reason — lack of the requisite interest of “interested parties.” The reference in § 5 to “interested parties,” like the reference in § 1 (20) to “party in interest,” must be interpreted in accordance with the rules relevant to standing to become parties in proceedings under the Interstate Commerce Act. A hearing under that Act is not like a legislative hearing and “interest” is not equivalent to “concern.” It may not always be easy to apply in particular cases the usual formulation of the general principle governing such standing- — e. g., “the complaint must show that plaintiff has, or represents others having, a legal right or interest that will be injuriously affected by the order.” Moffat Tunnel League v. United States, 289 U. S. 113, 119. In each case, the sufficiency of the “interest” in these situations must be determined with reference to the particular context in which the party seeks to assert its position. Appellees assert three grounds of interest in the merger-status order proceeding: that they were common stockholders of Alleghany, that the assertion of jurisdiction by the Interstate Commerce Commission would deprive them of the benefits of the Investment Company Act, 54 Stat. 789,15 U. S. C. § 80a-l et seq., and that the proposed preferred stock issue was unfair. The fact that appellees were common stockholders of Alleghany is insufficient “interest.” The proceeding before the Commission was to determine whether the Jef-fersonville-Big Four merger was a transaction requiring Commission approval as an acquisition of control by “a person which is not a carrier and which has control of one or more carriers” of “another carrier through ownership of its stock or otherwise . . . .” 54 Stat. 905, 49 U. S. C. § 5 (2)(a)(i). Unlike the subsequent preferred stock order whose threatened financial injury to appellees was sufficient to confer standing to bring the present proceedings, the merger agreement had no special effect on appellees or on common stockholders of Alleghany. See New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U. S. 12, 19-20. Nor did the proposed status order that Alleghany should be “considered as a carrier” and therefore regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission by itself pose any individualized threat to the welfare of the appellees. Reliance on the alleged benefits of protection under the Investment Company Act subtly begs the question. Alleghany would be subject to regulation under the Investment Company Act only if the Interstate Commerce Commission lacked jurisdiction to regulate it under § 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act. The fact that there may be another Act that gives appellees greater protection as investors is immaterial to the appellees’ right to a hearing in the merger-status order proceeding. The question here is whether the proposed transaction falls within the Interstate Commerce Commission’s jurisdiction, not what the consequences will be if it does not. No special threat to appellees arises from the mere assertion of Commission jurisdiction to regulate Alleghany. When subsequent Commission action in approving the Alleghany's new preferred stock issue did present a special threat to ap-pellees, that provided the “interest'' sufficient to attack the Commission's jurisdiction in the present proceeding. But this threat could not retroactively confer upon them the right to a hearing in the merger-status order proceeding, in which they had no “interest.” Appellees' claim that they were entitled to a hearing in the preferred stock proceeding is governed by § 20a (6) of the Act, which provides that “The Commission may hold hearings, if it sees fit, to enable it to determine its decision upon the application for authority.” 41 Stat. 495, 49 U. S. C. § 20a (6). For all these reasons, the judgment of the District Court must be reversed and the case remanded for consideration by the District Court of appellees’ claim, not previously discussed, that the preferred stock issue as approved by the Commission was in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act. This disposition renders it needless to pass on appellees’ motion to dismiss in No. 82. Reversed and remanded. Mr. Justice Whittaker took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Section 5 (3) provides: “Whenever a person which is not a carrier is authorized, by an order entered under paragraph (2), to acquire control of any carrier or of two or more carriers, such person thereafter shall, to the extent provided by the Commission in such order, be considered as a carrier subject to such of the following provisions as are applicable to any carrier involved in such acquisition of control: Section 20 (1) to (10), inclusive, of this part, sections 204 (a) (1) and (2) and 220 of part II, and section 313 of part III, (which relate to reports, accounts, and so forth, of carriers), and section 20a (2) to (11), inclusive, of this part, and section 214 of part II, (which relate to issues of securities and assumptions of liability of carriers), including in each case the penalties applicable in the case of violations of such provisions. In the application of such provisions of section 20a of this part and of section 214 of part II, in the case of any such person, the Commission shall authorize the issue or assumption applied for only if it finds that such issue or assumption is consistent with the proper performance of its service to the public by each carrier which is under the control of such person, that it will not impair the ability of any such carrier to perform such service, and that it is otherwise consistent with the public interest.” 54 Stat. 907, 49 U. S. C. § 5 (3). “Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b), none of the following persons is an investment company within the meaning of this title: "... Any company subject to regulation under the Interstate Commerce Act, or any company whose entire outstanding capital stock is owned or controlled by such a company: Provided, That the assets of the controlled company consist substantially of securities issued by companies which are subject to regulation under the Interstate Commerce Act.” 54 Stat. 789, 799, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-3 (c) (9). On this appeal, the Securities and Exchange Commission, as amicus, took no position on whether the District Court “correctly construed the relevant provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act or orders of the ICC thereunder; nor on the extent of the jurisdiction of the court below.” The views of the Securities and Exchange Commission were set forth only in relation to issues under the Investment Company Act. After the preliminary injunction was granted, Alleghany moved in the District Court for suspension of the injunction pending appeal to this Court. The two judges who heard the motion divided, and the motion was therefore denied. On application to Circuit Justice Harlan, a stay was granted with respect to that portion of the new preferred stock that had been issued before the District Court’s injunction was granted. 75 S. Ct. 912. The New York Stock Exchange, however, continued to suspend trading in the new preferred stock. See Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, 144, where the fact that the “contested order determining the status of the Rochester necessarily and immediately carried direction of obedience to previously formulated mandatory orders addressed generally to all carriers ... in conjunction with the other orders, made determination of the status of the Rochester a reviewable order of the Commission.” Whether reviewability of a status order, without more, be deemed a matter of standing to review or a matter of finality of administrative action, the basis for decision is the same: has the action of the administrative agency threatened the interests of the complainant, whether corporation or, as here, stockholder otherwise qualified to sue, sufficiently to allow attack? (This does not mean of course that the same agency action that allows attack by one allows attack by the other.) A brief summary of the history of § 5 is set forth in St. Joe Paper Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 347 U. S. 298, 315 (appendix). “Investing the [Federal 'Communications] Commission with the duty of ascertaining 'control’ of one company by another [as the basis for the Commission’s jurisdiction], Congress did not imply artificial tests of control. This is an issue of fact to be determined by the special circumstances of each case. So long as there is warrant in the record for the judgment of the expert body it must stand. The suggestion that the refusal to regard the New York ownership of only one third of the common stock of the Rochester as conclusive of the former’s lack of control of the latter should invalidate the Commission’s finding, disregards actualities in such intercorporate relations. Having found that the record permitted the Commission ■to draw the conclusion that it did, a court travels beyond its province to express concurrence therewith as an original question. ‘The judicial function is exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the conclusions approved by the administrative body.’ Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U. S. 282, 286-287; Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U. S. 297, 303, et seq.” 307 U. S., at 145-146. “This phrase [“control”] has been used because it has recently had the benefit of interpretation by the Supreme Court in the case of Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States (307 U. S. 125, decided April 17, 1939).” H. R. Rep. No. 2832, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 63. (This was the Conference Report.) The United States, which had supported the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission in the District Court proceedings, on this appeal has taken the position that the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed because the merger of the Jeffersonville into the Big Four did not involve an “acquisition of control” over the Jeffersonville by Alleghany.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the petitioning party (i.e., the plaintiff or the appellant) emerged victorious. The victory the Supreme Court provided the petitioning party may not have been total and complete (e.g., by vacating and remanding the matter rather than an unequivocal reversal), but the disposition is nonetheless a favorable one. Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case.
Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. Did the petitioning win the case?
[ "Yes", "No" ]
[ 0 ]
sc
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE v. ORLANDO VENTURA No. 02-29. Decided November 4, 2002 Per Curiam. Federal statutes authorize the Attorney General, in his discretion, to grant asylum to an alien who demonstrates “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of . . . [a] political opinion,” and they require the Attorney General to withhold deportation where the alien’s “life or freedom would be threatened” for that reason. Immigration and Nationality Act, §§ 101(a)(42)(A), 208(a), 243(h), 66 Stat. 166, as amended, 8 U. S. C. §§1101(a)(42), 1158(a), 1253(h)(1) (1994 ed. and Supp. V). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determined that respondent Fredy Orlando Ventura failed to qualify for this statutory protection because any persecution that he faced when he left Guatemala in 1993 was not “on account of” a “political opinion” The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the BIA’s holding. 264 F. 3d 1150 (2001) (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals then went on to consider an alternative argument that the Government had made before the Immigration Judge, namely, that Orlando Ventura failed to qualify for protection regardless of past persecution because conditions in Guatemala had improved to the point where no realistic threat of persecution currently existed. Both sides pointed out to the Ninth Circuit that the Immigration Judge had held that conditions had indeed changed to that point but that the BIA itself had not considered this alternative claim. And both sides asked that the Ninth Circuit remand the case to the BIA so that it might do so. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 99-71004 (CA9), pp. 5, 6, 24; Brief for Respondent in No. 99-71004 (CA9), pp. 8, 9, 23. The Court of Appeals, however, did not remand the case. Instead, it evaluated the Government’s claim itself. And it decided the matter in Orlando Ventura’s favor, holding that the evidence in the record failed to show sufficient change. 264 F. 3d, at 1157-1158. The Government, seeking certiorari here, argues that the Court of Appeals exceeded its legal authority when it decided the “changed circumstances” matter on its own. We agree with the Government that the Court of Appeals should have remanded the case to the BIA. And we summarily reverse its decision not to do so. I We shall describe the basic proceedings so far. In 1993 Orlando Ventura, a citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States illegally. In 1995 the Attorney General began deportation proceedings. And in 1998 an Immigration Judge considered Orlando Ventura’s application for asylum and withholding of deportation, an application based upon a fear and threat of persecution “on account of” a “political opinion.” 8 U. S. C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1253(h) (1994 ed. and Supp. V). Orlando Ventura testified that he had received threats of death or harm unless he joined the guerrilla army, that his family members had close ties to the Guatemalan military, and that, in his view, the guerrillas consequently believed he held inimical political opinions. The Immigration Judge denied relief. She recognized that Orlando Ventura subjectively believed that the guerrillas’ interest in him was politically based. And she credited testimony showing (a) that Orlando Ventura’s family had many connections to the military, (b) that he was very close to one cousin, an army lieutenant who had served for almost 12 years, (c) that in 1987 his uncle, a local military commissioner responsible for recruiting, was attacked by people with machetes, and (d) that in 1988 his cousin (a soldier) and the cousin’s brother (a civilian) were both shot at and the soldier-cousin killed. Nonetheless, Orlando Ventura had failed objectively “to demonstrate that the guerillas’ interest” in him was “on account of his political opinion.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a. The Immigration Judge added that "conditions” in Guatemala had changed significantly. Even “if the guerillas” once had had a politically based “interest” in Orlando Ventura, the evidence failed to show that the guerrillas would “continue to have motivation and inclination to persecute him in the future.” Ibid. The BIA, considering the matter de novo, “agree[dj” with the Immigration Judge that Orlando Ventura “did not meet his burden of establishing that he faces persecution ‘on account of’ a qualifying ground . . . .” Id., at 15a. The BIA added that it “need not address” the question of “changed country conditions.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals, reviewing the BIA’s decision, decided that this evidence “compel[led] ” it to reject the BIA’s conclusion. 264 F. 3d, at 1154 (emphasis added); see INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U. S. 478, 481, n. 1 (1992) (“To reverse the BIA finding we must find that the evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels it . . .” (emphasis in original)). It recognized that the BIA had not decided the “changed circumstances” question and that “generally” a court should remand to permit that consideration. 264 F. 3d, at 1157. Cf. Castillo v. INS, 951 F. 2d 1117, 1120-1121 (CA9 1991) (specifying that the Court of Appeals must review the decision of the BIA, not the underlying decision of the immigration judge). But the Court of Appeals added that it need “not remand .. . when it is clear that we would be compelled to reverse the BIA’s decision if the BIA decided the matter against the applicant.” 264 F. 3d, at 1157. And it held that the record evidence, namely, a 1997 State Department report about Guatemala, “clearly demonstrates that the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution was not rebutted.” Ibid. Hence, it concluded, “remand ... is inappropriate.” Ibid. The Government challenges the decision not to remand. And it says the matter is important. The “error,” it says, is a “recurring error [that] puts the Ninth Circuit in conflict with other courts of appeals, which generally respect the BIA’s role as fact-finder by remanding to the BIA in similar situations.” Pet. for Cert. 11. See also Pet. for Cert. in INS v. Chen, O. T. 2002, No. 25, p. 23 (referring to eight other recent decisions from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which, in the Government’s view, demonstrate this trend). After examining the record, we find that well-established principles of administrative law did require the Court of Appeals to remand the “changed circumstances” question to the BIA. II No one disputes the basic legal principles that govern remand. Within broad limits the law entrusts the agency to make the basic asylum eligibility decision here in question. E.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1994 ed.); Elias-Zacarias, supra, at 481; INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U. S. 415 (1999). See also 8 CFR §3.1 (2002). In such circumstances a “judicial judgment cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment.” SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 88 (1943). Nor can an “appellate court... intrude upon the domain which Congress has exclusively entrusted to an administrative agency.” Ibid. A court of appeals “is not generally empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed and to reach its own conclusions based on such an inquiry.” Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U. S. 729, 744 (1985). Rather, “the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.” Ibid. Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196 (1947) (describing the reasons for remand). Generally speaking, a court of appeals should remand a case to an agency for decision of a matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands. This principle has obvious importance in the immigration context. The BIA has not yet considered the “changed circumstances” issue. And every consideration that classically supports the law’s ordinary remand requirement does so here. The agency can bring its expertise to bear upon the matter; it can evaluate the evidence; it can make an initial determination; and, in doing so, it can, through informed discussion and analysis, help a court later determine whether its decision exceeds the leeway that the law provides. These basic considerations indicate that the Court of Appeals committed clear error here. It seriously disregarded the agency’s legally mandated role. Instead, it independently created potentially far-reaching legal precedent about the significance of political change in Guatemala, a highly complex and sensitive matter. And it did so without giving the BIA the opportunity to address the matter in the first instance in light of its own expertise. The Court of Appeals rested its conclusion upon its belief that the basic record evidence on the matter — the 1997 State Department report about Guatemala — compelled a finding of insufficiently changed circumstances. But that foundation is legally inadequate for two reasons. First, the State Department report is, at most, ambiguous about the matter. The bulk of the report makes clear that considerable change has occurred. The report says, for example, that in December 1996 the Guatemalan Government and the guerrillas signed a peace agreement, that in March 1996 there was a cease fire, that the guerrillas then disbanded as a fighting force, that “the guerrillas renounced the use of force to achieve political goals,” and that “there was [a] marked improvement in the overall human rights situation.” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U. S. Dept. of State, Guatemala-Profile of Asylum Claims & Country Conditions 2-4 (June 1997). As the Court of Appeals stressed, two parts of the report can be read to the contrary. They say that (1) even “after the March cease-fire, guerrillas continued to employ death threats” and (2) “the level of crime and violence now seems to be higher than in the recent past.” Id., at 3-4. Yet the report itself qualifies these statements. As to the second, the report (as the Court of Appeals noted) says: “Although the level of crime and violence now seems to be higher than in the recent past, the underlying motivation in most asylum cases now appears to stem from common crime and/or personal vengeance,” i. e., not politics. Id., at 4 (emphasis added). And the report (in sections to which the Court of Appeals did not refer) adds that in the context of claims based on political opinion, in “our experience, only party leaders or high-profile activists generally would be vulnerable to such harassment and usually only in their home communities.” Id., at 8. This latter phrase “only in their home communities” is particularly important in light of the fact that an individual who can relocate safely within his home country ordinarily cannot qualify for asylum here. See 8 CFR §208.13(b)(1)(i) (2002). Second, remand could lead to the presentation of further evidence of current circumstances in Guatemala — evidence that may well prove enlightening given the five years that have elapsed since the report was written. See §§3.1, 3.2 (permitting the BIA to reopen the record and to remand to the Immigration Judge as appropriate). III We conclude that the Court of Appeals should have applied the ordinary “remand” rule. We grant the Government’s petition for certiorari. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit insofar as it denies remand to the agency. And we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed. The information relevant to this variable may be found near the end of the summary that begins on the title page of each case, or preferably at the very end of the opinion of the Court. For cases in which the Court granted a motion to dismiss, consider "petition denied or appeal dismissed". There is "no disposition" if the Court denied a motion to dismiss.
What is the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed?
[ "stay, petition, or motion granted", "affirmed (includes modified)", "reversed", "reversed and remanded", "vacated and remanded", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded", "vacated", "petition denied or appeal dismissed", "certification to or from a lower court", "no disposition" ]
[ 3 ]
sc
FLOWER v. UNITED STATES No. 71-1180. Decided June 12, 1972 Per Curiam. Petitioner John Thomas Flower, a regional “Peace Education Secretary” of the American Friends Service Committee and a civilian, was arrested by military police while quietly distributing leaflets on New Braunfels Avenue at a point within the limits of Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas. In an ensuing prosecution before the United States District Court for the Western. District of Texas on charges of violating 18 U. S. C. § 1382 (“Whoever reenters or is found [within a military post] after having been removed therefrom or ordered not to reenter by any officer or person in command or charge thereof — Shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not. more than six months, or both”), it was established that petitioner had previously been barred from the post by ordfer of the deputy commanda’ because of alleged participation in an attempt to distribute “unauthorized” leaflets. The District Court found that § 1382 “is a valid law” and was validly applied. It sentenced petitioner to six months in prison. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.. 452 F. 2d 80 (CA5 1972). We reverse. Whatever power the authorities may have to restrict general access to a military facility, see Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886 (1961), here the fort commander chose not to exclude the public from the street where petitioner was arrested. As Judge Simpson, dissenting/noted below: “There is -no sentry post or guard at either entrance or anywhere along the route. Traffic flows through the post on this and other streets 24 hours a day. A traffic count conducted on New Braunfels Avenue on January 22, 1968, by the Director of Transportation of the city of San Antonio, shows a daily (24-hour) vehicular count of 15,110 south of Grayson Street (the place where the street enters the post boundary) and 17,740 vehicles daily north of that point. The street is an important traffic artery used freely by buses, taxi cabs and other public transportation facilities as well as by private vehicles, and its sidewalks are used extensively at all hours . of the day by civilians as well as by military personnel. Fort Sam Houston was an open post; the street, New Braunfels Avenue, was a completely open street.” 452 F. 2d, at 90. Under such circumstances the military has abandoned ' any claim that it has special interests in who walks, talks, or distributes leaflets on the avenue. The base commandant can no more order petitioner off this public street because he was distributing leaflets than could the city police order any leafleteer off any public street. Cf. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938), Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939). “[S]treets are natural and proper places for the dissemination of information and opinion,” 308 U. S., at 163. “[0]ne who is rightfully on a street which the state has left open to the public carries with him there as elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion.” Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413, 416 (1943). The First Amendment protects petitioner from the application of § 1382 under conditions like those of this case. Accordingly, without need to set the matter for further argument, we grant the petition for a writ of certiorari 'and reverse the conviction. Reversed and remanded. Mr. Justice Blackmun dissents, for he would grant the petition for 'certiorari and hear argument on the merits.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the manner in which the Court took jurisdiction. The Court uses a variety of means whereby it undertakes to consider cases that it has been petitioned to review. The most important ones are the writ of certiorari, the writ of appeal, and for legacy cases the writ of error, appeal, and certification. For cases that fall into more than one category, identify the manner in which the court takes jurisdiction on the basis of the writ. For example, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), an original jurisdiction and a mandamus case, should be coded as mandamus rather than original jurisdiction due to the nature of the writ. Some legacy cases are "original" motions or requests for the Court to take jurisdiction but were heard or filed in another court. For example, Ex parte Matthew Addy S.S. & Commerce Corp., 256 U.S. 417 (1921) asked the Court to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal judge. Do not code these cases as "original" jurisdiction cases but rather on the basis of the writ.
What is the manner in which the Court took jurisdiction?
[ "cert", "appeal", "bail", "certification", "docketing fee", "rehearing or restored to calendar for reargument", "injunction", "mandamus", "original", "prohibition", "stay", "writ of error", "writ of habeas corpus", "unspecified, other" ]
[ 0 ]
sc
IN RE BLODGETT, SUPERINTENDENT, WASHINGTON STATE PENITENTIARY, et al. No. 91-716. Decided January 13, 1992 Per Curiam. The Court has before it a petition from the State of Washington for a writ of mandamus to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The petition seeks an order directing the Court of Appeals to issue its decision on an appeal from the District Court’s denial of a second federal habeas petition in a capital case. The appeal was argued and submitted to the Court of Appeals on June 27, 1989, and no decision has been forthcoming. Charles Rodman Campbell was convicted of multiple murders in 1982 in the State of Washington and sentenced to death. After his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal and we denied certiorari, Campbell v. Washington, 471 U. S. 1094 (1985), his first federal habeas petition was filed in July-1985 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. Proceedings in that matter were completed when we denied certiorari in November 1988. Campbell v. Kincheloe, 488 U. S. 948. No relief was granted. In March 1989, Campbell filed a second federal habeas petition in the same District Court. The court acted with commendable dispatch, holding a hearing and issuing a written opinion denying a stay or other relief within days after the second petition was filed. On March 28, 1989, Campbell appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The Court of Appeals granted an indefinite stay of execution and set a briefing schedule. The case was argued and submitted in June 1989, but no decision was announced and the stay of execution remains in effect. The Washington attorney general sent letters to the panel in April and October 1990 inquiring about the status of the case, but neither letter was answered. In January 1990, Campbell filed a motion to withdraw certain issues from consideration by the Ninth Circuit panel, and he renewed this motion in April. The panel took no action. In July 1990, Campbell filed his third state action for collateral relief, a personal restraint petition, with the Washington Supreme Court. In September, Campbell again moved the Court of Appeals to withdraw three issues from consideration in the case that it was still holding under submission, leaving eight others to be decided. The panel did not respond until by order of February 21, 1991, it noted Campbell’s motion to withdraw the issues, requested a report on the status of the state-court proceedings, and vacated its own submission of the case. Both Washington and Campbell responded that all of the issues pending before the Ninth Circuit had been exhausted. The State requested that the case be resubmitted, but the panel did not do so. The Washington Supreme Court denied Campbell’s third personal restraint petition on its merits on March 21, 1991. On June 10, 1991, Campbell filed a document advising the Court of Appeals panel that he desired to discharge his attorneys and proceed pro se and that he would file a third federal habeas petition in the District Court. At that point more than two years had passed since the Ninth Circuit had heard oral argument in the case. Almost two months later, on August 7, 1991, the panel granted the motion to relieve counsel, directed Campbell to file his third federal habeas petition by August 30, and announced its intention to wait for the District Court’s ruling before taking further action. The District Court has set a briefing schedule for the third petition. On October 25, 1991, the Washington attorney general filed the mandamus petition now before us, and on November 22, the Court of Appeals and the members of the panel filed a response. Neither the response nor the record reveals any plausible explanation or reason for the panel’s delay in resolving the case from June 1989 until July 1990. The response addresses the events after Campbell’s third personal restraint petition was filed in the Washington Supreme Court. The response indicates that the panel vacated submission in February 1991 because if the Washington Supreme Court had granted the state petition, the appeal before the Ninth Circuit would have become moot. It further stated that the panel desired to avoid piecemeal appeals by awaiting the decision of the District Court on the third federal habeas petition. The response noted that the Ninth Circuit has formed a Death Penalty Task Force with the objective of eliminating successive habeas petitions and that the consolidation of the last two petitions is consistent with that objective. The delay of over a year before the third personal restraint petition was filed in Washington state court remains unexplained and was in fact compounded by the events that followed. The orders by the Ninth Circuit to vacate submission of the case until completion of the state collateral proceeding and then to hold the case in abeyance pending filing and resolution of the third federal habeas proceeding in the District Court raise the very concerns regarding delay that were part of the rationale for this Court’s decisions in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509 (1982), and McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467 (1991). Adherence to those decisions, and their prompt enforcement by the district courts and courts of appeals, will obviate in many cases what the Court of Appeals here seems to perceive to be the necessity for accommodating multiple filings. As to the Death Penalty Task Force, reports of joint committees of the bench and bar should be of urgent concern to all persons with the responsibility for the administration of justice in the Ninth Circuit, but the ordinary course of legal proceedings and the constant duty of all judges to discharge their duties with diligence and precision cannot be suspended to await its recommendations. None of the reasons offered in the response dispels our concern that the State of Washington has sustained severe prejudice by the 2V2-year stay of execution. The stay has prevented Washington from exercising its sovereign power to enforce the criminal law, an interest we found of great weight in McCleskey when discussing the importance of finality in the context of federal habeas corpus proceedings. Id., at 491. Given the potential for prejudice to the State of Washington, the Ninth Circuit was under a duty to consider Campbell’s claim for relief without delay. Our case law suggests that expedited review of this second habeas petition would have been proper. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 895 (1983) (“Even where it cannot be concluded that a [successive habeas] petition should be dismissed under Rule 9(b), it would be proper for the district court to expedite consideration of the petition”). The delay in this case demonstrates the necessity for the rule that we now make explicit. In a capital case the grant of a stay of execution directed to a State by a federal court imposes on that court the concomitant duty to take all steps necessary to ensure a prompt resolution of the matter, consistent with its duty to give full and fair consideration to all of the issues presented in the case. Despite our continuing concerns, we decline to issue mandamus to the Court of Appeals at this time. While there are grounds to question both the necessity and the propriety of the Ninth Circuit’s order of August 7, 1991, Campbell v. Blodgett, 940 F. 2d 549, the State did not file any objection to it. The State should have lodged its objection with the Court of Appeals, citing the cases it now cites to us. True, the State had taken some action. It wrote twice in 1990 to inquire about the status of the case. And after the panel’s order vacating submission, the State objected and asked that the case be resubmitted for decision. The argument could be made that further requests for an expedited decision on the merits had little chance of success. But as a predicate for extraordinary relief, the State should have asked the Court of Appeals to vacate or modify its order of August 7, 1991, before coming here. This Court’s Rule 20.1 (“To justify the granting of any writ under that provision, it must be shown . . . that adequate relief cannot be obtained in any other form or from any other court”). As we do not now issue a writ of mandamus, the Court of Appeals should determine how best to expedite the appeal, given the present posture of the case. Denial of the writ is without prejudice to the right of the State to again seek mandamus relief or to request any other extraordinary relief by motion or petition if unnecessary delays or unwarranted stays occur in the panel’s disposition of the matter. In view of the delay that has already occurred, any further postponements or extensions of time will be subject to a most rigorous scrutiny in this Court if the State of Washington files a further and meritorious petition for relief. The motion of respondent Charles R. Campbell for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The petition for writ of mandamus is Denied.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
What is the issue of the decision?
[ "involuntary confession", "habeas corpus", "plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise", "retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)", "search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)", "search and seizure, vehicles", "search and seizure, Crime Control Act", "contempt of court or congress", "self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)", "Miranda warnings", "self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution", "right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)", "cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)", "cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)", "line-up", "discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)", "double jeopardy", "ex post facto (state)", "extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous", "extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence", "extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom", "extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)", "extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)", "extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance", "extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)", "extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity", "confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)", "subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error", "subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)", "subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment", "subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies", "subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice", "subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)", "subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution", "subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness", "subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous", "Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure", "statutory construction of criminal laws: assault", "statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery", "statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)", "statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody", "statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)", "statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)", "statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms", "statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud", "statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling", "statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951", "statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)", "statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)", "statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes", "statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol", "statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice", "statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)", "statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952", "statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes", "statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines", "statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous", "jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)", "speedy trial", "miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)" ]
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DUNN v. LOUISIANA No. 664. Decided June 29, 1970 Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. Mr. Justice Marshall would reverse the judgment below for the reasons stated in his separate opinion in Williams v. Florida, ante, p. 116.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court in which the case originated. Focus on the court in which the case originated, not the administrative agency. For this reason, if appropiate note the origin court to be a state or federal appellate court rather than a court of first instance (trial court). If the case originated in the United States Supreme Court (arose under its original jurisdiction or no other court was involved), note the origin as "United States Supreme Court". If the case originated in a state court, note the origin as "State Court". Do not code the name of the state. The courts in the District of Columbia present a special case in part because of their complex history. Treat local trial (including today's superior court) and appellate courts (including today's DC Court of Appeals) as state courts. Consider cases that arise on a petition of habeas corpus and those removed to the federal courts from a state court as originating in the federal, rather than a state, court system. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus begins in the federal district court, not the state trial court. Identify courts based on the naming conventions of the day. Do not differentiate among districts in a state. For example, use "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York" for all the districts in New York.
What is the court in which the case originated?
[ "U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals", "U.S. Court of International Trade", "U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims", "U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces", "U.S. Court of Military Review", "U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals", "U.S. Customs Court", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit", "U.S. Tax Court", "Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals", "U.S. Court for China", "U.S. Consular Courts", "U.S. Commerce Court", "Territorial Supreme Court", "Territorial Appellate Court", "Territorial Trial Court", "Emergency Court of Appeals", "Supreme Court of the District of Columbia", "Bankruptcy Court", "U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)", "Alabama Middle U.S. District Court", "Alabama Northern U.S. District Court", "Alabama Southern U.S. District Court", "Alaska U.S. District Court", "Arizona U.S. District Court", "Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court", "Arkansas Western U.S. District Court", "California Central U.S. District Court", "California Eastern U.S. District Court", "California Northern U.S. District Court", "California Southern U.S. District Court", "Colorado U.S. District Court", "Connecticut U.S. District Court", "Delaware U.S. District Court", "District Of Columbia U.S. District Court", "Florida Middle U.S. District Court", "Florida Northern U.S. District Court", "Florida Southern U.S. District Court", "Georgia Middle U.S. District Court", "Georgia Northern U.S. District Court", "Georgia Southern U.S. District Court", "Guam U.S. District Court", "Hawaii U.S. District Court", "Idaho U.S. District Court", "Illinois Central U.S. District Court", "Illinois Northern U.S. District Court", "Illinois Southern U.S. District Court", "Indiana Northern U.S. District Court", "Indiana Southern U.S. District Court", "Iowa Northern U.S. District Court", "Iowa Southern U.S. District Court", "Kansas U.S. District Court", "Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court", "Kentucky Western U.S. District Court", "Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court", "Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court", "Louisiana Western U.S. District Court", "Maine U.S. District Court", "Maryland U.S. District Court", "Massachusetts U.S. District Court", "Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court", "Michigan Western U.S. District Court", "Minnesota U.S. District Court", "Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court", "Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court", "Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court", "Missouri Western U.S. District Court", "Montana U.S. District Court", "Nebraska U.S. District Court", "Nevada U.S. District Court", "New Hampshire U.S. District Court", "New Jersey U.S. District Court", "New Mexico U.S. District Court", "New York Eastern U.S. District Court", "New York Northern U.S. District Court", "New York Southern U.S. District Court", "New York Western U.S. District Court", "North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court", "North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court", "North Carolina Western U.S. District Court", "North Dakota U.S. District Court", "Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court", "Ohio Northern U.S. District Court", "Ohio Southern U.S. District Court", "Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court", "Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court", "Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court", "Oregon U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court", "Puerto Rico U.S. District Court", "Rhode Island U.S. District Court", "South Carolina U.S. District Court", "South Dakota U.S. District Court", "Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court", "Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court", "Tennessee Western U.S. District Court", "Texas Eastern U.S. District Court", "Texas Northern U.S. District Court", "Texas Southern U.S. District Court", "Texas Western U.S. District Court", "Utah U.S. District Court", "Vermont U.S. District Court", "Virgin Islands U.S. District Court", "Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court", "Virginia Western U.S. District Court", "Washington Eastern U.S. District Court", "Washington Western U.S. District Court", "West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court", "West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court", "Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court", "Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court", "Wyoming U.S. District Court", "Louisiana U.S. District Court", "Washington U.S. District Court", "West Virginia U.S. District Court", "Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court", "South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court", "South Carolina Western U.S. District Court", "Alabama U.S. District Court", "U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone", "Georgia U.S. District Court", "Illinois U.S. District Court", "Indiana U.S. District Court", "Iowa U.S. District Court", "Michigan U.S. District Court", "Mississippi U.S. District Court", "Missouri U.S. District Court", "New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)", "New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)", "New York U.S. District Court", "North Carolina U.S. District Court", "Ohio U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania U.S. District Court", "Tennessee U.S. District Court", "Texas U.S. District Court", "Virginia U.S. District Court", "Norfolk U.S. District Court", "Wisconsin U.S. District Court", "Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court", "New Jersey U.S. District Court", "California U.S. District Court", "Florida U.S. District Court", "Arkansas U.S. District Court", "District of Orleans U.S. District Court", "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", "State Trial Court", "Eastern Circuit (of the United States)", "Middle Circuit (of the United States)", "Southern Circuit (of the United States)", "Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama", "Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas", "California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California", "Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut", "Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware", "Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida", "Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia", "Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois", "Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana", "Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa", "Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas", "Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky", "Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana", "Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine", "Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland", "Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts", "Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan", "Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota", "Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi", "Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri", "Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada", "New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire", "New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey", "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York", "North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina", "Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio", "Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon", "Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania", "Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island", "South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina", "Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee", "Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas", "Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont", "Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia", "West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia", "Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin", "Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming", "Circuit Court of the District of Columbia", "Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska", "Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado", "Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington", "Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho", "Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana", "Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah", "South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota", "North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota", "Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma", "Court of Private Land Claims", "United States Supreme Court" ]
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PEEL v. ATTORNEY REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION OF ILLINOIS No. 88-1775. Argued January 17, 1990 Decided June 4, 1990 Stevens, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Brennan, Blackmun, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Brennan, J., joined, post, p. 111. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 118. O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, J., joined, post, p. 119. Bruce J. Ennis, Jr., argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Stephen J. Marzen argued the cause for the Federal Trade Commission as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Rill, Deputy Solicitor General Merrill, Kevin J. Arquit, Jay C. Shaffer, and Ernest J. Isenstadt. William F. Moran III argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was James J. Grogan. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Advertising Federation, Inc., by Philip B. Kurland and Alan S. Madans; for the Association of National Advertisers, Inc., by Burt Neuborne; for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America et al. by Jeffrey Robert White and Russ M. Herman; for Public Citizen by David C. Vladeck and Alan B. Morrison; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo, Paul D. Kamenar, Alan M. Slobodin, and Richard Samp. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Academy of Certified Trial Lawyers of Minnesota by Clarance E. Hagglund; and for the National Board of Trial Advocacy by Timothy Wilton and Jacob D. Fuchsberg. Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Justice Brennan, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Kennedy join. The Illinois Supreme Court publicly censured petitioner because his letterhead states that he is certified as a civil trial specialist by the National Board of Trial Advocacy. We granted certiorari to consider whether the statement on his letterhead is protected by the First Amendment. 492 U. S. 917 (1989). I This case comes to us against a background of growing interest in lawyer certification programs. In the 1973 Sonnett Memorial Lecture, then Chief Justice Warren E. Burger advanced the proposition that specialized training and certification of trial advocates is essential to the American system of justice. That proposition was endorsed by a number of groups of lawyers who were instrumental in establishing the National Board of Trial Advocacy (NBTA) in 1977. Since then, NBTA has developed a set of standards and procedures for periodic certification of lawyers with experience and competence in trial work. Those standards, which have been approved by a board of judges, scholars, and practitioners, are objective and demanding. They require specified experience as lead counsel in both jury and nonjury trials, participation in approved programs of continuing legal education, a demonstration of writing skills, and the successful completion of a day-long examination. Certification expires in five years unless the lawyer again demonstrates his or her continuing qualification. NBTA certification has been described as a “highly-structured” and “arduous process that employs a wide range of assessment methods.” Task Force on Lawyer Competence, Report With Findings and Recommendations to the Conference of Chief Justices, Publication No. NCSC-021, pp. 33-34 (May 26, 1982). After reviewing NBTA’s procedures, the Supreme Court of Minnesota found that “NBTA applies a rigorous and exacting set of standards and examinations on a national scale before certifying a lawyer as a trial specialist.” In re Johnson, 341 N. W. 2d 282, 283 (1983). The Alabama Supreme Court similarly concluded that “a certification of specialty by NBTA would indicate a level of expertise with regard to trial advocacy in excess of the level of expertise required for admission to the bar generally.” Ex parte Howell, 487 So. 2d 848, 851 (1986). II Petitioner practices law in Edwardsville, Illinois. He was licensed to practice in Illinois in 1968, in Arizona in 1979, and in Missouri in 1981. He has served as president of the Madison County Bar Association and has been active in both national and state bar association work. He has tried to verdict over 100 jury trials and over 300 nonjury trials, and has participated in hundreds of other litigated matters that were settled. NBTA issued petitioner a “Certificate in Civil Trial Advocacy” in 1981, renewed it in 1986, and listed him in its 1985 Directory of “Certified Specialists and Board Members.” Since 1983 petitioner’s professional letterhead has contained a statement referring to his NBTA certification and to the three States in which he is licensed. It appears as follows: “Gary E. Peel “Certified Civil Trial Specialist “By the National Board of Trial Advocacy “Licensed: Illinois, Missouri, Arizona.” In 1987, the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois (Commission) filed a complaint alleging that petitioner, by use of this letterhead, was publicly holding himself out as a certified legal specialist in violation of Rule 2-105(a)(3) of the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility. That Rule provides: “A lawyer or law firm may specify or designate any area or field of law in which he or its partners concentrates or limits his or its practice. Except as set forth in Rule 2-105(a), no lawyer may hold himself out as ‘certified’ or a ‘specialist.’” The complaint also alleged violations of Rule 2-101(b), which requires that a lawyer’s public “communication shall contain all information necessary to make the communication not misleading and shall not contain any false or misleading statement or otherwise operate to deceive,” and of Rule 1-102 (a)(1), which generally subjects a lawyer to discipline for violation of any Rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Disciplinary Rules 2-101(b), 1-102(a)(1) (1988). After a hearing, the Commission recommended censure for a violation of Rule 2-105(a)(3). It rejected petitioner’s First Amendment claim that a reference to a lawyer’s certification as a specialist was a form of commercial speech that could not be “‘subjected to blanket suppression.’” Report of the Hearing Panel, App. C to Pet. for Cert. 19a. Although the Commission’s “Findings of Facts” did not contain any statement as to whether petitioner’s representation was deceptive, its “Conclusion of Law” ended with the brief statement that petitioner, “by holding himself out, on his letterhead as ‘Gary E. Peel, Certified Civil Trial Specialist—By the National Board of Trial Advocacy,’ is in direct violation of the above cited Rule [2-105(a)(3)]. “We hold it is ‘misleading’ as our Supreme Court has never recognized or approved any certification process.” Id., at 20a. The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the Commission’s recommendation for censure. It held that the First Amendment did not protect petitioner’s letterhead because the letterhead was misleading in three ways. First, the State Supreme Court concluded that the juxtaposition of the reference to petitioner as “certified” by NBTA and the reference to him as “licensed” by Illinois, Missouri, and Arizona “could” mislead the general public into a belief that petitioner’s authority to practice in the field of trial advocacy was derived solely from NBTA certification. It thus found that the statements on the letterhead impinged on the court’s exclusive authority to license its attorneys because they failed to distinguish voluntary certification by an unofficial group from licensure by an official organization. In re Peel, 126 Ill. 2d 397, 405-406, 534 N. E. 980, 983-984 (1989). Second, the court characterized the claim of NBTA certification as “misleading because it tacitly attests to the qualifications of [petitioner] as a civil trial advocate.” Id., at 406, 534 N. E. 2d, at 984. The court noted confusion in the parties’ descriptions of NBTA’s requirements, but did not consider whether NBTA certification constituted reliable, verifiable evidence of petitioner’s experience as a civil trial advocate. Rather, the court reasoned that the statement was tantamount to an implied claim of superiority of the quality of petitioner’s legal services and therefore warranted restriction under our decision in In re R. M. J., 455 U. S. 191 (1982). 126 Ill. 2d, at 406, 534 N. E. 2d, at 984. Finally, the court reasoned that use of the term “specialist” was misleading because it incorrectly implied that Illinois had formally authorized certification of specialists in trial advocacy. The court concluded that the conjunction of the reference to being a specialist with the reference to being licensed implied that the former was the product of the latter. Id., at 410, 534 N. E. 2d, at 986. Concluding that the letterhead was inherently misleading for these reasons, the court upheld the blanket prohibition of Rule 2-105(a) under the First Amendment. III The Illinois Supreme Court considered petitioner’s letterhead as a form of commercial speech governed by the “constitutional limitations on the regulation of lawyer advertising.” 126 Ill. 2d, at 402, 534 N. E. 2d, at 982. The only use of the letterhead in the record is in petitioner’s correspondence with the Commission itself. Petitioner contends that, absent evidence of any use of the letterhead to propose commercial transactions with potential clients, the statement should be accorded the full protections of noncommercial speech. However, he also acknowledges that “this case can and should be decided on the narrower ground that even if it is commercial speech it cannot be categorically prohibited.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 9. We agree that the question to be decided is whether a lawyer has a constitutional right, under the standards applicable to commercial speech, to advertise his or her certification as a trial specialist by NBTA. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977), this Court decided that advertising by lawyers was a form of commercial speech entitled to protection by the First Amendment. Justice Powell summarized the standards applicable to such claims for the unanimous Court in In re R. M. J., 455 U. S., at 203: “Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the protections of the First Amendment. But when the particular content or method of the advertising suggests that it is inherently misleading or when experience has proved that in fact such advertising is subject to abuse, the States may impose appropriate restrictions. Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely. But the States may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading information, e. g., a listing of areas of practice, if the information also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive. . . . “Even when a communication is not misleading, the State retains some authority to regulate. But the State must assert a substantial interest and the interference with speech must be in proportion to the interest served.” (Emphasis added.) In this case we must consider whether petitioner’s statement was misleading and, even if it was not, whether the potentially misleading character of such statements creates a state interest sufficiently substantial to justify a categorical ban on their use. The facts stated on petitioner’s letterhead are true and verifiable. It is undisputed that NBTA has certified petitioner as a civil trial specialist and that three States have licensed him to practice law. There is no contention that any potential client or person was actually misled or deceived by petitioner’s stationery. Neither the Commission nor the State Supreme Court made any factual finding of actual deception or misunderstanding, but rather concluded, as a matter of law, that petitioner’s claims of being “certified” as a “specialist” were necessarily misleading absent an official state certification program. Notably, although petitioner was originally charged with a violation of Disciplinary Rule 2-101(b), which aims at misleading statements by an attorney, his letterhead was not found to violate this rule. In evaluating petitioner’s claim of certification, the Illinois Supreme Court focused not on its facial accuracy, but on its implied claim “as to the quality of [petitioner’s] legal services,” and concluded that such a qualitative claim “‘might be so likely to mislead as to warrant restriction.’” 126 Ill. 2d, at 406, 534 N. E. 2d, at 984 (quoting In re R. M. J., 455 U. S., at 201). This analysis confuses the distinction between statements of opinion or quality and statements of objective facts that may support an inference of quality. A lawyer’s certification by NBTA is a verifiable fact, as are the predicate requirements for that certification. Measures of trial experience and hours of continuing education, like information about what schools the lawyer attended or his or her bar activities, are facts about a lawyer’s training and practice. A claim of certification is not an unverifiable opinion of the ultimate quality of a lawyer’s work or a promise of success, cf. In re R. M. J., 455 U. S., at 201, n. 14, but is simply a fact, albeit one with multiple predicates, from which a consumer may or may not draw an inference of the likely quality of an attorney’s work in a given area of practice. We must assume that some consumers will infer from petitioner’s statement that his qualifications in the area of civil trial advocacy exceed the general qualifications for admission to a state bar. Thus if the certification had been issued by an organization that had made no inquiry into petitioner’s fitness, or by one that issued certificates indiscriminately for a price, the statement, even if true, could be misleading. In this case, there is no evidence that a claim of NBTA certification suggests any greater degree of professional qualification than reasonably may be inferred from an evaluation of its rigorous requirements. Much like a trademark, the strength of a certification is measured by the quality of the organization for which it stands. The Illinois Supreme Court merely notes some confusion in the parties’ explanation of one of those requirements. See n. 9, supra. We find NBTA standards objectively clear, and, in any event, do not see why the degree of uncertainty identified by the State Supreme Court would make the letterhead inherently misleading to a consumer. A number of other States have their own certification plans and expressly authorize references to specialists and certification, but there is no evidence that the consumers in any of these States are misled if they do not inform themselves of the precise standards under which claims of certification are allowed. Nor can we agree with the Illinois Supreme Court’s somewhat contradictory fears that juxtaposition of the references to being “certified” as a “specialist” with the identification of the three States in which petitioner is “licensed” conveys, on the one hand, the impression that NBTA had the authority to grant those licenses and, on the other, that the NBTA certification was the product of official state action. The separate character of the two references is plain from their texts: one statement begins with the verb “[c]ertified” and identifies the source as the “National Board of Trial Advocacy,” while the second statement begins with the verb “[licensed” and identifies States as the source of licensure. The references are further distinguished by the fact that one is indented below petitioner’s name while the other uses the same margin as his name. See supra, at 96. There has been no finding that any person has associated certification with governmental action—state or federal—and there is no basis for belief that petitioner’s representation generally would be so construed. We are satisfied that the consuming public understands that licenses—to drive cars, to operate radio stations, to sell liquor—are issued by governmental authorities and that a host of certificates—to commend job performance, to convey an educational degree, to commemorate a solo flight or a hole in one—are issued by private organizations. The dictionary definition of “certificate,” from which the Illinois Supreme Court quoted only excerpts, comports with this common understanding: “[A] document issued by a school, a state agency, or a professional organization certifying that one has satisfactorily completed a course of studies, has passed a qualifying examination, or has attained professional standing in a given field and may officially practice or hold a position in that field.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 367 (1986 ed.) (emphasis added to portions omitted from 126 Ill. 2d, at 405, 534 N. E. 2d, at 984). The court relied on a similarly cramped definition of “specialist,” turning from Webster’s—which contains no suggestion of state approval of “specialists”—to the American Bar Association’s Comment to Model Rule 7.4, which prohibits a lawyer from stating or implying that he is a “specialist” except for designations of patent, admiralty, or state-designated specialties. The Comment to the Rule concludes that the terms “specialist” and “specialty” “have acquired a secondary meaning implying formal recognition as a specialist and, therefore, use of these terms is misleading” in States that have no formal certification procedures. ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 7.4 and Comment (1989). We appreciate the difficulties that evolving standards for attorney certification present to national organizations like the ABA. However, it seems unlikely that petitioner’s statement about his certification as a “specialist” by an identified national organization necessarily would be confused with formal state recognition. The Federal Trade Commission, which has a long history of reviewing claims of deceptive advertising, fortifies this conclusion with its observation that “one can readily think of numerous other claims of specialty—from ‘air conditioning specialist’ in the realm of home repairs to ‘foreign car specialist’ in the realm of automotive repairs—that cast doubt on the notion that the public would automatically mistake a claim of specialization for a claim of formal recognition by the State.” Brief for Federal Trade Commission as Amicus Curiae 24. We reject the paternalistic assumption that the recipients of petitioner’s letterhead are no more discriminating than the audience- for children’s television. Cf. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S. 60, 74 (1983). The two state courts that have evaluated lawyers’ advertisements of their certifications as civil trial specialists by NBTA have concluded that the statements were not misleading or deceptive on their face, and that, under our recent decisions, they were protected by the First Amendment. Ex parte Howell, 487 So. 2d 848 (Ala. 1986); In re Johnson, 341 N. W. 2d 282 (Minn. 1983). Given the complete absence of any evidence of deception in the present case, we must reject the contention that petitioner’s letterhead is actually misleading. IV Even if petitioner’s letterhead is not actually misleading, the Commission defends Illinois’ categorical prohibition against lawyers’ claims of being “certified” or a “specialist” on the assertion that these statements are potentially misleading. In the Commission’s view, the State’s interest in avoiding any possibility of misleading some consumers with such communications is so substantial that it outweighs the cost of providing other consumers with relevant information about lawyers who are certified as specialists. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U. S. 557, 566 (1980). We may assume that statements of “certification” as a “specialist,” even though truthful, may not be understood fully by some readers. However, such statements pose no greater potential of misleading consumers than advertising admission to “Practice before: The United States Supreme Court,” In re R. M. J., 455 U. S. 191 (1982), of exploiting the audience of a targeted letter, Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Assn., 486 U. S. 466 (1988), or of confusing a reader with an accurate illustration, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U. S. 626 (1985). In this case, as in those, we conclude that the particular state rule restricting lawyers’ advertising is “‘broader than reasonably necessary to prevent the’ perceived evil.” Shapero, 486 U. S., at 472, (quoting In re R. M. J., 455 U. S., at 203). Cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447 (1978) (restricting in-person solicitation). The need for a complete prophylactic against any claim of specialty is undermined by the fact that use of titles such as “Registered Patent Attorney” and “Proctor in Admiralty,” which are permitted under Rule 2-105(a)’s exceptions, produces the same risk of deception. Lacking empirical evidence to support its claim of deception, the Commission relies heavily on the inherent authority of the Illinois Supreme Court to supervise its own bar. Justice O’Connor’s dissent urges that “we should be more deferential” to the State, asserting without explanation that “the Supreme Court of Illinois is in a far better position than is this Court to determine which statements are misleading or likely to mislead.” Whether the inherent character of a statement places it beyond the protection of the First Amendment is a question of law over which Members of this Court should exercise de novo review. Cf. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 498-511 (1984). That the judgment below is by a State Supreme Court exercising review over the actions of its State Bar Commission does not insulate it from our review for constitutional infirmity. See, e. g., Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U. S. 1 (1971). The Commission’s authority is necessarily constrained by the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and specifically by the principle that disclosure of truthful, relevant information is more likely to make a positive contribution to decisionmaking than is concealment of such information. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 770 (1976); Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., 447 U. S., at 562. Even if we assume that petitioner’s letterhead may be potentially misleading to some consumers, that potential does not satisfy the State’s heavy burden of justifying a categorical prohibition against the dissemination of accurate factual information to the public. In re R. M. J., 455 U. S., at 203. The presumption favoring disclosure over concealment is fortified in this case by the separate presumption that members of a respected profession are unlikely to engage in practices that deceive their clients and potential clients. As we noted in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S., at 379: “It is at least somewhat incongruous for the opponents of advertising to extol the virtues and altruism of the legal profession at one point, and, at another, to assert that its members will seize the opportunity to mislead and distort.” We do not ignore the possibility that some unscrupulous attorneys may hold themselves out as certified specialists when there is no qualified organization to stand behind that certification. A lawyer’s truthful statement that “XYZ Board” has “certified” him as a “specialist in admiralty law” would not necessarily be entitled to First Amendment protection if the certification were a sham. States can require an attorney who advertises “XYZ certification” to demonstrate that such certification is available to all lawyers who meet objective and consistently applied standards relevant to practice in a particular area of the law. There has been no showing—indeed no suggestion—that the burden of distinguishing between certifying boards that are bona fide and those that are bogus would be significant, or that bar associations and official disciplinary committees cannot police deceptive practices effectively. Cf. Shapero, 486 U. S., at 477 (“The record before us furnishes no evidence that scrutiny of targeted solicitation letters will be appreciably more burdensome or less reliable than scrutiny of advertisements”). “If the naiveté of the public will cause advertising by attorneys to be misleading, then it is the bar’s role to assure that the populace is sufficiently informed as to enable it to place advertising in its proper perspective.” Bates, 433 U. S., at 375. To the extent that potentially misleading statements of private certification or specialization could confuse consumers, a State might consider screening certifying organizations or requiring a disclaimer about the certifying organization or the standards of a specialty. In re R. M. J., 455 U. S., at 201-203. A State may not, however, completely ban statements that are not actually or inherently misleading, such as certification as a specialist by bona fide organizations such as NBTA. Cf. In re Johnson, 341 N. W. 2d, at 283 (striking down the Disciplinary Rule that prevented statements of being “ ‘a specialist unless and until the Minnesota Supreme Court adopts or authorizes rules or regulations permitting him to do so’”). Information about certification and specialties facilitates the consumer’s access to legal services and thus better serves the administration of justice. Petitioner’s letterhead was neither actually nor inherently misleading. There is no dispute about the bona fides and the relevance of NBTA certification. The Commission’s concern about the possibility of deception in hypothetical cases is not sufficient to rebut the constitutional presumption favoring disclosure over concealment. Disclosure of information such as that on petitioner’s letterhead both serves the public interest and encourages the development and utilization of meritorious certification programs for attorneys. As the public censure of petitioner for violating Rule 2-105(a)(3) violates the First Amendment, the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . If a statement may not be censored by the Federal Government, it is also protected from censorship by the State of Illinois. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931). Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice? 42 Ford. L. Rev. 227 (1973) (recording the Fourth Annual John F. Sonnett Memorial Lecture delivered on November 26, 1973). The address warned that a lawyer is not qualified, “simply by virtue of admission to the bar, to be an advocate in trial courts in matters of serious consequence.” Id., at 240. Other proponents stress more positive reasons for certification such as the creation of “a powerful professional and economic incentive to increase [lawyers’] competence.” Brief for Academy of Certified Trial Lawyers of Minnesota as Amicus Curiae 15. See Trial Advocacy as a Specialty: Final Report of the Annual Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference on Advocacy in the United States (sponsored by the Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation) (1976). The groups sponsoring NBTA include the National District Attorneys Association, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, the International Academy of Trial Lawyers, the International Society of Barristers, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the National Association of Women Lawyers, and the American Board of Professional Liability Attorneys. Brief for NBTA as Amicus Curiae 9-13. The current NBTA requirements are that an applicant: (1) be a bar member in good standing; (2) disclose any misconduct including criminal comrctions or professional discipline; (3) show at least five years of actual practice in civil trial law during the period immediately preceding application for certification; (4) show substantial involvement in trial practice, including 30% of professional time in civil trial litigation during each of the five years preceding application; (5) demonstrate experience by appearing as lead counsel in at least 15 complete trials of civil matters to verdict or judgment, including at least 45 days of trial and 5 jury trials, and by appearing as lead counsel in 40 additional contested matters involving the taking of testimony; (6) participate in 45 hours of continuing legal education in civil trial practice in the three years preceding application; 17) be confidentially reviewed by six attorneys, including two against or with whom the applicant has tried a civil matter, and a judge before whom the applicant has appeared within the preceding two years; (8) provide a substantial trial court memorandum or brief that was submitted to a court in the preceding three years; and (9) pass a day-long written examination testing both procedural and substantive law in various areas of civil trial practice. Petitioner has been vice chair of the Insurance and Tort Committee of the General Practice Session of the American Bar Association and an officer of the Tri-City Bar Association. He is a member of the Illinois State Bar Association, the Arizona State Bar Association, the Missouri State Bar Association, the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association, and the Association of Trial Lawyers of America. Hearing Tr., App. G to Pet. for Cert. 28a-29a. Report of the Hearing Panel, App. C to Pet. for Cert. 19a; App. 22-23. App. D to Pet. for Cert. 21a. Disciplinary Rule 2—105(a)(3) (1988). The exceptions are for patent, trademark, and admiralty lawyers. The remainder of Rule 2-105 provides: “Rule 2-105. Limitation of Practice. “(a) A lawyer shall not hold himself out publicly as a specialist, except as follows: “(1) A lawyer admitted to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office may use the designation ‘Patents,’ ‘Patent Attorney,’ ‘Patent Lawyer,’ or ‘Registered Patent Attorney’ or any combination of those terms, on his letterhead and office sign. “(2) A lawyer engaged in the trademark practice may use the designation ‘Trademarks,’ ‘Trademark Attorney’ or ‘Trademark Lawyer,’ or a combination of those terms, and a lawyer engaged in the admiralty practice may use the designation ‘Admiralty,’ ‘Proctor in Admiralty’ or ‘Admiralty Lawyer,’ or a combination of those terms, in any form of communication otherwise permitted under Rules 2-101 through 2-104.” 126 Ill. 2d, at 406-407, 534 N. E. 2d, at 984-985. The court noted some ambiguity and inconsistency in the descriptions of required trial experience: by petitioner as 40 jury trials carried to verdict, by amicus Association of Trial Lawyers of America as 15 major cases carried to verdict, and by amicus NBTA as 15 complete trials to verdict, at least 5 of which were to a jury. Petitioner’s brief to the state court did fail to report the newly revised standards provided by the amici, whose descriptions varied from each other’s only in terminology. Brief for Petitioner 23, n. 26. All parties have provided the revised standards to this Court. See n. 4, supra. Of course, many lawyers who do not have or publicize certification are in fact more able than others who do claim such a credential. The Commission does not suggest that the absence of certification leads consumers to conclude that these attorneys are unqualified. In any event, such a negative inference would be far more likely in a State that certifies attorneys under a comprehensive formal program, than in one that provides no official recognition. See, e. g., Ala. Code Prof. Resp. Temp. DR 2-112 (1989); Ariz. Rule Prof. Conduct ER 7.4 (1990); Ark. Model Rule Prof. Conduct 7.4(c) (1990); Cal. Rule Ct., Policies Governing the State Bar of California Program for Certifying Legal Specialists (1990); Conn. Rule Prof. Conduct 7.4A-C (1989); Fla. Rule Regulating Bar 6-4 (1990); Ga. Rules Ct. Ann., DR 2-105(3) (1989); La. Rev. Stat. Ann., Rule of Prof. Conduct 7.4(b) (1988); Minn. Rule of Prof. Conduct 7.4 and Minn. State Bd. of Legal Certification Rules 5, 6, 8 (1990); N. J. Ct. Rule 1:39 and N. J. Rule Prof. Conduct 7.4 (1989); N. M. Rules Governing Practice of Law, Legal Specialization 19-101 et seq. (1988); N. C. Ann. Rules, Plan of Certified Legal Specialization, App. H (1990); S. C. Sup. Ct. Rule 53 (1988); Tex. State Bar Rules, Art. 10, § 9, DR 2-101(C), (1989); Utah Rule Prof. Conduct 7.4(b) (1990). Board certification of specialists in various branches of medicine, handled by the 23 member boards of the American Board of Medical Specialties, is based on various requirements of education, residency, examinations and evaluations. American Board of Medical Specialties, Board Evaluation Procedures: Developing a Research Agenda, Conference Proceedings 7-11 (1981). The average member of the public does not know or necessarily understand these requirements, but board certification nevertheless has “come to be regarded as evidence of the skill and proficiency of those to whom they [have] been issued.” American Board of Medical Specialties, Evaluating the Skills of Medical Specialists 1 (J. Lloyd and D. Langsley eds. 1983). Prior to its revision in 1989, the Comment to ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 7.4 also prohibited any statement that a lawyer’s practice “is limited to,” or “concentrated in,” an area under the same explanation that these terms had “a secondary meaning implying formal recognition as a specialist.” Model Rule 7.4 Comment (1983). When Rule 7.4 was originally proposed in 1983, proponents of unsuccessful amendments to drop all prohibition of terms argued that “the public does not attach the narrow meaning to the word ‘specialist’ that the legal profession generally does. The public would perceive no distinction between a lawyer’s claim that he practices only probate law and a claim that he concentrates his practice in probate law.” ABA, The Legislative History of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 189 (1987). The amendments’ opponents argued that allowing lawyers to designate themselves as specialists would undermine the States’ ability to set up and control specialization programs. Ibid. This position essentially conceded that these terms did not yet have “a secondary meaning implying formal recognition,” but only that they could develop such a secondary meaning if state programs came into being. Rule 7.4’s exception for designations of “Patent Attorney” and “Proctor in Admiralty” ignores the asserted interest in avoiding confusion from any secondary meaning of these terms. The Comment to Rule 7.4 actually imbues these terms with a historical, virtually formal, recognition, despite the lack of any prerequisites for their use: “Recognition of specialization in patent matters is a matter of long-established policy of the Patent and Trademark Office. Designation of admiralty practice has a long historical tradition associated with maritime commerce and the federal courts.” ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 7.4 Comment (1989). Justice O’Connor’s legal conclusion about the deceptive potential of petitioner’s letterhead, like that of the Illinois Supreme Court, rests on a flexible appraisal of the character of the consuming public. For example, her opinion emphasizes the “public’s comparative lack of knowledge” about the legal profession and its lack of “sophistication concerning legal services,” post, at 120, 124, but simultaneously reasons that the public will believe that all certifications are state sanctioned because of their “common knowledge that States police the ethical standards of the profession” and their specific knowledge that States like California are now certifying legal specialists, post, at 124. These consumers also can distinguish “Registered Patent Attorney” from “Certified Patent Attorney,” interpreting the former as an acceptable “reporting of professional experience,” but the latter as a deceptive “claim of quality.” Post, at 126. We prefer to assume that the average consumer, with or without knowledge of the legal profession, can understand a statement that certification by a national organization is not certification by the State, and can decide what, if any, value to accord this information. The attempt in Justice O’Connor’s dissent to distinguish In re R. M. J. by reasoning that a consumer can contact the Supreme Court to see if a lawyer is really a member of the Court’s Bar, post, at 122, misses the point. Both admission to the Bar of this Court and certification by NBTA are facts, whether or not consumers verify them. The legal question is whether a statement of either fact is nonetheless so misleading that it falls beyond the First Amendment’s protections. We found that the advertisement of admission to the Bar of this Court could not be banned, despite recognition that “this relatively uninformative fact is at least bad taste” and “could be misleading to the general public unfamiliar with the requirements of admission to the Bar of this Court.” In re R. M. J., 455 U. S., at 205-206. It is noteworthy that Justice White’s reference to the overbreadth doctrine, see post, at 118-119, is potentially misleading. That doctrine allows a party whose own conduct is not protected by the First Amendment to challenge a regulation as overbroad because of its impact on parties not before the Court. In this case we hold that Illinois Disciplinary Rule 2-105 is invalid as applied to petitioner Peel. Accordingly, the over-breadth doctrine to which Justice White refers has no relevance to our analysis. Post, at 121. Justice O’Connor’s abdication of review would create radical disparities in First Amendment protections from State to State. On the one hand, it finds that the Illinois Supreme Court “properly concluded [that] certification is tantamount to a claim of quality and superiority and is therefore inherently likely to mislead.” Post, at 123. Under this analysis, claims of certification by States as well as by private organizations are deceptive and thus fall outside of the First Amendment’s protection; indeed, Illinois forbids claims of “certification” as a “specialist” by any entity. See also post, at 121 (listing States that ban certification). On the other hand, Justice O’Connor apparently also would defer to the contrary judgments of other States, which have held that the First Amendment protects claims of NBTA certification by members of their bars, e. g., Ex parte Howell, 487 So. 2d 848 (Ala. 1986); In re Johnson, 341 N. W. 2d 282 (Minn. 1983), and have held that claims of official state certification are permissible, see, e. g., post, at 124 (listing States that certify). It is not necessary here—as it also was not in In re R. M. J.—to consider when a State might impose some disclosure requirements, rather than a total prohibition, in order to minimize the possibility that a reader will misunderstand the significance of a statement of fact that is protected by the First Amendment. We agree with Justice Marshall, post, at 111, that a holding that a total ban is unconstitutional does not necessarily preclude less restrictive regulation of commercial speech. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350, 376 (1977). A principal reason why consumers do not consult lawyers is because they do not know how to find a lawyer able to assist them with their particular problems. Federal Trade Commission, Staff Report on Improving Consumer Access to Legal Services: The Case for Removing Restrictions of Truthful Advertising 1 (1984). Justice O’Connor would extend this convenience to consumers who seek admiralty, patent, and trademark lawyers, post, at 126, but not to consumers who need a lawyer certified or specializing in more commonly needed areas of the law.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations
What is the ideological direction of the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court?
[ "Conservative", "Liberal", "Unspecifiable" ]
[ 0 ]
sc
UNITED STATES v. LESLIE SALT CO. No. 74. Argued December 7, 1955. Decided March 5, 1956. John F. Davis argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant Attorney General Holland, Ellis N. Slack, A. F. Prescott and Fred E. Youngman. Bruce M. Casey, Jr. argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Walter C. Fox, Jr. Chester Rohrlich filed a brief for Rayonier Incorporated, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. On February 1, 1949, Leslie Salt Company, being in need of funds to meet maturing bank loans and for working capital, borrowed $3,000,000 from the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York and $1,000,000 from the Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company. As evidence of the indebtedness Leslie Salt delivered to each insurance company its “3/4% Sinking Fund Promissory Note Due February 1, 1964” in these amounts. The question presented is whether these instruments are subject to the documentary stamp taxes laid on “all bonds, debentures, or certificates of indebtedness issued by any corporation . . . under §§ 1800 and 1801 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue held the tax applicable, considering the two instruments to be “debentures” within the meaning of § 1801. However, in a tax recovery suit instituted by Leslie Salt, following payment of the tax under protest and the Commissioner’s denial of a refund, the District Court and the Court of Appeals held the instruments not to be “debentures” or otherwise subject to stamp taxes. We brought the case here, 349 U. S. 951, to resolve the uncertainty left by lower court decisions as to whether § 1801 applies to corporate notes of this type. Except as to amounts' and payees, the two instruments in question were in identical terms, having these principal features: (1) each instrument carried the promissory note description already indicated; (2) each had a maturity of 15 years; (3) each carried interest of 3%% payable August 1 and February 1 of each year on the unpaid balance; and (4) each was subject to the terms of an underlying agreement containing elaborate provisions for the protection of the note holders. Among those provisions was one under which each insurance company could require Leslie Salt to convert its note, which was typewritten on ordinary white paper, into a series of new notes in denominations of $1,000 or multiples thereof, “either in registered form without coupons or in coupon form, and in printed or in fully engraved form.” This option has not been exercised by either note holder. These transactions with the two insurance companies constituted a variety of “private placement,” a method of corporate financing which, because of its economies and conveniences, has become popular since the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933. The Government claims that these notes are taxable under § 1801 either as “debentures” or “certificates of indebtedness.” The taxpayer, on the other hand, contends that these terms, undefined in the statute, do not include notes of the type here in issue. Taking the statute in light of its legislative and administrative history, we agree with the taxpayer’s contention. “Debentures” and “certificates of indebtedness,” along with other kinds of corporate securities, have been subject to stamp taxes since 1898, except for the period between 1902 and 1914. “Promissory notes” were also subject to stamp duties from 1898 to 1901 and from 1914 until 1924, when the tax was repealed; it has never been re-enacted. The tax on “promissory notes,” however, was always carried in a section separate from that containing the tax on “bonds, debentures, or certificates of indebtedness,” and was always at a rate lower than the tax on those instruments. Since promissory notes, debentures, and certificates of indebtedness all serve the same basic purpose — that is, as evidence of a debt — this former legislative distinction between promissory notes and the other instruments assumes significance in determining whether the present notes are taxable. For unless the earlier statutes were intended to impose two taxes on the same instrument, which we should not assume, or the present tax on debentures and certificates of indebtedness is broader in scope than that in effect in 1924, of which there is no indication, it would seem to follow that these notes should not now be taxed if they can be said to fall within the class of “promissory notes” on which the tax was repealed. The Government argues that the repealed promissory note provision related only to ordinary short-term paper customarily used in day-to-day commercial transactions, and that it did not embrace notes, like those here involved, of large amounts, long maturity, and secured by an elaborate underlying agreement. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Higgins, 161 F. 2d 593, 595. The existence of these features, however, does not render either of the Leslie Salt instruments any the less a promissory note, as each was captioned. Nor do we find anything in the earlier legislation or in its history which satisfies us that this type of note would not have been taxable at the lower rate provided in the promissory note section of the former statute. See Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 213 F. 2d 305, 308-310. Moreover, the administrative interpretations of the Treasury, discussed below, affirmatively indicate that they would have been considered taxable under that section. But even assuming that these notes could not fairly be called “promissory notes,” it does not follow that they must therefore be regarded as “debentures” or “certificates of indebtedness.” That depends upon the meaning of those terms in the statute, and upon whether these notes, regardless of their descriptive caption, have the essential characteristics of “debentures” or “certificates of indebtedness,” as those terms are used in the statute. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Higgins, supra; Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Fitzpatrick, supra. And in determining the scope of the statute, which has remained substantially unchanged since its first enactment, the Treasury’s interpretations of it are entitled to great weight. White v. Winchester Club, 315 U. S. 32, 41. The administrative history of the statute establishes that until 1947, when the General Motors case, supra, was decided, only those instruments were considered subject to the “debenture” tax which were issued (1) in series, (2) under a trust indenture, and (3) in registered form or with coupons attached. In other words, that tax was considered to apply only to marketable corporate securities, as that term is generally understood. Conversely, corporate promissory notes lacking any of those features, such as those issued by respondent, were taxed at the lower promissory note rate until that tax was repealed in 1924, and were not taxed thereafter until the Government's success in the General Motors case in 1947. As early as 1918 the Treasury, in distinguishing instruments taxable at the “bond” and “debenture” rate from those taxable at the lower “promissory note” rate, then still in force, drew the line as follows: “(3) Instruments containing the essential features of a promissory note, but issued by corporations in numbers under a trust indenture, either in registered form or with coupons attached, embodying provisions for acceleration of maturity in the event of any default by the obligor, for optional registration in the case of bearer bonds, for authentication by the trustee, and sometimes for redemption before maturity, or similar provisions, are bonds within the meaning of the statute, whether called bonds, debentures, or notes. However, a short-term instrument, although issued by a corporation under a trust indenture, may be regarded as a note if every instrument of such issue both (a) is payable to bearer and incapable of registration and (5) lacks interest coupons and so requires presentation upon each payment of interest.” T. D. 2713, May 14, 1918, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 358 (1918). When Congress in 1918 amended the existing statute by-adding the language “and all instruments, however termed, issued by any corporation with interest coupons or in registered form, known generally as corporate securities . . . ,” still found in § 1801, the Treasury recognized that this was in effect an enactment of its prior restrictive interpretation. The regulations which followed the repeal in 1924 of the tax on promissory notes did not purport to enlarge the scope of the tax on “bonds” or “debentures”; the Treasury adhered to the same interpretation issued under the previous statute. The regulations were amended in 1941 to the less specific, but not inconsistent, form under which the present notes were taxed. Finally, explicit recognition that the attempt to tax notes not having the features of marketable corporate securities was a departure from prior Treasury-practice is found in a ruling by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that General Motors would not be applied retroactively: “The Bureau has for a considerable period of time held that an instrument termed ‘note/ not in registered form- and issued without interest coupons, is not subject to the stamp tax upon issuance or transfer. Because of this long and uniform holding of the Bureau and the consequent reliance of corporations on these rulings, it has been concluded that, under the authority contained in section 3791 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code, the decision in General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Higgins, supra, will not be applied retroactively, except that any tax which has been paid on the issuance or transfer of instruments falling within the scope of the decision will not be refunded.” Cum. Bull. 1948-2, M. T. 32, p. 160. The term “certificate of indebtedness” has a similar administrative background. Since 1920 the Treasury has considered certificates of indebtedness as akin to bonds and debentures, including “only instruments having the general character of investment securities, as distinguished from instruments evidencing debts arising in ordinary transaction between individuals . . . .” Sales Tax Rulings, L. O. 909, December 1920, ST. 1-20-85; Regs. 55 (Art. 14), October 26, 1920, 22 T. D. Int. Rev. 502 (1920). The essence of an “investment security” is, of course, marketability, and this basic feature the Leslie Salt notes did not have. The Treasury itself has acknowledged that promissory notes lacking this quality have never been taxed as “certificates of indebtedness,” Cum. Bull. 1948-2, M. T. 32, p. 160 (supra, p. 393), and none of the lower court cases, including General Motors, supra, have regarded instruments such as the Leslie Salt notes as being certificates of indebtedness. Moreover, it may be observed that in the stamp tax sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 the words “certificates of indebtedness,” consistently with this administrative history, have been eliminated as a separate taxable category of corporate instruments, and are employed simply as a term of art embracing all the instruments taxed, that is, “bonds,” “debentures” and other instruments in registered form or with coupons. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §§4311, 4381, 68A Stat. 514, 523, 26 U. S. C. §§4311, 4381. In contrast to the position it had consistently taken throughout the many years preceding the decision in the General Motors case, the Treasury now argues “that Congress intended in Section 1801 to cover all long-term debt obligations supported by elaborate protective covenants and that this is so regardless of the details of the papers used, the language by which the transaction was consummated or the nature of the purchaser’s business.” This contention seems to stem from the belief that had the “private placement” method of financing been as widely known in 1924 as it is now, Congress would not have repealed the promissory note tax in its entirety, as it did. But if that be so it is nevertheless for Congress, not the courts, to change the statute. We "must deal with the statute as we find it, and if these instruments are neither “debentures” nor “certificates of indebtedness” they may not be taxed under the present statute. These taxes are based not upon the nature of the transaction involved, but upon the character of the instruments employed. As long ago as 1873, this Court said: “The liability of an instrument to a stamp duty, as well as the amount of such duty, is determined by the form and face of the instrument, and cannot be affected by proof of facts outside of the instrument itself.” United States v. Isham, 17 Wall. 496, 504. There are persuasive reasons for construing “debentures” and “certificates of indebtedness” in accordance with the Treasury’s original interpretation of those terms in this statute’s altogether comparable predecessors. In Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294, 315, Mr. Justice Cardozo said: “administrative practice, consistent and generally unchallenged, will not be overturned except for very cogent reasons if the scope of the command is indefinite and doubtful. United States v. Moore, 95 U. S. 760, 763; Logan v. Davis, 233 U. S. 613, 627; Brewster v. Gage, 280 U. S. 327, 336; Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 375; Interstate Commerce Commn. v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 287 U. S. 178. The practice has peculiar weight when it involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in. motion, of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new.” Against the Treasury’s prior longstanding and consistent administrative interpretation its more recent ad hoc contention as to how the statute should be construed cannot stand. Moreover, that original interpretation has had both express and implied congressional acquiescence, through the 1918 amendment to the statute (supra, p. 391), which has ever since continued in effect, and through Congress having let the administrative interpretation remain undisturbed for so many years. See Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U. S. 46, 53; Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United States, supra, at p. 313. Still further, it is an interpretation which is in accord with the generally understood meaning of the term “debentures.” Cf. First Nat. Bank v. Flershem, 290 U. S. 504, 508. “The words of the statute [a stamp tax statute] are to be taken in the sense in which they will be understood by that public in which they are to take effect.” United States v. Isham, supra, at p. 504. Construing the statute as we have, we conclude that the Leslie Salt notes are neither “debentures” nor “certificates of indebtedness” within its meaning. The fact that the agreement underlying these notes provides for the substitution of instruments which might qualify as debentures does not render these notes taxable, for until debentures are in existence the “debenture” tax cannot be imposed. We hold these notes are not subject to stamp taxes under the statute. Affirmed. Sec. 1800. “There shall be levied, collected, and paid, for and in respect of the several bonds, debentures, or certificates of stock and of indebtedness, and other documents, instruments, matters, and things mentioned and described in sections 1801 to 1807, inclusive, or for or in respect of the vellum, parchment, or paper upon which such instruments, matters, or things, or any of them, are written or printed, the several taxes specified in such sections.” 53 Stat. 195, 26 U. S. C. § 1800. Sec. 1801. “On all bonds, debentures, or certificates of indebtedness issued by any corporation, and all instruments, however termed, issued by any corporation with interest coupons or in registered form, known generally as corporate securities, on each $100 of face value or fraction thereof, 11 cents: Provided, That every renewal of the foregoing shall be taxed as a new issue . . . .” 53 Stat. 195-196, 26 U. S. C. § 1801. 110 F. Supp. 680. 218 F. 2d 91. Decisions in the Courts of Appeals pointing toward the taxpayer’s view are Curtis Publishing Co. v. Smith, 220 F. 2d 748 (C. A. 3d Cir.); Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 213 F. 2d 305 (C. A. 2d Cir.); United States v. Ely & Walker Dry Goods Co., 201 F. 2d 584 (C. A. 8th Cir.); Allen v. Atlanta Metallic Casket Co., 197 F. 2d 460 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Belden Mfg. Co. v. Jarecki, 192 F. 2d 211 (C. A. 7th Cir.), and in the District Courts are Bijou Theatrical Enterprise Co. v. Menninger, 127 F. Supp. 16 (D. C. E. D. Mich.); Knudsen Creamery Co. of California v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 860 (D. C. S. D. Calif.); Shamrock Oil & Gas Co. v. Campbell, 107 F. Supp. 764 (D. C. N. D. Tex.); Follansbee Steel Corp. v. United States, 4 P-H 1955 Fed. Tax Serv. ¶72, 715 (D. C. W. D. Pa.); United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 4 P-H 1955 Fed. Tax Serv. ¶72, 567 (D. C. N. D. Ill.); Motor Finance Corp. v. United States, 4 P-H 1954 Fed. Tax Serv. ¶72,706 (D. C. D. N. J.). Decisions in the Courts of Appeals pointing the other way are General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Higgins, 161 F. 2d 593 (C. A. 2d Cir.), and Commercial Credit Co. v. Hofferbert, 188 F. 2d 574 (C. A. 4th Cir.), and in the District Courts are S. S. Pierce Co. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 396 (D. C. D. Mass.); H. Kobacker & Sons Co. v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 211 (D. C. N. D. Ohio); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Higgins, 120 F. Supp. 737 (D. C. S. D. N. Y.); United States v. General Shoe Corp., 117 F. Supp. 668 (D. C. M. D. Tenn.); Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. v. Kelm, 112 F. Supp. 872 (D. C. D. Minn.); Sharon Steel Corp. v. United States, 4 P-H 1955 Fed. Tax Serv. ¶72, 716 (D. C. W. D. Pa.) ; and Stuyvesant Town Corp. v. United States, 124 Ct. Cl. 686, 111 F. Supp. 243 (Ct. Cl.). Other provisions of these agreements may be summarized as follows: (1) The basic terms under which the insurance companies agreed to “purchase'’ the Leslie Salt notes. (2) Representations by Leslie Salt that financial statements and lists of property holdings submitted by it were complete and accurate. (3) Various conditions precedent to the purchase of the notes, including: opinion by counsel that the transaction was authorized under the applicable state law; that the balance of the $4,000,000 loan was subscribed; and that the loan documents would be in form satisfactory to counsel. (4) A representation by the lender that it was not acquiring the note for the purpose of sale. (5) A provision for prepayment by Leslie Salt of $285,000 principal amount for each year, without premium, and of an additional $285,000 annually at the option of Leslie Salt, also without premium, as long as the prepayment came from earnings or liquidation of assets. Leslie Salt had the right to make further prepayments, but subject to a premium of 3%, which after the first three years of the note descended in amount at the rate of %% each year. (6) Leslie Salt promised to pay all its taxes, keep its property in repair, keep accurate records, insure its properties, and make regular financial statements to the holders of the notes. (7) Leslie Salt promised not to become indebted, not to pay dividends or retire stock, except as provided in the agreement, and not to change the nature of its business or let its working capital decline beneath a specified amount. Act of June 13, 1898, 30 Stat. 448, 451, 458; Act of March 2, 1901, 31 Stat. 938, 940, 942; repealed by the Act of April 12, 1902, 32 Stat. 96, 97; re-enacted in the Act of October 22, 1914, 38 Stat. 745, 753, 759, and carried forward in subsequent Revenue Acts. Act of June 13, 1898, 30 Stat. 448, 451, 459; repealed by the Act of March 2, 1901, 31 Stat. 942; re-enacted in the Act of October 22, 1914, 38 Stat. 745, 753, 760; carried over in the Revenue Acts of 1917, 1918, and 1921, 40 Stat. 300, 319, 323; 40 Stat. 1057, 1133, 1137; 42 Stat. 227, 301, 305, and repealed by the Revenue Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 253, 352. In this same Treasury Decision “promissory note” was defined as “An instrument not under seal containing a simple promise to pay a sum of money at a specified time, such as is common in everyday commercial use, is a promissory note within the meaning of the statute.” It should be noted that the qualification which we have italicized was omitted from the definition of “promissory note” in the Regulations promulgated one year later. See note 10, infra. The then Solicitor of Internal Revenue, Mr. Robert N. Miller, expressed this view: “The words ‘all instruments, however termed, issued by any ‘corporation with interest coupons or in registered form, known generally as corporate securities,’ were clearly added in recognition of the varied forms in which corporate securities are issued, and to defeat any attempt by a corporation to avoid the tax by issuing instruments of the general character of bonds, debentures, or certificates of indebtedness under a different name.” Sales Tax Rulings, L. O. 909, December 1920, ST. 1-20-85. “Art. 8. Instruments issued in numbers, under a trust indenture, are bonds. — Instruments containing the essential features of a promissory note, but issued in series, secured by a trust indenture, either in registered form or with coupons attached, embodying provisions for acceleration of maturity in the event of any default by the obligor, for optional registration in the case of bearer bonds, for authentication by the trustee, and in some instances for redemption before maturity, or similar provisions, are bonds within the meaning of the statute, whether called bonds, debentures, or notes.” Treasury Regulations 55, September 13,1924. The regulations preceding the repeal of the tax on promissory notes provided: “Art. 8. Instruments issued by corporations in numbers, under a trust indenture, are bonds. — Instruments containing the essential features of a promissory note, but issued by corporations in series, secured by a trust indenture, either in registered form or with coupons attached, embodying provisions for acceleration of maturity in the event of any default by the obligor, for optional registration in the case of bearer bonds, for authentication by the trustee, and in some instances for redemption before maturity, or similar provisions, are bonds within the meaning of the statute, whether called bonds, debentures, or notes. “Art. 48. ‘Promissory note’ defined. — A promissory note is an unconditional promise in writing made by one person to another signed by the maker engaging to pay on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum certain in money to such other person or to order or to bearer, free from restrictions as to registration or transfer and usually without coupons.” Treasury Regulations 55, June 11,1919. The 1920 revision of Regulations 55 was substantially identical, as were the Regulations issued under the Revenue Act of 1921 (Regulations 55, Articles 8 and 35). Sec. 113.50. “Scope of tax. Section 1801 imposes a tax upon the issue by any corporation of bonds, debentures, certificates of indebtedness, and all instruments, however termed, with interest coupons or in registered form and known generally as corporate securities. Every renewal of the above described instruments is taxable as a new issue.” Sec. 113.55. “Issues subject to tax. Ordinarily, a corporate instrument styled a bond, debenture, or certificate of indebtedness is subject to the tax. However, the taxability of an instrument is not determined by the name alone but depends upon all the circumstances, such as the name, form, and terms of the instrument, etc. Hence, an instrument, however designated, having all the essential characteristics of a bond, debenture, or certificate of indebtedness is taxable as such. Similarly, an instrument issued with interest coupons, or with provision for registration, and coming within the class known generally as corporate securities will be held subject to the tax regardless of the name by which it may be called.” 26 CFR, 1944 Cum. Supp., §§ 113.50,113.55. The ruling by the Solicitor of Internal Revenue said: “The Century Dictionary defines ‘debenture’ as ‘A writing acknowledging a debt; specifically, an instrument, generally under seal, for the repayment of money lent; usually, if not exclusively, used as obligations of corporations or large moneyed copartnerships, issued in a form convenient to be bought and sold as investments.’ This definition was adopted by the court in Barton Nat. Bank v. Atkins, 72 Vt. 55; 47 Atl. 176, 180. The term 'certificates of indebtedness’ has also come to have in commercial use a similar meaning. In Denver v. Home Savings Bank, 236 U. S. 101, 105, the court said: “ 'What is true about bonds is true about certificates of indebtedness. Indeed it is difficult to see any distinction between them as they are commonly known to the business world. The essence of each is that they contain a promise under seal of the corporation to pay a certain sum to order or bearer.’ “If the term 'certificates of indebtedness’ standing by itself be susceptible of a broader meaning than that given to it above, its association here with bonds and debentures excludes such broader meaning. The maxim noscitur a sociis applies. “A consideration of Title XI as a whole supports the conclusion above arrived at. Three classes of paper issued by individuals, partnerships, and corporations are subject thereunder to stamp tax: Bonds of indebtedness (subdivision 1), certificates of stock (subdivision 3), and drafts or checks and promissory notes (subdivision 6); i. e., instruments possessing to a greater or less extent the attributes of commercial paper. “The premises lead inevitably to the conclusion that it was not the intention of Congress to tax under subdivision 1 of the said Schedule A every evidence of indebtedness other than those included under the heads of shares or certificates of stock, promissory notes, or bills of exchange, but only those evidences of indebtedness which have the general character of investment securities and which may properly be included under the term ‘bonds of indebtedness.’ The definition of ‘certificate of indebtedness’ as ‘primarily any instrument acknowledging liability for the payment of money, not in the recognized form of a promissory note or bill of exchange,’ contained in T. D. 2713, is too inclusive and does not sufficiently delimit the instruments included in the term. “It is therefore held that the term ‘certificate of indebtedness’ as used in subdivision 1 of Schedule A, Title XI, Revenue Act of 1918, includes only instruments having the general character of investment securities, as distinguished from instruments evidencing debts arising in ordinary transaction between individuals; and that conditional bills of sale are not certificates of indebtedness. “T. D. 2713 should be modified to conform with this holding. “Robert N. Miller, “Solicitor of Internal Revenue.” It should be said that the administrative practice, which we consider as crucial here, was not brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals in Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Fitzpatrick, supra. Nor do General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Higgins, supra, or any of the cases cited in note 4, supra, advert to that practice. As long ago as 1916, no less an authority on corporate finance than the late Mr. F. L. Stetson described debentures in the following terms: “In the United States, as already mentioned, the term ‘debenture’ is understood to mean serial obligations of a corporation not secured by a specific mortgage, pledge or assignment of property. Of course a series of debentures may be issued without the execution of any indenture relating thereto. Prior to 1900 the few issues that had been made of such debentures were not accompanied by a trust agreement. In such case the rights and privileges given to bondholders were set forth at length in the obligation, thus making a somewhat lengthy instrument. Since an issue of debentures under trust agreements by the Lake Shore R. It. Co. and by the New York Central, the custom of adopting such agreements has become general. Originally in 1893 the General Electric Company made a large issue of debentures without an agreement, but at the time of the refunding in 1912 a trust agreement was executed.” “Preparation of Corporate Bonds, Mortgages, Collateral Trusts and Debenture Indentures,” in Some Legal Phases of Corporate Financing, Reorganization and Regulation, p. 66 (Assn. of the Bar of the City of New York, 1917).
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.
What is the ideological direction of the decision?
[ "Conservative", "Liberal", "Unspecifiable" ]
[ 0 ]
sc
State of FLORIDA, Plaintiff v. State of GEORGIA. No. 142, Orig. Supreme Court of the United States Argued Jan. 8, 2018. Decided June 27, 2018. Gregory G. Garre, for the Plaintiff. Craig S. Primis, for the Defendant. Edwin S. Kneedler for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, in support of overruling Florida's exception 2c. Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the proper apportionment of the water of an interstate river basin. Florida, a downstream State, brought this lawsuit against Georgia, an upstream State, claiming that Georgia has denied it an equitable share of the basin's waters. We found that the dispute lies within our original jurisdiction, and we appointed a Special Master to take evidence and make recommendations. After lengthy evidentiary proceedings, the Special Master submitted a report in which he recommends that the Court deny Florida's request for relief on the ground that "Florida has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that its injury can be redressed by an order equitably apportioning the waters of the Basin." Report of Special Master 3. The case is before us on Florida's exceptions to the Special Master's Report. In light of our examination of the Report and relevant portions of the record, we remand the case to the Master for further findings and such further proceedings as the Master believes helpful. I A This original action arises out of a dispute over the division of water from an interstate river basin known as the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin. The Basin drains an area of more than 20,000 square miles across the southeastern United States. Three interstate rivers form the heart of the Basin and are central to this case. They are the Chattahoochee River, the Flint River, and the Apalachicola River. It is easiest to think of these three rivers as forming the capital letter "Y," with each branch starting at a different point in northeastern Georgia near Atlanta and the stem running through the Florida panhandle and emptying into Apalachicola Bay in the Gulf of Mexico. See Appendix, infra . The Chattahoochee River is the western branch of this Y-shaped river system. It runs from the foothills of Georgia's Blue Ridge Mountains, through most of Georgia, down to Lake Seminole, just north of Florida. The United States Army Corps of Engineers operates several dams and reservoirs along the Chattahoochee where it both stores water and controls the amount of water that flows downstream to Florida in accordance with the terms of its recently revised Master Water Control Manual (Master Manual). As we shall discuss in more detail, Part IV, infra, the Corps' operations are important to the resolution of this case. The Flint River, the eastern branch of the "Y," runs from just south of Atlanta down to the same lake, namely, Lake Seminole. Unlike the Chattahoochee, there are no dams along the Flint River; it flows unimpeded through southern Georgia's farmland, where the greatest share of the Basin's water is consumed by agricultural irrigation. After water from the Flint and Chattahoochee Rivers mixes at Lake Seminole, the mixed water (now forming the stem of the Y) continues its southward journey. At the southern end of Lake Seminole, it flows through the Woodruff Dam-a dam also controlled by the Corps. The mixed waters then change their name. They are called the Apalachicola River, and under that name they flow 106 miles through the Florida Panhandle and finally empty into the Gulf of Mexico. There, the fresh water of the Apalachicola River mixes with the Gulf's saltwater, forming Apalachicola Bay, which the United Nations, the United States, and the State of Florida have all recognized as one of the Northern Hemisphere's most productive estuaries. In total, the Apalachicola River accounts for 35% of the fresh water that flows along Florida's western coast. See Joint Exh. 168, p. 39. B Florida and Georgia have long disputed the apportionment of the Basin's waters. Florida contends that Georgia is consuming more than its equitable share of Flint River water. It adds that, were Georgia to consume less water from the Flint River, more water would flow into Lake Seminole, pass through the Woodruff Dam and subsequently flow down the Apalachicola River (the Y's stem) and into Apalachicola Bay. The additional water that would result from a cap on Georgia's consumption would, Florida argues, help (among other things) to recover and maintain its oyster industry, which collapsed following a drought in 2012. Georgia believes that it should not have to cut back on its Flint River water consumption because, in its view, it consumes no more than its equitable share. "This Court has recognized for more than a century its inherent authority, as part of the Constitution's grant of original jurisdiction, to equitably apportion interstate streams between States." Kansas v. Nebraska, 574 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 1042, 1052, 191 L.Ed.2d 1 (2015). But we have long noted our "preference" that States "settle their controversies by 'mutual accommodation and agreement.' " Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564, 83 S.Ct. 1468, 10 L.Ed.2d 542 (1963) (quoting Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392, 64 S.Ct. 176, 88 L.Ed. 116 (1943) (Kansas II )); see also id ., at 392, 64 S.Ct. 176 ("[Interstate] controversies may appropriately be composed by negotiation and agreement, pursuant to the compact clause of the federal Constitution"); Kansas v. Nebraska, supra, at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1049-1050 (describing codification of Republican River Compact); Montana v. Wyoming, 563 U.S. 368, 372, 131 S.Ct. 1765, 179 L.Ed.2d 799 (2011) (interpreting Yellowstone River Compact); Kansas v. Colorado, 543 U.S. 86, 125 S.Ct. 526, 160 L.Ed.2d 418 (2004) (resolving dispute over Arkansas River Compact). We recognize that Florida and Georgia (sometimes with the help of the Federal Government) have long tried to do so. But so far they have failed. In 1992, for example, the States signed a memorandum of agreement in which they "committed to a process for cooperative management and development" of the three-river Basin and agreed to "participate fully as equal partners" in a "comprehensive, basin-wide study" of its waters. Joint Exh. 004, at 1. Five years later, the States signed-and Congress approved-a compact, the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact, in which they agreed: "to develop an allocation formula for equitably apportioning the surface waters of the ACF Basin among the states while protecting the water quality, ecology and biodiversity of the ACF." 111 Stat. 2222-2223. But five years of negotiations under the Compact proved fruitless, and in 2003, the Compact expired. More than a decade later, in 2014, Congress again recognized the need for an equitable apportionment of Basin waters. See Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-121, § 1051(a), 128 Stat. 1259. But once again, despite drought, expanding city populations, and a dramatic increase in acreage devoted to agricultural irrigation, no agreement has been reached. The "last effort to reach an amicable resolution of this complex equitable apportionment proceeding" in 2017 was "unsuccessful." Report 24. The States instead have come to this Court. II A In 2013, Florida, the downstream State, sought to sue Georgia, the upstream State, asking us to exercise our "original and exclusive jurisdiction" and issue a decree equitably apportioning the waters of the Basin. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) ; see U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2; see also this Court's Rule 17. In its complaint, Florida alleged that Georgia's consumption of Flint River water "reduce[s] the amount of water flowing to the Apalachicola River at all times," and noted that "the effects are especially apparent during the low flow summer and fall periods." Complaint 9, ¶ 21; see also id., at 17, ¶ 49 (complaining that the impact of Georgia's water consumption "is significant, particularly during dry periods"). In addition, Florida alleged that "[a]s Georgia's upstream storage and consumption grows over time, low flow events will become more frequent and increase in severity, diminishing the likelihood that key species will survive and precluding any chance of recovery over the long term."Id., at 20, ¶ 59. To remedy these harms, Florida seeks a cap on Georgia's consumption of water from the Flint River. Id., at 21. Georgia filed a brief in opposition, arguing that Florida failed to allege an injury sufficient to warrant this Court's exercise of original jurisdiction. See State of Georgia's Opposition to Florida's Motion for Leave to File a Complaint 31 ("Florida has not pleaded facts plausibly suggesting that it will be able to establish clear and convincing evidence that it suffers substantial injury as a result of Georgia's consumption of water"). At our request, the United States filed a brief in which it told us that "Florida has pleaded an interstate water dispute of sufficient importance to warrant this Court's exercise of its original jurisdiction, and no other judicial forum is suitable for resolving the overall controversy." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12 (Sept. 18, 2014). But, the United States also warned that "[p]ractical considerations ... weigh against the Court's resolution of Florida's claims before the Corps has completed its process of updating the Master Manual for the federal projects in the ACF Basin." Ibid . It suggested that the Court could "grant Florida leave to file, but stay or provide for tailoring of any further proceedings until the Corps has issued the revised Master Manual" in March 2017, id., at 13 (which Florida has now done, see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 3, n. 1, 10-12). We subsequently agreed to exercise our original jurisdiction and appointed a Special Master "with authority to ... direct subsequent proceedings," "take such evidence as may be introduced and such as he may deem it necessary to call for," and "submit Reports as he may deem appropriate." 574 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 701, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (2014). At the outset, the United States declined to waive its sovereign immunity from suit in this case. And shortly thereafter, Georgia asked the Special Master to dismiss the case on the grounds that the United States was a necessary party but could not be forced to intervene. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19(b). The Master concluded that the motion to dismiss Florida's complaint should be denied. The Master reasoned that a decree binding the Corps might not prove necessary. Order on State of Georgia's Motion To Dismiss 14-15 (June 19, 2015). Rather, the Master concluded that "the few facts before me at this stage of the proceeding support the conclusion that" a cap on Georgia's Flint River water consumption could, at least in principle, redress Florida's injuries either by increasing the amount of water that flows into Florida's Apalachicola River or by "render[ing] periods of reduced flow releases [into the Apalachicola River] fewer and further between because of the increased reservoir levels that would result from Georgia's reduced consumption." Id ., at 14, and n. 5. The Special Master pointed out that Florida would have to show that "a consumption cap is justified and will afford adequate relief." Id., at 13. B The Master then held lengthy discovery and evidentiary proceedings. See Brief for Georgia 11; post, at 2541 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) ("During their 18 months of discovery, the parties produced 7.2 million pages of documents"). Ultimately, the Master submitted a 70-page Report to this Court in February 2017. He recommended that the Court dismiss Florida's complaint. In particular, despite the very large factual record amassed and "the extensive testimony bearing on numerous issues," the Special Master stated: "I have concluded that there is a single, discrete issue that resolves this case: even assuming that Florida has sustained injury as a result of unreasonable upstream water use by Georgia, can Florida's injury effectively be redressed by limiting Georgia's consumptive use of water from the Basin without a decree binding the [Army] Corps [of Engineers]? I conclude that Florida has not proven that its injury can be remedied without such a decree. The evidence does not provide sufficient certainty that an effective remedy is available without the presence of the Corps as a party in this case." Report 30-31 (emphasis added). For present purposes, we note that Florida and Georgia agree that the Master's recommendation "turned on a 'single, discrete issue'-whether Florida had shown that a cap on Georgia's consumption would redress its injury if the decree did not bind the Corps as well." Florida Brief in Support of Exceptions 23-24; see also Georgia's Reply to Florida's Exceptions 23 ("The Special Master reserved ruling on any issue other than effective redress"); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19-20 (Aug. 7, 2017) (same). In reviewing this determination, we do not agree with the dissent's view that the Master applied the "ordinary balance-of-harms test" that our equitable apportionment cases require. Post, at 2536 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); see also Part III-A, infra, (describing equitable apportionment doctrine). As we shall explain, the dissent's assertion that "the balance of harms cannot tip in Florida's favor" is, at best, premature. Post, at 2546 - 2547. That judgment may eventually prove right or it may prove wrong. Here, as we just said, we consider only the "single" and "threshold" question of "redressability" upon which the Master rested his conclusion and which the parties have now argued here. In determining precisely what we now review, we rely upon (and do not go beyond) the Report's specific and key statements, which include the following: • "As a threshold matter, equitable apportionment is only available to a state that has suffered 'real and substantial injury' as a result of proposed or actual upstream water use" and "the injury must be redressable by the Court ." Report 24 (emphasis added). • "Florida points to real harm and, at the very least, likely misuse of resources by Georgia. There is little question that Florida has suffered harm from decreased flows in the [Apalachicola] River," including "an unprecedented collapse of its oyster fisheries in 2012." Id., at 31. • "Much more could be said and would need to be said on these [and other] issues...." Id., at 34. • "I need only address the narrow question of which party bears the burden of proving injury and redressability ." Id., at 28-29 (emphasis added). • "Florida bears the burden to prove that the proposed remedy will provide redress for Florida's injury." Id., at 30. • "Florida has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that any additional streamflow in the Flint River or in the Chattahoochee River would be released from Jim Woodruff Dam into the Apalachicola River at a time that would provide a material benefit to Florida (i.e ., during dry periods), thereby alleviating Florida's injury." Id., at 47 (emphasis added). • "Florida has provided no evidence that a decree in this case could provide an effective remedy during normal (i.e., non-drought) periods." Id., at 68. • "[T]he Corps can likely offset increased streamflow in the Flint River by storing additional water in its reservoirs along the Chattahoochee River during dry periods [and so] ... [t]here is no guarantee that the Corps will exercise its discretion to release or hold back water at any particular time." Id ., at 69 (emphasis added). • "[W]ithout the Corps as a party, the Court cannot order the Corps to take any particular action." Id ., at 69-70. C Florida has filed exceptions to the Special Master's Report. Florida first challenges the legal standard the Master applied in resolving what the Master called the "threshold" question whether Florida had "proven ... that its injury can be redressed by an order equitably apportioning the waters of the Basin." Id., at 24, 3. The Master wrote that Florida must meet a "clear and convincing evidence" evidentiary burden. Id., at 3. Second, Florida argues that, in any event, its showing in respect to redressability was sufficient. We consider each of these exceptions in turn. III A We note at the outset that our role in resolving disputes between sovereign States under our original jurisdiction "significantly differs from the one the Court undertakes 'in suits between private parties." Kansas v. Nebraska, 574 U.S., at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1051 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). "In this singular sphere," we have observed, " 'the court may regulate and mould the process it uses in such a manner as in its judgment will best promote the purposes of justice.' " Id., at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1052 (quoting Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 98, 16 L.Ed. 717 (1861) ). We must approach interstate disputes "in the untechnical spirit proper for dealing with a quasi-international controversy, remembering that there is no municipal code governing the matter, and that this court may be called on to adjust differences that cannot be dealt with by Congress or disposed of by the legislature of either State alone." Virginia v. West Virginia, 220 U.S. 1, 27, 31 S.Ct. 330, 55 L.Ed. 353 (1911) (Holmes, J.). Where, as here, the Court is asked to resolve an interstate water dispute raising questions beyond the interpretation of specific language of an interstate compact, the doctrine of equitable apportionment governs our inquiry. See Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183, 103 S.Ct. 539, 74 L.Ed.2d 348 (1982) (Colorado I ); Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 74, n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 598, 157 L.Ed.2d 461 (2003) ("Federal common law governs interstate bodies of water, ensuring that the water is equitably apportioned between the States and that neither State harms the other's interest in the river"). In this realm, we have kept in mind several related but more specific sets of principles. First, as the Special Master pointed out, "the relevant guiding principle in this case" is a simple one. Report 26-27. Given the laws of the States, both Georgia and Florida possess " 'an equal right to make a reasonable use of the waters of the stream' "-which, in this case, is the Flint River. Id., at 26 (quoting United States v. Willow River Power Co ., 324 U.S. 499, 505, 65 S.Ct. 761, 89 L.Ed. 1101 (1945) ); see also Colorado I supra, at 184, 103 S.Ct. 539 ("Our prior cases clearly establish that equitable apportionment will only protect those rights to water that are 'reasonably required and applied.' ... [W]asteful or inefficient uses will not be protected (quoting Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 484, 42 S.Ct. 552, 66 L.Ed. 999 (1922) ) ); Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1025, 103 S.Ct. 2817, 77 L.Ed.2d 387 (1983) (Idaho II ) ("States have an affirmative duty under the doctrine of equitable apportionment to take reasonable steps to conserve and even to augment the natural resources within their borders for the benefit of other States"); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618, 65 S.Ct. 1332, 89 L.Ed. 1815 (1945) ; Kansas II, 320 U.S., at 394, 64 S.Ct. 176 ; Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 522, 527-528, 56 S.Ct. 540, 80 L.Ed. 837 (1936) ; New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342-343, 51 S.Ct. 478, 75 L.Ed. 1104 (1931) ; North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 372, 44 S.Ct. 138, 68 L.Ed. 342 (1923) (reaffirming that an upstream State may not "burden his lower neighbor with more than is reasonable"); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 102, 27 S.Ct. 655, 51 L.Ed. 956 (1907) (Kansas I ); Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F.Cas. 472, 474 (No. 14,312) (C.C.D.R.I.1827) (Story, J.) (setting forth the principle of "reasonable use"). Second, our prior decisions emphasize that, when we are confronted with competing claims to interstate water, the Court's "effort always is to secure an equitable apportionment without quibbling over formulas." New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S., at 342-343, 51 S.Ct. 478 (Holmes, J.). Where "[b]oth States have real and substantial interests in the River," those interests "must be reconciled as best they may be." Id., at 342-343, 51 S.Ct. 478. We have added that "[u]ncertainties about the future ... do not provide a basis for declining to fashion a decree." Idaho II, 462 U.S., at 1026, 103 S.Ct. 2817 ; see also ibid. ("Reliance on reasonable predictions of future conditions is necessary"); Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 322, 104 S.Ct. 2433, 81 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984) (Colorado II ) (requiring " absolute precision in forecasts ... would be unrealistic"); North Dakota v. Minnesota, supra, at 386, 44 S.Ct. 138 (emphasizing the need to "draw inferences as to the probabilities"); Kansas I, supra, at 97-98, 27 S.Ct. 655. Third, in light of the sovereign status and "equal dignity" of States, a complaining State must bear a burden that is "much greater" than the burden ordinarily shouldered by a private party seeking an injunction. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 669, 51 S.Ct. 286, 75 L.Ed. 602 (1931) ; see Kansas II, supra, at 392, 64 S.Ct. 176 ("The reason for judicial caution in adjudicating the relative rights of States in such cases is that, while we have jurisdiction of such disputes, they involve the interests of quasi-sovereigns, present complicated and delicate questions, and, due to the possibility of future change of conditions, necessitate expert administration rather than judicial imposition of a hard and fast rule" (footnote omitted) ). In particular, " '[b]efore this court can be moved to exercise its extraordinary power under the Constitution to control the conduct of one State at the suit of another,' " the complaining State must demonstrate that it has suffered a " 'threatened invasion of rights' " that is " 'of serious magnitude.' " Washington v. Oregon, supra, at 524, 56 S.Ct. 540 (quoting New York v. New Jersey , 256 U.S. 296, 309, 41 S.Ct. 492, 65 L.Ed. 937 (1921) ). The State must make that showing by " 'clear and convincing evidence.' " Washington v. Oregon, supra, at 522, 56 S.Ct. 540 (quoting New York v. New Jersey, supra, at 309, 41 S.Ct. 492 ); see also Idaho II, supra, at 1027, 103 S.Ct. 2817 ("A State seeking equitable apportionment under our original jurisdiction must prove by clear and convincing evidence some real and substantial injury or damage"); Colorado I, supra, at 187-188 , n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 539 ("[A] state seeking to prevent or enjoin [an upstream] diversion by another State" must "bear the initial burden of showing that a diversion by [the upstream State] will cause substantial injury to [the downstream State's] interests" (emphasis added) ). In addition, to the extent the Court has addressed the "initial burden" a State bears in respect to redressability, our prior decisions make clear that, as a general matter, "[t]o constitute a justiciable controversy, it must appear that the complaining State has suffered a wrong through the action of the other State, furnishing a ground for judicial redress, or is asserting a right against the other State which is susceptible of judicial enforcement according to the accepted principles of the common law or equity systems of jurisprudence." Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 15, 60 S.Ct. 39, 84 L.Ed. 3 (1939) ; see also Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 447, 452, 112 S.Ct. 789, 117 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) (same); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 735-736, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981). More specifically, we have said that "it should be clear that [the complaining] State has not merely some technical right, but also a right with a corresponding benefit" as a precondition to any equitable apportionment. Kansas I, supra, at 109, 27 S.Ct. 655. An effort to shape a decree cannot be "a vain thing." Foster v. Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co., 146 U.S. 88, 101, 13 S.Ct. 28, 36 L.Ed. 899 (1892). A State "will not be granted [relief] against something merely feared as liable to occur at some indefinite time in the future," Connecticut v. Massachusetts, supra, at 674, 51 S.Ct. 286 or when there is "no other or better purpose [at stake] than to vindicate a barren right." Washington v. Oregon, supra, at 523, 56 S.Ct. 540 ; cf. Idaho II, supra, at 1026, 103 S.Ct. 2817 (assessing whether "the formulation of a workable decree is impossible"). Fourth, in an interstate water matter, where a complaining State meets its "initial burden of showing 'real or substantial injury,' " Colorado II, supra, at 317, 104 S.Ct. 2433 (quoting Colorado I, 459 U.S., at 188, n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 539 ), this Court, recalling that equitable apportionment is " 'flexible,' " not "formulaic," will seek to "arrive at a ' "just and equitable" apportionment' of an interstate stream" by "consider[ing] 'all relevant factors .' " South Carolina v. North Carolina, 558 U.S. 256, 271, 130 S.Ct. 854, 175 L.Ed.2d 713 (2010) (quoting Colorado I, 459 U.S., at 183, 103 S.Ct. 539 ); see also id., at 190, 103 S.Ct. 539 ("Whether [relief] should be permitted will turn on an examination of all factors relevant to a just apportionment"); Kansas II, 320 U.S., at 393-394, 64 S.Ct. 176 ("[I]n determining whether one State is using, or threatening to use, more than its equitable share of the benefits of a stream, all the factors which create equities in favor of one State or the other must be weighed") (emphasis added). These factors include (but are not limited to): "physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water in the several sections of the river, the character and rate of return flows, the extent of established uses, the availability of storage water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, [and] the damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former." Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S., at 618, 65 S.Ct. 1332. Because "all the factors which create equities in favor of one State or the other must be weighed," Kansas II, supra, at 394, 64 S.Ct. 176 (emphasis added), extensive and "specific factual findings" are essential for the Court to properly apply the doctrine of equitable apportionment. Colorado I, supra, at 189-190, 103 S.Ct. 539 (emphasis added). And given the complexity of many water-division cases, the need to secure equitable solutions, the need to respect the sovereign status of the States, and the importance of finding flexible solutions to multi-factor problems, we typically appoint a Special Master and benefit from detailed factual findings. Without the full range of factual findings, we have said, the Court may lack an adequate basis on which to make "the delicate adjustment of interests" that the law requires. Nebraska v. Wyoming, supra, at 618, 65 S.Ct. 1332 ; Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S., at 519, 523-524, 56 S.Ct. 540 (emphasizing that "the Master's Report finds the facts fully"); see also Colorado I, supra, at 183, 189-190, 103 S.Ct. 539 (remanding "with instructions to the Special Master to make further findings of fact"); Colorado II, 467 U.S., at 312-315, 104 S.Ct. 2433 (explaining that because "the Master's report [was] unclear," the Court remanded to the Special Master "for additional factual findings on five specific issues" even after "a lengthy trial at which both States presented extensive evidence" in order "to assist this Court in balancing the benefit and harm"); Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 575-576, and n. 21, 103 S.Ct. 2558, 77 L.Ed.2d 1 (1983) ("[W]e return this case to the Special Master for determination of the unresolved issues framed in his pretrial order"); 3 A. Kelley, Water and Water Rights § 45.02(c), p. 45-14 (3d ed. 2018) ("If the factual findings in the report are insufficient for the Court to decide whether the master correctly applied the doctrine of equitable apportionment, the Court may refer the case back to the master for additional findings"). B Applying the principles just described, we conclude that the Special Master applied too strict a standard when he determined that the Court would not be able to fashion an appropriate equitable decree. See Report 3 ("Florida has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that its injury can be redressed by an order equitably apportioning the waters of the Basin"); see also id., at 31 ("The evidence does not provide sufficient certainty that an effective remedy is available without the presence of the Corps as a party in this case"). The Special Master referred to the relevant showing that Florida must make in this respect as a "threshold" showing. Report 24. We agree that the matter is "threshold" in one particular sense-namely, the sense that the Master has not yet determined several key remedy-related matters, including the approximate amount of water that must flow into the Apalachicola River in order for Florida to receive a significant benefit from a cap on Georgia's use of Flint River waters. See infra, at 2522 - 2523. The Master also wrote that Florida had failed to show "with sufficient certainty that the Corps must (or will choose to) operate its projects so as to permit all additional flows in the Flint River" or "the entire marginal increase in streamflow" to reach Florida "without any substantial delay." Id., at 48 (emphasis added); see also id., at 24, 70 (similar). He added that there "is no guarantee " that the Corps will exercise its relevant discretion. Id., at 69 (emphasis added). And he said that Florida must show the existence of a workable remedy by "clear and convincing evidence." Id., at 3; see also, e.g., id., at 28-29, 47, 51, 69-70. We believe the Master's standard, as indicated by these statements, is too strict. In our view, unless and until the Special Master makes the findings of fact necessary to determine the nature and scope of likely harm caused by the absence of water and the amount of additional water necessary to ameliorate that harm significantly, the complaining State should not have to prove with specificity the details of an eventually workable decree by "clear and convincing" evidence. Rather, the complaining State should have to show that, applying the principles of "flexibility" and "approximation" we discussed above, it is likely to prove possible to fashion such a decree. See supra, at 2513 - 2514. To require more definite proof at the outset may well (at least on some occasions) make little sense. Suppose, for example, downstream State A claims that upstream State B wastes at least 10,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) of water. And suppose further that no decree could enforce a 10,000 cfs consumption cap but that it may well prove possible to enforce a lesser requirement. If so, we would have to know at least approximately how much water will significantly ameliorate State A's water problem before we could know whether it is possible to shape a workable decree. And the workability of decrees themselves, approximate as they may be, may depend upon more precise findings in respect to the nature and scope of the range of likely harms and likely benefits that a Special Master finds are actually likely to exist. To require "clear and convincing evidence" about the workability of a decree before the Court or a Special Master has a view about likely harms and likely amelioration is, at least in this case, to put the cart before the horse. And that, we fear, is what the Master's statements, with their apparent references to a "clear and convincing" evidence standard in respect to "redressability" (where that refers to the availability of an eventual decree) have done here. Cf. post, at 2537 - 2538. That is also why our cases, while referring to the use of a "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard in respect to an initial showing of "invasion of rights" and "substantial injury," have never referred to that standard in respect to a showing of "remedy" or "redressability." See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U.S. 1, 8, 115 S.Ct. 1933, 132 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995) (repeating that as a threshold matter, a " 'threatened invasion of rights must be of a serious magnitude and it must be established by clear and convincing evidence' " without addressing the required initial burden in respect to remedy (quoting New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S., at 309, 41 S.Ct. 492 )); Colorado II, supra, at 317, 104 S.Ct. 2433 (describing the "initial burden" a State bears to show " 'real or substantial injury' " (quoting Colorado I, 459 U.S., at 187-188, n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 539 )); Idaho II, 462 U.S., at 1027, 103 S.Ct. 2817 ; Colorado I, supra, at 187-188, and n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 539 ("[A] State seeking to prevent or enjoin [an upstream] diversion by another State" must "bear the initial burden of showing that a diversion by [the upstream State] will cause substantial injury to [the downstream State's] interests" (emphasis added) ); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S., at 522, 56 S.Ct. 540 ; Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S., at 672, 51 S.Ct. 286 ; New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S., at 344-345, 51 S.Ct. 478 ; Kansas II, 320 U.S., at 393-394, 64 S.Ct. 176. The dissent does not dispute this. See post, at 2534 - 2535. As discussed, supra, at 2513 - 2515, our prior decisions have said that the "right" a complaining State asserts must be more than "merely some technical right" and must be "a right with a corresponding benefit, " Kansas I, 206 U.S., at 109, 27 S.Ct. 655 (emphasis added)-an effort to shape an equitable apportionment decree cannot be "a vain thing." Foster, 146 U.S., at 101, 13 S.Ct. 28 ; see also Idaho II, supra, at 1026, 103 S.Ct. 2817 (assessing whether "the formulation of a workable decree is impossible"); Washington v. Oregon, supra, at 523, 56 S.Ct. 540. But these statements apply to the general availability of judicial relief-not to the details of a final decree or to the workability of a decree that will depend on those details. Cf. Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon 444 U.S. 380, 392, 100 S.Ct. 616, 62 L.Ed.2d 564 (1980) (Idaho I ) (explaining that the question whether a State's proposed remedy will have an "appreciable effect" is a question that "goes to the merits" of the equitable apportionment inquiry). And, of course, to insist upon the use of such a strict standard, in respect to an eventual decree, runs directly contrary to the statements in, and holdings of, cases to which we have referred when discussing the need for "approximation" and "flexibility." See supra, at 2514 - 2515. IV We next address Florida's exceptions to the Master's evidentiary determinations. In doing so, we recognize that the record in this case is long. It addresses a number of highly technical matters on a range of subjects-from biology to hydrology to the workings of the Corps' newly revised Master Manual governing the organization's complex operations in the Basin. Insofar as the Special Master made findings of fact, those findings "deserve respect and a tacit presumption of correctness." Colorado II, 467 U.S., at 317, 104 S.Ct. 2433. But at the end of the day, "the ultimate responsibility for deciding what are correct findings of fact remains with us." Ibid. We have therefore read those portions of the record to which the parties, amici, or the Master refer, along with several other portions that we have found potentially relevant. Our "independent examination of the record," Kansas v. Missouri, 322 U.S. 213, 232, 64 S.Ct. 975, 88 L.Ed. 1234 (1944), leads us to conclude that, at this stage, Florida has met its "initial burden" in respect to remedy. But, we also believe that a remand is necessary to conduct the equitable-balancing inquiry. Cf. Colorado I, supra, at 183-190, 103 S.Ct. 539. We reserve judgment as to the ultimate disposition of this case, addressing here only the narrow "threshold" question the Master addressed below-namely, whether Florida has shown that its "injur[ies can] effectively be redressed by limiting Georgia's consumptive use of water from the Basin without a decree binding the Corps." Report 30-31. This dispositive threshold question leads us, in turn, to focus upon five subsidiary questions: First, has Florida suffered harm as a result of decreased water flow into the Apalachicola River? (The Special Master assumed "yes.") Second, has Florida shown that Georgia, contrary to equitable principles, has taken too much water from the Flint River (the eastern branch of the Y-shaped river system)? (Again, the Special Master assumed "yes.") Third, if so, has Georgia's inequitable use of Basin waters injured Florida? (The Special Master assumed "yes.") Fourth, if so, would an equity-based cap on Georgia's use of the Flint River lead to a significant increase in streamflow from the Flint River into Florida's Apalachicola River (the stem of the Y)? (This is the basic question before us.) Fifth, if so, would the amount of extra water that reaches the Apalachicola River significantly redress the economic and ecological harm that Florida has suffered? (This question is mostly for remand.) As our parentheticals suggest, the Special Master assumed that the answer to the first three questions was "yes." The fourth question is the question before us now. And the fifth question is partly for us now and partly for the Master to answer on remand. A The Report indicates that the Special Master assumed the answer to the first question is "yes." The Report says that the Special Master reached his conclusion on the "single, discrete issue that resolves this case" by "assuming that Florida has sustained injury." Id., at 30 (emphasis added); see also id., at 2 (repeating Georgia's argument that "without an order binding the Corps, Florida will not be assured any relief-assuming it has suffered any injury at all -by a decree entered in this proceeding because the Corps has the ability to impound water in various reservoirs that it maintains in the Basin" (emphasis added) ); id., at 65 ("Even if there were evidence of harm from other than low-flow conditions ..."). At the same time, the Report states that "Florida points to real harm." Id., at 31. And the Master specified that there is "little question that Florida has suffered harm from decreased flows in the [Apalachicola] River." Id., at 31 (emphasis added). That harm-caused (at least in part) by increased salinity-includes "an unprecedented collapse of [Florida's] oyster fisheries in 2012." Ibid. ; see id., at 32 (stating that "the evidence presented tends to show that increased salinity ... led to the collapse" of Apalachicola Bay's oysters and "greatly harmed the oystermen of the Apalachicola Region, threatening their longterm sustainability"). Cf. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S., at 343, 345, 51 S.Ct. 478 (finding redressable harm to oysters caused by diminished water flow and increased salinity). The harms of reduced streamflow may extend to other species in the Apalachicola Region, including in the river and its floodplain, which, as the Master noted, "is home to the highest species density of amphibians and reptiles in all of North America, and supports hundreds of endangered or threatened animal and plant species," including three "endangered" or "threatened" mussel species, the "[t]hreatened Gulf sturgeon," and the largest stand of Tupelo trees-of Tupelo Honey fame-in the world. Report 7-8; see also Joint Exh. 168, at 193, 195-196. B The Master also appears to have assumed the answer to the second question is "yes." The Report reached its key conclusion that Florida's (assumed) injuries cannot "effectively be redressed" by "assuming that Florida has sustained injury as a result of unreasonable upstream water use by Georgia ." Report 30 (emphasis added). But, at the same time, the Master acknowledged that "Florida points to real harm and, at the very least, likely misuse of resources by Georgia. " Id., at 31 (emphasis added). And the Report "provide[s] the Court a brief descriptive background regarding ... the unreasonableness of Georgia's consumptive water use." Ibid. ; see, e.g., id., at 32 ("Georgia's upstream agricultural water use has been-and continues to be-largely unrestrained"); id., at 33 ("Despite early warnings of oncoming drought, Georgi[a] ... chose not to declare a drought in 2011-apparently hoping for the best, and clearly not wishing to incur the cost of preventative action"); id ., at 34 ("Georgia's position-practically, politically, and legally-can be summarized as follows: Georgia's agricultural water use should be subject to no limitations, regardless of the long-term consequences for the Basin"). C In respect to the third question, the Master again assumed the answer "yes." In particular, the Report "assume[s]" that "Florida has sustained injury as a result of unreasonable upstream water use by Georgia." Id., at 30 (emphasis added). And as relevant to each of the first three questions, the Master added that "[m]uch more could be said and would need to be said about" Florida's injuries, the reasonableness of Georgia's water consumption, and "other issues, such as causation," if the case proceeds. Id., at 34. As we have explained, our prior equitable apportionment decisions make clear that "all factors which create equities in favor of one State or the other must be weighed ." Kansas II, 320 U.S., at 393-394, 64 S.Ct. 176 (emphasis added). Thus, a remand is necessary to consider each of the relevant factors, including those upon which the dissent focuses. See infra, at 2522; Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S., at 618, 65 S.Ct. 1332 ; cf. Colorado II, 467 U.S., at 323-324, 104 S.Ct. 2433. D We now turn to the fourth question, the basic question before us. Would an equity-based cap on Georgia's use of the Flint River lead to a significant increase in streamflow from the Flint River into Florida's Apalachicola River (the stem of the Y)? The answer depends upon (1) the amount of extra water that would flow into Lake Seminole as a result of a cap on Georgia's Flint River water consumption; and (2) the amount of water that could actually flow through the Corps-controlled Woodruff Dam at Lake Seminole's southern end and into Florida's Apalachicola River . 1 The record shows that Florida's proposed cap on Georgia's water consumption could result in the release of considerable extra water into Lake Seminole. Florida's expert, Dr. David Sunding, testified that the cap would limit the average amount of water that Georgia could use annually and also reduce the amount of water that Georgia could use during drought years, which could "materially reduce [Georgia's] depletions of river flows ... by 1,500 to over 2,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) in peak summer months of drought years." Updated Pre-Filed Direct Testimony (PFDT) of Sunding ¶ 8; see also id., ¶¶ 88-90. Dr. Sunding added that it would cost Georgia roughly $35 million annually (less than 0.2% of Georgia's annual budget) to reduce streamflow depletions by 2,000 cfs. Id ., ¶ 113, Table 4. Georgia's expert, Dr. Robert Stavins, disputed these conclusions. See Direct Testimony of Stavins ¶¶ 4, 90, 136; see also Brief for Georgia 18. The Master did not make specific findings of fact regarding this aspect of Florida's proposed remedy. Rather than expressly making any findings, the Master apparently "accept[ed] Florida's estimates of the increased streamflow that would result from a consumption cap." Report 67, n. 43. At this stage, we shall do the same. And as we shall later discuss, the record suggests that an increase in streamflow of 1,500 to 2,000 cfs is reasonably likely to benefit Florida significantly. See infra, at ---- - ---- (citing record evidence of benefits); see also Updated PFDT of J. David Allan ¶¶ 3d, 26, 67 (Allan) (discussing ecological benefits of increasing streamflow by 300 to 500 cfs); 10 Tr. 2629:7-15 (Kondolf) (detailing benefits of increasing streamflow into the Apalachicola River from 5,000 to 7,000 cfs); 3 id ., at 591:6-593:4, 596:17-598:1 (Allan). 2 The key question, however, is whether the 1,500 to 2,000 cfs of extra water that will flow into Lake Seminole from the Flint River as a result of a cap on Georgia's water consumption will flow beyond Lake Seminole, through the Woodruff Dam, and into the Apalachicola River at the relevant times. That is where the Army Corps of Engineers enters the picture. And it is where Florida disagrees with the Special Master and with Georgia. The Special Master and Georgia believe that-at any relevant time-the Corps might "offset" any extra Flint River water that flows into Lake Seminole by simultaneously reducing the amount of water that flows into that lake from the Chattahoochee River. See Report 48-53. Thus, if the 1,500 to 2,000 cfs of extra water that would reach Lake Seminole from the Flint as a result of Florida's proposed consumption cap, the question is whether and to what extent the Corps will "offset" that extra streamflow by releasing 1,500 to 2,000 cfs less water into Lake Seminole from its upstream Chattahoochee reservoirs. Of course, the Corps might, under certain circumstances, be authorized to "offset" extra streamflow from the Flint River. As the Special Master wrote, "[t]here is no guarantee that the Corps will exercise its discretion to release or hold back water at a particular time." Id., at 69. But as the United States has explained, increased streamflow into Lake Seminole (that is, increased Basin Inflow) "would generally benefit the ACF system by delaying the onset of drought operations, by allowing the Corps to meet the 5000 cfs minimum flow longer during extended drought, and by quickening the resumption of normal operations after drought." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28 (Aug. 7, 2017). And our reading of the record convinces us it is highly unlikely that the Corps will always reduce the flow in this way; it leads us to believe that, acting in accordance with the its own revised Master Manual, the Corps is likely to permit, and in some cases may be required to ensure that, material amounts of additional Flint water to flow through the Woodruff Dam and into the Apalachicola River. At the very least, we believe that more proceedings are necessary to reach a definitive determination. As an initial matter, the Master Manual makes clear that the amount of water the Corps will release turns in part on the amount of water stored in the Corps' Chattahoochee reservoirs. See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Master Manual, Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin, Florida and Georgia, App. A, pp. 7-4 to 7-5, 7-7. More specifically, the amount of water storage in those reservoirs dictates whether the Corps is conducting one of two possible types of "operations"-namely, "drought operations" or "nondrought operations." These are technical terms. See id ., at 7-14 to 7-16. The term "drought operations" need not correspond to dry periods, nor need the term "nondrought operations" refer to wet periods. Rather their applicability depends in part upon the amount of water that is stored behind the Corps' Chattahoochee dams. As the United States explained, "[t]he term 'drought operations' refers to more conservative operations that [the Corps conducts, which] are intended to enable the Corps to preserve water and operate its reservoir projects more effectively as drought conditions arise." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9 (Aug. 7, 2017). We therefore must clearly distinguish what the record tells us about the amount of extra water that could flow into Florida as a result of a consumption cap during each of these two distinct types of Corps operations. a Nondrought Operations When the Corps is conducting "nondrought operations," the Master Manual requires the Corps to release into Florida all or some of any extra water that flows from the Flint River into Lake Seminole, where it will then flow through the Woodruff Dam. See App. to Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 2a (Aug. 7, 2017) (detailing Corps operational protocol). As the United States has explained, when the total streamflow into Lake Seminole is between 5,000 and 10,000 cfs during "nondrought operations," the following facts are true: "[A]ny additional basin inflow ... would generally be passed straight through to Florida. If, for example, the conservation measures advocated by Florida as part of a consumption cap actually resulted in an increased flow in the Flint River of 2,000 cfs, see Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of David Sunding, Ph. D. at 44, Table 4, then flows into Florida would also increase by roughly that amount." United States Post-Trial Brief 12-13 (Dec. 15, 2016); see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18 (Aug. 7, 2017) (reaffirming that under these circumstances "flows in the Apalachicola would increase by the amount of increased Flint River flows" including during summer months). As far as we can tell, under the Corps' current operational protocol, the Corps may remain in "nondrought operations" even during the driest summer months of the driest years. For example, in 2007 the Corps conducted "nondrought operations" not only during late autumn, winter, and spring months, but also during the hottest summer and early autumn months "when streamflow is at its lowest." See Direct Testimony of Phillip Bedient ¶¶ 48-53 (stating that "[i]f 2007's Basin Inflow were repeated today and Drought Operations were not triggered," the Corps would have had 92 days of "nondrought operations," including 19 days "during summer and fall months, when streamflow was at its lowest" on which 100% of extra water resulting from a consumption cap would reach Florida). We note that these 19 days fell during a period of severe drought in which no extra water (let alone 2,000 cfs of extra water) was flowing into Lake Seminole. And, unsurprisingly, the same trend appears to be true in dry summer months of other years: all or some of the extra water that would result from a consumption cap would also pass through to Florida. See, e.g ., Ga. Exh. 949 (reporting streamflow data indicating several days in 2009 on which extra Flint River water would have passed through to Florida); Joint Exh. 128 (providing link to U.S. Geological Survey data indicating a similar trend based on streamflow into the Apalachicola River, including in 2016 and 2017). b Drought Operations The Corps' "drought operations" are different. Again, whether the Corps must initiate drought operations is not a matter of discretion; it depends, as we have said, upon the total amount of water the Corps has stored behind the dams it controls along the Chattahoochee River. The Master Manual requires that, when the total amount of water stored in pools behind the Corps' Chattahoochee dams drops below a certain level, the Corps must reduce the amount of water it releases from the Woodruff Dam to 5,000 cfs, or, in instances of extreme low water levels in the storage pools, to 4,500 cfs. Master Manual App. A, at 7-14 to 7-16. Accordingly, if additional water were to flow into Lake Seminole from the Flint River while the Corps is in drought operations, the Corps, pursuant to its Master Manual, must reduce the flow of its controlled upstream Chattahoochee water in order to maintain a defined water level in the pools behind its Chattahoochee dams, and no more than 4,500 cfs or 5,000 cfs can flow beyond the Woodruff Dam regardless. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 7. But even then, as we just said, the Corps must make certain that at least 4,500 cfs and more often 5,000 cfs flows though the Woodruff Dam. And, if more water flows from the Flint into Lake Seminole, and if the Corps uses that water to keep the water level high in its Chattahoochee reservoirs, then there will be fewer days in which the Corps is conducting either "drought operations" or "extreme drought operations." Instead, there will be more "nondrought operations" days where the Corps must pass most or all additional streamflow that exceeds 5,000 cfs through the Woodruff (because there will be more days, given the added Flint water, when its upstream Chattahoochee reservoirs are sufficiently high). The United States adds that "a cap on Georgia's consumption" could, among other things, generate increased streamflow that "would provide a cushion during low-flow periods, so that it would be possible to maintain a flow rate of greater than 5,000 cfs for a longer period of time without any alteration of the Corps' operations." United States Post-Trial Brief 18-19 (Dec. 15, 2016) (emphasis added); see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18 (Aug. 7, 2017) (same). We repeat this point with an example for purposes of clarity. Assume the following: (1) that it is August 13 and the Corps is conducting "drought operations"; (2) that as a result of a cap on Georgia's consumption, 2,000 cfs more water flows down the Flint and into Lake Seminole; and (3) that, consistent with the Master Manual, 5,000 cfs will flow from Lake Seminole, through the Woodruff Dam, and into Florida's Apalachicola River. On these three assumptions in all likelihood, as the dissent points out, no extra water will flow into Florida. But (and this "but" is key), the extra 2,000 cfs of water that flows into Lake Seminole on August 13 as a result of a cap on Georgia's from the Flint River water consumption will allow the Corps to store more water behind its upstream Chattahoochee dams (while still complying with the Master Manual's minimum release requirements). And that fact means that the Corps is likely to remain in "drought operations" for fewer days because whether the Corps remains in "drought operations" depends upon the water level behind the Chattahoochee dams. And the fewer days the Corps conducts "drought operations," the more days the Corps, consistent with its Master Manual, will allow all (or some) of the 2,000 cfs extra water that would result from a consumption cap to flow through the Woodruff Dam and into Florida's Apalachicola River. Again, record evidence makes clear that this is not a fanciful possibility. For example, Florida points to record evidence that suggests a consumption cap could have prevented the Corps from entering drought operations in 2011-2012 without departing from the terms of its Master Manual. See, e.g ., Florida Brief in Support of Exceptions 48-49, and n. 12 (citing record evidence, including Ga. Exh. 924 and Fla. Exh. 811, that the Special Master did not address suggesting that Florida's proposed consumption cap could have helped the Corps to "avoi[d] drought operations entirely" in 2011-2012 without departing from the Master Manual's requirements). The upshot is that, even when the Corps conducts its operations in accordance with the Master Manual, Florida's proposed consumption cap would likely mean more water in the Apalachicola-as much as 2,000 cfs more water when the Corps is conducting normal or "nondrought operations," which could take place in dry periods, including the driest days of summer, and 500 cfs more on days when the Corps is conducting "drought operations." And a cap would likely allow the Corps to conduct "nondrought operations" (i.e., reservoirs-sufficiently-full operations) more often as well. 3 We cannot agree with the dissent's efforts to deny these conclusions. To begin with, the dissent says that our conclusion "depends on the premise that, during droughts, the natural streamflow into Florida is between '5,000 and 10,000 cubic feet per second.' " Post, at 2544. If the dissent means by "droughts" simply dry days, or summer days, then it is obviously wrong, for pursuant to the Corps' Master Manual, the Corps must allow all or some of the 2,000 cfs extra water that would flow into Lake Seminole to continue through the Woodruff Dam into Florida during dry summer days when the Corps is not conducting "drought operations." This was true, as the dissent concedes, even during 19 summer days in 2007, which was among the driest years in the Basin's history. Or, does the dissent mean by "droughts" days on which the Corps is conducting "drought operations"? If so, then we agree that on such days, the Corps will normally allow no more than 5,000 cfs to flow into Florida. But, for the reasons just stated in the last few paragraphs, Florida's proposed consumption cap-which could result in as much as 2,000 extra cubic feet of water per second flowing from the Flint into Lake Seminole-will mean (consistent with the testimony of the very Georgia expert that the dissent so frequently quotes) that there will be significantly fewer such days. Is there a mistake then in the "concrete example" the dissent offers to support its point? See post, at 2543 - 2544. Invoking a hypothetical posed by Georgia's expert, the dissent says: "[I]f the natural flows in the Apalachicola River were 2,600 cubic feet per second, then the Corps would release 2,400 cubic feet per second from its [Chattahoochee] reservoirs.... And if a cap on Georgia['s Flint River consumption] increased the River's natural flow to 4,100 cubic feet per second, the Corps would release 900 cubic feet per second.... In either case, the total flow on the Apalachicola River would remain the same: 5,000 cubic feet per second. Thus, so long as the natural flows remain significantly less than 5,000 cubic feet per second, a cap on Georgia would only decrease the amount of water that the Corps releases from storage; it would not increase the overall amount of water flowing into the Apalachicola River." Id., at 29-30 (citing Bedient ¶¶ 45-47). If, however, a consumption cap causes 1,500 cfs extra water (from the Flint) to flow into Lake Seminole (as we assume Florida's proposed cap would), under the dissent's example, the Corps will reduce (or "offset") the amount of water it releases from its upstream Chattahoochee dams from 2,400 cfs to 900 cfs. That is because 2,400 cfs minus 900 cfs is 1,500 cfs. What happens to that 1,500 cfs extra water? When the Corps is in drought operations, the answer according to the Master Manual is that the Corps must store that water in its upstream Chattahoochee reservoirs. And with that 1,500 cfs extra water each day, the water levels in those reservoirs will rise (or, at a minimum, deplete less rapidly) and allow the Corps to resume "nondrought operations" more quickly. The United States repeats precisely this point-namely, when more water flows into Lake Seminole, it benefits Florida by "quickening the [Corps'] resumption of normal [i.e., "nondrought"] operations." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28 (Aug. 7, 2017). (That extra water also means that there will be more days when 5,000 cfs, rather than 4,500 cfs, flows from Lake Seminole into the Apalachicola River). And it means, as no one denies, that on days when the Corps conducts "nondrought operations" (which, as Georgia's own expert report shows, occur even during dry summer months), more water will reach Florida when Florida needs it. What about the dissent's point that Georgia's expert, Dr. Bedient, said that the extra 2,000 cfs would mean more water for Florida "only 19 days 'during the summer and fall months when streamflow was at its lowest' "? Post, at 2544. Dr. Bediant's exact words, as the dissent points out, were that in " 'dry years (e.g., 2007 and 2011), ... even significant changes in Georgia's consumptive use would lead to virtually no change in state-line flows during the low-flow months (e.g., June, July, August, September).' " Bedient ¶¶ 48-53. At this point, in our view, the dissent has pointed to record evidence with which other record evidence conflicts. It seems from record evidence, from the statements of the United States, from geological data, and from laws of mechanics, that 2,000 cfs extra water flowing into Lake Seminole when, in the dissent's words, "drought operations were not in effect" would have to mean more water in Florida. Post, at 2544. And the dissent does not dispute that some of these days are in the summer. Ibid . Our own check of the record reinforces the point. In particular, data from the U.S. Geological Survey's website, which the parties entered into the record at Joint Exh. 128, indicates that between May 2016 and August 2016, streamflow into the Apalachicola River was above 6,000 cfs each day with the exception of two days: August 30, 2016 and August 31, 2016. Nothing in the record suggests that the Corps was in drought operations during these days, and so it appears that under these conditions, any additional streamflow resulting from a cap on Georgia's Flint River consumption would pass through into Florida. However, without explicit findings, it is neither possible nor prudent for us in the first instance to read through this voluminous record and discover who is right on this matter of how much extra water there will be, when, and how much Florida would benefit from the extra water that there might be. That is why we are sending this case back for more findings. Finally, while the dissent suggests that "[i]t is incredibly odd to conclude that a Special Master's merits determination is 'premature' after a full trial," post, at 2537, this Court has repeatedly concluded that remand is "appropriate" to resolve certain issues in an equitable apportionment case even where, as here, there has already been a "lengthy trial at which both States presented extensive evidence." Colorado II, 467 U.S., at 313, 104 S.Ct. 2433 ; see also Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S., at 456-457, 42 S.Ct. 552 (explaining that "the evidence was taken" over the course of two years and presented to the Court two years later and that "[t]he case has been argued at bar three times" including because of the "importance of some of the questions involved"). Moreover, we note that adequate factfinding is especially important where, as here, no interstate compact guides our inquiry or sets forth a congressionally ratified water allocation formula. When such a compact exists, as it often does, our effort is relatively simple and focuses upon "declar[ing] rights under the Compact and enforc[ing] its terms." Kansas v. Nebraska, 574 U.S., at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1052 (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S., at 567, 103 S.Ct. 2558 ); id ., at 567-568, 103 S.Ct. 2558 ("If there is a compact, it is a law of the United States, and our first and last order of business is interpreting the compact"). Here, no compact guides our inquiry and it would appear to be important that we approach this complex controversy with the care and thoroughness that our precedent requires. E Our final question is this: Would the amount of extra water that reaches the Apalachicola significantly redress the economic and ecological harm that Florida has suffered? There is evidence indicating that the answer to the question is in the affirmative. See, e.g., Allan ¶ 3d, 26, 67 ("Even relatively modest increases in flows-on the order of 300 to 500 cfs during key periods of the year-could reduce harm to the [Apalachicola Region's] ecosystem and halt the cycle that is leading to irreversible harm" while "[g]reater increases could make even more dramatic improvements"); Updated PFDT of Patricia Glibert ¶¶ 5, 28-32, 58-60, and Table 1, Figs. 10, 19b; supra, at 2519 - 2520 (citing record evidence of benefits); see also 10 Tr. 2629:7-15 (Kondolf) (detailing benefits of increasing streamflow from 5,000 to 7,000 cfs); 3 id ., at 591:6-593:4, 596:17-598:1 (Allan). But the Master's Report does not explicitly answer this question. We consequently must remand the case to find the answer to this question (and others). * * * In sum, in respect to the evidentiary questions at issue, the Master assumed that: (1) Florida has likely suffered harm as a result of decreased water flow into the Apalachicola River; (2) Florida has made some showing that Georgia, contrary to equitable principles, has taken too much water from the Flint River; and (3) Georgia's inequitable use of the water may have injured Florida, but more findings are needed. And in light of the Master's assumptions, we conclude that: (4) an equity-based cap on Georgia's use of the Flint River would likely lead to a material increase in streamflow from the Flint River into Florida's Apalachicola River; and (5) the amount of extra water that reaches the Apalachicola may significantly redress the economic and ecological harm that Florida has suffered. Further findings, however, are needed on all of these evidentiary issues on remand. We add the following: The United States has made clear that the Corps will work to accommodate any determinations or obligations the Court sets forth if a final decree equitably apportioning the Basin's waters proves justified in this case. It states in its brief here that if a decree results "in more water flowing to Florida ... under existing Corps protocols, then the Corps would likely not need to change its operations." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28 (Aug. 7, 2017). It has added that, in any event, a decree "would necessarily form part of the constellation of laws to be considered by the Corps when deciding how best to operate the federal projects." Id., at 32. And in issuing its revised Master Manual, the Corps stated that it would "review any final decision from the U.S. Supreme Court and consider any operational adjustments that are appropriate in light of that decision, including modifications to the then-existing [Master Manual], if applicable." Record of Decision 18. The United States has "continually asserted its preparedness to implement, in accordance with federal law, any [agreed-upon] comprehensive water allocation formula." Id., at 4; see also Joint Exh. 124, at 6-35. And, of course, the Administrative Procedure Act requires the Corps to make decisions that are reasonable, i.e ., not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion" or "in excess of [the Corps'] statutory jurisdiction." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). We recognize that the Corps must take account of a variety of circumstances and statutory obligations when it allocates water. New circumstances may require the Corps to revise its Master Manual or devote more water from the Chattahoochee River to other uses. But, given the considerations we have set forth, we cannot agree with the Special Master that the Corps' "inheren[t] discretio[n]" renders effective relief impermissibly "uncertain" or that meaningful relief is otherwise precluded. Report 56, n. 38. We cannot now say that Florida has "merely some technical right" without "a corresponding benefit," Kansas I, 206 U.S., at 109, 27 S.Ct. 655 or that an effort to shape a decree will prove "a vain thing." Foster, 146 U.S., at 101, 13 S.Ct. 28. Ordinarily "[u]ncertainties about the future" do not "provide a basis for declining to fashion a decree." See Idaho II, 462 U.S., at 1026, 103 S.Ct. 2817. And in this case, the record leads us to believe that, if necessary and with the help of the United States, the Special Master, and the parties, we should be able to fashion one. V We keep in mind what our prior decisions make clear: " 'The difficulties of drafting and enforcing a decree' " do not necessarily provide a convincing " 'justification for us to refuse to perform the important function entrusted to us by the Constitution.' " Idaho I, 444 U.S., at 390, n. 7, 100 S.Ct. 616 (quoting Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S., at 616, 65 S.Ct. 1332 ); see also Idaho II, supra, at 1027, 103 S.Ct. 2817 ("Although the computation is complicated and somewhat technical, that fact does not prevent the issuance of an equitable decree"). For this reason and the others we have discussed, we agree with Florida that it has made a legally sufficient showing as to the possibility of fashioning an effective remedial decree. We repeat, however, that Florida will be entitled to a decree only if it is shown that "the benefits of the [apportionment] substantially outweigh the harm that might result." Colorado I, 459 U.S., at 187, 103 S.Ct. 539. In assessing whether that showing has been made, the Master may find it necessary to address in the first instance many of the evidentiary and legal questions the answers to which we have here assumed or found plausible enough to allow us to resolve the threshold remedial question. In order to determine whether Florida can eventually prove its right to cap Georgia's use of Flint River waters, it may find it necessary for the Special Master to make more specific factual findings and definitive recommendations regarding such questions as: To what extent does Georgia take too much water from the Flint River? To what extent has Florida sustained injuries as a result? To what extent would a cap on Georgia's water consumption increase the amount of water that flows from the Flint River into Lake Seminole? To what extent (under the Corps' revised Master Manual or under reasonable modifications that could be made to that Manual) would additional water resulting from a cap on Georgia's water consumption result in additional streamflow in the Apalachicola River? To what extent would that additional streamflow into the Apalachicola River ameliorate Florida's injuries? The Special Master may make other factual findings he believes necessary and hold hearings (or take additional evidence) as he believes necessary. Cf. Colorado I, 459 U.S., at 190, n. 14, 103 S.Ct. 539. Consistent with the principles that guide our inquiry in this context, answers need not be "mathematically precise or based on definite present and future conditions." Id., at 1026, 103 S.Ct. 2817. Approximation and reasonable estimates may prove "necessary to protect the equitable rights of a State." Ibid. And the answers may change over time. Cf. New Jersey v. New York, 347 U.S. 995, 996-1005, 74 S.Ct. 842, 98 L.Ed. 1127 (1954) ; New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S., at 344-346, 51 S.Ct. 478. Flexibility and approximation are often the keys to success in our efforts to resolve water disputes between sovereign States that neither Congress "nor the legislature of either State" has been able to resolve. Virginia v. West Virginia, 220 U.S., at 27, 31 S.Ct. 330. We consequently do not dismiss this case. Rather, we remand the case to the Special Master for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. APPENDIX ? Justice THOMAS, with whom Justice ALITO, Justice KAGAN, and Justice GORSUCH join, dissenting. Florida asks this Court to cap Georgia's use of water in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin (Basin). Florida claims that such a cap would allow additional water to flow into the Apalachicola River and Bay, which would benefit Florida by alleviating certain ecological harms. To prevail under our precedents, Florida must present clear and convincing evidence that its proposed cap will benefit Florida more than it harms Georgia. See Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 187, 103 S.Ct. 539, 74 L.Ed.2d 348 (1982) (Colorado I ). The Special Master applied this balance-of-harms standard and, after presiding over a 1-month trial involving 40 witnesses and more than 2,000 exhibits, found that Florida had not met its burden. Because that finding is well supported by the evidence, I would have overruled Florida's objections to the Special Master's Report (Report) and denied Florida's request for relief. I respectfully dissent. I The Court's recitation of the facts focuses on the geography of the relevant rivers and the failed compact negotiations between Florida and Georgia, but does not provide any details about the respective interests of Florida and Georgia or the extensive operations of the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). See ante, at 2508 - 2510. Because these missing details are crucial to determining whether equitable relief is warranted, I will supply them. A This case concerns Georgia's use of water in the Basin. Spanning Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, the Basin consists of three rivers-the Chattahoochee, the Flint, and the Apalachicola. The Chattahoochee River starts in northern Georgia, just north of Atlanta, and flows southwest along the Alabama-Georgia border until it reaches Florida. The Flint River starts east of the Chattahoochee, just south of Atlanta, and flows south until it reaches Florida. The Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers meet at the border of Florida, forming Lake Seminole. From Lake Seminole, the Apalachicola River flows south through the Florida panhandle and into the Gulf of Mexico at Apalachicola Bay. Both Georgia and Florida depend on Basin water. The Chattahoochee River supplies most of the water for metropolitan Atlanta. And the Flint River supplies most of the water for southern Georgia's large agricultural industry. In Florida, the Apalachicola River sustains a unique ecosystem that is home to a number of species, including mussels, sturgeon, and tupelo trees. Flows from the Apalachicola River (or River) also support the Apalachicola Bay (or Bay) ecosystem-one of the most productive estuaries in the Northern Hemisphere. The Apalachicola Bay's low-salinity and high-nutrient waters make it an extraordinarily productive habitat for oysters and other sea life. Although both Georgia and Florida depend on the Basin, the Florida portion of the Basin is significantly less populated and productive. The Georgia portion has a population of more than 5 million and accounts for around $283 billion in gross regional product per year. Direct Testimony of Robert Stavins 2, 16 (Stavins). The Florida portion, by contrast, has a population of fewer than 100,000 people and generates around $2 billion in gross regional product per year. Id., at 17. In relative terms, Georgia accounts for 98% of the population and 99% of the economic production. Ibid . B Florida and Georgia are not the only stakeholders in the Basin. The United States, through the Corps, operates five dams and four reservoirs on the Chattahoochee River. Only the three northernmost dams can store significant amounts of water. The two dams that are farthest south on the Chattahoochee-the George W. Andrews Dam and the Jim Woodruff Dam-cannot store an appreciable amount of water. The Corps does not operate any dams on the Flint River, which flows unimpeded until it reaches the Jim Woodruff Dam at Lake Seminole. The Corps operates its dams as a unit. It must do so in a way that achieves its congressionally authorized purposes, such as facilitating navigation, generating hydroelectric power, protecting the national defense, promoting recreation, maintaining the commercial value of riparian lands, and protecting the water supply for the surrounding metropolitan Atlanta area. See H.R. Doc. No. 342, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 77 (1939); River and Harbor Act of 1945, 59 Stat. 17; In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litigation, 644 F.3d 1160, 1167 (C.A.11 2011). The Corps also must ensure compliance with other federal laws, including laws governing the conservation of fish and wildlife, the quality of water, and the protection of threatened and endangered species. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. ; Flood Control Act of 1944, 33 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. ; Water Supply Act of 1958, 43 U.S.C. § 390b. Given these numerous demands, the Corps has long relied on water-control manuals to guide its operations of the dams. The current manual dictates the minimum amount of water that the Corps must provide to the Apalachicola River under various conditions. Three variables affect that minimum amount of water: the time of year, the amount of water in the Corps' storage reservoirs, and the amount of additional water entering the Basin. The manual is very complex, spanning 1,190 pages, but only a few provisions are relevant here. The manual provides that, as a general rule, most additional water that enters the Basin will pass through to Florida via the Apalachicola River. But, in certain circumstances, the Corps will artificially increase or decrease the amount of water that passes through to ensure that 5,000 cubic feet per second flows into the Apalachicola River. For example, if the natural streamflow entering the Basin (Basin inflow) is less than 5,000 cubic feet per second, then the Corps will artificially augment the flow by releasing additional water from its reservoirs. Or, if the amount of water in the Corps' reservoirs falls below a certain amount, the Corps will trigger what it calls "drought operations." During drought operations, no matter how much water is entering the Basin, the Corps will generally release only 5,000 cubic feet per second into the Apalachicola River until its reservoirs are completely replenished. The Corps' current manual reflects many lessons that it has learned over the past decade. In March 2006, for example, the Corps created an interim operating plan, which set high flow requirements to protect endangered species in the Apalachicola River. Direct Testimony of Wei Zeng 44-45 (Zeng). But those high flow requirements prevented the Corps from saving enough water during droughts to refill its reservoirs, putting all its other projects at risk. Id., at 45. So the Corps switched to more storage-friendly rules. Id., at 45-46. In December 2006, the Corps modified its operating plan to require a portion of the water entering the Basin to be devoted to refilling the Corps' reservoirs. Id., at 46. When this modification proved insufficient, the Corps created special rules for droughts, which saved even more water by decreasing the minimum flow into the Apalachicola River. Id., at 46-47. Later, the Corps altered its operations to save still more water, by increasing the amount it could dedicate to refilling its reservoirs during nondroughts and lowering the threshold for triggering the special drought rules. Id., at 47; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11 (Brief for United States). The Corps' current manual is a product of this decade of trial and error. The current manual also reflects decades of litigation. The Corps' first manual went into effect in 1958, and the Corps did not propose a new one until 1989. As soon as it did, Alabama sued. Florida, Georgia, and other stakeholders eventually sued as well. For its part, Florida alleged that the Corps' operations under the proposed manual and subsequent interim operating plans violated the Endangered Species Act by injuring mussels and sturgeon, as well as noncovered species like oysters and tupelo trees. The various lawsuits were eventually consolidated in the Middle District of Florida. Twenty years after Alabama first sued, the District Court ruled for Alabama but against Florida. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed with respect to Alabama. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litigation, 644 F.3d, at 1192, 1205. And Florida's case became moot in 2012, once the Corps issued the immediate predecessor to its current manual. II A Soon after the litigation against the Corps ended, Florida sought leave to file this lawsuit against Georgia, requesting an equitable apportionment of Basin water. This Court granted Florida leave to file its complaint in 2014. Florida's complaint alleged that Georgia was consuming more than its fair share of water in the Basin, causing economic and ecological harms to Florida. Florida sought relief only against Georgia and disclaimed seeking any "affirmative relief against the United States ... with respect to the Corps' operation of the federally authorized dam and reservoir system." Complaint ¶ 15. The United States could not be joined as a party because it declined to waive its sovereign immunity. Georgia moved to dismiss Florida's complaint for failure to join the United States as a necessary party. Florida opposed the motion, arguing that the United States was not necessary because Florida " 'ha[d] no quarrel' with the Corps' operation of dams, and [its] lawsuit is not seeking to impose a 'minimum flow' regime on the Corps." Florida Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 26. Florida reiterated that it "is not seeking any relief whatsoever with respect to the operations of the dams" and is "not seeking any relief asking the Corps to control the dams or pull the levers in any specific way." Tr. of Oral Arg. on Motion to Dismiss 27. Florida conceded that "if [the Special Master] conclude[s] after a trial that caps on [Georgia's] consumption will not redress Florida's harm, then Florida will not have proved its case." Id., at 29. Based on Florida's concessions, the Special Master denied Georgia's motion to dismiss. The Special Master recognized that Florida had "disclaimed any intention to seek a decree" binding the Corps in order to "sideste[p] the need to join the United States as a party." Order on Motion to Dismiss, p. 12. The Special Master warned Florida that this strategy was a " 'two edged sword.' " Id., at 13. "Having voluntarily narrowed its requested relief and shouldered the burden of proving that the requested relief is appropriate," the Special Master explained, "Florida's claim will live or die based on whether Florida can show that a consumption cap [on Georgia alone] is justified and will afford adequate relief." Ibid. B The parties proceeded to trial. Florida sought to cap Georgia's use of Basin water at its current levels through at least 2050. See Florida Pre-trial Brief 5; Updated Pre-Filed Direct Testimony (PFDT) of Dr. George M. Hornberger 58 (Hornberger). And, during drought years, Florida sought to reduce Georgia's use of Basin water by between 1,500 and 2,000 cubic feet per second. See Florida Pre-trial Brief 5; Hornberger 58; Updated PFDT of David Sunding 42 (Sunding); Florida Post-Trial Brief 18. To support its proposed caps, Florida first presented testimony about how much additional water it would receive during droughts. According to Florida's evidence, Georgia is currently using enough water during droughts to decrease streamflow on the Apalachicola River by around 4,000 cubic feet per second. See Hornberger 2. Florida proposed cutting that amount by half. One of its experts opined that, by implementing several conservation measures, Georgia could increase flows in the Apalachicola River during droughts by 1,500 to 2,000 cubic feet per second. See Sunding 3; Hornberger 4. Florida estimated that these measures would cost Georgia an additional $35.2 million per year. Sunding 44. Florida next presented evidence about how this additional water would benefit various species in the Apalachicola River. It argued that additional flows could benefit mussels, which need consistent flows of at least 6,000 cubic feet per second in the summer; sturgeon, which need consistent flows of at least 7,000 cubic feet per second in the summer; and tupelo trees, which need consistent flows of at least 14,100 cubic feet per second in the summer. See Updated PFDT of J. David Allan 23-24, 26, 32-33, 41, 44-45 (Allan). Additional flows could also benefit the oysters in the Apalachicola Bay by lowering its salinity. See Updated PFDT of J. Wilson White 48 (White); PFDT of Marcia Greenblatt 15. All of Florida's evidence about these species, however, addressed the benefits of additional water during droughts. See Report 63. Florida presented no evidence of any benefits during nondroughts. Finally, Florida attempted to prove that the additional water would actually reach Florida when it needs the water-i.e., during droughts. To do this, Florida needed to show that the Corps would deviate from its normal operating protocols, which specify that the Corps will generally release only 5,000 cubic feet per second during droughts. Florida relied on Dr. Peter Shanahan to make this showing. Dr. Shanahan testified that "the Corps would not ... hold back water and thwart the additional flow benefits [that] Florida would receive from Georgia['s] conservation efforts." Updated PFDT of Dr. Peter Shanahan 1 (Nov. 15, 2016). He reasoned that the Corps would either choose to release the additional water in its discretion or be compelled to release the additional water because its upstream dams have limited storage capacity and it does not operate any dams on the Flint River. Id ., at 17-27. In its defense, Georgia presented evidence that its current use has only a negligible impact on the amount of water that Florida receives through the Apalachicola River. Georgia's experts showed that the State's water use amounted to just 4% of Basin flows in an average year and 8% of Basin flows in a dry year, leaving anywhere from 92% to 96% of Basin water for Florida. See Stavins 16-18; Bedient 44-45. According to Georgia's experts, the primary factor that dictates flows in the Apalachicola River is precipitation, not consumption. See Direct Testimony of Charles A. Menzie 15. Georgia's experts also testified that Georgia's water use was entirely reasonable. Metropolitan Atlanta had taken substantial steps to conserve water, reducing its consumption to levels that even Florida's expert admitted demonstrated effective water conservation. Direct Testimony of Peter Mayer 2; see also, id., at 18 (showing that Florida's Basin residents used more water per capita than residents in metropolitan Atlanta). And, instead of Florida's estimate of 4,000 cubic feet per second, Georgia estimated that its water use had never decreased streamflow by more than 2,000 cubic feet per second, and only rarely by more than 1,400 cubic feet per second. See Zeng 2, 7. Georgia also presented evidence that Florida's proposed caps would cost Georgia significantly more than they would benefit Florida. Georgia's economic expert estimated that Florida's proposed caps would impose costs of more than "$2.1 billion for municipal and industrial water users and $335 million for Georgia farmers ... every single year." Stavins 2. Georgia's expert also testified that Florida's expert had dramatically lowered his initial evaluation of the costs to Georgia, which was initially $191 million. Id., at 31; see also 11 Trial Tr. 2787. That change apparently occurred because Florida's expert narrowed his definition of "cost" to exclude anything but additional, direct governmental expenditures. See id ., at 2791. But regardless of the precise cost, Georgia's expert testified that it would be inequitable to impose it on Georgia. "Georgia has 5 times the land area, 56 times the population, 80 times the number of employees, and 129 times the [gross regional product] of ... Florida. [Yet it] consumes only 4 percent of the total waters available in the ... Basin in an average year, and only 8 percent of the total waters available in the ... Basin in a dry year, leaving the rest for Florida's use." Stavins 2. Further, Florida's own expert estimated that a cap on Georgia would produce only minimal benefits for Florida: Cutting Georgia's water use in half would increase the oyster biomass in Apalachicola Bay by less than 0.6% in most instances, and only 1.2% during the worst droughts. White 50-51. These additional oysters would be worth only a few hundred thousand dollars. Stavins 51-52. Finally, Georgia rebutted Florida's assertion that, despite the Corps' operations, Florida would actually receive the additional water that a cap on Georgia would create during droughts. Using models that accounted for the Corps' prior operations, Georgia's expert on the Corps, Dr. Philip Bedient, testified that Florida would receive only 5,000 cubic feet per second during droughts, no matter how much additional water was created by a cap on Georgia and regardless of whether that water flowed into the Flint or the Chattahoochee River. See Bedient 23-26, 28-30. The United States filed an amicus brief to the same effect. It confirmed that, during droughts, "[t]he Corps expects ... that Apalachicola River flows would be very similar with or without a consumption cap [on Georgia]." Post-Trial Brief 17-18 (United States Post-Trial Brief). C All told, the trial lasted one month. After hearing the witnesses and reviewing the evidence, the Special Master recommended ruling against Florida. Report 70. The Special Master found that Florida likely had proved harm to its oysters, and assumed that Georgia was using too much water for agricultural purposes. Id., at 31-34. But the Special Master did not decide whether Georgia's agricultural water use caused the harm to Florida's oysters. Id., at 34. Instead, he concluded that Florida had failed to prove that a cap on Georgia would appreciably benefit it given the Corps' operations in the Basin. Id., at 3, 31-34. Citing this Court's precedents requiring States to prove an appreciable benefit before they can obtain an equitable apportionment that interferes with established uses, the Special Master concluded that Florida could not prove that its injury was "redressable by the Court." See id ., at 24 (citing, inter alia, Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 444 U.S. 380, 392, 100 S.Ct. 616, 62 L.Ed.2d 564 (1980) (Idaho I ); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 523, 56 S.Ct. 540, 80 L.Ed. 837 (1936) ); Report 30 (same); see also id., at 27 (citing New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342-345, 51 S.Ct. 478, 75 L.Ed. 1104 (1931) ; Colorado I, 459 U.S., at 187, 103 S.Ct. 539 ). According to the Special Master, Florida "ha[d] not proven by clear and convincing evidence that any additional streamflow in the Flint River or Chattahoochee River would be released from Jim Woodruff Dam into the Apalachicola River at a time that would provide a material benefit to Florida (i.e., during dry periods)." Report 47. The Special Master also found that "Florida ha[d] not met its requirement to show by clear and convincing evidence that its injury can be redressed by increased flows during nondrought conditions" because its "trial presentation did not address the benefits of increased flows during 'normal' periods" and Georgia's evidence showed "an absence of any significant benefit to Florida." Id., at 63-65. III Before delving into the parties' arguments, it is helpful to have a basic understanding of the rules that govern this Court's equitable-apportionment jurisprudence-or at least what used to be the rules before the Court's opinion muddled them beyond recognition. First, in equitable-apportionment cases, as in all cases, this Court requires the complaining party to prove standing. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 735-736, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981) ; Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 447, 452, 112 S.Ct. 789, 117 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) ; see also 3 A. Kelley, Water and Water Rights § 45.02(b), p. 45-12 (3d ed. 2018) (noting that standing is a justiciability requirement for equitable-apportionment cases) (Kelley). To prove standing, a complaining State must demonstrate that it has " 'suffered a wrong through the action of the other State ... which is susceptible of judicial enforcement according to the acceptable principles of the common law or equity systems of jurisprudence.' " Maryland, supra, at 735-736, 101 S.Ct. 2114 ; Wyoming, supra, at 452, 112 S.Ct. 789. Second, this Court requires the State seeking an apportionment to show by clear and convincing evidence a "threatened invasion of rights ... of serious magnitude." New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309, 41 S.Ct. 492, 65 L.Ed. 937 (1921) ; accord, Colorado I, supra, at 187, n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 539 ; Kelley § 45.04. Our precedents do not clarify whether this requirement goes to the case's justiciability, the merits of the complaining State's claim, or the propriety of affording injunctive relief. See ibid. But they are clear that such a showing must be made to obtain relief. See Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 669, 51 S.Ct. 286, 75 L.Ed. 602 (1931). Third, the State seeking an apportionment must "demonstrat[e] by clear and convincing evidence that the benefits of the [apportionment] substantially outweigh the harm that might result." Colorado I, supra, at 187, 103 S.Ct. 539 ; accord, Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316-317, 104 S.Ct. 2433, 81 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984) (Colorado II ); Kelley § 45.06, at 45-34 to 45-35. Since this Court's first equitable-apportionment case, this balance-of-harms test has been the basic merits inquiry that decides whether a State is entitled to an apportionment. See id., § 45.06(c)(1), at 45-39 to 45-40 ("Harm-benefit comparison goes back to the Court's first equitable apportionment case, Kansas v. Colorado [, 206 U.S. 46, 113-114, 27 S.Ct. 655, 51 L.Ed. 956 (1907) (Kansas I ) ]"). As part of the balance-of-harms test, this Court has required the State seeking an apportionment to prove that it would appreciably benefit from the apportionment-otherwise, the State could not possibly prevail in the balance-of-harms analysis. Idaho I, supra, at 392, 100 S.Ct. 616 ; Washington, supra, at 523, 56 S.Ct. 540 ; see also Kelley § 45.06(c)(1), at 45-39 (explaining that this appreciable-benefit requirement is part of the "harm-benefit" balance). Fourth, if the State seeking an apportionment makes all these showings, this Court must craft an equitable-apportionment decree. Our precedents hold that a State should not be denied a remedy merely because calculating the appropriate apportionment is difficult. See Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1026, 103 S.Ct. 2817, 77 L.Ed.2d 387 (1983) (Idaho II ). Reasonable predictions about future conditions are sufficient. Ibid. This case is about the third rule: the balance-of-harms analysis and, specifically, its appreciable-benefit requirement. The Special Master found that Florida had not proved that its requested cap on Georgia's water use would appreciably benefit it, since Florida could not prove that it would receive more water when it needed it. That this case is about the third rule is important. Throughout its opinion, the Court mushes the requirements from our precedents together, merging cases and principles from one area with cases and principles from another-sometimes in the same sentence. But our precedents are not so convoluted. They articulate clear rules, and the Special Master correctly applied one of them when making his recommendation in this case. He did not err by failing to apply the unrecognizable mishmash of principles set out in the Court's opinion. IV Florida raises three objections to the Special Master's Report. First, it argues that the Special Master required it to satisfy a legal standard that was too demanding. Second, Florida argues that it should prevail under the correct standard because, if this Court enters an equitable-apportionment decree, the Corps will likely allow more water to flow into Florida during droughts. And third, even if the Corps does not release more water into Florida during droughts, Florida argues that a cap on Georgia would still benefit it during nondroughts. None of these arguments has merit. A Florida's first objection fails because the Special Master applied the correct legal standard. A careful reading of his Report demonstrates that he applied the ordinary balance-of-harms test dictated by this Court's precedents. He did not, as the Court implies, deny Florida relief because calculating an appropriate apportionment was too difficult or because Florida failed to satisfy the "threshold" redressability requirement for Article III standing. And even if the Special Master did apply the wrong standard, his misstep would not justify a remand because his findings are plainly correct and establish that Georgia should prevail under the balance-of-harms test. 1 The Special Master applied the balance-of-harms test from this Court's precedents. A State seeking an equitable apportionment that interferes with established uses must "demonstrat[e] by clear and convincing evidence that the benefits of the [apportionment] substantially outweigh the harm that might result." Colorado I, 459 U.S., at 187, 103 S.Ct. 539 ; accord, Colorado II, supra, at 316-317, 104 S.Ct. 2433. This heavy burden reflects the need for "judicial caution" before granting equitable apportionments, which "involve the interests of quasi-sovereigns, present complicated and delicate questions, and ... necessitate expert administration." Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392, 64 S.Ct. 176, 88 L.Ed. 116 (1943) (Kansas II ); accord, Colorado II, 467 U.S., at 316, 104 S.Ct. 2433 (explaining that the clear-and-convincing-evidence burden "appropriately balance[s] the unique interests involved in water rights disputes between sovereigns"). It also reflects "this Court's long-held view that the proposed diverter should bear most, if not all, of the risks of erroneous decision" because the benefits he claims for proposed future uses are usually " 'speculative and remote' " while the costs of disrupting established uses are " 'typically certain and immediate.' " Ibid. (quoting Colorado I, supra, at 187, 103 S.Ct. 539 ). As part of the balance-of-harms analysis, this Court has repeatedly held that the State seeking to divert water from existing uses must show that it will obtain some appreciable benefit from an equitable apportionment. See, e.g., Idaho I, 444 U.S., at 392, 100 S.Ct. 616 ; New Jersey, 283 U.S., at 345, 51 S.Ct. 478. This appreciable-benefit requirement reflects the fact that a minimal benefit cannot outweigh the heavy costs that inevitably accompany equitable-apportionment decrees. See Colorado I, supra, at 187, 103 S.Ct. 539 ("[T]he equities supporting the [status quo] will usually be compelling"); Kansas II, supra, at 393, 64 S.Ct. 176 (expressing "great and serious caution" over granting equitable apportionments because they "interfer[e] with the action of a State"). Put another way, the Court will not "bring distress and even ruin to a long-established [water use] for no other or better purpose than to vindicate a barren right." Washington, 297 U.S., at 523, 56 S.Ct. 540 ; see also Kansas I, 206 U.S., at 109, 27 S.Ct. 655. ("[B]efore, at the instance of a sister state, [a State's water use] is destroyed or materially interfered with, it should be clear that such sister state has not merely some technical right, but also a right with a corresponding benefit"). Such an action would run contrary to "the high equity that moves the conscience of the court in giving judgment between states." Washington, 297 U.S., at 523, 56 S.Ct. 540. For example, in Washington v. Oregon -a case with facts strikingly similar to this one-the Court refused to cap Oregon's water use because it " 'would materially injure Oregon users without a compensating benefit to Washington users.' " Ibid . In that case, Washington complained about "temporary dams" that Oregon residents had erected to irrigate their crops during "seasons of [water] shortage." Id., at 522, 56 S.Ct. 540. Removing the dams, however, would mean that, "[d]uring the period of water shortage, only a small quantity of water would go by" and "would be quickly absorbed and lost in the deep gravel beneath the channel." Id., at 522-523, 56 S.Ct. 540. Because a cap on Oregon would not benefit Washington by supplying water when it most needed it, the Court declined to grant Washington's requested relief. Id., at 520-523, 56 S.Ct. 540. The Special Master applied this appreciable-benefit requirement. As he explained, Florida "ha[d] not proven by clear and convincing evidence" that the Corps would release any additional water "at a time that would provide a material benefit to Florida (i.e., during dry periods)." Report 47; see also id., at 47-48 ("[T]he Corps' operation[s] ... rende[r] any potential benefit to Florida from increased streamflow in the Flint River uncertain and speculative"). The Special Master likewise found "an absence of any significant benefit to Florida" during nondrought conditions. Id., at 65 ; see also id ., at 69 ("Florida has not shown that it would benefit from increased pass-through operations under normal conditions"); id., at 62-63 ("[T]he potential benefits to Florida of increased flows ... when the Corps is not in drought operations are uncertain, rendering the efficacy of any relief speculative"). Tellingly, the Special Master relied exclusively on this Court's precedents applying the appreciable-benefit requirement. See id., at 24 (citing, inter alia, Idaho I, supra, at 392, 100 S.Ct. 616 ; Washington, supra, at 523, 56 S.Ct. 540 ); Report 30 (same); id., at 27 (citing New Jersey, supra, at 345, 51 S.Ct. 478 ; Colorado I, supra, at 187, 103 S.Ct. 539 ). And Florida agreed that it had to present proof of some benefit. See, e.g., Florida's Post-Trial Response Brief 63 (conceding that it had to "prove that additional flows from a ... reduction in Georgia's consumption will result in meaningful benefits to the Bay and River"). In short, the Special Master correctly applied our precedents and required Florida to show that it would obtain some appreciable benefit from an equitable-apportionment decree. 2 The Court does not disagree that Florida failed to prove an appreciable benefit. Instead, it simply asserts that a decision on that question is "premature." Ante, at 2511 - 2512. It is incredibly odd to conclude that a Special Master's merits determination is "premature" after a full trial . The Court can draw that strange conclusion only by conflating the rules that govern our equitable-apportionment jurisprudence and then faulting the Special Master for misapplying two rules that he never applied. The Court criticizes the Special Master for applying "too strict a standard" when deciding the " 'threshold' " question whether the Court would be "able to fashion an appropriate equitable decree." Ante, at 2516. Although the Court's reasoning is far from clear, it appears to mean one of two things. The Court either means that the Special Master erred by denying relief on the ground that it was too difficult to calculate the appropriate apportionment-the fourth rule mentioned above. Or, the Court means that the Special Master erred by denying relief on the ground that Florida could not prove Article III standing-the first rule mentioned above. But the Special Master did not deny relief for either of these two reasons. a Both the Court and Florida suggest that the Special Master contravened this Court's statement in Idaho II that " '[u]ncertainties about the future ... do not provide a basis for declining to fashion a decree.' " Ante, at 2513 - 2514, 2526 (quoting Idaho II, 462 U.S., at 1026, 103 S.Ct. 2817 ); see also ante, at 2514 - 2515, 2517 (suggesting that the Special Master violated Idaho II by concluding that " 'the formulation of a workable decree is impossible' "); Brief for Plaintiff 30-31. But the Special Master nowhere contradicted this rule. The rule from Idaho II is a rule about fashioning an appropriate remedy when the complaining State has prevailed on the merits. In Idaho II, the Special Master concluded that he could not determine Idaho's entitlement to fish "for any past or future year" because "several unknown variables" made it too difficult to decide how many fish would be available to harvest at any given time. Special Master's Report, O.T. 1982, No. 67, Orig., p. 30. The Special Master rejected Idaho's proposed formula for calculating its entitlement because he could not understand the predictive models or mathematics involved in applying it. Id., at 40-42. Before this Court, Idaho objected to the Special Master's conclusion, arguing that its proposed formula relied on procedures "that are either being currently employed by defendants or which involve simple mathematical computations." Brief for Plaintiffs in O.T. 1982, No. 67, Orig., p. 82. The Court accepted Idaho's argument, noting that a decree need not "always be mathematically precise or based on definite present and future conditions" and that "Idaho's proposed formula for apportioning the fish is one possible basis for a decree." Idaho II, 462 U.S., at 1026, 103 S.Ct. 2817. "Uncertainties about the future," the Court explained, "do not provide a basis for declining to fashion a decree." Ibid. Unlike the Special Master in Idaho II, the Special Master in this case did not conclude that it was too difficult to calculate the amount of water that Florida should receive. As the Court acknowledges, ante, at 2520, the Special Master assumed it was feasible to impose Florida's requested cap on Georgia's water use and "accept[ed] Florida's estimates of the increased streamflow that would result from a consumption cap." Report 67, n. 43; see id., at 34-35. But even if a cap on Georgia generated the additional water that Florida claimed it would (1,500 to 2,000 cubic feet per second), the Special Master concluded that it would not appreciably benefit Florida because it would not be passed through when Florida needed it. See id., at 47-48, 62-65, 69. That is why the Special Master cited the appreciable-benefit rule from Idaho I, 444 U.S., at 392, 100 S.Ct. 616, and Washington, 297 U.S., at 523, 56 S.Ct. 540. He did not fail to make reasonable predictions in shaping a remedy or otherwise contravene the rule from Idaho II . b Florida alternatively contends that the Special Master applied the "redressability" requirement of Article III standing. See Brief for Plaintiff 29-32. At some points, the Court appears to agree with this characterization, as it describes the appreciable-benefit rule as an Article III standing requirement. See ante, at 2514 - 2515 (quoting the Article III standing rule from Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S., at 447, 452, 112 S.Ct. 789 Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S., at 735-736, 101 S.Ct. 2114, and Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 15, 60 S.Ct. 39, 84 L.Ed. 3 (1939), and describing the appreciable-benefit rule from Kansas I and Washington as a "[m]ore specifi[c]" articulation of that rule). This argument is incorrect. As explained, the Special Master applied the ordinary balance-of-harms analysis and found that Florida had not demonstrated an appreciable benefit from a cap on Georgia's use. Tellingly, the Special Master relied exclusively on cases conducting the balance-of-harms analysis. His Report does not cite any standing cases, or even mention "standing" or "Article III." Neither do any of the pre-trial or post-trial briefs that the parties filed. True, the Special Master's Report sometimes describes the appreciable-benefit requirement as a question of "redressability"-a word that is also associated with Article III standing. But the Special Master was merely following the parties' lead, as they phrased the appreciable-benefit requirement in terms of "redress" throughout the litigation. See Tr. of Oral Arg. on Motion to Dismiss 29 (Florida admitting that it must show "that caps on consumption will ... redress [its] harms" to "prov[e] its case"); Florida Pre-Trial Brief 37-39 (describing how a consumption cap "can redress Florida's worsening injuries" and "significantly benefit Florida's ecology"); Georgia Post-Trial Brief 80-88 (describing the appreciable-benefit aspect of the balance-of-harms test as a "redress" requirement); Georgia's Post-Trial Response Brief 3, 7 (same); see also United States Post-Trial Brief 19 (taking no position "on whether Florida has proved that a consumption cap would produce enough additional [B]asin inflow at the right times to redress Florida's alleged harm and justify the cost of imposing a consumption cap" (emphasis added) ). That the parties and the Special Master adopted this shorthand does not change the Special Master's analysis, which focused squarely on the appreciable-benefit requirement. c Because the Court wrongly assumes that the Special Master denied relief on the basis rejected in Idaho II or for lack of Article III standing, it faults the Special Master for imposing the higher burden of proof that governs the merits-i.e., "clear and convincing evidence." See ante, at 2515 - 2517. Of course, the far simpler explanation for why the Special Master applied the merits standard is that he was, in fact, making a decision about the merits, not about remedies or standing. The Court also appears to fault the Special Master for addressing the appreciable-benefit requirement without first making several preliminary findings. The Court asserts that Special Masters must make specific factual determinations in every case about the harm that the complaining State suffered, the exact amount of water needed to remedy that harm, and a host of other factors. See ante, at 2514 - 2517. The Court's suggested order of operations, which it appears to invent out of thin air, would fundamentally transform our equitable-apportionment jurisprudence. It will require States to litigate (and this Court to resolve) a host of complex factual questions, even where the State seeking the apportionment is obviously not entitled to relief because it cannot show an appreciable benefit-a requirement that Florida agrees is necessary for it to prevail, see Florida Post-Trial Response Brief 63 (agreeing it must "prove that additional flows from a ... reduction in Georgia's consumption will result in meaningful benefits to the Bay and River"); Tr. of Oral Arg. on Motion to Dismiss 29 (admitting it must show "that caps on consumption will ... redress [its] harms" to "prov[e] its case"). In no other area of the law do we require unnecessary findings and conclusions when a key element of the plaintiff's case is missing. And we have not applied this rule in equitable apportionment cases either. See, e.g., Idaho II, 462 U.S., at 1027-1029, 103 S.Ct. 2817 (denying relief, despite the Special Master's erroneous ruling on the requested remedy, because his findings also supported the conclusion that Idaho could not show injury and thus was not entitled to relief on the merits). The inefficiencies that this would create, and the costs it would impose on States, are obvious. Yet the Court faults the Special Master for resolving the dispositive question in this case first, without jumping through a series of unnecessary hoops. This is precisely the opposite of what Special Masters should be doing and what this Court should be encouraging. 3 Even if the Court is correct that the Special Master denied Florida relief for some reason other than the merits, there is no reason to send this case back for a do-over. As the Court acknowledges, " 'the ultimate responsibility for deciding what are correct findings of fact remains with us.' " Ante, at 2517 - 2518 (Colorado II, supra, at 317, 104 S.Ct. 2433 ). We "must bring our independent judgment to bear based upon 'our own independent examination of the record.' " Kansas v. Missouri, 322 U.S. 213, 232, 64 S.Ct. 975, 88 L.Ed. 1234 (1944). An independent examination of the record confirms that the Special Master was correct to find that the Corps would not change its operations during droughts if this Court capped Georgia's water use and thus Florida would not benefit from a cap during droughts. See Part IV-B-1, infra . The Special Master also was correct to find that Florida presented no evidence of a benefit during nondroughts. See Part IV-B-2, infra . Those findings support a judgment in Georgia's favor under the traditional balance-of-harms analysis. It makes little sense to send this case back to the Special Master so that he can amend his Report to say "appreciable benefit" instead of "redress" and then send this case right back to this Court. That pointless exercise will only needlessly prolong this litigation. The Court's subtle suggestion that Florida could present "additional evidence" on remand, ante, at 2527, is not a satisfactory response. During their 18 months of discovery, the parties produced 7.2 million pages of documents, served 130 third-party subpoenas, issued more than 30 expert reports, and conducted nearly 100 depositions, including 29 expert depositions. Florida thus had a more-than-ample opportunity to gather its evidence and then present it at a 1-month trial. Giving Florida another bite at the apple will likely yield no additional evidence, but it will be unfair to Georgia, which has already spent the time and resources to defeat the case that Florida chose to present. In short, we have all the evidence we need to decide this case now. We should have done so. B Florida's second and third objections-which challenge the Special Master's finding that Florida had not met its burden under the balance-of-harms test-also fail. As explained, a State seeking to interfere with established uses must prove its case by clear and convincing evidence-a "much greater" burden than the one normally imposed in civil cases. Connecticut, 282 U.S., at 669, 51 S.Ct. 286. To meet this burden, Florida must present enough evidence to leave this Court with an "abiding conviction that the truth of its factual contentions are 'highly probable' " and to "instantly til[t] the evidentiary scales in the affirmative when weighed against the evidence ... offered in opposition." Colorado II, supra, at 316, 104 S.Ct. 2433. As the Special Master found, Florida has not met this burden. The evidence demonstrates that, if this Court imposed Florida's proposed cap on Georgia, Florida would not receive an appreciable amount of additional water during droughts. And Florida would not benefit from the additional water that it received during nondroughts. 1 Florida did not demonstrate that, if this Court caps Georgia's water use, Florida would receive a meaningful amount of additional water during droughts. For Florida to receive more water, the Corps must change its current operating procedures. But the Corps is not a party, and it would not be bound by any decree issued by this Court. Because Florida cannot ask this Court to require the Corps to change its existing operations, it must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Corps will voluntarily make the necessary changes. Florida cannot do so. The United States' representations in this litigation and the Corps' history and practice in the Basin all reveal that the Corps will not change its existing practices, even if this Court caps Georgia's water use. Throughout this litigation, the United States has consistently maintained that the Corps "would not generally expect" to release more water into Florida during droughts, even if Florida convinced this Court to cap Georgia's use. Brief for United States 28; see also United States Post-Trial Brief 17-18 ("The Corps expects [during drought operations] that Apalachicola River flows would be very similar with or without a consumption cap until enough water is stored to return the system to normal operations"). This is because "[B]asin inflow ... has historically not been the primary factor in the Corps' decisionmaking process for making additional releases above 5[,]000 [cubic feet per second] during drought operations." Brief for United States 28. The Corps' "overriding" priorities during droughts are preserving enough water "to comply with the [Endangered Species Act] while avoiding catastrophic depletion of storage and refilling [its] reservoirs as rapidly as possible." Id., at 27. Deviations are made only "as needed to serve congressionally authorized project purposes" or "in emergency circumstances." Ibid. Since a general need to provide more water to Florida does not fall within either exception, the additional water that would flow into the Basin would not translate into additional flows for Florida. See id., at 29. The United States' representations are consistent with the Corps' historical practice. During droughts, the amount of water entering the Basin is almost always insufficient to meet the Corps' minimum-flow requirement of 5,000 cubic feet per second. See Bedient 24-27. Thus, a cap on Georgia would simply decrease the amount of water that the Corps must release from storage; it would not increase the amount of water flowing into the Apalachicola River. Id., at 21, 25-26. And once drought operations are triggered, the Corps limits its releases to around 5,000 cubic feet per second regardless of the amount of water entering the Basin. See United States Post-Trial Brief 9; Brief for United States 24-28. Indeed, during past drought operations, even when Basin inflow varied by tens of thousands of cubic feet per second, the measured flow from Jim Woodruff Dam into the Apalachicola River has consistently remained around 5,000 cubic feet per second. See Bedient 23, 62-63. Further, the models presented by Georgia's expert showed that, if Florida's proposed caps had been in place during the drought years of 2007 and 2012, Florida would not have received appreciable additional flows when the water was most needed. Cutting Georgia's use in half would have produced additional flows for only 14 to 19 days in the summer and fall of 2007, and would not have produced any additional flows during the summer or fall of 2012. Id., at 27-30; see also id., at 38 (showing the same for 2011). Florida argues that the Corps might exercise its discretion to ensure that additional water reaches Florida during droughts. Brief for Plaintiff 40-44. But Florida supports this claim with nothing more than speculation. See Colorado II, 467 U.S., at 320, 104 S.Ct. 2433 (explaining that a State cannot carry its burden in an equitable-apportionment action except "with specific evidence" and that "[m]ere assertions ... will not do"). All available evidence suggests that the Corps would not exercise its discretion to release more water into the Apalachicola River during droughts. Before this Court, the United States expressly rejected Florida's contention that "the Corps is likely to exercise its authority within existing operational protocols to provide Florida with additional flows produced by a cap on Georgia's consumption." Brief for United States 23. Basin inflows, it explained, simply do not dictate how much water the Corps releases into the Apalachicola River. Ibid. And the Corps could not make discretionary releases "that [are] not specifically provided for in the [water-control manual], not specifically authorized by Congress or mandated by general statute, [and not] required by a court order directed to the Corps," without raising "significant and difficult question[s]" about whether it had exceeded its authority. Id., at 29. Florida also suggests that the Corps might amend its water-control manual in response to an equitable decree from this Court. Florida's only support for this argument is a statement from the Corps that it will " 'take ... into account' " this Court's decision. Brief for Plaintiff 44 (quoting Record of Decision Adopting Proposed Action Alternative for Implementation of Updated Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Master Manual 18 (Mar. 30, 2017) ). But this vague statement was not a promise that the Corps will change its procedures, and there are a host of reasons to doubt that the Corps would voluntarily change its procedures just because this Court capped Georgia's use. For one, the Corps has already tried procedures that passed more water to Florida during droughts. The results were dreadful: Reservoir storage plummeted to dangerously low levels, putting all of the Corps' authorized project purposes at risk. Zeng 45-46. Since that time, the Corps' operating protocols have become increasingly protective of reservoir storage, particularly during droughts. As the Corps explained, it intends to pursue " 'a more proactive approach to conserve reservoir storage as drier conditions develop in the [B]asin' " because the "[s]torage of water during drought operations is critically important to retain sufficient water in the system." Brief for United States 11. For another, the last time the Corps attempted to change its water-control manual, it required more than two decades of litigation and administrative review to finalize those changes. Indeed, the main reason that the United States chose not to participate in this case is because it wanted "to avoid being bound by a decree that could directly affect the Corps operations before the Corps had a chance to finally complete its process of updating the [water-control manual]." Id., at 32. Given this, there is no reason to think that the Corps will volunteer to undertake the process of updating its manual again-especially so soon after it completed this arduous task. Florida's speculation is even more suspect in view of the changes that the Corps would have to make to benefit Florida during droughts. To even propose a new water-control manual, the Corps must "examin[e] ... the congressionally authorized purposes," "determin[e] ... how providing additional flows will impact those purposes [and] other laws," and "supplemen[t] documentation of environmental impacts as required by [the National Environmental Policy Act]." Id., at 31. Providing more water to Florida does not help the Corps satisfy any of these legal requirements. It is not one of the congressionally authorized purposes, see id., at 29, 31-32, and, by dropping its lawsuit against the Corps, Florida now accepts that a minimum flow of 5,000 cubic feet per second is sufficient to comply with the Endangered Species Act. Florida cannot claim that the law requires the Corps to provide it with more water. And the idea that the Corps will change its operating protocols to serve an unauthorized purpose when doing so could jeopardize its authorized purposes is simply not plausible. Taking a different tack, the Court suggests that additional water will pass through to Florida even if the Corps does not change its manual. Specifically, the Court concludes that the additional water will pass through to Florida during droughts so long as the Corps does not enter drought operations. See ante, at 2521 - 2522. According to the Court, the Corps will allow additional water to pass through to Florida whenever the natural flow of the Apalachicola River is between 5,000 and 10,000 cubic feet per second during normal or "nondrought" operations. See ante, at 2521 - 2522. The Court's conclusion depends on the premise that, during droughts, the natural streamflow into Florida is "between 5,000 and 10,000" cubic feet per second. Ibid. That premise is false. During droughts, the natural streamflow in the Apalachicola River is usually less than 5,000 cubic feet per second. Supra, at 2541 - 2542; see also Bedient 23 (showing that Basin inflow in 2012 was generally below 5,000 cubic feet per second between June and December); id., at 2542 - 2543 (same for 2007). To maintain a minimum flow of 5,000 cubic feet per second during droughts, the Corps must artificially augment the River's natural flow-even when the Corps is in nondrought operations. Id., at 2539 - 2540. For instance, during the 2011 drought (when the Corps was in nondrought operations), "Basin Inflow was below 5,000 [cubic feet per second] for most of th[e] period [between June and December], and the Corps was 'augmenting' streamflow by releasing water from the reservoirs to satisfy the 5,000 [cubic feet per second] minimum." Id., at 2536; see also id., at 2542 - 2543 (same for 2007). Once the Corps adds enough water to reach 5,000 cubic feet per second, however, it generally adds no more than that. Id., at 2539. To give a concrete example, if the natural flows in the Apalachicola River were 2,600 cubic feet per second, then the Corps would release 2,400 cubic feet per second from its reservoirs. See id., at 2541 - 2542. And if a cap on Georgia increased the River's natural flow to 4,100 cubic feet per second, the Corps would release 900 cubic feet per second. See ibid. In either case, the total flow on the Apalachicola River would remain the same: 5,000 cubic feet per second. Thus, so long as the natural flows remain significantly less than 5,000 cubic feet per second, a cap on Georgia would only decrease the amount of water that the Corps releases from storage; it would not increase the overall amount of water flowing into the Apalachicola River. For this reason, even when the Corps is in nondrought operations, a cap on Georgia would generally not increase flows to Florida. Georgia's expert proved that fact with evidence about past droughts where drought operations were not in effect. Using data from the 2007 drought, Georgia's expert concluded that the additional water from a cap on Georgia would be passed through to Florida almost entirely during the winter and spring months "when water in the [Basin] would be relatively plentiful." Id., at 2543. Florida would receive the additional water from a cap on Georgia only 19 days "during the summer and fall months, when streamflow was at its lowest." Ibid. ; accord, id., at 2524. Data from the 2011 drought showed similar results. See id., at 2524 ("[During] dry years (e.g., 2007 and 2011), ... even significant changes in Georgia's consumptive use would lead to virtually no change in state-line flows during the low-flow months (e.g., June, July, August, September)"). Florida has not shown that these infrequent and sporadic additional flows during droughts would appreciably benefit it. The Court hypothesizes that a cap on Georgia could benefit Florida by decreasing the length of drought operations and by increasing the number of days that the Corps can meet its minimum-flow requirements of 5,000 cubic feet per second (during normal drought operations) and 4,500 cubic feet per second (during extreme drought operations). Ante, at 2520 - 2521, 2522 - 2523. The Court cites the United States' assertion in its brief that increased Basin inflows " 'would generally benefit the [Basin] system by delaying the onset of drought operations, by allowing the Corps to meet the 5000 [cubic feet per second] minimum flow longer during extended drought, and by quickening the resumption of normal operations.' " Ante, at 2520 (quoting Brief for United States 28); see also ante, at 2522 - 2523 (quoting a similar statement in the United States Post-Trial Brief 18-19). Of course, statements in briefs are not evidence. And, as the United States recognizes in the very next sentence, Florida would have to show that these "benefits are of sufficient quantity to justify relief in this case." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28 (Aug. 7, 2017); see also United States Post-Trial Brief 19 (Dec. 15, 2016) (taking "no position on whether Florida has proven that a consumption cap would produce enough additional [B]asin inflow at the right times to redress Florida's alleged harm and justify the cost of imposing a consumption cap"). Florida offered no proof that a cap on Georgia would produce any appreciable benefit of this kind. And the evidence presented at trial suggests that these proposed benefits are wholly speculative. As explained above, the benefits to Florida from a cap on Georgia do not meaningfully change, regardless of whether the Corps enters drought operations. And there is no evidence that the Corps has had trouble meeting its minimum flow requirements during recent droughts, when Georgia's use remained uncapped. Even during the severe droughts of 2011 and 2012, the Corps consistently maintained flows of 5,000 cubic feet per second, never entered extreme drought operations, and never reduced flows on the Apalachicola River to 4,500 cubic feet per second. See Bedient 14. And the Corps is even more unlikely to run out of water during future droughts, given that its current manual is more proactive in conserving water during droughts. See Brief for United States 11-12. In sum, Florida has not shown that it is " 'highly probable' " that a cap on Georgia will result in meaningful additional flows in the Apalachicola River during droughts. Colorado II, 467 U.S., at 316, 104 S.Ct. 2433. It is thus not entitled to an equitable apportionment on this basis. 2 Because Florida will not receive additional water during droughts, it argues that it will benefit from additional water during nondroughts. As the Special Master correctly found, however, Florida presented no evidence to support such an assertion. That is because no such evidence exists. Florida would not benefit from additional water during nondroughts, because flows on the Apalachicola River during nondroughts are already plentiful. The Court does not contend that Florida would benefit from additional water during nondroughts, and Florida all but conceded the point below. When framing its case before the Special Master, Florida requested only that the Court order Georgia to reduce its water use during droughts; Florida did not ask the Court to reduce Georgia's current water use during nondroughts. See Florida Pre-trial Brief 5; Hornberger 58. Consistent with this request, Florida's evidence focused exclusively on the harms that it suffered during droughts. Florida's hydrology expert testified extensively about droughts. See id ., at 2-3, 15-26, 41-46, 49-50. He testified that the Basin usually receives "a rather good amount of a rainfall," so "major problems arise" only during "the low rainfall years." Id., at 13. That is why he limited his testimony to the "impacts of [Georgia's] consumption during drought." Id., at 15; see also id., at 20-22. Florida's other experts followed this drought-centric approach. For instance, one of Florida's experts on the harm to Florida's oysters connected that harm to "severe drought," which "reduced the discharge of fresh water from the Apalachicola River." Updated PFDT of David Kimbro 14. Florida's expert on the harm to sturgeon, mussels, and tupelo trees in the Apalachicola River similarly emphasized "dry periods of episodically dry years." Allan 17; see also id., at 25-27 (emphasizing the effects of sustained flows below 6,000 cubic feet per second). As one Florida expert put it, "[t]he discussions that [he] had, especially with the biologists and the hydrologists, were largely almost exclusively focused on dry years" and he "c[ould]n't think of any" "issues [that] other experts raised about average or wet-year problems." 11 Trial Tr. 2811. The other evidence presented at trial leaves little doubt that Florida would not benefit from additional water during nondroughts. For starters, when the Basin is not experiencing a drought, water is plentiful. Florida's expert testified that "[a]verage rainfall in the portion of the ... Basin above [Lake Seminole] is 51.5 inches per year, a rather good amount of a rainfall." Hornberger 13. As a result, average monthly flows in the Apalachicola River are nearly 20,000 cubic feet per second. Direct Testimony of Sorab Panday 30 (Panday). More than 95% of the time, Apalachicola River flows exceed 6,000 cubic feet per second. Brief for Unites States 12. And it is not unusual for flows in the Apalachicola River to exceed 50,000 cubic feet per second in the wetter months. See Panday 30. Even during drought years, flows in nonsummer months are relatively high. For instance, in the severe drought year of 2012, flow in the late winter and early spring regularly exceeded 10,000 cubic feet per second. See Bedient 29. Almost all of the additional water generated by a cap on Georgia would reach Florida during these high flow periods, when it would provide no benefit to Florida. See id., at 27-30. Take, for instance, the oysters in Apalachicola Bay-the only harm to Florida that the Special Master found in this case. See Report 31-32. Florida's own experts testified that, even if Georgia cut its agricultural water use in half during droughts, the resulting increase in Apalachicola River flows would have a negligible effect during nondroughts. During years of normal rainfall and the wetter months of drought years, the effect of additional flows on the Bay's salinity is less than one part per thousand. See 7 Trial Tr. 1768-1775. This immeasurable effect on the Bay's salinity would have no appreciable impact on oyster biomass. See White 50-51 (showing a less than 0.6% impact on oyster biomass, except in drier months and drought years). Assuming Florida's claims of harm to mussels, sturgeon, and tupelo trees have merit-something the Special Master never found-the harm to those species also would not be remedied by increased flows during nondroughts. Florida's expert on these species opined that significant harm to mussels occurs when flows drop below a threshold of 6,000 cubic feet per second for more than seven consecutive days between June 1 and September 30, Allan 33; that significant harm to sturgeons occurs when flows drop below a threshold of 7,000 cubic feet per second for more than 60 total days between May 1 and September 30, id., at 41; and that significant harm to tupelo trees occurs when flows drop below a threshold of 14,100 cubic feet per second for more than 90 consecutive days between March 20 and September 22, id., at 33, 41, 44-45. Accepting these statements as true, passing more water through to Florida during nondroughts would not do these species any good. All would still suffer the same harms during the summers of drought years when flows remain fixed at 5,000 cubic feet per second because of the Corps' operations. If we contrast the de minimus benefits that Florida might receive from small amounts of additional water during nondroughts with the massive harms that Georgia would suffer if this Court cut its water use in half during droughts, it is clear who should prevail in this case. Florida's expert estimated that a cap on Georgia would have an "[i]ncremental [f]iscal [c]ost" of $35.2 million per year. Sunding 44. This figure included only additional costs that would require "the [Georgia] legislature ... to appropriate money." 11 Trial Tr. 2791. The real cost of such a cap, which includes nongovernmental costs like welfare losses, would range anywhere from $191 million, id., at 2787; Stavins 31, to more than $2 billion per year, id., at 2. And the cap would trigger resulting losses in Georgia's gross regional product and employment, totaling around $322 million and 4,173 jobs annually. Id., at 40. Regardless of the measure used, this harm dwarfs the value of Florida's entire fishing industry in Apalachicola Bay, which produces annual revenues of $11.7 million. Id., at 16. And it greatly outweighs the value of the additional oysters that a cap on Georgia's use might produce-i.e., no more than a few hundred thousand dollars. Id., at 52. Imposing an enormously high cost on one State so that another State can achieve a hollow victory is "not the high equity that moves the conscience of the court in giving judgment between states." Washington, 297 U.S., at 523, 56 S.Ct. 540. * * * In the final analysis, Florida has not shown that it will appreciably benefit from a cap on Georgia's water use. Absent such a showing, the balance of harms cannot tip in Florida's favor. Accordingly, I would have overruled Florida's objections to the Special Master's Report and denied Florida's request for relief. I respectfully dissent. If the amount of water in the Corps' reservoirs falls to critically low levels, then the Corps will release only 4,500 cubic feet per second into the Apalachicola River. These extreme drought operations have not been triggered in recent droughts. See Direct Testimony of Phillip Bedient 14 (Bedient). (showing that flows remained around 5,000 cubic feet per second during the 2011 and 2012 droughts). The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service did not agree. It concluded that the minimum flows in the proposed manual and interim operating plans were sufficient to protect endangered species in the Apalachicola River. Zeng 46-47. The United States has made similar representations to this Court. See, e.g., Brief for United States 26-29 (explaining that the Corps "would not generally expect" flows into Florida to increase during droughts, even if Florida convinced this Court to cap Georgia's water use). The Special Master noted that Florida's alleged injuries to mussels, sturgeon, and tupelo trees were "less compelling." Report 64, n. 42. As for Georgia's municipal and industrial water use, the Special Master concluded that it was "less clear" that these uses were "unreasonable," given that Georgia had "taken significant steps to conserve water in the Atlanta metropolitan region." Id ., at 34, n. 28. The Court places great weight on the fact that the Special Master referred to redressability as a "threshold" requirement. See ante, at 2511 - 2512, 2515 - 2516, 2517 - 2518. But showing an appreciable benefit is a "threshold" requirement for prevailing under the balance-of-harms test, as a State that cannot show an appreciable benefit obviously cannot show that the balance of harms tilts in its favor. In other words, the Court need not engage in a full-scale balancing of benefits and harms if the party that bears the burden of proof has nothing to place on its side of the scale; it can reject that type of case at the "threshold." That the Special Master used the word "threshold" does not suggest that he was doing anything other than applying the ordinary balance-of-harms test. In faulting the Special Master for requiring clear and convincing evidence, the Court combines the rule from Idaho II with the balance-of-harms test from Kansas I, Washington, and Idaho I . See ante, at 2517. The Court reconciles these precedents as follows: "[T]hese [cases] apply to the general availability of judicial relief-not to the details of a final decree or to the workability of a decree that will depend on those details." Ibid. I do not understand this sentence, and I pity the litigants and Special Masters who will be forced to decipher it. The Court concedes that Florida cannot prevail in this case unless it proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would obtain an appreciable benefit from an equitable apportionment. See ante, at 2517 (noting that the appreciable benefit test " 'goes to the merits' of the equitable apportionment inquiry"); ante, at 2518 (noting "a remand is necessary to conduct the equitable-balancing inquiry"); ante, at 2526 -2527 (noting that Florida must ultimately prevail in the balance of harms test). It makes no difference whether the additional water generated by a cap on Georgia would enter the Flint River. Contra, Brief for Plaintiff 26, 38-39. If additional water entered the Flint River during droughts, the Corps would release less water from its upstream reservoirs on the Chattahoochee River to maintain a consistent flow of around 5,000 cubic feet per second from the Jim Woodruff Dam at Lake Seminole. See Bedient 24-26; Brief for United States 24-25. The Court contends that I have confused "droughts" and "drought operations." See ante, at 2523 - 2524. I have not, but the Court has. During droughts-periods in which there is a "lack of rain," 4 Oxford English Dictionary 1076 (2d ed. 1989)-the amount of water that naturally flows into the Basin rivers usually falls below 5,000 cubic feet per second, particularly in the summer and fall months. See infra, at 2543 - 2545. Since the Corps must ensure that the Apalachicola River always receives at least 5,000 cubic feet per second, the Corps augments the natural streamflow during droughts-even when the Corps is not in drought operations. Bedient 21. Thus, any additional water that a cap on Georgia generates during droughts would only increase streamflow into the Apalachicola River if it caused the natural streamflow to exceed 5,000 cubic feet per second. If the additional water increased streamflow to some amount less than that, then it would not increase flows in the Apalachicola River; it would simply decrease the amount of water that the Corps must release from its reservoirs. See ibid. Thus, as Georgia's expert explained, "reducing Georgia's consumptive use would only lead to additional ... flow into Florida under specific and limited circumstances. First, the Corps cannot be in Drought Operations or [Extreme Drought Operations]. Second, Basin Inflow cannot be below 5,000 [cubic feet per second], even if the Corps is in normal operations ." Id., at 26 (emphasis added). The Court contends that additional water from a cap on Georgia likely would have passed through to Florida in the summer of 2009. See ante, at 2521 - 2522. But this evidence is irrelevant. As Florida's own expert testified, "[t]he year 2009 was a relatively wet year." Hornberger 49; accord, Bedient 45. And Florida has only asked this Court to reduce Georgia's consumption by 1,500 to 2,000 cubic feet per second during "severe drought years," which 2009 was not. Hornberger 58. The Court also contends that additional water from a cap on Georgia likely would have passed through to Florida in the summers of 2016 and 2017. See ante, at 2521 - 2522, 2524 - 2525. The Court's data was generated simultaneously with or after most of the testimony in this case, so the experts do not speak to it. But even considering the data that the Court has found, I suspect that 2016 and 2017 are not "severe drought years" either and, thus, are irrelevant. The Court claims that "Florida's proposed consumption cap ... will mean (consistent with the testimony of the very Georgia expert that the dissent so frequently quotes) that there will be significantly fewer such days [of drought operations]." Ante, at 2523. I assume that the "Georgia expert" in this sentence is Dr. Philip Bedient. But I am aware of no testimony from Dr. Bedient that supports the Court's assertion, and the Court cites none. If the Corps had been in drought operations, the results would not have differed much, demonstrating that whether the Corps is in drought or nondrought operations is not dispositive. Had the Corps been in drought operations during 2007, for instance, Florida would have received the additional water from a cap on Georgia during 14 days in the summer and fall-a difference of only five days as compared to nondrought operations. Bedient 28.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
What is the issue of the decision?
[ "boundary dispute between states", "non-real property dispute between states", "miscellaneous interstate relations conflict", "incorporation of foreign territories" ]
[ 1 ]
sc
SMITH v. CALIFORNIA. No. 9. Argued October 20, 1959. Decided December 14, 1959. Stanley Fleishman and Sam Rosenwein argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant. Roger Arnebergh argued the cause for appellee. With him oh the brief was Philip E. Grey. A. L. Wirin and Fred Okrand filed a brief for the American Civil-Liberties Union, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. Mr. Justice. Brennan delivéred the opinion of the Court. Appellant, the proprietor of a bookstore, was convicted in a California Municipal Court under a Los Angeles City ordinance which makes it unlawful “for any person to have in his possession any obscene or indecent writing, [or] book . . . [i]n any place of business where . . . books . . . are sold or kept for sale.” The offense was defined by the Municipal Court, and by the Appellate Department of the Superior Court, which affirmed, the Municipal Court judgment imposing a jail sentence on appellant, as consisting solely of the possession, in the appellant’s bookstore, of a certain book found upon judiciál investigation to be obscene. The. definition included no element of scienter — knowledge by appellant of the contents of the book — and thus the ordinance was construed as imposing a “strict” or “absolute” criminal liability. The appellant made timely objection bélow that if the' ordinance were so construed it would be in conflict with the Constitution of the United States. This contention, together with other contentions based on the Constitution, was rejected, and the case comes here on appeal. 28. U. S. C. § 1257 (2); 358 U. S. 926. Almost 30 years ago, Chief Justice Hughes declared for this Court: “It is no longer open to doubt that the liberty of the . press, and of speech, is within the liberty safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action. It was found impossible to. conclude that this essential personal liberty of the citizen was left unprotected by the general guaranty of fundamental rights of person and property. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 707. It is too familiar for citation that such has been the doctrine of this Court, in respect of these freedoms, ever since. And it also requires no elaboration that the free publication and dissemination of books and other forms of the printed word furnish very familiar applications of these constitutionally protected freedoms. It is of course no matter that the dissemination takes place under commercial auspices. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc., v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233. Certainly a retail bookseller plays a most significant role in the process of the distribution of books. California here imposed a strict or absolute criminal responsibility on appellant not to have obscene books in his shop. “The existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.” Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, 500. Still, it is doubtless competent for the States to create, strict criminal liabilities by defining criminal offenses without any element of scienter— though even where no freedom-of-expression question is involved, there is precedent in this Court that this power is not without limitations. See Lambert v. California, 355 U. S. 225. But the'question here is as to the validity of this ordinance’s elimination of the scienter requirement — an elimination which may tend to work a substantial restriction on the freedom of speech and of the press. Our decisions furnish examples of legal devices and doctrines, in most applications consistent with the Constitution, which cannot be applied in settings where they have the collateral effect of inhibiting the freedom of expression, by making the individual the more reluctant to exercise it. The States generally may regulate the allocation of the burden of proof in their courts, and it is a common procedural device to impose on a taxpayer the burden of proving his entitlement to exemptions from taxation, but where we conceived that this device was being applied in a manner tending to cause even a self-imposed restriction of free expression, we struck down its application. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513. See Near v. Minnesota, supra, at 712-713. It has been stated here that the usual doctrines as to the separability of constitutional and unconstitutional applications of statutes may not apply where their effect is to leave standing a statute patently capable of many unconstitutional applications, threatening those who validly exercise their rights of free expression with the expense and inconvenience of criminal prosecution. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 97-98. Cf. Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U. S. 313. And this Court has intimated that stricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute haying a potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man may the less be required to act at his peril here, because the free dissemination of ideas may be the loser. Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 509-510, 517-518. Very much to the point here, where the question is the elimination of the mental element in an offense, is this Court’s holding in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183. There an oath as to past freedom from membership in subversive^, organizations, exacted by a State as a qualification.for public employment, was held to violate the Constitution in that it made no distinction between members who had, and those who had not, known of the organization’s' character. The Court said of the elimination of scienter in this context: “To thus inhibit individual freedom of movement is to stifle the flow of democratic expression and controversy at,one of its chief sources.” Id., at 191. These principles guide us to our decision here. We have held that obscene speech and writings are not protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and the press. Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476. The ordinance here in question, to. be sure, only imposes criminal sanctions on a bookseller if in fact there is to be found in his shop an obscene book. But our holding in Roth does not recognize any state power to restrict the dissemination of books which are not obscene; and we think this ordinance’s strict liability feature would tend seriously to have that effect, by penalizing booksellers, even though they had not the slightest notice of the character of the books they sold. The appellee and the court below analogize this strict liability penal ordinance to familiar forms of penal statutes which dispense with any element of knowledge on the part of the person charged, food and drug legislation being a principal example. We find the analogy instructive in our examination of the question before us. The usual rationale for such statutes is that the public interest in the purity of its food is so great as to warrant the imposition of the highest standard' of care on distributors — in fact .an absolute standard which will not hear the distributor’s plea as to the amount of care he has used. Cf. United States v. Balint, 258 U. S. 250, 252-253, 254. His ignorance of the character of the food is irrelevant. There is no specific constitutional inhibition against making the distributors of food the strictest censors of their merchandise, but- the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of speech and of the press stand in the way of imposing a similar requirement on the bookseller. By dispensing with any requirement of knowledge of the contents of the book on the part of the seller, the ordinance tends to. impose a severe limitation on the public’s access to constitutionally protected matter. For if the bookseller is criminally liable without knowledge of the contents, and the ordinance fulfills its purpose, he will tend to restrict the books he sells to those he has inspected; and thus the State will have imposed a restriction upon the distribution of constitutionally protected as well as obscene literature. It has been well observed of a statute construed as dispensing with any requirement of scienter that: “Every bookseller would be placed under an obligation to make himself aware of the contents of every book in his shop. ■ It would be altogether unreasonable to demand so near an approach to omniscience.” The King v. Ewart, 25 N. Z. L. R. 709, 729 (C. A.). And the bookseller’s burden would become the public’s burden, for by restricting him the public’s access to reading matter would be restricted. If the contents of bookshops and periodical stands were restricted to material of which their proprietors had made an inspection, they might be depleted indeed. The bookseller’s limitation in the amount of reading material with which he could familiarize himself, and his timidity in the face of. his absolute, criminal liability, thus would tend to restrict the public’s access to forms of the printed word which the .State could not constitutionally suppress directly. ' The bookseller’s self-censorship, compelled by the State, would be a censorship .affecting the whole public, hardly less virulent for being privately administered. Through it, the distribution of all books, both obscene and not obscene, would be impeded. It is argued that unless the scienter requirement is dispensed with, regulation of the distribution of obscene material will be ineffective, as booksellers will falsely disclaim knowledge of their books’ contents or falsely deny reason to suspect their obscenity. We might observe that it has been some time 'now since the law viewed itself as impotent to explore the actual 'state of a man’s mind. See Pound, The Role of the Will in Law, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1. Cf. American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 411. Eyewitness testimony of a bookseller’s perusal of a book hardly need be á necessary element in proving his awareness of its contents. The circumstances may warrant-the inference that he was aware of what a book contained, despite his denial. We need not. and most definitely do not pass today on what sort of mental element is requisite to a constitutionally permissible prosecution of a bookseller for carrying an obscene book in stock; whether honest mistake as to whether its contents in fact constituted obscenity need be an excuse; whether there might be circumstances under which the State constitutionally might require that a bookseller investigate further, or might put on him the burden of explaining why he did not, and what such circumstances might be. Doubtless any form of criminal obscenity statute applicable to a bookseller will induce some tendency to self-censorship and have some inhibitory effect on the dissemination of material not obscene, but we consider today only one which goes to the extent of eliminating all mental elements from the crime. We have said: “The fundamental freedoms of speech and press have contributed greatly to the development and well-being of our free society and are indispensable to its continued growth. Ceaseless vigilance is the watchword to prevent their erosion by Congress or by the States. The door barring federal and state intrusion into this area 'cannot be left ajar; it must be kept tightly closed and opened only the slightest crack necessary to prevent encroachment upon more important interests.” Roth v. United States, supra, at 488. This ordinance opens that door too far. ■ The existence of the State’s power to prevent the distribution of obscene matter does not mean that there can be no constitutional barrier to any form of practical exercise of that power. Cf. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U. S. 349. It is plain to us that the ordinance in question, though aimed at obscene matter, has such a tendency to inhibit constitutionally protected expression that it cannot stand under the Constitution. Reversed. The ordinance is § 41.01.1 of the Municipal Code of the City of Los Angeles. It provides: ■ “INDECENT WRITINGS, ETC. — POSSESSION PROHIBITED: “It shall be unlawful for any person to have in his possession any obscene ■ or indecent writing, book, pamphlet, picture, photograph, drawing, figure, motion picture film, phonograph recording, wire recording or transcription of any kind in any of the following places: “1. In any school, school-grounds, public park or playground or in any public place, grounds, street or way within 300 yards of any school, park or playground; “2. In any place of business where ice-cream, soft drinks, candy, food, school supplies, magazines, books, pamphlets, papers, pictures or postcards are sold or kept for sale; “3. In any toilet or restroom open to the public; “4. In any poolroom ór billiard parlor, or in any place where alcoholic liquor is sold or offered for sale to the public; ■’ “5. In any place where phonograph records, photographs, motion pictures, pr transcriptions of any kind are made, used, maintained, sold or exhibited.” . In this sort of proceeding, “the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had.” 28 U. S. C. § 1257. Cal. Const'., Art. VI, §§ 4, 4b, 5. See Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 171. See Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law, p. 280. The Appellate Department’s opinion is at 161 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 860, 327 P. 2d 636. The ordinance’s elimination of scienter was, in fact, a reason assigned by that court for upholding it as permissible supplementary municipal legislation against the contention that the field was occupied by' California Penal Code §311, a -state-wide obscenity statute which requires scienter.. .These other contentions, which are made again here, aré that evidence of a nature constitutionally required to be allowed tc be given for- the defense as to the obscene character of a book was not permitted to be introduced; that a constitutionally impermissible standard of obscenity was applied by the trier of the facts; and that the book was not in fact obscene. In the light of our determination as to the constitutional permissibility of a strict liability law under the circumstances, presented by this ease, we need not pass on these questions: For the purposes of discussion, we shall assume without deciding that the book was correctly adjudged below to be obscene. See also Williams, Criminal Law — The General Part, p. 238 et seq. See Note, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1208. In the Roth opinion there was also decided Alberts v. California, which dealt with the power of the States in this area. The effectiveness of absolute criminal liability laws in promoting caution has been subjected to criticism. See Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law, pp. 300-301. See generally Williams, Criminal Law—The General Part, pp. 267-274; Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Col. L. Rev. 55; Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 1043; Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246. Common-law prosecutions for the dissemination of obscene matter strictly adhered to the requirement of scienter. See the discussion in Attorney General v. Simpson, 93 Irish L. T. 33, 37-38 (Dist. Ct.). Cf. Obscene Publications Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 66, § 2 (5); American Law Institute Model Penal Code § 207.10 (7) (Tentative Draft No. 6, May 1957), and Comments, pp. 49-51. The general California obscenity statute, Penal Code § 311, requires scienter, see note 3, and was of course sustained b.y us in Roth v. United States, supra. See note 7. We emphasized in Roth, at p. 484, that there is a “limited area” where such other interests prevail, and we listed representative decisions in note 14 at that page.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
What is the issue area of the decision?
[ "Criminal Procedure", "Civil Rights", "First Amendment", "Due Process", "Privacy", "Attorneys", "Unions", "Economic Activity", "Judicial Power", "Federalism", "Interstate Relations", "Federal Taxation", "Miscellaneous", "Private Action" ]
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ALASKA INDUSTRIAL BOARD et al. v. CHUGACH ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION, INC., et al. No. 303. Argued April 8, 1958. — Decided April 28, 1958. John H. Dimond argued the cause for petitioners. On the brief were J. Gerald Williams, Attorney General of Alaska, for the Alaska Industrial Board, and Mr. Dimond for Jenkins, petitioners. Frederick 0. Eastaugh argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Ralph E. Robertson. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents an important question under the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act, 2 Alaska Comp. L. Ann., 1949, § 43-3-1 et seq. Petitioner Jenkins, an employee of respondent Chugach Electric Association, was injured in the course of his employment. Three surgical operations were required: amputation of his left arm at the shoulder; amputation of four toes on his left foot; and later, amputation of his right leg below the knee. Though the injury occurred in September 1950, the left foot had not healed three years later. As a result Jenkins was for a rather long period totally disabled. Respondents made “temporary disability” payments to Jenkins for approximately 38 weeks ($95.34 a week or a total of $3,645). At that point they decided that Jenkins had been totally and permanently disabled since the date of the last amputation and was therefore entitled to a lump-sum award of $8,100 under the Act and no more. They thereupon sent him a check for that amount less the $3,645 already received, viz., $4,455. Jenkins then applied to the Alaska Industrial Board for continuing benefits for temporary disability, despite his receipt of the lump-sum award for total and permanent disability. The Board allowed him temporary disability from the date of the last amputation. This temporary disability, said the Board, “continues to this date, no end medical result having been reached.” Respondents thereupon instituted this action in the District Court to set aside the Board's decision. That court reversed the Board, holding that an award of temporary disability could not be granted under the Act for physical disability arising from the same accident in which a scheduled, lump-sum award for total permanent disability had been granted. 122 F. Supp. 210. The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed, by a divided vote, modifying the judgment. 245 F. 2d 855. By that modification the lump-sum award was not to be reduced by the amount received as temporary disability prior to that time. The case is here on a petition for certiorari. 355 U. S. 810. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the lump-sum award for total and permanent disability was intended to represent a capitalization of future earnings. It concluded, therefore, that Jenkins had been compensated by the lump-sum award for any loss of future earnings and that he could not get a further award for loss of earnings, the lump-sum award being intended “as a maximum award.” Id,., at 862. We read the Act differently. The lump-sum awards for total and permanent disability under this Compensation Act ignore wage losses. Whatever the employee may have made before, whatever his wages may be after the injury, the award is the same. To that extent it is an arbitrary amount. But it is the expression of a legislative judgment that on average there has been a degree of impairment, and whatever may be the fact in a particular case, the lump sum should be paid without more. See 2 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation, § 58-10. There may, nevertheless, be a continuing ability to do some work; and as long as that remaining ability exists there is a factual basis for temporary disability awards. That seems to be the theory of the Act for it extends those awards to “all injuries causing temporary disability” and bases them on the “average daily wage earning capacity” of the injured employee, as determined by the Board. That award takes care of the lost wages during the healing period and until the employee is able to return to work though perhaps at a different job and at reduced pay. It also compensates him for any temporary loss of earning power based on the “wage earning capacity” that remains after the injury. The Court of Appeals assumed there was “no remaining ability to work” and therefore “no foundation for temporary disability benefits.” 245 F. 2d, at 862. But the Act, we think, is drawn on a different hypothesis. It seems to provide a system of temporary disabilities to all who are injured, whether their injuries are disfigurement, partial permanent disability, total and permanent disability, or so minor as to fall in lesser categories. Any other reading would seem to be hostile to the benign purpose of this legislation. Cf. Baltimore & Phila. S. Co. v. Norton, 284 U. S. 408, 414. Respondents maintain that Jenkins’ claim was not timely filed and that for other reasons also the Board had no jurisdiction to enter this award. These questions were decided adversely to respondents by the Court of Appeals and no cross-petition was filed, here. Those questions are therefore not open to respondents at this stage. LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U. S. 415, 421-422. The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the District Court for proceedings in conformity with this opinion. Reversed. Mr. Justice Whittaker, believing that an injured workman cannot be, or be legally compensated as, both “totally and permanently disabled” and “temporarily totally disabled” at one and the same time under the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act, would affirm for the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals, 245 F. 2d, at 862. Section 43-3-1 of the Act makes the following provision for “temporary disability”: “For all injuries causing temporary disability, the employer shall pay to the employee, during the period of such disability, sixty-five per centum (65%) of his daily average wages. And in all cases where the injury develops or proves to be such as to entitle the employee to compensation under some provision in this schedule, relating to cases other than temporary disability, the amount so paid or due him shall be in addition to the amount to which he shall be entitled under such provision in this schedule. “Payment for such temporary disability shall be made at the time compensation is customarily paid for labor performed or services rendered at the plant or establishment of the employer liable therefor and not less than once a month in any event. “The average daily wage earning capacity of an injured employee in case of temporary disability shall be determined by his actual earnings if such actual earnings fairly and reasonably represent his daily wage earning capacity. If such earnings do not fairly and reasonably represent his daily wage earning capacity, the Industrial Board shall fix such daily wage earning capacity as shall be reasonable and have a due regard for the nature of his injury, the degree of temporary impairment, his usual employment and any other factor or circumstance in the case which may affect his capacity to earn wages in his temporary disabled condition.” Section 43-3-1 of the Act defines total and permanent disability as follows: “The loss of both hands, or both arms, or both feet, or both legs, or both eyes, or any two thereof, or hearing in both ears, shall constitute total and permanent disability and be compensated according to the provisions of this Act with reference to total and permanent disability. “Amputation between the elbow and the wrist shall be considered equivalent to the loss of an arm, and amputation between the knee and the ankle shall be considered equivalent to the loss of a leg.” Section 43-3-1 of the Act provides: “Where any such employee receiving an injury arising out of, and in the course of his or her employment, as the result of which he or she is totally and permanently disabled, he or she shall be entitled to receive compensation as follows: “If such employee was at the time of his injury married he shall be entitled to receiye Seven Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($7,200.00) with Nine Hundred Dollars ($900.00) additional for each child under the age of eighteen (18) years, but the total to be paid shall not exceed Nine Thousand Dollars ($9,000.00).” Note 1, supra. Note 1, supra. Section 43-3-1 provides: “The Industrial Board may award proper and equitable compensation for serious head, neck, facial, or other disfigurement, not exceeding, however, the sum of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00).” Section 43-3-1 provides a schedule of partial permanent liability for losses of thumbs, toes, fingers, arms, legs, eyes, nose, and ear. See note 2, supra.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.
What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?
[ "judicial review (national level)", "judicial review (state level)", "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction", "statutory construction", "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order", "diversity jurisdiction", "federal common law" ]
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FRANK LYON CO. v. UNITED STATES No. 76-624. Argued November 2, 1977 Decided April 18, 1978 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a dissenting statement, post, p. 584. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 584. Erwin N. Griswold argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was /. Gaston Williamson. Stuart A. Smith argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Ferguson, and John A. Dudeck, Jr. George G. Gallantz filed a brief for the National Realty Committee as amicus curiae urging reversal. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the federal income tax consequences of a sale-and-leaseback in which petitioner Frank Lyon Company (Lyon) took title to a building under construction by Worthen Bank & Trust Company (Worthen) of Little Rock, Ark., and simultaneously leased the building back to Worthen for long-term use as its headquarters and principal banking facility. I The underlying pertinent facts are undisputed. They are established by stipulations, App. 9, 14, the trial testimony, and the documentary evidence, and are reflected in the District Court’s findings. A ■ Lyon is a closely held Arkansas corporation engaged in the distribution of home furnishings, primarily Whirlpool and RCA electrical products. Worthen in 1965 was an Arkansas-chartered bank and a member of the Federal Reserve System. Frank Lyon was Lyon’s majority shareholder and board chairman; he also served on Worthen’s board. Worthen at that time began to plan the construction of a multistory bank and office building to replace its existing facility in Little Rock. About the same time Worthen’s competitor, Union National Bank of Little Rock, also began to plan a new bank and office building. Adjacent sites on Capitol Avenue, separated only by Spring Street, were acquired by the two banks. It became a matter of competition, for both banking business and tenants, and prestige as to which bank would start and complete its building first. Worthen initially hoped to finance, to build, and to own the proposed facility at a total cost of $9 million for the site, building, and adjoining parking deck. This was to be accomplished by selling $4 million in debentures and using the proceeds in the acquisition of the capital stock of a wholly owned real estate subsidiary. This subsidiary would have formal title and would raise the remaining $5 million by a conventional mortgage loan on the new premises. Worthen’s plan, however, had to be abandoned for two significant reasons: 1. As a bank chartered under Arkansas law, Worthen legally could not pay more interest on any debentures it might issue than that then specified by Arkansas law. But the proposed obligations would not be marketable at that rate. 2. Applicable statutes or regulations of the Arkansas State Bank Department and the Federal Reserve System required Worthen, as a state bank subject to their supervision, to obtain prior permission for the investment in banking premises of any amount (including that placed in a real estate subsidiary) in excess of the bank’s capital stock or of 40% of its capital stock and surplus. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 67-547.1 (Supp. 1977) ; 12 U. S. C. § 371d (1976 ed.); 12 CFR § 265.2 (f) (7) (1977). Worthen, accordingly, was advised by staff employees of the Federal Reserve System that they would not recommend approval of the plan by the System’s Board of Governors. Worthen therefore was forced to seek an alternative solution that would provide it with the use of the building, satisfy the state and federal regulators, and attract the necessary capital. In September 1967 it proposed a sale-and-leaseback arrangement. The State Bank Department and the Federal Reserve System approved this approach, but the Department required that Worthen possess an option to purchase the leased property at the end of the 15th year of the lease at a set price, and the federal regulator required that the building be owned by an independent third party. Detailed negotiations ensued with investors that had indicated interest, namely, Goldman, Sachs & Company; White, Weld & Co.; Eastman Dillon, Union Securities & Company; and Stephens, Inc. Certain of these firms made specific proposals. Worthen then obtained a commitment from New York Life Insurance Company to provide $7,140,000 in permanent mortgage financing on the building, conditioned upon its approval of the titleholder. At this point Lyon entered the negotiations and it, too, made a proposal. Worthen submitted a counterproposal that incorporated the best features, from its point of view, of the several offers. Lyon accepted the counterproposal, suggesting, by way of further inducement, a $21,000 reduction in the annual rent for the first five years of the building lease. Worthen selected Lyon as the investor. After further negotiations, resulting in the elimination of that rent reduction (offset, however, by higher interest Lyon was to pay Worthen on a subsequent unrelated loan), Lyon in November 1967 was approved as an acceptable borrower by First National City Bank for the construction financing, and by New York Life, as the permanent lender. In April 1968 the approvals of the state and federal regulators were received. In the meantime, on September 15, before Lyon was selected, Worthen itself began construction. B In May 1968 Worthen, Lyon, City Bank, and New York Life executed complementary and interlocking agreements under which the building was sold by Worthen to Lyon as it was constructed, and Worthen leased the completed building back from Lyon. 1. Agreements between Worthen and Lyon. Worthen and Lyon executed a ground lease, a sales agreement, and a building lease. Under the ground lease dated May 1, 1968, App. 366, Worthen leased the site to Lyon for 76 years and 7 months through November 30, 2044. The first 19 months were the estimated construction period. The ground rents payable by Lyon to Worthen were $50 for the first 26 years and 7 months and thereafter in quarterly payments: 12/1/94 through 11/30/99 (5 years) — $100,000 annually 12/1/99 through 11/30/04 (5 years) — $150,000 annually 12/1/04 through 11/30/09 (5 years) — $200,000 annually 12/1/09 through 11/30/34 (25 years) — $250,000 annually 12/1/34 through 11/30/44 (10 years) — $10,000 annually. Under the sales agreement dated May 19, 1968, id., at 508, Worthen agreed to sell the building to Lyon, and Lyon agreed to buy it, piece by piece as it was constructed, for a total price not to exceed $7,640,000, in reimbursements to Worthen for its expenditures for the construction of the building. Under the building lease dated May 1, 1968, id., at 376, Lyon leased the building back to Worthen for a primary term of 25 years from December 1, 1969, with options in Worthen to extend the lease for eight additional 5-year terms, a total of 65 years. During the period between the expiration of the building lease (at the latest, November 30, 2034, if fully extended) and the end of the ground lease on November 30, 2044, full ownership, use, and control of the building were Lyon’s, unless, of course, the building had been repurchased by Worthen. Id., at 369. Worthen was not obligated to pay rent under the building lease until completion of the building. For the first 11 years of the lease, that is, until November 30, 1980, the stated quarterly rent was $145,581.03 ($582,324.12 for the year). For the next 14 years, the quarterly rent was $153,289.32 ($613,157.28 for the year), and for the option periods the rent was $300,000 a year, payable quarterly. Id., at 378-379. The total rent for the building over the 25-year primary term of the lease thus was $14,989,767.24. That rent equaled the principal and interest payments that would amortize the $7,140,000 New York Life mortgage loan over the same period. When the mortgage was paid off at the end of the primary term, the annual building rent, if Worthen extended the lease, came down to the stated $300,000. Lyon’s net rentals from the building would be further reduced by the increase in ground rent Worthen would receive from Lyon during the extension. The building lease was a “net lease,” under which Worthen was responsible for all expenses usually associated with the maintenance of an office building, including repairs, taxes, utility charges, and insurance, and was to keep the premises in good condition, excluding, however, reasonable wear and tear. Finally, under the lease, Worthen had the option to repurchase the building at the following times and prices: 11/30/80 (after 11 years) — $6,325,169.85 11/30/84 (after 15 years) — $5,432,607.32 11/30/89 (after 20 years) — $4,187,328.04 11/30/94 (after 25 years) — $2,145,935.00 These repurchase option prices were the sum of the unpaid balance of the New York Life mortgage, Lyon’s $500,000 investment, and 6% interest compounded on that investment. 2. Construction financing agreement. By agreement dated May 14, 1968, id., at 462, City Bank agreed to lend Lyon $7,000,000 for the construction of the building. This loan was secured by a mortgage on the building and the parking deck, executed by Worthen as well as by Lyon, and an assignment by Lyon of its interests in the building lease and in the ground lease. 3. Permanent financing agreement. By Note Purchase Agreement dated May 1, 1968, id., at 443, New York Life agreed' to purchase Lyon’s $7,140,000 6%% 25-year secured note to be issued upon completion of the building. Under this agreement Lyon warranted that it would lease the building to Worthen for a noncancelable term of at least 25 years under a net lease at a rent at least equal to the mortgage payments on the note. Lyon agreed to make quarterly payments of principal and interest equal to the rentals payable by Worthen during the corresponding primary term of the lease. Id., at 523. The security for the note was a first deed of trust and Lyon’s assignment of its interests in the building lease and in the ground lease. Id., at 527, 571. Worthen joined in the deed of trust as the owner of the fee and the parking deck. In December 1969 the building was completed and Worthen took possession. At that time Lyon received the permanent loan from New York Life, and it discharged the interim loan from City Bank. The actual cost of constructing the office building and parking complex (excluding the cost of the land) exceeded $10,000,000. C Lyon filed its federal income tax returns on the accrual and calendar year basis. On its 1969 return, Lyon accrued rent from Worthen for December. It asserted as deductions one month’s interest to New York Life; one month’s depreciation on the building; interest on the construction loan from City Bank; and sums for legal and other expenses incurred in connection with the transaction. On audit of Lyon’s 1969 return, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that Lyon was “not the owner for tax purposes of any portion of the Worthen Building,” and ruled that “the income and expenses related to this building are not allowable ... for Federal income tax purposes.” App. 304-305, 299. He also added $2,298.15 to Lyon’s 1969 income as “accrued interest income.” This was the computed 1969 portion of a gain, considered the equivalent of interest income, the realization of which was based on the assumption that Worthen would exercise its option to buy the building after 11 years, on November 30, 1980, at the price stated in the lease, and on the additional determination that Lyon had “loaned” $500,000 to Worthen. In other words, the Commissioner determined that the sale-and-leaseback arrangement was a financing transaction in which Lyon loaned Worthen $500,000 and acted as a conduit for the transmission of principal and interest from Worthen to New York Life. All this resulted in a total increase of $497,219.18 over Lyon’s reported income for 1969, and a deficiency in Lyon’s federal income tax for that year in the amount of $236,596.36. The Commissioner assessed that amount, together with interest of $43,790.84, for a total of $280,387.20 Lyon paid the assessment and filed a timely claim for its refund. The claim was denied, and this suit, to recover the amount so paid, was instituted in the United States District Court, for the Eastern District of Arkansas within the time allowed by 26 U. S. C. § 6532 (a) (1). After trial without a jury, the District Court, in a memorandum letter-opinion setting forth findings and conclusions, ruled in Lyon’s favor and held that its claimed deductions were allowable. 75-2 USTC ¶[ 9545 (1975), 36 AFTR 2d ¶ 75-5059 (1975); App. 296-311. It concluded that the legal intent of the parties had been to create a bona fide sale- and-leaseback in accordance with the form and language of the documents evidencing the transactions. It rejected the argument that Worthen was acquiring an equity in the building through its rental payments. It found that the rents were unchallenged and were reasonable throughout the period of the lease, and that the option prices, negotiated at arm’s length between the parties, represented fair estimates of market value on the applicable dates. It rejected any negative inference from the fact that the rentals, combined with the options, were sufficient to amortize the New York Life loan and to pay Lyon a 6% return on its equity investment. It found that Worthen would acquire an equity in the building only if it exercised one of its options to purchase, and that it was highly unlikely, as a practical matter, that any purchase option would ever be exercised. It rejected any inference to be drawn from the fact that the lease was a “net lease.” It found that Lyon had mixed motivations for entering into the transaction, including the need to diversify as well as the desire to have the benefits of a “tax shelter.” App. 296, 299. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 536 F. 2d 746 (1976). It held that the Commissioner correctly determined that Lyon was not the true owner of the building and therefore was not entitled to the claimed deductions. It likened ownership for tax purposes to a “bundle of sticks” and undertook its own evaluation of the facts. It concluded, in agreement with the Government’s contention, that Lyon “totes an empty bundle” of ownership sticks. Id., at 751. It stressed the following: (a) The lease agreements circumscribed Lyon’s right to profit from its investment in the building by giving Worthen the option to purchase for an amount equal to Lyon’s $500,000 equity plus 6% compound interest and the assumption of the unpaid balance of the New York Life mortgage. (b) The option prices did not take into account possible appreciation of the value of the building or inflation. (c) Any award realized as a result of destruction or condemnation of the building in excess of the mortgage balance and the $500,000 would be paid to Worthen and not Lyon. (d) The building rental payments during the primary term were exactly equal to the mortgage payments. (e) Worthen retained control over the ultimate disposition of the building through its various options to repurchase and to renew the lease plus its ownership of the site. (f) Worthen enjoyed all benefits and bore all burdens incident to the operation and ownership of the building so that, in the Court of Appeals’ view, the only economic advantages accruing to Lyon, in the event it were considered to be the true owner of the property, were income tax savings of approximately $1.5 million during the first 11 years of the arrangement. Id., at 752-753. The court concluded, id., at 753, that the transaction was “closely akin” to that in Helvering v. Lazarus & Co., 308 U. S. 252 (1939). “In sum, the benefits, risks, and burdens which [Lyon] has incurred with respect to the Worthen building are simply too insubstantial to establish a claim to the status of owner for tax purposes. . . . The vice of the present lease is that all of [its] features have been employed in the same transaction with the cumulative effect of depriving [Lyon] of any significant ownership interest.” 536 F. 2d, at 754. We granted certiorari, 429 U. S. 1089 (1977), because of an indicated conflict with American Realty Trust v. United States, 498 F. 2d 1194 (CA4 1974). II This Court, almost 50 years ago, observed that “taxation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with actual command over the property taxed- — the actual benefit for which the tax is paid.” Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376, 378 (1930). In a number of cases, the Court has refused to permit the transfer of formal legal title to shift the incidence of taxation attributable to ownership- of property where the transferor continues to retain significant control over the property transferred. E. g., Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591 (1948); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940). In applying this doctrine of substance over form, the Court has looked to the objective economic realities of a transaction rather than to the particular form the parties employed. The Court has never regarded “the simple expedient of drawing up papers,” Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U. S. 280, 291 (1946), as controlling for tax purposes when the objective economic realities are to the contrary. “In the field of taxation, administrators of the laws, and the courts, are concerned with substance and realities, and formal written documents are not rigidly binding.” Helvering v. Lazarus & Co., 308 U. S., at 255. See also Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U. S. 260, 266-267 (1958); Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U. S. 331, 334 (1945). Nor is the parties’ desire to achieve a particular tax result necessarily relevant. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U. S. 278, 286 (1960). In the light of these general and established principles, the Government takes the position that the Worthen-Lyon transaction in its entirety should be regarded as a sham. The agreement as a whole, it is said, was only an elaborate financing scheme designed to provide economic benefits to Worthen and a guaranteed return to Lyon. The latter was but a conduit used to forward the mortgage payments, made under the guise of rent paid by Worthen to Lyon, on to- New York Life as mortgagee. This, the Government claims, is the true substance of the transaction as viewed under the microscope of the tax laws. Although the arrangement was cast in sale-and-leaseback form, in substance it was only a financing transaction, and the terms of the repurchase options and lease renewals so indicate. It is said that Worthen co-uld reacquire the building simply by satisfying the mortgage debt and paying Lyon its $500,000 advance plus interest, regardless of the fair market value of the building at the time; similarly, when the mortgage was paid off, Worthen could extend the- lease at drastically reduced bargain rentals that likewise bore relation to fair rental value but were simply calculated to pay Lyon its $500,000 plus interest over the extended term. Lyon’s return on the arrangement in no' event could exceed 6% compound interest (although the Government conceded it might well be less, Tr. of Oral Arg. 32). Furthermore, the favorable option and lease renewal ternls made it highly unlikely that Worthen would abandon the building after it in effect had “paid off” the mortgage. The Government implies that the arrangement was one of convenience which, if accepted on its face, would enable Worthen to deduct its payments to Lyon as rent and would allow Lyon to claim a deduction for depreciation, based on the cost of construction ultimately borne by Worthen, which Lyon could offset against other income, and to deduct mortgage interest that roughly would offset the inclusion of Worthen’s rental payments in Lyon’s income. If, however, the Government argues, the arrangement was only a financing transaction under which Worthen was the owner of the building, Worthen’s payments would be deductible only to the extent that they represented mortgage interest, and Worthen would be entitled to’ claim depreciation; Lyon would not be entitled to deductions for either mortgage interest or depreciation and it would not have to include Worthen’s “rent” payments in its income because its function with respect to those payments was that of a conduit between Worthen and New York Life. The Government places great reliance on Helvering v. Lazarus & Co., supra, and claims it to' be precedent that controls this case. The taxpayer there was a department store. The legal title of its three buildings was in a bank as trustee for land-trust certificate holders. When the transfer to the trustee was made, the trustee at the same time leased the buildings back to the taxpayer for 99 years, with option to renew and purchase. The Commissioner, in stark contrast to his posture in the present case, took the position that the statutory right to depreciation followed legal title. The Board of Tax Appeals, however, concluded that the transaction between the taxpayer and the bank in reality was a mortgage loan and allowed the taxpayer depreciation on the buildings. This Court, as had the Court of Appeals, agreed with that conclusion and affirmed. It regarded the “rent” stipulated in the leaseback as a promise to pay interest on the loan, and a “depreciation fund” required by the lease as an amortization fund designed to pay off the loan in the stated period. Thus, said the Court, the Board justifiably concluded that the transaction, although in written form a transfer of ownership with a leaseback, was actually a loan secured by the property involved. The Lazarus case, we feel, is to be distinguished from the present one and is not controlling here. Its transaction was one involving only two (and not multiple) parties, the taxpayer-department store and the trustee-bank. The Court looked closely at the substance of the agreement between those two parties and rightly concluded that depreciation was deductible by the taxpayer despite the nomenclature of the instrument of conveyance and the leaseback. See also Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 562 F. 2d 258 (CA3 1977) (a two-party case with the added feature that the second party was a tax-exempt pension trust). The present case, in contrast, involves three parties, Worthen, Lyon, and the finance agency. The usual simple two-party arrangement was legally unavailable to Worthen. Independent investors were interested in participating in the alternative available to Worthen, and Lyon itself (also independent from Worthen) won the privilege. Despite Frank Lyon’s presence on Worthen’s board of directors, the transaction, as it ultimately developed, was not a familial one arranged by Worthen, but one compelled by the realities of the restrictions imposed upon the bank. Had Lyon not appeared, another interested investor would have been selected. The ultimate solution would have been essentially the same. Thus, the presence of the third party, in our view, significantly distinguishes this case from Lazarus and removes the latter as controlling authority. Ill It is true, of course, that the transaction took shape according to Worthen’s needs. As the Government points out, Worthen throughout the negotiations regarded the respective proposals of the independent investors in terms of its own cost of funds. B. g., App. 355. It is also true that both Worthen and the prospective investors compared the various proposals in terms of the return anticipated on the investor’s equity. But all this is natural for parties contemplating entering into a transaction of this kind. Worthen needed a building for its banking operations and other purposes and necessarily had to know what its cost would be. The investors were in business to employ their funds in the most remunerative way possible. And, as the Court has said in the past, a transaction must be given its effect in accord with what actually occurred and not in accord with what might have occurred. Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U. S. 134, 148-149 (1974); Central Tablet Mfg. Co. v. United States, 417 U. S. 673, 690 (1974). There is no simple device available to' peel away the form of this transaction and to reveal its substance. The effects of the transaction on all the parties were obviously different from those that would have resulted had Worthen been able simply to make a mortgage agreement with New York Life and to receive a $500,000 loan from Lyon. Then Lazarus would apply. Here, however, and most significantly, it was Lyon alone, and not Worthen, who was liable on the notes, first to City Bank, and then to New York Life. Despite the facts that Worthen had agreed to pay rent and that this rent equaled the amounts due from Lyon to New York Life, should anything go awry in the later years of the lease, Lyon was primarily liable. No matter how the transaction could have been devised otherwise, it remains a fact that as the agreements were placed in final form, the obligation on the notes fell squarely on Lyon. Lyon, an ongoing enterprise, exposed its very business well-being to this real and substantial risk. The effect of this liability on Lyon is not just the abstract possibility that something will go wrong and that Worthen will not be able to make its payments. Lyon has disclosed this liability on its balance sheet for all the world to- see. Its financial position was affected substantially by the presence of this long-term debt, despite the offsetting presence of the building as an asset. To the extent that Lyon has used its capital in this transaction, it is less able to obtain financing for other business needs. In concluding that there is this distinct element of economic reality in Lyon’s assumption of liability, we are mindful that the characterization of a transaction for financial accounting purposes, on the one hand, and for tax purposes, on the other, need not necessarily be the same. Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Assn., 403 U. S. 345, 355 (1971); Old Colony R. Co. v. Commissioner, 284 U. S. 552, 562 (1932). Accounting methods or descriptions, without more, do not lend substance to that which has no substance. But in this case accepted accounting methods, as understood by the several parties to the respective agreements and as applied to the transaction by others, gave the transaction a meaningful character consonant with the form it was given. Worthen was not allowed to enter into the type of transaction which the Government now urges to be the true substance of the arrangement. Lyon and Worthen cannot be said to have entered into the transaction intending that the interests involved were allocated in a way other than that associated with a sale-and-leaseback. Other factors also reveal that the transaction cannot be viewed as anything more than a mortgage agreement between Worthen and New York Life and a loan from Lyon to Worthen. There is no legal obligation between Lyon and Worthen representing the $500,000 “loan” extended under the Government’s theory. And the assumed 6% return on this putative loan — required by the audit to be recognized in the taxable year in question — will be realized only when and if Worthen exercises its options. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the rents alone, due after the primary term of the lease and after the mortgage has been paid, do not provide the simple 6% return which, the Government urges, Lyon is guaranteed, 536 F. 2d, at 752. Thus, if Worthen chooses not to exercise its options, Lyon is gambling that the rental value of the building during the last 10 years of the ground lease, during which the ground rent is minimal, will be sufficient to recoup its investment before it must negotiate again with Worthen regarding the ground lease. There are simply too many contingencies, including variations in the value of real estate, in the cost of money, and in the capital structure of Worthen, to permit the conclusion that the parties intended to enter into the transaction as structured in, the audit and according to- which the Government now urges they be taxed. It is not inappropriate to note that the Government is likely to lose little revenue, if any, as a result of the shape given the transaction by the parties. No deduction was created that is not either matched by an item of income or that would not have been available to one of the parties if the transaction had been arranged differently. While it is true that Worthen paid Lyon less to induce it to enter into the transaction because Lyon anticipated the benefit of the' depreciation deductions it would have as the owner of the building, those deductions would have been equally available to Worthen had it retained title to the building. The Government so concedes. Tr. of Oral Arg. 22-23. The fact that favorable tax consequences were taken into account by Lyon on entering into the transaction is no reason for disallowing those consequences. We cannot ignore the reality that the tax laws affect the shape of nearly every business transaction. See Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U. S. 563, 579-580 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). Lyon is not a corporation with no-purpose other than to hold title to the bank building. It was not created by Worthen or even financed to any degree by Worthen. The conclusion that the transaction is not a simple sham to-be ignored does not, of course, automatically compel the further conclusion that Lyon is entitled to the items claimed as deductions. Nevertheless, on the facts, this readily follows. As has been noted, the obligations on which Lyon paid interest were its obligations alone, and it is entitled to claim deductions therefor under § 163 (a) of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 163 (a). As is clear from the facts, none of the parties to this sale- and-leaseback was the owner of the building in any simple sense. But it is equally clear that the facts focus upon Lyon as the one whose capital was committed to the building and as the party, therefore, that was entitled to claim depreciation for the consumption of that capital. The Government has based its contention that Worthen should be treated as the owner on the assumption that throughout the term of the lease Worthen was acquiring an equity in the property. In order to establish the presence of that growing equity, however, the Government is forced to speculate that one of the options will be exercised and that, if it is not, this is only because the rentals for the extended term are a bargain. We cannot indulge in such speculation in view of the District Court’s clear finding to' the contrary. We therefore conclude that it is Lyon’s capital that is invested in the building according to the agreement of the parties, and it is Lyon that is entitled to depreciation deductions, under § 167 of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 167. Cf. United States v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 412 U. S. 401 (1973). IY We recognize that the Government’s position, and that taken by the Court of Appeals, is not without superficial appeal. One, indeed, may theorize that Frank Lyon’s presence on the Worthen board of directors; Lyon’s departure from its principal corporate activity into this unusual venture; the parallel between the payments under the building lease and the amounts due from Lyon on the New York Life mortgage; the provisions relating to condemnation or destruction of the property; the nature and presence of the several, options available to Worthen; and the tax benefits, such as the use of double declining balance depreciation, that accrue to Lyon during the initial years of the arrangement, form the basis of an argument that Worthen should be regarded as the owner of the building and as the recipient of nothing more from Lyon than a $500,000 loan. We, however, as did the District Court, find this theorizing incompatible with the substance and economic realities of the transaction: the competitive situation as it existed between Worthen and Union National Bank in 1965 and the years immediately following; Worthen’s undercapitalization; Worth-en’s consequent inability, as a matter of legal restraint, to carry its building plans into effect by a conventional mortgage and other borrowing; the additional barriers imposed by the state and federal regulators; the suggestion, forthcoming from the state regulator, that Worthen possess an option to purchase; the requirement, from the federal regulator, that the building be owned by an independent third party; the presence of several finance organizations seriously interested in participating in the transaction and in the resolution of Worthen’s problem; the submission of formal proposals by several of those organizations; the bargaining process and period that ensued; the competitiveness of the bidding; the bona fide character of the negotiations; the three-party aspect of the transaction; Lyon’s substantiality and its independence from Worthen; the fact that diversification was Lyon’s principal motivation; Lyon’s being liable alone on the successive notes to City Bank and New York Life; the reasonableness, as the District Court found, of the rentals and of the option prices; the substantiality of the purchase prices; Lyon’s not being engaged generally in the business of financing; the presence of all building depreciation risks on Lyon; the risk, borne by Lyon, that Worthen might default or fail, as other banks have failed; the facts that Worthen could “walk away” from the relationship at the end of the 25-year primary term, and probably would do so if the option price were more than the then-current worth of the building to Worthen; the inescapable fact that if the building lease Were not extended, Lyon would be the full owner of the building, free to do with it as it chose; Lyon’s liability for the substantial ground rent if Worthen decides not to exercise any of its options to extend; the absence of any understanding between Lyon and Worthen that Worthen would exercise any of the purchase options; the nonfamily and nonprivate nature of the entire transaction; and the absence of any differential in tax rates and of special tax circumstances for one of the parties— all convince us that Lyon has far the better of the case. In so concluding, we emphasize that we are not condoning manipulation by a taxpayer through arbitrary labels and dealings that have no economic significance. Such, however, has not happened in this case. In short, we hold that where, as here, there is a genuine multiple-party transaction with economic substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory realities, is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features that have meaningless labels attached, the Government should honor the allocation of rights and duties effectuated by the parties. Expressed another way, so long as the lessor retains significant and genuine attributes of the traditional lessor status, the form of the transaction adopted by the parties governs for tax purposes. What those attributes are in any particular case will necessarily depend upon its facts. It suffices to say that, as here, a sale-and-leaseback, in and of itself, does not necessarily operate to deny a taxpayer’s claim for deductions. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is reversed. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice White dissents and would affirm the judgment substantially for the reasons stated in the opinion in the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 536 F. 2d 746 (1976). Worthen, as of June 30, 1967, had capital stock of $4 million and surplus of $5 million. During the period the building was under construction Worthen became a national bank subject to the supervision and control of the Comptroller of the Currency. This arrangement appeared advisable and was made because purchases of materials by Worthen (which then had become a national bank) were not subject to Arkansas sales tax. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 84-1904 (1) (1960); First Agricultural Nat. Bank v. Tax Comm’n, 392 U. S. 339 (1968). Sales of the building elements to Lyon also were not subject to state sales tax, since they were sales of real estate. See Ark. Stat. Ann. §84r-1902 (c) (Supp. 1977). This, of course, is on the assumption that Worthen exercises its option to extend the building lease. If it does not, Lyon remains liable for the substantial rents prescribed by the ground lease. This possibility brings into sharp focus the fact that Lyon, in a very practical sense, is at least the ultimate owner of the building. If Worthen does not extend, the building lease expires and Lyon may do with the building as it chooses. The Government would point out, however, that the net amounts payable by Worthen to Lyon during the building lease’s extended terms, if all are claimed, would approximate the amount required to repay Lyon’s $500,000 investment at 6% compound interest. Brief for United States 14. These figures do not include uncontested adjustments not involved in this litigation. Lyon here challenges this assertion on the grounds that it had the right and opportunities to sell the building at a greater profit at any time; the return to Lyon was not insubstantial and was attractive to a true investor in real estate; the 6% return was the minimum Lyon would realize if Worthen exercised one of its options, an event the District Court found highly unlikely; and Lyon would own the building and realize a greater return than 6% if Worthen did not exercise an option to purchase. Lyon challenges this observation by pointing out that the District Court found the option prices to be the negotiated estimate of the parties of the fair market value of the building on the option dates and to be reasonable. App. 303, 299. Lyon asserts that this statement is true only with respect to the total destruction or taking of the building on or after December 1, 1980. Lyon asserts that it, not Worthen, would receive the excess above the mortgage balance in the event of total destruction or taking before December 1,1980, or in the event of partial damage or taking at any time. Id., at 408-410, 411. Lyon concedes the accuracy of this statement, but asserts that it does not justify the conclusion that Lyon served merely as a conduit by which mortgage payments would be transmitted to New York Life. It asserts that Lyon was the sole obligor on the New York Life note and would remain liable in the event of default by Worthen. It also asserts that the fact the rent was sufficient to amortize the loan during the primary term of the lease was a requirement imposed by New York Life, and is a usual requirement in most long-term loans secured by a long-term lease. As to this statement,, Lyon asserts that the Court of Appeals ignored Lyon’s right to sell the building to another at any time; the District Court’s finding that the options to purchase were not likely to be exercised; the uncertainty that Worthen would renew the lease for 40 years; Lyon’s right to lease to anyone at any price during the last 10 years of the ground lease; and Lyon’s continuing ownership of the building after the expiration of the ground lease. In response to this, Lyon asserts that the District Court found that the benefits of occupancy Worthen will enjoy are common in most long-term real estate leases, and that the District Court found that Lyon had motives other than tax savings in entering into the transaction. It also asserts that the net cash after-tax benefit would be $312,220, not $1.5 million. Other factors relied on by the Court of Appeals, 536 F. 2d, at 752, were the allocation of the investment credit to Worthen,, and a claim that Lyon’s ability to sell the building to a third party was “carefully circumscribed" by the lease agreements. The investment credit by statute is freely allocable between the parties, § 48 (d) of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. §48 (d), and the Government has not pressed either of these factors before this Court. New York Life required Lyon, not Worthen, to submit financial statements periodically. See Note Purchase Agreement, App. 453-454, 458-459. It may well be that the remedies available to New York Life against Lyon would be far greater than any remedy available to it against Worthen, which, as lessee, is liable to New York Life only through Lyon’s assignment of its interest as lessor. We are aware that accounting standards have changed significantly since 1968 and that the propriety of Worthen’s and Lyon’s methods of disclosing the transaction in question may be a matter for debate under these new standards. Compare Acccounting Principles Bd. Opinion No. 5, Reporting of Leases in Financial Statements of Lessee (1964), and Accounting Principles Bd. Opinion No. 7, Accounting for Leases in Financial Statements of Lessors (1966), with Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 13, Accounting for Leases (1976). See also Comptroller of the Currency, Banking Circular No. 95 (Nov. 11, 1977), instructing that national banks revise their financial statements in accord with FASB Standard No. 13. Standard No. 13, however, by its terms, states, ¶ 78, that there are many instances where tax and financial accounting treatments diverge. Further, Standard No. 13 is nonapplicable with respect to a lease executed prior to January 1, 1977 (as was the Lyon-Worthen lease), until January 1, 1981. Obviously, Banking Circular No. 95 was not in effect in 1968 when the Lyon-Worthen lease was executed. Then-existing pronouncements of the Internal Revenue Service gave Lyon very little against which to measure the transaction. The most complete statement on the general question of characterization of leases as sales, Rev. Rui. 55-540, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 39, by its terms dealt only with equipment leases. In that ruling it was stated that the Service will look at the intent of the parties at the time the agreement was executed to determine the proper characterization of the transaction. Generally, an intent to enter into a conditional sales agreement will be found to be present if (a) portions of the rental payments are made specifically applicable to an equity acquired by the lessee, (b) the lessee will acquire a title automatically after certain payments have been made, (c) the rental payments are a disproportionately large amount in relation to the sum necessary to complete the sale, (d) the rental payments are above fair rental value, (e) title can be acquired at a nominal option price, or (f) some portion of the rental payments are identifiable as interest. See also Rev. Rui. 60-122,1960-1 Cum. Bull. 56; Rev. Rul. 72-543,1972-2 Cum. Bull. 87. The Service announced more specific guidelines, indicating under what circumstances it would answer requests for rulings on leverage leasing transactions, in Rev. Proc. 75-21, 1975-1 Cum. Bull. 715. In general, “[u]nless other facts and circumstances indicate a contrary intent,” the Service will not rule that a lessor in a leveraged lease transaction is to be treated as the owner of the property in question unless (a) the lessor has incurred and maintains a minimal investment equal to 20% of the cost of the property, (b) the lessee has no right to purchase except at fair market value, (c) no part of the cost of the property is furnished by the lessee, (d) the lessee has not lent to the lessor or guaranteed any indebtedness of the lessor, and (e) the lessor must demonstrate that it expects to receive a profit on the transaction other than the benefits received solely from the tax treatment. These guidelines are not intended to be definitive, and it is not clear that they provide much guidance in assessing real estate transactions. See Rosenberg & Weinstein, Sale-leasebacks: An analysis of these transactions after the Lyon decision, 45 J. Tax. 146, 147 n. 1 (1976). Indeed, it is not inevitable that the transaction, as treated by Lyon and Worthen, will not result in more revenues to the Government rather than. less. Lyon is gambling that in the first 11 years of the lease it will have income that will be sheltered by the depreciation deductions, and that it will be able to make sufficiently good use of the tax dollars preserved thereby to malee up for the income it will recognize and pay taxes on during the last 14 years of the initial term of the lease and against which it will enjoy no- sheltering deduction. The general characterization of a transaction, for tax purposes is a question of law subject to review. The particular facts from which the characterization is to be made are not so subject. See American Realty Trust v. United States, 498 F. 2d 1194, 1198 (CA4 1974). Lyon’s consolidated balance sheet on December 31, 1968, showed assets of $12,225,612, and total stockholders’ equity of $3,818,671 Of the assets, the sum of $2,674,290 represented its then investment in the Worthen building. App. 587-588. Thus, the facts of this case stand in contrast to many others in which the form of the transaction actually created tax advantages that, for one reason or another, could not have been enjoyed had the transaction taken another form. See, e. g., Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 562 F. 2d 258 (CA3 1977) (sale-and-leaseback of land between taxpayer and tax-exempt trust enabled the taxpayer to amortize, through its rental deductions, the cost of acquiring land not otherwise depreciable). Indeed, the arrangements in this case can hardly be labeled as tax-avoidance techniques in light of the other arrangments being promoted at the time. See, e. g., Zeitlin, Tax Planning in Equipment-Leasing Shelters, 1969 So. Cal. Tax Inst. 621; Marcus, Real Estate Purchase-Leasebacks as Secured Loans, 2 Real Estate L. J. 664 (1974). See generally Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F. 2d 771 (CA3), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 858 (1967), on remand, 50 T. C. 782 (1968); Levinson v. Commissioner, 45 T. C. 380 (1966); World Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F. 2d 614 (CA8 1962); Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Commissioner, 58 T. C. 836 (1972), aff’d, 500 F. 2d 1222 (CA9 1974); Cubic Corp. v. United States, 541 F. 2d 829 (CA9 1976).
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.
What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?
[ "judicial review (national level)", "judicial review (state level)", "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction", "statutory construction", "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order", "diversity jurisdiction", "federal common law" ]
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BALL v. UNITED STATES No. 84-5004. Argued January 9, 1985 Decided March 26, 1985 BURGER, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., concurred in the judgment. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 867. Powell, J., took no part in the decision of the case. Jo S. Widener, by appointment of the Court, 469 U. S. 928, argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Andrew J. Pincus argued the cause pro hac vice for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Trott, Deputy Solicitor General Frey, Robert J. Erickson, and Thomas E. Booth. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari to decide whether a felon possessing a firearm may be convicted and concurrently sentenced under 18 U. S. C. § 922(h)(1) for receiving that firearm, and under 18 U. S. C. App. § 1202(a)(1) for possessing the same weapon. 469 U. S. 816 (1984). After driving around Honaker, Virginia, with several acquaintances, including petitioner Truman Ball, Hubert Romans discovered that his .32-caliber nickel-plated Rossi revolver was missing from the back seat of his car. He reported the incident to the Russell County Sheriff’s Department. Subsequently, a neighbor notified the Sheriff that Ball had threatened him with a pistol matching the description of Romans’ revolver. Later that same day, the police located Ball at another neighbor’s home where Ball had tried unsuccessfully to sell the revolver. When the police told Ball he was under arrest, Ball fled but was promptly apprehended with Romans’ revolver in his possession. Ball, a previously convicted felon, was indicted on charges of receiving a firearm shipped in interstate commerce, 18 U. S. C. §§ 922(h)(1) and 924(a), and possessing that firearm, 18 U. S. C. App. § 1202(a)(1). It is conceded that both counts rest on the same conduct. Ball was convicted on both counts by a jury in the Western District of Virginia and sentenced to consecutive terms of three years’ imprisonment on the receipt count and two years’ imprisonment on the possession count, the latter sentence suspended with two years’ probation. On appeal Ball challenged the validity of the consecutive sentences. The Government conceded that under United States v. Burton, 629 F. 2d 975 (CA4 1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 968 (1981), consecutive sentences could not be imposed for unlawful receipt and unlawful possession of the same firearm, when the unlawful possession was incident to its unlawful receipt. The Court of Appeals accepted this concession and adhered to its statement in Burton that “Congress in these firearms statutes created separate offenses, but did not authorize pyramiding penalties.” 734 F. 2d 965, 966 (CA4 1984) (citing Burton, supra, at 977). The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to modify the sentences to make them concurrent. The application of the firearms statutes, § 922(h)(1) and § 1202(a)(1), charging a convicted felon with receiving and possessing the same gun, has produced conflicting decisions among the Courts of Appeals. We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. We reverse. HH f — I This case requires the Court once again to resolve the “partial redundancy” of §§ 922(h) and 1202(a), provisions of Titles IV and VII, respectively, of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. E. g., United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 114, 118 (1979); United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 341-343, and n. 9 (1971). In these two Titles of the Omnibus Act, Congress sought to control the interstate traffic and availability of firearms. Although Congress’ purposes are obvious, courts understandably have had difficulty applying the overlapping provisions of the Act. This case affords an opportunity to address the application of Titles IV and VII to one set of circumstances — where a single act is relied upon to establish a convicted felon’s unlawful receipt and his unlawful possession of the same firearm. A It is clear that a convicted felon may be prosecuted simultaneously for violations of §§ 922(h) and 1202(a) involving the same firearm. This Court has long acknowledged the Government’s broad discretion to conduct criminal prosecutions, including its power to select the charges to be brought in a particular case. E. g., United States v. Goodwin, 457 U. S. 368, 382 (1982); Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454, 457-459 (1869). In Batchelder, this Court recognized that §§ 922(h) and 1202(a) proscribed similar conduct where the defendant is a convicted felon, but concluded that “each substantive statute, in conjunction with its own sentencing provision, operates independently of the other.” 442 U. S., at 118. This Court rejected the argument that § 1202(a) impliedly repealed § 922(h) with respect to acts covered by both provisions, noting that both the statutory language and the legislative history showed that the two provisions were to be applied independently. See id., at 118-121. Under these circumstances there is no bar to the Government’s proceeding with prosecution simultaneously under the two statutes. B To say that a convicted felon may be prosecuted simultaneously for violation of §§ 922(h) and 1202(a), however, is not to say that he may be convicted and punished for two offenses. Congress can be read as allowing charges under two different statutes with conviction and sentence confined to one. Indeed, “[a]ll guides to legislative intent,” United States v. Woodward, 469 U. S. 105, 109 (1985), show that Congress intended a felon in Ball’s position to be convicted and punished for only one of the two offenses if the possession of the firearm is incidental to receiving it. This Court has consistently relied on the test of statutory construction stated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299, 304 (1932), to determine whether Congress intended the same conduct to be punishable under two criminal provisions. The appropriate inquiry under Blockburger is “whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” See, e. g., United States v. Woodward, supra, at 107; Albernaz v. United States, 450 U. S. 333, 337 (1981); Whalen v. United States, 445 U. S. 684, 691-692 (1980). The assumption underlying the Blockburger rule is that Congress ordinarily does not intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes. For purposes of applying the Blockburger test in this setting as a means of ascertaining congressional intent, “punishment” must be the equivalent of a criminal conviction and not simply the imposition of sentence. Congress could not have intended to allow two convictions for the same conduct, even if sentenced under only one; Congress does not create criminal offenses having no sentencing component. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257, 275 (1880) (Clifford, J., dissenting). Cf. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 32(b)(1), which provides that the sentence is a necessary component of a “judgment of conviction.” Applying this rule to the firearms statutes, it is clear that Congress did not intend to subject felons to two convictions; proof of illegal receipt of a firearm necessarily includes proof of illegal possession of that weapon. “[W]hen received, a firearm is necessarily possessed.” United States v. Martin, 732 F. 2d 591, 592 (CA7 1984). In other words, Congress seems clearly to have recognized that a felon who receives a firearm must also possess it, and thus had no intention of subjecting that person to two convictions for the same criminal act. The legislative history of §§ 922(h) and 1202(a) supports this reading of congressional intent. Titles IV and VII, enacted together as components of the Omnibus Act, disclose “Congress’ worry about the easy availability of firearms, especially to those persons who pose a threat to community peace.” Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S. 55, 66 (1980). Accordingly, “[e]ach [Title] seeks to keep a firearm from ‘any person . . . who has been convicted’ of a felony . . . .” Id., at 64. Section 922(h), the receipt statute, is part of a “‘carefully constructed package of gun control legislation,’ which had been in existence for many years.” Batchelder, 442 U. S., at 120 (quoting Scarborough v. United States, 431 U. S. 563, 570 (1977)). One principal purpose of Title IV was to make “it possible to keep firearms out of the hands of those not legally entitled to possess them because of age, criminal background, or incompetency . . . S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 28 (1968). Section 1202(a), on the other hand, was a “last-minute Senate amendment” to the Omnibus Act, “hastily passed, with little discussion, no hearings, and no report.” United States v. Bass, 404 U. S., at 344 (footnote omitted). The circumstances surrounding consideration of Title VII and the haste in which it was enacted may well explain why it does not dovetail neatly with the prohibition that was, at the time of its passage, already contained in Title IV. Title VII was enacted as supplementary legislation; Title VII filled the gaps in and expanded the coverage of Title IV. In short, we are persuaded that Congress had no intention of creating duplicative punishment for one limited class of persons falling within the overlap between the two Titles — convicted felons who receive firearms and who, by definition, possess them. The independent but overlapping statutes simply are not “directed to separate evils” under the circumstances. Albemaz, 450 U. S., at 343. C Having concluded that Congress did not intend petitioner’s conduct to be punishable under both §§ 922(h) and 1202(a), the only remedy consistent with the congressional intent is for the District Court, where the sentencing responsibility resides, to exercise its discretion to vacate one of the underlying convictions. The remedy of ordering one of the sentences to be served concurrently with the other cannot be squared with Congress’ intention. One of the convictions, as well as its concurrent sentence, is unauthorized punishment for a separate offense. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U. S. 359, 368 (1983). The second conviction, whose concomitant sentence is served concurrently, does not evaporate simply because of the concurrence of the sentence. The separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored. For example, the presence of two convictions on the record may delay the defendant’s eligibility for parole or result in an increased sentence under a recidivist statute for a future offense. Moreover, the second conviction may be used to impeach the defendant’s credibility and certainly carries the societal stigma accompanying any criminal conviction. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784, 790-791 (1969); Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 54-56 (1968). Thus, the second conviction, even if it results in no greater sentence, is an impermissible punishment. We emphasize that while the Government may seek a multiple-count indictment against a felon for violations of §§ 922(h) and 1202(a) involving the same weapon where a single act establishés the receipt and possession, the accused may not suffer two convictions or sentences on that indictment. If, upon the trial, the district judge is satisfied that there is sufficient proof to go to the jury on both counts, he should instruct the jury as to the elements of each offense. Should the jury return guilty verdicts for each count, however, the district judge should enter judgment on only one of the statutory offenses. Ill We hold that Congress did not intend a convicted felon, in Ball’s position, to be convicted of both receiving a firearm in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 922(h), and possessing that firearm in violation of 18 U. S. C. App. § 1202(a). Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand with instructions to have the District Court exercise its discretion to vacate one of the convictions. It is so ordered. Justice Marshall concurs in the judgment. Justice Powell took no part in the decision of this case. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT Title 18 U. S. C. § 922(h) provides: “It shall be unlawful for any person— “(1) who is under indictment for, or who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; “(2) is a fugitive from justice; “(3) is an unlawful user of or addicted to marihuana or any depressant or stimulant drug (as defined in section 201(v) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act) or narcotic drug (as defined in section 4731(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954); or “(4) has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed to any mental institution; “to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” Title 18 U. S. C. § 924(a) provides in pertinent part: “Whoever violates any provision of this chapter . . . shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, and shall become eligible for parole as the Board of Parole shall determine.” Title 18 U. S. C. App. § 1202(a) provides: “Any person who— “(1) has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or any political subdivision thereof of a felony, or “(2) has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions, or “(3) has been adjudged by a court of the United States or of a State or any political subdivision thereof of being mentally incompetent, or “(4) having been a citizen of the United States has renounced his citizenship, or “(5) being an alien is illegally or unlawfully in the United States, “and who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce, after the date of enactment of this Act, any firearm shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.” In October 1981, Elliot Brothers of South Carolina had shipped the revolver to McGlothlin’s Store in Honaker, Virginia. On February 22, 1982, MeGlothlin sold the gun to Romans. At the outset of the trial, the parties stipulated that Ball previously had been convicted of the state felony of threatening a dwelling house. App. 2-3. See Appendix to this opinion for the complete texts of the relevant statutes. The chain of sale described in n. 1, supra, established the interstate commerce connection required by the firearms statutes. See Barrett v. United States, 423 U. S. 212 (1976); Scarborough v. United States, 431 U. S. 563 (1977). The Tenth Circuit has held that a convicted felon may be convicted and sentenced cumulatively under both statutes. United States v. Larranaga, 614 F. 2d 239, 241 (1980). The Fifth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits have concluded that the Government must elect to prosecute a convicted felon under one of the statutes. United States v. Larson, 625 F. 2d 67, 69 (CA5 1980); United States v. Conn, 716 F. 2d 550, 553 (CA9 1983); United States v. Girst, 207 App. D. C. 89, 92, 645 F. 2d 1014, 1017 (1979). The Fourth Circuit has decided that a convicted felon may be convicted under both statutes, but the separate sentences must run concurrently. United States v. Burton, 629 F. 2d 975, 977-978 (1980). The Third and Seventh Circuits have remanded cases to the District Courts in order to vacate one of the convictions and sentences. United States v. Taylor, 635 F. 2d 232, 233 (CA3 1980); United States v. Martin, 732 F. 2d 591, 593 (CA7 1984). We have no occasion to consider here whether a felon may be convicted of both offenses if he possessed a firearm on one occasion and, after giving up possession, later reacquired the gun, see, e. g., United States v. Robbins, 579 F. 2d 1151 (CA9 1978), or if he received and possessed different weapons at different times or in various places, see, e. g., United States v. Vance, 724 F. 2d 517 (CA6 1983); United States v. Filipponio, 702 F. 2d 664 (CA7 1983). Several Courts of Appeals have interpreted Batchelder to forbid the Government to proceed against a convicted felon in a single prosecution under §§ 922(h) and 1202(a). See, e. g., United States v. Larson, supra; United States v. Girst, supra; United States v. Conn, supra. These courts have relied upon the statement in Batchelder that “when an act violates more than one criminal statute, the Government may prosecute under either so long as it does not discriminate against any class of defendants,” 442 U. S, at 123-124, interpreting the reference to “either” statute to require the Government to proceed under only one of the two provisions. The Court’s observation was a response to the claim that the two statutes permitted excessive prosecutorial discretion because the Government could in effect choose the penalty to apply in a given case by proceeding under one statute instead of the other. The Court’s reference to “either” statute merely reaffirmed the Government’s discretion to charge under one statute rather than the other. The Court had no intention of restricting the Government to prosecuting for only a single offense, an issue not before the Court. This is confirmed by Batchelder’s conclusion that the two statutes are “each fully enforceable on [their] own terms.” Id., at 119. Given this congressional design, the Double Jeopardy Clause imposes no prohibition to simultaneous prosecutions. In Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U. S. 493 (1984), this Court held that even where the Clause bars cumulative punishment for a group of offenses, “the Clause does not prohibit the State from prosecuting [the defendant] for such multiple offenses in a single prosecution.” Id., at 500. Indeed, in United States v. Gaddis, 424 U. S. 544 (1976), the Court concluded that “there can be no impropriety ... for a prosecutor to file an information containing counts charging violations of” several different provisions of the federal bank robbery statute where there is evidence to support the charges, even though the defendant could not in the end stand convicted of both offenses. Id., at 550. As the Government suggests, the converse may not be true. For example, a felon may possess a firearm without having “received” it; he may have manufactured the gun himself. Brief for United States 13-14. Four months after enacting the Omnibus Act, the same Congress amended and reenacted Titles IV and VII as part of the Gun Control Act of 1968. 82 Stat. 1213. Congress renewed its effort to prohibit felons from having weapons. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 22 (1968); 114 Cong. Rec. 21784 (1968) (remarks of Rep. Celler). As the Court observed in Barrett v. United States, 423 U. S., at 220, the Gun Control Act “reflects a similar concern with keeping firearms out of the hands of categories of potentially irresponsible persons, including convicted felons.” Section 922(h) stemmed from §2(f) of the Federal Firearms Act of 1988, which had made it unlawful for “any person who has been convicted of a crime of violence or is a fugutive [sic] from justice to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce . . .,” 52 Stat. 1251. Section 922(h), although maintaining § 2(f )’s operative phrase, expanded the categories of persons prohibited from receiving firearms. See Appendix to this opinion. Senator Tydings, for example, explained that “Title VII. . . is . . . primarily designed to restrict access to handguns to criminals, juveniles, and fugitives.” 114 Cong. Rec. 13639 (1968). See also id., at 13868, 14773 (remarks of Sen. Long). For a concise review of Title VII’s surprisingly swift passage through the Congress, see Scarborough v. United States, 431 U. S. 563, 573-574 (1977); United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 344, n. 11 (1971). Each statute reaches substantial groups of people not covered by the other. Section 922(h), for example, covers persons who are under indictment for a felony, who are fugitives, and who are narcotics offenders. Section 1202(a), on the other hand, covers persons dishonorably discharged from the service, illegal aliens, and persons who have renounced their citizenship. Senator Long explained that the assortment of persons brought within the ambit of § 1202(a) reflected those responsible for the rash of assassinations and publicized murders in “recent history,” which included the deaths of President Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr., as well as the murders of several civil rights workers in the South. 114 Cong. Rec. 14773 (1968). Only two groups — convicted felons and adjudicated mental incompetents — fall within the overlap between the two provisions. There is no suggestion in the legislative history that these persons pose a greater threat to society such that Congress thought they deserved to be punished more severely, i. e., under both statutes for a single act. This appears to be the import of the Government’s concession in Taylor v. United States, 624 F. 2d 1092 (CA3), vacated and remanded, 449 U. S. 895 (1980), where the petitioner’s consecutive sentences for violating §§ 922(h) and 1202(a) had been upheld by the Court of Appeals under circumstances identical to those presented in this case. Before this Court, the Government acknowledged that “since receipt of a firearm will almost necessarily entail possession of that firearm ... we agree with petitioner that it is unlikely that Congress intended to permit consecutive punishment in the circumstances presented here.” Memorandum for United States in Taylor v. United States, O. T. 1980, No. 80-5187, pp. 2-3.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
What is the issue of the decision?
[ "involuntary confession", "habeas corpus", "plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise", "retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)", "search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)", "search and seizure, vehicles", "search and seizure, Crime Control Act", "contempt of court or congress", "self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)", "Miranda warnings", "self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution", "right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)", "cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)", "cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)", "line-up", "discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)", "double jeopardy", "ex post facto (state)", "extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous", "extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence", "extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom", "extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)", "extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)", "extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance", "extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)", "extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity", "confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)", "subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error", "subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)", "subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment", "subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies", "subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice", "subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)", "subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution", "subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness", "subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous", "Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure", "statutory construction of criminal laws: assault", "statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery", "statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)", "statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody", "statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)", "statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)", "statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms", "statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud", "statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling", "statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951", "statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)", "statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)", "statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes", "statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol", "statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice", "statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)", "statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952", "statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes", "statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines", "statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous", "jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)", "speedy trial", "miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)" ]
[ 43 ]
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Carlos TREVINO, Petitioner v. Rick THALER, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division. No. 11-10189. Supreme Court of the United States Argued Feb. 25, 2013. Decided May 28, 2013. Warren A. Wolf, San Antonio, TX, for Petitioner. Andrew S. Oldham, for Respondent. Warren Alan Wolf, Counsel of Record, Law Office of Warren Alan Wolf, John J. Ritenour, Jr., The Ritenour Law Firm, P.C., San Antonio, TX, Seth P. Waxman, Catherine M.A. Carroll, Annie L. Owens, Nicole Ries Fox, Ari Holtzblatt, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioner. Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, Daniel T. Hodge, First Assistant Attorney General, Jonathan F. Mitchell, Solicitor General, Adam W. Aston, Andrew S. Oldham, Deputy Solicitors General, Counsel of Record, James P. Sullivan, Arthur C. D'Andrea, Assistant Solicitors General, Office of the Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Respondent. Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. In Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012), we considered the right of a state prisoner to raise, in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In that case an Arizona procedural rule required a defendant convicted at trial to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel during his first state collateral review proceeding-or lose the claim. The defendant in Martinez did not comply with the state procedural rule. But he argued that the federal habeas court should excuse his state procedural failing, on the ground that he had good "cause" for not raising the claim at the right time, namely that, not only had he lacked effective counsel during trial, but also he lacked effective counsel during his first state collateral review proceeding. We held that lack of counsel on collateral review might excuse defendant's state law procedural default. We wrote: "[A] procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the [State's] initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective." Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1320. At the same time we qualified our holding. We said that the holding applied where state procedural law said that "claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding." Ibid. (emphasis added). In this case Texas state law does not say "must." It does not on its face require a defendant initially to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in a state collateral review proceeding. Rather, that law appears at first glance to permit (but not require) the defendant initially to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal. The structure and design of the Texas system in actual operation, however, make it "virtually impossible" for an ineffective assistance claim to be presented on direct review. See Robinson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 808, 810-811 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). We must now decide whether the Martinez exception applies in this procedural regime. We conclude that it does. I A Texas state court jury convicted petitioner, Carlos Trevino, of capital murder. After a subsequent penalty-phase hearing, the jury found that Trevino "would commit criminal acts of violence in the future which would constitute a continuing threat to society," that he "actually caused the death of Linda Salinas or, if he did not actually cause her death, he intended to kill her or another, or he anticipated a human life would be taken," and that "there were insufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant a sentence of life imprisonment" rather than death. 449 Fed.Appx. 415, 418 (C.A.5 2011). The judge consequently imposed a sentence of death. Eight days later the judge appointed new counsel to handle Trevino's direct appeal. App. 1, 3. Seven months after sentencing, when the trial transcript first became available, that counsel filed an appeal. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals then considered and rejected Trevino's appellate claims. Trevino's appellate counsel did not claim that Trevino's trial counsel had been constitutionally ineffective during the penalty phase of the trial court proceedings. Id., at 12-24. About six months after sentencing, the trial judge appointed Trevino a different new counsel to seek state collateral relief . As Texas' procedural rules provide, that third counsel initiated collateral proceedings while Trevino's appeal still was in progress. This new counsel first sought postconviction relief (through collateral review) in the trial court itself. After a hearing, the trial court denied relief; and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed that denial. Id., at 25-26, 321-349. Trevino's postconviction claims included a claim that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective during the penalty phase of Trevino's trial, but it did not include a claim that trial counsel's ineffectiveness consisted in part of a failure adequately to investigate and to present mitigating circumstances during the penalty phase of Trevino's trial. Id ., at 321-349; see Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (counsel's failure to investigate and present mitigating circumstances deprived defendant of effective assistance of counsel). Trevino then filed a petition in federal court seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Federal District Court appointed another new counsel to represent him. And that counsel claimed for the first time that Trevino had not received constitutionally effective counsel during the penalty phase of his trial in part because of trial counsel's failure to adequately investigate and present mitigating circumstances during the penalty phase. App. 438, 456-478. Federal habeas counsel pointed out that Trevino's trial counsel had presented only one witness at the sentencing phase, namely Trevino's aunt. The aunt had testified that Trevino had had a difficult upbringing, that his mother had an alcohol problem, that his family was on welfare, and that he had dropped out of high school. She had added that Trevino had a child, that he was good with children, and that he was not violent. Id., at 285-291. Federal habeas counsel then told the federal court that Trevino's trial counsel should have found and presented at the penalty phase other mitigating matters that his own investigation had brought to light. These included, among other things, that Trevino's mother abused alcohol while she was pregnant with Trevino, that Trevino weighed only four pounds at birth, that throughout his life Trevino suffered the deleterious effects of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, that as a child Trevino had suffered numerous head injuries without receiving adequate medical attention, that Trevino's mother had abused him physically and emotionally, that from an early age Trevino was exposed to, and abused, alcohol and drugs, that Trevino had attended school irregularly and performed poorly, and that Trevino's cognitive abilities were impaired. Id., at 66-67. The federal court stayed proceedings to permit Trevino to raise this claim in state court. The state court held that because Trevino had not raised this claim during his initial postconviction proceedings, he had procedurally defaulted the claim, id., at 27-28; and the Federal District Court then denied Trevino's ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, id., at 78-79. The District Court concluded in relevant part that, despite the fact that "even the most minimal investigation ... would have revealed a wealth of additional mitigating evidence," an independent and adequate state ground (namely Trevino's failure to raise the issue during his state postconviction proceeding) barred the federal habeas court from considering the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. Id., at 131-132. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-730, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). Trevino appealed. The Fifth Circuit, without considering the merits of Trevino's ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, agreed with the District Court that an independent, adequate state ground, namely Trevino's procedural default, barred its consideration. 449 Fed.Appx., at 426. Although the Circuit decided Trevino's case before this Court decided Martinez , the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in a later case, Ibarra v. Thaler, 687 F.3d 222 (2012), makes clear that the Fifth Circuit would have found that Martinez would have made no difference. That is because in Ibarra the Circuit recognized that Martinez had said that its good-cause exception applies where state law says that a criminal defendant must initially raise his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in initial state collateral review proceedings. 687 F.3d, at 225-226. Texas law, the Circuit pointed out, does not say explicitly that the defendant must initially raise the claim in state collateral review proceedings. Rather Texas law on its face appears to permit a criminal defendant to raise such a claim on direct appeal. Id., at 227. And the Circuit held that that fact means that Martinez does not apply in Texas. 687 F.3d, at 227. Since the Circuit's holding in Ibarra (that Martinez does not apply in Texas) would similarly govern this case, we granted certiorari here to determine whether Martinez applies in Texas. II A We begin with Martinez . We there recognized the historic importance of federal habeas corpus proceedings as a method for preventing individuals from being held in custody in violation of federal law. Martinez, 566 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1315-1316. See generally Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484-485, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). In general, if a convicted state criminal defendant can show a federal habeas court that his conviction rests upon a violation of the Federal Constitution, he may well obtain a writ of habeas corpus that requires a new trial, a new sentence, or release. We similarly recognized the importance of federal habeas corpus principles designed to prevent federal courts from interfering with a State's application of its own firmly established, consistently followed, constitutionally proper procedural rules. Martinez, supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1315-1316. Those principles have long made clear that a conviction that rests upon a defendant's state law "procedural default" (for example, the defendant's failure to raise a claim of error at the time or in the place that state law requires), normally rests upon "an independent and adequate state ground." Coleman, 501 U.S., at 729-730, 111 S.Ct. 2546. And where a conviction rests upon such a ground, a federal habeas court normally cannot consider the defendant's federal constitutional claim. Ibid. ; see Martinez, 566 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1315-1316. At the same time, we pointed out that "[t]he doctrine barring procedurally defaulted claims from being heard is not without exceptions. A prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted claim by showing cause for the default and prejudice from a violation of federal law." Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1316. And we turned to the issue directly before the Court: whether Martinez had shown "cause" to excuse his state procedural failing. Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1320-1321. Martinez argued that his lawyer should have raised, but did not raise, his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel during state collateral review proceedings. Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1214-1315. He added that this failure, itself amounting to ineffective assistance, was the "cause" of, and ought to excuse, his procedural default. Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1314-1315. But this Court had previously held that "[n]egligence on the part of a prisoner's postconviction attorney does not qualify as 'cause,' " primarily because a "principal" such as the prisoner, "bears the risk of negligent conduct on the part of his agent," the attorney. Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. ----, ----, 132 S.Ct. 912, 922, 181 L.Ed.2d 807 (2012) (quoting Coleman, supra, at 753-754, 111 S.Ct. 2546; emphasis added). Martinez, in effect, argued for an exception to Coleman 's broad statement of the law. We ultimately held that a "narrow exception" should "modify the unqualified statement in Coleman that an attorney's ignorance or inadvertence in a postconviction proceeding does not qualify as cause to excuse a procedural default." Martinez, 566 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1315. We did so for three reasons. First, the "right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial is a bedrock principle in our justice system.... Indeed, the right to counsel is the foundation for our adversary system." Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1317. Second, ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appellate review could amount to "cause," excusing a defendant's failure to raise (and thus procedurally defaulting) a constitutional claim. Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1316-1317. But States often have good reasons for initially reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel during state collateral proceedings rather than on direct appellate review. Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1317-1318. That is because review of such a claim normally requires a different attorney, because it often "depend[s] on evidence outside the trial record," and because efforts to expand the record on direct appeal may run afoul of "[a]bbreviated deadlines," depriving the new attorney of "adequate time ... to investigate the ineffective-assistance claim." Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1318. Third, where the State consequently channels initial review of this constitutional claim to collateral proceedings, a lawyer's failure to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim during initial-review collateral proceedings, could (were Coleman read broadly) deprive a defendant of any review of that claim at all. Martinez,supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1316. We consequently read Coleman as containing an exception, allowing a federal habeas court to find "cause," thereby excusing a defendant's procedural default, where (1) the claim of "ineffective assistance of trial counsel" was a "substantial" claim; (2) the "cause" consisted of there being "no counsel" or only "ineffective" counsel during the state collateral review proceeding; (3) the state collateral review proceeding was the "initial" review proceeding in respect to the "ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim"; and (4) state law requires that an "ineffective assistance of trial counsel [claim] ... be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding." Martinez, supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1318-1319, 1320-1321. B Here state law differs from that in Martinez in respect to the fourth requirement. Unlike Arizona, Texas does not expressly require the defendant to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in an initial collateral review proceeding. Rather Texas law on its face appears to permit (but not require) the defendant to raise the claim on direct appeal . Does this difference matter? 1 Two characteristics of the relevant Texas procedures lead us to conclude that it should not make a difference in respect to the application of Martinez . First, Texas procedure makes it "virtually impossible for appellate counsel to adequately present an ineffective assistance [of trial counsel] claim" on direct review. Robinson, 16 S.W.3d, at 810-811. As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals itself has pointed out, "the inherent nature of most ineffective assistance" of trial counsel "claims" means that the trial court record will often fail to "contai[n] the information necessary to substantiate" the claim. Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 475 (1997) (en banc). As the Court of Criminal Appeals has also noted, a convicted defendant may make a motion in the trial court for a new trial in order to develop the record on appeal. See Reyes v. State, 849 S.W.2d 812, 816 (1993). And, in principle, the trial court could, in connection with that motion, allow the defendant some additional time to develop a further record. Ibid. But that motion-for-new-trial "vehicle is often inadequate because of time constraints and because the trial record has generally not been transcribed at this point." Torres, supra, at 475. See Tex. Rule App. Proc. 21.4 (2013) (motion for a new trial must be made within 30 days of sentencing); Rules 21.8(a), (c) (trial court must dispose of motion within 75 days of sentencing); Rules 35.2(b), 35.3(c) (transcript must be prepared within 120 days of sentencing where a motion for a new trial is filed and this deadline may be extended). Thus, as the Court of Criminal Appeals has concluded, in Texas "a writ of habeas corpus" issued in state collateral proceedings ordinarily "is essential to gathering the facts necessary to ... evaluate ... [ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel] claims." Torres, supra, at 475. See Robinson, supra, at 810-811 (noting that there is "not generally a realistic opportunity to adequately develop the record for appeal in post-trial motions" and that "[t]he time requirements for filing and presenting a motion for new trial would have made it virtually impossible for appellate counsel to adequately present an ineffective assistance claim to the trial court"). See also Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813-814, and n. 6 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) ("[I]n the vast majority of cases, the undeveloped record on direct appeal will be insufficient for an appellant to satisfy the dual prongs of Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ]"; only "[r]arely will a reviewing court be provided the opportunity to make its determination on direct appeal with a record capable of providing a fair evaluation of the merits of the claim ..."); Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (similar); Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 102-103 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (similar); Ex parte Brown, 158 S.W.3d 449, 453 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (per curiam ) (similar); Jackson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 954, 957 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (per curiam ) (similar). See also 42 G. Dix & J. Schmolesky, Texas Practice Series § 29:76, pp. 844-845 (3d ed. 2011) (hereinafter Texas Practice) (explaining that "[o]ften" the requirement that a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel be supported by a record containing direct evidence of why counsel acted as he did "will require that the claim ... be raised in postconviction habeas proceedings where a full record on the matter can be raised"). This opinion considers whether, as a systematic matter, Texas affords meaningful review of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The present capital case illustrates why it does not. The trial court appointed new counsel for Trevino eight days after sentencing. Counsel thus had 22 days to decide whether, and on what grounds, to make a motion for a new trial. She then may have had an additional 45 days to provide support for the motion but without the help of a transcript (which did not become available until much later-seven months after the trial). It would have been difficult, perhaps impossible, within that time frame to investigate Trevino's background, determine whether trial counsel had adequately done so, and then develop evidence about additional mitigating background circumstances. See Reyes, supra, at 816 ("[M]otions for new trial [must] be supported by affidavit ... specifically showing the truth of the grounds of attack"). Second, were Martinez not to apply, the Texas procedural system would create significant unfairness. That is because Texas courts in effect have directed defendants to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on collateral, rather than on direct, review. As noted, they have explained why direct review proceedings are likely inadequate. See supra, at 1918 - 1919. They have held that failure to raise the claim on direct review does not bar the defendant from raising the claim in collateral proceedings. See, e.g., Robinson, 16 S.W.3d, at 813; Ex parte Duffy, 607 S.W.2d 507, 512-513 (Tex.Crim.App.1980) (overruled on other grounds by Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) ). They have held that the defendant's decision to raise the claim on direct review does not bar the defendant from also raising the claim in collateral proceedings. See, e.g., Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 143 (Tex.Crim.App.2011) ; Torres, supra, at 475. They have suggested that appellate counsel's failure to raise the claim on direct review does not constitute "ineffective assistance of counsel." See Sprouse v. State, No. AP-74933, 2007 WL 283152, *7 (Tex.Crim.App., Jan. 31, 2007) (unpublished). And Texas' highest criminal court has explicitly stated that "[a]s a general rule" the defendant "should not raise an issue of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal," but rather in collateral review proceedings. Mata v. State, 226 S.W.3d 425, 430, n. 14 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). See Robinson, supra, at 810 ("[A] post-conviction writ proceeding, rather than a motion for new trial, is the preferred method for gathering the facts necessary to substantiate" an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim). The criminal bar, not surprisingly, has taken this strong judicial advice seriously. See Guidelines and Standards for Texas Capital Counsel, 69 Tex. B.J. 966, 977, Guideline 12.2(B)(1)(d) (2006) ("[S]tate habeas corpus is the first opportunity for a capital client to raise challenges to the effectiveness of trial or direct appeal counsel"). Texas now can point to only a comparatively small number of cases in which a defendant has used the motion-for-a-new-trial mechanism to expand the record on appeal and then received a hearing on his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim on direct appeal. Brief for Respondent 35-36, and n. 6 (citing, inter alia, State v. Morales, 253 S.W.3d 686, 689-691 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) ; Robertson v. State, 187 S.W.3d 475, 480-481 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) ). And, of those, precisely one case involves trial counsel's investigative failures of the kind at issue here. See Armstrong v. State, No. AP-75706, 2010 WL 359020 (Tex.Crim.App., Jan. 27, 2010) (unpublished). How could federal law deny defendants the benefit of Martinez solely because of the existence of a theoretically available procedural alternative, namely direct appellate review, that Texas procedures render so difficult, and in the typical case all but impossible, to use successfully, and which Texas courts so strongly discourage defendants from using? Respondent argues that Texas courts enforce the relevant time limits more flexibly than we have suggested. Sometimes, for example, an appellate court can abate an appeal and remand the case for further record development in the trial court. See Cooks v. State, 240 S.W.3d 906 (Tex.Crim.App.2007). But the procedural possibilities to which Texas now points seem special, limited in their application, and, as far as we can tell, rarely used. See 43A Texas Practice § 50:15, at 636-639 ; 43B id., § 56:235, at 607-609. Cooks, for example, the case upon which respondent principally relies, involved a remand for further record development, but in circumstances where the lower court wrongly failed to give a defendant new counsel in time to make an ordinary new trial motion. 240 S.W.3d, at 911. We do not believe that this, or other, special, rarely used procedural possibilities can overcome the Texas courts' own well-supported determination that collateral review normally constitutes the preferred-and indeed as a practical matter, the only-method for raising an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. Respondent further argues that there is no equitable problem to be solved in Texas because if counsel fails to bring a substantial claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal, the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel may constitute cause to excuse the procedural default. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). But respondent points to no case in which such a failure by appellate counsel has been deemed constitutionally ineffective. And that lack of authority is not surprising given the fact that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has directed defendants to bring such claims on collateral review. 2 For the reasons just stated, we believe that the Texas procedural system-as a matter of its structure, design, and operation-does not offer most defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal. What the Arizona law prohibited by explicit terms, Texas law precludes as a matter of course. And, that being so, we can find no significant difference between this case and Martinez . The very factors that led this Court to create a narrow exception to Coleman in Martinez similarly argue for the application of that exception here. The right involved-adequate assistance of counsel at trial-is similarly and critically important. In both instances practical considerations, such as the need for a new lawyer, the need to expand the trial court record, and the need for sufficient time to develop the claim, argue strongly for initial consideration of the claim during collateral, rather than on direct, review. See Martinez, 566 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1318; see also Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505, 123 S.Ct. 1690, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003). In both instances failure to consider a lawyer's "ineffectiveness" during an initial-review collateral proceeding as a potential "cause" for excusing a procedural default will deprive the defendant of any opportunity at all for review of an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. See Martinez, supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1316. Thus, for present purposes, a distinction between (1) a State that denies permission to raise the claim on direct appeal and (2) a State that in theory grants permission but, as a matter of procedural design and systemic operation, denies a meaningful opportunity to do so is a distinction without a difference. In saying this, we do not (any more than we did in Martinez ) seek to encourage States to tailor direct appeals so that they provide a fuller opportunity to raise ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims. That is a matter for the States to decide. And, as we have said, there are often good reasons for hearing the claim initially during collateral proceedings. III For these reasons, we conclude that where, as here, state procedural framework, by reason of its design and operation, makes it highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal, our holding in Martinez applies: "[A] procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective." 566 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1320. Given this holding, Texas submits that its courts should be permitted, in the first instance, to decide the merits of Trevino's ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. Brief for Respondent 58-60. We leave that matter to be determined on remand. Likewise, we do not decide here whether Trevino's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is substantial or whether Trevino's initial state habeas attorney was ineffective. For these reasons we vacate the Fifth Circuit's judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Chief Justice ROBERTS, with whom Justice ALITO joins, dissenting. In our federal system, the "state courts are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ----, ----, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011)."Federal courts sitting in habeas," we have said, "are not an alternative forum for trying ... issues which a prisoner made insufficient effort to pursue in state proceedings." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). This basic principle reflects the fact that federal habeas review " 'intrudes on state sovereignty to a degree matched by few exercises of federal judicial authority.' " Richter, supra, at ----, 131 S.Ct., at 787 (quoting Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 282, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989) (KENNEDY, J., dissenting)). In order to prevent circumvention of the state courts and the unjustified intrusion on state sovereignty that results, we have held that "a state prisoner [who] fails to exhaust state remedies ... [or] has failed to meet the State's procedural requirements for presenting his federal claims" will not be entitled to federal habeas relief unless he can show "cause" to excuse his default. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). There is an exception to that rule where "failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice," ibid. ; that exception is not at issue here. Cause comes in different forms, but the one relevant here is attorney error. We recognized in Coleman that "[w]here a [habeas] petitioner defaults a claim as a result of the denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel, the State, which is responsible for the denial as a constitutional matter, must bear the cost of any resulting default." Id., at 754, 111 S.Ct. 2546. But we simultaneously recognized that "[a] different allocation of costs is appropriate in those circumstances where the State has no responsibility to ensure that the petitioner was represented by competent counsel." Ibid. In that situation , we held, "it is the petitioner who must bear the burden of a failure to follow state procedural rules." Ibid. Because the error in Coleman occurred during state postconviction proceedings, a point at which the habeas petitioner had no constitutional right to counsel, the petitioner had to bear the cost of his default. Id., at 757, 111 S.Ct. 2546. Last Term, in Martinez v. Ryan, we announced a "narrow exception" to Coleman 's"unqualified statement ... that an attorney's ignorance or inadvertence in a postconviction proceeding does not qualify as cause to excuse a procedural default." 566 U.S. 1, ----, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1315, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012). In Martinez , Arizona law did not allow defendants to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal; they could only raise such claims in state collateral proceedings. Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1313-1314. We held that while Arizona was free to structure its state court procedures in this way, its "decision is not without consequences for the State's ability to assert a procedural default in later proceedings." Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1318."By deliberately choosing to move trial-ineffectiveness claims outside of the direct-appeal process, where counsel is constitutionally guaranteed, the State significantly diminishes prisoners' ability to file such claims."Ibid. Thus, "within the context of this state procedural framework," attorney error would qualify as cause to excuse procedural default if it occurred in the first proceeding at which the prisoner was "allow[ed]" to raise his trial ineffectiveness claim. Id., at ----, ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1318, 1319-1320. We were unusually explicit about the narrowness of our decision: "The holding in this case does not concern attorney errors in other kinds of proceedings," and "does not extend to attorney errors in any proceeding beyond the first occasion the State allows a prisoner to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial." Id., at ---- - ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1320."Our holding here addresses only the constitutional claims presented in this case, where the State barred the defendant from raising the claims on direct appeal." Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1320. In "all but the limited circumstances recognized here," we said, "[t]he rule of Coleman governs." Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1320. This aggressively limiting language was not simply a customary nod to the truism that "we decide only the case before us." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981). It was instead an important part of our explanation for why "[t]his limited qualification to Coleman does not implicate the usual concerns with upsetting reliance interests protected by stare decisis principles." Martinez, supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1319. The fact that the exception was clearly delineated ensured that the Coleman rule would remain administrable. And because States could readily anticipate how such a sharply defined exception would apply to various procedural frameworks, the exception could be reconciled with our concerns for comity and equitable balancing that led to Coleman 's baseline rule in the first place. See Coleman, supra, at 750-751, 111 S.Ct. 2546 The States had a clear choice, which they could make with full knowledge of the consequences: If a State "deliberately cho[se] to move trial-ineffectiveness claims outside of the direct-appeal process" through a "decision to bar defendants from raising" them there, then-and only then-would "counsel's ineffectiveness in an initial-review collateral proceeding qualif[y] as cause for a procedural default." Martinez, 566 U.S., at ----, ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1318, 1320. Today, with hardly a mention of these concerns, the majority throws over the crisp limit we made so explicit just last Term. We announced in Martinez that the exception applies "where the State barred the defendant from raising the claims on direct appeal." Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1320. But today, the Court takes all the starch out of its rule with an assortment of adjectives, adverbs, and modifying clauses: Martinez 's"narrow exception" now applies whenever the "state procedural framework, by reason of its design and operation, makes it highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity" to raise his claim on direct appeal. Ante, at 1921. The questions raised by this equitable equation are as endless as will be the state-by-state litigation it takes to work them out. We are not told, for example, how meaningful is meaningful enough, how meaningfulness is to be measured, how unlikely highly unlikely is, how often a procedural framework's "operation" must be reassessed, or what case qualifies as the "typical" case. Take just this last example: The case before us involved a jury trial (hardly typical), a capital conviction (even less typical), and-as the majority emphasizes-a particular species of ineffectiveness claim that depends on time-consuming investigation of personal background and other mitigating circumstances. Ante, at 1919. Yet the majority holds it up, apparently, as a case that is typical in the relevant sense, saying that "[t]he present capital case illustrates" the "systematic" working of Texas's procedural framework. Ibid. Given that the standard is so opaque and malleable, the majority cannot describe the exception applied here as narrow, and does not do so. Gone are the repeated words of limitation that characterized the Martinez opinion. Gone too is the clear choice that Martinez gave the States about how to structure their criminal justice systems. Now, the majority offers them a gamble: If a State allows defendants to bring ineffectiveness claims both on direct appeal and in postconviction proceedings, then a prisoner might have to comply with state procedural requirements in order to preserve the availability of federal habeas review, if a federal judge decides that the state system gave the defendant (or enough other "typical" defendants) a sufficiently meaningful opportunity to press his claim. This invitation to litigation will, in precisely the manner that Coleman foreclosed, " 'frustrate both the States' sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.' " Coleman, 501 U.S., at 748, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982) ). In what I suspect (though cannot know) will be a broad swath of cases, the Court's approach will excuse procedural defaults that, under Coleman , should preclude federal review. But even in cases where federal courts ultimately decide that the habeas petitioner cannot establish cause under the new standard, the years of procedural wrangling it takes to reach that decision will themselves undermine the finality of sentences necessary to effective criminal justice. Because that approach is inconsistent with Coleman , Martinez itself, and the principles of equitable discretion and comity at the heart of both, I respectfully dissent. Justice SCALIA, with whom Justice THOMAS joins, dissenting. I dissent for the reasons set forth in my dissent in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012). That opinion sought to minimize the impact of its novel holding as follows: "Our holding here addresses only the constitutional claims presented in this case, where the State barred the defendant from raising the claims on direct appeal." Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1320. I wrote in my dissent: "That line lacks any principled basis, and will not last." Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1321, n. 1. The Court says today: "Texas law on its face appears to permit (but not require) the defendant to raise the claim on direct appeal. Does this difference matter?" "[W]e can find no significant difference between this case and Martinez ." Ante, at 1918, 1920 - 1921 (emphasis removed).
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
What is the issue of the decision?
[ "voting", "Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments", "ballot access (of candidates and political parties)", "desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)", "desegregation, schools", "employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.", "affirmative action", "slavery or indenture", "sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)", "reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act", "debtors' rights", "deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)", "employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)", "sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)", "sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)", "Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)", "Indians, state jurisdiction over", "juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)", "poverty law, constitutional", "poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.", "illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits", "handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes", "residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents", "military: draftee, or person subject to induction", "military: active duty", "military: veteran", "immigration and naturalization: permanent residence", "immigration and naturalization: citizenship", "immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization", "immigration and naturalization: access to public education", "immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits", "immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous", "indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)", "indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)", "indigents: payment of fine", "indigents: costs or filing fees", "indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee", "indigents: transcript", "indigents: assistance of psychiatrist", "indigents: miscellaneous", "liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)", "miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)" ]
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ARKANSAS ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE CORP. v. ARKANSAS PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION No. 81-731. Argued January 17, 1983 Decided May 16, 1983 Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., joined, post, p. 396. Robert D. Cabe argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Leland F. Leatherman. Jeff Broadwater argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Robert H. Wood, Jr. Wallace F. Tillman filed a brief for the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association as amicus curiae urging reversal. Paul Rodgers filed a brief for the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal requires us to decide whether the Arkansas Public Service Commission (PSC) acted contrary to the Commerce Clause or the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution when it asserted regulatory jurisdiction over the wholesale rates charged by the Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corporation (AECC) to its member retail distributors, all of whom are located within the State. The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the PSC’s assertion of jurisdiction. We affirm. I Maintaining the proper balance between federal and state authority in the regulation of electric and other energy utilities has long been a serious challenge to both judicial and congressional wisdom. On the one hand, the regulation of utilities is one of the most important of the functions traditionally associated with the police power of the States. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1877). On the other hand, the production and transmission of energy is an activity particularly likely to affect more than one State, and its effect on interstate commerce is often significant enough that uncontrolled regulation by the States can patently interfere with broader national interests. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 755-757 (1982); New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U. S. 331, 339 (1982). This dilemma came into sharp focus for this Court early in this century in a series of cases construing the restrictions imposed by the Commerce Clause on state regulation of the sale of natural gas. Our solution was to fashion a bright line dividing permissible from impermissible state regulation. See Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., 265 U. S. 298, 309 (1924); Public Utilities Comm’n for Kan. v. Landon, 249 U. S. 236 (1919); cf. Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of N. Y., 252 U. S. 23 (1920). Simply put, the doctrine of these cases was that the retail sale of gas was subject to state regulation, “even though the gas be brought from another State and drawn for distribution directly from interstate mains; and this is so whether the local distribution be made by the transporting company or by independent distributing companies,” Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., supra, at 309, but that the wholesale sale of gas in interstate commerce was not subject to state regulation even though some of the gas being sold was produced within the State. Our rationale was that “[transportation of gas from one State to another is interstate commerce; and the sale and delivery of it to the local distributing companies is a part of such commerce,” 265 U. S., at 307, but that “[w]ith the delivery of the gas to the distributing companies... the interstate movement ends” and the further “effect on interstate commerce, if there be any, is indirect and incidental,” id., at 308. See also, e. g., State Corporation Comm’n v. Wichita Gas Co., 290 U. S. 561, 563-564 (1934); East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Comm’n of Ohio, 283 U. S. 465, 470-471 (1931). The wholesale/retail line drawn in Landon and Kansas Gas was applied to electric utilities in Public Utilities Comm’n of R. I. v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U. S. 83 (1927). Attleboro involved an attempt by the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission to regulate the rates at which the Narragansett Electric Lighting Co. — a Rhode Island utility— could sell electric current to a Massachusetts distributor. We struck down the regulation, holding that, because it involved a transaction at wholesale, it imposed a “direct” rather than an “indirect” burden on interstate commerce. In doing so we held that it was immaterial “that the general business of the Narragansett Company appears to be chiefly local,” id., at 90, or that the State Commission grounded its assertion of jurisdiction on the need to facilitate the regulation of the company’s retail sales to its Rhode Island customers. As a direct result of Attleboro and its predecessor cases, Congress undertook to establish federal regulation over most of the wholesale transactions of electric and gas utilities engaged in interstate commerce, and created the Federal Power Commission (FPC) (now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) (FERC) to carry out that task. See Federal Power Act of 1935 (Title II of the Public Utility Act of 1935), 49 Stat. 838-863; Natural Gas Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 821. Although the main purpose of this legislation was to “ ‘fill the gap’ ” created by Attleboro and its predecessors, see New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, supra, at 340; United States v. Public Utilities Comm’n of California, 345 U. S. 295, 311 (1953), it nevertheless shifted this Court’s main focus — in determining the permissible scope of state regulation of utilities — from the constitutional issues that concerned us in Attleboro to analyses of legislative intent. For example, in Illinois Gas Co. v. Public Service Co., 314 U. S. 498 (1942), we were required to determine whether the sale of natural gas by an Illinois pipeline corporation to local distributors in Illinois was subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission or the Illinois Commerce Commission. We began our analysis by describing the wholesale/retail test drawn in Landon, Kansas Gas, Attleboro, and other cases. We then noted another line of cases — relating to both utility regulation and other Commerce Clause issues — in which the Court was “less concerned to find a point in time and space where the interstate commerce . . . ends and intrastate commerce begins, and . . . looked [instead] to the nature of the state regulation involved, the objective of the state, and the effect of the regulation upon the national interest in the commerce.” 314 U. S., at 505. We stated: “In the absence of any controlling act of Congress, we should now be faced with the question whether the interest of the state in the present regulation of the sale and distribution of gas transported into the state, balanced against the effect of such control on the commerce in its national aspect, is a more reliable touchstone for ascertaining state power than the mechanical distinctions on which appellee relies.” Id., at 506. We concluded, however, that we were “under no necessity of making that choice here,” ibid., for Congress, partly to avoid “drawing the precise line between state and federal power by the litigation of particular cases,” id., at 507, had adopted the “mechanical” line established in Kansas Gas and Attleboro as the statutory line dividing federal and state jurisdiction. The analysis in Illinois Gas was reaffirmed in subsequent cases and extended to similar jurisdictional disputes arising under the Federal Power Act. See, e. g., Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of lnd., 332 U. S. 507, 517 (1947) (“The line of the statute was . . . clear and complete. It cut sharply and cleanly between sales for resale and direct sales for consumptive uses”); United States v. Public Utilities Comm’n of California, supra, at 308 (“Congress interpreted [Attleboro] as prohibiting state control of wholesale rates in interstate commerce for resale, and so armed the Federal Power Commission with precisely that power”) (footnote omitted); FPC v. Southern California Edison Co., 376 U. S. 205 (1964). The last of these cases is particularly noteworthy for our purposes here, for it held, among other things, that under the Attleboro test, a California utility that received some of its power from out-of-state was subject to federal and not state regulation in its sales of electricity to a California municipality that resold the bulk of the power to others. See also FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U. S. 453 (1972). II AECC is one of a large number of customer-owned rural power cooperatives established with loan funds and technical assistance provided by the federal Rural Electrification Administration (REA) in order to bring electric power to parts of the country not adequately served by commercial utility companies. See generally Rural Electrification Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1363, 7 U. S. C. §901 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V). Unlike most rural power cooperatives, however, AECC does not provide power directly to individual consumers. Rather, its sole members and primary customers are 17 smaller Arkansas rural power cooperatives who in turn serve the ultimate consumer. AECC is governed by a Board of Directors consisting of 34 persons, 2 designated by each of the 17 member cooperatives. Among the duties of this Board is to determine the rates charged the member cooperatives by AECC. AECC obtains most of its energy from a number of power-plants located in Arkansas, which it wholly or partially owns. Moreover, it sells most of what it generates to its member cooperatives. Like most electric utilities, however, AECC also participates in a variety of sale and exchange arrangements with other producers, buying power when its own need or the excess capacity of other utilities is high, and selling it when the opposite is the case. By virtue of these arrangements, AECC is ultimately tied into a multicompany and multistate “grid,” and, electricity being what it is, see FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., supra, it is difficult to say with any confidence that the power AECC provides to its member cooperatives at any particular moment originated entirely within the State. The retail rates charged by AECC’s member cooperatives are regulated by the Arkansas PSC. If AECC were not a rural power cooperative, the wholesale rates it charges to its members would, under the scheme we described in Part I, supra, be subject exclusively to federal regulation. See § 201(b) of the Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 838, 847, as amended, 16 U. S. C. § 824(b) (1976 ed., Supp. V); FPC v. Southern California Edison Co., supra; FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., supra. In 1967, however, the FPC held that it had no jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act to regulate wholesale rates charged by rural power cooperatives under the supervision of the REA. Dairyland Power Cooperative, 37 F. P. C. 12, 67 P. U. R. 3d 340. Thus, until the proceedings that culminated in this case, the rates charged by AECC to its member cooperatives were not subject, at either the federal or the state level, to the type of pervasive rate regulation almost universally associated with electric utilities in this country. In 1979, after public hearings, the Arkansas PSC entered an order asserting jurisdiction over the rates charged by AECC to its member cooperatives. The PSC based its decision on the same Arkansas statutes that authorize its regulation of rural power cooperatives engaged in retail sales of electricity. App. 52-53; see Ark. Stat. Ann: §§73-201(a), 73-202(a), 73-202.1 (1979). In response to objections raised by AECC, the PSC held that state regulation was neither forbidden by Attleboro or FPC v. Southern California Edison Co., supra, nor pre-empted by the Federal Power Act or the Rural Electrification Act. On review, the Pulaski County Circuit Court set aside the PSC’s order, but the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and upheld the jurisdiction of the PSC. 273 Ark. 170, 618 S. W. 2d 151 (1981). We noted probable jurisdiction. 457 U. S. 1130 (1982). In its brief on the merits, AECC presses both the Commerce Clause and the pre-emption arguments rejected by the Arkansas PSC. We consider the statutory argument first. I — < h-Í The basic principles governing the pre-emption of state regulation by federal law are well known. See Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141 (1982); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525-526 (1977). In this case, we are concerned with the possible preemptive effects of two federal statutes and administrative acts taken pursuant to them: the Federal Power Act and the Rural Electrification Act. A As we discuss supra, at 381-382, the FPC determined in 1967 that it did not have jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act over the wholesale rates charged by rural power cooperatives. That does not dispose of the possibility that the Federal Power Act pre-empts state regulation, however, because a federal decision to forgo regulation in a given area may imply an authoritative federal determination that the area is best left tmregulated, and in that event would have as much pre-emptive force as a decision to regulate. See NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U. S. 138, 144 (1971); cf. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, supra, at 155. In this case, however, nothing in the language, history, or policy of the Federal Power Act suggests such a conclusion. Congress’ purpose in 1935 was to fill a regulatory gap, not to perpetuate one. Moreover, the FPC’s refusal in 1967 to assert jurisdiction over rural power cooperatives does not suggest anything to the contrary. In that decision, the FPC simply held that, purely as a jurisdictional matter, the relevant statutes gave the REA exclusive authority among federal agencies to regulate rural power cooperatives. Dairy land Power Cooperative, 37 F. P. C., at 26, 67 P. U. R. 3d, at 352-354. It did not determine that, as a matter of policy, rural power cooperatives that are engaged in sales for resale should be left unregulated. Indeed, the FPC’s published opinion concluded by specifically urging Congress to amend the statute and grant it jurisdiction over at least some of the activities of such utilities. Id., at 28, 67 P. U. R. 3d, at 355. We therefore find no bar to the PSC’s assertion of jurisdiction either in the Federal Power Act itself or in the FPC’s Dairyland decision. B We turn then to the REA. Nothing in the Rural Electrification Act expressly pre-empts state rate regulation of power cooperatives financed by the REA. Nevertheless, AECC and certain of the amici, including the United States, argue that the PSC’s assertion of jurisdiction interferes with the REA’s pervasive involvement in the management of the rural power cooperatives to which it loans funds, and may frustrate important federal interests. As the United States expresses this position in its brief: “The terms and conditions of a loan to a generation and transmission association [such as AECC] require the borrower’s rates and rate structure to be approved by the REA, not just at its inception, but throughout the term of the loan. And in passing on rate questions, the REA considers, not only the security thus afforded for payment of the loan, but also the suitability of the rates and structure to the Act’s underlying purpose of facilitating the availability of cheap electric power in rural America. “The spectre of state regulation poses a threat to the REA loan because of the possibility that the state may refuse to permit its cooperatives to pay a generation and transmission association the rates to which they agreed and upon the security of which the loan was issued. Moreover, the policy behind the Rural Electrification Act is at stake. . . . [T]he REA has always encouraged its borrowers to establish affordable rates for all of its subscribers. In this way, costs are shared in a manner which, over the long run, benefits all by the creation of a sound, extensive rural electric system. If the state were to insist on a restructuring of the generation and transmission association’s rate structure, the policies of the Act would be undermined.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12-13. As the United States and AECC admit, the REA is a lending agency rather than a classic public utility regulatory body in the mold of either FERC or the Arkansas PSC. This case might therefore present the interesting question of how we should in general define the proper relationship between the requirements established by federal lending agencies and the more direct regulatory activities of state authorities. We need not examine the issue at that level of abstraction, however, because we have quite specific indications of congressional and administrative intent on precisely the question before us. Cf. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S., at 159, n. 14. First, the legislative history of the Rural Electrification Act makes abundantly clear that, although the REA was expected to play a role in assisting the fledgling rural power cooperatives in setting their rate structures, it would do so within the constraints of existing state regulatory schemes. See, e. g., 80 Cong. Rec. 5316 (1936) (Rep. Lea); Hearing on S. 3483 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 30, 37, 51, 52 (1936). Admittedly, the legislative record focuses on retail rates charged by rural power cooperatives, but with respect to the particular concerns that AECC and amici have pressed in support of pre-emption, we can discern no relevant difference between wholesale and retail rates: both types of rates implicate the Government’s interest in securing its loans, and, if anything, retail rates more directly implicate the Government’s interest in assuring that individual rural households receive electricity at a reasonable price. Second, the present published policy of the REA is wholly inconsistent with pre-emption of state regulatory jurisdiction. Although generating cooperatives dealing with the REA must obtain the agency’s approval whenever they modify their wholesale rates, the same document setting out guidelines for what constitute proper wholesale rates also states: “Borrowers must, of course, submit proposed rate changes to any regulatory commissions having jurisdiction and must seek approval in the manner prescribed by those commissions.” REA Bulletin 111-4, pp. 1-2 (1972). Since Bulletin 111-4 was issued subsequent to the FPC’s decision in Dairyland, the “regulatory commissions having jurisdiction” to which it refers can only be state regulatory agencies such as the Arkansas PSC. Moreover, it is worth noting that the REA’s supervision of wholesale rates charged by its borrowers appears to be no more exclusive than its supervision over their retail rates, REA Bulletin 112-2 (1971); REA Bulletin 112-1, pp. 1, 16 (1979), and it has never been contended that state regulatory jurisdiction over those rates is pre-empted, see REA Bulletin 112-2, at 5; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11. There may come a time when the REA changes its present policy, and announces that state rate regulation of rural power cooperatives is inconsistent with federal policy. If that were to happen, and if such a rule was valid under the Rural Electrification Act, it would of course pre-empt any further exercise of jurisdiction by the Arkansas PSC. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151, 171-172 (1978); cf. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S., at 154; Free v. Bland, 369 U. S. 663, 668 (1962). Similarly, as Arkansas already recognizes, see Ark. Stat. Ann. §73-202.3 (1979), the PSC can make no regulation affecting rural power cooperatives which conflicts with particular regulations promulgated by the REA. Moreover, even without an explicit statement from the REA, a particular rate set by the Arkansas PSC may so seriously compromise important federal interests, including the ability of the AECC to repay its loans, as to b,e implicitly pre-empted by the Rural Electrification Act. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S., at 525-526, 540-543; cf. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 231-232 (1947). We will not, however, in this facial challenge to the PSC’s mere assertion of jurisdiction, assume that such a hypothetical event is so likely to occur as to preclude the setting of any rates at all. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U. S. 117, 130-131 (1978). See generally Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, Inc., 414 U. S. 117, 136-140 (1973). IV A Even in the absence of congressional legislation, “the Commerce Clause contains an implied limitation on the power of the States to interfere with or impose burdens on interstate commerce.” Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. Board of Equalization, 451 U. S. 648, 652 (1981) (footnote omitted). If the constitutional rule articulated in Attleboro were applied in this case, it would require setting aside the PSC’s assertion of jurisdiction over AECC, since AECC, like the utility in Attleboro, sells at wholesale electric energy transmitted in interstate commerce. As we pointed out in Illinois Gas, however, see supra, at 379-380, it is difficult to square the mechanical line drawn in Attleboro and its predecessor cases, and based on a supposedly precise division between “direct” and “indirect” effects on interstate commerce, with the general trend in our modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence to look in every case to “the nature of the state regulation involved, the objective of the state, and the effect of the regulation upon the national interest in the commerce.” 314 U. S., at 505. Cf. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970). This modern jurisprudence has usually, although not always, given more latitude to state regulation than the more categorical approach of which Attleboro is one example. But in any event, it recognizes, as Attleboro did not, that there is an “infinite variety of cases, in which regulation of local matters may also operate as a regulation of [interstate] commerce, [and] in which reconciliation of the conflicting claims of state and national power is to be attained only by some appraisal and accommodation of the competing demands of the state and national interests involved.” Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U. S. 761, 768-769 (1945). See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U. S. 456 (1981); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., supra, at 142; Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341, 362-363 (1943). We are faced, then, in this case, with precisely the question left open in Illinois Gas: Do we follow the mechanical test set out in Attleboro, or the balance-of-interests test applied in our Commerce Clause cases for roughly the past 45 years? Of course, the principle of stare decisis counsels us, here as elsewhere, not lightly to set aside specific guidance of the sort we find in Attleboro. Nevertheless, the same respect for the rule of law that requires us to seek consistency over time also requires us, if with somewhat more caution and deliberation, to seek consistency in the interpretation of an area of law at any given time. Thus, in recent years, this Court has explicitly abandoned a series of formalistic distinctions — akin to the one in Attleboro — which once both defined and controlled various corners of Commerce Clause doctrine. See, e. g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U. S. 609 (1981) (abandoning rule that constitutionality of state severance tax depended on whether it was imposed on goods prior to their entry into interstate commerce); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322 (1979) (rejecting rule, based on legal fiction of ownership, that States had absolute control over disposition of wild animals within their borders); Washington Revenue Dept. v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U. S. 734 (1978) (rejecting rule that tax on stevedoring automatically constituted an impermissible “direct” tax on interstate commerce); cf. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U. S. 276 (1976) (overruling “original package” rule in Import-Export Clause doctrine). The wholesale/retail line drawn in Attleboro is no less anachronistic than the rules we rejected in the cited cases. Moreover, we have had no occasion, since the 1930’s, either to apply that line or to reject it in a case not governed by statute. The difficulty of harmonizing Attleboro with modern Commerce Clause doctrine has been apparent for a long time, so much so that we expressed skepticism about its continuing soundness as a constitutional, rather than statutory, rule in Illinois Gas. Our constitutional review of state utility regulation in related contexts has not treated it as a special province insulated from our general Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U. S. 331 (1982); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Public Service Comm’n, 341 U. S. 329, 336-337 (1951). Finally, we can see no strong reliance interests that would be threatened by our rejection today of the mechanical line drawn in Attleboro. Therefore, here, as in few other contexts, the burden shifts somewhat to the party defending the rule to show why it should be applied in this case. AECC makes essentially two arguments, in the course of its brief and oral argument, for why Attleboro should govern here. First, it contends that the constitutional import of the Attleboro line was reaffirmed in FPC v. Southern California Edison Co., 376 U. S. 205, which was decided in 1964. This claim is simply wrong. Southern California Edison Co. did no more than interpret the Federal Power Act, and it cited with approval the constitutional agnosticism spelled out at length in Illinois Gas. See 376 U. S., at 214. Second, AECC argues that, although “[t]he Attleboro line of cases established an admittedly mechanical test for determining the limitation of state power, . . . the court arrived at that test by careful consideration of what was national importance as opposed to what was essentially local and could be, therefore, regulated by the states,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 11, and that nothing that has happened since has changed that implicit balance. This contention is also unpersuasive. Even if we assume — as is not necessarily the case, see supra, at 390 — that the underlying substantive concerns motivating the Court to strike down the state regulation in Attleboro were identical to the considerations articulated in our more recent cases, that in itself does not explain why the bright-line test drawn in Attleboro should be applied to the somewhat different set of facts present here, see n. 16, supra. Bright lines are important and necessary in many areas of the law, including constitutional law. Moreover, Southern California Edison Co. and other cases have made it clear that the Federal Power Act draws a bright line between the respective jurisdictions of federal and state regulatory agencies. Nevertheless, AECC has given us no good reason why a bright line between state regulation and unexercised federal power is more justifiable here than in other contexts in which we must interpret the negative implications of the Commerce Clause. Attleboro and its predecessors are by no means judicial atrocities, plainly wrong at the time they were decided. In the first place, it is not entirely insignificant, quite apart from the sort of statutory analysis in which we engaged in Part III, supra, that those cases were decided in a day before Congress had already spoken with some breadth on the subject of utility regulation. Cf. Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U. S. 390, 400 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring in result). This Court was in 1927 the sole authority safeguarding federal interests over a wide range of state utility regulation. Under those circumstances, drawing a fairly restrictive bright line may have made considerable sense. Indeed, the line the Court drew in Attleboro, though by no means perfect, would undoubtedly lead in a large number of cases to results entirely consistent with present-day doctrine. Second, the judicial turn of mind apparent in Attleboro, although problematic in many respects, can also be a healthy counterweight in many contexts to an otherwise too-easy dilution of guarantees contained in the Constitution. Nevertheless, Attleboro can no longer be thought to provide thersole standard by which to decide this case, and we proceed instead to undertake an analysis grounded more solidly in our modern cases. B Illinois Gas cited as examples of the less formalistic approach to the Commerce Clause such now-classic cases as South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177 (1938), and Duckworth v. Arkansas, supra. One recent reformulation of the test established in those cases is found in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.: “Where [a] statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.” 397 U. S., at 142 (citation omitted). Applying the Bruce Church test to this case is relatively simple. The most serious concern identified in Bruce Church — economic protectionism — is not implicated here. Compare Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617 (1978), with Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U. S., at 471-472. Moreover, state regulation of the wholesale rates charged by AECC to its members is well within the scope of “legitimate local public interests,” particularly considering that although AECC is tied into an interstate grid, its basic operation consists of supplying power from generating facilities located within the State to member cooperatives, all of which are located within the State. Cf. id., at 473, n. 17. An argument could be made that, because AECC’s Board of Directors consists exclusively of representatives of its 17 customers, it is effectively self-regulating, and that therefore any state regulation is not supported by an appreciable state interest. Cf. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District v. FPC, 129 U. S. App. D. C. 117, 120, 391 F. 2d 470, 473 (1968). Nevertheless, there is evidence that even cooperative power utilities may engage in economically inefficient behavior, see generally R. Schmalensee, The Control of Natural Monopolies 91-93 (1979), and sources cited, and we will not under these circumstances second-guess the State’s judgment that some degree of governmental oversight is warranted. See Clover Leaf Creamery Co., supra, at 469, 473; Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U. S., at 128. Finally, although we recognize that the PSC’s regulation of the rates AECC charges to its members will have an incidental effect on interstate commerce, we are convinced that “the burden imposed on such commerce is not clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Part of the power AECC sells is received from out-of-state. But the same is true of most retail utilities, and the national fabric does not seem to have been seriously disturbed by leaving regulation of retail utility rates largely to the States. Similarly, it is true that regulation of the prices AECC charges to its members may have some effect on the price structure of the interstate grid of which AECC is a part. But, again, we find it difficult to distinguish AECC in this respect from most relatively large utilities which sell power both directly to the public and to other utilities. It is not inconceivable that a particular rate structure required by the Arkansas PSC would be so unreasonable as to disturb appreciably the interstate market for electric power. But, as we said in our discussion of the pre-emption issue, see supra, at 389, we are not willing to allow such a hypothetical possibility to control this facial challenge to the PSC’s mere assertion of regulatory jurisdiction. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, supra, at 128-129. V On this record, the PSC’s assertion of jurisdiction over the wholesale rates charged by AECC to its members offends neither the Supremacy Clause nor the Commerce Clause. The judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court is Affirmed. See FPC v. Southern California Edison Co., 376 U. S. 205 (1964), and United States v. Public Utilities Comm’n of California, 345 U. S. 295 (1953), for discussions of the relevant legislative history. But cf., e. g., New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U. S. 331 (1982). We make no attempt in this opinion to trace the subsequent development of these statutes, except as may be relevant to our decision today. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reached the same conclusion in Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District v. FPC, 129 U. S. App. D. C. 117, 391 F. 2d 470 (1968). But cf. n. 7, infra. We discuss infra, at 385-388, the role of the REA in regulating the rates set by rural electric cooperatives. We also note infra, at 394, the argument that AECC, because it is owned and directly managed by its 17 principal customers, is essentially self-regulating. There is a legitimate question in this ease as to whether the pre-emption argument advanced by AECC is properly before us. AECC’s jurisdie-tional statement raised only the pure Commerce Clause issue, and did not offer pre-emption as a separate ground for reversal. Only after the United States, as amicus curiae, relied strongly on a pre-emption argument did AECC devote considerable attention to it in its brief on the merits. Nevertheless, the relationship between legislative and judicial enforcement of the Commerce Clause is close enough for the pre-emption issue to come, if by the barest of margins, within those “subsidiary questions] fairly included” in the principal question on appeal. See this Court’s Rule 15.1(a); Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Committee, 459 U. S. 87, 94, n. 9 (1982); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U. S. 365, 371, n. 4 (1967). See also Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U. S. 252, 258, n. 5 (1980). A more serious, because jurisdictional, problem was raised by AECC’s counsel’s statement at oral argument that, although the pre-emption issue was raised before the Arkansas PSC, it may not have been raised before the Arkansas Supreme Court. Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. As it turns out, however, the pre-emption argument was raised, if half-heartedly, both in AECC’s petition for review in the Pulaski County Circuit Court, Record 104¡ and in its brief in the Arkansas Supreme Court, Brief for Appellee in No. 80-313, pp. 16-17. Neither party here has challenged the correctness of that determination, and we express no opinion on the subject. Were FERC or the courts ever definitively to overrule Dairyland Power Cooperative, 37 F. P. C. 12, 67 P. U. R. 3d 340 (1967), and decide that the FPC did have jurisdiction, we would obviously be faced with a very different pre-emption question. As the dissent suggests, Congress in 1935 almost certainly thought that state regulation of the wholesale activities of rural power cooperatives operating in interstate commerce would be barred under this Court’s Attleboro doctrine. Cf. infra, at 389-390. To the extent that Congress sought to freeze its perception of Attleboro into law, however, it did so only as a means to accomplishing the end of workable federal regulation, not as an end in itself. If we start from the premise that Congress did not intend to subject rural power cooperatives to the federal regulatory scheme it was creating in the 1935 legislation, see n. 7, supra, then it would not have served Congress’ purposes to pre-empt state regulation over such cooperatives. Significantly, the dissent does not put forward any argument to the contrary. Similarly, although the Court of Appeals opinion in Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District v. FPC, supra, did suggest in its initial description of rural power cooperatives that they were effectively self-regulating as to rates, id., at 120, 391 F. 2d, at 473, its conclusions of law upholding the FPC’s refusal to take jurisdiction were grounded fundamentally on considerations of interagency jurisdiction. All this is not to say that officials of the REA have always welcomed state regulation of rural power cooperatives, or thought it was a good idea. See, e. g., REA, Rural Electrification on the March, pp. 25-26 (1938). But, of course, such expressions of opinion do not constitute sufficient grounds for pre-emption. Contrary to the suggestion in the dissent, we do not infer from this legislative history that Congress either “authorized” or “expected” “state regulation that this Court had barred States from engaging in.” Post, at 400. See n. 15, infra; n. 8, supra. The relevant inquiry, however, is not whether Congress authorized or expected such regulation, but whether it intended by its own actions to forbid it. Cf. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Comm’n, ante, p. 190. In answering that question, we look quite naturally to whether Congress intended in any way to forbid state regulation of rural power cooperatives. How well this oversight works in practice may be another matter. See REA Bulletin 111-1, Memorandum from REA Administrator to All REA Electric Borrowers, Managers, and Board Presidents (Mar. 18,1970) (complaining that some borrowers had neglected to obtain the necessary review and approval by the REA). As the United States admits in its brief, “the REA does not control the rates and rate structure of . . . generation and transmission associations as thoroughly or with the formality of the Federal Power Commission.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12. See also REA Bulletin 3-1, p. 1 (1955) (“It is the responsibility of borrowers ... to initiate and carry forward proceedings before regulatory bodies of appropriate jurisdiction in which all required certificates of convenience and necessity, franchises, and rate, tariff and other approvals are sought”). The dissent faults us for finding significance in REA Bulletin 111-4. Post, at 400-401. In particular, it speculates that “the statement [in Bulletin 111-4] could have been intended [only] to direct wholly intrastate cooperatives to comply with the orders of state commissions.” Post, at 401 (emphasis added). It is our understanding, however, that, as of 1972, all the generating cooperatives in the country, except perhaps those in Texas, were tied into an interstate grid. If this is true, it is unlikely that the REA would have used as broad and unqualified language as it did for the sole purpose of directing cooperatives in one State to submit to state regulation. In light of our discussion in text, an argument might be made that state rate regulation of rural power cooperatives engaged in sales for resale is not only not pre-empted, but is indeed affirmatively authorized by the Rural Electrification Act. Cf. Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. Board of Equalization, 451 U. S. 648, 652-653 (1981); Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 423-426 (1946). On balance, however, it seems most likely that Congress and the REA intended no more than to leave in place state regulation otherwise consistent with the requirements of the Commerce Clause. See New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U. S., at 341; Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U. S. 27, 49 (1980). It is possible to distinguish Attleboro on its facts, since it was concerned with the sale of power by a company in one State to a wholesale customer in another State. Nevertheless, it is much more difficult to dismiss the broad principle articulated in Attleboro and its predecessor cases, especially in light of the reading given to those cases in our subsequent decisions. See, e. g., Illinois Gas Co. v. Public Service Co., 314 U. S. 498, 504, 508 (1942); FPC v. Southern California Edison Co., 376 U. S., at 212, 214. Note also that the Arkansas PSC’s regulation of AECC’s rates can be justified, if on no other grounds, as facilitating its regulation of the retail rates charged by AECC’s members: The PSC’s inquiry into the reasonableness of those retail rates must already include an inquiry into the reasonableness of the wholesale rates upon which they in part depend. Moreover, if the retail rates are found unreasonable (by virtue of the wholesale rates being unreasonable), it seems likely that the retail cooperatives will, through their representatives on AECC’s Board of Directors, vote for a reduction in the wholesale rates. Regulating AECC’s rates directly allows the PSC both to rationalize and to streamline this process, and also to obtain the necessary information directly from its source.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the reason, if any, given by the court for granting the petition for certiorari.
What reason, if any, does the court give for granting the petition for certiorari?
[ "case did not arise on cert or cert not granted", "federal court conflict", "federal court conflict and to resolve important or significant question", "putative conflict", "conflict between federal court and state court", "state court conflict", "federal court confusion or uncertainty", "state court confusion or uncertainty", "federal court and state court confusion or uncertainty", "to resolve important or significant question", "to resolve question presented", "no reason given", "other reason" ]
[ 0 ]
sc
QUERN, DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AID OF ILLINOIS v. JORDAN No. 77-841. Argued November 8, 1978 Decided March 5, 1979 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in Parts I, II, and III of which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 349. Marshall, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 366. William A. Wenzel III, Special Assistant Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was William J. Scott, Attorney General. Sheldon Roodman argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was James D. Weill. Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, William G. Mundy, Deputy Attorney General, and Donald P. Bogará filed a brief for the State of Indiana as amicus curiae urging reversal. Mr. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. This case is a sequel to Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974), which we decided five Terms ago. In Edelman we held that retroactive welfare benefits awarded by a Federal District Court to plaintiffs, by reason of wrongful denial of benefits by state officials prior to the entry of the court’s order determining the wrongfulness of their actions, violated the Eleventh Amendment. The issue now before us is whether that same federal court may, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, order those state officials to send a mere explanatory notice to members of the plaintiff class advising them that there are state administrative procedures available by which they may receive a determination of whether they are entitled to past welfare benefits. We granted certiorari to resolve an apparent conflict between the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in this case and that of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Fanty v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Dept. of Public Welfare, 551 F. 2d 2 (1977). 435 U. S. 904 (1978). We believe that the case as it now comes to us involves little, if any, unbroken ground in this area, and affirm the judgment of the Seventh Circuit. Following our remand in Edelman, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, upon motion of the plaintiff, ordered the state officials to send to each member of the plaintiff class a notice informing the recipient: “[Y]ou were denied public assistance to which you were entitled in the amount of $-.” Jordan v. Trainor, 405 F. Supp. 802, 809 (1975). Enclosed with the required mailing was to be a “Notice of Appeal,” which when signed and returned to the Illinois Department of Public Aid, requested a hearing on the denial of benefits. That notice stated: “The department illegally delayed in the processing of-my AABD application, and, as a consequence, denied me benefits to which I was and am entitled.” Id., at 810. The Court of Appeals, en banc, found that this proposed form of notice would have been barred by the Eleventh Amendment, since it at least purported to decide that Illinois public funds should be used to satisfy the claims of plaintiff class members without the consent of the State by its appropriate officials. Jordan v. Trainor, 563 F. 2d 873, 875 (1977). The court reversed the District Court’s order for this reason, but stated that on remand the District Court could order the state officials to send a “mere explanatory notice to applicants advising them that there is a state administrative procedure available if they desire to have the state determine whether or not they may be eligible for past benefits. A simple returnable notice of appeal form could also be provided.” Ibid. In the court’s view, such a notice would not violate the distinction set forth in Edelman between prospective relief, which is permitted by the Eleventh Amendment, and retrospective relief, which is not: “The form of notice we envisage would not create a ‘liability’ against the state. Whether a liability might result would be a matter for state determination, not the federal court. No federal judgment against the state would be created. Such a notice could not be labeled equitable restitution or be considered an award of damages against the state. The defendant makes no issue out of any incidental administrative expense connected with the preparation or mailing of the notice. It has suggested in the record that the notice could be included in the regular monthly mailing. The necessary information comes from a computer. There is no indication that the administrative expense would be substantial.” 563 F. 2d, at 876. Under the contemplated modified notice procedure, the court stated, members of the plaintiff class would be given no more than “they would have gathered by sitting in the courtroom or by reading and listening to news accounts had the case attracted any attention.” Id., at 877-878. Three judges dissented on the ground that the majority’s revised notice form was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. In Edelman we reaffirmed the rule that had evolved in our earlier cases that a suit in federal court by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 415 U. S., at 663; see Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm’n, 327 U. S. 573 (1946); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459 (1945); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47 (1944). We rejected the notion that simply because the lower court’s grant of retroactive benefits had been styled “equitable restitution” it was permissible under the Eleventh Amendment. But we also pointed out that under the landmark decision in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), a federal court, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, may enjoin state officials to conform their future conduct to the requirements of federal law, even though such an injunction may have an ancillary effect on the state treasury. 415 U. S., at 667-668; see Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 289 (1977); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974). The distinction between that relief permissible under the doctrine of Ex parte Young and that found barred in Edelman was the difference between prospective relief on one hand and retrospective relief on the other. Petitioner state official devotes a significant part of his brief to an attack on the proposed notice which the District Court required the state officials to send. It is, however, the decision of the Court of Appeals, and not that of the District Court, which we review at the behest of petitioner. And just as petitioner insists on tilting at windmills by attacking the District Court’s decision, respondent suggests that our decision in Edelman has been eviscerated by later decisions such as Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978). Brief for Respondent 55 n. 37. See also Aldridge v. Turlington, No. TCA-78-830 (ND Fla., Nov. 17, 1978) ; but see Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 590 F. 2d 470 (CA3 1978). As we have noted above, we held in Edelman that in “a [42 U. S. C.] § 1983 action ... a federal court’s remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief, Ex parte Young, supra, and may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury, Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, supra.” 415 U. S., at 677. We disagree with respondent’s suggestion. This Court’s holding in Monell was “limited to local government units which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes,” 436 U. S., at 690 n. 54, and our Eleventh Amendment decisions subsequent to Edelman and to Monell have cast no doubt on our holding in Edelman. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978); Milliken v. Bradley, supra; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976); Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra. While the separate opinions in Hutto v. Finney, supra, debated the continuing soundness of Edelman after our decision in Monell, any doubt on that score was largely dispelled by Alabama v. Pugh, supra, decided just 10 days after Hutto. In Pugh the Court held, over three dissents, that the State of Alabama could not be joined as a defendant without violating the Eleventh Amendment, even though the complaint was based on 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and the claim was a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments similar to that made in Hutto. The Court said: “There can be no doubt, however, that suit against the State and its Board of Corrections is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, unless Alabama has consented to the filing of such a suit. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459 (1945); Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U. S. 292 (1937).” 438 U. S., at 782. The decision in Pugh was consistent both with Monell, which was limited to “local government units,” 436 U. S., at 690 n. 54, and with Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, supra. In the latter case we found that “ 'threshold fact of congressional authorization,' ” which had been lacking in Edelman, to be present in the express language of the congressional amendment making Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applicable to state and local governments. 427 U. S., at 452, quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 672. Mr. Justice Brennan in his opinion concurring in the judgment argues that our holding in Edelman that § 1983 does not abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity is “most likely incorrect.” Post, at 354. To reach this conclusion he relies on “assumptions]” drawn from the Fourteenth Amendment, post, at 355, on “occasional remarks” found in a legislative history that contains little debate on § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, the precursor to § 1983, post, at 358 n. 15, on the reference to “bodies politic” in the Act of Feb. 25, 1871, 16 Stat. 431, the “Dictionary Act,” post, at 355-357, and, finally on the general language of § 1983 itself, post, at 356. But, unlike our Brother Brennan, we simply are unwilling to believe, on the basis of such slender “evidence,” that Congress intended by the general language of § 1983 to override the traditional sovereign immunity of the States. We therefore conclude that neither the reasoning of Monell or of our Eleventh Amendment cases subsequent to Edelman, nor the additional legislative history or arguments set forth in Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion, justify a conclusion different from that which we reached in Edelman. There is no question that both the supporters and opponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 believed that the Act ceded to the Federal Government many important powers that previously had been considered to be within the exclusive province of the individual States. Many of the remarks from the legislative history of the Act quoted in Mr. Justice Brennan’s opinion amply demonstrate this point. Post, at 359-365. See also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 173-176 (1961). But neither logic, the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor the legislative history of the 1871 Act compels, or even warrants, a leap from this proposition to the conclusion that Congress intended by the general language of the Act to overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States. In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951), the Court rejected a similar attempt to interpret the word “person” in § 1983 as a withdrawal of the historic immunity of state legislators. The Court’s words bear repeating here: “Did Congress by the general language of its 1871 statute mean to overturn the tradition of legislative freedom achieved in England by Civil War and carefully preserved in the formation of State and National Governments here? Did it mean to subject legislators to civil liability for acts done within the sphere of legislative activity? . . . The limits of §§ 1 and 2 of the 1871 statute — now §§ 43 and 47 (3) of Title 8 — were not spelled out in debate. We cannot believe that Congress — itself a staunch advocate of legislative freedom— would impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history and reason by covert inclusion in the general language before us.” 341 U. S., at 376. Given the importance of the States’ traditional sovereign immunity, if in fact the Members of the 42d Congress believed that § 1 of the 1871 Act overrode that immunity, surely there would have been lengthy debate on this point and it would have been paraded out by the opponents of the Act along with the other evils that they thought would result from the Act. Instead, § 1 passed with only limited debate and not one Member of Congress mentioned the Eleventh Amendment or the direct financial consequences to the States of enacting § 1. We can only conclude that this silence on the matter is itself a significant indication of the legislative intent of § 1. Our cases consistently have required a clearer showing of congressional purpose to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity than our Brother Brennan is able to marshal. In Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 U. S. 279 (1973), the Court concluded that Congress did not lift the sovereign immunity of the States by enacting the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U. S. C. §§ 201-219, because of the absence of any indication “by clear language that the constitutional immunity was swept away. It is not easy to infer that Congress in legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause, which has grown to vast proportions in its applications, desired silently to deprive the States of an immunity they have long enjoyed under another part of the Constitution.” 411 U. S., at 285. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer the Court found present in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., the “threshold fact of congressional authorization” to sue the State as employer, because the statute made explicit reference to the availability of a private action against state and local governments in the event the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the Attorney General failed to bring suit or effect a conciliation agreement. 427 U. S., at 448 n. 1, 449 n. 2, 452; see Equal Opportunity Employment Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 105, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (f)(1); H. R. Rep. No. 92-238, pp. 17-19 (1971); S. Rep. No. 92-415, pp. 9-11 (1971); S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-681, pp. 17-18 (1972); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-899, pp. 17-18 (1972). Finally, in Hutto v. Finney, decided just last Term, the Court held that in enacting the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U. S. C. § 1988, Congress intended to override the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States and authorize fee awards payable by the States when their officials are sued in their official capacities. 437 U. S., at 693-694. Although the statutory language in Hutto did not separately impose liability on States in so many words, the statute had “a history focusing directly on the question of state liability; Congress considered and firmly rejected the suggestion that States should be immune from fee awards.” Id., at 698 n. 31. Also, the Court noted that the statute would have been rendered meaningless with respect to States if the Act did not impose liability for attorney’s fees on the States. Ibid.; see Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dept., supra, at 285-286. By contrast, § 1983 does not explicitly and by clear language indicate on its face an intent to sweep away the immunity of the States; nor does it have a history which focuses directly on the question of state liability and which shows that Congress considered and firmly decided to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States. Nor does our reaffirmance of Edelman render § 1983 meaningless insofar as States are concerned. See Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908). We turn, then, to the question which has caused disagreement between the Courts of Appeals: does the modified notice contemplated by the Seventh Circuit constitute permissible prospective relief or a “retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury” ? We think this relief falls on the Ex parte Young side of the Eleventh Amendment line rather than on the Edelman side. Petitioner makes no issue of the incidental administrative expense connected with preparing and mailing the notice. Instead, he argues that giving the proposed notice will lead inexorably to the payment of state funds for retroactive benefits and therefore it, in effect, amounts to a monetary award. But the chain of causation which petitioner seeks to establish is by no means unbroken; it contains numerous missing links, which can be supplied, if at all, only by the State and members of the plaintiff class and not by a federal court. The notice approved by the Court of Appeals simply apprises plaintiff class members of the existence of whatever administrative. procedures may already be available under state law by which they may receive a determination of eligibility for past benefits. The notice of appeal, we are told, is virtually identical to the notice sent by the Department of Public Aid in every case of a denial or reduction of benefits. The mere sending of that notice does not trigger the state administrative machinery. Whether a recipient of notice decides to take advantage of those available state procedures is left completely to the discretion of that particular class member; the federal court plays no role in that decision. And whether or not the class member will receive retroactive benefits rests entirely with the State, its agencies, courts, and legislature, not with the federal court. The notice approved by the Court of Appeals, unlike that ordered by the District Court, is more properly viewed as ancillary to the prospective relief already ordered by the court. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S., at 290. The notice in effect simply informs class members that their federal suit is at an end, that the federal court can provide them with no further relief, and that there are existing state administrative procedures which they may wish to pursue. Petitioner raises no objection to the expense of preparing or sending it. The class members are “given no more . . . than what they would have gathered by sitting in the courtroom.” Jordan v. Trainor, 563 F. 2d, at 877-878. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore Affirmed. The history of this ease is set forth in greater detail in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974). In Fanty, the plaintiff class alleged that the manner in which the defendant state officials had collected class members’ federal benefits in reimbursement of amounts granted under state welfare laws violated this Court’s decision in Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board, 409 U. S. 413 (1973). The District Court agreed, and while it denied retroactive relief against the State on the basis of Edelman v. Jordan, supra, it did require the defendant state officials to notify plaintiff class members that under Philpott they have no legal obligation to make reimbursement out of their federal disability benefits and that as a matter of state law they may have a cause of action against the Department of Public Welfare for refund of prior payments. The Court of Appeals, in three separate opinions, reversed. Chief Judge Seitz was of the opinion that the notice relief was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Judge Garth, concurring in the result, believed that the Eleventh Amendment issue was “borderline,” 551 F. 2d, at 6, but voted to reverse on the basis that there was no case or controversy. Judge Hunter dissented on grounds not relevant here. However, he disagreed with Chief Judge Seitz that the Eleventh Amendment prohibited the notice relief. Because this was a class .action qualifying under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b)(2), the class members had never received notice of the complaint, the original lower court judgment, this Court’s decision or its effect on them. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U. S. 156, 177 n. 14 (1974); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (e). Under Rule 23 (d) (2), however, a court may require appropriate notice “for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action.” Prior to ordering notice, the District Court requested the parties to submit information with respect to the number of persons in the plaintiff class, the cost of notifying them, the amounts involved, and other issues affecting the equities of sending notice. Respondent filed his response to the court’s request but the state officials submitted no response. Respondent indicated that there were approximately 20,000 to 33,500 members in the plaintiff class. App. 34a. The cost of identifying class members was stated to be simply the cost of running the department’s computer for a period necessary to cull out the names of the plaintiff class members. Respondent claimed that there would be no additional cost of notifying class members because the notice could be included in one of the regular mailings to the members of the plaintiff class. Petitioner has not disputed respondent’s allegations either below or before this Court. A panel of the Seventh Circuit originally had reversed the District Court’s order requiring notice on the ground that the Eleventh Amendment was a “jurisdictional bar to the exercise of federal judicial power concerning past action or inaction of a state with respect to the Aid to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled Program.” Jordan v. Trainor, 551 F. 2d 152, 155 (1977). In reaching its decision, the Seventh Circuit relied in part on our summary affirmance of Grubb v. Sterrett, 315 F. Supp. 990 (ND Ind.), aff’d, 400 U. S. 922 (1970), in which the District Court had ordered Indiana public assistance officials to send to plaintiff class members a notice similar to the one at issue here. As the Court of Appeals recognized, the list of summary affirmances overruled in Edelman was not necessarily intended to be exhaustive. See Jordan v. Trainor, 563 F. 2d, at 876. However, we prefer to rest our affirmance of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case on our conclusion that it is consistent with Edelman. As we stated in Edelman: “[T]hat portion of the District Court’s decree which petitioner challenges on Eleventh Amendment grounds goes much further than [Ex parte Young and the cases that had followed it]. It requires payment of state funds, not as a necessary consequence of compliance in the future with a substantive federal-question determination, but as a form of compensation to those whose applications were processed on the slower time schedule at a time when petitioner was under no court-imposed obligation to conform to a different standard. ... It will to a virtual certainty be paid from state funds, and not from the pockets of the individual state officials who were the defendants in the action. It is measured in terms of a monetary loss resulting from a past breach of a legal duty on the part of the defendant state officials.” 415 U. S., at 668. Mr. Justice Brennan’s opinion concurring in the judgment states that “Edelman v. Jordan, supra, had held that § 1983 did not override state immunity, for the reason, as the Court later stated in Fitzpatrick, that '[t]he Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, had been held in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 187-191 (1961), to exclude cities and other municipal corporations from its ambit; that being the case, it could not have been intended to include States as parties defendant.’ ” Post, at 351. Since Monell overruled Monroe’s holding that cities and other municipal corporations are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983, Mft. Justice Brennan’s opinion argues that the “premise” of Edelman has been “undercut.” Post, at 351. The fallacy of this line of reasoning was aptly demonstrated last Term by Mr. Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Hutto, where he stated: “The language in question from Fitzpatrick was not essential to the Court’s holding in that case. Moreover, this position ignores the fact that Edelman rests squarely on the Eleventh Amendment immunity, without adverting in terms to the treatment of the legislative history in Monroe v. Pape ...." 437 U. S., at 708-709, n. 6. In fact, Monroe v. Pape is not even cited in Edelman. In Hutto v. Finney there were three separate opinions in addition to that of the Court. Two opinions expressed the view that the Court had misapplied the rule laid down in Edelman. 437 U. S., at 704 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting); id., at 710 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Brennan, though joining the opinion of the Court, wrote separately to suggest that the Court’s opinions in Monell and Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer had rendered “the essential premise of our Edelman holding . . . no longer true.” 437 U. S., at 703. The Court itself in Hutto, however, recognized and applied Edelman’s distinction between retrospective and prospective relief. Our Brother Brennan in his opinion concurring in the judgment curiously suggests that the language quoted from Pugh in the text could not mean what it, on its face, says, because the briefs in the ease were filed before our decision in Monell was announced. Post, at 352-354. But while the parties in Pugh were “without the benefit of Monell’s major re-evaluation of the legislative history of § 1983," post, at 352-353, the Members of this Court labored under no similar disability. The decision in Pugh was handed down nearly one month after Monell and 10 days after Hutto, where separate opinions debated this precise point. If, after Monell and Hutto, this Court harbored any doubts about the continued validity of Edelman’s conclusion that § 1983 does not constitute a waiver of the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States, it is inconceivable that the Court would have taken the extraordinary action of summarily reversing a lower court on the basis of Edelman. There was only limited debate on § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and it passed without amendment. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S., at 665. The sections that drew most of the debate were those that created certain federal crimes, permitted the President to send the militia to any State with widespread Ku Klux Klan violence, and authorized suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in certain circumstances. Id., at 665 n. 11. The Dictionary Act was intended to provide a “few general rules for the construction of statutes.” Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 3d Sess., 1474 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Poland). While it was enacted two months before the enactment of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, it came more than five years after passage of § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, which served as the model for the language of § 1 of the 1871 Act. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger); see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 183-185 (1961); post, at 362 n. 17. Mr. Justice Brennan’s opinion characterizes this conclusion as “gratuitous” and “paten [t] dicta.” Post, at 350. But we cannot think of a more “gratuitous” or useless exercise of this Court’s discretionary jurisdiction than to decide which of two conflicting interpretations of Edelman v. Jordan is correct, if in truth we believed that Edelman itself no longer were valid. The question does not arise out of the blue; it was extensively discussed in our Brother Brennan’s concurrence in Hutto v. Finney last Term. We therefore fail to see how our reaffirmance of Edelman can be characterized as “dicta.” For example, the Act was attacked as an attempt to strip States of the power to punish and proscribe offenses within their borders, e. g., Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 396 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Rice); id., at App. 112 (remarks of Rep. Moore); id., at App. 117 (remarks of Sen. Blair), and of their authority to decide when the militia of the United States should be called into their territory to quell domestic disturbances, e. g., id., at 647 (remarks of Sen. Davis); id., at App. 139 (remarks of Rep. McCormick). Indeed the Prigg-Dennison-Day line of cases, relied on so heavily in Monell, would surely militate against such a conclusion. 436 U. S., at 672-683; see Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539 (1842); Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (1861); Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (1871). Our Brother Brennan’s concurrence in the judgment today relies on Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 (1880), and on Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313 (1880). But these cases were decided nearly a decade after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and as noted in Monell, substantially'undercut the Prigg-Dennison-Day line of cases for purposes of enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment. 436 U. S., at 676. But (as was noted in Monell) it was the Prigg-Dennison-Day line of cases that was “the reigning constitutional theory of [the] day” when the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was debated and enacted. 436 U. S., at 676. The Court in Employees “found not a word in the history of the [statute] to indicate a purpose of Congress to make it possible for a citizen of that State or another State to sue the State in the federal courts.” 411 U. S., at 285. The Court also added that its interpretation of the law did not render the statute’s inclusion of state institutions meaningless. Id., at 285-286. While Hutto, unlike Fitzpatrick and Employees, did not require an express statutory waiver of the State’s immunity, 437 U. S., at 695, 698 n. 31, the Court was careful to emphasize that it was concerned only with expenses incurred in litigation seeking prospective relief while the other cases involved retroactive liability for prelitigation conduct. Id., at 695. The Court also noted that it was not concerned with a statute that imposed “ 'enormous fiscal burdens on the States' ” and that if it were, it might require a formal indication of Congress’ intent to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity, as did Employees and Fitzpatrick. 437 U. S., at 697 n. 27. Extending § 1983 liability to States obviously would place "enormous fiscal burdens on the States.” But we need not reach the question whether an express waiver is required because neither the language of the statute nor the legislative history discloses an intent to overturn the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity by imposing liability directly upon them. The arguments in MR. Justice Brennan’s opinion regarding Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824), are similarly unpersuasive. Post, at 359-361, n. 16. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Osborn makes it clear that in determining whether a court can grant relief the key inquiry is whether the state officer was in fact the real party in interest or whether he was only a nominal party. 9 Wheat., at 858. See also Bank of United States v. Planters’ Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheat. 904, 907 (1824). Mr. Chief Justice Marshall emphasized this precise point just four years later in his opinion for the Court in Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 1 Pet. 110 (1828). In Madrazo, a vessel carrying slaves was seized and the slaves were delivered into the possession of the Governor of Georgia. The slaves were sold and the proceeds were placed in the state treasury. Madrazo filed a libel in the Federal District Court, naming the Governor of Georgia, among others, as a defendant. Restitution was ordered by the lower courts, but this Court reversed because although the demand for relief nominally was against the Governor of the State, it was clear that the action in fact sought relief directly from the state treasury, relief that was forbidden by the Eleventh Amendment. “The claim upon the governor, is as a governor; he is sued, not by his name, but by his title. The demand made upon him, is not made personally, but officially. “The decree is pronounced not against the person, but the officer, and appeared to have been pronounced against the successor of the original defendant; as the appeal bond was executed by a different governor from him who filed the information. In such a case, where the chief magistrate of a state is sued, not by Ms name, but by his style of office, and the claim made upon him is entirely in his official character, we think the state itself may be considered as a party on the record. If the state is not a party, there is no party against whom a decree can be made. No person in his natural capacity is brought before the Court as defendant. This not being a proceeding against the thing, but against the person, a person capable of appearing as a defendant, against whom a decree can be pronounced, must be a party to the causé before a decree can be regularly pronounced.” Id., at 123-124 (emphasis added). To similar effect see Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How., at 97-98, which reaffirmed these principles of Madrazo and which, as the Court in Monell emphasized, was “well known to Members of Congress” at the time of the passage of the 1871 Act. 436 U. S., at 679. To the extent that Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203 (1873), which did no more than affirm an injunctive decree against a state official, is inconsistent with the rule applied in Edel-man, it suffices to say that it was repudiated long before the latter decision. In Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459 (1945), the Court stated: “[W]hen the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants.” Id., at 464. In addition to petitioner’s Eleventh Amendment arguments, he contends that the Court of Appeals’ notice violates the law of the case as established in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974). We disagree. The doctrine of law of the case comes into play only with respect to issues previously determined. In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U. S. 247 (1895). On remand, the “Circuit Court may consider and decide any matters left open by the mandate of this court.” Id., at 256. Accord, Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U. S. 175 (1920). The Court in Edelman considered the constitutionality only of the relief before it. 415 U. S., at 665. It was not presented with the question of the propriety of notice relief. Petitioner also claims that the District Court lacked power to order notice under the terms of this Court’s remand. The simple answer to this contention is that we remanded the matter in Edelman “for further proceedings consistent with this opinion,” and we hold today that the award of notice relief, as fashioned by the Court of Appeals, is not inconsistent with either the spirit or express terms of our decision in Edelman. “While a mandate is controlling as to matters within its compass, on the remand a lower court is free as to other issues.” Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U. S. 161, 168 (1939), citing In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., supra. It appears from respondent’s answers to a District Court request that any expense associated with the preparation and mailing of the notice would be de minimis. See n. 3, supra. As of January 1, 1974, the Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled program was replaced by a completely federal-funded Supplemental Security Income program. Pub. L. 92-603, Title III, § 301, 86 Stat. 1465. Petitioner argues that the notice relief is impermissible because if retroactive benefits ultimately are awarded to the plaintiff class members, there is little likelihood that the Federal Government will reimburse the State for assistance payments made relating to a now defunct program. Thus, Illinois would have to bear the total cost of such retroactive payments. This fact may well be relevant to the state agency's or court's determination of whether to award retroactive benefits. But since the notice relief does not constitute a money judgment, it is not at all relevant to the question of the propriety of the notice fashioned by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner also states that even if the Department of Public Aid determines to grant retroactive relief, it may not request the Comptroller to draw, or the Treasurer to make payments from, funds appropriated for a current fiscal year for an outstanding obligation incurred during a prior fiscal year without the express authorization from the legislature. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 5. Thus, as a result of the lapse of Public Aid appropriations for fiscal years 1968, 1969, 1970, and 1971, petitioner claims that members of the plaintiff class would be required to resort to filing claims against the State in the Illinois Court of Claims. These facts may influence a plaintiff class member in deciding whether to pursue existing state remedies or the legislature in determining whether to give its approval to a payment of retroactive benefits, but they do not affect our conclusion that the notice relief awarded here is permissible under the Eleventh Amendment.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the state associated with the petitioner. If the petitioner is a federal court or federal judge, note the "state" as the United States. The same holds for other federal employees or officials.
What state is associated with the petitioner?
[ "Alabama", "Alaska", "American Samoa", "Arizona", "Arkansas", "California", "Colorado", "Connecticut", "Delaware", "District of Columbia", "Federated States of Micronesia", "Florida", "Georgia", "Guam", "Hawaii", "Idaho", "Illinois", "Indiana", "Iowa", "Kansas", "Kentucky", "Louisiana", "Maine", "Marshall Islands", "Maryland", "Massachusetts", "Michigan", "Minnesota", "Mississippi", "Missouri", "Montana", "Nebraska", "Nevada", "New Hampshire", "New Jersey", "New Mexico", "New York", "North Carolina", "North Dakota", "Northern Mariana Islands", "Ohio", "Oklahoma", "Oregon", "Palau", "Pennsylvania", "Puerto Rico", "Rhode Island", "South Carolina", "South Dakota", "Tennessee", "Texas", "Utah", "Vermont", "Virgin Islands", "Virginia", "Washington", "West Virginia", "Wisconsin", "Wyoming", "United States", "Interstate Compact", "Philippines", "Indian", "Dakota" ]
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BELL v. BURSON, DIRECTOR, GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY No. 5586. Argued March 23, 1971 Decided May 24, 1971 Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Douglas, HarlaN, Stewart, White, and Marshall, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., and Black and Blackmun, JJ., concurred in the result. Elizabeth Roediger Rindskopf argued the cause for petitioner pro hac vice. With her on the brief was Howard Moore, Jr. Dorothy T. Beasley, Assistant Attorney General of Georgia, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Harold N. Hill, Jr., Executive Assistant Attorney General, and Courtney Wilder Stanton, Assistant Attorney General. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Georgia’s Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act provides that the motor vehicle registration and driver’s license of an uninsured motorist involved in an accident shall be suspended unless he posts security to cover the amount of damages claimed by aggrieved parties in reports of the accident. The administrative hearing conducted prior to the suspension excludes consideration of the motorist’s fault or liability for the accident. The Georgia Court of Appeals rejected petitioner’s contention that the State’s statutory scheme, in failing before suspending the licenses to afford him a hearing on the question of his fault or liability, denied him due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment: the court held that “ ‘Fault’ or ‘innocence’ are completely irrelevant factors.” 121 Ga. App. 418, 420, 174 S. E. 2d 235, 236 (1970). The Georgia Supreme Court denied review. App. 27. We granted certiorari. 400 U. S. 963 (1970). We reverse. Petitioner is a clergyman whose ministry requires him to travel by car to cover three rural Georgia communities. On Sunday afternoon, November 24, 1968, petitioner was involved in an accident when five-year-old Sherry Capes rode her bicycle into the side of his automobile. The child’s parents filed an accident report with the Director of the Georgia Department of Public Safety indicating that their daughter had suffered substantial injuries for which they claimed damages of $5,000. Petitioner was thereafter informed by the Director that unless he was covered by a liability insurance policy in effect at the time of the accident he must file a bond or cash security deposit of $5,000 or present a notarized release from liability, plus proof of future financial responsibility, or suffer the suspension of his driver’s license and vehicle registration. App. 9. Petitioner requested an administrative hearing before the Director asserting that he was not liable as the accident was unavoidable, and stating also that he would be severely handicapped in the performance of his ministerial duties by a suspension of his licenses. A hearing was scheduled but the Director informed petitioner that “[t]he only evidence that the Department can accept and consider is: (a) was the petitioner or his vehicle involved in the accident; (b) has petitioner complied with the provisions of the Law as provided; or (c) does petitioner come within any of the exceptions of the'Law.” App. 11. At the administrative hearing the Director rejected petitioner’s proffer of evidence on liability, ascertained that petitioner was not within any of the statutory exceptions, and gave petitioner 30 days to comply with the security requirements or suffer suspension. Petitioner then exercised his statutory right to an appeal de novo in the Superior Court. Ga. Code Ann. § 92A-602 (1958). At that hearing, the court permitted petitioner to present his evidence on liability, and, although the claimants were neither parties nor witnesses, found petitioner free from fault. As a result, the Superior Court ordered “that the petitioner’s driver’s license not be suspended . . . [until] suit is filed against petitioner for the purpose of recovering damages for the injuries sustained by the child . . . .” App. 15. This order was reversed by the Georgia Court of Appeals in overruling petitioner’s constitutional contention. If the statute barred the- issuance of licenses to all motorists who did not carry liability insurance or who did not post security, the statute would not, under our cases, violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Ex parte Poresky, 290 U. S. 30 (1933); Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U. S. 352 (1932); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927). It does not follow, however, that the amendment also permits the Georgia statutory scheme where not all motorists, but rather only motorists involved in accidents, are required to post security under penalty of loss of the licenses. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 271 U. S. 583 (1926). Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner’s case, their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 (1969); Goldberg V. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970). This is but an application of the general proposition that relevant constitutional restraints limit state power to terminate an entitlement whether the entitlement is denominated a “right” or a “privilege.” Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963) (disqualification for unemployment compensation); Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U. S. 551 (1956) (discharge from public employment); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958) (denial of a tax exemption); Goldberg v. Kelly, supra (withdrawal of welfare benefits). See also Londoner v. Denver, 210 U. S. 373, 385-386 (1908); Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U. S. 117 (1926); Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U. S. 126 (1941). We turn then to the nature of the procedural due process which must be afforded the licensee on the question of his fault or liability for the accident. A procedural rule that may satisfy due process in one context may not necessarily satisfy procedural due process in every case. Thus, procedures adequate to determine a welfare claim may not suffice to try a felony charge. Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S., at 270-271, with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963). Clearly, however, the inquiry into fault or liability requisite to afford the licensee due process need not take the form of a full adjudication of the question of liability. That adjudication can only be made in litigation between the parties involved in the accident. Since the only purpose of the provisions before us is to obtain security from which to pay any judgments against the licensee resulting from the accident, we hold that procedural due process will be satisfied by an inquiry limited to the determination whether there is a reasonable possibility, of judgments in the amounts claimed being rendered against the licensee. The State argues that the licensee's interest in avoiding the suspension of his licenses is outweighed by countervailing governmental interests and therefore that this procedural due process need not be afforded him. We disagree. In cases where there is no reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against a licensee, Georgia’s interest in protecting a claimant from the possibility of an unrecoverable judgment is not, within the context of the State's fault-oriented scheme, a justification for denying the process due its citizens. Nor is additional expense occasioned by the expanded hearing sufficient to withstand the constitutional requirement. “ 'While the problem of additional expense must be kept in mind, it does not justify denying a hearing meeting the ordinary standards of due process.’ ” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S., at 261, quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 901 (SDNY 1968). The main thrust of Georgia’s argument is that it need not provide a hearing on liability because fault and liability are irrelevant to the statutory scheme. We may assume that were this so, the prior administrative hearing presently provided by the State would be “appropriate to the nature of the case.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 313 (1950). But “[i]n reviewing state action in this area . . . we look to substance, not to bare form, to determine whether constitutional minimums have been honored.” Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U. S. 96, 106-107 (1963) (concurring opinion). And looking to the operation of the State’s statutory scheme, it is clear that liability, in the sense of an ultimate judicial determination of responsibility, plays a crucial role in the Safety Responsibility Act. If prior to suspension there is a release from liability executed by the injured party, no suspension is worked by the Act. Ga. Code Ann. § 92A-606 (1958). The same is true if prior to suspension there is an adjudication of nonliability. Ibid. Even after suspension has been declared, a release from liability or an adjudication of nonliability will lift the suspension. Ga. Code Ann. § 92A-607 (Supp. 1970). Moreover, other of the Act’s exceptions are developed around liability-related concepts. Thus, we are not dealing here with a no-fault scheme. Since the statutory scheme makes liability an important factor in the State’s determination to deprive an individual of his licenses, the State may not, consistently with due process, eliminate consideration of that factor in its prior hearing. The hearing required by the Due Process Clause must be “meaningful,” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 (1965), and “appropriate to the nature of the case.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., supra, at 313. It is a proposition which hardly seems to need explication that a hearing which excludes consideration of an element essential to the decision whether licenses of the nature here involved shall be suspended does not meet this standard. Finally, we reject Georgia’s argument that if it must afford the licensee an inquiry into the question of liability, that determination, unlike the determination of the matters presently considered at the administrative hearing, need not be made prior to the suspension of the licenses. While “[m]any controversies have raged about . . . the Due Process Clause,” ibid., it is fundamental that except in emergency situations (and this is not one) due process requires that when a State seeks to terminate an interest such as that here involved, it must afford “notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case” before the termination becomes effective. Ibid. Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U. S., at 152-156; Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra; Goldberg v. Kelly, supra; Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433 (1971). We hold, then, that under Georgia’s present statutory scheme, before the State may deprive petitioner of his driver’s license and vehicle registration it must provide a forum for the determination of the question whether there is a reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against him as a result of the accident. We deem it inappropriate in this case to do more than lay down this requirement. The alternative methods of compliance are several. Georgia may decide merely to include consideration of the question at the administrative hearing now provided, or it may elect to postpone such a consideration to the de novo judicial proceedings in the Superior Court. Georgia may decide to withhold suspension until adjudication of an action for damages brought by the injured party. Indeed, Georgia may elect to abandon its present scheme completely and pursue one of the various alternatives in force in other States. Finally, Georgia may reject all of the above and devise an entirely new regulatory scheme. The area of choice is wide: we hold only that the failure of the present Georgia scheme to afford the petitioner a prior hearing on liability of the nature we have defined denied him procedural due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Black, and Mr. Justice Blackmun concur in the result. Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, Ga. Code Ann. § 92A-601 et seq. (1958). In pertinent part the Act provides that anyone involved in an accident must submit a report to the Director of Public Safety. Ga. Code Ann. § 92A-604 (Supp. 1970). Within 30 days of the receipt of the report the Director “shall suspend the license and all registration certificates and all registration plates of the operator and owner of any motor vehicle in any manner involved in the accident unless or until the operator or owner has previously furnished or immediately furnishes security, sufficient ... to satisfy any judgments for damages or injuries resulting . . . and unless such operator or owner shall give proof of financial responsibility for the future as is required in section 92A-615.1. . . Ga. Code Ann. § 92A-605 (a) (Supp. 1970). Section 92A-615.1 (Supp. 1970) requires that “such proof must be maintained for a one-year period.” Section 92A-605 (a) works no suspension, however, (1) if the owner or operator had in effect at the time of the accident a liability insurance policy or other bond, Ga. Code Ann. § 92A-605 (c) (Supp. 1970); (2) if the owner or operator qualifies as a self-insurer, ibid.; (3) if only the owner or operator was injured, Ga. Code Ann. § 92A-606 (1958); (4) if the automobile was legally parked at the time of the accident, ibid.; (5) if as to an owner, the automobile was being operated without permission, ibid.; or (6) “[i]f, prior to the date that the Director would otherwise suspend license and registration ... there shall be filed with the Director evidence satisfactory to him that the person who would otherwise have to file security has been released from liability or been finally adjudicated not to be liable or has executed a duly acknowledged written agreement providing for the payment of an agreed amount in installments . . . .” Ibid. Questions concerning the requirement of proof of future financial responsibility are not before us. The State’s brief, at 4, states: “The one year period for proof of financial responsibility has now expired, so [petitioner] would not be required to file such proof, even if the Court of Appeals decision were affirmed.” Ga. Code Ann. § 92A-602 (1958) provides: “The Director shall administer and enforce the provisions of this Chapter and may make rules and regulations necessary for its administration and shall provide for hearings upon request of persons aggrieved by orders or acts of the Director under the provisions of this Chapter. Such hearing need not be a matter of record and the decision as rendered by the Director shall be final unless the aggrieved person shall desire an appeal, in which case he shall have the right to enter an appeal to the superior court of the county of his residence, by notice to the Director, in the same manner as appeals are entered from the court of ordinary, except that the appellant shall not be required to post any bond nor pay the costs in advance. If the aggrieved person desires, the appeal may be heard by the judge at term or in chambers or before a jury at the first term. The hearing on the appeal shall be de novo, however, such appeal shall not act as a supersedeas of any orders or acts of the Director, nor shall the appellant be allowed to operate or permit a motor vehicle to be operated in violation of any suspension or revocation by the Director, while such appeal is pending. A notice sent by registered mail shall be sufficient service on the Director that such appeal has been entered.” Petitioner stated at oral argument that while “it would be possible to raise [an equal protection argument] ... we don’t raise this point here.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 14. See, e. g., Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U. S. 245 (1947); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U. S. 594 (1950). The various alternatives include compulsory insurance plans, public or joint public-private unsatisfied judgment funds, and assigned claims plans. See R. Keeton & J. O’Connell, After Cars Crash (1967).
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
What is the issue area of the decision?
[ "Criminal Procedure", "Civil Rights", "First Amendment", "Due Process", "Privacy", "Attorneys", "Unions", "Economic Activity", "Judicial Power", "Federalism", "Interstate Relations", "Federal Taxation", "Miscellaneous", "Private Action" ]
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SUPERINTENDENT, MASSACHUSETTS CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT WALPOLE v. HILL et al. No. 84-438. Argued March 25, 1985 Decided June 17, 1985 O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, and in Parts I, II, and III of which Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, -post, p. 457. Barbara A. H. Smith, Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General, and Martin E. Levin, Assistant Attorney General. Jamie Ann Sabino, by appointment of the Court, 469 U. S. 1084, argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief was Richard B. Klibaner. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Trott, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, and Kathleen A. Felton; and for the State of California et al. by John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, Steve White, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arnold Overoye, Assistant Attorney General, William George Prahl and Susan J. Orton, Deputy Attorneys General, Charles A. Graddick, Attorney General of Alabama, Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, Anthony B. Ching, Solicitor General, Joseph L. Lieberman, Attorney General of Connecticut, Cornelius Tuohy, Assistant Attorney General, Michael A. Lilly, Attorney General of Hawaii, Neil Hartigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Jill Wine-Banks, Solicitor General, Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana, Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, David Armstrong, Attorney General of Kentucky, William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Lewis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Attorney General of Mississippi, Robert L. Gibbs, Assistant Attorney General, John Ashcroft, Attorney General of Missouri, John M. Morris, Mike Greely, Attorney General of Montana, Paul Douglas, Attorney General of Nebraska, Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General of North Carolina, Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Attorney General of Ohio, T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina, Mark V. Meierhenry, Attorney General of South Dakota, John Easton, Jr., Attorney General of Vermont, Gerald L. Baliles, Attorney General of Virginia, and A. G. McGlintoek, Attorney General of Wyoming. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. Massachusetts inmates who comply with prison rules can accumulate good time credits that reduce the term of imprisonment. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 127, § 129 (West 1974). Such credits may be lost “if a prisoner violates any rule of his place of confinement.” Ibid. The question presented is whether revocation of an inmate’s good time credits violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if the decision of the prison disciplinary board is not supported by evidence in the record. We conclude that where good time credits constitute a protected liberty interest, a decision to revoke such credits must be supported by some evidence. Because the record in this case contains sufficient evidence to support the decision of the disciplinary board, we reverse. I — I Respondents Gerald Hill and Joseph Crawford are inmates at a state prison in Walpole, Mass. In May 1982, they each received prison disciplinary reports charging them with assaulting another inmate. At separate hearings for each inmate, a prison disciplinary board heard testimony from a prison guard, Sergeant Maguire, and received his written disciplinary report. According to the testimony and report, Maguire heard an inmate twice say loudly, “What’s going on?” The voice came from a walkway that Maguire could partially observe through a window. Maguire immediately opened the door to the walkway and found an inmate named Stephens bleeding from the mouth and suffering from a swollen eye. Dirt was strewn about the walkway, and Maguire viewed this to be further evidence of a scuffle. He saw three inmates, including respondents, jogging away together down the walkway. There were no other inmates in the area, which was enclosed by a chain link fence. Maguire concluded that one or more of the three inmates had assaulted Stephens and that they had acted as a group. Ma-guire also testified at Hill’s hearing that a prison “medic” had told him that Stephens had been beaten. Hill and Crawford each declared their innocence before the disciplinary board, and Stephens gave written statements that the other inmates had not caused his injuries. After hearing the evidence in each case, the disciplinary board found respondents guilty of violating prison regulations based on their involvement in the assault. App. 19, 27. The board recommended that Hill and Romano each lose 100 days of good time and be confined in isolation for 15 days. Respondents unsuccessfully appealed the board’s action to the superintendent of the prison. Id., at 23, 30. They then filed a complaint in the Superior Court, State of Massachusetts, alleging that the decisions of the board violated their constitutional rights because “there was no evidence to confirm that the incident took place nor was there any evidence to state that if the incident did take place the [respondents] were involved.” Id., at 10. After reviewing the record, the Superior Court concluded that “the Board’s finding of guilty rested, in each case, on no evidence constitutionally adequate to support that finding.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 8b. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for respondents and ordered that the findings of the disciplinary board be voided and the lost good time restored. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. 392 Mass. 198, 466 N. E. 2d 818 (1984). Inmates who observe prison rules, the state court noted, have a statutory right to good time credits and the loss of such credits affects a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 201, 466 N. E. 2d, at 821. The Supreme Judicial Court then observed that an entitlement to “judicial review of the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant the board’s findings” logically follows from Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 (1974). 392 Mass., at 201, 466 N. E. 2d, at 821. Without deciding whether the appropriate standard of review is “some evidence” or the stricter test of “substantial evidence,” id., at 203, n. 5, 466 N. E. 2d, at 822, n. 5, the Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the trial judge that the record failed to present even “some evidence which, if believed, would rationally permit the board’s findings.” Id., at 203, 466 N. E. 2d, at 822 (footnote omitted). The Massachusetts Attorney General filed a petition for a writ of certiorari urging this Court to decide whether prison inmates have a due process right to judicial review of prison disciplinary proceedings or, alternatively, whether the standard of review applied by the state court was more stringent than is required by the Due Process Clause. Pet. for Cert, i, 20-21. We granted the petition, 469 U. S. 1016 (1984), and we now reverse. II Petitioner first argues that the state court erred by holding that there is a constitutional right to judicial review of the sufficiency of evidence where good time credits are revoked in a prison disciplinary proceeding. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U. S. 656 (1973) (per curiam), petitioner contends, found no denial of due process where a filing fee prevented claimants from obtaining judicial review of an administrative decision reducing welfare payments. Petitioner urges that a similar conclusion should apply here: respondents were afforded all the process due when they received a hearing before the disciplinary board. Cf. id., at 659-660 (pretermination eviden-tiary hearing met requirements of due process despite lack of judicial review). Respondents answer by noting decisions of this Court which suggest that due process might require some form of judicial review of administrative decisions that threaten constitutionally protected liberty or property interests. See, e. g., St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 51-52 (1936); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 284-285 (1922). The extent to which legislatures may commit to an administrative body the unreviewable authority to make determinations implicating fundamental rights is a difficult question of constitutional law. See, e. g., Califano v. Sanders, 430 U. S. 99, 109 (1977); 5 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 28:3 (2d ed. 1984); Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362,1375-1378,1388-1391 (1953). The per curiam opinion in Ortwein did not purport to resolve this question definitively; nor are we disposed to construe that case as implicitly holding that due process would never require some form of judicial review of determinations made in prison disciplinary proceedings. Cf. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 87 (1932) (Brandéis, J., dissenting) (“under certain circumstances, the constitutional requirement of due process is a requirement of judicial process”). Whether the Constitution requires judicial review is only at issue if such review is otherwise barred, and we will not address the constitutional question unless it is necessary to the resolution of the case before the Court. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 366-367 (1974). Assuming, arguendo, that a decision revoking good time credits would violate due process if it were not supported by some modicum of evidence, we need not decide today whether the Constitution also requires judicial review of a challenge to a decision on such grounds. The Supreme Judicial Court correctly observed, 392 Mass., at 201, 466 N. E. 2d, at 821, that this Court has not previously held that the Due Process Clause creates a right to judicial review of prison disciplinary proceedings. Although the opinion of the state court does speak in terms of a constitutional entitlement, careful examination of that opinion persuades us that judicial review was available to respondents pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 249, §4 (West Supp. 1984), which provides in pertinent part: “A civil action in the nature of certiorari to correct errors in proceedings which are not according to the course of the common law, which proceedings are not otherwise reviewable by motion or by appeal, may be brought in the supreme judicial or superior court.” Petitioner notes that there is no statutory provision for judicial review of decisions by a prison disciplinary board. Nonetheless, the Supreme Judicial Court has observed that “ ‘[i]n the absence of a statutory method of judicial review, certiorari is an appropriate mode for correcting errors of law arising out of an administrative action.”’ Taunton Eastern Little League v. Taunton, 389 Mass. 719, 720, n. 1, 452 N. E. 2d 211, 212, n. 1 (1983), quoting Reading v. Attorney General, 362 Mass. 266, 269, 285 N. E. 2d 429, 431 (1972). In the present case, the Supreme Judicial Court expressly stated that respondents, who framed their complaints as petitions for a “‘writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum,”’ should have brought civil actions pursuant to § 4. 392 Mass., at 199, n. 2, 466 N. E. 2d, at 819, n. 2. The state court supported this conclusion by citing its previous decision in Boston Edison Co. v. Board of Selectmen of Concord, 355 Mass. 79, 242 N. E. 2d 868 (1968), and the decision of the Appeals Court of Massachusetts in Cepulonis v. Commissioner of Correction, 15 Mass. App. 292, 445 N. E. 2d 178 (1983). Boston Edison relied on §4 to review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support decisions by town selectmen denying rights-of-way for power lines. At the time Boston Edison was decided, § 4 allowed a party to petition the Supreme Judicial Court for a writ of certiorari on a claim “that the evidence which formed the basis of the action complained of or the basis of any specified finding or conclusion was as a matter of law insufficient to warrant such action, finding or conclusion.” Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 249, §4 (West 1959). Petitioner correctly informed this Court that the quoted phrase and the writ of certiorari were abolished by 1973 amendments to §4, 1973 Mass. Acts, ch. 1114, § 289. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25, 50-51. Somewhat inexplicably, petitioner failed to add that the 1973 amendments substituted “ ‘a civil action in the nature of certiorari’ ” for the previously available writ, and did not narrow the relief formerly obtainable under the statute. See, e. g., Boston Edison Co. v. Boston Redevelopment Authority, 374 Mass. 37, 47-49, 371 N. E. 2d 728, 737-738 (1977). The second decision cited by the Supreme Judicial Court, Cepulonis, construed an inmate’s challenge to a finding of a prison disciplinary board “as seeking review in the nature of certiorari” under §4. 15 Mass. App., at 292, 445 N. E. 2d, at 178. Cepulonis did not address a due process claim; instead, the inmate contended that the disciplinary board’s finding was not supported by “reliable evidence” as required by regulations of the Massachusetts Department of Corrections. Id., at 293, 445 N. E. 2d, at 179. Thus, Boston Edison and Cepulonis relied on § 4 to provide an avenue for judicial review where an adjudicatory decision by a nonjudicial body was challenged as not supported by sufficient evidence. In those cases, the aggrieved parties argued that the evidence was insufficient to meet standards imposed by state law. See also 1001 Plays, Inc. v. Mayor of Boston, 387 Mass. 879, 444 N. E. 2d 931 (1983) (§4 challenge to sufficiency of evidence to support denial of license for video game arcade); McSweeney v. Town Manager of Lexington, 379 Mass. 794, 401 N. E. 2d 113 (1980) (noting that appropriate standard varies according to nature of action sought to be reviewed). Nothing in the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court in this case suggests that §4 would be unavailable where a party alleges that evidence is insufficient under a standard imposed by the Federal Constitution. Cf. 392 Mass., at 202-203, 466 N. E. 2d, at 821-822 (failure to provide for review under state Administrative Procedure Act does not indicate legislative intent to preclude judicial review of sufficiency of evidence for disciplinary board decisions). Indeed, previous decisions by the Supreme Judicial Court indicate that §4 provides a means of review in state court where an administrative decision is challenged on federal constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Taunton Eastern Little League v. Taunton, supra, at 720-722, 452 N. E. 2d, at 212-213 (Establishment Clause challenge to rescission, of beano license). We therefore interpret the opinion of the state court as holding that §4 provides a mechanism for judicial review of respondents’ claims. Given the rule of judicial restraint requiring us to avoid unnecessary resolution of constitutional issues, see, e. g., Ashwander v. TWA, 297 U. S. 288, 346-347 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring), we decline to decide in this case whether due process would require judicial review. r — H HH h-4 The issue we address is whether findings of a prison disciplinary board that result in the loss of good time credits must be supported by a certain amount of evidence in order to satisfy due process. Petitioner argues that the Supreme Judicial Court applied too strict a standard in reviewing the decision of the disciplinary board and that such decisions should be upheld unless they are arbitrary and capricious. Brief for Petitioner 5, 19-21; Pet. for Cert. i, 20-21. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 (1974), the Court held that due process requires procedural protections before a prison inmate can be deprived of a protected liberty interest in good time credits. Petitioner does not challenge the holding below that Massachusetts law creates a liberty interest in good time credits. See also Nelson v. Commissioner of Correction, 390 Mass. 379, 456 N. E. 2d 1100 (1983) (statutory good time credits constitute a liberty interest protected by due process). Accordingly, we proceed on the assumption that the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to the loss of the good time credits involved here, and direct our inquiry to the nature of the constitutionally required procedures. Where a prison disciplinary hearing may result in the loss of good time credits, Wolff held that the inmate must receive: (1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. 418 U. S., at 563-567. Although Wolff did not require either judicial review or a specified quantum of evidence to support the factfinder’s decision, the Court did note that “the provision for a written record helps to assure that administrators, faced with possible scrutiny by state officials and the public, and perhaps even the courts, where fundamental human rights may have been abridged, will act fairly.” Id., at 565. We now hold that revocation of good time does not comport with “the minimum requirements of procedural due process,” id., at 558, unless the findings of the prison disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in the record. The requirements of due process are flexible and depend on a balancing of the interests affected by the relevant government action. E. g., Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961). Where a prisoner has a liberty interest in good time credits, the loss of such credits threatens his prospective freedom from confinement by extending the length of imprisonment. Thus the inmate has a strong interest in assuring that the loss of good time credits is not imposed arbitrarily. 418 U. S., at 561. This interest, however, must be accommodated in the distinctive setting of a prison, where disciplinary proceedings “take place in a closed, tightly controlled environment peopled by those who have chosen to violate the criminal law and who have been lawfully incarcerated for doing so.” Ibid. Consequently, in identifying the safeguards required by due process, the Court has recognized the legitimate institutional needs of assuring the safety of inmates and prisoners, avoiding burdensome administrative requirements that might be susceptible to manipulation, and preserving the disciplinary process as a means of rehabilitation. See, e. g., Ponte v. Real, 471 U. S. 491 (1985); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U. S. 308, 321-322 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, at 562-563. Requiring a modicum of evidence to support a decision to revoke good time credits will help to prevent arbitrary deprivations without threatening institutional interests or imposing undue administrative burdens. In a variety of contexts, the Court has recognized that a governmental decision resulting in the loss of an important liberty interest violates due process if the decision is not supported by any evidence. See, e. g., Douglas v. Buder, 412 U. S. 430, 432 (1973) (per curiam) (revocation of probation); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232, 239 (1957) (denial of admission to bar); United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U. S. 103, 106 (1927) (deportation). Because the written statement mandated by Wolff requires a disciplinary board to explain the evidence relied upon, recognizing that due process requires some evidentiary basis for a decision to revoke good time credits will not impose significant new burdens on proceedings within the prison. Nor does it imply that a disciplinary board’s factual findings or decisions with respect to appropriate punishment are subject to second-guessing upon review. We hold that the requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board to revoke good time credits. This standard is met if “there was some evidence from which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced . . . .” United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U. S., at 106. Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board. See ibid.; United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U. S. 131, 133-134 (1924); Willis v. Ciccone, 506 F. 2d 1011, 1018 (CA8 1974). We decline to adopt a more stringent evidentiary standard as a constitutional requirement. Prison disciplinary proceedings take place in a highly charged atmosphere, and prison administrators must often act swiftly on the basis of evidence that might be insufficient in less exigent circumstances. See Wolff, 418 U. S., at 562-563, 567-569. The fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Due Process Clause does not require courts to set aside decisions of prison administrators that have some basis in fact. Revocation of good time credits is not comparable to a criminal conviction, id., at 556, and neither the amount of evidence necessary to support such a conviction, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979), nor any other standard greater than some evidence applies in this context. IV Turning to the facts of this case, we conclude that the evidence before the disciplinary board was sufficient to meet the requirements imposed by the Due Process Clause. The disciplinary board received evidence in the form of testimony from the prison guard and copies of his written report. That evidence indicated that the guard heard some commotion and, upon investigating, discovered an inmate who evidently had just been assaulted. The guard saw three other inmates fleeing together down an enclosed walkway. No other inmates were in the area. The Supreme Judicial Court found that this evidence was constitutionally insufficient because it did not support an inference that more than one person had struck the victim or that either of the respondents was the assailant or otherwise participated in the assault. 392 Mass., at 203-204, 466 N. E. 2d, at 822. This conclusion, however, misperceives the nature of the evidence required by the Due Process Clause. The Federal Constitution does not require evidence that logically precludes any conclusion but the one reached by the disciplinary board. Instead, due process in this context requires only that there be some evidence to support the findings made in the disciplinary hearing. Although the evidence in this case might be characterized as meager, and there was no direct evidence identifying any one of three inmates as the assailant, the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary. Respondents relied only upon the Federal Constitution, and did not claim that the disciplinary board’s findings failed to meet evidentiary standards imposed by state law. See id., at 199, n. 2, 466 N. E. 2d, at 819, n. 2; Brief for Respondents 17. Because the determination of the disciplinary board was not so lacking in evidentiary support as to violate due process, the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. If the case arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, note the source as "United States Supreme Court". If the case arose in a state court, note the source as "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", or "State Trial Court". Do not code the name of the state.
What is the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed?
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of Appeals, Ninth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)", "Alabama Middle U.S. District Court", "Alabama Northern U.S. District Court", "Alabama Southern U.S. District Court", "Alaska U.S. District Court", "Arizona U.S. District Court", "Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court", "Arkansas Western U.S. District Court", "California Central U.S. District Court", "California Eastern U.S. District Court", "California Northern U.S. District Court", "California Southern U.S. District Court", "Colorado U.S. District Court", "Connecticut U.S. District Court", "Delaware U.S. District Court", "District Of Columbia U.S. District Court", "Florida Middle U.S. District Court", "Florida Northern U.S. District Court", "Florida Southern U.S. District Court", 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Court", "Florida U.S. District Court", "Arkansas U.S. District Court", "District of Orleans U.S. District Court", "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", "State Trial Court", "Eastern Circuit (of the United States)", "Middle Circuit (of the United States)", "Southern Circuit (of the United States)", "Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama", "Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas", "California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California", "Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut", "Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware", "Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida", "Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia", "Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois", "Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana", "Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa", "Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas", "Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of 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Rhode Island", "South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina", "Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee", "Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas", "Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont", "Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia", "West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia", "Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin", "Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming", "Circuit Court of the District of Columbia", "Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska", "Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado", "Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington", "Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho", "Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana", "Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah", "South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota", "North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota", "Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma", "Court of Private Land Claims" ]
[ 157 ]
sc
UNITED STATES v. UNITED STATES GYPSUM CO. ET AL. No. 76-1560. Argued March 1, 1978 Decided June 29, 1978 Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BreNNAN, Marshall, and White, JJ., joined; in all but Part IV of which Stewart, J., joined; in Parts I, II, V, and a portion of Part III of which Powell, J., joined; in»Part I and a portion of Part V of which RehNquist, J., joined; and in all but Part II of which SteveNS, J., joined. Powell, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, post, p. 469. Rehnquist, J., post, p. 471, and Stevens, J., post, p. 474, filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part. Blackmun, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Deputy Solicitor General Friedman argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Shenefield, Frank H. Easterbrook, Robert B, Nicholson, Rodney 0. Thorson, and Robert J. Wiggers. H. Francis DeLone, W. Donald McSweeney, and Fred H. Barilit, Jr., argued the cause for respondents. With them on the briefs were Stephen A. Stack, Jr., Mari M. Gursky, William A. Montgomery, Joseph R. Lundy, Thomas A. Gotts-chalk, Robert C. Keck, James G. Hiering, Cloyd R. Mellott, William B. Mállin, J. Gary Kosinski, D. Richard Funk, Clark M. Cliff ord, Carson M. Glass, and Thomas Richard Spradlin. A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for their respective States by Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General of California, Sanford N. Grushin, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Warren J. Abbott, Assistant Attorney General, and Michael I. Spiegel and Charles M. Kagay, Deputy Attorneys General; William J. Baxley, Attorney General of Alabama, and Thomas Troy Zieman, Jr., Jerry L. Weidler, and Susan Beth Farmer, Assistant Attorneys General; Bruce E. Babbitt, Attorney General of Arizona, and Alison B. Swan, Assistant Attorney General; J. D. McFarlane, Attorney General of Colorado, and Robert F. Hill, First Assistant Attorney General; Carl R. Afelio, Attorney General of Connecticut; Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General of Indiana; Curt Schneider, Attorney General of Kansas, and Thomas W. Regan, Assistant Attorney General; William J. Guste, Jr^ Attorney General of Louisiana; Francis B. Burch, Attorney General of Maryland; John Ashcroft, Attorney General of Missouri; William F. Hyland, Attorney General of New Jersey; Toney Anaya, Attorney General of New Mexico; Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, and John M. Desiderio, Assistant Attorney General; Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General of North Carolina, and David S. Crump, Special Deputy Attorney General; James A. Redden, Attorney General of Oregon, and Stephen L. Dunne; John L. Hill, Attorney General of Texas; Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General of Utah; M. Jerome Diamond, Attorney General of Vermont; Anthony F. Troy, Attorney General of Virginia; Slade Gorton, Attorney General of Washington, and Thomas L. Boeder, Assistant Attorney General; Bronson C. LaFollette, Attorney General of Wisconsin, and Michael L. Zaleski, Assistant Attorney General. Stanley T. Kaleczyc, Lawrence B. Kraus, and Stephen A. Bokat filed a brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as amicus curiae. Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion, of the Court. ' This case presents the following questions: (a) whether intent is an element of a criminal antitrust offense; (b) whether an exchange of price information for purposes of compliance with the Robinson-Patman Act is exempt from Sherman Act scrutiny; (c) the adequacy of jury instructions on membership in and withdrawal from the alleged conspiracy; and (d) the propriety of an ex parte meeting between the trial judge and the foreman of the jury. I Gypsum board, a laminated type of wallboard composed of paper, vinyl, or other specially treated coverings over a gypsum core, has in the last 30 years substantially replaced wet plaster as the primary component of interior walls and ceilings in residential and commercial construction. The product is essentially fungible; differences in price, credit terms, and delivery services largely dictate the purchasers’ choice between competing suppliers. Overall demand, however, is governed by the level of construction activity and is only marginally affected by price fluctuations. The gypsum board industry is highly concentrated, with the number of producers ranging from 9 to 15 in the period 1960-1973. The eight largest companies accounted for some 94% of the national sales with the seven “single-plant producers” accounting for the remaining 6%. Most of the major producers and a large number of the single-plant producers are members of the Gypsum Association which since 1930 has served as a trade association of gypsum board manufacturers. A Beginning in 1966, the Justice Department, as well as the Federal Trade Commission, became involved in investigations into possible antitrust violations in the gypsum board industry. In 1971, a grand jury was empaneled and the investigation continued for an additional 28 months. In late 1973, an indictment was filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania charging six major manufacturers and various of their corporate officials with violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § l. The indictment charged that the defendants had engaged in a combination and conspiracy “[b] eginning sometime prior to 1960 and continuing thereafter at least until sometime in 1973,” App. 34, in restraint of interstate trade and commerce in the manufacture and sale of gypsum board. The alleged combination and conspiracy consisted of: “[A] continuing agreement understanding and concert of action among the defendants and co-conspirators to (a) raise, fix, maintain and stabilize the prices of gypsum board; (b) fix, maintain and stabilize the terms and conditions of sale thereof; and (c) adopt and maintain uniform methods of packaging and handling such gypsum board.” Ibid. The indictment proceeded to specify some 13 types of actions taken by conspirators “[i]n formulating and effectuating” the combination and conspiracy, the most relevant of which, for our purposes, is specification (h) which alleged that the conspirators “telephoned or otherwise contacted one another to exchange and discuss current and future published or market prices and published or standard terms and conditions of sale and to ascertain alleged deviations therefrom.” The bill of particulars provided additional details about the continuing nature of the alleged exchanges of competitive information and the role played by such exchanges in policing adherence to the various other illegal agreements charged. B The first skirmish in the protracted litigation of this case was a motion for dismissal filed by the defendants alleging that their due process rights had been denied because of unreasonable preindictment delay. The District Court, after holding a five-day evidentiary hearing on the motion, concluded that there was “no evidence of unreasonable delay on the part of the Government,” 383 F. Supp. 462, 470 (WD Pa. 1974), and that the defendants were not “prejudiced to any extraordinary degree whatsoever by the chain of events leading to this indictment.” Ibid. The District Court denied a motion to dismiss the indictment. Thereafter nine of the defendants entered pleas of nolo contendere and were sentenced. The trial of the remaining seven defendants commenced on March 3, 1975, and lasted some 19 weeks. The focus of the Government’s price-fixing case at trial was interseller price verification — that is, the practice allegedly followed by the gypsum board manufacturers of telephoning a competing producer to determine the price currently being offered on gypsum board to a specific customer. The Government contended that these price exchanges were part of an agreement among the defendants, had the effect of stabilizing prices and policing agreed-upon price increases, and were undertaken on a frequent basis until sometime in 1973. Defendants disputed both the scope and duration of the verification activities, and further maintained that those exchanges of price information which did occur were for the purposes of complying with the Robinson-Patman Act and preventing customer fraud. These purposes, in defendants’ view, brought the disputed communications among competitors within a “controlling circumstance” exception to Sherman Act liability— at the extreme, precluding, as a matter of law, consideration of verification by the jury in determining defendants’ guilt on the price-fixing charge, and at the minimum, making the defendants’ purposes in engaging in such communications a threshold factual question. The instructions on the verification issue given by the trial judge provided that if the exchanges of price information were deemed by the jury to have been undertaken “in a good faith effort to comply with the Robinson-Patman Act,” verification standing alone would not be sufficient to establish an illegal price-fixing agreement. The paragraphs immediately following, however, provided that the purpose was essentially irrelevant if the jury found that the effect of verification was to raise, fix, maintain, or stabilize prices. The instructions on verification closed with the observation: “The law presumes that a person intends the necessary and natural consequences of his acts. Therefore, if the effect of the exchanges of pricing information was to raise, fix, maintain, and stabilize prices, then the parties to them are presumed, as a matter of law, to have intended that result.” The aspects of the charge dealing with the Government's burden in linking a particular defendant to the conspiracy, and the kinds of evidence the jury could properly consider in determining if one or more of the alleged conspirators had withdrawn from or abandoned the conspiracy were also a subject of some dispute between the judge and defense counsel. On the former, the disagreement was essentially over the proper specificity of the charge. Defendants requested a charge directing the jury to determine “what kind of agreement or understanding, if any, existed as to each defendant” before any could be found to be a member of the conspiracy. The trial judge was unwilling to give this precise instruction and instead emphasized at several points in the charge the jury's obligation to consider the evidence regarding the involvement of each defendant individually, and to find, as a precondition to liability, that each defendant was a knowing participant in the alleged conspiracy. On the matter of withdrawal from the conspiracy, defendants sought an instruction stating explicitly that evidence of vigorous price competition during the period covered by the indictment could be considered by the jury as indicating abandonment of the charged conspiracy by one or more of the defendants. Substantial evidence on this subject had been presented by the defendants in the course of the trial. The judge again was unwilling to accept defendants’ construction of the applicable law and substituted an instruction specifying that withdrawal had to be established by either affirmative notice to each other member of the conspiracy or by disclosure of the illegal enterprise to law enforcement officials. The trial judge allowed the defendants to argue their theory of withdrawal to the jury despite his unwillingness to refer to it explicitly in his charge. C The jury retired to deliberate early on the evening of Tuesday, July 8, 1975. Supplemental instructions were given in response to questions from the jury on Wednesday and Thursday, and the hours of deliberation were shortened on Friday after the court was informed that some of the jurors were exhausted and not feeling well. On Saturday, after responding to further requests from-the jury, the judge, sua sponte, in open court, used the supplemental instruction approved by the Court of Appeals to remind the jurors of their obligation to continue the deliberations. Essentially the same instruction was given to the jury again on Sunday, after the judge had received a note detailing the jury’s inability to reach a unanimous verdict. On Monday, the court received yet another note from the jury, this time stating that the foreman wished to “discuss the condition of the Jury” and to seek “further guidance” from the judge. The judge suggested to counsel that he confer privately with the foreman and that a transcript of the meeting be kept but impounded. The judge indicated that if his suggestion was rejected he would simply deny the foreman’s request for the meeting. In response to questions from counsel, the judge stated that the purpose of the meeting would be to determine if the jury was in serious physical condition, and he further indicated that no instructions on the law would be given to the foreman without calling in the jury and instructing them in open court with counsel present. After further discussion, all counsel agreed, albeit somewhat reluctantly, to the proposed meeting. Most of the discussion between the jury foreman and the judge concerned the deteriorating state of health of the jurors after almost five months on the case followed by five days of intensive deliberations and the existence of personality conflicts among the members of the panel. The foreman also stressed at least twice during the conversation with the judge his belief that the jury was unable to reach a verdict and that further discussion would not eliminate the disagreements which existed. The judge indicated that while he would take into consideration what the foreman had said, he wanted the jury to continue its deliberations. Near the close of the meeting, the following colloquy took place: “The Court. I would like to ask the jurors to continue their deliberations and I will take into consideration what you have told me. That is all I can say. “Mr. Russell. I appreciate it. It is a situation I don’t know how to help you get what you are after. “The Court. Oh, I am not after anything. “Mr. Russell. You are after a verdict one way or the other. “The Court. Which way it goes doesn’t make any difference to me.” Shortly thereafter, the foreman returned to the jury room and deliberations continued. The judge then informed counsel, in abbreviated fashion, what had transpired at the meeting with the foreman, and of his direction that the deliberations continue. Defense counsel asked to see the transcript of the in camera meeting and moved for a mistrial because of the jury’s apparent deadlock. These requests were denied, although the judge indicated that if no verdict were rendered by the following Friday, he would then reconsider the mistrial motions. The following morning, the jury returned guilty verdicts against each of the defendants. D The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the convictions. 550 F. 2d 115 (1977). The panel was unanimous in its rejection of the claim of preindictment delay, but divided over the proper disposition of the remaining issues. Two judges agreed that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that an effect on prices resulting from an agreement to exchange price information made out a Sherman Act violation regardless of whether respondents’ sole purpose in engaging in such exchanges was to establish a defense to price-discrimination charges. Instead, they regarded such a purpose, if certain conditions were met, as constituting a “controlling circumstance” which, under United States v. Container Corp., 393 U. S. 333 (1969), would excuse what might otherwise constitute an antitrust violation. One judge considered the instructions regarding the purpose and scope of the conspiracy and the kinds of conduct necessary to demonstrate a withdrawal therefrom to be infirm, while another concluded that the convictions should be reversed because the trial judge “improperly induced” the jury into reaching a verdict during the in camera conversation with the foreman. One judge, in dissent, would have sustained the convictions. He regarded the charge on verification to be consistent with Container Corp., and rejected the notion that the Robinson-Patman Act required the exchange of price information even in the limited circumstances identified by the majority. Neither of the alleged infirmities in the general conspiracy instructions, in his view, afforded any basis for reversal, and he disagreed with the characterization of the trial judge’s conduct as coercing a verdict. We granted certiorari, 434 U. S. 815 (1977), and we affirm. II We turn first to consider the jury instructions regarding the elements of the price-fixing offense charged in the indictment. Although the trial judge’s instructions on the price-fixing issue are not without ambiguity, it seems reasonably clear that he regarded an effect on prices as the crucial element of the charged offense. The jury was instructed that if it found interseller verification had the effect of raising, fixing, maintaining, or stabilizing the price of gypsum board, then such verification could be considered as evidence of an agreement to so affect prices. They were further charged, and it is this point which gives rise to our present concern, that “if the effect of the exchanges of pricing information was to raise, fix, maintain, and stabilize prices, then the parties to them are presumed, as a matter of law, to have intended that result.” App. 1722. (Emphasis added.) The Government characterizes this charge as entirely consistent with “this Court’s long-standing rule that an agreement among sellers to exchange information on current offering prices violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act if it has either the purpose or the effect of stabilizing prices,” Reply Brief for United States 1, and relies primarily on our decision in United States v. Container Corp., supra, a civil case, to support its position. See also American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377 (1921); United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U. S. 371 (1923); Maple Flooring Mfg. Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 563 (1925); Cement Mfrs. Protective Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 588 (1925). In this view, the trial court’s instructions would not be erroneous, even if interpreted, as they were by the Court of Appeals, to direct the jury to convict if it found that verification had an effect on prices, regardless of the purpose of the respondents. The Court of Appeals rejected the Government’s “effects alone” test, holding instead that in certain limited circumstances, a purpose of complying with the Robinson-Patman Act would constitute a controlling circumstance excusing Sherman Act liability, and hence an instruction allowing the jury to ignore purpose could not be sustained. We agree with the Court of Appeals that an effect on prices, without more, will not support a criminal conviction under the Sherman Act, but we do not base that conclusion on the existence of any conflict between the requirements of the Robinson-Patman and the Sherman Acts. Rather, we hold that a defendant’s state of mind or intent is an element of a criminal antitrust offense which must be established by evidence and inferences drawn therefrom and cannot be taken from the trier of fact through reliance on a legal presumption of wrongful intent from proof of an effect on prices. Cf. Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 274-275 (1952). Since the challenged instruction, as we read it, had this prohibited effect, it is disapproved. We are unwilling to construe the Sherman Act as mandating a regime of strict-liability criminal offenses. A We start with the familiar proposition that “[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.” Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, 500 (1951). See also United States v. Freed, 401 U. S. 601, 613 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); United States v. Balint, 258 U. S. 250, 251-253 (1922). In a much-cited passage in Morissette v. United States, supra, at 250-251, Mr. Justice Jackson speaking for the Court observed: “The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil. A relation between some mental element and punishment for a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child’s familiar exculpatory 'But I didn’t mean to,’ and has afforded the rational basis for a tardy and unfinished substitution of deterrence and reformation in place of retaliation and vengeance as the motivation for public prosecution. Unqualified acceptance of this doctrine by English common law in the Eighteenth Century was indicated by Blackstone’s sweeping statement that to constitute any crime there must first be a Vicious will.’ ” (Footnotes omitted.) Although Blackstone’s requisite “vicious will” has been replaced by more sophisticated and less colorful characterizations of the mental state required to support criminality, see ALI, Model Penal Code § 2.02 (Prop. Off. Draft 1962), intent generally remains an indispensable element of a criminal offense. This is as true in a sophisticated criminal antitrust case as in one involving any other criminal offense. This Court, in keeping with the common-law tradition and with the general injunction that “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity,” Rends v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 812 (1971), has on a number of occasions read a state-of-mind component into an offense even when the statutory definition did not in terms so provide. See, e. g., Morissette v. United States, supra. Cf. Lambert v. California, 355 U. S. 225 (1957). Indeed, the holding in Morissette can be fairly read as establishing, at least with regard to crimes having their origin in the common law, an interpretative presumption that mens rea is required. “[M]ere omission ... of intent [in the statute] will not be construed as eliminating that element from the crimes denounced”; instead Congress will be presumed to have legislated against the background of our traditional legal concepts which render intent a critical factor, and “absence of contrary direction [will] be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from them.” 342 U. S., at 263. While strict-liability offenses are not unknown to the criminal law and do not invariably offend constitutional requirements, see Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U. S. 57 (1910), the limited circumstances in which Congress has created and this Court has recognized such offenses, see e. g., United States v. Balint, supra; United States v. Behrman, 258 U. S. 280 (1922); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U. S. 277 (1943); United States v. Freed, supra, attest to their generally disfavored status. See generally ALI, Model Penal Code, Comment on § 2.05, p. 140 (Tent. Draft No. 4,1955); W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law 222-223 (1972). Certainly far more than the simple omission of the appropriate phrase from the statutory definition is necessary to justify dispensing with an intent requirement. In the context of the Sherman Act, this generally inhospitable attitude to non-mens rea offenses is reinforced by an array of considerations arguing against treating antitrust violations as strict-liability crimes. B The Sherman Act, unlike most traditional criminal statutes, does not, in clear and categorical terms, precisely identify the conduct which it proscribes. Both civil remedies and criminal sanctions are authorized with regard to the same generalized definitions of the conduct proscribed — restraints of trade or commerce and illegal monopolization — without reference to or mention of intent or state of mind. Nor has judicial elaboration of the Act always yielded the clear and definitive rules of conduct which the statute omits; instead open-ended and fact-specific standards like the “rule of reason” have been applied to broad classes of conduct falling within the purview of the Act’s general provisions. See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 60 (1911); United States v. Topeo Associates, 405 U. S. 596, 607 (1972); Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36, 49 (1977). Simply put, the Act has not been interpreted as if it were primarily a criminal statute; it has been construed to have a “generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions.” Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344, 359-360 (1933). See generally 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law § 310 (1978). Although in Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 376-378 (1913), the Court held that the indeterminacy of the Sherman Act’s standards did not constitute a fatal constitutional objection to their criminal enforcement, nevertheless, this factor has been deemed particularly relevant by those charged with enforcing the Act in accommodating its criminal and remedial sanctions. The 1955 Report of the Attorney General’s National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws concluded that the criminal provisions of the Act should be reserved for those circumstances where the law was relatively clear and the conduct egregious: “The Sherman Act, inevitably perhaps, is couched in language broad and general. Modern business patterns moreover are so complex that market effects of proposed conduct are only imprecisely predictable. Thus, it may be difficult for today’s businessman to tell in advance whether projected actions will run afoul of the Sherman Act’s criminal strictures. With this hazard in mind, we believe that criminal process should be used only where the law is clear and the facts reveal a flagrant offense and plain intent unreasonably to restrain trade.” Report of the Attorney General’s National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws 349 (1955). The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department took a similar, though slightly more moderate, position in its enforcement guidelines issued contemporaneously with the 1955 Report of the Attorney General's Committee: “In general, the following types of offenses are prosecuted criminally: (1) price fixing; (2) other violations of the Sherman Act where there is proof of a specific intent to restrain trade or to monopolize; (3) a less easily defined category of cases which might generally be described as involving proof of use of predatory practices (boycotts for example) to accomplish the objective of the combination or conspiracy; (4) the fact that a defendant has previously been convicted of or adjudged to have been, violating the antitrust laws may warrant indictment for a second offense. . . . The Division feels free to seek an indictment in any case where a prospective defendant has knowledge that practices similar to those in which he is engaging have been held to be in violation of the Sherman Act in a prior civil suit against other persons.” Id., at 350. While not dispositive of the question now before us, the recommendations of the Attorney General’s Committee and the guidelines promulgated by the Justice Department highlight the same basic concerns which are manifested in our general requirement of mens rea in criminal statutes and suggest that these concerns are at least equally salient in the antitrust context. Close attention to the type of conduct regulated by the Sherman Act buttresses this conclusion. With certain exceptions for conduct regarded as per se illegal because of its unquestionably anticompetitive effects, see, e. g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150 (1940), the behavior proscribed by the Act is often difficult to distinguish from the gray zone of socially acceptable and economically justifiable business conduct. Indeed, the type of conduct charged in the indictment in this case — the exchange of price information among competitors — is illustrative in this regard. The imposition of criminal liability on a corporate official, or for that matter on a corporation directly, for engaging in such conduct which only after the fact.is determined to violate the statute because of anticompetitive effects, without inquiring into the intent with which it was undertaken, holds out the distinct possibility of overdeterrence; salutary and procompetitive conduct lying close to the borderline of impermissible conduct might be shunned by businessmen who chose to be excessively cautious in the face of uncertainty regarding possible exposure to criminal punishment for even a good-faith error of judgment. See 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law 29 (1978); R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 78 (1978); Kadish, Some Observations On the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 423, 441-442 (1963). Further, the use of criminal sanctions in such circumstances would be difficult to square with the generally-accepted functions of the criminal law. See Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 401, 422-425 (1958); ALI, Model Penal Code, Comment on §2.05, p. 140 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). The criminal sanctions would be used, not to punish conscious and calculated wrongdoing at odds with statutory proscriptions, but instead simply to regulate business practices regardless of the intent with which they were undertaken.— While in certain cases we have imputed a regulatory purpose to Congress in choosing to employ criminal sanctions, see, e. g., United States v. Balint, 258 U. S. 250 (1922), the availability of a range of nonpenal alternatives to the criminal sanctions of the Sherman Act negates the imputation of any such purpose to Congress in the instant context. See generally Baker, To Indict or Not To Indict: Prosecutorial Discretion in Sherman Act Enforcement, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 405 (1978). For these reasons, we conclude that the criminal offenses defined by the Sherman Act should be construed as including intent as an element. C Having concluded that intent is a necessary element of a criminal antitrust violation, the task remaining is to treat the practical aspects of this requirement. As we have noted, the language of the Act provides minimal assistance in determining what standard of intent is appropriate, and the sparse legislative history of the criminal provisions is similarly unhelpful. We must therefore turn to more general sources and traditional understandings of the nature of the element of intent in the criminal law. In so doing, we must try to avoid “the variety, disparity and confusion” of judicial definitions of the “requisite but elusive mental élement” of criminal offenses. Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S., at 252. The ALI Model Penal Code is one source of guidance upon which the Court has relied to illuminate questions of this type. Cf. Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6, 46 n. 93 (1969) ; Turner v. United States, 396 U. S. 398, 416 n. 29 (1970). Recognizing that “mens rea is not a unitary concept,” United States v. Freed, 401 U. S., at 613 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment), the Code enumerates four possible levels of intent — purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. In dealing with the kinds of business decisions upon which the antitrust laws focus, the concepts of recklessness and negligence have no place. Our question instead is whether a criminal violation of the antitrust laws requires, in addition to proof of anticompetitive effects, a demonstration that the disputed conduct was undertaken with the “conscious object” of producing such effects, or whether it is sufficient that the conduct is shown to have been undertaken with knowledge that the proscribed effects would most likely follow. While the difference between these formulations is a narrow one, see ALI, Model Penal Code, Comment on § 2.02, p. 125 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955), we conclude that action undertaken with knowledge of its probable consequences and having the requisite anticompetitive effects can be a sufficient predicate for a finding of criminal liability under the antitrust laws. Several considerations fortify this conclusion. The element of intent in the criminal law has traditionally been viewed as a bifurcated concept embracing either the specific requirement of purpose or the more general one of knowledge or awareness. “[I]t is now generally accepted that a person who acts (or omits to act) intends a result of his act (or omission) under two quite different circumstances: (1) when he consciously desires that result, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct; and (2) when he knows that the result is practically certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result.” W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law 196 (1972). See also G. Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part §§ 16, 18 (2d ed. 1961); Cook, Act, Intention, and Motive in the Criminal Law, 26 Yale L. J. 645, 653-658 (1917); Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 905, 910-911 (1939). Generally this limited distinction between knowledge and purpose has not been considered important since “there is good reason for imposing liability whether the defendant desired or merely knew of the practical certainty of' the results.” LaFave & Scott, supra, at 197. See also ALI, Model Penal Code, Comment on § 2.02, p. 125 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). In either circumstance, the defendants are consciously behaving in a way the law prohibits, and such conduct is a fitting object of criminal punishment. See 1 Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws 124 (1970). Nothing in our analysis of the Sherman Act persuades us that this general understanding of intent should not be applied to criminal antitrust violations such as charged here. The business behavior which is likely to give rise to criminal antitrust charges is conscious behavior normally undertaken only after a full consideration of the desired results and a weighing of the costs, benefits, and risks. A requirement of proof not only of this knowledge of likely effects, but also of a conscious desire to bring them to fruition or to violate the law would seem, particularly in such a context, both unnecessarily cumulative and unduly burdensome. Where carefully planned and calculated conduct is being scrutinized in the context of a criminal prosecution, the perpetrator’s knowledge of the anticipated consequences is a sufficient predicate for a finding of criminal intent. D When viewed in terms of this standard, the jury instructions on the price-fixing charge cannot be sustained. “A conclusive presumption [of intent] which testimony could not overthrow would effectively eliminate intent as an ingredient of the offense.” Morissette, supra, at 275. The challenged jury instruction, as we read it, had precisely this effect; the jury was told that the requisite intent followed, as a matter of law, from a finding that the exchange of price information had an impact on prices. Although an effect on prices may well support an inference that the defendant had knowledge of the probability of such a consequence at the time "he acted, the jury must remain free to consider additional evidence before accepting or rejecting the inference. Therefore, although it would be correct to instruct the jury that it may infer intent from an effect on prices, ultimately the decision on the issue of intent must be left to the trier of fact alone. The instruction given invaded this factfinding function. III Our construction of the Sherman Act to require proof of intent as an element of a criminal antitrust violation leaves unresolved the question upon which the Court of Appeals focused, whether verification of price concessions with competitors for the sole purpose of taking advantage of the § 2 (b) meeting-competition defense should be treated as a “controlling circumstance” precluding liability under § 1 of the Sherman Act. We now turn to that question. A In Cement Mfrs. Protective Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 588 (1925), the Court held exempt from Sherman Act § 1 liability an exchange of price information among competitors because the exchange of information was necessary to protect the cement manufacturers from fraudulent behavior by contractors. Over 40 years later, in United States v. Container Corp., 393 U. S., at 335, Mr. Justice Douglas characterized the Cement holding in the following terms: “While there was present here, as in Cement Mfrs. Protective Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 588, an exchange of prices to specific customers, there was absent the controlling circumstance, viz., that cement manufacturers, to protect themselves from delivering to contractors more cement than was needed for a specific job and thus receiving a lower price, exchanged price information as a means of protecting their legal rights from fraudulent inducements to deliver more cement than needed for a specific job.” The use of the phrase “controlling circumstance” in Container Corp. implied that the exception from Sherman Act liability recognized in Cement Mfrs. was not necessarily limited to the special circumstances of that case, although the exact scope of the exception remained largely undefined. Since Container Corp., several courts have read the controlling-circumstance exception as encompassing exchanges of price information when undertaken for the purpose of compliance with § 2 (b) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. See, e. g., Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F. 2d 175, 181-182 (CA10 1972); Wall Products Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp. 295, 312-315 (ND Cal. 1971). The Court of Appeals in the instant case essentially adopted the same tack — albeit with some additional limitations — finding such a step necessary to eliminate a perceived conflict between the Sherman Act’s proscriptions regarding the exchange of price information among competitors and the claimed necessity of such exchanges to perfect the § 2 (b) defense. The Government challenges that resolution on two grounds: first, that there is no general controlling-circumstance exception to the Sherman Act, and second, that, in any event, there is no conflict between the two antitrust statutes which would require the prohibitions of the Sherman Act to be tempered even to the degree mandated by the Court of Appeals’ carefully circumscribed holding in this case. We agree generally with the Government as to the proper accommodation of the Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts, and therefore find it unnecessary to address the more general question going to the existence and proper scope of the so-called controlling-circumstance exception. B Section 2 (a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 13 (a) (1976 ed.), embodies a general prohibition of price discrimination between buyers when an injury to competition is the consequence. The primary exception to the § 2 (a) bar is the meeting-competition defense which is incorporated as a proviso to the burden-of-proof requirements set out in § 2 (b): “Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima facie case thus made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor.” The role of the § 2 (b) proviso in tempering the § 2 (a) prohibition of price discrimination was highlighted in Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U. S. 231 (1951). There we recognized the potential tension between the rationales underlying the Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts and sought to effect a partial accommodation by construing § 2 (b) to provide an absolute defense to liability for price discrimination. “We need not now reconcile, in its entirety, the economic theory which underlies the Robinson-Patman Act with that of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. It is enough to say that Congress did not seek by the Robinson-Patman Act either to abolish competition or so radically to curtail it that a seller would have no substantial right of self-defense against a price raid by a competitor. For example, if a large customer requests his seller to meet a temptingly lower price offered to him by one of his seller’s competitors, the seller may well find it essential, as a matter of business survival, to meet that price rather than to lose the customer. . . . There is . . . plain language and established practice which permits a seller, through §2 (b), to retain a customer by realistically meeting in good faith the price offered to that customer, without necessarily changing the seller’s price to its other customers.” 340 U. S., at 249-250. In FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U. S. 746 (1945), the Court provided the first and still the most complete explanation of the kind of showing which a seller must make in order to satisfy the good-faith requirement of the § 2 (b) defense: “Section 2 (b) does not require the seller to justify price discriminations by showing that in fact they met a competitor’s price. But it does place on the seller the burden of showing that the price was made in good faith to meet a competitor’s. . . . We agree with the Commission that the statute at least requires the seller, who has knowingly discriminated in price, to show the existence of facts which would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that the granting of a lower price would in fact meet the equally low price of a competitor.” Id., at 759-760. Application of these standards to the facts in Staley led to the conclusion that the § 2 (b) defense had not been made out. The record revealed that the lower price had been based simply on reports óf salesmen, brokers, or purchasers with no efforts having been made by the seller “to investigate or verify” the reports or the character and reliability of the informants. 324 U. S., at 758. Similarly, in Corn Products Co. v. FTC, 324 U. S. 726 (1945), decided the same day, the § 2 (b) defense was not allowed because “[t]he only evidence said to rebut the prima jade case ... of the price discriminations was given by witnesses who had no personal knowledge of the transactions, and was limited to statements of each witness's assumption or conclusion that the price discriminations were justified by competition.” 324 U. S., at 741. Staley’s “investigate or verify” language coupled with Corn Products’ focus on “personal knowledge of the transactions” have apparently suggested to a number of courts that, at least in certain circumstances, direct verification of discounts between competitors may be necessary to meet the burden-of-proof requirements of the § 2 (b) defense. See Gray v. Shell Oil Co., 469 F. 2d 742, 746-747 (CA9 1972); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F. 2d, at 181-182; Webster v. Sinclair Refining Co., 338 F. Supp. 248, 251-252 (SD Ala. 1971); Wall Products Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp., at 312-315; Di-Wall, Inc. v. Fibreboard Corp., 1970 Trade Cases ¶ 73,155 (ND Cal. 1970). In none of these cases were the courts called upon to address directly the question of whether interseller verification was actually required to satisfy § 2 (b)’s good-faith standard; instead, the issue was presented only obliquely in the form of a defense to the alleged Sherman Act violation. The Belliston and Webster cases accepted the defense despite the absence of evidence that alternative means of corroborating the claimed price reduction had been exhausted, while the Gray and Wall Products courts found the communication between sellers permissible only after other alternatives had been exhausted. The Court of Appeals critically and perceptively analyzed these cases and concluded that only a very narrow exception to Sherman Act liability should be recognized; that exception would cover the relatively few situations where the- veracity of the buyer seeking the matching discount was legitimately in doubt, other reasonable means of corroboration were unavailable to the seller, and the interseller communication was for the sole purpose of complying with the Robinson-Patman Act. Despite the court’s efforts to circumscribe the scope of the exception it was constrained to recognize, we find its analysis unacceptable. C A good-faith belief, rather than absolute certainty, that a price concession is being offered to meet an equally low price offered by a competitor is sufficient to satisfy the § 2 (b) defense. While casual reliance on uncorroborated reports of buyers or sales representatives without further investigation may not, as we noted earlier, be sufficient to make the requisite showing of good faith, nothing in the language of § 2 (b) or the gloss on that language in Staley and Corn Products indicates that direct discussions of price between competitors are required. Nor has any court, so far as we are aware, ever imposed such a requirement. See Rowe, Pricing and the Robinson-Patman Act, 41 A. B. A. Antitrust L. J. 98, 100-102 (1971); ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments 145 n. 241 (1975). On the contrary, the § 2 (b) defense has been successfully invoked in the absence of interseller verification on numerous occasions, see, e. g., International Air Industries, Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F. 2d 714, 725-726 (CA5 1975); Cadigan v. Texaco, Inc., 492 F. 2d 383 (CA9 1974); Jones v. Borden Co., 430 F. 2d 568, 572-574 (CA5 1970); National Dairy Products Corp. v. FTC, 395 F. 2d 517, 523 (CA7 1968). And in Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F. 2d 1372, 1376-1377 (CA6 1971), aff'g Beatrice Foods Co., 76 F. T. C. 719 (1969), the defense was recognized despite the fact that the price concession was ultimately found to have undercut that of the competition and thus technically to have fallen outside the “meet not beat” strictures of the defense. As these cases indicate, and as the Federal Trade Commission observed, it is the concept of good faith which lies at the core of the meeting-competition defense, and good faith “is a flexible and pragmatic, not technical or doctrinaire, concept. . . . Rigid rules and inflexible absolutes are especially inappropriate in dealing with the § 2 (b) defense; the facts and circumstances of the particular case, not abstract theories or remote conjectures, should govern its interpretation and application.” Continental Baking Co., 63 F. T. C. 2071, 2163 (1963). The so-called problem of the untruthful buyer which concerned the Court of Appeals does not in our view call for a different approach to the § 2 (b) defense. The good-faith standard remains the benchmark against which the seller’s conduct is to be evaluated, and we agree with the Government and the FTC that this standard can be satisfied by efforts falling short of interseller verification in most circumstances where the seller has only vague, generalized doubts about the reliability of its commercial adversary — the buyer. Given the fact-specific nature of the inquiry, it is difficult to predict all the factors the FTC or a court would consider in appraising a seller’s good faith in matching a competing offer in these circumstances. Certainly, evidence that a seller had received reports of similar discounts from other customers, cf. Jones v. Borden Co., supra, at 572-573; or was threatened with a termination of purchases if the discount were not met, cf. International Air Industries, Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., supra, at 726; Cadigan v. Texaco, Inc., supra, at 386, would be relevant in this regard. Efforts to corroborate the reported discount by seeking documentary evidence or by appraising its reasonableness in terms of available market data would also be probative as would the seller’s past experience with the particular buyer in question. There remains the possibility that in a limited number of situations a seller may have substantial reasons to doubt the accuracy of reports of a competing offer and may be unable to corroborate such reports in any of the generally accepted ways. Thus the defense may be rendered unavailable since unanswered questions about the reliability of a buyer’s representations may well be inconsistent with a good-faith belief that a competing offer had in fact been made. As an abstract proposition, resort to interseller verification as a means of checking the buyer’s reliability seems a possible solution to the seller’s plight, but careful examination reveals serious problems with the practice. Both economic theory and common human experience suggest that interseller verification — if undertaken on an isolated and infrequent basis with no provision for reciprocity or cooperation — will not serve its putative function of corroborating the representations of unreliable buyers regarding the existence of competing offers. Price concessions by oligopolists generally yield competitive advantages only if secrecy can be maintained; when the terms of the concession are made publicly known, other competitors are likely to follow and any advantage to the initiator is lost in the process. See generally F. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 208-209, 449 (1970); P. Areeda, Antitrust Analysis 230-231 (2d ed. 1974); Note, Meeting Competition Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1476, 1480-1481 (1977). See also United States v. Container Corp., 393 U. S., at 337. Thus, if one seller offers a price concession for the purpose of winning over one of his competitor’s customers, it is unlikely that the same seller will freely inform its competitor of the details of the concession so that it can be promptly matched and diffused. Instead, such a seller would appear to have at least as great an incentive to misrepresent the existence or size of the discount as would the buyer who received it. Thus verification, if undertaken on a one-shot basis for the sole purpose of complying with the § 2 (b) defense, does not hold out much promise as a means of shoring up buyers’ representations. The other variety of interseller verification is, like the conduct charged in the instant case, undertaken pursuant to an agreement, either tacic or express, providing for reciprocity among competitors in the exchange of price information. Such an agreement would make little economic sense, in our view, if its sole purpose were to guarantee all participants the opportunity to match the secret price concessions of other participants under §2(b). For in such circumstances, each seller would know that his price concession could not be kept from his competitors and no seller participating in the information-exchange arrangement would, therefore, have any incentive for deviating from the prevailing price level in the industry. See United States v. Container Corp., supra, at 336-337. Regardless of its putative purpose, the most likely consequence of any such agreement to exchange price information would be the stabilization of industry prices. See Scherer, supra, at 449; Note, Antitrust Liability for an Exchange of Price Information — What Happened to Container Corp., 63 Va. L. Rev. 639, 666 (1977). Instead of facilitating use of the § 2 (b) defense, such an agreement would have the effect of eliminating the very price concessions which provide the main element of competition in oligopolistic industries and the primary occasion for resort to the meeting-competition defense. Especially in oligopolistic industries such as the gypsum board industry, the exchange of price information among competitors carries with it the added potential for the development of concerted price-fixing arrangements which lie at the core of the Sherman Act’s prohibitions. The Department of Justice’s 1977 Report on the Robinson-Patman Act focused on the growing use of the Act as a cover for price fixing; former Antitrust Division Assistant Attorney General Kauper discussed the mechanics of the process: “And thus you find in some industries relatively extensive exchanges of price information for the purpose, at least the stated purpose, of complying with the Robinson-Patman Act.... “Now, the mere exchange of price information itself may tend to stabilize prices. But I think it is also relatively common that once that exchange process begins, certain understandings go along with it — that we will exchange prices, but it will be understood, for example, you will not undercut my prices. “And from there it is a rather easy step into a full-fledged price-fixing agreement. I think we have seen that from time to time, and I suspect we will continue to see it as long as there continues to be a need to justify particular price discriminations in the terms of the Robinson-Patman Act.” United States Department of Justice, Report on the Robinson-Patman Act 58-61 (1977). We are left, therefore, on the one hand, with doubts about both the need for and the efficacy of interseller verification as a means of facilitating compliance with § 2 (b), and, on the other, with recognition of the tendency for price discussions between competitors to contribute to the stability of oligopo-listic prices and open the way for the growth of prohibited anticompetitive activity. To recognize even a limited “controlling circumstance” exception for interseller verification in such circumstances would be to remove from scrutiny under the Sherman Act conduct falling near its core with no assurance, and indeed with serious doubts, that competing antitrust policies would be served thereby. In Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U. S. 61, 74 (1953), the Court suggested that as a general rule the Robinson-Patman Act should be construed so as to insure its coherence with “the broader antitrust policies that have been laid down by Congress”; that observation buttresses our conclusion that exchanges of price information— even when putatively for purposes of Robinson-Patman Act compliance — must remain subject to close scrutiny under the Sherman Act. IV One judge of the Court of Appeals was of the view that reversal was required not only because of infirmities in the antitrust instruction, but also because the trial judge had “encroach [ed] on [the] jury[’s] authority” and had foreclosed “a possible (no verdict’ outcome.” 550 F. 2d, at 134 (Adams, J., concurring). Our own review of the record and the circumstances surrounding the deliberations of the jury, and in particular the ex parte communications between the judge and jury foreman, leads us to the same conclusion. After hearing a mass of testimony for nearly five months, the jurors were sequestered when deliberations commenced. On the second and third days of deliberations, supplemental instructions were given in response to jury questions; on the fourth day, the hours of deliberations were shortened because of reported nervous tension among the jurors; on the fifth day, the judge sua sponte delivered what amounted to a modified Allen charge in the course of providing further answers to questions from the jury; and on the sixth day, the modified Allen charge was repeated, this time in response to a note from the jury that it was unable to reach a verdict. Against this background of internal pressures and apparent disagreements and confusion among the jurors, the jury foreman, on the morning of the seventh day of deliberations, requested a meeting with the judge “to discuss the condition of the Jury and further guidance.” The District Judge suggested that he meet alone with the jury foreman and counsel acquiesced. The transcript of the meeting, which was initially impounded but released for purposes of the appeal, contained several references by the foreman to the jury's deadlock, as well as an exchange suggesting the strong likelihood that the foreman carried away from the meeting the impression that the judge wanted a verdict “one way or the other.” The judge’s report to counsel summarizing the discussion made no reference to either of these matters. We find this sequence of events disturbing for a number of reasons. Any ex parte meeting or communication between the judge and the foreman of a deliberating jury is pregnant with possibilities for error. This record amply demonstrates that even an experienced trial judge cannot be certain to avoid all the pitfalls inherent in such an enterprise. First, it is difficult to contain, much less to anticipate, the direction the conversation will take at such a meeting. Unexpected questions or comments can generate unintended and misleading impressions of the judge’s subjective personal views which have no place in his instruction to the jury — all the more so when counsel are not present to challenge the statements. Second, any occasion which leads to communication with the whole jury panel through one juror inevitably risks innocent misstatements of the law and misinterpretations despite the undisputed good faith of the participants. Here, there developed a set of circumstances in which it can fairly be assumed that the foreman undertook to restate to his fellow jurors what he understood the judge to have implied regarding the resolution of the case in a definite verdict “one way or the other.” There is, of course, no way to determine precisely what the foreman said when he returned to the jury room. Finally, the absence of counsel from the meeting and the unavailability of a transcript or full report of the meeting aggravate the problems of having one juror serve as a conduit for communicating instructions to the whole panel. While all counsel acquiesced to the judge’s ex parte conference with the jury foreman, they did so on the express understanding that the judge merely intended — as no doubt at the time he did — to receive from the foreman a report on the state of affairs in the jury room and the prospects for a verdict. Certainly none of the parties waived the right to a full and accurate report of what transpired at the meeting nor did they agree that the judge was to repeat the instructions as to his understandable reluctance to accept the jury’s inability to reach a verdict. Because neither counsel received a full report from the judge, they were not aware of the scope of the conversation between the foreman and the judge, of the judge’s statement that the jury should continue to deliberate in order to reach a verdict, or of the real risk that the foreman’s impression was that a verdict “one way or the other” was required. Counsel were thus denied any opportunity to clear up the confusion regarding the judge’s direction to the foreman, which could readily have been accomplished by requesting that the whole jury be called into the courtroom for a clarifying instruction. See Rogers v. United States, 422 U. S. 35, 38 (1975); Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co., 250 U. S. 76, 81 (1919). Thus, it is not simply the action of the judge in having the private meeting with the jury foreman, standing alone — undesirable as that procedure is — which constitutes the error; rather, it is the fact that the ex parte discussion was inadvertently allowed to drift into what amounted to a supplemental instruction to the foreman relating to the jury’s obligation to return a verdict, coupled with the fact that counsel were denied any chance to correct whatever mistaken impression the foreman might have taken from this conversation, that we find most troubling. While it is, of course, impossible to gauge what part the disputed meeting played in the jury’s action of returning a verdict the following morning, this swift resolution of the issues in the face of positive prior indications of hopeless deadlock, at the very least, gives rise to serious questions in this regard. Cf. Rogers v. United States, supra, at 40-41. In Jenkins v. United States, 380 U. S. 445 (1965), we held an instruction directing the jury that it had to reach a verdict was reversible error; the logic of Jenkins cannot be said to be inapposite here, given the peculiar circumstances in which discussions between the judge and the foreman took place. We are persuaded that the Court of Appeals would have been justified in reversing the convictions solely because of the risk that the foreman believed the court was insisting on a dispositive verdict; a belief which we must assume was promptly conveyed to the jurors. The unintended direction of the colloquy between the judge and the jury foreman illustrates the hazards of ex parte communications with a deliberating jury or any of its members. y Respondents also challenged in the Court of Appeals the jury instructions regarding participation in the conspiracy and withdrawal therefrom; one judge on the panel concluded that these instructions were infirm. We agree with the Government that the charge concerning participation in the conspiracy, while perhaps not as clear as it might have been, was sufficient. The jury was informed repeatedly that only a single conspiracy was alleged and that liability could only be predicated on the knowing involvement of each defendant, considered individually, in the conspiracy charged. As given, the instruction was substantially in accord with those generally given in similar antitrust cases. See ABA Antitrust Section, Jury Instructions in Criminal Antitrust Cases 1964-1976, chs. 10, 28 (1978); 2 E. Devitt & C. Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions §§ 55.09, 55.17 (3d ed., 1977). And in any event, the disputed instruction differed in only minor and immaterial respects from the instruction requested by respondents. We have more difficulty with the instruction on withdrawal from the conspiracy. The jury was charged in the following terms: “In order to find that a defendant abandoned or withdrew from a conspiracy prior to December 27, 1968, you must find, from the evidence, that he or it took some affirmative action to disavow or defeat its purpose. Mere inaction would not be enough to demonstrate abandonment. To withdraw, a defendant either must have affirmatively notified each other member of the conspiracy he will no longer participate in the undertaking so they understand they can no longer expect his participation or acquiescence, or he must make disclosures of the illegal scheme to law enforcement officials. “Thus, once a defendant is shown to have joined a conspiracy, in order for you to find he abandoned the conspiracy, the evidence must show that the defendant took some definite, decisive step, indicating a complete disassociation from the unlawful enterprise.” (Emphasis added). Respondents had requested a more expansive instruction which would have specifically allowed the jury to consider a “ [r] esumption of competitive behavior, such as intensified price cutting or price wars,” as affirmative action showing a withdrawal from the price-fixing enterprise. While the judge allowed this theory to be argued to the jury, he declined to include it in his instructions. The Government now seeks to defend the charge as given on the ground that the first sentence was sufficiently broad to satisfy respondents' concerns, and the third sentence, to which respondents principally object, did not in any meaningful way detract from the generality of the first. We cannot agree. The charge, fairly read, limited the jury’s consideration to only two circumscribed and arguably impractical methods of demonstrating withdrawal from the conspiracy. Nothing that we have been able to find in the case law suggests, much less commands, that such confining blinders be placed on the jury’s freedom to consider evidence regarding the continuing participation of alleged conspirators in the charged conspiracy. Affirmative acts inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy and communicated in a manner reasonably calculated to reach co-conspirators have generally been regarded as sufficient to establish withdrawal or abandonment. See, e. g., Hyde v. United States, 225 U. S. 347, 369 (1912); United States v. Borelli, 336 F. 2d 376, 385 (CA2 1964). See also Note, Developments in the Law — Criminal Conspiracy, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 920, 958 (1959). We conclude that the unnecessarily confining nature of the instruction, standing alone, constituted reversible error. If a new trial takes place, an instruction correcting this error and giving the jury broader compass on the question of withdrawal must be given. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Me. Justice Stewart joins all but Part IV of this opinion. Me. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT '[Present: The foreman of the jury and the Court.] The Couet. What is your problem, sir? Mr. Russell. I have two problems. And first of all, if I refer to a juror with a sexual gender, I would like it struck, because I would like to say juror. The Couet. In other words, if he says he or she, make it neutral. Mr. Russell. The two problems are health and the status of the count. The Court. You can’t tell me that now. Mr. Russell. • I am not going to tell you what the status is in no way. In fact, I can’t tell you, because I can’t remember. The Court. All right. Mr. Russell. But first of all, I would like to thank you for that 6:30, because I don’t think you would have a jury left. I am not a doctor, but these people are getting very distraught. It is not that they go into a depression and stay there; they go into a depression and they’re coming out high. Now I would say at least eight of the jurors are taking some kind of pill. Some of the pills have been even issued by the doctor downstairs. I am not a doctor and I can’t judge these things, but I have seen one of [3] these jurors at one time I thought she was going to jump out the window. And I, just for my own sake, without telling you this, I cannot take the responsibility that this could happen. I know this is part of Mr. Keene’s job, but like I say, they go high and low, and sometimes by the time I get to Mr. Keene and get him down there, they are perfectly normal again. In fact, one of the instances was when I saw this one girl— The Court. May I ask this: If we discharged — we can excuse one juror for health reasons. Is there any juror we could excuse that would help the situation? If it is more than that, there is no point. Mr. Russell. I think there is more than that, Judge. I am not a doctor, so I can’t say. I’m not even sure these are true sicknesses. They seem — I mean, with the high and low, they seem induced, but when a person thinks they are sick, they’re generally sick. The Court. It is just as bad, if they think they are. Mr. Russell. As I say, I am not a doctor. I don’t like to be a judge, but I think for my own sake, my feelings, it is my responsibility as foreman to tell you these things. I do not want to be responsible for anybody’s health. The Court. I don’t, either. [4] You recall, though, that before — when I had two alternate jurors, I asked all the jurors if there was anybody who was not physically able to go ahead and everybody wanted to do it. Mr. Russell. I realize that. I think every juror out there wants to do their duty. The Court. See, we have tried this case now for four months. Mr. Russell. This is part of it, I will grant you, but it is not the whole part of it. There is some personality conflicts on the jury that have led to certain situations and I think we have overcome those. The Court. If we continue to deliberate from 9 to 6:30, with a lunch hour, for a while longer— Mr. Russell. What I want to tell you next is — and that is, again, my opinion — and you can tell me I am wrong — and I have to look at it in a different way. We have taken enough ballots now, and we have had enough discussions, and the way it is divided is not going to be settled by any document, any remembrance of testimony. It is based on a belief and even if they — even if they would sign a document today, and you would ask me to get up in the jury box and swear I think this is a true and just verdict, I would have to say no, because I believe in the twelve or multiple system of a jury; that if we are to decide beyond a [6] reasonable doubt, when you get twelve, or whatever the number has to be— The Court. That is what you have to decide. Mr. Russell. -it proves it beyond a shadow of a doubt. The Court. Not beyond a shadow of a doubt. Mr. Russell. I know. Each individual proves it to himself, but for a man to be convicted guilty, or the company, we do it beyond a reasonable doubt, but if you have twelve, you know it is beyond a shadow of a doubt and you cannot have any conscience over it as far as a juror or anything else. That is the way I feel, Judge. The Court. What are you suggesting? Mr. Russell. I am asking you what I should do. I am to the point- The Court. I would like this jury to deliberate longer. I say that because, as I say, we have tried it for a considerable period of time. Mr. Russell. Everybody realizes that and I do. The Court. We have individual people here who are concerned and the jury has now deliberated — they deliberated three full days, Wednesday, Thursday and [6] Friday. They deliberated a half a day on Saturday and a half day on Sunday. They are not deliberating a full day, because jurors usually deliberate until eleven or ten at night. Mr. Russell. We know that and we want to thank you. The Court. You have not deliberated that long yet. Mr. Russell. I know that is the way you would like it, but what I am trying to tell you is I don’t think deliberation is going to change it. It is not a matter of time anymore. The Court. Are you telling me this jury is hopelessly deadlocked and will never reach a verdict? Mr. Russell. In my opinion, it is. I have to rely on that. I have no experience in this kind of thing. I don’t know what people go through in a jury. This is the first time I have ever served on one and it is a new experience and I will never forget it. But it is a terrible responsibility and what I said, if it was a matter of finding a document or finding a part of a testimony that would convince somebody, I would say sure, and good. The Court. All right. For the time being continue your deliberations. I will take into consideration what you have told me. [7] Mr. Russell. As I said, the health problem is something that I think has to be looked at. I don’t know how you are going to judge this or whether you call Mr. Keene and ask him or the Marshal’s opinion, but I think something ought to be done. The Court. All right. I will take it into consideration. I have to talk to counsel. Mr. Russell. I appreciate that. I didn’t expect a decision, but I would like some kind of guidance. The Court. I would like to ask the jurors to continue their deliberations and I will take into consideration what you have told me. That is all I can say. Mr. Russell. I appreciate it. It is a situation I don’t know how to help you get what you are after. The Court. Oh, I am not after anything. Mr. Russell. You are after a verdict one way or the other. The Court. Which way it goes doesn’t make any difference to me. Mr. Russell. They keep saying, “If you will tell him what the situation is, he might accept it.” I said, “He doesn’t want to know. He told me that he doesn’t want to know what the decision is.” [8] The Court. No, I don’t want to know that. It would not be proper for me to know. Mr. Russell. You may imply something from what I said. The Court. I can imply something from just watching, but I don’t want you to tell me. That would be a breach of your duty. Mr. Russell. I have told you as best I can. The Court. Thank you. You tell them to keep deliberating and see if they can come to a verdict. .[At 12:04 p. m. the jury foreman returned to the deliberation room.] Certified true and correct transcript. /s/ Marion C. Wike Marion C. Wike Official Reporter [App. 1837-1840.] The major producers operate numerous plants to serve a wide range of geographical markets. The single-plant producers are limited in terms of the markets they can serve because of the difficulties and expense involved in long-distance transportation of gypsum board. The corporate defendants named in the indictment were: United States Gypsum Co., National Gypsum Co., Georgia Pacific Corp., Kaiser-Gypsum Co., Inc., Celotex Corp., and Flintkote Co. The individual defendants included: the Chairman of the Board and the Executive Vice-President of United States Gypsum, the Chairman of the Board and Vice-President for Sales of National Gypsum, the President of Georgia Pacific, the President and the Vice-President and General Manager of Kaiser-Gypsum, the President of Celotex, and the Chairman of the Board and the President of Flintkote. The Gypsum Association was named as an unindicted co-conspirator as were two other gypsum board producers — Johns-Manville Corp. and Fibreboard Corp. The remaining corporate defendants were United States Gypsum, National Gypsum, Georgia Pacific, and Celotex, and the remaining individual defendants were the Chairman of the Board and the Vice-President of Sales of National Gypsum and the Executive Vice-President of United States Gypsum. Defendants contended that the exchange of price information or verification was necessary to enable them to take advantage of the meeting-competition defense contained in § 2 (b) of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13 (b) (1976 ed.); see Part III, infra. Relevant portions of the charge dealing with this issue are excerpted in the opinion of the Court of Appeals. 550 F. 2d 115, 127 n. 12 (1977) ; id., at 137-138 (Weis, J., dissenting). See United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F. 2d 407 (CA3), cert. denied sub now,. Panaccione v. United States, 396 U. S. 837 (1969). The judge observed that the only instruction he might give the foreman was “to go* back and continue his deliberations.” App. 1823. The complete colloquy between the foreman and the judge is reproduced as an appendix to this opinion. “Significantly, the judge did not tell counsel about the .foreman’s opinion that the jury was hopelessly deadlocked; did not indicate that the foreman was under the impression that the court wanted a definite verdict either for the prosecution or the defendants; and did not mention the directive to the jury that it should ‘see if [it] can come to a verdict.’ ” 550 F. 2d, at 132 (Adams, J., concurring). After the conclusion of the trial, the Court of Appeals ordered the transcript of the meeting between the judge and the foreman released to counsel to aid them in preparation of the appeal. “Therefore, appellants were entitled to an instruction that their verification practice would not violate the Sherman Act if the jury found: (1) the appellants engaged in the practice solely to comply with the strictures of Bobinson-Patman; (2) they had first resorted to all other reasonable means of corroboration, without success; (3) they had good, independent reason to doubt the buyers’ truthfulness; and (4) their communication with competitors was strictly limited to the one price and one buyer at issue.” Id., at 126. See Part III, infra. Our analysis focuses solely on the elements of a criminal offense under the antitrust laws, and leaves unchanged the general rule that a civil violation can be established by proof of either an unlawful purpose or an anticompetitive effect. See United States v. Container Corp., 393 U. S. 333, 337 (1969); id., at 341 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Of course, consideration of intent may play an important role in divining the actual nature and effect of the alleged anticompetitive conduct. See Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U. S. 231, 238 (1918). Senator Sherman adverted to the open texture of the statutory language in 1890 and accurately forecast its consequence — a central role for the courts in giving shape and content to the Act’s proscriptions. “I admit that it is difficult to define in legal language the precise line between lawful and unlawful combinations. This must be left for the courts to determine in each particular case. All that we, as lawmakers, can do is to declare general principles, and we can be assured that the courts will apply them so as to carry out the meaning of the law . . . .” 21 Cong. Rec. 2460 (1890). In 1967, the Antitrust Division refined its guidelines to emphasize that criminal prosecutions should only be brought against willful violations of the law. See The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact— An Assessment 110 (1967). The exchange of price data and other information among competitors does not invariably have anticompetitive effects; indeed such practices can in certain circumstances increase economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, competitive. For this reason, we have held that such exchanges of information do not constitute a per se violation of the Sherman Act. See, e. g., United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank, 422 U. S. 86, 113 (1975); United States v. Container Corp., 393 U. S., at 338 (Fortas, J., concurring). A number of factors including most prominently the structure of the industry involved and .the nature of the information exchanged are generally considered in divining the procompetitive or anticompetitive effects of this type of interseller communication. See United States v. Container Corp., supra. See generally L. Sullivan, Law of Antitrust 265-274 (1977). Exchanges of current price information, of course, have the greatest potential for generating anticom-petitive effects and although not per se unlawful have consistently been held to violate the Sherman Act. See American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377 (1921); United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U. S. 371 (1923); United States v. Container Corp., supra. The possibility that those subjected to strict liability will take extraordinary care in their dealings is frequently regarded as one advantage of a rule of strict liability. See J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 344 (2d ed. 1960); W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law 222-223 (1972). ■However, where the conduct proscribed is difficult to distinguish from conduct permitted and indeed encouraged, as in the antitrust context, the excessive caution spawned by a regime of strict liability will not necessarily redound to the public’s benefit. The antitrust laws differ in this regard from, for example, laws designed to insure that adulterated food will not be sold to consumers. In the latter situation, excessive caution on the part of producers is entirely consistent with the legislative purpose. See United States v. Park, 421 U. S. 658, 671-672 (1975). Congress has recently increased the criminal penalties for violation of the Sherman Act. Individual violations are now treated as felonies punishable by a fine not to exceed $100,000, or by imprisonment for up to three years, or both. Corporate violators áre subject to a $1 million fine. 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1976 ed.). The severity of these sanctions provides further support for our conclusion that the Sherman Act should not be construed as creating strict-liability crimes. Cf. Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 256 (1952); Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 55, 72 (1933) (strict liability generally inappropriate when offense punishable by imprisonment). Respondents here were not prosecuted under the new penalty provisions since they were indicted prior to the December 21, 1974, effective date for the increased sanctions. An accommodation of the civil and criminal provisions of the Act similar to that which we approve here was suggested by Senator Sherman in response to Senator George’s argument during floor debate that the Act was primarily a penal statute to be construed narrowly in accord with traditional maxims: “The first section, being a remedial statute, would be construed liberally with a view to promote its object. It defines a civil remedy, and the courts will construe it liberally .... “In providing a remedy the intention of the combination is immaterial. . . . “The third section is a criminal statute, which would be construed strictly and is difficult to be enforced. In the present state of the law it is impossible to describe, in precise language, the nature and limits of the offense in terms specific enough for an indictment.” 21 Cong. Rec. 2456 (1890). Although the bill being debated by Senators George and Sherman differed in form from the Act as ultimately passed, the colloquy between them indicates that Congress was fully aware of the traditional distinctions between the elements of civil and criminal offenses and apparently did not intend to do away with them in the Act. In a conspiracy, two different types of intent are generally required— the basic intent to agree, which is necessary to establish the existence of the conspiracy, and the more traditional intent to effectuate the object of the conspiracy. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law 464465 (1972). Our discussion here focuses only on the second type of intent. In so holding, we do not mean to suggest that conduct undertaken with the purpose of producing anticompetitive effects would not also support criminal liability, even if such effects did not come to pass. Cf. United States v. Griffith, 334 U. S. 100, 105 (1948). We hold only that this elevated standard of intent need not be established in cases where anticompetitive effects have been demonstrated; instead, proof that the defendant’s conduct was undertaken with knowledge of its probable consequences will satisfy the Government’s burden. Respondents contend that “prior to the trial of this case, no court had ever held that a mere exchange of information which had a stabilizing effect on prices violated the Sherman Act, regardless of the purpose for the exchange.” Joint Brief for Respondents 50. Retroactive application of “this judicially expanded definition of the crime” would, the argument continues, contravene the “principles of fair notice embodied in the Due Process Clause.” Ibid. While we have rejected on other grounds the “effects only” test in the context of criminal proceedings, we do not agree with respondents that the prior case law dealing with the exchange of price information required proof of a purpose to restrain competition in order to make out a Sherman Act violation. Certainly our decision in United States v. Container Corp., 393 U. S. 333 (1969), is fairly’read as indicating that proof of an anticompetitive effect is a sufficient predicate for liability. In that case, liability followed from proof that “the exchange of price information has had an anticom-petitive effect in the industry,” id., at 337, and no suggestion was made that proof of a purpose to restrain trade or competition was also required. Thus, at least in the post-Container period, which comprises almost the entire time period at issue here, respondents’ claimed lack of notice cannot be credited. Nor are the prior cases treating exchanges of information among competitors more favorable to respondents’ position. See American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U. S., at 400 (“[A]ny concerted action ... to cause, or which in fact does cause, . . . restraint of competition ... is unlawful”); United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U. S. 371, 389 (1923) (“[A] necessary tendency ... to suppress competition . . . [is] unlawful”); Maple Flooring Mfrs. Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 563, 585 (1925) (purpose to restrain trade or conduct which “had resulted, or would necessarily result, in tending arbitrarily to lessen production or increase prices” sufficient for liability). While in Cement Mfrs. Protective Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 588 (1925), an exception from Sherman Act liability was recognized for conduct intended to prevent fraud, we do not read that case as repudiating the rule set out in prior cases; instead Cement highlighted a narrow limitation on the application of the general rule that either purpose or effect will support liability. We do not understand respondents to be making the related claim that they relied on the several lower court cases exempting interseller verification for purposes of complying with the Robinson-Patman Act from scrutiny under the Sherman Act, see injra, at 452-453, and thus should not be penalized if those decisions turn out to have been incorrect. Whatever the merits of such an argument, respondents would appear unable to invoke it since the initiation of their verification practices antedated those lower court decisions. This question was not resolved by the prior discussion because a purpose of complying with the Robinson-Patman Act by exchanging price information is not inconsistent with knowledge that such exchanges of information will have the probable effect of fixing or stabilizing prices. Since we hold knowledge of the probable consequences of conduct to be the requisite mental state in a criminal prosecution like the instant one where an effect on prices is also alleged, a defendant’s purpose in engaging in the proscribed conduct will not insulate him from liability unless it is deemed of sufficient merit to justify a general exception to the Sherman Act’s proscriptions. Cf. Cement Mfrs. Protective Assn. v. United States, supra. Respondents maintain that their verification practices not only were for the purpose of complying with the Robinson-Patman Act, but also served to protect them, from fraud on the part of their customers, and thus fall squarely within the Cement exception. The Court of Appeals rejected this claim, 550 F. 2d, at 123 n. 9, and we find no reason to upset this determination. Although the Belliston court did not specifically refer to Cement’s “controlling circumstance” exception, it adopted the rationale of the Wall Products case where that exception was explicitly relied upon to immunize verification from the proscriptions of the Sherman Act. See n. 11, supra. The decision in Di-Wall is ambiguous on the question of whether alternatives short of verification were exhausted prior to the exchange of price information. 1970 Trade Cases, ¶ 73,155, p: 88,557. In Viviano Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 411 F. 2d 255 (CA3 1969), the § 2 (b) defense was not recognized because the seller had relied solely on the report of its customer regarding other competitive offers without undertaking any investigation to corroborate the offer or the reliability of the customer. The Court of Appeals in the instant case read Viviano as at least suggesting, if not requiring, interseller verification when the veracity of the buyer was in doubt. As we read that case, however, it simply reaffirms the teaching of Staley, and does not compel the further conclusion that only interseller verification will satisfy the good-faith requirement, even in the particular circumstances identified by the Court of Appeals. See 550 F. 2d, at 135 (Weis, J., dissenting). “Although a seller may take advantage of the meeting competition defense only if it has a commercially reasonable belief that its price concession is necessary to meet an equally low price of a competitor, a seller may acquire this belief, and hence perfect its defense, by doing everything reasonably feasible — short of violating some other statute, such as the Sherman Act — to determine the veracity of a customer’s statement that he has been offered a lower price. If, after making reasonable, lawful, inquiries, the seller cannot ascertain that the buyer is lying, the seller is entitled to make the sale. . . . There is no need for a seller to discuss price with his competitors to take advantage of the meeting competition defense.” (Citations omitted.) Brief for United States 86-87, and n. 78. See also App. to Pet. for Cert. 97a-99a. It may also turn out that sustained enforcement of § 2 (f) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, which imposes liability on buyers for inducing illegal price discounts, will serve to bolster the credibility of buyers’ representations and render reliance thereon by sellers a more reasonable and secure predicate for a finding of good faith under § 2 (b). See generally Note, Meeting Competition Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1476, 1495-1496 (1977). In both Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 557 F. 2d 971 (CA2 1977), and Kroger v. FTC, 438 F. 2d 1372 (CA6 1971), buyers have been held liable under § 2 (f) despite the fact that the sellers were either found not to have violated the Robinson-Patman Act (Kroger) or were not charged with such a violation (A&P). Certiorari has been granted in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. to consider the permissibility of enforcing the Robinson-Patman Act in this manner. 435 U. S. 922 (1978). We need not and do not decide that in all such circumstances the defense would be unavailable. The ease-by-case interpretation and elaboration of the § 2 (b) defense is properly left to the other federal courts and the FTC in the context of concrete fact situations. We note also that our conclusions regarding the proper interpretation of § 2 (f), see n. 30, supra, may well affect subsequent application of the § 2 (b) defense. That the § 2 (b) defense may not be available in every situation where a competing offer has in fact been made is not, in our view, a meaningful objection to our holding. The good-faith requirement of the § 2 (b)' defense implicitly suggests a somewhat imperfect matching between competing offers actually made and those allowed to be met. Unless this requirement is to be abandoned, it seems clear that inadequate information will, in a limited number of cases, deny the defense to some who, if all the facts had been known, would have been entitled to invoke it. For reasons already discussed, interseller verification does not provide a satisfactory solution to this seemingly inevitable problem of inadequate information. Moreover, § 2 (b) affords only a defense to liability and not an affirmative right under the Act. While sellers are, of course, entitled to take advantage of the defense when they can satisfy its requirements, efforts to increase its availability at the expense of broader, affirmative antitrust policies must be rejected. Allen v. United States, 164 U. S. 492 (1896). An injunction to the jury “to deliberate with a view toward reaching an agreement if you can, without violence, to individual judgment,” was also included in the judge’s original instruction prior to the commencement of deliberations. See n. 9, supra. See n. 5, supra. The requested charge was as follows: “Because the gist of the offense charged is a continuing agreement to raise, fix, maintain and stabilize prices of gypsum products, it is .essential for you to determine what kind of agreement or understanding, if any, existed as to- each defendant. Each defendant is chargeable with the acts of his or its fellow defendants and alleged co-conspirators only if the acts are done in furtherance of the joint venture as he or it understood it. No defendant is to be held responsible for what some of the alleged conspirators, unknown to the rest, do beyond the reasonable intendment of the common agreement or understanding, if any, to which you may find him or it a party.” 550 F. 2d, at 128-129, n. 13 (emphasis omitted). In this case the obligation to notify “each other member” of the charged conspiracy would be a manageable task; in other situations all “other" members might not be readily identifiable. The instruction on withdrawal and proper evidence thereof may have been of particular importance here because respondents vigorously argued throughout the trial that competition within the industry resumed before December 27, 1968, the critical date for purposes of the applicable five-year statute of limitations.
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DAN'S CITY USED CARS, INC., dba Dan's City Auto Body, Petitioner v. Robert PELKEY. No. 12-52. Supreme Court of the United States Argued March 20, 2013. Decided May 13, 2013. Andre D. Bouffard, Burlington, VT, for Petitioner. Brian C. Shaughnessy, Manchester, NH, for Respondent. Lewis S. Yelin, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the Respondent. Andre D. Bouffard, Downs Rachlin Martin PLLC, Counsel of Record, Burlington, VT, Katherine M. Strickland, Downs Rachlin Martin PLLC, Lebanon, NH, for Petitioner. Brian C. Shaughnessy, Kazan, Shaughnessy, Kasten & McDonald, PLLC, Counsel of Record, Manchester, NH, Adina H. Rosenbaum, Allison M. Zieve, Scott L. Nelson, Washington, DC, for Respondent. Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the preemptive scope of a provision of the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA or Act) applicable to motor carriers. Codified at 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1), the provision reads: "[A] State ... may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... with respect to the transportation of property." Plaintiff-respondent Robert Pelkey brought suit under New Hampshire law against defendant-petitioner Dan's City Used Cars (Dan's City), a towing company. Pelkey alleged that Dan's City took custody of his car after towing it without Pelkey's knowledge, failed to notify him of its plan to auction the car, held an auction despite Pelkey's communication that he wanted to arrange for the car's return, and eventually traded the car away without compensating Pelkey for the loss of his vehicle. Disposal of abandoned vehicles by a "storage company" is regulated by chapter 262 of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated. See N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 262:31 to 262:40-c (West 2004 and 2012 West Cum.Supp.). Dan's City relied on those laws to dispose of Pelkey's vehicle for nonpayment of towing and storage fees. According to Pelkey, however, Dan's City failed to comply with New Hampshire's provisions governing the sale of stored vehicles and the application of sale proceeds. Pelkey charged that Dan's City's disposal of his car without following the requirements contained in chapter 262 violated the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act, § 358-A:2 (West 2009), as well as Dan's City's statutory and common-law duties as bailee to exercise reasonable care while in possession of a bailor's property. We hold, in accord with the New Hampshire Supreme Court, that state-law claims stemming from the storage and disposal of a car, once towing has ended, are not sufficiently connected to a motor carrier's service with respect to the transportation of property to warrant preemption under § 14501(c)(1). The New Hampshire law in point regulates no towing services, no carriage of property. Instead, it trains on custodians of stored vehicles seeking to sell them. Congress did not displace the State's regulation of that activity by any federal prescription. I A The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978(ADA), 92 Stat. 1705, largely deregulated the domestic airline industry. In keeping with the statute's aim to achieve "maximum reliance on competitive market forces," id., at 1706, Congress sought to "ensure that the States would not undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own." Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992). Congress therefore included a preemption provision, now codified at 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1), prohibiting States from enacting or enforcing any law " related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier." Two years later, the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 793, extended deregulation to the trucking industry. Congress completed the deregulation 14 years thereafter, in 1994, by expressly preempting state trucking regulation. Congress did so upon finding that state governance of intrastate transportation of property had become "unreasonably burden[some]" to "free trade, interstate commerce, and American consumers." Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 440, 122 S.Ct. 2226, 153 L.Ed.2d 430 (2002) (citing FAAAA § 601(a)(1), 108 Stat. 1605). Borrowing from the ADA's preemption clause, but adding a new qualification, § 601(c) of the FAAAA supersedes state laws "related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... with respect to the transportation of property ." 108 Stat. 1606, now codified at 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (emphasis added). The Act exempts certain measures from its preemptive scope, including state laws regulating motor vehicle safety, size, and weight; motor carrier insurance; and the intrastate transportation of household goods. § 14501(c)(2)(A)-(B). Also exempted from preemption are state laws "relating to the price" of "vehicle transportation by a tow truck," if towing occurs without prior consent of the vehicle owner. § 14501(c)(2)(C). This case involves the interaction between the FAAAA's preemption clause and the State of New Hampshire's regulation of the removal, storage, and disposal of abandoned motor vehicles. Chapter 262 of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated establishes procedures by which an "authorized official" or the "owner ... of any private property ... on which a vehicle is parked without permission" may arrange to have the vehicle towed and stored. N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 262:31 to 262:34, 262:40-a(I). It generally makes the owner of a towed vehicle responsible for reasonable removal and storage fees. See § 262:33(I) (reasonable removal and storage charges " shall be a lien against the vehicle which shall be paid by the owner"); § 262:33(II) (owner entitled to recover vehicle after "payment of all reasonable towing and storage charges"); § 262:40-a(II) (owner of a vehicle towed from a parking lot or parking garage is responsible for "removal and storage charges" when the lot or garage conspicuously posts notice of parking restrictions). Under chapter 262, the custodian of a car that remains unclaimed for 30 days following a tow may dispose of the vehicle upon compliance with notice requirements. § 262:36-a(I), (II). A "garage owner or keeper" must post notices of an impending sale in public places and provide mail notice to the vehicle owner whenever the owner's address may "be ascertained ... by the exercise of reasonable diligence." § 262:38. If a towed vehicle is not fit for legal use, its custodian need not provide individual or public notice prior to disposal, and sale of the vehicle may occur upon written notice to and approval from New Hampshire's Department of Public Safety. § 262:36-a(III). On compliance with the statutory requirements, the custodian of a stored vehicle may sell the vehicle by public auction at its place of business. § 262:37. The storage company may use the sale proceeds to pay "the amount of the liens and the reasonable expenses incident to the sale." § 262:39 (West 2004). Remaining proceeds are payable "to the [vehicle's] owner ... if claimed at any time within one year from the date of sale." Ibid. B The landlord of the apartment complex in which Pelkey lived required tenants to remove their cars from the parking lot in the event of a snowstorm, so that the snow could be cleared. Pelkey's 2004 Honda Civic remained in the lot during and after a February 2007 snowstorm. At the landlord's request, Dan's City towed and stored the vehicle. Confined to his bed with a serious medical condition, Pelkey did not know his car had been towed. Soon after removal of his car, Pelkey was admitted to the hospital for a procedure to amputate his left foot, during which he suffered a heart attack. He remained under hospital care until his discharge on April 9, 2007. Unaware of Pelkey's identity or illness, Dan's City sought permission from New Hampshire's Department of Public Safety to sell the Honda at auction without notice. In response, the department identified Pelkey as the last known owner of the vehicle. Dan's City wrote to Pelkey, notifying him that it had towed and was storing his car. When the post office returned the letter, checking the box "moved, left no address," Dan's City scheduled an auction for April 19. Meanwhile, in the days following Pelkey's discharge from the hospital, his attorney learned from counsel for the apartment complex that the car had been towed by Dan's City and was scheduled to be sold at public auction. On April 17, Pelkey's attorney informed Dan's City that Pelkey wanted to pay any charges owed and reclaim his vehicle. Dan's City nevertheless proceeded with the auction. Attracting no bidders, Dan's City later disposed of the car by trading it to a third party. Pelkey was not notified in advance of the trade, and has received no proceeds from the sale. Pelkey brought suit against Dan's City in New Hampshire Superior Court. He alleged that Dan's City violated the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act, N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 358-A:2, by failing to comply with chapter 262's requirements for disposal of stored vehicles, making false statements about the condition and value of his Honda, and proceeding with the auction despite notice that Pelkey wanted to reclaim the car. He also alleged that Dan's City negligently breached both statutory and common-law duties as a bailee to use reasonable care in disposing of the car. Granting summary judgment to Dan's City, the New Hampshire Superior Court concluded that Pelkey's claims were preempted by the FAAAA. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed. It held the FAAAA's preemption clause, 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1), inapplicable because Pelkey's claims related to Dan's City's conduct in disposing of his Honda post-storage, not to conduct concerning "the transportation of property." 163 N.H. 483, 490-493, 44 A.3d 480, 487-489 (2012) (emphasis deleted). Alternatively, the court ruled that, even if Pelkey's claims could be said to concern the transportation of property, they did not "sufficiently relat[e] to a towing company's 'service' to be preempted." Id., at 493, 44 A.3d, at 490. We granted certiorari to resolve a division of opinion in state supreme courts on whether 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) preempts a vehicle owner's state-law claims against a towing company regarding the company's post-towing disposal of the vehicle. 568 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 786, 184 L.Ed.2d 526 (2012). Compare 163 N.H. 483, 44 A.3d 480 (this case), with Weatherspoon v. Tillery Body Shop, Inc., 44 So.3d 447, 458 (Ala.2010) ( § 14501(c)(1) preempts state statutory and common-law claims arising out of storage and sale of a towed vehicle). II A Where, as in this case, Congress has superseded state legislation by statute, our task is to "identify the domain expressly pre-empted." Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541, 121 S.Ct. 2404, 150 L.Ed.2d 532 (2001). To do so, we focus first on the statutory language, "which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress' pre-emptive intent." CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993). The FAAAA's preemption clause prohibits enforcement of state laws "related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... with respect to the transportation of property." 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). In Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Assn., 552 U.S. 364, 370, 128 S.Ct. 989, 169 L.Ed.2d 933 (2008), our reading of this language was informed by decisions interpreting the parallel language in the ADA's preemption clause. The phrase "related to," we said, embraces state laws "having a connection with or reference to" carrier " 'rates, routes, or services,' " whether directly or indirectly. Ibid. (quoting Morales, 504 U.S., at 384, 112 S.Ct. 2031; emphasis deleted). See also id. , at 383, 128 S.Ct. 989 ("ordinary meaning of ... words ['related to'] is a broad one," thus ADA's use of those words "expresses a broad pre-emptive purpose"). At the same time, the breadth of the words "related to" does not mean the sky is the limit. We have refused to read the preemption clause of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), which supersedes state laws "relate[d] to any employee benefit plan," with an "uncritical literalism," else "for all practical purposes pre-emption would never run its course." New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655-656, 115 S.Ct. 1671, 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). And we have cautioned that § 14501(c)(1) does not preempt state laws affecting carrier prices, routes, and services "in only a 'tenuous, remote, or peripheral ... manner.' " Rowe, 552 U.S., at 371, 128 S.Ct. 989 (quoting Morales, 504 U.S., at 390, 112 S.Ct. 2031). B The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that Pelkey's state-law claims are "related to" neither the "transportation of property" nor the "service" of a motor carrier. We agree. Pelkey's claims escape preemption, we hold, because they are not "related to" the service of a motor carrier "with respect to the transportation of property." § 14501(c)(1). Although § 14501(c)(1) otherwise tracks the ADA's air-carrier preemption provision, see Rowe, 552 U.S., at 370, 128 S.Ct. 989, the FAAAA formulation contains one conspicuous alteration-the addition of the words "with respect to the transportation of property." That phrase "massively limits the scope of preemption" ordered by the FAAAA. Ours Garage, 536 U.S., at 449, 122 S.Ct. 2226 (SCALIA, J., dissenting). As the New Hampshire Supreme Court correctly understood, for purposes of FAAAA preemption, it is not sufficient that a state law relates to the "price, route, or service" of a motor carrier in any capacity; the law must also concern a motor carrier's "transportation of property." See 163 N.H., at 490, 44 A.3d, at 487. Title 49 defines "transportation," in relevant part, as "services related to th[e] movement" of property, "including arranging for, receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer in transit, refrigeration, icing, ventilation, storage, handling, packing, unpacking, and interchange of passengers and property." § 13102(23)(B). Pelkey's Consumer Protection Act and negligence claims are not "related to th[e] movement " of his car. Ibid. (emphasis added). He charges Dan's City with failure to comply with chapter 262 and neglect of its statutory and common-law duties of care as a bailee of his stored vehicle. Chapter 262 does not limit when, where, or how tow trucks may be operated. The Chapter regulates, instead, the disposal of vehicles once their transportation-here, by towing-has ended. Pelkey does not object to the manner in which his car was moved or the price of the tow; he seeks redress only for conduct subsequent to "transportation," conduct occurring after the car ceased moving and was stored. Dan's City maintains that because § 13102(23)(B)'s definition of "transportation" includes "storage" and "handling," Pelkey's claims, which do concern the storage and handling of his car, fall within § 14501(c)(1)'s preemptive ambit. Dan's City overlooks, however, that under § 13102(23)(B), services such as "storage" and "handling" fit within the definition of "transportation" only when those services "relat[e] to th[e] movement" of property. Temporary storage of an item in transit en route to its final destination relates to the movement of property and therefore fits within § 13102(23)(B)'s definition. But property stored after delivery is no longer in transit. Cf. 49 C.F.R. § 375.609 (2012) (distinguishing between "storage-in-transit" and "permanent storage" (regulation of Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration)). Here, no storage occurred in the course of transporting Pelkey's vehicle. Dan's City's storage of Pelkey's car after the towing job was done, in short, does not involve "transportation" within the meaning of the federal Act. Pelkey's claims also survive preemption under § 14501(c)(1) because they are unrelated to a "service" a motor carrier renders its customers. The transportation service Dan's City provided was the removal of Pelkey's car from his landlord's parking lot. That service, which did involve the movement of property, ended months before the conduct on which Pelkey's claims are based. His claims rely on New Hampshire's abandoned vehicle disposal regime, prescribed in chapter 262, for the rules governing Dan's City's conduct. Chapter 262 addresses "storage compan[ies]" and "garage owner[s] or keeper[s]," not transportation activities. See N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 262:36-a, 262:38. Unlike Maine's tobacco delivery regulations at issue in Rowe, chapter 262 has neither a direct nor an indirect connection to any transportation services a motor carrier offers its customers. See 552 U.S., at 371, 128 S.Ct. 989. We need not venture an all-purposes definition of transportation "service[s]" in order to conclude that state-law claims homing in on the disposal of stored vehicles fall outside § 14501(c)(1)'s preemptive compass. Our conclusion that state-law claims regarding disposal of towed vehicles are not preempted is in full accord with Congress' purpose in enacting § 14501(c)(1). Concerned that state regulation "impeded the free flow of trade, traffic, and transportation of interstate commerce," Congress resolved to displace "certain aspects of the State regulatory process." FAAAA § 601(a), 108 Stat. 1605 (emphasis added). The target at which it aimed was "a State's direct substitution of its own governmental commands for competitive market forces in determining (to a significant degree) the services that motor carriers will provide." Rowe, 552 U.S., at 372, 128 S.Ct. 989 (internal quotation marks omitted). Pelkey's claims are far removed from Congress' driving concern. He sued under state consumer protection and tort laws to gain compensation for the alleged unlawful disposal of his vehicle. The state laws in question hardly constrain participation in interstate commerce by requiring a motor carrier to offer services not available in the market. Nor do the state laws invoked by Pelkey "freez[e] into place services that carriers might prefer to discontinue in the future." Ibid. New Hampshire's laws on disposal of stored vehicles, moreover, will not open the way for "a patchwork of state service-determining laws, rules, and regulations." Id., at 373, 128 S.Ct. 989. As Dan's City concedes, abandoned vehicle laws like chapter 262 "do not hamper the operations of tow truckers" and "are not the kind of burdensome state economic regulation Congress sought to preempt." Reply Brief 21. C Dan's City advances two further arguments in favor of preemption. First, Dan's City contends that Congress' enumeration of exceptions to preemption, detailed in 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2), (3), and (5), permits state regulation of motor carriers only when the State's law comes within a specified exception. Because Pelkey's claims do not fit within any exception to preemption, Dan's City urges, those claims must be preempted. This argument exceeds sensible bounds. Exceptions to a general rule, while sometimes a helpful interpretive guide, do not in themselves delineate the scope of the rule. The exceptions to § 14501(c)(1)'s general rule of preemption identify matters a State may regulate when it would otherwise be precluded from doing so, but they do not control more than that. An example may clarify the point. Section 14501(c) does not exempt zoning regulations. Such laws, however, "are peculiarly within the province of state and local legislative authorities." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508, n. 18, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). It is hardly doubtful that state or local regulation of the physical location of motor-carrier operations falls outside the preemptive sweep of § 14501(c)(1). That is so because zoning ordinances ordinarily are not "related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... with respect to the transportation of property." § 14501(c)(1). The same is true of New Hampshire's regulation of the disposal of stored vehicles. Dan's City, in a second argument, urges otherwise. Pelkey's claims, Dan's City maintains, are "related to" the towing service it rendered because selling Pelkey's car was the means by which Dan's City obtained payment for the tow. But if such state-law claims are preempted, no law would govern resolution of a non-contract-based dispute arising from a towing company's disposal of a vehicle previously towed or afford a remedy for wrongful disposal. Federal law does not speak to these issues. Thus, not only would the preemption urged by Dan's City leave vehicle owners without any recourse for damages, it would eliminate the sole legal authorization for a towing company's disposal of stored vehicles that go unclaimed. No such design can be attributed to a rational Congress. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251, 104 S.Ct. 615, 78 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984) ("It is difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct."). In sum, Dan's City cannot have it both ways. It cannot rely on New Hampshire's regulatory framework as authorization for the sale of Pelkey's car, yet argue that Pelkey's claims, invoking the same state-law regime, are preempted. New Hampshire's legislation on abandoned vehicles gave rise to Pelkey's debt and established the conditions under which Dan's City could collect on that debt by selling Pelkey's Honda. See N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 262:33, 262:36-a, 262:40-a ; supra, at 1775 - 1777. Pelkey's claims, attacking Dan's City's conduct in disposing of the vehicle, rest on the very same provisions. See Brief for Petitioner 41 ("All of the alleged wrongful conduct of Dan's City was part of the state sanctioned and regulated process for disposing of abandoned vehicles under Ch. 262."). * * * For the reasons stated, we hold that 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) does not preempt state-law claims for damages stemming from the storage and disposal of a towed vehicle. The judgment of the New Hampshire Supreme Court is therefore affirmed. It is so ordered. The term "motor carrier" is defined as "a person providing motor vehicle transportation for compensation." 49 U.S.C. § 13102(14) (2006 ed., Supp. V). We have previously recognized that tow trucks qualify as "motor carriers" under § 14501(c)(1). Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 430, 122 S.Ct. 2226, 153 L.Ed.2d 430 (2002). Dan's City's qualification as a motor carrier under the FAAAA is uncontested by the parties. See Brief for Petitioner i; Brief for Respondent 18. Section 262:36-a has been amended since April 2007, when Dan's City's alleged misconduct occurred. The amendments do not bear on the outcome of this case. The Consumer Protection Act makes it unlawful for "any person to use any unfair method of competition or any unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce within" New Hampshire. N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 358-A:2 (West 2009). It authorizes a private claim for damages and equitable relief; for a willful or knowing violation, the Act allows the plaintiff to recover "as much as 3 times, but not less than 2 times," actual damages. § 358-A:10(I) (2012 West Cum.Supp.). Although this statement appears in the Ours Garage dissent, nothing in the Court's opinion in that case is in any way inconsistent with the dissent's characterization of § 14501(c)(1). The parties dispute whether, as Pelkey alleges, conduct that violates chapter 262 may qualify as an unfair or deceptive act or practice proscribed by New Hampshire's Consumer Protection Act. This dispute turns on interpretation of state law, a matter on which we express no opinion. There is an exception to Congress' silence, but it is of no aid to Dan's City: The Act spares from preemption laws "relating to the price of for-hire motor vehicle transportation by a tow truck, if such transportation is performed [as it was here] without the prior consent or authorization of the owner or operator of the motor vehicle." 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(C).
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
What is the issue area of the decision?
[ "Criminal Procedure", "Civil Rights", "First Amendment", "Due Process", "Privacy", "Attorneys", "Unions", "Economic Activity", "Judicial Power", "Federalism", "Interstate Relations", "Federal Taxation", "Miscellaneous", "Private Action" ]
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MARTIN, SUCCESSOR TO LAWLER, SECRETARY OF HIGHWAYS OF PENNSYLVANIA, et. al. v. CREASY et al. No. 157. Argued April 2, 1959. Decided June 8, 1959. Anne X. Alpern, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, argued, the cause for appellants. On the brief were Harry J. Rubin, Deputy Attorney General, Harrington Adams and Leonard M. Mendelson. ■ Edward P. Good argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were A. E. Kountz and Thomas D. Caldwell. Opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice Stewart, announced by Mr. Justice Whittaker. This action was instituted in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania by owners of property abutting a- section of highway which runs between downtown Pittsburgh and the Greater Pittsburgh Airport. The complaint stated that the Secretary of Highways and the Governor of Pennsylvania, were about to designate that section of the road a “limited access highway” under authority of a Pennsylvania statute. Claiming that such action would deprive them of their property without due process of law, since the Pennsylvania statute allegedly did not provide compensation for loss of access to the highway, the plaintiffs asked for injunctive relief and for a judgment declaring the statute unconstitutional. The legislation under which it was asserted the state officials were planning to act is the Pennsylvania Limited Access Highways Act of 1945. The Act defines a limited access highway as “a public highway to which owners or occupants of abutting property or the traveling public have no right of ingress or egress to, from or across such highway, except as may be provided by the authorities responsible therefor.” It authorizes the Secretary of Highways, with the approval of the Governor, to declare any highway, or part thereof, to be a limited access highway. Section 8 of the statute, as amended in 1947, provides: “The owner or owners of private property affected by the construction or designation of a limited access highway . . . shall be entitled only to damages arising from an actual taking of property. The Commonwealth shall not be liable for consequential damages where no property is taken . . . .” The latter section wás specifically attacked by the plaintiffs, who claimed that in the light of the Pennsylvania courts’ interpretation of other statutes, this provision would be construed to mean that compensation was to be paid only if land were taken. The Limited Access Highways. Act itself had never been construed by the courts of Pennsylvania. The district judge issued a temporary restraining order. Thereafter a three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281 and 2284. After stipulations of fact were filed, the District Court .entered an order staying proceedings to permit the parties to seek a determination of their rights under the statute in the courts of Pennsylvania. Thereupon the plaintiffs filed an equitable proceeding in the Common Pleas Court of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. That court pointed out that the plaintiffs were asking for a determination of “whether or not a taking of property has occurred and what damages shall be awarded therefor, and that, if the depriving them óf access is found to be a taking of a compensable property right, that plaintiffs’ legitimate interests will be constitutionally safeguarded by a resort to viewers proceedings and, if necessary, by later appeals to the courts.” Creasy v. Lawler, 8 Pa. D. & C. 2d 535, 537. As a court of equity, the county court found it proper to determine only the last of' these questions, and its answer was unequivocal: “All of plaintiffs’ rights can be protected and secured in a proceeding before viewers, as is provided in section 8 of The Limited Access Highway Act of May 29, 1945. . . . Here the legislature, in The Limited Access Highways Act, . . . has provided a way in which' every property owner may have it decided whether he is entitled to compensation and, if so, when, for what, and in what amounts. . . . Should the Commonwealth proceed, then at that time plaintiffs will have the right to proceed before viewers on the question of their right to damages. In the orderly course of the procedure provided by The Limited Access Highways Act, they will have a right of appeal to the common pleas court and a jury trial, and still later to have their rights adjudicated in the appellate courts: At all times their constitutional rights,, whatever they may be, will be guarded and protected.” 8 Pa. D. & C. 2d, at 538-539. This decision was affirmed per curiam by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which explicitly adopted the lowér court’s opinion. 389 Pa. 635, 133 A. 2d 178. Further proceedings were then had in the District. Court." Although stating its awareness “that the federal’ courts should be reluctant to exercise jurisdiction in cases where the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights will be properly protected in the state tribunal and where thF statute under attack has not yet been construed by the State courts,” nevertheless the District Court proceeded to adjudicate the merits of the controversy, believing that the plaintiffs might be irreparably harmed during the period required to determine their rights in the state courts. “Without venturing to predict the ultimate decision of the Pennsylvania Courts on the issue of compensation,” the District Court was of the view that the Pennsylvania Legislature did not intend to compensate abutting landowners “whose right of access to an existing' highway is destroyed by the designation of that highway as a limited-access highway.” For that reason the court found the statute repugnant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A final decree was issued, permanently enjoining, in the most sweeping terms, the Secretary of Highways and the Governor from proceeding. Creasy, v. Stevens, 160 F. Supp. 404. The case is here by way of a direct appeal, 28 U. S. C. § 1253, of which this Court noted probable jurisdiction. 358 U. S. 807. It was the clear pronouncement of the Pennsylvania courts that the state statute provides a complete procedure to guard and protect the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights “at all times.” In the light of this pronouncement it is difficult to perceive the basis for the District Court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs would be irreparably harmed unless the state ófíieers were enjoined from proceeding under the statute. There is no question-here of the State’s right to create or designate a limited access highway. The only question is the plaintiffs’ right to compensation. It must be assumed that the courts of Pennsylvania meant what they said in stating that the •plaintiffs will be afforded a procedure through which the full measure of their rights under the United States Constitution will be preserved. Assuming, however, that there was a basis to support intervention by a court of equity, the District Court, we think, should nevertheless have declined-to adjudicate this controversy. The circumstances which should impel a federal court to abstain from blócking-the exercise by state officials of their appropriate functions are present here in a marked degree. The considerations which support the vpsdom of such abstention -have been so thoroughly and repeatedly discussed by this . Court as to require little elaboration. Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496; Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, 316 U. S. 168; Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101; American Federation of Labor v. Watson, 327 U. S. 582; Government Employees v. Windsor, 353 U. S. 364. See also Alabama Comm’n v. Southern R. Co., 341 U. S. 341. Reflected among the concerns which have traditionally counseled a federal court to- stay its hand are the desirability of avoiding unseemly conflict between two sovereignties, the unnecessary impairment of state functions, afid the premature determination of constitutional questions. All those factors are present here. At least one additional reason for abstention in the .present case is to be found in the complex and varying effects which the contemplated state action may have upon the different7 landowners. Some of them may be completely'deprived of access; others may have access to existing roads --or service roads , to be constructed ; still others may have access to the highway itself through points of ingress and egress established under the statute. In the state court proceedings the case of each landowner will be considered separately, with whatever particular problems each case may present. There is no reason to suppose that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania will not accord full constitutional scope to the statutory phrase “actual taking of property.” If, after all is said and done in the Pennsylvania courts, any of the plaintiffs believe that the Commonwealth has deprived them of their property without due process of law, this Court will be here. Reversed. Pa. Laws 1945, No. 402, § 1 et seq., as amended, Pa. Laws 1947, No. 213 and Pa. Laws 1957, No. 112. 36 Purdon’s Pa. Stat. Ann. §2391.1 et seq. 36 Purdon’s Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2391.1. 36 Purdon’s Pa. Stat. Ann. §2391.2. The language of the court’s order was as follows: “Now, Therefore, It Is Finally Determined, Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the defendants, Lewis M. Stevens, Secretary of Highways of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and George M. Leader, Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, be and they hereby are permanently enjoined from enforcing or otherwise complying with the Pennsylvania ‘Limited-Access Highways Act’, 1945, May 29, P. L. 1108, § 1, et seq., as amended, 36 Purdon’s Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2391.1 et seq., so as to interfere with or deprive the plaintiffs of their right of ingr^ss^or egress to, from or across the ‘Airport Parkway’ in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.” See Bowie, Limiting Highway Access, 4 Md. L. Rev. 219 (1940); Clarke, The Limited-Access Highway, 27 Wash. L. Rev. 111 (1952); Cunnyngham, The Limited-Access Highway from a Lawyer’s Viewpoint, 13 Mo. L. Rev. 19 (1948); Duhaime, Limiting Access to Highways, 33 Ore. L. Rev. 16 (1953); Enfield and McLean, Controlling the Use of Access, National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Highway Research Board Bulletin No. 101 (1955),. p. 70; and Reese, Legal Aspects of Limiting Highway Access, National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Highway Research Board Bulletin No. 77 (1953), p. 36.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations
What is the ideological direction of the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court?
[ "Conservative", "Liberal", "Unspecifiable" ]
[ 1 ]
sc
BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY & STEAMSHIP CLERKS, FREIGHT HANDLERS, EXPRESS & STATION EMPLOYEES v. ASSOCIATION FOR THE BENEFIT OF NON-CONTRACT EMPLOYEES. No. 138. Argued March 4, 1965. Decided April 28, 1965 James L. Highsaw, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner in No. 138. With him on the brief were Milton Kramer and William J. Donlon. Stuart Bernstein argued the cause for petitioner in No. 139. With him on the brief were H. Templeton Brown and Robert L. Stern. Solicitor General Cox argued the cause for petitioners in No. 369 and respondents in No. 139. With him on the briefs were Assistant ¡Attorney General Douglas, Daniel M. Friedman, Morton Hollander and John C. Eldridge. Alex L. Arguello argued the cause for respondent in Nos. 138 and 369. With him on the brief was Jerome C. Muys. Clarence M. Mulholland and Edward J. Hickey, Jr., filed a brief for the Railway Labor Executives’ Association, as amicus curiae, urging reversal in Nos. 138 and 369 and affirmance in No. 139. Together with No. 139, United Air Lines, Inc. v. National Mediation Board et al. and No. 369, National Mediation Board et al. v. Association for the Benefit of Non-Contract Employees, also on certiorari to the same court. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. These consolidated cases involve claims of United Air Lines (United) and the Association for the Benefit of Non-Contract Employees of United (the Association), attacking the form of ballot that the Board intends to use in a representation election among United’s employees under § 2, Ninth» of the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 152, Ninth (1958 ed.). United also contends that the National Mediation Board (Board) should hold a hearing under the same section, with its participation, to determine the appropriate craft or class in which the election should be held. Before the Board the conflicting unions — Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks (Brotherhood) and International Association of Machinists (Machinists) — agreed that the appropriate craft or class in which the election should be held was “clerical, office, stores, fleet and passenger service employees” ; over the objection of United the Board ordered an election in this unit to determine which union, if either, would be its bargaining representative. United then filed suit against the Board raising the questions it presses here. This case was dismissed and is here, after affirmance by the Court of Appeals, as No. 139. After this dismissal the Association filed suit against the Board, the Brotherhood being permitted to intervene, and raised substantially the same claims. The District Court enjoined the Board from conducting an election with a ballot that did not permit an employee to cast a vote against collective bargaining representation; the other issues were remanded to the Board for further consideration. 218 F. Supp. 114. The Court of Appeals affirmed these cases by a divided court and they are here as Nos. 138 and 369. 117 U. S. App. D. C. 387, 330 F. 2d 853. Judge Wright, dissenting, thought the District Court was without jurisdiction to enjoin the Board from conducting a representation election, citing Switchmen’s Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U. S. 297 (1943). We granted certiorari in all three of the cases. 379 U. S. 814. We hold that the Board satisfied its statutory duty to investigate the dispute; that United is not entitled to be a party to proceedings by which the Board determines the scope of the appropriate craft or class; and that the Board’s choice of ballot for its future elections does not exceed its statutory authority and is therefore not open to judicial review. 1. The Facts. In January 1947, after lengthy hearings in which United and other airlines participated at the request of the Board, it was determined that the “clerical, office, stores, fleet and passenger service” grouping of employees constituted an appropriate craft or class, within the meaning of the Act, for collective bargaining purposes. Case No. R-1706, N. M. B. Determinations of Craft or Class 423 (1948). All of the parties here, save the Association, participated in this public hearing. Since that time they have participated in other cases involving the same questions decided in R-1706, but, with some exceptions, the Board has continued through the years to hold elections in that craft or class. In August 1962 the Brotherhood filed with the Board an application under § 2, Ninth to investigate a representation dispute among employees of United. In its original application the Brotherhood proposed to exclude those stores and fleet service personnel then represented by the Machinists. After the Board had advised United and the Machinists of the Brotherhood’s application each informed the Board that in its opinion the application should be dismissed because it did not conform to what the Board had found to constitute a craft or class in Case No. R-1706, supra. Alternatively, United requested that if dismissal was not in order the Board should hold hearings to determine the proper craft or class in which the election should be held. Upon receiving notice of this opposition the Brotherhood amended its application to include the full craft or class approved in R-1706. The Machinists then agreed that this was the appropriate unit in which to conduct the election. The Board concluded that a dispute existed requiring an election and scheduled one for January 1963. It proposed to use its standard form of ballot which provided for the printing of the names of the labor organizations— in this case, the Brotherhood and the Machinists — with a box below each name for the employee to check the representative preferred. A third space was provided in which the employee could write in the name of any other organization or individual he wished to represent him. There was not a place on the ballot in which the employee could vote specifically for “no union.” The Board, on December 19, 1962, directed that a list of the employees involved be supplied by United not later than January 14, 1963. On January 11 United advised that the request was premature and requested a hearing as to the scope of the unit involved in the Brotherhood’s amended application. It outlined in some detail the past practices of the Board in dealing with such requests and attacked the continued suitability of the R-1706 determination, asking that the case be re-opened and that the group be divided into three separate crafts or classes. On January 17 the Board denied this request. It pointed out that United on September 7, 1962, had objected to the craft proposed in the Brotherhood’s original application on the sole ground that it did not conform to R-1706; that the Brotherhood had then amended its request to conform with R-1706; that United had been notified of this change on October 8, 1962; that on October 24 the Board had requested United to furnish the number of employees in the craft or class as amended and that it had furnished this information on November 2, stating that there were 12,451 as of a given date; and that it had failed to furnish the names of the employees. The Board then commented that “the carrier is not a party to this representation dispute”; that “no request for a review of... Case No. R-1706, et al. has been received from either organization party to NMB Case No. 3590” (the pending application of the Brotherhood); and that United’s request was “not timely made, since the Board, on December 19, 1962, found that a representation dispute existed among the employees in this craft or class, and has authorized an election.” United requested reconsideration of this decision, but without success. Meanwhile, on January 18, 1963, when United advised the Board that it was “willing to allow a ballot box election on Company property provided the ballot follows the form used by the National Labor Relations Board,” i. e., the ballot “would have a space for the employee to vote against representation as well as space for the employee to vote for representation” by the Brotherhood or the Machinists. (Emphasis in the original.) The Board replied that its form of ballot had been used since 1934 and that it saw no reason to depart from it. Thereafter United advised that it would furnish the list of employees by February 11, but on that date the list was refused and action was begun the next day against the Board in the District Court for the District of Columbia. This case was later dismissed, as we have noted. It appears that while the election was being delayed the Association was being organized among United’s employees. By March 1963 it claimed 6,400 members, about 50% of the total number of United’s employees. It sought, like United, to be heard in a craft or class proceeding and to have the ballot amended. It stated, however, that it did not seek recognition as a bargaining representative, and it did not want its name on the ballot. It intended to dissolve after the election. The Board denied the applications. After United’s case was dismissed, the Association filed a similar suit in the same court, seeking substantially the same relief. The Brotherhood was permitted to intervene, and it filed a separate appeal from that of the Board after the court had disposed of the case as we have already stated. After we granted certiorari, the Board adopted an amended form of ballot on which there appears the following directly above the names of the unions seeking election as representative: “INSTRUCTIONS FOR VOTING “No employee is required to vote. If less than a majority of the employees cast valid ballots, no representative will be certified.” In effect, this amended ballot stated on its face what has been the practice of the Board in these elections since its inception. The Board has announced its intention to use this form of ballot in future representation elections, including any that may be held in this particular matter. 2. The Purposes of the Act and the Board’s Function. The major objective of the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§ 151-188 (1958 ed.), was “the avoidance of industrial strife, by conference between the authorized representatives of employer and employee.” Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515, 547 (1937). Section 2, Ninth set up the machinery for the selection of the representatives of employees. It authorized the National Mediation Board, upon request, to investigate disputes over representation; to “designate” those who were affected; to use a secret ballot or any other appropriate means of ascertaining the choice of employees; to establish rules governing elections and to certify the representatives so chosen to represent the employees in negotiations. Upon the issuance of this certificate the employer, under the Act, is required to “treat” with the representative certified to it by the Board. As we said in Virginian R. Co.: “The statute does not undertake to compel agreement between the employer and employees, but it does command those preliminary steps without which no agreement can be reached. It at least requires the employer to meet and confer with the authorized representative of its employees, to listen to their complaints, to make reasonable effort to compose differences — in short, to enter into a negotiation for the settlement of labor disputes such as is contemplated by § 2, First.” Id., at 548. In Switchmen’s Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U. S. 297 (1943), the petitioner sued for the cancellation of a Board representation certificate. The Court held that the Act precluded review of the Board’s certification of a collective bargaining representative under § 2, Ninth. The case involved a question of statutory construction, i. e., whether the Act permitted the division of crafts or classes of a single carrier into smaller units for collective bargaining purposes. The Court refused to consider the merits of the claim, holding that it was for the Board, not the courts, finally to resolve such questions. “The Act in § 2, Fourth,” the Court said, “writes into law the 'right’ of the 'majority of any craft or class of employees’ to 'determine who shall be the representative of the craft or class for the purposes of this Act.’ That 'right’ is protected by § 2, Ninth which gives the Mediation Board the power to resolve controversies concerning it and as an incident thereto to determine what is the appropriate craft or class in which the election should be held.” Id., at 300-301. The Court goes on to note that Congress decided on the method which might be employed to protect this “right”; and that where Congress “has not expressly authorized judicial review,” id., at 301, “this Court has often refused to furnish one even where questions of law might be involved,” id., at 303. The Court’s conclusion was that “the intent seems plain — the dispute was to reach its last terminal point when the administrative finding was made. There was to be no dragging out of the controversy into other tribunals of law.” Id., at 305. Thus, the Court held there could be no judicial review. It is sometimes said that in Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U. S. 184 (1958), the Court created an “exception” to the doctrine of Switchmen’s Union. In Kyne, it was held that the law afforded a remedy in the courts when unlawful action by the National Labor Relations Board inflicted injury on one of the parties to a bargaining dispute. But this was no exception to Switchmen’s Union. Rather the Court was careful to note that “[t]his suit is not one to ‘review,’ in the sense of that term as used in the Act, a decision of the Board made within its jurisdiction. Rather it is one to strike down an order of the Board made in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the Act.” Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U. S. 184, 188. (Emphasis supplied.) The limited nature of this holding was re-emphasized only last Term where we referred to the “narrow limits” and “painstakingly delineated procedural boundaries of Kyne.” Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U. S. 473, 481 (1964). It is with these principles in mind that we turn to the questions in the instant cases. 3. The Craft or Class Determination. The order of the District Court in Nos. 138 and 369 enjoins the Board from conducting an election “in which the form of the ballot does not permit a voting employee to cast a vote against collective bargaining representation . . . .” The Association concedes that the order does not enjoin the holding of the election until the Board reconsiders its craft or class determination; nor has it petitioned here for a review of that portion of the decision.' Thus, we need not reach the question of the Association’s right to demand or participate in proceedings leading to such a determination. The same is not true of United, however, for it specifically sought and was denied such relief, and it comes here contending that this denial constituted error. United argues that since the Act compels it to treat with the representative chosen by the majority of its employees in the craft or class in which the election is held, it has a direct and substantial interest in the scope of that unit; and that since the Act provides for no administrative or judicial review, due process requires that it be accorded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings by which the Board determines which employees may participate. It also contends that the Board, in designating the employees who could participate in the election, did not do so as a result of the statutorily required investigation— which, United contends, requires that the Board take evidence and make findings — but made an arbitrary determination, relying solely on the agreement of the unions. United’s position is that Switchmen’s Union does not control a claim that the Board has ignored an express command of the Act. This particular question was reserved in the 1943 cases. In General Committee v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 320 U. S. 323 (1943), a companion case to Switchmen’s Union, the Court stated: “Whether judicial power may ever be exerted to require the Mediation Board to exercise the 'duty’ imposed upon it under § 2, Ninth and, if so, the type or types of situations in which it may be invoked present questions not involved here.” Id,., at 336, n. 12. We think that the Board’s action here is reviewable only to the extent that it bears on the question of whether it performed its statutory duty to “investigate” the dispute. Reviewing that action, however, we conclude that the contention is completely devoid of merit. Section 2, Ninth makes it the duty of the Board to “investigate” a representation dispute and “to certify to both parties, in writing, within thirty days after the receipt of the invocation of its services, the name or names of the individuals or organizations that have been designated and authorized to represent the employees involved in the dispute, and certify the same to the carrier.” This command is broad and sweeping. We should note at the outset that the Board’s duty to investigate is a duty to make such investigation as the nature of the case requires. An investigation is “essentially informal, not adversary” ; it is “not required to take any particular form.” Inland Empire District Council v. Millis, 325 U. S. 697, 706 (1945). These principles are particularly apt here where Congress has simply told the Board to investigate and has left to it the task of selecting the methods and procedures which it should employ in each case. In dealing with the sufficiency of the investigation it is necessary to examine the experience of the Board through the years in resolving questions of craft or class appropriateness. That experience, insofar as it concerns the unit involved here, dates back to 1946 in Case No. R-1706, supra, when it was called upon for the first time to apply the craft or class principle of representation to the airline industry. At that time it had before it a fledgling industry, a relatively new statutory command and a huge group of employees for whom there were no recognized crafts or classes within the meaning of the Act. At least five unions were involved, all urging different employee groupings, and all of the major airlines were invited to participate in an extended public hearing. United was among those participating and in fact supported the very craft or class unit which the Board eventually decided upon and to which it has adhered here. Because it was the first time the Board had recognized such a craft or class, it cautiously provided in denying reconsideration of its determination that it was subject to future re-examination where to do so would further the purposes of the Act. Thereafter began a period in which the workability of the R-1706 determination was tested in practice, and it did not go completely unchallenged. In 1948 United voluntarily recognized the Machinists as the collective bargaining representative for its ramp and stores employees. It supplied the Board with evidence upon which this recognition was based and its reasons for departing from its usual policy. It is noteworthy that the Board replied that voluntary recognition would not preclude future determination by the Board of the proper craft or class to which those employees would belong. In 1951 the determination of R-1706 withstood challenge in Matter of Representation of Employees of Northwest Airlines, Inc., Case No. R-2357, 2 N. M. B. Determinations of Craft or Class 60 (1955). United submitted a statement in this proceeding, emphasizing its disagreement with the R-1706 decision and requesting that it be disregarded. The Board refused to do so, but it did reiterate what it had implied in 1947 — that it was “of the opinion that upon proper application ... it will be advisable to reexamine the determination in case R-J.706 et al., with the view of making such modifications as may be found to be justified at that time.” Id., at 67. We note that in both cases — R-1706 and R-2357 — the unions competing for representative status were in disagreement as to the appropriate unit in which elections should be held. Again in 1952, in Case No. R-2482, 2 N. M. B. Determinations of Craft or Class 72 (1955), United participated when the Air Line Dispatch Clerks Association sought to represent its general dispatch clerks, dispatch clerks A, B, and C and crew schedulers; the Brotherhood there disputed the grouping, contending that R-1706 established the scope of the election. The Board sustained this position, which was also that of United, and held that R-1706 should be adhered to. United had argued that the dispatch clerks and schedulers were not a separate craft or class but merely components of the R-1706 unit, and that representation could be had only through investigation and election in that group. The Board ultimately discussed the application in these terms: “The precedents heretofore established by the Board, however, cannot be disregarded. Moreover, the record of stable industrial relations which has followed in the years since the Determination in R-1706 must be given due and careful consideration. “. . . In an industry which is still expanding, the agency charged with the duty of certifying designated representatives for collective bargaining must of necessity hesitate before acquiescing In the desires of certain employees to establish small segregated groups, because by that very course it may retard, or even destroy job opportunities. Flexibility in the use of employee talent carries just as many advantages for the employees as it does for the carrier. The Board is fully aware that the action taken herein will have, as an end result, the withholding of an immediate opportunity to select a collective-bargaining agent by this group of employees, but nevertheless, it is convinced that the basic purposes of the Railway Labor Act will be better served by adherence to the policy of preserving established crafts or classes.” Id,., at 76. Nor do the subsequent cases brought to our attention strip the R-1706 decision of its continuing validity. In both these matters — Cases No. C-2252 and C-2389, 3 N. M. B. Determinations of Craft or Class 16 (1961) — the Board determined that stock and storeroom employees were separate crafts or classes of employees at North Central and Trans-Texas Air Lines. Neither of these airlines had participated in the 1946 proceedings. Both were feeder lines, and in both cases the contending unions disagreed as to the appropriate unit in which the election should be held. In any event, the Board was simply pursuing the policy it had announced when it decided R-1706 — that it would re-examine craft or class determinations when it thought the purpose of the Act would be furthered thereby. This in itself belies the notion that the Board has blindly followed the R-1706 ruling. It is in light of this background that we must decide whether the Board’s reaffirmation of the R-1706 determination in these cases was made after a sufficient investigation, within the meaning of the Act. We reject the contention that it adhered solely to the craft or class chosen by the unions. Time and again it has acknowledged that it has the task of determining the appropriateness of a craft or class, and nothing in this case suggests that it abdicated that responsibility here. Where units untested by actual collective bargaining have been proposed by the unions involved the Board has consistently held hearings to determine the propriety of holding elections in those crafts or classes. But where the unions have agreed and the unit they have agreed upon has been one well-established in industry bargaining circles, it has. usually held elections without full-scale hearings, not simply because the unions agree but because the unit upon which they agree is one that is well-recognized under prior determinations of the Board and has proven satisfactory in actual experience. This is what it did here. The Board received the Brotherhood’s application; it requested, received and considered statements from the carrier and the Machinists. On the basis of these preliminary actions, it scheduled an election. But it continued to correspond with United, accepting and studying its detailed application for reconsideration of the Board’s decision to proceed to election in the R-1706 craft or class. Viewed alongside prior experience with the R-1706 grouping in the air transport industry this procedure clearly complied with the statutory command that the Board “investigate” the dispute. The only missing element of the required investigation is the election and that can now be held promptly. United sought to have the District Court require the Board to hold a hearing on the craft or class issue in which it would participate as a “party in interest.” But the Act does not require a hearing when the Board itself designates those who may participate in the election. It provides that “the Board shall designate who may participate in the election ... , or may appoint a committee of three neutral persons who after hearing shall within ten days designate the employees who may participate in the election.” (Emphasis supplied.) Indeed, United seems aware of this, for it stated in its brief that if “the Railway Labor Act does not specifically require a hearing, it does require an ‘investigation,’ ” and that United must be heard in the course of that proceeding. Clearly, then, the Board cannot be required to hold a hearing. Nor does the Act require that United be made a party to whatever procedure the Board uses to define the scope of the electorate. This status is accorded only to those organizations and individuals who seek to represent the employees, for it is the employees’ representative that is to be chosen, not the carriers’. Whether and to what extent carriers will be permitted to present their views on craft or class questions is a matter that the Act leaves solely in the discretion of the Board. The gist of United’s claim, therefore, is that it should be accorded a greater role in the Board’s investigation. This argument must be rejected. Here United participated in the proceeding establishing the craft or class in question as a cognizable grouping of employees, and it has had opportunities since that time to present further evidence. It must be remembered that United is under no compulsion to reach an agreement with the certified representative. As Chief Justice Stone said in Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, supra, “The quality of the action compelled, its reasonableness, and therefore the lawfulness of the compulsion, must be judged in the light of the conditions which have occasioned the exercise of governmental power.” Id., at 558-559. Likewise, as the Court observed in Hannah v. Larche, 363 U. S. 420, 442 (1960), the procedural requirements in a particular proceeding depend on “[t]he nature of the alleged right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden on that proceeding ....” The Board, as we noted in Switchmen’s Union, performs the “function of a referee.” It does not select one organization or another; it simply investigates, defines the scope of the electorate, holds the election and certifies the winner. Thus, while the Board’s investigation and resolution of a dispute in one craft or class rather than another might impose some additional burden upon the carrier, we cannot say that the latter’s interest rises to a status which requires the full panoply of procedural protections. We find support for this conclusion when we consider the burden that acceptance of United’s contentions would visit upon the administration of the Act. To require full-dress hearings on craft or class in each representation dispute would fly in the face of Congress’ instruction that representatives should be certified within 30 days of invocation of the Board’s services. It places beyond reach the speed which the Act’s framers thought an objective of the first order. In view of these considerations, we hold that the Board performed its statutory duty to conduct an investigation and designate the craft or class in which the election should be held and that it did so in a manner satisfying any possible constitutional requirements that might exist. Its determination, therefore, is not subject to judicial review. Switchmen’s Union v. National Mediation Board, supra. As was pointed out there, the “highly selective manner in which Congress has provided for judicial review of administrative orders or determinations under the Act,” id., at 305, indicates the confidence that it reposed in the Board. In turn the fair and equitable manner in which the Board has discharged its difficult function is attested by the admirable results- it has attained. 4. The Form of the Ballot. As we have noted the District Court enjoined the Board from conducting an election with a ballot that did not permit an employee to cast a vote against collective representation. We believe this was error. Section 2, Ninth empowers the Board to establish the rules governing elections. Moreover, it provides that in resolving representation disputes the Board is authorized “to take a secret ballot of the employees involved, or to utilize any other appropriate method of ascertaining the names of their duly designated and authorized representatives in such manner as shall insure the choice of representatives by the employees without interference, influence, or coercion exercised by the carrier.” Thus, not only does the statute fail to spell out the form of any ballot that might be used but it does not even require selection by ballot. It leaves the details to the broad discretion of the Board with only the caveat that it “insure” freedom from carrier interference. That the details of ■ selecting representatives were to be left for the final determination of the Board is buttressed by legislative history clearly indicating as much. See Hearings on H. R. 7650, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 34^35. In summary, then, the selection of a ballot is a necessary incident of the Board’s duty to resolve disputes. The Act expressly says as much, instructing the Board alone to establish the rules governing elections. Thus, it is clear that its decision on the matter is not subject to judicial review where there is no showing that it has acted in excess of its statutory authority. United and the Association, however, apparently relying on Leedom v. Kyne, supra, contend that the Board has exceeded its statutory authority in selecting the proposed ballot. The argument is that § 2, Fourth, which provides that “[t]he majority of any craft or class of employees shall have the right to determine whp shall be the representative of the craft or class” requires a ballot with a “no union” box. They urge that in Virginian B. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, supra, at 560, certification on the basis of a majority of the votes cast, rather than a majority of the eligible voters, was upheld on the ground that nonvoters “are presumed to assent to the expressed will of the majority of those voting.” And they say that the Board’s ballot is inconsistent with this rationale. But the Board has not followed the presumption of Virginian R. Co. Indeed the caveat on the face of the proposed ballot expressly refutes such an assumption. The Board’s rule of election procedure is that no vote is a vote for no representation, and this is now made plain to the voting employees. It is, as we have said, an assumption more favorable to the employees that the Association represents. Thus, under the Board’s practice a majority of the craft or class, as required by § 2, Fourth, does have the right to determine who shall be the representative of the group or, indeed, whether they shall have any representation at all. It is also claimed that since § 9 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 453, as amended, 61 Stat. 143, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (a) (1958 ed.) and § 2, Ninth of the Railway Labor Act are both designed to encourage collective bargaining and the National Labor Relations Board uses a ballot with a “no union” box, the Mediation Board must use one also. Even assuming that the “no union” ballot would implement the purpose of the Act, this is a far cry from saying that it is the only form of ballot that would do so. Given broad discretion as it is the Mediation Board has followed a presumption contrary to that adhered to by the Labor Relations Board. The latter has tailored its ballot to conform to the presumption of Virginian R. Co. If in a Labor Board election, an employee does not vote, he can safely be presumed to have acquiesced in the will of the majority of the voters. In a Mediation Board election, if the employee refuses to vote he is treated as having voted for no representation. We venture no opinion as to whether the Board’s proposed ballot will best effectuate the purposes of the Act. We do say that there is nothing to suggest that in framing it the Board has exceeded its statutory authority. Unable to point to any specific requirement of a “no union” ballot in the Act, United and the Association are left to arguing in terms of policy and broad generalities as to what the Railway Labor Act should provide. The very nature of the arguments indicates that the Board’s choice of its proposed ballot is not subject to judicial review, for it was to avoid the haggling and delays of litigation that such questions were left to the Board. These are matters for Congress and the Board rather than the courts. Here the Board — a creature of Congress — has been, as we have said, careful to provide fair, yet effective procedures and we feel certain that it will continue to do so. If its decision on the ballot is not acceptable, the place to go is to Congress, not to us. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments in Nos. 138 and 369 and affirm the judgment in No. 139. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Black concurs in the result. Section 2, Ninth provides: “If any dispute shall arise among a carrier’s employees as to who are the representatives of such employees designated and authorized in accordance with the requirements of this chapter, it shall be the duty of the Mediation Board, upon request of either party to the dispute, to investigate such dispute and to certify to both parties, in writing, within thirty days after the receipt of the invocation of its services, the name or names of the individuals or organizations that have been designated and authorized to represent the employees involved in the dispute, and certify the same to the carrier. Upon receipt of such certification the carrier shall treat with the representative so certified as the representative of the craft or class for the purposes of this chapter. In such an investigation, the Mediation Board shall be authorized to take a secret ballot of the employees involved, or to utilize any other appropriate method of ascertaining the names of their duly designated and authorized representatives in such manner as shall insure the choice of representatives by the employees without interference, influence, or coercion exercised by the carrier. In the conduct of any election for the purposes herein indicated the Board shall designate who may participate in the election and establish the rules to govern the election, or may appoint a committee of three neutral persons who after hearing shall within ten days designate the employees who may participate in the election. . . .” 45 U. S. C. § 152, Ninth. Indeed in the keystone case dealing with the Railway Labor Act, Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation No. Jfi, supra, the validity of the Board’s certificate was attacked because it failed to recite the number of eligible voters in the craft or class in which the election was held. The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the certificate would be conclusive absent such a finding, but it commented: “But we think it plain that if the Board omits to certify any of them [the facts concerning the number of eligible voters, the number participating and the choice of the majority], the omitted fact is open to inquiry by the court asked to enforce the command of the statute. . . . Such inquiry was made by the trial court, which found the number of eligible voters and thus established the correctness of the Board’s ultimate conclusion.” Id., at 562. Ruby v. American Airlines, Inc., 323 F. 2d 248, 255; WES Chapter, Flight Engineers’ Int’l Assn. v. National Mediation Board, 114 U. S. App. D. C. 229, 232, 314 F. 2d 234, 237. It should be noted, however, that in nearly all cases subsequent to Nos. C-2252 and C-2389, the Board has held elections among clerical, office, stores, fleet and passenger service employees without re-examining that grouping and without noticeable protest. Mr. Thompson, Executive Secretary of the Board, lists 19 such cases in his affidavit in the District Court supporting the Board’s motion to dismiss. This hardly supports United’s contention that the Board is clinging in this case to a determination it has found obsolete. The legislative history supports the view that the employees are to have the option of rejecting collective representation. The ballot that the Board proposes to use in future elections fully comports with this conception of the Act. Using the Board’s ballot an employee may refrain from joining a union and refuse to bargain collectively. All he need do is not vote and this is considered a vote against representation under the Board’s practice of requiring that a majority of the eligible voters in a craft or class actually vote for some representative before the election is valid. The practicalities of voting — the fact that many who favor some representation will not vote — are in favor of the employee who wants “no union.” Indeed, the method proposed by the Board might .well be more effective than providing a “no union” box, since, if one were added, a failure to vote would then be taken as a vote approving the choice of the majority of those voting. This is the practice of the National Labor Relations Board. The Solicitor General’s changes would leave the slots on the ballot intact (not supplying a “no union” box) but would append the following caption: “INSTRUCTIONS FOR VOTING “No employee is required to vote. If less than a majority of the employees cast valid ballots, no representative will be certified.” It is this revised form of ballot which the Court today approves, rather than the old form which was before the Court of Appeals. The original § 9 (c) of the Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 453, stated the Labor Board’s powers in the following language: “Whenever a question affecting commerce arises concerning the representation of employees, the Board may investigate such controversy and certify to the parties, in writing, the name or names of the representatives that have been designated or selected. In any such investigation, the Board shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice, either in conjunction with a proceeding under section 10 or otherwise, and may take a secret ballot of employees, or utilize any other suitable method to ascertain such representatives.” Compare § 2, Ninth of the Railway Labor Act: "If any dispute shall arise among a carrier’s employees as to who are the representatives of such employees designated and authorized in accordance with the requirements of this chapter, it shall be the duty of the Mediation Board, upon request of either party to the dispute, to investigate such dispute and to certify to both parties, in writing, within thirty days after the receipt of the invocation of its services, the name or names of the individuals or organizations that have been designated and authorized to represent the employees involved in the dispute, and certify the same to the carrier. ... In such an investigation, the Mediation Board shall be authorized to take a secret ballot of the emploj'ees involved, or to utilize any other appropriate method of ascertaining the names of their duly designated and authorized representatives in such manner as shall insure the choice of representatives by the employees without interference, influence, or coercion exercised by the carrier. . . 45 U. S. C. §152, Ninth (1958 ed.). The similarity in the purposes of the Wagner Act and the Railway Labor Act was pointed out in the report of the House Committee on Labor which stated that “the bill is merely an amplification and further clarification of the principles enacted into law by the Railway Labor Act . . . .” H. R. Rep. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3. See 40 Op. Atty. Gen. 541 (Attorney General Clark).
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the reason, if any, given by the court for granting the petition for certiorari.
What reason, if any, does the court give for granting the petition for certiorari?
[ "case did not arise on cert or cert not granted", "federal court conflict", "federal court conflict and to resolve important or significant question", "putative conflict", "conflict between federal court and state court", "state court conflict", "federal court confusion or uncertainty", "state court confusion or uncertainty", "federal court and state court confusion or uncertainty", "to resolve important or significant question", "to resolve question presented", "no reason given", "other reason" ]
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NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. BOEING CO. et al. No. 71-1607. Argued March 26, 1973 Decided May 21, 1973 RehNQüist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BreNNAN, Stewart, White, Marshall, and Powell, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 78. Douglas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 79. Norton J. Come argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Peter G. Nash, and Patrick Hardin. Samuel Lang argued the cause for respondent Boeing Co. With him on the brief were C. Dale Stout and Frederick A. Kullman. Bernard Dunau argued the cause for respondent Booster Lodge No. 405, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO. With him on the briefs were Plato E. Papps, Louis P. Poulton, and C. Paul Barker J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and Thomas E. Harris filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging reversal. Milton Smith, Gerard C. Smetana, and Jerry Kronenberg filed a brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented in this case is whether the National Labor Relations Board is required by § 8 (b) (1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act to inquire into the reasonableness of a disciplinary fine imposed by a union upon a member when the Board exercises its admitted authority under that section to determine whether the fine otherwise constitutes an unfair labor practice. The Board held that the validity of union fines under the Act does not depend on their being reasonable in amount. Booster Lodge No. 405, 185 N. L. R. B. 380, 383 n. 16, 75 L. R. R. M. 1004, 1007 n. 16 (1970). On petition for judicial review of this determination, the Court of Appeals held that an unreasonably large fine is coercive and restraining within the meaning of § 8 (b) (1) (A), and remanded the case to the Board with directions to consider “questions relating to the reasonableness of the fines imposed by the Union.” Booster Lodge No. 405, International Association of Machinists v. NLRB, 148 U. S. App. D. C. 119, 137, 459 F. 2d 1143, 1161 (1972). We granted certiorari, 409 U. S. 1074 (1972), and now reverse the judgment below. From May 16,1963, through September 15,1965, Booster Lodge No. 405, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO (the Union), and the Boeing Co. (the Company) were parties to a collective-bargaining agreement. Upon expiration of this agreement the Union called a lawful economic strike at the Company's Michoud plant in New Orleans and at other locations. As of October 2, 1965, the parties signed a new collective-bargaining agreement and the strikers thereafter returned to work. Both agreements contained maintenance-of-membership clauses that required Union members to retain their membership during the contract term. New employees were required to notify the Union and the Company within 40 days of accepting employment if they elected not to join the Union. During the 18-day strike some 143 employees out of 1,900 production and maintenance employees in the bargaining unit at the Michoud plant crossed the picket lines and returned to work. All of these employees were Union members at the time the strike began, although some of them tendered their resignations either before or after crossing the picket lines. In late October or early November 1965 the Union notified these employees that charges had been preferred against them for violating the International Union’s constitution. The constitution provides penalties for the “improper conduct of a member,” which term includes “[accepting employment ... in an establishment where a strike . . . exists.” In accordance with appropriate union procedures, including notice and opportunity for a hearing, all strikebreakers were found guilty, fined $450, and barred from holding Union office for a period of five years. While some of the fines were reduced and some partial payments were received by the Union, no member paid the full $450. After warning members to pay their fines or face the consequences, the Union filed suits in state court against nine individual employees to collect the fines. None of these suits has been finally adjudicated. In February 1966 the Company filed a charge with the Labor Board alleging that the attempted court enforcement of the fines violated § 8 (b) (1) (A) of the National Labor Relations Act. The allegations were basically twofold: first, that the Union committed an unfair labor practice by fining employees who had resigned from the Union, an issue that we consider in the companion case, Machinists <& Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, post, p. 84; and, second, that as to the members who were otherwise validly fined, the fines were unreasonable in amount. Thereafter the Board’s General Counsel issued a complaint and the case was heard by a Trial Examiner. With respect to the second issue, the Trial Examiner determined that the fines were impermissibly excessive, but the Board refused to adopt his conclusion. It relied on a case decided the same day, Machinists, Local Lodge 504 (Arrow Development Co.), 185 N. L. R. B. 365, 75 L. R. R. M. 1008 (1970), reversed sub nom. O’Reilly v. NLRB, 472 F. 2d 426 (CA9 1972), in which it held that Congress did not intend to give the Board authority to regulate the size of union fines or to establish standards with respect to a fine’s reasonableness. Section 8 (b)(1)(A) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization “to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 of this title.” Among the § 7 rights guaranteed to employees is the right to refrain from any of the concerted activities described in that section. We have previously held that § 8 (b)(1) (A) was not intended to give the Board power to regulate internal union affairs, including the imposition of disciplinary fines, with their consequent court enforcement, against members who violate the unions' constitutions and bylaws. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 175 (1967); Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U. S. 423 (1969). In Allis-Chalmers we held that court enforcement of fines ranging from $20 to $100 for crossing picket lines did not “restrain or coerce” employees within the meaning of the Act. And in Scofield we held that the union did not violate the Act in imposing fines of $50 and $100 on members for violating a union rule relating to production ceilings. In deciding these cases, the Court several times referred to the unions' imposition of “reasonable” fines. In particular, the Scofield Court concluded “that the union rule is valid and that its enforcement by reasonable fines does not constitute the restraint or coercion proscribed by § 8 (b) (1) (A).” 394 U. S., at 436 (emphasis added). The Company contends, not illogically, that the Court’s use of the adjective “reasonable” was intended to suggest to the Board that an unreasonable fine would amount to an unfair labor practice. This interpretation, however, permissible as it may be, is only dicta, since in both Allis-Chalmers and in Scofield the reasonableness of the fines was assumed. 388 U. S., at 192-193, n. 30; 394 U. S., at 430. Being squarely presented with the issue in this case, we recede from the implications of the dicta in these earlier cases. While “unreasonable” fines may be more coercive than “reasonable” fines, all fines are coercive to a greater or lesser degree. The underlying basis for the holdings of Allis-Chalmers and Scofield was not that reasonable fines were noncoercive under the language of §8 (b)(1)(A) of the Act, but was instead that those provisions were not intended by Congress to apply to the imposition by the union of fines not affecting the employer-employee relationship and not otherwise prohibited by the Act. The reason for this determination, in turn, was that Congress had not intended by enacting this section to regulate the internal affairs of unions to the extent that would be required in order to base unfair labor practice charges on the levying of such fines. The Court's examination of the legislative history of this provision in Allis-Chalmers led to the conclusion that: “What legislative materials there are dealing with §8 (b)(1) (A) contain not a single word referring to the application of its prohibitions to traditional internal union discipline in general, or disciplinary fines in particular. On the contrary there are a number of assurances by its sponsors that the section was not meant to regulate the internal affairs of unions.” 388 U. S., at 185-186 (emphasis added) . In Scofield we decided that Congress intended to distinguish between the external and the internal enforcement of union rules, and that therefore the Board would have authority to pass on those rules affecting an individual’s employment status but not on his union membership status. 394 U. S., at 428-430. Inquiry by the Board into the multiplicity of factors that the parties and the Court of Appeals correctly thought to have a bearing on the issue of reasonableness would necessarily lead the Board, to a substantial involvement in strictly internal union affairs. While the line may not always be clear between those matters that are internal and those that are external, to the extent that the Board was required to examine into such questions as a union’s motivation for imposing a fine it would be delving into internal union affairs in a manner which we have previously held Congress did not intend. Given the rationale of Allis-Chalmers and Scofield, the Board’s conclusion that §8 (b)(1) (A) of the Act has nothing to say about union fines of this nature, whatever their size, is correct. Issues as to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of such fines must be decided upon the basis of the law of contracts, voluntary associations, or such other principles of law as may be applied in a forum competent to adjudicate the issue. Under our holding, state courts will be wholly free to apply state law to such issues at the suit of either the union or the member fined. Our conclusion is also supported by the Board’s longstanding administrative construction to the same effect. At least since 1954, it has been the Board’s consistent position that it has “not been empowered by Congress ... to pass judgment on the penalties a union may impose on a member so long as the penalty does not impair the member’s status as an employee.” Local 288, UAW, 145 N. L. R. B. 1097, 1104 (1964). See also Minneapolis Star ■& Tribune Co., 109 N. L. R. B. 727, 34 L. R. R. M. 1431 (1954). We have held in analogous situations that such a consistent and contemporaneous construction of a statute by the agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to great deference by the courts. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 433-434 (1971); Udall v. Tollman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965). The Court of Appeals and the Company have suggested several policy reasons why the Board should not leave the determinations of reasonableness entirely to the state courts. Their basic reasons are, first, that more uniformity in the determination of what is reasonable will result if the Board suggests standards and, second, that more expertise in labor matters will be brought to bear if the issue is decided by the Board rather than solely by the courts. Even if we were to concede the relevance of policy factors in determining congressional intent, we are not persuaded that the Board is necessarily the better forum for determining the reasonableness of a fine. As we noted in Allis-Chalmers, court enforcement of union fines is not a recent innovation but has been known at least since 1867. 388 U. S., at 182 n. 9. See also Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 Yale L. J. 175 (1960). The relationship between a member and his union is generally viewed as contractual in nature, International Association of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U. S. 617, 618 (1958) ; Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U. S., at 426 n. 3; NLRB v. Textile Workers, 409 U. S. 213, 217 (1972), and the local law of contracts or voluntary associations usually governs the enforcement of this relationship. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U. S., at 182 and 193 n. 32; Scofield v. NLRB, supra, at 426 n. 3. We alluded to state court enforcement of unusually harsh union discipline in Allis-Chalmers when we stated that “state courts, in reviewing the imposition of union discipline, find ways to strike down ‘discipline [which] involves a severe hardship.’ ” 388 U. S., at 193 n. 32, quoting Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1049, 1078 (1951). The Board assumed that in view of this statement, our reference to “reasonable” fines, when reasonableness was not in issue, in Allis-Chalmers and in Scofield, was merely adverting to the usual standard applied by state courts in deciding whether to enforce union-imposed fines. The Board reads these cases, therefore, as encouraging state courts to use a reasonableness standard, not as a directive to the Board. Our review of state court cases decided both before and after our decisions in Allis-Chalmers and Scofield reveals that state courts applying state law are quite willing to determine whether disciplinary fines are reasonable in amount. Indeed, the expertise required for a determination of reasonableness may well be more evident in a judicial forum that is called upon to assess reasonableness in varying factual contexts than it is in a specialized agency. In assessing the reasonableness of disciplinary fines, for example, state courts are often able to draw on their experience in areas of the law apart from labor relations. Nor is it clear, as contended by the Court of Appeals, that the Board’s setting of standards of reasonableness will necessarily result in greater uniformity in this area even if uniformity is thought to be a desirable goal. Since state courts will have jurisdiction to determine reasonableness in the enforcement context in any event, the Board’s independent determination of reasonableness in an unfair labor practice context might well yield a conflict when the two forums are called upon to review the same fine. For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Board was warranted in determining that when the union discipline does not interfere with the employee-employer relationship or otherwise violate a policy of the National Labor Relations Act, the Congress did not authorize it “to evaluate the fairness of union discipline meted out to protect a legitimate union interest.” The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, Reversed. “(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— “(1) to restrain or coerce (A). employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein . . . ." 61 Stat. 141, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b)(1)(A). Of the 143 employees who crossed the picket lines, 24 made no attempt to resign from the Union, 61 resigned before crossing the picket lines, and 58 resigned after crossing the picket lines and reporting for work. The validity of the fines imposed against those who resigned from the Union is considered in a companion case, Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, post, p. 84. See also NLRB v. Textile Workers, 409 U. S. 213 (1972). The Union constitution provides that members found guilty of misconduct after notice and a hearing are subject to “reprimand, fine, suspension, or expulsion from membership or any lesser penalty or combination.” The constitution sets no maximum dollar limitation on fines. The base income of the employees fined ranges from $95 to $145 for a 40-hour workweek. Fines were reduced to 50% of wages earned during the strike for 35 members who appeared for the Union trial, apologized for their actions, and pledged loyalty to the Union. Eighteen of these reduced fines have been paid in full. The proviso to this section states: “That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein.” It has been the Board’s position that this proviso authorizes the unions to impose disciplinary fines on union members. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 109 N. L. R. B. 727, 34 L. R. R. M. 1431 (1954); Wisconsin Motor Corp., 145 N. L. R. B. 1097, 55 L. R. R. M. 1085 (1964); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 149 N. L. R. B. 67, 57 L. R. R. M. 1242 (1964). This Court, however, in holding that court enforcement of union fines was not an unfair labor practice in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 175 (1967), relied on congressional intent only with respect to the first part of this section. The parties’ principal contentions in this case do not depend on the scope of the proviso and we do not consider its interpretation necessary to our conclusion. In its entiret}'- § 7 provides: “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8 (a) (3).” 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. § 157. Moreover, since the Board has consistently over a long period of time interpreted the Act as not giving it authority to examine the reasonableness of disciplinary fines, infra, at 74^75, it is not likely that the Court specificially intended, by the use of a single adjective, and without mentioning the Labor Board cases to the contrary, to overturn the Board’s interpretation of the Act. Nor can it be argued that the Court was unaware of the Board’s interpretation, for the Scofield Court stated that in Allis-Chalmers it “essentially accepted the position of the National Labor Relations Board dating from Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 109 N. L. R. B. 727 (1954) where the Board also distinguished internal from external enforcement in holding that a union could fine a member for his failure to take part in picketing during a strike . . . .” Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U. S. 423, 428 (1969). As we also noted in Allis-Chalmers, this interpretation is supported by the Landriun-Griffin Act, where “Congress expressly recognized that a union member may be ‘fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined,’ and enacted only procedural requirements to be observed. 73 Stat. 523, 29 U. S. C. § 411 (a) (5).” NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U. S., at 194. Cf. Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U. S. 274, 296 (1971); U. O. P. Norplex v. NLRB, 445 F. 2d 155, 158 (CA7 1971) (“The reasonableness of the fines is a matter for the state court to determine should the Union seek judicial enforcement of the fines”). It is also noteworthy that when Congress has intended the Board to examine a fee for being excessive or unreasonable, it has specifically so stated and has provided statutory standards for the Board to follow in making such a determination. See, e. g., 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b) (5) (union initiation fees). The Board’s interpretation of our decisions is basically the following: “Thus, the Court’s findings that the fines in those cases were reasonable seems directed to enforcing courts, encouraging those courts to make an independent determination of the reasonableness of the fine in each case presented, in the same fashion as courts limit other union discipline which imposes a severe hardship. Such considerations are of an equitable nature rather than of the character of restraint and coercion with which the National Labor Relations Act treats.” Machinists, Local Lodge 604 (Arrow Development Co.), 185 N. L. R. B. 365, 368, 75 L. R. R. M. 1008, 1010 (1970). Auto Workers Local 283 v. Scofield, 76 L. R. R. M. 2433 (Wis. Sup. Ct. 1971) ($100 fine deemed reasonable); Farnum v. Kurtz, 70 L. R. R. M. 2035 (Los Angeles Mun. Ct. 1968) ($592 fine deemed unreasonable and reduced to $100); McCauley v. Federation of Musicians, 26 L. R. R. M. 2304 (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas 1950) ($300 fine deemed excessive and reduced to $100); North Jersey News-payer Guild Local No. 173 v. Rakos, 110 N. J. Super. 77, 264 A. 2d 453 (1970) ($750 fine reduced to $500, which was deemed reasonable); Walsh v. Communications Workers of America, Local me, 259 Md. 608, 271 A. 2d 148 (1970) ($500 fine deemed reasonable) ; Local 248, United Auto Workers v. Natzke, 36 Wis. 2d 237, 153 N. W. 2d 602 (1967) ($100 fine upheld); Jost v. Communications Workers of America, Local 9408, 13 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 7, 91 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1970) ($299 fine upheld, the court stating that “it is the settled law in this country that such a fine becomes a debt enforceable by the courts in an amount that is not unreasonably large.” Id., at 12, 91 Cal. Rptr., at 725). See, e. g., Farnum v. Kurtz, supra, at 2041, where a municipal court judge, in reducing a union-imposed fine of $592 to $100, revealed that the kind of expertise required by this type of case is not that of a technical knowledge of labor law: “Based upon the facts herein and the Court’s experiences [in passing judgment in thousands of misdemeanor cases], the fine assessed is much too large and unreasonable. The Court finds that a fine of $100.00 serves the ends of justice and is more in keeping with the circumstances herein and reasonable.” Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U. S., at 429; NLRB v. Marine Workers, 391 U. S. 418 (1968). Machinists, Local Lodge 504 (Arrow Development Co.), 185 N. L. R. B. 365, 638, 75 L. R. R. M. 1008, 1011 (1970). The Board has long held that the Act proscribes certain unacceptable methods of union coercion, such as physical violence to force an employee to join a union or to participate in a strike. In re Maritime Union, 78 N. L. R. B. 971, enforced, 175 F. 2d 686 (CA2 1949), cited in Scofield v. NLRB, supra, at 428 n. 4.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed. The information relevant to this variable may be found near the end of the summary that begins on the title page of each case, or preferably at the very end of the opinion of the Court. For cases in which the Court granted a motion to dismiss, consider "petition denied or appeal dismissed". There is "no disposition" if the Court denied a motion to dismiss.
What is the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed?
[ "stay, petition, or motion granted", "affirmed (includes modified)", "reversed", "reversed and remanded", "vacated and remanded", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded", "vacated", "petition denied or appeal dismissed", "certification to or from a lower court", "no disposition" ]
[ 2 ]
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RENT-A-CENTER, WEST, INC. v. JACKSON No. 09-497. Argued April 26, 2010 Decided June 21, 2010 Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, JJ., joined, post, p. 76. Robert F. Friedman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Edward F. Berbarie, Henry D. Lederman, Carter G. Phillips, Michael T. Garone, Ronald D. DeMoss, Andrew Trusevich, and Mary Harokopus. Ian E. Silverberg argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Del Hardy, Scott L. Nelson, Deepak Gupta, F. Paul Bland, Jr., Matthew Wessler, Amy Radon, Arthur H. Bryant, Leslie A. Bailey, and Leslie A. Brueckner Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America by Donald M. Falk, Archis A. Parasharami, Robin S. Conrad, and Shane Brennan Kawka; for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Rae T. Vann and Ann Elizabeth Reesman; and for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Deborah J. La Fetra and Timothy Sandefur. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Association for Justice et al. by Jeffrey R. White and Julie Nepveu; for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Lynn K. Rhinehart, James B. Coppess, and Laurence S. Gold; for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Michael L. Foreman, Sarah C. Crawford, Vincent A Eng, Elizabeth B. Wydra, and Dina Lassow; for the National Association of Consumer Advocates by Michael J. Quirk and Ira Rheingold; for the National Consumer Law Center et al. by Stuart T Rossman and Patricia T. Sturdevant; for Professional Arbitrator Roger I. Abrams et al. by Kevin K. Russell; and for the Service Employees International Union et al. by Michael Rubin, Shelley A. Gregory, Rebecca M. Hamburg, Cliff Palefsky, Catherine Ruckelshaus, and Terisa E. Chaw. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. We consider whether, under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA or Act), 9 U. S. C. §§ 1-16, a district court may decide a claim that an arbitration agreement is unconscionable, where the agreement explicitly assigns that decision to the arbitrator. I On February 1, 2007, the respondent here, Antonio Jackson, filed an employment-discrimination suit under Rev. Stat. § 1977, 42 U. S. C. § 1981, against his former employer in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. The defendant and petitioner here, Rent-A-Center, West, Inc., filed a motion under the FAA to dismiss or stay the proceedings, 9 U. S. C. § 3, and to compel arbitration, § 4. Rent-A-Center argued that the Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims (Agreement), which Jackson signed on February 24, 2003, as a condition of his employment there, precluded Jackson from pursuing his claims in court. The Agreement provided for arbitration of all “past, present or future” disputes arising out of Jackson’s employment with Rent-A-Center, including “claims for discrimination” and “claims for violation of any federal . . . law.” App. 29-30. It also provided that “[t]he Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation of this Agreement including, but not limited to any claim that all or any part of this Agreement is void or voidable.” Id., at 34. Jackson opposed the motion on the ground that “the arbitration agreement in question is clearly unenforceable in that it is unconscionable” under Nevada law. Id., at 40. Rent-A-Center responded that Jackson’s unconscionability claim was not properly before the court because Jackson had expressly agreed that the arbitrator would have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute about the enforceability of the Agreement. It also disputed the merits of Jackson’s unconscionability claims. The District Court granted Rent-A-Center’s motion to dismiss the proceedings and to compel arbitration. The court found that the Agreement “'“clearly and unmistakenly [sic]”’” gives the arbitrator exclusive authority to decide whether the Agreement is enforceable, App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U. S. 79, 83 (2002)), and, because Jackson challenged the validity of the Agreement as a whole, the issue was for the arbitrator, App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a (citing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U. S. 440, 444-445 (2006)). The court noted that even if it were to examine the merits of Jackson’s unconscionability claims, it would have rejected the claim that the agreement to split arbitration fees was substantively unconscionable under Nevada law. It did not address Jackson’s procedural or other substantive unconscionability arguments. Without oral argument, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. 581 F. 3d 912 (2009). The court reversed on the question of who (the court or arbitrator) had the authority to decide whether the Agreement is enforceable. It noted that “Jackson does not dispute that the language of the Agreement clearly assigns the arbitrability determination to the arbitrator,” but held that where “a party challenges an arbitration agreement as unconscionable, and thus asserts that he could not meaningfully assent to the agreement, the threshold question of unconscionability is for the court.” Id., at 917. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s alternative conclusion that the fee-sharing provision was not substantively unconscionable and remanded for consideration of Jackson’s other unconscionability arguments. Id., at 919-921, and n. 3. Judge Hall dissented on the ground that “the question of the arbitration agreement’s validity should have gone to the arbitrator, as the parties 'clearly and unmistakably provide[d]’ in their agreement.” Id., at 921. We granted certiorari, 558 U. S. 1142 (2010). II A The FAA reflects the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract. Section 2, the “primary substantive provision of the Act,” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 24 (1983), provides: “A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U. S. C. §2. The FAA thereby places arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts, Buckeye, supra, at 443, and requires courts to enforce them according to their terms, Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Le land, Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U. S. 468, 478 (1989). Like other contracts, however, they may be invalidated by “generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.” Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U. S. 681, 687 (1996). The Act also establishes procedures by which federal courts implement § 2’s substantive rule. Under § 3, a party may apply to a federal court for a stay of the trial of an action “upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration.” Under §4, a party “aggrieved” by the failure of another party “to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration” may petition a federal court “for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.” The court “shall” order arbitration “upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue.” Ibid. The Agreement here contains multiple “written provisiones]” to “settle by arbitration a controversy,” §2. Two are relevant to our discussion. First, the section titled “Claims Covered By The Agreement” provides for arbitration of all “past, present or future” disputes arising out of Jackson’s employment with Rent-A-Center. App. 29. Second, the section titled “Arbitration Procedures” provides that “[t]he Arbitrator . . . shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the . . . enforceability ... of this Agreement including, but not limited to any claim that all or any part of this Agreement is void or voidable.” Id., at 32, 34. The current “controversy” between the parties is whether the Agreement is unconscionable. It is the second provision, which delegates resolution of that controversy to the arbitrator, that Rent-A-Center seeks to enforce. Adopting the terminology used by the parties, we will refer to it as the delegation provision. The delegation provision is an agreement to arbitrate threshold issues concerning the arbitration agreement. We have recognized that parties can agree to arbitrate “gateway” questions of “arbitrability,” such as whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate or whether their agreement covers a particular controversy. See, e. g., Howsam, 537 U. S., at 83-85; Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U. S. 444, 452 (2003) (plurality opinion). This line of cases merely reflects the principle that arbitration is a matter of contract. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U. S. 938, 943 (1995). An agreement to arbitrate a gateway issue is simply an additional, antecedent agreement the party seeking arbitration asks the federal court to enforce, and the FAA operates on this additional arbitration agreement just as it does on any other. The additional agreement is valid under §2 “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,” and federal courts can enforce the agreement by staying federal litigation under §3 and compelling arbitration under §4. The question before us, then, is whether the delegation provision is valid under § 2. B There are two types of validity challenges under § 2: “One type challenges specifically the validity of the agreement to arbitrate,” and “[t]he other challenges the contract as a whole, either on a ground that directly affects the entire agreement (e. g., the agreement was fraudulently induced), or on the ground that the illegality of one of the contract’s provisions renders the whole contract invalid.” Buckeye, 546 U. S., at 444. In a line of cases neither party has asked us to overrule, we held that only the first type of challenge is relevant to a court’s determination whether the arbitration agreement at issue is enforceable. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 395, 403-404 (1967); Buckeye, supra, at 444-446; Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U. S. 346, 353-354 (2008). That is because §2 states that a “written provision” “to settle by arbitration a controversy” is “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” without mention of the validity of the contract in which it is contained. Thus, a party’s challenge to another provision of the contract, or to the contract as a whole, does not prevent a court from enforcing a specific agreement to arbitrate. “[A]s a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision is severable from the remainder of the contract.” Buckeye, 546 U. S., at 445; see also id., at 447 (the severability rule is based on § 2). But that agreements to arbitrate are severable does not mean that they are unassailable. If a party challenges the validity under §2 of the precise agreement to arbitrate at issue, the federal court must consider the challenge before ordering compliance with that agreement under §4. In Prima Paint, for example, if the claim had been “fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself,” then the court would have considered it. 388 U. S., at 403-404. “To immunize an arbitration agreement from judicial challenge on the ground of fraud in the inducement would be to elevate it over other forms of contract,” id., at 404, n. 12. In some cases the claimed basis of invalidity for the contract as a whole will be much easier to establish than the same basis as applied only to the severable agreement to arbitrate. Thus, in an employment contract many elements of alleged unconscionability applicable to the entire contract (outrageously low wages, for example) would not affect the agreement to arbitrate alone. But even where that is not the case — as in Prima Paint itself, where the alleged fraud that induced the whole contract equally induced the agreement to arbitrate which was part of that contract — we nonetheless require the basis of challenge to be directed specifically to the agreement to arbitrate before the court will intervene. Here, the “written provision ... to settle by arbitration a controversy,” 9 U. S. C. § 2, that Rent-A-Center asks us to enforce is the delegation provision — the provision that gave the arbitrator “exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the . .. enforceability ... of this Agreement,” App. 34. The “remainder of the contract,” Buckeye, supra, at 445, is the rest of the agreement to arbitrate claims arising out of Jackson’s employment with Rent-A-Center. To be sure this case differs from Prima Paint, Buckeye, and Pres ton, in that the arbitration provisions sought to be enforced in those cases were contained in contracts unrelated to arbitration — contracts for consulting services, see Prima Paint, supra, at 397, check-cashing services, see Buckeye, supra, at 442, and “personal management” or “talent agent” services, see Preston, supra, at 352. In this case, the underlying contract is itself an arbitration agreement. But that makes no difference. Application of the severability rule does not depend on the substance of the remainder of the contract. Section 2 operates on the specific “written provision” to “settle by arbitration a controversy” that the party seeks to enforce. Accordingly, unless Jackson challenged the delegation provision specifically, we must treat it as valid under § 2, and must enforce it under §§ 3 and 4, leaving any challenge to the validity of the Agreement as a whole for the arbitrator. C The District Court correctly concluded that Jackson challenged only the validity of the contract as a whole. Nowhere in his opposition to Rent-A-Center’s motion to compel arbitration did he even mention the delegation provision. See App. 39-47. Rent-A-Center noted this fact in its reply: “[Jackson’s response] fails to rebut or otherwise address in any way [Rent-A-Center’s] argument that the Arbitrator must decide [Jackson’s] challenge to the enforceability of the Agreement. Thus, [Rent-A-Center’s] argument is uncontested.” Id., at 50 (emphasis in original). The arguments Jackson made in his response to Rent-A-Center’s motion to compel arbitration support this conclusion. Jackson stated that “the entire agreement seems drawn to provide [Rent-A-Center] with undue advantages should an employment-related dispute arise.” Id., at 44 (emphasis added). At one point, he argued that the limitations on discovery “further suppor[t] [his] contention that the arbitration agreement as a whole is substantively unconscionable.” Ibid, (emphasis added). And before this Court, Jackson describes his challenge in the District Court as follows: He “opposed the motion to compel on the ground that the entire arbitration agreement, including the delegation clause, was unconscionable.” Brief for Respondent 55 (emphasis added). That is an accurate description of his filings. As required to make out a claim of unconscionability under Nevada law, see 581 F. 3d, at 919, he contended that the Agreement was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. It was procedurally unconscionable, he argued, because it “was imposed as a condition of employment and was non-negotiable.” App. 41. But we need not consider that claim because none of Jackson’s substantive unconscionability challenges was specific to the delegation provision. First, he argued that the Agreement’s coverage was one sided in that it required arbitration of claims an employee was likely to bring — contract, tort, discrimination, and statutory claims — but did not require arbitration of claims Rent-A-Center was likely to bring — intellectual property, unfair competition, and trade secrets claims. Id., at 42-43. This one-sided-coverage argument clearly did not go to the validity of the delegation provision. Jackson’s other two substantive unconscionability arguments assailed arbitration procedures called for by the contract — the fee-splitting arrangement and the limitations on discovery — procedures that were to be used during arbitration under both the agreement to arbitrate employment-related disputes and the delegation provision. It may be that had Jackson challenged the delegation provision by arguing that these common procedures as applied to the delegation provision rendered that provision unconscionable, the challenge should have been considered by the court. To make such a claim based on the discovery procedures, Jackson would have had to argue that the limitation upon the number of depositions causes the arbitration of his claim that the Agreement is unenforceable to be unconscionable. That would be, of course, a much more difficult argument to sustain than the argument that the same limitation renders arbitration of his factbound employment-discrimination claim unconscionable. Likewise, the unfairness of the fee-splitting arrangement may be more difficult to establish for the arbitration of enforceability than for arbitration of more complex and fact-related aspects of the alleged employment discrimination. Jackson, however, did not make any arguments specific to the delegation provision; he argued that the fee-sharing and discovery procedures rendered the entire Agreement invalid. Jackson’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit confirms that he did not contest the validity of the delegation provision in particular. His brief noted the existence of the delegation provision, Brief for Appellant in No. 07-16164, p. 3, but his unconscionability arguments made no mention of it, id., at 3-7. He also repeated the arguments he had made before the District Court, see supra, at 73, that the “entire agreement” favors Rent-A-Center and that the limitations on discovery further his “contention that the arbitration agreement as a whole is substantively unconscionable,” Brief for Appellant 7-8. Finally, he repeated the argument made in his District Court filings, that under state law the unconscionable clauses could not be severed from the arbitration agreement, see id., at 8-9. The point of this argument, of course, is that the Agreement as a whole is unconscionable under state law. Jackson repeated that argument before this Court. At oral argument, counsel stated: “There are certain elements of the arbitration agreement that are unconscionable and, under Nevada law, which would render the entire arbitration agreement unconscionable.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 43 (emphasis added). And again, he stated, “we’ve got both certain provisions that are unconscionable, that under Nevada law render the entire agreement unconscionable . . . , and that’s what the Court is to rely on.” Id., at 43-44 (emphasis added). In his brief to this Court, Jackson made the contention, not mentioned below, that the delegation provision itself is substantively unconscionable because the quid pro quo he was supposed to receive for it — that “in exchange for initially allowing an arbitrator to decide certain gateway questions,” he would receive “plenary post-arbitration judicial review”— was eliminated by the Court’s subsequent holding in Hall Street Associates, L. L. C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U. S. 576 (2008), that the nonplenary grounds for judicial review in § 10 of the FAA are exclusive. Brief for Respondent 59-60. He brought this challenge to the delegation provision too late, and we will not consider it. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U. S. 247, 273-274 (2009). We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. It is so ordered. There is one caveat. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U. S. 938, 944 (1995), held that “[ejourts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is ‘clea[r] and unmistakablfe]’ evidence that they did so.” The parties agree the heightened standard applies here. See Brief for Petitioner 21; Brief for Respondent 54. The District Court concluded the “Agreement to Arbitrate clearly and unmistakenly [sic] provides the arbitrator with the exclusive authority to decide whether the Agreement to Arbitrate is enforceable.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a. The Ninth Circuit noted that Jackson did not dispute that the text of the Agreement was clear and unmistakable on this point. 581 F. 3d 912, 917 (2009). He also does not dispute it here. What he argues now, however, is that it is not “clear and unmistakable” that his agreement to that text was valid, because of the unconscionability claims he raises. See Brief for Respondent 54-55. The dissent makes the same argument. See post, at 80-82 (opinion of Stevens, J.). This mistakes the subject of the First Options “clear and unmistakable” requirement. It pertains to the parties’ manifestation of intent, not the agreement’s validity. As explained in Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U. S. 79, 83 (2002), it is an “interpretive rule,” based on an assumption about the parties’ expectations. In “circumstance[s] where contracting parties would likely have expected a court to have decided the gateway matter,” ibid., we assume that is what they agreed to. Thus, “[u]nless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator.” AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U. S. 643, 649 (1986). The validity of a written agreement to arbitrate (whether it is legally binding, as opposed to whether it was in fact agreed to — including, of course, whether it was void for unconscionability) is governed by §2’s provision that it shall be valid “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Those grounds do not include, of course, any requirement that its lack of unconscionability must be “clear and unmistakable.” And they are not grounds that First Options added for agreements to arbitrate gateway issues; § 2 applies to all written agreements to arbitrate. The issue of the agreement’s “validity” is different from the issue whether any agreement between the parties “was ever concluded,” and, as in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U. S. 440 (2006), we address only the former. Id., at 444, n. 1. The dissent calls this a “breezy assertion,” post, at 77, but it seems to us self-evident. When the dissent comes to discussing the point, post, at 85-86, it gives no logical reason why an agreement to arbitrate one controversy (an employment-discrimination claim) is not severable from an agreement to arbitrate a different controversy (enforceability). There is none. Since the dissent accepts that the invalidity of one provision within an arbitration agreement does not necessarily invalidate its other provisions, post, at 81-82, n. 7, it cannot believe in some sort of magic bond between arbitration provisions that prevents them from being severed from each other. According to the dissent, it is fine to sever an invalid provision within an arbitration agreement when severability is a matter of state law, but severability is not allowed when it comes to applying Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 395 (1967). Jackson’s argument fails. The severability rule is a “matter of substantive federal arbitration law,” and we have repeatedly “rejected the view that the question of ‘severability’ was one of state law, so that if state law held the arbitration provision not to be severable a challenge to the contract as a whole would be decided by the court.” Buckeye, 546 U. S., at 445 (citing Prima Paint, 388 U. S., at 400, 402-403; Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1, 10-14 (1984); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U. S. 265, 270-273 (1995)). For the same reason, the Agreement’s statement that its provisions are severable, see App. 37, does not affect our analysis. Hall Street Associates, L. L. C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U. S. 576 (2008), was decided after Jackson submitted his brief to the Ninth Circuit, but that does not change our conclusion that he forfeited the argument. Jackson could have submitted a supplemental brief during the year and a half between this Court’s decision of Hall Street on March 25, 2008, and the Ninth Circuit’s judgment on September 9, 2009. Moreover, Hall Street affirmed a rule that had been in place in the Ninth Circuit since 2003. Id., at 583-584, and n. 5.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the court opinion mentions that one or more of the members of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed dissented. Focus on whether there exists any statement to this effect in the opinion, for example "divided," "dissented," "disagreed," "split.". A reference, without more, to the "majority" or "plurality" does not necessarily evidence dissent (the other judges may have concurred). If a case arose on habeas corpus, indicate dissent if either the last federal court or the last state court to review the case contained one. If the highest court with jurisdiction to hear the case declines to do so by a divided vote, indicate dissent. If the lower court denies an en banc petition by a divided vote and the Supreme Court discusses same, indicate dissent.
Does the court opinion mention that one or more of the members of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed dissented?
[ "Yes", "No" ]
[ 0 ]
sc
YOUNGBLOOD v. WEST VIRGINIA No. 05-6997. Decided June 19, 2006 Per Curiam. In April 2001, the State of West Virginia indicted petitioner Denver A. Youngblood, Jr., on charges including abduction of three young women, Katara, Kimberly, and Wendy, and two instances of sexual assault upon Katara. The cases went to trial in 2003 in the Circuit Court of Morgan County, where a jury convicted Youngblood of two counts of sexual assault, two counts of brandishing a firearm, and one count of indecent exposure. The conviction rested principally on the testimony of the three women that they were held captive by Youngblood and a friend of his, statements by Katara that she was forced at gunpoint to perform oral sex on Youngblood, and evidence consistent with a claim by Katara about disposal of certain physical evidence of their sexual encounter. Youngblood was sentenced to a combined term of 26 to 60 years’ imprisonment, with 25 to 60 of those years directly attributable to the sexual-assault convictions. Several months after being sentenced, Youngblood moved to set aside the verdict. He claimed that an investigator working on his case had uncovered new and exculpatory evidence, in the form of a graphically explicit note that both squarely contradicted the State’s account of the incidents and directly supported Youngblood’s consensual-sex defense. The note, apparently written by Kimberly and Wendy, taunted Youngblood and his friend for having been “played” for fools, warned them that the girls had vandalized the house where Youngblood brought them, and mockingly thanked Youngblood for performing oral sex on Katara. The note was said to have been shown to a state trooper investigating the sexual-assault allegations against Young-blood; the trooper allegedly read the note but declined to take possession of it, and told the person who produced it to destroy it. Youngblood argued that the suppression of this evidence violated the State’s federal constitutional obligation to disclose evidence favorable to the defense, and in support of his argument he referred to cases citing and applying Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963). The trial court denied Youngblood a new trial, saying that the note provided only impeachment, but not exculpatory, evidence. The trial court did not discuss Brady or its scope, but expressed the view that the investigating trooper had attached no importance to the note, and because he had failed to give it to the prosecutor the State could not now be faulted for failing to share it with Youngblood’s counsel. See App. C to Pet. for Cert. (Tr. 22-23 (Sept. 25, 2003)). A bare majority of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, but without examining the specific constitutional claims associated with the alleged suppression of favorable evidence. 217 W. Va. 535, 548, 618 S. E. 2d 544, 557 (2005) (per curiam). Justice Davis, dissenting in an opinion that Justice Starcher joined, unambiguously characterized the trooper’s instruction to discard the new evidence as a Brady violation. 217 W. Va., at 550-552, 618 S. E. 2d, at 559-561. The dissenters concluded that the note indicating that Youngblood engaged in consensual sex with Katara had been suppressed and was material, id., at 550, n. 6, 618 S. E. 2d, at 559, n. 6 (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 435, 437-438 (1995)), both because it was at odds with the testimony provided by the State’s three chief witnesses (Katara, Kimberly, and Wendy) and also because it was entirely consistent with Youngblood’s defense at trial that his sexual encounters with Katara were consensual, 217 W. Va., at 551-552, 618 S. E. 2d, at 560-561. Youngblood then filed this petition for a writ of certiorari. A Brady violation occurs when the government fails to disclose evidence materially favorable to the accused. See 373 U. S., at 87. This Court has held that the Brady duty extends to impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence, United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S. 667, 676 (1985), and Brady suppression occurs when the government fails to turn over even evidence that is “known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor,” Kyles, 514 U. S., at 438. See id., at 437 (“[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police”). “Such evidence is material ‘if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different,’ ” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U. S. 263, 280 (1999) (quoting Bagley, supra, at 682 (opinion of Blackmun, J.)), although a “showing of materiality does not require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant’s acquittal,” Kyles, 514 U. S., at 434. The reversal of a conviction is required upon a “showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Id., at 435. Youngblood clearly presented a federal constitutional Brady claim to the State Supreme Court, see Brief for Appellant in No. 31765 (Sup. Ct. App. W. Va.), pp. 42-47, as he had to the trial court, see App. C to Pet. for Cert. (Tr. 6, 44-45, 50, 51 (Sept. 25, 2003)); id., at 13, 17 (Sept. 29, 2003). And, as noted, the dissenting justices discerned the significance of the issue raised. If this Court is to reach the merits of this case, it would be better to have the benefit of the views of the full Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia on the Brady issue. We, therefore, grant the petition for certiorari, vacate the judgment of the State Supreme Court, and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the state or territory of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed.
What is the state of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed?
[ "Alabama", "Alaska", "American Samoa", "Arizona", "Arkansas", "California", "Colorado", "Connecticut", "Delaware", "District of Columbia", "Federated States of Micronesia", "Florida", "Georgia", "Guam", "Hawaii", "Idaho", "Illinois", "Indiana", "Iowa", "Kansas", "Kentucky", "Louisiana", "Maine", "Marshall Islands", "Maryland", "Massachusetts", "Michigan", "Minnesota", "Mississippi", "Missouri", "Montana", "Nebraska", "Nevada", "New Hampshire", "New Jersey", "New Mexico", "New York", "North Carolina", "North Dakota", "Northern Mariana Islands", "Ohio", "Oklahoma", "Oregon", "Palau", "Pennsylvania", "Puerto Rico", "Rhode Island", "South Carolina", "South Dakota", "Tennessee", "Texas", "Utah", "Vermont", "Virgin Islands", "Virginia", "Washington", "West Virginia", "Wisconsin", "Wyoming", "United States", "Interstate Compact", "Philippines", "Indian", "Dakota" ]
[ 56 ]
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WEINBERGER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, et al. v. CATHOLIC ACTION OF HAWAII/PEACE EDUCATION PROJECT et al. No. 80-1377. Argued October 13, 1981 Decided December 1, 1981 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Marshall, Powell, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Brennan, J., joined, post, p. 147. Solicitor General Lee argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were former Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Dinkins, Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne, Harlon L. Dalton, Peter R. Steenland, Jr., Raymond N. Zagone, and Martin Green. Nancy Steams argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief was Robert L. Boehm. Ronald A. Zambrun and Raymond M. Momboisse filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging reversal. Ronald J. Wilson filed a brief for the National Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Doron Weinberg filed a brief for the Fellowship of Reconciliation et al. as amici curiae. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that § 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 853, 42 U. S. C. §4332(2)(C), requires the Navy to prepare and release to the public a “Hypothetical Environmental Impact Statement” with regard to the operation of a facility capable of storing nuclear weapons. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project v. Brown, 643 F. 2d 569, 572 (1980). Because we conclude that the “Hypothetical Environmental Impact Statement” is a creature of judicial cloth, not legislative cloth, and that it is not mandated by any of the statutory or regulatory provisions upon which the Court of Appeals relied, we reverse its decision. The facts relevant to our decision are not seriously controverted. Pursuant to a decision by the Navy to transfer ammunition and weapons stored at various locations on the island of Oahu, Hawaii, to the West Loch branch of the Lualualei Naval Magazine, the Navy prepared an Environmental Impact Assessment (ElA) concerning how the plan would affect the environment. The assessment concluded that the necessary construction of 48 earth-covered magazines and associated structures would have no significant environmental impact, and therefore no Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was prepared at the construction stage. Construction contracts were let in March 1977 and in April 1978. Construction of the West Loch facilities has been completed and the magazines are now in use. It is stipulated that the magazines are capable of storing nuclear weapons. Because the information is classified for national security reasons, the Navy’s regulations forbid it either to admit or to deny that nuclear weapons are actually stored at West Loch. In 1978, the Navy prepared a Candidate Environmental Impact Statement (CEIS). This CEIS deals generally with the environmental hazards associated with the storage, handling, and transporation of nuclear weapons, but does not refer to any specific site or storage facility. It concludes that no significant hazards to the environment are present. In March 1978, respondents brought this action seeking an injunction against the building of the new facilities at West Loch until an EIS had been filed. Their principal complaint was that the Navy’s EIA had ignored the enhanced risk of a nuclear accident resulting from West Loch’s proximity to three nearby air facilities, the effects of such an accident on the population and environment of Hawaii, and the effects of radiation from the storage of nuclear weapons in a populated area. The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii concluded that the “construction and use of the storage facilities at West Loch is a major federal action” within the meaning of § 102(2)(C). 468 F. Supp. 190, 193 (1979). But given certain national security provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U. S. C. §2011 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), and the Navy’s own regulations concerning nuclear weapons, the District Court concluded that petitioners had complied with NEPA “to the fullest extent possible.” 468 F. Supp., at 193. We find it unnecessary to reach the question posed by the District Court’s reliance on the security provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, since respondents have made no showing in this case that the Navy has failed to comply, or even need comply, with NEPA’s requirements regarding the preparation and public disclosure of an EIS. Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, 42 U. S. C. §4332(2)(C), provides that, “to the fullest extent possible,” all federal agencies shall “include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement” discussing, inter alia, the environmental impact of the proposed action and possible alternatives. Section 102(2)(C) also requires that the EIS be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), and the public, subject to the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U. S. C. § 552 (1976 ed. and Süpp. V). We have previously noted: “The thrust of § 102(2)(C) is . . . that environmental concerns be integrated into the very process of agency decisionmaking. The ‘detailed statement’ it requires is the outward sign that environmental values and consequences have been considered during the planning stage of agency actions.” Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U. S. 347, 350 (1979). Section 102(2)(C) thus serves twin aims. The first is to inject environmental considerations into the federal agency’s decisionmaking process by requiring the agency to prepare an EIS. The second aim is to inform the public that the agency has considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process. Through the disclosure of an EIS, the public is made aware that the agency has taken environmental considerations into account. Public disclosure of the EIS is expressly governed by FOIA. 42 U. S. C. §4332(2)(C). The decisionmaking and public disclosure goals of §102 (2)(C), though certainly compatible, are not necessarily coextensive. Thus, § 102(2)(C) contemplates that in a given situation a federal agency might have to include environmental considerations in its decisionmaking process, yet withhold public disclosure of any NEPA documents, in whole or in part, under the authority of an FOIA exemption. That the decisionmaking and disclosure requirements of NEPA are not coextensive has been recognized by the Department of Defense’s regulations, both at the time the West Loch facility was constructed and today. In an apparent attempt to balance what it considered to be the disclosure requirements of NEPA with national security interests, the Court of Appeals concluded that petitioners could prepare and disclose an EIS that would assess the impact of the storage of nuclear weapons at West Loch without revealing specific information regarding the number and type of nuclear weapons to be stored at the facility. 643 F. 2d, at 572. The EIS could hypothesize, but not concede, that the facility will be used for the purpose for which it has been made capable. Ibid. But in inventing the “Hypothetical Environmental Impact Statement,” the Court of Appeals departed from the express intent of Congress manifested by the explicit language in §102(2)(C). That language provides that public disclosure of the EIS shall be governed by FOIA. As we concluded in EPA v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73, 80 (1973), FOIA was intended by Congress to balance the public’s need for access to official information with the Government’s need for confidentiality. Of the nine exemptions in Subsection (b) of FOIA, we think two are relevant in determining whether the Navy must release an EIS. Exemption 3, 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(3), which authorizes the withholding of documents “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute,” arguably exempts the publication of an EIS under the Atomic Energy Act. But we find it unnecessary to decide this question, because to us it is clear that Exemption 1, 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(1), is applicable. Exemption 1 exempts from disclosure matters that are “(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.” Executive Order No. 12065, 3 CFR 190 (1978-1979 Comp.), confers upon specified officials the power to classify information if its release would pose a threat to national security. Virtually all information relating to the storage of nuclear weapons is classified. Thus, any material properly classified pursuant to Executive Order No. 12065 is exempt from disclosure under Exemption 1, and therefore is exempt from the public disclosure requirements of NEPA. Congress has thus effected a balance between the needs of the public for access to documents prepared by a federal agency and the necessity of nondisclosure or secrecy. The Court of Appeals in this case should have accepted the balance struck by Congress, rather than engrafting onto the statutory language unique concepts of its own making. By requiring the Navy to prepare a “hypothetical” EIS, the Court of Appeals required the production of a document that would not exist save for what that court thought to be NEPA’s public disclosure requirements. But NEPA’s public disclosure requirements are expressly governed by FOIA. In NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U. S. 132, 161-162 (1975), we held that FOIA “does not compel agencies to write opinions in cases in which they would not otherwise be required to do so. It only requires disclosure of certain documents which the law requires the agency to prepare or which the agency has decided for its own reasons to create.” See Forsham v. Harris, 445 U. S. 169, 185-186 (1980); Kissinger v. Reporters Committee, 445 U. S. 136, 152 (1980). It follows that if the Navy would not be required by FOIA to release an EIS were one already prepared, it is obviously not required to prepare a “hypothetical” EIS nowhere mentioned in NEPA. Since the public disclosure requirements of NEPA are governed by FOIA, it is clear that Congress intended that the public’s interest in ensuring that federal agencies comply with NEPA must give way to the Government’s need to preserve military secrets. In the instant case, an EIS concerning a proposal to store nuclear weapons at West Loch need not be disclosed. As we indicated earlier, whether or not nuclear weapons are stored at West Loch is classified information exempt from disclosure to the public under Exemption 1. If the Navy proposes to store nuclear weapons at West Loch, the Department of Defense’s regulations can fairly be read to require that an EIS be prepared solely for internal purposes, even though such a document cannot be disclosed to the public. The Navy must consider environmental consequences in its decisionmaking process, even if it is unable to meet NEPA’s public disclosure goals by virtue of FOIA Exemption 1. it does not follow, however, that the Navy is required to prepare an EIS in this case. The Navy is not required to prepare an EIS regarding the hazards of storing nuclear weapons at West Loch simply because the facility is “nuclear capable.” As we held in Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390, 405-406 (1976), an EIS need not be prepared simply because a project is contemplated, but only when the project is proposed. To say that the West Loch facility is “nuclear capable” is to say little more than that the Navy has contemplated the possibility that nuclear weapons, of whatever variety, may at some time be stored here. It is the proposal to store nuclear weapons at West Loch that triggers the Navy’s obligation to prepare an EIS. Due to national security reasons, however, the Navy can neither admit nor deny that it proposes to store nuclear weapons at West Loch. In this case, therefore, it has not been and cannot be established that the Navy has proposed the only action that would require the preparation of an EIS dealing with the environmental consequences of nuclear weapons storage at West Loch. Ultimately, whether or not the Navy has complied with NEPA “to the fullest extent possible” is beyond judicial scrutiny in this case. In other circumstances, we have held that “public policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be violated.” Totten v. United States, 92 U. S. 105, 107 (1876). See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1 (1953). We confront a similar situation in the instant case. The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to reinstate the judgment of dismissal entered by the District Court. It is so ordered. An Environmental Impact Assessment is a document prepared by a federal agency in order to determine whether a formal Environmental Impact Statement should be prepared. See 40 CFR § 1508.9 (1981). Navy Security Classification Guide for Nuclear Weapons, Navy SWOP 55-1 (1974); Dept, of Navy, OPNAV Instruction 5721.1C (1975). 42 U. S. C. §§2014(y), 2161, 2162, 2271. 32 CFR §214.8 (1978) (repealed). 32 CFR §214.6 (1980). Executive Order No. 12065 superseded Executive Order No. 11652, 3 CFR 678 (1971-1975 Comp.), which in turn superseded Executive Order No. 10501, 3 CFR 979 (1949-1953 Comp.). Our decision in EPA v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73 (1973), rested on an application of Executive Order No. 10501. 410 U. S., at 81, and n. 7, 84, and n. 9. See 32 CFR §214.8 (1978) (repealed); 32 CFR §214.6 (1980).
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. If the case arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, note the source as "United States Supreme Court". If the case arose in a state court, note the source as "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", or "State Trial Court". Do not code the name of the state.
What is the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed?
[ "U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals", "U.S. Court of International Trade", "U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims", "U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces", "U.S. Court of Military Review", "U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals", "U.S. Customs Court", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit", "U.S. Tax Court", "Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals", "U.S. Court for China", "U.S. Consular Courts", "U.S. Commerce Court", "Territorial Supreme Court", "Territorial Appellate Court", "Territorial Trial Court", "Emergency Court of Appeals", "Supreme Court of the District of Columbia", "Bankruptcy Court", "U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)", "Alabama Middle U.S. District Court", "Alabama Northern U.S. District Court", "Alabama Southern U.S. District Court", "Alaska U.S. District Court", "Arizona U.S. District Court", "Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court", "Arkansas Western U.S. District Court", "California Central U.S. District Court", "California Eastern U.S. District Court", "California Northern U.S. District Court", "California Southern U.S. District Court", "Colorado U.S. District Court", "Connecticut U.S. District Court", "Delaware U.S. District Court", "District Of Columbia U.S. District Court", "Florida Middle U.S. District Court", "Florida Northern U.S. District Court", "Florida Southern U.S. District Court", "Georgia Middle U.S. District Court", "Georgia Northern U.S. District Court", "Georgia Southern U.S. District Court", "Guam U.S. District Court", "Hawaii U.S. District Court", "Idaho U.S. District Court", "Illinois Central U.S. District Court", "Illinois Northern U.S. District Court", "Illinois Southern U.S. District Court", "Indiana Northern U.S. District Court", "Indiana Southern U.S. District Court", "Iowa Northern U.S. District Court", "Iowa Southern U.S. District Court", "Kansas U.S. District Court", "Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court", "Kentucky Western U.S. District Court", "Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court", "Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court", "Louisiana Western U.S. District Court", "Maine U.S. District Court", "Maryland U.S. District Court", "Massachusetts U.S. District Court", "Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court", "Michigan Western U.S. District Court", "Minnesota U.S. District Court", "Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court", "Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court", "Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court", "Missouri Western U.S. District Court", "Montana U.S. District Court", "Nebraska U.S. District Court", "Nevada U.S. District Court", "New Hampshire U.S. District Court", "New Jersey U.S. District Court", "New Mexico U.S. District Court", "New York Eastern U.S. District Court", "New York Northern U.S. District Court", "New York Southern U.S. District Court", "New York Western U.S. District Court", "North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court", "North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court", "North Carolina Western U.S. District Court", "North Dakota U.S. District Court", "Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court", "Ohio Northern U.S. District Court", "Ohio Southern U.S. District Court", "Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court", "Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court", "Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court", "Oregon U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court", "Puerto Rico U.S. District Court", "Rhode Island U.S. District Court", "South Carolina U.S. District Court", "South Dakota U.S. District Court", "Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court", "Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court", "Tennessee Western U.S. District Court", "Texas Eastern U.S. District Court", "Texas Northern U.S. District Court", "Texas Southern U.S. District Court", "Texas Western U.S. District Court", "Utah U.S. District Court", "Vermont U.S. District Court", "Virgin Islands U.S. District Court", "Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court", "Virginia Western U.S. District Court", "Washington Eastern U.S. District Court", "Washington Western U.S. District Court", "West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court", "West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court", "Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court", "Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court", "Wyoming U.S. District Court", "Louisiana U.S. District Court", "Washington U.S. District Court", "West Virginia U.S. District Court", "Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court", "South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court", "South Carolina Western U.S. District Court", "Alabama U.S. District Court", "U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone", "Georgia U.S. District Court", "Illinois U.S. District Court", "Indiana U.S. District Court", "Iowa U.S. District Court", "Michigan U.S. District Court", "Mississippi U.S. District Court", "Missouri U.S. District Court", "New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)", "New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)", "New York U.S. District Court", "North Carolina U.S. District Court", "Ohio U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania U.S. District Court", "Tennessee U.S. District Court", "Texas U.S. District Court", "Virginia U.S. District Court", "Norfolk U.S. District Court", "Wisconsin U.S. District Court", "Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court", "New Jersey U.S. District Court", "California U.S. District Court", "Florida U.S. District Court", "Arkansas U.S. District Court", "District of Orleans U.S. District Court", "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", "State Trial Court", "Eastern Circuit (of the United States)", "Middle Circuit (of the United States)", "Southern Circuit (of the United States)", "Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama", "Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas", "California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California", "Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut", "Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware", "Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida", "Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia", "Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois", "Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana", "Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa", "Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas", "Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky", "Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana", "Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine", "Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland", "Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts", "Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan", "Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota", "Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi", "Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri", "Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada", "New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire", "New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey", "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York", "North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina", "Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio", "Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon", "Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania", "Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island", "South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina", "Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee", "Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas", "Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont", "Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia", "West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia", "Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin", "Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming", "Circuit Court of the District of Columbia", "Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska", "Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado", "Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington", "Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho", "Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana", "Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah", "South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota", "North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota", "Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma", "Court of Private Land Claims" ]
[ 27 ]
sc
Mark J. McBURNEY, et al., Petitioners v. Nathaniel L. YOUNG, Deputy Commissioner and Director, Virginia Division of Child Support Enforcement, et al. No. 12-17. Supreme Court of the United States Argued Feb. 20, 2013. Decided April 29, 2013. Deepak Gupta, for Petitioners. Duncan Getchell, Jr., Solicitor General, for Respondents. Brian Wolfman, Anne King, Institute for Public Representation, Washington, DC, Deepak Gupta, Counsel of Record, Gregory A. Beck, Jonathan E. Taylor, Gupta Beck PLLC, Washington, DC, for Petitioners. Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General of Virginia, Patricia L. West, Chief Deputy Attorney General, E. Duncan Getchell, Jr. Solicitor General of Virginia, Counsel of Record, Michael H. Brady, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Richmond, VA, Joseph P. Rapisarda, Jr., County Attorney, Benjamin A. Thorp, Assistant County Attorney, Henrico County Attorney's Office, Henrico, VA, for Respondents. Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, we must decide whether the Virginia Freedom of Information Act, Va.Code Ann. § 2.2-3700 et seq. , violates either the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the Constitution or the dormant Commerce Clause. The Virginia Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), provides that "all public records shall be open to inspection and copying by any citizens of the Commonwealth," but it grants no such right to non-Virginians. § 2.2-3704(A) (Lexis 2011). Petitioners, who are citizens of other States, unsuccessfully sought information under the Act and then brought this constitutional challenge. We hold, however, that petitioners' constitutional rights were not violated. By means other than the state FOIA, Virginia made available to petitioners most of the information that they sought, and the Commonwealth's refusal to furnish the additional information did not abridge any constitutionally protected privilege or immunity. Nor did Virginia violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The state Freedom of Information Act does not regulate commerce in any meaningful sense, but instead provides a service that is related to state citizenship. For these reasons, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals rejecting petitioners' constitutional claims. I Petitioners Mark J. McBurney and Roger W. Hurlbert are citizens of Rhode Island and California respectively. McBurney and Hurlbert each requested documents under the Virginia FOIA, but their requests were denied because of their citizenship. McBurney is a former resident of Virginia whose ex-wife is a Virginia citizen. After his ex-wife defaulted on her child support obligations, McBurney asked the Commonwealth's Division of Child Support Enforcement to file a petition for child support on his behalf. The agency complied, but only after a 9-month delay. McBurney attributes that delay to agency error and says that it cost him nine months of child support. To ascertain the reason for the agency's delay, McBurney filed a Virginia FOIA request seeking "all emails, notes, files, memos, reports, letters, policies, [and] opinions" pertaining to his family, along with all documents "regarding [his] application for child support" and all documents pertaining to the handling of child support claims like his. App. in No. 11-1099(CA4), p. 39A. The agency denied McBurney's request on the ground that he was not a Virginia citizen. McBurney later requested the same documents under Virginia's Government Data Collection and Dissemination Practices Act, Va.Code Ann. § 2.2-3800 et seq. , and through that request he received most of the information he had sought that pertained specifically to his own case. He did not, however, receive any general policy information about how the agency handled claims like his. Hurlbert is the sole proprietor of Sage Information Services, a business that requests real estate tax records on clients' behalf from state and local governments across the United States. In 2008, Hurlbert was hired by a land/title company to obtain real estate tax records for properties in Henrico County, Virginia. He filed a Virginia FOIA request for the documents with the Henrico County Real Estate Assessor's Office, but his request was denied because he was not a Virginia citizen. Petitioners filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for violations of the Privileges and Immunities Clause and, in Hurlbert's case, the dormant Commerce Clause. The District Court granted Virginia's motion for summary judgment, McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 780 F.Supp.2d 439 (E.D.Va.2011), and the Court of Appeals affirmed, 667 F.3d 454 (C.A.4 2012). Like Virginia, several other States have enacted freedom of information laws that are available only to their citizens. See, e.g., Ala.Code § 36-12-40 (2012 Cum.Supp.); Ark.Code Ann. § 25-19-105 (2011 Supp.); Del.Code Ann., Tit. 29, § 10003 (2012 Supp.); Mo.Rev.Stat. § 109.180 (2012) ; N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 91-A:4 (West 2012) ; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 47:1A-1 (West 2003) ; Tenn.Code Ann. § 10-7-503 (2012). In Lee v. Minner, 458 F.3d 194 (2006), the Third Circuit held that this feature of Delaware's FOIA violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. 568 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 421, 184 L.Ed.2d 252 (2012). II Under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, "[t]he Citizens of each State [are] entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. We have said that "[t]he object of the Privileges and Immunities Clause is to 'strongly ... constitute the citizens of the United States [as] one people,' by 'plac[ing] the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned.' " Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 296, 118 S.Ct. 766, 139 L.Ed.2d 717 (1998) (quoting Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180, 19 L.Ed. 357 (1869) ). This does not mean, we have cautioned, that "state citizenship or residency may never be used by a State to distinguish among persons." Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 383, 98 S.Ct. 1852, 56 L.Ed.2d 354 (1978). "Nor must a State always apply all its laws or all its services equally to anyone, resident or nonresident, who may request it so to do." Ibid. Rather, we have long held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects only those privileges and immunities that are "fundamental." See, e.g., id., at 382, 388, 98 S.Ct. 1852. Petitioners allege that Virginia's citizens-only FOIA provision violates four different "fundamental" privileges or immunities: the opportunity to pursue a common calling, the ability to own and transfer property, access to the Virginia courts, and access to public information. The first three items on that list, however, are not abridged by the Virginia FOIA, and the fourth-framed broadly-is not protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. A Hurlbert argues that Virginia's citizens-only FOIA provision abridges his ability to earn a living in his chosen profession, namely, obtaining property records from state and local governments on behalf of clients. He is correct that the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects the right of citizens to "ply their trade, practice their occupation, or pursue a common calling." Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524, 98 S.Ct. 2482, 57 L.Ed.2d 397 (1978) ; Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 280, 105 S.Ct. 1272, 84 L.Ed.2d 205 (1985) (" '[O]ne of the privileges which the Clause guarantees to citizens of State A is that of doing business in State B on terms of substantial equality with the citizens of that State' "). But the Virginia FOIA does not abridge Hurlbert's ability to engage in a common calling in the sense prohibited by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Rather, the Court has struck laws down as violating the privilege of pursuing a common calling only when those laws were enacted for the protectionist purpose of burdening out-of-state citizens. See, e.g., Hicklin, supra, (striking down as a violation of noncitizens' privileges and immunities an "Alaska Hire" statute containing a resident hiring preference for all employment related to the development of the State's oil and gas resources); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395, 397, 68 S.Ct. 1156, 92 L.Ed. 1460 (1948) (striking down a South Carolina statute imposing a $2,500 license fee on out-of-state shrimping boats and only a $25 fee on in-state shrimping boats where petitioners alleged that the "purpose and effect of this statute ... [was] not to conserve shrimp, but to exclude non-residents and thereby create a commercial monopoly for South Carolina residents," and the "record cas[t] some doubt on" the State's counterassertion that the statute's "obvious purpose was to conserve its shrimp supply"); United Building & Constr. Trades Council of Camden Cty. v. Mayor and Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 104 S.Ct. 1020, 79 L.Ed.2d 249 (1984) (New Jersey municipal ordinance requiring that at least 40% of employees of contractors and subcontractors working on city construction projects be city residents facially burdened out-of-state citizens' ability to pursue a common calling). In each case, the clear aim of the statute at issue was to advantage in-state workers and commercial interests at the expense of their out-of-state counterparts. Virginia's FOIA differs sharply from those statutes. By its own terms, Virginia's FOIA was enacted to "ensur[e] the people of the Commonwealth ready access to public records in the custody of a public body or its officers and employees, and free entry to meetings of public bodies wherein the business of the people is being conducted." Va.Code Ann. § 2.2-3700(B) (Lexis 2011). Hurlbert does not allege-and has offered no proof-that the challenged provision of the Virginia FOIA was enacted in order to provide a competitive economic advantage for Virginia citizens. Cf. Hillside Dairy Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 67, 123 S.Ct. 2142, 156 L.Ed.2d 54 (2003) (piercing a professedly nondiscriminatory statute to find economic protectionism). Rather, it seems clear that the distinction that the statute makes between citizens and noncitizens has a distinctly nonprotectionist aim. The state FOIA essentially represents a mechanism by which those who ultimately hold sovereign power (i.e., the citizens of the Commonwealth) may obtain an accounting from the public officials to whom they delegate the exercise of that power. See Va. Const., Art. I, § 2 ; Va.Code Ann. § 2.2-3700(B). In addition, the provision limiting the use of the state FOIA to Virginia citizens recognizes that Virginia taxpayers foot the bill for the fixed costs underlying recordkeeping in the Commonwealth. Tr. of Oral Arg. 53-54. The challenged provision of the state FOIA does not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause simply because it has the incidental effect of preventing citizens of other States from making a profit by trading on information contained in state records. While the Clause forbids a State from intentionally giving its own citizens a competitive advantage in business or employment, the Clause does not require that a State tailor its every action to avoid any incidental effect on out-of-state tradesmen. B Hurlbert next alleges that the challenged provision of the Virginia FOIA abridges the right to own and transfer property in the Commonwealth. Like the right to pursue a common calling, the right to "take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal," has long been seen as one of the privileges of citizenship. See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F.Cas. 546, 552 (No. 3,230) (CCED Pa.1825) ; see also Paul, supra, at 180 (listing "the acquisition and enjoyment of property" among the privileges of citizenship). Thus, if a State prevented out-of-state citizens from accessing records-like title documents and mortgage records-that are necessary to the transfer of property, the State might well run afoul of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Cf. State v. Grimes, 29 Nev. 50, 85, 84 P. 1061, 1073 (1906) ("Caveat emptor being the rule with us in the absence of a special agreement, it is just and essential to the protection of persons intending to purchase or take incumbrances that they be allowed the right of inspection"); Jackson ex dem. Center v. Campbell, 19 Johns. 281, 283 (N.Y.1822) (the "plain intention" of the State's property records system was "to give notice, through the medium of the county records, to persons about to purchase"). Virginia, however, does not prevent citizens of other States from obtaining such documents. Under Virginia law, "any records and papers of every circuit court that are maintained by the clerk of the circuit court shall be open to inspection by any person and the clerk shall, when requested, furnish copies thereof." Va.Code Ann. § 17.1-208 (Lexis 2010). Such records and papers include records of property transfers, like title documents, § 55 - 106 (LEXIS 2012); notices of federal tax liens and other federal liens against property, § 55-142.1 ; notices of state tax liens against property, § 58.1-314 (Lexis 2009) (state taxes generally), § 58.1-908 (estate tax liens), § 58.1-1805 (state taxes generally), § 58.1-2021(A) (liens filed by agencies other than the Tax Commission); and notice of mortgages and other encumbrances, § 8.01-241 (Lexis Supp. 2012). A similar flaw undermines Hurlbert's claim that Virginia violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause by preventing citizens of other States from accessing real estate tax assessment records. It is true that those records, while available to Virginia citizens under the state FOIA, are not required by statute to be made available to noncitizens. See Associated Tax Service, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick, 236 Va. 181, 183, 187, 372 S.E.2d 625, 627, 629 (1988). But in fact Virginia and its subdivisions generally make even these less essential records readily available to all. These records are considered nonconfidential under Virginia law and, accordingly, they may be posted online. § 58.1-3122.2 (Lexis 2009). Henrico County, from which Hurlbert sought real estate tax assessments, follows this practice, as does almost every other county in the Commonwealth. Requiring noncitizens to conduct a few minutes of Internet research in lieu of using a relatively cumbersome state FOIA process cannot be said to impose any significant burden on noncitizens' ability to own or transfer property in Virginia. C McBurney alleges that Virginia's citizens-only FOIA provision impermissibly burdens his "access to public proceedings." Brief for Petitioners 42. McBurney is correct that the Privileges and Immunities Clause "secures citizens of one State the right to resort to the courts of another, equally with the citizens of the latter State." Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Clarendon Boat Oar Co., 257 U.S. 533, 535, 42 S.Ct. 210, 66 L.Ed. 354 (1922). But petitioners do not suggest that the Virginia FOIA slams the courthouse door on noncitizens; rather, the most they claim is that the law creates "[a]n information asymmetry between adversaries based solely on state citizenship." Brief for Petitioners 42. The Privileges and Immunities Clause does not require States to erase any distinction between citizens and non-citizens that might conceivably give state citizens some detectable litigation advantage. Rather, the Court has made clear that "the constitutional requirement is satisfied if the non-resident is given access to the courts of the State upon terms which in themselves are reasonable and adequate for the enforcing of any rights he may have, even though they may not be technically and precisely the same in extent as those accorded to resident citizens." Canadian Northern R. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 562, 40 S.Ct. 402, 64 L.Ed. 713 (1920). The challenged provision of the Virginia FOIA clearly does not deprive noncitizens of "reasonable and adequate" access to the Commonwealth's courts. Virginia's rules of civil procedure provide for both discovery, Va. Sup.Ct. Rule 4:1 (2012), and subpoenas duces tecum, Rule 4:9. There is no reason to think that those mechanisms are insufficient to provide noncitizens with any relevant, nonprivileged documents needed in litigation. Moreover, Virginia law gives citizens and noncitizens alike access to judicial records. Va.Code Ann. § 17.1-208 ; see also Shenandoah Publishing House, Inc. v. Fanning, 235 Va. 253, 258, 368 S.E.2d 253, 256 (1988). And if Virginia has in its possession information about any person, whether a citizen of the Commonwealth or of another State, that person has the right under the Government Data Collection and Dissemination Practices Act to inspect that information. § 2.2-3806(A)(3) (Lexis 2011). McBurney's own case is illustrative. When his FOIA request was denied, McBurney was told that he should request the materials he sought pursuant to the Government Data Collection and Dissemination Practices Act. Upon placing a request under that Act, he ultimately received much of what he sought. Accordingly, Virginia's citizens-only FOIA provision does not impermissibly burden noncitizens' ability to access the Commonwealth's courts. D Finally, we reject petitioners' sweeping claim that the challenged provision of the Virginia FOIA violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause because it denies them the right to access public information on equal terms with citizens of the Commonwealth. We cannot agree that the Privileges and Immunities Clause covers this broad right. This Court has repeatedly made clear that there is no constitutional right to obtain all the information provided by FOIA laws. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14, 98 S.Ct. 2588, 57 L.Ed.2d 553 (1978) (plurality opinion) (" 'The Constitution itself is [not] a Freedom of Information Act' "); see also Los Angeles Police Dept. v. United Reporting Publishing Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40, 120 S.Ct. 483, 145 L.Ed.2d 451 (1999) (the Government could decide "not to give out [this] information at all"); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. ----, ----, 131 S.Ct. 2653, 2677, 180 L.Ed.2d 544 (2011) (BREYER, J., dissenting) ("[T]his Court has never found that the First Amendment prohibits the government from restricting the use of information gathered pursuant to a regulatory mandate"). It certainly cannot be said that such a broad right has "at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign." Corfield, 6 F.Cas., at 551. No such right was recognized at common law. See H. Cross, The People's Right to Know 25 (1953) ("[T]he courts declared the primary rule that there was no general common law right in all persons (as citizens, taxpayers, electors or merely as persons) to inspect public records or documents"). Most founding-era English cases provided that only those persons who had a personal interest in non-judicial records were permitted to access them. See, e.g., King v. Shelley, 3 T.R. 141, 142, 100 Eng. Rep. 498, 499 (K.B.1789) (Buller, J.) ("[O]ne man has no right to look into another's title deeds and records, when he ... has no interest in the deeds or rolls himself"); King v. Justices of Staffordshire, 6 Ad. & E. 84, 101, 112 Eng. Rep. 33, 39 (K.B.1837) ("The utmost ... that can be said on the ground of interest, is that the applicants have a rational curiosity to gratify by this inspection, or that they may thereby ascertain facts useful to them in advancing some ulterior measures in contemplation as to regulating county expenditure; but this is merely an interest in obtaining information on the general subject, and would furnish an equally good reason for permitting inspection of the records of any other county: there is not that direct and tangible interest, which is necessary to bring them within the rule on which the Court acts in granting inspection of public documents"). Nineteenth-century American cases, while less uniform, certainly do not support the proposition that a broad-based right to access public information was widely recognized in the early Republic. See, e.g., Cormack v. Wolcott, 37 Kan. 391, 394, 15 P. 245, 246 (1887) (denying mandamus to plaintiff seeking to compile abstracts of title records; "At common law, parties had no vested rights in the examination of a record of title, or other public records, save by some interest in the land or subject of record"); Brewer v. Watson, 71 Ala. 299, 305 (1882) ("The individual demanding access to, and inspection of public writings must not only have an interest in the matters to which they relate, a direct, tangible interest, but the inspection must be sought for some specific and legitimate purpose. The gratification of mere curiosity, or motives merely speculative will not entitle him to demand an examination of such writings"); Nadel, What are "Records" of Agency Which Must Be Made Available Under State Freedom of Information Act, 27 A.L.R.4th 680, 687, § 2 [b] (1984) ("[A]t common law, a person requesting inspection of a public record was required to show an interest therein which would enable him to maintain or defend an action for which the document or record sought could furnish evidence or necessary information"). Nor is such a sweeping right "basic to the maintenance or well-being of the Union." Baldwin, 436 U.S., at 388, 98 S.Ct. 1852. FOIA laws are of relatively recent vintage. The federal FOIA was enacted in 1966, § 1, 80 Stat. 383, and Virginia's counterpart was adopted two years later, 1968 Va. Acts ch. 479, p. 690. There is no contention that the Nation's unity foundered in their absence, or that it is suffering now because of the citizens-only FOIA provisions that several States have enacted. III In addition to his Privileges and Immunities Clause claim, Hurlbert contends that Virginia's citizens-only FOIA provision violates the dormant Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause empowers Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several States." Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause does not expressly impose any constraints on "the several States," and several Members of the Court have expressed the view that it does not do so. See General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 312, 117 S.Ct. 811, 136 L.Ed.2d 761 (1997) (SCALIA, J., concurring) ("[T]he so-called 'negative' Commerce Clause is an unjustified judicial intervention, not to be expanded beyond its existing domain"); United Haulers Assn . Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. 330, 349, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) ("The negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the Constitution and has proved unworkable in practice"). Nonetheless, the Court has long inferred that the Commerce Clause itself imposes certain implicit limitations on state power. See, e.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia ex rel. Soc. for Relief of Distressed Pilots, 12 How. 299, 318-319, 13 L.Ed. 996 (1852) ; cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 209, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.) (dictum). Our dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence "significantly limits the ability of States and localities to regulate or otherwise burden the flow of interstate commerce." Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151, 106 S.Ct. 2440, 91 L.Ed.2d 110 (1986). It is driven by a concern about "economic protectionism-that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors." New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-274, 108 S.Ct. 1803, 100 L.Ed.2d 302 (1988) ; see also Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624, 98 S.Ct. 2531, 57 L.Ed.2d 475 (1978) ("The crucial inquiry ... must be directed to determining whether [the challenged statute] is basically a protectionist measure, or whether it can fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental"). Virginia's FOIA law neither "regulates" nor "burdens" interstate commerce; rather, it merely provides a service to local citizens that would not otherwise be available at all. The "common thread" among those cases in which the Court has found a dormant Commerce Clause violation is that "the State interfered with the natural functioning of the interstate market either through prohibition or through burdensome regulation." Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 806, 96 S.Ct. 2488, 49 L.Ed.2d 220 (1976). Here, by contrast, Virginia neither prohibits access to an interstate market nor imposes burdensome regulation on that market. Rather, it merely creates and provides to its own citizens copies-which would not otherwise exist-of state records. As discussed above, the express purpose of Virginia's FOIA law is to "ensur[e] the people of the Commonwealth ready access to public records in the custody of a public body or its officers and employees, and free entry to meetings of public bodies wherein the business of the people is being conducted." Va.Code Ann. § 2.2-3700(B). This case is thus most properly brought under the Privileges and Immunities Clause: It quite literally poses the question whether Virginia can deny out-of-state citizens a benefit that it has conferred on its own citizens. Cf. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 257 U.S., at 535, 42 S.Ct. 210 (analyzing whether the privilege of access to a State's courts must be made available to out-of-state citizens equally with the citizens of the relevant State). Because it does not pose the question of the constitutionality of a state law that interferes with an interstate market through prohibition or burdensome regulations, this case is not governed by the dormant Commerce Clause. Even shoehorned into our dormant Commerce Clause framework, however, Hurlbert's claim would fail. Insofar as there is a "market" for public documents in Virginia, it is a market for a product that the Commonwealth has created and of which the Commonwealth is the sole manufacturer. We have held that a State does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause when, having created a market through a state program, it "limits benefits generated by [that] state program to those who fund the state treasury and whom the State was created to serve." Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 442, 100 S.Ct. 2271, 65 L.Ed.2d 244 (1980). "Such policies, while perhaps 'protectionist' in a loose sense, reflect the essential and patently unobjectionable purpose of state government-to serve the citizens of the State." Ibid. ;cf. Department of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 341, 128 S.Ct. 1801, 170 L.Ed.2d 685 (2008) ("[A] government function is not susceptible to standard dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny owing to its likely motivation by legitimate objectives distinct from the simple economic protectionism the Clause abhors"). For these reasons, Virginia's citizens-only FOIA provision does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. * * * Because Virginia's citizens-only FOIA provision neither abridges any of petitioners' fundamental privileges and immunities nor impermissibly regulates commerce, petitioners' constitutional claims fail. The judgment below is affirmed. It is so ordered. At oral argument, the Solicitor General of Virginia contended that, as a matter of Virginia law, Hurlbert "is entitled to the tax assessment data in the clerk's office." Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. Neither at oral argument nor in its briefs did Virginia cite any Virginia statute providing that real estate tax assessment records be filed in the clerk's office. Virginia Code Ann. § 58.1-3300 (Lexis 2009), which directs that "reassessment" records be filed with the clerk, may be the statute to which counsel referred, but without an official construction of the statute by Virginia's Supreme Court-and, in light of the fact that petitioners have not been afforded an opportunity to rebut its importance-we do not rely upon it here. See http://www.co.henrico.va.us/finance/disclaimer.html (as visited April 26, 2013, and available in Clerk of Court's case file).
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the petitioning party (i.e., the plaintiff or the appellant) emerged victorious. The victory the Supreme Court provided the petitioning party may not have been total and complete (e.g., by vacating and remanding the matter rather than an unequivocal reversal), but the disposition is nonetheless a favorable one. Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case.
Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. Did the petitioning win the case?
[ "Yes", "No" ]
[ 1 ]
sc
KLEPPE, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR v. NEW MEXICO et al. No. 74-1488. Argued March 23, 1976 Decided June 17, 1976 MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Deputy Solicitor General Randolph argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Taft, Edmund B. Clark, and Dirk D. Snel. George T. Harris, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General of New Mexico, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Murdaugh Stuart Madden for the Humane Society of the United States; by Paul A. Lenzini for the International Association of Game, Fish, and Conservation Commissioners; and by Thomas H. Wakefield for Hope Ryden. Ronald A. Zumbrun and John H. Findley filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by 7. Frank Mendicino, Attorney General, and Sterling A. Case, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Wyoming et al.; by Robert List, Attorney General, for the Nevada State Board of Agriculture; by Jack E. Hull and John C. Miller for the Central Committee of Nevada State Grazing Boards et al.; and by David R. Belding and William I. Althen for Wild Horse Organized Assistance, Inc. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. At issue in this case is whether Congress exceeded its powers under the Constitution in enacting the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act. I The Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act, 85 Stat. 649, 16 U. S. C. §§ 1331-1340 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), was enacted in 1971 to protect “all unbranded and unclaimed horses and burros on public lands of the United States,” § 2 (b) of the Act, 16 U. S. C. § 1332 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), from “capture, branding, harassment, or death.” §1, 16 U. S. C. § 1331 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). The Act provides that all such horses and burros on the public lands administered by the Secretary of the Interior through the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) or by the Secretary of Agriculture through the Forest Service are committed to the jurisdiction of the respective Secretaries, who are “directed to protect and manage [the animals] as components of the public lands ... in a manner that is designed to achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance on the public lands.” § 3 (a), 16 U. S. C. § 1333 (a) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). If protected horses or burros “stray from public lands onto privately owned land, the owners of such land may inform the nearest federal marshal or agent of the Secretary, who shall arrange to have the animals removed.” § 4, 16 U. S. C. § 1334 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Section 6, 16 U. S. C. § 1336 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), authorizes the Secretaries to promulgate regulations, see 36 CFR § 231.11 (1975) (Agriculture); 43 CFR pt. 4710 (1975) (Interior), and to enter into cooperative agreements with other landowners and with state and local governmental agencies in furtherance of the Act’s purposes. On August 7, 1973, the Secretaries executed such an agreement with the New Mexico Livestock Board, the agency charged with enforcing the New Mexico Estray Law, N. M. Stat. Ann. § 47-14-1 et seq. (1966). The agreement acknowledged the authority of the Secretaries to manage and protect the wild free-roaming horses and burros on the public lands of the United States within the State and established a procedure for evaluating the claims of private parties to ownership of such animals. The Livestock Board terminated the agreement three months later. Asserting that the Federal Government lacked power to control wild horses and burros on the public lands of the United States unless the animals were moving in interstate commerce or damaging the public lands and that neither of these bases of regulation was available here, the Board notified the Secretaries of its intent “to exercise all regulatory, impoundment and sale powers which it derives from the New Mexico Estray Law, over all estray horses, mules or asses found running at large upon public or private lands within New Mexico .... This includes the right to go upon Federal or State lands to take possession of said horses or burros, should the Livestock Board so desire.” App. 67, 72. The differences between the Livestock Board and the Secretaries came to a head in February 1974. On February 1, 1974, a New Mexico rancher, Kelley Stephenson, was informed by the BLM that several unbranded burros had been seen near Taylor Well, where Stephenson watered his cattle. Taylor Well is on federal property, and Stephenson had access to it and some 8,000 surrounding acres only through a grazing permit issued pursuant to § 3 of the Taylor Grazing Act, 48 Stat. 1270, as amended, 43 U. S. C. § 315b. After the BLM made it clear to Stephenson that it would not remove the burros and after he personally inspected the Taylor Well area, Stephenson complained to the Livestock Board that the burros were interfering with his livestock operation by molesting his cattle and eating their feed. Thereupon the Board rounded up and removed 19 unbranded and unclaimed burros pursuant to the New Mexico Estray Law. Each burro was seized on the pub-lie lands of the United States and, as the director of the Board conceded, each burro fit the definition of a wild free-roaming burro under § 2 (b) of the Act. App. 43. On February 18, 1974, the Livestock Board, pursuant to its usual practice, sold the burros at a public auction. After the sale, the BLM asserted jurisdiction under the Act and demanded that the Board recover the animals and return them to the public lands. On March 4, 1974, appellees filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico seeking a declaratory judgment that the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act is unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2282. Following an evidentiary hearing, the District Court held the Act unconstitutional and permanently enjoined the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) from enforcing its provisions. The court found that the Act “conflicts with . . . the traditional doctrines concerning wild animals,” New Mexico v. Morton, 406 F. Supp. 1237, 1238 (1975), and is in excess of Congress’ power under the Property Clause of the Constitution, Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. That Clause, the court found, enables Congress to regulate wild animals found on the public land only for the “protection of the public lands from damage of some kind.” 406 F. Supp., at 1239 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, this power was exceeded in this case because “[t]he statute is aimed at protecting the wild horses and burros, not at protecting the land they live on.” Ibid. We noted probable jurisdiction, 423 U. S. 818 (1975), and we now reverse. II The Property Clause of the Constitution provides that “Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. In passing the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act, Congress deemed the regulated animals “an integral part of the natural system of the public lands” of the United States, § 1, 16 U. S. C, § 1331 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), and found that their management was necessary “for achievement of an ecological balance on the public lands.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-681, p. 5 (1971). According to Congress, these animals, if preserved in their native habitats, “contribute to the diversity of life forms within the Nation and enrich the lives of the American people.” § 1, 16 U. S. C. § 1331 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). See Hearing on Protection of Wild Horses and Burros on Public Lands before the Subcommittee on Public Lands of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 69, 122, 128, 138, 169, 183 (1971). Indeed, Congress concluded, the wild free-roaming horses and burros “are living symbols of the historic and pioneer spirit of the West.” § 1, 16 U. S. C. § 1331 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Despite their importance, the Senate committee found: “[These animals] have been cruelly captured and slain and their carcasses used in the production of pet food and fertilizer. They have been used for target practice and harassed for ‘sport’ and profit. In spite of public outrage, this bloody traffic continues unabated, and it is the firm belief of the committee that this senseless slaughter must be brought to an end.” S. Rep. No. 92-242, pp. 1-2 (1971). For these reasons, Congress determined to preserve and protect the wild free-roaming horses and burros on the public lands of the United States. The question under the Property Clause is whether this determination can be sustained as a “needful” regulation “respecting” the public lands. In answering this question, we must remain mindful that, while courts must eventually pass upon them, determinations under the Property Clause are entrusted primarily to the judgment of Congress. United States v. San Francisco, 310 U. S. 16, 29-30 (1940); Light v. United States, 220 U. S. 523, 537 (1911) United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. 526, 537-538 (1840). Appellees argue that the Act cannot be supported by the Property Clause. They contend that the Clause grants Congress essentially two kinds of power: (1) the power to dispose of and make incidental rules regarding the use of federal property; and (2) the power to protect federal property. According to appellees, the first power is not broad enough to support legislation protecting wild animals that live on federal property; and the second power is not implicated since the Act is designed to protect the animals, which are not themselves federal property, and not the public lands. As an initial matter, it is far from clear that the Act was not passed in part to protect the public lands of the United States or that Congress cannot assert a property interest in the regulated horses and burros superior to that of the State. But we need not consider whether the Act can be upheld on either of these grounds, for we reject appellees’ narrow reading of the Property Clause. Appellees ground their argument on a number of cases that, upon analysis, provide no support for their position. Like the District Court, appellees cite Hunt v. United States, 278 U. S. 96 (1928), for the proposition that the Property Clause gives Congress only the limited power to regulate wild animals in order to protect the public lands from damage. But Hunt, which upheld the Government’s right to kill deer that were damaging foliage in the national forests, only holds that damage to the land is a sufficient basis for regulation; it contains no suggestion that it is a necessary one. Next, appellees refer to Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 89 (1907). The referenced passage in that case states that the Property Clause “clearly . . . does not grant to Congress any legislative control over the States, and must, so far as they are concerned, be limited to authority over the property belonging to the United States within their limits.” But this does no more than articulate the obvious: The Property Clause is a grant of power only over federal property. It gives no indication of the kind of “authority” the Clause gives Congress over its property. Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518 (1897), is of even less help to appellees. Appellees rely upon the following language from Camfield: “While we do not undertake to say that Congress has the unlimited power to legislate against nuisances within a State, which it would have within a Territory, we do not think the admission of a Territory as a State deprives it of the power of legislating for the protection of the public lands, though it may thereby involve the exercise of what is ordinarily known as the police power, so long as such power is directed solely to its own protection.” Id., at 525-526 (emphasis added). Appellees mistakenly read this language to limit Congress’ power to regulate activity on the public lands; in fact, the quoted passage refers to the scope of congressional power to regulate conduct on private land that affects the public lands. And Camfield holds that the Property Clause is broad enough to permit federal regulation of fences built on private land adjoining public land when the regulation is for the protection of the federal property. Camfield contains no suggestion of any limitation on Congress’ power over conduct on its own property; its sole message is that the power granted by the Property Clause is broad enough to reach beyond territorial limits. Lastly, appellees point to dicta in two cases to the effect that, unless the State has agreed to the exercise of federal jurisdiction, Congress’ rights in its land are “only the rights of an ordinary proprietor . . . .” Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 527 (1885). See also Paul v. United States, 371 U. S. 245, 264 (1963). In neither case was the power of Congress under the Property Clause at issue or considered and, as we shall see, these dicta fail to account for the raft of cases in which the Clause has been given a broader construction. In brief, beyond the Fort Leavenworth and Paul dicta, appellees have presented no support for their position that the Clause grants Congress only the power to dispose of, to make incidental rules regarding the use of, and to protect federal property. This failure is hardly surprising, for the Clause, in broad terms, gives Congress the power to determine what are “needful” rules “respecting” the public lands. United States v. San Francisco, 310 U. S., at 29-30; Light v. United States, 220 U. S., at 537; United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet., at 537-538. And while the furthest reaches of the power granted by the Property Clause have not yet been definitively resolved, we have repeatedly observed that “[t]he power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.” United States v. San Francisco, supra, at 29. See Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U. S. 275, 294-295 (1958); Alabama v. Texas, 347 U. S. 272, 273 (1954); FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U. S. 17, 21 (1952); United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19, 27 (1947); Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 92, 99 (1872); United States v. Gratiot, supra, at 537. The decided cases have supported this expansive reading. It is the Property Clause, for instance, that provides the basis for governing the Territories of the United States. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 673-674 (1945); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U. S. 298, 305 (1922); Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138, 149 (1904); United States v. Gratiot, supra, at 537; Sere v. Pitot, 6 Cranch 332, 336-337 (1810). See also Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U. S. 377, 381 (1948). And even over public land within the States, “[t]he general Government doubtless has a power over its own property analogous to the police power of the several States, and the extent to which it may go in the exercise of such power is measured by the exigencies of the particular case.” Camfield v. United States, supra, at 525. We have noted, for example, that the Property Clause gives Congress the power over the public lands “to control their occupancy and use, to protect them from trespass and injury and to prescribe the conditions upon which others may obtain rights in them . . . .” Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389, 405 (1917). And we have approved legislation respecting the public lands “[i]f it be found to be necessary for the protection of the public, or of intending settlers [on the public lands].” Cornfield v. United States, supra, at 525. In short, Congress exercises the powers both of a proprietor, and of a legislature over the public domain. Alabama v. Texas, supra, at 273; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263, 297 (1929); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459, 474 (1915). Although the Property Clause does not authorize “an exercise of a general control over public policy in a State,” it does permit “an exercise of the complete power which Congress has over particular public property entrusted to it.” United States v. San Francisco, supra, at 30 (footnote omitted). In our view, the “complete power” that Congress has over public lands necessarily includes the power to regulate and protect the wildlife living there. Ill Appellees argue that if we approve the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act as a valid exercise of Congress’ power under the Property Clause, then we have sanctioned an impermissible intrusion on the sovereignty, legislative authority, and police power of the State and have wrongly infringed upon the State’s traditional trustee powers over wild animals. The argument appears to be that Congress could obtain exclusive legislative jurisdiction over the public lands in the State only by state consent, and that in the absence of such consent Congress lacks the power to act contrary to state law. This argument is without merit. Appellees’ claim confuses Congress’ derivative legislative powers, which are not involved in this case, with its powers under the Property Clause. Congress may acquire derivative legislative power from a State pursuant to Art. I, § 8, cl, 17, of the Constitution by consensual acquisition of land, or by nonconsensual acquisition followed by the State's subsequent cession of legislative authority over the land. Paul v. United States, 371 U. S., at 264; Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S., at 541-542. In either case, the legislative jurisdiction acquired may range from exclusive federal jurisdiction with no residual state police power, e. g., Pacific Coast Dairy v. Dept. of Agriculture of Cal., 318 U. S. 285 (1943), to concurrent, or partial, federal legislative jurisdiction, which may allow the State to exercise certain authority. E. g., Paul v. United States, supra, at 265; Collins v. Yosemite Park Co., 304 U. S. 518, 528-530 (1938); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 147-149 (1937). But while Congress can acquire exclusive or partial jurisdiction over lands within a State by the State’s consent or cession, the presence or absence of such jurisdiction has nothing to do with Congress’ powers under the Property Clause. Absent consent or cession a State undoubtedly retains jurisdiction over federal lands within its territory, but Congress equally surely retains the power to enact legislation respecting those lands pursuant to the Property Clause. Mason Co. v. Tax Comm’n of Washington, 302 U. S. 186, 197 (1937); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S., at 403-405; Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U. S. 276, 283 (1899). And when Congress so acts, the federal legislation necessarily overrides conflicting state laws under the Supremacy Clause. U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. See Hunt v. United States, 278 U. S., at 100; McKelvey v. United States, 260 U. S. 353, 359 (1922). As we said in Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S., at 526, in response to a somewhat different claim: “A different rule would place the public domain of the United States completely at the mercy of state legislation.” Thus, appellees' assertion that “[ajbsent state consent by complete cession of jurisdiction of lands to the United States, exclusive jurisdiction does not accrue to the federal landowner with regard to federal lands within the borders of the State,” Brief for Appellees 24, is completely beside the point; and appellees’ fear that the Secretary’s position is that “the Property Clause totally exempts federal lands within state borders from state legislative powers, state police powers, and all rights and powers of local sovereignty and jurisdiction of the states,” id., at 16, is totally unfounded. The Federal Government does not assert exclusive jurisdiction over the public lands in New Mexico, and the State is free to enforce its criminal and civil laws on those lands. But where those state laws conflict with the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act, or with other legislation passed pursuant to the Property Clause, the law is clear: The state laws must recede. McKelvey v. United States, supra, at 359. Again, none of the cases relied upon by appellees are to the contrary. Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 647, 650 (1930), merely states the rule outlined above that, “without more,” federal ownership of lands within a State does not withdraw those lands from the jurisdiction of the State. Likewise, Wilson v. Cook, 327 U. S. 474, 487-488 (1946), holds only that, in the absence of consent or cession, the Federal Government did not acquire exclusive jurisdiction over certain federal forest reserve lands in Arkansas and the State retained legislative jurisdiction over those lands. No question was raised regarding Congress’ power to regulate the forest reserves under the Property Clause. And in Colorado v. Toll, 268 U. S. 228, 230-231 (1925), the Court found that Congress had not purported to assume jurisdiction over highways within the Rocky Mountain National Park, not that it lacked the power to do so under the Property Clause. In short, these cases do not support appellees’ claim that upholding the Act would sanction an impermissible intrusion upon state sovereignty. The Act does not establish exclusive federal jurisdiction over the public lands in New Mexico; it merely overrides the New Mexico Estray Law insofar as it attempts to regulate federally protected animals. And that is but the necessary consequence of valid legislation under the Property Clause. Appellees’ contention that the Act violates traditional state power over wild animals stands on no different footing. Unquestionably the States have broad trustee and police powers over wild animals within their jurisdictions. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385, 402 (1948); Lacoste v. Department of Conservation, 263 U. S. 545, 549 (1924); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519, 528 (1896). But, as Geer v. Connecticut cautions, those powers exist only “in so far as [their] exercise may be not incompatible with, or restrained by, the rights conveyed to the Federal government by the Constitution.” Ibid. “No doubt it is true that as between a State and its inhabitants the State may regulate the killing and sale of [wildlife], but it does not follow that its authority is exclusive of paramount powers.” Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416, 434 (1920). Thus, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 2, cl. 1, precludes a State from imposing prohibitory licensing fees on nonresidents shrimping in its waters, Toomer v. Witsell, supra; the Treaty Clause, U. S. Const., Art. II, § 2, permits Congress to enter into and enforce a treaty to protect migratory birds despite state objections, Missouri v. Holland, supra; and the Property Clause gives Congress the power to thin overpopulated herds of deer on federal lands contrary to state law. Hunt v. United States, 278 U. S. 96 (1928). We hold today that the Property Clause also gives Congress the power to protect wildlife on the public lands, state law notwithstanding. IV In this case, the New Mexico Livestock Board entered upon the public lands of the United States and removed wild burros. These actions were contrary to the provisions of the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act. We find that, as applied to this case, the Act is a constitutional exercise of congressional power under the Property Clause. We need not, and do not, decide whether the Property Clause would sustain the Act in all of its conceivable applications. Appellees are concerned that the Act's extension of protection to wild free-roaming horses and burros that stray from public land onto private land, § 4, 16 U. S. C. § 1334 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), will be read to provide federal jurisdiction over every wild horse or burro that at any time sets foot upon federal land. While it is clear that regulations under the Property Clause may have some effect on private lands not otherwise under federal control, Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518 (1897), we do not think it appropriate in this declaratory judgment proceeding to determine the extent, if any, to which the Property Clause empowers Congress to protect animals on private lands or the extent to which such regulation is attempted by the Act. We have often declined to decide important questions regarding “the scope and constitutionality of legislation in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case,” Longshoremen v. Boyd, 347 U. S. 222, 224 (1954), or in the absence of “an adequate and full-bodied record.” Public Affairs Press v. Rickover, 369 U. S. 111, 113 (1962). Cf. Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U. S. 426 (1948). We follow that course in this case and leave open the question of the permissible reach of the Act over private lands under the Property Clause. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The landowner may elect to allow straying wild free-roaming horses and burros to remain on his property, in which case he must so notify the relevant Secretary. He may not destroy any such animals, however. § 4 of the Act, 16 U. S. C. § 1334 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Under the New Mexico law, an estray is defined as: “Any bovine animal, horse, mule or ass, found running at large upon public or private lands, either fenced or unfenced, in the state of New Mexico, whose owner is unknown in the section where found, or which shall be fifty (50) miles or more from the limits of its usual range or pasture, or that is branded with a brand which is not on record in the office of the cattle sanitary board of New Mexico . . . .” N. M. Stat. Ann. §47-14-1 (1966). It is not disputed that the animals regulated by the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act are estrays within the meaning of this law. The record is somewhat unclear on this point, but appellees conceded at oral argument that all the burros were seized on the public lands of the United States. Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. Appellees are the State of New Mexico, the New Mexico Livestock Board, the Board’s director, and a purchaser of three of the burros seized at Taylor Well. Since appellees did not file suit against the Secretary of Agriculture, the District Court’s injunction was limited to the Secretary of the Interior, who is the appellant in this Court. The court also held that the Act could not be sustained under the Commerce Clause because “all the evidence establishes that the wild burros in question here do not migrate across state lines” and “Congress made no findings to indicate that it was in any way relying on the Commerce Clause in enacting this statute.” 406 F. Supp., at 1239. While the Secretary argues in this Court that the Act is sustainable under the Commerce Clause, we have no occasion to address this contention since we find the Act, as applied, to be a permissible exercise of congressional power under the Property Clause. Congress expressly ordered that the animals were to be managed and protected in order “to achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance on the public lands.” § 3 (a), 16 U. 8. C. § 1333 (a) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Cf. Hunt v. United States, 278 U. S. 96 (1928). See infra, at 545-546. The Secretary makes no claim here, however, that the United States owns the wild free-roaming horses and burros found on public land. Indeed, Hunt v. United States, supra, and Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518 (1897), both relied upon by appellees, are inconsistent with the notion that the United States has only the rights of an ordinary proprietor with respect to its land. An ordinary proprietor may not, contrary to state law, kill game that is damaging his land, as the Government did in Hunt; nor may he prohibit the fencing in of his property without the assistance of state law, as the Government was able to do in Camfield. Appellees ask us to declare that the Act is unconstitutional because the animals are not, as Congress found, “fast disappearing from the American scene.” § 1, 16 U. S. C. § 1331 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). At the outset, no reason suggests itself why Congress’ power under the Property Clause to enact legislation to protect wild free-roaming horses and burros “from capture, branding, harassment, or death,” ibid., must depend on a finding that the animals are decreasing in number. But responding directly to appellees’ contention, we note that the evidence before Congress on this question was conflicting and that Congress weighed the evidence and made a judgment. See Hearing on Protection of Wild Horses and Burros on Public Lands before the Subcommittee on Public Lands of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2, 7, 11-14, 17, 26-32, 80, 87-88, 101, 103, 134-136, 139-141 (1971). What appellees ask is that we reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of Congress. This we must decline to do. United States v. San Francisco, 310 U. S. 16, 29-30 (1940); Light v. United States, 220 U. S. 523, 537 (1911); United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. 526, 537-538 (1840). See also Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U. S. 583, 594 (1939). In any event, we note that Congress has provided for periodic review of the administration of the Act. § 10, 16 U. S. C. §1340 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Article I, § 8, cl. 17, of the Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power: “To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of Particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings . . . .” The Clause has been broadly construed, and the acquisition by consent or cession of exclusive or partial jurisdiction over properties for any legitimate governmental purpose beyond those itemized is permissible. Collins v. Yosemite Park Co., 304 U. S. 518, 528-530 (1938). Referring to the Act creating the National Park, the Court said: “There is no attempt to give exclusive jurisdiction to the United States, but on the contrary the rights of the State over the roads are left unaffected in terms. Apart from those terms the State denies the power of Congress to curtail its jurisdiction or rights without an act of cession from it and an acceptance by the national government. The statute establishing the park would not be construed to attempt such a result. As the [park superintendent] is undertaking to assert exclusive control and to establish a monopoly in, a matter as to which, if the allegations of the bill are maintained, the State has not surrendered its legislative power, a cause of action is disclosed if we do not look beyond the bill, and it was wrongly dismissed.” 268 U. S., at 231 (citations omitted). While Colorado thus asserted that, absent cession, the Federal Government lacked power to regulate the highways within the park, and the Court held that the State was entitled to attempt to prove that it had not surrendered legislative jurisdiction to the United States, at most the case stands for the proposition that where Congress does not purport to override state power over public lands under the Property Clause and where there has been no cession, a federal official lacks power to regulate contrary to state law.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed. The information relevant to this variable may be found near the end of the summary that begins on the title page of each case, or preferably at the very end of the opinion of the Court. For cases in which the Court granted a motion to dismiss, consider "petition denied or appeal dismissed". There is "no disposition" if the Court denied a motion to dismiss.
What is the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed?
[ "stay, petition, or motion granted", "affirmed (includes modified)", "reversed", "reversed and remanded", "vacated and remanded", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded", "vacated", "petition denied or appeal dismissed", "certification to or from a lower court", "no disposition" ]
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FOGARTY, TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY, v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 6. Argued October 10, 1950. Decided November 6, 1950. George M. Shkoler argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Henry 8. Blum. Oscar H. Davis argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Morison, Samuel D. Slade and Hubert H. Margolies. Raoul Berger filed a brief for Howard Industries, Inc., as amicus curiae, supporting petitioner. Mr. Justice Minton delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner, as trustee in bankruptcy of Inland Waterways, Inc., brought suit against the United States in the District Court of Minnesota, Fifth Division, under the War Contract Hardship Claims Act, popularly known as the Lucas Act, adopted August 7, 1946, 60 Stat. 902, 41 U. S. C. § 106 note, to recover $328,804.42 as losses alleged to have been sustained under certain contracts with the Navy Department for the production of war supplies and materials. On motion, summary judgment was entered for the United States. 80 F. Supp. 90. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 176 F. 2d 599. The suit turns on the interpretation and meaning to be ascribed to parts of the federal statute. Because' we deemed resolution of the issues important, especially in view of asserted conflicts of decision in the interpretation of the statute among other federal courts, certiorari was granted. 339 U. S. 909. The facts are not in dispute. Inland Waterways, financed by a Government guaranteed'loan and advances under the contracts, entered into several contracts and supplemental agreements with the Navy Department, dated from September 18, 1941, to October 30, 1942, for the production of submarine chasers and plane rearming boats. Little progress had been made under the contracts when, on December 18, 1942, Inland Waterways filed a petition for reorganization in bankruptcy. Petitioner was appointed trustee in bankruptcy. The United States filed claims in these proceedings based primarily on the unpaid balance of the loan plus interest, the cost of completing incomplete and defective work on ships delivered under the contracts, and decreased costs resulting from certain changes in the plans and specifications. Petitioner filed a counterclaim based primarily on payments due for progress in construction, overtime work, changes in plans and specifications and in wage rates involving increased cost to Inland Waterways, and the value of partially completed work requisitioned by the Government and the cost of its preservation. In support of his counterclaim, petitioner submitted to the bankruptcy court a petition for compensation for requisitioned property and a number of invoices purporting to bill the Navy Department for goods and services, all of which had previously been submitted to agencies of the Navy Department. On February 20, 1945, the Government and petitioner executed an agreement compromising these claims upon payment of some $16,000 by the United States to petitioner. The settlement agreement embodied a mutual general release in the broadest of terms and was approved by the bankruptcy court. Petitioner initiated his efforts to secure relief under the Lucas Act on February 1, 1947, by filing a claim with the War Contracts Relief Board of the Navy Department based on the same matters which had been the subject of the compromise agreement effected some two years before in the bankruptcy proceedings. The same documents submitted in support of the counterclaim in the bankruptcy court, plus the counterclaim itself, were relied on by petitioner as showing a timely request for relief under the Lucas Act. The Board denied the claim. This suit followed under § 6 of the Lucas Act. The only question decided by the Court of Appeals was that petitioner did not file with the Navy Department on or before August 14,1945, a “written request for relief” within the meaning of § 3 of the Lucas Act. We direct our attention to the correctness of that holding. Neither the Act nor the regulations of the President thereunder define the term. Pertinent parts of the Act are set forth in the margin. Shortly after Pearl Harbor, Congress granted to the President under § 201 of the First War Powers Act, 55 Stat. 838, 839, 50 U. S. C. App. § 611, the power to authorize Government agencies to make amendments and modifications of contracts for war supplies without regard to consideration if “such action would facilitate the prosecution of the war.” Throughout the war, departments and agencies of the Government utilized the provisions of the Act and regulations thereunder to alleviate hardships encountered by war contractors in an economy geared to all-out war. After the termination of hostilities August 14, 1945, however, departments of the Government took different views of their powers under the Act and regulations. Some continued to exercise those powers, while others took the position that they were no longer applicable, since the war was over and contract modifications could not “facilitate the prosecution of the war.” This resulted in a disparity of treatment of claimants for the relief of the Act whose claims had been filed but not acted upon before August 14,1945. Whether such a contractor was to be accorded relief under the Act depended on the view the department with which he had contracted took of the Act. This situation motivated congressional action. See S. Rep. No. 1669, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., accompanying S. 1477, which became the Lucas Act. This legislative history illuminates, for purposes of the question at hand, the relation of the First War Powers and the Lucas Acts. The words of the Lucas Act itself shed further light on that subject. Like § 201 of the First War Powers Act, the Lucas Act contemplates relief by grace and not in recognition of legal rights. It speaks in § 1 of “equitable claims ... for losses ... in the performance of such contracts or subcontracts,” and in § 2, of “fair and equitable settlement of claims.” Further, the Act limits the departments and agencies which may grant relief to those which were authorized to grant relief under the First War Powers Act. Finally, it limits claims upon which relief may be granted to those which had been presented “on or before August 14, 1945.” As we have seen, that date was the one around which departments and agencies adopted the differing views of the First War Powers Act which necessitated congressional action. In the light of the foregoing considerations and the relation of the Lucas Act to the First War Powers Act, we think Congress intended the term “written request for relief” to mean written notice presented prior to August 14,1945, to an agency which was authorized to grant relief under § 201 of the First War Powers Act. Since there is no definition of the term in the Act or regulations, and since the legislative history of the Act does not show that any settled usage of the term was brought to the attention of Congress, no particular form of notice is required. But whatever the form of notice, it must be sufficient to apprise the agency that it was being asked to grant extralegal relief under the First War Powers Act for losses sustained in the performance of war contracts. Petitioner, in attempting to establish an interpretation of the Lucas Act which would allow him to maintain this suit, has placed much reliance on events which occurred in Congress subsequent to its enactment. The second session of the Eighty-first Congress passed H. R. 3436, which was vetoed by the President. 96 Cong. Rec. 8291, 8658, 9602. Thereafter, Congress passed S. 3906, which failed of enactment over another veto of the President. 96 Cong. Rec. 12911, 14652. Petitioner’s argument is that these bills and their legislative history show that Congress had a different intent in passing the Lucas Act than that attributed to it by its administrators and some of the courts. If there is anything in these subsequent events at odds with our finding of the meaning of § 3, it would not supplant the contemporaneous intent of the Congress which enacted the Lucas Act. Cf. United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 281-282. We do not think that the documents relied on by petitioner come within the meaning of the term “written request for relief.” Neither the counterclaim in the bankruptcy court, nor the petition for compensation for requisitioned property, nor the invoices for extras, sought relief as a matter of grace. They sought payment as a matter of right. The counterclaim demanded judgment of the bankruptcy court. The petition for requisitioned property and the invoices were legal claims for compensation under contract. As such, they constituted a basis for suit in court. See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 1346. That petitioner himself thought of them as judicially cognizable claims is evidenced by the fact that he included them in the counterclaim filed with the bankruptcy court, which obviously had no jurisdiction to award any extra-legal relief under the First War Powers Act. None of the documents relied on by petitioner was sufficient to apprise the Navy Department that it was being asked to accord relief under the First War Powers Act. We must therefore agree with the Court of Appeals that no “written request for relief” was filed, and, therefore, that recovery was not available to petitioner under the Lucas Act. We do not reach alternative questions. The judgment is Affirmed. Me. Justice Black concurs in the result. Sec. 1. “. . . where work, supplies, or services have been furnished between September 16, 1940, and August 14, 1945, under a contract or subcontract, for any department or agency of the Government which prior to the latter date was authorized to enter into contracts and amendments or modifications of contracts under section 201 of the First War Powers Act, 1941 . . . such departments and agencies are hereby authorized, in accordance with regulations to be prescribed by the President ... to consider, adjust, and settle equitable claims . . . for losses (not including diminution of anticipated profits) incurred between September 16, 1940, and August 14, 1945, without fault or negligence on their part in the performance of such contracts or subcontracts. . . . “Sec. 2. (a) In arriving at a fair and equitable settlement of claims under this Act .... “Sec. 3. Claims for losses shall not be considered unless filed with the department or agency concerned within six months after the date of approval of this Act, and shall be limited to losses with respect to which a written request for relief was filed with such department or agency on or before August 14, 1945 . . . .” “This bill, as amended, would afford financial relief to those contractors who suffered losses in the performance of war contracts in those cases where the claim would have received favorable consideration under the First War Powers Act and Executive Order No. 9001 if action had been taken by the Government prior to the capitulation of the Japanese Government. However, upon the capitulation, the position was taken by certain departments and agencies of the Government involved, that no relief should be granted under the authority which then existed, unless the action was required in order to insure continued production necessary to meet post VJ-day requirements. This was on the basis that the First War Powers Act was enacted to aid in the successful prosecution of the war and not as an aid to the contractors. As a result, a number of claims which were in process at the time of the surrender of the Japanese Government, or which had not been presented prior to such time, were denied even though the facts in a particular case would have justified favorable action if such action had been taken prior to surrender.”
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed. The information relevant to this variable may be found near the end of the summary that begins on the title page of each case, or preferably at the very end of the opinion of the Court. For cases in which the Court granted a motion to dismiss, consider "petition denied or appeal dismissed". There is "no disposition" if the Court denied a motion to dismiss.
What is the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed?
[ "stay, petition, or motion granted", "affirmed (includes modified)", "reversed", "reversed and remanded", "vacated and remanded", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded", "vacated", "petition denied or appeal dismissed", "certification to or from a lower court", "no disposition" ]
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AERONAUTICAL INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT LODGE 727 v. CAMPBELL et al. No. 333. Argued January 31, 1949. Decided June 20, 1949. Maurice J. Hindin argued the cause and' filed a brief for petitioner. Assistant Attorney General Morison argued the cause, for Campbell et al., individual respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Paul A. Sweeney and Morton Hollander. - Robert H. Canan submitted on brief for the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, respondent. Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the Court. We brought this case here, 335 U. S. 869, to resolve a conflict of views between two Courts of Appeals in their interpretation of the rights given to . veterans of World War II by § 8 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, 54 Stat. 885, 890, 58 Stat. 798, 50 U. S. C. App. § 308. Three veterans brought this suit for compensation for the period of a layoff while employed at Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, a respondent here. The facts controlling the legal claims of all three may be represented by the circumstances attending Kirk’s employment and layoff. The petitioner, Aeronautical Industrial District Lodge No. 727, was the duly recognized collective bargaining agent of the employees at Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. In September, .1941, the Union had negotiated an agreement with Lockheed covering the range of subjects touching conditions of employment typical of such agreements in the aircraft industry. This agreement was in effect when Kirk was employed in August, 1942, by Yega Aircraft Corporation, which afterwards was merged with Lockheed. He joined the Union and has remained a member throughout this controversy. He left Lockheed two years later to enter the Army, from which he was honorably discharged in January, 1946, and was restored to his job at Lockheed in accordance with § 8 (a) of the Selective. Service Act. 54 Stat. 885, 890, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 308 (a). While Kirk was in military service his Union made a new agreement with Lockheed modifying the terms of the 1941 agreement in various particulars. Crucial to the issue here was a change in the seniority provisions of the former agreement. The change provided that “Union Chairmen who have acquired seniority shall be deemed to havé top seniority so long as they remain Chairmen,” In plain English this means that thereafter employees who served as union chairmen were entitled to be retained in case of layoffs regardless of their length of service in the plant. In the latter part of June, 1946, and within a year after Kirk’s reemployment, it was necessary to lay off employees in Kirk’s industrial unit. These layoffs followed the conventional sequence of seniority, time for military service being duly credited, with the exception that union chairmen were retainéd in accordance with the 1945 agreement, even though they had less time with the company than those who were laid off, veterans or not. Kirk was among those laid off, and the retention as union chairmen of men who were junior to him is the basis of his claim that § 8 of the Act had been infringed. Kirk was brought back to work within a month, but Lockheed refused to pay him for the time he was laid off. For this sum he brought this suit! Petitioner Union was . allowed to intervene in order to protect its labor contract. Judgment went for Kirk, and the Union alone took the case to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. That court affirmed the judgment, 169 F. 2d 252, holding that § 8 of the Act forbade disregard of length of employment, so far as veterans are affected, in enforcing provisions in a collective agreement for the .retention of union chairmen in the event of layoffs, regardless of their length of service. In so holding it ran counter to a series of decisions in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Gauweiler v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 162 F. 2d 448; Koury v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 162 F. 2d 544; Di Maggio v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 162 F. 2d 546, and Payne v. Wright Aeronautical Corp., 162 F. 2d 549. It is of the essence of collective bargaining .that it is a continuous process. Neither the conditions to which it addresses itself nor the benefits to be secured by it remain static. They are not frozen even by war. ■ Thus, under the Act the veteran accumulates time toward his seniority while in the service; he also becomes the beneficiary of those gains the achievement of .which is the constant thrust of collective bargaining. In other words, the Act gives him the status of one who has been “on furlough or leave of absence” but uninterruptedly a member of the working force on whose behalf successive collective agreements are made. In this way the Act protects the furloughed employee from being prejudiced by any change in the terms of a collective agreement because he is “on furlough,” but he is not to be favored as a furloughed employee as against his fellows. This is the essence of our decision in Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U. S. 275. In providing that a veteran shall be restored to the position he had before he entered the • military service “without loss of seniority,” § 8 of the Act uses the term “seniority” without definition. It is thus apparent that Congress was not creating a system of seniority but recognizing its operation as part of the process of collective bargaining. We must therefore look to the conventional uses of the seniority system in the process of collective bargaining in order to determine the rights of seniority which the Selective Service Act guaranteed the veteran. Barring legislation not here involved, seniority rights derive their scope and significance from union contracts, confined as they almost exclusively are to unionized industry. See Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U. S. 40, 53, n. 21. There are great variations in the use of the seniority principle through collective bargaining bearing on the time when seniority begins, determination of the units subject to the same seniority, and the consequences which flow from seniority. All these variations disclose limitations upon the dogmatic use of the principle of seniority in the interest of the ultimate aims of collective bargaining. Thus, probationary conditions .must often be met before seniority begins to operate; sometimes it becomes retroáctive to the date of employment; in other instances it is effective only as from the qualifying.date; in some industries it is determined on a.company'basis, in others the occupation or the plant is taken as the unit for seniority determination; sometimes special provisions are made for workers in key positions; and then again these factors are found in varying combinations. See Williamson & Harris, Trends in Collective Bargaining, 100-102 (1945); Harbison, Seniority Policies and Procedures .as Developed through' Collective Bargaining 1-10 (1941). To draw from the Selective Service Act an implication that date of employment is the inflexible basis for determining seniority rights as reflected in layoffs is to ignore a vast body of long-established controlling practices in the process of collective bargaining of which the seniority system to which that Act refers is a part. One of the safeguards insisted upon by unions for the effective functioning of collective bargaining is continuity in office for its shop stewards or union chairmen. To that end provision is made, as it was made here, .against laying them off merely on the basis of temporal seniority. Because they are union chairmen they are not regarded as merely. individual members of the union; they are in a special position in relation to collective bargaining for the benefit of the whole union. To retain them as such is not an encroachment on the seniority system but á due regard of union interests which embrace the system of seniority rights. These considerations are decisive of the case. The agreements made by the Union with Lockheed represent familiar developments in the process of collective bargaining which the Selective Service Act presupposes and in the context' of which it must be placed. Kirk’s rights, including seniority, before he entered the service were derived from the agreement of 1941. So, likewise, ‘were his rights, including seniority, as an employee on furlough defined'by the agreement of 1945, inasmuch as that agreement -in no wise disadvantaged his position because he was in the military service. In the ordinary and orderly course of formulating the terms of employment, the 1945 agreement between the Union and Lockheed in some directions modified the provisions of the 1941 agreement. A labor agreement is a code for the government of-an industrial enterprise and, like all government, ultimately depends for its effectiveness on the quality of enforcement of its code. Because a labor agreement assumes the-proper adjustment of grievances at their source, the union chairmen play a very important role in the whole process of collective bargaining. Therefore it' is deemed, highly desirable that union chairmen have the authority and skill which are derived from continuity in office. A provision for the retention of union chairmen beyond the routine requirements of seniority is not at all uncommon and surely ought not to be deemed arbitrary or discriminatory. The fact that it may involve, as. in Kirk’s case, the-temporary layoff of a veteran while a non veteran chairman with less time at the plant is retained, is wholly unrelated to the veteran’s absence in the service. Under the 1945 agreement chairmen were to be elected once a year, and unless the election occurred on the day before a veteran returned to the plant, his chance of election would be the same as that of persons who had been continuously at work in the plant. Of course, the Selective Service Act restricts a readjustment of seniority rights during the veteran’s absence to the disadvantage of the veteran. _ But-it would be an undue restriction of the process of collective bargaining (without compensating gain to the veteran) to forbid changes in collective bargaining arrangements which secure a fixed tenure for union chairmen, whereby veterans as well as nonveterans are benefited by promoting greater protection of their rights and smoother- operation of labor-management relations. All this presupposes, obviously, that an agreement containing the 1945 provisions expresses honest desires for the protection of the interests of all members of the Union and is not a skillful device of hostility to veterans. There is not the remotest suggestion that the 1945 agreement was other than what it purported to be — the means for securing both to veterans and to non veterans better working conditions through elected leaders not subject to the contingencies of a labor turnover. . Reversed. Mr. Justice Douglas concurs in the result. One of the three veterans, James L. Campbell, withdrew from the Union on the first day of March, 1946, but this did not affect, his status as an employee with the company. There is no contention that his withdrawal from the Union affects in any manner his rights under § 8 of the Act, or that withdrawal from the Union should cause a different result. The collective bargaining agreement signed in -1941, so far as seniority was concerned, provided: “In case of a slack in production, layoffs are to be made primarily on the basis of the principle of seniority. Due consideration will be given, however, to (a) knowledge, training, ability, skill and efficiency, and (b) deportment record and other factors. If it becomes necessary to reduce the working, force in any plant or department, a plan of layoff procedure will be prepared by the management and submitted to the Union for approval. If such plan is not acceptable to the Union the Company agrees-to enter negotiations with the Union and to attempt to arrive at a mutually agreeable plan. If, however, at the end of one working week from the date the Company submitted its original plan of layoff procedure to the Union no new plan has been mutually agreed'to, the Company may proceed according to its proposed plan of layoff subject to Article II, Section 6.” 1941 Agreement, Art. Ill, § 5. The later agreement provided: “(A) General Layoff Procedure. Layoffs shall be made in order of Company-wide seniority applied by occupation where ability, skill and efficiency are substantially equal. However, in the .case of employees with four years’ or more seniority, the Company may, in its discretion, retain them in order of their Company-wide seniority, regardless of occupation, where ability, skill and efficiency are substantially equal. Any claim of unjust discrimination in the exercise of such discretion may be taken up as a grievance. Employees who have not acquired seniority rights may be laid off without regard to relative length of service. “(D) Top Seniority for Union Chairmen for Purpose of Layoffs. For the purpose of applying the Temporary and General, Layoff Procedures, Union Chairmen who have acquired seniority shall be deemed to have top seniority so long as they remain Chairmen. . . .” 1945 Agreement, Art. IV, §3 (A), (D). These are the relevant statutory provisions: “(a) Any person inducted into the land or naval forces under this Act for training and service, who, in the judgment of those in authority over him, satisfactorily completes his period of training and service under section 3 (b) shall be entitled to a certificate to that effect upon the completion of such period of training and service, which shall include a record of any special proficiency or merit attained. : . . “ (b)' In the. case of any such person who, in order to perform such training and service, has left or leaves a position, other than a temporary position, in the employ of any employer and who (1) receives such certificate, (2) is still qualified to perform the duties of such position, and~(3) makes application for reemployment within ninety days after he’ is relieved from such training and service or from hospitalization continuing after discharge for a period of not moré than one year— “(B) if such position was in the employ of a private employer, such employer shall restore such person to such position or to a position of like seniority, status, and pay unless the employer’s circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so; “(c) Any person who is restored to a position in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (A) or (B) of subsection (b) shall be considered as having been on furlough or leave of absence during his period of training and service in the land or naval forces, shall be so restored without loss of seniority, shall be entitled to participate in .insurance or other benefits offered by the employer pursuant to established rules and practices relating to employees on furlough or leave of absence in effect with the employer at the time such person was inducted into such forces, and shall not be discharged from such position without cause within one year after such restoration.” 54 Stat. 885, 890, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 308.. ' ; Lockheed, the respondent in the District Court, did not appeal. But since the judgment was not merely for money damages but also involyed the construction of the collective agreement, the Union had the right to appeal. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U. S. 275, 281-84. See Greenman, Getting Along With Unions 26 (1948); Union Agreements in the Cotton-Textile Industry, U. S. Dept. of Labor, Bull. No. 885, p. 28 (1946); Thomas, Automobile Unionism 56 (1941); Collective. Bargaining Provisions, Seniority Provisions, U. S. Dept, of Labor 28-29 (1948); Collective Bargaining in the Office, American Management Assn., Research Rep: No. 12, p. 72: The ad- • vantage of this modification in seniority according to length of service in the plant is “the mutual interest of union and management' in •preserving the continuity of the bargaining and grievance adjustment personnel.” Seniority Provisions in Union Agreements, U. S. Dept. of Labor, Serial No. R. 1308, p. 7 (1941). While there is not complete agreement on the advantage of seniority for union chairmen, it -is certainly within the area of collective bargaining. See Williamson and Harris,. Trends in Collective Bargaining 101-103 (1945); see Greenman, Getting Along With Unions 85-86 (1948). The National War Labor Board recognized “that the functions of shop stewards and other local union officials were of value to a company as well as to its- employees in settling and preventing labor grievances. For this reason, it usually directed seniority preference for union officials in disputes over the issue.” The Terminal tion Report of the National War Labor Board, U. S. Dept, of Labor, Vol.T, p. 148.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
What is the issue of the decision?
[ "voting", "Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments", "ballot access (of candidates and political parties)", "desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)", "desegregation, schools", "employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.", "affirmative action", "slavery or indenture", "sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)", "reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act", "debtors' rights", "deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)", "employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)", "sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)", "sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)", "Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)", "Indians, state jurisdiction over", "juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)", "poverty law, constitutional", "poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.", "illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits", "handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes", "residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents", "military: draftee, or person subject to induction", "military: active duty", "military: veteran", "immigration and naturalization: permanent residence", "immigration and naturalization: citizenship", "immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization", "immigration and naturalization: access to public education", "immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits", "immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous", "indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)", "indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)", "indigents: payment of fine", "indigents: costs or filing fees", "indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee", "indigents: transcript", "indigents: assistance of psychiatrist", "indigents: miscellaneous", "liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)", "miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)" ]
[ 25 ]
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January 30, 1956. No. 13, Original. Wisconsin v. Tennessee. Vernon W. Thomson, Attorney General, argued the cause for the State of Wisconsin, plaintiff. With him on the brief were Stewart O. Honeck, Deputy Attorney General, and Roy G. Tulane and George F. Sieker, Assistant Attorneys General. Knox Bigham, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for the State of Tennessee, defendant. With him on the brief were George F. McCanless, Attorney General, Allison B. Humphreys, Jr., Solicitor General, and James M. Glasgow, Assistant Attorney General. On motion for leave to file complaint. Argued January 23,1956. Decided January 30, 1956. Per Curiam: The motion for leave to file the complaint is denied. Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
What is the issue area of the decision?
[ "Criminal Procedure", "Civil Rights", "First Amendment", "Due Process", "Privacy", "Attorneys", "Unions", "Economic Activity", "Judicial Power", "Federalism", "Interstate Relations", "Federal Taxation", "Miscellaneous", "Private Action" ]
[ 10 ]
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STORER et al. v. BROWN, SECRETARY OF STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al. No. 72-812. Argued November 5, 1973 Decided March 26, 1974 White, J., delivered the opinion of the’Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Douglas and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 755. Paul N. Halvonik and Joseph Remcho argued the cause for appellants in both cases. With them on the brief for appellants in No. 72-812 was Charles C. Marson. Appellant pro se filed a brief in No. 72-6050. Clayton P. Roche, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellee Brown in both cases. With him on the brief were Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, and Iver E. Skjeie, Assistant Attorney General. Together with No. 72-6050, Frommhagen v. Brown, Secretary of State of California, et al., also on appeal from the same court. Rolland R. O’Hare filed a brief for the Committee for Democratic Election Laws as amicus curiae in No. 72-812. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The California Elections Code forbids ballot position to an independent candidate for elective public office if he voted in the immediately preceding primary, § 6830 (c) (Supp. 1974), or if he had a registered affiliation with a qualified political party at any time within one year prior to the immediately preceding primary election. § 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974). The independent candidate must also file nomination papers signed by voters not less in number than 5% nor more than 6% of the entire vote east in the preceding general election in the area for which the candidate seeks to run. § 6831 (1961). All of these signatures must be obtained during a 24-day period following the primary and ending 60 days prior to the general election, § 6833 (Supp. 1974), and none of the signatures may be gathered from persons who vote at the primary election. § 6830 (c) (Supp. 1974). The constitutionality of these provisions is challenged here as infringing on rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments and as adding qualifications for the office of United States Congressman, contrary to Art. I, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution. Prior to the 1972 elections, appellants Storer, Fromm-hagen, Hall, and Tyner, along with certain of their supporters, filed their actions to have the above sections of the Elections Code declared unconstitutional and their enforcement enjoined. Storer and Frommhagen each sought ballot status as an independent candidate for Congressman from his district. Both complained about the party disaffiliation requirement of § 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974) and asserted that the combined effects of the provisions were unconstitutional burdens on their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Hall and Tyner claimed the right to ballot position as independent candidates for President and Vice President of the United States. They were members of the Communist Party but that party had not qualified for ballot position in California. They, too, complained of the combined effect of the indicated sections of the Elections Code on their ability to achieve ballot position. A three-judge District Court concluded that the statutes served a sufficiently important state interest to sustain their constitutionality and dismissed the complaints. Two separate appeals were taken from the judgment. We noted probable jurisdiction and consolidated the cases for oral argument. 410 U. S. 965 (1973). I We affirm the judgment of the District Court insofar as it refused relief to Storer and Frommhagen with respect to the 1972 general election. Both men were registered Democrats until early in 1972, Storer until January and Frommhagen until March of that year. This affiliation with a qualified political party within a year prior to the 1972 primary disqualified both men under § 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974); and in our view the State of California was not prohibited by the United States Constitution from enforcing that provision against these men. In Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1968), the Court held that although the citizens of a State are free to associate with one of the two major political parties, to participate in the nomination of their chosen party’s candidates for public office and then to cast their ballots in the general election, the State must also provide feasible means for other political parties and other candidates to appear on the general election ballot. The Ohio law under examination in that case made no provision for independent candidates and the requirements for any but the two major parties qualifying for the ballot were so burdensome that it was “virtually impossible” for other parties, new or old, to achieve ballot position for their candidates. Id., at 25. Because these restrictions, which were challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, severely burdened the right to associate for political purposes and the right to vote effectively, the Court, borrowing from other cases, ruled that the discriminations against new parties and their candidates had to be justified by compelling state interests. The Court recognized the substantial state interest in encouraging compromise and political stability, in attempting to ensure that the election winner will represent a majority of the community and in providing the electorate with an understandable ballot and inferred that “reasonable requirements for ballot position,” id., at 32, would be acceptable. But these important interests were deemed insufficient to warrant burdens so severe as to confer an effective political monopoly on the two major parties. The First and Fourteenth Amendments, including the Equal Protection Clause of the latter, required as much. In challenging § 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974), appellants rely on Williams v. Rhodes and assert that under that case and subsequent cases dealing with exclusionary voting and candidate qualifications, e. g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U. S. 621 (1969), substantial burdens on the right to vote or to associate for political purposes are constitutionally suspect and invalid under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and under the Equal Protection Clause unless essential to serve a compelling state interest. These cases, however, do not necessarily condemn § 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974). It has never been suggested that the Williams-Kramer-Dunn rule automatically invalidates every substantial restriction on the right to vote or to associate. Nor could this be the case under our Constitution where the States are given the initial task of determining the qualifications of voters who will elect members of Congress. Art. I, § 2, cl. 1. Also Art. I, § 4, cl. 1, authorizes the States to prescribe “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives.” Moreover, as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes. In any event, the States have evolved comprehensive, and in many respects complex, election codes regulating in most substantial ways, with respect to both federal and state elections, the time, place, and manner of holding primary and general elections, the- registration and qualifications of voters, and the selection and qualification of candidates. It is very unlikely that all or even a large portion of the state election laws would fail to pass muster under our cases; and the rule fashioned by the Court to pass on constitutional challenges to specific provisions of election laws provides no litmus-paper test for separating those restrictions that are valid from those that are invidious under the Equal Protection Clause. The rule is not self-executing and is no substitute for the hard judgments that must be made. Decision in this context, as in others, is very much a “matter pf degree,” Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 348, very much a matter of “consider [ing] the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification.” Williams v. Rhodes, supra, at 30; Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 335. What the result of this process will be in any specific case may be very difficult to predict with great assurance. The judgment in Dunn v. Blumstein invalidated the Tennessee one-year residence requirement for voting but agreed that the State’s interest was obviously sufficient to limit voting to residents, to require registration for voting, and to close the registration books at some point prior to the election, a deadline which every resident must meet if he is to cast his vote at the polls. Subsequently, three-judge district courts differed over the validity of a requirement that voters be registered for 50 days prior to election. This Court, although divided, sustained the provision. Burns v. Fortson, 410 U. S. 686 (1973); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U. S. 679 (1973). Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U. S. 752 (1973), is more relevant to the problem before us. That case dealt with a provision that to vote in a party primary the voter must have registered as a party member 30 days prior to the previous general election, a date eight months prior to the presidential primary and 11 months prior to the nonpresidential primary. Those failing to meet this deadline, with some exceptions, were barred from voting at either primary. We sustained the provision as “in no sense invidious or arbitrary,” because it was “tied to [the] particularized legitimate purpose,” id., at 762, of preventing interparty raiding, a matter which bore on “the integrity of the electoral process.” Id., at 761. Later the Court struck down similar Illinois provisions aimed at the same evil, where the deadline for changing party registration was 23 months prior to the primary date. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U. S. 51 (1973). One consequence was that a voter wishing to change parties could not vote in any primary that occurred during the waiting period. The Court did not retreat from Rosario or question the recognition in that case of the States’ strong interest in maintaining the integrity of the political process by preventing interparty raiding. Although the 11-month requirement imposed in New York had been accepted as necessary for an effective remedy, the Court was unconvinced that the 23-month period established in Illinois was an essential instrument to counter the evil at which it was aimed. Other variables must be considered where qualifications for candidates rather than for voters are at issue. In Jenness v. Forison, 403 U. S. 431 (1971), we upheld a requirement that independent candidates must demonstrate substantial support in the community by securing supporting signatures amounting to 5% of the total registered voters in the last election for filling the office sought by the candidate. The Court said: “There is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political organization’s candidate on the ballot— the interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception, and even frustration of the democratic process at the general election.” Id., at 442. Subsequently, in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S., at 145, a unanimous Court said: “The Court has recognized that a State has a legitimate interest in regulating the number of candidates on the ballot. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U. S., at 442; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S., at 32. In so doing, the State understandably and properly seeks to prevent the clogging of its election machinery, avoid vote* confusion, and assure that the winner is the choice of a majority, or at least a strong plurality, of those voting, without the expense and burden of runoff elections. Although we have no way of gauging the number of candidates who might enter primaries in Texas if access to the ballot were unimpeded by the large filing fees in question here, we are bound to respect the legitimate objectives of the State in avoiding overcrowded ballots. Moreover, a State has an interest, if not a duty, to protect the integrity of its political processes from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U. S., at 442.” Against this pattern of decisions we have no hesitation in sustaining § 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974). In California, the independent candidacy route to obtaining ballot position is but a part of the candidate-nominating process, an alternative to being nominated in one of the direct party primaries. The independent candidate need not stand for primary election but must qualify for the ballot by demonstrating substantial public support in another way. Otherwise, the qualifications required of the independent candidate are very similar to, or identical with, those imposed on party candidates. Section 6401 (Supp. 1974) imposes a flat disqualification upon any candidate seeking to run in a party primary if he has been “registered as affiliated with a political party other than that political party the nomination of which he seeks within 12 months immediately prior to the filing of the declaration.” Moreover, §§ 6402 and 6611 provide that a candidate who has been defeated in a party primary may not be nominated as an independent or be a candidate of any other party; and no person may file nomination papers for a party nomination and an independent nomination for the same office, or for more than one office at the same election. The requirement that the independent candidate not have been affiliated with a political party for a year before the primary is expressive of a general state policy aimed at maintaining the integrity of the various routes to the ballot. It involves no discrimination against independents. Indeed, the independent candidate must be clear of political party affiliations for a year before the primary; the party candidate must not have been registered with another party for a year before he files his declaration, which must be done not less than 83 and not more than 113 days prior to the primary. § 6490 (Supp. 1974). In Rosario v. Rockefeller, there was an 11-month waiting period for voters who wanted to change parties. Here, a person terminating his affiliation with a political party must wait at least 12 months before he can become a candidate in another party’s primary or an independent candidate for public office. The State’s interests recognized in Rosario are very similar to those that undergird the California waiting period; and the extent of the restriction is not significantly different. It is true that a California candidate who desires to run for office as an independent must anticipate his candidacy substantially in advance of his election campaign, but the required foresight is little more than the possible 11 months examined in Rosario, and its direct impact is on the candidate, and not voters. In any event, neither Storer nor Frommhagen is in position to .complain that the waiting period is one year, for each of them was affiliated with a qualified party no more than six months prior to the primary. As applied to them, § 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974) is valid. After long experience, California came to the direct party primary as a desirable way of nominating candidates for public office. It has also carefully determined which public offices will be subject to partisan primaries and those that call for nonpartisan elections. Moreover, after long experience with permitting candidates to run in the primaries of more than one party, California forbade the cross-filing practice in 1959. A candidate in one party primary may not now run in that of another; if he loses in the primary, he may not run as an independent; and he must not have been associated with another political party for a year prior to the primary. See §§ 6401, 6611. The direct party primary in California is not merely an exercise or warm-up for the general election but an integral part of the entire election process, the initial stage in a two-stage process by which the people choose their public officers. It functions to winnow out and finally reject all but the chosen candidates. The State’s general policy is to have contending forces within the party employ the primary campaign and primary election to finally settle their differences. The general election ballot is reserved for major struggles; it is not a forum for continuing intraparty feuds. The provision against defeated primary candidates running as independents effectuates this aim, the visible result being to prevent the losers from continuing the struggle and to limit the names on the ballot to those who have won the primaries and those independents who have properly qualified. The people, it is hoped, are presented with understandable choices and the winner in the general election with sufficient support to govern effectively. Section 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974) carries very similar credentials. It protects the direct primary process by refusing to recognize independent candidates who do not make early plans to leave a party and take the alternative course to the ballot. It works against independent candidacies prompted by short-range political goals, pique, or personal quarrel. It is also a substantial barrier to a party fielding an “independent” candidate to capture and .bleed off votes in the general election that might well go to another party. A State need not take the course California has, but California apparently believes with the Founding Fathers that splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism may do significant damage to the fabric of government. See The Federalist, No. 10 (Madison). It appears obvious to us that the one-year disaffiliation provision furthers the State’s interest in the stability of its political system. We also consider that interest as not only permissible, but compelling and as outweighing the interest the candidate and his supporters may have in making a late rather than an early decision to seek independent ballot status. Nor do we have reason for concluding that the device California chose, § 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974), was not an essential part of its overall mechanism to achieve its acceptable goals. As we indicated in Rosario, the Constitution does not require the State to choose ineffectual means to achieve its aims. To conclude otherwise might sacrifice the political stability of the system of the State, with profound consequences for the entire citizenry, merely in the interest of particular candidates and their supporters having instantaneous access to the ballot. We conclude that § 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974) is not unconstitutional, and Storer and Frommhagen were properly barred from the ballot as a result of its application. Cf. Lippitt v. Cipollone, 404 U. S. 1032 (1972). Having reached this result, there is no need to examine the constitutionality of the other provisions of the Elections Code as they operate singly or in combination as applied to these candidates. Even if these statutes were wholly or partly unconstitutional, Storer and Frommhagen were still properly barred from having their names placed on the 1972 ballot. Although Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S., at 34, spoke in terms of assessing the “totality” of the election laws as they affected constitutional rights, if a candidate is absolutely and validly barred from the ballot by one provision of the laws, he cannot challenge other provisions as applied to other candidates. The concept of “totality” is applicable only in the sense that a number of facially valid provisions of election laws may operate in tandem to produce impermissible barriers to constitutional rights. The disaffiliation requirement does not change its character when Qombined with other provisions of the electoral code. It is an absolute bar to candidacy, and a valid one. The District Court need not have heard a challenge to these other provisions of the California Elections Code by one who did not satisfy the age requirement for becoming a member of Congress, and there was no more reason to consider them at the request of Storer and Frommhagen or at the request of voters who desire to support unqualified candidates. II We come to different conclusions with respect to Hall and Tyner. As to these two men we vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand the case for further proceedings to determine whether the California election laws place an unconstitutional burden on their access to the ballot. We start with the proposition that the requirements for an independent's attaining a place on the general election ballot can be unconstitutionally severe, Williams v. Rhodes, supra. We must, therefore, inquire as to the nature, extent, and likely impact of the California requirements. Beyond the one-year party disaffiliation condition and the rule against voting in the primary, both of which Hall apparently satisfied, it was necessary for an independent candidate to file a petition signed by voters not less in number than 5% of the total votes cast in California at the last general election. This percentage, as such, does not appear to be excessive, see Jenness v. Fortson, supra, but to assess realistically whether the law imposes excessively burdensome requirements upon independent candidates it is necessary to know other critical facts which do not appear from the evidentiary record in this case. It is necessary in the first instance to know the “entire vote” in the last general election. Appellees suggest that 5% of that figure, whatever that is, is 325,000. Assuming this to be the correct total signature requirement, we also know that it must be satisfied within a period of 24 days between the primary and the general election. But we do not know the number of qualified voters from which the requirement must be satisfied within this period of time. California law disqualifies from signing the independent’s petition all registered voters who voted in the primary. In theory, it could be that voting in the primary was so close to 100% of those registered, and new registrations since closing the books before primary day were so low, that eligible signers of an unaffiliated candidate’s petition would number less than the total signatures required. This is unlikely, for it is usual that a substantial percentage of those eligible do not vote in the primary, and there were undoubtedly millions of voters qualified to vote in the 1972 primary. But it is not at all unlikely that the available pool of possible signers, after eliminating the total primary vote, will be substantially smaller than the total vote in the last general election and that it will require substantially more than 5% of the eligible pool to produce the necessary 325,000 signatures. This would be in excess, percentagewise, of anything the Court has approved to date as a precondition to an independent’s securing a place on the ballot and in excess of the 5% which we said in Jenness was higher than the requirement imposed by most state election codes. We are quite sure, therefore, that further proceedings should be had in the District Court to permit further findings with respect to the extent of the burden imposed on independent candidates for President and Vice President under California law. Standing alone, gathering 325,000 signatures in 24 days would not appear to be an impossible burden. Signatures at the rate of 13,542 per day would be required, but 1,000 canvassers could perform the task if each gathered 14 signers a day. On its face, the statute would not appear to require an impractical undertaking for one who desires to be a candidate for President. But it is a substantial requirement; and if the additional likelihood is, as it seems to us to be, that the total signatures required will amount to a substantially higher percentage of the available pool than the 5% stipulated in the statute, the constitutional claim asserted by Hall is not frivolous. Before the claim is finally dismissed, it should be determined whether the available pool is so diminished in size by the disqualification of those who voted in the primary that the 325,000-signature requirement, to be satisfied in 24 days, is too great a burden on the independent candidates for the offices of President and Vice President. Because further proceedings are required, we must resolve certain issues that are in dispute in order that the ground rules for the additional factfinding in the District Court will more clearly appear. First, we have no doubt about the validity of disqualifying from signing an independent candidate’s petition all those registered voters who voted a partisan ballot in the primary, although they did not vote for the office sought by the independent. We have considered this matter at greater length in American Party of Texas v. White, see post, at 785-786, and we merely repeat here that a State may confine each voter to one vote-in one primary election, and that to maintain the integrity of the nominating process the State is warranted in limiting the voter to participating in but one of the two alternative procedures, the partisan or the nonpartisan, for nominating candidates for the general election ballot. Second, the District Court apparently had little doubt that the California law disqualified anyone voting in the primary election, whether or not he confined his vote to nonpartisan offices and propositions. The State of California asserts this to be an erroneous interpretation of California law and claims that the District Court should have abstained to permit the California courts to address the question. In any event, the State does not attempt to justify disqualifying as signers of an independent’s petition those who voted only a nonpartisan ballot at the primary, such as independent voters who themselves were disqualified from voting a partisan ballot. See § 311 (Supp. 1974). With what we have before us, it would be difficult to ascertain any rational ground, let alone a compelling interest, for disqualifying nonpartisan voters at the primary from signing an independent candidate’s petition, and we think the District Court should reconsider the matter in the light of tentative views expressed here. Under the controlling cases, the District Court may, if it is so advised, abstain and permit the California courts to construe the California statute. On the other hand, it may be that adding to the qualified pool of signers all those nonpartisan voters at the primary may make so little difference in the ultimate assessment of the overall burden of the signature requirement that the status of the nonpartisan voter is in fact an insignificant consideration not meriting abstention. Third, once the number of signatures required in the 24-day period is ascertained, along with the total pool from which they may be drawn, there will arise the inevitable question for judgment: in the context of California politics, could a reasonably diligent independent candidate be expected to satisfy the signature requirements, or will it be only rarely that the unaffiliated candidate will succeed in getting on the ballot? Past experience will be a helpful, if not always an unerring, guide: it will be one thing if independent candidates have qualified with some regularity and quite a different matter if they have not. We note here that the State mentions only one instance of an independent candidate’s qualifying for any office under § 6430, but disclaims having made any comprehensive survey of the official records that would perhaps reveal the truth of the matter. One of the difficulties will be that the number of signatures required will vary with the total vote in the last election; the total disqualifying vote at the primary election and hence the size of the eligible pool of possible signers will also vary from election to election. Also to be considered is the relationship between the showing of support through a petition requirement and the percentage of the vote the State can reasonably expect of a candidate who achieves ballot status in the general election. As a preliminary matter, it would appear that the State, having disqualified defeated candidates and recent defectors, has in large part achieved its major purpose of providing and protecting an effective direct primary system and must justify its independent signature requirements chiefly by its interest in having candidates demonstrate substantial support in the community so that the ballot, in turn, may be protected from frivolous candidacies and kept within limits understandable to the voter. If the required signatures approach 10% of the eligible pool of voters, is it necessary to serve the State’s compelling interest in a manageable ballot to require that the task of signature gathering be crowded into 24 days? Of course, the petition period must end at a reasonable time before election day to permit nomination papers to be verified. Neither must California abandon its policy of confining each voter to a single nominating act — either voting in the partisan primary or a signature on an independent petition. But the question remains whether signature gathering must await conclusion of the primary. It would not appear untenable to permit solicitation of signatures to begin before primary day and finish afterwards. Those signing before the primary could either be definitely disqualified from a partisan vote in the primary election or have the privilege of canceling their petition signatures by the act of casting a ballot in the primary election. And if these alternatives are unacceptable, there would remain the question whether it is essential to demonstrate community support to gather signatures of substantially more than 5% of the group from which the independent is permitted to solicit support. Appellees insist, however, that the signature requirements for independent candidates are of no consequence because California has provided a valid way for new political parties to qualify for ballot position, an alternative that Hall could have pursued, but did not. Under § 6430, new political parties can be recognized and qualify their candidate for ballot position if 135 days before a primary election it appears that voters equal in number to at least 1% of the entire vote of the State at the last preceding gubernatorial election have declared to the county clerks their intention to affiliate with the new party, or if, by the same time, the new party files a petition with signatures equal in number to 10% of the last gubernatorial vote. It is argued that the 1% registration requirement is feasible, has recently been resorted to successfully by two new political parties now qualified for the California ballot, and goes as far as California constitutionally must go in providing an alternative to the direct party primary of the major parties. It may be that the 1% registration requirement is a valid condition to extending ballot position to a new political party. Cf. American Party of Texas v. White, post, p. 767. But the political party and the independent candidate approaches to political activity are entirely different and neither is a satisfactory substitute for the other. A new party organization contemplates a statewide, ongoing organization with distinctive political character. Its goal is typically to gain control of the machinery of state government by electing its candidates to public office. From the standpoint of a potential supporter, affiliation with the new party would mean giving up his ties with another party or sacrificing his own independent status, even though his possible interest in the new party centers around a particular candidate for a particular office. For the candidate himself, it would mean undertaking the serious responsibilities of qualified party status under California law, such as the conduct of a primary, holding party conventions, and the promulgation of party platforms. But more fundamentally, the candidate, who is by definition an independent and desires to remain one, must now consider himself a party man, surrendering his independent status. Must he necessarily choose the political party route if he wants to appear on the ballot in the general election? We think not. In Williams v. Rhodes, the opportunity for political activity within either of two major political parties was seemingly available to all. But this Court held that to comply with the First and Fourteenth Amendments the State must provide a feasible opportunity for new political organizations and their candidates to appear on the ballot. No discernible state interest justified the burdensome and complicated regulations that in effect made impractical any alternative to the major parties. Similarly, here, we perceive no sufficient state interest in conditioning ballot position for an independent candidate on his forming a new political party as long as the State is free to assure itself that the candidate is a serious contender, truly independent, and with a satisfactory level of community support. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment in No. 72-812 insofar as it refused relief to Hall and Tyner and remand the case in this respect to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment in No. 72-812 and No. 72-6050 is affirmed. So ordered. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT California Elections Code § 41. “Nonpartisan office” “Nonpartisan office” means an office for which no party may nominate a candidate. Judicial, school, county, and municipal offices are nonpartisan offices. §311 [Supp. 1974]. Declaration of political affiliation; voting at primary elections At the time of registering and of transferring registration, each elector may declare the name of the political party with which he intends to affiliate at the ensuing primary election. The name of that political party shall be stated in the affidavit of registration and the index. If the elector declines to state his political affiliation, he shall be registered as “Nonpartisan” or “Declines to state,” as he chooses. If the elector declines to state his political affiliation, he shall be informed that no person shall be entitled to vote the ballot of any political party at any primary election unless he has stated the name of the party with which he intends to affiliate at the time of registration. He shall not be permitted to vote the ballot of any party or for delegates to the convention of any party other than the party designated in his registration. § 2500. General election There shall be held throughout the State, on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November in every even-numbered year, an election, to be known as the general election. § 2501. Direct primary For the nomination of all candidates to be voted for at the general election, a direct primary shall be held at the legally designated polling places in each precinct on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in the immediately preceding June. § 2502. Primary elections Any primary election other than the direct primary or presidential primary shall be held on Tuesday, three weeks next preceding the election for which the primary election is held. § 6401 [Supp. 1974]. Party affiliation No declaration of candidacy for a partisan office or for membership on a county central committee shall be filed, either by the candidate himself or by sponsors on his behalf, (1) unless at the time of presentation of the declaration and continuously for not less than three months immediately prior to that time, or for as long as he has been eligible to register to vote in the state, the candidate is shown by his affidavit of registration to be affiliated with the political party the nomination of which he seeks, and (2) the candidate has not been registered as affiliated with a political party other than that political party the nomination of which he seeks within 12 months immediately prior to the filing of the declaration. The county clerk shall attach a certificate to the declaration of candidacy showing the date on which the candidate registered as intending to affiliate with the political party the nomination of which he seeks, and indicating that the candidate has not been affiliated with any other political party for the 12-month period immediately preceding the filing of the declaration. § 6402. Independent nominees This chapter does not prohibit the independent nomination of candidates under the provisions of Chapter 3 (commencing at Section 6800) of this division, subject to the following limitations: (a) A candidate whose name has been on the ballot as a candidate of a party at the direct primary and who has been defeated for that party nomination is ineligible for nomination as an independent candidate. He is also ineligible as a candidate named by a party central committee to fill a vacancy on the ballot for a general election. (b) No person may file nomination papers for a party nomination and an independent nomination for the same office, or for more than one office at the same election. § 6430. Qualified parties A party is qualified to participate in any primary election: (a) If at the last preceding gubernatorial election there was polled for any one of its candidates who was the candidate of that party only for any office voted on throughout the State, at least 2 percent of the entire vote of the State; or (b) If at the last preceding gubernatorial election there was polled for any one of its candidates who, upon the date of that election, as shown by the affidavits of registration of voters in the county of his residence, was affiliated with that party and was the joint candidate of that party and any other party for any office voted on throughout the State, at least 6 percent of the entire vote of the State; or (c) If on or before the 135th day before any primary election, it appears to the Secretary of State, as a result of examining and totaling the statement of voters and their political affiliations transmitted to him by the county clerks, that voters equal in number to at least 1 percent of the entire vote of the State at the last preceding gubernatorial election have declared their intention to affiliate with that party; or (d) If on or before the 135th day before any primary election, there is filed with the Secretary of State a petition signed by voters, equal in number to at least 10 percent of the entire vote of the State at the last preceding gubernatorial election, declaring that they represent a proposed party, the name of which shall be stated in the petition, which proposed party those voters desire to have participate in that primary election. This petition shall be circulated, signed, verified and the signatures of the voters on it shall be certified to and transmitted to the Secretary of State by the county clerks substantially as provided for initiative petitions. Each page of the petition shall bear a caption in 18-point blackface type, which caption shall be the name of the proposed party followed by the words “Petition to participate in the primary election.” No voters or organization of voters shall assume a party name or designation which is so similar to the name of an existing party as to mislead voters. Whenever the registration of any party which qualified in the previous direct primary election falls below one-fifteenth of 1 percent of the total state registration, that party shall not be qualified to participate in the primary election but shall be deemed to have been abandoned by the voters, since the expense of printing ballots and holding a primary election would be an unjustifiable expense and burden to the State for so small a group. The Secretary of State shall immediately remove the name of the party from any list, notice, ballot, or other publication containing the names of the parties qualified to participate in the primary election. § 6490 [Supp. 1974], Declaration of candidacy No candidate's name shall be printed on the ballot to be used at a direct primary unless a declaration of his candidacy is filed not less than 83 and not more than 113 days prior to the direct primary. The declaration may be made by the candidate or by sponsors on his behalf. When the declaration is made by sponsors the candidate’s affidavit of acceptance shall be filed with the declaration. § 6611. Unsuccessful candidate; ineligibility as candidate of another party A candidate who fails to receive the highest number of votes for the nomination of the political party with which he was registered as affiliated on the date his declaration of candidacy or declaration of acceptance of nomination was filed with the county clerk cannot be the candidate of any other political party. § 6803. Group of candidates for presidential electors; designation of presidential and vice presidential candidates Whenever a group of candidates for presidential electors, equal in number to the number of presidential electors to which this State is entitled, files a nomination paper with the Secretary of State pursuant to this chapter, the nomination paper may contain the name of the candidate for President of the United States and the name of the candidate for Vice President of the United States for whom all of those candidates for presidential electors pledge themselves to vote. § 6804. Printing of names on ballot When a group of candidates for presidential electors designates the presidential and vice presidential candidates for whom all of the group pledge themselves to vote, the names of the presidential candidate and vice presidential candidate designated by that group shall be printed on the ballot. § 6830 [Supp. 1974], Contents Each candidate or group of candidates shall file a nomination paper which shall contain: (a) The name and residence address of each candidate, including the name of the county in which he resides. (b) A designation of the office for which the candidate or group seeks nomination. (c) A statement that the candidate and each signer of his nomination paper did not vote at the immediately preceding primary election at which a candidate was nominated for the office mentioned in the nomination paper. The statement required in this subdivision shall be omitted when no candidate was nominated for the office at the preceding primary election. (d) A statement that the candidate is not, and was not at any time during the one year preceding the immediately preceding primary election at which a candidate was nominated for the office mentioned in the nomination paper, registered as affiliated with a political party qualified under the provisions of Section 6430. The statement required by this subdivision shall be omitted when no primary election was held to nominate candidates for the office to which the independent nomination paper is directed. § 6831. Signatures required Nomination papers shall be signed by voters of the area for which the candidate is to be nominated, not less in number than 5 percent nor more than 6 percent of the entire vote cast in the area at the preceding general election. Nomination papers for Representative in Congress, State Senator or Assemblyman, to be voted for at a special election to fill a vacancy, shall be signed by voters in the district not less in number than 500 or 1 percent of the entire vote cast in the area at the preceding general election, whichever is less, nor more than 1,000. § 6833 [Supp. 1974]. Time for filing, circulation and signing; verification Nomination papers required to be filed with the Secretary of State or with the county clerk shall be filed not more than 79 nor less than 64 days before the day of the election, but shall be prepared, circulated, signed, verified and left with the county clerk for examination, or for examination and filing, no earlier than 84 days before the, election and no later than 5 p. m. 60 days before the election. If the total number of signatures submitted to a county clerk for an office entirely within that county does not equal the number of signatures needed to qualify the candidate, the county clerk shall declare the petition void and is not required to verify the signatures. If the district falls within two or more counties, the county clerk shall within two working days report in writing to the Secretary of State the total number of signatures filed. If the Secretary of State finds that the total number of signatures filed in the district or state is less than the minimum number required to qualify the candidate he shall within one working day notify in writing the counties involved that they need not verify the signatures. § 10014. Ballots for voters at primary elections At a primary election only a nonpartisan ballot shall be furnished to each voter who is not registered as intending to affiliate with any one of the political parties participating in the primary election; and to any voter registered as intending to affiliate with a political party participating in a primary election, there shall be furnished only a ballot of the political party with which he is registered as intending to affiliate. § 10232. Inconveniently large ballots If the election board of a county determines that due to the number of candidates and measures that must be printed on the general election ballot, the ballot will be larger than may be conveniently handled, the board may order nonpartisan offices and local measures omitted from the general election ballot and printed on a separate ballot in a form substantially the same as provided for the general election ballot. If the board so orders, each voter shall receive both ballots, and the procedure prescribed for the handling and canvassing of ballots shall be modified to the extent necessary to permit the use of two ballots by a voter. The board may, in such case, order the second ballot to be printed on paper of a different tint and assign to those ballots numbers higher than those assigned to the ballots containing partisan offices and statewide ballot measures. § 10318. Inconveniently large ballots If the election board of a county determines that due to the number of candidates and measures that must be printed on the direct primary ballot the ballot will be larger than may be conveniently handled, the board may provide that a nonpartisan ballot shall be given to each partisan voter, together with his partisan ballot, and that the material appearing under the heading “Nonpartisan Offices” on partisan ballots, as well as the heading itself, shall be omitted from the partisan ballots. If the board so provides, the procedure prescribed for the handling and canvassing of ballots shall be modified to the extent necessary to permit the use of two ballots by partisan voters. § 18600 [Supp. 1974]. Write-in votes Any name written upon a ballot shall be counted, unless prohibited by Section 18603, for that name for the office under which it is written, if it is written in the blank space therefor, whether or not a cross (+) is stamped or made with pen or pencil in the voting square after the name so written. § 18601 [Supp. 1974]. Declaration required Every person who desires to have his name as written on the ballots of an election counted for a particular office shall file a declaration stating that he is a write-in candidate for the nomination for or election to the particular office and giving the title of that office. § 18602 [Supp. 1974], Declaration; filing The declaration required by Section 18601 shall be filed no later than the eighth day prior to the election to which it applies. It shall be filed with the clerks, registrar of voters, or district secretary responsible for the conduct of the election in which the candidate desires to have write-in votes of his name counted. § 18603 [Supp. 1974], Requirements for tabulation of write-in vote No name written upon a ballot in any state, county, city, city and county, or district election shall be counted for an office or nomination unless (a) A declaration has been filed pursuant to Sections 18601 and 18602 declaring a write-in candidacy for that particular person for that particular office or nomination and (b) The fee required by Section 6555 is paid when the declaration of write-in candidacy is filed pursuant to Section 18602. The relevant provisions of the California Elections Code are printed in the appendix to this opinion. Storer’s action, No. 72-812, was filed first. Frommhagen was allowed to intervene. Hall and Tyner later filed suit. In its opinion the District Court noted that “[b]y appropriate orders and stipulations, although the cases were never consolidated, the parties to Hall will be bound by the rulings made in Storer which are common to both cases and any separate issues in Hall stand submitted without further briefing or oral argument. The view taken by the Court herein is such that there are no separate issues in Hall and the rulings expressed are dispositive of both cases.” Storer sought to be a candidate from the Sixth Congressional District, Frommhagen from the Twelfth. The California Elections Code § 41 provides that judicial, school, county, and municipal offices are nonpartisan offices for which no party may nominate a candidate. See Gaylord, History of the California Election Laws 59, contained in West’s Ann. Elec. Code (1961), preceding §§1-11499. See In re McGee, 36 Cal. 2d 592, 226 P. 2d 1 (1951). Moreover, we note that the independent candidate who cannot qualify for the ballot may nevertheless resort to the write-in alternative provided by California law, see §§ 18600-18603 (Supp. 1974). The 1972 election, is long over, and no effective relief can be provided to the candidates or voters, but this case is not moot, since the issues properly presented, and their effects on independent candidacies, will persist as the California statutes are applied in future elections. This is, therefore, a case where the controversy is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U. S. 752, 756 n. 5 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 333 n. 2 (1972); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814, 816 (1969); Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911). The “capable of repetition, yet evading review” doctrine, in the context of election cases, is appropriate when there are “as applied” challenges as well as in the more typical case involving only facial attacks. The construction of the statute, an understanding of its operation, and possible constitutional limits on its application, will have the effect of simplifying future challenges, thus increasing the likelihood that timely filed cases can be adjudicated before an election is held. In California, presidential electors must meet candidacy requirements and file their nomination papers with the required signatures. §§ 6803, 6830. The State claims, therefore, that the electors, not Hall and Tyner, are the only persons with standing to raise the validity of the signature requirements. But it is Hall’s and Tyner’s names that go on the California ballot for consideration of the voters. § 6804. Without the necessary signatures this will not occur. It is apparent, contrary to the State’s suggestion, that Hall and Tyner have ample standing to challenge the signature requirement. Hereafter, in the text and notes, reference to Hall should be understood as referring also to Tyner. See also Auerbach v. Mandel, 409 U. S. 808 (1972) (3%); Wood v. Putterman, 316 F. Supp. 646 (Md. 1970) (three-judge court), aff’d mem., 400 U. S. 859 (1970) (3%); and Beller v. Kirk, 328 F. Supp. 485 (SD Fla. 1970) (three-judge court), aff’d mem. sub nom. Beller v. Askew, 403 U. S. 925 (1971) (3%). We note that in Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes, 318 F. Supp. 1262 (SD Ohio 1970) (three-judge court), the District Court struck down a 7% petition requirement. That issue became moot on appeal, Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U. S. 583, 585 (1972). Two ballots are authorized in California primaries, the one for partisan office and the other for nonpartisan offices and propositions. See §§ 10014, 10232, 10318. A voter may take only the nonpartisan ballot and refrain from voting on partisan candidates. From the official published voting statistics published by the California Secretary of State, it would appear that the total vote in the 1972 primaries, seemingly the total number of persons voting, was 6,460,220, while the total vote for partisan presidential candidates was 5,880,845. Thus all but approximately 579,000 voted for a partisan candidate in the presidential primary and it is likely that many of the 579,000 not voting for President cast a partisan ballot for other candidates. But assuming that they did not, the maximum addition to the pool available to Hall would be 579,000, probably a relatively small difference in terms of the total number of eligible signers. See Secretary of State, Statement of Vote, State of California, Consolidated Primary Election, June 6, 1972, pp. 3, 4-23. Appellees argue only that the independent candidate’s canvassing for signatures should await the announcement of the primary winners and the promulgation of party platforms so that the voters eligible to sign, i. e., those not voting in the primary, will have a meaningful choice between the primary nominations and the independents. This does not appear to be a matter particularly relevant to signing petitions for ballot position, for the meaningful choice referred to by appellees will be finally presented at the general election. It may help to put this case in proper context to hypothesize the scope of Hall’s petition and signature burden under the California law by employing the election statistics available from official sources in California. Assuming that the “entire vote” in the last general election was the total number of persons voting in the 1970 election, 6,633,400, 5% of that figure, or the total number of signatures required, is 331,670. See Secretary of State, Statement of Vote, General Election, November 7, 1972, p. 6. The total registration for the 1972 primary was 9,105,287. See 1972 Primary Vote, p. 3. Adding to this figure an estimate of the increase in registration since the primary date and subtracting the minimum partisan vote at the primary election, the available pool of possible signers, by this calculation, would be 4,072,279, see Secretary of State, Report of Registration, September 1972, p. 8, of which the required 331,670 signatures was 8.1%. The 1% registration requirement contemplates independent voters registering as affiliated with the party. The 10%-signature requirement,' on the other hand, need not involve signers changing their registration. Appellants also contend that § 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974) purports to establish an additional qualification for office of Representative and is invalid under Art. I, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution. The argument is wholly without merit. Storer and Frommhagen would not have been disqualified had they been nominated at a party primary or by an adequately supported independent petition and then elected at the general election. The non-affiliation requirement no more establishes an additional requirement for the office of Representative than the requirement that the candidate win the primary to secure a place on the general ballot or otherwise demonstrate substantial community support.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. If the case arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, note the source as "United States Supreme Court". If the case arose in a state court, note the source as "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", or "State Trial Court". Do not code the name of the state.
What is the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed?
[ "U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals", "U.S. Court of International Trade", "U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims", "U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces", "U.S. Court of Military Review", "U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals", "U.S. Customs Court", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit", "U.S. Tax Court", "Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals", "U.S. Court for China", "U.S. Consular Courts", "U.S. Commerce Court", "Territorial Supreme Court", "Territorial Appellate Court", "Territorial Trial Court", "Emergency Court of Appeals", "Supreme Court of the District of Columbia", "Bankruptcy Court", "U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)", "Alabama Middle U.S. District Court", "Alabama Northern U.S. District Court", "Alabama Southern U.S. District Court", "Alaska U.S. District Court", "Arizona U.S. District Court", "Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court", "Arkansas Western U.S. District Court", "California Central U.S. District Court", "California Eastern U.S. District Court", "California Northern U.S. District Court", "California Southern U.S. District Court", "Colorado U.S. District Court", "Connecticut U.S. District Court", "Delaware U.S. District Court", "District Of Columbia U.S. District Court", "Florida Middle U.S. District Court", "Florida Northern U.S. District Court", "Florida Southern U.S. District Court", "Georgia Middle U.S. District Court", "Georgia Northern U.S. District Court", "Georgia Southern U.S. District Court", "Guam U.S. District Court", "Hawaii U.S. District Court", "Idaho U.S. District Court", "Illinois Central U.S. District Court", "Illinois Northern U.S. District Court", "Illinois Southern U.S. District Court", "Indiana Northern U.S. District Court", "Indiana Southern U.S. District Court", "Iowa Northern U.S. District Court", "Iowa Southern U.S. District Court", "Kansas U.S. District Court", "Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court", "Kentucky Western U.S. District Court", "Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court", "Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court", "Louisiana Western U.S. District Court", "Maine U.S. District Court", "Maryland U.S. District Court", "Massachusetts U.S. District Court", "Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court", "Michigan Western U.S. District Court", "Minnesota U.S. District Court", "Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court", "Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court", "Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court", "Missouri Western U.S. District Court", "Montana U.S. District Court", "Nebraska U.S. District Court", "Nevada U.S. District Court", "New Hampshire U.S. District Court", "New Jersey U.S. District Court", "New Mexico U.S. District Court", "New York Eastern U.S. District Court", "New York Northern U.S. District Court", "New York Southern U.S. District Court", "New York Western U.S. District Court", "North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court", "North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court", "North Carolina Western U.S. District Court", "North Dakota U.S. District Court", "Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court", "Ohio Northern U.S. District Court", "Ohio Southern U.S. District Court", "Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court", "Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court", "Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court", "Oregon U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court", "Puerto Rico U.S. District Court", "Rhode Island U.S. District Court", "South Carolina U.S. District Court", "South Dakota U.S. District Court", "Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court", "Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court", "Tennessee Western U.S. District Court", "Texas Eastern U.S. District Court", "Texas Northern U.S. District Court", "Texas Southern U.S. District Court", "Texas Western U.S. District Court", "Utah U.S. District Court", "Vermont U.S. District Court", "Virgin Islands U.S. District Court", "Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court", "Virginia Western U.S. District Court", "Washington Eastern U.S. District Court", "Washington Western U.S. District Court", "West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court", "West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court", "Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court", "Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court", "Wyoming U.S. District Court", "Louisiana U.S. District Court", "Washington U.S. District Court", "West Virginia U.S. District Court", "Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court", "South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court", "South Carolina Western U.S. District Court", "Alabama U.S. District Court", "U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone", "Georgia U.S. District Court", "Illinois U.S. District Court", "Indiana U.S. District Court", "Iowa U.S. District Court", "Michigan U.S. District Court", "Mississippi U.S. District Court", "Missouri U.S. District Court", "New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)", "New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)", "New York U.S. District Court", "North Carolina U.S. District Court", "Ohio U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania U.S. District Court", "Tennessee U.S. District Court", "Texas U.S. District Court", "Virginia U.S. District Court", "Norfolk U.S. District Court", "Wisconsin U.S. District Court", "Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court", "New Jersey U.S. District Court", "California U.S. District Court", "Florida U.S. District Court", "Arkansas U.S. District Court", "District of Orleans U.S. District Court", "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", "State Trial Court", "Eastern Circuit (of the United States)", "Middle Circuit (of the United States)", "Southern Circuit (of the United States)", "Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama", "Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas", "California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California", "Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut", "Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware", "Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida", "Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia", "Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois", "Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana", "Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa", "Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas", "Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky", "Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana", "Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine", "Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland", "Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts", "Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan", "Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota", "Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi", "Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri", "Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada", "New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire", "New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey", "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York", "North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina", "Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio", "Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon", "Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania", "Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island", "South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina", "Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee", "Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas", "Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont", "Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia", "West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia", "Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin", "Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming", "Circuit Court of the District of Columbia", "Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska", "Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado", "Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington", "Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho", "Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana", "Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah", "South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota", "North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota", "Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma", "Court of Private Land Claims" ]
[ 40 ]
sc
RED LION BROADCASTING CO., INC., et al. v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION et al. No. 2. Argued April 2-3, 1969. Decided June 9, 1969. Roger Robb argued the cause for petitioners in No. 2. With him on the brief were H. Donald Kistler and Thomas B. Sweeney. Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for the United States and the Federal Communications Commission, petitioners in No. 717 and respondents in No. 2. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General McLaren, Deputy Solicitor General Springer, Francis X. Beytagh, Jr., Henry Getter, and Daniel R. Ohlbaum. Archibald Cox argued the cause for respondents in No. 717. With him on the brief for respondents Radio Television News Directors Assn, et al. were W. Theodore Pierson, Harold David Cohen, Vernon C. Kohlhaas, and J. Laurent ScharjJ. On the brief for respondent National Broadcasting Co., Inc., were Lawrence J. McKay, Raymond L. Falls, Jr., Corydon B. Dunham, Howard Mon-derer, and Abraham P. Ordover. On the brief for respondent Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., were Lloyd N. Cutler, J. Roger Wollenberg, Timothy B. Dyk, Robert V. Evans, and Herbert Wechsler. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in No. 717 and affirmance in No. 2 were filed by Melvin L. Wulf and Eleanor Holmes Norton for the American Civil Liberties Union, and by Earle K. Moore and William B. Ball for the Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ et al. J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and Thomas E. Harris filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor & Congress of Industrial Organizations urging reversal in No. 717. Together with No. 717, United States et al. v. Radio Television News Directors Assn. et al., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, argued April 3, 1969. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The Federal Communications Commission has for many years imposed on radio and television broadcasters the requirement that discussion of public issues be presented on broadcast stations, and that each side of those issues must be given fair coverage. This is known as the fairness doctrine, which originated very early in the history of broadcasting and has maintained its present outlines for some time. It is an obligation whose content has been defined in a long series of FCC rulings in particular cases, and which is distinct from the statutory requirement of § 315 of the Communications Act that equal time be allotted all qualified candidates for public office. Two aspects of the fairness doctrine, relating to personal attacks in the context of controversial public issues and to political editorializing, were codified more precisely in the form of FCC regulations in 1967. The two cases before us now, which were decided separately below, challenge the constitutional and statutory bases of the doctrine and component rules. Red Lion involves the application of the fairness doctrine to a particular broadcast, and RTNDA arises as an action to review the FCC’s 1967 promulgation of the personal attack and political editorializing regulations, which were laid down after the Red Lion litigation had begun. I. A. The Red Lion Broadcasting Company is licensed to operate a Pennsylvania radio station, WGCB. On November 27, 1964, WGCB carried a 15-minute broadcast by the Reverend Billy James Hargis as part of a “Christian Crusade” series. A book by Fred J. Cook entitled “Goldwater — Extremist on the Right” was discussed by Hargis, who said that Cook had been fired by a newspaper for making false charges against city officials; that Cook had then worked for a Communist-affiliated publication; that he had defended Alger Hiss and attacked J. Edgar Hoover and the Central Intelligence Agency; and that he had now written a “book to smear and destroy Barry Goldwater.” When Cook heard of the broadcast he concluded that he had been personally attacked and demanded free reply time, which the station refused. After an exchange of letters among Cook, Red Lion, and the FCC, the FCC declared that the Hargis broadcast constituted a personal attack on Cook; that Red Lion had failed to meet its obligation under the fairness doctrine as expressed in Times-Mirror Broadcasting Co., 24 P & F Radio Reg. 404 (1962), to send a tape, transcript, or summary of the broadcast to Cook and offer him reply time; and that the station must provide reply time whether or not Cook would pay for it. On review in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the FCC’s position was upheld as constitutional and otherwise proper. 127 U. S. App. D. C. 129, 381 F. 2d 908 (1967). B. Not long after the Red Lion litigation was begun, the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 31 Fed. Reg. 5710, with an eye to making the personal attack aspect of the fairness doctrine more precise and more readily enforceable, and to specifying its rules relating to political editorials. After considering written comments supporting and opposing the rules, the FCC adopted them substantially as proposed, 32 Fed. Reg. 10303. Twice amended, 32 Fed. Reg. 11531, 33 Fed. Reg. 5362, the rules were held unconstitutional in the RTNDA litigation by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, on review of the rule-making proceeding, as abridging the freedoms of speech and press. 400 F. 2d 1002 (1968). As they now stand amended, the regulations read as follows: “Personal attacks; political editorials. “(a) When, during the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public importance, an attack is made upon the honesty, character, integrity or like personal qualities of an identified person or group, the licensee shall, within a reasonable time and in no event later than 1 week after the attack, transmit to the person or group attacked (1) notification of the date, time and identification of the broadcast; (2) a script or tape (or an accurate summary if a script or tape is not available) of the attack; and (3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity to respond over the licensee’s facilities. “(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall not be applicable (1) to attacks on foreign groups or foreign public figures; (2) to personal attacks which are made by legally qualified candidates, their authorized spokesmen, or those associated with them in the campaign, on other such candidates, their authorized spokesmen, or persons associated with the candidates in the campaign; and (3) to bona fide newscasts, bona fide news interviews, and on-the-spot coverage of a bona fide news event (including commentary or analysis contained in the foregoing programs, but the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall be applicable to editorials of the licensee). “Note: The fairness doctrine is applicable to situations coming within [ (3)], above, and, in a specific factual situation, may be applicable in the general area of political broadcasts [(2)], above. See, section 315 fa) of the Act, 47 U. S. C. 315 (a); Public Notice: Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Dandling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance. 29 F. R. 10415. The categories listed in [(3)] are the same as those specified in section 315 (a) of the Act. “(c) Where a licensee, in an editorial, (i) endorses or (ii) opposes a legally qualified candidate or candidates, the licensee shall, within 24 hours after the editorial, transmit to respectively (i) the other qualified candidate or candidates for the same office or (ii) the candidate opposed in the editorial (1) notification of the date and the time of the editorial; (2) a script or tape of the editorial; and (3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity for a candidate or a spokesman of the candidate to respond over the licensee’s facilities: Provided, however, That where such editorials are broadcast within 72 hours prior to the day of the election, the licensee shall comply with the provisions of this paragraph sufficiently far in advance of the broadcast to enable the candidate or candidates to have a reasonable opportunity to prepare a response and to present it in a timely fashion.” 47 CFR §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.598, 73.679 (all identical). C. Believing that the specific application of the fairness doctrine in Red Lion, and the promulgation of the regulations in RTNDA, are both authorized by Congress and enhance rather than abridge the freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment, we hold them valid and constitutional, reversing the judgment below in RTNDA and affirming the judgment below in Red Lion. II. The history of the emergence of the fairness doctrine and of the related legislation shows that the Commission’s action in the Red Lion case did not exceed its authority, and that in adopting the new regulations the Commission was implementing congressional policy rather than embarking on a frolic of its own. A. Before 1927, the allocation of frequencies was left entirely to the private sector, and the result was chaos. It quickly became apparent that broadcast frequencies constituted a scarce resource whose use could be regulated and rationalized only by the Government. Without government control, the medium would be of little use because of the cacaphony of competing voices, none of which could be clearly and predictably heard. Consequently, the Federal Radio Commission was established to allocate frequencies among competing applicants in a manner responsive to the public “convenience, interest, or necessity.” Very shortly thereafter the Commission expressed its view that the “public interest requires ample play for the free and fair competition of opposing views, and the commission believes that the principle applies ... to all discussions of issues of importance to the public.” Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F. R. C. Ann. Rep. 32, 33 (1929), rev’d on other grounds, 59 App. D. C. 197, 37 F. 2d 993, cert. dismissed, 281 U. S. 706 (1930). This doctrine was applied through denial of license renewals or construction permits, both by the FRC, Trinity Methodist Church, South v. FRC, 61 App. D. C. 311, 62 F. 2d 850 (1932), cert. denied, 288 U. S. 599 (1933), and its successor FCC, Young People’s Association for the Propagation of the Gospel, 6 F. C. C. 178 (1938). After an extended period during which the licensee was obliged not only to cover and to cover fairly the views of others, but also to refrain from expressing his own personal views, Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F. C. C. 333 (1940), the latter limitation on the licensee was abandoned and the doctrine developed into its present form. There is a twofold duty laid down by the FCC’s decisions and described by the 1949 Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F. C. C. 1246 (1949). The broadcaster must give adequate coverage to public issues, United Broadcasting Co., 10 F. C. C. 515 (1945), and coverage must be fair in that it accurately reflects the opposing views. New Broadcasting Co., 6 P & F Radio Reg. 258 (1950). This must be done at the broadcaster’s own expense if sponsorship is unavailable. Cullman Broadcasting Co., 25 P & F Radio Reg. 895 (1963). Moreover, the duty must be met by programming obtained at the licensee’s own initiative if available from no other source. John J. Dempsey, 6 P & F Radio Reg. 615 (1950); see Metropolitan Broadcasting Corp., 19 P & F Radio Reg. 602 (1960); The Evening News Assn., 6 P & F Radio Reg. 283 (1950). The Federal Radio Commission had imposed these two basic duties on broadcasters since the outset, Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F. R. C. Ann. Rep. 32 (1929), rev’d on other grounds, 59 App. D. C. 197, 37 F. 2d 993, cert. dismissed, 281 U. S. 706 (1930); Chicago Federation of Labor v. FRC, 3 F. R. C. Ann. Rep. 36 (1929), aff’d, 59 App. D. C. 333, 41 F. 2d 422 (1930); KFKB Broadcasting Assn. v. FRC, 60 App. D. C. 79, 47 F. 2d 670 (1931), and in particular respects the personal attack rules and regulations at issue here have spelled them out in greater detail. When a personal attack has been made on a figure involved in a public issue, both the doctrine of cases such as Red Lion and Times-Mirror Broadcasting Co., 24 P & F Radio Reg. 404 (1962), and also the 1967 regulations at issue in RTNDA require that the individual attacked himself be offered an opportunity to respond. Likewise, where one candidate is endorsed in a political editorial, the other candidates must themselves be offered reply time to use personally or through a spokesman. These obligations differ from the general fairness requirement that issues be presented, and presented with coverage of competing views, in that the broadcaster does not have the option of presenting the attacked party’s side himself or choosing a third party to represent that side. But insofar as there is an obligation of the broadcaster to see that both sides are presented, and insofar as that is an affirmative obligation, the personal attack doctrine and regulations do not differ from the preceding fairness doctrine. The simple fact that the attacked men or unen-dorsed candidates may respond themselves or through agents is not a critical distinction, and indeed, it is not unreasonable for the FCC to conclude that the objective of adequate presentation of all sides may best be served by allowing those most closely affected to make the response, rather than leaving the response in the hands of the station which has attacked their candidacies, endorsed their opponents, or carried a personal attack upon them. B. The statutory authority of the FCC to promulgate these regulations derives from the mandate to the “Commission from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires” to promulgate “such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions ... as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter . . . .” 47 U. S. C. § 303 and § 303 (r) . The Commission is specifically directed to consider the demands of the public interest in the course of granting licenses, 47 U. S. C. §§ 307 (a), 309 (a); renewing them, 47 U. S. C. § 307; and modifying them. Ibid. Moreover, the FCC has included among the conditions of the Red Lion license itself the requirement that operation of the station be carried out in the public interest, 47 U. S. C. § 309 (h). This mandate to the FCC to assure that broadcasters operate in the public interest is a broad one, a power “not niggardly but expansive,” National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 219 (1943), whose validity we have long upheld. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 138 (1940); FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U. S. 86, 90 (1963); FRC v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 266, 285 (1933). It is broad enough to encompass these regulations. The fairness doctrine finds specific recognition in statutory form, is in part modeled on explicit statutory provisions relating to political candidates, and is approvingly reflected in legislative history. In 1959 the Congress amended the statutory requirement of § 315 that equal time be accorded each political candidate to except certain appearances on news programs, but added that this constituted no exception “from the obligation imposed upon them under this Act to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance.” Act of September 14, 1959, § 1, 73 Stat. 557, amending 47 U. S. C. § 315 (a) (emphasis added). This language makes it very plain that Congress, in 1959, announced that the phrase “public interest,” which had been in the Act since 1927, imposed a duty on broadcasters to discuss both sides of controversial public issues. In other words, the amendment vindicated the FCC’s general view that the fairness doctrine inhered in the public interest standard. Subsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight in statutory construction. And here this principle is given special force by the equally venerable principle that the construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong, especially when Congress has refused to alter the administrative construction. Here, the Congress has not just kept its silence by refusing to overturn the administrative construction, but has ratified it with positive legislation. Thirty years of consistent administrative construction left undisturbed by Congress until 1959, when that construction was expressly accepted, reinforce the natural conclusion that the public interest language of the Act authorized the Commission to require licensees to use their stations for discussion of public issues, and that the FCC is free to implement this requirement by reasonable rules and regulations which fall short of abridgment of the freedom of speech and press, and of the censorship proscribed by § 326 of the Act. The objectives of § 315 themselves could readily be circumvented but for the complementary fairness doctrine ratified by § 315. The section applies only to campaign appearances by candidates, and not by family, friends, campaign managers, or other supporters. Without the fairness doctrine, then, a licensee could ban all campaign appearances by candidates themselves from the air and proceed to deliver over his station entirely to the supporters of one slate of candidates, to the exclusion of all others. In this way the broadcaster could have a far greater impact on the favored candidacy than he could by simply allowing a spot appearance by the candidate himself. It is the fairness doctrine as an aspect of the obligation to operate in the public interest, rather than §315, which prohibits the broadcaster from taking such a step. The legislative history reinforces this view of the effect of the 1959 amendment. Even before the language relevant here was added, the Senate report on amending § 315 noted that “broadcast frequencies are limited and, therefore, they have been necessarily considered a public trust. Every licensee who is fortunate in obtaining a license is mandated to operate in the public interest and has assumed the obligation of presenting important public questions fairly and without bias.” S. Rep. No. 562, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 8-9 (1959). See also, specifically adverting to Federal Communications Commission doctrine, id., at 13. Rather than leave this approval solely in the legislative history, Senator Proxmire suggested an amendment to make it part of the Act. 105 Cong. Rec. 14457. This amendment, which Senator Pastore, a manager of the bill and a ranking member of the Senate Committee, considered “rather surplusage,” 105 Cong. Rec. 14462, constituted a positive statement of doctrine and was altered to the present merely approving language in the conference committee. In explaining the language to the Senate after the committee changes, Senator Pastore said: “We insisted that that provision remain in the bill, to be a continuing reminder and admonition to the Federal Communications Commission and to the broadcasters alike, that we were not abandoning the philosophy that gave birth to section 315, in giving the people the right to have a full and complete disclosure of conflicting views on news of interest to the people of the country.” 105 Cong. Rec. 17830. Senator Scott, another Senate manager, added that: “It is intended to encompass all legitimate areas of public importance which are controversial,” not just politics. 105 Cong. Rec. 17831. It is true that the personal attack aspect of the fairness doctrine was not actually adjudicated until after 1959, so that Congress then did not have those rules specifically before it. However, the obligation to offer time to reply to a personal attack was presaged by the FCC’s 1949 Report on Editorializing, which the FCC views as the principal summary of its ratio decidendi in cases in this area: “In determining whether to honor specific requests for time, the station will inevitably be confronted with such questions as . . . whether there may not be other available groups or individuals who might be more appropriate spokesmen for the particular point of view than the person making the request. The latter’s personal involvement in the controversy may also be a factor which must be considered, for elementary considerations of fairness may dictate that time be allocated to a person or group which has been specifically attacked over the station, where otherwise no such obligation would exist.” 13 F. C. C., at 1251-1252. When the Congress ratified the FCC’s implication of a fairness doctrine in 1959 it did not, of course, approve every past decision or pronouncement by the Commission on this subject, or give it a completely free hand for the future. The statutory authority does not go so far. But we cannot say that when a station publishes personal attacks or endorses political candidates, it is a misconstruction of the public interest standard to require the station to offer time for a response rather than to leave the response entirely within the control of the station which has attacked either the candidacies or the men who wish to reply in their own defense. When a broadcaster grants time to a political candidate, Congress itself requires that equal time be offered to his opponents. It would exceed our competence to hold that the Commission is unauthorized by the statute to employ a similar device where personal attacks or political editorials are broadcast by a radio or television station. In light of the fact that the “public interest” in broadcasting clearly encompasses the presentation of vigorous debate of controversial issues of importance and concern to the public; the fact that the FCC has rested upon that language from, its very inception a doctrine that these issues must be discussed, and fairly; and the fact that Congress has acknowledged that the analogous provisions of § 315 are not preclusive in this area, and knowingly preserved the FCC’s complementary efforts, we think the fairness doctrine and its component personal attack and political editorializing regulations are a legitimate exercise of congressionally delegated authority. The Communications Act is not notable for the precision of its substantive standards and in this respect the explicit provisions of § 315, and the doctrine and rules at issue here which are closely modeled upon that section, are far more explicit than the generalized “public interest” standard in which the Commission ordinarily finds its sole guidance, and which we have held a broad but adequate standard before. FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U. S. 86, 90 (1953); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 216-217 (1943) ; FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 138 (1940); FRC v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 266, 285 (1933). We cannot say that the FCC’s declaratory ruling in Red Lion, or the regulations at issue in RTNDA, are beyond the scope of the con-gressionally conferred power to assure that stations are operated by those whose possession of a license serves “the public interest.” III. The broadcasters challenge the fairness doctrine and its specific manifestations in the personal attack and political editorial rules on conventional First Amendment grounds, alleging that the rules abridge their freedom of speech and press. Their contention is that the First Amendment protects their desire to use their allotted frequencies continuously to broadcast whatever they choose, and to exclude whomever they choose from ever using that frequency. No man may be prevented from saying or publishing what he thinks, or from refusing in his speech or other utterances to give equal weight to the views of his opponents. This right, they say, applies equally to broadcasters. A. Although broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by a First Amendment interest, United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U. S. 131, 166 (1948), differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 503 (1952). For example, the ability of new technology to produce sounds more raucous than those of the human voice justifies restrictions on the sound level, and on the hours and places of use, of sound trucks so long as the restrictions are reasonable and applied without discrimination. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949). Just as the Government may limit the use of sound-amplifying equipment potentially so noisy that it drowns out civilized private speech, so may the Government limit the use of broadcast equipment. The right of free speech of a broadcaster, the user of a sound truck, or any other individual does not embrace a right to snuff out the free speech of others. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1, 20 (1945). When two people converse face to face, both should not speak at once if either is to be clearly understood. But the range of the human voice is so limited that there could be meaningful communications if half the people in the United States were talking and the other half listening. Just as clearly, half the people might publish and the other half read. But the reach of radio signals is incomparably greater than the range of the human voice and the problem of interference is a massive reality. The lack of know-how and equipment may keep many from the air, but only a tiny fraction of those with resources and intelligence can hope to communicate by radio at the same time if intelligible communication is to be had, even if the entire radio spectrum is utilized in the present state of commercially acceptable technology. It was this fact, and the chaos which ensued from permitting anyone to use any frequency at whatever power level he wished, which made necessary the enactment of the Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934, as the Court has noted at length before. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 210-214 (1943). It was this reality which at the very least necessitated first the division of the radio spectrum into portions reserved respectively for public broadcasting and for other important radio uses such as amateur operation, aircraft, police, defense, and navigation; and then the subdivision of each portion, and assignment of specific frequencies to individual users or groups of users. Beyond this, however, because the frequencies reserved for public broadcasting were limited in number, it was essential for the Government to tell some applicants that they could not broadcast at all because there was room for only a few. Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish. If 100 persons want broadcast licenses but there are only 10 frequencies to allocate, all of them may have the same “right” to a license; but if there is to be any effective communication by radio, only a few can be licensed and the rest must be barred from the airwaves. It would be strange if the First Amendment, aimed at protecting and furthering communications, prevented the Government from making radio communication possible by requiring licenses to broadcast and by limiting the number of licenses so as not to overcrowd the spectrum. This has been the consistent view of the Court. Congress unquestionably has the power to grant and deny licenses and to eliminate existing stations. FRC v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 266 (1933). No one has a First Amendment right to a license or to monopolize a radio frequency; to deny a station license because “the public interest” requires it “is not a denial of free speech.” National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 227 (1943). By the same token, as far as the First Amendment is concerned those who are licensed stand no better than those to whom licenses are refused. A license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional right to be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are representative of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves. This is not to say that the First Amendment is irrelevant to public broadcasting. On the contrary, it has a major role to play as the Congress itself recognized in § 326, which forbids FCC interference with “the right of free speech by means of radio communication.” Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be expressed on this unique medium. But the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470, 475 (1940); FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U. S. 358, 361-362 (1955); 2 Z. Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 546 (1947). It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1, 20 (1945); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964); Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). “[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 74-75 (1964). See Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1965). It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC. B. Rather than confer frequency monopolies on a relatively small number of licensees, in a Nation of 200,-000,000, the Government could surely have decreed that each frequency should be shared among all or some of those who wish to use it, each being assigned a portion of the broadcast day or the broadcast week. The ruling and regulations at issue here do not go quite so far. They assert that under specified circumstances, a licensee must offer to make available a reasonable amount of broadcast time to those who have a view different from that which has already been expressed on his station. The expression of a political endorsement, or of a personal attack while dealing with a controversial public issue, simply triggers this time sharing. As we have said, the First Amendment confers no right on licensees to prevent others from broadcasting on “their” frequencies and no right to an unconditional monopoly of a scarce resource which the Government has denied others the right to use. In terms of constitutional principle, and as enforced sharing of a scarce resource, the personal attack and political editorial rules are indistinguishable from the equal-time provision of § 315, a specific enactment of Congress requiring stations to set aside reply time under specified circumstances and to which the fairness doctrine and these constituent regulations are important complements. That provision, which has been part of the law since 1927, Radio Act of 1927, § 18, 44 Stat. 1170, has been held valid by this Court as an obligation of the licensee relieving him of any power in any way to prevent or censor the broadcast, and thus insulating him from liability for defamation. The constitutionality of the statute under the First Amendment was unquestioned. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, 360 U. S. 525 (1959). Nor can we say that it is inconsistent with the First Amendment goal of producing an informed public capable of conducting its own affairs to require a broadcaster to permit answers to personal attacks occurring in the course of discussing controversial issues, or to require that the political opponents of those endorsed by the station be given a chance to communicate with the public. Otherwise, station owners and a few networks would have unfettered power to make time available only to the highest bidders, to communicate only their own views on public issues, people and candidates, and to permit on the air only those with whom they agreed. There is no sanctuary in the First Amendment for unlimited private censorship operating in a medium not open to all. “Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests.” Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1, 20 (1945). C. It is strenuously argued, however, that if political editorials or personal attacks will trigger an obligation in broadcasters to afford the opportunity for expression to speakers who need not pay for time and whose views are unpalatable to the licensees, then broadcasters will be irresistibly forced to self-censorship and their coverage of controversial public issues will be eliminated or at least rendered wholly ineffective. Such a result would indeed be a serious matter, for should licensees actually eliminate their coverage of controversial issues, the purposes of the doctrine would be stifled. At this point, however, as the Federal Communications Commission has indicated, that possibility is at best speculative. The communications industry, and in particular the networks, have taken pains to present controversial issues in the past, and even now they do not assert that they intend to abandon their efforts in this regard. It would be better if the FCC’s encouragement were never necessary to induce the broadcasters to meet their responsibility. And if experience with the administration of these doctrines indicates that they have the net effect of reducing rather than enhancing the volume and quality of coverage, there will be time enough to reconsider the constitutional implications. The fairness doctrine in the past has had no such overall effect. That this will occur now seems unlikely, however, since if present licensees should suddenly prove timorous, the Commission is not powerless to insist that they give adequate and fair attention to public issues. It does not violate the First Amendment to treat licensees given the privilege of using scarce radio frequencies as proxies for the entire community, obligated to give suitable time and attention to matters of great public concern. To condition the granting or renewal of licenses on a willingness to present representative community views on controversial issues is consistent with the ends and purposes of those constitutional provisions forbidding the abridgment of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Congress need not stand idly by and permit those with licenses to ignore the problems which beset the people or to exclude from the airways anything but their own views of fundamental questions. The statute, long administrative practice, and cases are to this effect. Licenses to broadcast do not confer ownership of designated frequencies, but only the temporary privilege of using them. 47 U. S. C. § 301. Unless renewed, they expire within three years. 47 U. S. C. § 307 (d). The statute mandates the issuance of licenses if the “public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served thereby.” 47 U. S. C. § 307 (a). In applying this standard the Commission for 40 years has been choosing licensees based in part on their program proposals. In FRC v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 266, 279 (1933), the Court noted that in “view of the limited number of available broadcasting frequencies, the Congress has authorized allocation and licenses.” In determining how best to allocate frequencies, the Federal Radio Commission considered the needs of competing communities and the programs offered by competing stations to meet those needs; moreover, if needs or programs shifted, the Commission could alter its allocations to reflect those shifts. Id., at 286. In the same vein, in FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 137-138 (1940), the Court noted that the statutory standard was a supple instrument to effect congressional desires “to maintain ... a grip on the dynamic aspects of radio transmission” and to allay fears that “in the absence of governmental control the public interest might be subordinated to monopolistic domination in the broadcasting field.” Three years later the Court considered the validity of the Commission’s chain broadcasting regulations, which among other things forbade stations from devoting too much time to network programs in order that there be suitable opportunity for local programs serving local needs. The Court upheld the regulations, unequivocally recognizing that the Commission was more than a traffic policeman concerned with the technical aspects of broadcasting and that it neither exceeded its powers under the statute nor transgressed the First Amendment in interesting itself in general program format and the kinds of programs broadcast by licensees. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190 (1943). D. The litigants embellish their First Amendment arguments with the contention that the regulations are so vague that their duties are impossible to discern. Of this point it is enough to say that, judging the validity of the regulations on their face as they are presented here, we cannot conclude that the FCC has been left a free hand to vindicate its own idiosyncratic conception of the public interest or of the requirements of free speech. Past adjudications by the FCC give added precision to the regulations; there was nothing vague about the FCC’s specific ruling in Red Lion that Fred Cook should be provided an opportunity to reply. The regulations at issue in RTNDA could be employed in precisely the same way as the fairness doctrine was in Red Lion. Moreover, the FCC itself has recognized that the applicability of its regulations to situations beyond the scope of past cases may be questionable, 32 Fed. Reg. 10303, 10304 and n. 6, and will not impose sanctions in such cases without warning. We need not approve every aspect of the fairness doctrine to decide these cases, and we will not now pass upon the constitutionality of these regulations by envisioning the most extreme applications conceivable, United States v. Sullivan, 332 U. S. 689, 694 (1948), but will deal with those problems if and when they arise. We need not and do not now ratify every past and future decision by the FCC with regard to programming. There is no question here of the Commission’s refusal to permit the broadcaster to carry a particular program or to publish his own views; of a discriminatory refusal to require the licensee to broadcast certain views which have been denied access to the airwaves; of government censorship of a particular program contrary to § 326; or of the official government view dominating public broadcasting. Such questions would raise more serious First Amendment issues. But we do hold that the Congress and the Commission do not violate the First Amendment when they require a radio or television station to give reply time to answer personal attacks and political editorials. E. It is argued that even if at one time the lack of available frequencies for all who wished to use them justified the Government’s choice of those who would best serve the public interest by acting as proxy for those who would present differing views, or by giving the latter access directly to broadcast facilities, this condition no longer prevails so that continuing control is not justified. To this there are several answers. Scarcity is not entirely a thing of the past. Advances in technology, such as microwave transmission, have led to more efficient utilization of the frequency spectrum, but uses for that spectrum have also grown apace. Portions of the spectrum must be reserved for vital uses unconnected with human communication, such as radio-navigational aids used by aircraft and vessels. Conflicts have even emerged between such vital functions as defense preparedness and experimentation in methods of averting midair collisions through radio warning devices. “Land mobile services” such as police, ambulance, fire department, public utility, and other communications systems have been occupying an increasingly crowded portion of the frequency spectrum and there are, apart from licensed amateur radio operators’ equipment, 5,000,000 transmitters operated on the “citizens’ band” which is also increasingly congested. Among the various uses for radio frequency space, including marine, aviation, amateur, military, and common carrier users, there are easily enough claimants to permit use of the whole with an even smaller allocation to broadcast radio and television uses than now exists. Comparative hearings between competing applicants for broadcast spectrum space are by no means a thing of the past. The radio spectrum has become so congested that at times it has been necessary to suspend new applications. The very high frequency television spectrum is, in the country’s major markets, almost entirely occupied, although space reserved for ultra high frequency television transmission, which is a relatively recent development as a commercially viable alternative, has not yet been completely filled. The rapidity with which technological advances succeed one another to create more efficient use of spectrum space on the one hand, and to create new uses for that space by ever growing numbers of people on the other, makes it unwise to speculate on the future allocation of that space. It is enough to say that the resource is one of considerable and growing importance whose scarcity impelled its regulation by an agency authorized by Congress. Nothing in this record, or in our own researches, convinces us that the resource is no longer one for which there are more immediate and potential uses than can be accommodated, and for which wise planning is essential. This does not mean, of course, that every possible wavelength must be occupied at every hour by some vital use in order to sustain the congressional judgment. The substantial capital investment required for many uses, in addition to the potentiality for confusion and interference inherent in any scheme for continuous kaleidoscopic reallocation of all available space may make this unfeasible. The allocation need not be made at such a breakneck pace that the objectives of the allocation are themselves imperiled. Even where there are gaps in spectrum utilization, the fact remains that existing broadcasters have often attained their present position because of their initial government selection in competition with others before new technological advances opened new opportunities for further uses. Long experience in broadcasting, confirmed habits of listeners and viewers, network affiliation, and other advantages in program procurement give existing broadcasters a substantial advantage over new entrants, even where new entry is technologically possible. These advantages are the fruit of a preferred position conferred by the Government. Some present possibility for new entry by competing stations is not enough, in itself, to render unconstitutional the Government’s effort to assure that a broadcaster’s programming ranges widely enough to serve the public interest. In view of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, the Government’s role in allocating those frequencies, and the legitimate claims of those unable without governmental assistance to gain access to those frequencies for expression of their views, we hold the regulations and ruling at issue here are both authorized by statute and constitutional. The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Red Lion is affirmed and that in RTNDA reversed and the causes remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Not having heard oral argument in these cases, Me. Justice Douglas took no part in the Court’s decision. Communications Act of 1934, Tit. Ill, 48 Stat. 1081, as amended, 47 U. S. C. § 301 et seq. Section 315 now reads: “315. Candidates for public office; facilities; rules. “(a) If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station: Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this section. No obligation is imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate. Appearance by a legally qualified candidate on any— “(1) bona fide newscast, “(2) bona fide news interview, “(3) bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the candidate is incidental to the presentation of the subject or subjects covered by the news documentary), or “(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including but not limited to political conventions and activities incidental thereto), shall not be deemed to be use of a broadcasting station within the meaning of this subsection. Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in connection with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them under this chapter to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance. “(b) The charges made for the use of any broadcasting station for any of the purposes set forth in this section shall not exceed the charges made for comparable use of such station for other purposes. “(e) The Commission shall prescribe appropriate rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this section.” According to the record, Hargis asserted that his broadcast included the following statement: “Now, this paperback book by Fred J. Cook is entitled, ‘GOLDWATER — EXTREMIST ON THE RIGHT.’ Who is Cook? Cook was fired from the New York World Telegram after he made a false charge publicly on television against an un-named official of the New York City government. New York publishers and NEWSWEEK Magazine for December 7, 1959, showed that Fred Cook and his pal, Eugene Gleason, had made up the whole story and this confession was made to New York District Attorney, Frank Hogan. After losing his job, Cook went to work for the left-wing publication, THE NATION, one of the most scurrilous publications of the left which has championed many communist causes over many years. Its editor, Carry McWilliams, has been affiliated with many communist enterprises, scores of which have been cited as subversive by the Attorney General of the U. S. or by other government agencies .... Now, among other things Fred Cook wrote for THE NATION, was an article absolving Alger Hiss of any wrong doing . . . there was a 208 page attack on the FBI and J. Edgar Hoover; another attack by Mr. Cook was on the Central Intelligence Agency . . . now this is the man who wrote the book to smear and destroy Barry Goldwater called ‘Barry Goldwater — Extremist Of The Right!’ ” The Court of Appeals initially dismissed the petition for want of a reviewable order, later reversing itself en banc upon argument by the Government that the FCC rule used here, which permits it to issue “a declaratory ruling terminating a controversy or removing uncertainty,” 47 CFR § 1.2, was in fact justified by the Administrative Procedure Act. That Act permits an adjudicating agency, “in its sound discretion, with like effect as in the case of other orders, to issue a declaratory order to terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty.” § 5, 60 Stat. 239, 5 U. S. C. § 1004 (d). In this case, the FCC could have determined the question of Red Lion’s liability to a cease-and-desist order or license revocation, 47 U. S. C. § 312, for failure to comply with the license’s condition that the station be operated “in the public interest,” or for failure to obey a requirement of operation in the public interest implicit in the ability of the FCC to revoke licenses for conditions justifying the denial of an initial license, 47 U. S. C. § 312 (a) (2), and the statutory requirement that the public interest be served in granting and renewing licenses, 47 U. S. C. §§307 (a), (d). Since the FCC could have adjudicated these questions it could, under the Administrative Procedure Act, have issued a declaratory order in the course of its adjudication which would have been subject to judicial review. Although the FCC did not comply with all of the formalities for an adjudicative proceeding in this case, the petitioner itself adopted as its own the Government’s position that this was a reviewable order, waiving any objection it might have had to the procedure of the adjudication. Because of this chaos, a series of National Radio Conferences was held between 1922 and 1925, at which it was resolved that regulation of the radio spectrum by the Federal Government was essential and that regulatory power should be utilized to ensure that allocation of this limited resource would be made only to those who would serve the public interest. The 1923 Conference expressed the opinion that the Radio Communications Act of 1912, 37 Stat. 302, conferred upon the Secretary of Commerce the power to regulate frequencies and hours of operation, but when Secretary Hoover sought to implement this claimed power by penalizing the Zenith Radio Corporation for operating on an unauthorized frequency, the 1912 Act was held not to permit enforcement. United States v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 12 F. 2d 614 (D. C. N. D. Ill. 1926). Cf. Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 52 App. D. C. 339, 286 F. 1003 (1923) (Secretary had no power to deny licenses, but was empowered to assign frequencies). An opinion issued by the Attorney General at Hoover’s request confirmed the impotence of the Secretary under the 1912 Act. 35 Op. Atty. Gen. 126 (1926). Hoover thereafter appealed to the radio industry to regulate itself, but his appeal went largely unheeded. See generally L. Schmeckebier, The Federal Radio Commission 1-14 (1932). Congressman White, a sponsor of the bill enacted as the Radio Act of 1927, commented upon the need for new legislation: “We have reached the definite conclusion that the right of all our people to enjoy this means of communication can be preserved only by the repudiation of the idea underlying the 1912 law that anyone who will may transmit and by the assertion in its stead of the doctrine that the right of the public to service is superior to the right of any individual .... The recent radio conference met this issue squarely. It recognized that in the present state of scientific development there must be a limitation upon the number of broadcasting stations and it recommended that licenses should be issued only to those stations whose operation would render a benefit to the public, are necessary in the public interest, or would contribute to the development of the art. This principle was approved by every witness before your committee. We have written it into the bill. If enacted into law, the broadcasting privilege will not be a right of selfishness. It will rest upon an assurance of public interest to be served.” 67 Cong. Rec. 5479. Radio Act of 1927, § 4, 44 Stat. 1163. See generally Davis, The Radio Act of 1927, 13 Va. L. Rev. 611 (1927). As early as 1930, Senator Dill expressed the view that the Federal Radio Commission had the power to make regulations requiring a licensee to afford an opportunity for presentation of the other side on “public questions.” Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 6, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 1616 (1930): “Senator Dill. Then you are suggesting that the provision of the statute that now requires a station to give equal opportunity to candidates for office shall be applied to all public questions? “Commissioner Robinson. Of course, I think in the legal concept the law requires it now. I do not see that there is any need to legislate about it. It will evolve one of these days. Somebody will go into court and say, ‘I am entitled to this opportunity,’ and he will get it. “Senator Dill.' Has the Commission considered the question of making regulations requiring the stations to do that? “Commissioner Robinson. Oh, no. “Senator Dill. It would be within the power of the commission, I think, to make regulations on that subject.” Federal Housing Administration v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U. S. 84, 90 (1958); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, 541 (1962) (opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Stewart). This principle is a venerable one. Alexander v. Alexandria, 5 Cranch 1 (1809); United States v. Freeman, 3 How. 556 (1845); Stockdale v. The Insurance Companies, 20 Wall. 323 (1874). Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 11-12 (1965); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16-18 (1965); Commissioner v. Sternberger’s Estate, 348 U. S. 187, 199 (1955); Hastings & D. R. Co. v. Whitney, 132 U. S. 357, 366 (1889); United States v. Burlington & Missouri River R. Co., 98 U. S. 334, 341 (1879); United States v. Alexander, 12 Wall. 177, 179-181 (1871); Surgett v. Lapice, 8 How. 48, 68 (1850). Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 11-12 (1965); United States v. Bergh, 352 U. S. 40, 46-47 (1956); Alstate Construction Co. v. Durkin, 345 U. S. 13, 16-17 (1953); Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U. S. 341, 345 (1932). An attempt to limit sharply the FCC’s power to interfere with programming practices failed to emerge from Committee in 1943. S. 814, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943). See Hearings on S. 814 before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943). Also, attempts specifically to enact the doctrine failed in the Radio Act of 1927, 67 Cong. Ree. 12505 (1926) (agreeing to amendment proposed by Senator Dill eliminating coverage of “question affecting the public”), and a similar proposal in the Communications Act of 1934 was accepted by the Senate, 78 Cong. Rec. 8854 (1934); see S. Rep. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1934), but was not included in the bill reported by the House Committee, see H. R. Rep. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). The attempt which came nearest success was a bill, H. R. 7716, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), passed by Congress but pocket-vetoed by the President in 1933, which would have extended “equal opportunities” whenever a public question was to be voted on at an election or by a government agency. H. R. Rep. No. 2106, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1933). In any event, unsuccessful attempts at legislation are not the best of guides to legislative intent. Fogarty v. United States, 340 U. S. 8, 13-14 (1950); United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 281-282 (1947). A review of some of the legislative history over the years, drawing a somewhat different conclusion, is found in Staff Study of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Legislative History of the Fairness Doctrine, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print. 1968). This inconclusive history was, of course, superseded by the specific statutory language added in 1959. “§ 326. Censorship. “Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio communication.” John P. Crommelin, 19 P & F Radio Reg. 1392 (1960). The Proxmire amendment read: “[B]ut nothing in this sentence shall be construed as changing the basic intent of Congress with respect to the provisions of this act, which recognizes that television and radio frequencies are in the public domain, that the license to operate in such frequencies requires operation in the public interest, and that in newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries, on-the-spot coverage of news events, and panel discussions, all sides of public controversies shall be given as equal an opportunity to be heard as is practically possible.” 105 Cong. Rec. 14457. The general problems raised by a technology which supplants atomized, relatively informal communication with mass media as a prime source of national cohesion and news were discussed at considerable length by Zechariah Chafee in Government and Mass Communications (1947). Debate on the particular implications of this view for the broadcasting industry has continued unabated. A compendium of views appears in Freedom and Responsibility in Broadcasting (J. Coons ed.) (1961). See also Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. Law & Econ. 15 (1967); M. Ernst, The First Freedom 125-180 (1946); T. Robinson, Radio Networks and the Federal Government, especially at 75-87 (1943). The considerations which the newest technology brings to bear on the particular problem of this litigation are concisely explored by Louis Jaffe in The Fairness Doctrine, Equal Time, Reply to Personal Attacks, and the Local Service Obligation; Implications of Technological Change, Printed for Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (1968). The range of controls which have in fact been imposed over the last 40 years, without giving rise to successful constitutional challenge in this Court, is discussed in W. Emery, Broadcasting and Government: Responsibilities and Regulations (1961); Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 701 (1964). This has not prevented vigorous argument from developing on the constitutionality of the ancillary FCC doctrines. Compare Barrow, The Equal Opportunities and Fairness Doctrines in Broadcasting: Pillars in the Forum of Democracy, 37 U. Cin. L. Rev. 447 (1968), with Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 Minn. L. Rev. 67 (1967), and Sullivan, Editorials and Controversy: The Broadcaster’s Dilemma, 32 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 719 (1964). The expression of views opposing those which broadcasters permit to be aired in the first place need not be confined solely to the broadcasters themselves as proxies. “Nor is it enough that he should hear the arguments of adversaries from his own teachers, presented as they state them, and accompanied by what they offer as refutations. That is not the way to do justice to the arguments, or bring them into real contact with his own mind. He must be able to hear them from persons who actually believe them; who defend them in earnest, and do their very utmost for them.” J. Mill, On Liberty 32 (R. McCallum ed. 1947). The President of the Columbia Broadcasting System has recently declared that despite the Government, “we are determined to continue covering controversial issues as a public service, and exercising our own independent news judgment and enterprise. I, for one, refuse to allow that judgment and enterprise to be affected by official intimidation.” F. Stanton, Keynote Address, Sigma Delta Chi National Convention, Atlanta, Georgia, November 21, 1968. Problems of news coverage from the broadcaster’s viewpoint are surveyed in W. Wood, Electronic Journalism (1967). Current discussions of the frequency allocation problem appear in Telecommunication Science Panel, Commerce Technical Advisory Board, U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Electromagnetic Spectrum Utilization — The Silent Crisis (1966); Joint Technical Advisory Committee, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers and Electronic Industries Assn., Report on Radio Spectrum Utilization (1964); Note, The Crisis in Electromagnetic Frequency Spectrum Allocation, 53 Iowa L. Rev. 437 (1967). A recently released study is the Final Report of the President’s Task Force on Communications Policy (1968). Bendix Aviation Corp. v. FCC, 106 U. S. App. D. C. 304, 272 F. 2d 533 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U. S. 965 (1960). 1968 FCC Annual Report 65-69. New limitations on these users, who can also lay claim to First Amendment protection, were sustained against First Amendment attack with the comment, “Here is truly a situation where if everybody could say anything, many could say nothing.” Lafayette Radio Electronics Corp. v. United States, 345 F. 2d 278, 281 (1965). Accord, California Citizens Band Assn. v. United States, 375 F. 2d 43 (C. A. 9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 844 (1967). Kessler v. FCC, 117 U. S. App. D. C. 130, 326 F. 2d 673 (1963). In a table prepared by the FCC on the basis of statistics current as of August 31, 1968, VHF and UHF channels allocated to and those available in the top 100 market areas for television are set forth: COMMERCIAL Channels On the Air, Channels Authorized, or Available Market Areas Allocated Applied for Channels VHF UHF VHF UHF VHF UHF Top 10 . 40 45 40 44 0 1 Top 50. 157 163 157 136 0 27 Top 100 . 264 297 264 213 0 84 NONCOMMERCIAL Channels On the Air, Channels Authorized, or Available Market Areas Reserved Applied for Channels VHF UHF VHF UHF VHF UHF Top 10. 7 17 7 16 0 1 Top 50. 21 79 20 47 1 32 Top 100. 35 138 34 69 1 69 1968 FCC Annual Report 132-135. RTNDA argues that these regulations should be held invalid for failure of the FCC to make specific findings in the rule-making proceeding relating to these factual questions. Presumably the fairness doctrine and the personal attack decisions themselves, such as Red Lion, should fall for the same reason. But this argument ignores the fact that these regulations are no more than the detailed specification of certain consequences of long-standing rules, the need for which was recognized by the Congress on the factual predicate of scarcity made plain in 1927, recognized by this Court in the 1943 National Broadcasting Co. case, and reaffirmed by the Congress as recently as 1959. “If the number of radio and television stations were not limited by available frequencies, the committee would have no hesitation in removing completely the present provision regarding equal time and urge the right of each broadcaster to follow his own conscience .... However, broadcast frequencies are limited and, therefore, they have been necessarily considered a public trust.” S. Rep. No. 562, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 8-9 (1959). In light of this history; the opportunity which the broadcasters have had to address the FCC and show that somehow the situation had radically changed, undercutting the validity of the congressional judgment; and their failure to adduce any convincing evidence of that in the record here, we cannot consider the absence of more detailed findings below to be determinative. The “airwaves [need not] be filled at the earliest possible moment in all circumstances without due regard for these important factors.” Community Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 107 U. S. App. D. C. 95, 105, 274 F. 2d 753, 763 (1960). Accord, enforcing the fairness doctrine, Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 123 U. S. App. D. C. 328, 343, 359 F. 2d 994, 1009 (1966). We need not deal with the argument that even if there is no longer a technological scarcity of frequencies limiting the number of broadcasters, there nevertheless is an economic scarcity in the sense that the Commission could or does limit entry to the broadcasting market on economic grounds and license no more stations than the market will support. Hence, it is said, the fairness doctrine or its equivalent is essential to satisfy the claims of those excluded and of the public generally. A related argument, which we also put aside, is that quite apart from scarcity of frequencies, technological or economic, Congress does not abridge freedom of speech or press by legislation directly or indirectly multiplying the voices and views presented to the public through time sharing, fairness doctrines, or other devices which limit or dissipate the power of those who sit astride the channels of communication with the general public. Cf. Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U. S. 131 (1969).
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the manner in which the Court took jurisdiction. The Court uses a variety of means whereby it undertakes to consider cases that it has been petitioned to review. The most important ones are the writ of certiorari, the writ of appeal, and for legacy cases the writ of error, appeal, and certification. For cases that fall into more than one category, identify the manner in which the court takes jurisdiction on the basis of the writ. For example, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), an original jurisdiction and a mandamus case, should be coded as mandamus rather than original jurisdiction due to the nature of the writ. Some legacy cases are "original" motions or requests for the Court to take jurisdiction but were heard or filed in another court. For example, Ex parte Matthew Addy S.S. & Commerce Corp., 256 U.S. 417 (1921) asked the Court to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal judge. Do not code these cases as "original" jurisdiction cases but rather on the basis of the writ.
What is the manner in which the Court took jurisdiction?
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SPENCE v. WASHINGTON No. 72-1690. Argued January 9, 1974 Decided June 25, 1974 Peter Greenfield argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Burt Neuborne, Melvin L. Wulf, and Joel M. Gora. James E. Warms argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Christopher T. Bayley. Per Curiam. Appellant displayed a United States flag, which he owned, out of the window of his apartment. Affixed to both surfaces of the flag was a large peace symbol fashioned of removable tape. Appellant was convicted under a Washington statute forbidding the exhibition of a United States flag to which is attached or superimposed figures, symbols, or other extraneous material. The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed appellant’s conviction. 81 Wash. 2d 788, 506 P. 2d 293 (1973). It rejected appellant’s contentions that the statute under which he was charged, on its face and as applied, contravened the First Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, and was void for vagueness. We noted probable jurisdiction. 414 U. S. 815 (1973). We reverse on the ground that as applied to appellant’s activity the Washington statute impermissibly infringed protected expression. I On May 10, 1970, appellant, a college student, hung his United States flag from the window of his apartment on private property in Seattle, Washington. The flag was upside down, and attached to the front and back was a peace symbol (i. e., a circle enclosing a trident) made of removable black tape. The window was above the ground floor. The flag measured approximately three by five feet and was plainly visible to passersby. The peace symbol occupied roughly half of the surface of the flag. Three Seattle police officers observed the flag and entered the apartment house. They were met at the main door by appellant, who said: “I suppose you are here about the flag. I didn’t know there was anything wrong with it. I will take it down.” Appellant permitted the officers to enter his apartment, where they seized the flag and arrested him. Appellant cooperated with the officers. There was no disruption or altercation. Appellant was not charged under Washington’s flag-desecration statute. See Wash. Rev. Code § 9.86.030, as amended. Rather, the State relied on the so-called “improper use” statute, Wash. Rev. Code § 9.86.020. This statute provides, in pertinent part: “No person shall, in any manner, for exhibition or display: “(1) Place or cause to be placed any word, figure, mark, picture, design, drawing or advertisement of any nature upon any flag, standard, color, ensign or shield of the United States or of this state ... or “(2) Expose to public view any such flag, standard, color, ensign or shield upon which shall have been printed, painted or otherwise produced, or to which shall have been attached, appended, affixed or annexed any such word, figure, mark, picture, design, drawing or advertisement....” Appellant initially was tried to the bench in a local justice court, where he was found guilty and sentenced to 90 days’ confinement, with 60 days suspended. Appellant exercised his right to be tried de novo in King County Superior Court, where he received a jury trial. The State based its case on the flag itself and the testimony of the three arresting officers, who testified that they had observed the flag displayed from appellant’s window and that on the flag was superimposed what they identified as a peace symbol. Appellant took the stand in his own defense. He testified that he put a peace symbol on the flag and displayed it to -public view as a protest against the invasion of Cambodia and the killings at Kent State University, events which occurred a few days prior to his arrest. He said that his purpose was to associate the American flag with peace instead of war and violence: “I felt there had been so much killing and that this was not what America stood for. I felt that the flag stood for America and I wanted' people to know that I thought America stood for peace.” Appellant further testified that he chose to fashion the peace symbol from tape so that it could be removed without damaging the flag. The State made no effort to controvert any of appellant’s testimony. The trial court instructed the jury in essence that the mere act of displaying the flag with the peace symbol attached, if proved beyond a reasonable doubt, was sufficient to convict. There was no requirement of specific intent to do anything more than display the flag in that manner. The jury returned a verdict of guilty. The court sentenced appellant to 10 days in jail, suspended, and to a $75 fine. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. 5 Wash. App. 752, 490 P. 2d 1321 (1971). It held the improper-use statute over-broad and invalid on its face under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. With one justice dissenting and two concurring in the result, the Washington Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the conviction. 81 Wash. 2d 788, 506 P. 2d 293 (1973). II A number of factors are important in the instant case. First, this was a privately owned flag. In a technical property sense it was not the property of any government. We have no doubt that the State or National Governments constitutionally may forbid anyone from mishandling in any manner a flag that is public property. But this is a different case. Second, appellant displayed his flag on private property. He engaged in no trespass or disorderly conduct. Nor is this a case that might be analyzed in terms of reasonable time, place, or manner restraints on access to a public area. Third, the record is devoid of proof of any risk of breach of the peace. It was not appellant’s purpose to incite violence or even stimulate a public demonstration. There is no evidence that any crowd gathered or that appellant made any effort to attract attention beyond hanging the flag out of his own window. Indeed, on the facts stipulated by the parties there is no evidence that anyone other than the three police officers observed the flag. Fourth, the State concedes, as did the Washington Supreme Court, that appellant engaged in a form of communication. Although the stipulated facts fail to show that any member of the general public viewed the flag, the State’s concession is inevitable on this record. The undisputed facts are that appellant “wanted people to know that I thought America stood for peace.” To be sure, appellant did not choose to articulate his views through printed or spoken words. It is therefore necessary to determine whether his activity was sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, for as the Court noted in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 376 (1968), “[w]e cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.” But the nature of appellant’s activity, combined with the factual context and environment in which it was undertaken, lead to the conclusion that he engaged in a form of protected expression. The Court for decades has recognized the communicative connotations of the use of flags. E. g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931). In many of their uses flags are a form of symbolism comprising a “primitive but effective way of communicating ideas . . . ,” and “a short cut from mind to mind.” Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 632 (1943). On this record there can be little doubt that appellant communicated through the use of symbols. The symbolism included not only the flag but also the superimposed peace symbol. Moreover, the context in which a symbol is used for purposes of expression is important, for the context may give meaning to the symbol. See Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U. S. 503 (1969). In Tinker, the wearing of black armbands in a school environment conveyed an unmistakable message about a contemporaneous issue of intense public concern — the Vietnam hostilities. Id., at 505-514. In this case, appellant’s activity was roughly simultaneous with and concededly triggered by the Cambodian incursion and the Kent State tragedy, also issues of great public moment. Cf. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974). A flag bearing a peace symbol and displayed upside down by a student today might be interpreted as nothing more than bizarre behavior, but it would have been difficult for the great majority of citizens to miss the drift of appellant’s point at the time that he made it. It may be noted, further, that this was not an act of mindless nihilism. Rather, it was a pointed expression of anguish by appellant about the then-current domestic and foreign affairs of his government. An intent to convey a particularized message was present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it. We are confronted then with a case of prosecution for the expression of an idea through activity. Moreover, the activity occurred on private property, rather than in an environment over which the State by necessity must have certain supervisory powers unrelated to expression. Cf. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396 (1974); Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines School District, supra. Accordingly, we must examine with particular care the interests advanced by appellee to support its prosecution. We are met at the outset with something of an enigma in the manner in which the case was presented to us. The Washington Supreme Court rejected any reliance on a breach-of-the-peace rationale. 81 Wash. 2d, at 796 n. 1, 506 P. 2d, at 299 n. 1. It based its result primarily on the ground that “the nation and state both have a recognizable interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of the nation . ...” Yet counsel for the State declined to support the highest state court’s principal rationale in argument before us. He pursued instead the breach-of-the-peace theory discarded by the state court. Indeed, that was the only basis on which he chose to support the constitutionality of the state statute. Despite counsel’s approach, we think it appropriate to review briefly the range of various state interests that might be thought to support the challenged conviction, drawing upon the arguments before us, the opinions below, and the Court’s opinion in Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 590-594 (1969). The first interest at issue is prevention of breach of the peace. In our view, the Washington Supreme Court correctly rejected this notion. It is totally without support in the record. We are also unable to affirm the judgment below on the ground that the State may have desired to protect the sensibilities of passersby. “It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.” Street v. New York, supra, at 592. Moreover, appellant did not impose his ideas upon a captive audience. Anyone who might have been offended could easily have avoided the display. See Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15 (1971). Nor may appellant be punished for failing to show proper respect for our national emblem. Street v. New York, supra, at 593; Board of Education v. Barnette, supra. We are brought, then, to the state court’s thesis that Washington has an interest in preserving the national flag as an unalloyed symbol of our country. The court did not define this interest; it simply asserted it. See 81 Wash. 2d, at 799, 506 P. 2d, at 300. Mr. Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion today, see post, at 420-422, adopts essentially the same approach. Presumably, this interest might be seen as an effort to prevent the appropriation of a revered national symbol by an individual, interest group, or enterprise where there was a risk that association of the symbol with a particular product or viewpoint might be taken erroneously as evidence of governmental endorsement. Alternatively, it might be argued that the interest asserted by the state court is based on the uniquely universal character of the national flag as a symbol. For the great majority of us, the flag is a symbol of patriotism, of pride in the history of our country, and of the service, sacrifice, and valor of the millions of Americans who in peace and war have joined together to build and to defend a Nation in which self-government and personal liberty endure. It evidences both the unity and diversity which are America. For others the flag carries in varying degrees a different message. “A person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and what is one man’s comfort and inspiration is another’s jest and scorn.” Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S., at 632-633. It might be said that we all draw something from our national symbol, for it is capable of conveying simultaneously a spectrum of meanings. If it may be destroyed or permanently disfigured, it could be argued that it will lose its capability of mirroring the sentiments of all who view it. But we need not decide in this case whether the interest advanced by the court below is valid. We assume, arguendo, that it is. The statute is nonetheless unconstitutional as applied to appellant’s activity. There was no risk that appellant’s acts would mislead viewers into assuming that the Government endorsed his viewpoint. To the contrary, he was plainly and peacefully protesting the fact that it did not. Appellant was not charged under the desecration statute, see n. 1, supra, nor did he permanently disfigure the flag or destroy it. He displayed it as a flag of his country in a way closely analogous to the manner in which flags have always been used to convey ideas. Moreover, his message was direct, likely to be understood, and within the contours of the First Amendment. Given the protected character of his expression and in light of the fact that no interest the State may have in preserving the physical integrity of a privately owned flag was significantly impaired on these facts, the conviction must be invalidated. The judgment is reversed. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Blackmun concurs in the result. This statute provides in part: “No person shall knowingly cast contempt upon any flag, standard, color, ensign or shield ... by publicly mutilating; defacing, defiling, burning, or trampling upon said flag, standard, color, ensign or shield.” Washington Rev. Code § 9.86.010 defines the flags and other symbols protected by the desecration and improper-use statutes as follows: “The words flag, standard, color, ensign or shield, as used in this chapter, shall include any flag, standard, color, ensign or shield, or copy; picture or representation thereof, made of any substance or represented or produced thereon, and of any size, evidently purporting to be such flag, standard, color, ensign or shield of the United States or of this state, or a copy, picture or representation thereof.” Brief for Appellee 3; 81 Wash. 2d, at 799, 800, 506 P. 2d, at 300, 301. 81 Wash. 2d, at 799, 506 P. 2d, at 300. A subsidiary ground relied on by the Washington Supreme Court must be rejected summarily. It found the inhibition on appellant’s freedom of expression “minuscule and trifling” because there are “thousands of other means available to [him] for the dissemination of his personal views . . . .” Id., at 799, 800, 506 P. 2d, at 300, 301. As the Court noted in, e. g., Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 163 (1939), “one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.” Brief for Appellee 6; Tr. of Oral Arg. 31-32. Counsel for the State conceded that promoting respect for the flag is not a legitimate state interest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 30. Undoubtedly such a concern underlies that portion of the improper-use statute forbidding the utilization of representations of the flag in a commercial context. Indeed, the third subpara-graph of the improper-use statute, Wash. Rev. Code §9.86.020 (3), which is not at issue here, is aimed directly at commercial exploitation of our national symbol. There is no occasion in this case to address the application of the challenged statute to commercial behavior. Cf. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34 (1907). Mr. Justice Rehnquist’s dissent places major reliance on Halter, see post, at 418-420, despite the fact that Halter was decided nearly 20 years before the Court concluded that the First Amendment applies to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925). If this interest is valid, we note that it is directly related to expression in the context of activity like that undertaken by appellant. For that reason and because no other governmental interest unrelated to expression has been advanced or can be supported on this record, the four-step analysis of United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377 (1968), is inapplicable. Because we agree with appellant’s as-applied argument, we do not reach the more comprehensive overbreadth contention he also advances. But it is worth noting the nearly limitless sweep of the Washington improper-use flag statute. Read literally, it forbids a veteran’s group from attaching, e. g., battalion commendations to a United States flag. It proscribes photographs of war heroes standing in front of the flag. It outlaws newspaper mastheads composed of the national flag with superimposed print. Other examples could easily be listed. Statutes of such sweep suggest problems of selective enforcement. We are, however, unable to agree with appellant’s void-for-vagueness argument. The statute’s application is quite mechanical, particularly when implemented with jury instructions like the ones given in this case. The law in Washington, simply put, is that nothing may be affixed to or superimposed on a United States flag or a representation thereof. Thus, if selective enforcement has occurred, it has been a result of prosecutorial discretion, not the language of the statute. Accordingly, this case is unlike Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566 (1974), where the words of the statute at issue (“publicly . . . treats contemptuously”) were themselves sufficiently indefinite to prompt subjective treatment by prosecutorial authorities. Appellant’s activity occurred at a time of national turmoil over the introduction of United States forces into Cambodia and the deaths at Kent State University. It is difficult now, more than four years later, to recall vividly the depth of emotion that pervaded most colleges and universities at the time, and that was widely shared by young Americans everywhere. A spontaneous outpouring of feeling resulted in widespread action, not all of it rational when viewed in retrospect. This included the closing down of some schools, as well as other disruptions of many centers of education. It was against this highly inflamed background that appellant chose to express his own views in a manner that can fairly be described as gentle and restrained as compared to the actions undertaken by a number of his peers. The similarity of our holding to that of the Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Kool, 212 N. W. 2d 518 (1973), merits note. In that case, the defendant displayed a replica of the United States flag upside down in his window, superimposing a peace symbol to create an effect identical to that achieved by Spence. Recognizing the communicative character of the defendant’s activity, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed his conviction for flag misuse and held the statute unconstitutional as applied. The court eschewed an overbreadth analysis, and it rejected a number of the state interests we have found unavailing in the instant case. The Court states in a footnote: “There is no occasion in this case to address the application of the challenged statute to commercial behavior. Cf. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34 (1907).” Ante, at 413 n. 7.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the reason, if any, given by the court for granting the petition for certiorari.
What reason, if any, does the court give for granting the petition for certiorari?
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HARRIS v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. No. 14. Argued October 16, 1950. Decided November 27, 1950. Irwin N. Wilpon argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Lee A. Jackson argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Caudle, Ellis N. Slack and I. Henry Kutz. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. The federal estate tax and the federal gift tax, as held in a line of cases ending with Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U. S. 303, and Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U. S. 308, are construed in pari materia, since the purpose of the gift tax is to complement the estate tax by preventing tax-free depletion of the transferor’s estate during his lifetime. Both the gift tax and the estate tax exclude transfers made for “an adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth.” In the estate tax this requirement is limited to deductions for claims based upon “a promise or agreement”; but the consideration for the “promise or agreement” may not be the release of marital rights in the decedent’s property. In the Wemyss and Merrill cases the question was whether the gift tax was applicable to premarital property settlements. If the standards of the estate tax were to be applied ex proprio vigore in gift tax cases, those transfers would be taxable because there was a “promise or agreement” touching marital rights in property. We sustained the tax, thus giving “adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth” the same meaning under both statutes insofar as premarital property settlements or agreements are concerned. The present case raises the question whether Wemyss and Merrill require the imposition of the gift tax in the type of post-nuptial settlement of property rights involved here. Petitioner divorced her husband, Reginald Wright, in Nevada in 1943. Both she and her husband had substantial property interests. They reached an understanding as respects the unscrambling of those interests, the settlement of all litigated claims to the separate properties, the assumption of obligations, and the transfer of properties. Wright received from petitioner the creation of a trust for his lifetime of the income from her remainder interest in a then-existing trust; an assumption by her of an in-débtedness of his of $47,650; and her promise to pay him $416.66 a month for ten years. Petitioner received from Wright 21/90 of certain real property in controversy; a discontinuance of a partition suit then pending; an indemnification from and assumption by him of all liability on a bond and mortage on certain real property in London, England; and an indemnification against liability in connection with certain real property in the agreement. It was found that the value of the property transferred to Wright exceeded that received by petitioner by $107,150. The Commissioner assessed a gift tax on the theory that any rights which Wright might have given up by entering into the agreement could not be adequate and full consideration. If the parties had without 'more gone ahead and voluntarily unravelled their business interests on the basis of this compromise, there would be no question that the gift tax would be payable. For there would have been a “promise or agreement” that effected a relinquishment of marital rights in property. It therefore would fall under the ban of the provision of the estate tax which by judicial construction has been incorporated into the gift tax statute. But the parties did not simply undertake a voluntary contractual division of their property interests. They were faced with the fact that Nevada law not only authorized but instructed the divorce court to decree a just and equitable disposition of both the community and the separate property of the parties. The agreement recited that it was executed in order to effect a settlement of the respective property rights of the parties “in the event a divorce should be decreed”; and it provided that the agreement should be submitted to the divorce court “for its approval.” It went on to say, “It is of the essence of this agreement that the settlement herein provided for shall not become operative in any manner nor shall any of the Recitals or covenants herein become binding upon either party unless a decree of absolute divorce between the parties shall be entered in the pending Nevada action.” If the agreement had stopped there and were in fact submitted to the court, it is clear that the gift tax would not be applicable. That arrangement would not be a “promise or agreement” in the statutory sense. It would be wholly conditional upon the entry of the decree; the divorce court might or might not accept the provisions of the arrangement as the measure of the respective obligations ; it might indeed add to or subtract from them. The decree, not the arrangement submitted to the court, would fix the rights and obligations of the parties. That was the theory of Commissioner v. Maresi, 156 F. 2d 929, and we think it sound. Even the Commissioner concedes that that result would be correct in case the property settlement was litigated in the divorce action. That was what happened in Commissioner v. Converse, 163 F. 2d 131, where' the divorce court decreed a lump-sum award in lieu of monthly payments provided by the separation agreement. Yet without the decree there would be no enforceable, existing agreement whether the settlement was litigated or unliti-gated. Both require the approval of the court before an obligation arises. The happenstance that the divorce court might approve the entire settlement, or modify it in unsubstantial details, or work out material changes seems to us unimportant. In each case it is the decree that creates the rights and the duties; and a decree is not a “promise or agreement” in any sense — popular or statutory. But the present case is distinguished by reason of a further provision in the undertaking and in the decree. The former provided that “the covenants in this agreement shall survive any decree of divorce which may be entered.” And the decree stated “It is ordered that said agreement and said trust agreements forming a part thereof shall survive this decree.” The Court of Appeals turned the case on those provisions. It concluded that since there were two sanctions for the payments and transfers — contempt under the divorce decree and execution under the contract — they were founded not only on the decree but upon both the decree and a “promise or agreement.” It therefore held the excess of the value of the property which petitioner gave her husband over what he gave her to be taxable as a gift. 178 F. 2d 861. We, however, think that the gift tax statute is concerned with the source of rights, not with the manner in which rights at some distant time may be enforced. Remedies for enforcement will vary from state to state. It is “the transfer” of the property with which the gift tax statute is concerned, not the sanctions which the law supplies to enforce transfers. If “the transfer” of marital rights in property is effected by the parties, it is pursuant to a “promise or agreement” in the meaning of the statute. If “the transfer” is effected by court decree, no “promise or agreement” of the parties is the operative fact. In no realistic sense is a court decree a “promise or agreement” between the parties to a litigation. If finer, more legalistic lines are to be drawn, Congress must do it. If, as we hold, the case is free from any “promise or agreement” concerning marital rights in property, it presents no remaining problems of difficulty. The Treasury Regulations recognize as tax free “a sale, exchange, or other transfer of property made in the ordinary course of business (a transaction which is bona fide, at arm’s length, and free from any donative intent).” This transaction is not “in the ordinary course of business” in any conventional sense. Few transactions between husband and wife ever would be; and those under the aegis of a divorce court are not. But if two partners on dissolution of the firm entered into a transaction of this character or if chancery did it for them, there would seem to be no doubt that the unscrambling of the business interests would satisfy the spirit of the Regulations. No reason is apparent why husband and wife should be under a heavier handicap absent a statute which brings all marital property settlements under the gift tax. We are now advised that since submission of the case on October 16, 1950, petitioner has died, and that it will take some weeks before an administrator of her estate can be appointed. Accordingly we enter our judgment as of October 16, 1950, in pursuance of the practice obtaining in those circumstances. See Mitchell v. Overman, 103 U. S. 62, 64-65; McDonald v. Maxwell, 274 U. S. 91, 99. Reversed. Section 1002 of 26 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) provides: “Where property is transferred for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth, then the amount by which the value of the property exceeded the value of the consideration shall, for the purpose of the tax imposed by this chapter, be deemed a gift, and shall be included in computing the amount of gifts made during the calendar year.” (Italics added.) Section 812 of 26 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) provides: “For the purpose of the tax the value of the net estate shall be determined, in the case of a citizen or resident of the United States by deducting from the value of the gross estate — . . . (b) Expenses, losses, indebtedness, and taxes. Such amounts — . . . (3) for claims against the estate, (4) for unpaid mortgages upon, or any indebtedness in respect to, property where the value of decedent’s interest therein, undiminished by such mortgage or indebtedness, is included in the value of the gross estate, ... as are allowed by the laws of the jurisdiction, whether within or without the United States, under which the estate is being administered,' but not including any income taxes upon income received after the death of the decedent, or property taxes not accrued before his death, or any estate, succession, legacy, or inheritance taxes. The deduction herein allowed in the case of claims against the estate, unpaid mortgages, or any indebtedness shall, when founded upon a promise or agreement, be limited to the extent that they were contracted bona fide and for an adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth .... For the purposes of this subchapter, a relinquishment or promised relinquishment of dower, curtesy, or of a statutory estate created in lieu of dower or curtesy, or of other marital rights in the decedent’s property or estate, shall not be considered to any extent a consideration ‘in money or money’s worth.’ ” (Italics added.) See § 812 (b) supra, note 2. Ibid. See § 812 (b) supra, note 2. At the time of the divorce Nevada Compiled Laws (Supp. 1931-1941) § 9463 provided: “In granting a divorce, the court may award such alimony to the wife and shall make such disposition of the community and separate property of the parties as shall appear just and equitable, having regard to the respective merits of the parties and to the condition in which they will be left by such divorce, and to the party through whom the property was acquired, and to the burdens, if any, imposed upon it for the benefit of the children. . . ." Section 1000 of 26 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) provides: “(a) For the calendar year 1940 and each calendar year thereafter a tax, computed as provided in section 1001, shall be imposed upon the transfer during such calendar year by any individual, resident or nonresident, of property by gift. ... (b) The tax shall apply whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether the gift is direct or indirect, and whether the property is real or personal, tangible or intangible; but, in the case of a nonresident not a citizen of the United States, shall apply to a transfer only if the property is situated within the United States.” (Italics added.) Section 86.8 of Treas. Reg. 108 provides: “Transfers reached by the statute are not confined to those only which, being without a valuable consideration, accord with the common law concept of gifts, but embrace as well sales, exchanges, and other dispositions of property for a consideration in money or money’s worth to the extent that the value of the property-transferred by the donor exceeds the value of the consideration given therefor. However, a sale, exchange, or other transfer of property made in the ordinary course of business (a transaction which is bona fide, at arm’s length, and free from any donative intent), will be considered as made for an adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth. A consideration not reducible to a money value, as love and affection, promise of marriage, etc., is to be wholly disregarded, and the entire value of the property transferred constitutes the amount of the gift.”
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
What is the issue of the decision?
[ "federal taxation, typically under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code", "federal taxation of gifts, personal, business, or professional expenses", "priority of federal fiscal claims: over those of the states or private entities", "miscellaneous federal taxation (cf. national supremacy: state tax)" ]
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ILLINOIS v. LIDSTER No. 02-1060. Argued November 5, 2003 Decided January 13, 2004 Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined, and in which Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined as to Parts I and II. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post, p. 428. Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General of Illinois, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Lisa Mad-igan, Attorney General, and Linda D. Woloshin, Lisa Anne Hoffman, and Karen Kaplan, Assistant Attorneys General. Patricia A. Millett argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Wray, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Patty Merkamp Stemler. Donald John Ramsell argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Ohio et al. by Jim Petro, Attorney General of Ohio, Douglas R. Cole, State Solicitor, and Robert C. Maier, Assistant Solicitor, Robert J. Spagnoletti, Acting Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: William H. Pryor, Jr., of Alabama, Terry Goddard of Arizona, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Steve Carter of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, G. Steven Rowe of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Mike Hatch of Minnesota, Mike McGrath of Montana, Brian Sandoval of Nevada, Peter Heed of New Hampshire, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, Henry Dargan McMaster of South Carolina, Lawrence E. Long of South Dakota, Greg Abbott of Texas, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, Jerry W. Kilgore of Virginia, and Iver A. Stridiron of the Virgin Islands; for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson; and for the Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police et al. by James G. Sotos. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. by Lawrence S. Lustberg, Joshua L. Dratel, Steven R. Shapiro, and Harvey Grossman; and for the National College for DUI Defense by Barry T. Simons and W. Troy McKinney. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. This Fourth Amendment case focuses upon a highway checkpoint where police stopped motorists to ask them for information about a recent hit-and-run accident. We hold that the police stops were reasonable, hence, constitutional. I The relevant background is as follows: On Saturday, August 23,1997, just after midnight, an unknown motorist traveling eastbound on a highway in Lombard, Illinois, struck and killed a 70-year-old bicyclist. The motorist drove off without identifying himself. About one week later at about the same time of night and at about the same place, local police set up a highway checkpoint designed to obtain more information about the accident from the motoring public. Police cars with flashing lights bound lanes of the highway. The blockage forced traffic to slow down, leading to lines of up to 15 cars in each lane. As each vehicle drew up to the checkpoint, an officer would stop it for 10 to 15 seconds, ask the occupants whether they had seen anything happen there the previous weekend, and hand each driver a flyer. The flyer said “ALERT . . . FATAL HIT & RUN ACCIDENT” and requested “ASSISTANCE IN IDENTIFYING THE VEHICLE AND DRIVER INVOLVED IN THIS ACCIDENT WHICH KILLED A 70 YEAR OLD BICYCLIST.” App. 9. Robert Lidster, the respondent, a ward the checkpoint. As he approached the checkpoint, his van swerved, nearly hitting one of the officers. The officer smelled alcohol on Lidster’s breath. He directed Lidster to a side street where another officer administered a sobriety test and then arrested Lidster. Lidster was tried and convicted in Illinois state court of driving under the influence of alcohol. Lidster challenged the lawfulness of his arrest and conviction on the ground that the government had obtained much of the relevant evidence through use of a checkpoint stop that violated the Fourth Amendment. The triaí court rejected that challenge. But an Illinois appellate court ■reached the opposite conclusion. 319 Ill. App. 3d 825, 747 N. E. 2d 419 (2001). The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court. It held (by a vote of 4 to 3) that our decision in Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. 32 (2000), required it to And the stop unconstitutional. 202 Ill. 2d 1, 779 N. E. 2d 855 (2002). Because lower courts have reached different conclusions about this matter, we granted certiorari. See Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 541 S. E. 2d 872, cert. denied, 534 U. S. 1043 (2001) (Anding similar checkpoint stop constitutional). We now reverse the Illinois Supreme Court’s determination. II The Illinois Supreme Court basically held that our decision in Edmond governs the outcome of this case. We do not agree. Edmond involved a checkpoint at which police stopped vehicles to look for evidence of drug crimes committed by occupants of those vehicles. After stopping a vehicle at the checkpoint, police would examine (from outside the vehicle) the vehicle’s interior; they would walk a drug-sniffing dog around the exterior; and, if they found sufficient evidence of drug (or other) crimes, they would arrest the vehicle’s occupants. 531 U. S., at 35. We found that police had set up this checkpoint primarily for general “crime.control” purposes, i. e., “to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.” Id., at 41. We noted that the stop was made without individualized suspicion. And we held that the' Fourth Amendment forbids such a stop, in the absence of special circumstances. Id., at 44. The checkpoint stop here differs signiAcantly from that in Edmond. The stop’s primary law enforcement purpose was not to determine whether a vehicle’s occupants were committing a crime, but to ask vehicle occupants, as members of the public, for their help in providing information about a crime in all likelihood committed by others. The police expected the information elicited to help them apprehend, not the vehicle’s occupants, but other individuals. Edmond’s language, as well as its context, makes clear that the constitutionality of this latter, information-seeking kind of stop was not then before the Court. Edmond refers to the subject matter of its holding as “stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime.” Ibid, (emphasis added). We concede that Edmond describes the law enforcement objective there in question as a “general interest in crime control,” but it specifies that the phrase “general interest in crime control” does not refer to every “law enforcement” objective. Id., at 44, n. 1. We must read this and related general language in Edmond as we often read general language in judicial opinions — as referring in context to circumstances similar to the circumstances then before the Court and not referring to quite different circumstances that the Court was not then considering.. Neither do we believe, Edmond aside, that the Fourth Amendment would have us apply an Edmond-type rule of automatic unconstitutionality to brief, information-seeking highway stops of the kind now before us. For one thing, the fact that such stops normally lack individualized suspicion cannot by itself determine the constitutional outcome. As in Edmond, the stop here at issue involves a motorist. The Fourth Amendment does not treat a motorist’s car as his castle. See, e. g., New York v. Class, 475 U. S. 106, 112-113 (1986); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 561 (1976). And special, law enforcement concerns will sometimes justify highway stops without individualized suspicion. See Michigan Dept, of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U. S. 444 (1990) (sobriety checkpoint); Martinez-Fuerte, supra (Border Patrol checkpoint). Moreover, unlike Edmond, the context here (seeking information from the public) is one in which, by definition, the concept of individualized suspicion has little role to play. Like certain other forms of police activity, say, crowd control or public safety, an information-seeking stop is not the kind of event that involves suspicion, or lack of suspicion, of the relevant individual. . For another thing, information-seeking highway stops are less likely to provoke anxiety or to prove intrusive. The stops are likely brief. The police are not likely to ask questions designed to elicit self-incriminating information. And citizens will often react positively when police simply ask for their help as “responsible citizen[s]” to “give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 477-478 (1966). Further, the law ordinarily permits police to seek the voluntary cooperation of members of the public in the investigation of a crime. “[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, [or] by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 497 (1983). See also ALI, Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure §110.1(1) (1975) (“[L]aw enforcement officer may... request any person to furnish information or otherwise cooperate in the investigation or prevention of crime”). That, in part, is because voluntary requests play a vital role in police investigatory work. See, e. g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 515 (1963) (“[interrogation of witnesses ... is undoubtedly an essential tool in effective law enforcement”); U. S. Dept. of Justice, Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement 14-15 (Oct. 1999) (instructing law enforcement to gather information from witnesses near the scene). The importance of soliciting the public’s assistance is offset to some degree by the need to stop a motorist to obtain that help — a need less likely present where a pedestrian, not a motorist, is involved. The difference is significant in light of our determinations that such an involuntary stop amounts to a “seizure” in Fourth Amendment terms. E. g., Edmond, 531 U. S., at 40. That difference, however, is not important enough to justify an Edmond-type rule here. After all, as we have said, the motorist stop will likely be brief. Any accompanying traffic delay should prove no more onerous than many that typically accompany normal traffic congestion. And the resulting voluntary questioning of a motorist is as likely to prove important for police investigation as is the questioning of a pedestrian. Given these considerations, it would seem anomalous were the law (1) ordinarily to allow police freely to seek the voluntary cooperation of pedestrians but (2) ordinarily to forbid police to seek similar voluntary cooperation from motorists. Finally, we do not believe that an Edmond-type rule is needed to prevent an unreasonable proliferation of police checkpoints. Cf. 202 Ill. 2d, at 9-10, 779 N. E. 2d, at 859-860 (expressing that concern). Practical considerations— namely, limited police resources and community hostility to related traffic tieups — seem likely to inhibit any such proliferation. See Fell, Ferguson, Williams, & Fields, Why Aren’t Sobriety Checkpoints Widely Adopted as an Enforcement Strategy in the United States? 35 Accident Analysis & Prevention 897 (Nov. 2003) (finding that sobriety checkpoints are not more widely used due to the lack of police resources and the lack of community support). And, of course, the Fourth Amendment’s normal insistence that the stop be reasonable in context will still provide an important legal limitation on police use of this kind of information-seeking checkpoint. These considerations, takén together, convince us that an Edmond-type presumptive rule of unconstitutionality does not apply here. That does not mean the stop is automatically, or even presumptively, constitutional. It simply means that we must judge its reasonableness, hence, its constitutionality, on the basis of the individual circumstances. And as this Court said in Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 51 (1979), in judging reasonableness, we look to “the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.” See also Sitz, 496 U. S., at 450-455 (balancing these factors in determining reasonableness of a checkpoint stop); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S., at 556-564 (same). III We now consider the reasonableness of the checkpoint stop before us in light of the factors just mentioned, an issue that, in our view, has been fully argued here. See Brief for Petitioner 14-18; Brief for Respondent 17-27. We hold that the stop was constitutional. The relevant public concern was grave. Police were investigating a crime that had resulted in a human death. No one denies the police’s need to obtain more information at that time. And the stop’s objective was to help find the perpetrator of a specific and known crime, not of unknown crimes of a general sort. Cf. Edmond, supra, at 44. The stop advanced this grave public concern to a significant degree. The police appropriately tailored their checkpoint stops to fit important criminal investigatory needs. The stops took place about one week after the hit-and-run accident, on the same highway near the location of the accident, and at about the same time of night. And police used the stops to obtain information from drivers, some of whom might well have been in the vicinity of the crime at the time it occurred. See App. 28-29 (describing police belief that motorists routinely leaving work after night shifts at nearby industrial complexes might have seen something relevant). Most importantly, the stops interfered only minimally with liberty of the sort the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect. Viewed objectively, each stop required only a brief wait in line — a very few minutes at most. Contact with the police lasted only a few seconds. Cf. Martinez-Fuerte, supra, at 547 (upholding stops of three-to-five minutes); Sitz, supra, at 448 (upholding delays of 25 seconds). Police contact consisted simply of a request for information and the distribution of a flyer. Cf. Martinez-Fuerte, supra, at 546 (upholding inquiry as to motorists’ citizenship and immigration status); Sitz, supra, at 447 (upholding examination of all drivers for signs of intoxication). Viewed subjectively, the contact provided little reason for anxiety or alarm. The police stopped all vehicles systematically. Cf. Martinez-Fuerte, supra, at 558; Sitz, supra, at 452-453. And there is no allegation here that the police acted in a discriminatory or otherwise unlawful manner while questioning motorists during stops. For these reasons we conclude that the checkpoint stop was constitutional. The judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court is Reversed.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the state or territory of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed.
What is the state of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed?
[ "Alabama", "Alaska", "American Samoa", "Arizona", "Arkansas", "California", "Colorado", "Connecticut", "Delaware", "District of Columbia", "Federated States of Micronesia", "Florida", "Georgia", "Guam", "Hawaii", "Idaho", "Illinois", "Indiana", "Iowa", "Kansas", "Kentucky", "Louisiana", "Maine", "Marshall Islands", "Maryland", "Massachusetts", "Michigan", "Minnesota", "Mississippi", "Missouri", "Montana", "Nebraska", "Nevada", "New Hampshire", "New Jersey", "New Mexico", "New York", "North Carolina", "North Dakota", "Northern Mariana Islands", "Ohio", "Oklahoma", "Oregon", "Palau", "Pennsylvania", "Puerto Rico", "Rhode Island", "South Carolina", "South Dakota", "Tennessee", "Texas", "Utah", "Vermont", "Virgin Islands", "Virginia", "Washington", "West Virginia", "Wisconsin", "Wyoming", "United States", "Interstate Compact", "Philippines", "Indian", "Dakota" ]
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David A. ZUBIK, et al., petitioners v. Sylvia BURWELL, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al. Priests for Life, et al., petitioners v. Department of Health and Human Services, et al. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington, et al., petitioners v. Sylvia Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al. East Texas Baptist University, et al., petitioners v. Sylvia Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al. Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver, Colorado, et al., petitioners v. Sylvia Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al. Southern Nazarene University, et al., petitioners v. Sylvia Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al. Geneva College, petitioner v. Sylvia Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al. Nos. 14-1418 14-1453 14-1505 15-35 15-105 15-119 15-191. Supreme Court of the United States May 16, 2016. Noel J. Francisco, David T. Raimer, Anthony J. Dick, Jones Day, Washington, DC, Paul M. Pohl, John D. Goetz, Leon F. DeJulius, Jr., Ira M. Karoll, Jones Day, Pittsburgh, PA, Matthew A. Kairis, Jones Day, Columbus, OH, for petitioners in Nos. 14-1418 and 14-1505. Paul D. Clement, Erin E. Murphy, Robert M. Bernstein, Bancroft PLLC, Washington, DC, David A. Cortman, Gregory S. Baylor, Jordan W. Lorence, Kevin H. Theriot, Matthew S. Bowman, Rory T. Gray, Alliance Defending Freedom, Washington, DC, for petitioners in Nos. 15-119 and 15-191. Robert J. Muise, David Yerushalmi, American Freedom Law Center, Ann Arbor, MI, for petitioner in Nos. 14-1453. Mark Rienzi, Eric C. Rassbach, Hannah C. Smith, Diana M. Verm, Adèle Auxier Keim, Daniel H. Blomberg, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Washington, DC, for East Texas Baptist University, Houston Baptist University, and petitioners in No. 15-105. Kenneth R. Wynne, Wynne & Wynne LLP, Houston, TX, for Westminster Theological Seminary. David A. Cortman, Gregory S. Baylor, Jordan W. Lorence, Kevin H. Theriot, Matthew S. Bowman, Rory T. Gray, Alliance Defending Freedom, Washington, DC, for petitioners in Nos. 15-119 and 15-191. Bradley S. Tupi, Pittsburgh, PA, for Geneva College. Carl C. Scherz, Laurence A. Hansen, Locke Lord LLP, Dallas, TX, Kevin C. Walsh, Richmond, VA, for petitioners in No. 15-105. Paul D. Clement, Erin E. Murphy, Robert M. Bernstein, Bancroft PLLC, Washington, DC, Mark Rienzi, Eric C. Rassbach, Hannah C. Smith, Diana M. Verm, Adèle Auxier Keim, Daniel H. Blomberg, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Washington, DC, for East Texas Baptist University, Houston Baptist, University, and petitioners in No. 15-105. Paul M. Pohl, John D. Goetz, Leon F. DeJulius, Jr., Ira M. Karoll, Jones Day, Pittsburgh, PA, Robert J. Muise, David Yerushalmi, American Freedom, Law Center, Ann Arbor, MI, Noel J. Francisco, David T. Raimer, Anthony J. Dick, Jones Day, Washington, DC, for petitioners. Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant, Attorney General, Ian Heath Gershengorn, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitors General, Brian H. Fletcher, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Mark B. Stern, Alisa B. Klein, Adam C. Jed, Patrick G. Nemeroff, Megan Barbero, Joshua Salzman, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondents. PER CURIAM. Petitioners are primarily nonprofit organizations that provide health insurance to their employees. Federal regulations require petitioners to cover certain contraceptives as part of their health plans, unless petitioners submit a form either to their insurer or to the Federal Government, stating that they object on religious grounds to providing contraceptive coverage. Petitioners allege that submitting this notice substantially burdens the exercise of their religion, in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq . Following oral argument, the Court requested supplemental briefing from the parties addressing "whether contraceptive coverage could be provided to petitioners' employees, through petitioners' insurance companies, without any such notice from petitioners." Post, p. 1561. Both petitioners and the Government now confirm that such an option is feasible. Petitioners have clarified that their religious exercise is not infringed where they "need to do nothing more than contract for a plan that does not include coverage for some or all forms of contraception," even if their employees receive cost-free contraceptive coverage from the same insurance company. Supplemental Brief for Petitioners 4. The Government has confirmed that the challenged procedures "for employers with insured plans could be modified to operate in the manner posited in the Court's order while still ensuring that the affected women receive contraceptive coverage seamlessly, together with the rest of their health coverage." Supplemental Brief for Respondents 14-15. In light of the positions asserted by the parties in their supplemental briefs, the Court vacates the judgments below and remands to the respective United States Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits. Given the gravity of the dispute and the substantial clarification and refinement in the positions of the parties, the parties on remand should be afforded an opportunity to arrive at an approach going forward that accommodates petitioners' religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners' health plans "receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage." Id., at 1. We anticipate that the Courts of Appeals will allow the parties sufficient time to resolve any outstanding issues between them. The Court finds the foregoing approach more suitable than addressing the significantly clarified views of the parties in the first instance. Although there may still be areas of disagreement between the parties on issues of implementation, the importance of those areas of potential concern is uncertain, as is the necessity of this Court's involvement at this point to resolve them. This Court has taken similar action in other cases in the past. See, e.g., Madison County v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 562 U.S. 42, 43, 131 S.Ct. 704, 178 L.Ed.2d 587 (2011) (per curiam ) (vacating and remanding for the Second Circuit to "address, in the first instance, whether to revisit its ruling on sovereign immunity in light of [a] new factual development, and-if necessary-proceed to address other questions in the case consistent with its sovereign immunity ruling"); Kiyemba v. Obama, 559 U.S. 131, 132, 130 S.Ct. 1235, 175 L.Ed.2d 1070 (2010) (per curiam ) (vacating and remanding for the D.C. Circuit to "determine, in the first instance, what further proceedings in that court or in the District Court are necessary and appropriate for the full and prompt disposition of the case in light of the new developments"); Villarreal v. United States, 572 U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 1939, 188 L.Ed.2d 957 (2014) (vacating and remanding to the Fifth Circuit "for further consideration in light of the position asserted by the Solicitor General in his brief for the United States"). The Court expresses no view on the merits of the cases. In particular, the Court does not decide whether petitioners' religious exercise has been substantially burdened, whether the Government has a compelling interest, or whether the current regulations are the least restrictive means of serving that interest. Nothing in this opinion, or in the opinions or orders of the courts below, is to affect the ability of the Government to ensure that women covered by petitioners' health plans "obtain, without cost, the full range of FDA approved contraceptives." Wheaton College v. Burwell, 573 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 2806, 2807, 189 L.Ed.2d 856 (2014). Through this litigation, petitioners have made the Government aware of their view that they meet "the requirements for exemption from the contraceptive coverage requirement on religious grounds." Id., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2807. Nothing in this opinion, or in the opinions or orders of the courts below, "precludes the Government from relying on this notice, to the extent it considers it necessary, to facilitate the provision of full contraceptive coverage" going forward. Ibid . Because the Government may rely on this notice, the Government may not impose taxes or penalties on petitioners for failure to provide the relevant notice. The judgments of the Courts of Appeals are vacated, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice SOTOMAYOR, with whom Justice GINSBURG joins, concurring. I join the Court's per curiam opinion because it expresses no view on "the merits of the cases," "whether petitioners' religious exercise has been substantially burdened," or "whether the current regulations are the least restrictive means of serving" a compelling governmental interest. Ante, at 1560 - 1561. Lower courts, therefore, should not construe either today's per curiam or our order of March 29, 2016, as signals of where this Court stands. We have included similarly explicit disclaimers in previous orders. See, e.g., Wheaton College v. Burwell, 573 U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 2806, 189 L.Ed.2d 856 (2014) ("[T]his order should not be construed as an expression of the Court's views on the merits"). Yet some lower courts have ignored those instructions. See, e.g., Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 801 F.3d 927, 944 (C.A.8 2015) ("[I]n Wheaton College, Little Sisters of the Poor, and Zubik, the Supreme Court approved a method of notice to HHS that is arguably less onerous than [existing regulations] yet permits the government to further its interests. Although the Court's orders were not final rulings on the merits, they at the very least collectively constitute a signal that less restrictive means exist by which the government may further its interests"). On remand in these cases, the Courts of Appeals should not make the same mistake. I also join the Court's opinion because it allows the lower courts to consider only whether existing or modified regulations could provide seamless contraceptive coverage " 'to petitioners' employees, through petitioners' insurance companies, without any ... notice from petitioners.' " Ante, at 1559. The opinion does not, by contrast, endorse the petitioners' position that the existing regulations substantially burden their religious exercise or that contraceptive coverage must be provided through a "separate policy, with a separate enrollment process." Supp. Brief for Petitioners 1; Supp. Reply Brief for Petitioners 5. Such separate contraceptive-only policies do not currently exist, and the Government has laid out a number of legal and practical obstacles to their creation. See Supp. Reply Brief for Respondents 3-4. Requiring standalone contraceptive-only coverage would leave in limbo all of the women now guaranteed seamless preventive-care coverage under the Affordable Care Act. And requiring that women affirmatively opt into such coverage would "impose precisely the kind of barrier to the delivery of preventive services that Congress sought to eliminate." Id., at 6. Today's opinion does only what it says it does: "afford[s] an opportunity" for the parties and Courts of Appeals to reconsider the parties' arguments in light of petitioners' new articulation of their religious objection and the Government's clarification about what the existing regulations accomplish, how they might be amended, and what such an amendment would sacrifice. Ante, at 1560. As enlightened by the parties' new submissions, the Courts of Appeals remain free to reach the same conclusion or a different one on each of the questions presented by these cases.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them. Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer. Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.
Who is the respondent of the case?
[ "attorney general of the United States, or his office", "specified state board or department of education", "city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit", "state commission, board, committee, or authority", "county government or county governmental unit, except school district", "court or judicial district", "state department or agency", "governmental employee or job applicant", "female governmental employee or job applicant", "minority governmental employee or job applicant", "minority female governmental employee or job applicant", "not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable", "retired or former governmental employee", "U.S. House of Representatives", "interstate compact", "judge", "state legislature, house, or committee", "local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough", "governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact", "state or U.S. supreme court", "local school district or board of education", "U.S. Senate", "U.S. senator", "foreign nation or instrumentality", "state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of", "state college or university", "United States", "State", "person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime", "advertising business or agency", "agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor", "airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes", "airline", "distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages", "alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked", "American Medical Association", "National Railroad Passenger Corp.", "amusement establishment, or recreational facility", "arrested person, or pretrial detainee", "attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association", "author, copyright holder", "bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company", "bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization", "establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store", "water transportation, stevedore", "bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines", "brewery, distillery", "broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm", "construction industry", "bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle", "business, corporation", "buyer, purchaser", "cable TV", "car dealer", "person convicted of crime", "tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband", "chemical company", "child, children, including adopted or illegitimate", "religious organization, institution, or person", "private club or facility", "coal company or coal mine operator", "computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software", "consumer, consumer organization", "creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company", "person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial", "defendant", "debtor", "real estate developer", "disabled person or disability benefit claimant", "distributor", "person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector", "drug manufacturer", "druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy", "employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of", "employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan", "electric equipment manufacturer", "electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company", "eleemosynary institution or person", "environmental organization", "employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.", "farmer, farm worker, or farm organization", "father", "female employee or job applicant", "female", "movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of", "fisherman or fishing company", "food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard", "foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity", "franchiser", "franchisee", "lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization", "person who guarantees another's obligations", "handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to", "health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor", "heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be", "hospital, medical center", "husband, or ex-husband", "involuntarily committed mental patient", "Indian, including Indian tribe or nation", "insurance company, or surety", "inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder", "investor", "injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related", "juvenile", "government contractor", "holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor", "magazine", "male", "medical or Medicaid claimant", "medical supply or manufacturing co.", "racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant", "minority female employee or job applicant", "manufacturer", "management, executive officer, or director, of business entity", "military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist", "mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company", "mother", "auto manufacturer", "newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service", "radio and television network, except cable tv", "nonprofit organization or business", "nonresident", "nuclear power plant or facility", "owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels", "shareholders to whom a tender offer is made", "tender offer", "oil company, or natural gas producer", "elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly", "out of state noncriminal defendant", "political action committee", "parent or parents", "parking lot or service", "patient of a health professional", "telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company", "physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society", "public interest organization", "physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee", "pipe line company", "package, luggage, container", "political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official", "indigent, needy, welfare recipient", "indigent defendant", "private person", "prisoner, inmate of penal institution", "professional organization, business, or person", "probationer, or parolee", "protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer", "public utility", "publisher, publishing company", "radio station", "racial or ethnic minority", "person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination", "racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "realtor", "journalist, columnist, member of the news media", "resident", "restaurant, food vendor", "retarded person, or mental incompetent", "retired or former employee", "railroad", "private school, college, or university", "seller or vendor", "shipper, including importer and exporter", "shopping center, mall", "spouse, or former spouse", "stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder", "retail business or outlet", "student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only", "tenant or lessee", "theater, studio", "forest products, lumber, or logging company", "person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent", "trucking company, or motor carrier", "television station", "union member", "unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant", "union, labor organization, or official of", "veteran", "voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)", "wholesale trade", "wife, or ex-wife", "witness, or person under subpoena", "network", "slave", "slave-owner", "bank of the united states", "timber company", "u.s. job applicants or employees", "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "General Land Office of Commissioners", "Transportation Security Administration", "Surface Transportation Board", "U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.", "Reconstruction Finance Corp.", "Department or Secretary of Homeland Security", "Unidentifiable", "International Entity" ]
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ARTEAGA v. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 97-6749. Decided February 23, 1998 Together with Arteaga v. Wilson, Governor of California, et al., also on motion for leave to proceed informa pauperis. Per Curiam. Pro se petitioner Lorenzo Arteaga seeks leave to proceed informa pauperis to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal with prejudice of petitioner’s complaint for failure to amend his complaints pursuant to the District Court’s instructions. We deny petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis. He is allowed, until March 16,1998, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and to submit his petition in compliance with Rule 38.1. For the reasons discussed below, we also direct the Clerk of the Court not to accept any further petitions for certiorari in noneriminal matters from petitioner unless he first pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33.1. Petitioner has filed 20 petitions with this Court, 16 in the past two Terms. All have been denied without recorded dissent. In 1997, we invoked Rule 39.8 to deny petitioner in forma pauperis status. Arteaga v. California, post, p. 804. Petitioner nevertheless has filed another frivolous petition with this Court. In his petition and supplemental petition, Arteaga appears to assert that he is an innocent person falsely imprisoned and to allege numerous constitutional violations and conspiracies among prison, court, and government officials. He does not address the reasons for the . District Court’s dismissal. Accordingly, we enter this order barring prospective in forma pauperis filings by petitioner in noncriminal cases for the reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). It is so ordered.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court in which the case originated. Focus on the court in which the case originated, not the administrative agency. For this reason, if appropiate note the origin court to be a state or federal appellate court rather than a court of first instance (trial court). If the case originated in the United States Supreme Court (arose under its original jurisdiction or no other court was involved), note the origin as "United States Supreme Court". If the case originated in a state court, note the origin as "State Court". Do not code the name of the state. The courts in the District of Columbia present a special case in part because of their complex history. Treat local trial (including today's superior court) and appellate courts (including today's DC Court of Appeals) as state courts. Consider cases that arise on a petition of habeas corpus and those removed to the federal courts from a state court as originating in the federal, rather than a state, court system. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus begins in the federal district court, not the state trial court. Identify courts based on the naming conventions of the day. Do not differentiate among districts in a state. For example, use "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York" for all the districts in New York.
What is the court in which the case originated?
[ "U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals", "U.S. Court of International Trade", "U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims", "U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces", "U.S. Court of Military Review", "U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals", "U.S. Customs Court", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit", "U.S. Tax Court", "Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals", "U.S. Court for China", "U.S. Consular Courts", "U.S. Commerce Court", "Territorial Supreme Court", "Territorial Appellate Court", "Territorial Trial Court", "Emergency Court of Appeals", "Supreme Court of the District of Columbia", "Bankruptcy Court", "U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)", "Alabama Middle U.S. District Court", "Alabama Northern U.S. District Court", "Alabama Southern U.S. District Court", "Alaska U.S. District Court", "Arizona U.S. District Court", "Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court", "Arkansas Western U.S. District Court", "California Central U.S. District Court", "California Eastern U.S. District Court", "California Northern U.S. District Court", "California Southern U.S. District Court", "Colorado U.S. District Court", "Connecticut U.S. District Court", "Delaware U.S. District Court", "District Of Columbia U.S. District Court", "Florida Middle U.S. District Court", "Florida Northern U.S. District Court", "Florida Southern U.S. District Court", "Georgia Middle U.S. District Court", "Georgia Northern U.S. District Court", "Georgia Southern U.S. District Court", "Guam U.S. District Court", "Hawaii U.S. District Court", "Idaho U.S. District Court", "Illinois Central U.S. District Court", "Illinois Northern U.S. District Court", "Illinois Southern U.S. District Court", "Indiana Northern U.S. District Court", "Indiana Southern U.S. District Court", "Iowa Northern U.S. District Court", "Iowa Southern U.S. District Court", "Kansas U.S. District Court", "Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court", "Kentucky Western U.S. District Court", "Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court", "Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court", "Louisiana Western U.S. District Court", "Maine U.S. District Court", "Maryland U.S. District Court", "Massachusetts U.S. District Court", "Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court", "Michigan Western U.S. District Court", "Minnesota U.S. District Court", "Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court", "Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court", "Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court", "Missouri Western U.S. District Court", "Montana U.S. District Court", "Nebraska U.S. District Court", "Nevada U.S. District Court", "New Hampshire U.S. District Court", "New Jersey U.S. District Court", "New Mexico U.S. District Court", "New York Eastern U.S. District Court", "New York Northern U.S. District Court", "New York Southern U.S. District Court", "New York Western U.S. District Court", "North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court", "North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court", "North Carolina Western U.S. District Court", "North Dakota U.S. District Court", "Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court", "Ohio Northern U.S. District Court", "Ohio Southern U.S. District Court", "Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court", "Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court", "Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court", "Oregon U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court", "Puerto Rico U.S. District Court", "Rhode Island U.S. District Court", "South Carolina U.S. District Court", "South Dakota U.S. District Court", "Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court", "Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court", "Tennessee Western U.S. District Court", "Texas Eastern U.S. District Court", "Texas Northern U.S. District Court", "Texas Southern U.S. District Court", "Texas Western U.S. District Court", "Utah U.S. District Court", "Vermont U.S. District Court", "Virgin Islands U.S. District Court", "Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court", "Virginia Western U.S. District Court", "Washington Eastern U.S. District Court", "Washington Western U.S. District Court", "West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court", "West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court", "Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court", "Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court", "Wyoming U.S. District Court", "Louisiana U.S. District Court", "Washington U.S. District Court", "West Virginia U.S. District Court", "Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court", "South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court", "South Carolina Western U.S. District Court", "Alabama U.S. District Court", "U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone", "Georgia U.S. District Court", "Illinois U.S. District Court", "Indiana U.S. District Court", "Iowa U.S. District Court", "Michigan U.S. District Court", "Mississippi U.S. District Court", "Missouri U.S. District Court", "New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)", "New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)", "New York U.S. District Court", "North Carolina U.S. District Court", "Ohio U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania U.S. District Court", "Tennessee U.S. District Court", "Texas U.S. District Court", "Virginia U.S. District Court", "Norfolk U.S. District Court", "Wisconsin U.S. District Court", "Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court", "New Jersey U.S. District Court", "California U.S. District Court", "Florida U.S. District Court", "Arkansas U.S. District Court", "District of Orleans U.S. District Court", "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", "State Trial Court", "Eastern Circuit (of the United States)", "Middle Circuit (of the United States)", "Southern Circuit (of the United States)", "Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama", "Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas", "California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California", "Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut", "Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware", "Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida", "Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia", "Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois", "Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana", "Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa", "Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas", "Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky", "Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana", "Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine", "Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland", "Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts", "Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan", "Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota", "Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi", "Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri", "Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada", "New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire", "New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey", "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York", "North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina", "Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio", "Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon", "Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania", "Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island", "South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina", "Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee", "Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas", "Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont", "Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia", "West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia", "Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin", "Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming", "Circuit Court of the District of Columbia", "Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska", "Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado", "Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington", "Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho", "Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana", "Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah", "South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota", "North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota", "Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma", "Court of Private Land Claims", "United States Supreme Court" ]
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Jon HUSTED, Ohio Secretary of State, Petitioner v. A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE, et al. No. 16-980. Supreme Court of the United States Argued Jan. 10, 2018. Decided June 11, 2018. Eric E. Murphy, Columbus, OH, for Petitioner. Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the petitioner. Paul M. Smith, for Respondents. Michael Dewine, Attorney General of Ohio, Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, Steven T. Voigt, Principal Assistant Attorney General, Columbus, OH, for Petitioner Jon Husted, Ohio Secretary of State. Stuart C. Naifeh, Naila S. Awan, Cameron A. Bell, Demos, Dale E. Ho, Sophia Lin Lakin, Theresa J. Lee, Cecillia D. Wang, Julie A. Ebenstein, T. Alora Thomas, Rachel Wainer Apter, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York, NY, Brenda Wright, Demos, Newton, MA, Freda Levenson, Daniel P. Tokaji, Paul Moke, Richard Saphire, ACLU of Ohio, Cleveland, OH, David D. Cole, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Washington, DC, for Respondents. Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court. It has been estimated that 24 million voter registrations in the United States-about one in eight-are either invalid or significantly inaccurate. Pew Center on the States, Election Initiatives Issue Brief (Feb. 2012). And about 2.75 million people are said to be registered to vote in more than one State. Ibid. At issue in today's case is an Ohio law that aims to keep the State's voting lists up to date by removing the names of those who have moved out of the district where they are registered. Ohio uses the failure to vote for two years as a rough way of identifying voters who may have moved, and it then sends a preaddressed, postage prepaid card to these individuals asking them to verify that they still reside at the same address. Voters who do not return this card and fail to vote in any election for four more years are presumed to have moved and are removed from the rolls. We are asked to decide whether this program complies with federal law. I A Like other States, Ohio requires voters to reside in the district in which they vote. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3503.01(A) (West Supp. 2017); see National Conference of State Legislatures, Voting by Nonresidents and Noncitizens (Feb. 27, 2015). When voters move out of that district, they become ineligible to vote there. See § 3503.01(A). And since more than 10% of Americans move every year, deleting the names of those who have moved away is no small undertaking. For many years, Congress left it up to the States to maintain accurate lists of those eligible to vote in federal elections, but in 1993, with the enactment of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), Congress intervened. The NVRA "erect[s] a complex superstructure of federal regulation atop state voter-registration systems." Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 5, 133 S.Ct. 2247, 186 L.Ed.2d 239 (2013). The Act has two main objectives: increasing voter registration and removing ineligible persons from the States' voter registration rolls. See § 2, 107 Stat. 77, 52 U.S.C. § 20501(b). To achieve the latter goal, the NVRA requires States to "conduct a general program that makes a reasonable effort to remove the names" of voters who are ineligible "by reason of" death or change in residence. § 20507(a)(4). The Act also prescribes requirements that a State must meet in order to remove a name on change-of-residence grounds. §§ 20507(b), (c), (d). The most important of these requirements is a prior notice obligation. Before the NVRA, some States removed registrants without giving any notice. See J. Harris, Nat. Munic. League, Model Voter Registration System 45 (rev. 4th ed. 1957). The NVRA changed that by providing in § 20507(d)(1) that a State may not remove a registrant's name on change-of-residence grounds unless either (A) the registrant confirms in writing that he or she has moved or (B) the registrant fails to return a preaddressed, postage prepaid "return card" containing statutorily prescribed content. This card must explain what a registrant who has not moved needs to do in order to stay on the rolls, i.e., either return the card or vote during the period covering the next two general federal elections. § 20507(d)(2)(A). And for the benefit of those who have moved, the card must contain "information concerning how the registrant can continue to be eligible to vote." § 20507(d)(2)(B). If the State does not send such a card or otherwise get written notice that the person has moved, it may not remove the registrant on change-of-residence grounds. See § 20507(d)(1). While the NVRA is clear about the need to send a "return card" (or obtain written confirmation of a move) before pruning a registrant's name, no provision of federal law specifies the circumstances under which a return card may be sent. Accordingly, States take a variety of approaches. See Nat. Assn. of Secretaries of State (NASS) Report: Maintenance of State Voter Registration Lists 5-6 (Dec. 2017). The NVRA itself sets out one option. A State may send these cards to those who have submitted "change-of-address information" to the United States Postal Service. § 20507(c)(1). Thirty-six States do at least that. See NASS Report, supra, at 5, and n. v (listing States). Other States send notices to every registered voter at specified intervals (say, once a year). See, e.g., Iowa Code § 48A.28.3 (2012); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 7-5-330(F), 7-5-340(2) -(3) (2017 Cum. Supp.); see also S. Rep. No. 103-6, p. 46 (1993). Still other States, including Ohio, take an intermediate approach, see NASS Report, supra, at 5-6, such as sending notices to those who have turned in their driver's licenses, e.g., Ind. Code §§ 3-7-38.2-2(b)(2), (c)(4) (2004), or sending notices to those who have not voted for some period of time, see, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2-234 (Supp. 2017); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3503.21(B)(2) ; Okla. Admin. Code § 230:15-11-19(a)(3) (2016); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 25, § 1901(b)(3) (Purdon 2007); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 6.50(1) (2017 West Cum. Supp.). When a State receives a return card confirming that a registrant has left the district, the State must remove the voter's name from the rolls. §§ 20507(d)(1)(A), (3). And if the State receives a card stating that the registrant has not moved, the registrant's name must be kept on the list. See § 20507(d)(2)(A). What if no return card is mailed back? Congress obviously anticipated that some voters who received cards would fail to return them for any number of reasons, and it addressed this contingency in § 20507(d), which, for convenience, we will simply call "subsection (d)." Subsection (d) treats the failure to return a card as some evidence -but by no means conclusive proof-that the voter has moved. Instead, the voter's name is kept on the list for a period covering two general elections for federal office (usually about four years). Only if the registrant fails to vote during that period and does not otherwise confirm that he or she still lives in the district (e.g., by updating address information online) may the registrant's name be removed. § 20507(d)(2)(A) ; see §§ 20507(d)(1)(B), (3). In addition to these specific change-of-residence requirements, the NVRA also imposes two general limitations that are applicable to state removal programs. First, all such programs must be "uniform, nondiscriminatory, and in compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965." § 20507(b)(1). Second, the NVRA contains what we will call the "Failure-to-Vote Clause." See § 20507(b)(2). At present, this clause contains two parts. The first is a prohibition that was included in the NVRA when it was originally enacted in 1993. It provides that a state program "shall not result in the removal of the name of any person ... by reason of the person's failure to vote." Ibid. The second part, added by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), 116 Stat. 1666, explains the meaning of that prohibition. This explanation says that "nothing in [the prohibition] may be construed to prohibit a State from using the procedures described in [ §§ 20507 ](c) and (d) to remove an individual from the official list of eligible voters." § 20507(b)(2). These referenced subsections, §§ 20507(c) and (d), are the provisions allowing the removal of registrants who either submitted change-of-address information to the Postal Service (subsection (c)) or did not mail back a return card and did not vote during a period covering two general federal elections (subsection (d)). And since one of the requirements for removal under subsection (d) is the failure to vote during this period, the explanation added by HAVA in 2002 makes it clear that the statutory phrase "by reason of the person's failure to vote" in the Failure-to-Vote Clause does not categorically preclude the use of nonvoting as part of a test for removal. Another provision of HAVA makes this point more directly. After directing that "registrants who have not responded to a notice and ... have not voted in 2 consecutive general elections for Federal office shall be removed," it adds that "no registrant may be removed solely by reason of a failure to vote." § 21083(a)(4)(A) (emphasis added). B Since 1994, Ohio has used two procedures to identify and remove voters who have lost their residency qualification. First, the State utilizes the Postal Service option set out in the NVRA. The State sends notices to registrants whom the Postal Service's "national change of address service" identifies as having moved. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3503.21(B)(1). This procedure is undisputedly lawful. See 52 U.S.C. § 20507(c)(1). But because according to the Postal Service "[a]s many as 40 percent of people who move do not inform the Postal Service," Ohio does not rely on this information alone. In its so-called Supplemental Process, Ohio "identif [ies] electors whose lack of voter activity indicates they may have moved." Record 401 (emphasis deleted). Under this process, Ohio sends notices to registrants who have "not engage[d] in any voter activity for a period of two consecutive years." Id., at 1509. "Voter activity" includes "casting a ballot" in any election-whether general, primary, or special and whether federal, state, or local. See id., at 1507. (And Ohio regularly holds elections on both even and odd years.) Moreover, the term "voter activity" is broader than simply voting. It also includes such things as "sign [ing] a petition," "filing a voter registration form, and updating a voting address with a variety of [state] entities." Id., at 295, 357. After sending these notices, Ohio removes registrants from the rolls only if they "fai[l] to respond" and "continu[e] to be inactive for an additional period of four consecutive years, including two federal general elections." Id., at 1509; see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3503.21(B)(2). Federal law specifies that a registration may be canceled if the registrant does not vote "in an election during the period" covering two general federal elections after notice, § 20507(d)(1)(B)(ii), but Ohio rounds up to "four consecutive years" of nonvoting after notice, Record 1509. Thus, a person remains on the rolls if he or she votes in any election during that period-which in Ohio typically means voting in any of the at least four elections after notice. Combined with the two years of nonvoting before notice is sent, that makes a total of six years of nonvoting before removal. Ibid. C A pair of advocacy groups and an Ohio resident (respondents here) think that Ohio's Supplemental Process violates the NVRA and HAVA. They sued petitioner, Ohio's Secretary of State, seeking to enjoin this process. Respondents alleged, first, that Ohio removes voters who have not actually moved, thus purging the rolls of eligible voters. They also contended that Ohio violates the NVRA's Failure-to-Vote Clause because the failure to vote plays a prominent part in the Ohio removal scheme: Failure to vote for two years triggers the sending of a return card, and if the card is not returned, failure to vote for four more years results in removal. The District Court rejected both of these arguments and entered judgment for the Secretary. It held that Ohio's Supplemental Process "mirror[s] the procedures established by the NVRA" for removing people on change-of-residence grounds and does not violate the Failure-to-Vote Clause because it does not remove anyone "solely for [their] failure to vote." App. to Pet. for Cert. 43a, 57a, 69a-70a. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. 838 F.3d 699 (2016). It focused on respondents' second argument, holding that Ohio violates the Failure-to-Vote Clause because it sends change-of-residence notices "based 'solely' on a person's failure to vote." Id., at 711. In dissent, Judge Siler explained why he saw the case as a simple one: "The State cannot remove the registrant's name from the rolls for a failure to vote only, and Ohio does not do [that]." Id., at 716. We granted certiorari, 581 U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2188, 198 L.Ed.2d 254 (2017), and now reverse. II A As noted, subsection (d), the provision of the NVRA that directly addresses the procedures that a State must follow before removing a registrant from the rolls on change-of-residence grounds, provides that a State may remove a registrant who "(i) has failed to respond to a notice" and "(ii) has not voted or appeared to vote ... during the period beginning on the date of the notice and ending on the day after the date of the second general election for Federal office that occurs after the date of the notice" (about four years). 52 U.S.C. § 20507(d)(1)(B). Not only are States allowed to remove registrants who satisfy these requirements, but federal law makes this removal mandatory. § 20507(d)(3) ; see also § 21083(a)(4)(A). Ohio's Supplemental Process follows subsection (d) to the letter. It is undisputed that Ohio does not remove a registrant on change-of-residence grounds unless the registrant is sent and fails to mail back a return card and then fails to vote for an additional four years. B Respondents argue (and the Sixth Circuit held) that, even if Ohio's process complies with subsection (d), it nevertheless violates the Failure-to-Vote Clause-the clause that generally prohibits States from removing people from the rolls "by reason of [a] person's failure to vote." § 20507(b)(2) ; see also § 21083(a)(4)(A). Respondents point out that Ohio's Supplemental Process uses a person's failure to vote twice: once as the trigger for sending return cards and again as one of the requirements for removal. Respondents conclude that this use of nonvoting is illegal. We reject this argument because the Failure-to-Vote Clause, both as originally enacted in the NVRA and as amended by HAVA, simply forbids the use of nonvoting as the sole criterion for removing a registrant, and Ohio does not use it that way. Instead, as permitted by subsection (d), Ohio removes registrants only if they have failed to vote and have failed to respond to a notice. When Congress clarified the meaning of the NVRA's Failure-to-Vote Clause in HAVA, here is what it said: "[C]onsistent with the [NVRA], ... no registrant may be removed solely by reason of a failure to vote." § 21083(a)(4)(A) (emphasis added). The meaning of these words is straightforward. "Solely" means "alone." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2168 (2002); American Heritage Dictionary 1654 (4th ed. 2000). And "by reason of" is a "quite formal" way of saying "[b]ecause of." C. Ammer, American Heritage Dictionary of Idioms 67 (2d ed. 2013). Thus, a State violates the Failure-to-Vote Clause only if it removes registrants for no reason other than their failure to vote. This explanation of the meaning of the Failure-to-Vote Clause merely makes explicit what was implicit in the clause as originally enacted. At that time, the clause simply said that a state program "shall not result in the removal of the name of any person from the [rolls for federal elections] by reason of the person's failure to vote." 107 Stat. 83. But that prohibition had to be read together with subsection (d), which authorized removal if a registrant did not send back a return card and also failed to vote during a period covering two successive general elections for federal office. If possible, "[w]e must interpret the statute to give effect to both provisions," Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 580, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 174 L.Ed.2d 490 (2009), and here, that is quite easy. The phrase "by reason of" denotes some form of causation. See Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009). Thus, the Failure-to-Vote Clause applies when nonvoting, in some sense, causes a registrant's name to be removed, but the law recognizes several types of causation. When a statutory provision includes an undefined causation requirement, we look to context to decide whether the statute demands only but-for cause as opposed to proximate cause or sole cause. See Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 503 U.S. 258, 265-268, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992). Cf. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 692-693, 131 S.Ct. 2630, 180 L.Ed.2d 637 (2011). Which form of causation is required by the Failure-to-Vote Clause? We can readily rule out but-for causation. If "by reason of" in the Failure-to-Vote Clause meant but-for causation, a State would violate the clause if the failure to vote played a necessary part in the removal of a name from the list. Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 211, 134 S.Ct. 881, 187 L.Ed.2d 715 (2014). But the removal process expressly authorized by subsection (d) allows a State to remove a registrant if the registrant, in addition to failing to send back a return card, fails to vote during a period covering two general federal elections. So if the Failure-to-Vote Clause were read in this way, it would cannibalize subsection (d). Interpreting the Failure-to-Vote Clause as incorporating a proximate cause requirement would lead to a similar problem. Proximate cause is an elusive concept, see McBride, supra, at 692-693, 131 S.Ct. 2630, but no matter how the term is understood, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the failure to vote is a proximate cause of removal under subsection (d). If a registrant, having failed to send back a return card, also fails to vote during the period covering the next two general federal elections, removal is the direct, foreseeable, and closely connected consequence. See Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 444-445, 134 S.Ct. 1710, 188 L.Ed.2d 714 (2014) ; Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 553 U.S. 639, 654, 128 S.Ct. 2131, 170 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2008). By process of elimination, we are left with sole causation. This reading harmonizes the Failure-to-Vote Clause and subsection (d) because the latter provision does not authorize removal solely by reason of a person's failure to vote. Instead, subsection (d) authorizes removal only if a registrant also fails to mail back a return card. For these reasons, we conclude that the Failure-to-Vote Clause, as originally enacted, referred to sole causation. And when Congress enacted HAVA, it made this point explicit. It added to the Failure-to-Vote Clause itself an explanation of how it is to be read, i.e., in a way that does not contradict subsection (d). And in language that cannot be misunderstood, it reiterated what the clause means: "[R]egistrants who have not responded to a notice and who have not voted in 2 consecutive general elections for Federal office shall be removed from the official list of eligible voters, except that no registrant may be removed solely by reason of a failure to vote." § 21083(a)(4)(A) (emphasis added). In this way, HAVA dispelled any doubt that a state removal program may use the failure to vote as a factor (but not the sole factor) in removing names from the list of registered voters. That is exactly what Ohio's Supplemental Process does. It does not strike any registrant solely by reason of the failure to vote. Instead, as expressly permitted by federal law, it removes registrants only when they have failed to vote and have failed to respond to a change-of-residence notice. C Respondents and the dissent advance an alternative interpretation of the Failure-to-Vote Clause, but that reading is inconsistent with both the text of the clause and the clarification of its meaning in § 21083(a)(4)(A). Respondents argue that the clause allows States to consider nonvoting only to the extent that subsection (d) requires-that is, only after a registrant has failed to mail back a notice. Any other use of the failure to vote, including as the trigger for mailing a notice, they claim, is proscribed. In essence, respondents read the language added to the clause by HAVA-"except that nothing in this paragraph may be construed to prohibit a State from using the procedures described in subsections (c) and (d)"-as an exception to the general rule forbidding the use of nonvoting. See Brief for Respondents 37. And the Sixth Circuit seemed to find this point dispositive, reasoning that " 'exceptions in statutes must be strictly construed.' " 838 F.3d, at 708 (quoting Detroit Edison Co. v. SEC, 119 F.2d 730, 739 (C.A.6 1941) ). We reject this argument for three reasons. First, it distorts what the new language added by HAVA actually says. The new language does not create an exception to a general rule against the use of nonvoting. It does not say that the failure to vote may not be used "except that this paragraph does not prohibit a State from using the procedures described in subsections (c) and (d)." Instead, it says that "nothing in this paragraph may be construed " to have that effect. § 20507(b)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, it sets out not an exception, but a rule of interpretation. It does not narrow the language that precedes it; it clarifies what that language means. That is precisely what Congress said when it enacted HAVA: It added the "may not be construed" provision to "[c]larif[y]," not to alter, the prohibition's scope. § 903, 116 Stat. 1728. Second, under respondents' reading, HAVA's new language is worse than superfluous. Even without the added language, no sensible person would read the Failure-to-Vote Clause as prohibiting what subsections (c) and (d) expressly allow. Yet according to respondents, that is all that the new language accomplishes. So at a minimum, it would be redundant. But the implications of this reading are actually worse than that. There is no reason to create an exception to a prohibition unless the prohibition would otherwise forbid what the exception allows. So if the new language were an exception, it would seem to follow that prior to HAVA, the Failure-to-Vote Clause did outlaw what subsections (c) and (d) specifically authorize. And that, of course, would be nonsensical. Third, respondents' reading of the language that HAVA added to the Failure-to-Vote Clause makes it hard to understand why Congress prescribed in another section of the same Act, i.e., § 21083(a)(4)(A), that "no registrant may be removed solely by reason of a failure to vote." As interpreted by respondents, the amended Failure-to-Vote Clause prohibits any use of nonvoting with just two narrow exceptions-the uses allowed by subsections (c) and (d). So, according to respondents, the amended Failure-to-Vote Clause prohibits much more than § 21083(a)(4)(A). That provision, in addition to allowing the use of nonvoting in accordance with subsections (c) and (d), also permits the use of nonvoting in any other way that does not treat nonvoting as the sole basis for removal. There is no plausible reason why Congress would enact the provision that respondents envision. As interpreted by respondents, HAVA would be like a law that contains one provision making it illegal to drive with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or higher and another provision making it illegal to drive with a blood alcohol level of 0.10 or higher. The second provision would not only be redundant; it would be confusing and downright silly. Our reading, on the other hand, gives the new language added to the Failure-to-Vote Clause "real and substantial effect." Husky Int'l Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, 578 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 1581, 1586, 194 L.Ed.2d 655 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). It clarifies the meaning of the prohibition against removal by reason of nonvoting, a matter that troubled some States prior to HAVA's enactment. See, e.g., FEC Report on the NVRA to the 106th Congress 19 (1999). Respondents and the dissent separately claim that the Failure-to-Vote Clause must be read to bar the use of nonvoting as a trigger for sending return cards because otherwise it would be "superfluous." Post, at 1858 - 1859 (opinion of BREYER, J.); see Brief for Respondents 29. After all, subsection (d) already prohibits States from removing registrants because of a failure to vote alone. See § 20507(d)(1). To have meaning independent of subsection (d), respondents reason, the Failure-to-Vote Clause must prohibit other uses of the failure to vote, including its use as a trigger for sending out notices. This argument is flawed because the Failure-to-Vote Clause has plenty of work to do under our reading. Most important, it prohibits the once-common state practice of removing registered voters simply because they failed to vote for some period of time. Not too long ago, "[c]ancellation for failure to vote [was] the principal means used ... to purge the [voter] lists." Harris, Model Voter Registration System, at 44. States did not use a person's failure to vote as evidence that the person had died or moved but as an independent ground for removal. See ibid. Ohio was one such State. Its Constitution provided that "[a]ny elector who fails to vote in at least one election during any period of four consecutive years shall cease to be an elector unless he again registers to vote." Art. V, § 1 (1977). In addition, our reading prohibits States from using the failure to vote as the sole cause for removal on any ground, not just because of a change of residence. Recall that subsection (d)'s removal process applies only to change-of-residence removals but that the Failure-to-Vote Clause applies to all removals. Without the Failure-to-Vote Clause, therefore, States could use the failure to vote as conclusive evidence of ineligibility for some reason other than change of residence, such as death, mental incapacity, or a criminal conviction resulting in prolonged imprisonment. D Respondents put forth one additional argument regarding the Failure-to-Vote Clause. In essence, it boils down to this. So many properly registered voters simply discard return cards upon receipt that the failure to send them back is worthless as evidence that the addressee has moved. As respondents' counsel put it at argument, "a notice that doesn't get returned" tells the State "absolutely nothing about whether the person has moved." Tr. of Oral Arg. 41, 58. According to respondents, when Ohio removes registrants for failing to respond to a notice and failing to vote, it functionally "removes people solely for non-voting" unless the State has additional "reliable evidence" that a registrant has moved. Id ., at 49, 71. This argument is based on a dubious empirical conclusion that the NVRA and HAVA do not allow us to indulge. Congress clearly did not think that the failure to send back a return card was of no evidentiary value because Congress made that conduct one of the two requirements for removal under subsection (d). Requiring additional evidence not only second-guesses the congressional judgment embodied in subsection (d)'s removal process, but it also second-guesses the judgment of the Ohio Legislature as expressed in the State's Supplemental Process. The Constitution gives States the authority to set the qualifications for voting in congressional elections, Art. I, § 2, cl. 1; Amdt. 17, as well as the authority to set the "Times, Places and Manner" to conduct such elections in the absence of contrary congressional direction, Art. I, § 4, cl. 1. We have no authority to dismiss the considered judgment of Congress and the Ohio Legislature regarding the probative value of a registrant's failure to send back a return card. See Inter Tribal, 570 U.S., at 16-19, 133 S.Ct. 2247 ; see also id., at 36-37, 133 S.Ct. 2247 (THOMAS, J., dissenting); id., at 42-43, 46, 133 S.Ct. 2247 (ALITO, J., dissenting). For all these reasons, we hold that Ohio law does not violate the Failure-to-Vote Clause. III We similarly reject respondents' argument that Ohio violates other provisions of the NVRA and HAVA. A Respondents contend that Ohio removes registered voters on a ground not permitted by the NVRA. They claim that the NVRA permits the removal of a name for only a few specified reasons-a person's request, criminal conviction, mental incapacity, death, change of residence, and initial ineligibility. Brief for Respondents 25-26; see 52 U.S.C. §§ 20507(a)(3), (4). And they argue that Ohio removes registrants for other reasons, namely, for failing to respond to a notice and failing to vote. This argument plainly fails. Ohio simply treats the failure to return a notice and the failure to vote as evidence that a registrant has moved, not as a ground for removal. And in doing this, Ohio simply follows federal law. Subsection (d), which governs removals "on the ground that the registrant has changed residence," treats the failure to return a notice and the failure to vote as evidence that this ground is satisfied. § 20507(d)(1). If respondents' argument were correct, then it would also be illegal to remove a name under § 20507(c) because that would constitute removal for submitting change-of-address information to the Postal Service. Likewise, if a State removed a name after receiving a death certificate or a judgment of criminal conviction, that would be illegal because receipt of such documents is not listed as a permitted ground for removal under § 20507(a)(3) or § 20507(a)(4). About this argument no more need be said. B Respondents maintain, finally, that Ohio's procedure is illegal because the State sends out notices without having any "reliable indicator" that the addressee has moved. Brief for Respondents 31. The "[f]ailure to vote for a mere two-year period," they argue, does not reliably "indicate that a registrant has moved out of the jurisdiction." Id., at 30; see also, e.g., Brief for State of New York et al. as Amici Curiae 13-28. This argument also fails. The degree of correlation between the failure to vote for two years and a change of residence is debatable, but we know from subsection (d) that Congress thought that the failure to vote for a period of two consecutive general elections was a good indicator of change of residence, since it made nonvoting for that period an element of subsection (d)'s requirements for removal. In a similar vein, the Ohio Legislature apparently thought that nonvoting for two years was sufficiently correlated with a change of residence to justify sending a return card. What matters for present purposes is not whether the Ohio Legislature overestimated the correlation between nonvoting and moving or whether it reached a wise policy judgment about when return cards should be sent. For us, all that matters is that no provision of the NVRA prohibits the legislature from implementing that judgment. Neither subsection (d) nor any other provision of the NVRA demands that a State have some particular quantum of evidence of a change of residence before sending a registrant a return card. So long as the trigger for sending such notices is "uniform, nondiscriminatory, and in compliance with the Voting Rights Act," § 20507(b)(1), States can use whatever plan they think best. That may be why not even the Sixth Circuit relied on this rationale. Respondents attempt to find support for their argument in subsection (c), which allows States to send notices based on Postal Service change-of-address information. This provision, they argue, implicitly sets a minimum reliability requirement. Thus, they claim, a State may not send out a return card unless its evidence of change of residence is at least as probative as the information obtained from the Postal Service. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 56. Nothing in subsection (c) suggests that it is designed to play this role. Subsection (c) says that "[a] State may meet" its obligation "to remove the names" of ineligible voters on change-of-residence grounds by sending notices to voters who are shown by the Postal Service information to have moved, but subsection (c) does not even hint that it imposes any sort of minimum reliability requirement for sending such notices. §§ 20507(a)(4), (c). By its terms, subsection (c) simply provides one way-the minimal way-in which a State "may meet the [NVRA's] requirement[s]" for change-of-residence removals. § 20507(c) (emphasis added). As respondents agreed at argument, it is not the only way. Tr. of Oral Arg. 53. C Nothing in the two dissents changes our analysis of the statutory language. 1 Despite its length and complexity, the principal dissent sets out only two arguments. See post, at 1853 - 1854 (opinion of BREYER, J.). The first is one that we have already discussed at length, namely, that the Failure-to-Vote Clause prohibits any use of the failure to vote except as permitted by subsections (c) and (d). We have explained why this argument is insupportable, supra, at 1856 - 1858, and the dissent has no answer to any of the problems we identify. The dissent's only other argument is that Ohio's process violates § 20507(a)(4), which requires States to make a "reasonable effort" to remove the names of ineligible voters from the rolls. The dissent thinks that this provision authorizes the federal courts to go beyond the restrictions set out in subsections (b), (c), and (d) and to strike down any state law that does not meet their own standard of "reasonableness." But see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28-29. The dissent contends that Ohio's system violates this supposed "reasonableness" requirement primarily because it relies on the failure to mail back the postcard sent to those who have not engaged in voter activity for two years. Based on its own cobbled-together statistics, post, at 1856 - 1857, and a feature of human nature of which the dissent has apparently taken judicial notice (i.e., "the human tendency not to send back cards received in the mail," post, at 1856), the dissent argues that the failure to send back the card in question "has no tendency to reveal accurately whether the registered voter has changed residences"; it is an "irrelevant factor" that "shows nothing at all that is statutorily significant." Post, at 1856 - 1857, 1858 - 1859. Whatever the meaning of § 20507(a)(4)'s reference to reasonableness, the principal dissent's argument fails since it is the federal NVRA, not Ohio law, that attaches importance to the failure to send back the card. See §§ 20507(d)(1)(B)(i), (d)(2)(A). The dissenters may not think that the failure to send back the card means anything, but that was not Congress's view. The NVRA plainly reflects Congress's judgment that the failure to send back the card, coupled with the failure to vote during the period covering the next two general federal elections, is significant evidence that the addressee has moved. It is not our prerogative to judge the reasonableness of that congressional judgment, but we note that, whatever the general "human tendency" may be with respect to mailing back cards received in the mail, the notice sent under subsection (d) is nothing like the solicitations for commercial products or contributions that recipients may routinely discard. The notice in question here warns recipients that unless they take the simple and easy step of mailing back the preaddressed, postage prepaid card-or take the equally easy step of updating their information online-their names may be removed from the voting rolls if they do not vote during the next four years. See Record 295-296, 357. It was Congress's judgment that a reasonable person with an interest in voting is not likely to ignore notice of this sort. 2 Justice SOTOMAYOR's dissent says nothing about what is relevant in this case-namely, the language of the NVRA-but instead accuses us of "ignor[ing] the history of voter suppression" in this country and of "uphold[ing] a program that appears to further the ... disenfranchisement of minority and low-income voters." Post, at 1865 - 1866. Those charges are misconceived. The NVRA prohibits state programs that are discriminatory, see § 20507(b)(1), but respondents did not assert a claim under that provision. And Justice SOTOMAYOR has not pointed to any evidence in the record that Ohio instituted or has carried out its program with discriminatory intent. * * * The dissents have a policy disagreement, not just with Ohio, but with Congress. But this case presents a question of statutory interpretation, not a question of policy. We have no authority to second-guess Congress or to decide whether Ohio's Supplemental Process is the ideal method for keeping its voting rolls up to date. The only question before us is whether it violates federal law. It does not. The judgment of the Sixth Circuit is reversed. It is so ordered. I join the Court's opinion in full. I write separately to add that respondents' proposed interpretation of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) should also be rejected because it would raise significant constitutional concerns. Respondents would interpret the NVRA to prevent States from using failure to vote as evidence when deciding whether their voting qualifications have been satisfied. Brief for Respondents 25-30. The Court's opinion explains why that reading is inconsistent with the text of the NVRA. See ante, at 1841 - 1847. But even if the NVRA were "susceptible" to respondents' reading, it could not prevail because it "raises serious constitutional doubts" that the Court's interpretation avoids. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. ----, ----, 138 S.Ct. 830, 836, 200 L.Ed.2d 122 (2018). As I have previously explained, constitutional text and history both "confirm that States have the exclusive authority to set voter qualifications and to determine whether those qualifications are satisfied." Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 29, 133 S.Ct. 2247, 186 L.Ed.2d 239 (2013) (THOMAS, J., dissenting). The Voter-Qualifications Clause provides that, in elections for the House of Representatives, "the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." U.S. Const., Art. I, § 2, cl. 1. The Seventeenth Amendment imposes an identical requirement for elections of Senators. And the Constitution recognizes the authority of States to "appoint" Presidential electors "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct." Art. II, § 1, cl. 2; see Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., 570 U.S., at 35, n. 2, 133 S.Ct. 2247 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). States thus retain the authority to decide the qualifications to vote in federal elections, limited only by the requirement that they not " 'establish special requirements' " for congressional elections " 'that do not apply in elections for the state legislature.' " Id., at 26, 133 S.Ct. 2247 (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 865, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995) (THOMAS, J., dissenting)). And because the power to establish requirements would mean little without the ability to enforce them, the Voter Qualifications Clause also "gives States the authority ... to verify whether [their] qualifications are satisfied." 570 U.S., at 28, 133 S.Ct. 2247. Respondents' reading of the NVRA would seriously interfere with the States' constitutional authority to set and enforce voter qualifications. To vote in Ohio, electors must have been a state resident 30 days before the election, as well as a resident of the county and precinct where they vote. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3503.01(A) (Lexis 2015); see also Ohio Const., Art. V, § 1. Ohio uses a record of nonvoting as one piece of evidence that voters no longer satisfy the residence requirement. Reading the NVRA to bar Ohio from considering nonvoting would therefore interfere with the State's "authority to verify" that its qualifications are met "in the way it deems necessary." Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., supra, at 36, 133 S.Ct. 2247. Respondents' reading thus renders the NVRA constitutionally suspect and should be disfavored. See Jennings, supra, at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 836. Respondents counter that Congress' power to regulate the "Times, Places and Manner" of holding congressional elections includes the power to impose limits on the evidence that a State may consider when maintaining its voter rolls. See Brief for Respondents 51-55; see also Art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators"). But, as originally understood, the Times, Places and Manner Clause grants Congress power "only over the 'when, where, and how' of holding congressional elections," not over the question of who can vote. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., supra, at 29, 133 S.Ct. 2247 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (quoting T. Parsons, Notes of Convention Debates, Jan. 16, 1788, in 6 Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 1211 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds. 2000) (Massachusetts ratification delegate Sedgwick)). The " 'Manner of holding Elections' " was understood to refer to "the circumstances under which elections were held and the mechanics of the actual election." 570 U.S., at 30, 133 S.Ct. 2247 (quoting Art. I, § 4, cl. 1). It does not give Congress the authority to displace state voter qualifications or dictate what evidence a State may consider in deciding whether those qualifications have been met. See 570 U.S., at 29-33, 133 S.Ct. 2247. The Clause thus does not change the fact that respondents' reading of the NVRA is constitutionally suspect. The Court's interpretation of the NVRA was already the correct reading of the statute: The NVRA does not prohibit a State from considering failure to vote as evidence that a registrant has moved. The fact that this reading avoids serious constitutional problems is an additional reason why, in my view, today's decision is undoubtedly correct. Section 8 of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 requires States to "conduct a general program that makes a reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters by reason of ... a change in the residence of the registrant." § 8(a)(4), 107 Stat. 82-83, 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(4). This case concerns the State of Ohio's change-of-residence removal program (called the "Supplemental Process"), under which a registered voter's failure to vote in a single federal election begins a process that may well result in the removal of that voter's name from the federal voter rolls. See infra, at 1853 - 1854. The question is whether the Supplemental Process violates § 8, which prohibits a State from removing registrants from the federal voter roll "by reason of the person's failure to vote." § 20507(b)(2). In my view, Ohio's program does just that. And I shall explain why and how that is so. I This case concerns the manner in which States maintain federal voter registration lists. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a number of "[r]estrictive registration laws and administrative procedures" came into use across the United States-from literacy tests to the poll tax and from strict residency requirements to "selective purges." H.R. Rep. No. 103-9, p. 2 (1993). Each was designed "to keep certain groups of citizens from voting" and "discourage participation." Ibid. By 1965, the Voting Rights Act abolished some of the "more obvious impediments to registration," but still, in 1993, Congress concluded that it had "unfinished business" to attend to in this domain. Id., at 3. That year, Congress enacted the National Voter Registration Act "to protect the integrity of the electoral process," "increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal office," and "ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained." § 20501(b). It did so mindful that "the purpose of our election process is not to test the fortitude and determination of the voter, but to discern the will of the majority." S. Rep. No. 103-6, p. 3 (1993). In accordance with these aims, § 8 of the Registration Act sets forth a series of requirements that States must satisfy in their "administration of voter registration for elections for Federal office." § 20507. Ohio's Supplemental Process fails to comport with these requirements; it erects needless hurdles to voting of the kind Congress sought to eliminate by enacting the Registration Act. Four of § 8's provisions are critical to this case: subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d). The text of each subsection is detailed and contains multiple parts. Given the complexity of the statute, readers should consult these provisions themselves (see Appendix A, infra, at 1860 - 1862) and try to keep the thrust of those provisions in mind while reading this opinion. At the outset, I shall address each of them. A 1 We begin with subsection (a)'s "Reasonable Program" requirement. That provision says that "each State shall": "conduct a general program that makes a reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters by reason of ... a change in the residence of the registrant, in accordance with subsections (b), (c), and (d)." § 20507(a)(4). This provision tells each State that it must try to remove ineligible voters from the rolls, that it must act reasonably in doing so, and that, when it does so, it must follow the rules contained in the next three subsections of § 8-namely, subsections (b), (c), and (d). 2 Subsection (b)'s "Failure-to-Vote" Clause generally forbids state change-of-residence removal programs that rely upon a registrant's failure to vote as a basis for removing the registrant's name from the federal voter roll. Before 1993, when Congress enacted this prohibition, many States would assume a registered voter had changed his address, and consequently remove that voter from the rolls, simply because the registrant had failed to vote. Recognizing that many registered voters who do not vote "may not have moved," S. Rep. No. 103-6, at 17, Congress consequently prohibited States from using the failure to vote as a proxy for moving and thus a basis for purging the voter's name from the rolls. The Failure-to-Vote Clause, as originally enacted, said: "Any State program or activity to protect the integrity of the electoral process by ensuring the maintenance of an accurate and current voter registration roll for elections for Federal office ... shall not result in the removal of the name of any person from the official list of voters registered to vote in an election for Federal office by reason of the person's failure to vote." 107 Stat. 83; see § 20507(b)(2). As I shall discuss, Congress later clarified that "using the procedures described in subsections (c) and (d) to remove an individual" from the federal voter roll is permissible and does not violate the Failure-to-Vote Clause. See § 8(b)(2) of the National Voter Registration Act, 107 Stat. 83, and as amended, 116 Stat. 1728, 52 U.S.C. § 20507(b)(2). 3 Subsection (c), which is entitled "Voter Removal Programs," explains how "[a] State may meet the requirement of subsection (a)(4)." § 20507(c)(1). Because subsection (a)(4) itself incorporates all of the relevant requirements of subsections (b), (c), and (d) within it, see § 20507(a)(4), subsection (c) sets forth one way a State can comply with the basic requirements of § 8 at issue in this case (including subsection (b)). A State's removal program qualifies under subsection (c) if the following two things are true about the program: "(A) change-of-address information supplied by the Postal Service through its licensees is used to identify registrants whose addresses may have changed; and "(B) if it appears [that] the registrant has moved to a different residence address not in the same registrar's jurisdiction, the registrar uses the notice procedure described in subsection (d)(2) to confirm the change of address." § 20507(c)(1). The upshot is that subsection (c) explains one way a State may comply with subsection (a)'s Reasonable Program requirement without violating subsection (b)'s Failure-to-Vote prohibition. It is a roadmap that points to a two-step removal process. At step 1, States first identify registered voters whose addresses may have changed; here, subsection (c) points to one (but not the only) method a State may use to do so. At step 2, subsection (c) explains, States must "confirm the change of address" by using a special notice procedure, which is further described in subsection (d). 4 Subsection (d) sets forth the final procedure, which Ohio refers to as the "Confirmation Procedure." Brief for Petitioner 7. The statute makes clear that a State must use the Confirmation Procedure to "confirm" a change of address in respect to any registered voter it initially identifies as someone who has likely changed addresses. It works as follows: the State must send the registrant identified as having likely moved a special kind of notice by forwardable mail. That notice must warn the registrant that his or her name will be removed from the voter roll unless the registrant either returns an attached card and confirms his or her current address in writing or votes in an election during the period covering the next two federal elections. In a sense, the notice a State is required to send as part of the Confirmation Procedure gives registered voters whom the State has identified as likely ineligible a "last chance" to correct the record before being removed from the federal registration list. The Confirmation Procedure is mandatory for all change-of-residence removals, regardless of the method the State uses to make its initial identification of registrants whose addresses may have changed. In particular, subsection (d) says: "A State shall not remove the name of a registrant from the official list of eligible voters ... on the ground that the registrant has changed residence unless the registrant [either]- "(A) confirms in writing that the registrant has changed residence to a place outside the registrar's jurisdiction in which the registrant is registered; or "(B)(i) has failed to respond to a notice described in [subsection (d)(2) ]; and (ii) has not voted [in two subsequent federal elections]." § 20507(d)(1). Subsection (d)(2) then goes on to describe (in considerable detail) the "last chance" notice the State must send to the registrant. In particular, the notice must be sent by forwardable mail so that the notice will reach the registrant even if the registrant has changed addresses. It must include a postage-prepaid, preaddressed "return card" that the registrant may send back to the State to confirm or correct the State's record of his or her current address. And, the notice must warn the registrant that unless the card is returned, if the registrant does not vote in the next two federal elections, then his or her name will be removed from the list of eligible voters. * * * In sum, § 8 tells States the following: • In general, establish a removal-from-registration program that "makes a reasonable effort" to remove voters who become ineligible because they change residences. • Do not target registered voters for removal from the registration roll because they have failed to vote. However, "using the procedures described in subsections (c) and (d) to remove an individual" from the federal voter roll is permissible and does not violate the Failure-to-Vote prohibition. • The procedures described in subsections (c) and (d) consist of a two-step removal process in which at step 1, the State uses change-of-address information (which the State may obtain, for instance, from the Postal Service) to identify registrants whose addresses may have changed; and then at step 2, the State must use the mandatory "last chance" notice procedure described in subsection (d) to confirm the change of address. • The "last chance" confirmation notice must be sent by forwardable mail. It must also include a postage-prepaid, preaddressed "return card" that the registrant may send back to the State verifying his or her current address. And it must warn the registrant that unless the card is returned, if the registrant does not vote in the next two federal elections, then his or her name will be removed from the list of eligible voters. B The Supplemental Process, Ohio's program for removing registrants from the federal rolls on the ground that the voter has changed his address, is much simpler. Each of Ohio's 88 boards of elections sends its version of subsection (d)'s "last chance" notice to those on a list "of individuals who, according to the board's records, have not engaged in certain kinds of voter activity"-including "casting a ballot"-for a period of "generally two years." Record 1507. Accordingly, each board's list can include registered voters who failed to vote in a single federal election. And anyone on the list who "continues to be inactive" by failing to vote for the next "four consecutive years, including two federal elections," and fails to respond to the notice is removed from the federal voter roll. Id., at 1509. Under the Supplemental Process, a person's failure to vote is the sole basis on which the State identifies a registrant as a person whose address may have changed and the sole reason Ohio initiates a registered voter's removal using subsection (d)'s Confirmation Procedure. II Section 8 requires that Ohio's program "mak[e] a reasonable effort to remove" ineligible registrants from the rolls because of "a change in the residence of the registrant," and it must do so "in accordance with subsections (b), (c), and (d)." § 20507(a)(4)(B). In my view, Ohio's program is unlawful under § 8 in two respects. It first violates subsection (b)'s Failure-to-Vote prohibition because Ohio uses nonvoting in a manner that is expressly prohibited and not otherwise authorized under § 8. In addition, even if that were not so, the Supplemental Process also fails to satisfy subsection (a)'s Reasonable Program requirement, since using a registrant's failure to vote is not a reasonable method for identifying voters whose registrations are likely invalid (because they have changed their addresses). First, as to subsection (b)'s Failure-to-Vote Clause, recall that Ohio targets for removal registrants who fail to vote. In identifying registered voters who have likely changed residences by looking to see if those registrants failed to vote, Ohio's program violates subsection (b)'s express prohibition on "[a]ny State program or activity [that] result[s] in the removal" of a registered voter "by reason of the person's failure to vote." § 20507(b)(2) (emphasis added). In my view, these words are most naturally read to prohibit a State from considering a registrant's failure to vote as part of any process "that is used to start, or has the effect of starting, a purge of the voter rolls." H.R. Rep. No. 103-9, at 15. In addition, Congress enacted the Failure-to-Vote Clause to prohibit "the elimination of names of voters from the rolls solely due to [a registrant's] failure to respond to a mailing." Ibid . But that is precisely what Ohio's Supplemental Process does. The program violates subsection (b)'s prohibition because under it, a registrant who fails to vote in a single federal election, fails to respond to a forwardable notice, and fails to vote for another four years may well be purged. Record 1508. If the registrant had voted at any point, the registrant would not have been removed. See supra, at 1853 - 1854; infra, at 1855 - 1857. Ohio does use subsection (d)'s Confirmation Procedure, but that procedure alone does not satisfy § 8's requirements. How do we know that Ohio's use of the Confirmation Procedure alone cannot count as statutorily significant? The statute's basic structure along with its language makes clear that this is so. In respect to language, § 8 says that the function of subsection (d)'s Confirmation Procedure is "to confirm the change of address" whenever the State has already "identif[ied] registrants whose addresses may have changed." §§ 20507(c)(1)(A), (d)(2). The function of the Confirmation Procedure is not to make the initial identification of registrants whose addresses may have changed. As a matter of English usage, you cannot confirm that an event happened without already having some reason to believe at least that it might have happened. Black's Law Dictionary 298 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "confirm" as meaning "[t]o complete or establish that which was imperfect or uncertain"). Ohio, of course, says that it has a ground for believing that those persons they remove from the rolls have, in fact, changed their address, but the ground is the fact that the person did not vote-the very thing that the Failure-to-Vote Clause forbids Ohio to use as a basis for removing a registered voter from the registration roll. In respect to structure, two statutory illustrations make clear what the word "confirm" already suggests, namely, that the Confirmation Procedure is a necessary but not a sufficient procedure for removing a registered voter from the voter roll. The first illustration of how the Confirmation Procedure is supposed to function appears in subsection (c), which describes a removal process under which the State first identifies registrants who have likely changed addresses and then "confirm[s] " that change of residence using the Confirmation Procedure and sending the required "last chance" notice. § 20507(c)(1) (emphasis added). The identification method subsection (c) says a State may use is "change-of-address information supplied by the Postal Service." § 20507(c)(1)(A). A person does not notify the Postal Service that he is moving unless he is likely to move or has already moved. And, as the Registration Act says, "if it appears from change-of-address provided by the Postal Service that ... the registrant has moved to a different residence not in the same registrar's jurisdiction," the State has a reasonable (hence acceptable) basis for "us[ing] the notice procedure described in subsection (d)(2) to confirm the change of address." § 20507(c)(1)(B). The second illustration of how the Confirmation Procedure is supposed to function appears in a portion of the statute I have not yet discussed-namely, § 6 of the National Voter Registration Act, which sets out the rules for voter registration by mail. See § 6, 107 Stat. 80, 52 U.S.C. § 20505. In particular, § 6(d), entitled "Undelivered Notices," says that, "[i]f a notice of the disposition of a mail voter registration application ... is sent by non forwardable mail and is returned undelivered," at that point the State "may proceed in accordance with section 8(d)," namely, the Confirmation Procedure, and send the same "last chance" notice that I have just discussed. § 20505(d) (emphasis added). Note that § 6(d) specifies a non forwardable mailing-and not a forwardable mailing, like one specified in § 8(d). This distinction matters. Why? If a person moves, a forwardable mailing will be sent along (i.e., "forwarded") to that person's new address; in contrast, a non forwardable mailing will not be forwarded to the person's new address but instead will be returned to the sender and marked "undeliverable." And so a non forwardable mailing that is returned to the sender marked "undeliverable" indicates that the intended recipient may have moved. After all, the Postal Service, as the majority points out, returns mail marked "undeliverable" if the intended recipient has moved-not if the person still lives at his old address. Ante, at 1840, and n. 3. Under § 6(d), the Registration Act expressly endorses non forwardable mailings as a reasonable method for States to use at step 1 to identify registrants whose addresses may have changed before the State proceeds to step 2 and sends the forwardable notice required under subsection (d)'s Confirmation Procedure. Specifically, § 6(d) explains that, if a State sends its registrants a mailing by non forwardable mail (which States often do), and if "[that mailing] is returned undelivered," the State has a fairly good reason for believing that the person has moved and therefore "may proceed in accordance with" § 8(d) by sending the "last chance" forwardable notice that the Confirmation Procedure requires. § 20505(d). In contrast to a non forwardable notice that is returned undeliverable, which tells the State that a registrant has likely moved, a forwardable notice that elicits no response whatsoever tells the State close to nothing at all. That is because, as I shall discuss, most people who receive confirmation notices from the State simply do not send back the "return card" attached to that mailing-whether they have moved or not. In sum, § 6(d), just like §§ 8(a) and 8(c), indicates that the State, as an initial matter, must use a reasonable method to identify a person who has likely moved and then must send that person a confirmatory notice that will in effect give him a "last chance" to remain on the rolls. And these provisions thus tend to deny, not to support, the majority's suggestion that somehow sending a "last chance" notice is itself a way (other than nonvoting) to identify someone who has likely moved. I concede that some individuals who have, in fact, moved do, in fact, send a return card back to the State making clear that they have moved. And some registrants do send back a card saying that they have not moved. Thus, the Confirmation Procedure will sometimes help provide confirmation of what the initial identification procedure is supposed to accomplish: finding registrants who have probably moved. But more often than not, the State fails to receive anything back from the registrant, and the fact that the State hears nothing from the registrant essentially proves nothing at all. Anyone who doubts this last statement need simply consult figures in the record along with a few generally available statistics. As a general matter, the problem these numbers reveal is as follows: Very few registered voters move outside of their county of registration. But many registered voters fail to vote. Most registered voters who fail to vote also fail to respond to the State's "last chance" notice. And the number of registered voters who both fail to vote and fail to respond to the "last chance" notice exceeds the number of registered voters who move outside of their county each year. Consider the following facts. First, Ohio tells us that a small number of Americans-about 4% of all Americans-move outside of their county each year. Record 376. (The majority suggests the relevant number is 10%, ante, at 1838 - 1839, but that includes people who move within their county.) At the same time, a large number of American voters fail to vote, and Ohio voters are no exception. In 2014, around 59% of Ohio's registered voters failed to vote. See Brief for League of Women Voters et al. as Amici Curiae 16, and n. 12 (citing Ohio Secretary of State, 2014 Official Election Results). Although many registrants fail to vote and only a small number move, under the Supplemental Process, Ohio uses a registrant's failure to vote to identify that registrant as a person whose address has likely changed. The record shows that in 2012 Ohio identified about 1.5 million registered voters-nearly 20% of its 8 million registered voters-as likely ineligible to remain on the federal voter roll because they changed their residences. Record 475. Ohio then sent those 1.5 million registered voters subsubsection (d) "last chance" confirmation notices. In response to those 1.5 million notices, Ohio only received back about 60,000 return cards (or 4%) which said, in effect, "You are right, Ohio. I have, in fact, moved." Ibid. In addition, Ohio received back about 235,000 return cards which said, in effect, "You are wrong, Ohio, I have not moved." In the end, however, there were more than 1,000,000 notices -the vast majority of notices sent-to which Ohio received back no return card at all. Ibid. What about those registered voters-more than 1 million strong-who did not send back their return cards? Is there any reason at all (other than their failure to vote) to think they moved? The answer to this question must be no. There is no reason at all. First, those 1 million or so voters accounted for about 13% of Ohio's voting population. So if those 1 million or so registered voters (or even half of them) had, in fact, moved, then vastly more people must move each year in Ohio than is generally true of the roughly 4% of all Americans who move to a different county nationwide (not all of whom are registered voters). See Id ., at 376. But there is no reason to think this. Ohio offers no such reason. And the streets of Ohio's cities are not filled with moving vans; nor has Cleveland become the Nation's residential moving companies' headquarters. Thus, I think it fair to assume (because of the human tendency not to send back cards received in the mail, confirmed strongly by the actual numbers in this record) the following: In respect to change of residence, the failure of more than 1 million Ohio voters to respond to forwardable notices (the vast majority of those sent) shows nothing at all that is statutorily significant. To put the matter in the present statutory context: When a State relies upon a registrant's failure to vote to initiate the Confirmation Procedure, it violates the Failure-to-Vote Clause, and a State's subsequent use of the Confirmation Procedure cannot save the State's program from that defect. Even if that were not so, a nonreturned confirmation notice adds nothing to the State's understanding of whether the voter has moved or not. And that, I repeat, is because a nonreturned confirmation notice (as the numbers show) cannot reasonably indicate a change of address. Finally, let us return to § 8's basic mandate and purpose. Ohio's program must "mak[e] a reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible voters" from its federal rolls on change-of-residence grounds. § 20507(a)(4) (emphasis added). Reasonableness under § 8(a) is primarily measured in terms of the program's compliance with "subsections (b), (c), and (d)." § 20507(a)(4)(B). That includes the broad prohibition on removing registrants because of their failure to vote. More generally, the statute seeks to "protect the integrity of the electoral process" and "ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained." §§ 20501(b)(3), (4). Ohio's system adds to its non-voting-based identification system a factor that has no tendency to reveal accurately whether the registered voter has changed residences. Nothing plus one is still one. And, if that "one" consists of a failure to vote, then Ohio's program also fails to make the requisite "reasonable effort" to comply with subsection (a)'s statutory mandate. It must violate the statute. III The majority tries to find support in two provisions of a different statute, namely, the Help America Vote Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 1666, the pertinent part of which is reprinted in Appendix B, infra, at 1862 - 1863. The first is entitled "Clarification of Ability of Election Officials To Remove Registrants From Official List of Voters on Grounds of Change of Residence." § 903, id., at 1728. That provision was added to the National Voter Registration Act's Failure-to-Vote Clause, subsection (b)(2), which says that a State's registrant removal program "shall not result in the removal of the name of any person from the official list ... by reason of the person's failure to vote." § 20507(b)(2) ; see supra, at 1851. The "Clarification" adds: "except that nothing in this paragraph may be construed to prohibit a State from using the procedures described in subsections (c) and (d) to remove an individual from the official list of eligible voters if the individual-(A) has not either notified the applicable registrar (in person or in writing) or responded ... to the [confirmation] notice sent by the applicable registrar; and then (B) has not voted or appeared to vote in 2 or more consecutive general elections for Federal office." § 903, id., at 1728 (emphasis added). This amendment simply clarified that the use of nonvoting specified in subsections (c) and (d) does not violate the Failure-to-Vote Clause. The majority asks why, if the matter is so simple, Congress added the new language at all. The answer to this question is just what the title attached to the new language says, namely, Congress added the new language for purposes of clarification . And the new language clarified any confusion States may have had about the relationship between, on the one hand, subsection (b)'s broad prohibition on any use of a person's failure to vote in removal programs and, on the other hand, the requirement in subsections (c) and (d) that a State consider whether a registrant has failed to vote at the end of the Confirmation Procedure. This reading finds support in several other provisions in both the National Voter Registration Act and the Help America Vote Act, which make similar clarifications. See, e.g., § 20507(c)(2)(B) (clarifying that a particular prohibition "shall not be construed to preclude" States from complying with separate statutory obligations); see also §§ 20510(d)(2) (similar rule of construction), 21081(c)(1), 21083(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(A)(iii), (b)(5), (d)(1)(A)-(B); 21084. The majority also points out that another provision of the Help America Vote Act, § 303. See § 303(a)(4), 116 Stat. 1708, 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(4). That provision once again reaffirms that a State's registration list-maintenance program must "mak[e] a reasonable effort to remove registrants who are ineligible to vote" and adds that "consistent with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 ... registrants who have not responded to a notice and who have not voted in 2 consecutive general elections for Federal office shall be removed from the official list of eligible voters, except that no registrant may be removed solely by reason of a failure to vote." § 21083(a)(4)(A) (emphasis added). The majority tries to make much of the word "solely." But the majority makes too much of too little. For one thing, the Registration Act's Failure-to-Vote Clause under subsection (b) does not use the word "solely." And § 303 of the Help America Vote Act tells us to interpret its language (which includes the word "solely") "consistent with the" Registration Act. § 21083(a)(4)(A). For another, the Help America Vote Act says that "nothing in this [Act] may be construed to authorize or require conduct prohibited under [the National Voter Registration Act], or to supersede, restrict or limit the application of ... [t]he National Voter Registration Act." § 21145(a)(4). The majority's view of the statute leaves the Registration Act's Failure-to-Vote Clause with nothing to do in respect to change-of-address programs. Let anyone who doubts this read subsection (d) (while remaining aware of the fact that it requires the sending of a confirmation notice) and ask himself or herself: What else is there for the Failure-to-Vote Clause to do? The answer is nothing. Section 8(d) requires States to send a confirmation notice for all change-of-address removals, and, in the majority's view, failing to respond to that forwardable notice is always a valid cause for removal, even if that notice was sent by reason of the registrant's initial failure to vote. Thus the Failure-to-Vote Clause is left with no independent weight since complying with subsection (d) shields a State from violating subsection (b). To repeat the point, under the majority's view, the Failure-to-Vote Clause is superfluous in respect to change-of-address programs: subsection (d) already accomplishes everything the majority says is required of a State's removal program-namely, the sending of a notice. Finally, even if we were to accept the majority's premise that the question here is whether Ohio's system removes registered voters from the registration list "solely by reason of a failure to vote," that would not change anything. As I have argued, Part II, supra, the failure to respond to a forwardable notice is an irrelevant factor in terms of what it shows about whether that registrant changed his or her residence. To add an irrelevant factor to a failure to vote, say, a factor like having gone on vacation or having eaten too large a meal, cannot change Ohio's sole use of "failure to vote" into something it is not. IV Justice THOMAS, concurring, suggests that my reading of the statute " 'raises serious constitutional doubts.' " Ante, at 1849 (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. ----, ----, 138 S.Ct. 830, 836, 200 L.Ed.2d 122 (2018) ). He believes that it "would seriously interfere with the States' constitutional authority to set and enforce voter qualifications." Ante, at 1849. At the same time, the majority "assume[s]" that "Congress has the constitutional authority to limit voting eligibility requirements in the way respondents suggest." Ante, at 1846, n. 5. But it suggests possible agreement with Justice THOMAS, for it makes this assumption only "for the sake of argument." Ibid. Our cases indicate, however, that § 8 neither exceeds Congress' authority under the Elections Clause, Art. I, § 4, nor interferes with the State's authority under the Voter Qualification Clause, Art. 1, § 2. Indeed, this Court's precedents interpreting the scope of congressional authority under the Elections Clause make clear that Congress has the constitutional power to adopt the statute before us. The Elections Clause states: "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators." U.S. Const., Art. I, § 4, cl. 1. The Court has frequently said that "[t]he Clause's substantive scope is broad," and that it "empowers Congress to pre-empt state regulations governing the 'Times, Places and Manner' of holding congressional elections." Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc ., 570 U.S. 1, 8, 133 S.Ct. 2247, 186 L.Ed.2d 239 (2013). We have long held that "[t]he power of Congress over the 'Times, Places and Manner' of congressional elections 'is paramount, and may be exercised at any time, and to any extent which it deems expedient; and so far as it is exercised, and no farther, the regulations effected supersede those of the State which are inconsistent therewith.' " Id ., at 9, 133 S.Ct. 2247 (quoting Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 392, 25 L.Ed. 717 (1880) ). The words " 'Times, Places, and Manner,' " we have said, are " 'comprehensive words' " that " 'embrace authority to provide a complete code for congressional elections.' " Tribal Council, supra, at 8-9, 133 S.Ct. 2247 (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366, 52 S.Ct. 397, 76 L.Ed. 795 (1932) ). That "complete code" includes the constitutional authority to enact "regulations relating to 'registration.' " Ibid. ; see also Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 524, 121 S.Ct. 1029, 149 L.Ed.2d 44 (2001) (same); Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 24-25, 92 S.Ct. 804, 31 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972). That is precisely what § 8 does. Neither does § 8 tell the States "who may vote in" federal elections. Tribal Council, 570 U.S., at 16, 133 S.Ct. 2247. Instead, § 8 considers the manner of registering those whom the State itself considers qualified. Unlike the concurrence, I do not read our precedent as holding to the contrary. But see id ., at 26, 133 S.Ct. 2247 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). And, our precedent strongly suggests that, given the importance of voting in a democracy, a State's effort (because of failure to vote) to remove from a federal election roll those it considers otherwise qualified is unreasonable. Cf. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91-93, 96, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965) (State can impose "reasonable residence restrictions on the availability of the ballot" but cannot forbid otherwise qualified members of military to vote); see also Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 625, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 23 L.Ed.2d 583 (1969) ("States have the power to impose reasonable citizenship, age, and residency requirements on the availability of the ballot" (emphasis added)); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) ("To introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor"). For these reasons, with respect, I dissent. APPENDIX A The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 "SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES. "(a) FINDINGS .-The Congress finds that- "(1) The right of citizens of the United States to vote is a fundamental right; "(2) it is the duty of the Federal, State, and local governments to promote the exercise of that right; and "(3) discriminatory and unfair registration laws and procedures can have a direct and damaging effect on voter participation in elections for Federal office and disproportionately harm voter participation ..., including racial minorities. "(b) PURPOSES .-The purposes of this Act are- "(1) to establish procedures that will increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal office; "(2) to make it possible for Federal, State, and local governments to implement this Act in a manner that enhances the participation of eligible citizens as voters in elections for Federal office; "(3) to protect the integrity of the electoral process; and "(4) to ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained." 107 Stat. 77. "SEC. 5. SIMULTANEOUS APPLICATION FOR VOTER REGISTRATION AND APPLICATION FOR MOTOR VEHICLE DRIVER'S LICENSE. "(d) CHANGE OF ADDRESS .-Any change of address form submitted in accordance with State law for purposes of a State motor vehicle driver's license shall serve as notification of change of address for voter registration with respect to elections for Federal office for the registrant involved unless the registrant states on the form that the change of address is not for voter registration purposes." Id., at 79. "SEC. 6. MAIL REGISTRATION. "(d) UNDELIVERED NOTICES . If a notice of the disposition of a mail voter registration application under section 8(a)(2) is sent by nonforwardable mail and is returned undelivered, the registrar may proceed in accordance with section 8(d)." Id., at 80. "SEC. 8. REQUIREMENTS WITH RESPECT TO ADMINISTRATION OF VOTER REGISTRATION. "(a) IN GENERAL -In the administration of voter registration for elections for Federal office, each State shall- "(1) ensure that any eligible applicant is registered to vote in an election- . . . . . "(2) require the appropriate State election official to send notice to each applicant of the disposition of the application; "(3) provide that the name of a registrant may not be removed from the official list of eligible voters except- "(A) at the request of the registrant; "(B) as provided by State law, by reason of criminal conviction or mental incapacity; or "(C) as provided under paragraph (4); "(4) conduct a general program that makes a reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters by reason of- "(A) the death of the registrant; or "(B) a change in the residence of the registrant, in accordance with subsections (b), (c), and (d); . . . . . "(b) CONFIRMATION OF VOTER REGISTRATION .-Any State program or activity to protect the integrity of the electoral process by ensuring the maintenance of an accurate and current voter registration roll for elections for Federal office- "(1) shall be uniform, nondiscriminatory, and in compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ( 42 U.S.C. 1973 et seq. ); and "(2) shall not result in the removal of the name of any person from the official list of voters registered to vote in an election for Federal office by reason of the person's failure to vote. "(c) VOTER REMOVAL PROGRAMS .-(1) A State may meet the requirement of subsection (a)(4) by establishing a program under which- "(A) change-of-address information supplied by the Postal Service through its licensees is used to identify registrants whose addresses may have changed; and "(B) if it appears from information provided by the Postal Service that- "(i) a registrant has moved to a different residence address in the same registrar's jurisdiction in which the registrant is currently registered, the registrar changes the registration records to show the new address and sends the registrant a notice of the change by forwardable mail and a postage prepaid pre-addressed return form by which the registrant may verify or correct the address information; or "(ii) the registrant has moved to a different residence address not in the same registrar's jurisdiction, the registrar uses the notice procedure described in subsection (d)(2) to confirm the change of address. "(2)(A) A State shall complete, not later than 90 days prior to the date of a primary or general election for Federal office, any program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters. "(B) Subparagraph (A) shall not be construed to preclude- "(i) the removal of names from official lists of voters on a basis described in paragraph (3)(A) or (B) or (4)(A) of subsection (a); or "(ii) correction of registration records pursuant to this Act. "(d) REMOVAL OF NAMES FROM VOTING ROLLS .-"(1) A State shall not remove the name of a registrant from the official list of eligible voters in elections for Federal office on the ground that the registrant has changed residence unless the registrant- "(A) confirms in writing that the registrant has changed residence to a place outside the registrar's jurisdiction in which the registrant is registered; or "(B)(i) has failed to respond to a notice described in paragraph (2); and "(ii) has not voted or appeared to vote (and, if necessary, correct the registrar's record of the registrant's address) in an election during the period beginning on the date of the notice and ending on the day after the date of the second general election for Federal office that occurs after the date of the notice. "(2) A notice is described in this paragraph if it is a postage prepaid and pre-addressed return card, sent by forwardable mail, on which the registrant may state his or her current address, together with a notice to the following effect: "(A) If the registrant did not change his or her residence, or changed residence but remained in the registrar's jurisdiction, the registrant should return the card not later than the time provided for mail registration under subsection (a)(1)(B). If the card is not returned, affirmation or confirmation of the registrant's address may be required before the registrant is permitted to vote in a Federal election during the period beginning on the date of the notice and ending on the day after the date of the second general election for Federal office that occurs after the date of the notice, and if the registrant does not vote in an election during that period the registrant's name will be removed from the list of eligible voters. "(B) If the registrant has changed residence to a place outside the registrar's jurisdiction in which the registrant is registered, information concerning how the registrant can continue to be eligible to vote. "(3) A voting registrar shall correct an official list of eligible voters in elections for Federal office in accordance with change of residence information obtained in conformance with this subsection." Id., at 82-84. APPENDIX B The Help America Vote Act of 2002 "SEC. 303. COMPUTERIZED STATEWIDE VOTER REGISTRATION LIST REQUIREMENTS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR VOTERS WHO REGISTER BY MAIL. "(a) COMPUTERIZED STATEWIDE VOTER REGISTRATION LIST REQUIREMENTS .- . . . . . "(4) MINIMUM STANDARD FOR ACCURACY OF STATE VOTER REGISTRATION RECORDS .-The State election system shall include provisions to ensure that voter registration records in the State are accurate and are updated regularly, including the following: "(A) A system of file maintenance that makes a reasonable effort to remove registrants who are ineligible to vote from the official list of eligible voters. Under such system, consistent with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 ( 42 U.S.C. 1973gg et seq. ), registrants who have not responded to a notice and who have not voted in 2 consecutive general elections for Federal office shall be removed from the official list of eligible voters, except that no registrant may be removed solely by reason of a failure to vote. "(B) Safeguards to ensure that eligible voters are not removed in error from the official list of eligible voters." 116 Stat. 1708-1710. "SEC. 903. CLARIFICATION OF ABILITY OF ELECTION OFFICIALS TO REMOVE REGISTRANTS FROM OFFICIAL LIST OF VOTERS ON GROUNDS OF CHANGE OF RESIDENCE. "Section 8(b)(2) of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 ... is amended by striking the period at the end and inserting the following: ", except that nothing in this paragraph may be construed to prohibit a State from using the procedures described in subsections (c) and (d) to remove an individual from the official list of eligible voters if the individual- "(A) has not either notified the applicable registrar (in person or in writing) or responded during the period described in subparagraph (B) to the notice sent by the applicable registrar; and then "(B) has not voted or appeared to vote in 2 or more consecutive general elections for Federal office." Id., at 1728. "SEC. 906. NO EFFECT ON OTHER LAWS. "(a) IN GENERAL .-... [N]othing in this Act may be construed to authorize or require conduct prohibited under any of the following laws, or to supersede, restrict, or limit the application of such laws [including]: . . . . . "(4) The National Voter Registration Act of 1993." Id., at 1729. I join the principal dissent in full because I agree that the statutory text plainly supports respondents' interpretation. I write separately to emphasize how that reading is bolstered by the essential purposes stated explicitly in the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) to increase the registration and enhance the participation of eligible voters in federal elections. 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501(b)(1)-(2). Congress enacted the NVRA against the backdrop of substantial efforts by States to disenfranchise low-income and minority voters, including programs that purged eligible voters from registration lists because they failed to vote in prior elections. The Court errs in ignoring this history and distorting the statutory text to arrive at a conclusion that not only is contrary to the plain language of the NVRA but also contradicts the essential purposes of the statute, ultimately sanctioning the very purging that Congress expressly sought to protect against. Concerted state efforts to prevent minorities from voting and to undermine the efficacy of their votes are an unfortunate feature of our country's history. See Schuette v. BAMN, 572 U.S. 291, 337-338, 134 S.Ct. 1623, 188 L.Ed.2d 613 (2014) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting). As the principal dissent explains, "[i]n the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a number of '[r]estrictive registration laws and administrative procedures' came to use across the United States." Ante, at 1850 (opinion of BREYER, J.). States enforced "poll tax [es], literacy tests, residency requirements, selective purges, ... and annual registration requirements," which were developed "to keep certain groups of citizens from voting." H.R. Rep. No. 103-9, p. 2 (1993). Particularly relevant here, some States erected procedures requiring voters to renew registrations "whenever [they] moved or failed to vote in an election," which "sharply depressed turnout, particularly among blacks and immigrants." A. Keyssar, The Right To Vote 124 (2009). Even after the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, many obstacles remained. See ante, at 1850 (opinion of BREYER, J.). Congress was well aware of the "long history of such list cleaning mechanisms which have been used to violate the basic rights of citizens" when it enacted the NVRA. S. Rep. No. 103-6, p. 18 (1993). Congress thus made clear in the statutory findings that "the right of citizens of the United States to vote is a fundamental right," that "it is the duty of the Federal, State, and local governments to promote the exercise of that right," and that "discriminatory and unfair registration laws and procedures can have a direct and damaging effect on voter participation ... and disproportionately harm voter participation by various groups, including racial minorities." 52 U.S.C. § 20501(a). In light of those findings, Congress enacted the NVRA with the express purposes of "increas[ing] the number of eligible citizens who register to vote" and "enhanc[ing] the participation of eligible citizens as voters." §§ 20501(b)(1)-(2). These stated purposes serve at least in part to counteract the history of voter suppression, as evidenced by § 20507(b)(2), which forbids "the removal of the name of any person from the official list of voters registered to vote in an election for Federal office by reason of the person's failure to vote." Ibid. Of course, Congress also expressed other objectives, "to protect the integrity of the electoral process" and "to ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained." §§ 20501(b)(3)-(4). The statute contemplates, however, that States can, and indeed must, further all four stated objectives. As relevant here, Congress crafted the NVRA with the understanding that, while States are required to make a "reasonable effort" to remove ineligible voters from the registration lists, § 20507(a)(4), such removal programs must be developed in a manner that "prevent[s] poor and illiterate voters from being caught in a purge system which will require them to needlessly re-register" and "prevent[s] abuse which has a disparate impact on minority communities," S. Rep. No. 103-6, at 18. Ohio's Supplemental Process reflects precisely the type of purge system that the NVRA was designed to prevent. Under the Supplemental Process, Ohio will purge a registrant from the rolls after six years of not voting, e.g., sitting out one Presidential election and two midterm elections, and after failing to send back one piece of mail, even though there is no reasonable basis to believe the individual actually moved. See ante, at 1857 - 1858 (BREYER, J., dissenting). This purge program burdens the rights of eligible voters. At best, purged voters are forced to "needlessly reregister" if they decide to vote in a subsequent election; at worst, they are prevented from voting at all because they never receive information about when and where elections are taking place. It is unsurprising in light of the history of such purge programs that numerous amici report that the Supplemental Process has disproportionately affected minority, low-income, disabled, and veteran voters. As one example, amici point to an investigation that revealed that in Hamilton County, "African-American-majority neighborhoods in downtown Cincinnati had 10% of their voters removed due to inactivity" since 2012, as "compared to only 4% of voters in a suburban, majority-white neighborhood." Brief for National Association for the Advancement of Colored People et al. as Amici Curiae 18-19. Amici also explain at length how low voter turnout rates, language-access problems, mail delivery issues, inflexible work schedules, and transportation issues, among other obstacles, make it more difficult for many minority, low-income, disabled, homeless, and veteran voters to cast a ballot or return a notice, rendering them particularly vulnerable to unwarranted removal under the Supplemental Process. See Brief for Asian Americans Advancing Justice | AAJC et al. as Amici Curiae 15-26; Brief for National Disability Rights Network et al. as Amici Curiae 17, 21-24, 29-31; Brief for VoteVets Action Fund as Amicus Curiae 23-30. See also Brief for Libertarian National Committee as Amicus Curiae 19-22 (burdens on principled nonvoters). Neither the majority nor Ohio meaningfully dispute that the Supplemental Process disproportionately burdens these communities. At oral argument, Ohio suggested that such a disparate impact is not pertinent to this case because respondents did not challenge the Supplemental Process under § 20507(b)(1), which requires that any removal program "be uniform, nondiscriminatory, and in compliance with the Voting Rights Act." Tr. of Oral Arg. 23. The fact that respondents did not raise a claim under § 20507(b)(1), however, is wholly irrelevant to our assessment of whether, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the Supplemental Process removes voters "by reason of the person's failure to vote" in violation of § 20507(b)(2). Contrary to the majority's view, ante, at 1848, the NVRA's express findings and purpose are highly relevant to that interpretive analysis because they represent "the assumed facts and the purposes that the majority of the enacting legislature ... had in mind, and these can shed light on the meaning of the operative provisions that follow." A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law 218 (2012). Respondents need not demonstrate discriminatory intent to establish that Ohio's interpretation of the NVRA is contrary to the statutory text and purpose. In concluding that the Supplemental Process does not violate the NVRA, the majority does more than just misconstrue the statutory text. It entirely ignores the history of voter suppression against which the NVRA was enacted and upholds a program that appears to further the very disenfranchisement of minority and low-income voters that Congress set out to eradicate. States, though, need not choose to be so unwise. Our democracy rests on the ability of all individuals, regardless of race, income, or status, to exercise their right to vote. The majority of States have found ways to maintain accurate voter rolls without initiating removal processes based solely on an individual's failure to vote. See App. to Brief for League of Women Voters of the United States et al. as Amici Curiae 1a-9a; Brief for State of New York et al. as Amici Curiae 22-28. Communities that are disproportionately affected by unnecessarily harsh registration laws should not tolerate efforts to marginalize their influence in the political process, nor should allies who recognize blatant unfairness stand idly by. Today's decision forces these communities and their allies to be even more proactive and vigilant in holding their States accountable and working to dismantle the obstacles they face in exercising the fundamental right to vote. United States Census Bureau, CB16-189, Americans Moving at Historically Low Rates (Nov. 16, 2016), available at https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2016/cb16-189.html (all Internet materials as last visited June 8, 2018). States must update the addresses of even those voters who move within their county of residence, for (among other reasons) counties may contain multiple voting districts. Cf. post, at 1856 -1857 (BREYER, J., dissenting). For example, Cuyahoga County contains 11 State House districts. See House District Map, Ohio House Districts 2012-2022, online at http://www.ohiohouse.gov/members/district-map. The principal dissent attaches a misleading label to this return card, calling it a " 'last chance' notice." Post, at 1852 - 1853, 1854 - 1856 (opinion of BREYER, J.). It is actually no such thing. Sending back the notice does not represent a voter's "last chance" to avoid having his or her name stricken from the rolls. Instead, such a voter has many more chances over a period of four years to avoid that result. All that the voter must do is vote in any election during that time. See 52 U.S.C. § 20507(d)(1)(B). U.S. Postal Service, Office of Inspector Gen., MS-MA-15-006, Strategies for Reducing Undeliverable as Addressed Mail 15 (2015); see also Brief for Buckeye Institute as Amicus Curiae 10. Respondents and one of their amici dispute this statistic. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 46; Brief for Asian Americans Advancing Justice et al. as Amici Curiae 27-28. See, e.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. § 11-17(a) (1993); Idaho Code Ann. § 34-435 (1981); Minn. Stat. § 201.171 (1992) ; Mont. Code Ann. § 13-2-401(1) (1993); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:31-5 (West Supp. 1989) ; Okla. Stat., Tit. 26, § 4-120.2 (1991); Utah Code § 20-2-24(1)(b) (1991). We assume for the sake of argument that Congress has the constitutional authority to limit voting eligibility requirements in the way respondents suggest. The majority characterizes these objectives as ones to "remov[e] ineligible persons from the States' voter registration rolls," ante, at 1850 - 1851, but maintaining "accurate" rolls and "protecting the integrity of the electoral process" surely encompass more than just removing ineligible voters. An accurate voter roll and fair electoral process should also reflect the continued enrollment of eligible voters. In this way, the NVRA's enhanced-participation and accuracy-maintenance goals are to be achieved simultaneously, and are mutually reinforcing.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
What is the issue of the decision?
[ "voting", "Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments", "ballot access (of candidates and political parties)", "desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)", "desegregation, schools", "employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.", "affirmative action", "slavery or indenture", "sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)", "reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act", "debtors' rights", "deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)", "employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)", "sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)", "sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)", "Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)", "Indians, state jurisdiction over", "juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)", "poverty law, constitutional", "poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.", "illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits", "handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes", "residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents", "military: draftee, or person subject to induction", "military: active duty", "military: veteran", "immigration and naturalization: permanent residence", "immigration and naturalization: citizenship", "immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization", "immigration and naturalization: access to public education", "immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits", "immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous", "indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)", "indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)", "indigents: payment of fine", "indigents: costs or filing fees", "indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee", "indigents: transcript", "indigents: assistance of psychiatrist", "indigents: miscellaneous", "liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)", "miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)" ]
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DAMERON v. BRODHEAD, MANAGER OF REVENUE & EX-OFFICIO TREASURER OF THE CITY & COUNTY OF DENVER. No. 302. Argued February 4, 1953. Decided April 6, 1953. Philip Elman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cummings, Assistant Attorney General Lyon, Ellis N. Slack and Berryman Green. Leonard M. Campbell argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was John C. Banks. Mr. Justice Reed delivered the opinion of the Court. The facts here are simple and undisputed. Petitioner is a commissioned officer of the United States Air Force. He was assigned to duty at Lowry Field, near Denver, Colorado, in 1948 and, throughout that year, resided in a privately rented apartment in that city. Respondent, acting Manager of Revenue and ex-officio Treasurer and Assessor of the City and County of Denver, assessed a tax of $23.51 on his personal property, mostly household goods in the apartment, which he valued at $460, by virtue of 4A Colorado Statutes Annotated (1935 ed.), c. 142. Petitioner paid the tax under protest, and sued to recover. His complaint pleaded as a fact that he, “during the whole of the calendar year -1948, and for many years prior thereto, was, and at the present time is, a citizen and a resident of the State of Louisiana, domiciled in the Town of Port Allen, in the Parish of West Baton Rouge, in the State of Louisiana, and remains a domiciliary of that town, parish, and state, and a citizen and resident of said state, in which during all of the period of time pertinent hereto the plaintiff was and is a qualified voter.” He claimed that § 514 of the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, 54 Stat. 1186, as amended, 56 Stat. 777, 58 Stat. 722, 50 TJ. S. C. App. §§ 501, 574, therefore forbade imposition of the Colorado tax. Respondent moved to dismiss, argument was had and the trial court entered judgment for petitioner. The Colorado Supreme Court, on appeal, reversed. Cass v. Dameron, 125 Colo. 477, 244 P. 2d 1082. It held that the purpose of the statute was to prevent multiple taxation of military personnel, but that since Louisiana had not taxed petitioner’s personal property, Colorado was free to do so. Our grant of certiorari rested on 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (3). 344 U. S. 891. Section 514 of the Act was added, in large part, in 1942. It then provided essentially that: “For the purposes of taxation in respect of any person, or of his property, income, or gross income, by any State, Territory, possession, or political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or by the District of Columbia, such person shall not be deemed to have lost a residence or domicile in any State, Territory, possession, or political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or in the District of Columbia, solely by reason of being absent therefrom in compliance with military or naval orders, or to have acquired a residence or domicile in, or to have become resident in or a resident of, any other State, Territory, possession, or political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or the District of Columbia, while, and solely by reason of being, so absent.” The 1944 Amendment thereto, which is crucial here, first concerned personal property taxes. It stated: “personal property shall not be deemed to be located or present in or to have a situs for taxation in such State, Territory, possession, or political subdivision, or district.” It also interpolated “personal” in the second line of §514(1). 58 Stat. 722. Respondent’s argument that the statute in this form cannot affect Colorado’s attempt to tax petitioner is twofold — either it does not apply or is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of federal legislation exempting servicemen from the substantial burdens of seriate taxation by the states in which they may be required to be present by virtue of their service, cannot be doubted. Generally similar relief has often been accorded other types of federal operations or functions. And we have upheld the validity of such enactments, even when they reach beyond the activities of federal agencies and corporations to private parties who have seen fit to contract to carry on functions of the Federal Government. Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U. S. 232, and cases cited; cf. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 160-161. Nor do we see any distinction between those cases and this. Surely, respondent may not rely on the fact that petitioner here is not a business contractor. He is not the less engaged in a function of the Federal Government merely because his relationship is not entirely economic. We have, in fact, generally recognized the especial burdens of required service with the armed forces in discussing the compensating benefits Congress provides. Le Maistre v. Leffers, 333 U. S. 1; Boone v. Lightner, 319 U. S. 561. Cf. Board of Commissioners v. Seber, 318 U. S. 705. Petitioner’s duties are directly related to an activity which the Constitution delegated to the National Government, that “to declare War,” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 11, and “to raise and support Armies.” Ibid., cl. 12. Since this is so, congressional exercise of a “necessary and proper” supplementary power such as this statute must be upheld. Pittman v. Home Owners’ Corp., 308 U. S. 21, 32-33; Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Co., 314 U. S. 95, 102-104. Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., supra, at 234. What has been said in no way affects the reserved powers of the states to tax. For this statute merely states that the taxable domicile of servicemen shall not be changed by military assignments. This we think is within the federal power. We turn, then, to the interpretation of the statute within the factual confines of this particular case. Respondent’s theory here also has no merit. It is based on the statements of the legislative history that, for instance, the provision was “designed to prevent multiple State taxation.” H. R. Rep. No. 2198, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 6. The short answer to the argument that it therefore only applies where multiple taxation is a real possibility is that the plain words of the statute do not say so. In fact, they are much broader: “personal property shall not be deemed to be located or present in or to have a situs for taxation” in the state of temporary presence in any case. There is no suggestion that the state of original residence must have imposed a property tax. Since the language of the section does not establish a condition to its application, we would not be justified in doing so. For we are shown nothing that indicates that a straightforward application of the language as written would violate or affect the clear purpose of the enactment. See United States v. Public Utilities Comm’n, ante, p. 295, decided today, and cases cited. In fact, though the evils of potential multiple taxation may have given rise to this provision, Congress appears to have chosen the broader technique of the statute carefully, freeing servicemen from both income and property taxes imposed by any state by virtue of their presence there as a result of military orders. It saved the sole right of taxation to the state of original residence whether or not that state exercised the right. Congress, manifestly, thought that compulsory presence in a state should not alter the benefits and burdens of our system of dual federalism during service with the armed forces. For similar reasons, we reject the argument that the word “deemed” as used implies a rebuttable presumption so as to permit taxation by the state of temporary presence in some cases. Such a construction would nullify the statute. For in every case, the absence of the property from the state of the serviceman’s temporary presence would be a fiction, rebuttable by further evidence. Reversed. This statute, in standard form, provides that “[a]ll personal property within this state on March first at twelve o’clock meridian in the then current year shall be listed and assessed,” § 72, and that the taxes so assessed “shall be and remain a perpetual lien upon the property so levied upon,” § 197 (a). See also Hearings, House Committee on Military Affairs on H. R. 7029, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.; S. Rep. No. 959, 78th Cong., 2d Sess.; H. R. Rep. No. 1514, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. Hearings, note 2, supra, p. 28.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the state or territory of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed.
What is the state of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed?
[ "Alabama", "Alaska", "American Samoa", "Arizona", "Arkansas", "California", "Colorado", "Connecticut", "Delaware", "District of Columbia", "Federated States of Micronesia", "Florida", "Georgia", "Guam", "Hawaii", "Idaho", "Illinois", "Indiana", "Iowa", "Kansas", "Kentucky", "Louisiana", "Maine", "Marshall Islands", "Maryland", "Massachusetts", "Michigan", "Minnesota", "Mississippi", "Missouri", "Montana", "Nebraska", "Nevada", "New Hampshire", "New Jersey", "New Mexico", "New York", "North Carolina", "North Dakota", "Northern Mariana Islands", "Ohio", "Oklahoma", "Oregon", "Palau", "Pennsylvania", "Puerto Rico", "Rhode Island", "South Carolina", "South Dakota", "Tennessee", "Texas", "Utah", "Vermont", "Virgin Islands", "Virginia", "Washington", "West Virginia", "Wisconsin", "Wyoming", "United States", "Interstate Compact", "Philippines", "Indian", "Dakota" ]
[ 6 ]
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FOREMOST-McKESSON, INC. v. PROVIDENT SECURITIES CO. No. 74-742. Argued October 7, 1975 Decided January 13, 1976 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, and in all but Part IV-C of which White, J., joined. Stevens, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the ease. Morton Moskin argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Thomas McGanney and Philip E. Diamond. Noble K. Gregory argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were John B. Bates and Walter R. Allan. S. Hazard Gillespie filed a brief for Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. as amicus curiae urging reversal. Whitney North Seymour, John A. Guzzetta, Bernhardt K. Wruble, and Conrad K. Harper filed a brief for Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents an unresolved issue under § 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Act), 48 Stat. 896, 15 U. S. C. § 78p (b). That section of the Act was designed to prevent a corporate director or officer or “the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum” of a corporation from profiteering through short-swing securities transactions on the basis of inside information. It provides that a corporation may capture for itself the profits realized on a purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of its securities within six months by a director, officer, or beneficial owner. Section 16 (b)’s last sentence, however, provides that it “shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved . . . .” The question presented here is whether a person purchasing securities that put his holdings above the 10% level is a beneficial owner “at the time of the purchase” so that he must account for profits realized on a sale of those securities within six months. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit answered this question in the negative. 506 F. 2d 601 (1974). We afiirm. I Respondent, Provident Securities Co., was a personal holding company. In 1968 Provident decided tentatively to liquidate and dissolve, and it engaged an agent to find a purchaser for its assets. Petitioner, Foremost-McKes-son, Inc., emerged as a potential purchaser, but extensive negotiations were required to resolve a disagreement over the nature of the consideration Foremost would pay. Provident wanted cash in order to facilitate its dissolution, while Foremost wanted to pay with its own securities. Eventually a compromise was reached, and Provident and Foremost executed a purchase agreement embodying their deal on September 25, 1969. The agreement provided that Foremost would buy two-thirds of Provident’s assets for $4.25 million in cash and $49.75 million in Foremost convertible subordinated debentures. The agreement further provided that Foremost would register under the Securities Act of 1933 $25 million in principal amount of the debentures and would participate in an underwriting agreement by which those debentures would be sold to the public. At the closing on October 15, 1969, Foremost delivered to Provident the cash and a $40 million debenture which was subsequently exchanged for two debentures in the principal amounts of $25 million and $15 million. Foremost also delivered a $2.5 million debenture to an escrow agent on the closing date. On October 20 Foremost delivered to Provident a $7.25 million debenture representing the balance of the purchase price. These debentures were immediately convertible into more than 10% of Foremost’s outstanding common stock. On October 21 Provident, Foremost, and a group of underwriters executed an underwriting agreement to be closed on October 28. The agreement provided for sale to the underwriters of the $25 million debenture. On October 24 Provident distributed the $15 million and $7.25 million debentures to its stockholders, reducing the amount of Foremost common into which the company’s holdings were convertible to less than 10%. On October 28 the closing under the underwriting agreement was accomplished. Provident thereafter distributed the cash proceeds of the debenture sale to its stockholders and dissolved. Provident’s holdings in Foremost debentures as of October 20 were large enough to make it a beneficial owner of Foremost within the meaning of § 16. Having acquired and disposed of these securities within six months, Provident faced the prospect of a suit by Foremost to recover any profits realized on the sale of the debenture to the underwriters. Provident therefore sued for a declaration that it was not liable to Foremost under § 16 (b). The District Court granted summary judgment for Provident, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Provident’s principal argument below for nonliability was based on Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Corp., 411 U. S. 582 (1973). There we held that an “unorthodox transaction” in securities that did not present the possibility of speculative abuse of inside information was not a “sale” within the meaning of § 16 (b). Provident contended that its reluctant acceptance of Foremost debentures in exchange for its assets was an “unorthodox transaction” not presenting the possibility of speculative abuse and therefore was not a “purchase” within the meaning of § 16 (b). Although the District Court’s pre-Kern County opinion had adopted this type of analysis, 331 F. Supp. 787 (ND Cal. 1971), the Court of Appeals rejected it, reasoning that Provident’s acquisition of the debentures was not “unorthodox” and that the circumstances did not preclude the possibility of speculative abuse. 506 F. 2d, at 604-605. The Court of Appeals then considered two theories of nonliability based on § 16 (b)’s exemptive provision: “This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase . . . .” The first was Provident’s argument that it was not a beneficial owner “at the time of . . . sale.” After the October 24 distribution of some debentures to stockholders, the debentures held by Provident were convertible into less than 10% of Foremost’s outstanding common stock. Provident contended that its sale to the underwriters did not occur until the underwriting agreement was closed on October 28. If this were the case, the sale would not have been covered by § 16 (b), since Provident would not have been a beneficial owner “at the time of . . . sale.” The Court of Appeals rejected this argument because it found that the sale occurred on October 21 upon execution of the underwriting agreement. The Court of Appeals then turned to the theory of nonliability based on the exemptive provision that we consider here. It held that in a purchase-sale sequence the phrase “at the time of the purchase,” “must be construed to mean prior to the time when the decision to purchase is made.” 506 F. 2d, at 614. Thus, although Provident became a beneficial owner of Foremost by acquiring the debentures, it was not a beneficial owner “at the time of the purchase.” Accordingly, the exemptive provision prevented any § 16 (b) liability on Provident’s part. II The meaning of the exemptive provision has been disputed since § 16 (b) was first enacted. The discussion has focused on the application of the provision to a purchase-sale sequence, the principal disagreement being whether “at the time of the purchase” means “before the purchase” or “immediately after the purchase.” The difference in construction is determinative of a beneficial owner’s liability in cases such as Provident’s where such owner sells within six months of purchase the securities the acquisition of which made him a beneficial owner. The commentators divided immediately over which construction Congress intended, and they remain divided. The Courts of Appeals also are in disagreement over the issue. The question of what Congress intended to accomplish by the exemptive provision in a purchase-sale sequence came to a Court of Appeals for the first time in Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F. 2d 299 (CA2), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 831 (1956). There the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit without discussion, but over a dissent, affirmed the District Court’s adoption of the “immediately after the purchase” construction. That court had been impelled to this construction at least in part by concern over what the phrase “at the time of . . . purchase” means in a sale-repurchase sequence, reasoning: “If the [‘before the purchase’] construction urged by [Graham-Paige] is placed upon the exemption provision, it would be possible for a person to purchase a large block of stock, sell it out until his ownership was reduced to less than 10%, and then repeat the process, ad infinitum.” 104 F. Supp. 957, 959 (SDNY 1952). The District Court may have thought that “before the purchase” seemed an unlikely construction of the exemptive provision in a sale-repurchase sequence, so it could not be the proper construction in a purchase-sale sequence. The Stella construction of the exemptive provision has been adhered to in the Second Circuit, Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F. 2d 348, 355-356, cert. denied, 400 U. S. 854 (1970); Perine v. William Norton & Co., 509 F. 2d 114, 118 (1974), and adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Emerson Electric Co. v. Reliance Electric Co., 434 F. 2d 918, 923-924 (1970), aff'd on other grounds, 404 U. S. 418 (1972). But in none of the foregoing cases did the court examine critically the legislative history of § 16 (b). The Court of Appeals considered this case against the background, sketched above, of ambiguity in the pertinent statutory language, continued disagreement among the commentators, and a perceived absence in the relatively few decided cases of a full consideration of the purpose and legislative history of § 16 (b). The court found unpersuasive the rationales offered in Stella and its progeny for the “immediately after the purchase” construction. It noted that construing the provision to require that beneficial-ownership status exist before the purchase in a purchase-sale sequence would not foreclose an “immediately after the purchase” construction in a sale-repurchase sequence. 506 F. 2d, at 614-615. More significantly, the Court of Appeals challenged directly the premise of the earlier cases that a “before the purchase” construction in a purchase-sale sequence would allow abuses Congress intended to abate. The court reasoned that in § 16 (b) Congress intended to reach only those beneficial owners who both bought and sold on the basis of inside information, which was presumptively available to them only after they became statutory “insiders.” 506 F. 2d at 608-614. III A The general purpose of Congress in enacting § 16 (b) is well known. See Kern County Land Co., 411 U. S., at 591-592; Reliance Electric Co., 404 U. S., at 422, and the authorities cited therein. Congress recognized that insiders may have access to information about their corporations not available to the rest of the investing public. By trading on this information, these persons could reap profits at the expense of less well informed investors. In § 16 (b) Congress sought to “curb the evils of insider trading [by] . . . taking the profits out of a class of transactions in which the possibility of abuse was believed to be intolerably great.” Reliance Electric Co., supra, at 422. It accomplished this by defining directors, officers, and beneficial owners as those presumed to have access to inside information and enacting a flat rule that a corporation could recover the profits these insiders made on a pair of security transactions within six months. Foremost points to this purpose, and invokes the observation in Reliance Electric Go. that “where alternative constructions of the terms of § 16 (b) are possible, those terms are to be given the construction that best serves the congressional purpose of curbing short-swing speculation by corporate insiders.” 404 U. S., at 424 (footnote omitted). From these premises Foremost argues that the Court of Appeals’ construction of the exemptive provision must be rejected because it makes § 16 (b) inapplicable to some possible abuses of inside information that the statute would reach under the Stella construction. We find this approach unsatisfactory in its focus on situations that § 16 (b) may not reach rather than on the language and purpose of the exemptive provision itself. Foremost’s approach also invites an imposition of § 16 (b)’s liability without fault that is not consistent with the premises upon which Congress enacted the section. B The exemptive provision, which applies only to beneficial owners and not to other statutory insiders, must have been included in § 16 (b) for a purpose. Although the extensive legislative history of the Act is bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress’ intent, see Reliance Electric Co., supra, at 424, the evolution of § 16 (b) from its initial proposal through passage does shed significant light on the purpose of the exemptive provision. The original version of what would develop into the Act was S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). It provided in § 15 (b): “It shall be unlawful for any director, officer, or owner of securities, owning as of record and/or beneficially more than 5 per centum of any class of stock of any issuer, any security of which is registered on a national securities exchange— “(1) To purchase any such registered security with the intention or expectation of selling the same security within six months; and any profit made by such person on any transaction in such a registered security extending over a period of less than six months shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention or expectation on his part in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased for a period exceeding six months.” In the next version of the legislation, H. It. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), § 15 (b) read almost identically to § 16 (b) as it was eventually enacted: “Any profit realized by such beneficial owner, director, or officer from any purchase and sale or sale and purchase of any such registered equity security within a period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months.... This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale or sale and purchase of the security involved, nor any transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer.” Thomas G. Corcoran, a spokesman for S. 2693’s drafters, explained § 15 (b) as forbidding an insider “to carry on any short-term specu[la]tions in the stock. He cannot, with his inside information get in and out of stock within six months.” Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 133 (1934). The Court of Appeals concluded that § 15 (b) of S. 2693 would have applied only to a beneficial owner who had that status before a purchase-sale sequence was initiated, 506 F. 2d, at 609, and we agree. Foremost appears not to contest this point. Brief for Petitioner 29. The question thus becomes whether H. R. 8720's change in the language imposing liability and its addition of the exemp-tive provision were intended to change S. 2693's result in a purchase-sale sequence by a beneficial owner. We think the legislative history shows no such intent. S. 2693 and its House counterpart, H. R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), met substantial criticism on a number of scores, including various provisions of § 15. See Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15 (1934); Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720, supra, at 1-623. S. 2693 was recast into H. R. 8720 to take account of the criticisms that the bill’s drafters thought valid. Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720, supra, at 625, 674. The primary substantive criticism directed at § 15 (b) of S. 2693 was that it did not prevent the use of inside information to reap a short-term profit in a sale-repurchase situation. See Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 6557-6558. Criticism was also directed at making liability for short-term profits turn on ownership “as of record and/or beneficially.” See id., at 6914. H. R. 8720 remedied these perceived shortcomings by providing in § 15 (b): “Any profit realized by such beneficial owner, director, or officer from any purchase and sale or sale and purchase . . . shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer.” The term “such beneficial owner” was defined in § 15 (a) to mean one “who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum of any class” of a registered security. The structure of the clause imposing liability in the revised § 15 (b) did not unambiguously retain S. 2693’s requirement that beneficial ownership precede a purchase-sale sequence. But we cannot assume easily that Congress intended to eliminate the requirement in the revised bill. The legislative history reveals that the requirement was made clear in the hearings, yet no complaint was made about it. The testimony on S. 2693 demonstrates that the drafters were emphatic about the requirement. In explaining the bill Corcoran pointed out a technical flaw in S. 2693’s language: “It shall be unlawful for any director, officer, or owner of securities, owning as of record and/or beneficially more than 5 per centum of any class of stock . . . .” It was possible to construe the phrase “owning ... 5 per centum” to apply to directors -and officers as well as to mere stockholders, so that trading by directors and officers would not be subject to § 15 (b) if their previous holdings did not exceed 5%. But Cor-coran made clear that the requirement of pre-existing ownership of the specified percentage applied only to beneficial owners. “Mr. Corcoran. . . . The bill is not very well drawn there. It ought to-read to cover every director, every officer, and every stockholder who owns more than 5 percent of the stock. That is the way it was intended to read. “Mr. Mapes. It ought to read 'and/or beneficially more than 5 percent’ followed by 'is a director, or officer.’ “Mr. Corcoran. It is badly drawn. We slipped on that. It ought to read 'every director and every officer’ and then ‘every big stockholder.’ ” Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720, supra, at 133. See Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 6555. The legislative record thus reveals that the drafters focused directly on the fact that S. 2693 covered a short-term purchase-sale sequence by a beneficial owner only if his status existed before the purchase, and no concern was expressed about the wisdom of this requirement. But the explicit requirement was omitted from the operative language of the section when it was restructured to cover sale-repurchase sequences. In the same draft, however, the exemptive provision was added to the section. On this record we are persuaded that the exemptive provision was intended to preserve the requirement of beneficial ownership before the purchase. Later discussions of the present § 16 (b) in the hearings are consistent with this interpretation. We hold that, in a purchase-sale sequence, a beneficial owner must account for profits only if he was a beneficial owner “before the purchase.” IV Additional considerations support our reading of the legislative history. A Section 16 (b) imposes a strict prophylactic rule with respect to insider, short-swing trading. In Kern County Land Co., 411 U. S., at 695, we noted: “The statute requires the [statutorily defined] inside, short-swing trader to disgorge all profits realized on all ‘purchases’ and ‘sales’ within the specified time period, without proof of actual abuse of insider information, and without proof of intent to profit on the basis of such information.” In short, this statute imposes liability without fault within its narrowly drawn limits. As noted earlier, Foremost recognizes the ambiguity of the exemptive provision, but argues that where “alternative constructions” of § 16 (b)’s terms are available, we should choose the construction that best serves the statute’s purposes. Foremost relies on statements generally to this effect in Kern County Land Co., supra, at 595, and Reliance Electric Co., 404 U. S., at 424. In neither of those cases, however, did the Court adopt the construction that would have imposed liability, thus recognizing that serving the congressional purpose does not require resolving every ambiguity in favor of liability under § 16 (b). We reiterate that nothing suggests that the construction urged by Foremost would serve better to further congressional purposes. Indeed, the legislative history of § 16 (b) indicates that by adding the exemptive provision Congress deliberately expressed a contrary choice. But even if the legislative record were more ambiguous, we would hesitate to adopt Foremost’s construction. It is inappropriate to reach the harsh result of imposing § 16 (b)’s liability without fault on the basis of unclear language. If Congress wishes to impose such liability, we must assume it will do so expressly or by unmistakable inference. It is not irrelevant that Congress itself limited carefully the liability imposed by § 16 (b). See Reliance Electric Co., supra, at 422-425. Even an insider may trade freely without incurring the statutory liability if, for example, he spaces his transactions at intervals greater than six months. When Congress has so recognized the need to limit carefully the “arbitrary and sweeping coverage” of § 16 (b), Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F. 2d 693, 696 (CA7 1970), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 992 (1971), courts should not be quick to determine that, despite an acknowledged ambiguity, Congress intended the section to cover a particular transaction. B Our construction of § 16 (b) also is supported by the distinction Congress recognized between short-term trading by mere stockholders and such trading by directors and officers. The legislative discourse revealed that Congress thought that all short-swing trading by directors and officers was vulnerable to abuse because of their intimate involvement in corporate affairs. But trading by mere stockholders was viewed as being subject to abuse only when the size of their holdings afforded the potential for access to corporate information.' These different perceptions simply reflect the realities of corporate life. It would not be consistent with this perceived distinction to impose liability on the basis of a purchase made when the percentage of stock ownership requisite to insider status had not been acquired. To be sure, the possibility does exist that one who becomes a beneficial owner by a purchase will sell on the basis of information attained by virtue of his newly acquired holdings. But the purchase itself was not one posing dangers that Congress considered intolerable, since it was made when the purchaser owned no shares or less than the percentage deemed necessary to make one an insider. Such a stockholder is more analogous to the stockholder who never owns more than 10% and thereby is excluded entirely from the operation of § 16 (b), than to a director or officer whose every purchase and sale is covered by the statute. While this reasoning might not compel our construction of the exemptive provision, it explains why Congress may have seen fit to draw the line it did. Cf. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840, 845 (CA2 1959). C Section 16 (b)’s scope, of course, is not affected by whether alternative sanctions might inhibit the abuse of inside information. Congress, however, has left some problems of the abuse of inside information to other remedies. These sanctions alleviate concern that ordinary investors are unprotected against actual abuses of inside information in transactions not covered by § 16 (b). For example, Congress has passed general antifraud statutes that proscribe fraudulent practices by insiders. See Securities Act of 1933, § 17 (a), 48 Stat. 84, 15 U. S. C. § 77q (a); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10 (b), 15 U. S. C. §78j(b); 3 Loss, supra, n. 11, at 1423-1429, 1442-1445. Today an investor who can show harm from the misuse of material inside information may have recourse, in particular, to § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1975). It also was thought that § 16 (a)’s publicity requirement would afford indirect protection against some potential misuses of inside information. See Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720, supra, at 134-135; H. R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (to accompany H. R. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., passed by the House, May 4, 1934, without the present § 16 (b)). V We must still consider briefly Foremost’s contention that the “before the purchase” construction renders other enactments of Congress unnecessary and conflicts with the interpretation of § 16 (b) by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Foremost and amicus Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. point to §§16 (d) and (e) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78p (d) and (e), as congressional actions that would not have been necessary unless one selling the securities the acquisition of which made him a beneficial owner is liable under § 16 (b). Section 16 (d), in part, exempts from § 16 (b) certain transactions by a securities “dealer in the ordinary course of his business and incident to the establishment or maintenance by him of a primary or secondary market.” Section 16 (e) provides an exemption for certain “foreign or domestic arbitrage transactions.” They argue similarly that the SEC’s Rule 16b-2, 17 CFR § 240.16b-2 (1975), is unnecessary if our construction of § 16 (b) is correct. Rule 16b-2 exempts from § 16 (b) specified transactions “in connection with the distribution of a substantial block of securities.” We do not consider these provisions to be inconsistent with our holding. Nothing on their faces would make them applicable to one selling the securities the purchase of which made him a beneficial owner. But the exemptions would be necessary to protect stockholders already qualifying as beneficial owners when they purchased and they would, of course, apply to transactions by directors and officers as well. Foremost and the amicus also remind us that the interpretation of the exemptive provision for which they contend has been adopted by the SEC in the past. See Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae in Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., O. T. 1971, No. 70-79, pp. 22-27. But the Commission has not appeared as an amicus in this case. In any event, even if the Commission’s views have not changed we would not afford them the deference to which the views of the agency administering a statute are usually entitled, for in Reliance Electric Co., 404 U. S., at 425-427, the Court rejected the basic theory on which the SEC based its interpretation of the exemptive provision. Our re-examination of the exemptive provision confirms the view that the SEC’s theory did not reflect the intent of Congress. The judgment is Affirmed. Mr. Justice White joins in the judgment of the Court, and in all but Part IY-C of the Court’s opinion. Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The corporate “insiders” whose trading is regulated by § 16 (b) are defined in § 16 (a) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78p (a), as “[e]very person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security) which is registered pursuant to section 781 of this title, or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such security.” Section 16(b), 15 U. S. C. §78p(b), reads in full: “For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit was realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection.” The debentures wer.e issued expressly to acquire Provident’s assets, and all of them were used for that purpose. The underwriters delivered $25,366,666.66 in cash to Provident. That amount represented a purchase price of 101%% of the principal amount of the debenture ($25,312,500) plus interest accrued from October 15 to the date of closing ($54,166.66). The amount of profit realized by Provident has never been established. A beneficial owner is one who owns more than 10% of an “equity security” registered pursuant to § 12 of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 781. See n. 1, supra. The owner of debentures convertible into more than 10% oí a corporation’s registered common stock is a beneficial owner within the meaning of the Act. §§ 3 (a) (10), (11) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78c (a) (10), (11); Rule 16a-2 (b), 17 CFR § 240.16a-2 (b) (1975). Foremost’s common stock was registered; thus Provident’s holdings made it a beneficial owner. This contention was based on Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418 (1972). There the Court held that a sale made after a former beneficial owner had already reduced its holdings below 10% was exempted from § 16 (b) by the phrase “at the time of . . . sale” in the exemptive provision. See n. 25, infra. Section 3 (a) (14) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a) (14), defines “sale” and “sell” to include “any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of.” But Provident argued that the October 28 closing date was the day of sale because contractual conditions prevented the contract from becoming binding until closing. The underwriting agreement provided in paragraph 7: “7. Termination of Agreement: This agreement may be terminated, prior to the time the Registration Statement becomes effective, by you or by any group of Underwriters which has agreed hereunder to purchase in the aggregate at least 50% of the Debentures, if, in your judgment or in the judgment of any such group of Underwriters, there shall have occurred a material unfavorable change in political, financial or economic conditions generally.” App. A134. And in paragraph 5, the agreement provided: “The several obligations of the Underwriters hereunder are subject to the following conditions: “(h) That, between the time of execution of this agreement and the time of purchase, there shall occur no material and unfavorable change, financial or otherwise (other than as referred to in the Registration Statement and the Prospectus), in the condition of the Company and its consolidated subsidiaries as a whole; and the Company will, at the time of purchase, deliver to you a certificate of two of its executive officers to the foregoing effect.” App. A134. The Court of Appeals agreed that conditions to performance might prevent a contract from being a “sale” prior to closing. But it ruled that all significant conditions here were satisfied when the registration statement required by paragraph 7 became effective on October 21, the day the underwriting agreement was executed. The court also found that after October 21, Provident was no longer subject to the risk of a decline in the market for Foremost’s stock. 506 F. 2d, at 607. For reasons not apparent from its opinion, the court did not address the possibility that paragraph 5 (h) left Provident subject to market risks. See n. 8, infra. Our holding on this issue disposes of this case by precluding any liability on Provident’s part. We therefore do not consider whether the Court of Appeals properly rejected Provident’s arguments based on Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Corp., 411 U. S. 582 (1973), and on the sale’s not having occurred until October 28. The alternative construction to “before the purchase” is sometimes denominated “simultaneously with the purchase,” as it was by the Court of Appeals. 506 F. 2d, at 608. Compare C. Meyer, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, p. 112 (1934) (adopting a “before” construction), with Seligman, Problems Under the Securities Exchange Act, 21 Va. L. Rev. 1, 19-20 (1934) (adopting an “immediately after” construction). Compare, e. g., Munter, Section 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: An Alternative to “Burning Down the Bam in Order to Kill the Rats,” 52 Cornell L. Q. 69, 74-75 (1966); Note, Insider Liability for Short-Swing Profits: The Substance and Function of the Pragmatic Approach, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 592, 616— 619 (1974); Comment, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 582 (1957) (adopting a “before” construction), with, e. g., 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1060 (2d ed. 1961) (favoring an “immediately after” construction). The weight of the commentary appears to be with the “before the purchase” construction. The ALI Federal Securities Code (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1973), § 1413 (d) and Comment (6), considers the “immediately after the purchase” construction “questionable” on the statutory language and proposes an amendment to codify the result. Stella was decided before § 10 (b) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. §78j(b), as implemented by Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR §240.10b-5 (1975), developed fully as a private remedy for actual abuses of inside information. See 6 L. Loss, supra, n. 11, at 3559. The sale-repurchase abuse that worried the Stella court would now invite § 10 (b) liability, see n. 29, infra, as well as possible liability under § 16 (b). To rationalize its view as applied to the purchase-sale sequence, the court in Newmark wrote: “[T]he presumed access to [inside] information resulting from [the] purchase [that makes one a beneficial owner] provides him with an. opportunity, not available to the investing public, to sell his shares at the moment most advantageous to him. Thus, a purchase of shares which makes the buyer an insider creates an opportunity for the type of speculative abuse the statute was enacted to prevent.” 425 F. 2d, at 356. When this Court decided Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418 (1972), the question presented here was no longer in the case. See n. 25, infra. The view of the Court of Appeals that “at the time of” may mean different things in different contexts is not unique. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & Western Industries, 527 F. 2d 335 (CA7 1975), cert. pending, No. 75-580. We express no opinion here on this view. Shortly before this case was argued the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached the same conclusion on somewhat different analysis. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., supra, at 347-349. The court apparently would have reached its result even in the absence of the exemptive provision, reasoning that § 16 (b) covers no transactions by any § 16 (b) insiders who were not insiders before their initial transaction. Id., at 347-348. Since we rely on the exemptive provision, we intimate no view on the proper analysis of a case where a director or officer makes an initial transaction before obtaining insider status. See, e. g., Adler v. Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840 (CA2 1959). Nor do we have occasion here to assess the approach taken by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to the exemptive provision. 527 F. 2d, at 348-349, and n. 13. See n. 25, infra. The purpose of § 16 (b) is stated explicitly to be “preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer.” 15 U. S. C. §78p(b). Section 16 (b) states that any short-swing profits “shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months.” 15 U. S. C. § 78p (b). In lieu of the Court of Appeals’ construction, Foremost offers a construction whereby any purchases prior to the purchase making one a beneficial owner are exempted from the operation of § 16 (b). See 2 Loss, supra, n. 11, at 1060. Newmark describes a possible abuse of inside information covered only under the Stella construction. See n. 13, supra. As can be seen by comparing H. R. 8720’s version of § 15 (b) with § 16 (b), supra, n. 2, the differences are relatively minor. For-maEy, the statement of purpose was moved to the front of the statute and various grammatical changes were made. A significant substantive change not apparent from the faces of the two sections is that § 16 (b) beneficial owners are those owning more than 10% of a registered security, while H. R. 8720 retained S. 2693’s 5% requirement. Compare §16 (a) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78p (a), with H. R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., § 15 (a) (1934). Corcoran termed § 15 “one of the most important provisions in [S. 2693]Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6555 (1934). But most of the proposed legislation was directed at regulation of the stock exchanges themselves and certain trading practices that were considered undesirable regardless of who performed them. See id., at 6465-6466. Most of the hearings, therefore, dealt with other problems. The other major substantive change effected in § 15 (b) by H. R. 8720 was the elimination of the potential criminal liability. The criminal liability aspect of S. 2693’s version of § 15 (b) received almost no attention in hearings. But cf. Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 6966. It may have been thought, however, that a criminal case could never be made out. The difficulties of proving the mental elements on which criminal liability turned had already led the drafters to eliminate those questions of fact in civil suits to recover profits. See n. 26, infra. “Mr. PecoRA. The theory was that the ownership of 5 percent of the stock would practically constitute him an insider, and by virtue of that position he could acquire confidential information which he might use for his own enrichment by trading in the open market, against the interests of the general body of the stockholders. That is the main purpose sought to be served.” Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 7741. Ferdinand Pécora was counsel to the subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency that conducted extensive hearings on stock exchange operations prior to the enactment of the Act. He was also one of the draftsmen of S. 2693. Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 83 11934). In Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418 (1972), the Court also had occasion to consider the application of the exemptive provision in a purchase-sale sequence. There Emerson acquired 13.2% of the shares of Reliance’s predecessor pursuant to a tender offer and within six months disposed of its holdings in two sales of 3.24% and 9.96%. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the purchase, by which Emerson became a beneficial owner, was covered by § 16 (b). But it ruled that Emerson was liable for the profits on only its first sale, because “at the time of . . . sale” of the-9.96%, it was not a beneficial owner. The Court granted certiorari on Reliance’s petition to review this construction of “at the time of . . . sale,” and affirmed. The construction of “at the time of the purchase,” however, was not before the Court. 404 U. S., at 42CM22. Emerson thus remained liable for the 3.24% sale, although it would have had no liability under our holding today. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has noted correctly that the construction of “at the time of . . . sale” in Reliance Electric Co. is superfluous in fight of the construction of “at the time of the purchase” adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which we affirm here. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 527 F. 2d, at 348 n. 12. But the procedural posture of Reliance Electric Co. prevented a full consideration of the meaning of the exemptive provision. See ibid. We express no opinion on the interpretation of the provision by which the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit sought to avoid the apparent superfluity of the “at the time of . . . sale” language. Id., at 348; supra, n. 16. “Mr. CoRcoRAN. . . . You hold the director, irrespective of any intention or expectation to sell the security within 6 months after, because it will be absolutely impossible to prove the existence of such intention or expectation, and you have to have this crude rule of thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden of having to prove that the director intended, at the time he bought, to get out on a short swing. “Senator Gore. You infer the intent from the fact. “Mr. CorcoraN. From the fact. “Senator Kean. Suppose he got stuck in something else, and he had to sell? “Senator Barioey. All he would get would be what he put into it. He would get his original investment. “Mr. Corcoran. He would get his money out, but the profit goes to the corporation. “Senator Kean. Suppose he had to sell. “Mr. Corcoran. Let him get out what he put in, but give the corporation the profit.” Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, n. 22, at 6556-6557. This distinction is especially evident in the following exchange, directed to the reporting requirements imposed by § 15 (a) of S. 2693 on beneficial owners: “Senator KeaN. Suppose a man is not a director at all and does not want to be a director, and he happens to own 5 percent or buy 5 percent. Do you think you are going to get him to file with the exchange all the time just the number of shares he has ? “Mr. CoRCoraN. I think so, sir. “Senator KeaN. I think it is all right to apply it to a director or officer, but I think to require the ordinary investor- “Mr. CorcoraN. Five percent is a lot in a modern corporation. Many corporations are controlled by 5 percent or 10 percent. “Senator KeaN. They may own it or they may sell it. This applies to all corporations, and you are getting down to the point where you are interfering with the individual a good deal there. I agree with you.with respect to the officers and directors. “Mr. CorcoraN. A stockholder owning 5 percent is as much an insider as an officer or director. Whether he is a titular director or not, he normally is, as a practical matter of fact, a director. “Senator KeaN. He might not be.” Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, n. 22, at 6556. The distinction also is reflected in the discussion of the technical flaw in S. 2693. See id., at 6555; Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720, supra, n. 24, at 133. See also Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, n. 22, at 7741-7743. Thus, according to the presumption of the statute, the purchaser did not have access to inside information in making the purchase. It should be noted further that as a matter of practicalities the crucial point in the acquisition of securities is not the technical “purchase,” but rather the decision to make an acquisition. In the case of an acquisition of a large block of a corporation’s stock, that decision may precede the “purchase” by a considerable period of time. A prudent investor will want to investigate all available information on the corporation. Such an investor also may need time to finance the purchase, and may wish to effectuate purchases without influencing the market price. These realities emphasize that the acquisition decision by a beneficial owner normally will occur well in advance of the event that is presumed to afford access to inside information. Rule 10b-5 has been held to embrace evils that Foremost urges its construction of § 16 (b) is necessary to prevent. The Rule has been applied to trading by one who acquired inside information in the course of negotiations with a corporation, such as the negotiations for Provident’s purchase of the Foremost debentures. Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., 43 S. E. C. 1080 (1969); 3 Loss, supra, n. 11, at 1451-1452. And a stockholder trading on information not generally known has been held subject to the sanctions of the Rule. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F. 2d 228 (CA2 1974); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d 833 (CA2 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U. S. 976 (1969). The liability of insiders who improperly “tip” others, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F. 2d 1301 (CA2), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1971), may reduce the threat that beneficial owners not themselves represented on the board of directors will be able to acquire inside information from officers and directors. We cite these cases for illustrative purposes without necessarily implying approval. Section 16 (a), 15 U. S. C. § 78p (a), provides: “Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security) which is registered pursuant to section 781 of this title, or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of such security on a national securities exchange or by the effective date of a registration statement filed pursuant to section 781 (g) of this title, or within ten days after he becomes such beneficial owner, director, or officer, a statement with the Commission (and, if such security is registered on a national securities exchange, also with the exchange) of the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he is the beneficial owner, and within ten days after the close of each calendar month thereafter, if there has been a change in such ownership during such month, shall file with the Commission (and if such security is registered on a national securities exchange, shall also file with the exchange), a statement indicating his ownership at the close of the calendar month and such changes in his ownership as have occurred during such calendar month.” The drafters clearly thought that § 16 (a) would help deter abuses not covered by § 16 (b). “[Mr. Corcoran.] [S]ection 15 (a), requires every director, officer, or principal holder of any securities listed on an exchange to file with the exchange and with the commission a statement of how many shares he owns and to file that statement at the end of each month to show whether there has been any change in his position during the month. That is to prevent the insider from taking advantage of information to sell or buy shares ahead of the release of information to the public about the company.” These remarks were addressed to S. 2693. Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720, supra, n. 24, at 132. Section 16(d), 15 U. S. C. §78p(d), provides: “The provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall not apply to any purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, and the provisions of subsection (c) of this section shall not apply to any sale, of an equity security not then or theretofore held by him in an investment account, by a dealer in the ordinary course of his business and incident to the establishment or maintenance by him of a primary or secondary market (otherwise than on a national securities exchange or an exchange exempted from registration under section 78e of this title) for such security. The Commission may, by such rules and regulations as it deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest, define and prescribe terms and conditions with respect to securities held in an investment account and transactions made in the ordinary course of business and incident to the establishment or maintenance of a primary or secondary market.” “Dealer” is defined in § 3 (a) (5) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a) (5). Section 16 (e), 15 U. S. C. § 78p (e), provides: “The provisions of this section shall not apply to foreign or domestic arbitrage transactions unless made in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may adopt in order to carry out the purposes of this section.” Section 16 (b) provides in its final clause that it shall not cover “any transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection.” 15 U. S. C. §78p(b). Rule 16b-2, 17 CFR § 240.16b-2 (1975), provides: “(a) Any transaction of purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of a security which is effected in connection with the distribution of a substantial block of securities shall be exempt from the provisions of section 16 (b) of the Act, to the extent specified in this § 240.16b-2, as not comprehended within the purpose of said section, upon the following conditions: “(1) The person effecting the transaction is engaged in the business of distributing securities and is participating in good faith, in the ordinary course of such business, in the' distribution of such block of securities; “ (2) The security involved in the transaction is (i) a part of such block of securities and is acquired by the person effecting the transaction, with a view to the distribution thereof, from the issuer or other person on whose behalf such securities are being distributed or from a person who is participating in good faith in the distribution of such block of securities, or (ii) a security purchased in good faith by or for the account of the person effecting the transaction for the purpose of stabilizing the market price of securities of the class being distributed or to cover an over-allotment or other short position created in connection with such distribution; and “(3) Other persons not within the purview of section 16 (b) of the Act are participating in the distribution of such block of securities on terms at least as favorable as those on which such person is participating and to an extent at least equal to the aggregate participation of all persons exempted from the provisions of section 16 (b) of the Act by this § 240.16b-2. However, the performance of the functions of manager of a distributing group and the receipt of a bona fide payment for performing such functions shall not preclude an exemption which would otherwise be available under this § 240.16b-2. “(b) The exemption of a transaction pursuant to this §240.16b-2 with respect to the participation therein of one party thereto shall not render such transaction exempt with respect to participation of any other party therein unless such other party also meets the conditions of this § 240.16b-2.” The press release accompanying the SEC’s initial promulgation of Rule 16b-2 demonstrates this point. It explained: “The new Rule [16b-2] affords an exemption for certain cases by providing that underwriters who happen to have a member of their firm also an officer or director of the issuer or one of its principal stockholders who are regularly engaged in the business of buying and selling securities need not account to the company for profits realized from purchases and sales made in the distribution of a security for the company . . . .” SEC Release No. 34-264 (June 8,1935).
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations
What is the ideological direction of the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court?
[ "Conservative", "Liberal", "Unspecifiable" ]
[ 0 ]
sc
SELING, SUPERINTENDENT, SPECIAL COMMITMENT CENTER v. YOUNG No. 99-1185. Argued October 81, 2000 Decided January 17, 2001 O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnqtjist, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Souter, J., joined, post, p. 267. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 270. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 274. Maureen Hart, Senior Assistant Attorney General of Washington, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Christine 0. Gregoire, Attorney General, Sarah Blackman Sappington, Assistant Attorney General, David J. W. Hackett, Special Assistant Attorney General, and William Berggren Collins, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Robert C. Boruchowitz argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were David B. Hirsch, Dennis P. Carroll, and Christine Jackson. A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for the State of Kansas et al. by Carla J. Stovall, Attorney General of Kansas, Stephen R. McAllister, State Solicitor, and Jared S. Maag, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama, Janet Napolitano of Arizona, Mark Pryor of Arkansas, Bill Lockyer of California, Ken Salamr of Colorado, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Jennifer M. Granholm of Michigan, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, John J. Farmer, Jr., of New Jersey, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, Mark Barnett of South Dakota, Jan Graham of Utah, Mark L. Earley of Virginia, and James E. Doyle of Wisconsin. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the California Atascadero State Hospital Section 6600 Civil Committees by Joel E. Krischer; and for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Edward M. Chikofsky and Barbara E. Bergman. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. Washington State’s Community Protection Act of 1990 authorizes the civil commitment of “sexually violent predators,” persons who suffer from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes them likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence. Wash. Rev. Code §71.09.010 et seq. (1992). Respondent, Andre Brigham Young, is confined as a sexually violent predator at the Special Commitment Center (Center), for which petitioner is the superintendent. After respondent’s challenges to his commitment in state court proved largely unsuccessful, he instituted a . habeas action under 28 U. S. C. §2254, seeking release from confinement. The Washington Supreme Court had already held that the Act is civil, In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d 1, 857 P. 2d 989 (1993) (en banc), and this Court held a similar commitment scheme for sexually violent predators in Kansas to be civil on its face, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346 (1997). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit nevertheless concluded that respondent could challenge the statute as being punitive “as applied” to him in violation of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses, and remanded the case to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing. I A Washington State’s Community Protection Act of 1990 (Act) was a response to citizens’ concerns about laws and procedures regarding sexually violent offenders. One of the Act’s provisions authorizes civil commitment of such offenders. Wash. Rev. Code §71.09.010 et seq. (1992 and Supp. 2000). The Act defines a sexually violent predator as someone who has been convicted of, or charged with, a crime of sexual violence and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility. §71.09.020(1) (Supp. 2000). The statute reaches prisoners, juveniles, persons found incompetent to stand trial, persons found not guilty by reason of insanity, and persons at any time convicted of a sexually violent offense who have committed a recent overt act. §71.09.030. Generally, when it appears that a person who has committed a sexually violent offense is about to be released from confinement, the prosecuting attorney files a petition alleging that that person is a sexually violent predator. Ibid. That filing triggers a process for charging and trying the person as a sexually violent predator, during which he is afforded a panoply of protections including counsel and experts (paid for by the State in cases of indigency), a probable cause hearing, and trial by judge or jury at the individual’s option. §§ 71.09.040-71.09.050. At trial, the State bears the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is a sexually violent predator. § 71.09.060(1). Upon the finding that a person is a sexually violent predator, he is committed for control, care, and treatment to the custody of the department of social and health services. Ibid. Once confined, the person has a right to adequate care and individualized treatment. § 71.09.080(2). The person is also entitled to an annual examination of his mental condition. § 71.09.070. If that examination indicates that the individual’s condition is so changed that he is not likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence, state officials must authorize the person to petition the court for conditional release or discharge. § 71.09.090(1). The person is entitled to a hearing at which the State again bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he is not safe to be at large. Ibid. The person may also independently petition the court for release. § 71.09.090(2). At a show cause hearing, if the court finds probable cause to believe that the person is no longer dangerous, a full hearing will be held at which the State again bears the burden of proof. Ibid. The Act also provides a procedure to petition for conditional release to a less restrictive alternative to confinement. §71.09.090. Before ordering conditional release, the court must find that the person will be treated by a state certified sexual offender treatment provider, that there is a specific course of treatment, that housing exists that will be sufficiently secure to protect the community, and that the person is willing to comply with the treatment and supervision requirements. §71.09.092. Conditional release is subject to annual review until the person is unconditionally released. §§71.09.096, 71.09.098. B Respondent, Andre Brigham Young, was convicted of six rapes over three decades. App. to Pet. for Cert. 33a. Young was scheduled to be released from prison for his most recent conviction in October 1990. One day prior to his scheduled release, the State filed a petition to commit Young as a sexually violent predator. Id., at 32a. At the commitment hearing, Young’s mental health experts testified that there is no mental disorder that makes a person likely to reoffend and that there is no way to predict accurately who will reoffend. The State called an expert who testified, based upon a review of Young’s records, that Young suffered from a severe personality disorder not otherwise specified with primarily paranoid and antisocial features, and a severe paraphilia, which would be classified as either paraphilia sexual sadism or paraphilia not otherwise specified (rape). See generally American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 522-523, 530, 532, 634, 645-646, 673 (4th ed. 1994). In the state expert’s opinion, severe paraphilia constituted a mental abnormality under the Act. The State’s expert concluded that Young’s condition, in combination with the personality disorder, the span of time during which Young committed his crimes, his recidivism, his persistent denial, and his lack of empathy or remorse, made it more likely than not that he would commit further sexually violent acts. The victims of Young’s rapes also testified. The jury unanimously concluded that Young was a sexually violent predator. Young and another individual appealed their commitments in state court, arguing that the Act violated the Double Jeopardy, Ex Post Facto, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal Constitution. In major respects, the Washington Supreme Court held that the Act is constitutional. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d 1, 857 P. 2d 989 (1993) (en banc). To the extent the court concluded that the Act violated due process and equal protection principles, those rulings are reflected in subsequent amendments to the Act. See Part I-A, supra. The Washington court reasoned that the claimants’ double jeopardy and ex post facto claims hinged on whether the Act is civil or criminal in nature. Following this Court’s precedents, the court examined the language of the Act, the legislative history, and the purpose and effect of the statutory scheme. The court found that the legislature clearly intended to create a civil scheme both in the statutory language and legislative history. The court then turned to examine whether the actual impact of the Act is civil or criminal. The Act, the court concluded, is concerned with treating committed persons for a current mental abnormality, and protecting society from the sexually violent acts associated with that abnormality, rather than being concerned with criminal culpability. The court distinguished the goals of incapacitation and treatment from the goal of punishment. The court found that the Washington Act is designed to further legitimate goals of civil confinement and that the claimants had failed to provide proof to the contrary. 122 Wash. 2d, at 18-25, 857 P. 2d, at 996-1000. The Act spawned several other challenges in state and federal court, two of which bear mention. Richard Turay, committed as a sexually violent predator, filed suit in Federal District Court against Center officials under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement and inadequate treatment at the Center. In 1994, a jury concluded that the Center had failed to provide constitutionally adequate mental health treatment. App. 64-68. The court ordered officials at the Center to bring the institution up to constitutional standards, appointing a Special Master to monitor progress at the Center. The Center currently operates under an injunction. Turay v. Seling, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (WD Wash. 2000). See also Brief for Petitioner 8-9. Turay also appealed his commitment as a sexually violent predator in state court, claiming, among other things, that the conditions of confinement at the Center rendered the Washington Act punitive “as applied” to him in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Washington Supreme Court ruled that Turay’s commitment was valid. In re Turay, 139 Wash. 2d 379, 986 P. 2d 790 (1999) (en bane). The court explained that in Young, it had concluded that the Act is civil. 139 Wash. 2d, at 415, 986 P. 2d, at 809. The court also noted that this Court had recently held Kansas’ Sexually Violent Predator Act, nearly identical to Washington’s Act, to be civil on its face. Ibid. The Washington Supreme Court rejected Turay’s theory of double jeopardy, reasoning that the double jeopardy claim must be resolved by asking whether the Act itself is civil. Id., at 416-417, 986 P. 2d, at 810 (citing Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93 (1997)). The court concluded that Turay’s proper remedy for constitutional violations in conditions of confinement at the Center was his § 1983 action for damages and injunctive relief. 139 Wash. 2d, at 420, 986 P. 2d, at 812. C That brings us to the action before this Court. In 1994, after unsuccessful challenges to his confinement in state court, Young filed a habeas action under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 against the superintendent of the Center. Young contended that the Act was unconstitutional and that his confinement was illegal. He sought immediate release. The District Court granted the writ, concluding that the Act violated substantive due process, that the Act was criminal rather than civil, and that it violated the double jeopardy and ex post facto guarantees of the Constitution. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (WD Wash. 1995). The superintendent appealed. While the appeal was pending, this Court decided Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346 (1997), which held that Kansas’ Sexually Violent Predator Act, on its face, met substantive due process requirements, was nonpunitive, and thus did not violate the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded Young’s case to the District Court for reconsideration in light of Hendricks. 122 F. 3d 38 (1997). On remand, the District Court denied Young’s petition. Young appealed and the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded in part and affirmed in part. 192 F. 3d 870 (1999). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling that Young’s confinement did not violate the substantive due process requirement that the State prove mental illness and dangerousness to justify confinement. Id., at 876. The Court of Appeals also left undisturbed the District Court’s conclusion that the Act meets procedural due process and equal protection guarantees, and the District Court’s rejection of Young’s challenges to his commitment proceedings. Id., at 876-877. Young did not seek a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Ninth Circuit for its decision affirming the District Court in these respects, and accordingly, those issues are not before this Court. The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s determination that because the Washington Act is civil, Young’s double jeopardy and ex post facto claims must fail. The “linchpin” of Young’s claims, the court reasoned, was whether the Act was punitive “as applied” to Young. Id., at 873. The court did not read this Court’s decision in Hendricks to preclude the possibility that the Act could be punitive as applied. The court reasoned that actual conditions of confinement could divest a facially valid statute of its civil label upon a showing by the clearest proof that the statutory scheme is punitive in effect. 192 F. 3d, at 874. The Court of Appeals reviewed Young’s claims that conditions of confinement at the Center were punitive and did not comport with due process. Id., at 875. Young alleged that for seven years, he had been subject to conditions more restrictive than those placed on true civil commitment detainees, and even state prisoners. The Center, located wholly within the perimeter of a larger Department of Corrections (DOC) facility, relied on the DOC for a host of essential services, including library services, medical care, food, and security. More recently, Young claimed, the role of the DOC had increased to include daily security “walk-throughs.” Young contended that the conditions and restrictions at the Center were not reasonably related to a legitimate nonpunitive goal, as residents were abused, confined to their rooms, subjected to random searches of their rooms and units, and placed under excessive security. Young also contended that conditions at the Center were incompatible with the Act's treatment purpose. The Center had a policy of videotaping therapy sessions and withholding privileges for refusal to submit to treatment. The Center residents were housed in units that, according to the Special Master in the Turay litigation, were clearly inappropriate for persons in a mental health treatment program. The Center still lacked certified sex offender treatment providers. Finally, there was no possibility of release. A court-appointed resident advocate and psychologist concluded in his final report that because the Center had not fundamentally changed over so many years, he had come to suspect that the Center was designed and managed to punish and confine individuals for life without any hope of release to a less restrictive setting. 192 F. 3d, at 875. See also Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Supplemental Brief on Remand, and Motion to Alter Judgment 4-5, 8-9, 11-12, 15, 20, 24-26, in No. C94-480C (WD Wash.), Record, Doe. Nos. 57, 155, and 167. The Ninth Circuit concluded that “[b]y alleging that [the Washington Act] is punitive as applied, Young alleged facts which, if proved, would entitle him to relief.” 192 F. 3d, at 875. The court remanded the case to the District Court for a hearing to determine whether the conditions at the Center rendered the Act punitive as applied to Young. Id., at 876. This Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari, 529 U. S. 1017 (2000), to resolve the conflict between the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Washington Supreme Court. Compare 192 F. 3d 870 (1999), with In re Turay, 139 Wash. 2d 379, 986 P. 2d 790 (1999). II As the Washington Supreme Court held and the Ninth Circuit acknowledged, we proceed on the Washington Act is civil in nature. The Washington Act is strikingly similar to a commitment scheme we reviewed four Terms ago in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 846 (1997). In fact, Kansas patterned its Act after Washington’s. See In re Hendricks, 259 Kan. 246, 249, 912 P. 2d 129, 131 (1996). In Hendricks, we explained that the question whether an Act is civil or punitive in nature is initially one of statutory construction. 521 U. S., at 361 (citing Allen v. Illinois, 478 U. S. 364, 368 (1986)). A court must ascertain whether the legislature intended the statute to establish civil proceedings. A court will reject the legislature’s manifest intent only where a party challenging the Act provides the clearest proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive in either purpose or effect as to negate the State’s intention. 521 U. S., at 361 (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U. S. 242, 248-249 (1980)). We concluded that the confined individual in that case had failed to satisfy his burden with respect to the Kansas Act. We noted several factors: The Act did not implicate retribution or deterrence; prior criminal convictions were used as evidence in the commitment proceedings, but were not a prerequisite to confinement; the Act required no finding of scienter to commit a person; the Act was not intended to function as a deterrent; and although the procedural safeguards were similar to those in the criminal context, they did not alter the character of the scheme. 521 U. S., at 361-365. We also examined the conditions of confinement provided by the Act. Id., at 363-364. The Court was aware that sexually violent predators in Kansas were to be held in a segregated unit within the prison system. Id., at 368. We explained that the Act called for confinement in a secure facility because the persons confined were dangerous to the community. Id., at 363. We noted, however, that conditions within the unit were essentially the same as conditions for other involuntarily committed persons in mental hospitals. Ibid. Moreover, confinement under the Act was not necessarily indefinite in duration. Id., at 364. Finally, we observed that in addition to protecting the public, the Act also provided treatment for sexually violent predators. Id., at 365-368. We acknowledged that not all mental conditions were treatable. For those individuals with untreatable conditions, however, we explained that there was no federal constitutional bar to their civil confinement, because the State had an interest in protecting the public from dangerous individuals with treatable as well as untreatable conditions. Id., at 366. Our conclusion that the Kansas Act was “non-punitive thus remove[d] an essential prerequisite for both Hendricks’ double jeopardy and ex post facto claims.” Id., at 369. Since deciding Hendricks, this Court has reaffirmed the principle that determining the civil or punitive nature of an Act must begin with reference to its text and legislative history. Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93 (1997). In Hudson, which involved a double jeopardy challenge to monetary penalties and occupational debarment, this Court expressly disapproved of evaluating the civil nature of an Act by reference to the effect that Act has on a single individual. Instead, courts must evaluate the question by reference to a variety of factors “ ‘considered in relation to the statute on its face’ the clearest proof is required to override legislative intent and conclude that an Act denominated civil is punitive in purpose or effect. Id., at 100 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 169 (1963)). With this in mind, we turn to the Court of Appeals’ determination that respondent could raise an “as-applied” challenge to the Act on double jeopardy and ex post facto grounds and seek release from confinement. Respondent essentially claims that the conditions of his confinement at the Center are too restrictive, that the conditions are incompatible with treatment, and that the system is designed to result in indefinite confinement. Respondent’s claims are in many respects like the claims presented to the Court in Hendricks, where we concluded that the conditions of confinement were largely explained by the State’s goal to incapacitate, not to punish. 521 U. S., at 362-368. Nevertheless, we do not deny that some of respondent’s allegations are serious. Nor do we express any view as to how his allegations would bear on a court determining in the first instance whether Washington’s confinement scheme is civil. Here, we evaluate respondent’s allegations as presented in a double jeopardy and ex post facto challenge under the assumption that the Act is civil. We hold that respondent cannot obtain release through an “as-applied” challenge to the Washington Act on double jeopardy and ex post facto grounds. We agree with petitioner that an “as-applied” analysis would prove unworkable. Such an analysis would never conclusively resolve whether a particular scheme is punitive and would thereby prevent a final determination of the scheme’s validity under the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses. Brief for Petitioner 30; Reply Brief for Petitioner 9. Unlike a fine, confinement is not a fixed event. As petitioner notes, it extends over time under conditions that are subject to change. The particular features of confinement may affect how a confinement scheme is evaluated to determine whether it is civil rather than punitive, but it remains no less true that the query must be answered definitively. The civil nature of a confinement scheme cannot be altered based merely on vagaries in the implementation of the authorizing statute. Respondent contends that the Ninth Circuit’s “as-applied” analysis comports with this Court’s precedents. He points out that this Court has considered conditions of confinement in evaluating the validity of confinement schemes in the past. Brief for Respondent 11 — 16, 29 (citing Hendricks, supra, at 363; Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 301-302 (1993); United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 747-748 (1987); Allen v. Illinois, supra, at 373-374; Scholl v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253, 269-273 (1984)). All of those cases, however, presented the question whether the Act at issue was punitive. Permitting respondent’s as-applied challenge would invite an end run around the Washington Supreme Court’s decision that the Act is civil in circumstances where a direct attack on that decision is not before this Court. Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, takes issue with our view that the question before the Court concerns an as-applied challenge to a civil Act. He first contends that respondent’s challenge is not a true “as-applied” challenge because respondent does not claim that the statute “ ‘by its own terms’ is unconstitutional as applied ... but rather that the statute is not being applied according to its terms at all.” Post, at 271. We respectfully disagree. The Act requires “adequate care and individualized treatment,” Wash. Rev. Code §71.09.080(2) (Supp. 2000), but the Act is silent with respect to the confinement conditions required at the Center, and that is the source of many of respondent’s complaints, see supra, at 259-260. Justice Thomas next contends that we incorrectly assume that the Act is civil, instead of viewing the Act as “‘otherwise . . . civil,’ or civil ‘on its face.’” Post, at 270 (emphasis added by Thomas, J.). However the Washington Act is described, our analysis in this case turns on the prior finding by the Washington Supreme Court that the Act is civil, and this Court’s decision in Hendricks that a nearly identical Act was civil. Petitioner could not have claimed that the Washington Act is “otherwise” or “facially” civil without relying on those prior decisions. In dissent, Justice Stevens argues that we “incorrectly assum[e]” that the Act is “necessarily civil,” post, at 275, but the case has reached this Court under that very assumption. The Court of Appeals recognized that the Act is civil, and treated respondent’s claim as an individual, “as-applied” challenge to the Act. The Court of Appeals then remanded the case to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing to determine respondent’s conditions of confinement. Contrary to the dissent’s characterization of the case, the Court of Appeals did not purport to undermine the validity of the Washington Act as a civil confinement scheme. The court did not conclude that respondent’s allegations, if substantiated, would be sufficient to refute the Washington Supreme Court’s conclusion that the Act is civil, and to require the release of all those confined under its authority. The Ninth Circuit addressed only respondent’s individual case, and we do not decide claims that are not presented by the decision below. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 516 U. S. 367, 379 (1996). We reject the Ninth Circuit’s “as-applied” analysis for double jeopardy and ex post facto claims as fundamentally flawed. Ill Our decision today does not mean that respondent and others committed as sexually violent predators have no remedy for the alleged conditions and treatment regime at the Center. The text of the Washington Act states that those confined under its authority have the right to adequate care and individualized treatment. Wash. Rev. Code §71.09.080(2) (Supp. 2000); Brief for Petitioner 14. As petitioner acknowledges, if the Center fails to fulfill its statutory duty, those confined may have a state law cause of action. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, 10-11, 52. It is for the Washington courts to determine whether the Center is operating in accordance with state law and provide a remedy. State courts, in addition to federal courts, remain competent to adjudicate and remedy challenges to civil confinement schemes arising under the Federal Constitution. As noted above, the Washington Supreme Court has already held that the Washington Act is civil in nature, designed to incapacitate and to treat. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d, at 18-25, 857 P. 2d, at 996-1000. Accordingly, due process requires that the conditions and duration of confinement under the Act bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are committed. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U. S. 71, 79 (1992); Youngherg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307, 324 (1982); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715., 738 (1972). Finally, we note that a § 1983 action against the Center is pending in the Western District of Washington. See supra, at 257. The Center operates under an injunction that requires it to adopt and implement a plan for training and hiring competent sex. offender therapists; to improve relations between residents and treatment providers; to implement a treatment program for residents containing elements required by prevailing professional standards; to develop individual treatment programs; and to provide a psychologist or psychiatrist expert in the diagnosis and treatment of sex offenders to supervise the staff. App. 67. A Special Master has assisted in bringing the Center into compliance with the injunction. In its most recent published opinion on the matter, the District Court noted some progress at the Center in meeting the requirements of the injunction. Turay v. Seling, 108 F. Supp. 2d, at 1154-1155. This case gives us no occasion to consider how the civil nature of a confinement scheme relates to other constitutional challenges, such as due process, or to consider the extent to which a court may look to actual conditions of confinement and implementation of the statute to determine in the first instance whether a confinement scheme is civil in nature. Justice Scalia, concurring, contends that conditions of confinement are irrelevant to determining whether an Act is civil unless state courts have interpreted the Act as permitting those conditions. By contrast, Justice Stevens would consider conditions of confinement at any time in order to gain “full knowledge of the effects of the statute.” Post, at 277. Whether a confinement scheme is punitive has been the threshold question for some constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346 (1997) (double jeopardy and ex post facto); United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739 (1987) (due process); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U. S. 364 (1986) (Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination). Whatever these cases may suggest about the relevance of conditions of confinement, they do not endorse the approach of the dissent, which would render the inquiry into the “effects of the statute,” post, at 277, completely open ended. In one case, the Court refused to consider alleged confinement conditions because the parties had entered into a consent decree to improve conditions. Flores, 507 U. S., at 301. The Court presumed that conditions were in compliance with the requirements of the consent decree. Ibid. In another case, the Court found that anecdotal case histories and a statistical study were insufficient to render a regulatory confinement scheme punitive. Martin, 467 U. S., at 272. In such cases, we have decided whether a confinement scheme is punitive notwithstanding the inherent difficulty in ascertaining current conditions and predicting future events. We have not squarely addressed the relevance of conditions of confinement to a first instance determination, and that question need not be resolved here. An Act, found to be civil, cannot be deemed punitive “as applied” to a single individual in violation of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses and provide cause for release. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.
What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?
[ "judicial review (national level)", "judicial review (state level)", "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction", "statutory construction", "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order", "diversity jurisdiction", "federal common law" ]
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HEIKKILA v. BARBER, DISTRICT DIRECTOR OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, et al. No. 426. Argued February 4-5, 1953. Decided March 16, 1953. Joseph Forer and Lloyd E. McMurray argued the cause for appellant. With them on the brief was Allan Brotsky. Robert W. Ginnane argued the cause for Barber, ap-pellee. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cummings, Assistant Attorney General Murray, Beatrice Rosenberg and John R. Wilkins. Robert L. Stern, then Acting Solicitor General, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and a statement in opposition to appellant’s statement of jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. Heikkila is an alien whose deportation has been ordered by the Attorney General. He began this action against the District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service by a complaint seeking a “review of agency action” as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. His main substantive claim is that § 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 1006, upon which the order was based, and which makes Communist Party membership per se ground for deportation, is unconstitutional. A three-judge District Court convened under 28 U. S. C. §§ 2282, 2284, dismissed the complaint without opinion. Together with the constitutional question, this appeal presents two important procedural questions: whether the validity of deportation orders may be tested by some procedure other than habeas corpus and, if so, whether the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization is an indispensable party to the action. It is clear that prior to the Administrative Procedure Act habeas corpus was the only remedy by which deportation orders could be challenged in the courts. The courts have consistently rejected attempts to use injunctions, declaratory judgments and other types of relief for this purpose. Accordingly, in asserting the availability of judicial review of the type sought here, appellant relies primarily on § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, conceding that the question has not yet been decided by this Court. The Government contends that because § 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1917 makes the decision of the Attorney General “final” the underlying statute precludes judicial review and comes within the first exception to § 10. Apart from the words quoted, the Administrative Procedure Act itself is silent on which “statutes preclude judicial review.” Both the Senate and the House Committee Reports on the Act commented that “Very rarely do statutes withhold judicial review.” And the House Report added that “To preclude judicial review under this bill a statute, if not specific in withholding such review, must upon its face give clear and convincing evidence of an intent to withhold it. The mere failure to provide specially by statute for judicial review is certainly no evidence of intent to withhold review.” The spirit of these statements together with the broadly remedial purposes of the Act counsel a judicial attitude of hospitality towards the claim that § 10 greatly expanded the availability of judicial review. However, such generalities are not dispositive of the issue here, else a balance would have to be struck between those in the Committee reports and material in the debates which indicates inconsistent legislative understandings as to how extensively § 10 changed the prior law on judicial review. No easy answer is found in our decisions on the subject. Each statute in question must be examined individually; its purpose and history as well as its text are to be considered in deciding whether the courts were intended to provide relief for those aggrieved by administrative action. Mere failure to provide for judicial intervention is not conclusive; neither is the presence of language which appears to bar it. That the Attorney General’s decisions are “final” does not settle the question. The appellant properly emphasizes the ambiguity in that term. Read alone, it might refer to the doctrine requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before judicial process can be invoked. But “final,” as used in immigration legislation, has a history, both in the statutes and in the decisions of this Court. It begins with § 8 of the Immigration Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 1085, which provided in part that “All decisions made by the inspection officers or their assistants touching the right of any alien to land, when adverse to such right, shall be final unless appeal be taken to the superintendent of immigration, whose action shall be subject to review by the Secretary of the Treasury.” The appellant in Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651 (1892) argued that if § 8 was interpreted as making the administrative exclusion decision conclusive, she was deprived of a constitutional right to have the courts on habeas corpus determine the legality of her detention and, incidental thereto, examine the facts on which it was based. Relying on the peculiarly political nature of the legislative power over aliens, the Court was clear on the power of Congress to entrust the final determination of the facts in such cases to executive officers. Cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580 (1952). Mr. Justice Gray-found that § 8 was “manifestly intended to prevent the question of an alien immigrant’s right to land, when once decided adversely by an inspector, acting within the jurisdiction conferred upon him, from being impeached or reviewed, in the courts or otherwise, save only by appeal to the inspector’s official superiors, and in accordance with the provisions of the act.” 142 U. S., at 663. With changes unimportant here, this finality provision was carried forward in later immigration legislation. See, e. g., § 25 of the 1903 Act, 32 Stat. 1220, and § 25 of the 1907 Act, 34 Stat. 906. During these years, the cases continued to recognize that Congress had intended to make these administrative decisions nonreviewable to the fullest extent possible under the Constitution. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698 (1893). In Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538 (1895), treating a comparable provision for the enforcement of the Chinese Exclusion Act, Mr. Justice Harlan observed that when Congress made the administrative decision final, “the authority of the courts to review the decision of the executive officers was taken away.” Id., at 549. And by 1901, Mr. Chief Justice Fuller was able to describe as “for many years the recognized and declared policy of the country” the congressional decision to place “the final determination of the right of admission in executive officers, without judicial intervention.” Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U. S. 296, 305 (1902). See also The Japanese Immigrant Case (Yamataya v. Fisher), 189 U. S. 86 (1903); Pearson v. Williams, 202 U. S. 281 (1906); Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U. S. 272 (1912). Read against this background of a quarter of a century of consistent judicial interpretation, § 19 of the 1917 Immigration Act, 39 Stat. 889, clearly had the effect of pre-eluding judicial intervention in deportation cases except insofar as it was required by the Constitution. And the decisions have continued to regard this point as settled. Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U. S. 22, 34 (1939); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 149, 166, 167 (1945); Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114, 122, 123, n. 14 (1946); Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 177, n. 3 (1947). Clearer evidence that for present purposes the Immigration Act of 1917 is a statute precluding judicial review would be hard to imagine. Whatever view be taken as to the breadth of § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, the first exception to that section applies to the case before us. The result is that appellant’s rights were not enlarged by that Act. Now, as before, he may attack a deportation order only by habeas corpus. The three Court of Appeals decisions to the contrary have taken the position that habeas corpus itself represented judicial review, albeit of a limited nature. United States ex rel. Trinler v. Carusi, 166 F. 2d 457; Kristensen v. McGrath, 86 U. S. App. D. C. 48, 179 F. 2d 796; Prince v. Commissioner, 185 F. 2d 578. Under this approach, the finality of an administrative decision must be absolute before the first exception to § 10 can apply. Our difficulty with this position begins with the nature of the writ and ends with the language of § 10. Regardless of whether or not the scope of inquiry on habeas corpus has been expanded, the function of the courts has always been limited to the enforcement of due process requirements. To review those requirements under the Constitution, whatever the intermediate formulation of their constituents, is very different from applying a statutory standard of review, e. g., deciding “on the whole record” whether there is substantial evidence to support administrative findings of fact under § 10 (e). Yet, for all that appears, § 10 (e) might be called into play as well as § 10 (b) if habeas corpus were regarded as judicial review. In short, it is the scope of inquiry on habeas corpus that differentiates use of the writ from judicial review as that term is used in the Administrative Procedure Act. We hold that deportation orders remain immune to direct attack. Heikkila suggests that Perkins v. Elg, 307 U. S. 325 (1939) (declaratory and injunctive relief), and McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U. S. 162 (1950) (declaratory relief), were deviations from this rule. But neither of those cases involved an outstanding deportation order. Both Elg and Kristensen litigated erroneous determinations of their status, in one case citizenship, in the other eligibility for citizenship. Elg’s right to a judicial hearing on her claim of citizenship had been recognized as early as 1922 in Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276. And Kristensen’s ineligibility for naturalization was set up in contesting the Attorney General’s refusal to suspend deportation proceedings under the special provisions of § 19 (c) of the 1917 Immigration Act, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 155 (c). Heikkila’s status as an alien is not disputed and the relief he wants is against an outstanding deportation order. He has not brought himself within Elg or Kristensen. Appellant’s Administrative Procedure Act argument is his strongest one. The reasons which take his case out of § 10 apply a fortiori to arguments based on the general equity powers of the federal courts and the Declaratory Judgment Act. 28 U. S. C. § 2201. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Co., 339 U. S. 667, 671-672 (1950). Because we decide the judgment below must be affirmed on this procedural ground, we do not reach the other questions briefed and argued by the parties. The rule which we reaffirm recognizes the legislative power to prescribe applicable procedures for those who would contest deportation orders. Congress may well have thought that habeas corpus, despite its apparent inconvenience to the alien, should be the exclusive remedy in these cases in order to minimize opportunities for repetitious litigation and consequent delays as well as to avoid possible venue difficulties connected with any other type of action. We are advised that the Government has recommended legislation which would permit what Heikkila has tried here. But the choice is not ours. Affirmed. Mr. Chief Justice Stone, dissenting (on other grounds), in Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 167 (1945). Fafalios v. Doak, 60 App. D. C. 215, 50 F. 2d 640; Poliszek v. Doak, 61 App. D. C. 64, 57 F. 2d 430; Kabadian v. Doak, 62 App. D. C. 114, 65 F. 2d 202; Darabi v. Northrup, 54 F. 2d 70. See also Impiriale v. Perkins, 62 App. D. C. 279, 66 F. 2d 805; Azzollini v. Watkins, 172 F. 2d 897. “Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action is by law committed to agency discretion— “(a) Right op review. — Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof. “(b) Form AND VENUE op ACTION. — The form of proceeding for judicial review shall be any special statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in any court specified by statute or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action (including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus) in any court of competent jurisdiction. Agency action shall be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial enforcement except to the extent that prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for such review is provided by law. “(c) Reviewable acts. — Every agency action made reviewable by statute and every final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in any court shall be subject to judicial review. Any preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable shall be subject to review upon the review of the final agency action. . . . “(e) Scope op review. — So far as necessary to decision and where presented the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of any agency action. It shall (A) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and (B) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (4) without observance of procedure required by law; (5) unsupported by substantial evidence in any case subject to the requirements of sections 7 and 8 or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or (6) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court. In making the foregoing determinations the court shall review the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.” 60 Stat. 243, 5 U. S. C. § 1009. “In every case where any person is ordered deported from the United States under the provisions of this Act, or of any law or treaty, the decision of the Attorney General shall be final.” 39 Stat. 889, as amended, 54 Stat. 1238, 8 U. S. C. § 155 (a). We do not consider the 1952 Act, 66 Stat. 163, which took effect after Heikkila’s complaint was filed. Legislative History, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 212, 275. Legislative History, 275. Legislative History, 311, 325. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U. S. 160 (1948); American Federation of Labor v. Labor Board, 308 U. S. 401 (1940); Switchmen’s Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U. S. 297 (1943); Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288 (1944). The Senate Committee said, “The last [finality] provision, while new in this particular location, is not new in the law, the courts having repeatedly held that in the cases of aliens arrested for deportation, as well as in the cases of those excluded at our ports, the decision of the administrative officers is final, and the Supreme Court having in several decisions regarded the case of the alien arrested for deportation as practically a deferred exclusion (The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S., 86; Pearson v. Williams, 202 U. S., 281; etc.).” S. Rep. No. 352, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 2, 16. We need not consider whether the same result follows from the first part of § 10 (b), “The form of proceeding for judicial review shall be any special statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in any court specified by statute . . . Compare The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86 (1903), with United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U. S. 103 (1927), and Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135 (1945). The lower courts have split on this question and we express no opinion on it now. Yiakoumis v. Hall, 83 F. Supp. 469; Lindenau v. Watkins, 73 F. Supp. 216. See Paolo v. Garfinkel, 200 F. 2d 280.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them. Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer. Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.
Who is the respondent of the case?
[ "attorney general of the United States, or his office", "specified state board or department of education", "city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit", "state commission, board, committee, or authority", "county government or county governmental unit, except school district", "court or judicial district", "state department or agency", "governmental employee or job applicant", "female governmental employee or job applicant", "minority governmental employee or job applicant", "minority female governmental employee or job applicant", "not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable", "retired or former governmental employee", "U.S. House of Representatives", "interstate compact", "judge", "state legislature, house, or committee", "local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough", "governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact", "state or U.S. supreme court", "local school district or board of education", "U.S. Senate", "U.S. senator", "foreign nation or instrumentality", "state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of", "state college or university", "United States", "State", "person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime", "advertising business or agency", "agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor", "airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes", "airline", "distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages", "alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked", "American Medical Association", "National Railroad Passenger Corp.", "amusement establishment, or recreational facility", "arrested person, or pretrial detainee", "attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association", "author, copyright holder", "bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company", "bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization", "establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store", "water transportation, stevedore", "bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines", "brewery, distillery", "broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm", "construction industry", "bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle", "business, corporation", "buyer, purchaser", "cable TV", "car dealer", "person convicted of crime", "tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband", "chemical company", "child, children, including adopted or illegitimate", "religious organization, institution, or person", "private club or facility", "coal company or coal mine operator", "computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software", "consumer, consumer organization", "creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company", "person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial", "defendant", "debtor", "real estate developer", "disabled person or disability benefit claimant", "distributor", "person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector", "drug manufacturer", "druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy", "employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of", "employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan", "electric equipment manufacturer", "electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company", "eleemosynary institution or person", "environmental organization", "employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.", "farmer, farm worker, or farm organization", "father", "female employee or job applicant", "female", "movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of", "fisherman or fishing company", "food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard", "foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity", "franchiser", "franchisee", "lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization", "person who guarantees another's obligations", "handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to", "health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor", "heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be", "hospital, medical center", "husband, or ex-husband", "involuntarily committed mental patient", "Indian, including Indian tribe or nation", "insurance company, or surety", "inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder", "investor", "injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related", "juvenile", "government contractor", "holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor", "magazine", "male", "medical or Medicaid claimant", "medical supply or manufacturing co.", "racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant", "minority female employee or job applicant", "manufacturer", "management, executive officer, or director, of business entity", "military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist", "mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company", "mother", "auto manufacturer", "newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service", "radio and television network, except cable tv", "nonprofit organization or business", "nonresident", "nuclear power plant or facility", "owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels", "shareholders to whom a tender offer is made", "tender offer", "oil company, or natural gas producer", "elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly", "out of state noncriminal defendant", "political action committee", "parent or parents", "parking lot or service", "patient of a health professional", "telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company", "physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society", "public interest organization", "physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee", "pipe line company", "package, luggage, container", "political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official", "indigent, needy, welfare recipient", "indigent defendant", "private person", "prisoner, inmate of penal institution", "professional organization, business, or person", "probationer, or parolee", "protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer", "public utility", "publisher, publishing company", "radio station", "racial or ethnic minority", "person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination", "racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "realtor", "journalist, columnist, member of the news media", "resident", "restaurant, food vendor", "retarded person, or mental incompetent", "retired or former employee", "railroad", "private school, college, or university", "seller or vendor", "shipper, including importer and exporter", "shopping center, mall", "spouse, or former spouse", "stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder", "retail business or outlet", "student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only", "tenant or lessee", "theater, studio", "forest products, lumber, or logging company", "person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent", "trucking company, or motor carrier", "television station", "union member", "unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant", "union, labor organization, or official of", "veteran", "voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)", "wholesale trade", "wife, or ex-wife", "witness, or person under subpoena", "network", "slave", "slave-owner", "bank of the united states", "timber company", "u.s. job applicants or employees", "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "General Land Office of Commissioners", "Transportation Security Administration", "Surface Transportation Board", "U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.", "Reconstruction Finance Corp.", "Department or Secretary of Homeland Security", "Unidentifiable", "International Entity" ]
[ 254 ]
sc
GEORGIA et al. v. UNITED STATES No. 72-75. Argued February 21-22, 1973 Decided May 7, 1973 Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 541. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, post, p. 542. Powell, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 545. Harold N. Hill, Jr., Executive Assistant Attorney General of Georgia, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, and Robert J. Castellani and Dorothy Y. Kirkley, Assistant Attorney General. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Norman, James P. Turner, William Bradford Reynolds, and John C. Hoyle Stephen J. Pollak, Richard M. Sharp, and Armand Derfner filed a brief for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. The Attorney General of the United States brought this suit under § 12 (d) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973j (d), to enjoin the State of Georgia from conducting elections for its House of Representatives under the 1972 legislative reapportionment law. A three-judge District Court in the Northern District of Georgia agreed that certain aspects of the reapportionment law came within the ambit of § 5 of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, and that the State, which is subject to the provisions of § 5, had not obtained prior clearance from either the Attorney General or the District Court for the District of Columbia. Accordingly, and without reaching the question whether the reapportionment plan had the purpose or effect of “denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,” 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, the District Court issued the requested injunction. The State brought this appeal. We noted probable jurisdiction, staying enforcement of the District Court judgment pending disposition of the appeal. 409 U. S. 911. Following the 1970 Census, the Georgia Legislature set out to reapportion its State House of Representatives, State Senate, and federal congressional electoral districts. We are here concerned only with the reapportionment plan for the State House of Representatives. The result of the legislature’s deliberations was a plan (hereinafter the 1971 plan) that, as compared with the prior 1968 scheme, decreased the number of districts from 118 to 105, and increased the number of multimember districts from 47 to 49. Whereas the prior apportionment plan had generally preserved county lines, the 1971 plan did not: 31 of the 49 multimember districts and 21 of the 56 single-member districts irregularly crossed county boundaries. The boundaries of nearly all districts were changed, and in many instances the number of representatives per district was altered. Residents of some 31 counties formerly in single-member districts were brought into multimember districts. Under continuing Georgia law, a candidate receiving less than a majority of the votes cast for a position was required to participate in a majority runoff election. Ga. Code Ann. § 34-1513. And in the multimember districts, each candidate was required to designate the seat for which he was running, referred to as the “numbered post.” Ga. Code Ann. § 34-1015. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act forbids States subject to the Act from implementing any change in a “voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting” without first obtaining a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia that the proposed change “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,” or submitting the plan to the Attorney General of the United States and receiving no objection within 60 days. 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. Pursuant to this requirement, the State of Georgia submitted the 1971 plan to the Attorney General on November 5, 1971. Two weeks later, a representative of the Department of Justice wrote to the State Attorney General, requesting further information needed to assess the racial impact of the tendered plan. This information was received on January 6, 1972, and on March 3, 1972, the Attorney General of the United States formally objected to the State’s plan. The objection letter cited the combination of multimember districts, numbered posts, majority runoff elections, and the extensive departure from the State’s prior policy of adhering to county lines. On the basis of these changes, plus particular changes in the structure of potential black majority single-member districts, the Attorney General was “unable to conclude that the plan does not have a discriminatory racial effect on voting.” The letter stated that the Attorney General therefore felt obligated to “interpose an objection to changes submitted by these reapportionment plans.” The State Legislature immediately enacted a new reapportionment plan and repealed its predecessor. The 1972 plan increased the number of districts from 105 to 128, and decreased the number of multimember districts from 49 to 32. Twenty-two of the multimember districts and 37 of the single-member districts still crossed county boundaries. This 1972 plan was submitted to the Attorney General on March 15, and he objected on March 24. The Assistant Attorney General’s letter stated, in part: “After a careful analysis of the Act redistricting the Georgia House of Representatives, I must conclude that this reapportionment does not satisfactorily remove the features found objectionable in your prior submission, namely, the combination of multi-member districts, numbered posts, and a majority (runoff) requirement discussed in my March 3, 1972, letter to you interposing an objection to your earlier Section 5 submission. Accordingly, and for the reasons enunciated in my March 3, 1972, letter I must, on behalf of the Attorney General, object to S. B. 690 reapportioning the Georgia House of Representatives.” When the Georgia Legislature resolved that it would take no further steps to enact a new plan, the Attorney General brought the present lawsuit. The State of Georgia claims that § 5 is inapplicable to the 1972 House plan, both because the Act does not reach “reapportionment” and because the 1972 plan does not constitute a change from procedures “in force or effect on November 1, 1964.” If applicable, the Act is claimed to be unconstitutional as applied. The State also challenges two aspects of the Attorney General’s conduct of the § 5 objection procedure, claiming, first, that the Attorney General cannot object to a state plan without finding that it in fact has a discriminatory purpose or effect, and, second, that the Attorney General’s objection to the 1971 plan was not made within the 60-day time period allowed for objection under the Act. I Despite the fact that multimember districts, numbered posts, and a majority runoff requirement were features of Georgia election law prior to November 1, 1964, the changes that followed from the 1972 reapportionment are plainly sufficient to invoke § 5 if that section of the Act reaches the substance of those changes. Section 5 is not concerned with a simple inventory of voting procedures, but rather with the reality of changed practices as they affect Negro voters. It seems clear that the extensive reorganization of voting districts and the creation of multimember districts in place of single-member districts in certain areas amounted to substantial departures from the electoral state of things under previous law. The real question is whether the substance of these changes undertaken as part of the state reapportionment are “standards, practices, or procedures with respect to voting” within the meaning of § 5. The prior decisions of this Court compel the conclusion that changes of the sort included in Georgia’s 1972 House reapportionment plan are cognizable under § 5. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, we upheld the basic constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act. Mr. Justice Black dissented from that judgment to the extent that it held every part of § 5 is constitutional, precisely describing the broad sweep of § 5: “Section 5 goes on to provide that a State covered by § 4 (b) can in no way amend its constitution or laws relating to voting without first trying to persuade the Attorney General of the United States or the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia that the new proposed laws do not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying the right to vote to citizens on account of their race or color.” 383 U. S., at 356 (concurring and dissenting opinion). The applicability of § 5 to election law changes such as those enacted by Georgia in its 1972 plan was all but conclusively established by the opinion of this Court in Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544. The Allen opinion, dealing with four companion cases, held that § 5 applied to a broad range of voting law changes, and was constitutional as applied. With respect to the reach of § 5, we held that “[t]he legislative history on the whole supports the view that Congress intended to reach any state enactment which altered the election law of a covered State in even a minor way.” Id., at 566. One of the companion cases, Fairley v. Patterson, involved a claim that a change from district to at-large voting for county supervisor was a change in a “standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting.” The challenged procedure was held to be covered by § 5. We noted that “[t]he right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 555 (1964).” Id., at 569. In holding that § 5 reached voting law changes that threatened to dilute Negro voting power, and in citing Reynolds v. Sims, we implicitly recognized the applicability of § 5 to similar but more sweeping election law changes arising from the reapportionment of state legislatures. 393 U. S., at 565-566, 583-586 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). Had Congress disagreed with the interpretation of § 5 in Allen, it had ample opportunity to amend the statute. After extensive deliberations in 1970 on bills to extend the Voting Rights Act, during which the Allen case was repeatedly discussed, the Act was extended for five years, without any substantive modification of § 5. Pub. L. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314, 315. We can only conclude, then, that Allen correctly interpreted the congressional design when it held that “the Act gives a broad interpretation to the right to vote, recognizing that voting includes 'all action necessary to make a vote effective.” 393 U. S., at 565-566. Another measure of the decisiveness with which Allen controls the present case is the actual practice of covered States since the Allen case was decided. Georgia, for example, submitted its 1971 plan to the Attorney General because it clearly believed that plan was covered by § 5. Its submission was “made pursuant to § 5,” and the State Attorney General explained in his submission that the 1968 reapportionment of the Georgia House of Representatives “was not submitted because at that time, prior to Allen v. Board of Elections, ... it was believed to be unnecessary to submit reapportionment plans to the United States Attorney General pursuant to the Voting Rights Act of 1965.” When the Attorney General objected, Georgia changed its House plan and resubmitted it pursuant to § 5. Other States covered by the Act have also read Allen as controlling. The brief for the United States advises us that as of December 1, 1972, 381 post-Allen reapportionment plans had been presented to the Attorney General by various States for § 5 approval. In the present posture of this case, the question is not whether the redistricting of the Georgia House, including extensive shifts from single-member to multimember districts, in fact had a racially discriminatory purpose or effect. The question, rather, is whether such changes have the potential for diluting the value of the Negro vote and are within the definitional terms of § 5. It is beyond doubt that such a potential exists, cf. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 141-144. In view of the teaching of Allen reaffirmed in Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, we hold that the District Court was correct in deciding that the changes enacted in the 1972 reapportionment plan for the Georgia House of Representatives were within the ambit of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. And for the reasons stated at length in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 308-337, we reaffirm that the Act is a permissible exercise of congressional power under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. II By way of implementing the performance of his obligation to pass on state submissions under § 5, the Attorney General has promulgated and published in the Federal Register certain administrative regulations, 28 CFR Part 51. The appellants claim these regulations are without legislative authorization, and object in particular to the application in the present case of two regulations which set forth the standards for decision on submissions and more fully define the 60-day time period provided in the Act. It is true, as the appellants contend, that § 5 itself does not authorize the Attorney General to promulgate any regulations. But § 5 is also silent as to the procedures the Attorney General is to employ in deciding whether or not to object to state submissions, as to the standards governing the contents of those submissions, and as to the meaning of the 60-day time period in which the Attorney General is to object, if at all. Rather than reading the statute to grant him unfettered discretion as to procedures, standards, and administration in this sensitive area, the Attorney General has chosen instead to formulate and publish objective ground rules. If these regulations are reasonable and do not conflict with the Voting Rights Act itself, then 5 U. S. C. § 301, which gives to “[t]he head of an Executive department” the power to “prescribe regulations for the government of his department, . . . [and] the distribution and performance of its business . . . ,” is surely ample legislative authority for the regulations. See United States v. Morehead, 243 U. S. 607; Smith v. United States, 170 U. S. 372. In 28 CFR § 51.19, the Attorney General has set forth the standards to be employed in deciding whether or not to object to a state submission. The regulation states that the burden of proof is on the submitting party, and that the Attorney General will refrain from objecting only if his review of the material submitted satisfies him that the proposed change does not have a racially discriminatory purpose or effect. If he is persuaded to the contrary, or if he cannot within the 60-day time period satisfy himself that the change is without a discriminatory purpose or effect, the regulation states that the Attorney General will object to the submission. In objecting to the 1971 plan, the Assistant Attorney General wrote that he was “unable to conclude that the plan does not have a discriminatory racial effect on voting.” The objection letter to the 1972 plan did not specify a degree of certainty as to the plan’s discriminatory impact, but instead stated that the new plan had not remedied the features found objectionable in its predecessor. Although both objections were consistent with the Attorney General’s regulations, the appellants in effect attack the legitimacy of the regulation described above in contending that the Attorney General is without power to object unless he has actually found that the changes contained in a submission have a discriminatory purpose or effect. In assessing this claim, it is important to focus on the entire scheme of § 5. That portion of the Voting Rights Act essentially freezes the election laws of the covered States unless a declaratory judgment is obtained in the District Court for the District of Columbia holding that a proposed change is without discriminatory purpose or effect. The alternative procedure of submission to the Attorney General “merely gives the covered State a rapid method of rendering a new state election law enforceable.” Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S., at 549. It is well established that in a declaratory judgment action under § 5, the plaintiff State has the burden of proof. What the Attorney General’s regulations do is to place the same burden on the submitting party in a § 5 objection procedure. Though the choice of language in the objection letter sent to the State of Georgia was not a model of precision, in the context of the promulgated regulations the letter surely notified the State with sufficient clarity that it had not sustained its burden of proving that the proposed changes were free of a racially discriminatory effect. It is not necessary to hold that this allocation of the burden of proof by the Attorney General was his only possible choice under the Act, in order to find it a reasonable means of administering his § 5 obligation. Any less stringent standard might well have rendered the formal declaratory judgment procedure a dead letter by making available to covered States a far smoother path to clearance. The Attorney General’s choice of a proof standard was thus at least reasonable and consistent with the Act, and we hold that his objection pursuant to that standard was lawful and effective. The appellant’s final contention is that the Attorney General’s objection to the 1971 plan was untimely, and so the submitted plan should have been held by the District Court to have gone into effect. It is far from clear that this claim is not simply moot, since the state enactment establishing the 1972 plan explicitly repealed the 1971 plan, and the objection to the 1972 plan was clearly within the statutory time period. In any event, the claim is without merit. In promulgating regulations, the Attorney General dealt with several aspects of the 60-day time limit established by § 5 of the Act. The regulations provide that all calendar days count as part of the allotted period, that parties whose submissions are objected to may seek reconsideration on the basis of new information and obtain a ruling within 60 days of that request, and that the 60-day period shall commence from the time the Department of Justice receives a submission satisfying the enumerated requirements. 28 CFR § 51.3 (b)-(d). In the present case, the Attorney General found the initial submission of the 1971 plan incomplete under the regulations. Two weeks after receiving it, he requested additional information. His letter referred to 28 CFR § 51.18, a regulation providing for a request for additional information, and noted the additional regulatory provision that the 60-day period would not commence until the information was received. The State did not submit the requested data until January 6, 1972. Under the above-mentioned regulation the 60-day period commenced on that date, and the Department of Justice made its objection within 60 days — on March 3. The appellants argue that the Attorney General has granted himself more time than the statute provides by promulgating regulations suspending the time period until a complete submission is received. Here again, the question is whether the regulation is a reasonable administrative effectuation of § 5 of the Act. The judgment that the Attorney General must make is a difficult and complex one, and no one would argue that it should be made without adequate information. There is no serious claim in this case that the additional information requested was unnecessary or irrelevant to § 5 evaluation of the submitted reapportionment plan. Yet, if the Attorney General were denied the power to suspend the 60-day period until a complete submission were tendered, his only plausible response to an inadequate or incomplete submission would be simply to object to it. He would then leave it to the State to submit adequate information if it wished to take advantage of this means of clearance under § 5. This result would only add acrimony to the administration of § 5. We conclude, therefore, that this facet of the Attorney General’s regulations is wholly reasonable and consistent with the Act. III For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed. Since, however, elections were conducted under the disputed 1972 plan by reason of this Court’s stay order, it would be inequitable to require new elections at this time. The case is remanded to the District Court with instructions that any future elections under the Georgia House reapportionment plan be enjoined unless and until the State, pursuant to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, tenders to the Attorney General a plan to which he does not object, or obtains a favorable declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia. It is so ordered. A State is subject to § 5 if it qualifies under § 4 (b), 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (b). Covered States are those which on November 1, 1964, employed any of several enumerated tests or devices as a prerequisite to voting, and in which less than 50% of eligible voters were registered to vote or actually voted in the November 1964 presidential election. States that meet identical criteria with respect to the 1968 presidential election are also covered under the amended Act. It is stipulated that Georgia is covered under §4 (b). 351 F. Supp. 444, 446-447. No objection was interposed with respect to the State Senate or federal congressional districts. The Justice Department asked for census maps of the 1964 and 1968 House districts; the distribution of white and nonwhite population within the 1964, 1968, and 1971 districts; a history of the primary and general elections in which Negro candidates ran; data, including race, with respect to all elected state representatives; and the legislative history of all redistricting bills. See, e. g., Hearings before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 4249, H. R. 5538, and Similar Proposals, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1, 4, 18, 83, 130-131, 133, 147-149, 154-155, 182-184, 402-454; Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on Bills to Amend the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 48, 195-196, 369-370, 397-398, 426-427, 469. David L. Norman, then Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, testified that, from court decisions, all these redistricting plans are going to have to be submitted to the Attorney General for his approval because they are voting changes.” Senate Hearings, supra, at 507. The appellants point to language in the Allen opinion that, they say, left open the question of the applicability of § 5 to a state reapportionment law. The cited passage in Allen is as follows: “Appellees in No. 25 [Fairley v. Patterson] also argue that § 5 was not intended to apply to a change from district to at-large voting, because application of § 5 would cause a conflict in the administration of reapportionment legislation. They contend that under such a broad reading of § 5, enforcement of a reapportionment plan could be enjoined for failure to meet the § 5 approval requirements, even though the plan had been approved by a federal court. Appellees urge that Congress could not have intended to force the States to submit a reapportionment plan to two different courts. “We must reject a narrow construction that appellees would give to § 5. . . . “. . . The argument that some administrative problem might arise in the future does not establish that Congress intended that § 5 have a narrow scope; we leave to another case a consideration of any possible conflict.” 393 U. S. 544, 56A-565, 569. The caveat implicit in this language would support the appellants’ position only if practical problems of administration had emerged in the period that has elapsed since Allen was decided. This does not appear to have been the case. The brief of the United States advises us that the Department of Justice has adopted procedures designed to minimize any conflicts between § 5 administrative review and federal court litigation based on Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment attacks upon state reapportionment plans. Where a Teapportionment plan has been prescribed by federal judicial decree, the Attorney General does not review it. See Connor v. Johnson, 402 U. S. 690, 691. Where a plan has been submitted to the Attorney General and is at the same time being litigated with respect to a Fifteenth Amendment claim, the Attorney General has deferred to the judicial determination regarding racial discrimination. Finally, the number of instances presenting an administrative-judicial overlap has been small. Of the 381 reapportionments submitted to the Attorney General, only 19 of the objected-to submissions were involved in litigation when submitted. Georgia has argued that § 5 approval is needed only with respect to those electoral districts in which a change in a “standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting” occurred. In an appropriate case, a State might establish that a reapportionment plan left some districts unaffected by even a minor change with the potential for diluting the value of the Negro vote. We do not decide whether Georgia could show the existence of any unaffected districts in this case, and we leave that issue for consideration by the District Court on remand. Title 28 CFR §51.19, in pertinent part, states that: “the burden of proof on the submitting authority is the same in submitting changes to the Attorney General as it would be in submitting changes to the District Court for the District of Columbia. ... If the Attorney General is satisfied that the submitted change does not have a racially discriminatory purpose or effect, he will not object to the change and will so notify the submitting authority. If the Attorney General determines that the submitted change has a racially discriminatory purpose or effect, he will enter an objection and will so notify the submitting authority. If the evidence as to the purpose or effect of the change is conflicting, and the Attorney General is unable to resolve the conflict within the 60-day period, he shall, consistent with the above-described burden of proof applicable in the District Court, enter an objection and so notify the submitting authority.” The very effect of § 5 was to shift the burden of proof with respect 'to racial discrimination in voting. Rather than requiring affected parties to bring suit to challenge every changed voting practice, States subject to § 5 were required to obtain prior clearance before proposed changes could be put into effect. The burden of proof is on “the areas seeking relief.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 335. See Ga. Senate Bill 690, Mar. 9, 1972. The letter sent to the Attorney General of Georgia stated that a “preliminary examination” of the materials submitted led the Department of Justice to conclude “that the data sent to the Attorney General are insufficient to evaluate properly the changes you have submitted. In accordance with Sections 51.10 (a) (6) and 51.18 (a) of the Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 . . . would you-please assist us by providing this Department the following additional information: . . . .” The promulgated regulations define in 28 CFR § 51.10 the contents of a submission. Section 51.10 (a)(6) states: “With respect to redistricting, annexation, and other complex changes, other information which the Attorney General determines is required to enable him to evaluate the purpose or effect of the change. Such other information may include items listed under paragraph (b) of this section. When such other information is required, the Attorney General shall notify the submitting authority in the manner provided in § 51.18 (a).” Section 51.10 (b) “strongly urges” submitting authorities to produce the information enumerated to the extent it is available and relevant to the submitted changes. Virtually all of the information requested in this case, see n. 4, supra, falls within the enumerated categories of §51.10 (b). See n. 4, supra. The appellants contend that to allow the Attorney General to promulgate this regulation is to open the way to frivolous and repeated delays by the Justice Department of laws of vital concern to the covered States. No such conduct by the Attorney General is presented here, and by upholding the basic validity of the regulation we most assuredly do not prejudge any ease in which such unwarranted administrative conduct may be shown. Furthermore, a submission to the Attorney General is not the exclusive mode of preclearance under § 5. If a State finds the Attorney General’s delays unreasonable, or if he objects to the submission, the State “may still enforce the legislation upon securing a declaratory judgment in the District Court for the District of Columbia.” Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S., at 549.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed. The information relevant to this variable may be found near the end of the summary that begins on the title page of each case, or preferably at the very end of the opinion of the Court. For cases in which the Court granted a motion to dismiss, consider "petition denied or appeal dismissed". There is "no disposition" if the Court denied a motion to dismiss.
What is the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed?
[ "stay, petition, or motion granted", "affirmed (includes modified)", "reversed", "reversed and remanded", "vacated and remanded", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded", "vacated", "petition denied or appeal dismissed", "certification to or from a lower court", "no disposition" ]
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NAVARRO SAVINGS ASSN. v. LEE et al. No. 79-465. Argued March 18, 1980 Decided May 19, 1980 Powell, J., delivered the opinibn of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joiñed. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 466. Bernus Wm. Fischman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Lawrence 8. Fischman. Jámes A. Ellis, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. The question is whether the trustees of a business trust may irivoke the diversity jurisdictión of the federal courts on the basis of their own citizenship, rather than that of the trust’s beneficial shareholders. I The respondents are eight individual trustees of Fidelity Mortgage Investors, a business trust organized under Massachusetts law. They hold title to real estate investments in trust for the benefit of Fidelity’s shareholders. The declaration of trust gives the respondents exclusive authority over this property “free from any power and control of the Shareholders, to the same extent as if the Trustees were the sole owners of the Trust Estate in their own right. ...” The respondents have power to transact Fidelity’s business, execute documents, and “sue and be sued in the name of the Trust or in their names as Trustees of the Trust.” They may invest the funds of the trust, lend money, and initiate or compromise lawsuits relating to the trust’s affairs. In 1971, respondents lent $850,000 to a Texas firm in return for a promissory note payable to themselves as trustees. The note was secured in part by a commitment letter in which petitioner Navarro Savings Association agreed to lend the Texas firm $850,000 to cover its obligation to the respondents. In 1973, respondents called upon Navarro to make the “takeout” loan. Navarro refused, and this action followed. The amended complaint, filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, sought approximately $175,000 in damages for breach of contract. Federal jurisdiction was premised upon diversity of citizenship. 28 U. S. C. § 1332. The complaint asserted — and the parties agree — that Navarro was a Texas citizen and that each respondent was a citizen of another State. The parties have stipulated, however, that some of Fidelity’s beneficial shareholders were Texas residents. The District Court dismissed the action for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. 416 F. Supp. 1186 (1976). Concluding that a business trust is a citizen of every State in which its shareholders reside, the court held that the parties lacked the complete diversity required by Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267 (1806). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. 597 F. 2d 421 (1979). It held that the respondent trustees were real parties in interest because they had full power to manage and control the trust and to sue on its behalf. Since complete diversity existed among the actual parties to the controversy, the Court of Appeals directed the District Court to proceed to trial on the merits. We granted certiorari, 444 U. S. 962 (1979), and we now affirm. II Federal courts have jurisdiction over controversies between “Citizens of different States” by virtue of 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (a)(1) and U. S. Const., Art. Ill, §2. Early in its history, this Court established that the “citizens” upon whose diversity a plaintiff grounds jurisdiction must be real and substantial parties to the controversy. McNutt v. Bland, 2 How. 9, 15 (1844); see Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 16 How. 314, 328-329 (1854); Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 11 Wall. 172, 177 (1871). Thus, a federal court must disregard nominal or formal parties and rest jurisdiction only upon the citizenship of real parties to the controversy. E. g., McNutt v. Bland, supra, at 14; see 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1556, pp. 710-711 (1971). The early cases held that only persons could be real parties to the controversy. Artificial or “invisible” legal creatures were not citizens of any State. Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 86-87, 91 (1809). Although corporations suing in diversity long have been “deemed” citizens, see n. 7, supra, unincorporated associations remain mere collections of individuals. When the “persons composing such association” sue in their collective name, they are the parties whose citizenship determines the diversity jurisdiction of a federal court. Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U. S. 449, 456 (1900) (limited partnership association); see Steelworkers v. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U. S. 145 (1965) (labor union); Chapman v. Barney, 129 U. S. 677 (1889) (joint stock company). Navarro contends that Fidelity’s trust form masks an unincorporated association of • individuals who make joint real estate investments. Navarro observes that certain features of the trust’s operations also characterize the operations of an association: centralized management, continuity of enterprise, and unlimited duration. Arguing that this trust is in substance an association, Navarro reasons that the real parties to the lawsuit are Fidelity’s beneficial shareholders. Ill We need not reject the argument that Fidelity shares some attributes of an association. In certain respects, a business trust also resembles a corporation. But this case involves neither an association nor a corporation. Fidelity is an express trust, and the question is whether its trustees are real parties to this controversy for purposes of a federal court’s diversity jurisdiction. As early as 1808, this Court stated that trustees of an express trust are entitled to bring diversity actions in their own names and upon the basis of their own citizenship. Chappedelaine v. Dechenaux, 4 Cranch 306, 308. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 (a) now provides that such trustees are real parties in interest for procedural purposes. Yet similar principles governed diversity jurisdiction long before the advent of uniform rules of procedure. In 1870, the Court declared that jurisdiction properly founded upon the diverse citizenship of individual trustees “is not defeated by the fact that the parties whom they represent may be disqualified.” Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 11 Wall., at 175 (mortgage contract). “[T]he residence of those who may have the equitable interest” is simply irrelevant. Bonnafee v. Williams, 3 How. 574, 577 (1845) (note held in trust for third party). The same rule applies when “the beneficiaries are many.” Dodge v. Tulleys, 144 U. S. 451, 456 (1892) (dictum) (railroad trust deed). In Bullard v. Cisco, 290 U. S. 179, 189 (1933), the trust beneficiaries were “numerous and widely scattered” investors who had conveyed certain bonds to a committee formed by a protective, agreement. The agreement did not use trust terminology. Nevertheless, the Court held that the “rights, powers and duties expressly assigned” to committee members “necessarily” made them trustees. Ibid. The agreement gaye the committeemen “full title to the deposited bonds,” and it defined “the control and power of disposal which the trustees were to have over them.” Ibid. Refusing to analogize the committee to a collection agency, the Court concluded that “[t]he beneficiaries were not necessary parties and their citizenship was immaterial.” Id., at 190. Bullard reaffirms that a trustee is a real party to the controversy for purposes of diversity jurisdiction when he possesses certain customary powers to hold, manage, and dispose of assets for the benefit of others. The trustees in this case have such powers. At all relevant times, Fidelity operated under a declaration of trust that authorized the trustees to take legal title to trust assets, to invest those assets for the benefit of the shareholders, and to sue and be sued in their capacity as trustees. Respondents filed this lawsuit in that capacity. They seek damages for breach of an obligation running to the holder of a promissory note held in their own names. Fidelity’s 9,500 beneficial shareholders had no voice in the initial investment decision. They can neither control the disposition of this action nor intervene in the affairs of the trust except in the most extraordinary situations. We conclude that these respondents are active trustees whose control over the assets held in their names is Teal and substantial. That the trust may depart from conventional forms in other respects has no bearing upon this determination. Nor does Fidelity’s resemblance to a business enterprise alter the distinctive rights and duties of the trustees. There is no allegation of sham or collusion. See 28 U. S. C. § 1359; Bullard v. Cisco, supra, at 187-188, and n. 5. The respondents are not “naked trustees” who act as “mere conduits” for a remedy flowing to others. McNutt v. Bland, 2 How., at 13-14; see Browne v. Strode, 5 Cranch 303 (1809). They have legal title; they manage the assets; they control the litigation. In short, they are real parties to the controversy. For more than 150 years, the law has permitted trustees who meet .this standard to sue in their own right, without regard to the citizenship of the trust beneficiaries. We find no reason to forsake that principle today. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Fidelity merged into a Delaware corporation in 1978, but Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25 (c) permits the original parties to continue the litigation. Jurisdiction turns on the facts existing at the time the suit commenced. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Louisville Trust Co., 174 U. S. 552, 556 (1899). Fidelity Mortgage Investors Fifth Amended and Restated Declaration of Trust (hereinafter Fidelity Declaration of Trust), App. A44-A45. Id.., Art. 3.1, App. A49-A50. Id., Art. 1.1, App. A45. Id., Art. 3.2, App. A50-A55. Section 1332 (a)(1) provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States. . . .” In view of our disposition of the case, we need not consider respondents’ alternative claim to jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 or their attempt to bring a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.2. Although overruled in Louisville, C., & C. R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497 (1844), Deveaux was resurrected by Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 16 How. 314 (1854). Marshall held that an artificial entity cannot be a citizen, but that the persons who “act under [corporate] faculties . . . and use [the] corporate name” are presumed to reside in the State of incorporation. Id., at 328; see St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. James, 161 U. S. 545, 562 (1896). This view endured until 1958, when Congress amended the diversity statute to provide explicitly that “a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business.” Act of July 25, 1958, § 2, 72 Stat. 415 (codified at 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (c)). The dissenting opinion, post, at 471-472, and n. 4, 476, n. 7, asserts that Massachusetts law would treat Fidelity as a trust for some purposes and as a partnership for others. Neither the parties nor the courts below addressed these questions of state law. Assuming that the dissent is correct, its observations cast no doubt on our conclusion that Fidelity is a form of express trust. It is black letter law that “[m]any of the rules applicable to trusts are applied to business trusts. . . .” Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 1, Comment b, p. 4 (1959). Many others are not. Our task is simply to determine, as a matter of federal law, whether the rules applicable to trustees who sue in diversity fall in the former or the latter category. There is a "rough symmetry” between the “real party in interest” standard of Rule 17 (a) and the rule that diversity jurisdiction depends upon the citizenship of real parties to the controversy. But the two rules serve different purposes and need not produce identical outcomes in all cases. Note, Diversity Jurisdiction over Unincorporated Business Entities: The Real Party in Interest as a Jurisdictional Rule, 56 Texas L. Rev. 243, 247-250 (1978); see 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1556, pp. 710-711 (1971). In appropriate circumstances, for example, a labor union may file suit in its own name as a real party in interest under Rule 17 (a). To establish diversity, however, the union must rely upon the citizenship of each of its members. Steelworkers v. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U. S. 145 (1965). The Court never has analogized express trusts to business entities for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Even when the Court espoused the view that a corporation lacked citizenship, Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch, at 91, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall explained that the doctrine had no bearing on the status of trustees. “When [persons suing by a corporate name] are said to be substantially the parties to the controversy, the court does not mean to liken it to the ease of a trustee. A trustee is a real person capable of being a citizen . . . , who has the whole legal estate in himself. At law, he is the real proprietor, and he represents himself, and sues in his own right.” Thomas v. Board of Trustees, 195 U. S. 207 (1904), cited by Navarro, js not to the contrary. The Court there considered the Board of Trustees of a state university. Rejecting the contention that the Board was analogous to a corporation, the Court held that jurisdiction depended upon the citizenship of the individual trustees. Id., at 215-217. The Court did not discuss the nature of the “trust” or the possible existence of beneficiaries. The actual issue in Bullard was not citizenship but amount in controversy. The claims of certain individual bondholders were too small to satisfy the $3,000 jurisdictional threshold then in effect. The trustees, on the other hand, held legal title to unpaid bonds and coupons worth about $350,000. 290 U. S., at 180-181. The relative simplicity of this established principle, see post, at 475, is one of its virtues. “It is of first importance to have a definition . . . [that] will not invite extensive threshold litigation over jurisdiction,” although the resulting “differentiations of treatment . . . appear somewhat arbitrary.” American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction between State and Federal Courts 128 (1969). “Jurisdiction should be as self-regulated as breathing; . . . litigation over whether the case is in the right court is essentially a waste of time and resources.” Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, Part I, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1968). The analysis proposed by the dissent, post, at 475-476, see post, at 467-472, and n. 4, could present serious difficulties for district courts called upon to determine questions of diversity jurisdiction. The shareholders may elect and remove trustees; they may terminate the trust or amend the Declaration; and they must approve any disposition of more than half of the trust estate. Fidelity Declaration of Trust, Arts. 2.2, 6.7, 8.2, 8.3, App. A47, A67, A79-A80. No other shareholder action can bind the trustees. Id., Arts. 3.1, 6.2, App. A49, A64. The dissent believes that these limited powers of intervention establish a “pervasive measure of [shareholder] control . . . over the trustees’ actions. . . .” Post, at 476. Therefore, the dissent would hold that Fidelity is a citizen of each State in which any of its 9,500 shareholders resides. But this form of “control” does not strip the trustees of the powers that make them real parties to the controversy for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. See supra, at 459, 463-465. Indeed, their authority over trust property — short of partial liquidation — is expressly made “free from any power and control of the Shareholders, to the same extent as if the Trustees were the sole owners of the Trust Estate in their own right. . . .” Fidelity Declaration of Trust, Art. 3.1, App. A49-A50. That business trusts may be treated as associations under the Internal Revenue Code, Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U. S. 344 (1935), is simply irrelevant.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them. Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer. Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.
Who is the petitioner of the case?
[ "attorney general of the United States, or his office", "specified state board or department of education", "city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit", "state commission, board, committee, or authority", "county government or county governmental unit, except school district", "court or judicial district", "state department or agency", "governmental employee or job applicant", "female governmental employee or job applicant", "minority governmental employee or job applicant", "minority female governmental employee or job applicant", "not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable", "retired or former governmental employee", "U.S. House of Representatives", "interstate compact", "judge", "state legislature, house, or committee", "local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough", "governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact", "state or U.S. supreme court", "local school district or board of education", "U.S. Senate", "U.S. senator", "foreign nation or instrumentality", "state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of", "state college or university", "United States", "State", "person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime", "advertising business or agency", "agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor", "airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes", "airline", "distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages", "alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked", "American Medical Association", "National Railroad Passenger Corp.", "amusement establishment, or recreational facility", "arrested person, or pretrial detainee", "attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association", "author, copyright holder", "bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company", "bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization", "establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store", "water transportation, stevedore", "bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines", "brewery, distillery", "broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm", "construction industry", "bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle", "business, corporation", "buyer, purchaser", "cable TV", "car dealer", "person convicted of crime", "tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband", "chemical company", "child, children, including adopted or illegitimate", "religious organization, institution, or person", "private club or facility", "coal company or coal mine operator", "computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software", "consumer, consumer organization", "creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company", "person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial", "defendant", "debtor", "real estate developer", "disabled person or disability benefit claimant", "distributor", "person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector", "drug manufacturer", "druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy", "employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of", "employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan", "electric equipment manufacturer", "electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company", "eleemosynary institution or person", "environmental organization", "employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.", "farmer, farm worker, or farm organization", "father", "female employee or job applicant", "female", "movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of", "fisherman or fishing company", "food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard", "foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity", "franchiser", "franchisee", "lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization", "person who guarantees another's obligations", "handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to", "health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor", "heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be", "hospital, medical center", "husband, or ex-husband", "involuntarily committed mental patient", "Indian, including Indian tribe or nation", "insurance company, or surety", "inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder", "investor", "injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related", "juvenile", "government contractor", "holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor", "magazine", "male", "medical or Medicaid claimant", "medical supply or manufacturing co.", "racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant", "minority female employee or job applicant", "manufacturer", "management, executive officer, or director, of business entity", "military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist", "mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company", "mother", "auto manufacturer", "newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service", "radio and television network, except cable tv", "nonprofit organization or business", "nonresident", "nuclear power plant or facility", "owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels", "shareholders to whom a tender offer is made", "tender offer", "oil company, or natural gas producer", "elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly", "out of state noncriminal defendant", "political action committee", "parent or parents", "parking lot or service", "patient of a health professional", "telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company", "physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society", "public interest organization", "physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee", "pipe line company", "package, luggage, container", "political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official", "indigent, needy, welfare recipient", "indigent defendant", "private person", "prisoner, inmate of penal institution", "professional organization, business, or person", "probationer, or parolee", "protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer", "public utility", "publisher, publishing company", "radio station", "racial or ethnic minority", "person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination", "racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "realtor", "journalist, columnist, member of the news media", "resident", "restaurant, food vendor", "retarded person, or mental incompetent", "retired or former employee", "railroad", "private school, college, or university", "seller or vendor", "shipper, including importer and exporter", "shopping center, mall", "spouse, or former spouse", "stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder", "retail business or outlet", "student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only", "tenant or lessee", "theater, studio", "forest products, lumber, or logging company", "person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent", "trucking company, or motor carrier", "television station", "union member", "unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant", "union, labor organization, or official of", "veteran", "voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)", "wholesale trade", "wife, or ex-wife", "witness, or person under subpoena", "network", "slave", "slave-owner", "bank of the united states", "timber company", "u.s. job applicants or employees", "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "General Land Office of Commissioners", "Transportation Security Administration", "Surface Transportation Board", "U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.", "Reconstruction Finance Corp.", "Department or Secretary of Homeland Security", "Unidentifiable", "International Entity" ]
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Lester Gerard PACKINGHAM, Petitioner v. NORTH CAROLINA. No. 15-1194. Supreme Court of the United States Argued Feb. 27, 2017. Decided June 19, 2017. David T. Goldberg, for Petitioner. Robert C. Montgomery, Raleigh, NC, for Respondent. Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, Office of the Appellate Defender, Durham, NC, David T. Goldberg, Jeffrey L. Fisher, Pamela S. Karlan, Stanford Law School Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, Stanford, CA, for Petitioner. Josh Stein, Attorney General of North Carolina, John F. Maddrey, Solicitor General of North Carolina, Robert C. Montgomery, Senior Deputy Attorney General, Daniel P. O'Brien, Special Deputy Attorney General, Anne Murray Middleton, Special Deputy Attorney General, North Carolina Department of Justice, Raleigh, NC, for Respondent. Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. In 2008, North Carolina enacted a statute making it a felony for a registered sex offender to gain access to a number of websites, including commonplace social media websites like Facebook and Twitter. The question presented is whether that law is permissible under the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause, applicable to the States under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I A North Carolina law makes it a felony for a registered sex offender "to access a commercial social networking Web site where the sex offender knows that the site permits minor children to become members or to create or maintain personal Web pages." N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-202.5(a), (e) (2015). A "commercial social networking Web site" is defined as a website that meets four criteria. First, it "[i]s operated by a person who derives revenue from membership fees, advertising, or other sources related to the operation of the Web site." § 14-202.5(b). Second, it "[f]acilitates the social introduction between two or more persons for the purposes of friendship, meeting other persons, or information exchanges." Ibid. Third, it "[a]llows users to create Web pages or personal profiles that contain information such as the name or nickname of the user, photographs placed on the personal Web page by the user, other personal information about the user, and links to other personal Web pages on the commercial social networking Web site of friends or associates of the user that may be accessed by other users or visitors to the Web site." Ibid. And fourth, it "[p]rovides users or visitors ... mechanisms to communicate with other users, such as a message board, chat room, electronic mail, or instant messenger." Ibid. The statute includes two express exemptions. The statutory bar does not extend to websites that "[p]rovid[e] only one of the following discrete services: photo-sharing, electronic mail, instant messenger, or chat room or message board platform." § 14-202.5(c)(1). The law also does not encompass websites that have as their "primary purpose the facilitation of commercial transactions involving goods or services between [their] members or visitors." § 14-202.5(c)(2). According to sources cited to the Court, § 14-202.5 applies to about 20,000 people in North Carolina and the State has prosecuted over 1,000 people for violating it. Brief for Petitioner 6-8. B In 2002, petitioner Lester Gerard Packingham-then a 21-year-old college student-had sex with a 13-year-old girl. He pleaded guilty to taking indecent liberties with a child. Because this crime qualifies as "an offense against a minor," petitioner was required to register as a sex offender-a status that can endure for 30 years or more. See § 14-208.6A; see § 14-208.7(a). As a registered sex offender, petitioner was barred under § 14-202.5 from gaining access to commercial social networking sites. In 2010, a state court dismissed a traffic ticket against petitioner. In response, he logged on to Facebook.com and posted the following statement on his personal profile: "Man God is Good! How about I got so much favor they dismissed the ticket before court even started? No fine, no court cost, no nothing spent...... Praise be to GOD, WOW! Thanks JESUS!" App. 136. At the time, a member of the Durham Police Department was investigating registered sex offenders who were thought to be violating § 14-202.5. The officer noticed that a " 'J.R. Gerrard' " had posted the statement quoted above. 368 N.C. 380, 381, 777 S.E.2d 738, 742 (2015). By checking court records, the officer discovered that a traffic citation for petitioner had been dismissed around the time of the post. Evidence obtained by search warrant confirmed the officer's suspicions that petitioner was J.R. Gerrard. Petitioner was indicted by a grand jury for violating § 14-202.5. The trial court denied his motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the charge against him violated the First Amendment. Petitioner was ultimately convicted and given a suspended prison sentence. At no point during trial or sentencing did the State allege that petitioner contacted a minor-or committed any other illicit act-on the Internet. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals of North Carolina. That court struck down § 14-202.5 on First Amendment grounds, explaining that the law is not narrowly tailored to serve the State's legitimate interest in protecting minors from sexual abuse. 229 N.C.App. 293, 304, 748 S.E.2d 146, 154 (2013). Rather, the law "arbitrarily burdens all registered sex offenders by preventing a wide range of communication and expressive activity unrelated to achieving its purported goal." Ibid. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the law is "constitutional in all respects." 368 N.C., at 381, 777 S.E.2d, at 741. Among other things, the court explained that the law is "carefully tailored ... to prohibit registered sex offenders from accessing only those Web sites that allow them the opportunity to gather information about minors." Id., at 389, 777 S.E.2d, at 747. The court also held that the law leaves open adequate alternative means of communication because it permits petitioner to gain access to websites that the court believed perform the "same or similar" functions as social media, such as the Paula Deen Network and the website for the local NBC affiliate. Id., at 390, 777 S.E.2d, at 747. Two justices dissented. They stated that the law impermissibly "creates a criminal prohibition of alarming breadth and extends well beyond the evils the State seeks to combat." Id., at 401, 777 S.E.2d, at 754 (opinion of Hudson, J.) (alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court granted certiorari, 580 U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 368, 196 L.Ed.2d 283 (2016), and now reverses. II A fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that all persons have access to places where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once more. The Court has sought to protect the right to speak in this spatial context. A basic rule, for example, is that a street or a park is a quintessential forum for the exercise of First Amendment rights. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). Even in the modern era, these places are still essential venues for public gatherings to celebrate some views, to protest others, or simply to learn and inquire. While in the past there may have been difficulty in identifying the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today the answer is clear. It is cyberspace-the "vast democratic forums of the Internet" in general, Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 868, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997), and social media in particular. Seven in ten American adults use at least one Internet social networking service. Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae 5-6. One of the most popular of these sites is Facebook, the site used by petitioner leading to his conviction in this case. According to sources cited to the Court in this case, Facebook has 1.79 billion active users. Id., at 6. This is about three times the population of North America. Social media offers "relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds." Reno, supra, at 870, 117 S.Ct. 2329. On Facebook, for example, users can debate religion and politics with their friends and neighbors or share vacation photos. On LinkedIn, users can look for work, advertise for employees, or review tips on entrepreneurship. And on Twitter, users can petition their elected representatives and otherwise engage with them in a direct manner. Indeed, Governors in all 50 States and almost every Member of Congress have set up accounts for this purpose. See Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation 15-16. In short, social media users employ these websites to engage in a wide array of protected First Amendment activity on topics "as diverse as human thought." Reno, supra, at 870, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (internal quotation marks omitted). The nature of a revolution in thought can be that, in its early stages, even its participants may be unaware of it. And when awareness comes, they still may be unable to know or foresee where its changes lead. Cf. D. Hawke, Benjamin Rush: Revolutionary Gadfly 341 (1971) (quoting Rush as observing: " 'The American war is over; but this is far from being the case with the American revolution. On the contrary, nothing but the first act of the great drama is closed' "). So too here. While we now may be coming to the realization that the Cyber Age is a revolution of historic proportions, we cannot appreciate yet its full dimensions and vast potential to alter how we think, express ourselves, and define who we want to be. The forces and directions of the Internet are so new, so protean, and so far reaching that courts must be conscious that what they say today might be obsolete tomorrow. This case is one of the first this Court has taken to address the relationship between the First Amendment and the modern Internet. As a result, the Court must exercise extreme caution before suggesting that the First Amendment provides scant protection for access to vast networks in that medium. III This background informs the analysis of the North Carolina statute at issue. Even making the assumption that the statute is content neutral and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny, the provision cannot stand. In order to survive intermediate scrutiny, a law must be "narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest." McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 2518, 2534, 189 L.Ed.2d 502 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, the law must not "burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests." Id., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2535 (internal quotation marks omitted). For centuries now, inventions heralded as advances in human progress have been exploited by the criminal mind. New technologies, all too soon, can become instruments used to commit serious crimes. The railroad is one example, see M. Crichton, The Great Train Robbery, p. xv (1975), and the telephone another, see 18 U.S.C. § 1343. So it will be with the Internet and social media. There is also no doubt that, as this Court has recognized, "[t]he sexual abuse of a child is a most serious crime and an act repugnant to the moral instincts of a decent people." Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244, 122 S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002). And it is clear that a legislature "may pass valid laws to protect children" and other victims of sexual assault "from abuse." See id., at 245, 122 S.Ct. 1389 ; accord, New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982). The government, of course, need not simply stand by and allow these evils to occur. But the assertion of a valid governmental interest "cannot, in every context, be insulated from all constitutional protections." Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 563, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969). It is necessary to make two assumptions to resolve this case. First, given the broad wording of the North Carolina statute at issue, it might well bar access not only to commonplace social media websites but also to websites as varied as Amazon.com, Washingtonpost.com, and Webmd.com. See post, at 1741 - 1743; see also Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation 24-27; Brief for Cato Institute et al. as Amici Curiae 10-12, and n. 6. The Court need not decide the precise scope of the statute. It is enough to assume that the law applies (as the State concedes it does) to social networking sites "as commonly understood"-that is, websites like Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter. See Brief for Respondent 54; Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. Second, this opinion should not be interpreted as barring a State from enacting more specific laws than the one at issue. Specific criminal acts are not protected speech even if speech is the means for their commission. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-449, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969) ( per curiam ). Though the issue is not before the Court, it can be assumed that the First Amendment permits a State to enact specific, narrowly tailored laws that prohibit a sex offender from engaging in conduct that often presages a sexual crime, like contacting a minor or using a website to gather information about a minor. Cf. Brief for Respondent 42-43. Specific laws of that type must be the State's first resort to ward off the serious harm that sexual crimes inflict. (Of importance, the troubling fact that the law imposes severe restrictions on persons who already have served their sentence and are no longer subject to the supervision of the criminal justice system is also not an issue before the Court.) Even with these assumptions about the scope of the law and the State's interest, the statute here enacts a prohibition unprecedented in the scope of First Amendment speech it burdens. Social media allows users to gain access to information and communicate with one another about it on any subject that might come to mind. Supra, at 1735 - 1736. By prohibiting sex offenders from using those websites, North Carolina with one broad stroke bars access to what for many are the principal sources for knowing current events, checking ads for employment, speaking and listening in the modern public square, and otherwise exploring the vast realms of human thought and knowledge. These websites can provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard. They allow a person with an Internet connection to "become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox." Reno, 521 U.S., at 870, 117 S.Ct. 2329. In sum, to foreclose access to social media altogether is to prevent the user from engaging in the legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights. It is unsettling to suggest that only a limited set of websites can be used even by persons who have completed their sentences. Even convicted criminals-and in some instances especially convicted criminals-might receive legitimate benefits from these means for access to the world of ideas, in particular if they seek to reform and to pursue lawful and rewarding lives. IV The primary response from the State is that the law must be this broad to serve its preventative purpose of keeping convicted sex offenders away from vulnerable victims. The State has not, however, met its burden to show that this sweeping law is necessary or legitimate to serve that purpose. See McCullen, 573 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2540. It is instructive that no case or holding of this Court has approved of a statute as broad in its reach. The closest analogy that the State has cited is Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 112 S.Ct. 1846, 119 L.Ed.2d 5 (1992). There, the Court upheld a prohibition on campaigning within 100 feet of a polling place. That case gives little or no support to the State. The law in Burson was a limited restriction that, in a context consistent with constitutional tradition, was enacted to protect another fundamental right-the right to vote. The restrictions there were far less onerous than those the State seeks to impose here. The law in Burson meant only that the last few seconds before voters entered a polling place were "their own, as free from interference as possible." Id., at 210, 112 S.Ct. 1846. And the Court noted that, were the buffer zone larger than 100 feet, it "could effectively become an impermissible burden" under the First Amendment. Ibid. The better analogy to this case is Board of Airport Comm'rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 107 S.Ct. 2568, 96 L.Ed.2d 500 (1987), where the Court struck down an ordinance prohibiting any "First Amendment activities" at Los Angeles International Airport because the ordinance covered all manner of protected, nondisruptive behavior including "talking and reading, or the wearing of campaign buttons or symbolic clothing," id., at 571, 575, 107 S.Ct. 2568. If a law prohibiting "all protected expression" at a single airport is not constitutional, id., at 574, 107 S.Ct. 2568 (emphasis deleted), it follows with even greater force that the State may not enact this complete bar to the exercise of First Amendment rights on websites integral to the fabric of our modern society and culture. * * * It is well established that, as a general rule, the Government "may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech." Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S., at 255, 122 S.Ct. 1389. That is what North Carolina has done here. Its law must be held invalid. The judgment of the North Carolina Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Justice ALITO, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Justice THOMAS join, concurring in the judgment. The North Carolina statute at issue in this case was enacted to serve an interest of "surpassing importance." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) -but it has a staggering reach. It makes it a felony for a registered sex offender simply to visit a vast array of websites, including many that appear to provide no realistic opportunity for communications that could facilitate the abuse of children. Because of the law's extraordinary breadth, I agree with the Court that it violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. I cannot join the opinion of the Court, however, because of its undisciplined dicta. The Court is unable to resist musings that seem to equate the entirety of the internet with public streets and parks. Ante, at 1735 - 1736. And this language is bound to be interpreted by some to mean that the States are largely powerless to restrict even the most dangerous sexual predators from visiting any internet sites, including, for example, teenage dating sites and sites designed to permit minors to discuss personal problems with their peers. I am troubled by the implications of the Court's unnecessary rhetoric. I A The North Carolina law at issue makes it a felony for a registered sex offender "to access a commercial social networking Web site where the sex offender knows that the site permits minor children to become members or to create or maintain personal Web pages." N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-202.5(a), (e) (2015). And as I will explain, the statutory definition of a "commercial social networking Web site" is very broad. Packingham and the State debate the analytical framework that governs this case. The State argues that the law in question is content neutral and merely regulates a "place" (i.e., the internet) where convicted sex offenders may wish to engage in speech. See Brief for Respondent 20-25. Therefore, according to the State, the standard applicable to "time, place, or manner" restrictions should apply. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). Packingham responds that the challenged statute is "unlike any law this Court has considered as a time, place, or manner restriction," Brief for Petitioner 37, and he advocates a more demanding standard of review, id., at 37-39. Like the Court, I find it unnecessary to resolve this dispute because the law in question cannot satisfy the standard applicable to a content-neutral regulation of the place where speech may occur. B A content-neutral "time, place, or manner" restriction must serve a "legitimate" government interest, Ward, supra, at 798, 109 S.Ct. 2746 and the North Carolina law easily satisfies this requirement. As we have frequently noted, "[t]he prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance." Ferber, supra, at 757, 102 S.Ct. 3348. "Sex offenders are a serious threat," and "the victims of sexual assault are most often juveniles." McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32, 122 S.Ct. 2017, 153 L.Ed.2d 47 (2002) (plurality opinion); see Connecticut Dept. of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4, 123 S.Ct. 1160, 155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2003). "[T]he ... interest [of] safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor ... is a compelling one," Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, County of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 607, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982), and "we have sustained legislation aimed at protecting the physical and emotional well-being of youth even when the laws have operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected rights," Ferber, supra, at 757, 102 S.Ct. 3348. Repeat sex offenders pose an especially grave risk to children. "When convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault." McKune, supra, at 33, 122 S.Ct. 2017 (plurality opinion); see United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 133 S.Ct. 2496, 2503-2504, 186 L.Ed.2d 540 (2013). The State's interest in protecting children from recidivist sex offenders plainly applies to internet use. Several factors make the internet a powerful tool for the would-be child abuser. First, children often use the internet in a way that gives offenders easy access to their personal information-by, for example, communicating with strangers and allowing sites to disclose their location. Second, the internet provides previously unavailable ways of communicating with, stalking, and ultimately abusing children. An abuser can create a false profile that misrepresents the abuser's age and gender. The abuser can lure the minor into engaging in sexual conversations, sending explicit photos, or even meeting in person. And an abuser can use a child's location posts on the internet to determine the pattern of the child's day-to-day activities-and even the child's location at a given moment. Such uses of the internet are already well documented, both in research and in reported decisions. Because protecting children from abuse is a compelling state interest and sex offenders can (and do) use the internet to engage in such abuse, it is legitimate and entirely reasonable for States to try to stop abuse from occurring before it happens. C 1 It is not enough, however, that the law before us is designed to serve a compelling state interest; it also must not "burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests." Ward, 491 U.S., at 798-799, 109 S.Ct. 2746 ; see also McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 134 S.Ct. 2518, 2535, 189 L.Ed.2d 502 (2014). The North Carolina law fails this requirement. A straightforward reading of the text of N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-202.5 compels the conclusion that it prohibits sex offenders from accessing an enormous number of websites. The law defines a "commercial social networking Web site" as one with four characteristics. First, the website must be "operated by a person who derives revenue from membership fees, advertising, or other sources related to the operation of the Web site." § 14-202.5(b)(1). Due to the prevalence of advertising on websites of all types, this requirement does little to limit the statute's reach. Second, the website must "[f]acilitat[e] the social introduction between two or more persons for the purposes of friendship, meeting other persons, or information exchanges." § 14-202.5(b)(2). The term "social introduction" easily encompasses any casual exchange, and the term "information exchanges" seems to apply to any site that provides an opportunity for a visitor to post a statement or comment that may be read by other visitors. Today, a great many websites include this feature. Third, a website must "[a]llo[w] users to create Web pages or personal profiles that contain information such as the name or nickname of the user, photographs placed on the personal Web page by the user, other personal information about the user, and links to other personal Web pages on the commercial social networking Web site of friends or associates of the user that may be accessed by other users or visitors to the Web site." § 14-202.5(b)(3) (emphasis added). This definition covers websites that allow users to create anything that can be called a "personal profile," i.e., a short description of the user. Contrary to the argument of the State, Brief for Respondent 26-27, everything that follows the phrase "such as" is an illustration of features that a covered website or personal profile may (but need not) include. Fourth, in order to fit within the statute, a website must "[p]rovid[e] users or visitors ... mechanisms to communicate with other users, such as a message board, chat room, electronic mail, or instant messenger." § 14-202.5(b)(4) (emphasis added). This requirement seems to demand no more than that a website allow back-and-forth comments between users. And since a comment function is undoubtedly a "mechanis[m] to communicate with other users," ibid., it appears to follow that any website with such a function satisfies this requirement. 2 The fatal problem for § 14-202.5 is that its wide sweep precludes access to a large number of websites that are most unlikely to facilitate the commission of a sex crime against a child. A handful of examples illustrates this point. Take, for example, the popular retail website Amazon.com, which allows minors to use its services and meets all four requirements of § 14-202.5' s definition of a commercial social networking website. First, as a seller of products, Amazon unquestionably derives revenue from the operation of its website. Second, the Amazon site facilitates the social introduction of people for the purpose of information exchanges. When someone purchases a product on Amazon, the purchaser can review the product and upload photographs, and other buyers can then respond to the review. This information exchange about products that Amazon sells undoubtedly fits within the definition in § 14-202.5. It is the equivalent of passengers on a bus comparing notes about products they have purchased. Third, Amazon allows a user to create a personal profile, which is then associated with the product reviews that the user uploads. Such a profile can contain an assortment of information, including the user's name, e-mail address, and picture. And fourth, given its back-and-forth comment function, Amazon satisfies the final statutory requirement. Many news websites are also covered by this definition. For example, the Washington Post's website gives minors access and satisfies the four elements that define a commercial social networking website. The website (1) derives revenue from ads and (2) facilitates social introductions for the purpose of information exchanges. Users of the site can comment on articles, reply to other users' comments, and recommend another user's comment. Users can also (3) create personal profiles that include a name or nickname and a photograph. The photograph and name will then appear next to every comment the user leaves on an article. Finally (4), the back-and-forth comment section is a mechanism for users to communicate among themselves. The site thus falls within § 14-202.5 and is accordingly off limits for registered sex offenders in North Carolina. Or consider WebMD-a website that contains health-related resources, from tools that help users find a doctor to information on preventative care and the symptoms associated with particular medical problems. WebMD, too, allows children on the site. And it exhibits the four hallmarks of a "commercial social networking" website. It obtains revenue from advertisements. It facilitates information exchanges-via message boards that allow users to engage in public discussion of an assortment of health issues. It allows users to create basic profile pages: Users can upload a picture and some basic information about themselves, and other users can see their aggregated comments and "likes." WebMD also provides message boards, which are specifically mentioned in the statute as a "mechanis[m] to communicate with other users." N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-202.5(b)(4). As these examples illustrate, the North Carolina law has a very broad reach and covers websites that are ill suited for use in stalking or abusing children. The focus of the discussion on these sites-shopping, news, health-does not provide a convenient jumping off point for conversations that may lead to abuse. In addition, the social exchanges facilitated by these websites occur in the open, and this reduces the possibility of a child being secretly lured into an abusive situation. These websites also give sex offenders little opportunity to gather personal details about a child; the information that can be listed in a profile is limited, and the profiles are brief. What is more, none of these websites make it easy to determine a child's precise location at a given moment. For example, they do not permit photo streams (at most, a child could upload a single profile photograph), and they do not include up-to-the minute location services. Such websites would provide essentially no aid to a would-be child abuser. Placing this set of websites categorically off limits from registered sex offenders prohibits them from receiving or engaging in speech that the First Amendment protects and does not appreciably advance the State's goal of protecting children from recidivist sex offenders. I am therefore compelled to conclude that, while the law before us addresses a critical problem, it sweeps far too broadly to satisfy the demands of the Free Speech Clause. II While I thus agree with the Court that the particular law at issue in this case violates the First Amendment, I am troubled by the Court's loose rhetoric. After noting that "a street or a park is a quintessential forum for the exercise of First Amendment rights," the Court states that "cyberspace" and "social media in particular" are now "the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views." Ante, at 1735. The Court declines to explain what this means with respect to free speech law, and the Court holds no more than that the North Carolina law fails the test for content-neutral "time, place, and manner" restrictions. But if the entirety of the internet or even just "social media" sites are the 21st century equivalent of public streets and parks, then States may have little ability to restrict the sites that may be visited by even the most dangerous sex offenders. May a State preclude an adult previously convicted of molesting children from visiting a dating site for teenagers? Or a site where minors communicate with each other about personal problems? The Court should be more attentive to the implications of its rhetoric for, contrary to the Court's suggestion, there are important differences between cyberspace and the physical world. I will mention a few that are relevant to internet use by sex offenders. First, it is easier for parents to monitor the physical locations that their children visit and the individuals with whom they speak in person than it is to monitor their internet use. Second, if a sex offender is seen approaching children or loitering in a place frequented by children, this conduct may be observed by parents, teachers, or others. Third, the internet offers an unprecedented degree of anonymity and easily permits a would-be molester to assume a false identity. The Court is correct that we should be cautious in applying our free speech precedents to the internet. Ante, at 1736. Cyberspace is different from the physical world, and if it is true, as the Court believes, that "we cannot appreciate yet" the "full dimensions and vast potential" of "the Cyber Age," ibid., we should proceed circumspectly, taking one step at a time. It is regrettable that the Court has not heeded its own admonition of caution. See Pew Research Center, Teens, Social Media, and Privacy 5 (May 21, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2013/05/PIP_TeensSocialMediaandPrivacy_PDF.pdf (all internet materials as last visited June 16, 2017); J. Wolak, K. Mitchell, & D. Finkelhor, National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, Online Victimization of Youth: Five Years Later 7 (2006) (prepared by Univ. of N.H., Crimes Against Children Research Center), http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/CV138.pdf. See id., at 2-3; Wolak, Finkelhor, Mitchell, & Ybarra, Online "Predators" and Their Victims, 63 Am. Psychologist 111, 112 (Feb.-Mar. 2008). For example, in State v. Gallo, 275 Or.App. 868, 869, 365 P.3d 1154, 1154-1155 (2015), a 32-year-old defendant posing as a 15-year-old boy used a social networking site to contact and befriend a 16-year-old autistic girl. "He then arranged to meet the victim, took her to a park, and sexually abused her." Ibid., 365 P.3d, at 1155. In United States v. Steele, 664 Fed.Appx. 260, 261 (C.A.3 2016), the defendant "began interacting with a minor [victim] on the gay social networking cell phone application 'Jack'd.' " He eventually met the 14-year-old victim and sexually abused him. Ibid. Sadly, these cases are not unique. See, e.g., Himko v. English, 2016 WL 7645584, *1 (N.D.Fla., Dec. 5, 2016) (a convicted rapist and registered sex offender "contacted a sixteen-year-old girl using ... Facebook" and then exchanged explicit text messages and photographs with her), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 54246 (Jan. 4, 2017) ; Roberts v. United States, 2015 WL 7424858, *2-*3 (S.D.Ohio, Nov. 23, 2015) (the defendant "met a then 14-year-old child online via a social networking website called vampirefreaks.com" and then enticed the child to his home and "coerced the child to perform oral sex on him"), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 112647 (Jan. 8, 2016), certificate of appealability denied, No. 16-3050 (CA6 June 15, 2016); State v. Murphy, 2016-0901, p. 3 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/28/16), 206 So.3d 219, 224 (a defendant "initiated conversations" with his 12-year-old victim "on a social network chat site called 'Kik' " and later sent sexually graphic photographs of himself to the victim and received sexually graphic photos from her). See New Oxford American Dictionary 1394 (3d ed. 2010); Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1811 (2002); 12 Oxford English Dictionary 576 (2d ed. 1989). See Amazon, Conditions of Use (June 21, 2016), https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=help_search_1-2?ie=UTF8&nodeId=201909000&qid=1490898710&sr=1-2. See Amazon, About Customer Reviews, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=hp_left_v4_sib?ie=UTF8&nodeId=201967050; Amazon, About Public Activity, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=hp_left_v4_sib?ie=UTF8&nodeId=202076150. See Amazon, About Your Profile, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=hp_left_v4_sib?ie=UTF8&nodeId=202076210; Amazon, About Public Information, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=help_search_1-2?ie=UTF8&nodeId=202076170&qid=1490835739&sr=1-2. Amazon does not appear to fall within the statute's exemption for websites that have as their "primary purpose the facilitation of commercial transactions involving goods or services between its members or visitors." § 14-202.5(c)(2). Amazon's primary purpose seems to be the facilitation of commercial transactions between its users and itself. See Washington Post, Terms of Service (July 1, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/terms-of-service/2011/11/18/gIQAldiYiN_story.html?utm_term=.9be5851f95. See Washington Post, Ad choices (Nov. 21, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/how-can-i-opt-out-of-online-advertising-cookies/2011/11/18/gIQABECbiN_story.html?utm_term=3da1f56d67e7; Washington Post, Privacy Policy (May 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/privacy-policy/2011/11/18/gIQASIiaiN_story.html?utm_term=.8252a76f8df2. See WebMD, Terms and Conditions of Use (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.webmd.com/about-webmd-policies/about-terms-and-conditions-of-use. WebMD, Advertising Policy (June 9, 2016), http://www.webmd.com/ about-webmd-policies/about-advertising-policy. WebMD, Message Board Overview (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.webmd.com/about-webmd-policies/about-community-overview. See WebMD, Change Your Profile Settings (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.webmd.com/about-webmd-policies/profile. I express no view on whether a law that does not reach the sort of sites discussed above would satisfy the First Amendment. Until such a law is before us, it is premature to address that question. As the law at issue here shows, it is not easy to provide a precise definition of a "social media" site, and the Court makes no effort to do so. Thus, the scope of its dicta is obscure.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. If the case arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, note the source as "United States Supreme Court". If the case arose in a state court, note the source as "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", or "State Trial Court". Do not code the name of the state.
What is the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed?
[ "U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals", "U.S. Court of International Trade", "U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims", "U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces", "U.S. Court of Military Review", "U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals", "U.S. Customs Court", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit", "U.S. Tax Court", "Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals", "U.S. Court for China", "U.S. Consular Courts", "U.S. Commerce Court", "Territorial Supreme Court", "Territorial Appellate Court", "Territorial Trial Court", "Emergency Court of Appeals", "Supreme Court of the District of Columbia", "Bankruptcy Court", "U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)", "Alabama Middle U.S. District Court", "Alabama Northern U.S. District Court", "Alabama Southern U.S. District Court", "Alaska U.S. District Court", "Arizona U.S. District Court", "Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court", "Arkansas Western U.S. District Court", "California Central U.S. District Court", "California Eastern U.S. District Court", "California Northern U.S. District Court", "California Southern U.S. District Court", "Colorado U.S. District Court", "Connecticut U.S. District Court", "Delaware U.S. District Court", "District Of Columbia U.S. District Court", "Florida Middle U.S. District Court", "Florida Northern U.S. District Court", "Florida Southern U.S. District Court", "Georgia Middle U.S. District Court", "Georgia Northern U.S. District Court", "Georgia Southern U.S. District Court", "Guam U.S. District Court", "Hawaii U.S. District Court", "Idaho U.S. District Court", "Illinois Central U.S. District Court", "Illinois Northern U.S. District Court", "Illinois Southern U.S. District Court", "Indiana Northern U.S. District Court", "Indiana Southern U.S. District Court", "Iowa Northern U.S. District Court", "Iowa Southern U.S. District Court", "Kansas U.S. District Court", "Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court", "Kentucky Western U.S. District Court", "Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court", "Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court", "Louisiana Western U.S. District Court", "Maine U.S. District Court", "Maryland U.S. District Court", "Massachusetts U.S. District Court", "Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court", "Michigan Western U.S. District Court", "Minnesota U.S. District Court", "Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court", "Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court", "Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court", "Missouri Western U.S. District Court", "Montana U.S. District Court", "Nebraska U.S. District Court", "Nevada U.S. District Court", "New Hampshire U.S. District Court", "New Jersey U.S. District Court", "New Mexico U.S. District Court", "New York Eastern U.S. District Court", "New York Northern U.S. District Court", "New York Southern U.S. District Court", "New York Western U.S. District Court", "North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court", "North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court", "North Carolina Western U.S. District Court", "North Dakota U.S. District Court", "Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court", "Ohio Northern U.S. District Court", "Ohio Southern U.S. District Court", "Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court", "Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court", "Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court", "Oregon U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court", "Puerto Rico U.S. District Court", "Rhode Island U.S. District Court", "South Carolina U.S. District Court", "South Dakota U.S. District Court", "Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court", "Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court", "Tennessee Western U.S. District Court", "Texas Eastern U.S. District Court", "Texas Northern U.S. District Court", "Texas Southern U.S. District Court", "Texas Western U.S. District Court", "Utah U.S. District Court", "Vermont U.S. District Court", "Virgin Islands U.S. District Court", "Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court", "Virginia Western U.S. District Court", "Washington Eastern U.S. District Court", "Washington Western U.S. District Court", "West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court", "West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court", "Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court", "Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court", "Wyoming U.S. District Court", "Louisiana U.S. District Court", "Washington U.S. District Court", "West Virginia U.S. District Court", "Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court", "South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court", "South Carolina Western U.S. District Court", "Alabama U.S. District Court", "U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone", "Georgia U.S. District Court", "Illinois U.S. District Court", "Indiana U.S. District Court", "Iowa U.S. District Court", "Michigan U.S. District Court", "Mississippi U.S. District Court", "Missouri U.S. District Court", "New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)", "New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)", "New York U.S. District Court", "North Carolina U.S. District Court", "Ohio U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania U.S. District Court", "Tennessee U.S. District Court", "Texas U.S. District Court", "Virginia U.S. District Court", "Norfolk U.S. District Court", "Wisconsin U.S. District Court", "Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court", "New Jersey U.S. District Court", "California U.S. District Court", "Florida U.S. District Court", "Arkansas U.S. District Court", "District of Orleans U.S. District Court", "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", "State Trial Court", "Eastern Circuit (of the United States)", "Middle Circuit (of the United States)", "Southern Circuit (of the United States)", "Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama", "Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas", "California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California", "Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut", "Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware", "Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida", "Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia", "Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois", "Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana", "Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa", "Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas", "Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky", "Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana", "Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine", "Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland", "Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts", "Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan", "Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota", "Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi", "Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri", "Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada", "New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire", "New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey", "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York", "North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina", "Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio", "Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon", "Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania", "Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island", "South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina", "Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee", "Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas", "Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont", "Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia", "West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia", "Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin", "Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming", "Circuit Court of the District of Columbia", "Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska", "Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado", "Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington", "Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho", "Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana", "Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah", "South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota", "North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota", "Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma", "Court of Private Land Claims" ]
[ 157 ]
sc
AT&T TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA et al. No. 84-1913. Argued January 22, 1986 Decided April 7, 1986 White, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. BRENNAN, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 652. Rex E. Lee argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were David W. Carpenter, Gerald D. Skoning, Charles C. Jackson, Howard J. Trienens, Alfred A. Green, and Joseph Ramirez. Laurence Gold argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Irving M. Friedman, Stanley Eisenstein, Harold A. Katz, David Silberman, and James Coppess. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by John S. Irving, Carl L. Taylor, and Stephen A. Bokat; and for the National Association of Manufacturers by Jan S. Admundson and Gary D. Lipkin. David E. Feller filed a brief for the National Academy of Arbitrators as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue presented in this case is whether a court asked to order arbitration of a grievance filed under a collective-bargaining agreement must first determine that the parties intended to arbitrate the dispute, or whether that determination is properly left to the arbitrator. HH AT&T Technologies, Inc. (AT&T or the Company), and the Communications Workers of America (the Union) are parties to a collective-bargaining agreement which covers telephone equipment installation workers. Article 8 of this agreement establishes that “differences arising with respect to the interpretation of this contract or the performance of any obligation hereunder” must be referred to a mutually agreeable arbitrator upon the written demand of either party. This Article expressly does not cover disputes “excluded from arbitration by other provisions of this contract.” Article 9 provides that, “subject to the limitations contained in the provisions of this contract, but otherwise not subject to the provisions of the arbitration clause,” AT&T is free to exercise certain management functions, including the hiring and placement of employees and the termination of employment. “When lack of work necessitates Layoff,” Article 20 prescribes the order in which employees are to be laid off. On September 17, 1981, the Union filed a grievance challenging AT&T’s decision to lay off 79 installers from its Chicago base location. The Union claimed that, because there was no lack of work at the Chicago location, the planned layoffs would violate Article 20 of the agreement. Eight days later, however, AT&T laid off all 79 workers, and soon thereafter, the Company transferred approximately the same number of installers from base locations in Indiana and Wisconsin to the Chicago base. AT&T refused to submit the grievance to arbitration on the ground that under Article 9 the Company’s decision to lay off workers when it determines that a lack of work exists in a facility is not arbitrable. The Union then sought to compel arbitration by filing suit in federal court pursuant to § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 185(a). Communications Workers of America v. Western Electric Co., No. 82 C 772 (ND Ill., Nov. 18, 1983). Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court reviewed the provisions of Articles 8, 9, and 20, and set forth the parties’ arguments as follows: “Plaintiffs interpret Article 20 to require that there be an actual lack of work prior to employee layoffs and argue that there was no such lack of work in this case. Under plaintiffs’ interpretation, Article 20 would allow the union to take to arbitration the threshold issue of whether the layoffs were justified by a lack of work. Defendant interprets Article 20 as merely providing a sequence for any layoffs which management, in its exclusive judgment, determines are necessary. Under defendant’s interpretation, Article 20 would not allow for an arbitrator to decide whether the layoffs were warranted by a lack of work but only whether the company followed the proper order in laying off the employees.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 10A. Finding that “the union’s interpretation of Article 20 was at least ‘arguable,’” the court held that it was “for the arbitrator, not the court to decide whether the union’s interpretation has merit,” and accordingly, ordered the Company to arbitrate. Id., at 11A. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Communications Workers of America v. Western Electric Co., 751 F. 2d 203 (1984). The Court of Appeals understood the District Court to have ordered arbitration of the threshold issue of arbitrability. Id., at 205, n. 4. The court acknowledged the “general rule” that the issue of arbitrability is for the courts to decide unless the parties stipulate otherwise, but noted that this Court’s decisions in Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U. S. 574 (1960), and Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U. S. 564 (1960), caution courts to avoid becoming entangled in the merits of a labor dispute under the guise of deciding arbitrability. From this observation, the court announced an “exception” to the general rule, under which “a court should compel arbitration of the arbitrability issue where the collective bargaining agreement contains a standard arbitration clause, the parties have not clearly excluded the arbitrability issue from arbitration, and deciding the issue would entangle the court in interpretation of substantive provisions of the collective bargaining agreement and thereby involve consideration of the merits of the dispute.” 751 F. 2d, at 206. All of these factors were present in this case. Article 8 was a “standard arbitration clause,” and there was “no clear, unambiguous exclusion from arbitration of terminations predicated by a lack of work determination.” Id., at 206-207. Moreover, although there were “colorable arguments” on both sides of the exclusion issue, if the court were to decide this question it would have to interpret not only Article 8, but Articles 9 and 20 as well, both of which are “substantive provisions of the Agreement.” The court thus “decline[d] the invitation to decide arbitrability,” and ordered AT&T “to arbitrate the arbitrability issue.” Id., at 207. The court admitted that its exception was “difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court’s discussion of a court’s duty to decide arbitrability in [John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U. S. 543 (1964)].” The court asserted, however, that the discussion was “dicta,” and that this Court had reopened the issue in Nolde Brothers, Inc. v. Bakery Workers, 430 U. S. 243, 255, n. 8 (1977). 751 F. 2d, at 206. We granted certiorari, 474 U. S. 814 (1985), and now vacate the Seventh Circuit’s decision and remand for a determination of whether the Company is required to arbitrate the Union’s grievance. II The principles necessary to decide this case are not new. They were set out by this Court over 25 years ago in a series of cases known as the Steelworkers Trilogy: Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., supra; Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., supra; and Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593 (1960). These precepts have served the industrial relations community well, and have led to continued reliance on arbitration, rather than strikes or lockouts, as the preferred method of resolving disputes arising during the term of a collective-bargaining agreement. We see no reason either to question their continuing validity, or to eviscerate their meaning by creating an exception to their general applicability. The first principle gleaned from the Trilogy is that “arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” Warrior & Gulf, supra, at 582; American Mfg. Co., supra, at 570-571 (Brennan, J., concurring). This axiom recognizes the fact that arbitrators derive their authority to resolve disputes only because the parties have agreed in advance to submit such grievances to arbitration. Gateway Coal Co. v. Mine Workers, 414 U. S. 368, 374 (1974). The second rule, which follows inexorably from the first, is that the question of arbitrability — whether a collective-bargaining agreement creates a duty for the parties to arbitrate the particular grievance — is undeniably an issue for judicial determination. Unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator. Warrior & Gulf, supra, at 582-583. See Operating Engineers v. Flair Builders, Inc., 406 U. S. 487, 491 (1972); Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U. S. 238, 241 (1962), overruled in part on other grounds, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U. S. 235 (1970). Accord, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 626 (1985). The Court expressly reaffirmed this principle in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U. S. 543 (1964). The “threshold question” there was whether the court or an arbitrator should decide if arbitration provisions in a collective-bargaining contract survived a corporate merger so as to bind the surviving corporation. Id., at 546. The Court answered that there was “no doubt” that this question was for the courts. “‘Under our decisions, whether or not the company was bound to arbitrate, as well as what issues it must arbitrate, is a matter to be determined by the Court on the basis of the contract entered into by the parties.’ . . . The duty to arbitrate being of contractual origin, a compulsory submission to arbitration cannot precede judicial determination that the collective bargaining agreement does in fact create such a duty.” Id., at 546-547 (citations omitted). The third principle derived from our prior cases is that, in deciding whether the parties have agreed to submit a particular grievance to arbitration, a court is not to rule on the potential merits of the underlying claims. Whether “arguable” or not, indeed even if it appears to the court to be frivolous, the union’s claim that the employer has violated the collective-bargaining agreement is to be decided, not by the court asked to order arbitration, but as the parties have agreed, by the arbitrator. “The courts, therefore, have no business weighing the merits of the grievance, considering whether there is equity in a particular claim, or determining whether there is particular language in the written instrument which will support the claim. The agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not merely those which the court will deem meritorious.” American Mfg. Co., 363 U. S., at 568 (footnote omitted). Finally, it has been established that where the contract contains an arbitration clause, there is a presumption of arbitrability in the sense that “[a]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.” Warrior & Gulf, 363 U. S., at 582-583. See also Gateway Coal Co. v. Mine Workers, supra, at 377-378. Such a presumption is particularly applicable where the clause is as broad as the one employed in this case, which provides for arbitration of “any differences arising with respect to the interpretation of this contract or the performance of any obligation hereunder . . . .” In such cases, “[i]n the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail.” Warrior & Gulf, supra, at 584-585. This presumption of arbitrability for labor disputes recognizes the greater institutional competence of arbitrators in interpreting collective-bargaining agreements, “furthers the national labor policy of peaceful resolution of labor disputes and thus best accords with the parties’ presumed objectives in pursuing collective bargaining.” Schneider Moving & Storage Co. v. Robbins, 466 U. S. 364, 371-372 (1984) (citation omitted). See Gateway Coal Co., supra, at 378-379. The willingness of parties to enter into agreements that provide for arbitration of specified disputes would be “drastically reduced,” however, if a labor arbitrator had the “power to determine his own jurisdiction . . . .” Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1509 (1959). Were this the applicable rule, an arbitrator would not be constrained to resolve only those disputes that the parties have agreed in advance to settle by arbitration, but, instead, would be empowered “to impose obligations outside the contract limited only by his understanding and conscience.” Ibid. This result undercuts the longstanding federal policy of promoting industrial harmony through the use of collective-bargaining agreements, and is antithetical to the function of a collective-bargaining agreement as setting out the rights and duties of the parties. With these principles in mind, it is evident that the Seventh Circuit erred in ordering the parties to arbitrate the arbitrability question. It is the court’s duty to interpret the agreement and to determine whether the parties intended to arbitrate grievances concerning layoffs predicated on a “lack of work” determination by the Company. If the court determines that the agreement so provides, then it is for the arbitrator to determine the relative merits of the parties’ substantive interpretations of the agreement. It was for the court, not the arbitrator, to decide in the first instance whether the dispute was to be resolved through arbitration. The Union does not contest the application of these principles to the present case. Instead, it urges the Court to examine the specific provisions of the agreement for itself and to affirm the Court of Appeals on the ground that the parties had agreed to arbitrate the dispute over the layoffs at issue here. But it is usually not our function in the first instance to construe collective-bargaining contracts and arbitration clauses, or to consider any other evidence that might unmistakably demonstrate that a particular grievance was not to be subject to arbitration. The issue in the case is whether, because of express exclusion or other forceful evidence, the dispute over the interpretation of Article 20 of the contract, the layoff provision, is not subject to the arbitration clause. That issue’should have been decided by the District Court and reviewed by the Court of Appeals; it should not have been referred to the arbitrator. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for proceedings in conformity with this opinion. It is so ordered. Article 8 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “If the National and the Company fail to settle by negotiation any differences arising with respect to the interpretation of this contract or the performance of any obligation hereunder, such differences shall (provided that such dispute is not excluded from arbitration by other provisions of this contract, and provided that the grievance procedures as to such dispute have been exhausted) be referred upon written demand of either party to an impartial arbitrator mutually agreeable to both parties.” App. 21. Article 9 states: “The Union recognizes the right of the Company (subject to the limitations contained in the provisions of this contract, but otherwise not subject to the provisions of the arbitration clause) to exercise the functions of managing the business which involve, among other things, the hiring and placement of Employees, the termination of employment, the assignment of work, the determination of methods and equipment to be used, and the control of the conduct of work.” Id., at 22. Article 20 provides, in pertinent part, that “[w]hen lack of work necessitates Layoff, Employees shall be Laid-Off in accordance with Term of Employment and by Layoff groups as set forth in the following [subpara-graphs stating the order of layoff].” Id., at 23. ' Article 1.11 defines the term “Layoff” to mean “a termination of employment arising out of a reduction in the force due to lack of work.” Id., at 20. Section 301(a), 61 Stat. 156, 29 U. S. C. § 185(a) states: “Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect of the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.”
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the treatment the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed, that is, whether the court below the Supreme Court (typically a federal court of appeals or a state supreme court) affirmed, reversed, remanded, denied or dismissed the decision of the court it reviewed (typically a trial court). Adhere to the language used in the "holding" in the summary of the case on the title page or prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. Exceptions to the literal language are the following: where the Court overrules the lower court, treat this a petition or motion granted; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing refuses to enforce or enjoins the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as reversed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing enforces the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as affirmed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing sets aside the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as vacated; if the decision is set aside and remanded, treat it as vacated and remanded.
What treatment did the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed?
[ "stay, petition, or motion granted", "affirmed", "reversed", "reversed and remanded", "vacated and remanded", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded", "vacated", "petition denied or appeal dismissed", "modify", "remand", "unusual disposition" ]
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LEE, SUPERINTENDENT OF PORT AUTHORITY POLICE v. INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA CONSCIOUSNESS, INC., et al. No. 91-339. Argued March 22, 1992 Decided June 26, 1992 Arthur P. Berg argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Philip Maurer, Arnold D. Kolikoff, and Milton H. Paehter. Barry A. Fisher argued the cause for respondents. With him on the Briefs were David Grosz, Robert C. Moest, David M. Liberman, Jay Alan Sekulow, and Jeremiah S. Gutman. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Airports Association Council International-North America by Michael M. Conway; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Steven R. Shapiro, John A. Powell, and Arthur N Eisenberg; for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Marsha S. Berzon, Walter Kamiat, and Laurence Gold; for the American Jewish Congress et al. by Bradley P. Jacob and Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr.; for the American Newspaper Publishers Association et al. by Robert C. Bernius, Alice Neff Lucan, René P. Milam, Richard A Bernstein, Barbara Wartelle Wall, John C. Fontaine, Cristina L. Mendoza, George Freeman, and Carol D. Melamed; for the American Tract Society et al. by James Matthew Henderson, Sr., Mark N. Troobnick, Thomas Patrick Monaghan, and Charles E. Rice; for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson; for the Free Congress Foundation by Wendell R. Bird and David J. Myers; for Multimedia Newspaper Co. et al. by Carl F. Muller and Wallace K. Lightsey; for Project Vote et al. by Robert Plotkin and Elliot M. Minceberg; and for the National Institute of Municipal Law Of-fleers by Benjamin L. Brown, Analeslie Muncy, Robert J. Alfton, Frank B. Gunvmey III, Frederick S. Dean, Neal M. Janey, Victor J. Kaleta, Robert J. Mangier, Neal E. McNeill, Robert J. Watson, and Iris J. Jones. Per Curiam. For the reasons expressed in the opinions of Justice O’Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter, see ante, p. 685 (O’Connor, J., concurring in No. 91-155 and concurring in judgment in No. 91-339), ante, p. 693 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgments), and ante, p. 709 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment in No. 91-339 and dissenting in No. 91-155), the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that the ban on distribution of literature in the Port Authority airport terminals is invalid under the First Amendment is Affirmed.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. If the case arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, note the source as "United States Supreme Court". If the case arose in a state court, note the source as "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", or "State Trial Court". Do not code the name of the state.
What is the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed?
[ "U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals", "U.S. Court of International Trade", "U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims", "U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces", "U.S. Court of Military Review", "U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals", "U.S. Customs Court", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit", "U.S. Tax Court", "Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals", "U.S. Court for China", "U.S. Consular Courts", "U.S. Commerce Court", "Territorial Supreme Court", "Territorial Appellate Court", "Territorial Trial Court", "Emergency Court of Appeals", "Supreme Court of the District of Columbia", "Bankruptcy Court", "U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)", "Alabama Middle U.S. District Court", "Alabama Northern U.S. District Court", "Alabama Southern U.S. District Court", "Alaska U.S. District Court", "Arizona U.S. District Court", "Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court", "Arkansas Western U.S. District Court", "California Central U.S. District Court", "California Eastern U.S. District Court", "California Northern U.S. District Court", "California Southern U.S. District Court", "Colorado U.S. District Court", "Connecticut U.S. District Court", "Delaware U.S. District Court", "District Of Columbia U.S. District Court", "Florida Middle U.S. District Court", "Florida Northern U.S. District Court", "Florida Southern U.S. District Court", "Georgia Middle U.S. District Court", "Georgia Northern U.S. District Court", "Georgia Southern U.S. District Court", "Guam U.S. District Court", "Hawaii U.S. District Court", "Idaho U.S. District Court", "Illinois Central U.S. District Court", "Illinois Northern U.S. District Court", "Illinois Southern U.S. District Court", "Indiana Northern U.S. District Court", "Indiana Southern U.S. District Court", "Iowa Northern U.S. District Court", "Iowa Southern U.S. District Court", "Kansas U.S. District Court", "Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court", "Kentucky Western U.S. District Court", "Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court", "Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court", "Louisiana Western U.S. District Court", "Maine U.S. District Court", "Maryland U.S. District Court", "Massachusetts U.S. District Court", "Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court", "Michigan Western U.S. District Court", "Minnesota U.S. District Court", "Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court", "Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court", "Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court", "Missouri Western U.S. District Court", "Montana U.S. District Court", "Nebraska U.S. District Court", "Nevada U.S. District Court", "New Hampshire U.S. District Court", "New Jersey U.S. District Court", "New Mexico U.S. District Court", "New York Eastern U.S. District Court", "New York Northern U.S. District Court", "New York Southern U.S. District Court", "New York Western U.S. District Court", "North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court", "North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court", "North Carolina Western U.S. District Court", "North Dakota U.S. District Court", "Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court", "Ohio Northern U.S. District Court", "Ohio Southern U.S. District Court", "Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court", "Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court", "Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court", "Oregon U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court", "Puerto Rico U.S. District Court", "Rhode Island U.S. District Court", "South Carolina U.S. District Court", "South Dakota U.S. District Court", "Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court", "Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court", "Tennessee Western U.S. District Court", "Texas Eastern U.S. District Court", "Texas Northern U.S. District Court", "Texas Southern U.S. District Court", "Texas Western U.S. District Court", "Utah U.S. District Court", "Vermont U.S. District Court", "Virgin Islands U.S. District Court", "Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court", "Virginia Western U.S. District Court", "Washington Eastern U.S. District Court", "Washington Western U.S. District Court", "West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court", "West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court", "Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court", "Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court", "Wyoming U.S. District Court", "Louisiana U.S. District Court", "Washington U.S. District Court", "West Virginia U.S. District Court", "Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court", "South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court", "South Carolina Western U.S. District Court", "Alabama U.S. District Court", "U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone", "Georgia U.S. District Court", "Illinois U.S. District Court", "Indiana U.S. District Court", "Iowa U.S. District Court", "Michigan U.S. District Court", "Mississippi U.S. District Court", "Missouri U.S. District Court", "New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)", "New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)", "New York U.S. District Court", "North Carolina U.S. District Court", "Ohio U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania U.S. District Court", "Tennessee U.S. District Court", "Texas U.S. District Court", "Virginia U.S. District Court", "Norfolk U.S. District Court", "Wisconsin U.S. District Court", "Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court", "New Jersey U.S. District Court", "California U.S. District Court", "Florida U.S. District Court", "Arkansas U.S. District Court", "District of Orleans U.S. District Court", "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", "State Trial Court", "Eastern Circuit (of the United States)", "Middle Circuit (of the United States)", "Southern Circuit (of the United States)", "Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama", "Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas", "California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California", "Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut", "Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware", "Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida", "Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia", "Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois", "Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana", "Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa", "Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas", "Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky", "Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana", "Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine", "Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland", "Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts", "Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan", "Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota", "Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi", "Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri", "Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada", "New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire", "New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey", "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York", "North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina", "Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio", "Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon", "Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania", "Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island", "South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina", "Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee", "Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas", "Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont", "Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia", "West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia", "Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin", "Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming", "Circuit Court of the District of Columbia", "Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska", "Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado", "Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington", "Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho", "Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana", "Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah", "South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota", "North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota", "Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma", "Court of Private Land Claims" ]
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CARTER, PUBLIC VEHICLE LICENSE COMMISSIONER OF CHICAGO v. MILLER No. 76-1171. Argued November 29-30, 1977 Decided January 17, 1978 William R. Quinlan argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Daniel Pascóle and Robert Retke. Robert Masur argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were Alan Freedman, Howard Eglit, and David Goldberger. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by William B. Spann, Jr., and Robert B. McKay for the American Bar Assn.; and by James R. Madison and Norman C. Hile for the San Francisco Lawyers' Committee for Urban Affairs. Per Curiam. The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court. Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them. Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer. Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.
Who is the respondent of the case?
[ "attorney general of the United States, or his office", "specified state board or department of education", "city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit", "state commission, board, committee, or authority", "county government or county governmental unit, except school district", "court or judicial district", "state department or agency", "governmental employee or job applicant", "female governmental employee or job applicant", "minority governmental employee or job applicant", "minority female governmental employee or job applicant", "not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable", "retired or former governmental employee", "U.S. House of Representatives", "interstate compact", "judge", "state legislature, house, or committee", "local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough", "governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact", "state or U.S. supreme court", "local school district or board of education", "U.S. Senate", "U.S. senator", "foreign nation or instrumentality", "state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of", "state college or university", "United States", "State", "person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime", "advertising business or agency", "agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor", "airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes", "airline", "distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages", "alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked", "American Medical Association", "National Railroad Passenger Corp.", "amusement establishment, or recreational facility", "arrested person, or pretrial detainee", "attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association", "author, copyright holder", "bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company", "bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization", "establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store", "water transportation, stevedore", "bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines", "brewery, distillery", "broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm", "construction industry", "bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle", "business, corporation", "buyer, purchaser", "cable TV", "car dealer", "person convicted of crime", "tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband", "chemical company", "child, children, including adopted or illegitimate", "religious organization, institution, or person", "private club or facility", "coal company or coal mine operator", "computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software", "consumer, consumer organization", "creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company", "person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial", "defendant", "debtor", "real estate developer", "disabled person or disability benefit claimant", "distributor", "person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector", "drug manufacturer", "druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy", "employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of", "employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan", "electric equipment manufacturer", "electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company", "eleemosynary institution or person", "environmental organization", "employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.", "farmer, farm worker, or farm organization", "father", "female employee or job applicant", "female", "movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of", "fisherman or fishing company", "food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard", "foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity", "franchiser", "franchisee", "lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization", "person who guarantees another's obligations", "handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to", "health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor", "heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be", "hospital, medical center", "husband, or ex-husband", "involuntarily committed mental patient", "Indian, including Indian tribe or nation", "insurance company, or surety", "inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder", "investor", "injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related", "juvenile", "government contractor", "holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor", "magazine", "male", "medical or Medicaid claimant", "medical supply or manufacturing co.", "racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant", "minority female employee or job applicant", "manufacturer", "management, executive officer, or director, of business entity", "military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist", "mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company", "mother", "auto manufacturer", "newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service", "radio and television network, except cable tv", "nonprofit organization or business", "nonresident", "nuclear power plant or facility", "owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels", "shareholders to whom a tender offer is made", "tender offer", "oil company, or natural gas producer", "elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly", "out of state noncriminal defendant", "political action committee", "parent or parents", "parking lot or service", "patient of a health professional", "telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company", "physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society", "public interest organization", "physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee", "pipe line company", "package, luggage, container", "political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official", "indigent, needy, welfare recipient", "indigent defendant", "private person", "prisoner, inmate of penal institution", "professional organization, business, or person", "probationer, or parolee", "protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer", "public utility", "publisher, publishing company", "radio station", "racial or ethnic minority", "person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination", "racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "realtor", "journalist, columnist, member of the news media", "resident", "restaurant, food vendor", "retarded person, or mental incompetent", "retired or former employee", "railroad", "private school, college, or university", "seller or vendor", "shipper, including importer and exporter", "shopping center, mall", "spouse, or former spouse", "stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder", "retail business or outlet", "student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only", "tenant or lessee", "theater, studio", "forest products, lumber, or logging company", "person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent", "trucking company, or motor carrier", "television station", "union member", "unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant", "union, labor organization, or official of", "veteran", "voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)", "wholesale trade", "wife, or ex-wife", "witness, or person under subpoena", "network", "slave", "slave-owner", "bank of the united states", "timber company", "u.s. job applicants or employees", "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "General Land Office of Commissioners", "Transportation Security Administration", "Surface Transportation Board", "U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.", "Reconstruction Finance Corp.", "Department or Secretary of Homeland Security", "Unidentifiable", "International Entity" ]
[ 105 ]
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FUENTES v. SHEVIN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA, et al. No. 70-5039. Argued November 9, 1971 Decided June 12, 1972 Stewart, J., delivered the'opinion of the Court, in which Douglas, BrenNAN, and Marshall, JJ., joined., White, J.,. filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and BlackmuN, J., joined, post, ,p. 97. Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. C. Michael Abbott argued the cause pro hoc vice for. appellant ip No. 70-5039. With him on the brief , was Brúce S. Rogow. David A. School argued the cause pro hac vice for appellants in No. 70-5138. With him on the brief was Harvey N. Schmidt. Herbert T. Schwartz, Deputy Attorney General of Florida, argued the cause for appellee Shevin in No. 70-5039. On the brief was Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, pro se. George W. Wright, Jr., argued the cause for appellee Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. in No. 70-5039. With him on the brief was Karl B. Block, Jr. Robert F. Maxwell argued the cause for appellees in No. 70-5138 and was on the brief for ap-pellee Sears, Roebuck & Co. J. Shane Creamer, Attorney General, and Peter W. Brown, Deputy Attorney General, filed a brief for appellee the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in No. 70-5138. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in No.. 70-5039 were filed by Allan Ashman for the National Legal Aid and Defender Association and by Blair C. Shick, Jean Camper Cahn, and Barbara B. Gregg for the National Consumer Law Center of Boston College Law School et al. ■ Harry N. Boureau, Ross L. Malone, Robert L. Glare, Jr., and George J. Wade filed a brief for General Motors Acceptance Corp. et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance in No. 70-5039. Together with No. 70-5138, Parham et al. v. Cortese et al., on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court, We here review the decisions of two three-judge federal District Courts that upheld thé constitutionality of Florida and Pennsylvania laws authorizing the summary seizure of goods or chattels in a person’s possession under a writ of replevin. Both statutes provide for the issuance of writs ordering state agents to seize a person’s possessions, simply upon the ex parte application of any other person who claims a right to them and posts a security bond. Neither-statute provides for notice to be given to the possessor of the property, and neither statute gives the possessor an opportunity to challenge the seizure at any kind of prior hearing. The question is whether these statutory procedures violate the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no State shall deprive any person of property, without due process of law. I The appellant in No. 5039, Margárita Fuentes, is a résident of Florida. She purchased a gas stove and service policy from the Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. (Firestone) under a conditional sales contract calling for monthly payments over a period of time. A few months later, she purchased a stefeophonic phonograph from the same company under the same sort of contract. The' total cost of the stove and stereo was about $500, plus an additional financing charge of over $100. Under the contracts, Firestone retained title to the merchandise, but Mrs. Fuentes was entitled to possession unless and until, she should default on her installment payments. For more than a year, Mrs. Fuentes made her installment payments. But then, with only about $200 remaining to be paid, a dispute developed between her and Firestone over the servicing of the stove. Firestone instituted an action in a small-claims' court for repossession of both the stove and the stereo, claiming that Mrs. Fuentes had refused to make her remaining payments. Simultaneously with the filing of that action and before Mrs. Fuentes had even received a summons to answer its complaint, Firestone obtained a writ of replevin ordering a sheriff to seize the disputed goods at once. In conformance with Florida procedure, Firestone had only to fill in the blanks on the appropriate form documents and submit them to the clerk of the small-claims court. The clerk signed and stamped the documents and issued a writ of replevin. Later the same day, a local deputy sheriff and an agent of Firestone went to Mrs. Fuentes’ home and seized the stove and stereo. Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Fuentes instituted the present action in a federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of the Florida prejudgment replevin procedures under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. She sought declaratory and in-junctive relief against continued enforcement of the procedural provisions of the state statutes that authorize prejudgment replevin. The appellants in No. 5138 filed a very similar action in a federal district court in Pennsylvania, challenging the constitutionality of that State’s prejudgment re-plevin process. Like Mrs. Fuentes, they had had possessions seized under writs of replevin. Three of the appellants had purchased personal property — a bed, a table, and other household goods — under installment sales contracts like the one signed by Mrs. Fuentes; and the sellers of the property had obtained and executed summary writs of replevin, claiming that the appellants had fallen behind in their installment payments. The experience of the fourth appellant, Rosa Washing'-'-' ton, had b.een more bizarre. She had been divorced from a local deputy sheriff and was engaged in a dispute with him over the custody of their son. Her former husband, being familiar with the routine forms used in the replevin process, had obtained a writ that ordered the seizure of the boy’s clothes, furniture, and toys. In both No. 5039 and No. 5138, three-judge District Courts were convened to consider the appellants’ challenges 'to the constitutional validity of the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes. The courts in both cases upheld the constitutionality of the statutes. Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (SD Fla); Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (ED Pa.). We noted probable jurisdiction of both appeals. 401 U. S. 906; 402 U. S. 994. II Under the Florida statute challenged here, “[a]ny person whose goods or chattels are wrongfully detained by any other person . . . may have a writ of replevin to recover them . . . Fla. Stat. Ann. § 78.01' (Supp. 1972-1973). There is no requirement that the applicant make a convincing showing before the seizure that the goods are, in fact, “wrongfully detained.” Rather, Florida law automatically relies on the bare assertion of the party . seeking the writ that he is entitled to one and allows a court clerk to issue the writ summarily. It requires only that the applicant file a complaint, initiating a court action for repossession and reciting in conclusory fashion that he is “lawfully entitled to the possession” of the property, and that he file a security bond “in at least double the value of the property to be replevied conditioned Ihat plaintiff will prosecute his action to effect and without delay and that if defendant recovers judgment against him in the action, he will return the property, if return thereof is adjudged, and will pay defendant all sums of money recovered, against plaintiff by defendant in the action.” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 78.07 (Supp. 1972-1973). On the sole basis of the complaint and bond,' a writ is issued “command [ing] the officer to whom it maybe directed to replevy the goods and chattels in possession of defendant. . . and to summon the defendant to answer the complaint.” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 78.08 (Supp. 1972-1973). If the goods'are “in any dwelling house or other building or enclosure,” the officer is required to demand their delivery; but, if they are not delivered, “he shall cause such house, building or enclosure to be broken open and shall make replevin according to the writ....” Fla. Stat. Ann. §78.10 (Supp. 1972-1973). Thus, at the same moment that the defendant receives the complaint seeking .repossession of property through court action, the property is seized from him. He is provided no prior notice and allowed no opportunity whatever to challenge the issuance of the writ. After the property has been seized, he will eventually have an opportunity for a hearing, as the defendant in the trial of the court action for repossession, which the plaintiff is required to pursue. And he is also not wholly without recourse in the meantime. For under the Florida statute, the officer who seizes' the property must keep it for three days, and during that period the defendant may reclaim possession of the property by posting his own security bond in double its value. But if he does not post such a bond, the property is transferred to the party who sought the writ, pending a final judgment in the underlying action for repossession. Fla. Stat. Ann. §78.13 (Supp. 1972-1973). The Pennsylvania law differs, though not in its essential nature, from that of Florida. As in Florida, a private party may obtain a prejudgment writ of replevin through a summary process of ex parte application to a prothonotary. As' iii Florida, the party seeking the.writ may simply post with his application a bond in double the value of the property to be seized. Pa. Rule Civ. Proc. 1073 (a). There is no opportunity for a prior hearing and no prior notice to the other party. On this basis, a sheriff is required to execute the writ by seizing the specified property. Unlike the Florida statute,- however, the Pennsylvania law does not require that there ever be opportunity for a hearing on the merits of the conflicting claims to possession of the replevied property. The party seeking the. writ is not obliged to initiate a court action for repossession. Indeed, he need not even formally allege that he is lawfully entitled to the property. The most that is required is that he file an “affidavit of the value of the property to be replevied.” Pa. Rule Civ. Proc. 1073 (a). If the party who loses property through replevin seizure is to get even a post-seizure hearing, he must initiate a lawsuit himself. He may also, as under Florida law, post his own eounterbond within three days after the seizure to regain possession. Pa. Rule Civ. Proc. 1076. Ill Although these prejudgment replevin statutes are descended from the common-law replevin action of six centuries ago, they bear very little resemblance to it. Replevin at common law was an action for the return of specific goods wrongfully taken or “distrained.” Typically, it was used after a landlord (the “distrainor”) had seized possessions from a tenant (the “distrainee”) to satisfy a debt allegedly owed. If the tenant then instituted a replevin action and 'posted security, the landlord could be ordered to return the property at once, pending a final judgment in the underlying action. However, this prejudgment replevin of goods at common law did not follow from an entirely ex parte process of pleading by the distrainee. For “[t]he distrainor could always stop the action of replevin by claiming to be the owner of the goods; and as this claim was often made merely to delay the proceedings, the writ de proprietate probanda was devised early in the fourteenth century, which enabled the sheriff to determine summarily the question of ownership. If the question of ownership was determined against the distrainor the goods were delivered back to the distrainee [pending final judgment].” 3 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law 284 (.1927), Prejudgment replevin statutes like those of Florida and Pennsylvania are derived from this ancient posses-sory action in that they authorize the seizure of property before a final judgment.. But the similarity ends there. As in the present cases, such statutes are most commonly used by creditors to seize goods allegedly wrongfully detained — not wrongfully taken — by debtors. At common law, if a creditor wished to invoke state power to recover goods wrongfully detained, .he had to proceed through the action of debt or detinue. These actions, however, did not provide for a return of property before final judgment. And, more importantly, on the occasions when the common law did allow prejudgment seizure by state power, it provided some kind of notice and opportunity to be heard to the party then in possession of the property, and a state official made at least a summary determination of the relative rights of the disputing parties before stepping into the dispute and taking goods from one of them. IY For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: “Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.” Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 233. See Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 409; Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385. It is equally fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard “must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552. The primary question in the present cases is whether these state statutes are constitutionally defective in failing to provide for hearings “at a meaningful time.” The Florida replevin process guarantees an opportunity for a hearing after the seizure of goods, and the Pennsylvania process allows a post-seizure hearing if the aggrieved party shoulders the burden of initiating one. But neither the Florida nor the Pennsylvania statute provides for notice or an opportunity to be heard before the seizure, The issue is whether procedural due process in the context of these cases requires an opportunity .for a hearing before the State'authorizes its agents to seize property in the possession of a person upon the application of another. The constitutional right to be heard is a b'asic aspect of the duty of government to follow a fair process of decisionmaking when it acts to deprive a person of his possessions. The purpose of this requirement is not only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual. Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment— to minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of property, a danger that, is especially great when the State seizes goods simply upon the application of and. for the benefit of a private party. So viewed, the prohibition against the deprivation of property without due process of law reflects the high value, embedded in our constitutional and political history, that we place on a person’s right to enjoy what is his, free of governmental interference. See Lynch v. Household, Finance Corp., 405 U. S. 538, 552. The requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard raises no impenetrable barrier to the taking of a person’s possessions. But thé fair process of decision-making that it guarantees works, by itself, to protect against arbitrary deprivation of property. For when a person has an opportunity to speak up in his own defense, and when the State must listen to what he has to say, substantively unfair and simply mistaken deprivations of property interests, can be prevented. It has long been recognized that “fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights. .... [And n]o better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy, of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.” Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 170-172 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). If the right to notice and a hearing is to serve its full purpose, then, it is clear that it must be granted at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented. At a later hearing, an individual’s possessions can be returned to him if they were unfairly or mistakenly taken in the first place. Damages may even be awarded to him for the wrongful deprivation. But no later' hearing and no damage award can undo the fact that the arbitrary taking , that was subject to the right of procedural due process has already occurred. “This Court has not . . , embraced the general proposition that a wrong may be done if it can be undone.” Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 647. This is no new principle of constitutional law. The right to a prior hearing has long been recognized by this Court under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. Although the Court has held that due process tolerates variances in the form of a hearing “appropriate to the nature of the case,” Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U. S. 306, 313, and “depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the mature of the subsequent proceedings [if any],” Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 378, the Court has traditionally insisted that, whatever its form, opportunity for that hearing must be provided before the deprivation at issue takes effect. E. g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 542; Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433, 437; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397. U. S. 254; Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S., at 551; Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., supra, at 313; Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U. S. 126, 152-153; United States v. Illinois Central R. Co., 291 U. S. 457, 463; Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 210 U. S. 373, 385-386. See In re Buffalo, 390 U. S. 544, 550-551. .“That the hearing required by due process is subject to waiver, and is not fixed in form does not affect its root requirement that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest, except for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event.” Boddie v. Connecticut, supra, at 378-379 (emphasis, in original). The Florida and Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin statutes fly in the face of this principle. To be sure, the requirements that a party seeking a writ must first post a bond, allege conclusorily that he is entitled to specific goods, and open himself to possible liability in damages if he is wrong, serve to deter wholly unfounded applications for a writ. But those requirements are hardly a substitute for a prior hearing, for they test no more than the strength of the applicant’s own belief in his rights. Since, his private gain is at stake, the danger is all too great that his confidence in his cause will be misplaced. Lawyers and judges are familiar with the phenomenon of a party mistakenly but firmly convinced that his view of the facts and law will prevail, and therefore quite willing to risk the costs of litigation. Because of the understandable, self-interested fallibility of litigants, a court does not decide a dispute until it has had an opportunity to hear both sides — and does not generally take even tentative action until it has itself examined the support for the plaintiff’s position. The Florida and Pennsylvania statutes do not even require the official issuing a writ of replevin to do • that much. The minimal deterrent effect of a bond requirement is, in a practical sense, no substitute for an informed evaluation by a neutral official. More specifically, as a matter of constitutional principle, it is no replacement for the right to a prior hearing that is the only truly effective safeguard against arbitrary deprivation of property. While the existence of these other, less effective, safeguards may. be among the considerations that affect the form of hearing demanded by due process, they are far. from enough by themselves to obviate the right to a prior hearing of some kind. .V The right to a prior hearing, of course, attaches only to the deprivation of an interest encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection. In the present cases, the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes were applied to replevy chattels in the appellants’ possession. The replevin was not cast as a final judgment; most, if not all, .of the appellants lacked full title to the chattels; and their claim even to continued possession was a matter-in dispute... Moreover, the chattels at stake were nothing more than an assortment of household goods. Nonetheless, it is clear that the appellants were deprived of possessory interests in those chattels that were within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. A A deprivation of a person’s possessions under a prejudgment writ of replevin, at least in theory, may be only temporary. The Florida and Pennsylvania statutes do not require a person to wait until a post-seizure hearing and final judgment to recover what has beén replevied. Within three days after the seizure, the statutes allow him to recover the goods if he, in. return, surrenders other . property — a payment necessary to secure a bond in double the value of the goods seized from him. But it is now well settled that a temporary, nonfinal deprivation of property is nonetheless a “deprivation” in the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337; Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535. Both Sniadach and Bell involved takings of property pending a final judgment in an underlying dispute. In both cases, the challenged statutes included recovery provisions, allowing the defendants to post security to quickly regain the property taken from them. Yet the Court firmly held that these were deprivations of property that had to be preceded by a fair hearing. The present cases are no different. When officials of Florida of Pennsylvania seize one piece of property from a person’s possession and then agree to return it if he surrenders another, they deprive him of property whether or not he has the funds, the knowledge, and the time needed to take advantage of the recovery provision. The Fourteenth Amendment draws no bright lines around three-day, 10-day or 50-day deprivations of property. Any significant taking of property by the State is. within the purview of the Due Process Clause. While the length and consequent severity of a deprivation may be another factor to weigh in determining the appropriate form of hearing, it is not. decisive of the basic right to a prior hearing of some kind. B The appellants who signed conditional sales contracts lacked full legal title to the replevied goods. The Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of “property,” however, has never been interpreted to safeguard only the rights of undisputed ownership. Rather, it has been read broadly to extend protection to “any significant property interest,” Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S., at 379, including statutory entitlements. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S., at 539; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S., at 262. The appellants were deprived of such an interest in the replevied goods — the interest in continued possession and use of the goods. See Sniadach v. Family Finance Cory., 395 U. S., at 342 (Harlan, J., concurring). They had acquired this interest under the conditional sales contracts that entitled them to possession and use of the chattels before transfer of title. In exchange for immediate possession, the appellants had agreed to pay a major financing charge beyond the basic price of the merchandise. Moreover, by the time the goods were summarily repossessed, they had made substantial installment payments. Clearly, their possessory interest in the goods, dearly bought and protected by contract,. was sufficient to invoke the protection of the Due Process Clause. Their ultimate right to continued possession was, of course, in dispute. If it were shown at a hearing that the appellants had defaulted on their contractual obligations, it might well be that the sellers of the goods would be entitled to repossession. But even assuming that the appellants had fallen behind in their installment payments, and that they had no other valid defenses, that is immaterial here. The right to be heard does not depend upon an advance showing .that one will surely prevail at the hearing. “To one who protests against the taking of his property without due process of law, it is no answer to say that in his particular case due process of law would have led to the same result because he had no • adequate defense upon the merits.” Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U. S. 413, 424. It is enough to invoke the procedural safeguards of the Fourteenth Amendment that a significant property interest is at stake,, whatever the ultimate outcome of a hearing on the contractual right to continued possession and use of the goods. c Nevertheless, the District Courts rejected the appellants’ constitutional claim on the ground that the goods seized from them — a stove, a stereo, a table, a bed, and so forth — were not deserving of due process protection, since they were not absolute necessities of life. The courts based this holding on a very narrow reading of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra, and Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, in which this Court held that the Constitution requires a hearing before prejudgment wage garnishment and before the termination of certain welfare benefits. They reasoned .that Sniadach and Goldberg, as a matter of constitutional principle, established no more than that a prior hearing is required with respect to the deprivation of such basically “necessary” items as wages and welfare benefits. This reading of Sniadach ahd Goldberg reflects the premise that those cases marked a radical departure from established principles of procedural due process.. They did not. Both decisions were in the mainstream of past cases, having little or nothing to do with the absolute “necessities” of life but establishing that due process requires an opportunity for a hearing before a deprivation of property takes effect. E. g., Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U. S., at 152-153;, United States v. Illinois Central R. Co., 291 U. S., at 463; Southern R. Co. v. Virginia, 290 U. S. 190; Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 210 U. S. 373; Central of Georgia v. Wright, 207 U. S. 127; Security Trust Co, v. Lexington, 203 U. S. 323; Hibben v. Smith, 191 U. S. 310; Glidden v. Harrington, 189 U. S. 255. In none of those cases did the Court hold that this most basic due process requirement is limited to the protection of only a few types of property interests. While Sniadach and Goldberg emphasized the special importance of wages and welfare benefits, they did not convert that emphasis into a new and more limited' constitutional doctrine. Nor did they carve out a rule of “necessity” for the sort of nonfinal deprivations of property that they involved. That was made clear in Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, holding that there must be an opportunity for a fair hearing .before mere suspension of a driver’s license. A driver’s license clearly does not rise to the level of “necessity” exemplified by wages and welfare benefits. Rather, as the Court accurately stated, it is an “important interest,” id., at 539, entitled to the protection of procedural due process of law. The household goods, for which the appellants, contracted and paid substantial sums, are deserving of similar protection. While a driver’s license, for example, “may become [indirectly], essential in the' pursuit of a livelihood,” ibid., a stove or a' bed may be equally éssen-tiál to provide a minimally decent environment for human, Beings in their day-to-day lives. „ It is,' after all, such consumer goods that people work and earn a livelihood in order to acquire. No doubt, there may be many gradations in the “importance” or “necessity” of various consumer goods. Stoves could be compared, to television sets, or beds could be compared to tables. But if the root principle of procedural due process is to be applied with objectivity, it cannot rest on such distinctions. The Fourteenth Amendment speaks of “property” generally. And, under our free-enterprise-system, an' individual’s choices in the marketplace are respected, however unwise they may seem to someone,’ else. It is not the business of a court adjudicating due process rights to make its own critical evaluation of those choices and protect only the ones that, by its own lights, are “necessary.” - VI There are “extraordinary situations” that justify postponing notice and opportunity for a hearing. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S., at 379. These situations, however, must be truly unusual. Only in a few limited situations has this Court allowed outright seizure without opportunity for a prior hearing. First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an important governmental or general public interest. Second, there has beén a special need for very prompt action. Third, the State has kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person initiating the. seizure has been a government official responsible for determining, under the standards of ¿ narrowly drawn statute, that it. was -necessary and justified in the particular instance. Thus, the Court has allowed summary seizure of property to collect the internal revenue of the United States, to meet the needs of' a national war effort, to protect against the economic disaster of a bank failure, and to ^protect the public from misbranded drugs and contaminated food. The Florida and Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin statutes serve no such important governmental or general public interest. They allow, summary seizure of a person’s possessions when no more than private gain is directly at stake. The réplevin of chattels, as in the present cases, may satisfy a debt or settle a score. . But state intervention in a private dispute hardly compares to state action furthering a war effort or protecting the., public health. Nor do the broadly drawn Florida and Pennsylvania statutes limit the summary seizure of goods to special situations demanding prompt action. There may be. cases in which a creditor could make a showing of immediate danger that, a debtor will destroy or conceal disputed goods. But the statutes before us are not-'‘narrowly drawn to meet any such unusual condition.” Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra, at 339. And no such unusual situation is presented by the facts of these cases. The statutes, moreover, abdicate, effective state control over state power. Private parties, serving their own private advantage, may unilaterally invoke state power to replevy goods from another.. No state official participates in the decision to seek a writ; no state official reviews the basis for the claim to repossession; and no state official evaluates) the need for immediate seizure. There is not even a requirement that the plaintiff provide any information to the court on these matters. The State acts largely in the dark. VII Finally, we must consider the contention that the appellants who signed conditional sales contracts thereby waived their basic procedural due process rights. The contract signed by Mrs. Fuentes provided that “in the event of default of any payment or payments, Seller at its option may take back the merchandise . . . .” The contracts signed by the Pennsylvania appellants similarly provided that the seller “may retake” or “repossess” the merchandise in the event of a “default in any payment.” These terms .were parts of printed form contracts, appearing in relatively small type and unaccompanied by any explanations clarifying their meaning. In D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U. S. 174, the Court recently outlined the considerations relevant to determination of a contractual waiver of due process rights. Applying, the star dards governing waiver of constitutional rights in a criminal proceeding — although not holding that such standards must necessarily apply — the Court held that, on the particular facts of that case, the contractual waiver of due process rights was “voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly” made. Id., at 187. The contract in *Overmyer was negotiated between two corporations; the waiver provision was specifically bargained for and drafted by their lawyers in the process of these negotiations. As the Court noted, it was “not a case of unequal bargaining power or overreaching. The Overmyer-Frick agreement, from the start, was not a contract of adhesion.” Id., at 186. Both parties were “aware of the significance” of the waiver provision. Ibid. The facts of the present cases are a' far cry .from those of Overmyer. There was no bargaining over contractual terms between the parties who, in any event, were far from equal in bargaining power. The purported waiver provision was a printed part of a form sales contract and a necessary condition of the sale. The appellees .made no showing whatever that the appellants were actually aware or made aware of the significance of the fine print now relied upon as a waiver of constitutional rights. The Court in Overmyer observed that “where the contract is one of adhesion, where there is great disparity in bargaining power, and where the debtor receives nothing for the [waiver] provision, other legal consequences may ensue.” Id., at 188. Yet, as in Over-myer, there is no need in the present cases to canvass those consequences fully. For a waiver of constitutional rights in any context must, at the very least, be clear. We need not concern ourselves with the in voluntariness or unintelligence of a waiver when the contractual language relied upon does not, on its face, even amount to a waiver. The conditional sales contracts here simply provided that upon a default the seller “may take back,” “may retake” or “may repossess” merchandise. The contracts included nothing about the waiver of a prior hearing. They did not indicate how .or through what process— a final judgment, self-help, prejudgment replevin with a prior hearing, or prejudgment replevin without a prior hearing-^-the seller could take back the goods. Rather, the purported waiver provisions' here are no more than a statement of the seller’s right to repossession upon occurrence of certain events. The appellees do not suggest that these provisions waived the appellants’ right to a full post-seizure hearing to determine whether those events had, in fact, occurred and to consider any other available defenses. By-the same token, the language of the purported waiver provisions did not waive the appellants’ constitutional right to a preseizure hearing of some kind. VIII We hold that the Florida and Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin provisions work a deprivation of property without due process of law insofar as they deny the right to a prior opportunity to be heard before chattels are taken from their possessor. Our holding, however, is a narrow one. We do not question' the power of a State to seize goods before a final judgment in order to protect the security interests of creditors so long as those' creditors have tested their claim to the goods through the process of a fair prior hearing. The nature and form of such prior hearings, moreover, are legitimately open to many potential variations and are a subject, at this point, for legislation — not adjudication. Since the essential reason for the requirement of a prior hearing is to prevent unfair and mistaken deprivations of property, however, it is axiomatic that the hearing must provide a real test. “[D]ue process is afforded only by the kinds of ‘notice’ and ‘hearing’ that are aimed at establishing the validity, or at least the probable validity, of the underlying claim against the alleged debtor before he can be deprived of his property . . . .” Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra, at 343 (Harlan, J., concurring) . See Bell v. Burson, supra, at 540; Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 267. For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the District Courts are vacated and these cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Powell and Me. Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the consideration or decision of these ' cases. See infra, at 73-75. Both Mrs. Fuentes and the appellants in No. 5138 also challenged the prejudgment replevin procedures under the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth. We do not, however, reach that issue. See n. 32, infra. Neither Mrs. Fuentes nor the appellants in No. 5138 sought an injunction against any pending or future court proceedings as such. Compare Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37. Rather, they challenged only the summary extra-judicial process of. prejudgment seizure of property to which they had already been subjected. They invoked the jurisdiction of the federal district courts under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3). Unlike Mrs. Fuentes ill No. 5039, none of the appellants in No. 5138 was ever sued in any court by the party who initiated seizure of the property. See infra, at 77-78. Since the announcement of this Court's decision in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337, summary prejudgment remedies have come under constitutional challenge throughout the country. The summary deprivation of property under statutes very similar to the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes at issue here has been held unconstitutional by at least two courts. Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (NDNY); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P. 2d 1242. But see Brunswick Corp. v. J. & P., Inc., 424 F. 2d 100 (CA10); Wheeler v. Adams Co., 322 F. Supp. 645 (Md.); Almor Furniture & Appliances, Inc. v. MacMillan, 116 N. J. Super. 65, 280 A. 2d 862. Applying Sniadach to other closely related forms of summary prejudgment remedies, some courts have construed that decision as setting forth general principles of procedural due process-and have struck down such remedies. E. g., Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (SD Cal.); Collins v. The Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (ND Ill.); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (ED Pa.); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (ND Cal.); Randone v. Appellate Dept., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P. 2d 13; Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N. W. 2d 20; Jones Press Inc. v. Motor Travel Services Inc,, 286 Minn. 205, 176 N. W. 2d 87. See Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Finance Corp., 326. F. Supp. 1335, 1341-1348 (ED Pa.). Other courts, however, have construed Sniadach as closely confined to its own facts and have upheld- such summary prejudgment remedies. E. g., Reeves v. Motor Contract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011 (ND Ga.); Black Watch Farms v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (Conn.); American Olean Tile Co. v. Zimmerman, 317 F. .Supp. 150.(Hawaii); Young v. Bidley, 309 F. Supp. 1308 (DC); Termplan, Inc. v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P. 2d 68; 300 West 154th Street-Realty Co. v. Department of Buildings, 26 N. Y. 2d 538, 260 N. E. 2d 534. The relevant Florida statutory provisions are the following: Fla. Stat. Ann. § 78.01 (Supp. 1972-4323): “Right to replevin. — Any person whose goods or chattels are wrongfully detained by any other person or officer may have a writ of replevin to recover them and any damages sustained by reason of the wrongful caption or detention as herein provided. Or such person may seek like relief, but with summons to defendant ,instead of replevy writ in which event no bond is required and the property shall be seized only after judgment, such judgment to be in like form as that provided when defendant has retaken the property on a forthcoming bond.” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 78.62 fSuppr-1972-1973): ' “Bond; Requisites. — Before a replevy writ issues, plaintiff shall file a bond with surety payable to defendant to be approved by the clerk in at least double the value, ofjhe property to Jbe'íéplev-ied conditioned that plaintiff will prosecute his Action to effect and without delay and that if defendant recovers judgment against him in the action, he will return the property,’ if return thereof is adjudged, and will pay defendant all sums of money recovered against plaintiff by defendant in the action.” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 78.08 (Supp. 1972-1973) : “Writ;.'form; return. — The writ shall command the officer to whom it may be directed to replevy the goods and chattels in possession of defendant, describing them, and to summon the defendant to answer the complaint.” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 78.10 (Supp. 1972-1973): “Writ; execution on property in buildings, etc. — In executing-the writ of replevin, if the property or any part , thereof is secreted or concealed in any dwelling house or other building or enclosure, the officer shall publicly demand delivery thereof and if it is not delivered by the defendant or some other person, he shall cause such house, building or enclosure to be broken open and shall make replevin according to the writ; and if necessary, he shall take to his assistance the power of the county.” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 78.13 (Supp. 1972-1973): “Writ; disposition of property levied on. — The officer executing the writ shall deliver the property to plaintiff after the lapse of three (3) days from the time the property was taken unless within the three (3) days defendant gives bond with surety to be approved by the officer in double the value of the property as appraised by the officer, conditioned to have the property forthcoming to abide the result of the action, in which event the property shall be redelivered to defendant.” The basic Pennsylvania statutory provision regarding the issuance of writs of replevin is the following: Pa.. Stat. Ann., Tit. 12, § 1821. Writs of replevin authorized “It shall and may be lawful for the justices of each county in this province to grant writs of replevin, in all cases whatsoever, where replevins may be granted by the laws of England, taking security as the said law directs, and make them returnable to the respective courts of common pleas, in the proper county, there to be determined according to law.” The procedural prerequisites to issuance of a prejudgment writ are, however, set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. The relevant rules are the following: “Rule 1073. Commencement of Action “(a) An action of replevin with bond shall be commenced by filing with the prothonotary a praecipe for a writ of replevin with bond, together with “(1) the plaintiff’s affidavit of the value of the property to be replevied, and “(2) the plaintiff’s bond in double the value of the property,' with security approved by the prothonotary, naming the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as obligee, .conditioned that if the plaintiff fails to maintain his right of possession of the property, he shall pay to the party entitled thereto the value of the property and all legal costs, fees and damages sustainéd by reason of the issuance of the writ. .“(b) An action of replevin without bond shall be commenced by filing with the prothonotary “(1) a praecipe for a writ of replevin without bond or “(2) a.complaint. “If the action is commenced without bond, the sheriff shall not replevy the property but at any time before the entry of judgment the plaintiff, upon filing the affidavit and bond prescribed by subdivision (a) of this rule, may obtain a writ of replevin with bond, issued in the original action, and have the sheriff replevy the property. “Rule 1076. ■ Counterbond “(a) A counterbond may be filed with the prothonotary by a defendant or intervenor claiming the right to the possession of the property, except a party claiming only a lien thereon, within seventy-two (72) hours after the property has been replevied, or within seventy-two (72) hours after service upon the defendant when the taking of possession of the property by the sheriff has been waived by the plaintiff as provided by Rule 1077 (a), or within.such extension of time as may be granted by the court upon cause shown. “(b) The counterbond shall be in the same amount as the original bond, with security • approved . by the prothonotary, naming the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as obligee, conditioned that if the party filing it fails to maintain his right to possession of the property he shall pay to the party -entitled thereto the value of the property, and all legal costs, fees and damages sustained by reason of the delivery of the replevied property to the party filing the counterbond. “Rule 1077. Disposition of Replevied Property. Sheriff’s Return “(a) When a writ of replevin with bond is issued, the sheriff shall leave the property during the time allowed for the filing of a counter-bond in the possession of the defendant or of any other person if the plaintiff so authorizes him in writing. “(b) Property taken into possession by the sheriff shall be held by' him until the expiration of the time for filing a counterbond. If the property is not ordered to be impounded and if no counter-bond is filed, the sheriff shall deliver the property to the plaintiff. “(c) If the property is not ordered to be impounded and the person in possession files a counterbond, the property shall be delivered to him, but if he does not file a counterbond, the property shall be delivered to the party first filing a counterbond. “(d) When perishable property is replevied the court may make such order relating to its sale or disposition as shall be proper. “(e) The return of the sheriff to the writ of replevin with bond shall state the disposition made by him of the property and the name and address of any person found in possession of the property.” Pa. Rule Civ. Proc. 1073 (b) does establish a procedure whereby an applicant may obtain a writ by filing a complaint, initiating a later court action. See n. 7, supra. In the case of every appellant in No. 70-5138, the applicant proceeded under Rule 1073 (a) rather than 1073 (b), seizing property under no more than a security bond and initiating no court action. Pa. Rule Civ. Proc. 1037 (a) establishes the procedure for initiating such a suit: “If an action is not commenced by a complaint [under Rule 1073 (b)j, the prothonotary, upon praecipe of the defendant, shall enter a rule upon the plaintiff to file a complaint. If a complaint is not filed within twenty (20) days after service of the rule, the prothon-otary, upon praecipe of the defendant, shall enter a judgment of non pros.” None of the appellants in No. 70-5138 attempted to initiate the process to require the filing of a post-seizure complaint under Rule 1037 (a). See T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 367-369 (1956); 3 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law 284-285 (1927); 2 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, History of English Law.577 (1909); J. Cbbbey, Replevin 19-29 (1890). See Plucknett, supra, n. 10, at 362-365; Pollock & Maitland, supra, n. 10, at 173-175, 203-211. The creditor could, of course, proceed without the use of state power, through self-help, by “distraining” the property before a judgment. See n. 10, supra. They may not even test that much. For if an applicant for the writ knows that he is dealing with an uneducated, uninformed consumer with little access to legal help and little familiarity with legal procedures, there may be a substantial possibility that a summary seizure of property — however unwarranted — may go unchallenged, and the applicant may feel that he can act with impunity. The appellants argue that this opportunity for quick recovery. exists only in theory. They allege that very few people in their position are able to obtain a recovery bond, even if they know of the possibility. Appellant Fuentes says that in her case she was.never told that she could recover the stove and stereo and that the deputy sheriff seizing them gave them at once to the Firestone agent, rather than holding them for three days. She further asserts that of 442 cases of prejudgment replevin in small-claims courts in Dade County, .Florida, in 1969, there was not one case in which the defendant took advantage of the recovery provision. Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 536. Although not mentioned in the Sniadach opinion, there clearly was a quick-recovery provision in the Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment statute at issue. Wis. Stat. Ann.' §267.21 (1) (Supp. 1970-1971). Family Finance Corp. v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 173-174, 154 N. W. 2d 259, 265. Mr. Justice Harlan adverted to the recovery provision in his concurring opinion. 395 U. S., at 343. These sorts of provisions' for recovery of property by posting •security are,- of course, entirely different from the security requirement upheld in Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56, 65. There; the Court upheld a requirement that a tenant wanting a continuance of an eviction hearing must post security for accruing rent during the .continuance. The tenant did not have to post security in order to remain in possession before a hearing; rather, he had to post security only in order to obtain a continuance of the hearing. Moreover, the security requirement in Lindsey was- not a recovery provision. For the tenant was not deprived of his possessory interest even for one day without opportunity for a hearing. The possessory interest of Rosa Washington, an appellant in No. 5138, in her son’s clothes, furniture, and toys was no less sufficient to invoke due process safeguards. Her interest was not protected by contract. Rather, it was protected by ordinary property law, there being a dispute between her and her estranged husband over which of them had a legal right not only to custody of the child but also to possession of the chattels. Mrs. Fuentes argues that Florida iaw allows her to defend on the ground that Firestone breached its obligations under the sales contract by failing to repair serious defects in the stove it sold her. We need not consider this issue here. It is enough -that the right to continued possession of the goods was open to some dispute at a hearing since' the sellers of the goods had to show, at the least, that the appellants had defaulted in their payments. The issues decisive of the ultimate right to continued possession, of course, may be quite simple. The simplicity of the issues might be relevant to the formality or scheduling of a prior hearing. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S., at 65. But it certainly cannot undercut the right to a prior hearing of some kind. The Supreme Court.of California recently put the matter accurately: “Sniadach does not mark a radical departure in constitutional adjudication. It is' not a rivulet of wage garnishment but part of the mainstream of the past procedural due process decisions of the United States Supreme Court.” Randone v. Appellate Dept., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 550, 488 P. 2d 13, 22. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra, at 340; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264. Of course, the primary, issue in Goldberg was the form of hearing demanded by due process before termination of welfare benefits; the importance of welfare was "directly relevant to that question. The relative weight of liberty or property interests is relevant, of course, to the form of notice and hearing required by due process. See,- e. g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 378, and cases cited' therein. But some form of notice and hearing — formal or informal— is required before deprivation of a property interest that “cannot be characterized as de minimis.” Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra, at 342 (Harlan, J., concurring). A prior hearing always imposes some costs in time, effort, and expense, and it is often more, efficient to dispense with the opportunity for such a hearing. But these rather ordinary costs cannot out-weigh the constitutional right. See Bell v. Burson, supra, at 540-541; Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 261. Procedural due process is not intended to promote efficiency or accommodate all possible interests: it is intended to protect the particular interests of the person whose possessions are about to be taken. “The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance" in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing; concern for efficiency arid efficacy that'may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.” Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 656. Of course, outright seizure of property is not the only kind of deprivation that must be preceded by a prior hearing. See, e. g., Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra. In three cases, the Court has .allowed the attachment of property without a prior hearing. In one, the attachment was neeessary to protect the public against the same sort of immediate harm involved in the seizure cases— a bank failure. Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U. S. 29. Another case involved attachment necessary’ to secure jurisdiction in state court — clearly a most basic and important public interest. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94. It is much less clear what .interests were involved in the third case, decided with an unexplicated per curiam opinion simply ’ citing Coffin Bros. and Ownbey, McKay v. McInnes, 279 U. S. 820. As far as essential procedural due process doctrine goés, McKay cannot stand for any more than was established in the Coffin Bros, and Ownbey casés ori which it relied completely. See Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra, at 340; id., at 344 (Harlan, J., concurring). ■ In cases involving deprivation of other interests, such as government. employment, the Court similarly has required an unusually important governmental’need to outweigh the right to a. prior hearing. See, e. g., Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895-896. Seizure under , a search warrant is quite a different matter, see n. 30, infra. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589. The Court stated that “[d]elay in the judicial determination of property rights is not uncommon where it* is essential that governmental needs be immediately satisfied.” Id., at 597 (emphasis supplied). The Court, then relied on “the need of the government promptly to secure its revenues.” Id., at 596. Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U. S. 554, 566; Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U. S. 239, 245; United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U. S. 547, 553. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U. S. 245. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U. S. 594. North American Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306. By allowing repossession without an opportunity for a prior hearing, the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes may be intended specifically to ¿reduce the costs for the private party seeking to seize goods in another party’s possession. Even if the private gain at stake in repossession actions were equal to the great public interests recognized in this Court’s past decisions, see nn. 24-28, supra, the Court has made clear that the avoidance of the ordinary costs imposed by the opportunity for a hearing is not sufficient to override the constitutional right. See n. 22, supra. The appellees argue that the cost of holding hearings may be especially onerous in the context of the creditor-debtor relationship. But the Court’s holding in Sniadach v: Family Finance Corp., supra, indisputably demonstrates that ordinary hearing costs ■ are no more able to override due process rights in the creditor-debtor context than in other contexts. In any event, the aggregate cost of an opportunity to be heard, before repossession should not be exaggerated. For we deal here only with the right to an opportunity to be heard. Since the issues and facts decisive of rights in repossession suits may .very often be quite simple, there is a likelihood that many defendants would forgo their opportunity, sensing the futility of the exercise in the particular case. And, of course, no hearing need .be held unless the defendant, having received notice of his opportunity,, takes advantage of. it. The seizure of possessions under a writ of replevin is entirely different from the seizure of possessions under a.search warrant. First, a search warrant is generally issued to serve a highly important governmental need — e. g., the apprehension and conviction of criminals — rather than the mere private advantage of á private party in an economic transaction. Second, a search' warrant is generally issued in situations demánding prompt action. The danger is all too obvious that a criminal will destroy or hide evidence or fruits of his crime if given ,any prior notice. Third, the Fourth Amendment guarantees that the State will not issue search warrants merely upon the 'conclusory application of a private, party. It guarantees that the State will not abdicate control over the issuance of warrants and that no warrant will be issued without a prior showing of probable cause. Thus, our decision today in no way implies that there must be opportunity for an adversary hearing before a search warrant is issued. But cf. A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U. S. 205. See Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 748; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464. In the civil area, the Court has said that “[w]e do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights,” Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 301 U. S. 292, 307. Indeed, in the civil no less than the criminal area, “courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.” Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U. S. 389, 393. We do not re.ach the appellants’ argument that the Florida and Pennsylvania statutory procedures violate the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth. See n. 2, supra. For once a prior hearing is required, at which the applicant for a writ must establish the probable validity of his claim for repossession, the Fourth Amendment problem may well be obviated. There is no need for us to decide that question at this point. Leeway remains to develop a form of hearing that will minimize unnecessary cost and delay while preserving the fairness and effectiveness of the hearing in preventing seizures of goods where the party seeking the writ has little probability of succeeding on'the merits of the dispute.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed. The information relevant to this variable may be found near the end of the summary that begins on the title page of each case, or preferably at the very end of the opinion of the Court. For cases in which the Court granted a motion to dismiss, consider "petition denied or appeal dismissed". There is "no disposition" if the Court denied a motion to dismiss.
What is the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed?
[ "stay, petition, or motion granted", "affirmed (includes modified)", "reversed", "reversed and remanded", "vacated and remanded", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded", "vacated", "petition denied or appeal dismissed", "certification to or from a lower court", "no disposition" ]
[ 4 ]
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PEEL v. ATTORNEY REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION OF ILLINOIS No. 88-1775. Argued January 17, 1990 Decided June 4, 1990 Stevens, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Brennan, Blackmun, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Brennan, J., joined, post, p. 111. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 118. O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, J., joined, post, p. 119. Bruce J. Ennis, Jr., argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Stephen J. Marzen argued the cause for the Federal Trade Commission as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Rill, Deputy Solicitor General Merrill, Kevin J. Arquit, Jay C. Shaffer, and Ernest J. Isenstadt. William F. Moran III argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was James J. Grogan. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Advertising Federation, Inc., by Philip B. Kurland and Alan S. Madans; for the Association of National Advertisers, Inc., by Burt Neuborne; for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America et al. by Jeffrey Robert White and Russ M. Herman; for Public Citizen by David C. Vladeck and Alan B. Morrison; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo, Paul D. Kamenar, Alan M. Slobodin, and Richard Samp. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Academy of Certified Trial Lawyers of Minnesota by Clarance E. Hagglund; and for the National Board of Trial Advocacy by Timothy Wilton and Jacob D. Fuchsberg. Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Justice Brennan, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Kennedy join. The Illinois Supreme Court publicly censured petitioner because his letterhead states that he is certified as a civil trial specialist by the National Board of Trial Advocacy. We granted certiorari to consider whether the statement on his letterhead is protected by the First Amendment. 492 U. S. 917 (1989). I This case comes to us against a background of growing interest in lawyer certification programs. In the 1973 Sonnett Memorial Lecture, then Chief Justice Warren E. Burger advanced the proposition that specialized training and certification of trial advocates is essential to the American system of justice. That proposition was endorsed by a number of groups of lawyers who were instrumental in establishing the National Board of Trial Advocacy (NBTA) in 1977. Since then, NBTA has developed a set of standards and procedures for periodic certification of lawyers with experience and competence in trial work. Those standards, which have been approved by a board of judges, scholars, and practitioners, are objective and demanding. They require specified experience as lead counsel in both jury and nonjury trials, participation in approved programs of continuing legal education, a demonstration of writing skills, and the successful completion of a day-long examination. Certification expires in five years unless the lawyer again demonstrates his or her continuing qualification. NBTA certification has been described as a “highly-structured” and “arduous process that employs a wide range of assessment methods.” Task Force on Lawyer Competence, Report With Findings and Recommendations to the Conference of Chief Justices, Publication No. NCSC-021, pp. 33-34 (May 26, 1982). After reviewing NBTA’s procedures, the Supreme Court of Minnesota found that “NBTA applies a rigorous and exacting set of standards and examinations on a national scale before certifying a lawyer as a trial specialist.” In re Johnson, 341 N. W. 2d 282, 283 (1983). The Alabama Supreme Court similarly concluded that “a certification of specialty by NBTA would indicate a level of expertise with regard to trial advocacy in excess of the level of expertise required for admission to the bar generally.” Ex parte Howell, 487 So. 2d 848, 851 (1986). II Petitioner practices law in Edwardsville, Illinois. He was licensed to practice in Illinois in 1968, in Arizona in 1979, and in Missouri in 1981. He has served as president of the Madison County Bar Association and has been active in both national and state bar association work. He has tried to verdict over 100 jury trials and over 300 nonjury trials, and has participated in hundreds of other litigated matters that were settled. NBTA issued petitioner a “Certificate in Civil Trial Advocacy” in 1981, renewed it in 1986, and listed him in its 1985 Directory of “Certified Specialists and Board Members.” Since 1983 petitioner’s professional letterhead has contained a statement referring to his NBTA certification and to the three States in which he is licensed. It appears as follows: “Gary E. Peel “Certified Civil Trial Specialist “By the National Board of Trial Advocacy “Licensed: Illinois, Missouri, Arizona.” In 1987, the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois (Commission) filed a complaint alleging that petitioner, by use of this letterhead, was publicly holding himself out as a certified legal specialist in violation of Rule 2-105(a)(3) of the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility. That Rule provides: “A lawyer or law firm may specify or designate any area or field of law in which he or its partners concentrates or limits his or its practice. Except as set forth in Rule 2-105(a), no lawyer may hold himself out as ‘certified’ or a ‘specialist.’” The complaint also alleged violations of Rule 2-101(b), which requires that a lawyer’s public “communication shall contain all information necessary to make the communication not misleading and shall not contain any false or misleading statement or otherwise operate to deceive,” and of Rule 1-102 (a)(1), which generally subjects a lawyer to discipline for violation of any Rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Disciplinary Rules 2-101(b), 1-102(a)(1) (1988). After a hearing, the Commission recommended censure for a violation of Rule 2-105(a)(3). It rejected petitioner’s First Amendment claim that a reference to a lawyer’s certification as a specialist was a form of commercial speech that could not be “‘subjected to blanket suppression.’” Report of the Hearing Panel, App. C to Pet. for Cert. 19a. Although the Commission’s “Findings of Facts” did not contain any statement as to whether petitioner’s representation was deceptive, its “Conclusion of Law” ended with the brief statement that petitioner, “by holding himself out, on his letterhead as ‘Gary E. Peel, Certified Civil Trial Specialist—By the National Board of Trial Advocacy,’ is in direct violation of the above cited Rule [2-105(a)(3)]. “We hold it is ‘misleading’ as our Supreme Court has never recognized or approved any certification process.” Id., at 20a. The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the Commission’s recommendation for censure. It held that the First Amendment did not protect petitioner’s letterhead because the letterhead was misleading in three ways. First, the State Supreme Court concluded that the juxtaposition of the reference to petitioner as “certified” by NBTA and the reference to him as “licensed” by Illinois, Missouri, and Arizona “could” mislead the general public into a belief that petitioner’s authority to practice in the field of trial advocacy was derived solely from NBTA certification. It thus found that the statements on the letterhead impinged on the court’s exclusive authority to license its attorneys because they failed to distinguish voluntary certification by an unofficial group from licensure by an official organization. In re Peel, 126 Ill. 2d 397, 405-406, 534 N. E. 980, 983-984 (1989). Second, the court characterized the claim of NBTA certification as “misleading because it tacitly attests to the qualifications of [petitioner] as a civil trial advocate.” Id., at 406, 534 N. E. 2d, at 984. The court noted confusion in the parties’ descriptions of NBTA’s requirements, but did not consider whether NBTA certification constituted reliable, verifiable evidence of petitioner’s experience as a civil trial advocate. Rather, the court reasoned that the statement was tantamount to an implied claim of superiority of the quality of petitioner’s legal services and therefore warranted restriction under our decision in In re R. M. J., 455 U. S. 191 (1982). 126 Ill. 2d, at 406, 534 N. E. 2d, at 984. Finally, the court reasoned that use of the term “specialist” was misleading because it incorrectly implied that Illinois had formally authorized certification of specialists in trial advocacy. The court concluded that the conjunction of the reference to being a specialist with the reference to being licensed implied that the former was the product of the latter. Id., at 410, 534 N. E. 2d, at 986. Concluding that the letterhead was inherently misleading for these reasons, the court upheld the blanket prohibition of Rule 2-105(a) under the First Amendment. III The Illinois Supreme Court considered petitioner’s letterhead as a form of commercial speech governed by the “constitutional limitations on the regulation of lawyer advertising.” 126 Ill. 2d, at 402, 534 N. E. 2d, at 982. The only use of the letterhead in the record is in petitioner’s correspondence with the Commission itself. Petitioner contends that, absent evidence of any use of the letterhead to propose commercial transactions with potential clients, the statement should be accorded the full protections of noncommercial speech. However, he also acknowledges that “this case can and should be decided on the narrower ground that even if it is commercial speech it cannot be categorically prohibited.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 9. We agree that the question to be decided is whether a lawyer has a constitutional right, under the standards applicable to commercial speech, to advertise his or her certification as a trial specialist by NBTA. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977), this Court decided that advertising by lawyers was a form of commercial speech entitled to protection by the First Amendment. Justice Powell summarized the standards applicable to such claims for the unanimous Court in In re R. M. J., 455 U. S., at 203: “Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the protections of the First Amendment. But when the particular content or method of the advertising suggests that it is inherently misleading or when experience has proved that in fact such advertising is subject to abuse, the States may impose appropriate restrictions. Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely. But the States may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading information, e. g., a listing of areas of practice, if the information also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive. . . . “Even when a communication is not misleading, the State retains some authority to regulate. But the State must assert a substantial interest and the interference with speech must be in proportion to the interest served.” (Emphasis added.) In this case we must consider whether petitioner’s statement was misleading and, even if it was not, whether the potentially misleading character of such statements creates a state interest sufficiently substantial to justify a categorical ban on their use. The facts stated on petitioner’s letterhead are true and verifiable. It is undisputed that NBTA has certified petitioner as a civil trial specialist and that three States have licensed him to practice law. There is no contention that any potential client or person was actually misled or deceived by petitioner’s stationery. Neither the Commission nor the State Supreme Court made any factual finding of actual deception or misunderstanding, but rather concluded, as a matter of law, that petitioner’s claims of being “certified” as a “specialist” were necessarily misleading absent an official state certification program. Notably, although petitioner was originally charged with a violation of Disciplinary Rule 2-101(b), which aims at misleading statements by an attorney, his letterhead was not found to violate this rule. In evaluating petitioner’s claim of certification, the Illinois Supreme Court focused not on its facial accuracy, but on its implied claim “as to the quality of [petitioner’s] legal services,” and concluded that such a qualitative claim “‘might be so likely to mislead as to warrant restriction.’” 126 Ill. 2d, at 406, 534 N. E. 2d, at 984 (quoting In re R. M. J., 455 U. S., at 201). This analysis confuses the distinction between statements of opinion or quality and statements of objective facts that may support an inference of quality. A lawyer’s certification by NBTA is a verifiable fact, as are the predicate requirements for that certification. Measures of trial experience and hours of continuing education, like information about what schools the lawyer attended or his or her bar activities, are facts about a lawyer’s training and practice. A claim of certification is not an unverifiable opinion of the ultimate quality of a lawyer’s work or a promise of success, cf. In re R. M. J., 455 U. S., at 201, n. 14, but is simply a fact, albeit one with multiple predicates, from which a consumer may or may not draw an inference of the likely quality of an attorney’s work in a given area of practice. We must assume that some consumers will infer from petitioner’s statement that his qualifications in the area of civil trial advocacy exceed the general qualifications for admission to a state bar. Thus if the certification had been issued by an organization that had made no inquiry into petitioner’s fitness, or by one that issued certificates indiscriminately for a price, the statement, even if true, could be misleading. In this case, there is no evidence that a claim of NBTA certification suggests any greater degree of professional qualification than reasonably may be inferred from an evaluation of its rigorous requirements. Much like a trademark, the strength of a certification is measured by the quality of the organization for which it stands. The Illinois Supreme Court merely notes some confusion in the parties’ explanation of one of those requirements. See n. 9, supra. We find NBTA standards objectively clear, and, in any event, do not see why the degree of uncertainty identified by the State Supreme Court would make the letterhead inherently misleading to a consumer. A number of other States have their own certification plans and expressly authorize references to specialists and certification, but there is no evidence that the consumers in any of these States are misled if they do not inform themselves of the precise standards under which claims of certification are allowed. Nor can we agree with the Illinois Supreme Court’s somewhat contradictory fears that juxtaposition of the references to being “certified” as a “specialist” with the identification of the three States in which petitioner is “licensed” conveys, on the one hand, the impression that NBTA had the authority to grant those licenses and, on the other, that the NBTA certification was the product of official state action. The separate character of the two references is plain from their texts: one statement begins with the verb “[c]ertified” and identifies the source as the “National Board of Trial Advocacy,” while the second statement begins with the verb “[licensed” and identifies States as the source of licensure. The references are further distinguished by the fact that one is indented below petitioner’s name while the other uses the same margin as his name. See supra, at 96. There has been no finding that any person has associated certification with governmental action—state or federal—and there is no basis for belief that petitioner’s representation generally would be so construed. We are satisfied that the consuming public understands that licenses—to drive cars, to operate radio stations, to sell liquor—are issued by governmental authorities and that a host of certificates—to commend job performance, to convey an educational degree, to commemorate a solo flight or a hole in one—are issued by private organizations. The dictionary definition of “certificate,” from which the Illinois Supreme Court quoted only excerpts, comports with this common understanding: “[A] document issued by a school, a state agency, or a professional organization certifying that one has satisfactorily completed a course of studies, has passed a qualifying examination, or has attained professional standing in a given field and may officially practice or hold a position in that field.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 367 (1986 ed.) (emphasis added to portions omitted from 126 Ill. 2d, at 405, 534 N. E. 2d, at 984). The court relied on a similarly cramped definition of “specialist,” turning from Webster’s—which contains no suggestion of state approval of “specialists”—to the American Bar Association’s Comment to Model Rule 7.4, which prohibits a lawyer from stating or implying that he is a “specialist” except for designations of patent, admiralty, or state-designated specialties. The Comment to the Rule concludes that the terms “specialist” and “specialty” “have acquired a secondary meaning implying formal recognition as a specialist and, therefore, use of these terms is misleading” in States that have no formal certification procedures. ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 7.4 and Comment (1989). We appreciate the difficulties that evolving standards for attorney certification present to national organizations like the ABA. However, it seems unlikely that petitioner’s statement about his certification as a “specialist” by an identified national organization necessarily would be confused with formal state recognition. The Federal Trade Commission, which has a long history of reviewing claims of deceptive advertising, fortifies this conclusion with its observation that “one can readily think of numerous other claims of specialty—from ‘air conditioning specialist’ in the realm of home repairs to ‘foreign car specialist’ in the realm of automotive repairs—that cast doubt on the notion that the public would automatically mistake a claim of specialization for a claim of formal recognition by the State.” Brief for Federal Trade Commission as Amicus Curiae 24. We reject the paternalistic assumption that the recipients of petitioner’s letterhead are no more discriminating than the audience- for children’s television. Cf. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S. 60, 74 (1983). The two state courts that have evaluated lawyers’ advertisements of their certifications as civil trial specialists by NBTA have concluded that the statements were not misleading or deceptive on their face, and that, under our recent decisions, they were protected by the First Amendment. Ex parte Howell, 487 So. 2d 848 (Ala. 1986); In re Johnson, 341 N. W. 2d 282 (Minn. 1983). Given the complete absence of any evidence of deception in the present case, we must reject the contention that petitioner’s letterhead is actually misleading. IV Even if petitioner’s letterhead is not actually misleading, the Commission defends Illinois’ categorical prohibition against lawyers’ claims of being “certified” or a “specialist” on the assertion that these statements are potentially misleading. In the Commission’s view, the State’s interest in avoiding any possibility of misleading some consumers with such communications is so substantial that it outweighs the cost of providing other consumers with relevant information about lawyers who are certified as specialists. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U. S. 557, 566 (1980). We may assume that statements of “certification” as a “specialist,” even though truthful, may not be understood fully by some readers. However, such statements pose no greater potential of misleading consumers than advertising admission to “Practice before: The United States Supreme Court,” In re R. M. J., 455 U. S. 191 (1982), of exploiting the audience of a targeted letter, Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Assn., 486 U. S. 466 (1988), or of confusing a reader with an accurate illustration, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U. S. 626 (1985). In this case, as in those, we conclude that the particular state rule restricting lawyers’ advertising is “‘broader than reasonably necessary to prevent the’ perceived evil.” Shapero, 486 U. S., at 472, (quoting In re R. M. J., 455 U. S., at 203). Cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447 (1978) (restricting in-person solicitation). The need for a complete prophylactic against any claim of specialty is undermined by the fact that use of titles such as “Registered Patent Attorney” and “Proctor in Admiralty,” which are permitted under Rule 2-105(a)’s exceptions, produces the same risk of deception. Lacking empirical evidence to support its claim of deception, the Commission relies heavily on the inherent authority of the Illinois Supreme Court to supervise its own bar. Justice O’Connor’s dissent urges that “we should be more deferential” to the State, asserting without explanation that “the Supreme Court of Illinois is in a far better position than is this Court to determine which statements are misleading or likely to mislead.” Whether the inherent character of a statement places it beyond the protection of the First Amendment is a question of law over which Members of this Court should exercise de novo review. Cf. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 498-511 (1984). That the judgment below is by a State Supreme Court exercising review over the actions of its State Bar Commission does not insulate it from our review for constitutional infirmity. See, e. g., Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U. S. 1 (1971). The Commission’s authority is necessarily constrained by the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and specifically by the principle that disclosure of truthful, relevant information is more likely to make a positive contribution to decisionmaking than is concealment of such information. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 770 (1976); Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., 447 U. S., at 562. Even if we assume that petitioner’s letterhead may be potentially misleading to some consumers, that potential does not satisfy the State’s heavy burden of justifying a categorical prohibition against the dissemination of accurate factual information to the public. In re R. M. J., 455 U. S., at 203. The presumption favoring disclosure over concealment is fortified in this case by the separate presumption that members of a respected profession are unlikely to engage in practices that deceive their clients and potential clients. As we noted in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S., at 379: “It is at least somewhat incongruous for the opponents of advertising to extol the virtues and altruism of the legal profession at one point, and, at another, to assert that its members will seize the opportunity to mislead and distort.” We do not ignore the possibility that some unscrupulous attorneys may hold themselves out as certified specialists when there is no qualified organization to stand behind that certification. A lawyer’s truthful statement that “XYZ Board” has “certified” him as a “specialist in admiralty law” would not necessarily be entitled to First Amendment protection if the certification were a sham. States can require an attorney who advertises “XYZ certification” to demonstrate that such certification is available to all lawyers who meet objective and consistently applied standards relevant to practice in a particular area of the law. There has been no showing—indeed no suggestion—that the burden of distinguishing between certifying boards that are bona fide and those that are bogus would be significant, or that bar associations and official disciplinary committees cannot police deceptive practices effectively. Cf. Shapero, 486 U. S., at 477 (“The record before us furnishes no evidence that scrutiny of targeted solicitation letters will be appreciably more burdensome or less reliable than scrutiny of advertisements”). “If the naiveté of the public will cause advertising by attorneys to be misleading, then it is the bar’s role to assure that the populace is sufficiently informed as to enable it to place advertising in its proper perspective.” Bates, 433 U. S., at 375. To the extent that potentially misleading statements of private certification or specialization could confuse consumers, a State might consider screening certifying organizations or requiring a disclaimer about the certifying organization or the standards of a specialty. In re R. M. J., 455 U. S., at 201-203. A State may not, however, completely ban statements that are not actually or inherently misleading, such as certification as a specialist by bona fide organizations such as NBTA. Cf. In re Johnson, 341 N. W. 2d, at 283 (striking down the Disciplinary Rule that prevented statements of being “ ‘a specialist unless and until the Minnesota Supreme Court adopts or authorizes rules or regulations permitting him to do so’”). Information about certification and specialties facilitates the consumer’s access to legal services and thus better serves the administration of justice. Petitioner’s letterhead was neither actually nor inherently misleading. There is no dispute about the bona fides and the relevance of NBTA certification. The Commission’s concern about the possibility of deception in hypothetical cases is not sufficient to rebut the constitutional presumption favoring disclosure over concealment. Disclosure of information such as that on petitioner’s letterhead both serves the public interest and encourages the development and utilization of meritorious certification programs for attorneys. As the public censure of petitioner for violating Rule 2-105(a)(3) violates the First Amendment, the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . If a statement may not be censored by the Federal Government, it is also protected from censorship by the State of Illinois. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931). Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice? 42 Ford. L. Rev. 227 (1973) (recording the Fourth Annual John F. Sonnett Memorial Lecture delivered on November 26, 1973). The address warned that a lawyer is not qualified, “simply by virtue of admission to the bar, to be an advocate in trial courts in matters of serious consequence.” Id., at 240. Other proponents stress more positive reasons for certification such as the creation of “a powerful professional and economic incentive to increase [lawyers’] competence.” Brief for Academy of Certified Trial Lawyers of Minnesota as Amicus Curiae 15. See Trial Advocacy as a Specialty: Final Report of the Annual Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference on Advocacy in the United States (sponsored by the Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation) (1976). The groups sponsoring NBTA include the National District Attorneys Association, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, the International Academy of Trial Lawyers, the International Society of Barristers, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the National Association of Women Lawyers, and the American Board of Professional Liability Attorneys. Brief for NBTA as Amicus Curiae 9-13. The current NBTA requirements are that an applicant: (1) be a bar member in good standing; (2) disclose any misconduct including criminal comrctions or professional discipline; (3) show at least five years of actual practice in civil trial law during the period immediately preceding application for certification; (4) show substantial involvement in trial practice, including 30% of professional time in civil trial litigation during each of the five years preceding application; (5) demonstrate experience by appearing as lead counsel in at least 15 complete trials of civil matters to verdict or judgment, including at least 45 days of trial and 5 jury trials, and by appearing as lead counsel in 40 additional contested matters involving the taking of testimony; (6) participate in 45 hours of continuing legal education in civil trial practice in the three years preceding application; 17) be confidentially reviewed by six attorneys, including two against or with whom the applicant has tried a civil matter, and a judge before whom the applicant has appeared within the preceding two years; (8) provide a substantial trial court memorandum or brief that was submitted to a court in the preceding three years; and (9) pass a day-long written examination testing both procedural and substantive law in various areas of civil trial practice. Petitioner has been vice chair of the Insurance and Tort Committee of the General Practice Session of the American Bar Association and an officer of the Tri-City Bar Association. He is a member of the Illinois State Bar Association, the Arizona State Bar Association, the Missouri State Bar Association, the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association, and the Association of Trial Lawyers of America. Hearing Tr., App. G to Pet. for Cert. 28a-29a. Report of the Hearing Panel, App. C to Pet. for Cert. 19a; App. 22-23. App. D to Pet. for Cert. 21a. Disciplinary Rule 2—105(a)(3) (1988). The exceptions are for patent, trademark, and admiralty lawyers. The remainder of Rule 2-105 provides: “Rule 2-105. Limitation of Practice. “(a) A lawyer shall not hold himself out publicly as a specialist, except as follows: “(1) A lawyer admitted to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office may use the designation ‘Patents,’ ‘Patent Attorney,’ ‘Patent Lawyer,’ or ‘Registered Patent Attorney’ or any combination of those terms, on his letterhead and office sign. “(2) A lawyer engaged in the trademark practice may use the designation ‘Trademarks,’ ‘Trademark Attorney’ or ‘Trademark Lawyer,’ or a combination of those terms, and a lawyer engaged in the admiralty practice may use the designation ‘Admiralty,’ ‘Proctor in Admiralty’ or ‘Admiralty Lawyer,’ or a combination of those terms, in any form of communication otherwise permitted under Rules 2-101 through 2-104.” 126 Ill. 2d, at 406-407, 534 N. E. 2d, at 984-985. The court noted some ambiguity and inconsistency in the descriptions of required trial experience: by petitioner as 40 jury trials carried to verdict, by amicus Association of Trial Lawyers of America as 15 major cases carried to verdict, and by amicus NBTA as 15 complete trials to verdict, at least 5 of which were to a jury. Petitioner’s brief to the state court did fail to report the newly revised standards provided by the amici, whose descriptions varied from each other’s only in terminology. Brief for Petitioner 23, n. 26. All parties have provided the revised standards to this Court. See n. 4, supra. Of course, many lawyers who do not have or publicize certification are in fact more able than others who do claim such a credential. The Commission does not suggest that the absence of certification leads consumers to conclude that these attorneys are unqualified. In any event, such a negative inference would be far more likely in a State that certifies attorneys under a comprehensive formal program, than in one that provides no official recognition. See, e. g., Ala. Code Prof. Resp. Temp. DR 2-112 (1989); Ariz. Rule Prof. Conduct ER 7.4 (1990); Ark. Model Rule Prof. Conduct 7.4(c) (1990); Cal. Rule Ct., Policies Governing the State Bar of California Program for Certifying Legal Specialists (1990); Conn. Rule Prof. Conduct 7.4A-C (1989); Fla. Rule Regulating Bar 6-4 (1990); Ga. Rules Ct. Ann., DR 2-105(3) (1989); La. Rev. Stat. Ann., Rule of Prof. Conduct 7.4(b) (1988); Minn. Rule of Prof. Conduct 7.4 and Minn. State Bd. of Legal Certification Rules 5, 6, 8 (1990); N. J. Ct. Rule 1:39 and N. J. Rule Prof. Conduct 7.4 (1989); N. M. Rules Governing Practice of Law, Legal Specialization 19-101 et seq. (1988); N. C. Ann. Rules, Plan of Certified Legal Specialization, App. H (1990); S. C. Sup. Ct. Rule 53 (1988); Tex. State Bar Rules, Art. 10, § 9, DR 2-101(C), (1989); Utah Rule Prof. Conduct 7.4(b) (1990). Board certification of specialists in various branches of medicine, handled by the 23 member boards of the American Board of Medical Specialties, is based on various requirements of education, residency, examinations and evaluations. American Board of Medical Specialties, Board Evaluation Procedures: Developing a Research Agenda, Conference Proceedings 7-11 (1981). The average member of the public does not know or necessarily understand these requirements, but board certification nevertheless has “come to be regarded as evidence of the skill and proficiency of those to whom they [have] been issued.” American Board of Medical Specialties, Evaluating the Skills of Medical Specialists 1 (J. Lloyd and D. Langsley eds. 1983). Prior to its revision in 1989, the Comment to ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 7.4 also prohibited any statement that a lawyer’s practice “is limited to,” or “concentrated in,” an area under the same explanation that these terms had “a secondary meaning implying formal recognition as a specialist.” Model Rule 7.4 Comment (1983). When Rule 7.4 was originally proposed in 1983, proponents of unsuccessful amendments to drop all prohibition of terms argued that “the public does not attach the narrow meaning to the word ‘specialist’ that the legal profession generally does. The public would perceive no distinction between a lawyer’s claim that he practices only probate law and a claim that he concentrates his practice in probate law.” ABA, The Legislative History of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 189 (1987). The amendments’ opponents argued that allowing lawyers to designate themselves as specialists would undermine the States’ ability to set up and control specialization programs. Ibid. This position essentially conceded that these terms did not yet have “a secondary meaning implying formal recognition,” but only that they could develop such a secondary meaning if state programs came into being. Rule 7.4’s exception for designations of “Patent Attorney” and “Proctor in Admiralty” ignores the asserted interest in avoiding confusion from any secondary meaning of these terms. The Comment to Rule 7.4 actually imbues these terms with a historical, virtually formal, recognition, despite the lack of any prerequisites for their use: “Recognition of specialization in patent matters is a matter of long-established policy of the Patent and Trademark Office. Designation of admiralty practice has a long historical tradition associated with maritime commerce and the federal courts.” ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 7.4 Comment (1989). Justice O’Connor’s legal conclusion about the deceptive potential of petitioner’s letterhead, like that of the Illinois Supreme Court, rests on a flexible appraisal of the character of the consuming public. For example, her opinion emphasizes the “public’s comparative lack of knowledge” about the legal profession and its lack of “sophistication concerning legal services,” post, at 120, 124, but simultaneously reasons that the public will believe that all certifications are state sanctioned because of their “common knowledge that States police the ethical standards of the profession” and their specific knowledge that States like California are now certifying legal specialists, post, at 124. These consumers also can distinguish “Registered Patent Attorney” from “Certified Patent Attorney,” interpreting the former as an acceptable “reporting of professional experience,” but the latter as a deceptive “claim of quality.” Post, at 126. We prefer to assume that the average consumer, with or without knowledge of the legal profession, can understand a statement that certification by a national organization is not certification by the State, and can decide what, if any, value to accord this information. The attempt in Justice O’Connor’s dissent to distinguish In re R. M. J. by reasoning that a consumer can contact the Supreme Court to see if a lawyer is really a member of the Court’s Bar, post, at 122, misses the point. Both admission to the Bar of this Court and certification by NBTA are facts, whether or not consumers verify them. The legal question is whether a statement of either fact is nonetheless so misleading that it falls beyond the First Amendment’s protections. We found that the advertisement of admission to the Bar of this Court could not be banned, despite recognition that “this relatively uninformative fact is at least bad taste” and “could be misleading to the general public unfamiliar with the requirements of admission to the Bar of this Court.” In re R. M. J., 455 U. S., at 205-206. It is noteworthy that Justice White’s reference to the overbreadth doctrine, see post, at 118-119, is potentially misleading. That doctrine allows a party whose own conduct is not protected by the First Amendment to challenge a regulation as overbroad because of its impact on parties not before the Court. In this case we hold that Illinois Disciplinary Rule 2-105 is invalid as applied to petitioner Peel. Accordingly, the over-breadth doctrine to which Justice White refers has no relevance to our analysis. Post, at 121. Justice O’Connor’s abdication of review would create radical disparities in First Amendment protections from State to State. On the one hand, it finds that the Illinois Supreme Court “properly concluded [that] certification is tantamount to a claim of quality and superiority and is therefore inherently likely to mislead.” Post, at 123. Under this analysis, claims of certification by States as well as by private organizations are deceptive and thus fall outside of the First Amendment’s protection; indeed, Illinois forbids claims of “certification” as a “specialist” by any entity. See also post, at 121 (listing States that ban certification). On the other hand, Justice O’Connor apparently also would defer to the contrary judgments of other States, which have held that the First Amendment protects claims of NBTA certification by members of their bars, e. g., Ex parte Howell, 487 So. 2d 848 (Ala. 1986); In re Johnson, 341 N. W. 2d 282 (Minn. 1983), and have held that claims of official state certification are permissible, see, e. g., post, at 124 (listing States that certify). It is not necessary here—as it also was not in In re R. M. J.—to consider when a State might impose some disclosure requirements, rather than a total prohibition, in order to minimize the possibility that a reader will misunderstand the significance of a statement of fact that is protected by the First Amendment. We agree with Justice Marshall, post, at 111, that a holding that a total ban is unconstitutional does not necessarily preclude less restrictive regulation of commercial speech. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350, 376 (1977). A principal reason why consumers do not consult lawyers is because they do not know how to find a lawyer able to assist them with their particular problems. Federal Trade Commission, Staff Report on Improving Consumer Access to Legal Services: The Case for Removing Restrictions of Truthful Advertising 1 (1984). Justice O’Connor would extend this convenience to consumers who seek admiralty, patent, and trademark lawyers, post, at 126, but not to consumers who need a lawyer certified or specializing in more commonly needed areas of the law.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the state associated with the respondent. If the respondent is a federal court or federal judge, note the "state" as the United States. The same holds for other federal employees or officials.
What state is associated with the respondent?
[ "Alabama", "Alaska", "American Samoa", "Arizona", "Arkansas", "California", "Colorado", "Connecticut", "Delaware", "District of Columbia", "Federated States of Micronesia", "Florida", "Georgia", "Guam", "Hawaii", "Idaho", "Illinois", "Indiana", "Iowa", "Kansas", "Kentucky", "Louisiana", "Maine", "Marshall Islands", "Maryland", "Massachusetts", "Michigan", "Minnesota", "Mississippi", "Missouri", "Montana", "Nebraska", "Nevada", "New Hampshire", "New Jersey", "New Mexico", "New York", "North Carolina", "North Dakota", "Northern Mariana Islands", "Ohio", "Oklahoma", "Oregon", "Palau", "Pennsylvania", "Puerto Rico", "Rhode Island", "South Carolina", "South Dakota", "Tennessee", "Texas", "Utah", "Vermont", "Virgin Islands", "Virginia", "Washington", "West Virginia", "Wisconsin", "Wyoming", "United States", "Interstate Compact", "Philippines", "Indian", "Dakota" ]
[ 16 ]
sc
LOGAN v. ZIMMERMAN BRUSH CO. et al. No. 80-5950. Argued October 14, 1981 Decided February 24, 1982 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., also filed a separate opinion, in which Brennan, Marshall, and O’Connor, JJ., joined, post, p. 438. Powell, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Rehnquist, J., joined, post, p. 443. Gary H. Palm argued the cause and filed briefs for appellant. Tyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General of Illinois, filed a brief for the Illinois Human Rights Commission et al. as ap-pellees under this Court’s Rule 10.4 in support of appellants. With him on the brief were Paul J. Bargiel and Russell C. Grimes, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General. Jay A. Cartel argued the cause and filed briefs for appellee Zimmerman Brush Co. James D. Weill filed a brief for the Congress of Organizations of the Physically Handicapped et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in this case is whether a State may terminate a complainant’s cause of action because a state official, for reasons beyond the complainant’s control, failed to comply with a statutorily mandated procedure. I A The Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA or Act), Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 48, ¶851 et seq. (1979), barred employment discrimination on the basis of “physical. . . handicap unrelated to ability.” ¶853(a). It also established a comprehensive scheme for adjudicating allegations of discrimination. To begin the process, a complainant had to bring a charge of unlawful conduct before the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission (Commission) within 180 days of the occurrence of the allegedly discriminatory act. ¶ 858(a). The statute—in the provision directly at issue here—then gave the Commission 120 days within which to convene a factfinding conference designed to obtain evidence, ascertain the positions of the parties, and explore the possibility of a negotiated settlement. ¶ 858(b). If the Commission found “substantial evidence” of illegal conduct, it was to attempt to “eliminate the effect thereof ... by means of conference and conciliation,” 1858(c), and, if that proved impossible, to issue a formal complaint against the employer within 180 days after the expiration of the 120-day period. 1858(d). A formal adversary hearing was then to be held before a commissioner or duly appointed adjudicator, who was to make findings and who was empowered to recommend reinstatement, backpay, and reasonable attorney’s fees. 1858.01. If the commissioner or adjudicator did not find substantial evidence of discrimination, he was to recommend dismissal of the charge. Ibid. The findings and recommended order were to be filed with the Commission. A complainant was entitled to obtain review by the full Commission of any of the possible dispositions of his charge, including an initial determination that the evidence did not justify a complaint. The Commission was to file a written order and decision. 1858.02; Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission, Rules and Regulations, §4.5 (1979). If still not satisfied, the complainant could seek judicial review of any Commission order. 1860. B On November 9, 1979, appellant Láveme L. Logan, a probationary employee hired one month previously, was discharged by appellee Zimmerman Brush Company, purportedly because Logan’s short left leg made it impossible for him to perform his duties as a shipping clerk. Five days later, Logan, acting pro se, filed a charge with the Commission alleging that his employment had been unlawfully terminated because of his physical handicap. App. 3. This triggered the Commission’s statutory obligation under ¶ 858(b) to convene a factfinding conference within 120 days; in Logan’s case, this meant by March 13,1980. Apparently through inadvertence, the Commission’s representative scheduled the conference for March 18, five days after expiration of the statutory period. Notice of the meeting, which was mailed to both parties in January 1980, specified the hearing’s date and location and declared that attendance was “required.” It, however, did not allude to the FEPA’s 120-day time limit. App. 5. The Commission also asked the company to complete a short questionnaire concerning its employment practices, and directed that it submit its answers by March 10. Ibid. The company did this without objection. When the conference date arrived, the company moved that Logan’s charge be dismissed because the Commission had failed to hold the conference within the statutorily mandated 120-day period. Id., at 12. This request was rejected. Id., at 16. The company thereupon petitioned the Supreme Court of Illinois for an original writ of prohibition. That court stayed proceedings on Logan’s complaint pending decision on the request for a writ. Id., at 24. Logan meanwhile obtained counsel, and — because 180 days had not yet passed since the occurrence of the allegedly discriminatory act — filed a second charge with the Commission. Id., at 26. Before the Illinois Supreme Court, Logan argued that terminating his claim because of the Commission’s failure to convene a timely conference — a matter beyond Logan’s, or indeed the company’s, control — would violate his federal rights to due process and equal protection of the laws. But the court noted that the statutory provision at issue, ¶ 858(b), declared: “Within 120 days of the proper filing of a charge, the Commission shall convene a fact finding conference. ...” (Emphasis added.) The Illinois court found this legislative language to be mandatory, and accordingly it held that failure to comply deprived the Commission of jurisdiction to consider Logan’s charge. Zimmerman Brush Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Comm’n, 82 Ill. 2d 99, 411 N. E. 2d 277 (1980). The court found controlling its decision in Springfield-Sangamon County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Fair Employment Practices Comm’n, 71 Ill. 2d 61, 373 N. E. 2d 1307 (1978), where it had determined that ¶ 858(c)’s 180-day deadline for issuing a complaint was mandatory; since the state legislature wrote ¶ 858(b) after the Spring fie Id-S angamon decision, and used language similar to that employed in ¶ 858(c), it must have intended the 120-day time limit to be jurisdictional as well. This result, reasoned the court, comported with the statute’s purposes by facilitating the “just and expeditious resolutions of employment disputes,” 82 Ill. 2d, at 107, 411 N. E. 2d, at 282, while protecting employers “‘from unfounded charges of discrimination,’” id., at 106, 411 N. E. 2d, at 281, quoting ¶ 851. The Illinois Supreme Court summarily rejected Logan’s argument that his due process and equal protection rights would be violated were the Commission’s error allowed to extinguish his cause of action. The state legislature had established the right to redress for discriminatory employment practices, it was said, and “[t]he legislature could establish reasonable procedures to be followed upon a charge . . . .” Id., at 108, 411 N. E. 2d, at 282. The court then went on to rule that Logan could not file a second charge with the Commission based upon the same act of alleged discrimination, for to allow the second complaint to proceed would circumvent the design of the Act and frustrate the public interest in an expeditious resolution, of disputes. Id., at 108-109, 411 N. E. 2d, at 282-283. Logan appealed, bringing his federal claims to this Court. We noted probable jurisdiction. 450 U. S. 909 (1981). a > Justice Jackson, writing for the Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306 (1950), observed: “Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Id., at 313. At the outset, then, we are faced with what has become a familiar two-part inquiry: we must determine whether Logan was deprived of a protected interest, and, if so, what process was his due. The first question, we believe, was affirmatively settled by the Mullane case itself, where the Court held that a cause of action is a species of property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. There, the Court confronted a challenge to a state law that provided for the settlement of common trust fund accounts by fiduciaries, upon notice given through newspaper publication. The effect of the statute was to terminate “every right which beneficiaries would otherwise have against the trust company ... for improper management of the common trust fund.” Id,., at 311. This, the Court concluded, worked to deprive the beneficiaries of property by, among other things, “cut[ting] off their rights to have the trustee answer for negligent or illegal impairments of their interests.” Id., at 313. Such a result was impermissible unless constitutionally adequate notice and hearing procedures were established before the settlement process went into effect. Id., at 315. Despite appel-lee Zimmerman Brush Company’s arguments to the contrary, we see no meaningful distinction between the cause of action at issue in Mullane and Logan’s right to use the FEPA’s adjudicatory procedures. This conclusion is hardly a novel one. The Court traditionally has held that the Due Process Clauses protect civil litigants who seek recourse in the courts, either as defendants hoping to protect their property or as plaintiffs attempting to redress grievances. In Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U. S. 197 (1958), for example — where a plaintiff’s claim had been dismissed for failure to comply with a trial court’s order — the Court read the “property” component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to impose “constitutional limitations upon the power of courts, even in aid of their own valid processes, to dismiss an action without affording a party the opportunity for a hearing on the merits of his cause.” Id., at 209. See also Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322, 349-351 (1909) (power to enter default judgment); Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 409 (1897) (same); Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274 (1876) (same). Cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 558 (1974). Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause has been interpreted as preventing the States from denying potential litigants use of established adjudicatory procedures, when such an action would be “the equivalent of denying them an opportunity to be heard upon their claimed right[s].” Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 380 (1971). In any event, the view that Logan’s FEPA claim is a constitutionally protected one follows logically from the Court’s more recent cases analyzing the nature of a property interest. The hallmark of property, the Court has emphasized, is an individual entitlement grounded in state law, which cannot be removed except “for cause.” Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 11-12 (1978); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 573-574 (1975); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 576-578 (1972). Once that characteristic is found, the types of interests protected as “property” are varied and, as often as not, intangible, relating “to the whole domain of social and economic fact.” National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U. S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 207-208, and n. 2 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S., at 571-572, 576-577. See, e. g., Barry v. Barchi, 443 U. S. 55 (1979) (horse trainer’s license protected); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, supra (utility service); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976) (disability benefits); Goss v. Lopez, supra (high school education); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U. S. 207 (1971) (government employment); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971) (driver’s license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits). The right to use the FEPA’s adjudicatory procedures shares these characteristics. A claimant has more than an abstract desire or interest in redressing his grievance: his right to redress is guaranteed by the State, with the adequacy of his claim assessed under what is, in essence, a “for cause” standard, based upon the substantiality of the evidence. And an FEPA claim, which presumably can be surrendered for value, is at least as substantial as the right to an education labeled as property in Goss v. Lopez, supra. Certainly, it would require a remarkable reading of a “broad and majestic ter[m],” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S., at 571, to conclude that a horse trainer’s license is a protected property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, while a state-created right to redress discrimination is not. The Illinois Supreme Court nevertheless seemed to believe that no individual entitlement could come into being under the FEPA until the Commission took appropriate action within the statutory deadline. Because the entitlement arises from statute, the court reasoned, it was the legislature’s prerogative to establish the “procedures to be followed upon a charge.” 82 Ill. 2d, at 108, 411 N. E. 2d, at 282. This analysis, we believe, misunderstands the nature of the Constitution’s due process guarantee. Each of our due process cases has recognized, either explicitly or implicitly, that because “minimum [procedural] requirements [are] a matter of federal law, they are not diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own procedures that it may deem adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse official action.” Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491 (1980). See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S., at 166-167 (Powell, J., concurring in part); id., at 211 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Indeed, any other conclusion would allow the State to destroy at will virtually any state-created property interest. The Court has considered and rejected such an approach: “While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest,... it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards. . . . [T]he adequacy of statutory procedures for deprivation of a statutorily created property interest must be analyzed in constitutional terms.’” Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S., at 490-491, n. 6, quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S., at 167 (opinion concurring in part). Of course, the State remains free to create substantive defenses or immunities for use in adjudication — or to eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether — just as it can amend or terminate its welfare or employment programs. The Court held as much in Martinez v. California, 444 U. S. 277 (1980), where it upheld a California statute granting officials immunity from certain types of state tort claims. We acknowledged that the grant of immunity arguably did deprive the plaintiffs of a protected property interest. But they were not thereby deprived of property without due process, just as a welfare recipient is not deprived of due process when the legislature adjusts benefit levels. Cf. U. S. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 174 (1980); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U. S. 572, 575 (1979); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 609-610 (1960); Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U. S. 304, 312, n. 8, 315-316 (1945). In each case, the legislative determination provides all the process that is due, see Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U. S. 441, 445-446 (1915); it “remain[s] true that the State’s interest in fashioning its own rules of tort law is paramount to any discernible federal interest, except perhaps an interest in protecting the individual citizen from state action that is wholly arbitrary or irrational.” Martinez v. California, 444 U. S., at 282. Indeed, as was acknowledged in Martinez, it may well be that a substantive “immunity defense, like an element of the tort claim itself, is merely one aspect of the State’s definition of that property interest.” Id., at 282, n. 5. Cf. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U. S. 193, 198 (1979). The 120-day limitation in the FEPA, ¶ 858(b), of course, involves no such thing. It is a procedural limitation on the claimant’s ability to assert his rights, not a substantive element of the FEPA claim. Because the state scheme has deprived Logan of a property right, then, we turn to the determination of what process is due him. B As our decisions have emphasized time and again, the Due Process Clause grants the aggrieved party the opportunity to present his case and have its merits fairly judged. Thus it has become a truism that “some form of hearing” is required before the owner is finally deprived of a protected property interest. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S., at 570-571, n. 8 (emphasis in original). And that is why the Court has stressed that, when a “statutory scheme makes liability an important factor in the State’s determination . . . , the State may not, consistent with due process, eliminate consideration of that factor in its prior hearing.” Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S., at 541. To put it as plainly as possible, the State may not finally destroy a property interest without first giving the putative owner an opportunity to present his claim of entitlement. See id., at 542. On the other hand, the Court has acknowledged that the timing and nature of the required hearing “will depend on appropriate accommodation of the competing interests involved.” Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S., at 579. These include the importance of the private interest and the length or finality of the deprivation, see Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U. S., at 19, and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S., at 334-335; the likelihood of governmental error, see id., at 335; and the magnitude of the governmental interests involved, see ibid., and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S., at 561-563. Each of these factors leads us to conclude that appellant Logan is entitled to have the Commission consider the merits of his charge, based upon the substantiality of the available evidence, before deciding whether to terminate his claim. Logan’s interests in retaining his employment, in disproving his employer’s charges of incompetence or inability, and— more intangibly — in redressing an instance of alleged discrimination, are all substantial. At the same time, the deprivation here is final; Logan, unlike a claimant whose charge is dismissed on the merits for lack of evidence, cannot obtain judicial review of the Commission action. A system or procedure that deprives persons of their claims in a random manner, as is apparently true of ¶ 858(b), necessarily presents an unjustifiably high risk that meritorious claims will be terminated. And the State’s interest in refusing Lo» gan’s procedural request is, on this record, insubstantial. There has been no suggestion that any great number of claimants are in Logan’s position, or that directing the State to consider the merits of Logan’s claim will be unduly burdensome. In any event, the State by statute has eliminated the mandatory hearing requirement, see n. 1, supra, demonstrating that it no longer has any appreciable interest in defending the procedure at issue. Despite appellee Zimmerman Brush Company’s arguments, the recent decision in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981), is not to the contrary. There, a state employee negligently lost a prisoner’s hobby kit; while the Court concluded that the prisoner had suffered a deprivation of property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, it held that all the process due was provided by the State’s tort claims procedure. In such a situation, the Court observed, “[i]t is difficult to conceive of how the State could provide a meaningful hearing before the deprivation takes place.” Id., at 541. The company suggests that Logan is complaining of the same type of essentially negligent deprivation, and that he therefore should be remitted to the tort remedies provided by the Illinois Court of Claims Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, ¶439.1 et seq. (1979). That statute allows an action “against the State for damages in cases sounding in tort, if a like cause of action would lie against a private person.¶439.8(d). This argument misses Parrott’s point. In Parrott, the Court emphasized that it was dealing with “a tortious loss of . . . property as a result of a random and unauthorized act by a state employee . . . not a result of some established state procedure.” 451 U. S., at 541. Here, in contrast, it is the state system itself that destroys a complainant’s property interest, by operation of law, whenever the Commission fails to convene a timely conference — whether the Commission’s action is taken through negligence, maliciousness, or otherwise. Parratt was not designed to reach such a situation. See id., at 545 (second concurring opinion). Unlike the complainant in Parratt, Logan is challenging not the Commission’s error, but the “established state procedure” that destroys his entitlement without according him proper procedural safeguards. In any event, the Court’s decisions suggest that, absent “the necessity of quick action by the State or the impracticality of providing any predeprivation process,” a postdeprivation hearing here would be constitutionally inadequate. Parratt, 451 U. S., at 539. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U. S., at 19-20; Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S., at 570, n. 7; Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S., at 542; Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S., at 379. Cf. Barry v. Barchi, 443 U. S., at 64-65 (post-termination hearing permitted where the decision to terminate was based on a reliable pretermination finding); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S., at 343-347 (same). That is particularly true where, as here, the State’s only post-termination process comes in the form of an independent tort action. Seeking redress through a tort suit is apt to be a lengthy and speculative process, which in a situation such as this one will never make the complainant entirely whole: the Illinois Court of Claims Act does not provide for reinstatement — as appellee Zimmerman Brush Company conceded at oral argument, Tr. of Oral Arg. 39— and even a successful suit will not vindicate entirely Logan’s right to be free from discriminatory treatment. Obviously, nothing we have said entitles every civil litigant to a hearing on the merits in every case. The State may erect reasonable procedural requirements for triggering the right to an adjudication, be they statutes of limitations, cf. Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U. S., at 314-316, or, in an appropriate case, filing fees. United States v. Kras, 409 U. S. 434 (1973). And the State certainly accords due process when it terminates a claim for failure to comply with a reasonable procedural or evidentiary rule. Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S., at 351; Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S., at 278. What the Fourteenth Amendment does require, however, “is ‘an opportunity . . . granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,’ Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 (1965) (emphasis added), ‘for [a] hearing appropriate to the nature of the case,’ Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., supra, at 313.” Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S., at 378. It is such an opportunity that Logan was denied. Ill The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois, accordingly, is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice O’Connor join. The Court’s opinion, ante, considers appellant Logan’s due process claim and decides that issue in his favor. As has been noted, Logan also raised an equal protection claim and that issue has been argued and briefed here. Although the Court considered that it was unnecessary to discuss and dispose of the equal protection claim when the due process issue was being decided in Logan’s favor, I regard the equal protection issue as sufficiently important to require comment on my part, particularly inasmuch as a majority of the Members of the Court are favorably inclined toward the claim, although, to be sure, that majority is not the one that constitutes the Court for the controlling opinion. On its face, Logan’s equal protection claim is an unconventional one. The Act’s ¶ 858(b) establishes no explicit classifications and does not expressly distinguish between claimants, and the company therefore argues that Logan has no more been deprived of equal protection than anyone would be who is injured by a random act of governmental misconduct. As the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the statute, however, ¶ 858(b) unambiguously divides claims—and thus, necessarily, claimants—into two discrete groups that are accorded radically disparate treatment. Claims processed within 120 days are given full consideration on the merits, and complainants bringing such charges are awarded the opportunity for full administrative and judicial review. In contrast, otherwise identical claims that do not receive a hearing within the statutory period are unceremoniously, and finally, terminated. Because the Illinois court recognized, in so many words, that the FEPA establishes two categories of claims, one may proceed to determine whether the classification drawn by the statute is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. For over a century, the Court has engaged in a continuing and occasionally almost metaphysical effort to identify the precise nature of the Equal Protection Clause’s guarantees. At the minimum level, however, the Court “consistently has required that legislation classify the persons it affects in a manner rationally related to legitimate governmental objectives.” Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U. S. 221, 230 (1981). This is not a difficult standard for a State to meet when it is attempting to act sensibly and in good faith. But the “rational-basis standard is ‘not a toothless one,”’ id., at 234, quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 510 (1976); the classificatory scheme must “rationally advanc[e] a reasonable and identifiable governmental objective.” Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U. S., at 235. I see no need to explore the outer bounds of this test, for I find that the Illinois statute runs afoul of the lowest level of permissible equal protection scrutiny. The FEPA itself has two express purposes: eliminating employment discrimination, and protecting employers and other potential defendants “from unfounded charges of discrimination.” ¶ 851. It is evident at a glance that neither of these objectives is advanced by ¶ 858(b)’s deadline provision. Terminating potentially meritorious claims in a random manner obviously cannot serve to redress instances of discrimination. And it cannot protect employers from unfounded charges, for the frivolousness of a claim is entirely unrelated to the length of time the Commission takes to process that claim. So far as this purpose is concerned, ¶ 858(b) stands on precisely the same footing as the state statute invalidated in Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56 (1972). There, the Court struck down a provision requiring a tenant to post a double bond before appealing an adverse forcible entry judgment. “The claim that the double-bond requirement operates to screen out frivolous appeals is unpersuasive,” the Court noted, “for it not only bars nonfrivolous appeals by those who are unable to post the bond but also allows meritless appeals by others who can afford the bond.” Id., at 78. Accord, Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U. S. 305, 310 (1966). Here, of course, the FEPA may operate to terminate meritorious claims without any hearing at all, while allowing frivolous complaints to proceed through the entire administrative and judicial review process. While it may well be true that “[n]o bright line divides the merely foolish from the arbitrary law,” Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U. S., at 243 (dissenting opinion), I have no doubt that ¶ 858(b) is patently irrational in the light of its stated purposes. In its opinion, however, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized a third rationale for ¶ 858(b): that provision, according to the court, was designed to further the “just and expeditious resolutio[n]” of employment disputes. Zimmerman Brush Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Comm’n, 82 Ill. 2d 99, 107, 411 N. E. 2d 277, 282 (1980). Insofar as the court meant to suggest that a factfinding conference may help settle controversies and frame issues for a more efficient fiiture resolution, it was undoubtedly correct. But I cannot agree that terminating a claim that the State itself has mis-scheduled is a rational way of expediting the resolution of disputes. Most important, the procedure at issue does not serve generally to hasten the processing or ultimate termination of employment controversies. Once the Commission has scheduled a factfinding conference and issued a complaint, there are no statutory time limits at all on the length of time it can take to resolve the claim. And ¶ 858(b) does not serve to protect employers from stale charges, because it does not function as a statute of limitation; Logan does not and could not quarrel with the requirement that complainants file their charges in a timely fashion. It is true, of course, that ¶ 858(b) serves to expedite the resolution of certain claims — those not processed within 120 days — in a most obvious way, and in that sense it furthers the purpose of terminating disputes expeditiously. But it is not enough, under the Equal Protection Clause, to say that the legislature sought to terminate certain claims and succeeded in doing so, for that is “a mere tautological recognition of the fact that [the legislature] did what it intended to do.” U. S. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 180 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). This Court still has an obligation to view the classificatory system, in an effort to determine whether the disparate treatment accorded the affected classes is arbitrary. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U. S., at 308 (“The Equal Protection Clause requires more of a state law than nondiscriminatory application within the class it establishes”). Cf. U. S. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S., at 178. Here, that inquiry yields an affirmative result. So far as the State’s purpose is concerned, every FEPA claimant’s charge, when filed with the Commission, stands on the same footing. Yet certain randomly selected claims, because processed too slowly by the State, are irrevocably terminated without review. In other words, the State converts similarly situated claims into dissimilarly situated ones, and then uses this distinction as the basis for its classification. This, I believe, is the very essence of arbitrary state action. “[T]he Equal Protection Clause ‘imposes a requirement of some rationality in the nature of the class singled out,”’ James v. Strange, 407 U. S. 128, 140 (1972), quoting Rinaldi, 384 U. S., at 308-309, and that rationality is absent here. The Court faced an analogous situation in a case involving sex-based classifications, and its conclusion there is applicable to the case before us now: giving preference to a discrete class “merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause . . . .” Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 76 (1971). Finally, it is possible that the Illinois Supreme Court meant to suggest that the deadline contained in ¶ 858(b) can be justified as a means of thinning out the Commission’s caseload, with the aim of encouraging the Commission to convene timely hearings. This rationale, however, suffers from the defect outlined above: it draws an arbitrary line between otherwise identical claims. In any event, the State’s method of furthering this purpose — if this was in fact the legislative end — has so speculative and attenuated a connection to its goal as to amount to arbitrary actiorju The State’s rationale must be something more than the exercise of a strained imagination; while the connection between means and ends need not be precise, it, at the least, must have some objective basis. That is not so here. I thus agree with appellant Logan that the Illinois scheme also deprives him of his Fourteenth Amendment right to the equal protection of the laws. Wustice O’Connor joins only the separate opinion, post, p. 438. After the inception of the present litigation, the Illinois Legislature repealed the FEPA, and put in its place the more comprehensive Illinois Human Rights Act. 1979 Ill. Laws, P. A. 81-1216, later amended by 1980 Ill. Laws, P. A. 81-1267. The new statute bars discrimination in real estate and financial transactions and in public accommodations, as well as in employment. It replaces the Fair Employment Practices Commission with two agencies: a Department of Human Rights, ¶ 7-101 et seq., which is given the responsibility for investigating charges and issuing complaints upon a finding of substantial evidence, and a Human Rights Commission, 18-101 et seq., which reviews the Department’s findings and holds hearings upon issued complaints. The new Act modifies a number of the FEPA’s procedural provisions; most important for present purposes, it commits to the Department’s discretion the decision whether to hold a factfinding conference. 17-102(0(3). These revisions have no effect on Logan’s case, however, for the Illinois Supreme Court has ruLd that the Human Rights Act is not to be applied retroactively. Zimmerman Brush Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Comm’n, 82 Ill. 2d 99, 108-109, 411 N. E. 2d 277, 282-283 (1980). See also Board of Governors v. Fair Employment Practices Comm’n, 78 Ill. 2d 143, 149, 399 N. E. 2d 590, 593 (1979); Wilson v. All-Steel, Inc., 87 Ill. 2d 28, 428 N. E. 2d 489 (1981). The Illinois court also refused to give retroactive application to the new Illinois Human Rights Act, which makes the convening of a factfinding conference discretionary. 82 Ill. 2d, at 108-109, 411 N. E. 2d, at 282-283. See n. 1, supra. Two years ago, in Martinez v. California, 444 U. S. 277, 281-282 (1980), the Court noted that “[ajrguably,” a state tort claim is a “species of ‘property’ protected by the Due Process Clause.” The Court’s cases involving the right of access to courts provide an analogous method of analysis supporting our reasoning here. In Boddie, the Court established that, at least where interests of basic importance are involved, “absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” 401 U. S., at 377. Thus, the State’s imposition of substantial filing and other fees upon indigents seeking divorces was held to deny them due process. In United States v. Kras, 409 U. S. 434 (1973), we agreed that a due process right of access to the courts exists when fundamental interests are present and the State has exclusive control over “the adjustment of [the] legal relationship[s]” involved. Id., at 445. The relationship between these opinions and the right to procedural due process at issue in the instant case is made clear in Boddie, which relied in large part on the analysis of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306 (1950), and its guarantee “to all individuals [of] a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Boddie, 401 U. S., at 379; see also id., at 377-378, 380, 382. Thus, while the right to seek a divorce may not be a property interest in the same sense as is a tort or a discrimination action, the theories of the cases are not very different: having made access to the courts an entitlement or a necessity, the State may not deprive someone of that access unless the balance of state and private interests favors the government scheme. An FEPA claim is therefore distinguishable from an enforcement action like those conducted by the National Labor Relations Board pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. In such a proceeding, the prosecution is controlled by the NLRB’s General Counsel, and the Counsel’s refusal to issue a complaint is generally not reviewable either by the Board or by the courts. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U. S. 132, 138-139 (1975). This is not to suggest, of course, that the State must consider the merits of the claim when the claimant fails to comply with a reasonable procedural requirement, or fails to file a timely charge. See infra, at 437. Here, of course, we are not concerned with the timing of the required review on the merits. The Commission must consider the merits before the case may proceed; it is not meaningful to discuss the possibility of a post-termination hearing, because the property interest here is destroyed when the case is terminated. Logan might also have a remedy under the Equal Opportunities for the Handicapped Act (EOHA), Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ¶ 65-21 et seq. (1979), which provided an action for damages and “other relief’ to those discriminated against on the basis of physical handicap. ¶ 65-29. While the EOHA also was repealed when the Illinois Human Rights Act was passed, see n. 1, supra, the latter statute does not disturb claims arising or accruing under the EOHA prior to July 1, 1980. ¶ 9-102(B)(2). It is not clear to us, however, that such an action is available to Logan; the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that allowing Logan to file a second FEPA claim would frustrate the design of the FEPA by prejudicing the employer’s rights, 82 Ill. 2d, at 109, 411 N. E. 2d, at 283, and it might well apply a similar analysis to bar an EOHA claim here. We would hesitate to remit Logan to so speculative a remedy. In any event, our conclusion about the inadequacy of any post-termination remedy here makes the availability of an EOHA suit irrelevant for present purposes. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), the Court concluded that state tort remedies provided adequate process for students subjected to corporal punishment in school. In doing so, however, the Court emphasized that the state scheme “preserved what ‘has always been the law of the land,’ ” id., at 679, quoting United States v. Barnett, 376 U. S. 681, 692 (1964), and that adding additional safeguards would be unduly burdensome. 430 U. S., at 680-682. Here, neither of those rationales is available. Terminating potentially meritorious claims in a random manner is hardly a practice in line with our common-law traditions. And the State’s abandonment of the challenged practice makes it difficult to argue that requiring a determination on the merits will impose undue burdens on the state administrative process. “It cannot be suggested that in cases where the author [in writing by assignment] is the mere instrument of the Court he must forego expression of his own convictions.” Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562, 576 (1949) (separate opinion). See also Abbate v. United States, 359 U. S. 187, 196 (1959) (separate opinion); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619, 639-640 (1937). “Members of the Court continue to hold divergent views on the clarity with which a legislative purpose must appear . . . and about the degree of deference afforded the legislature in suiting means to ends . . . .” Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U. S. 221, 243, n. 4 (1981) (dissenting opinion). The Illinois court concluded that the factfinding conference itself would help to resolve disputes expeditiously by encouraging settlement and “aid-ling] the Commission in setting up a procedural framework for the conciliatory process which follows.” 82 Ill. 2d, at 106, 411 N. E. 2d, at 281. It is less clear to me that the court viewed the practice of terminating mis-scheduled claims as one that would aid the just and expeditious resolution of controversies. In light of my conclusions about the rationality of such a justification, however, it is irrelevant whether the Illinois Supreme Court intended to state that this was the actual or articulated rationale for ¶ 858(b)’s deadline proviso. I note that the rationales discussed in the text have not been expressed by the State’s representatives; the Illinois Human Rights Commission, by the State’s Attorney General, has filed a brief in this Court supporting Logan.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the treatment the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed, that is, whether the court below the Supreme Court (typically a federal court of appeals or a state supreme court) affirmed, reversed, remanded, denied or dismissed the decision of the court it reviewed (typically a trial court). Adhere to the language used in the "holding" in the summary of the case on the title page or prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. Exceptions to the literal language are the following: where the Court overrules the lower court, treat this a petition or motion granted; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing refuses to enforce or enjoins the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as reversed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing enforces the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as affirmed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing sets aside the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as vacated; if the decision is set aside and remanded, treat it as vacated and remanded.
What treatment did the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed?
[ "stay, petition, or motion granted", "affirmed", "reversed", "reversed and remanded", "vacated and remanded", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded", "vacated", "petition denied or appeal dismissed", "modify", "remand", "unusual disposition" ]
[ 1 ]
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UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION v. LONG ISLAND RAIL ROAD CO. et al. No. 80-1925. Argued January 20, 1982 Decided March 24, 1982 Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Edward D. Friedman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Robert Hart and Harold A. Ross. Lewis B. Kaden argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Mary P. Bass and Thomas M. Taranto. Joshua I. Schwartz argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, T. Timothy Ryan, Jr., Lois G. Williams, Joseph Woodward, and Ronald M. Etters J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and George Kaufmann filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by William T. Coleman, Jr., Donald T. Bliss, and Zoé E. Baird, for the American Public Transit Association; by Henry W. Underhill, Jr., Benjamin L. Brown, John Dekker, James B. Brennan, George Agnost, Roger F. Cutler, Lee E. Holt, George F. Knox, Jr., Walter M. Powell, Allen G. Schwartz, J. Lamar Shelley, John W. Witt, Max P. Zall, Conard B. Mattox, Jr., and Charles S. Rhyne for the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers; and by Ross D. Davis for the National League of Cities. Martin L. Barr, Jerome Thier, and Anthony Cagliostro filed a brief for the New York State Public Employment Relations Board as amicus curiae. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari to decide whether the Tenth Amendment prohibits application of the Railway Labor Act to a state-owned railroad engaged in interstate commerce. I The Long Island Rail Road (the Railroad), incorporated m 1834, provides both freight and passenger service to Long Island. In 1966, after 132 years of private ownership and a period of steadily growing operating deficits, the Railroad was acquired by New York State through the Metropolitan Transportation Authority. Thereafter, the Railroad continued to conduct collective bargaining pursuant to the procedures of the Railway Labor Act. 44 Stat. (part 2) 577, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. The United Transportation Union, petitioner in this case, represents the Railroad’s conductors, brakemen, switchmen, firemen, motormen, collectors, and related train crew employees. In 1978, the Union notified the Railroad that it desired to commence negotiations and the parties began collective bargaining as provided by the Act. They failed to reach agreement during preliminary negotiations and, in April 1979, the Railroad and the Union jointly petitioned the National Mediation Board for assistance. Seven months of mediation efforts by the Board failed to produce agreement, however, and the Board released the case from mediation. This triggered a 30-day cooling-off period under the Act; absent Presidential intervention, the Act permits the parties to resort to economic weapons, including strikes, upon the expiration of the cooling-off period. The Union anticipated the State’s challenge to the applicability of the Act to the Railroad; on December 7, 1979, one day before the expiration of the 30-day cooling-off period, it sued in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that the dispute was covered by the Railway Labor Act and not the Taylor Law, New York’s law governing public employee collective bargaining and prohibiting strikes by public employees. The next day, the Union commenced what was to be a brief strike. Pursuant to the Act, the President of the United States intervened on December 14, thus imposing an additional 60-day cooling-off period which was to expire on February 13, 1980. A few days before the expiration of the 60-day period*- the State converted the Railroad from a private stock corporation to a public benefit corporation, apparently believing that the change would eliminate Railway Labor Act coverage and bring the employees under the umbrella of the Taylor Law. The Railroad then filed suit in state court on February 13, 1980, seeking to enjoin the impending strike under the Taylor Law. Before the state court acted, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York heard and decided the Union’s suit for declaratory relief, holding that the Railroad was a carrier subject to the Railway Labor Act, that the Act, rather than the Taylor Law, was applicable, and that declaratory relief was in order. 509 F. Supp. 1300 (1980). In a footnote the District Court rejected the argument now presented to this Court that application of the Act to a state-owned railroad was inconsistent with National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976). 509 F. Supp., at 1306, n. 4. The District Court noted that in National League of Cities, the Supreme Court “specifically held that the operation of a railroad in interstate commerce is not an integral part of governmental activity” and affirmed the rulings in California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957), and United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175 (1936), which held that the Railway Labor Act and the Safety Appliance Act could be applied to state-owned railroads. 509 F. Supp., at 1306, n. 4. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the operation of the Railroad was an integral state governmental function and that the federal Act displaced “essential governmental decisions” involving that function. 634 F. 2d 19 (CA2 1980). The court applied a balancing approach and held that the State’s interest in controlling the operation of its railroad outweighed the federal interest in having the federal Act apply. We granted certiorari, 452 U. S. 960 (1981), and we reverse. II There can be no serious question that, as both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held, the Railroad is subject to the terms of the Railway Labor Act, or that the Commerce Clause grants Congress the plenary authority to regulate labor relations in the railroad industry in general. This dispute concerns the application of this acknowledged congressional authority to a state-owned railroad; we must decide whether that application so impairs the ability of the State to carry out its constitutionally preserved sovereign function as to come into conflict with the Tenth Amendment. A The Railroad claims immunity from the Railway Labor Act, relying on National League of Cities v. Usery, supra, where we held that Congress could not impose the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on state and local governments. The Fair Labor Standards Act generally requires covered employers to pay employees no less than a minimum hourly wage and to pay them at one and one-half times their regular hourly rate for all time worked in any workweek in excess of 40 hours. Prior to 1974, the Act excluded most governmental employers. However in that year Congress amended the law to extend its provisions in somewhat modified form to “public agencies,” including state governments and their political subdivisions. We held that the 1974 amendments were invalid “insofar as [they] operate to directly displace the States’ freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions . . . .” 426 U. S., at 852. (Emphasis supplied.) Only recently we had occasion to apply the National League of Cities doctrine in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264 (1981). In holding that the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U. S. C. § 1201 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV), did not violate the Tenth Amendment by usurping state authority over land-use regulations, we set out a three-prong test to be applied in evaluating claims under National League of Cities: “[I]n order to succeed, a claim that congressional commerce power legislation is invalid under the reasoning of National League of Cities must satisfy each of three requirements. First, there must be a showing that the challenged regulation regulates the ‘States as States.’ [426 U. S.], at 854. Second, the federal regulation must address matters that are indisputably ‘attributes of state sovereignty.’ Id., at 845. And third, it must be apparent that the States’ compliance with the federal law would directly impair their ability ‘to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.’ Id., at 852.” 452 U. S., at 287-288. The key prong of the National League of Cities test applicable to this case is the third one, which examines whether “the States’ compliance with the federal law would directly impair their ability ‘to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.’” B The determination of whether a federal law impairs a state’s authority with respect to “areas of traditional [state] functions” may at times be a difficult one. In this case, however, we do not write on a clean slate. As the District Court noted, in National League of Cities we explicitly reaffirmed our holding in United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175 (1936), and in two other cases involving federal regulation of railroads: “The holding of United States v. California ... is quite consistent with our holding today. There California’s activity to which the congressional command was directed was not in an area that the States have regarded as integral parts of their governmental activities. It was, on the contrary, the operation of a railroad engaged in ‘common carriage by rail in interstate commerce . . . .’ 297 U. S., at 182.” 426 U. S., at 854, n. 18. It is thus clear that operation of a railroad engaged in interstate commerce is not an integral part of traditional state activities generally immune from federal regulation under National League of Cities. See also Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 422-424 (1978) (concurring opinion). The Long Island is concededly a railroad engaged in interstate commerce. The Court of Appeals undertook to distinguish the three railroad cases discussed in National League of Cities, noting that they dealt with freight carriers rather than primarily passenger railroads such as the Long Island. That distinction does not warrant a different result, however. Operation of passenger railroads, no less than operation of freight railroads, has traditionally been a function of private industry, not state or local governments. It is certainly true that some passenger railroads have come under state control in recent years, as have several freight lines, but that does not alter the historical reality that the operation of railroads is not among the functions traditionally performed by state and local governments. Federal regulation of state-owned railroads simply does not impair a state’s ability to function as a state. Ill In concluding that the operation of a passenger railroad is not among those governmental functions generally immune from federal regulation under National League of Cities, we are not merely following dicta of that decision or looking only to the past to determine what is “traditional.” In essence, National League of Cities held that under most circumstances federal power to regulate commerce could not be exercised in such a manner as to undermine the role of the states in our federal system. This Court’s emphasis on traditional governmental functions and traditional aspects of state sovereignty was not meant to impose a static historical view of state functions generally immune from federal regulation. Rather it was meant to require an inquiry into whether the federal regulation affects basic state prerogatives in such a way as would be likely to hamper the state government’s ability to fulfill its role in the Union and endanger its “separate and independent existence.” 426 U. S., at 851. Just as the Federal Government cannot usurp traditional state functions, there is no justification for a rule which would allow the states, by acquiring functions previously performed by the private sector, to erode federal authority in areas traditionally subject to federal statutory regulation. Railroads have been subject to comprehensive federal regulation for nearly a century. The Interstate Commerce Act— the first comprehensive federal regulation of the industry— was passed in 1887. A year earlier we had held that only the Federal Government, not the states, could regulate the interstate rates of railroads. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557 (1886). The first federal statute dealing with railroad labor relations was the Arbitration Act of 1888; the provisions of that Act were invoked by President Cleveland in reaction to the Pullman strike of 1894. Federal mediation of railroad labor disputes was first provided by the Erdman Act of 1898 and strengthened by the Newlands Act of 1913. In 1916, Congress mandated the 8-hour day in the railroad industry. After federal operation of the railroads during World War I, Congress passed the Transportation Act of 1920, which further enhanced federal involvement in railroad labor relations. Finally, in 1926, Congress passed the Railway Labor Act, which was jointly drafted by representatives of the railroads and the railroad unions. The Act has been amended a number of times since 1926, but its basic structure has remained intact. The Railway Labor Act thus has provided the framework for collective bargaining between all interstate railroads and their employees for the past 56 years. There is no comparable history of longstanding state regulation of railroad collective bargaining or of other aspects of the railroad industry. Moreover, the Federal Government has determined that a uniform regulatory scheme is necessary to the operation of the national rail system. In particular, Congress long ago concluded that federal regulation of railroad labor relations is necessary to prevent disruptions in vital rail service essential to the national economy. A disruption of service on any portion of the interstate railroad system can cause serious problems throughout the system. Congress determined that the most effective means of preventing such disruptions is by way of requiring and facilitating free collective bargaining between railroads and the labor organizations representing their employees. Rather than absolutely prohibiting strikes, Congress decided to assure equitable settlement of railroad labor disputes, and thus prevent interruption of rail service, by providing mediation and imposing cooling-off periods, thus creating “an almost interminable” collective-bargaining process. Detroit & T.S.L.R. Co. v. Transportation Union, 396 U. S. 142, 149 (1969). “[T]he procedures of the Act are purposely long and drawn out, based on the hope that reason and practical considerations will provide in time an agreement that resolves the dispute.” Railway & Steamship Clerks v. Florida E.C.R. Co., 384 U. S. 238, 246 (1966). To allow individual states, by acquiring railroads, to circumvent the federal system of railroad bargaining, or any of the other elements of federal regulation of railroads, would destroy the uniformity thought essential by Congress and would endanger the efficient operation of the interstate rail system. In addition, a state acquiring a railroad does so knowing that the railroad is subject to this longstanding and comprehensive scheme of federal regulation of its operations and its labor relations. See California v. Taylor, 353 U. S., at 568. Here the State acquired the Railroad with full awareness that it was subject to federal regulation under the Railway Labor Act. At the time of the acquisition, a spokesman stated: “We just have a new owner and a new board of directors. We’re under the Railway Labor Act, just as we’ve always been. The people do not become state employes, they remain railroad employes and retain all the benefits and drawbacks of that.” The parties proceeded along those premises for the next 13 years, with both sides making use of the procedures available under the Railway Labor Act, and with Railroad employees covered by the Railroad Retirement Act, the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, and the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. Conversely, Railroad employees were not eligible for any of the retirement, insurance, or job security benefits of state employees. The State knew of and accepted the federal regulation; moreover, it operated under federal regulation for 13 years without claiming any impairment of its traditional sovereignty. Indeed, the State’s initial response to this suit was to acknowledge that the Railway Labor Act applied. It can thus hardly be maintained that application of the Act to the State’s operation of the Railroad is likely to impair the State’s ability to fulfill its role in the Union or to endanger the “separate and independent existence” referred to in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S., at 851. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. The Railroad’s western terminus is Pennsylvania Station in Manhattan; there it connects with lines of railroads which serve other parts of the country. The eastern terminus is at Montauk Point, at the tip of Long Island, but most of its main and branch line'traffic originates in the western half of Long Island, in the boroughs of Brooklyn and Queens, and in the suburbs of Nassau and western Suffolk Counties. By far the bulk of the Railroad’s business is carrying commuters between Long Island’s suburban communities and their places of employment in New York City. However, the Railroad supplies Long Island’s only freight service; it does a significant volume of freight business, with 1979 freight revenue of over $12 million. On January 17,1980, the Railroad responded to the Union’s suit for declaratory judgment by asserting that no justiciable controversy existed because the Railroad did not believe the Taylor Law applied and therefore had no intention to invoke its provisions. The Presidential intervention also triggered the creation of a Presidential Emergency Board to investigate and report on the matter. The Railroad acknowledges in its brief that its freight service, which is admittedly engaged in interstate commerce, “eliminat[es] any dispute regarding its coverage by the RLA.” Brief for Respondents 23. In the Court of Appeals, the Railroad maintained that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to state-owned passenger railroads. 634 F. 2d, at 23. Whatever merit that claim may have had, it is no longer tenable. After that court rendered its decision, Congress amended the Act to add § 9a, 95 Stat. 681, 45 U. S. C. § 159a (1976 ed., Supp. V). Section 9a establishes special procedures to be applied to any dispute “between a publicly funded and publicly operated carrier providing rail commuter service . . . and its employees.” See Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Railway & Steamship Clerks, 281 U. S. 548 (1930). The Tenth Amendment provides: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” The Fair Labor Standards Act is codified at 29 U. S. C. §201 et seq. 88 Stat. 55. The 1974 amendments modified several of the definitions contained in 29 U. S. C. § 203. However, even if these three requirements are met, the federal statute is not automatically unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment. The federal interest may still be so great as to “justiffy] state submission.” 452 U. S., at 288, n. 29. Cf. Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S. 92 (1946). Farden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U. S. 184 (1964); California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957). “[T]here [is] certainly no question that a Stated operation of a common carrier, even without profit and as a ‘public function,’ would be subject to federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. . . . “The National League of Cities opinion focused its delineation of the ‘attributes of sovereignty1... on a determination as to whether the State’s interest involved ‘functions essential to separate and independent existence.’ [426 U. S., at 845], quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559, 580 (1911). It should be evident, I would think, that the running of a business enterprise is not an integral operation in the area of traditional government functions. . . . Indeed, the reaffirmance of the holding in United States v. California, supra, by National League of Cities, supra, at 854, n. 18, strongly supports this understanding.” 435 U. S., at 422-424 (Burger, C. J., concurring in part and in judgment). At the time of this suit, there were 17 commuter railroads in the United States; only 2 of those railroads were publicly owned and operated, both by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority. American Public Transit Assn., Transit Fact Book 74-75 (1979). Those two public railroads — the Long Island and the Staten Island — were originally private railroads. The Staten Island was founded in 1899 and acquired by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority in 1971. Moody’s Transportation Manual 97 (1979). The initial exercise of the federal authority over railroads occurred before the completion of the first transcontinental railroad. See the Pacific Railroad Act of 1862. 12 Stat. 489. Of course, federal regulation of interstate transportation goes back many more years than that. See the 1793 Act regulating coastal trade discussed in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824). 24 Stat. 379. Ch. 1063, 25 Stat. 501. 30 Stat. 424. Ch. 6, 38 Stat. 103. Adamson Act of 1916, ch. 436, 39 Stat. 721. 41 Stat. 456. Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. (part 2) 577, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. The purposes of the Railway Labor Act are set out in §2 of the Act, 45 U. S. C. § 151a: “The purposes of the chapter are: (1) To avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein; (2) to forbid any limitation upon freedom of association among employees or any denial, as a condition of employment or otherwise, of the right of employees to join a labor organization; (3) to provide for the complete independence of carriers and of employees in the matter of self-organization to carry out the purposes of this chapter; (4) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions; (5) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.” Under the recent amendments to the Act, adding a new § 9a, 95 Stat. 68, 45 U. S. C. § 159a (1976 ed., Supp. V), the process has been made even more “long and drawn out” insofar as it applies to publicly owned commuter rail lines such as the Long Island. The law now provides for a “cooling-off period” of up to 240 days after failure of mediation. Any party to the dispute, or the Governor of any state through which the rail service operates, may request appointment of a Presidential Emergency Board to investigate and report on the dispute. If the dispute is not settled within 60 days after creation of the Emergency Board, the National Mediation Board must hold a public hearing at which each party must appear and explain any refusal to accept the Emergency Board’s recommendations. The law then requires appointment of a second Emergency Board at the request of any party or Governor of an affected state. That Emergency Board must examine the final offers submitted by each party and must determine which is the most reasonable. Finally, if a work stoppage occurs, substantial penalties are provided against the party refusing to accept the offer determined by the Emergency Board to be most reasonable.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them. Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer. Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.
Who is the petitioner of the case?
[ "attorney general of the United States, or his office", "specified state board or department of education", "city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit", "state commission, board, committee, or authority", "county government or county governmental unit, except school district", "court or judicial district", "state department or agency", "governmental employee or job applicant", "female governmental employee or job applicant", "minority governmental employee or job applicant", "minority female governmental employee or job applicant", "not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable", "retired or former governmental employee", "U.S. House of Representatives", "interstate compact", "judge", "state legislature, house, or committee", "local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough", "governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact", "state or U.S. supreme court", "local school district or board of education", "U.S. Senate", "U.S. senator", "foreign nation or instrumentality", "state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of", "state college or university", "United States", "State", "person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime", "advertising business or agency", "agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor", "airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes", "airline", "distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages", "alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked", "American Medical Association", "National Railroad Passenger Corp.", "amusement establishment, or recreational facility", "arrested person, or pretrial detainee", "attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association", "author, copyright holder", "bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company", "bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization", "establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store", "water transportation, stevedore", "bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines", "brewery, distillery", "broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm", "construction industry", "bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle", "business, corporation", "buyer, purchaser", "cable TV", "car dealer", "person convicted of crime", "tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband", "chemical company", "child, children, including adopted or illegitimate", "religious organization, institution, or person", "private club or facility", "coal company or coal mine operator", "computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software", "consumer, consumer organization", "creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company", "person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial", "defendant", "debtor", "real estate developer", "disabled person or disability benefit claimant", "distributor", "person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector", "drug manufacturer", "druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy", "employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of", "employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan", "electric equipment manufacturer", "electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company", "eleemosynary institution or person", "environmental organization", "employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.", "farmer, farm worker, or farm organization", "father", "female employee or job applicant", "female", "movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of", "fisherman or fishing company", "food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard", "foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity", "franchiser", "franchisee", "lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization", "person who guarantees another's obligations", "handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to", "health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor", "heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be", "hospital, medical center", "husband, or ex-husband", "involuntarily committed mental patient", "Indian, including Indian tribe or nation", "insurance company, or surety", "inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder", "investor", "injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related", "juvenile", "government contractor", "holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor", "magazine", "male", "medical or Medicaid claimant", "medical supply or manufacturing co.", "racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant", "minority female employee or job applicant", "manufacturer", "management, executive officer, or director, of business entity", "military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist", "mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company", "mother", "auto manufacturer", "newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service", "radio and television network, except cable tv", "nonprofit organization or business", "nonresident", "nuclear power plant or facility", "owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels", "shareholders to whom a tender offer is made", "tender offer", "oil company, or natural gas producer", "elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly", "out of state noncriminal defendant", "political action committee", "parent or parents", "parking lot or service", "patient of a health professional", "telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company", "physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society", "public interest organization", "physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee", "pipe line company", "package, luggage, container", "political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official", "indigent, needy, welfare recipient", "indigent defendant", "private person", "prisoner, inmate of penal institution", "professional organization, business, or person", "probationer, or parolee", "protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer", "public utility", "publisher, publishing company", "radio station", "racial or ethnic minority", "person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination", "racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "realtor", "journalist, columnist, member of the news media", "resident", "restaurant, food vendor", "retarded person, or mental incompetent", "retired or former employee", "railroad", "private school, college, or university", "seller or vendor", "shipper, including importer and exporter", "shopping center, mall", "spouse, or former spouse", "stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder", "retail business or outlet", "student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only", "tenant or lessee", "theater, studio", "forest products, lumber, or logging company", "person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent", "trucking company, or motor carrier", "television station", "union member", "unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant", "union, labor organization, or official of", "veteran", "voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)", "wholesale trade", "wife, or ex-wife", "witness, or person under subpoena", "network", "slave", "slave-owner", "bank of the united states", "timber company", "u.s. job applicants or employees", "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "General Land Office of Commissioners", "Transportation Security Administration", "Surface Transportation Board", "U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.", "Reconstruction Finance Corp.", "Department or Secretary of Homeland Security", "Unidentifiable", "International Entity" ]
[ 177 ]
sc
UNITED STATES v. WHITE MOUNTAIN APACHE TRIBE No. 01-1067. Argued December 2, 2002 Decided March 4, 2003 Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, O’Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Breyer, J., joined, post, p. 479. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., joined, post, p. 481. Gregory G. Garre argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Sansonetti, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Elizabeth Ann Peterson, and James M. Upton. Robert C. Brauchli argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. John E. Echohawk and Tracy A Labin filed a brief for the National Congress of American Indians as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in this case arises under the Indian Tucker Act: does the Court of Federal Claims have jurisdiction over the White Mountain Apache Tribe’s suit against the United States for breach of fiduciary duty to manage land and improvements held in trust for the Tribe but occupied by the Government. We hold that it does. I The former military post of Fort Apache dates back to 1870 when the United States established the fort within territory that became the Tribe’s reservation in 1877. In 1922, Congress transferred control of the fort to the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) and, in 1923, set aside about 400 acres, out of some 7,000, for use as the Theodore Roosevelt Indian School. Act of Jan. 24, 1923, ch. 42, 42 Stat. 1187. Congress attended to the fort again in 1960, when it provided by statute that “former Fort Apache Military Reservation” would be “held by the United States in trust for the White Mountain Apache Tribe, subject to the right of the Secretary of the Interior to use any part of the land and improvements for administrative or school purposes for as long as they «re needed for the purpose.” Pub. L. 86-392, 74 Stat. 8 (1960 Act). The Secretary exercised that right, and although the record does not catalog the uses made by the Department of the Interior, they extended to about 30 of the post’s buildings and appurtenances, a few of which had been built when the Government first occupied the land. Although the National Park Service listed the fort as a national historical site in 1976, the recognition was no augury of fortune, for just over 20 years later the World Monuments Watch placed the fort on its 1998 List of 100 Most Endangered Monuments. Brief for Respondent 3. In 1993, the Tribe commissioned an engineering assessment of the property, resulting in a finding that as of 1998 it would cost about $14 million to rehabilitate the property occupied by the Government in accordance with standards for historic preservation. This is the amount the Tribe sought in 1999, when it sued the United States in the Court of Federal Claims, citing the terms of the 1960 Act, among others, and alleging breach of fiduciary duty to “maintain, protect, repair and preserve” the trust property. App. to Pet. for Cert. 37a. The United States moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief might be granted and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. While the Government acknowledged that the Indian Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1505, invested the Court of Federal Claims with jurisdiction to render judgments in certain claims by Indian tribes against the United States, including claims based on an Act of Congress, it stressed that the waiver operated only when underlying substantive law could fairly be interpreted as giving rise to a particular duty, breach of which should be compen-sable in money damages. The Government contended that jurisdiction was lacking here because no statute or regulation cited by the Tribe could fairly be read as imposing a legal obligation on the Government to maintain or restore the trust property, let alone authorizing compensation for breach. The Court of Federal Claims agreed with the United States and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, relying primarily on the two seminal cases of tribal trust claims for damages, United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535 (1980) (Mitchell I), and United States v. Mitchell, 463 U. S. 206 (1983) (Mitchell II). Mitchell I held that the Indian General Allotment Act (Allotment Act), 24 Stat. 388, as amended, 25 U. S. C. §331 et seq. (1976 ed.) (§§331-333 repealed 2000), providing that “the United States does and will hold the land thus allotted ... in trust for the sole use and benefit of the Indian,” §348; Mitchell I, supra, at 541, established nothing more than a “bare trust” for the benefit of tribal members. Mitchell II, supra, at 224. The general trust provision established no duty of the United States to manage timber resources, tribal members, rather, being “responsible for using the land,” “occupying] the land,” and “managing] the land.” 445 U. S., at 542-543. The opposite result obtained in Mitchell II, however, based on timber management statutes, 25 U. S. C. §§ 406-407, 466, and regulations, 25 CFR pt. 163 (1983), under which the United States assumed “elaborate control” over the tribal forests. 463 U. S., at 209, 225. Mitchell II identified a specific trust relationship enforceable by award of damages for breach. Id., at 225-226. Here, the Court of Federal Claims compared the 1960 Act to the Allotment Act in Mitchell I, as creating nothing more than a “bare trust.” It saw in the 1960 Act no mandate that the United States manage the site on behalf of the Tribe, and thus no predicate in the statutes and regulations identified by the Tribe for finding a fiduciary obligation enforceable by monetary relief. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, on the understanding that the United States’s use of property under the proviso of the 1960 Act triggered the duty of a common law trustee to act reasonably to preserve any property the Secretary had chosen to utilize, an obligation fairly interpreted as supporting a claim for money damages. The Court of Appeals held that the provision for the Government’s exclusive control over the building actually occupied raised the trust to the level of Mitchell II, in which the trust relationship together with Government’s control over the property triggered a specific responsibility. Chief Judge Mayer dissented on the understanding that the 1960 Act “carve[d] out” from the trust the portions of the property that the Government is entitled to use for its own benefit, with the consequence that the Tribe held only a contingent future interest in the property, insufficient to support even a common law action for permissive waste. 249 F. 3d 1364, 1384 (2001). We granted certiorari to decide whether the 1960 Act gives rise to jurisdiction over suits for money damages against the United States, 535 U. S. 1016 (2002), and now affirm. II A Jurisdiction over any suit against the Government requires a clear statement from the United States waiving sovereign immunity, Mitchell I, supra, at 538-539, together with a claim falling within the terms of the waiver, Mitchell II, supra, at 216-217. The terms of consent to be sued may not be inferred, but must be “unequivocally expressed,” Mitchell I, supra, at 538 (quoting United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 4 (1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted), in order to “define [a] court’s jurisdiction,” Mitchell I, supra, at 538 (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 586 (1941)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Tucker Act contains such a waiver, Mitchell II, supra, at 212, giving the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction to award damages upon proof of “any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress,” 28 U. S. C. § 1491(a)(1), and its companion statute, the Indian Tucker Act, confers a like waiver for Indian tribal claims that “otherwise would be cognizable in the Court of Federal Claims if the claimant were not an Indian tribe.” § 1505. Neither Act, however, creates a substantive right enforceable against the Government by a claim for money damages. Mitchell I, supra, at 538-540; Mitchell II, supra, at 216. As we said in Mitchell II, a statute creates a right capable of grounding a claim within the waiver of sovereign immunity if, but only if, it “can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.” 463 U. S., at 217 (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 400 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This “fair interpretation” rule demands a showing demonstrably lower than the standard for the initial waiver of sovereign immunity. “Because the Tucker Act supplies a waiver of immunity for claims of this nature, the separate statutes and regulations need not provide a second waiver of sovereign immunity, nor need they be construed in the manner appropriate to waivers of sovereign immunity.” Mitchell II, supra, at 218-219. It is enough, then, that a statute creating a Tucker Act right be reasonably amenable to the reading that it mandates a right of recovery in damages. While the premise to a Tucker Act claim will not be “lightly inferred,” 463 U. S., at 218, a fair inference will do. B The two Mitchell cases give a sense of when it is fair to infer a fiduciary duty qualifying under the Indian Tucker Act and when it is not. The characterizations of the trust as “limited,” Mitchell I, 445 U. S., at 542, or “bare,” Mitchell II, supra, at 224, distinguish the Allotment Act’s trust-in-name from one with hallmarks of a more conventional fiduciary relationship. See United States v. Navajo Nation, post, at 504 (discussing §§ 1 and 2 of the Allotment Act in Mitchell I as having “removed a standard element of a trust relationship”). Although in form the United States “h[e]ld the land ... in trust for the sole use and benefit of the Indian,” 25 U. S. C. § 348, the statute gave the United States no functional obligations to manage timber; on the contrary, it established that “the Indian allottee, and not a representative of the United States, is responsible for using the land,” that “the allottee would occupy the land,” and that “the allottee, and not the United States, was to manage the land.” Mitchell I, 445 U. S., at 542-543. Thus, we found that Congress did not intend to “impose any duty” on the Government to manage resources, id., at 542; cf. Mitchell II, supra, at 217-218, and we made sense of the trust language, considered without reference to any statute beyond the Allotment Act, as intended “to prevent alienation of the land” and to guarantee that the Indian allottees were “immune from state taxation,” Mitchell I, supra, at 544. The subsequent case of Mitchell II arose on a claim that did look beyond the Allotment Act, and we found that statutes and regulations specifically addressing the management of timber on allotted lands raised the fair implication that the substantive obligations imposed on the United States by those statutes and regulations were enforceable by damages. The Department of the Interior possessed “comprehensive control over the harvesting of Indian timber” and “exercise[d] literally daily supervision over [its] harvesting and management,” Mitchell II, supra, at 209, 222 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 145, 147 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted), giving it a “pervasive” role in the sale of timber from Indian lands under regulations addressing “virtually every aspect of forest management,” Mitchell II, supra, at 219, 220. As the statutes and regulations gave the United States “full responsibility to manage Indian resources and land for the benefit of the Indians,” we held that they “define[d] . . . contours of the United States’ fiduciary responsibilities” beyond the “bare” or minimal level, and thus could “fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation” through money damages if the Government faltered in its responsibility. 463 U. S., at 224-226. III A The 1960 Act goes beyond a bare trust and permits a fair inference that the Government is subject to duties as a trustee and liable in damages for breach. The statutory language, of course, expressly defines a fiduciary relationship in the provision that Fort Apache be “held by the United States in trust for the White Mountain Apache Tribe.” 74 Stat. 8. Unlike the Allotment Act, however, the statute proceeds to invest the United States with discretionary authority to make direct use of portions of the trust corpus. The trust property is “subject to the right of the Secretary of the Interior to use any part of the land and improvements for administrative or school purposes for as long as they are needed for the purpose,” ibid., and it is undisputed that the Government has to this day availed itself of its option. As to the property subject to the Government’s actual use, then, the United States has not merely exercised daily supervision but has enjoyed daily occupation, and so has obtained control at least as plenary as its authority over the timber in Mitchell II. While it is true that the 1960 Act does not, like the statutes cited in that case, expressly subject the Government to duties of management and conservation, the fact that the property occupied by the United States is expressly subject to a trust supports a fair inference that an obligation to preserve the property improvements was incumbent on the United States as trustee. This is so because elementary trust law, after all, confirms the commonsense assumption that a fiduciary actually administering trust property may not allow it to fall into ruin on his watch. “One of the fundamental common-law duties of a trustee is to preserve and maintain trust assets,” Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 472 U. S. 559, 572 (1985) (citing G. Bogert & G. Bogert, Law of Trusts and Trustees §582, p. 346 (rev. 2d ed. 1980)); see United States v. Mason, 412 U. S. 391, 398 (1973) (standard of responsibility is “such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own property” (quoting 2 A. Scott, Trusts 1408 (3d ed. 1967) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 176 (1957) (“The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to use reasonable care and skill to preserve the trust property”). Given this duty on the part of the trustee to preserve corpus, “it naturally follows that the Government should be liable in damages for the breach of its fiduciary duties.” Mitchell II, supra, at 226. B The United States raises three defenses against this conclusion, the first being that the property occupied by the Government is not trust corpus at all. It asserts that in the 1960 Act Congress specifically “carve[d] out of the trust” the right of the Federal Government to use the property for the Government’s own purposes. Brief for United States 24-25 (emphasis deleted). According to the United States, this carve-out means that the 1960 Act created even less than the “bare trust” in Mitchell I. But this position is at odds with a natural reading of the 1960 Act. It provided that “Fort Apache” was subject to the trust; it did not read that the trust consisted of only the property not used by the Secretary. Nor is there any apparent reason to strain to avoid the straightforward reading; it makes sense to treat even the property used by the Government as trust property, since any use the Secretary would make of it would presumably be intended to redound to the benefit of the Tribe in some way. Next, the Government contends that no intent to provide a damages remedy is fairly inferable, for the reason that “[t]here is not a word in the 1960 Act — the only substantive source of law on which the Tribe relies — that suggests the existence of such a mandate.” Brief for United States 28. The argument rests, however, on a failure to appreciate either the role of trust law in drawing a fair inference or the scope of United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392 (1976), and Army and Air Force Exchange Service v. Sheehan, 456 U. S. 728 (1982), cited in support of the Government’s position. To the extent that the Government would demand an explicit provision for money damages to support every claim that might be brought under the Tucker Act, it would substitute a plain and explicit statement standard for the less demanding requirement of fair inference that the law was meant to provide a damages remedy for breach of a duty. To begin with, this would leave Mitchell II a wrongly decided case, for one would look in vain for a statute explicitly providing that inadequate timber management would be compensated through a suit for damages. But the more fundamental objection to the Government’s position is that, if carried to its conclusion, it would read the trust relation out of Indian Tucker Act analysis; if a specific provision for damages is needed, a trust obligation and trust law are not. And this likewise would ignore Mitchell I, where the trust relationship was considered when inferring that the trust obligation was enforceable by damages. To be sure, the fact of the trust alone in Mitchell I did not imply a remedy in damages or even the duty claimed, since the Allotment Act failed to place the United States in a position to discharge the management responsibility asserted. To find a specific duty, a further source of law was needed to provide focus for the trust relationship. But once that focus was provided, general trust law was considered in drawing the inference that Congress intended damages to remedy a breach of obligation. Sheehan and Testan are not to the contrary; they were cases without any trust relationship in the mix of relevant fact, but with affirmative reasons to believe that no damages remedy could have been intended, absent a specific provision. In Sheehan, specific authorization was critical because of a statute that generally granted employees the damages remedy petitioner sought, but “expressly denie[d] that cause of action” to Army and Air Force Exchange Service personnel, such as petitioner. 456 U. S., at 740. In Sheehan, resting in part on Testan, the Tucker Act plaintiffs unsuccessfully asserted that the Court of Claims had jurisdiction over a claim against the United States for money damages for allegedly improper job classifications under the Classification Act. We stressed that no provision in the statute “expressly makes the United States liable,” Testan, 424 U. S., at 399, and rather, that there was a longstanding presumption against petitioner’s argument. “The established rule is that one is not entitled to the benefit of a position until he has been duly appointed to it.... The Classification Act does not purport by its terms to change that rule, and we see no suggestion in it or in its legislative history that Congress intended to alter it.” Id., at 402. Thus, in both Sheehan and Testan we required an explicit authorization of a damages remedy because of strong indications that Congress did not intend to mandate money damages. Together they show that a fair inference will require an express provision, when the legal current is otherwise against the existence of a cognizable claim. But that was not the case in Mitchell II and is not the case here. Finally, the Government argues that the inference of a damages remedy is unsound simply because damages are inappropriate as a remedy for failures of maintenance, prospective injunctive relief being the sole relief tailored to the situation. Reply Brief for United States 19. We think this is clearly wrong. If the Government is suggesting that the recompense for run-down buildings should be an affirmative order to repair them, it is merely proposing the economic (but perhaps cumbersome) equivalent of damages. But if it is suggesting that relief must be limited to an injunction to toe the fiduciary mark in the future, it would bar the courts from making the Tribe whole for deterioration already suffered, and shield the Government against the remedy whose very availability would deter it from wasting trust property in the period before a Tribe has gone to court for injunctive relief. Mitchell II, 463 U. S., at 227 (“Absent a retrospective damages remedy, there would be little to deter federal officials from violating their trust duties, at least until the allot-tees managed to obtain a judicial decree against future breaches of trust” (quoting Mitchell I, 445 U. S., at 550 (internal quotation marks omitted))). IV The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the Court of Federal Claims for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. These included the Snyder Act, 42 Stat. 208, as amended, 25 U. S. C. § 13, and the National Historic Preservation Act, 80 Stat. 915, 16 U. S. C. §470 et seq. Although it appears that the United States has not yet relinquished control of any of the buildings, the United States concedes that “some buildings have fallen into varying states of disrepair, and a few structures have been condemned or demolished.” Brief for United States 4. For present purposes we need not address whether or how this affects the Tribe’s claims. Where, as in Mitchell II, 463 U. S. 206, 225 (1983), the relevant sources of substantive law create “[a]ll of the necessary elements of a common-law trust,” there is no need to look elsewhere for the source of a trust relationship. We have recognized a general trust relationship since 1831. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 16 (1831) (characterizing the relationship between Indian tribes and the United States as “a ward to his guardian”); Mitchell II, supra, at 225 (discussing “the undisputed existence of a general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian people”). The proper measure of damages is not before us. We mean to imply nothing about the relevance of any historic building or preservation standards. Neither do we address the significance of the fact that a trustee is generally indemnified for the cost of upkeep and maintenance. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts §244 (1957) (“The trustee is entitled to indemnity out of the trust estate for expenses properly incurred by him in the administration of the trust”). Nor do we reach the issue whether a rent-free occupant is obligated to supply funds to maintain the property it benefits from. See Restatement of Property §187, Comment b (1936) (“When the right of the owner of the future interest is that the owner of the estate for life shall do a given act, as for example,... make repairs ... then this right is made effective through compelling by judicial action the specific doing of the act”).
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed. The information relevant to this variable may be found near the end of the summary that begins on the title page of each case, or preferably at the very end of the opinion of the Court. For cases in which the Court granted a motion to dismiss, consider "petition denied or appeal dismissed". There is "no disposition" if the Court denied a motion to dismiss.
What is the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed?
[ "stay, petition, or motion granted", "affirmed (includes modified)", "reversed", "reversed and remanded", "vacated and remanded", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded", "vacated", "petition denied or appeal dismissed", "certification to or from a lower court", "no disposition" ]
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BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY & STEAMSHIP CLERKS, FREIGHT HANDLERS, EXPRESS & STATION EMPLOYEES v. ASSOCIATION FOR THE BENEFIT OF NON-CONTRACT EMPLOYEES. No. 138. Argued March 4, 1965. Decided April 28, 1965 James L. Highsaw, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner in No. 138. With him on the brief were Milton Kramer and William J. Donlon. Stuart Bernstein argued the cause for petitioner in No. 139. With him on the brief were H. Templeton Brown and Robert L. Stern. Solicitor General Cox argued the cause for petitioners in No. 369 and respondents in No. 139. With him on the briefs were Assistant ¡Attorney General Douglas, Daniel M. Friedman, Morton Hollander and John C. Eldridge. Alex L. Arguello argued the cause for respondent in Nos. 138 and 369. With him on the brief was Jerome C. Muys. Clarence M. Mulholland and Edward J. Hickey, Jr., filed a brief for the Railway Labor Executives’ Association, as amicus curiae, urging reversal in Nos. 138 and 369 and affirmance in No. 139. Together with No. 139, United Air Lines, Inc. v. National Mediation Board et al. and No. 369, National Mediation Board et al. v. Association for the Benefit of Non-Contract Employees, also on certiorari to the same court. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. These consolidated cases involve claims of United Air Lines (United) and the Association for the Benefit of Non-Contract Employees of United (the Association), attacking the form of ballot that the Board intends to use in a representation election among United’s employees under § 2, Ninth» of the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 152, Ninth (1958 ed.). United also contends that the National Mediation Board (Board) should hold a hearing under the same section, with its participation, to determine the appropriate craft or class in which the election should be held. Before the Board the conflicting unions — Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks (Brotherhood) and International Association of Machinists (Machinists) — agreed that the appropriate craft or class in which the election should be held was “clerical, office, stores, fleet and passenger service employees” ; over the objection of United the Board ordered an election in this unit to determine which union, if either, would be its bargaining representative. United then filed suit against the Board raising the questions it presses here. This case was dismissed and is here, after affirmance by the Court of Appeals, as No. 139. After this dismissal the Association filed suit against the Board, the Brotherhood being permitted to intervene, and raised substantially the same claims. The District Court enjoined the Board from conducting an election with a ballot that did not permit an employee to cast a vote against collective bargaining representation; the other issues were remanded to the Board for further consideration. 218 F. Supp. 114. The Court of Appeals affirmed these cases by a divided court and they are here as Nos. 138 and 369. 117 U. S. App. D. C. 387, 330 F. 2d 853. Judge Wright, dissenting, thought the District Court was without jurisdiction to enjoin the Board from conducting a representation election, citing Switchmen’s Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U. S. 297 (1943). We granted certiorari in all three of the cases. 379 U. S. 814. We hold that the Board satisfied its statutory duty to investigate the dispute; that United is not entitled to be a party to proceedings by which the Board determines the scope of the appropriate craft or class; and that the Board’s choice of ballot for its future elections does not exceed its statutory authority and is therefore not open to judicial review. 1. The Facts. In January 1947, after lengthy hearings in which United and other airlines participated at the request of the Board, it was determined that the “clerical, office, stores, fleet and passenger service” grouping of employees constituted an appropriate craft or class, within the meaning of the Act, for collective bargaining purposes. Case No. R-1706, N. M. B. Determinations of Craft or Class 423 (1948). All of the parties here, save the Association, participated in this public hearing. Since that time they have participated in other cases involving the same questions decided in R-1706, but, with some exceptions, the Board has continued through the years to hold elections in that craft or class. In August 1962 the Brotherhood filed with the Board an application under § 2, Ninth to investigate a representation dispute among employees of United. In its original application the Brotherhood proposed to exclude those stores and fleet service personnel then represented by the Machinists. After the Board had advised United and the Machinists of the Brotherhood’s application each informed the Board that in its opinion the application should be dismissed because it did not conform to what the Board had found to constitute a craft or class in Case No. R-1706, supra. Alternatively, United requested that if dismissal was not in order the Board should hold hearings to determine the proper craft or class in which the election should be held. Upon receiving notice of this opposition the Brotherhood amended its application to include the full craft or class approved in R-1706. The Machinists then agreed that this was the appropriate unit in which to conduct the election. The Board concluded that a dispute existed requiring an election and scheduled one for January 1963. It proposed to use its standard form of ballot which provided for the printing of the names of the labor organizations— in this case, the Brotherhood and the Machinists — with a box below each name for the employee to check the representative preferred. A third space was provided in which the employee could write in the name of any other organization or individual he wished to represent him. There was not a place on the ballot in which the employee could vote specifically for “no union.” The Board, on December 19, 1962, directed that a list of the employees involved be supplied by United not later than January 14, 1963. On January 11 United advised that the request was premature and requested a hearing as to the scope of the unit involved in the Brotherhood’s amended application. It outlined in some detail the past practices of the Board in dealing with such requests and attacked the continued suitability of the R-1706 determination, asking that the case be re-opened and that the group be divided into three separate crafts or classes. On January 17 the Board denied this request. It pointed out that United on September 7, 1962, had objected to the craft proposed in the Brotherhood’s original application on the sole ground that it did not conform to R-1706; that the Brotherhood had then amended its request to conform with R-1706; that United had been notified of this change on October 8, 1962; that on October 24 the Board had requested United to furnish the number of employees in the craft or class as amended and that it had furnished this information on November 2, stating that there were 12,451 as of a given date; and that it had failed to furnish the names of the employees. The Board then commented that “the carrier is not a party to this representation dispute”; that “no request for a review of... Case No. R-1706, et al. has been received from either organization party to NMB Case No. 3590” (the pending application of the Brotherhood); and that United’s request was “not timely made, since the Board, on December 19, 1962, found that a representation dispute existed among the employees in this craft or class, and has authorized an election.” United requested reconsideration of this decision, but without success. Meanwhile, on January 18, 1963, when United advised the Board that it was “willing to allow a ballot box election on Company property provided the ballot follows the form used by the National Labor Relations Board,” i. e., the ballot “would have a space for the employee to vote against representation as well as space for the employee to vote for representation” by the Brotherhood or the Machinists. (Emphasis in the original.) The Board replied that its form of ballot had been used since 1934 and that it saw no reason to depart from it. Thereafter United advised that it would furnish the list of employees by February 11, but on that date the list was refused and action was begun the next day against the Board in the District Court for the District of Columbia. This case was later dismissed, as we have noted. It appears that while the election was being delayed the Association was being organized among United’s employees. By March 1963 it claimed 6,400 members, about 50% of the total number of United’s employees. It sought, like United, to be heard in a craft or class proceeding and to have the ballot amended. It stated, however, that it did not seek recognition as a bargaining representative, and it did not want its name on the ballot. It intended to dissolve after the election. The Board denied the applications. After United’s case was dismissed, the Association filed a similar suit in the same court, seeking substantially the same relief. The Brotherhood was permitted to intervene, and it filed a separate appeal from that of the Board after the court had disposed of the case as we have already stated. After we granted certiorari, the Board adopted an amended form of ballot on which there appears the following directly above the names of the unions seeking election as representative: “INSTRUCTIONS FOR VOTING “No employee is required to vote. If less than a majority of the employees cast valid ballots, no representative will be certified.” In effect, this amended ballot stated on its face what has been the practice of the Board in these elections since its inception. The Board has announced its intention to use this form of ballot in future representation elections, including any that may be held in this particular matter. 2. The Purposes of the Act and the Board’s Function. The major objective of the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§ 151-188 (1958 ed.), was “the avoidance of industrial strife, by conference between the authorized representatives of employer and employee.” Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515, 547 (1937). Section 2, Ninth set up the machinery for the selection of the representatives of employees. It authorized the National Mediation Board, upon request, to investigate disputes over representation; to “designate” those who were affected; to use a secret ballot or any other appropriate means of ascertaining the choice of employees; to establish rules governing elections and to certify the representatives so chosen to represent the employees in negotiations. Upon the issuance of this certificate the employer, under the Act, is required to “treat” with the representative certified to it by the Board. As we said in Virginian R. Co.: “The statute does not undertake to compel agreement between the employer and employees, but it does command those preliminary steps without which no agreement can be reached. It at least requires the employer to meet and confer with the authorized representative of its employees, to listen to their complaints, to make reasonable effort to compose differences — in short, to enter into a negotiation for the settlement of labor disputes such as is contemplated by § 2, First.” Id., at 548. In Switchmen’s Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U. S. 297 (1943), the petitioner sued for the cancellation of a Board representation certificate. The Court held that the Act precluded review of the Board’s certification of a collective bargaining representative under § 2, Ninth. The case involved a question of statutory construction, i. e., whether the Act permitted the division of crafts or classes of a single carrier into smaller units for collective bargaining purposes. The Court refused to consider the merits of the claim, holding that it was for the Board, not the courts, finally to resolve such questions. “The Act in § 2, Fourth,” the Court said, “writes into law the 'right’ of the 'majority of any craft or class of employees’ to 'determine who shall be the representative of the craft or class for the purposes of this Act.’ That 'right’ is protected by § 2, Ninth which gives the Mediation Board the power to resolve controversies concerning it and as an incident thereto to determine what is the appropriate craft or class in which the election should be held.” Id., at 300-301. The Court goes on to note that Congress decided on the method which might be employed to protect this “right”; and that where Congress “has not expressly authorized judicial review,” id., at 301, “this Court has often refused to furnish one even where questions of law might be involved,” id., at 303. The Court’s conclusion was that “the intent seems plain — the dispute was to reach its last terminal point when the administrative finding was made. There was to be no dragging out of the controversy into other tribunals of law.” Id., at 305. Thus, the Court held there could be no judicial review. It is sometimes said that in Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U. S. 184 (1958), the Court created an “exception” to the doctrine of Switchmen’s Union. In Kyne, it was held that the law afforded a remedy in the courts when unlawful action by the National Labor Relations Board inflicted injury on one of the parties to a bargaining dispute. But this was no exception to Switchmen’s Union. Rather the Court was careful to note that “[t]his suit is not one to ‘review,’ in the sense of that term as used in the Act, a decision of the Board made within its jurisdiction. Rather it is one to strike down an order of the Board made in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the Act.” Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U. S. 184, 188. (Emphasis supplied.) The limited nature of this holding was re-emphasized only last Term where we referred to the “narrow limits” and “painstakingly delineated procedural boundaries of Kyne.” Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U. S. 473, 481 (1964). It is with these principles in mind that we turn to the questions in the instant cases. 3. The Craft or Class Determination. The order of the District Court in Nos. 138 and 369 enjoins the Board from conducting an election “in which the form of the ballot does not permit a voting employee to cast a vote against collective bargaining representation . . . .” The Association concedes that the order does not enjoin the holding of the election until the Board reconsiders its craft or class determination; nor has it petitioned here for a review of that portion of the decision.' Thus, we need not reach the question of the Association’s right to demand or participate in proceedings leading to such a determination. The same is not true of United, however, for it specifically sought and was denied such relief, and it comes here contending that this denial constituted error. United argues that since the Act compels it to treat with the representative chosen by the majority of its employees in the craft or class in which the election is held, it has a direct and substantial interest in the scope of that unit; and that since the Act provides for no administrative or judicial review, due process requires that it be accorded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings by which the Board determines which employees may participate. It also contends that the Board, in designating the employees who could participate in the election, did not do so as a result of the statutorily required investigation— which, United contends, requires that the Board take evidence and make findings — but made an arbitrary determination, relying solely on the agreement of the unions. United’s position is that Switchmen’s Union does not control a claim that the Board has ignored an express command of the Act. This particular question was reserved in the 1943 cases. In General Committee v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 320 U. S. 323 (1943), a companion case to Switchmen’s Union, the Court stated: “Whether judicial power may ever be exerted to require the Mediation Board to exercise the 'duty’ imposed upon it under § 2, Ninth and, if so, the type or types of situations in which it may be invoked present questions not involved here.” Id,., at 336, n. 12. We think that the Board’s action here is reviewable only to the extent that it bears on the question of whether it performed its statutory duty to “investigate” the dispute. Reviewing that action, however, we conclude that the contention is completely devoid of merit. Section 2, Ninth makes it the duty of the Board to “investigate” a representation dispute and “to certify to both parties, in writing, within thirty days after the receipt of the invocation of its services, the name or names of the individuals or organizations that have been designated and authorized to represent the employees involved in the dispute, and certify the same to the carrier.” This command is broad and sweeping. We should note at the outset that the Board’s duty to investigate is a duty to make such investigation as the nature of the case requires. An investigation is “essentially informal, not adversary” ; it is “not required to take any particular form.” Inland Empire District Council v. Millis, 325 U. S. 697, 706 (1945). These principles are particularly apt here where Congress has simply told the Board to investigate and has left to it the task of selecting the methods and procedures which it should employ in each case. In dealing with the sufficiency of the investigation it is necessary to examine the experience of the Board through the years in resolving questions of craft or class appropriateness. That experience, insofar as it concerns the unit involved here, dates back to 1946 in Case No. R-1706, supra, when it was called upon for the first time to apply the craft or class principle of representation to the airline industry. At that time it had before it a fledgling industry, a relatively new statutory command and a huge group of employees for whom there were no recognized crafts or classes within the meaning of the Act. At least five unions were involved, all urging different employee groupings, and all of the major airlines were invited to participate in an extended public hearing. United was among those participating and in fact supported the very craft or class unit which the Board eventually decided upon and to which it has adhered here. Because it was the first time the Board had recognized such a craft or class, it cautiously provided in denying reconsideration of its determination that it was subject to future re-examination where to do so would further the purposes of the Act. Thereafter began a period in which the workability of the R-1706 determination was tested in practice, and it did not go completely unchallenged. In 1948 United voluntarily recognized the Machinists as the collective bargaining representative for its ramp and stores employees. It supplied the Board with evidence upon which this recognition was based and its reasons for departing from its usual policy. It is noteworthy that the Board replied that voluntary recognition would not preclude future determination by the Board of the proper craft or class to which those employees would belong. In 1951 the determination of R-1706 withstood challenge in Matter of Representation of Employees of Northwest Airlines, Inc., Case No. R-2357, 2 N. M. B. Determinations of Craft or Class 60 (1955). United submitted a statement in this proceeding, emphasizing its disagreement with the R-1706 decision and requesting that it be disregarded. The Board refused to do so, but it did reiterate what it had implied in 1947 — that it was “of the opinion that upon proper application ... it will be advisable to reexamine the determination in case R-J.706 et al., with the view of making such modifications as may be found to be justified at that time.” Id., at 67. We note that in both cases — R-1706 and R-2357 — the unions competing for representative status were in disagreement as to the appropriate unit in which elections should be held. Again in 1952, in Case No. R-2482, 2 N. M. B. Determinations of Craft or Class 72 (1955), United participated when the Air Line Dispatch Clerks Association sought to represent its general dispatch clerks, dispatch clerks A, B, and C and crew schedulers; the Brotherhood there disputed the grouping, contending that R-1706 established the scope of the election. The Board sustained this position, which was also that of United, and held that R-1706 should be adhered to. United had argued that the dispatch clerks and schedulers were not a separate craft or class but merely components of the R-1706 unit, and that representation could be had only through investigation and election in that group. The Board ultimately discussed the application in these terms: “The precedents heretofore established by the Board, however, cannot be disregarded. Moreover, the record of stable industrial relations which has followed in the years since the Determination in R-1706 must be given due and careful consideration. “. . . In an industry which is still expanding, the agency charged with the duty of certifying designated representatives for collective bargaining must of necessity hesitate before acquiescing In the desires of certain employees to establish small segregated groups, because by that very course it may retard, or even destroy job opportunities. Flexibility in the use of employee talent carries just as many advantages for the employees as it does for the carrier. The Board is fully aware that the action taken herein will have, as an end result, the withholding of an immediate opportunity to select a collective-bargaining agent by this group of employees, but nevertheless, it is convinced that the basic purposes of the Railway Labor Act will be better served by adherence to the policy of preserving established crafts or classes.” Id,., at 76. Nor do the subsequent cases brought to our attention strip the R-1706 decision of its continuing validity. In both these matters — Cases No. C-2252 and C-2389, 3 N. M. B. Determinations of Craft or Class 16 (1961) — the Board determined that stock and storeroom employees were separate crafts or classes of employees at North Central and Trans-Texas Air Lines. Neither of these airlines had participated in the 1946 proceedings. Both were feeder lines, and in both cases the contending unions disagreed as to the appropriate unit in which the election should be held. In any event, the Board was simply pursuing the policy it had announced when it decided R-1706 — that it would re-examine craft or class determinations when it thought the purpose of the Act would be furthered thereby. This in itself belies the notion that the Board has blindly followed the R-1706 ruling. It is in light of this background that we must decide whether the Board’s reaffirmation of the R-1706 determination in these cases was made after a sufficient investigation, within the meaning of the Act. We reject the contention that it adhered solely to the craft or class chosen by the unions. Time and again it has acknowledged that it has the task of determining the appropriateness of a craft or class, and nothing in this case suggests that it abdicated that responsibility here. Where units untested by actual collective bargaining have been proposed by the unions involved the Board has consistently held hearings to determine the propriety of holding elections in those crafts or classes. But where the unions have agreed and the unit they have agreed upon has been one well-established in industry bargaining circles, it has. usually held elections without full-scale hearings, not simply because the unions agree but because the unit upon which they agree is one that is well-recognized under prior determinations of the Board and has proven satisfactory in actual experience. This is what it did here. The Board received the Brotherhood’s application; it requested, received and considered statements from the carrier and the Machinists. On the basis of these preliminary actions, it scheduled an election. But it continued to correspond with United, accepting and studying its detailed application for reconsideration of the Board’s decision to proceed to election in the R-1706 craft or class. Viewed alongside prior experience with the R-1706 grouping in the air transport industry this procedure clearly complied with the statutory command that the Board “investigate” the dispute. The only missing element of the required investigation is the election and that can now be held promptly. United sought to have the District Court require the Board to hold a hearing on the craft or class issue in which it would participate as a “party in interest.” But the Act does not require a hearing when the Board itself designates those who may participate in the election. It provides that “the Board shall designate who may participate in the election ... , or may appoint a committee of three neutral persons who after hearing shall within ten days designate the employees who may participate in the election.” (Emphasis supplied.) Indeed, United seems aware of this, for it stated in its brief that if “the Railway Labor Act does not specifically require a hearing, it does require an ‘investigation,’ ” and that United must be heard in the course of that proceeding. Clearly, then, the Board cannot be required to hold a hearing. Nor does the Act require that United be made a party to whatever procedure the Board uses to define the scope of the electorate. This status is accorded only to those organizations and individuals who seek to represent the employees, for it is the employees’ representative that is to be chosen, not the carriers’. Whether and to what extent carriers will be permitted to present their views on craft or class questions is a matter that the Act leaves solely in the discretion of the Board. The gist of United’s claim, therefore, is that it should be accorded a greater role in the Board’s investigation. This argument must be rejected. Here United participated in the proceeding establishing the craft or class in question as a cognizable grouping of employees, and it has had opportunities since that time to present further evidence. It must be remembered that United is under no compulsion to reach an agreement with the certified representative. As Chief Justice Stone said in Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, supra, “The quality of the action compelled, its reasonableness, and therefore the lawfulness of the compulsion, must be judged in the light of the conditions which have occasioned the exercise of governmental power.” Id., at 558-559. Likewise, as the Court observed in Hannah v. Larche, 363 U. S. 420, 442 (1960), the procedural requirements in a particular proceeding depend on “[t]he nature of the alleged right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden on that proceeding ....” The Board, as we noted in Switchmen’s Union, performs the “function of a referee.” It does not select one organization or another; it simply investigates, defines the scope of the electorate, holds the election and certifies the winner. Thus, while the Board’s investigation and resolution of a dispute in one craft or class rather than another might impose some additional burden upon the carrier, we cannot say that the latter’s interest rises to a status which requires the full panoply of procedural protections. We find support for this conclusion when we consider the burden that acceptance of United’s contentions would visit upon the administration of the Act. To require full-dress hearings on craft or class in each representation dispute would fly in the face of Congress’ instruction that representatives should be certified within 30 days of invocation of the Board’s services. It places beyond reach the speed which the Act’s framers thought an objective of the first order. In view of these considerations, we hold that the Board performed its statutory duty to conduct an investigation and designate the craft or class in which the election should be held and that it did so in a manner satisfying any possible constitutional requirements that might exist. Its determination, therefore, is not subject to judicial review. Switchmen’s Union v. National Mediation Board, supra. As was pointed out there, the “highly selective manner in which Congress has provided for judicial review of administrative orders or determinations under the Act,” id., at 305, indicates the confidence that it reposed in the Board. In turn the fair and equitable manner in which the Board has discharged its difficult function is attested by the admirable results- it has attained. 4. The Form of the Ballot. As we have noted the District Court enjoined the Board from conducting an election with a ballot that did not permit an employee to cast a vote against collective representation. We believe this was error. Section 2, Ninth empowers the Board to establish the rules governing elections. Moreover, it provides that in resolving representation disputes the Board is authorized “to take a secret ballot of the employees involved, or to utilize any other appropriate method of ascertaining the names of their duly designated and authorized representatives in such manner as shall insure the choice of representatives by the employees without interference, influence, or coercion exercised by the carrier.” Thus, not only does the statute fail to spell out the form of any ballot that might be used but it does not even require selection by ballot. It leaves the details to the broad discretion of the Board with only the caveat that it “insure” freedom from carrier interference. That the details of ■ selecting representatives were to be left for the final determination of the Board is buttressed by legislative history clearly indicating as much. See Hearings on H. R. 7650, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 34^35. In summary, then, the selection of a ballot is a necessary incident of the Board’s duty to resolve disputes. The Act expressly says as much, instructing the Board alone to establish the rules governing elections. Thus, it is clear that its decision on the matter is not subject to judicial review where there is no showing that it has acted in excess of its statutory authority. United and the Association, however, apparently relying on Leedom v. Kyne, supra, contend that the Board has exceeded its statutory authority in selecting the proposed ballot. The argument is that § 2, Fourth, which provides that “[t]he majority of any craft or class of employees shall have the right to determine whp shall be the representative of the craft or class” requires a ballot with a “no union” box. They urge that in Virginian B. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, supra, at 560, certification on the basis of a majority of the votes cast, rather than a majority of the eligible voters, was upheld on the ground that nonvoters “are presumed to assent to the expressed will of the majority of those voting.” And they say that the Board’s ballot is inconsistent with this rationale. But the Board has not followed the presumption of Virginian R. Co. Indeed the caveat on the face of the proposed ballot expressly refutes such an assumption. The Board’s rule of election procedure is that no vote is a vote for no representation, and this is now made plain to the voting employees. It is, as we have said, an assumption more favorable to the employees that the Association represents. Thus, under the Board’s practice a majority of the craft or class, as required by § 2, Fourth, does have the right to determine who shall be the representative of the group or, indeed, whether they shall have any representation at all. It is also claimed that since § 9 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 453, as amended, 61 Stat. 143, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (a) (1958 ed.) and § 2, Ninth of the Railway Labor Act are both designed to encourage collective bargaining and the National Labor Relations Board uses a ballot with a “no union” box, the Mediation Board must use one also. Even assuming that the “no union” ballot would implement the purpose of the Act, this is a far cry from saying that it is the only form of ballot that would do so. Given broad discretion as it is the Mediation Board has followed a presumption contrary to that adhered to by the Labor Relations Board. The latter has tailored its ballot to conform to the presumption of Virginian R. Co. If in a Labor Board election, an employee does not vote, he can safely be presumed to have acquiesced in the will of the majority of the voters. In a Mediation Board election, if the employee refuses to vote he is treated as having voted for no representation. We venture no opinion as to whether the Board’s proposed ballot will best effectuate the purposes of the Act. We do say that there is nothing to suggest that in framing it the Board has exceeded its statutory authority. Unable to point to any specific requirement of a “no union” ballot in the Act, United and the Association are left to arguing in terms of policy and broad generalities as to what the Railway Labor Act should provide. The very nature of the arguments indicates that the Board’s choice of its proposed ballot is not subject to judicial review, for it was to avoid the haggling and delays of litigation that such questions were left to the Board. These are matters for Congress and the Board rather than the courts. Here the Board — a creature of Congress — has been, as we have said, careful to provide fair, yet effective procedures and we feel certain that it will continue to do so. If its decision on the ballot is not acceptable, the place to go is to Congress, not to us. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments in Nos. 138 and 369 and affirm the judgment in No. 139. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Black concurs in the result. Section 2, Ninth provides: “If any dispute shall arise among a carrier’s employees as to who are the representatives of such employees designated and authorized in accordance with the requirements of this chapter, it shall be the duty of the Mediation Board, upon request of either party to the dispute, to investigate such dispute and to certify to both parties, in writing, within thirty days after the receipt of the invocation of its services, the name or names of the individuals or organizations that have been designated and authorized to represent the employees involved in the dispute, and certify the same to the carrier. Upon receipt of such certification the carrier shall treat with the representative so certified as the representative of the craft or class for the purposes of this chapter. In such an investigation, the Mediation Board shall be authorized to take a secret ballot of the employees involved, or to utilize any other appropriate method of ascertaining the names of their duly designated and authorized representatives in such manner as shall insure the choice of representatives by the employees without interference, influence, or coercion exercised by the carrier. In the conduct of any election for the purposes herein indicated the Board shall designate who may participate in the election and establish the rules to govern the election, or may appoint a committee of three neutral persons who after hearing shall within ten days designate the employees who may participate in the election. . . .” 45 U. S. C. § 152, Ninth. Indeed in the keystone case dealing with the Railway Labor Act, Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation No. Jfi, supra, the validity of the Board’s certificate was attacked because it failed to recite the number of eligible voters in the craft or class in which the election was held. The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the certificate would be conclusive absent such a finding, but it commented: “But we think it plain that if the Board omits to certify any of them [the facts concerning the number of eligible voters, the number participating and the choice of the majority], the omitted fact is open to inquiry by the court asked to enforce the command of the statute. . . . Such inquiry was made by the trial court, which found the number of eligible voters and thus established the correctness of the Board’s ultimate conclusion.” Id., at 562. Ruby v. American Airlines, Inc., 323 F. 2d 248, 255; WES Chapter, Flight Engineers’ Int’l Assn. v. National Mediation Board, 114 U. S. App. D. C. 229, 232, 314 F. 2d 234, 237. It should be noted, however, that in nearly all cases subsequent to Nos. C-2252 and C-2389, the Board has held elections among clerical, office, stores, fleet and passenger service employees without re-examining that grouping and without noticeable protest. Mr. Thompson, Executive Secretary of the Board, lists 19 such cases in his affidavit in the District Court supporting the Board’s motion to dismiss. This hardly supports United’s contention that the Board is clinging in this case to a determination it has found obsolete. The legislative history supports the view that the employees are to have the option of rejecting collective representation. The ballot that the Board proposes to use in future elections fully comports with this conception of the Act. Using the Board’s ballot an employee may refrain from joining a union and refuse to bargain collectively. All he need do is not vote and this is considered a vote against representation under the Board’s practice of requiring that a majority of the eligible voters in a craft or class actually vote for some representative before the election is valid. The practicalities of voting — the fact that many who favor some representation will not vote — are in favor of the employee who wants “no union.” Indeed, the method proposed by the Board might .well be more effective than providing a “no union” box, since, if one were added, a failure to vote would then be taken as a vote approving the choice of the majority of those voting. This is the practice of the National Labor Relations Board. The Solicitor General’s changes would leave the slots on the ballot intact (not supplying a “no union” box) but would append the following caption: “INSTRUCTIONS FOR VOTING “No employee is required to vote. If less than a majority of the employees cast valid ballots, no representative will be certified.” It is this revised form of ballot which the Court today approves, rather than the old form which was before the Court of Appeals. The original § 9 (c) of the Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 453, stated the Labor Board’s powers in the following language: “Whenever a question affecting commerce arises concerning the representation of employees, the Board may investigate such controversy and certify to the parties, in writing, the name or names of the representatives that have been designated or selected. In any such investigation, the Board shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice, either in conjunction with a proceeding under section 10 or otherwise, and may take a secret ballot of employees, or utilize any other suitable method to ascertain such representatives.” Compare § 2, Ninth of the Railway Labor Act: "If any dispute shall arise among a carrier’s employees as to who are the representatives of such employees designated and authorized in accordance with the requirements of this chapter, it shall be the duty of the Mediation Board, upon request of either party to the dispute, to investigate such dispute and to certify to both parties, in writing, within thirty days after the receipt of the invocation of its services, the name or names of the individuals or organizations that have been designated and authorized to represent the employees involved in the dispute, and certify the same to the carrier. ... In such an investigation, the Mediation Board shall be authorized to take a secret ballot of the emploj'ees involved, or to utilize any other appropriate method of ascertaining the names of their duly designated and authorized representatives in such manner as shall insure the choice of representatives by the employees without interference, influence, or coercion exercised by the carrier. . . 45 U. S. C. §152, Ninth (1958 ed.). The similarity in the purposes of the Wagner Act and the Railway Labor Act was pointed out in the report of the House Committee on Labor which stated that “the bill is merely an amplification and further clarification of the principles enacted into law by the Railway Labor Act . . . .” H. R. Rep. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3. See 40 Op. Atty. Gen. 541 (Attorney General Clark).
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them. Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer. Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.
Who is the petitioner of the case?
[ "attorney general of the United States, or his office", "specified state board or department of education", "city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit", "state commission, board, committee, or authority", "county government or county governmental unit, except school district", "court or judicial district", "state department or agency", "governmental employee or job applicant", "female governmental employee or job applicant", "minority governmental employee or job applicant", "minority female governmental employee or job applicant", "not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable", "retired or former governmental employee", "U.S. House of Representatives", "interstate compact", "judge", "state legislature, house, or committee", "local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough", "governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact", "state or U.S. supreme court", "local school district or board of education", "U.S. Senate", "U.S. senator", "foreign nation or instrumentality", "state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of", "state college or university", "United States", "State", "person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime", "advertising business or agency", "agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor", "airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes", "airline", "distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages", "alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked", "American Medical Association", "National Railroad Passenger Corp.", "amusement establishment, or recreational facility", "arrested person, or pretrial detainee", "attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association", "author, copyright holder", "bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company", "bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization", "establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store", "water transportation, stevedore", "bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines", "brewery, distillery", "broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm", "construction industry", "bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle", "business, corporation", "buyer, purchaser", "cable TV", "car dealer", "person convicted of crime", "tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband", "chemical company", "child, children, including adopted or illegitimate", "religious organization, institution, or person", "private club or facility", "coal company or coal mine operator", "computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software", "consumer, consumer organization", "creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company", "person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial", "defendant", "debtor", "real estate developer", "disabled person or disability benefit claimant", "distributor", "person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector", "drug manufacturer", "druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy", "employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of", "employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan", "electric equipment manufacturer", "electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company", "eleemosynary institution or person", "environmental organization", "employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.", "farmer, farm worker, or farm organization", "father", "female employee or job applicant", "female", "movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of", "fisherman or fishing company", "food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard", "foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity", "franchiser", "franchisee", "lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization", "person who guarantees another's obligations", "handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to", "health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor", "heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be", "hospital, medical center", "husband, or ex-husband", "involuntarily committed mental patient", "Indian, including Indian tribe or nation", "insurance company, or surety", "inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder", "investor", "injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related", "juvenile", "government contractor", "holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor", "magazine", "male", "medical or Medicaid claimant", "medical supply or manufacturing co.", "racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant", "minority female employee or job applicant", "manufacturer", "management, executive officer, or director, of business entity", "military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist", "mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company", "mother", "auto manufacturer", "newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service", "radio and television network, except cable tv", "nonprofit organization or business", "nonresident", "nuclear power plant or facility", "owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels", "shareholders to whom a tender offer is made", "tender offer", "oil company, or natural gas producer", "elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly", "out of state noncriminal defendant", "political action committee", "parent or parents", "parking lot or service", "patient of a health professional", "telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company", "physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society", "public interest organization", "physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee", "pipe line company", "package, luggage, container", "political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official", "indigent, needy, welfare recipient", "indigent defendant", "private person", "prisoner, inmate of penal institution", "professional organization, business, or person", "probationer, or parolee", "protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer", "public utility", "publisher, publishing company", "radio station", "racial or ethnic minority", "person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination", "racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "realtor", "journalist, columnist, member of the news media", "resident", "restaurant, food vendor", "retarded person, or mental incompetent", "retired or former employee", "railroad", "private school, college, or university", "seller or vendor", "shipper, including importer and exporter", "shopping center, mall", "spouse, or former spouse", "stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder", "retail business or outlet", "student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only", "tenant or lessee", "theater, studio", "forest products, lumber, or logging company", "person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent", "trucking company, or motor carrier", "television station", "union member", "unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant", "union, labor organization, or official of", "veteran", "voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)", "wholesale trade", "wife, or ex-wife", "witness, or person under subpoena", "network", "slave", "slave-owner", "bank of the united states", "timber company", "u.s. job applicants or employees", "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "General Land Office of Commissioners", "Transportation Security Administration", "Surface Transportation Board", "U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.", "Reconstruction Finance Corp.", "Department or Secretary of Homeland Security", "Unidentifiable", "International Entity" ]
[ 177 ]
sc
NORDLINGER v. HAHN, in his capacity as TAX ASSESSOR FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY, et al. No. 90-1912. Argued February 25, 1992 Decided June 18, 1992 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, O’Connor, Scaua, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined, and in which Thomas, J., joined as to Part II-A. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 18. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 28. Carlyle W. Hall, Jr., argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Rex E. Lee argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Carter G. Phillips, Mark D. Hopson, De-Witt W. Clinton, David L. Muir, and Albert Ramseyer Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Building Industry Association of Southern California, Inc., et al. by Brent N. Rush-forth, Bruce J. Ennis, Jr., and Anthony C. Epstein; and for William K. Rentz, pro se. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of California by Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, and Robert D. Milam, Deputy Attorney General; for Pete Wilson, Governor of California, et al. by L. Michael Bogart; for the California Taxpayers’ Association by Robert Joe Hull and Douglas L. Kindrick; for the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association et al. by Ronald A Zumbrun, John H. Findley, Anthony T. Caso, and Trevor A Grimm; for the People’s Advocate, Inc., et al. by Jayna P. Kapinski; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo and John C. Scully. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Senate of the State of California by Jeremiah F. Hallisey; for the American Planning Association et al. by William W. Abbott and Marilee Hanson; for the California Assessors’ Association by Douglas J. Maloney and Allen A Haim; for the International Association of Assessing Officers by James F. Gossett; and for the League of Women Voters of California by Steven C. McCracken and Robert E. Palmer. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1978, California voters staged what has been described as a property tax revolt by approving a statewide ballot initiative known as Proposition 13. The adoption of Proposition 13 served to amend the California Constitution to impose strict limits on the rate at which real property is taxed and on the rate at which real property assessments are increased from year to year. In this litigation, we consider a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the manner in which real property now is assessed under the California Constitution. I A Proposition 13 followed many years of rapidly rising real property taxes in California. From fiscal years 1967-1968 to 1971-1972, revenues from these taxes increased on an average of 11.5% per year. See Report of the Senate Commission on Property Tax Equity and Revenue to the California State Senate 23 (1991) (Senate Commission Report). In response, the California Legislature enacted several property tax relief measures, including a cap on tax rates in 1972. Id., at 23-24. The boom in the State’s real estate market persevered, however, and the median price of an existing home doubled from $31,530 in 1973 to $62,430 in 1977. As a result, tax levies continued to rise because of sharply increasing assessment values. Id., at 23. Some homeowners saw their tax bills double or triple during this period, well outpacing any growth in their income and ability to pay. Id., at 25. See also Oakland, Proposition 13 — Genesis and Consequences, 32 Nat. Tax J. 387, 392 (Supp. June 1979). By 1978, property tax relief had emerged as a major political issue in California. In only one month’s time, tax relief advocates collected over 1.2 million signatures to qualify Proposition 13 for the June 1978 ballot. See Lefcoe & Allison, The Legal Aspects of Proposition 13: The Amador Valley Case, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 173, 174 (1978). On election day, Proposition 13 received a favorable vote of 64.8% and carried 55 of the State’s 58 counties. California Secretary of State, Statement of Vote and Supplement, Primary Election, June 6, 1978, p. 39. California thus had a novel constitutional amendment that led to a property tax cut of approximately $7 billion in the first year. Senate Commission Report 28. A California homeowner with a $50,000 home enjoyed an immediate reduction of about $750 per year in property taxes. Id., at 26. As enacted by Proposition 13, Article XIIIA of the California Constitution caps real property taxes at 1% of a property’s “full cash value.” § 1(a). “Full cash value” is defined as the assessed valuation as of the 1975-1976 tax year or, “thereafter, the appraised value of real property when purchased, newly constructed, or a change in ownership has occurred after the 1975 assessment.” §2(a). The assessment “may reflect from year to year the inflationary rate not to exceed 2 percent for any given year.” § 2(b). Article XIIIA also contains several exemptions from this reassessment provision. One exemption authorizes the legislature to allow homeowners over the age of 55 who sell their principal residences to carry their previous base-year assessments with them to replacement residences of equal or lesser value. §2(a). A second exemption applies to transfers of a principal residence (and up to $1 million of other real property) between parents and children. §2(h). In short, Article XIIIA combines a 1% ceiling on the property tax rate with a 2% cap on annual increases in assessed valuations. The assessment limitation, however, is subject to the exception that new construction or a change of ownership triggers a reassessment up to current appraised value. Thus, the assessment provisions of Article XIIIA essentially embody an “acquisition value” system of taxation rather than the more commonplace “current value” taxation. Real property is assessed at values related to the value of the property at the time it is acquired by the taxpayer rather than to the value it has in the current real estate market. Over time, this acquisition-value system has created dramatic disparities in the taxes paid by persons owning similar pieces of property. Property values in California have inflated far in excess of the allowed 2% cap on increases in assessments for property that is not newly constructed or that has not changed hands. See Senate Commission Report 31-32. As a result, longer term property owners pay lower property taxes reflecting historic property values, while newer owners pay higher property taxes reflecting more recent values. For that reason, Proposition 13 has been labeled by some as a “welcome stranger” system — the newcomer to an established community is “welcome” in anticipation that he will contribute a larger percentage of support for locál government than his settled neighbor who owns a comparable home. Indeed, in dollar terms, the differences in tax burdens are staggering. By 1989, the 44% of California homeowners who have owned their homes since enactment of Proposition 13 in 1978 shouldered only 25% of the more than $4 billion in residential property taxes paid by homeowners statewide. Id., at 33. If property values continue to rise more than the annual 2% inflationary cap, this disparity will continue to grow. B According to her amended complaint, petitioner Stephanie Nordlinger in November 1988 purchased a house in the Baldwin Hills neighborhood of Los Angeles County for $170,000. App. 5. The prior owners bought the home just two years before for $121,500. Id., at 6. Before her purchase, petitioner had lived in a rented apartment in Los Angeles and had not owned any real property in California. Id., at 5; Tr. of Oral Arg. 12. In early 1989, petitioner received a notice from the Los Angeles County Tax Assessor, who is a respondent here, informing her that her home had been reassessed upward to $170,100 on account of its change in ownership. App. 7. She learned that the reassessment resulted in a property tax increase of $453.60, up 36% to $1,701, for the 1988-1989 fiscal year. Ibid. Petitioner later discovered she was paying about five times more in taxes than some of her neighbors who owned comparable homes since 1975 within the same residential development. For example, one block away, a house of identical size on a lot slightly larger than petitioner’s was subject to a general tax levy of only $358.20 (based on an assessed valuation of $35,820, which reflected the home’s value in 1975 plus the up-to-2% per year inflation factor). Id., at 9-10. According to petitioner, her total property taxes over the first 10 years in her home will approach $19,000, while any neighbor who bought a comparable home in 1975 stands to pay just $4,100. Brief for Petitioner 3. The general tax levied against her modest home is only a few dollars short of that paid by a pre-1976 owner of a $2.1 million Malibu beachfront home. App. 24. After exhausting administrative remedies, petitioner brought suit against respondents in Los Angeles County Superior Court. She sought a tax refund and a declaration that her tax was unconstitutional. In her amended complaint, she alleged: “Article XIIIA has created an arbitrary-system which assigns disparate real property tax burdens on owners of generally comparable and similarly situated properties without regard to the use of the real property taxed, the burden the property places on government, the actual value of the property or the financial capability of the property owner.” Id., at 12. Respondents demurred. Id., at 14. By minute order, the Superior Court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the complaint without leave to amend. App. to Pet. for Cert. D2. The California Court of Appeal affirmed. Nordlinger v. Lynch, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1259, 275 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1990). It noted that the Supreme Court of California already had rejected a constitutional challenge to the disparities in taxation resulting from Article XIIIA. See Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P. 2d 1281 (1978). Characterizing Article XIIIA as an “acquisition value” system, the Court of Appeal found it survived equal protection review, because it was supported by at least two rational bases: First, it prevented property taxes from reflecting unduly inflated and unforeseen current values, and, second, it allowed property owners to estimate future liability with substantial certainty. 225 Cal. App. 3d, at 1273, 275 Cal. Rptr., at 691-692 (citing Amador, 22 Cal. 3d, at 235, 583 P. 2d, at 1293). The Court of Appeal also concluded that this Court’s more recent decision in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm’n of Webster Cty., 488 U. S. 336 (1989), did not warrant a different result. At issue in Allegheny Pittsburgh was the practice of a West Virginia county tax assessor of assessing recently purchased property on the basis of its purchase price, while making only minor modifications in the assessments of property that had not recently been sold. Properties that had been sold recently were reassessed and taxed at values between 8 and 35 times that of properties that had not been sold. Id., at 341. This Court determined that the unequal assessment practice violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court of Appeal distinguished Allegheny Pittsburgh on the grounds that “California has opted for an assessment method based on each individual owner’s acquisition cost,” while, “[i]n marked contrast, the West Virginia Constitution requires property to be taxed at a uniform rate statewide according to its estimated current market value” (emphasis in original). 225 Cal. App. 3d, at 1277-1278, 275 Cal. Rptr., at 695. Thus, the Court of Appeal found: “Allegheny does not prohibit the states from adopting an acquisition value assessment method. That decision merely prohibits the arbitrary enforcement of a current value assessment method” (emphasis omitted). Id., at 1265, 275 Cal. Rptr., at 686. The Court of Appeal also rejected petitioner’s argument that the effect of Article XIIIA on the constitutional right to travel warranted heightened equal protection review. The court determined that the right to travel was not infringed, because Article XIIIA “bases each property owner’s assessment on acquisition value, irrespective of the owner’s status as a California resident or the owner’s length of residence in the state.” Id., at 1281, 275 Cal. Rptr., at 697. Any benefit to longtime California residents was deemed “incidental” to an acquisition-value approach. Finally, the Court of Appeal found its conclusion was unchanged by the exemptions in Article XIIIA. Ibid. The Supreme Court of California denied review. App. to Pet. for Cert. Bl. We granted certiorari. 502 U. S. 807 (1991). II The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, § 1, commands that no State shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Of course, most laws differentiate in some fashion between classes of persons. The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid classifications. It simply keeps governmental deci-sionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike. F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920). As a general rule, “legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality.” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425-426 (1961). Accordingly, this Court’s eases are clear that, unless a classification warrants some form of heightened review because it jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental right or categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the classification rationally further a legitimate state interest. See, e. g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432, 439-441 (1985); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303 (1976). A At the outset, petitioner suggests that Article XIIIA qualifies for heightened scrutiny because it infringes upon the constitutional right to travel. See, e. g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S. 55, 60, n. 6 (1982); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250, 254-256 (1974). In particular, petitioner alleges that the exemptions to reassessment for transfers by owners over the age of 55 and for transfers between parents and children run afoul of the right to travel, because they classify directly on the basis of California residency. But the complaint does not allege that petitioner herself has been impeded from traveling or from settling in California because, as has been noted, prior to purchasing her home, petitioner lived in an apartment in Los Angeles. This Court’s prudential standing principles impose a “general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751 (1984). See also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163, 166 (1972). Petitioner has not identified any obstacle preventing others who wish to travel or settle in California from asserting claims on their own behalf, nor has she shown any special relationship with those whose rights she seeks to assert, such that we might overlook this prudential limitation. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U. S. 617, 623, n. 3 (1989). Accordingly, petitioner may not assert the constitutional right to travel as a basis for heightened review. B The appropriate standard of review is whether the difference in treatment between newer and older owners rationally furthers a legitimate state interest. In general, the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is a plausible policy reason for the classification, see United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 174, 179 (1980), the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based rationally may have been considered to be true by the governmental decisionmaker, see Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U. S. 456, 464 (1981), and the relationship of the classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational, see Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S., at 446. This standard is especially deferential in the context of classifications made by complex tax laws. “[I]n structuring internal taxation schemes ‘the States have large leeway in making classifications and drawing lines which in their judgment produce reasonable systems of taxation.’ ” Williams v. Vermont, 472 U. S. 14, 22 (1985), quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U. S. 356, 359 (1973). See also Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U. S. 540, 547 (1983) (“Legislatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes”). As between newer and older owners, Article XIIIA does not discriminate with respect to either the tax rate or the annual rate of adjustment in assessments. Newer and older owners alike benefit in both the short and long run from the protections of a 1% tax rate ceiling and no more than a 2% increase in assessment value per year. New owners and old owners are treated differently with respect to one factor only — the basis on which their property is initially assessed. Petitioner’s true complaint is that the State has denied her— a new owner — the benefit of the same assessment value that her neighbors — older owners — enjoy. We have no difficulty in ascertaining at least two rational or reasonable considerations of difference or policy that justify denying petitioner the benefits of her neighbors’ lower assessments. First, the State has a legitimate interest in local neighborhood preservation, continuity, and stability. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926). The State therefore legitimately can decide to structure its tax system to discourage rapid turnover in ownership of homes and businesses, for example, in order to inhibit displacement of lower income families by the forces of gentrifi-eation or of established, “mom-and-pop” businesses by newer chain operations. By permitting older owners to pay progressively less in taxes than new owners of comparable property, the Article XIIIA assessment scheme rationally furthers this interest. Second, the State legitimately can conclude that a new owner at the time of acquiring his property does not have the same reliance interest warranting protection against higher taxes as does an existing owner. The State may deny a new owner at the point of purchase the right to “lock in” to the same assessed value as is enjoyed by an existing owner of comparable property, because an existing owner rationally may be thought to have vested expectations in his property or home that are more deserving of protection than the antic-ipator expectations of a new owner at the point of purchase. A new owner has full information about the scope of future tax liability before acquiring the property, and if he thinks the future tax burden is too demanding, he can decide not to complete the purchase at all. By contrast, the existing owner, already saddled with his purchase, does not have the option of deciding not to buy his home if taxes become prohibitively high. To meet his tax obligations, he might be forced to sell his home or to divert his income away from the purchase of food, clothing, and other necessities. In short, the State may decide that it is worse to have owned and lost, than never to have owned at all. This Court previously has acknowledged that classifications serving to protect legitimate expectation and reliance interests do not deny equal protection of the laws. “The protection of reasonable reliance interests is not only a legitimate governmental objective: it provides an exceedingly persuasive justification_” Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U. S. 728, 746 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). For example, in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U. S. 450 (1988), the Court determined that a prohibition on user fees for bus service in “reorganized” school districts, but not in “nonreorganized” school districts, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, because “the legislature could conceivably have believed that such a policy would serve the legitimate purpose of fulfilling the reasonable expectations of those residing in districts with free busing arrangements imposed by reorganization plans.” Id., at 465. Similarly, in United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, the Court determined that a denial of dual “windfall” retirement benefits to some railroad workers, but not others, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, because “Congress could properly conclude that persons who had actually acquired statutory entitlement to windfall benefits while still employed in the railroad industry had a greater equitable claim to those benefits than the members of appellee’s class who were no longer in railroad employment when they became eligible for dual benefits.” 449 U. S., at 178. Finally, in New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297 (1976), the Court determined that an ordinance banning certain street-vendor operations, but grandfathering existing vendors who had been in operation for more than eight years, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the “city could reasonably decide that newer businesses were less likely to have built up substantial reliance interests in continued operation.” Id., at 305. Petitioner argues that Article XIIIA cannot be distinguished from the tax assessment practice found to violate the Equal Protection Clause in Allegheny Pittsburgh. Like Article XIIIA, the practice at issue in Allegheny Pittsburgh resulted in dramatic disparities in taxation of properties of comparable value. But an obvious and critical factual difference between this ease and Allegheny Pittsburgh is the absence of any indication in Allegheny Pittsburgh that the policies underlying an acquisition-value taxation scheme could conceivably have been the purpose for the Webster County tax assessor’s unequal assessment scheme. In the first place, Webster County argued that “its assessment scheme is rationally related to its purpose of assessing properties at true current value” (emphasis added). 488 U. S., at 343. Moreover, the West Virginia “Constitution and laws provide that all property of the kind held by petitioners shall be taxed at a rate uniform throughout the State according to its estimated market value,” and the Court found “no suggestion” that “the State may have adopted a different system in practice from that specified by statute.” Id., at 345. To be sure, the Equal Protection Clause does not demand for purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature or governing decisionmaker actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification. United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S., at 179. See also McDonald v. Board of Election Comm’rs of Chicago, 394 U. S. 802, 809 (1969) (legitimate state purpose may be ascertained even when the legislative or administrative history is silent). Nevertheless, this Court’s review does require that a purpose may conceivably or “may reasonably have been the purpose and policy” of the relevant governmental decisionmaker. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bow ers, 358 U. S. 522, 528-529 (1959). See also Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U. S. 221, 235 (1981) (classifieatory scheme must “rationally advanc[e] a reasonable and identifiable governmental objective” (emphasis added)). Allegheny Pittsburgh was the rare case where the facts precluded any plausible inference that the reason for the unequal assessment practice was to achieve the benefits of an acquisition-value tax scheme. By contrast, Article XIIIA was enacted precisely to achieve the benefits of an acquisition-value system. Allegheny Pittsburgh is not controlling here. Finally, petitioner contends that the unfairness of Article XIIIA is made worse by its exemptions from reassessment for two special classes of new owners: persons aged 55 and older, who exchange principal residences, and children who acquire property from their parents. This Court previously has declined to hold that narrow exemptions from a general scheme of taxation necessarily render the overall scheme invidiously discriminatory. See, e. g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash, 461 U. S., at 550-551 (denial of tax exemption to nonprofit lobbying organizations, but with an exception for veterans’ groups, does not violate equal protection). For purposes of rational-basis review, the “latitude of discretion is notably wide in . . . the granting of partial or total exemptions upon grounds of policy.” F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S., at 415. The two exemptions at issue here rationally further legitimate purposes. The people of California reasonably could have concluded that older persons in general should not be discouraged from moving to a residence more suitable to their changing family size or income. Similarly, the people of California reasonably could have concluded that the interests of family and neighborhood continuity and stability are furthered by and warrant an exemption for transfers between parents and children. Petitioner has not demonstrated that no rational bases lie for either of these exemptions. Ill Petitioner and amici argue with some appeal that Article XIIIA frustrates the “American dream” of home ownership for many younger and poorer California families. They argue that Article XIIIA places startup businesses that depend on ownership of property at a severe disadvantage in competing with established businesses. They argue that Article XIIIA dampens demand for and construction of new housing and buildings. And they argue that Article XIIIA constricts local tax revenues at the expense of public education and vital services. Time and again, however, this Court has made clear in the rational-basis context that the “Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted” (footnote omitted). Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93, 97 (1979). Certainly, California’s grand experiment appears to vest benefits in a broad, powerful, and entrenched segment of society, and, as the Court of Appeal surmised, ordinary democratic processes may be unlikely to prompt its reconsideration or repeal. See 225 Cal. App. 3d, at 1282, n. 11, 275 Cal. Rptr., at 698, n. 11. Yet many wise and well-intentioned laws suffer from the same malady. Article XIIIA is not palpably arbitrary, and we must decline petitioner’s request to upset the will of the people of California. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. It is so ordered. See N. Y. Times, June 8, 1978, p. 23, col. 1; Washington Post, June 11, 1978, p. H1. Petitioner proffered to the trial court additional evidence suggesting that the disparities in residential tax burdens were greater in other Los Angeles County neighborhoods. For example, a small two-bedroom house in Santa Monica that was previously assessed at $27,000 and that was sold for $465,000 in 1989 would be subject to a tax levy of $4,650, a bill 17 times more than the $270 paid the year before by the previous owner. App. 76-77. Petitioner also proffered evidence suggesting that similar disparities obtained with respect to apartment buildings and commercial and industrial income-producing properties. Id., at 68-69,82-85. California by statute grants a cause of action to a taxpayer “where the alleged illegal or unconstitutional assessment or collection occurs as the direct result of a change in administrative regulations or statutory or constitutional law that became effective not more than 12 months prior to the date the action is initiated by the taxpayer.” Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. § 4808 (West 1987). Although Proposition 13 was enacted 11 years before she filed her complaint, petitioner contended that the relevant change in law was this Court's decision in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm’n of Webster Cty., 488 U. S. 336 (1989), decided 9 months before petitioner filed her amended complaint. Because the California courts did not discuss whether petitioner's action was timely under §4808, we do not do so. Outside the context of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has not hesitated to recognize the legitimacy of protecting reliance and expectational interests. See, e. g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 143 (1978) ("[PJrotection of the Fourth Amendment depends . . . upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place”); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 124 (1978) (whether regulation of property constitutes a “taking” depends in part on “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations”); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 601 (1972) (state-law “property” interest for purpose of federal due process denotes “interests that are secured by existing rules or understandings”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because we conclude that Article XIIIA rationally furthers the State’s interests in neighborhood stability and the protection of property owners’ reliance interests, we need not' consider whether it permissibly serves other interests discussed by the parties, including whether it taxes real property according to the taxpayers’ ability to pay or whether it taxes real property in such a way as to promote stability of local tax revenues. Webster County argued that the outdated assessments it used were consistent with current-value taxation, because periodic upward adjustments were made for inflation and it was not feasible to reassess individually each piece of property every year. Although the county obliquely referred in a footnote to the advantages of historical cost accounting, Brief for Respondent in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm’n of Webster Cty., O. T. 1988, No. 87-1303, p. 30, n. 23, this was not an assertion of the general policies supporting acquisition-value taxation. Even if acquisition-value policies had been asserted, the assertion would have been nonsensical given its inherent inconsistency with the county’s principal argument that it was in fact trying to promote current-value taxation. In Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 368 U. S. 622 (1959), the Court distinguished on similar grounds its decision in Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562 (1949), which invalidated a state statutory scheme exempting from taxation certain notes and accounts receivable owned by residents of the State but not notes and accounts receivable owned by nonresidents. 358 U. S., at 529. After the Court in Wheeling Steel determined that the statutory scheme’s stated purpose was not legitimate, the other purposes did not need to be considered because “[h]aving themselves specifically declared their purpose, the Ohio statutes left no room to conceive of any other purpose for their existence.” 358 U. S., at 530. In finding Allegheny Pittsburgh distinguishable, we do not suggest that the protections of the Equal Protection Clause are any less when the classification is drawn by legislative mandate, as in this case, than by administrative action, as in Allegheny Pittsburgh. See Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 352 (1918). Nor do we suggest that the Equal Protection Clause constrains administrators, as in Allegheny Pittsburgh, from violating state law requiring uniformity of taxation of property. See Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Browning, 310 U. S. 362, 368-370 (1940); Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. County of King, 264 U. S. 22, 27-28 (1924). See generally Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1, 8-11 (1944).
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them. Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer. Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.
Who is the respondent of the case?
[ "attorney general of the United States, or his office", "specified state board or department of education", "city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit", "state commission, board, committee, or authority", "county government or county governmental unit, except school district", "court or judicial district", "state department or agency", "governmental employee or job applicant", "female governmental employee or job applicant", "minority governmental employee or job applicant", "minority female governmental employee or job applicant", "not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable", "retired or former governmental employee", "U.S. House of Representatives", "interstate compact", "judge", "state legislature, house, or committee", "local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough", "governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact", "state or U.S. supreme court", "local school district or board of education", "U.S. Senate", "U.S. senator", "foreign nation or instrumentality", "state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of", "state college or university", "United States", "State", "person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime", "advertising business or agency", "agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor", "airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes", "airline", "distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages", "alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked", "American Medical Association", "National Railroad Passenger Corp.", "amusement establishment, or recreational facility", "arrested person, or pretrial detainee", "attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association", "author, copyright holder", "bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company", "bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization", "establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store", "water transportation, stevedore", "bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines", "brewery, distillery", "broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm", "construction industry", "bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle", "business, corporation", "buyer, purchaser", "cable TV", "car dealer", "person convicted of crime", "tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband", "chemical company", "child, children, including adopted or illegitimate", "religious organization, institution, or person", "private club or facility", "coal company or coal mine operator", "computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software", "consumer, consumer organization", "creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company", "person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial", "defendant", "debtor", "real estate developer", "disabled person or disability benefit claimant", "distributor", "person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector", "drug manufacturer", "druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy", "employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of", "employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan", "electric equipment manufacturer", "electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company", "eleemosynary institution or person", "environmental organization", "employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.", "farmer, farm worker, or farm organization", "father", "female employee or job applicant", "female", "movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of", "fisherman or fishing company", "food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard", "foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity", "franchiser", "franchisee", "lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization", "person who guarantees another's obligations", "handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to", "health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor", "heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be", "hospital, medical center", "husband, or ex-husband", "involuntarily committed mental patient", "Indian, including Indian tribe or nation", "insurance company, or surety", "inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder", "investor", "injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related", "juvenile", "government contractor", "holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor", "magazine", "male", "medical or Medicaid claimant", "medical supply or manufacturing co.", "racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant", "minority female employee or job applicant", "manufacturer", "management, executive officer, or director, of business entity", "military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist", "mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company", "mother", "auto manufacturer", "newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service", "radio and television network, except cable tv", "nonprofit organization or business", "nonresident", "nuclear power plant or facility", "owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels", "shareholders to whom a tender offer is made", "tender offer", "oil company, or natural gas producer", "elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly", "out of state noncriminal defendant", "political action committee", "parent or parents", "parking lot or service", "patient of a health professional", "telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company", "physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society", "public interest organization", "physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee", "pipe line company", "package, luggage, container", "political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official", "indigent, needy, welfare recipient", "indigent defendant", "private person", "prisoner, inmate of penal institution", "professional organization, business, or person", "probationer, or parolee", "protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer", "public utility", "publisher, publishing company", "radio station", "racial or ethnic minority", "person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination", "racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "realtor", "journalist, columnist, member of the news media", "resident", "restaurant, food vendor", "retarded person, or mental incompetent", "retired or former employee", "railroad", "private school, college, or university", "seller or vendor", "shipper, including importer and exporter", "shopping center, mall", "spouse, or former spouse", "stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder", "retail business or outlet", "student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only", "tenant or lessee", "theater, studio", "forest products, lumber, or logging company", "person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent", "trucking company, or motor carrier", "television station", "union member", "unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant", "union, labor organization, or official of", "veteran", "voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)", "wholesale trade", "wife, or ex-wife", "witness, or person under subpoena", "network", "slave", "slave-owner", "bank of the united states", "timber company", "u.s. job applicants or employees", "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "General Land Office of Commissioners", "Transportation Security Administration", "Surface Transportation Board", "U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.", "Reconstruction Finance Corp.", "Department or Secretary of Homeland Security", "Unidentifiable", "International Entity" ]
[ 18 ]
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COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. LoBUE. No. 373. Argued March 6, 1956. Decided May 28, 1956. Philip Elman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobelojf, Assistant Attorney General Holland, Acting Assistant Attorney General Rice, Hilbert P. Zarky and Joseph F. Goetten. Richard F. Barrett argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Melville F. Weston. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves the federal income tax liability of respondent LoBue for the years 1946 and 1947. From 1941 to 1947 LoBue was manager of the New York Sales Division of the Michigan Chemical Corporation, a producer and distributor of chemical supplies. In 1944 the company adopted a stock option plan making 10,000 shares of its common stock available for distribution to key employees at $5 per share over a 3-year period. LoBue and a number of other employees were notified that they had been tentatively chosen to be recipients of nontransferable stock options contingent upon their continued employment. LoBue’s notice told him: “You may be assigned a greater or less amount of stock based entirely upon your individual results and that of the entire organization.” About 6 months later he was notified that he had been definitely awarded an option to buy 150 shares of stock in recognition of his “contribution and efforts in making the operation of the Company successful.” As to future allotments he was told “It is up to you to justify your participation in the plan during the next two years.” LoBue’s work was so satisfactory that the company in the course of 3 years delivered to him 3 stock options covering 340 shares. He exercised all these $5 per share options in 1946 and in 1947, paying the company only $1,700 for stock having a market value when delivered of $9,930. Thus, at the end of these transactions, LoBue’s employer was worth $8,230 less to its stockholders and LoBue was worth $8,230 more than before. The company deducted this sum as an expense in its 1946 and 1947 tax returns but LoBue did not report any part of it as income. Viewing the gain to LoBue as compensation for personal services the Commissioner levied a deficiency assessment against him, relying on § 22 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 53 Stat. 9, as amended, 53 Stat. 574, which defines gross income as including “gains, profits, and income derived from . . . compensation for personal service ... of whatever kind and in whatever form paid . . . .” LoBue petitioned the Tax Court to redetermine the deficiency, urging that “The said options were not intended by the Corporation or the petitioner to constitute additional compensation but were granted to permit the petitioner to acquire a proprietary interest in the Corporation and to provide him with the interest in the successful operation of the Corporation deriving from an ownership interest.” The Tax Court held that LoBue had a taxable gain if the options were intended as compensation but not if the options were designed to provide him with “a proprietary interest in the business.” Finding after hearings that the options were granted to give LoBue “a proprietary interest in the corporation, and not as compensation for services” the Tax Court held for LoBue. 22 T. C. 440, 443. Relying on this finding the Court of Appeals affirmed, saying: “This was a factual issue which it was the peculiar responsibility of the Tax Court to resolve. From our examination of the evidence we cannot say that its finding was clearly erroneous.” 223 F. 2d 367, 371. Disputes over the taxability of stock option transactions such as this are longstanding. We granted certiorari to consider whether the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals had given § 22 (a) too narrow an interpretation. 350 U. S. 893. We have repeatedly held that in defining “gross income” as broadly as it did in § 22 (a) Congress intended to “tax all gains except those specifically exempted.” See, e. g., Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U. S. 426, 429-430. The only exemption Congress provided from this very comprehensive definition of taxable income that could possibly have application here is the gift exemption of § 22 (b) (3). But there was not the slightest indication of the kind of detached and disinterested generosity which might evidence a “gift” in the statutory sense. These transfers of stock bore none of the earmarks of a gift. They were made by a company engaged in operating a business for profit, and the Tax Court found that the stock option plan was designed to achieve more profitable operations by providing the employees “with an incentive to promote the growth of the company by permitting them to participate in its success.” 22 T. C., at 445. Under these circumstances the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals properly refrained from treating this transfer as a gift. The company was not giving something away for nothing. Since the employer’s transfer of stock to its employee LoBue for much less than the stock’s value was not a gift, it seems impossible to say that it was not compensation. The Tax Court held there was no taxable income, however, on the ground that one purpose of the employer was to confer a “proprietary interest.” But there is not a word in § 22 (a) which indicates that its broad coverage should be narrowed because of an employer’s intention to enlist more efficient service from his employees by making them part proprietors of his business. In our view there is no statutory basis for the test established by the courts below. When assets are transferred by an employer to an employee to secure better services they are plainly compensation. It makes no difference that the compensation is paid in stock rather than in money. Section 22 (a) taxes income derived from compensation “in whatever form paid.” And in another stock option case we said that § 22 (a) “is broad enough to include in taxable income any economic or financial benefit conferred on the employee as compensation, whatever the form or mode by which it is effected.” Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U. S. 177, 181. LoBue received a very substantial economic and financial benefit from his employer prompted by the employer’s desire to get better work from him. This is “compensation for personal service” within the meaning of § 22 (a). LoBue nonetheless argues that we should treat this transaction as a mere purchase of a proprietary interest on which no taxable gain was “realized” in the year of purchase. It is true that our taxing system has ordinarily treated an arm’s length purchase of property even at a bargain price as giving rise to no taxable gain in the year of purchase. See Palmer v. Commissioner, 302 U. S. 63, 69. But that is not to say that when a transfer which is in reality compensation is given the form of a purchase the Government cannot tax the gain under §22 (a). The transaction here was unlike a mere purchase. It was not an arm’s length transaction between strangers. Instead it was an arrangement by which an employer transferred valuable property to his employees in recognition of their services. We hold that LoBue realized taxable gain when he purchased the stock. A question remains as to the time when the gain on the shares should be measured. LoBue gave his employer promissory notes for the option price of the first 300 shares but the shares were not delivered until the notes were paid in cash. The market value of the shares was lower when the notes were given than when the cash was paid. The Commissioner measured the taxable gain by the market value of the shares when the cash was paid. LoBue contends that this was wrong, and that the gain should be measured either when the options were granted or when the notes were given. It is of course possible for the recipient of a stock option to realize an immediate taxable gain. See Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U. S. 177, 181-182. The option might have a readily ascertainable market value and the recipient might be free to sell his option. But this is not such a case. These three options were not transferable and LoBue’s right to buy stock under them was contingent upon his remaining an employee of the company until they were exercised. Moreover, the uniform Treasury practice since 1923 has been to measure the compensation to employees given stock options subject to contingencies of this sort by the difference between the option price and the market value of the shares at the time the option is exercised. We relied in part upon this practice in Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U. S. 177, 324 U. S. 695. And in its 1950 Act affording limited tax benefits for “restricted stock option plans” Congress adopted the same kind of standard for measurement of gains. § 130A, Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as amended, 64 Stat. 942. And see § 421, Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 68A Stat. 142. Under these circumstances there is no reason for departing from the Treasury practice. The taxable gain to LoBue should be measured as of the time the options were exercised and not the time they were granted. It is possible that a bona fide delivery of a binding promissory note could mark the completion of the stock purchase and that gain should be measured as of that date. Since neither the Tax Court nor the Court of Appeals passed on this question the judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals with instructions to remand the case to the Tax Court for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded. There may be some question as to whether the first option was exercised in 1945 or 1946. See the discussion, infra, as to when the transactions were completed. The Commissioner assessed a deficiency on the basis of $8,680 although the record figures show a difference between option price and market value of $8,230. No explanation for the discrepancy appears in the record. See, e. g., Durkee v. Welch, 49 F. 2d 339; Erskine v. Commissioner, 26 B. T. A. 147; Geeseman v. Commissioner, 38 B. T. A. 258; Evans v. Commissioner, 38 B. T. A. 1406. See also Miller, The Treasury’s Proposal to Tax Employee’s Bargain Purchases, 56 Yale L. J. 706; Note, 64 Yale L. J. 269; 93 Cong. Rec. A4060-A4066; Surrey and Warren, Federal Income Taxation (1955 ed.), 653-674. Robertson v. United States, 343 U. S. 711, 713-714; Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U. S. 34. The Tax Court noted “that in practically all such cases as the one before us, both the element of additional compensation and the granting of a proprietary interest are present.” 22 T. C., at 445. See also Geeseman v. Commissioner, 38 B. T. A. 258, 263. Since our view of the statute requires taxation of gain here it is unnecessary for us to rely on the Treasury Regulations to reach that conclusion. Apparently the present regulations were not applicable to all of the options. See 26 CFR, Rev. 1953, § 39.22 (a)-l (c); 1939-1 Cum. Bull. 159; 1946-1 Cum. Bull. 15-18. And since the transactions in question here occurred prior to 1950 the 1950 statute establishing special tax treatment for “restricted stock option plans” has no relevance. See § 130A, Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as amended, 64 Stat. 942. And see § 421, Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 68A Stat. 142. LoBue paid cash for the last 40 shares. Cf. McNamara v. Commissioner, 210 F. 2d 505. See 1923 II-l Cum. Bull. 50; 1939-1 Cum. Bull. 159; 1946-1 Cum. Bull. 15-18; Dillavou, Employee Stock Options, 20 Accounting Review 320; Miller, The Treasury's Proposal to Tax Employee’s Bargain Purchases, 56 Yale L. J. 706, 713-715. See also Note, The Valuation of Option Stock Subject to Repurchase Options and Restraints on Sale, 62 Yale L. J. 832; Note, Tax Effects of Absence of Market Value on Employee Bargain Purchases, 21 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 464.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. If the case arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, note the source as "United States Supreme Court". If the case arose in a state court, note the source as "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", or "State Trial Court". Do not code the name of the state.
What is the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed?
[ "U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals", "U.S. Court of International Trade", "U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims", "U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces", "U.S. Court of Military Review", "U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals", "U.S. Customs Court", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit", "U.S. Tax Court", "Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals", "U.S. Court for China", "U.S. Consular Courts", "U.S. Commerce Court", "Territorial Supreme Court", "Territorial Appellate Court", "Territorial Trial Court", "Emergency Court of Appeals", "Supreme Court of the District of Columbia", "Bankruptcy Court", "U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit", "U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)", "Alabama Middle U.S. District Court", "Alabama Northern U.S. District Court", "Alabama Southern U.S. District Court", "Alaska U.S. District Court", "Arizona U.S. District Court", "Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court", "Arkansas Western U.S. District Court", "California Central U.S. District Court", "California Eastern U.S. District Court", "California Northern U.S. District Court", "California Southern U.S. District Court", "Colorado U.S. District Court", "Connecticut U.S. District Court", "Delaware U.S. District Court", "District Of Columbia U.S. District Court", "Florida Middle U.S. District Court", "Florida Northern U.S. District Court", "Florida Southern U.S. District Court", "Georgia Middle U.S. District Court", "Georgia Northern U.S. District Court", "Georgia Southern U.S. District Court", "Guam U.S. District Court", "Hawaii U.S. District Court", "Idaho U.S. District Court", "Illinois Central U.S. District Court", "Illinois Northern U.S. District Court", "Illinois Southern U.S. District Court", "Indiana Northern U.S. District Court", "Indiana Southern U.S. District Court", "Iowa Northern U.S. District Court", "Iowa Southern U.S. District Court", "Kansas U.S. District Court", "Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court", "Kentucky Western U.S. District Court", "Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court", "Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court", "Louisiana Western U.S. District Court", "Maine U.S. District Court", "Maryland U.S. District Court", "Massachusetts U.S. District Court", "Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court", "Michigan Western U.S. District Court", "Minnesota U.S. District Court", "Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court", "Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court", "Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court", "Missouri Western U.S. District Court", "Montana U.S. District Court", "Nebraska U.S. District Court", "Nevada U.S. District Court", "New Hampshire U.S. District Court", "New Jersey U.S. District Court", "New Mexico U.S. District Court", "New York Eastern U.S. District Court", "New York Northern U.S. District Court", "New York Southern U.S. District Court", "New York Western U.S. District Court", "North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court", "North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court", "North Carolina Western U.S. District Court", "North Dakota U.S. District Court", "Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court", "Ohio Northern U.S. District Court", "Ohio Southern U.S. District Court", "Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court", "Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court", "Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court", "Oregon U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court", "Puerto Rico U.S. District Court", "Rhode Island U.S. District Court", "South Carolina U.S. District Court", "South Dakota U.S. District Court", "Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court", "Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court", "Tennessee Western U.S. District Court", "Texas Eastern U.S. District Court", "Texas Northern U.S. District Court", "Texas Southern U.S. District Court", "Texas Western U.S. District Court", "Utah U.S. District Court", "Vermont U.S. District Court", "Virgin Islands U.S. District Court", "Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court", "Virginia Western U.S. District Court", "Washington Eastern U.S. District Court", "Washington Western U.S. District Court", "West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court", "West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court", "Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court", "Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court", "Wyoming U.S. District Court", "Louisiana U.S. District Court", "Washington U.S. District Court", "West Virginia U.S. District Court", "Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court", "South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court", "South Carolina Western U.S. District Court", "Alabama U.S. District Court", "U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone", "Georgia U.S. District Court", "Illinois U.S. District Court", "Indiana U.S. District Court", "Iowa U.S. District Court", "Michigan U.S. District Court", "Mississippi U.S. District Court", "Missouri U.S. District Court", "New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)", "New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)", "New York U.S. District Court", "North Carolina U.S. District Court", "Ohio U.S. District Court", "Pennsylvania U.S. District Court", "Tennessee U.S. District Court", "Texas U.S. District Court", "Virginia U.S. District Court", "Norfolk U.S. District Court", "Wisconsin U.S. District Court", "Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court", "New Jersey U.S. District Court", "California U.S. District Court", "Florida U.S. District Court", "Arkansas U.S. District Court", "District of Orleans U.S. District Court", "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", "State Trial Court", "Eastern Circuit (of the United States)", "Middle Circuit (of the United States)", "Southern Circuit (of the United States)", "Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama", "Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas", "California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California", "Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut", "Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware", "Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida", "Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia", "Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois", "Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana", "Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa", "Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas", "Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky", "Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana", "Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine", "Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland", "Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts", "Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan", "Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota", "Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi", "Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri", "Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada", "New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire", "New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey", "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York", "North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina", "Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio", "Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon", "Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania", "Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island", "South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina", "Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee", "Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas", "Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont", "Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia", "West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia", "Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin", "Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming", "Circuit Court of the District of Columbia", "Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska", "Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado", "Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington", "Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho", "Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana", "Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah", "South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota", "North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota", "Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma", "Court of Private Land Claims" ]
[ 21 ]
sc
UNITED STATES et al. v. COLEMAN et al. No. 630. Argued March 28, 1968. Decided April 22, 1968. Frank J. Barry argued the cause for the United States et al. On the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Martz, Robert S. Rifkind, Roger P. Marquis and George R. Hyde. Howard A. Twitty argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were George W. Nilsson, W. Howard Gray, Edward A. McCabe and Monta W. Shirley. Winston S. Howard and Don H. Sherwood filed a brief for the New Jersey Zinc Co., as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1956 respondent Coleman applied to the Department of the Interior for a patent to certain public lands based on his entry onto and exploration of these lands and his discovery there of a variety of stone called quartzite, one of the most common of all solid materials. It was, and still is, respondent Coleman’s contention that the quartzite deposits qualify as “valuable mineral deposits” under 30 U. S. C. § 22 and make the land “chiefly valuable for building stone” under 30 U. S. C. § 161. The Secretary of the Interior held that to qualify as “valuable mineral deposits” under 30 U. S. C. § 22 it must be shown that the mineral can be “extracted, removed and marketed at a profit” — the so-called “marketability test.” Based on the largely undisputed evidence in the record, the Secretary concluded that the deposits claimed by respondent Coleman did not meet that criterion. As to the alternative “chiefly valuable for building stone” claim, the Secretary held that respondent Coleman’s quartzite deposits were a “common variet[y]” of stone within the meaning of 30 U. S. C. § 611, and thus they could not serve as the basis for a valid mining claim under the mining laws. The Secretary denied the patent application, but respondent Coleman remained on the land, forcing the Government to bring this present action in ejectment in the District Court against respondent Coleman and his lessee, respondent McClennan. The respondents filed a counterclaim seeking to have the District Court direct the Secretary to issue a patent to them. The District Court, agreeing with the Secretary, rendered summary judgment for the Government. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding specifically that the test of profitable marketability was not a proper standard for determining whether a discovery of “valuable mineral deposits” under 30 U. S. C. § 22 had been made and that building stone could not be deemed a “common variet[y]” of stone under 30 U. S. C. § 611. We granted the Government’s petition for certiorari because of the importance of the decision to the utilization of the public lands. 389 U. S. 970. We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals and believe that the rulings of the Secretary of the Interior were proper. The Secretary’s determination that the quartzite deposits did not qualify as valuable mineral deposits because the stone could not be marketed at a profit does no violence to the statute. Indeed, the marketability test is an admirable effort to identify with greater precision and objectivity the factors relevant to a determination that a mineral deposit is “valuable.” It is a logical complement to the “prudent-man test” which the Secretary has been using to interpret the mining laws since 1894. Under this “prudent-man test” in order to qualify as “valuable mineral deposits,” the discovered deposits must be of such a character that “a person of ordinary prudence would be justified in the further expenditure of his labor and means, with a reasonable prospect of success, in developing a valuable mine . . . .” Castle v. Womble, 19 L. D. 455, 457 (1894). This Court has approved the prudent-man formulation and interpretation on numerous occasions. See, for example, Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U. S. 313, 322; Cameron v. United States, 252 U. S. 450, 459; Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U. S. 334, 335-336. Under the mining laws Congress has made public lands available to people for the purpose of mining valuable mineral deposits and not for other purposes. The obvious intent was to reward and encourage the discovery of minerals that are valuable in an economic sense. Minerals which no prudent man will extract because there is no demand for them at a price higher than the cost of extraction and transportation are hardly economically valuable. Thus, profitability is an important consideration in applying the prudent-man test, and the marketability test which the Secretary has used here merely recognizes this fact. The marketability test also has the advantage of throwing light on a claimant’s intention, a matter which is inextricably bound together with valuableness. For evidence that a mineral deposit is not of economic value and cannot in all likelihood be operated at a profit may well suggest that a claimant seeks the land for other purposes. Indeed, as the Government points out, the facts of this case — the thousands of dollars and hours spent building a home on 720 acres in a highly scenic national forest located two hours from Los Angeles, the lack of an economically feasible market for the stone, and the immense quantities of identical stone found in the area outside the claims — might well be thought to raise a substantial question as to respondent Coleman’s real intention. Finally, we think that the Court of Appeals’ objection to the marketability test on the ground that it involves the imposition of a different and more onerous standard on claims for minerals of widespread occurrence than for rarer minerals which have generally been dealt with under the prudent-man test is unwarranted. As we have pointed out above, the prudent-man test and the marketability test are not distinct standards, but are complementary in that the latter is a refinement of the former. While it is true that the marketability test is usually the critical factor in cases involving nonmetallic minerals of widespread occurrence, this is accounted for by the perfectly natural reason that precious metals which are in small supply and for which there is a great demand, sell at a price so high as to leave little room for doubt that they can be extracted and marketed at a profit. We believe that the Secretary of the Interior was also correct in ruling that “[i]n view of the immense quanti- ties of identical stone found in the area outside the claims, the stone must be considered a ‘common variety’ ” and thus must fall within the exclusionary language of § 3 of the 1955 Act, 69 Stat. 368, 30 U. S. C. § 611, which declares that'“[a] deposit of common varieties of . . . stone . . . shall not be deemed a valuable mineral deposit within the meaning of the mining laws . . . .” Respondents rely on the earlier 1892 Act, 30 U. S. C. § 161, which makes the mining laws applicable to “lands that are chiefly valuable for building stone” and contend that the 1955 Act has no application to building stone, since, according to respondents, “[sjtone which is chiefly valuable as building stone is, by that very fact, not a common variety of stone.” This was also the reasoning of the Court of Appeals. But this argument completely fails to take into account the reason why Congress felt compelled to pass the 1955 Act with its modification of the mining laws. The legislative history makes clear that this Act (30 U. S. C. § 611) was intended to remove common types of sand, gravel, and stone from the coverage of the mining laws, under which they served as a basis for claims to land patents, and to place the disposition of such materials under the Materials Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 681, 30 U. S. C. § 601, which provides for the sale of such materials without disposing of the land on which they are found. For example, the Chairman of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs explained the 1955 Act as follows: “The reason we have done that is because sand, stone, gravel . . . are really building materials, and are not the type of material contemplated to be handled under the mining laws, and that is precisely where we have had so much abuse of the mining laws. . . .” 101 Cong. Rec. 8743. (Emphasis added.) Similarly, the Senate Committee Report stated that the bill was intended to: “Provide that deposits of common varieties of sand, building stone, gravel, pumice, pumicite, and cinders on the public lands, where they are found in widespread abundance, shall be disposed of under the Materials Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 681), rather than under the mining law of 1872.” S. Rep. No. 554, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 2. (Emphasis added.) Thus we read 30 U. S. C. § 611, passed in 1955, as removing from the coverage of the mining laws “common varieties” of building stone, but leaving 30 U. S. C. § 161, the 1892 Act, entirely effective as to building stone that has “some property giving it distinct and special value” (expressly excluded under § 611). For these reasons we hold that the United States is entitled to eject respondents from the land and that respondents’ counterclaim for a patent must fail. The case is reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for further proceedings to carry out this decision. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The cornerstone of federal legislation dealing with mineral lands is the Act of May 10, 1872, 17 Stat. 91, 30 U. S. C. § 22, which provides in § 1 that citizens may enter and explore the public domain and, if they find “valuable mineral deposits,” may obtain title to the land on which such deposits are located by application to the Department of the Interior. The Secretary of the Interior is “charged with seeing . . . that valid claims . . . [are] recognized, invalid ones eliminated, and the rights of the public preserved.” Cameron v. United States, 252 U. S. 450, 460. The 1872 Act, supra, was supplemented in 1892 by the passage of the Act of August 4, 1892, 27 Stat. 348, 30 U. S. C. § 161, which provides in § 1 in pertinent part: “That any person authorized to enter lands under the mining laws of the United States may enter lands that are chiefly valuable for building stone under the provisions of the law in relation to placer mineral claims . . . .” Section 3 of the Act of July 23, 1955, 69 Stat. 368, 30 U. S. C. § 611, provides in pertinent part as follows: “A deposit of common varieties of sand, stone, gravel, pumice, pumicite, or cinders shall not be deemed a valuable mineral deposit within the meaning of the mining laws of the United States so as to give effective validity to any mining claim hereafter located under such mining laws .... 'Common varieties’ as used in this Act does not include deposits of such materials which are valuable because the deposit has some property giving it distinct and special value . . . .” 17 Stat. 92, 30 U. S. C. § 29, provides in pertinent part as follows: “A patent for any land claimed and located for valuable deposits may be obtained in the following manner: Any person . . . having claimed and located a piece of land for such -purposes . . . may file . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them. Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer. Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.
Who is the respondent of the case?
[ "attorney general of the United States, or his office", "specified state board or department of education", "city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit", "state commission, board, committee, or authority", "county government or county governmental unit, except school district", "court or judicial district", "state department or agency", "governmental employee or job applicant", "female governmental employee or job applicant", "minority governmental employee or job applicant", "minority female governmental employee or job applicant", "not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable", "retired or former governmental employee", "U.S. House of Representatives", "interstate compact", "judge", "state legislature, house, or committee", "local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough", "governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact", "state or U.S. supreme court", "local school district or board of education", "U.S. Senate", "U.S. senator", "foreign nation or instrumentality", "state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of", "state college or university", "United States", "State", "person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime", "advertising business or agency", "agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor", "airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes", "airline", "distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages", "alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked", "American Medical Association", "National Railroad Passenger Corp.", "amusement establishment, or recreational facility", "arrested person, or pretrial detainee", "attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association", "author, copyright holder", "bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company", "bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization", "establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store", "water transportation, stevedore", "bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines", "brewery, distillery", "broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm", "construction industry", "bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle", "business, corporation", "buyer, purchaser", "cable TV", "car dealer", "person convicted of crime", "tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband", "chemical company", "child, children, including adopted or illegitimate", "religious organization, institution, or person", "private club or facility", "coal company or coal mine operator", "computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software", "consumer, consumer organization", "creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company", "person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial", "defendant", "debtor", "real estate developer", "disabled person or disability benefit claimant", "distributor", "person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector", "drug manufacturer", "druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy", "employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of", "employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan", "electric equipment manufacturer", "electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company", "eleemosynary institution or person", "environmental organization", "employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.", "farmer, farm worker, or farm organization", "father", "female employee or job applicant", "female", "movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of", "fisherman or fishing company", "food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard", "foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity", "franchiser", "franchisee", "lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization", "person who guarantees another's obligations", "handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to", "health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor", "heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be", "hospital, medical center", "husband, or ex-husband", "involuntarily committed mental patient", "Indian, including Indian tribe or nation", "insurance company, or surety", "inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder", "investor", "injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related", "juvenile", "government contractor", "holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor", "magazine", "male", "medical or Medicaid claimant", "medical supply or manufacturing co.", "racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant", "minority female employee or job applicant", "manufacturer", "management, executive officer, or director, of business entity", "military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist", "mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company", "mother", "auto manufacturer", "newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service", "radio and television network, except cable tv", "nonprofit organization or business", "nonresident", "nuclear power plant or facility", "owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels", "shareholders to whom a tender offer is made", "tender offer", "oil company, or natural gas producer", "elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly", "out of state noncriminal defendant", "political action committee", "parent or parents", "parking lot or service", "patient of a health professional", "telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company", "physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society", "public interest organization", "physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee", "pipe line company", "package, luggage, container", "political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official", "indigent, needy, welfare recipient", "indigent defendant", "private person", "prisoner, inmate of penal institution", "professional organization, business, or person", "probationer, or parolee", "protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer", "public utility", "publisher, publishing company", "radio station", "racial or ethnic minority", "person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination", "racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "realtor", "journalist, columnist, member of the news media", "resident", "restaurant, food vendor", "retarded person, or mental incompetent", "retired or former employee", "railroad", "private school, college, or university", "seller or vendor", "shipper, including importer and exporter", "shopping center, mall", "spouse, or former spouse", "stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder", "retail business or outlet", "student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only", "tenant or lessee", "theater, studio", "forest products, lumber, or logging company", "person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent", "trucking company, or motor carrier", "television station", "union member", "unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant", "union, labor organization, or official of", "veteran", "voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)", "wholesale trade", "wife, or ex-wife", "witness, or person under subpoena", "network", "slave", "slave-owner", "bank of the united states", "timber company", "u.s. job applicants or employees", "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "General Land Office of Commissioners", "Transportation Security Administration", "Surface Transportation Board", "U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.", "Reconstruction Finance Corp.", "Department or Secretary of Homeland Security", "Unidentifiable", "International Entity" ]
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DOWD, WARDEN, v. UNITED STATES ex rel. COOK. No. 66. Argued November 28, 1950. Decided January 2, 1951. Charles F. O’Connor, Deputy Attorney General of Indiana, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were J. Emmett McManamon, Attorney General, and George W. Hand and Merl M. Wall, Deputy Attorneys General. William S. I sham argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent, Lawrence E. Cook, brought this habeas corpus proceeding in the United States District Court in 1948. After hearing evidence, the District Court found as follows: In 1931 respondent was convicted of murder in an Indiana court, sentenced to life imprisonment, and immediately confined in the state penitentiary. Within the six-month period allowed for appeal as of right by Indiana law, respondent prepared proper appeal papers. His efforts to file the documents in the state supreme court, however, were frustrated by the warden acting pursuant to prison rules. Subsequently, but after the six-month period had expired, the ban on sending papers from the prison was lifted and respondent unsuccessfully sought to have the state courts review his conviction by coram nobis in 1937 and by habeas corpus in 1945. In 1946 his petition to the Supreme Court of Indiana for a delayed appeal was denied. On these findings, the District Court held that there had been a denial of equal protection of the law for which the State provided no remedy, and ordered respondent’s discharge. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 180 F. 2d 212. In this Court the State admits, as it must, that a discriminatory denial of the statutory right of appeal is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U. S. 255. It contends, however, that the 1946 litigation in the Supreme Court of Indiana established that the prison authorities had not prevented a timely appeal by respondent, and that the principle of res judicata precluded a contrary determination of this fact by the District Court. Even if the rule of res judicata were applicable in habeas corpus proceedings, but cf. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101, 105, it would have no bearing in the present case. The Indiana court made only one finding, and that pertained to a matter not now in dispute. Moreover, so far as the suppression of respondent’s original appeal papers is concerned, the record before us strongly indicates that the finding ascribed to the state supreme court could not have been made. The State also contends that despite the denial of equal protection, respondent is no longer entitled to relief because he “waived” his right of appeal. The argument is that the ban on sending papers from the prison suspended the statutory limitation on the time for review so that respondent could have appealed within six months from the date the restraint was removed in 1933. We cannot accept this view. In 1931 Indiana appellate jurisdiction apparently was conditioned on a timely filing of the proper papers. More recently, the rigid rule may have been relaxed so as to provide discretionary delayed appeals for convicted defendants. But we find no indication either that there is any time limitation on the taking of delayed appeals or that such appeals will ever be heard as of right. The record shows that respondent’s delayed appeal was denied in 1946, apparently as a matter within the state court’s discretion. Consequently, respondent has never had the same review of the judgment against him as he would have had as of right in 1931 but for the suppression of his papers. We therefore agree with the Court of Appeals that, while the State’s “waiver” theory is ingenious, it is without merit. Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, nothing short of an actual appellate determination of the merits of the conviction — according to the procedure prevailing in ordinary cases — would cure the original denial of equal protection of the law. There remains the question of the disposition to be made of this case. Fortunately, we are not confronted with the dilemma envisaged by the State of having to choose between ordering an absolute discharge of the prisoner and denying him all relief. The District Court has power in a habeas corpus proceeding to “dispose of the matter as law and justice require.” 28 U. S. C. § 2243. The Fourteenth Amendment precludes Indiana from keeping respondent imprisoned if it persists in depriving him of the type of appeal generally afforded those convicted of crime. On the other hand, justice does not require Indiana to discharge respondent if such an appeal is granted and reveals a trial record free from error. Now that this Court has determined the federal constitutional question, Indiana may find it possible to provide the appellate review to which respondent is entitled. The judgments of the Court of Appeals and the District Court are vacated and the case remanded. On remand, the District Court should enter such orders as are appropriate to allow the State a reasonable time in which to afford respondent the full appellate review he would have received but for the suppression of his papers, failing which he shall be discharged. See Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 46. It is so ordered. See Cook v. State, 219 Ind. 234, 37 N. E. 2d 63; State ex rel. Cook v. Wickens, 222 Ind. 383, 53 N. E. 2d 630. State ex rel. Cook v. Howard, 223 Ind. 694, 64 N. E. 2d 25, cert. denied 327 U. S. 808. This order is unreported. Certiorari to review the denial of the petition for delayed appeal was sought here and denied. 330 U. S. 841. The finding was that “the basic allegation of said petition to-wit : that [Cook’s] counsel refused, without pay, to take an appeal is not true . . . .” Dudley v. State, 200 Ind. 398, 161 N. E. 1; Farlow v. State, 196 Ind. 295, 142 N. E. 849; Farrell v. State, 85 Ind. 221; Winsett v. State, 54 Ind. 437; Lichtenfels v. State, 53 Ind. 161. The Supreme Court of Indiana suggested in 1945 that this respondent might be able to take a delayed appeal. State ex rel. Cook v. Howard, 223 Ind. 694, 64 N. E. 2d 25. Cf. also Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co., 217 Ind. 93, 26 N. E. 2d 399; State ex rel. White v. Hilgemann, 218 Ind. 572, 34 N. E. 2d 129; but cf. Johns v. State, 227 Ind. 737, 89 N. E. 2d 281. In 1947 Indiana enacted the more liberal rule into its statutory law. Burns’ Ind. Ann. Stat., 1942 Replacement Yol. (Cum. Supp. 1949), § 9-3305. See note 3 supra; cf. Sweet v. State, 226 Ind. 566, 81 N. E. 2d 679.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the manner in which the Court took jurisdiction. The Court uses a variety of means whereby it undertakes to consider cases that it has been petitioned to review. The most important ones are the writ of certiorari, the writ of appeal, and for legacy cases the writ of error, appeal, and certification. For cases that fall into more than one category, identify the manner in which the court takes jurisdiction on the basis of the writ. For example, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), an original jurisdiction and a mandamus case, should be coded as mandamus rather than original jurisdiction due to the nature of the writ. Some legacy cases are "original" motions or requests for the Court to take jurisdiction but were heard or filed in another court. For example, Ex parte Matthew Addy S.S. & Commerce Corp., 256 U.S. 417 (1921) asked the Court to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal judge. Do not code these cases as "original" jurisdiction cases but rather on the basis of the writ.
What is the manner in which the Court took jurisdiction?
[ "cert", "appeal", "bail", "certification", "docketing fee", "rehearing or restored to calendar for reargument", "injunction", "mandamus", "original", "prohibition", "stay", "writ of error", "writ of habeas corpus", "unspecified, other" ]
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GONZALEZ v. CROSBY, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS No. 04-6432. Argued April 25, 2005 Decided June 23, 2005 Paul M. Rashkind argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Richard C. Klugh. Christopher M. Rise, Solicitor General of Florida, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Carolyn Snurkowski, Assistant Deputy Attorney General, and Cassandra Dolgin, Assistant Attorney General. Patricia A. Millett argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With her on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Wray, and Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben. Briefs of amid curiae urging reversal were filed for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Joshua L. Dratel and David Oscar Markus; for the Office of the Federal Public Defender for the Middle District of Tennessee by Paul R. Bottei; and for Abu-Ali Abdur’Rahman by Thomas G. Goldstein, Amy Howe, William P. Redick, Jr., Pamela S. Karlan, and Bradley A MacLean. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Tennessee et al. by Paul G. Summers, Attorney General of Tennessee, Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, Joseph F. Whalen, Associate Solicitor General, and Christopher L. Maraño, Chief State’s Attorney of Connecticut, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Troy King of Alabama, Terry Goddard of Arizona, Mike Beebe of Arkansas, John W. Suthers of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Steve Carter of Indiana, Gregory D. Stumbo of Kentucky, Jim Hood of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Montana, Jon Bruning of Nebraska, Brian Sandoval of Nevada, Jim Petro of Ohio, W. A Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Lawrence E. Long of South Dakota, Greg Abbott of Texas, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, Judith Williams Jagdmann of Virginia, and Patrick J. Crank of Wyoming; and for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. After the federal courts denied petitioner habeas corpus relief from his state conviction, he filed a motion for relief from that judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The question presented is whether, in a habeas case, such motions are subject to the additional restrictions that apply to “second or successive” habeas corpus petitions under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), codified at 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b). I Petitioner Aurelio Gonzalez pleaded guilty in Florida Circuit Court to one count of robbery with a firearm. He filed no appeal and began serving his 99-year sentence in 1982. Some 12 years later, petitioner began to seek relief from his conviction. He filed two motions for state postconviction relief, which the Florida courts denied. Thereafter, in June 1997, petitioner filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging that his guilty plea had hot been entered knowingly and voluntarily. Upon the State’s motion, the District Court dismissed petitioner’s habeas petition as barred by AEDPA’s statute of limitations, 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d). Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, petitioner’s filing deadline, absent tolling, was April 23,1997, one year after AEDPA’s statute of limitations took effect. Wilcox v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, 158 F. 3d 1209, 1211 (CA11 1998) (per curiam). Adopting a Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, the District Court concluded that the limitations period was not tolled during the 163-day period while petitioner’s second motion for state postconviction relief was pending. Section 2244(d)(2) tolls the statute of limitations during the pendency of “properly filed” applications only, and the District Court thought petitioner’s motion was not “properly filed” because it was both untimely and successive. Without tolling, petitioner’s federal habeas petition was two months late, so the District Court dismissed it as time barred. A judge of the Eleventh Circuit denied a certificate of appealability (GOA) on April 6, 2000, and petitioner did not file for rehearing or review of that decision. On November 7, 2000, we held in Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4, that an application for state postconviction relief can be “properly filed” even if the state courts dismiss it as procedurally barred. See id., at 8-9. Almost nine months later, petitioner filed in the District Court a pro se “Motion to Amend or Alter Judgment,” contending that the District Court’s time-bar ruling was incorrect under Artuz’s construction of § 2244(d), and invoking Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), which permits a court to relieve a party from the effect of a final judgment. The District Court denied the motion, and petitioner appealed. A judge of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit granted petitioner a COA, but a panel quashed the certificate as improvidently granted. 317 F. 3d 1308, 1310, 1314 (2003). The full court vacated that order and reheard the case en banc. It granted petitioner a COA but held, by a vote of 7 to 4, that the District Court was correct to deny his Rule 60(b) motion. The en banc majority determined that petitioner’s motion — indeed, any postjudgment motion under Rule 60(b) save one alleging fraud on the court under Rule 60(b)(3) — was in substance a second or successive habeas corpus petition. 366 F. 3d 1253, 1278, 1281-1282 (2004). A state prisoner may not file such a petition without precerti-fication by the court of appeals that the petition meets certain stringent criteria. § 2244(b). Because petitioner’s motion did not satisfy these requirements, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed its denial. Id., at 1282. We granted certiorari. 543 U. S. 1086 (2005). HH HH Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment, and request reopening of his case, under a limited set of circumstances including fraud, mistake, and newly discovered evidence. Rule 60(b)(6), the particular provision under which petitioner brought his motion, permits reopening when the movant shows “any ... reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment” other than the more specific circumstances set out in Rules 6Q(b)(1)-(5). See Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U. S. 847, 863, n. 11 (1988); Klapprott v. United States, 335 U. S. 601, 613 (1949) (opinion of Black, J.). The mere recitation of these provisions shows why we give little weight to respondent’s appeal to the virtues of finality. That policy consideration, standing alone, is unpersuasive in the interpretation of a provision whose whole purpose is to make an exception to finality. The issue here is whether the text of Rule 60(b) itself, or of some other provision of law, limits its application in a manner relevant to the case before us. AEBPA did not expressly circumscribe the operation of Rule 60(b). (By contrast, AEBPA directly amended other provisions of the Federal Rules. See, e. g., AEBPA, § 103, 110 Stat. 1218 (amending Fed. Rule App. Proc. 22).) The new habeas restrictions introduced by AEBPA are made indirectly relevant, however, by the fact that Rule 60(b), like the rest of the Rules of Civil Procedure, applies in habeas corpus proceedings under 28 U. S. C. §2254 only “to the extent that [it is] not inconsistent with” applicable federal statutory provisions and rules. 28 U. S. C. §2254 Rule 11; see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 81(a)(2). The relevant provisions of the AEBPA-amended habeas statutes, 28 U. S. C. §§ 2244(b)(lM3), impose three requirements on second or successive habeas petitions: First, any claim that has already been adjudicated in a previous petition must be dismissed. § 2244(b)(1). Second, any claim that has not' already been adjudicated must be dismissed unless it relies on either a new and retroactive rule of constitutional law or new facts showing a high probability of actual innocence. § 2244(b)(2). Third, before the district court may accept a successive petition for filing, the court of appeals must determine that it presents a claim not previously raised that is sufficient to meet §2244(b)(2)’s new-rule or actual-innocence provisions. § 2244(b)(3). We proceed to consider whether these provisions limit the application of Rule 60(b) to the present case. A “As a textual matter, § 2244(b) applies only where the court acts pursuant to a prisoner’s ‘application’ ” for a writ of habeas corpus. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U. S. 538, 554 (1998). We therefore must decide whether a Rule 60(b) motion filed by a habeas petitioner is a “habeas corpus application” as the statute uses that term. Under § 2244(b), the first step of analysis is to determine whether a “claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application” was also “presented in a prior application.” If so, the claim must be dismissed; if not, the analysis proceeds to whether the claim satisfies one of two narrow exceptions. In either event, it is clear that for purposes of § 2244(b) an “application” for habeas relief is a filing that contains one or more “claims.” That definition is consistent with the use of the term “application” in the other habeas statutes in chapter 153 of title 28. See, e. g., Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U. S. 202, 207 (2003) (for purposes of § 2254(d), an application for habeas corpus relief is a filing that seeks “an adjudication on the merits of the petitioner’s claims”). These statutes, and our own decisions, make clear that a “claim” as used in § 2244(b) is an asserted federal basis for relief from a state court’s judgment of conviction. In some instances, a Rule 60(b) motion will contain one or more “claims:” For example, it might straightforwardly assert that owing to “excusable neglect,” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(1), the movant’s habeas petition had omitted a claim of constitutional error, and seek leave to present that claim. Cf. Harris v. United States, 367 F. 3d 74, 80-81 (CA2 2004) (petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion sought relief from judgment because habeas counsel had failed to raise a Sixth Amendment claim). Similarly, a motion might seek leave to present “newly discovered evidence,” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(2), in support of a claim previously denied. E. g., Rod-well v. Pepe, 324 F. 3d 66,69 (CAl 2003). Or a motion might contend that a subsequent change in substantive law is a “reason justifying relief,” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(6), from the previous denial of a claim. E. g., Dunlap v. Litscher, 301 F. 3d 873, 876 (CA7 2002). Virtually every Court of Appeals to consider the question has held that such a pleading, although labeled a Rule 60(b) motion, is in substance a successive habeas petition and should be treated accordingly. E. g., Rodwell, supra, at 71-72; Dunlap, supra, at 876. We think those holdings are correct. A habeas petitioner’s filing that seeks vindication of such a claim is, if not in substance a “habeas corpus application,” at least similar enough that failing to subject it to the same requirements would be “inconsistent with” the statute. 28 U. S. C. §2254 Rule 11. Using Rule 60(b) to present new claims for relief from a state court’s judgment of conviction — even claims couched in the language of a true Rule 60(b) motion — circumvents AEDPA’s requirement that a new claim be dismissed unless it relies on either a new rule of constitutional law or newly discovered facts. § 2244(b)(2). The same is true of a Rule 60(b)(2) motion presenting new evidence in support of a claim already litigated: Even assuming that reliance on a new factual predicate causes that motion to escape § 2244(b)(l)’s prohibition of claims “presented in a prior application,” § 2244(b)(2)(B) requires a more convincing factual showing than does Rule 60(b). Likewise, a Rule 60(b) motion based on a purported change in the substantive law governing the claim could be used to circumvent §2244(b)(2)(A)’s dictate that the only new law on which a successive petition may rely is “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” In addition to the substantive conflict with AEBPA standards, in each of these three examples use of Rule 60(b) would impermissibly circumvent the requirement that a successive habeas petition be precertified by the court of appeals as falling within an exception to the successive-petition bar. § 2244(b)(3). In most cases, determining whether a Rule 60(b) motion advances one or more “claims” will be relatively simple. A motion that seeks to add a new ground for relief, as in Harris, supra, will of course qualify. A motion can also be said to bring a “claim” if it attacks the federal court’s previous resolution of a claim on the merits, , since alleging that the court erred in denying habeas relief on the merits is effectively indistinguishable from alleging that the movant is, under the substantive provisions of the statutes, entitled to habeas relief. That is not the case, however, when a Rule 60(b) motion attacks, not the substance of the federal court’s resolution of a claim on the merits, but some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings. B When no “claim” is presented, there is no basis for contending that the Rule 60(b) motion should be treated like a habeas corpus application. If neither the motion itself nor the federal judgment from which it seeks relief substantively addresses federal grounds for setting aside the movant’s state conviction, allowing the motion to proceed as denominated creates no inconsistency with the habeas statute or rules. Petitioner’s motion in the present case, which alleges that the federal courts misapplied the federal statute of limitations set out in § 2244(d), fits this description. Like the Court of Appeals, respondent relies heavily on our decision in Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U. S. 538 (1998). In that case we reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision to recall its mandate and reconsider the denial of Thompson’s first federal habeas petition; the recall was, we held, an abuse of discretion because of its inconsistency with the policies embodied in AEDPA. Id., at 554-559. Analogizing an appellate court’s recall of its mandate to a district court’s grant of relief from judgment, the Eleventh Circuit thought that Calderon’s disposition applied to Rule 60(b). 366 F. 3d, at 1272-1277. We think otherwise. To begin with, as the opinion said, compliance with the actual text of AEDPA’s successive-petition provision was not at issue in Calderon— because the Court of Appeals considered only the claims and evidence presented in Thompson’s first federal habeas petition. 523 U. S., at 554. Calderon did state, however, that “a prisoner’s motion to recall the mandate on the basis of the merits of the underlying decision can be regarded as a second or successive application.” Id., at 553 (emphasis added). But that is entirely consonant with the proposition that a Rule 60(b) motion that seeks to revisit the federal court’s denial on the merits of a claim for relief should be treated as a successive habeas petition. The problem for respondent is that this case does not present a revisitation of the merits. The motion here, like some other Rule 60(b) motions in §2254 cases, confines itself not only to the first federal habeas petition, but to a nonmerits aspect of the first federal habeas proceeding. Nothing in Calderon suggests that entertaining such a filing is “inconsistent with” AEDPA. Rule 60(b) has an unquestionably valid role to play in ha-beas cases. The Rule is often used to relieve parties from the effect of a default judgment mistakenly entered against them, e. g., Klapprott, 335 U. S., at 615 (opinion of Black, J.), a function as legitimate in habeas cases as in run-of-the-mine civil cases. The Rule also preserves parties’ opportunity to obtain vacatur of a judgment that is void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction — a consideration just as valid in habeas cases as in any other, since absence of jurisdiction altogether deprives a federal court of the power to adjudicate the rights of the parties. Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 94, 101 (1998). In some instances, we may note, it is the State, not the habeas petitioner, that seeks to use Rule 60(b), to reopen a habeas judgment granting the writ. See, e. g., Ritter v. Smith, 811 F. 2d 1398, 1400 (CA11 1987). Moreover, several characteristics of a Rule 60(b) motion limit the friction between the Rule and the successive-petition prohibitions of AEDPA, ensuring that our harmonization of the two will not expose federal courts to an avalanche of frivolous postjudgment motions. First, Rule 60(b) contains its own limitations, such as the requirement that the motion “be made within a reasonable time” and the more specific 1-year deadline for asserting three of the most open-ended grounds of relief (excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, and fraud). Second, our cases have required a movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) to show “extraordinary circumstances” justifying the reopening of a final judgment. Ackermann v. United States, 340 U. S. 193, 199 (1950); accord, id., at 202; Liljeberg, 486 U. S., at 864; id., at 873 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting) (“This very strict interpretation of Rule 60(b) is essential if the finality of judgments is to be preserved”). Such circumstances will rarely occur in the habeas context. Third, Rule 60(b) proceedings are subject to only limited and deferential appellate review. Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections of Ill., 434 U. S. 257, 263, n. 7 (1978). Many Courts of Appeals have construed 28 U. S. C. § 2253 to impose an additional limitation on appellate review by requiring a habeas petitioner to obtain a COA as a prerequisite to appealing the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion. Because petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion challenges only the District Court’s previous ruling on the AEDPA statute of limitations, it is not the equivalent of a successive habeas petition. The Eleventh Circuit therefore erred in holding that petitioner did not qualify even to seek Rule 60(b) relief. )=H Although the Eleventh Circuit s reasoning is inconsistent with our holding today, we nonetheless affirm its denial of petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion. Petitioner’s only ground for reopening the judgment denying his first federal habeas petition is that our decision in Artuz showed the error of the District Court’s statute-of-limitations ruling. We assume for present purposes that the District Court’s ruling was incorrect. As we noted above, however, relief under Rule 60(b)(6) — the only subsection petitioner invokes — requires a showing of “extraordinary circumstances.” Petitioner contends that Artuz’s change in the interpretation of the AEDPA statute of limitations meets this description. We do not agree. The District Court’s interpretation was by all appearances correct under the Eleventh Circuit’s then-prevailing interpretation of 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(2). It is hardly extraordinary that subsequently, after petitioner’s case was no longer pending, this Court arrived at a different interpretation. Although our constructions of federal statutes customarily apply to all cases then pending on direct review, see, e. g., Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U. S. 86, 97 (1993), not every interpretation of the federal statutes setting forth the requirements for habeas provides cause for reopening cases long since final. If Artuz justified reopening long-ago dismissals based on a lower court’s unduly parsimonious interpretation of § 2244(d)(2), then Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U. S. 408 (2005), would justify reopening long-ago grants of habeas relief based on a lower court’s unduly generous interpretation of the same tolling provision. The change in the law worked by Artuz is all the less extraordinary in petitioner’s case, because of his lack of diligence in pursuing review of the statute-of-limitations issue. At the time Artuz was decided, petitioner had abandoned any attempt to seek review of the District Court’s decision on this statute-of-limitations issue. Although the District Court relied on Eleventh Circuit precedent holding that a state postconviction application is not “properly filed” if it is procedurally defaulted, and although that precedent was at odds with the rule in several other Circuits, petitioner neither raised that issue in his application for a COA, nor filed a petition for rehearing of the Eleventh Circuit’s denial of a COA, nor sought certiorari review of that denial. This lack of diligence confirms that Artuz is not an extraordinary circumstance justifying relief from the judgment in petitioner’s case. Indeed, in one of the cases in which we explained Rule 60(b)(6)’s extraordinary-circumstances requirement, the movant had failed to appeal an adverse ruling by the District Court, whereas another party to the same judgment had appealed and won reversal. Ackermann, 340 U. S., at 195. Some years later, the petitioner sought Rule 60(b) relief, which the District Court denied. We affirmed the denial of Rule 60(b) relief, noting that the movant’s decision not to appeal had been free and voluntary, although the favorable ruling in the companion case made it appear mistaken in hindsight. See id., at 198. Under the Rule 60(b) standards that properly govern petitioner’s motion, the District Court was correct to deny relief. * * * We hold that a Rule 60(b)(6) motion in a § 2254 case is not to be treated as a successive habeas petition if it does not assert, or reassert, claims of error in the movant’s state conviction. A motion that, like petitioner’s, challenges only the District Court’s failure to reach the merits does not warrant such treatment, and can therefore be ruled upon by the District Court without precertification by the Court of Appeals pursuant to § 2244(b)(3). In this case, however, petitioner’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion fails to set forth an “extraordinary circumstance” justifying relief. For that reason, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is so ordered. Although the title “Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment” suggests that petitioner was relying on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), the substance of the motion made clear that petitioner sought relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Rule 60(b) provides in relevant part: “On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud ..., misrepresentation, or misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.” In this case we consider only the extent to which Rule 60(b) applies to habeas proceedings under 28 U. S. C. §2254, which governs federal habeas relief for prisoners convicted in state court. Federal prisoners generally seek postconviction relief under §2255, which contains its own provision governing second or successive applications. Although that portion of §2255 is similar to, and refers to, the statutory subsection applicable to second or successive §2254 petitions, it is not identical. Accordingly, we limit our consideration to §2254 cases. The term “on the merits” has multiple usages. See, e. g., Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U. S. 497, 501-503 (2001). We refer here to a determination that there exist or do not exist grounds entitling a petitioner to habeas corpus relief under 28 U. S. C. §§ 2254(a) and (d). When a movant asserts one of those grounds (or asserts that a previous ruling regarding one of those grounds was in error) he is making a habeas corpus claim. He is not doing so when he merely asserts that a previous ruling which precluded a merits determination was in error — for example, a denial for such reasons as failure to exhaust, procedural default, or statute-of-limitations bar. Fraud on the federal habeas court is one example of such a defect. See generally Rodriguez v. Mitchell, 252 F. 3d 191, 199 (CA2 2001) (a witness’s allegedly fraudulent basis for refusing to appear at a federal habeas hearing “relate[d] to the integrity of the federal habeas proceeding, not to the integrity of the state criminal trial”). We note that an attack based on the movant’s own conduct, or his habeas counsel’s omissions, see, e. g., supra, at 530-531, ordinarily does not go to the integrity of the proceedings, but in effect asks for a second chance to have the merits determined favorably. Petitioner notes that we held in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U. S. 473 (2000), that when a petition is dismissed without prejudice as unexhausted, the refiled petition is not “successive.” He argues that, by parity of reasoning, his Rule 60(b) motion challenging the District Court dismissal of his petition on statute-of-limitations grounds is not “successive.” If this argument is correct, petitioner would be able to file not just a Rule 60(b) motion, but a full-blown habeas petition, without running afoul of § 2244(b). But see, e. g., Murray v. Greiner, 394 F. 3d 78, 81 (CA2 2005). We need not consider this contention, however, because we conclude that petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion is not subject to the limitations applicable to ha-beas petitions. See Reid v. Angelone, 369 F. 3d 363, 369, n. 2 (CA4 2004) (citing cases); 366 F. 3d 1253, 1263 (CA11 2004) (case below); cf. Langford v. Day, 134 F. 3d 1381, 1382 (CA9 1998) (before AEDPA, a certificate of probable cause was a prerequisite to appealing the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion in a habeas case); Reid, supra, at 368 (same). But see Dunn v. Cockrell, 302 F. 3d 491, 492 (CA5 2002); 366 F. 3d, at 1298-1300 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although we do not decide in this case whether this construction of §2253 is correct (the Eleventh Circuit granted petitioner a COA), the COA requirement appears to be a more plausible and effective screening requirement, with sounder basis in the statute, than the near-absolute bar imposed here by the Court of Appeals. Although respondent contends that petitioner’s motion for state post-conviction relief was untimely, and that the District Court’s denial of statutory tolling was therefore correct under Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U. S. 408 (2005), the Florida courts made no reference to untimeliness in dismissing petitioner’s motion. A change in the interpretation of a substantive statute may have consequences for cases that have already reached final judgment, particularly in the criminal context. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U. S. 614, 619-621 (1998); cf. Fiore v. White, 531 U. S. 225, 228-229 (2001) (per curiam). We granted review to resolve the conflict over the interpretation of “properly filed” on April 17, 2000, only eight days after the Eleventh Circuit denied petitioner a COA and well within the 90-day period in which petitioner could have sought certiorari. Artuz v. Bennett, 529 U. S. 1065. Whether or not petitioner was aware that the issue was pending before us, see post, at 544-545, n. 7 (Stevens, J., dissenting), it is indisputable that had he but filed a petition raising the statute-of-limitations argument he now advances, we would surely have granted him the reconsideration in light of Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4 (2000), that he later sought in his Kule 60(b) motion. See, e. g., Brown v. Moore, 532 U. S. 968 (2001) (granting a pro se petition for certiorari, vacating the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment denying a COA, and remanding for reconsideration in light of Artuz, 531 U. S. 4).
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the court opinion mentions that one or more of the members of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed dissented. Focus on whether there exists any statement to this effect in the opinion, for example "divided," "dissented," "disagreed," "split.". A reference, without more, to the "majority" or "plurality" does not necessarily evidence dissent (the other judges may have concurred). If a case arose on habeas corpus, indicate dissent if either the last federal court or the last state court to review the case contained one. If the highest court with jurisdiction to hear the case declines to do so by a divided vote, indicate dissent. If the lower court denies an en banc petition by a divided vote and the Supreme Court discusses same, indicate dissent.
Does the court opinion mention that one or more of the members of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed dissented?
[ "Yes", "No" ]
[ 0 ]
sc
ALFRED DUNHILL OF LONDON, INC. v. REPUBLIC OF CUBA et al. No. 73-1288. Argued December 10, 1974 Reargued January 19, 1976 Decided May 24, 1976 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens (except for Part III), JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 715. Stevens, J., filed a concurring statement, post, p. 715. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Brennan, Stewart, and Blackmun, JJ., joined, post, p. 715. Victor 8. Friedman reargued the cause and filed a supplemental brief for the petitioner. With him on the brief on the original argument was Peter D. Ehrenhaft. Victor Rabinowitz reargued the cause for respondents. With him on the briefs on reargument were Michael Krinsky and Dorian Bowman. With him on the brief on the original argument was Mr. Bowman. Antonin Scalia argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. On the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Jones, and Bruno A. Ristau. Robert B. Fiske, Jr., and Wilmot B. Hastings filed a brief for the Bank of Boston International as amicus curiae urging reversal. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in this case is whether the failure of respondents to return to petitioner Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. (Dunhill), funds mistakenly paid by Dun-hill for cigars that had beén sold to Dunhill by certain expropriated Cuban cigar businesses was an “act of state” by Cuba precluding an affirmative judgment against respondents. I The rather involved factual and legal context in which this litigation arises is fully set out in the District Court’s opinion in this ease, Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527 (SDNY 1972), and in closely related litigation, F. Palicio y Compania, S. A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481 (SDNY 1966), aff’d, 375 F. 2d 1011 (CA2), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 830 (1967). For present purposes, the following recitation will suffice. In 1960, the Cuban Government confiscated the business and assets of the five leading manufacturers of Havana cigars. These companies, three corporations and two partnerships, were organized under Cuban law. Virtually all of their owners were Cuban nationals. None were American, These companies sold large quantities of cigars to customers in other countries, including the United States, where the three principal importers were Dunhill, Saks & Co. (Saks), and Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc. (Faber). The Cuban Government named “interventors” to take possession of and operate the business of the seized Cuban concerns. Interventors continued to ship cigars to foreign purchasers, including the United States importers. This litigation began when the former owners of the Cuban companies, most of whom had fled to the United States, brought various actions against the three American importers for trademark infringement and for the purchase price of any cigars that had been shipped to importers from the seized Cuban plants and that bore United States trademarks claimed by the former owners to be their property. Following the conclusion of the related litigation in F. Palicio y Compania, S. A. v. Brush, supra, the Cuban interventor and the Republic of Cuba were allowed to intervene in these actions, which were consolidated for trial. Both the former owners and the interventora had asserted their right to some $700,000 due from the three importers for postintervention shipments: Faber, $582,588.86; Dunhill, $92,949.70; and Saks, $24,250. It also developed that as of the date of intervention, the three importers owed sums totaling $477,200 for cigars shipped prior to intervention: Faber, $322,000; Dunhill, $148,600; and Saks, $6,600. These latter sums the importers had paid to interventora subsequent to intervention on the assumption that inter-ventora were entitled to collect the accounts receivable of the intervened businesses. The former owners claimed title to and demanded payment of these accounts. Based on the “act of state” doctrine which had been reaffirmed in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398 (1964), the District Court held in F. Palicio y Compania, S. A. v. Brush, supra, and here, that it was required to give full legal effect to the 1960 confiscation of the five cigar companies insofar as it purported to take the property of Cuban nationals located within Cuba. Interventora were accordingly entitled to collect from the importers all amounts due and unpaid with respect to shipments made after the date of intervention. The contrary conclusion was reached as to the accounts owing at the time of intervention: Because the United States courts will not give effect to foreign government confiscations without compensation of property located in the United States and because under Republic of Iraq v. First Nat. City Bank, 353 F. 2d 47 (CA2 1965), cert. denied, 382 U. S. 1027 (1966), the situs of the accounts receivable was with the importer-debtors, the 1960 seizures did not reach the preintervention accounts, and the former owners, rather than the interventors, were entitled to collect them from the importers — even though the latter had already paid them to interventors in the mistaken belief that they were fully discharging trade debts in the ordinary course of their business. This conclusion brought to the fore the importers’ claim that their payment of the preintervention accounts had been made in error and that they were entitled to recover these payments from interventors by way of set-off and counterclaim. Although their position that the 1960 confiscation entitled them to the sums due for pre-intervention sales had been rejected and the District Court had ruled that they "had no right to receive or retain such payment,” interventors claimed those payments on the additional ground that the obligation, if any, to repay was a quasi-contractual debt having a situs in Cuba and that their refusal to honor the obligation was an act of state not subject to question in our courts. The District Court rejected this position for two reasons. First, the repayment obligated was more properly deemed situated in the United States and hence remained unaffected by any purported confiscatory act of the Cuban Government. Second, in the District Court’s view, nothing had occurred which qualified for recognition as an act of state: “[TJhere was no formal repudiation of these obligations by Cuban Government decree of general application or otherwise. . . . Here, all that occurred was a statement by counsel for the interventors, during trial, that the Cuban Government and the inter-ventors denied liability and had refused to make repayment. This statement was made after the interventors had invoked the jurisdiction of this Court in order to pursue their claims against the importers for post-intervention shipments. It is hard to conceive how, if such a statement can be elevated to the status of an act of state, any refusal by any state to honor any obligation at any time could be considered anything else.” 345 F. Supp., at 545. The importers were accordingly held entitled to set off their mistaken payments to interventors for preintervention shipments against the amounts due from them for their post-intervention purchases. Faber and Saks, because they owed more than interventors were obligated to return to them, were satisfied completely by the right to setoff. But Dunhill — and at last we arrive at the issue in this case — was entitled to more from interven-tors — $148,000—than it owed for postintervention shipments — $93,000—and to be made whole, asked for and was granted judgment against interventors for the full amount of its claim, from which would be deducted the smaller judgment entered against it. The Court of Appeals, Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F. 2d 1355 (CA2 1973), agreed that the former owners were entitled to recover from the importers the full amount of preintervention accounts receivable. It also held that the mistaken payments by importers to inter-ventors gave rise to a quasi-contractual obligation to repay these sums. But, contrary to the District Court, the Court of Appeals was of the view that the obligation to repay had a situs in Cuba and had been repudiated in the course of litigation by conduct that was sufficiently official to be deemed an act of state: “[I]n the absence of evidence that the interventors were not acting within the scope of their authority as agents of the Cuban government, their repudiation was an act of state even though not embodied in a formal decree.” Id., at 1371. Although the repudiation of the interventors' obligation was considered an act of state, the Court of Appeals went on to hold that First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U. S. 759 (1972), entitled importers to recover the sums due them from interventors by way of set-off against the amounts due from them for postintervention shipments. The act of state doctrine was said to bar the affirmative judgment awarded Dunhill to the extent that its claim exceeded its debt. The judgment of the District Court was reversed in this respect, and it is this action which was the subject of the petition for certio-rari filed by Dunhill. In granting the petition, 416 U. S. 981 (1974), we requested the parties to address certain questions, the first being whether the statement by counsel for the Republic of Cuba that Dunhill’s unjust-enrichment claim would not be honored constituted an act of state. The case was argued twice in this Court. We have now concluded that nothing in the record reveals an act of state with respect to interventors’ obligation to return monies mistakenly paid to them. Accordingly we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. II The District Court and the Court of Appeals held that for purposes of this litigation interventors were not entitled to the preintervention accounts receivable by virtue of the 1960 confiscation and that, despite other arguments to the contrary, nothing based on their claim to those accounts entitled interventors to retain monies mistakenly paid on those accounts by importers. We do not disturb these conclusions. The Court of Appeals nevertheless observed that interventors had “ignored” demands for the return of the monies and had “fail[ed] to honor the importers’ demand (which was confirmed by the Cuban government’s counsel at trial).” This conduct was considered to be “the Cuban government’s repudiation of its obligation to return the funds” and to constitute an act of state not subject to question in our courts. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F. 2d; at 1369, 1371. We cannot agree. If interventors, having had their liability adjudicated and various defenses rejected, including the claimed act of state, with respect to preintervention accounts, represented by the Cuban confiscation in 1960, were nevertheless to escape repayment by claiming a second and later act of state involving the funds mistakenly paid them, it was their burden to prove that act., Concededly, they declined to pay over the funds; but refusal to repay does not necessarily assert anything more than what interventors had claimed from the outset and what they have continued to claim in this Court — that the pre-intervention accounts receivable were theirs and that they had no obligation to return payments on those accounts. Neither does it demonstrate that in addition to authority to operate commercial businesses, to pay their bills and to collect their accounts receivable, inter-ventors had been invested with sovereign authority to repudiate all or any part of the debts incurred by those businesses. Indeed, it is difficult to believe that they had the power selectively to refuse payment of legitimate debts arising from the operation of those commercial enterprises. In The “Gul Djemal,” 264 U. S. 90 (1924), a supplier libeled and caused the arrest of the Gul Djemal, a steamship owned and operated for commercial purposes by the Turkish Government, in an effort to recover for supplies and services sold to and performed for the ship. The ship’s master, “a duly commissioned officer of the Turkish Navy,” id., at 94-95, appeared in court and asserted sovereign immunity, claiming that such an assertion defeated the court’s' jurisdiction. A direct appeal was taken to this Court, where it was held that the master’s assertion of sovereign immunity was insufficient because his mere representation of his government as master of a commercial ship furnished no basis for assuming he was entitled to represent the sovereign in other capacities. Here there is no more reason to suppose that the inter-ventors possess governmental, as opposed to commercial, authority than there was to suppose that the master of the Gul Djemal possessed such authority. The master of the Gul Djemal claimed the authority to assert sovereign immunity while the interventors claim that they had the authority to commit an act of state, but the difference is unimportant. In both cases, a party claimed to have had the authority to exercise sovereign power. In both, the only authority shown is commercial authority. We thus disagree with the Court of Appeals that the mere refusal of the interventors to repay funds followed by a failure to prove that interventors “were not acting within the scope of their authority as agents of the Cuban government” satisfied respondents’ burden of establishing their act of state defense. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F. 2d, at 1371. Nor do we consider Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250 (1897), heavily relied upon by the Court of Appeals, to require a contrary conclusion. In that case and in Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297 (1918), and Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U. S. 304 (1918), it was apparently concluded that the facts were sufficient to demonstrate that the conduct in question was the public act of those with authority to exercise sovereign powers and was entitled to respect in our courts. We draw no such conclusion from the facts of the case before us now. As the District Court found, the only evidence of an act of state other than the act of nonpayment by interventors was “a statement by counsel for the interventors, during trial, that the Cuban Government and the interventors denied liability and had refused to make repayment.” Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp., at 545. But this merely restated respondents’ original legal position and adds little, if anything, to the proof of an act of state. No statute, decree, order, or resolution of the Cuban Government itself was offered in evidence indicating that Cuba had repudiated its obligations in general or any class thereof or that it had as a sovereign matter determined to confiscate the amounts due three foreign importers. Ill If we assume with the Court of Appeals that the Cuban Government itself had purported to exercise sovereign power to confiscate the mistaken payments belonging to three foreign creditors and to repudiate interventors’ adjudicated obligation to return those funds, we are nevertheless persuaded by the arguments of petitioner and by those of the United States that the concept of an act of state should not be extended to include the repudiation of a purely commercial obligation owed by a foreign sovereign or by one of its commercial instrumentalities. Our cases have not yet gone so far, and we decline to expand their reach to the extent necessary to affirm the Court of Appeals. Distinguishing between the public and governmental acts of sovereign states on the one hand and their private and commercial acts on the other is not a novel approach. As the Court stated through Mr. Chief Justice Marshall long ago in Bank of the United States v. Planters’ Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheat. 904, 907 (1824): “It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of communicating to the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom it associates itself, and takes the character which belongs to its associates, and to the business which is to be transacted.” Cf. Sloan Shipyards v. United States Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 549, 567-568 (1922). In this same tradition, South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437 (1905), drew a line for purposes of tax immunity between the historically recognized governmental functions of a State and businesses engaged in by a State of the kind which theretofore had been pursued by private enterprise. Similarly, in Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, 369 (1934), the Court said: “If a state chooses to go into the business of buying and selling commodities, its right to do so may be conceded so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned; but the exercise of the right is not the performance of a governmental function .... When a state enters the market place seeking customers it divests itself of its quasi sovereignty pro tanto, and takes on the character of a trader .. . .” It is thus a familiar concept that “there is a constitutional line between the State as government and the State as trader . . . .” New York v. United States, 326 U. S. 572, 579 (1946). See also Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U. S. 184, 189-190 (1964); California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553, 564 (1957); United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175, 183 (1936). It is the position of the United States, stated in an amicus brief filed by the Solicitor General, that such a line should be drawn in defining the outer limits of the act of state concept and that repudiations by a foreign sovereign of its commercial debts should not be considered to be acts of state beyond legal question in our courts. Attached to the brief of the United States and to this opinion as Appendix 1 is the letter of November 26, 1975, in which the Department of State, speaking through its Legal Adviser agrees with the brief filed by the Solicitor General and, more specifically, declares that “we do not believe that the Dunhill ease raises an act of state question because the case involves an act which is commercial, and not public, in nature.” The major underpinning of the act of state doctrine is the policy of foreclosing court adjudications involving the legality of acts of foreign states on their own soil that might embarrass the Executive Branch of our Government in the conduct of our foreign relations. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S., at 427-428, 431-433. But based on the presently expressed views of those who conduct our relations with foreign countries, we are in no sense compelled to recognize as an act of state the purely commercial conduct of foreign governments in order to avoid embarrassing conflicts with the Executive Branch. On the contrary, for the reasons to which we now turn, we fear that embarrassment and conflict would more likely ensue if we were to require that the repudiation of a foreign government’s debts arising from its operation of a purely commercial business be recognized as an act of state and immunized from question in our courts. Although it had other views in years gone by, in 1952, as evidenced by Appendix 2 (the Tate letter) attached to this opinion, the United States abandoned the absolute theory of sovereign immunity and embraced the restrictive view under which immunity in our courts should be granted only with respect to causes of action arising out of a foreign state’s public or governmental actions and not with respect to those arising out of its commercial or proprietary actions. This has been the official policy of our Government since that time as the attached letter of November 26,1975, confirms: “Moreover, since 1952, the Department of State has adhered to the position that the commercial and private activities of foreign states do not give rise to sovereign immunity. Implicit in this position is a determination that adjudications of commercial liability against foreign states do not impede the conduct of foreign relations, and that such adjudications are consistent with international law on sovereign immunity.” Repudiation of a commercial debt cannot, consistent with this restrictive approach to sovereign immunity, be treated as an act of state; for if it were, foreign govern-merits, by merely repudiating the debt before or after its adjudication, would enjoy an immunity which our Government would not extend them under prevailing sovereign immunity principles in this country. This would undermine the policy supporting the restrictive view of immunity, which is to assure those engaging in commercial transactions with foreign sovereignties that their rights will be determined in the courts whenever possible. Although at one time this Court ordered sovereign immunity extended to a commercial vessel of a foreign country absent a suggestion of immunity from the Executive Branch and although the policy of the United States with respect to its own merchant ships was then otherwise, Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S. S. Pesaro, 271 U. S. 562 (1926), the authority of that case has been severely diminished by later cases such as Ex parte Peru, 318 U. S. 578 (1943), and Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U. S. 30 (1945). In the latter case the Court unanimously denied immunity to a commercial ship owned but not possessed by the Mexican Government. The decision rested on the fact that the Mexican Government was not in possession, but the Court declared, id., at 35-36: “Every judicial action exercising or relinquishing jurisdiction over the vessel of a foreign government has its effect upon our relations with that government. Hence it is a guiding principle in determining whether a court should exercise or surrender its jurisdiction in such cases, that the courts should not so act as to embarrass the executive arm in its conduct of foreign affairs. 'In such cases the judicial department of this government follows the action of the political branch, and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.' United States v. Lee, supra, 209; Ex parte Peru, supra, 588. “It is therefore not for the courts to deny an immunity which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which the government has not seen fit to recognize. The judicial seizure of the property of a friendly state may be regarded as such an affront to its dignity and may so affect our relations with it, that it is an accepted rule of substantive law governing the exercise of the jurisdiction of the courts that they accept and follow the executive determination that the vessel shall be treated as immune. Ex parte Peru, supra, 588. But recognition by the courts of an immunity upon principles which the political department of government has not sanctioned may be equally embarrassing to it in securing the protection of our national interests and their recognition by other nations.” (Footnote omitted.) In a footnote the Court expressly questioned the Berizzi Bros, holding, and two concurring Justices asserted that the Court had effectively overruled that case. Since that time, as we have said, the United States has adopted and adhered to the policy declining to extend sovereign immunity to the commercial dealings of foreign governments. It has based that policy in part on the fact that this approach has been accepted by a large and increasing number of foreign states in the international community; in part on the fact that the United States had already adopted a policy of consenting to be sued in foreign courts in connection with suits against its merchant vessels; and in part because the enormous increase in the extent to which foreign sovereigns had become involved in international trade made essential “a practice which will enable persons doing business with them to have their rights determined in the courts.” Appendix 2 to this opinion, infra, at 714. In the last 20 years, lower courts have concluded, in light of this Court’s decisions in Ex parte Peru, supra, and Mexico v. Hoffman, supra, and from the Tate letter and the changed international environment, that Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S. S. Pesaro, supra, no longer correctly states the law; and they have declined to extend sovereign immunity to foreign sovereigns in cases arising out of purely commercial transactions. Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F. 2d 354 (CA2 1964), cert. denied, 381 U. S. 934 (1965); Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F. 2d 103 (CA2), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 931 (1966); Premier S. S. Co. v. Embassy of Algeria, 336 F. Supp. 507 (SDNY 1971); Ocean Transport Co. v. Government of Republic of Ivory Coast, 269 F. Supp. 703 (ED La. 1967); ADM Milling Co. v. Republic of Bolivia, Civ. Action No. 75-946 (DC Aug. 8, 1975); Et Ve Balik Kurumu v. B. N. S. Int’l Sales Corp., 25 Misc. 2d 299, 304 N. Y. S. 2d 971 (1960); Harris & Co. Advtg., Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 127 So. 2d 687 (Fla. Ct. App. 1961). Indeed, it is fair to say that the “restrictive theory” of sovereign immunity appears to be generally accepted as the prevailing law in this country. ALI, Restatement (Second), Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 69 (1965). Participation by foreign sovereigns in the international commercial market has increased substantially in recent years. Cf. International Economic Report of the President 56 (1975). The potential injury to private businessmen — and ultimately to international trade itself— from a system in which some of the participants in the international market are not subject to the rule of law has therefore increased correspondingly. As noted above, courts of other countries have also recently adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. Of equal importance is the fact that subjecting foreign governments to the rule of law in their commercial dealings presents a much smaller risk of affronting their sovereignty than would an attempt to pass on the legality of their governmental acts. In their commercial capacities, foreign governments do not exercise powers peculiar to sovereigns. Instead, they exercise only those powers that can also be exercised by private citizens. Subjecting them in connection with such acts to the same rules of law that apply to private citizens is unlikely to touch very sharply on “national nerves.” Moreover, as this Court has noted: “[T]he greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the application of an agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the national interest or with international justice.” Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S., at 428. See also id., at 430 n. 34. There may be little codification or consensus as to the rules of international law concerning exercises of governmental powers, including military powers and expropriations, within a sovereign state's borders affecting the property or persons of aliens, However, more discernible rules of international law have emerged with regard to the commercial dealings of private parties in the international market. The restrictive approach to sovereign immunity suggests that these established rules should be applied to the commercial transactions of sovereign states. Of course, sovereign immunity has not been pleaded in this case; but it is beyond cavil that part of the foreign relations law recognized by the United States is that the commercial obligations of a foreign government may be adjudicated in those courts otherwise having jurisdiction to enter such judgments. Nothing in our national policy calls on us to recognize as an act of state a repudiation by Cuba of an obligation adjudicated in our courts and arising out of the operation of a commercial business by one of its instrumentalities. For all the reasons which led the Executive Branch to adopt the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, we hold that the mere assertion of sovereignty as a defense to a claim arising out of purely commercial acts by a foreign sovereign is no more effective if given the label “Act of State” than if it is given the label “sovereign immunity.” In describing the act of state doctrine in the past we have said that it “precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory.” Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, supra, at 401 (emphasis added), and that it applies to “acts done within their own States, in the exercise of governmental authority.” Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S., at 252 (emphasis added). We decline to extend the act of state doctrine to acts committed by foreign sovereigns in the course of their purely commercial operations. Because the act relied on by respondents in this case was an act arising out of the conduct by Cuba’s agents in the operation of cigar businesses for profit, the act was not an act of state. Reversed. APPENDIX 1 TO OPINION OF THE COURT The Legal Adviser, Department of State, Washington, November SB, 1975. Dear Mr. Solicitor General: In the case of Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. The Republic of Cuba, which is before the Supreme Court on petition for a writ of certiorari, No. 73-1288, the Court has requested the parties to discuss whether its holding in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398, should be reconsidered. The Department of State believes that the question of whether the Sabbatino case should be reconsidered involves matters of importance to the foreign policy interests of the United States and requests that its views be conveyed to the Supreme Court. The views expressed herein are in addition to the arguments presented in the brief amicus curiae which the United States is filing in the Dunhill case. As urged in that brief, we do not believe that the Dunhill case raises an act of state question because the case involves an act which is commercial, and not public, in nature. Moreover, since 1952, the Department of State has adhered to the position that the commercial and private activities of foreign states do not give rise to sovereign immunity. Implicit in this position is a determination that adjudications of commercial liability against foreign states do not impede the conduct of foreign relations, and that such adjudications are consistent with international law on sovereign immunity. In the event, however, that the Court reaches the question whether the Sabbatino holding should be reconsidered, we believe that the following considerations should be called to the Court's attention: Since Sabbatino was decided in 1964, the Department of State has on two occasions expressed to courts in the United States its views concerning act of state adjudications. First, in the Sabbatino case itself, on remand, the Executive Branch declined to make a determination under the Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U. S. C. 2370 (e)(2), "that application of the act of state doctrine is required in this case by the foreign policy interests of the United States.” Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 272 F. Supp. 836, 837 (S. D. N. Y.), aff’d, 383 F. 2d 166 (C. A. 2), certiorari denied, 390 U. S. 956. Having taken note of the Executive Branch’s position, the district court in Farr applied the Hickenlooper Amendment and held that a Cuban decree of confiscation violated customary international law. 272 F. Supp., at 838. Second, in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U. S. 759, the Department of State informed the Supreme Court that general foreign relations considerations did not require application of the act of state doctrine to bar adjudication of a counterclaim when the foreign state’s claim arises from a relationship between the parties existing when the act of state occurred, and when the amount of relief to be granted is limited to the amount of the foreign state’s claim. Relying on the precedent of Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche Amerikaanshe, Etc., 210 F. 2d 375 (C. A. 2), where the Department had advised that the act of state doctrine need not apply to a class of cases involving Nazi confiscations, the Department in First National City Bank concluded that the act of state doctrine need not be applied “in this or like cases.” Significantly, the Farr, Bernstein and First National City Bank cases each involved an Executive Branch determination which opened the way for U. S. courts to review an act of state on the merits under international law. In each of these cases, the claim or counterclaim in question alleged that an act of state violated customary international law. Thus, at least on a case-by-case basis, the trend in Executive Branch pronouncements has been that foreign relations considerations do not require application of the act of state doctrine to bar adjudications under international law. This trend is mirrored in other countries. Apart from the cases cited by Mr. Justice White in Sabbatino, 376 U. S., at 440 n. 1, there have been several recent decisions where foreign courts have reviewed state acts under international law. English law, from which our act of state doctrine derives, does not require British courts to abstain from reviewing state acts under international law. As far as can be determined, this exercise of the judicial function in foreign jurisdictions has not caused serious foreign relations consequences for the countries concerned. The present case is similar to Bernstein, Farr and First National City Bank, This Department is of the opinion that there would be no embarrassment to the conduct of foreign policy if the Court should decide in this case to adjudicate the legality of any act of state found to have taken place and to make such adjudication in accordance with any principle of international law found to be relevant. In general this Department’s experience provides little support for a presumption that adjudication of acts of foreign states in accordance with relevant principles of international law would embarrass the conduct of foreign policy. Thus, it is our view that if the Court should decide to overrule the holding in Sabbatino so that acts of state would thereafter be subject to adjudication in American courts under international law, we would not anticipate embarrassment to the conduct of the foreign policy of the United States. Sincerely, Monroe Leigh. APPENDIX 2 TO OPINION OF THE COURT May 19, 1952. My dear Mr. Attorney General : The Department of State has for some time had under consideration the question whether the practice of the Government in granting immunity from suit to foreign governments made parties defendant in the courts of the United States without their consent should not be changed. The Department has now reached the conclusion that such immunity should no longer be granted in certain types of cases. In view of the obvious interest of your Department in this matter I should like to point out briefly some of the facts which influenced the Department’s decision. A study of the law of sovereign immunity reveals the existence of two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory of sovereign immunity, a sovereign cannot, without his consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure gestionis). There is agreement by proponents of both theories, supported by practice, that sovereign immunity should not be claimed or granted in actions with respect to real property (diplomatic and perhaps consular property excepted) or with respect to the disposition of the property of a deceased person even though a foreign sovereign is the beneficiary. The classical or virtually absolute theory of sovereign immunity has generally been followed by the courts of the United States, the British Commonwealth, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, and probably Poland. The decisions of the courts of Brazil, Chile, China, Hungary, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, and Portugal may be deemed to support the classical theory of immunity if one or at most two old decisions anterior to the development of the restrictive theory may be considered sufficient on which to base a conclusion. The position of the Netherlands, Sweden, and Argentina is less clear since although immunity has been granted in recent cases coming before the courts of those countries, the facts were such that immunity would have been granted under either the absolute or restrictive theory. However, constant references by the courts of these three countries to the distinction between public and private acts of the state, even though the distinction was not involved in the result of the case, may indicate an intention to leave the way open for a possible application of the restrictive theory of immunity if and when the occasion presents itself. A trend to the restrictive theory is already evident in the Netherlands where the lower courts have started to apply that theory .following a Supreme Court decision to the effect that immunity would have been applicable in the case under consideration under either theory. The German courts, after a period of hesitation at the end of the nineteenth century have held to the classical theory, but it should be noted that the refusal of the Supreme Court in 1921 to yield to pressure by the lower courts for the newer theory was based on the view that that theory had not yet developed sufficiently to justify a change. In view of the growth of the restrictive theory since that time the German courts might take a different view today. The newer or restrictive theory of sovereign immunity has always been supported by the courts of Belgium and Italy. It was adopted in turn by the courts of Egypt and of Switzerland. In addition, the courts of France, Austria, and Greece, which were traditionally supporters of the classical theory, reversed their position in the 20jg to embrace the restrictive theory. Rumania, Peru, and possibly Denmark also appear to follow this theory. Furthermore, it should be observed that in most of the countries still following the classical theory there is a school of influential writers favoring the restrictive theory and the views of writers, at least in civil law countries, are a major factor in the development of the law. Moreover, the leanings of the lower courts in civil law countries are more significant in shaping the law than they are in common law countries where the rule of precedent prevails and the trend in these lower courts is to the restrictive theory. Of related interest to this question is the fact that ten of the thirteen countries which have been classified above as supporters of the classical theory have ratified the Brussels Convention of 1926 under which immunity for government owned merchant vessels is waived. In addition the United States, which is not a party to the Convention, some years ago announced and has since followed, a policy of not claiming immunity for its public owned or operated merchant vessels. Keeping in mind the importance played by cases involving public vessels in the field of sovereign immunity, it is thus noteworthy that these ten countries (Brazil, Chile, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden) and the United States have already relinquished by treaty or in practice an important part of the immunity which they claim under the classical theory. It is thus evident that with the possible exception of the United Kingdom little support has been found except on the part of the Soviet Union and its satellites for continued full acceptance of the absolute theory of sovereign immunity. There are evidences that British authorities are aware of its deficiencies and ready for a change. The reasons which obviously motivate state trading countries in adhering to the theory with perhaps increasing rigidity are most persuasive that the United States should change its policy. Furthermore, the granting of sovereign immunity to foreign governments in the courts of the United States is most inconsistent with the action of the Government of the United States in subjecting itself to suit in these same courts in both contract and tort and with its long established policy of not claiming immunity in foreign jurisdictions for its merchant vessels. Finally, the Department feels that the widespread and increasing practice on the part of governments of engaging in commercial activities makes necessary a practice which will enable persons doing business with them to have their rights determined in the courts. For these reasons it will hereafter be the Department’s policy to follow the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in the consideration of requests of foreign governments for a grant of sovereign immunity. It is realized that a shift in policy by the executive cannot control the courts but it is felt that the courts are less likely to allow a plea of sovereign immunity where the executive has declined to do so. There have been indications that at least some Justices of the Supreme Court feel that in this matter courts should follow the branch of the Government charged with responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations. In order that your Department, which is charged with representing the interests of the Government before the courts, may be adequately informed it will be the Department’s practice to advise you of all requests by foreign governments for the grant of immunity from suit and of the Department’s action thereon. Sincerely yours, For the Secretary of State: Jack B. Tate Acting Legal Adviser Part III of this opinion is joined only by The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist. When the prior owners sued the importers, the interventors and the Republic of Cuba brought separate litigation against the prior owners’ attorneys seeking to restrain the further prosecution of the actions brought by the prior owners. The interventors were there held entitled to the proceeds of sales made to American buyers after intervention but the prior owners' trademark litigation was permitted to continue. F. Palicio y Compania, S. A. v. Brush. Prior to intervening in this lawsuit, interventor-respondent Pinera had replaced the original interventora as to the five companies on whose behalf he has pursued this suit. For convenience’ sake we will refer to those representing the tobacco businesses as “inter-ventors” both in discussing their conduct prior to the lawsuit and in discussing the single interventor’s conduct as a party to the lawsuit. The District Court also disagreed with interventors that there was insufficient evidence to show that they had actually received the sums assertedly paid them by the importers. Neither could the District Court agree that the importers, if they were entitled to the funds at all, were entitled to be repaid only in pesos. The Court of Appeals did not disturb these holdings. The Court of Appeals rejected the importers’ contention that the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, 22 U. S. C. §2370 (e)(2), precluded interventors from invoking the act of state doctrine. The correctness of that judgment i^' not before us in this litigation. Our order granting certiorari directed counsel to brief $nd argue two questions: “1. Can statements by counsel for the Republic of Cuba, that petitioner’s unjust enrichment counterclaim would not f>e honored, constitute an act of state? “2. If so, is an exception to the act of state doctrine created, under First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U. S. 759 (1972), where petitioner’s counterclaim does not exceed the net balance owed to Cuba on its claims by petitioner’s codefend-ants, and where all claims and counterclaims arise out of the subject matter in litigation in this case?” When the case was restored to the calendar for reargument, 422 U. S. 1005 (1975), the Court directed: “In addition to other questions presented by this case, counsel are requested to brief and discuss during oral argument: Should this Court’s holding in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398 (1964), be reconsidered?” In addition to the present petition the Court has before it the petition of the interventors. Republic of Cuba v. Saks & Co., No. 73-1287, challenging, on the ground that the intervention successfully seized the accounts receivable and that the $477,000 properly belonged to them, the propriety of permitting even a setoff, and the conditional cross-petition of the importers, Saks & Co. v. Republic of Cuba, No. 73-1289, challenging the propriety of the judgment against them and in favor of the owners for the $477,000 due on preintervention shipments. Today we deny these petitions, post, p. 991. The traditional formulation of the act of state doctrine is that in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250, 252 (1897): “Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.” Their entitlement to the 1477,000 derived under this theory from the initial act of state — i. e., the intervention of the owners' business. All parties agree that intervention is to be given effect with respect to all of the owners' tangible property in Cuba at the time of intervention. The Court of Appeals held, however, that since the accounts receivable were not in Cuba at the time of intervention, the intervention did not reach them. The dissent points to a statement by trial counsel that when Dunhill's money arrived in Cuba after the intervention “the Cuban government took this money and under the act of state doctrine it belongs to the Cuban government,” The statement was made during counsel's closing argument in the District Court and is not and does not purport to be a {actual representation that a second act of state occurred. Indeed in his brief in this Court the same counsel states “counsel’s in-court statements were 'no more than statements of a litigating position,’ ” Brief for Respondents 16, and “The statement of . . , a lawyer is not proof of anything.” Id., at 17 n. 8. Indeed, if counsel’s statements were proof of anything, petitioner would have been entitled to cross-examine him under oath. As a legal argument that the original act of state automatically matured when Dunhill’s money arrived in Cuba and transformed the account receivable from an intangible to a tangible asset, the statement was rejected by the Court of Appeals, which held that the original intervention did not seize the accounts receivable from the prior owners even with respect to accounts later paid by Dunhill. Finally, we are unwilling, absent proof, to infer from the fact that Cuba seized the assets of the cigar business from Cuban nationals that it must necessarily have intended to make and did make a later discriminatory and confiscatory seizure of money belonging to the United States companies. Indeed, respondents have argued vigorously before this Court that no international law issue is raised precisely because “[a] 11 of the acts of the Cuban sovereign have been directed at its nationals . . .” and “there was no intent to divest Dunhill of ownership.” Brief for Respondents on Reargument 4r-5. In supporting its conclusion that Cuba necessarily did intend to seize Dunhill’s money when it arrived in Cuba, the dissent quotes a remark by counsel — in the third brief filed in this Court by respondents — that they had contended below that the “refusal to acquiesce in the quasi-contractual obligation sought to be imposed by a foreign court, was ... an act of state.” Once again, this is merely a statement of respondents’ incorrect litigating position that the failure to pay Dunhill established a refusal by Cuba to acquiesce in an admitted obligation and was therefore an act of state. The litigating position is incorrect because, as stated supra, at 691, respondents have never admitted an obligation to Dun-hill and therefore their failure to pay Dunhill, without more, is inadequate to establish a sovereign repudiation of such an obligation. “The Anne, 3 Wheat. 435, reaffirmed by The Sao Vicente, 260 U. S. 151, is enough to show that the immunity could not have been successfully set up by a duly recognized consul, representative of his sovereign in commercial matters, in the ordinary course of his official duties, and there seems no adequate reason to presume that the master of the Gul Djemal had any greater authority in respect thereto. Although an officer of the Turkish Navy, he was performing no naval or military duty, and was serving upon a vessel not functioning in naval or military capacity but engaged in commerce .... He was not shown to have any authority to represent his sovereign other than can be inferred from his position as master ...” (Emphasis added.) 264 U. S., at 95. There the commander of a successful revolution, in control of the city of Bolivar, refused a passport to Underhill. Upon suit by Underhill for his detention, this Court refused to inquire into the propriety of the detention because “[t]he acts complained of were the acts of a military commander representing the authority of the revolutionary party as government, which afterwards succeeded and was recognized by the United States.” 168 U. S., at 254. The dissent, assuming that the Republic of Cuba purported to exercise sovereign powers in refusing to return Dunhill’s money, asserts that there is no distinction between the refusal to honor its obligation to return DunhilPs money and the original expropriation of the cigar businesses; and that the case therefore does not involve a purely commercial act. The dissent is wrong. Cuba’s debt to Dunhill arose out of the conduct by Cuba’s agents of a commercial business for profit. The same may not be said of conventional expropriations of foreign assets located ab initio inside a country’s territorial borders. Dunhill was continuing to buy cigars from the interventora after intervention and Dunhill knew when the payments were made that the interventora would receive them. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F. 2d 1355, 1367-1368 (CA2 1973). The debt would never have arisen if Cuba’s agents had not gone into the cigar business and sold to Dunhill. This case is therefore no different from any case in which a buyer overpays for goods sold by a commercial business operated by a foreign government — a commonplace event in international commerce. The letter also takes the position that sovereign immunity, as such, does not prevent entry of an affirmative judgment on a counterclaim arising out of the same “transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the claim of the foreign state,” and inferentially that the act of state doctrine is likewise unavailable as a method of avoiding such an affirmative judgment. In light of our conclusion that repudiation by a sovereign of a commercial debt is not an act of state, we do not reach the State Department’s alternative position. The letter also takes the position that the overruling of Sabbatino, so that acts of state would hereafter be subject to adjudication in American courts under international law, would not result in embarrassment to the conduct of United States foreign policy. We need not resolve this issue either. “This salutary principle was not followed in Berizzi Bros. Co. v. The Pesaro, 271 U. S. 562, where the court allowed the immunity, for the first time, to a merchant vessel owned by a foreign government and in its possession and service, although the State Department had declined to recognize the immunity. The propriety of thus extending the immunity where the political branch of the government had refused to act was not considered. “Since the vessel here, although owned by the Mexican Government, was not in its possession and service, we have no occasion to consider the questions presented in the Berizzi case. It is enough that we find no persuasive ground for allowing the immunity in this case, an important reason being that the State Department has declined to recognize it.” 324 U. S., at 35 n. 1. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Mr. Justice Black, said: “The fact of the matter is that the result in Berizzi Bros. Co. v. The Pesaro, supra, was reached without submission by the Department of State of its relevant policies in the conduct of our foreign relations and largely on the basis of considerations which have steadily lost whatever validity they may then have had. Compare the overruling of The Thomas Jefferson, 10 Wheat. 428 (1825), by The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443 (185[2]). The views of our State Department against immunity for commercial ships owned by foreign governments have been strongly supported by international conferences, some held after the decision in the Pesaro case. See Lord Maugham in Compania Naviera Vascongado v. The Cristina [1938] A. C. 485, 521-523. But the real change has been the enormous growth, particularly in recent years, of ‘ordinary merchandising’ activity by governments. See The Western Maid, 257 U. S. 419, 432. Lord Maugham in the Cristina thus put the matter: “ ‘Half a century ago foreign Governments very seldom embarked in trade with ordinary ships, though they not infrequently owned vessels destined for public uses, and in particular hospital vessels, supply ships and surveying or exploring vessels. These were doubtless very strong reasons for extending the privilege long possessed by ships of war to public ships of the nature mentioned; but there has been a very large development of State-owned commercial ships since the Great War, and the question whether the immunity should continue to be given to ordinary trading ships has become acute. Is it consistent with sovereign dignity to acquire a tramp steamer and to compete with ordinary shippers and ship-owners in the markets of the world? Doing so, is it consistent to set up the immunity of a sovereign if, owing to the want of skill of captain and crew, serious damage is caused to the ship of another country? Is it also consistent to refuse to permit proceedings to enforce a right of salvage in respect of services rendered, perhaps at great risk, by the vessel of another country?’ [1938] A. C. 485, 521-522. “It is my view, in short, that courts should not disclaim jurisdiction which otherwise belongs to them in relation to vessels owned by foreign governments however operated except when ‘the department of the government charged with the conduct of our foreign relations,’ or of course Congress, explicitly asserts that the proper conduct of these relations calls for judicial abstention. Thereby responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations will be placed where power lies. And unless constrained by the established policy of our State Department, courts will best discharge their responsibility by enforcement of the regular judicial processes.” Id., at 40-42. Austria: Collision with Foreign Government-Owned Motor Car (Austria) Case, [1961] 40 Int'l L. Rep. 73 (Sup. Ct.). Belgium: “Socobel” v. Greek State, [1951] 18 Int’l L. Rep. 3 (Trib. Civ. Brussels). Canada: Penthouse Studios, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela, [1970] 8 D. L. R. 3d 686 (Quebec Ct. App., 1969). England: Thai-Europe Tapioca Service v. Government of Pakistan, [1975] 1 W. L. R. 1485 (C. A.). Philippine Admiral v. Wallem Shipping, [1976] 1 All E. R. 78 (P. C.). Egypt: Federated People’s Republic of Yugoslavia v. Kafr El-Zayat Cotton Co., [1951] 18 Int’l L. Rep. 225 (Civ. Trib. Alexandria) France: Administration des Chemins de Fer Iraniens v. Société Levant Express Transport, 73 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 883 (Sup. Ct. 1969). Germany: Claim against the Empire of Iran Case, [1963] 45 Int’l L. Rep. 57 (Fed. Const. Ct.). Greece: Papaevangelou v. United States Government (Athens First Instance Ct., Apr. 23, 1960). Hong Kong: Midland Investment Co., Ltd. v. Bank of Communications, [1956] 40 H. K. L. Rep. 42, 23 Int’l L. Rep. 234 (S. Ct.). Italy: United States v. Soc. I. R. S. A., 86 II Foro Italiano Part I, 1405 (Sup. Ct., en banc, Mar. 13, 1963). Pakistan: Gammon-Layton v. Secretary of State, U. S. A., P. L. D. 1965 (W. P.) Karachi 425. Philippines: Carried Lumber Co. v. United States of America (Ct. App. Manila, Sept. 24, 1974). Yugoslavia: Zarko v. Office of International Trade Fairs, U. S. Department of Commerce (Dist. Ct. Zagreb, June 10, 1966). In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398, 428 (1964), the Court noted in the context of the act of state doctrine: “It is also evident that some aspects of international law touch much more sharply on national nerves than do others; the less important the implications of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker the justification for exclusivity in the political branches.” Schmitthoff, The Unification or Harmonisation of Law by Means of Standard Contracts and General Conditions, 17 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 551, 563-564 (1968). See also A. Lowenfeld, International Private Trade 1-2 (1975); Gal, The Commercial Law of Nations and the Law of International Trade, 6 Com. Int’l L. J. 55, 64 (1972); H. Trammer, The Law of Foreign Trade in the Legal Systems of the Countries of Planned Economy, in The Sources of the Law of International Trade 41 (Schmitthoff ed. 1964) (hereinafter Sehmitthoff); V. Knapp, The Function, Organization and Activities of Foreign Trade Corporations in the European Socialist Countries, Schmitthoff 52; A. Goldstajn, International Conventions and Standard Contracts as Means of Escaping from the Application of Municipal Law — I, Sehmitthoff 103; T. lonasco & I. Nestor, The Limits of Party Autonomy — I, Schmitthoff 167; and Schmitthoff, Introduction, Schmitthoff ix. The dissent states that the doctrines of sovereign immunity and act of state are distinct — the former conferring on a sovereign “exemption from suit by virtue of its status” and the latter “merely [telling] a court what law to apply to a case.” Post, at 725-726, 726. It may be true that the one doctrine has been described in jurisdictional terms and the other in choice-of-law terms; and it may be that the doctrines point to different results in certain cases. It cannot be gainsaid, however, that the proper application of each involves a balancing of the injury to our foreign policy, the conduct of which is committed primarily to the Executive Branch, through judicial affronts to sovereign powers, compare Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U. S., at 35-36 (sovereign immunity), with Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, supra, at 423, 427-428 (act of state), against the injury to the private party, who is denied justice through judicial deference to a raw assertion of sovereignty, and a consequent injury to international trade. The State Department has concluded that in the commercial area the need for merchants "to have their rights determined in courts” outweighs any injury to foreign policy. This conclusion was reached in the context of the jurisdictional problem of sovereign immunity. We reach the same one in the choice-of-law context of the act of state doctrine. Since First National City Bank was decided, the Department of State has taken the position in the sovereign immunity area that even where a counterclaim exceeds the foreign state’s claim, the courts may adjudicate the counterclaim if it arises from the same "transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the claim of the foreign state.” S. 566, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 1607 (1); see, ALI, Restatement, Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Second, §70 (2) (b). In our view, the adjudication of counterclaims against a foreign state, arising from the same transaction, occurrence or subject matter as the claim of the foreign state, does not pose foreign relations difficulties. See, e. g., In The Matter of Minera El Teniente, S. A., 12 Int’l Legal Materials 251 (Superior Ct. Hamburg, 1973) (a foreign state’s act of expropriation that violates international law will not be recognized by German courts if the subject matter of the litigation has a substantial contact with Germany); Braden Copper Co. v. Le Groupement d’Importation des Métaux, 12 Int’l Legal Materials 187 (Ct. of Extended Jurisdiction Paris, 1972) (rejecting sovereign immunity of a state trading company that marketed expropriated copper); Compagnie Française de Crédit et de Banque v. Consorts Atard, Clunet, J. du Droit Int’l, 98 (1971), p. 86 (France: Cour d’Appel Amiens, 1970) (foreign expropriation decrees will not be recognized in France absent the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation); Crédit Foncier d’Algerie et de Tunisie v. Narbonne, Clunet, J. du Droit Int’l 96 (1969), p. 912 (France: Cou[r] de Cassation, 1969) (acts of expropriation not recognized in France unless equitable compensation is first determined); Obe[r]sfer Gerichtshof (Austrian Supreme Court), decision of 22 December 1965, Osterr. Juristenzeitung 21 (1966), p. 204, Clunet, J. du Droit Int’l, 94 (1967), p. 941 (an expropriation without compensation violates international law, but no recovery against purchasers of expropriated property); N. V. Assurantie Maatschappij de Nederlanden van 1845 v. P. T. Escomptobank, 33 Int’l L. Rep. 80 (D. Ct. The Hague, 1962) (rejecting act of state defense where there is a violation of international law). Banco de Vizcaya v. Don Alfonso de Borbon y Austria, [1935] 1 K. B. 140, 50 T. L. R. 284; Re Helbert Wagg & Co. Ltd., [1956] Ch. 323, 346; 1 Lauterpacht, Oppenheim’s International Law, 267-268 (8th ed. 1955). See also Republic of Peru v. Peruvian Guano Co., [1887] 36 Ch. D. 489 and Republic of Peru v. Dreyfus Brothers & Co. [1888] 38 Ch. D. 348, where British courts, under international law, refused to give effect to Peruvian laws annulling acts of the preceding Peruvian government; cf. Buttes Gas and Oil Co. v. Hammer [1975] 2 W. L. R. 425, at 434-435. 26 Dept. State Bull. 98A-985 (1952).
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations
What is the ideological direction of the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court?
[ "Conservative", "Liberal", "Unspecifiable" ]
[ 0 ]
sc
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION et al. v. BEACH COMMUNICATIONS, INC., et al. No. 92-603. Argued March 29, 1993 Decided June 1, 1993 John F. Manning argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Deputy Solicitor General Roberts, Douglas N. Letter, and Bruce G. Forrest. Deborah C. Costlow argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief for respondents Beach Communications, Inc., et al. was Thomas C. Power. Daniel L. Brenner, Michael S. Schooler, Diane B. Burstein, H. Bartow Farr III, and Paul M. Smith filed a brief for respondent National Cable Television Association. Richard Ruda filed a brief for the National League of Cities et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. In providing for the regulation of cable television facilities, Congress has drawn a distinction between facilities that serve separately owned and managed buildings and those that serve one or more buildings under common ownership or management. Cable facilities in the latter category are exempt from regulation as long as they provide services without using public rights-of-way. The question before us is whether there is any conceivable rational basis justifying this distinction for purposes of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. I The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (Cable Act), 98 Stat. 2779, amended the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U. S. C. § 151 et seq., to establish a national framework for regulating cable television. One objective of the Cable Act was to set out “franchise procedures and standards which encourage the growth and development of cable systems and which assure that cable systems are responsive to the' needs and interests of the local community.” §601(2), 47 U. S. C. § 521(2). To that end, Congress provided for the franchising of cable systems by local governmental authorities, § 621(a), 47 U. S. C. § 541(a), and prohibited any person from operating a cable system without a franchise, subject to certain exceptions, § 621(b), 47 U. S. C. § 541(b). Section 602(7) of the Communications Act, as amended, 47 U. S. C. A. § 522(7) (Supp. 1993), determines the reach of the franchise requirement by defining the operative term “cable system.” A cable system means any facility designed to provide video programming to multiple subscribers through “closed transmission paths,” but does not include, inter alia, “a facility that serves only subscribers in 1 or more multiple unit dwellings under common ownership, control, or management, unless such facility or facilities us[e] any public right-of-way.” § 602(7)(B), 47 U. S. C. § 522(7)(B) (1988 ed., Supp. V). In part, this provision tracks a regulatory “private cable” exemption previously promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) pursuant to preexisting authority under the Communications Act. See 47 CFR § 76.5(a) (1984) (exempting from the definition of “cable television system” “any such facility that serves or will serve only subscribers in one or more multiple unit dwellings under common ownership, control, or management”)! The earlier regulatory exemption derived in turn from the Commission’s first set of cable rules, published in 1965. See Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, 38 F. C. C. 683, 741 (1965) (exempting from the definition of “community antenna television system” “any such facility which serves only the residents of one or more apartment dwellings under common ownership, control, or management, and commercial establishments located on the premises of such an apartment house”). The Cable Act narrowed the terms of the regulatory exemption by further excluding from the exemption any closed transmission facilities that use public rights-of-way. This case arises out of an FCC proceeding clarifying the agency’s interpretation of the term "cable system” as it is used in the Gable Act. See In re Definition of a Cable Television System, 5 F. C. C. Rcd. 7638 (1990). In this proceeding, the Commission addressed the application of the exemption codified in §602(7)(B) to satellite master antenna television (SMATV) facilities. Unlike a traditional cable television system, which delivers video programming to a large community of subscribers through coaxial cables laid under city streets or along utility lines, an SMATV system typically receives a signal from a satellite through a. small satellite dish located on a rooftop and then retransmits the signal by wire to units within a building or complex of buildings. See 5 F. C. C. Rcd., at 7639. The Commission ruled that an SMATV system that serves multiple buildings via a network of interconnected physical transmission lines is a cable system, unless it falls within the §602(7)(B) exemption. See id., at 7639-7640. Consistent with the plain terms of the statutory exemption, the Commission concluded that such an SMATV system is subject to the franchise requirement if its transmission lines interconnect separately owned and managed buildings or if its lines use or cross any public right-of-way. See id., at 7641-7642. Respondents Beach Communications, Inc., Maxtel Limited Partnership, Pacific Cablevision, and Western Cable Communications, Inc. — SMATV operators that would be subject to franchising under the Cable Act as construed by the. Commission-petitioned the Court of Appeals for review. The Court of Appeals rejected respondents’ statutory challenge to the Commission’s interpretation, but a majority of the court found merit in the claim that § 602(7) violates the implied equal protection guarantee of the Due Process Clause. 294 U. S. App. D. C. 377, 959 F. 2d 975 (1992). In the absence of what it termed “the predominant rationale for local franchising” (use of public rights-of-way), the court saw no rational basis “[o]n the record,” and was “unable to imagine” any conceivable basis, for distinguishing between those facilities exempted by the statute and those SMATV cable systems that link separately owned and managed buildings. Id., at 389, 959 F. 2d, at 987. The court remanded the record and directed the FCC to provide “additional ‘legislative facts’ ” to justify the distinction. Ibid. A report subsequently filed by the Commission failed to satisfy the Court of Appeals. The Commission stated that it was “unaware of any desirable policy or other considerations . . . that would support the challenged distinctions,” other than those offered by a concurring member of the court. App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a. The concurrence had believed it sufficient that Congress could have reasoned that SMATV systems serving separately owned buildings are more similar to traditional cable systems than are facilities serving commonly owned buildings, in terms of the problems presented for consumers and the potential for regulatory benefits. See 294 U. S. App. D. C., at 392, 959 F. 2d, at 990 (Mikva, C. J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). In a second opinion, the majority found this rationale to be “a naked intuition, unsupported by conceivable facts or policies,” 296 U. S. App. D. C. 141, 143, 965 F. 2d 1103, 1105 (1992), and held that “the Cable Act violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, insofar as it imposes a discriminatory franchising requirement,” id., at 142, 965 F. 2d, at 1104. The court declared the franchise requirement void to the extent it covers respondents and similarly situated SMATV operators. Id., at 144, 965 F. 2d, at 1106. Because the Court of Appeals held an Act of Congress unconstitutional, we granted certiorari. 506 U. S. 997 (1992). We now reverse. II Whether embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment or inferred from the Fifth, equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U. S. 478, 485 (1990); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U. S. 587, 600-603 (1987); United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 174-179 (1980); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 484-485 (1970). Where there are “plausible reasons” for Congress’ action, “our inquiry is at an end.” United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, supra, at 179. This standard of review is a paradigm of judicial restraint. “The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.” Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93, 97 (1979) (footnote omitted). On rational-basis review, a classification in a statute such as the Cable Act comes to us bearing a strong presumption of validity, see Lyng v. Automobile Workers, 485 U. S. 360, 370 (1988), and those attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden “to negative every conceivable basis which might support it,” Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U. S. 356, 364 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U. S. 314, 331-332 (1981). Moreover, because we never require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature. United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, supra, at 179. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 612 (1960). Thus, the absence of “‘legislative facts’ ” explaining the distinction “[o]n the record,” 294 U. S. App. D. C., at 389, 959 F. 2d, at 987, has no significance in rational-basis analysis. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U. S. 1, 15 (1992) (equal protection “does not demand for purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature or governing decisionmaker actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification”). In other words, a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. See Vance v. Bradley, supra, at 111. See also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U. S. 456, 464 (1981). “ ‘Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function.’” Lehnhausen, supra, at 365 (quoting Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495, 510 (1937)). These restraints on judicial review have added force “where the legislature must necessarily engage in a process of line-drawing.” United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U. S., at 179. Defining the class of persons subject to a regulatory requirement — much like classifying governmental beneficiaries — “inevitably requires that some persons who have an almost equally strong claim to favored treatment be placed on different sides of the line, and the fact [that] the line might have been drawn differently at some points is a matter for legislative, rather than judicial, consideration.” Ibid, (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The distinction at issue here represents such a line: By excluding from the definition of “cable system” those facilities that serve commonly owned or managed buildings without using public rights-of-way, § 602(7)(B) delineates the bounds of the regulatory field. Such scope-of-eoverage provisions are unavoidable components of most economic or social legislation. In establishing the franchise requirement, Congress had to draw the line somewhere; it had to choose which facilities to franchise. This necessity renders the precise coordinates of the resulting legislative judgment virtually unreviewable, since the legislature must be allowed leeway to approach a perceived problem incrementally. See, e. g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U. S. 483 (1955): “The problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire definition. Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Or the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others. The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no further than the invidious discrimination.” Id., at 489 (citations omitted). Applying these principles, we conclude that the common-ownership distinction is constitutional. There are at least two possible bases for the distinction; either one suffices. First, Congress borrowed §602(7)(B) from pre-Cable Act regulations, and although the existence of a prior administrative scheme is certainly not necessary to the rationality of the statute, it is plausible that Congress also adopted the FCC’s earlier rationale. Under that rationale, eommon ownership was thought to be indicative of those systems for which the costs of regulation would outweigh the benefits to consumers. Because the number of subscribers was a similar indicator, the Commission also exempted cable facilities that served fewer than 50 subscribers. See 47 CFR § 76.5(a) (1984). In explaining both exemptions, the Commission stated: “[N]ot all [systems] can be subject to effective regulation with the resources available nor is regulation necessarily needed in every instance. A sensible regulatory program requires that a division between the regulated and unregulated be made in a manner which best conserves regulatory energies and allows the most cost effective use of available resources. In attempting to make this division, we have focused on subscriber numbers as well as the multiple unit dwelling indicia on the theory that the very small are inefficient to regulate and can safely be ignored in terms of their potential for impact on broadcast service to the public and on multiple unit dwelling facilities on the theory that this effectively establishes certain maximum size limitations.” In re Definition of a Cable Television System, 67 F. C. C. 2d 716, 726 (1978). This regulatory-efficiency model, originally suggested by Chief Judge Mikva in his concurring opinion, provides a conceivable basis for the common-ownership exemption. A legislator might rationally assume that systems serving only commonly owned or managed buildings without crossing public rights-of-way would typically be limited in size or would share some other attribute affecting their impact on the welfare of cable viewers such that regulators could “safely ignor[e]” these systems. Respondents argue that Congress did not intend common ownership to be a surrogate for small size, since Congress simultaneously rejected the FCC’s 50-subscriber exemption by omitting it from the Cable Act. Brief for Respondents 22. Whether the posited reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated Congress is “constitutionally irrelevant,” United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, supra, at 179 (internal quotation marks omitted), and, in any event, the FCC’s explanation indicates that both common ownership and number of subscribers were considered indicia of “very small” cable systems. Respondents also contend that an SMATV operator could increase his subscription base and still qualify for the exemption simply by installing a separate satellite dish on each building served. Brief for Respondents 42. The additional cost of multiple dishes and associated transmission equipment, however, would impose an independent constraint on system size. Furthermore, small size is only one plausible ownership-related factor contributing to consumer welfare. Subscriber influence is another. Where an SMATV system serves a complex of buildings under common ownership or management, individual subscribers could conceivably have greater bargaining power vis-a-vis the cable operator (even if the number of dwelling units were large), since all the subscribers could negotiate with one voice through the common owner or manager. Such an owner might have substantial leverage, because he could withhold permission to operate the SMATV system on his property. He would also have an incentive to guard the interests of his tenants. Thus, there could be less need to establish regulatory safeguards for subscribers in commonly owned complexes. Respondents acknowledge such possibilities, see id., at 44, and we certainly cannot say that these assumptions would be irrational. There is a second conceivable basis for the statutory distinction. Suppose competing SMATV operators wish to sell video programming to subscribers in a group of contiguous buildings, such as a single city block, which can be interconnected by wire without crossing a public right-of-way. If all the buildings belong to one owner or are commonly managed, that owner or manager could freely negotiate a deal for all subscribers on a competitive basis. But if the buildings are separately owned and managed, the first SMATV operator who gains a foothold by signing a contract and installing a satellite dish and associated transmission equipment on one of the buildings would enjoy a powerful cost advantage in competing for the remaining subscribers: He could connect additional buildings for the cost of a few feet of cable, whereas any competitor would have to recover the cost of his own satellite headend facility. Thus, the first operator could charge rates well above his cost and still undercut the competition. This potential for effective monopoly power might theoretically justify regulating the latter class of SMATV systems and not the former. Ill The Court of Appeals quite evidently believed that the crossing or use of a public right-of-way is the only conceivable basis upon which Congress could rationally require local franchising of SMATV systems. See 296 U. S. App. D. C., at 143, 965 F. 2d, at 1105; 294 U. S. App. D. C., at 389, 959 F. 2d, at 987. As we have indicated, however, there are plausible rationales unrelated to the use of public rights-of:way for regulating cable facilities serving separately owned and managed buildings. The assumptions underlying these rationales may be erroneous, but the very fact that they are “arguable” is sufficient, on rational-basis review, to “immuniz[e]” the congressional choice from constitutional challenge. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S., at 112. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 — enacted after the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case — amended the Communications Act to provide, among other things, for the regulation of rates charged by cable systems. See §3,106 Stat. 1464. The 1992 Act renumbered the subsections of 47 U. S. C. § 522 but did not amend the provision at issue, which is now subsection (7). We refer to the current version of the Communications Act. In its initial interpretation of the Cable Act, the Commission had ruled that the dispositive distinction between a cable system and other video distribution systems was “the crossing of the public rights-of-way, not the ownership, control or management” of the buildings served. In re Amendments of Parts 1, 68, & 76, 104 F. C. C. 2d 386, 396-397 (1986). After a District Court held that this interpretation contravened the unambiguous terms of the statute, the Commission abandoned it in the proceedings at issue here. See In re Definition of a Cable Television System, 5 F. C. C. Rcd. 7638, 7641 (1990). Respondents also claimed that the Cable Act’s franchise requirement violates the First Amendment and that the § 602(7)(B) classification should receive heightened scrutiny under the Due Process Clause because it discriminates on the basis of speech activities. The Court of Appeals held the First Amendment claim unripe, 294 U. S. App. D. C., at 386-387, 959 F. 2d, at 984-985, and refused to address the heightened scrutiny argument without first applying “rational basis” analysis, id, at 388, 959 F. 2d, at 986. Chief Judge Mikva dissented for the reasons given in his earlier concurrence. 296 U. S. App. D. C., at 144, 965 F. 2d, at 1106. The Court of Appeals had also questioned whether there existed a rational basis for distinguishing facilities connecting separately owned buildings by wire from those that do not connect separate buildings or that do so only by wireless media, such as radio or microwave transmission. See 294 U. S. App. D. C., at 382, 389, 959 F. 2d, at 980, 987. In its second opinion, however, the court found it unnecessary to consider that question, see 296 U. S. App. D. C., at 143, 965 F. 2d, at 1105, and it is not presented here. As they did in the Court of Appeals, respondents seek heightened scrutiny, claiming that the statute discriminates on the basis of First Amendment activities. Brief for Respondents Beach Communications, Inc., et al. 12-17 (hereinafter Brief for Respondents). We will confine ourselves, however, to the question presented, which is limited to whether the distinction in §602(7)(B) is “rationally related to a legitimate government purpose under the Due Process Clause.” Pet. for Cert. I. The Court of Appeals did not reach respondents’ heightened-serutiny challenge because it found merit in their rational-basis contentions. 294 U. S. App. D. C., at 388, 969 F. 2d, at 986. In renewing their arguments for heightened scrutiny here, see Brief for Respondents 14-15, respondents point to the burdens imposed on franchised cable systems under the newly enacted Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, an Act the Court of Appeals had no opportunity to consider. In these circumstances, respondents’ arguments for heightened scrutiny are best left open for consideration by the Court of Appeals on remand. Respondents also raise a threshold issue. They argue that no case or controversy exists, or that the issue is “moot,” on the theory that Congress “adopted” the Court of Appeals’ “construction” of §602(7) (presumably thereby acquiescing in the judgment that local franchising must depend on use of public rights-of-way) when it took no action to amend or defend the provision in later passing the 1992 Act. Brief for Respondents 8-12. Cf. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580-581 (1978). This notion of congressional adoption of statutory interpretations, however, has no place in constitutional review, and the controversy presented in this case is obviously a live one, since petitioners stand ready to defend the statute as drafted. See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485 (1970) (classification does not violate equal protection simply because it “is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U. S. 61, 69-70 (1913) (“The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations — illogical, it may be, and unscientific”); Heath & Milligan Mfg. Co. v. Worst, 207 U. S. 338, 354 (1907) (“logical appropriateness of the inclusion or exclusion of objects or persons” and “exact wisdom and nice adaptation of remedies are not required”). According to respondents, the FCC’s pre-Cable Act common-ownership exemption provides no support for the rationality of § 602(7)(B) for another reason. They assert that the regulatory exemption’s sole purpose was to exempt master antenna television (MATV) facilities — ordinary rooftop antenna facilities that receive conventional broadcast signals for transmission by wire to units within a single multiunit building or complex, see 294 U. S. App. D. C., at 379-380, 959 F. 2d, at 977-978. Respondents argue that this prior exemption merely reflected the FCC's judgment that common antennas, unlike SMATV systems, were nothing more than residential amenities posing no threat to broadcast services. See Brief for Respondents 23-25. This argument is unavailing, because Congress is not bound by the administrative derivation of the “private cable” exemption. Moreover, regardless of the origin of the exemption, the Commission had already applied it to SMATV facilities before passage of the Cable Act. See In re Earth Satellite Communications, Inc., 95 F. C. C. 2d 1223, 1224, n. 3 (1983), aff’d sub nom. New York State Comm’n on Cable Television v. FCC, 242 U. S. App. D. C. 126, 749 F. 2d 804 (1984). Indeed, in these proceedings, the Commission construed §602(7) to apply equally to SMATV and MATV facilities. See 5 F C. C. Rcd., at 7639-7641.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
What is the issue of the decision?
[ "antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)", "mergers", "bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)", "sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death", "election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things", "liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.", "liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages", "liability, punitive damages", "Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)", "state or local government tax", "state and territorial land claims", "state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)", "federal or state regulation of securities", "natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)", "corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending", "zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property", "arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)", "federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts", "patents and copyrights: patent", "patents and copyrights: copyright", "patents and copyrights: trademark", "patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes", "federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad", "federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat", "federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier", "federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)", "federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline", "federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power", "federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power", "federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer", "federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer", "federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)", "federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)", "federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)", "federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company", "miscellaneous economic regulation" ]
[ 33 ]
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MELKONYAN v. SULLIVAN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES No. 90-5538. Argued April 15, 1991 Decided June 10, 1991 Brian Wolfman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Alan B. Morrison, Patti A. Goldman, and John Ohanian. Clifford M. Sloan argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Deputy Solicitor General Shapiro, Edwin S. Kneedler, and William Ranter. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. A party that prevails against the United States in a civil action is entitled, in certain circumstances, to an award of attorney’s fees, court costs, and other expenses. Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U. S. C. § 2412. Among other requirements, the prevailing party must submit to the court an application for fees and expenses “within thirty days of final judgment in the action.” § 2412(d)(1)(B). This case requires us to decide whether an administrative decision rendered following a remand from the District Court is a “final judgment” within the meaning of EAJA. I — I In May 1982, petitioner Zakhar Melkonyan filed an application for disability benefits under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program established by Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 86 Stat. 1465, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1381 et seq. Following a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that petitioner was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. The Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision. In June 1984, petitioner timely filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, seeking judicial review pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1383(c)(3), which incorporates the review provisions of 42 U. S. C. § 405(g). On May 30, 1984, shortly tioner filed a second application for SSI disability benefits accompanied by new evidence of disability. In August 1984, petitioner’s second application was approved as of the date it was filed. He then sought summary judgment in his action to review the administrative decision denying his first application for benefits. The Secretary cross-filed for summary judgment. While the summary Secretary requested that the case be remanded to the Appeals Council so the first application could be reconsidered in light of the new evidence. Petitioner initially opposed the Secretary’s remand request, arguing that evidence already in the record amply established his disability. Three months later, however, citing failing health and the prospect of increased medical expenses, petitioner moved the court to “either issue [the decision] or remand the cause to the Secretary.” App. 9-10. In response, on April 3, 1985, the District Court entered a “judgment” which read in its entirety: “Defendant’s motion to remand, concurred in by plaintiff, is granted. The matter is remanded to the Secretary for all further proceedings.” App. 11. sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. One month after the remand, the Appeals Council vacated the ALJ’s prior decision and found petitioner disabled as of the date of his original SSI application. That decision granted petitioner all the relief he had initially requested. More than a year later, petitioner Court for attorney’s fees under EAJA. The Magistrate recommended that the fee application be denied, concluding that the Secretary’s decision to deny the first application was “substantially justified” at the time because the original record did not establish that petitioner was disabled. App. 20-21. The District Court agreed and denied the fee request. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court’s judgment. It agreed that petitioner was not eligible for attorney’s fees under EAJA, but for a different reason. Melkonyan v. Heckler, 895 F. 2d 556 (1990). The Court of Appeals noted that EAJA requires an application for fees to be filed within 30 days of the “ ‘final judgment in the action,”’ a term defined in the statute as a “‘judgment that is final and not appealable.’” Id., at 557 (quoting 28 U. S. C. § 2412(d)(2)(G)). In the court’s view, its task was to determine when that “final and not appealable” judgment was rendered. 895 F. 2d, at 557. The Court of Appeals recognized that the District Court’s order remanding the case to the Secretary was not a “final judgment” because both parties anticipated further administrative proceedings. Id., at 557-558. On remand, the Appeals Council reversed itself and held for petitioner; having won all he had asked for, there was no reason to return to the District Court. Under those circumstances, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Appeals Council’s decision to award benefits was, in effect, a “final judgment” under EAJA, thereby commencing the 30-day period for filing the fee application. Id., at 558-559. Because petitioner waited more than a year after the Appeals Council’s decision, his application was untimely. Id., at 559. We granted certio-rari, 498 U. S. 1023 (1991), and now vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals. II As relevant to this case, EAJA provides: “(A) Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, ... incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases “(B) A party seeking an penses shall, within thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an application for fees and other expenses which shows that the party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award under this subsection” 28 U. S. C. §§ 2412(d)(1)(A), (B) (emphasis added). Petitioner argues that this provision is most naturally read to mean that it is the court before which the civil action is pending that must render the “final judgment” that starts the running of the 30-day E AJA filing period. Brief for Petitioner 13. We agree. As the highlighted language indicates, subsections (d)(1)(A) and (d)(1)(B) work in tandem. Subsection (d)(1)(A) authorizes the awarding of fees to parties that prevail against the United States in nontort civil actions, subject to qualifications not pertinent here. Subsection (d)(1)(B) explains what the prevailing party must do to secure the fee award. The requirement that the fee application be filed within 30 days of “final judgment in the action” plainly refers back to the “civil action ... in any court” in (d)(1)(A). The plain language makes clear that a “final judgment” under § 2412 can only be the judgment of a court of law. This reading is reinforced by the contrast between § 2412 and 5 U. S. C. § 504(a). Section 504 was enacted at the same time as § 2412, and is the only part of the EAJA that allows fees and expenses for administrative proceedings conducted prior to the filing of a civil action. The pertinent language of § 504(a)(2) largely mirrors that of § 2412(d)(1)(B), with one notable exception: It states that a “party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within thirty days of a final disposition in the adversary adjudication, ” file an application for fees. 5 U. S. C. § 504(a)(2) (emphasis added). Clearly Congress knew how to distinguish between a “final judgment in [an] action” and a “final disposition in [an] adversary adjudication.” One is rendered by a court; the other includes adjudication by an administrative agency. The Secretary’s sole argument to the contrary rests on the 1985 amendments to EAJA, which added a definition of “final judgment” to § 2412. Traditionally, a “final judgment” is one that is final and appealable. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54(a) (“ ‘Judgment’ as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies”); Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U. S. 617, 628 (1990) (“‘[F]inal judgments’ are at the core of matters appealable under § 1291”). Under § 2412, as amended, however, a “final judgment” is one that is “final and not appealable.” 28 U. S. C. § 2412(d)(2)(G) (emphasis added). In the Secretary’s view, “[t]his significant departure from the usual characteristic] of a ‘judgment’ entered by a court” dictates a different understanding of how the phrase “final judgment” is used in § 2412(d)(1)(B). Brief for Respondent 20. The Secretary argues that under the revised statute, a “final judgment” includes not only judgments rendered by a court, but also decisions made by administrative agencies. Ibid. We reject this argument. Section 2412(d)(1)(B) does not speak merely of a “judgment”; it speaks of a “final judgment in the action.” As we have explained, the “action” referred to in subsection (d)(1)(B) is a “civil action ... in any court” under subsection (d)(1)(A). The Secretary’s suggested interpretation of “final judgment” does not alter this unambiguous requirement of judgment by a court. As for why Congress added the unusual definition of “final judgment,” the answer is clear. “The definition . . . was added in 1985 to resolve a conflict in the lower courts on the question whether a ‘judgment’ was to be regarded as ‘final’ for EAJA purposes when it was entered, or only when the period for taking an appeal had lapsed.” Brief for Respondent 20 (footnote omitted). The Ninth Circuit had held that the 30-day EAJA filing period began to run when the district court entered judgment. McQuiston v. Marsh, 707 F. 2d 1082, 1085 (1983). The Seventh Circuit rejected this view, holding that the EAJA filing period should be deemed to begin only after the time for taking an appeal from the district court judgment had expired. McDonald v. Schweiker, 726 F. 2d 311, 314 (1983). Accord, Massachusetts Union of Public Housing Tenants, Inc. v. Pierce, 244 U. S. App. D. C. 34, 36, 755 F. 2d 177, 179 (1985). Congress responded to this split in the federal courts by explicitly adopting and ratifying the McDonald approach. S. Rep. No. 98-586, p. 16 (1984) (“The Committee believes that the interpretation of the court in [McDonald] is the correct one”). See also H. R. Rep. No. 98-992, p. 14 (1984) (“The term ‘final judgment' has been clarified to mean a judgment the time to appeal which has expired for all parties”); H. R. Rep. No. 99-120, p. 18 (1985). There simply is no evidence to support the argument the Secretary now advances — that, in defining “final judgment” so as to resolve an existing problem, Congress also intended, sub silentio, to alter the meaning of the term to include-a final agency decision. We conclude that, notwithstanding the 1985 amendment, Congress’ use of “judgment” in 28 U. S. C. §2412 refers to judgments entered by a court of law, and does not encompass decisions rendered by an administrative agency. Accordingly, we hold that a “final judgment” for purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) means a judgment rendered by a court that terminates the civil action for which EAJA fees may be received. The 30-day EAJA clock begins to run after the time to appeal that “final judgment” has expired. Our decision in Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U. S. 877 (1989), is not to the contrary. The issue in Hudson was whether, under § 2412(d), a “civil action” could include administrative proceedings so that a claimant could receive attorney’s fees for work done at the administrative level following a remand by the district court. We explained that certain administrative proceedings are “so intimately connected with judicial proceedings as to be considered part of the ‘civil action’ for purposes of a fee award.” Id., at 892. We defined the narrow class of qualifying administrative proceedings to be those “where ‘a suit [has been] brought in a court,’ and where ‘a formal complaint within the jurisdiction of a court of law’ remains pending and depends for its resolution upon the outcome of the administrative proceedings.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Hudson thus stands for the proposition that in those cases where the district court retains jurisdiction of the civil action and contemplates entering a final judgment following the completion of administrative proceedings, a claimant may collect EAJA fees for work done at the administrative level. Ibid. “We did not say that proceedings on remand to an agency are ‘part and parcel’ of a civil action in federal district court for all purposes . . . .” Sullivan v. Finkelstein, supra, at 630-631. HH b — I 1 — 1 Having decided that EAJA requires a final judgment” entered by a court, it is obvious that no “final judgment” was entered in this case before petitioner initiated his appeal. Petitioner filed a civil action in the District Court under 42 U. S. C. § 405(g), seeking review of the Secretary’s decision that he was not entitled to disability benefits. Without ruling on the correctness of the Secretary’s decision, the District Court remanded the case for further administrative proceedings. On remand, the Appeals Council awarded petitioner the disability benefits he sought. Neither petitioner nor the Secretary returned to the District Court for entry of a final judgment. The question we must decide now is whether either party is entitled to do so. The answer depends on what kind of remand the District Court contemplated. In Finkelstein, we examined closely the language of § 405(g) and identified two kinds of remands under that statute: (1) remands pursuant to the fourth sentence, and (2) remands pursuant to the sixth sentence. See 496 U. S., at 623-629. The fourth sentence of § 405(g) authorizes a court to enter “a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” The parties agree that the remand order in this case was not entered pursuant to sentence four, as the District Court did not affirm, modify, or reverse the Secretary’s decision. We concur. The District Court did not make any substantive ruling; it merely returned the case to the agency for disposition, noting that both parties agreed to this course. The sixth sentence of § 405(g), as we stein, “describes an entirely different kind of remand.” Id., at 626. The district court does not affirm, modify, or reverse the Secretary’s decision; it does not rule in any way as to the correctness of the administrative determination. Rather, the court remands because new evidence has come to light that was not available to the claimant at the time of the administrative proceeding and that evidence might have changed the outcome of the prior proceeding. Ibid. The statute provides that following a sentence six remand, the Secretary must return to the district court to “file with the court any such additional or modified findings of fact and decision, and a transcript of the additional record and testimony upon which his action in modifying or affirming was based.” 42 U. S. C. § 405(g). Petitioner argues, plausibly, that the court contemplated a sentence six remand. Indeed, it is undisputed that it was consideration of later-acquired evidence that led the Appeals Council ultimately to reverse its earlier decision and declare petitioner eligible for benefits from the date of his original application. Petitioner further argues that this must have been a sentence six remand because § 405(g) authorizes only two kinds of remands — those pursuant to sentence four and those pursuant to sentence six — and the Secretary concedes that this was not a sentence four remand. The Secretary maintains that this was not a sentence six remand. While acknowledging that the remand request was prompted by the discovery of new evidence of disability, see Brief for Respondent 27-28, the Secretary observes correctly that the sixth sentence of § 405(g) requires a showing of “good cause” for the failure to present the additional evidence in the prior proceeding and that the District Court did not rule explicitly that such a showing had been made. The Secretary also notes that the District Court did not manifest any intent to retain jurisdiction, as would be the case under sentence six, but rather remanded to the agency “for all further proceedings.” The Secretary also disputes petitioner’s assumption that sentences four and six set forth the only kinds of remands that are permitted under § 405(g), arguing that the district court has inherent authority to enter other types of remand orders. Id., at 28-29, n. 23. On this point, we think petitioner has the better of the argument. As mentioned, in Finkelstein we analyzed § 405(g) sentence by sentence and identified two kinds of possible remands under the statute. While we did not state explicitly at that time that these were the only kinds of remands permitted under the statute, we do so today. Under sentence four, a district court may remand in conjunction with a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the Secretary’s decision. Under sentence six, the district court may remand in light of additional evidence without making any substantive ruling as to the , correctness of the Secretary’s decision, but only if the claimant shows good cause for failing to present the evidence earlier. Congress’ explicit delineation in § 405(g) regarding the circumstances under which remands are authorized leads Us to conclude that it intended to limit the district courts’ authority to enter remand orders to these two types. Cf. United States v. Smith, 499 U. S. 160 (1991) (expressly enumerated exceptions presumed to be exclusive). This reading of the of § 405(g) and is supported by the legislative history. In amending the sixth sentence of § 405(g) in 1980, Congress made it unmistakably clear that it intended to limit the power of district courts to order remands for “new evidence” in Social Security cases. Pub. L. 96-265, § 307, 94 Stat. 458. The Senate Report accompanying the amendments explained: “[U]nder existing law the court itself, on its own or on motion of the claimant, has discretionary authority ‘for good cause’ to remand the case back to the ALJ. It would appear that, although many of these court remands are justified, some remands are undertaken because the judge disagrees with the outcome of the case even though he would have to sustain it under the ‘substantial evidence rule.’ Moreover, the number of these court remands seems to be increasing. . . . The bill would continue the provision of present law which gives the court discretionary authority to remand cases to the Secretary, but adds the requirement that remand for the purpose of taking new evidence be limited to cases in which there is a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there was good cause for failure to incorporate it into the record in a prior proceeding.” S. Rep. No. 96-408, pp. 58-59 (1979) (emphasis added). See also H. R. Rep. No. 96-100, p. 13 (1979) (same). Congressman Pickle, one of the floor managers of the bill, echoed this explanation when he noted in a floor statement that with the amendment “we have tried to speed up the judicial process so that these cases would not just go on and on and on. The court could remand [them] back down to the AL J without cause or other reason which was weakening the appeal process at that level.” 125 Cong. Rec. 23383 (1979). The amendment to sentence six, of course, was not intended to limit a district court’s ability to order remands under sentence four. The House Report explains that “[t]his language [amending sentence six] is not to be construed as a limitation of judicial remands currently recognized under the law in cases which the Secretary has failed to provide a full and fair hearing, to make explicit findings, or to have correctly apply [sic] the law and regulations.” H. R. Rep. No. 96-100, supra, at 13. Thus, under sentence four, a district court may still remand in conjunction with a judgment reversing in part the Secretary’s decision. It is evident from these passages that Congress believed courts were often remanding Social Security cases without good reason. While normally courts have inherent power, among other things, to remand cases, see United States v. Jones, 336 U. S. 641, 671 (1949), both the structure of § 405(g), as amended, and the accompanying legislative history show Congress’ clear intent to limit courts to two kinds of remands in these cases. Cf. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., ante, p. 32 (finding no congressional intent to limit a court’s inherent authority to impose sanctions). light of the foregoing, we conclude that in § 405(g) actions, remand orders must either accompany a final judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the administrative decision in accordance with sentence four, or conform with the requirements outlined by Congress in sentence six. Construing remand orders in this manner harmonizes the remand provisions of § 405(g) with the EAJA requirement that a “final judgment” be entered in the civil action in order to trigger the EAJA filing period. 28 U. S. C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). In sentence four cases, the filing period begins after the final judgment (“affirming, modifying, or reversing”) is entered by the court and the appeal period has run, so that the judgment is no longer appealable. See § 2412(d)(2)(G). In sentence six cases, the filing period does not begin until after the postremand proceedings are completed, the Secretary returns to court, the court enters a final judgment, and the appeal period runs. Although we agree with petitioner that the district court’s remand authority is confined to those circumstances specifically defined in § 405(g), we cannot state with certainty that the remand in this case was, as petitioner contends, a sentence six remand. As the Secretary points out, the District Court did not make a finding that “good cause” had been shown, nor did the court seem to anticipate that the parties would return to court following the administrative proceedings. Indeed, it may be that the court treated the joint request for remand as a voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a), although the parties did not file a signed stipulation, as required by the Rule. Because the record before us does not clearly indicate what the District Court intended by its disposition, we vacate the judgment and remand the matter to enable the District Court to clarify its order. If petitioner is correct that the court remanded the case under sentence six, the Secretary must return to District Court, at which time the court will enter a final judgment. Petitioner will be entitled to EAJA fees unless the Secretary’s initial position was substantially justified, a question which was not addressed by the Court of Appeals. If, on the other hand, this was not a sentence six remand, it may be that petitioner is not entitled to EAJA fees at all. For example, if the court’s order was, in effect, a dismissal under Rule 41(a), the District Court’s jurisdiction over the case would have ended at that point, and petitioner would not have been a prevailing party “in [a] civil action.” 28 U. S. C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Under those circumstances, the Secretary would not return to the District Court and petitioner would not be eligible to receive EAJA fees. IV At oral argument the parties discussed the timeliness of petitioner’s fee application. EAJA requires prevailing parties seeking an award of fees to file with the court, “within thirty days of final judgment in the action,” an application for fees and other expenses. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Petitioner claims that this language permits him to apply for fees at any time up to 30 days after entry of judgment, and even before judgment is entered, as long as he has achieved prevailing party status. Tr. of Oral Arg. 16-18. This case is not an appropriate vehicle for resolving the issue. If petitioner is correct that this was a sentence six remand, the District Court may determine that the application he has already filed is sufficient. Alternatively, petitioner can easily reapply for EAJA fees following the District Court’s entry of a final judgment. In either case, petitioner will not be prejudiced by having filed prematurely. On the other hand, if this was not a sentence six remand, we have already explained that petitioner would not be entitled to fees, so the timeliness of the application will not be an issue. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals with instructions to remand to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Sentence six of § 405(g) provides in full: . “The court may, on motion of the Secretary made for good cause shown before he files his answer, remand the case to the Secretary for further action by the Secretary, and it may at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Secretary, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding; and the Secretary shall, after the case is remanded, and after hearing such additional evidence if so ordered, modify or affirm his findings of fact or his decision, or both, and shall file with the court any such additional and modified findings of fact and decision, and a transcript of the additional record and testimony upon which his action in modifying or affirming was based.” Sentence six also authorizes the district court to remand on motion by the Secretary made before the Secretary has filed a response in the action. That subcategory of sentence six remands is not implicated in this case.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the reason, if any, given by the court for granting the petition for certiorari.
What reason, if any, does the court give for granting the petition for certiorari?
[ "case did not arise on cert or cert not granted", "federal court conflict", "federal court conflict and to resolve important or significant question", "putative conflict", "conflict between federal court and state court", "state court conflict", "federal court confusion or uncertainty", "state court confusion or uncertainty", "federal court and state court confusion or uncertainty", "to resolve important or significant question", "to resolve question presented", "no reason given", "other reason" ]
[ 11 ]
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STORER et al. v. BROWN, SECRETARY OF STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al. No. 72-812. Argued November 5, 1973 Decided March 26, 1974 White, J., delivered the opinion of the’Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Douglas and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 755. Paul N. Halvonik and Joseph Remcho argued the cause for appellants in both cases. With them on the brief for appellants in No. 72-812 was Charles C. Marson. Appellant pro se filed a brief in No. 72-6050. Clayton P. Roche, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellee Brown in both cases. With him on the brief were Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, and Iver E. Skjeie, Assistant Attorney General. Together with No. 72-6050, Frommhagen v. Brown, Secretary of State of California, et al., also on appeal from the same court. Rolland R. O’Hare filed a brief for the Committee for Democratic Election Laws as amicus curiae in No. 72-812. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The California Elections Code forbids ballot position to an independent candidate for elective public office if he voted in the immediately preceding primary, § 6830 (c) (Supp. 1974), or if he had a registered affiliation with a qualified political party at any time within one year prior to the immediately preceding primary election. § 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974). The independent candidate must also file nomination papers signed by voters not less in number than 5% nor more than 6% of the entire vote east in the preceding general election in the area for which the candidate seeks to run. § 6831 (1961). All of these signatures must be obtained during a 24-day period following the primary and ending 60 days prior to the general election, § 6833 (Supp. 1974), and none of the signatures may be gathered from persons who vote at the primary election. § 6830 (c) (Supp. 1974). The constitutionality of these provisions is challenged here as infringing on rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments and as adding qualifications for the office of United States Congressman, contrary to Art. I, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution. Prior to the 1972 elections, appellants Storer, Fromm-hagen, Hall, and Tyner, along with certain of their supporters, filed their actions to have the above sections of the Elections Code declared unconstitutional and their enforcement enjoined. Storer and Frommhagen each sought ballot status as an independent candidate for Congressman from his district. Both complained about the party disaffiliation requirement of § 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974) and asserted that the combined effects of the provisions were unconstitutional burdens on their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Hall and Tyner claimed the right to ballot position as independent candidates for President and Vice President of the United States. They were members of the Communist Party but that party had not qualified for ballot position in California. They, too, complained of the combined effect of the indicated sections of the Elections Code on their ability to achieve ballot position. A three-judge District Court concluded that the statutes served a sufficiently important state interest to sustain their constitutionality and dismissed the complaints. Two separate appeals were taken from the judgment. We noted probable jurisdiction and consolidated the cases for oral argument. 410 U. S. 965 (1973). I We affirm the judgment of the District Court insofar as it refused relief to Storer and Frommhagen with respect to the 1972 general election. Both men were registered Democrats until early in 1972, Storer until January and Frommhagen until March of that year. This affiliation with a qualified political party within a year prior to the 1972 primary disqualified both men under § 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974); and in our view the State of California was not prohibited by the United States Constitution from enforcing that provision against these men. In Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1968), the Court held that although the citizens of a State are free to associate with one of the two major political parties, to participate in the nomination of their chosen party’s candidates for public office and then to cast their ballots in the general election, the State must also provide feasible means for other political parties and other candidates to appear on the general election ballot. The Ohio law under examination in that case made no provision for independent candidates and the requirements for any but the two major parties qualifying for the ballot were so burdensome that it was “virtually impossible” for other parties, new or old, to achieve ballot position for their candidates. Id., at 25. Because these restrictions, which were challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, severely burdened the right to associate for political purposes and the right to vote effectively, the Court, borrowing from other cases, ruled that the discriminations against new parties and their candidates had to be justified by compelling state interests. The Court recognized the substantial state interest in encouraging compromise and political stability, in attempting to ensure that the election winner will represent a majority of the community and in providing the electorate with an understandable ballot and inferred that “reasonable requirements for ballot position,” id., at 32, would be acceptable. But these important interests were deemed insufficient to warrant burdens so severe as to confer an effective political monopoly on the two major parties. The First and Fourteenth Amendments, including the Equal Protection Clause of the latter, required as much. In challenging § 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974), appellants rely on Williams v. Rhodes and assert that under that case and subsequent cases dealing with exclusionary voting and candidate qualifications, e. g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U. S. 621 (1969), substantial burdens on the right to vote or to associate for political purposes are constitutionally suspect and invalid under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and under the Equal Protection Clause unless essential to serve a compelling state interest. These cases, however, do not necessarily condemn § 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974). It has never been suggested that the Williams-Kramer-Dunn rule automatically invalidates every substantial restriction on the right to vote or to associate. Nor could this be the case under our Constitution where the States are given the initial task of determining the qualifications of voters who will elect members of Congress. Art. I, § 2, cl. 1. Also Art. I, § 4, cl. 1, authorizes the States to prescribe “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives.” Moreover, as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes. In any event, the States have evolved comprehensive, and in many respects complex, election codes regulating in most substantial ways, with respect to both federal and state elections, the time, place, and manner of holding primary and general elections, the- registration and qualifications of voters, and the selection and qualification of candidates. It is very unlikely that all or even a large portion of the state election laws would fail to pass muster under our cases; and the rule fashioned by the Court to pass on constitutional challenges to specific provisions of election laws provides no litmus-paper test for separating those restrictions that are valid from those that are invidious under the Equal Protection Clause. The rule is not self-executing and is no substitute for the hard judgments that must be made. Decision in this context, as in others, is very much a “matter pf degree,” Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 348, very much a matter of “consider [ing] the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification.” Williams v. Rhodes, supra, at 30; Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 335. What the result of this process will be in any specific case may be very difficult to predict with great assurance. The judgment in Dunn v. Blumstein invalidated the Tennessee one-year residence requirement for voting but agreed that the State’s interest was obviously sufficient to limit voting to residents, to require registration for voting, and to close the registration books at some point prior to the election, a deadline which every resident must meet if he is to cast his vote at the polls. Subsequently, three-judge district courts differed over the validity of a requirement that voters be registered for 50 days prior to election. This Court, although divided, sustained the provision. Burns v. Fortson, 410 U. S. 686 (1973); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U. S. 679 (1973). Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U. S. 752 (1973), is more relevant to the problem before us. That case dealt with a provision that to vote in a party primary the voter must have registered as a party member 30 days prior to the previous general election, a date eight months prior to the presidential primary and 11 months prior to the nonpresidential primary. Those failing to meet this deadline, with some exceptions, were barred from voting at either primary. We sustained the provision as “in no sense invidious or arbitrary,” because it was “tied to [the] particularized legitimate purpose,” id., at 762, of preventing interparty raiding, a matter which bore on “the integrity of the electoral process.” Id., at 761. Later the Court struck down similar Illinois provisions aimed at the same evil, where the deadline for changing party registration was 23 months prior to the primary date. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U. S. 51 (1973). One consequence was that a voter wishing to change parties could not vote in any primary that occurred during the waiting period. The Court did not retreat from Rosario or question the recognition in that case of the States’ strong interest in maintaining the integrity of the political process by preventing interparty raiding. Although the 11-month requirement imposed in New York had been accepted as necessary for an effective remedy, the Court was unconvinced that the 23-month period established in Illinois was an essential instrument to counter the evil at which it was aimed. Other variables must be considered where qualifications for candidates rather than for voters are at issue. In Jenness v. Forison, 403 U. S. 431 (1971), we upheld a requirement that independent candidates must demonstrate substantial support in the community by securing supporting signatures amounting to 5% of the total registered voters in the last election for filling the office sought by the candidate. The Court said: “There is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political organization’s candidate on the ballot— the interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception, and even frustration of the democratic process at the general election.” Id., at 442. Subsequently, in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S., at 145, a unanimous Court said: “The Court has recognized that a State has a legitimate interest in regulating the number of candidates on the ballot. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U. S., at 442; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S., at 32. In so doing, the State understandably and properly seeks to prevent the clogging of its election machinery, avoid vote* confusion, and assure that the winner is the choice of a majority, or at least a strong plurality, of those voting, without the expense and burden of runoff elections. Although we have no way of gauging the number of candidates who might enter primaries in Texas if access to the ballot were unimpeded by the large filing fees in question here, we are bound to respect the legitimate objectives of the State in avoiding overcrowded ballots. Moreover, a State has an interest, if not a duty, to protect the integrity of its political processes from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U. S., at 442.” Against this pattern of decisions we have no hesitation in sustaining § 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974). In California, the independent candidacy route to obtaining ballot position is but a part of the candidate-nominating process, an alternative to being nominated in one of the direct party primaries. The independent candidate need not stand for primary election but must qualify for the ballot by demonstrating substantial public support in another way. Otherwise, the qualifications required of the independent candidate are very similar to, or identical with, those imposed on party candidates. Section 6401 (Supp. 1974) imposes a flat disqualification upon any candidate seeking to run in a party primary if he has been “registered as affiliated with a political party other than that political party the nomination of which he seeks within 12 months immediately prior to the filing of the declaration.” Moreover, §§ 6402 and 6611 provide that a candidate who has been defeated in a party primary may not be nominated as an independent or be a candidate of any other party; and no person may file nomination papers for a party nomination and an independent nomination for the same office, or for more than one office at the same election. The requirement that the independent candidate not have been affiliated with a political party for a year before the primary is expressive of a general state policy aimed at maintaining the integrity of the various routes to the ballot. It involves no discrimination against independents. Indeed, the independent candidate must be clear of political party affiliations for a year before the primary; the party candidate must not have been registered with another party for a year before he files his declaration, which must be done not less than 83 and not more than 113 days prior to the primary. § 6490 (Supp. 1974). In Rosario v. Rockefeller, there was an 11-month waiting period for voters who wanted to change parties. Here, a person terminating his affiliation with a political party must wait at least 12 months before he can become a candidate in another party’s primary or an independent candidate for public office. The State’s interests recognized in Rosario are very similar to those that undergird the California waiting period; and the extent of the restriction is not significantly different. It is true that a California candidate who desires to run for office as an independent must anticipate his candidacy substantially in advance of his election campaign, but the required foresight is little more than the possible 11 months examined in Rosario, and its direct impact is on the candidate, and not voters. In any event, neither Storer nor Frommhagen is in position to .complain that the waiting period is one year, for each of them was affiliated with a qualified party no more than six months prior to the primary. As applied to them, § 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974) is valid. After long experience, California came to the direct party primary as a desirable way of nominating candidates for public office. It has also carefully determined which public offices will be subject to partisan primaries and those that call for nonpartisan elections. Moreover, after long experience with permitting candidates to run in the primaries of more than one party, California forbade the cross-filing practice in 1959. A candidate in one party primary may not now run in that of another; if he loses in the primary, he may not run as an independent; and he must not have been associated with another political party for a year prior to the primary. See §§ 6401, 6611. The direct party primary in California is not merely an exercise or warm-up for the general election but an integral part of the entire election process, the initial stage in a two-stage process by which the people choose their public officers. It functions to winnow out and finally reject all but the chosen candidates. The State’s general policy is to have contending forces within the party employ the primary campaign and primary election to finally settle their differences. The general election ballot is reserved for major struggles; it is not a forum for continuing intraparty feuds. The provision against defeated primary candidates running as independents effectuates this aim, the visible result being to prevent the losers from continuing the struggle and to limit the names on the ballot to those who have won the primaries and those independents who have properly qualified. The people, it is hoped, are presented with understandable choices and the winner in the general election with sufficient support to govern effectively. Section 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974) carries very similar credentials. It protects the direct primary process by refusing to recognize independent candidates who do not make early plans to leave a party and take the alternative course to the ballot. It works against independent candidacies prompted by short-range political goals, pique, or personal quarrel. It is also a substantial barrier to a party fielding an “independent” candidate to capture and .bleed off votes in the general election that might well go to another party. A State need not take the course California has, but California apparently believes with the Founding Fathers that splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism may do significant damage to the fabric of government. See The Federalist, No. 10 (Madison). It appears obvious to us that the one-year disaffiliation provision furthers the State’s interest in the stability of its political system. We also consider that interest as not only permissible, but compelling and as outweighing the interest the candidate and his supporters may have in making a late rather than an early decision to seek independent ballot status. Nor do we have reason for concluding that the device California chose, § 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974), was not an essential part of its overall mechanism to achieve its acceptable goals. As we indicated in Rosario, the Constitution does not require the State to choose ineffectual means to achieve its aims. To conclude otherwise might sacrifice the political stability of the system of the State, with profound consequences for the entire citizenry, merely in the interest of particular candidates and their supporters having instantaneous access to the ballot. We conclude that § 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974) is not unconstitutional, and Storer and Frommhagen were properly barred from the ballot as a result of its application. Cf. Lippitt v. Cipollone, 404 U. S. 1032 (1972). Having reached this result, there is no need to examine the constitutionality of the other provisions of the Elections Code as they operate singly or in combination as applied to these candidates. Even if these statutes were wholly or partly unconstitutional, Storer and Frommhagen were still properly barred from having their names placed on the 1972 ballot. Although Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S., at 34, spoke in terms of assessing the “totality” of the election laws as they affected constitutional rights, if a candidate is absolutely and validly barred from the ballot by one provision of the laws, he cannot challenge other provisions as applied to other candidates. The concept of “totality” is applicable only in the sense that a number of facially valid provisions of election laws may operate in tandem to produce impermissible barriers to constitutional rights. The disaffiliation requirement does not change its character when Qombined with other provisions of the electoral code. It is an absolute bar to candidacy, and a valid one. The District Court need not have heard a challenge to these other provisions of the California Elections Code by one who did not satisfy the age requirement for becoming a member of Congress, and there was no more reason to consider them at the request of Storer and Frommhagen or at the request of voters who desire to support unqualified candidates. II We come to different conclusions with respect to Hall and Tyner. As to these two men we vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand the case for further proceedings to determine whether the California election laws place an unconstitutional burden on their access to the ballot. We start with the proposition that the requirements for an independent's attaining a place on the general election ballot can be unconstitutionally severe, Williams v. Rhodes, supra. We must, therefore, inquire as to the nature, extent, and likely impact of the California requirements. Beyond the one-year party disaffiliation condition and the rule against voting in the primary, both of which Hall apparently satisfied, it was necessary for an independent candidate to file a petition signed by voters not less in number than 5% of the total votes cast in California at the last general election. This percentage, as such, does not appear to be excessive, see Jenness v. Fortson, supra, but to assess realistically whether the law imposes excessively burdensome requirements upon independent candidates it is necessary to know other critical facts which do not appear from the evidentiary record in this case. It is necessary in the first instance to know the “entire vote” in the last general election. Appellees suggest that 5% of that figure, whatever that is, is 325,000. Assuming this to be the correct total signature requirement, we also know that it must be satisfied within a period of 24 days between the primary and the general election. But we do not know the number of qualified voters from which the requirement must be satisfied within this period of time. California law disqualifies from signing the independent’s petition all registered voters who voted in the primary. In theory, it could be that voting in the primary was so close to 100% of those registered, and new registrations since closing the books before primary day were so low, that eligible signers of an unaffiliated candidate’s petition would number less than the total signatures required. This is unlikely, for it is usual that a substantial percentage of those eligible do not vote in the primary, and there were undoubtedly millions of voters qualified to vote in the 1972 primary. But it is not at all unlikely that the available pool of possible signers, after eliminating the total primary vote, will be substantially smaller than the total vote in the last general election and that it will require substantially more than 5% of the eligible pool to produce the necessary 325,000 signatures. This would be in excess, percentagewise, of anything the Court has approved to date as a precondition to an independent’s securing a place on the ballot and in excess of the 5% which we said in Jenness was higher than the requirement imposed by most state election codes. We are quite sure, therefore, that further proceedings should be had in the District Court to permit further findings with respect to the extent of the burden imposed on independent candidates for President and Vice President under California law. Standing alone, gathering 325,000 signatures in 24 days would not appear to be an impossible burden. Signatures at the rate of 13,542 per day would be required, but 1,000 canvassers could perform the task if each gathered 14 signers a day. On its face, the statute would not appear to require an impractical undertaking for one who desires to be a candidate for President. But it is a substantial requirement; and if the additional likelihood is, as it seems to us to be, that the total signatures required will amount to a substantially higher percentage of the available pool than the 5% stipulated in the statute, the constitutional claim asserted by Hall is not frivolous. Before the claim is finally dismissed, it should be determined whether the available pool is so diminished in size by the disqualification of those who voted in the primary that the 325,000-signature requirement, to be satisfied in 24 days, is too great a burden on the independent candidates for the offices of President and Vice President. Because further proceedings are required, we must resolve certain issues that are in dispute in order that the ground rules for the additional factfinding in the District Court will more clearly appear. First, we have no doubt about the validity of disqualifying from signing an independent candidate’s petition all those registered voters who voted a partisan ballot in the primary, although they did not vote for the office sought by the independent. We have considered this matter at greater length in American Party of Texas v. White, see post, at 785-786, and we merely repeat here that a State may confine each voter to one vote-in one primary election, and that to maintain the integrity of the nominating process the State is warranted in limiting the voter to participating in but one of the two alternative procedures, the partisan or the nonpartisan, for nominating candidates for the general election ballot. Second, the District Court apparently had little doubt that the California law disqualified anyone voting in the primary election, whether or not he confined his vote to nonpartisan offices and propositions. The State of California asserts this to be an erroneous interpretation of California law and claims that the District Court should have abstained to permit the California courts to address the question. In any event, the State does not attempt to justify disqualifying as signers of an independent’s petition those who voted only a nonpartisan ballot at the primary, such as independent voters who themselves were disqualified from voting a partisan ballot. See § 311 (Supp. 1974). With what we have before us, it would be difficult to ascertain any rational ground, let alone a compelling interest, for disqualifying nonpartisan voters at the primary from signing an independent candidate’s petition, and we think the District Court should reconsider the matter in the light of tentative views expressed here. Under the controlling cases, the District Court may, if it is so advised, abstain and permit the California courts to construe the California statute. On the other hand, it may be that adding to the qualified pool of signers all those nonpartisan voters at the primary may make so little difference in the ultimate assessment of the overall burden of the signature requirement that the status of the nonpartisan voter is in fact an insignificant consideration not meriting abstention. Third, once the number of signatures required in the 24-day period is ascertained, along with the total pool from which they may be drawn, there will arise the inevitable question for judgment: in the context of California politics, could a reasonably diligent independent candidate be expected to satisfy the signature requirements, or will it be only rarely that the unaffiliated candidate will succeed in getting on the ballot? Past experience will be a helpful, if not always an unerring, guide: it will be one thing if independent candidates have qualified with some regularity and quite a different matter if they have not. We note here that the State mentions only one instance of an independent candidate’s qualifying for any office under § 6430, but disclaims having made any comprehensive survey of the official records that would perhaps reveal the truth of the matter. One of the difficulties will be that the number of signatures required will vary with the total vote in the last election; the total disqualifying vote at the primary election and hence the size of the eligible pool of possible signers will also vary from election to election. Also to be considered is the relationship between the showing of support through a petition requirement and the percentage of the vote the State can reasonably expect of a candidate who achieves ballot status in the general election. As a preliminary matter, it would appear that the State, having disqualified defeated candidates and recent defectors, has in large part achieved its major purpose of providing and protecting an effective direct primary system and must justify its independent signature requirements chiefly by its interest in having candidates demonstrate substantial support in the community so that the ballot, in turn, may be protected from frivolous candidacies and kept within limits understandable to the voter. If the required signatures approach 10% of the eligible pool of voters, is it necessary to serve the State’s compelling interest in a manageable ballot to require that the task of signature gathering be crowded into 24 days? Of course, the petition period must end at a reasonable time before election day to permit nomination papers to be verified. Neither must California abandon its policy of confining each voter to a single nominating act — either voting in the partisan primary or a signature on an independent petition. But the question remains whether signature gathering must await conclusion of the primary. It would not appear untenable to permit solicitation of signatures to begin before primary day and finish afterwards. Those signing before the primary could either be definitely disqualified from a partisan vote in the primary election or have the privilege of canceling their petition signatures by the act of casting a ballot in the primary election. And if these alternatives are unacceptable, there would remain the question whether it is essential to demonstrate community support to gather signatures of substantially more than 5% of the group from which the independent is permitted to solicit support. Appellees insist, however, that the signature requirements for independent candidates are of no consequence because California has provided a valid way for new political parties to qualify for ballot position, an alternative that Hall could have pursued, but did not. Under § 6430, new political parties can be recognized and qualify their candidate for ballot position if 135 days before a primary election it appears that voters equal in number to at least 1% of the entire vote of the State at the last preceding gubernatorial election have declared to the county clerks their intention to affiliate with the new party, or if, by the same time, the new party files a petition with signatures equal in number to 10% of the last gubernatorial vote. It is argued that the 1% registration requirement is feasible, has recently been resorted to successfully by two new political parties now qualified for the California ballot, and goes as far as California constitutionally must go in providing an alternative to the direct party primary of the major parties. It may be that the 1% registration requirement is a valid condition to extending ballot position to a new political party. Cf. American Party of Texas v. White, post, p. 767. But the political party and the independent candidate approaches to political activity are entirely different and neither is a satisfactory substitute for the other. A new party organization contemplates a statewide, ongoing organization with distinctive political character. Its goal is typically to gain control of the machinery of state government by electing its candidates to public office. From the standpoint of a potential supporter, affiliation with the new party would mean giving up his ties with another party or sacrificing his own independent status, even though his possible interest in the new party centers around a particular candidate for a particular office. For the candidate himself, it would mean undertaking the serious responsibilities of qualified party status under California law, such as the conduct of a primary, holding party conventions, and the promulgation of party platforms. But more fundamentally, the candidate, who is by definition an independent and desires to remain one, must now consider himself a party man, surrendering his independent status. Must he necessarily choose the political party route if he wants to appear on the ballot in the general election? We think not. In Williams v. Rhodes, the opportunity for political activity within either of two major political parties was seemingly available to all. But this Court held that to comply with the First and Fourteenth Amendments the State must provide a feasible opportunity for new political organizations and their candidates to appear on the ballot. No discernible state interest justified the burdensome and complicated regulations that in effect made impractical any alternative to the major parties. Similarly, here, we perceive no sufficient state interest in conditioning ballot position for an independent candidate on his forming a new political party as long as the State is free to assure itself that the candidate is a serious contender, truly independent, and with a satisfactory level of community support. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment in No. 72-812 insofar as it refused relief to Hall and Tyner and remand the case in this respect to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment in No. 72-812 and No. 72-6050 is affirmed. So ordered. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT California Elections Code § 41. “Nonpartisan office” “Nonpartisan office” means an office for which no party may nominate a candidate. Judicial, school, county, and municipal offices are nonpartisan offices. §311 [Supp. 1974]. Declaration of political affiliation; voting at primary elections At the time of registering and of transferring registration, each elector may declare the name of the political party with which he intends to affiliate at the ensuing primary election. The name of that political party shall be stated in the affidavit of registration and the index. If the elector declines to state his political affiliation, he shall be registered as “Nonpartisan” or “Declines to state,” as he chooses. If the elector declines to state his political affiliation, he shall be informed that no person shall be entitled to vote the ballot of any political party at any primary election unless he has stated the name of the party with which he intends to affiliate at the time of registration. He shall not be permitted to vote the ballot of any party or for delegates to the convention of any party other than the party designated in his registration. § 2500. General election There shall be held throughout the State, on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November in every even-numbered year, an election, to be known as the general election. § 2501. Direct primary For the nomination of all candidates to be voted for at the general election, a direct primary shall be held at the legally designated polling places in each precinct on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in the immediately preceding June. § 2502. Primary elections Any primary election other than the direct primary or presidential primary shall be held on Tuesday, three weeks next preceding the election for which the primary election is held. § 6401 [Supp. 1974]. Party affiliation No declaration of candidacy for a partisan office or for membership on a county central committee shall be filed, either by the candidate himself or by sponsors on his behalf, (1) unless at the time of presentation of the declaration and continuously for not less than three months immediately prior to that time, or for as long as he has been eligible to register to vote in the state, the candidate is shown by his affidavit of registration to be affiliated with the political party the nomination of which he seeks, and (2) the candidate has not been registered as affiliated with a political party other than that political party the nomination of which he seeks within 12 months immediately prior to the filing of the declaration. The county clerk shall attach a certificate to the declaration of candidacy showing the date on which the candidate registered as intending to affiliate with the political party the nomination of which he seeks, and indicating that the candidate has not been affiliated with any other political party for the 12-month period immediately preceding the filing of the declaration. § 6402. Independent nominees This chapter does not prohibit the independent nomination of candidates under the provisions of Chapter 3 (commencing at Section 6800) of this division, subject to the following limitations: (a) A candidate whose name has been on the ballot as a candidate of a party at the direct primary and who has been defeated for that party nomination is ineligible for nomination as an independent candidate. He is also ineligible as a candidate named by a party central committee to fill a vacancy on the ballot for a general election. (b) No person may file nomination papers for a party nomination and an independent nomination for the same office, or for more than one office at the same election. § 6430. Qualified parties A party is qualified to participate in any primary election: (a) If at the last preceding gubernatorial election there was polled for any one of its candidates who was the candidate of that party only for any office voted on throughout the State, at least 2 percent of the entire vote of the State; or (b) If at the last preceding gubernatorial election there was polled for any one of its candidates who, upon the date of that election, as shown by the affidavits of registration of voters in the county of his residence, was affiliated with that party and was the joint candidate of that party and any other party for any office voted on throughout the State, at least 6 percent of the entire vote of the State; or (c) If on or before the 135th day before any primary election, it appears to the Secretary of State, as a result of examining and totaling the statement of voters and their political affiliations transmitted to him by the county clerks, that voters equal in number to at least 1 percent of the entire vote of the State at the last preceding gubernatorial election have declared their intention to affiliate with that party; or (d) If on or before the 135th day before any primary election, there is filed with the Secretary of State a petition signed by voters, equal in number to at least 10 percent of the entire vote of the State at the last preceding gubernatorial election, declaring that they represent a proposed party, the name of which shall be stated in the petition, which proposed party those voters desire to have participate in that primary election. This petition shall be circulated, signed, verified and the signatures of the voters on it shall be certified to and transmitted to the Secretary of State by the county clerks substantially as provided for initiative petitions. Each page of the petition shall bear a caption in 18-point blackface type, which caption shall be the name of the proposed party followed by the words “Petition to participate in the primary election.” No voters or organization of voters shall assume a party name or designation which is so similar to the name of an existing party as to mislead voters. Whenever the registration of any party which qualified in the previous direct primary election falls below one-fifteenth of 1 percent of the total state registration, that party shall not be qualified to participate in the primary election but shall be deemed to have been abandoned by the voters, since the expense of printing ballots and holding a primary election would be an unjustifiable expense and burden to the State for so small a group. The Secretary of State shall immediately remove the name of the party from any list, notice, ballot, or other publication containing the names of the parties qualified to participate in the primary election. § 6490 [Supp. 1974], Declaration of candidacy No candidate's name shall be printed on the ballot to be used at a direct primary unless a declaration of his candidacy is filed not less than 83 and not more than 113 days prior to the direct primary. The declaration may be made by the candidate or by sponsors on his behalf. When the declaration is made by sponsors the candidate’s affidavit of acceptance shall be filed with the declaration. § 6611. Unsuccessful candidate; ineligibility as candidate of another party A candidate who fails to receive the highest number of votes for the nomination of the political party with which he was registered as affiliated on the date his declaration of candidacy or declaration of acceptance of nomination was filed with the county clerk cannot be the candidate of any other political party. § 6803. Group of candidates for presidential electors; designation of presidential and vice presidential candidates Whenever a group of candidates for presidential electors, equal in number to the number of presidential electors to which this State is entitled, files a nomination paper with the Secretary of State pursuant to this chapter, the nomination paper may contain the name of the candidate for President of the United States and the name of the candidate for Vice President of the United States for whom all of those candidates for presidential electors pledge themselves to vote. § 6804. Printing of names on ballot When a group of candidates for presidential electors designates the presidential and vice presidential candidates for whom all of the group pledge themselves to vote, the names of the presidential candidate and vice presidential candidate designated by that group shall be printed on the ballot. § 6830 [Supp. 1974], Contents Each candidate or group of candidates shall file a nomination paper which shall contain: (a) The name and residence address of each candidate, including the name of the county in which he resides. (b) A designation of the office for which the candidate or group seeks nomination. (c) A statement that the candidate and each signer of his nomination paper did not vote at the immediately preceding primary election at which a candidate was nominated for the office mentioned in the nomination paper. The statement required in this subdivision shall be omitted when no candidate was nominated for the office at the preceding primary election. (d) A statement that the candidate is not, and was not at any time during the one year preceding the immediately preceding primary election at which a candidate was nominated for the office mentioned in the nomination paper, registered as affiliated with a political party qualified under the provisions of Section 6430. The statement required by this subdivision shall be omitted when no primary election was held to nominate candidates for the office to which the independent nomination paper is directed. § 6831. Signatures required Nomination papers shall be signed by voters of the area for which the candidate is to be nominated, not less in number than 5 percent nor more than 6 percent of the entire vote cast in the area at the preceding general election. Nomination papers for Representative in Congress, State Senator or Assemblyman, to be voted for at a special election to fill a vacancy, shall be signed by voters in the district not less in number than 500 or 1 percent of the entire vote cast in the area at the preceding general election, whichever is less, nor more than 1,000. § 6833 [Supp. 1974]. Time for filing, circulation and signing; verification Nomination papers required to be filed with the Secretary of State or with the county clerk shall be filed not more than 79 nor less than 64 days before the day of the election, but shall be prepared, circulated, signed, verified and left with the county clerk for examination, or for examination and filing, no earlier than 84 days before the, election and no later than 5 p. m. 60 days before the election. If the total number of signatures submitted to a county clerk for an office entirely within that county does not equal the number of signatures needed to qualify the candidate, the county clerk shall declare the petition void and is not required to verify the signatures. If the district falls within two or more counties, the county clerk shall within two working days report in writing to the Secretary of State the total number of signatures filed. If the Secretary of State finds that the total number of signatures filed in the district or state is less than the minimum number required to qualify the candidate he shall within one working day notify in writing the counties involved that they need not verify the signatures. § 10014. Ballots for voters at primary elections At a primary election only a nonpartisan ballot shall be furnished to each voter who is not registered as intending to affiliate with any one of the political parties participating in the primary election; and to any voter registered as intending to affiliate with a political party participating in a primary election, there shall be furnished only a ballot of the political party with which he is registered as intending to affiliate. § 10232. Inconveniently large ballots If the election board of a county determines that due to the number of candidates and measures that must be printed on the general election ballot, the ballot will be larger than may be conveniently handled, the board may order nonpartisan offices and local measures omitted from the general election ballot and printed on a separate ballot in a form substantially the same as provided for the general election ballot. If the board so orders, each voter shall receive both ballots, and the procedure prescribed for the handling and canvassing of ballots shall be modified to the extent necessary to permit the use of two ballots by a voter. The board may, in such case, order the second ballot to be printed on paper of a different tint and assign to those ballots numbers higher than those assigned to the ballots containing partisan offices and statewide ballot measures. § 10318. Inconveniently large ballots If the election board of a county determines that due to the number of candidates and measures that must be printed on the direct primary ballot the ballot will be larger than may be conveniently handled, the board may provide that a nonpartisan ballot shall be given to each partisan voter, together with his partisan ballot, and that the material appearing under the heading “Nonpartisan Offices” on partisan ballots, as well as the heading itself, shall be omitted from the partisan ballots. If the board so provides, the procedure prescribed for the handling and canvassing of ballots shall be modified to the extent necessary to permit the use of two ballots by partisan voters. § 18600 [Supp. 1974]. Write-in votes Any name written upon a ballot shall be counted, unless prohibited by Section 18603, for that name for the office under which it is written, if it is written in the blank space therefor, whether or not a cross (+) is stamped or made with pen or pencil in the voting square after the name so written. § 18601 [Supp. 1974]. Declaration required Every person who desires to have his name as written on the ballots of an election counted for a particular office shall file a declaration stating that he is a write-in candidate for the nomination for or election to the particular office and giving the title of that office. § 18602 [Supp. 1974], Declaration; filing The declaration required by Section 18601 shall be filed no later than the eighth day prior to the election to which it applies. It shall be filed with the clerks, registrar of voters, or district secretary responsible for the conduct of the election in which the candidate desires to have write-in votes of his name counted. § 18603 [Supp. 1974], Requirements for tabulation of write-in vote No name written upon a ballot in any state, county, city, city and county, or district election shall be counted for an office or nomination unless (a) A declaration has been filed pursuant to Sections 18601 and 18602 declaring a write-in candidacy for that particular person for that particular office or nomination and (b) The fee required by Section 6555 is paid when the declaration of write-in candidacy is filed pursuant to Section 18602. The relevant provisions of the California Elections Code are printed in the appendix to this opinion. Storer’s action, No. 72-812, was filed first. Frommhagen was allowed to intervene. Hall and Tyner later filed suit. In its opinion the District Court noted that “[b]y appropriate orders and stipulations, although the cases were never consolidated, the parties to Hall will be bound by the rulings made in Storer which are common to both cases and any separate issues in Hall stand submitted without further briefing or oral argument. The view taken by the Court herein is such that there are no separate issues in Hall and the rulings expressed are dispositive of both cases.” Storer sought to be a candidate from the Sixth Congressional District, Frommhagen from the Twelfth. The California Elections Code § 41 provides that judicial, school, county, and municipal offices are nonpartisan offices for which no party may nominate a candidate. See Gaylord, History of the California Election Laws 59, contained in West’s Ann. Elec. Code (1961), preceding §§1-11499. See In re McGee, 36 Cal. 2d 592, 226 P. 2d 1 (1951). Moreover, we note that the independent candidate who cannot qualify for the ballot may nevertheless resort to the write-in alternative provided by California law, see §§ 18600-18603 (Supp. 1974). The 1972 election, is long over, and no effective relief can be provided to the candidates or voters, but this case is not moot, since the issues properly presented, and their effects on independent candidacies, will persist as the California statutes are applied in future elections. This is, therefore, a case where the controversy is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U. S. 752, 756 n. 5 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 333 n. 2 (1972); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814, 816 (1969); Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911). The “capable of repetition, yet evading review” doctrine, in the context of election cases, is appropriate when there are “as applied” challenges as well as in the more typical case involving only facial attacks. The construction of the statute, an understanding of its operation, and possible constitutional limits on its application, will have the effect of simplifying future challenges, thus increasing the likelihood that timely filed cases can be adjudicated before an election is held. In California, presidential electors must meet candidacy requirements and file their nomination papers with the required signatures. §§ 6803, 6830. The State claims, therefore, that the electors, not Hall and Tyner, are the only persons with standing to raise the validity of the signature requirements. But it is Hall’s and Tyner’s names that go on the California ballot for consideration of the voters. § 6804. Without the necessary signatures this will not occur. It is apparent, contrary to the State’s suggestion, that Hall and Tyner have ample standing to challenge the signature requirement. Hereafter, in the text and notes, reference to Hall should be understood as referring also to Tyner. See also Auerbach v. Mandel, 409 U. S. 808 (1972) (3%); Wood v. Putterman, 316 F. Supp. 646 (Md. 1970) (three-judge court), aff’d mem., 400 U. S. 859 (1970) (3%); and Beller v. Kirk, 328 F. Supp. 485 (SD Fla. 1970) (three-judge court), aff’d mem. sub nom. Beller v. Askew, 403 U. S. 925 (1971) (3%). We note that in Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes, 318 F. Supp. 1262 (SD Ohio 1970) (three-judge court), the District Court struck down a 7% petition requirement. That issue became moot on appeal, Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U. S. 583, 585 (1972). Two ballots are authorized in California primaries, the one for partisan office and the other for nonpartisan offices and propositions. See §§ 10014, 10232, 10318. A voter may take only the nonpartisan ballot and refrain from voting on partisan candidates. From the official published voting statistics published by the California Secretary of State, it would appear that the total vote in the 1972 primaries, seemingly the total number of persons voting, was 6,460,220, while the total vote for partisan presidential candidates was 5,880,845. Thus all but approximately 579,000 voted for a partisan candidate in the presidential primary and it is likely that many of the 579,000 not voting for President cast a partisan ballot for other candidates. But assuming that they did not, the maximum addition to the pool available to Hall would be 579,000, probably a relatively small difference in terms of the total number of eligible signers. See Secretary of State, Statement of Vote, State of California, Consolidated Primary Election, June 6, 1972, pp. 3, 4-23. Appellees argue only that the independent candidate’s canvassing for signatures should await the announcement of the primary winners and the promulgation of party platforms so that the voters eligible to sign, i. e., those not voting in the primary, will have a meaningful choice between the primary nominations and the independents. This does not appear to be a matter particularly relevant to signing petitions for ballot position, for the meaningful choice referred to by appellees will be finally presented at the general election. It may help to put this case in proper context to hypothesize the scope of Hall’s petition and signature burden under the California law by employing the election statistics available from official sources in California. Assuming that the “entire vote” in the last general election was the total number of persons voting in the 1970 election, 6,633,400, 5% of that figure, or the total number of signatures required, is 331,670. See Secretary of State, Statement of Vote, General Election, November 7, 1972, p. 6. The total registration for the 1972 primary was 9,105,287. See 1972 Primary Vote, p. 3. Adding to this figure an estimate of the increase in registration since the primary date and subtracting the minimum partisan vote at the primary election, the available pool of possible signers, by this calculation, would be 4,072,279, see Secretary of State, Report of Registration, September 1972, p. 8, of which the required 331,670 signatures was 8.1%. The 1% registration requirement contemplates independent voters registering as affiliated with the party. The 10%-signature requirement,' on the other hand, need not involve signers changing their registration. Appellants also contend that § 6830 (d) (Supp. 1974) purports to establish an additional qualification for office of Representative and is invalid under Art. I, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution. The argument is wholly without merit. Storer and Frommhagen would not have been disqualified had they been nominated at a party primary or by an adequately supported independent petition and then elected at the general election. The non-affiliation requirement no more establishes an additional requirement for the office of Representative than the requirement that the candidate win the primary to secure a place on the general ballot or otherwise demonstrate substantial community support.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the type of decision made by the court among the following: Consider "opinion of the court (orally argued)" if the court decided the case by a signed opinion and the case was orally argued. For the 1791-1945 terms, the case need not be orally argued, but a justice must be listed as delivering the opinion of the Court. Consider "per curiam (no oral argument)" if the court decided the case with an opinion but without hearing oral arguments. For the 1791-1945 terms, the Court (or reporter) need not use the term "per curiam" but rather "The Court [said],""By the Court," or "By direction of the Court." Consider "decrees" in the infrequent type of decisions where the justices will typically appoint a special master to take testimony and render a report, the bulk of which generally becomes the Court's decision. This type of decision usually arises under the Court's original jurisdiction and involves state boundary disputes. Consider "equally divided vote" for cases decided by an equally divided vote, for example when a justice fails to participate in a case or when the Court has a vacancy. Consider "per curiam (orally argued)" if no individual justice's name appears as author of the Court's opinion and the case was orally argued. Consider "judgment of the Court (orally argued)" for formally decided cases (decided the case by a signed opinion) where less than a majority of the participating justices agree with the opinion produced by the justice assigned to write the Court's opinion.
What type of decision did the court make?
[ "opinion of the court (orally argued)", "per curiam (no oral argument)", "decrees", "equally divided vote", "per curiam (orally argued)", "judgment of the Court (orally argued)", "seriatim" ]
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FLEMMING, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, v. FLORIDA CITRUS EXCHANGE et al. No. 27. Argued November 17, 1958. Decided December 15, 1958. William W. Goodrich argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briéf were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Anderson and Beatrice Rosenberg. J. Hardin Peterson argued the cause and filed a brief for the Florida Citrus Exchange et al., respondents. /. Lewis Hall argued the cause for Schell, respondent. With him on the brief was Morris E. White. Richard W. Ervin, Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of Florida, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Commercially grown Florida and Texas oranges have for many years been colored with a red coal-tar color. In 1939 the Food and Drug Administration, after testing and pursuant to § 406 (b) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, certified this color, FD&C Red No. 32 (hereafter Red 32), to be harmless and suitable for use in food. However, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, on November 10,1955, ordered Red 32 and two other coal-tar colors to be removed from the certified list, after new tests in 1951-1953 cast doubt whether Red 32 was harmless, and after public hearings were held upon the matter on notice published in the Federal Register. The consequence of the Secretary’s order was that under § 402 (c) of the Act any food bearing or containing such colors would be deemed to be adulterated. The validity of the Secretary’s order was attacked in petitions under § 701 (f) of the Act filed in several Courts of Appeals by persons and organizations claiming to be adversely affected. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sustained the order against a general attack. Certified Color Industry Comm. v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 236 P. 2d 866. In the instant case, however, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, by a divided vote, set aside the order insofar as it removed the certification of Red 32 as harmless and suitable for use as external coloring on Florida and Texas oranges. 246 F. 2d 850. The Secretary did not determine that Red 32 in the quantities used in color-added oranges was harmful for human consumption, but rather determined on the basis of the 1951-1953 tests only that Red 32 and the other suspect coal-tar colors were toxic and therefore not “harmless and suitable for use in food.” The Court of Appeals held that the 1939 finding that Red 32 was harmless “should not be supplanted” by a contrary finding “unless there is evidence that, in the amounts used, and in the manner of use, oranges colored with Red 32 are unsafe for human consumption.” 246 F. 2d, at 861-862. The word “harmless” was construed to be a term “of relation,” preventing the Secretary from denying the continued use of Red 32 in the quantities used in color-added oranges in the absence of evidence that such quantities could not be consumed “without risk of injury or harm.” Id., at 858. The Court of Appeals held further that in light of its premise that “harmless” was a term of relation and because two congressional Committees had found that the practice of adding the color to oranges was an economic necessity, it would be incumbent upon the Secretary to determine whether the use of the color was “required in the production” of food within the meaning of § 406 (a), and if so, to promulgate a safe tolerance for Red 32 on oranges pursuant to that section. Until such a tolerance was promulgated, the court held that the Secretary was required to certify Red 32 as a safe color for use on oranges without one. Id., at 860-862. We granted certiorari to determine this controversial question of construction of this important statute designed for the protection of the public health. 356 U. S. 911. Senate and House Committees have reported that the practice of adding color is an economic necessity in the production of Florida and Texas oranges for market. When mature oranges are removed from the tree, their skins, for botanical reasons unnecessary to detail here, are frequently green in color. Since the consumer would be prone incorrectly to interpret this greenness as a sign of immaturity, oranges are put through a “degreening” process which involves exposure to ethylene gas. In the case of certain California oranges, this gas process is sufficient to turn a green orange into one of the desired orange color. But the degreening process does not produce the desired color in Florida and Texas oranges; a light yellow shade results. The more desired color is therefore produced by immersing the oranges in, or spraying them with, a solution containing Red 32. The evidence at the hearings held by the Secretary was that the process infuses the peel of an orange with 0.0017% to 0.0034% of Red 32. Other evidence indicated that oranges taken as a whole, and candied peel, marmalade and orange juice would contain less — in many cases, much less — of the coal-tar color. It is conceded by the Secretary that there is no evidence that the level of ingestion of Red 32 involved in human consumption of color-added oranges is harmful. However, the evidence at the Secretary’s hearing did indicate that Red 32 had a poisonous effect on animals. Feeding the color to rats in quantities as small as 0.1% of their diet was deleterious and often fatal, with liver damage and enlargement of the heart in evidence. In larger quantities, 1.0% and 2.0% of the diet, ingestion of Red 32 by rats caused death within twelve days and a week, respectively. The health of dogs taking 0.2% of the color in their diets deteriorated rapidly; that of those taking 0.04% somewhat more slowly, but definitely; and ill effects were indicated at a feeding level as low as 0.01% of the diet. No safe level of administration of Red 32 to the test animals was established. These and similar tests, involving the administration of Red 32 and the other coal-tar colors involved to test animals generally as an item of diet, were the basis on which the Secretary’s order rested. The Secretary argues that the legislative history and the consistent administrative interpretation of the Act establish that his authority to list or continue the listing of coal-tar colors is confined to his authority under § 406 (b) to certify “harmless” coal-tar colors, those which are wholly innocuous and demonstrated to be without adverse physiological effect. The argument runs that a toxic coal-tar color, such as the Court of Appeals agreed that Red 32 was, was to be prohibited completely without regard to whether it might possibly be used in safe amounts on a particular food product. The Secretary argues further that since Congress made known its will specifically and precisely in § 406 (b) that a toxic coal-tar color, that is, one not “harmless,” was not to be certified under any circumstances, the tolerance provisions of § 406 (a) have no relevance to the validity of his order. We are of the opinion that the Court of Appeals erred and that its judgment cannot stand. First. The provisions of §§402 (c) and 406 (b) dealing expressly with coal-tar colors were innovations in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938; there were no counterpart provisions in the original 1906 food and drug legislation. By these provisions, Congress carefully distinguished the treatment to be given by the Secretary to toxic coal-tar colors. The original Act dealt generally with poisonous and other deleterious substances in food, as are now treated under § 402 (a), but it did not deal specifically with coal-tar colors. Section 7 of the original Food and Drugs Act, 34 Stat. 769, provided that an article of food should be deemed adulterated “If it contain any added poisonous or other added deleterious ingredient which may render such article injurious to health . . . .” This Court held in United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U. S. 399, following the “plain meaning” of the statutory language, that this placed the burden upon the Government of establishing that the added substance was such as might render the food to which it was added injurious to health. This rule applied without distinction where coal-tar colors were involved. Congress was aware of the difficulties of this test which required that the questioned food product be evaluated as a whole, and of the existence in this area of an informal certification practice under the 1906 Act under which not food products but the coal-tar colors themselves were subjected to test to determine their poisonous or harmful character. Cf. S. Rep. No. 361, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 7-8. Of course, when litigation occurred, the Lexington. Mill standard was applied. See W. B. Wood Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 286 F. 84, 86-87. It was against this background that the 1938 statute was proposed and enacted. It is obvious to us that an approach different from the rule in Lexington Mill was intended by Congress when in § 402 (c) and § 406 (b) it addressed itself to the severable and narrow problem of coal-tar colors. The- language involved in Lexington Mill survived generally in the Act’s broadest and most general test of food adulteration, § 402 (a)(1), Section 402 (c) provided a separate test: that a food should be deemed adulterated “If it bears or contains a coal-tar color other than one from a batch that has been certified in accordance with regulations as provided by section 406 . . . .” Plainly Congress banned any addition to foods of coal-tar colors not certified by the Secretary. The standard established for the Secretary was set forth in § 406 (b): “The Secretary shall promulgate regulations providing for the listing of coal-tar colors which are harmless and suitable for use in food and for the certification of batches of such colors . . . There appears in Senator Copeland’s memorandum on the first of the bills which led to the 1938 Act, S. 1944, 73d Cong., Ist Sess., which contained new provisions on coal-tar colors similar to the ones in the Act as finally passed, a clear indication that one of the purposes of these provisions was to do away, in this area, with the Lexington Mill approach. 77 Cong. Rec. 5721. This had the effect of making the certification system, in which analysis concentrated on the color substances themselves, rather than an examination of the effect of the use of the colors in the context of the food products involved, the conclusive test of adulteration. Thus it is that the test of certification laid down in § 406 (b) concentrates on the color substance itself; it is to be listed only if it is harmless. The Secretary is to address himself to the harmless character of the substance first; once this is assured, the statutory plan is that it may be freely used in foods, subject to the provisions of the other sections of the Act. Clearly such a plan is a rational one to ascribe to Congress. It is true that the ultimate purpose here concerned of the adulteration provisions of the Act is to protect health, and that no one makes the color substances by themselves an item of diet. But it certainly was competent for Congress, in the light of what were recognized problems to health in the use of such added colors, to adopt a rule of caution in treating this recognized and definable problem area. This rule of caution is here one which relieves the Secretary from the burden of showing in each case that a food containing them raises a possibility of injury to health, and requires that the color stuffs, whose positive values are only visual and which are not naturally found in foods, not be added unless they could pass a higher standard. The significance of such an approach is demonstrated here. No safe level for ingestion of Red 32 has been established, either in respect of humans or of animals. No one contends that it is impossible that ill effects will be experienced in human beings if unrestricted use of the substance is permitted in articles of food. On the other hand, no instance of a harmful use of Red 32 in a particular food was established in the record. These questions present broad inquiries, difficult of proof, and doubtless apt to be more long-drawn-out in investigation than even the ones which the Secretary pursued. Yet it has been shown that the color of itself has poisonous properties. In the light of the over-all purpose of the Act, cf. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U. S. 277, 280, and the specific terms here involved, it seems to us that Congress did not intend that a verdict of “not proven” on the questions mentioned should preclude the Government from preventing the use of substances like the one in question when they were shown to have poisonous effects by themselves. We are not persuaded by the respondents’ argument, adopted by the Court of Appeals, that the words “harmless” and “poisonous” are relative words, referring not to the effect of a substance in vacuo, but to its effect, taken in a particular way and in particular quantities, on an organic system. Of course this is so, but the question before us certainly does not depend on it. This is not a case like the examples put which remind us that pure water would be deleterious if taken at the rate of four gallons an hour or common table salt at several ounces. The color substances appear to have been administered at toxicologically significant levels; they played a relatively small part in the diets of the test animals, generally less, and frequently much less, than 1%. Obviously if the color substances themselves are made an item of diet in the trifling percentages used on the test animals, their effect is poisonous. Congress may have intended “harmless” in a relative sense, but we think it was in relation to such laboratory tests as the ones the Secretary performed that Congress was speaking when it required that coal-tar colors be “harmless.” We do not believe that Congress required the Secretary first to attempt to analyze the uses being made of the colors in the market place, and then feed them experimentally only in the proportions in which they appeared in certain of the food products in which the colors were used. This appears to be the very procedure on which Congress turned its back in the 1938 Act. The respondents contend that since the Secretary himself maintains various lists of certified colors, one containing colors harmless and suitable for all food, drug and cosmetic uses, another of colors harmless and suitable for general use in drugs and cosmetics, and a third of colors harmless and suitable for external use in drugs and cosmetics, 21 CFR §§ 9.3, 9.4, 9.5, he has recognized that “harmless,” as used in the statute, does not bear the “absolute” meaning he is alleged to give it. From this it is said to follow that the Secretary must, in forbidding the use of colors in foods, restrict his prohibition to specific food uses in which the color is shown to be capable of a deleterious effect. We do not draw this inference. Provisions similar to those dealing with the use of coal-tar colors in foods are repeated in the portions of the Act dealing with drugs and with cosmetics. Section 501 (a)(4), 52 Stat. 1049, 21 U. S. C. §351 (a)(4), proscribes the use of uncertified colors in drugs for the purpose of coloring, and refers to § 504, 52 Stat. 1052, 21 U. S. C. § 354, which authorizes the listing and certification of coal-tar colors which are "harmless and suitable for use in drugs.” Comparable provisions are found with respect to cosmetics in §§ 601 (e) and 604, 52 Stat. 1054, 1055, 21 U. S. C. §§ 361 (e), 364. It is clear from these provisions that Congress contemplated that a color might be harmless in respect of drugs or cosmetics but not of foods. And the fact that the Secretary has established a further category, distinguishing between colors intended for external and for general use, we do not think inconsistent with our interpretation of the Act. These distinctions can be established through tests run on the color substance as such, in the way in which the Secretary has conducted the tests in the matter before us. It is a far cry from saying that the Act permits a generic distinction capable of laboratory proof, between external and internal uses of a color, to say that it commands that the colors cannot be inquired of at all except in the specific contexts of their use in food, drug and cosmetic products. Second. But even if the Secretary’s approach of viewing the harmlessness of coal-tar colors in terms of the colors themselves, rather than in their specific applications, is correct, the respondents insist, as the court below indicated, that the Secretary should establish tolerances for the use of colors in food, even though not found to be “harmless.” The respondents point to § 406 (a) of the Act which allows the Secretary to establish tolerances for poisonous substances added to food where the substance is “required in the production” of the food or “cannot be avoided by good manufacturing practice.” They argue that this provision should be used by the Secretary to establish a maximum tolerance for the application of Red 32 to the skins of oranges, either because it applies by its own terms or it is applicable by analogy. The Secretary contends that he is without power to permit the use of harmful coal-tar colors in specific foods through a system of tolerances. We believe he is correct. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is a detailed and thorough piece of legislation. Its treatment of many public health and food problems is quite specific, and of course it is the duty of the courts in construing it to be mindful of its approach in terms of draftsmanship. Here again, in our construction of this explicit Act, we must be sensitive to what Congress has written, and recall that “It is for us to ascertain — neither to add nor to subtract, neither to delete nor to distort.” 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U. S. 593, 596. Section 406 (a), which provides for the system of tolerances, constitutes by its terms a definition of the term “unsafe,” which appears in § 402 (a) (2), a prohibition on foods which bear or contain “any added poisonous or added deleterious substance . . . which is unsafe within the meaning of section 406.” This is a prohibition entirely separate and distinct from the prohibitions of § 402 (c) on foods containing or bearing uncertified coal-tar colors. The existence of a tolerance is specifically stated in § 406 (a) only to give sanction to what would otherwise amount to adulteration within the terms of § 402 (a)(1). Accordingly, it is obvious from the language of the statute that the provisions authorizing the establishment of tolerances apply only to § 402 (a)(1) and (2) and do not apply to § 402 (c)’s flat prohibition against the use of uncertified colors. Respondents do not direct us to any substantial contrary indication in the legislative history. Nor can the tolerance provisions be applied to coal-tar colors through some form of analogy. The command of the statute is plain: where a coal-tar color is not harmless, it is not to be certified; if it is not certified, it is not to be used at all. In this regard also, an approach in terms of the toxicity of the coloring ingredient, rather than of the food product as a whole was chosen by Congress. It evidently took the view that unless coal-tar colors were harmless, the considerations of the benefits of visual appeal that might be urged in favor of their use should not prevail, in the light of the considerations of the public health. In the case of other sorts of added poisons, though only where they were required in the production of the food concerned or could not under good manufacturing practice be avoided, a different congressional policy was expressed in the 1938 enactment. It is the duty of the Secretary to give effect to this distinction; he has done so with apparent substantial uniformity and has done so here. Third. After the promulgation of the Secretary’s order, Congress afforded temporary relief to those economically interested in the coloring of oranges with Red 32. Legislation was enacted in the summer of 1956 to afford a period of approximately three years (until March 1, 1959) during which use of the color would be allowed solely in application to the skins of oranges. The statute does not, in our view, affect the situation presented to the courts for judicial review; the Secretary’s order remains to be tested under the permanent provisions of the Act, insofar as they will affect respondents after March 1, 1959. The statute accordingly operates as a legislatively ordained stay of the Secretary’s order insofar as it affects the present respondents and those similarly situated. See H. R. Rep. No. 1982, p. 3, and S. Rep. No. 2391, p. 3, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. In view of the very temporary nature of this legislative “stay,” the automatic resumption of the status quo upon its expiration, and the effect of the order on the respondents, even during the legislative stay, we agree with the parties that the matter before us is not moot. The Secretary’s order was the promulgation of a general rule, prospective in operation, and the facts of the respondents’ business are such that if the order is upheld, there will be a practical effect on them even during the span of the temporary legislation. Accordingly, the respondents remain persons adversely affected by the Secretary’s order, and it is proper for us now to determine the legal situation in regard to them when the temporary legislation expires. Under the permanent provisions of §§ 402 and 406 the Secretary’s order was lawful, and the respondents present no grounds on which they can legally object to its application to them. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, setting the Secretary’s order aside in part, must be Reversed. The Act, as amended, is 52 Stat. 1040, 21 U. S. C. § 301 et seq. Section 406 (b), 52 Stat. 1049, 21 U. S. C. §346 (b) provides: “The Secretary shall promulgate regulations providing for the listing of coal-tar colors which are harmless and suitable for use in food and for the certification of batches of such colors, with or without harmless diluents.” Section 402 (c), 52 Stat. 1047, 21 U. S. C. §342 (c), provides that a food shall be deemed to be adulterated “If it bears or contains a coal-tar color other than one from a batch that has been certified in accordance with regulations as provided by section 406 . . . .” Section 301 of the Act prohibits the introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce, or the receipt in interstate commerce, and the delivery thereof, of adulterated food, or the adulteration of food in interstate commerce. 52 Stat. 1042, 21 U. S. C. § 331. Sanctions for the prohibited acts, in the form of injunction proceedings, criminal prosecutions, and seizure actions, are provided in §§ 302-304, 52 Stat. 1043, 1044, 21 U. S. C. §§ 332-334. “In a case of actual controversy as to the validity of any order under subsection (e), any person who will be adversely affected by such order if placed in effect may at any time prior to the ninetieth day after such order is issued file a petition with the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit wherein such person resides or has his principal place of business, for a judicial review of such order. The summons and petition may be served at any place in the United States. The Secretary, promptly upon service of the summons and petition, shall certify and file in the court the transcript of the proceedings and the record on which the Secretary based his order.” 52 Stat. 1055, 21 U. S. C. §371 (f). Review was sought in three Courts of Appeals in all. In the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, a petition was dismissed before it was adjudicated. The persons and firms who are respondents here are all engaged in the growing, packing or marketing of Florida or Texas oranges. One is also interested in the patented process whereby the Red 32 color is applied to the skins of oranges. The Court of Appeals set aside the order: “. . . in so far as said order removes the coal-tar color FD&C Red No. 32 from the list of colors which may be certified for use in coloring the skin of oranges meeting minimum maturity standards prescribed in the State of Florida and Texas; provided, that nothing herein or in the judgment of this Court entered pursuant hereto shall restore said coal-tar color to the list of colors which may be certified for unrestricted use in food, drugs and cosmetics but shall operate to authorize the certification of batches of said color conforming to the specifications for the color appearing at 21 C. F. R. 135.3 (1949 ed.) for the purpose of coloring the skin of mature oranges only; provided further, that the Secretary shall be required to certify only sufficient batches of FD&C Red No. 32 as may be necessary to color the skin of mature oranges from time to time; provided further, that the certificates issued for batches of FD&C Red No. 32 may be limited by their certificate for use in coloring mature oranges only; and provided further, that nothing herein or in the judgment of this Court entered pursuant hereto shall be deemed to restrict the Secretary from making further investigations and conducting hearings for a determination of whether the use of Red 32 is required in the production of oranges and to determine the tolerances, if any, that are safe and harmless, as harmless is herein construed and defined.” 246 F. 2d, at 862. 52 Stat. 1049, 21 U. S. C. § 346 (a), which provides: “(a) Any poisonous or deleterious substance added to any food, except where such substance is required in the production thereof or cannot be avoided by good manufacturing practice shall be deemed to be unsafe for purposes of the application of clause (2) of section 402 (a); but when such substance is so required or cannot be so avoided, the Secretary shall promulgate regulations limiting the quantity therein or thereon to such extent as he finds necessary for the protection of public health, and any quantity exceeding the limits so fixed shall also be deemed to be unsafe for purposes of the application of clause (2) of section 402 (a). While such a regulation is in effect limiting the quantity of any such substance in the case of any food, such food shall not, by reason of bearing or containing any added amount of such substance, be considered to be adulterated within the meaning of clause (1) of section 402 (a). In determining the quantity of such added substance to be tolerated in or on different articles of food the Secretary shall take into account the extent to which the use of such substance is required or cannot be avoided in the production of each such article, and the other ways in which the consumer may be affected by the same or other poisonous or deleterious substances.” S. Rep. No. 2391, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 1; H. R. Rep. No. 1982, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2. The 1938 enactment contained a proviso to § 402 (c) . . That this paragraph shall not apply to citrus fruit bearing or containing a coal-tar color if application for listing of such color has been made under this Act and such application has not been acted on by the Secretary, if such color was commonly used prior to the enactment of this Act for the purpose of coloring citrus fruit.” 52 Stat. 1047, 21 U. S. C. §342 (c). Respondents suggest that this proviso somehow suggests a congressional intent to deal with their color more leniently under the present circumstances, but we can draw no such inference. Section 402 (a) (2), with its reference to § 406, see note 7, supra, revised the rule of the Lexington Mill case substantially in its own factual context, that of added poisonous substances in food. Section 402 (a) (2) has been the subject of subsequent revisions itself, the latest one of which is § 3 of the Food Additives Amendment of 1958, Public Law 85-929, September 6, 1958, 72 Stat. 1784. See note 12, infra. Considerably more of the color was regularly produced before the entry of the Secretary’s order than could be accounted for as actually being on the skins of oranges. Neither the Government nor the respondents account for the difference more than speculatively. The Government urges that the difference must have been used in other food products. Respondents emphasize the inevitable waste of quantities of the color during the orange-coloring process. To us this underlines the approach of the provisions in question; where a color is found to be harmless in itself, no further inquiry can be made of it; if it is harmful, none need be. A single dose of 100 milligrams of the color substance (0.0035 oz. avoirdupois, or y3 the weight of a standard aspirin tablet) produced a rapid diarrheic effect in test dogs. One respondent assails the validity, even within the framework of the Secretary’s interpretation of the statute, of the tests performed on the experimental animals. The Court of Appeals found that the evidence justified the Secretary’s finding that the color was poisonous, 246 F. 2d, at 859, and we are in agreement. The Court of Appeals’ judgment had the effect of staying the Secretary’s order in toto as it affected orange coloring until he developed a tolerance. The Secretary argues here that even if he is authorized to establish a tolerance for the use of Red 32 on oranges, his order should stand until he has established it. In the view of the case that we take, we do not reach this contention. The Act of July 9, 1956, c. 530, 70 Stat. 512, added the following proviso to §402 (c) of the Act: “Provided further, That this paragraph shall not apply to oranges meeting minimum maturity standards established by or under the laws of the States in which the oranges were grown and not intended for processing (other than oranges designated by the trade as ‘packing house elimination’), the skins of which have been colored at any time prior to March 1, 1959, with the coal-tar color certified prior to the-enactment of this proviso as F. D. & C. Red 32, or certified after such enactment as External D. & C. Red 14 in accordance with section 21, Code of Federal Regulations, part 9: And provided further, That the preceding proviso shall have no further effect if prior to March 1, 1959, another coal-tar color suitable for coloring oranges is listed under section 406.”
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them. Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer. Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.
Who is the respondent of the case?
[ "attorney general of the United States, or his office", "specified state board or department of education", "city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit", "state commission, board, committee, or authority", "county government or county governmental unit, except school district", "court or judicial district", "state department or agency", "governmental employee or job applicant", "female governmental employee or job applicant", "minority governmental employee or job applicant", "minority female governmental employee or job applicant", "not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable", "retired or former governmental employee", "U.S. House of Representatives", "interstate compact", "judge", "state legislature, house, or committee", "local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough", "governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact", "state or U.S. supreme court", "local school district or board of education", "U.S. Senate", "U.S. senator", "foreign nation or instrumentality", "state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of", "state college or university", "United States", "State", "person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime", "advertising business or agency", "agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor", "airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes", "airline", "distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages", "alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked", "American Medical Association", "National Railroad Passenger Corp.", "amusement establishment, or recreational facility", "arrested person, or pretrial detainee", "attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association", "author, copyright holder", "bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company", "bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization", "establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store", "water transportation, stevedore", "bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines", "brewery, distillery", "broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm", "construction industry", "bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle", "business, corporation", "buyer, purchaser", "cable TV", "car dealer", "person convicted of crime", "tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband", "chemical company", "child, children, including adopted or illegitimate", "religious organization, institution, or person", "private club or facility", "coal company or coal mine operator", "computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software", "consumer, consumer organization", "creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company", "person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial", "defendant", "debtor", "real estate developer", "disabled person or disability benefit claimant", "distributor", "person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector", "drug manufacturer", "druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy", "employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of", "employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan", "electric equipment manufacturer", "electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company", "eleemosynary institution or person", "environmental organization", "employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.", "farmer, farm worker, or farm organization", "father", "female employee or job applicant", "female", "movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of", "fisherman or fishing company", "food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard", "foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity", "franchiser", "franchisee", "lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization", "person who guarantees another's obligations", "handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to", "health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor", "heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be", "hospital, medical center", "husband, or ex-husband", "involuntarily committed mental patient", "Indian, including Indian tribe or nation", "insurance company, or surety", "inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder", "investor", "injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related", "juvenile", "government contractor", "holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor", "magazine", "male", "medical or Medicaid claimant", "medical supply or manufacturing co.", "racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant", "minority female employee or job applicant", "manufacturer", "management, executive officer, or director, of business entity", "military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist", "mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company", "mother", "auto manufacturer", "newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service", "radio and television network, except cable tv", "nonprofit organization or business", "nonresident", "nuclear power plant or facility", "owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels", "shareholders to whom a tender offer is made", "tender offer", "oil company, or natural gas producer", "elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly", "out of state noncriminal defendant", "political action committee", "parent or parents", "parking lot or service", "patient of a health professional", "telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company", "physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society", "public interest organization", "physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee", "pipe line company", "package, luggage, container", "political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official", "indigent, needy, welfare recipient", "indigent defendant", "private person", "prisoner, inmate of penal institution", "professional organization, business, or person", "probationer, or parolee", "protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer", "public utility", "publisher, publishing company", "radio station", "racial or ethnic minority", "person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination", "racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "realtor", "journalist, columnist, member of the news media", "resident", "restaurant, food vendor", "retarded person, or mental incompetent", "retired or former employee", "railroad", "private school, college, or university", "seller or vendor", "shipper, including importer and exporter", "shopping center, mall", "spouse, or former spouse", "stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder", "retail business or outlet", "student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only", "tenant or lessee", "theater, studio", "forest products, lumber, or logging company", "person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent", "trucking company, or motor carrier", "television station", "union member", "unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant", "union, labor organization, or official of", "veteran", "voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)", "wholesale trade", "wife, or ex-wife", "witness, or person under subpoena", "network", "slave", "slave-owner", "bank of the united states", "timber company", "u.s. job applicants or employees", "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "General Land Office of Commissioners", "Transportation Security Administration", "Surface Transportation Board", "U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.", "Reconstruction Finance Corp.", "Department or Secretary of Homeland Security", "Unidentifiable", "International Entity" ]
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WALKER v. CITY OF HUTCHINSON et al. No. 13. Argued October 15-16, 1956. Decided December 10, 1956. Herbert Monte Levy argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was A. Lewis Oswald. Fred C. Littooy argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees. Opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice Black, announced by Mr. Justice Douglas. The appellant Lee Walker owned certain land in the City of Hutchinson, Kansas. In 1954 the City filed an action in the District Court of Reno County, Kansas, to condemn part of his property in order to open, widen, and extend one of the City’s streets. The proceeding was instituted under the authority of Article 2, Chapter 26 of the General Statutes of Kansas, 1949. Pursuant to § 26-201 of that statute the court appointed three commissioners to determine compensation for the property taken and for any other damage suffered. These commissioners were required by § 26-202 to give landowners at least ten days’ notice of the time and place of their proceedings. Such notice could be given either “in writing ... or by one publication in the official city paper . ...” The appellant here was not given notice in writing but publication was made in the official city paper of Hutchinson. The commissioners fixed his damages at $725, and pursuant to statute, this amount was deposited with the city treasurer for the benefit of appellant. Section 26-205 authorized an appeal from the award of the commissioners if taken within 30 days after the filing of their report. Appellant took no appeal within the prescribed period. Some time later, however, he brought the present equitable action in the Kansas District Court. His petition alleged that he had never been notified of the condemnation proceedings and knew nothing about them until after the time for appeal had passed. He charged that the newspaper publication authorized by the statute was not sufficient notice to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process requirements. He asked the court to enjoin the City of Hutchinson and its agents from entering or trespassing on the property “and for such other and further relief as to this Court seem[s] just and equitable.” After a hearing, the Kansas trial court denied relief, holding that the newspaper publication provided for by § 26-202 was sufficient notice of the Commissioners' proceedings to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause. Agreeing with the trial court, the State Supreme Court affirmed. 178 Kan. 263, 284 P. 2d 1073. The case is properly here on appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). The only question we find it necessary to decide is whether, under circumstances of this kind, newspaper publication alone measures up to the quality of notice the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires as a prerequisite to proceedings to fix compensation in condemnation cases. It cannot be disputed that due process requires that an owner whose property is taken for public use must be given a hearing in determining just compensation. The right to a hearing is meaningless without notice. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, we gave thorough consideration to the problem of adequate notice under the Due Process Clause. That case establishes the rule that, if feasible, notice must be reasonably calculated to inform parties of proceedings which may directly and adversely affect their legally protected interests. We there called attention to the impossibility of setting up a rigid formula as to the kind of notice that must be given; notice required will vary with circumstances and conditions. We recognized that in some cases it might not be reasonably possible to give personal notice, for example where people are missing or unknown. Measured by the principles stated in the Mullane case, we think that the notice by publication here falls short of the requirements of due process. It is common knowledge that mere newspaper publication rarely informs a landowner of proceedings against his property. In Mullane we pointed out many of the infirmities of such notice and emphasized the advantage of some kind of personal notice to interested parties. In the present case there seem to be no compelling or even persuasive reasons why such direct notice cannot be given. Appellant’s name was known to the city and was on the official records. Even a letter would have apprised him that his property was about to be taken and that he must appear if he wanted to be heard as to its value. Nothing in our prior decisions requires a holding that newspaper publication under the circumstances here provides adequate notice of a hearing to determine compensation. The State relies primarily on Huling v. Kaw Valley Railway & Improvement Co., 130 U. S. 559. We think that reliance is misplaced. Decided in 1889, that case upheld notice by publication in a condemnation proceeding on the ground that the landowner was a nonresident. Since appellant in this case is a resident of Kansas, we are not called upon to consider the extent to which Mullane may have undermined the reasoning of the Huling decision. There is nothing peculiar about litigation between the Government and its citizens that should deprive those citizens of a right to be heard. Nor is there any reason to suspect that it will interfere with the orderly condemnation of property to preserve effectively the citizen’s rights to a hearing in connection with just compensation. In too many instances notice by publication is no notice at all. It may leave government authorities free to fix one-sidedly the amount that must be paid owners for their property taken for public use. For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Section 26-201 reads in part as follows: “Private property jor city purposes; survey; ordinance fixing benefit district; application to district court; commissioners. Whenever it shall be deemed necessary by any governing body of any city to appropriate private property for the opening, widening, or extending any street or alley, . . . the governing body shall cause a survey and description of the land or easement so required to be made by some competent engineer and file with the city clerk. And thereupon the governing body shall make an order setting forth such condemnation and for what purpose the same is to be used. . . . The governing body, as soon as practicable after making the order declaring the appropriation of such land necessary . . . shall present a written application to the judge of the district court of the county in which said land is situated describing the land sought to be taken and setting forth the land necessary for the use of the city and . . . praying for the appointment of three commissioners to make an appraisement and assessment of the damages therefor.” Section 26-202 read in part as follows: “Notice to property owners or lienholders of record; appraisement and assessment of damages; reports. The commissioners appointed by the judge of the district court shall give any owner and any lien-holder of record of the property sought to be taken at least ten days’ notice in writing of the time and place when and where the damage will be assessed, or by one publication in the official city paper, and at the time fixed by such notice shall, upon actual view, appraise the value of the lands taken and assess the other damages done to the owners of such property, respectively, by such appropriations. For the payment of such value and damages the commissioners shall assess against the city the amount of the benefit to the public generally and the remainder of such damages against the property within the benefit district which shall in the opinion of the appraisers be especially benefited by the proposed improvement. The said commissioners may adjourn as often and for such length of time as may be deemed convenient, and may, during any adjournment, perfect or correct all errors or omissions in the giving of notice by serving new notices or making new publication, citing corporations or individual property owners who have not been notified or to whom defective notice or insufficient notice has been given, and notice of any adjourned meeting shall be as effective as notice of the first meeting of the commissioners. . . Although the relief prayed for was an injunction against the taking, the Supreme Court of Kansas evidently construed the pleadings as adequately raising the question whether notice was sufficient to assure the constitutionality of the compensation procedure; in its opinion it passed only on § 26-202, dealing with the latter problem. Since Kansas requires a showing of actual damage for standing to maintain an equity suit, McKeever v. Buker, 80 Kan. 201, 101 P. 991, and since the Kansas court took the complaint as alleging damage as a result of the compensation rather than the taking procedure, the pleading was evidently treated by the state court as alleging monetary damage resulting from the lack of notice in connection with compensation. We accept this construction of the complaint by the Kansas court as sufficient allegation of damage. See Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U. S. 57, where the adequacy of notice of compensation proceedings was passed on by this Court in an injunction suit like this one. We applied the same rule in Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U. S. 141; see also City of New York v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 344 U. S. 293. Section 26-202 was amended in 1955, after this Court’s decision in Mullane, to require that the city must give notice to property owners by mailing a copy of the newspaper notice to their last known residence, unless such residence could not be located by diligent inquiry. Kan. Gen. Stat., 1949 (Supp. 1955), §26.202. The State also relies on North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U. S. 276, and Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U. S. 57. But the holdings in those cases do not conflict with our holding here. The North Laramie case upheld c. 73, § 2, of the 1913 Laws of Wyoming, which provided for notice by publication in a newspaper and required that a copy of the newspaper must be sent to the landowner by registered mail. This Court’s opinion stated at p. 282 that: “The Supreme Court of Wyoming held that the procedure followed complied with the statutory requirements. By that determination we are bound.” In Bragg v. Weaver, supra, at pp. 61-62, this Court stated that the controlling Virginia statute provided that a landowner must be notified “in writing and shall have thirty days after such notice within which to appeal. ... It is apparent therefore that special care is taken to afford him ample opportunity to appeal and thereby to obtain a full hearing in the circuit court.”
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the manner in which the Court took jurisdiction. The Court uses a variety of means whereby it undertakes to consider cases that it has been petitioned to review. The most important ones are the writ of certiorari, the writ of appeal, and for legacy cases the writ of error, appeal, and certification. For cases that fall into more than one category, identify the manner in which the court takes jurisdiction on the basis of the writ. For example, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), an original jurisdiction and a mandamus case, should be coded as mandamus rather than original jurisdiction due to the nature of the writ. Some legacy cases are "original" motions or requests for the Court to take jurisdiction but were heard or filed in another court. For example, Ex parte Matthew Addy S.S. & Commerce Corp., 256 U.S. 417 (1921) asked the Court to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal judge. Do not code these cases as "original" jurisdiction cases but rather on the basis of the writ.
What is the manner in which the Court took jurisdiction?
[ "cert", "appeal", "bail", "certification", "docketing fee", "rehearing or restored to calendar for reargument", "injunction", "mandamus", "original", "prohibition", "stay", "writ of error", "writ of habeas corpus", "unspecified, other" ]
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FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. MORTON SALT CO. No. 464. Argued March 10, 1948. Decided May 3, 1948. Robert L. Stern argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Sonnett and W. T. Kelley. Lloyd M. McBride argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. The Federal Trade Commission, after a hearing, found that the respondent, which manufactures and sells table salt in interstate commerce, had discriminated in price between different purchasers of like grades and qualities, and concluded that such discriminations were in violation of § 2 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526,15 U. S. C. § 13. It accordingly issued a cease and desist order. 39 F. T. C. 35. Upon petition of the respondent the Circuit Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, set aside the Commission’s findings and order, directed the Commission to dismiss its complaint against respondent, and denied a cross petition of the Commission for enforcement of its order. 162 F. 2d 949. The Court’s judgment rested on its construction of the Act, its holding that crucial findings of the Commission were either not supported by evidence or were contrary to the evidence, and its conclusion that the Commission’s order was too broad. Since questions of importance in the construction and administration of the Act were presented, we granted certiorari. 332 U. S. 850. Disposition of these questions requires only a brief narration of the facts. Respondent manufactures several different brands of table salt and sells them directly to (1) wholesalers or jobbers, who in turn resell to the retail trade, and (2) large retailers, including chain store retailers. Respondent sells its finest brand of table salt, known as Blue Label, on what it terms a standard quantity discount system available to all customers. Under this system the purchasers pay a delivered price and the cost to both wholesale and retail purchasers of this brand differs according to the quantities bought. These prices are as follows, after making allowance for rebates and discounts: Per case Less-than-carload purchases. $1. 60 Carload purchases. 1.50 5,000-case purchases in any consecutive 12 months... 1.40 50,000-case purchases in any consecutive 12 months.. 1.35 Only five companies have ever bought sufficient quantities of respondent’s salt to obtain the $1.35 per case price. These companies could buy in such quantities because they operate large chains of retail stores in various parts of the country. As a result of this low price these five companies have been able to sell Blue Label salt at retail cheaper than wholesale purchasers from respondent could reasonably sell the same brand of salt to independently operated retail stores, many of whom competed with the local outlets of the five chain stores. Respondent’s table salts, other than Blue Label, are also sold under a quantity discount system differing slightly from that used in selling Blue Label. Sales of these other brands in less-than-carload lots are made at list price plus freight from plant to destination. Carload purchasers are granted approximately a 5 per cent discount; approximately a 10 per cent discount is granted to purchasers who buy as much as $50,000 worth of all brands of salt in any consecutive twelve-month period. Respondent’s quantity discounts on Blue Label and on other table salts were enjoyed by certain wholesalers and retailers who competed with other wholesalers and retailers to whom these discounts were refused. In addition to these standard quantity discounts, special allowances were granted certain favored customers who competed with other customers to whom they were denied. First. Respondent’s basic contention, which it argues this case hinges upon, is that its “standard quantity discounts, available to all on equal terms, as contrasted, for example, to hidden or special rebates, allowances, prices or discounts, are not discriminatory within the meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act.” Theoretically, these discounts are equally available to all, but functionally they are not. For as the record indicates (if reference to it on this point were necessary) no single independent retail grocery store', and probably no single wholesaler, bought as many as 50,000 cases or as much as $50,000 worth of table salt in one year. Furthermore, the record shows that, while certain purchasers were enjoying one or more of respondent’s standard quantity discounts, some of their competitors made purchases in such small quantities that they could not qualify for any of respondent’s discounts, even those based on carload shipments. The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act makes it abundantly clear that Congress considered it to be an evil that a large buyer could secure a competitive advantage over a small buyer solely because of the large buyer’s quantity purchasing ability. The Robinson-Patman Act was passed to deprive a large buyer of such advantages except to the extent that a lower price could be justified by reason of a seller’s diminished costs due to quantity manufacture, delivery or sale, or by reason of the seller’s good faith effort to meet a competitor’s equally low price. Section 2 of the original Clayton Act had included a proviso that nothing contained in it should prevent “discrimination in price ... on account of differences in the grade, quality, or quantity of the commodity sold, or that makes only due allowance for difference in the cost of selling or transportation . . . .” That section has been construed as permitting quantity discounts, such as those here, without regard to the amount of the seller’s actual savings in cost attributable to quantity sales or quantity deliveries. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 101 F. 2d 620. The House Committee Report on the Robinson-Patman Act considered that the Clayton Act’s proviso allowing quantity discounts so weakened § 2 “as to render it inadequate, if not almost a nullity.” The Committee considered the present Robinson-Patman amendment to § 2 “of great importance.” Its purpose was to limit “the use of quantity price differentials to the sphere of actual cost differences. Otherwise,” the report continued, “such differentials would become instruments of favor and privilege and weapons of competitive oppression.” The Senate Committee reporting the bill emphasized the same purpose, as did the Congressman in charge of the Conference Report when explaining it to the House just before final passage. And it was in furtherance of this avowed purpose — to protect competition from all price differentials except those based in full on cost savings — that § 2 (a) of the amendment provided “That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered.” The foregoing references, without regard to others which could be mentioned, establish that respondent’s standard quantity discounts are discriminatory within, the meaning of the Act, and are prohibited by it whenever they have the defined effect on competition. See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Staley Co., 324 U. S. 746, 751. Second. The Government interprets the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals as having held that in order to establish “discrimination in price” under the Act the burden rested on the Commission to prove that respondent’s quantity discount differentials were not justified by its cost savings. Respondent does not so understand the Court of Appeals decision, and furthermore admits that no such burden rests on the Commission. We agree that it does not. First, the general rule of statutory construction that the burden of proving justification or exemption under a special exception to the prohibitions of a statute generally rests on one who claims its benefits, requires that respondent undertake this proof under the proviso of § 2 (a). Secondly, § 2 (b) of the Act specifically imposes the burden of showing justification upon one who is shown to have discriminated in prices. And the Senate committee report on the bill explained that the provisos of § 2 (a) throw “upon any who claim the benefit of those exceptions the burden of showing that their case falls within them.” We think that the language of the Act, and the legislative history just cited, show that Congress meant by using the words “discrimination in price” in § 2 that in a case involving competitive injury between a seller’s customers the Commission need only prove that a seller had charged one purchaser a higher price for like goods than he had charged one or more of the purchaser’s competitors. This construction is consistent with the first sentence of § 2 (a) in which it is made unlawful “to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce . . . and where the effect of such discrimination may be ... to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them: . . .” Third. It is argued that the findings fail to show that respondent’s discriminatory discounts had in fact caused injury to competition. There are specific findings that such injuries had resulted from respondent’s discounts, although the statute does not require the Commission to find that injury has actually resulted. The statute requires no more than that the effect of the prohibited price discriminations “may be substantially to lessen competition ... or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition.” After a careful consideration of this provision of the Robinson-Patman Act, we have said that “the statute does not require that the discriminations must in fact have harmed competition, but only that there is a reasonable possibility that they ‘may’ have such an effect.” Corn Products Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 324 U. S. 726, 742. Here the Commission found what would appear to be obvious, that the competitive opportunities of certain merchants were injured when they had to pay respondent substantially more for their goods than their competitors had to pay. The findings are adequate. Fourth. It is urged that the evidence is inadequate to support the Commission’s findings of injury to competition. As we have pointed out, however, the Commission is authorized by the Act to bar discriminatory prices upon the “reasonable possibility” that different prices for like goods to competing purchasers may have the defined effect on competition. That respondent’s quantity discounts did result in price differentials between competing purchasers sufficient in amount to influence their resale prices of salt was shown by evidence. This showing in itself is adequate to support the Commission’s appropriate findings that the effect of such price discrim-inations “may be substantially to lessen competition . . . and to injure, destroy, and prevent competition.” The adequacy of the evidence to support the Commission’s findings of reasonably possible injury to competition from respondent’s price differentials between competing carload and less-than-carload purchasers is singled out for special attacks here. It is suggested that in considering the adequacy of the evidence to show injury to competition respondent’s carload discounts and its other quantity discounts should not be treated alike. The argument is that there is an obvious saving to a seller who delivers goods in carload lots. Assuming this to be true, that fact would not tend to disprove injury to the merchant compelled to pay the less-than-carload price. For a ten-cent carload price differential against a merchant would injure him competitively just as much as a ten-cent differential under any other name. However relevant the separate carload argument might be to the question of justifying a differential by cost savings, it has no relevancy in determining whether the differential works an injury to a competitor. Since Congress has not seen fit to give carload discounts any favored classification we cannot do so. Such discounts, like all others, can be justified by a seller who proves that the full amount of the discount is based on his actual savings in cost. The trouble with this phase of respondent’s case is that it has thus far failed to make such proof. It is also argued that respondent’s less-than-carload sales are very small in comparison with the total volume of its business and for that reason we should reject the Commission’s finding that the effect of the carload discrimination may substantially lessen competition and may injure competition between purchasers who are granted and those who are denied this discriminatory discount. To support this argument, reference is made to the fact that salt is a small item in most wholesale and retail businesses and in consumers’ budgets. For several reasons we cannot accept this contention. There are many articles in a grocery store that, considered separately, are comparatively small parts of a merchant’s stock. Congress intended to protect a merchant from competitive injury attributable to discriminatory prices on any or all goods sold in interstate commerce, whether the particular goods constituted a major or minor portion of his stock. Since a grocery store consists of many comparatively small articles, there is no possible way effectively to protect a grocer from discriminatory prices except by applying the prohibitions of the Act to each individual article in the store. Furthermore, in enacting the Robinson-Patman Act, Congress was especially concerned with protecting small businesses which were unable to buy in quantities, such as the merchants here who purchased in less-than-carload lots. To this end it undertook to strengthen this very phase of the old Clayton Act. The committee reports on the Robinson-Patman Act emphasized a belief that § 2 of the Clayton Act had “been too restrictive, in requiring a showing of general injury to competitive conditions . . . .” The new provision, here controlling, was intended to justify a finding of injury to competition by a showing of “injury to the competitor victimized by the discrimination.” Since there was evidence sufficient to show that the less-than-carload purchasers might have been handicapped in competing with the more favored carload purchasers by the differential in price established by respondent, the Commission was justified in finding that competition might have thereby been substantially lessened or have been injured within the meaning of the Act. Apprehension is expressed in this Court that enforcement of the Commission’s order against respondent’s continued violations of the Robinson-Patman Act might lead respondent to raise table salt prices to its carload purchasers. Such a conceivable, though, we think, highly improbable, contingency, could afford us no reason for upsetting the Commission’s findings and declining to direct compliance with a statute passed by Congress. The Commission here went much further in receiving evidence than the statute requires. It heard testimony from many witnesses in various parts of the country to show that they had suffered actual financial losses on account of respondent’s discriminatory prices. Experts were offered to prove the tendency of injury from such prices. The evidence covers about two thousand pages, largely devoted to this single issue — injury to competition. It would greatly handicap effective enforcement of the Act to require testimony to show that which we believe to be self-evident, namely, that there is a “reasonable possibility” that competition may be adversely affected by a practice under which manufacturers and producers sell their goods to some customers substantially cheaper than they sell like goods to the competitors of these customers. This showing in itself is sufficient to justify our conclusion that the Commission’s findings of injury to competition were adequately supported by evidence. Fifth. The Circuit Court of Appeals held, and respondent here contends, that the order was too sweeping, that it required the respondent to “conduct its business generally at its peril,” and that the Commission had exceeded its jurisdiction in entering such an order. Reliance for this contention chiefly rests on Labor Board v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U. S. 426. That case held that the Labor Board could not broadly enjoin violations of all the provisions of the statute merely because a single violation of one of the Act’s many provisions had been found. Id. at 435-436. But it also pointed out that the Labor Board, “Having found the acts which constitute the unfair labor practice ... is free to restrain the practice and other like or related unlawful acts.” It there pointed out that this Court had applied a similar rule to a Federal Trade Commission order in Federal Trade Comm’n v. Beech-Nut Co., 257 U. S. 441, 455. In the latter case the Court not only approved restraint of the unlawful price-fixing practices found, but “any other equivalent cooperative means of accomplishing the maintenance of prices fixed by the company.” See also May Dep’t Stores Co. v. Labor Board, 326 U. S. 376, 392-393. We think the Commission’s order here, save for the provisos in (a) and (b) later considered, is specifically aimed at the pricing practices found unlawful, and therefore does not run counter to the holding in the Express Publishing Co. case. Certainly the order in its relation to the circumstances of this case is only designed “to prevent violations, the threat of which in the future is indicated because of their similarity or relation to those unlawful acts which the Board [Commission] has found to have been committed by the . . . [respondent] in the past.” Labor Board v. Express Publishing Co., supra, 436-437. The specific restraints of paragraphs (a) and (b) of the order are identical, except that one applies to prices respondent charges wholesalers and the other to prices charged retailers. It is seen that the first part of these paragraphs, preceding the provisos, would absolutely bar respondent from selling its table salt, regardless of quantities, to some wholesalers and retailers at prices different from that which it charged competing wholesalers and retailers for the same grade of salt. The Commission had found that respondent had been continuously engaged in such discriminations through the use of discounts, rebates and allowances. It had further found that respondent had failed to show justification for these differences by reason of a corresponding difference in its costs. Thus the restraints imposed by the Commission upon respondent are concerned with the precise unlawful practices in which it was found to have engaged for a number of years. True, the Commission did not merely prohibit future discounts, rebates, and allowances in the exact mathematical percentages previously utilized by respondent. Had the order done no more than that, respondent could have continued substantially the same unlawful practices despite the order by simply altering the discount percentages and the quantities of salt to which the percentages applied. Paragraphs (a) and (b) up to the language of the provisos are approved. The provisos in (a) and (b) present a more difficult problem. They read: “provided, however, that this shall not prevent price differences of less than five cents per case which do not tend to lessen, injure, or destroy competition among such wholesalers [retailers].” The first clause of the provisos, but for the second qualifying clause, would unequivocally permit respondent to maintain price differentials of less than five cents as between competing wholesalers and as between competing retailers. This clause would appear to benefit respondent, and no challenge to it, standing alone, is here raised. ■ But respondent seriously objects to the second clause of the proviso which qualifies the permissive less-than-five-cent differentials provided in the first clause. That qualification permits such differentials only if they do “not tend to lessen, injure, or destroy competition.” Respondent points out that where a differential tends in no way to injure competition, the Act permits it. “The Commission,” so respondent urges, “must either find and rule that a given differential injures competition, and then prohibit it, or it must leave that differential entirely alone.” Whether, and under what circumstances, if any, the Commission might prohibit differentials which do not of themselves tend to injure competition, we need not decide, for the Commission has not in either (a) or (b) taken action which forbids such noninjurious differentials. But other objections raised to the qualifying clauses require consideration. One of the reasons for entrusting enforcement of this Act primarily to the Commission, a body of experts, was to authorize it to hear evidence as to given differential practices and to make findings concerning possible injury to competition. Such findings are to form the basis for cease and desist orders definitely restraining the particular discriminatory practices which may tend to injure competition without justification. The effective administration of the Act, insofar as the Act entrusts administration to the Commission, would be greatly impaired if, without compelling reasons not here present, the Commission’s cease and desist orders did no more than shift to the courts in subsequent contempt proceedings for their violation the very fact questions of injury to competition, etc., which the Act requires the Commission to determine as the basis for its order. The enforcement responsibility of the courts, once a Commission order has become final either by lapse of time or by court approval, 15 U. S. C. §§ 21, 45, is to adjudicate questions concerning the order’s violation, not questions of fact which support that valid order. Whether on this record the Commission was compelled to exempt certain differentials of less than five cents we do not decide. But once the Commission exempted the differentials in question from its order, we are constrained to hold that as to those differentials it could not then shift to the courts a responsibility in enforcement proceedings of trying issues of possible injury to competition, issues which Congress has primarily entrusted to the Commission. This leaves for consideration the objection to paragraph (c) of the order which reads: “By selling such products to any retailer at prices lower than prices charged wholesalers whose customers compete with such retailer.” The only criticism here urged to (c) is that it bars respondent from selling to a retailer at a price lower than that charged a wholesaler whose customers compete with the retailer. Section 2 (a) of the Act specifically authorizes the Commission to bar discriminatory prices which tend to lessen or injure competition with “any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them.” This provision plainly supports paragraph (c) of the order. We sustain the Commission’s order with the exception of the provisos in paragraphs (a) and (b) previously set out. Since the qualifying clauses constitute an important limitation to the provisos, we think the Commission should have an opportunity to reconsider the entire provisos in light of our rejection of the qualifying clauses, and to refashion these provisos as may be deemed necessary. This the Commission may do upon the present evidence and findings or it may hear other evidence and make other findings on this phase of the case, should it conclude to do so. See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U. S. 212, 218. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed and the proceedings are remanded to that court to be disposed of in conformity with this opinion. Reversed. Section 2 (a) provides in part: “It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them . . . .” The original findings and order were modified by the Commission on its own motion. The controversy here deals only with the findings and order as modified. Respondent also produces and sells other kinds of salt, but the trade practices here involved only relate to table salt. These chain stores are American Stores Company, National Tea Company, Kroger Grocery Co., Safeway Stores, Inc., and Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company. One such customer, a wholesaler, received a special discount of 7% cents per case on purchases of carload lots of Blue Label Salt. Respondent sold to this wholesaler at $1.42% per case, although competing wholesalers were required to pay $1.50 per case on carload lots. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that findings of the Commission on these special allowances were supported by substantial evidence, that they were not maintained to meet lower prices of respondent’s competitors, and that the allowances were discriminatory. It nevertheless set the findings aside on the ground that the Commission’s finding of injury to competition from the discriminations engaged in by respondent was too general and had little evidence to support it. We think the finding and supporting evidence of injury to competition on account of these special allowances are similar to the finding and evidence with reference to the quantity discount system and need not be separately treated. H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7. Id. at 9. Sen. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6. 80 Cong. Rec. 9417. See 42 III. L. Rev. 556-561; 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 384-391, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 1167-1169. Javierre v. Central Altagracia, 217 U. S. 502, 507-508 and cases cited. Sen. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3. See also 80 Cong. Rec. 3599,8241,9418. See Moss, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 148 F. 2d 378, 379, holding that proof of a price differential in itself constituted “discrimination in price,” where the competitive injury in question was between sellers. See also Federal Trade Comm’n v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 721-726. This language is to be read also in the light of the following statement in the same case, discussing the meaning of § 2 (a), as contained in the Robinson-Patman Act, in relation to § 3 of the Clayton Act: "It is to be observed that § 2 (a) does not require a finding that the discriminations in price have in fact had an adverse effect on competition. The statute is designed to reach such discriminations ‘in their incipiency/ before the harm to competition is effected. It is enough that they ‘may’ have the prescribed effect. Cf. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U. S. 346, 356-357. But as was held in the Standard Fashion case, supra, with respect to the like provisions of § 3 of the Clayton Act, prohibiting tying clause agreements, the effect of which 'may be to substantially lessen competition/ the use of the word ‘may’ was not to prohibit discrimina-tions having ‘the mere possibility’ of those consequences, but to reach those which would probably have the defined effect on competition.” 324 U. S. at 738; see also United States v. Lexington Mill Co., 232 U.S. 399, 411. The Committee Reports and Congressional debate on this provision of the Robinson-Patman Act indicate that it was intended to have a broader scope than the corresponding provision of the old Clayton Act. See note 18 infra. After discussing all of respondent’s discriminations, the Commission stated: “The Commission finds that the effect of the dis-criminations in price, including discounts, rebates, and allowances, generally and specifically described herein may be substantially to lessen competition in the line of commerce in which the purchaser receiving the benefit of said discriminatory price is engaged and to injure, destroy, and prevent competition between those purchasers receiving the benefit of said discriminatory prices, discounts, rebates, and allowances and those to whom they are denied.” The statute outlaws any discrimination the effect of which “may be substantially to lessen competition ... or to injure . . . competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them: . . .” Respondent introduced testimony and exhibits intended to show that only one-tenth of one per cent of its sales were made at less-than-carload prices. It appears that this figure relates only to a single one-year period and was obtained by lumping together statistics on respondent's sales of table salt along with those on sales of its other products, such as salt tablets, coarse rock salt, and sal soda. Since this proceeding is concerned only with discounts on table salts, these figures are of dubious value. Furthermore, they are limited to sales in respondent’s Chicago area, whereas respondent carried on a nation-wide business. In explaining this clause of the proposed Robinson-Patman Act, the Senate Judiciary Committee said: “This clause represents a recommended addition to the bill as referred to your committee. It tends to exclude from the bill otherwise harmless violations of its letter, but accomplishes a substantial broadening of a similar clause now contained in section 2 of the Clayton Act. The latter has in practice been too restrictive, in requiring a showing of general injury to competitive conditions in the line of commerce concerned; whereas the more immediately important concern is in injury to the competitor victimized by the discrimination. Only through such injuries, in fact, can the larger general injury result, and to catch the weed in the seed will keep it from coming to flower.” S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4. See also H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8; 80 Cong. Rec. 9417. The prohibiting paragraphs of the order were: “ (a) By selling such products to some wholesalers thereof at prices different from the prices charged other wholesalers who in fact compete in the sale and distribution of such products; provided, however, that this shall not prevent price differences of less than five cents per case which do not tend to lessen, injure, or destroy competition among such wholesalers. “(b) By selling such products to some retailers thereof at prices different from the prices charged other retailers who in fact compete in the sale and distribution of such products; provided, however, that this shall not prevent price differences of less than five cents per case which do not tend to lessen, injure, or destroy competition among such retailers. “(c) By selling such products to any retailer at prices lower than prices charged wholesalers whose customers compete with such retailer. “For the purposes of comparison, the term ‘puce’ as used in this order takes into account discounts, rebates, allowances, and other terms and conditions of sale.” The only finding of the Commission specifically relating to five-cent differentials was: “Salt is a staple commodity with a medium turnover and is generally sold by wholesalers to their retail customers on a lower margin of profit than that received on other commodities. Consequently, the price at which the wholesaler offers his table salt is usually controlling, and a difference of five cents per case may result in the loss of a sale to a customer, not only of the salt involved but of other commodities as well, the order for which might be placed with the salt purchase.”
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
What is the issue area of the decision?
[ "Criminal Procedure", "Civil Rights", "First Amendment", "Due Process", "Privacy", "Attorneys", "Unions", "Economic Activity", "Judicial Power", "Federalism", "Interstate Relations", "Federal Taxation", "Miscellaneous", "Private Action" ]
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ABBATE et al. v. UNITED STATES. No. 7. Argued October 22, 1958. Decided March 30, 1959. Charles A. Bellows argued the cause, and filed a brief for petitioners. Leonard B. Sand argued the cause for the United States. With him on. the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Anderson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Carl H. Imlay. ’ Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the- opinion of the Court. During a strike against the Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, the petitioners and one McLeod were solicited in Chicago, Illinois, by a union official, Shelby, to dynamite facilities of the telephone company located in the States of Mississippi, Tennessee, and Louisiana. The four men met in Chicago where Shelby gave the petitioners and McLeod the plans of the facilities to be dynamited and instructed them as to the method to be used. After Shelby left Chicago the petitioners told McLeod that they would not go through with the plan. McLeod, however, obtained dynamite and went to Mississippi to destroy telephone company facilities located there. The petitioners thereupon disclosed the plot to the telephone company and the Chicago police. The petitioners, with Shelby and McLeod, were subsequently indicted by the State of Illinois for violating an Illinois statute making it a crime to conspire to injure or destroy the property of another. The indictment describes the property as “communication facilities belonging to the Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company” and “belonging to the American Telephone and Telegraph Company.” The petitioners entered pleas of guilty to the indictment and were each sentenced to three months’ imprisonment. Thereafter indictments^ were returned in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against the petitioners and Shelby, and also against one Perry who pointed out to McLeod the property to be dynamited. This indictment does not refer to the facilities as belonging tq the telephone companies, but charges the offense of violating 18 U. S. C. § 371 by conspiring to destroy, contrary to 18 U. S. C. § 1362, “certain works, property and material known ás coaxial repeater stations and micro-wave towers . . . located in the States of Mississippi, Tennessee and Louisiana . . . which were essential and'integral parts of systems and means of communication operated and controlled by the United States.” McLeod confessed to his part in the conspiracy and testified on the federal trial to petitioners’ acts of participation, in the conspiracy. These same acts were the basis of the Illinois convictions. The Government also introduced proof that the Strategic Air Command, the Civil Aeronautics Administration, the Navy and other federal agencies have the exclusive use of some of the circuits within the coaxial cables carried by the repeater stations and micro-wave towers that were to be destroyed.. The federal jury found the four defendants guilty as charged. On appeal the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the convictions of Shelby and Perry for error in the admission of evidence, but affirmed the convictions of the petitioners^ 247 F. 2d 410. We granted certiorari limited to consideration of the claim that the federal prosecutions, based on the same acts as were the prior state convictions, placed petitioners twice in jeopardy contrary to the Fifth Amendment, 355 U. S. 902. In Bartkus v. Illinois, ante, p. 121, also decided today, the order of the prosecutions was the reverse of the order in this case. Here the federal prosecution came after the Illinois convictions. Thus this case squarely raises the question whether a federal prosecution of defendants already prosecuted for the same acts by a State subjects those defendants “for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb” in violation of the Fifth Amendment. We do not write on a clean slate in deciding this question'. As early as 1820 in Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, it was recognized that this issue would arise from the concurrent application of state and federal laws. During the following three decades a number of state courts reached differing conclusions as to whether a state prosecution would bar a subsequent federal prosecution of the same person for the same acts. Against this background this Court thoroughly considered the question in-three cases between 1847 and. 1852. In Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410, the petitioner had been convicted of passing a counterfeit coin of the United States within the State of Ohio in violation of á state statute. She contended that the Fifth Amendment prohibited successive state and federal prosecutions for the same acts, and therefore that a prosecution under the Ohio statute would prevent federal authorities from prosecuting the same act under the federal counterfeiting laws. Thus, the argument continued, the Court should declare the Ohio statute unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause in order to preserve the effectiveness of federal law enforcement. Houston v. Moore and some of the leading state authorities bearing on whether the Fifth Amendment applied to successive state and federal prosecutions were argued to the Court. All members of the Court agreed that the Fifth Amendment would not prohibit a federal prosecution even though based on the same act of passing the counterfeit-coin that resulted in the state prosecution. There was a division, however, as to what disposition of the case was required by this conclusion. The majority reasoned that since the Ohio prosecution would not render the Federal Government powerless to enforce its counterfeit laws there was no basis for declaring the Ohio statute unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. Mr. Justice McLean, dissenting, thought that since “the punishment under the State law would be no bar to a prosecution under the law of Congress,” 5 How., at 439, this undesirable result should be avoided by declaring the state statute unconstitutional, for, he said, “Nothing can be more repugnant . . . than two punishments for the same act,” id., at 440. Three years later, in United States v. Marigold, 9 How. 560, a unanimous Court affirmed a conviction under the federal counterfeiting statute that was discussed in Fox. The Court, in holding that a state and a federal statute could both apply to the same conduct, accepted the conclusion of Fox that “the same act might ... constitute an offence against both the State and Federal governments, and might draw to its commission the penalties denounced by either . . . .” 9 How., at 569. The third case, Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13, gave clear expression to the emerging principle that the Fifth Amendment did not apply to a federal prosecution subsequent to a state prosecution of the same person for the same acts. That case involved a conviction of Moore under an Illinois statute for harboring an escaped slave. A federal, statute outláwed the same act as an interference with the rights of the owner of the slave. Moore urged that the Illinois statute was void “as it subjects the delinquent to a double punishment for a single offence,” 14 How., at 19. 'Tire Court rejected this argument, saying: “Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either. The same act may be an offence or transgression of the laws of- both. . . . That either or both may (if they see fit) punish such an offendér, cannot be doubted. Yet it cannot be truly averred that , the offender has been twice punished for the same offence; but only that by one act he has committed two offences, for each of which he is justly punishable. He could not plead the punishment by one in bar to a conviction-by the other; consequently, this court has decided, in the case of Fox v. The State of Ohio, . . . that, a State may punish the offence of uttering or passing false coin, as a cheat or fraud practised on its citizens; and, in the case of the United States v. Marigold, . . .- that Congress, in the proper exercise of its authority, may punish the same act as an offence against the United States.” 14 How., at 20. Justice McLean again dissented on the ground of his dissent in Fox, namely, that the state law should be declared invalid for the very reason that “the conviction and punishment undér the State law would be no bar to a prosecution under the law of Congress.” Id., at 21. The reasoning of the Court in these three cases was subsequently accepted by this Court, in dictum, in the following cases: United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 550; Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U. S. 509, 518; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 389; United States v. Arjona, 120 U. S. 479, 487; Cross v. North Carolina, 132 U. S. 131, 139; In re Loney, 134 U. S. 372, 375; Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197, 209; Crossley v. California, 168 U. S. 640, 641; Sexton v. California, 189 U. S. 319, 322-323; Matter of Heff, 197 U. S. 488, 507; Grafton v. United States, 206 U. S. 333, 353-354; Southern R. Co. v. Railroad Comm’n of Indiana, 236 U. S. 439, 445; and McKelvey v. United States, 260 U. S. 353, 358-359. Typical of the statements adopting the principle is that of Chief Justice Taney, on circuit, in United States v. Amy, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14,445 (C. C. D. Va. 1859), at p. 811, that “from the nature of our government, the same act may be an offence against the laws of the United States and also of a state, and be punishable in both.” Culminating this development was United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, where the issue was directly presented to this Court. Lanza was convicted by the State of. Washington for “manufacturing, transporting, and having in possession” a quantity of liquor in violation of a state statute. He was subsequently- convicted in a Federal District Court of violating the Volstead Act, 41 Stat. 305, for performing the same acts with regard to the same liquor. The Court held that, the prior state conviction did not bar the federal prosecution. It pointed out that the State could constitutionally make Lanza’s acts criminal under its original powers reserved by the Tenth Amendment, and’the Federal Government could constitutionally prohibit the acts under the Eighteenth Amendment. Thus this case presented the situation hypothesized in Fox v. Ohio and other early cases; two sovereigns had, within their constitutional authority, prohibited the same acts, and each was punishing a breach of its prohibition. A unanimous Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Taft, held: “We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources, capable of dealing with the same subject-matter within the same territory. . . . Each- government in determining what shall be an offense against its peace and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other. “It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be punished by each. The Fifth Amendment, like all the other guaranties in the first eight amendments, applies only to proceedings by the Federal Government, . . . and- the double jeopardy therein forbidden is a second prosecution under authority of the Federal Government after a first trial for the same offense under the same authority.” 260 U. S., at 382. The Lanza principle has been accepted without question in. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, also a Volstead Act case, and in the following cases in this Court arising under other statutes: Westfall v. United States, 274 U. S. 256, 258; Puerto Rico v. The Shell Co., 302 U. S. 253, 264-266; Jerome v. United States, 318 U. S. 101, 105; Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 108, And see California v. Zook, 336 U. S. 725, 752-753, 758 (dissenting opinion). Similarly, Lanza has been considered in many cases in the Courts of Appeals to have established the general principle that a federal prosecution is not barred by a prior state prosecution, of the same person for the same acts. Petitioner asks us to overrule Lanza. We decline to do so. No consideration or persuasive reason not presented to the Court in the prior cases is advanced why we should depart from its firmly established principle. On the contrary, undesirable consequences would, follow if Lanza were overruled. The basic dilemma was recog.nized over a century ago in Fox v. Ohio. As was there pointed out, if the States are free to prosecute criminal acts violating their laws, and the resultant state prosecutions bar federal prosecutions based on the same acts, federal law enforcement must necessarily be hindered. For example, the petitioners in this case insist that their Illinois convictions resulting in three months’ prison sentences should bar this federal prosecution which could result in a sentence of up to five years. Such a disparity will very often arise when, as in this case, the defendants’ acts impinge more seriously on a federal interest than on a state interest. But no one would suggest that, in order to maintain the effectiveness of federal law enforcement; it is desirable completely to displace state power to prosecute crimes based on acts which might also violate federal law. This would bring about a marked change in the distribution of powers to administer criminal justice, for the States under our federal system have the principal responsibility for defining and prosecuting crimes. See Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 109; Jerome v. United States, 318 U. S. 101, 104-105. Thus, unless the federal authorities could somehow insure that there would be no state prosecutions for particular acts that also constitute federal offenses, the efficiency of federal law enforcement must suffer if the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents successive state and federal prosecutions. Needless to say, it would be highly impractical for the federal authorities to attempt to keep informed of all state prosecutions which might bear on federal offenses. The conclusion is therefore compelled that the prior Illinois conviction of the petitioners did not bar the instant federal prosecution. Affirmed. By Mr. Justice Brennan. The Government, in its brief and on oral argument in this case, urged that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed on an alternative ground to that upon which the Court rests the decision. The Government argued that it was unnecessary, to delimit the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to successive state and federal prosecutions of the same acts beyond holding that the clause does not apply when those prosecutions, as in this case, aré under statutes which require different evidence for a conviction and which protect different interests. The contention is that in this case additional evidence is necessary to convict under the federal statute, namely,, proof that federal property was knowingly to be destroyed, and that the two statutes are designed to protect different interests, the state statute to protect “the sanctity of privately-owned property” and the federal statute to prevent injury to “means of communication, operated or controlled by the United States.” The gist of the argument is that two prosecutions are not “for the sanie offense” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment when they are based upon the violation of two statutes designed to vindicate different governmental interests and requiring different evidence to. support convictions. Although the Court considered that it was unnecessary to discuss this suggested ground for decision, I consider its implications to be so disturbing as to require comment. I cannot escape the fact that this reasoning would apply equally if each of two successive federal prosecutions based on the same acts was brought under a different federal statute, and each statute was designed to protect a different federal interest. Indeed, the Government supports its argument by citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299; Gore v. United States, 357 U. S. 386; and Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U. S. 640, cases which involved only federal prosecutions, and Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U. S. 464, which involved successive prosecutions by the same State. The argument then obviously is that the mere fact that there are two statutes which vindicate different interests and require different-evidence of itself means that the' Fifth Amendment does not prohibit successive prosecutions of the same acts under the respective statutes. However, whatever the case under the Fourteenth Amendment as to successive state prosecutions, Hoag v. New Jersey, supra, or under the Fifth Amendment as to consecutive federal sentences imposed upon one trial, e. g., Gore v. United States, supra, I think it clear that successive federal prosecutions of the same person based on the same acts are prohibited by the Fifth Amendment even though bróught under federal statutes requiring different evidence and protecting different federal interests. It is true that this Court has said: “where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299, 304. But, so far as appears, neither this “same evidence” test nor a “separate interests” test has been sanctioned by this Court under the Fifth Amendment except in cases in which consecutive sentences were imposed on conviction of several offenses at one, trial. The accused, although punished separately and cumulatively for various aspects, of a single transaction, is subject to only one prosecution and one trial. If the Government attempted multiple prosecutions of the same offenses, an entirely different constitutional issue would be presented, cf. Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U. S., at 467. The basis of the Fifth Amendment protection against double' jeopardy is that a person shall not be harassed by successive trials; that an accused shall not have to marshal the resources and energies necessary for his defense more than once for the same alleged criminal acts. “The underlying idea ... is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to .live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity . . . .” Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 187. In short, “The prohibition is not against being twice punished, but against being twice put in jeopardy. . . United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662, 669. Obviously separate prosecutions of the same criminal conduct can be far more effectively used by a prosecutor to harass an accused than can the imposition of consecutive sentences for various aspects of that conduct. It is always within the discretion of the trial judge whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences, whereas, unless the Fifth Amendment applies, it would be solely within the prosecutor’s discretion to bring successive prosecutions based on the same acts, thereby requiring the accused to defend himself more than once. Furthermore, separate prosecutions, unlike multiple punishments based on one trial, raise the possibility of an accused acquitted by one jury being subsequently convicted by another for essentially the same conduct. See Hoag v. New Jersey, supra; cf. Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U. S. 571. Thus to permit the Government statutorily to multiply the number of-offenses resulting from the same acts, and to allow successive prosecutions of the several offenses, rather than merely the. imposition of consecutive sentences after one trial 'óf those offenses, would enable, the Government to “wear the accused out bv a multitude of cases with accumulated trials.” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 328. Repetitive harassment in such a manner goes to the heart of the Fifth Amendment protection. This protection cannot be thwarted either by the “same evidence” test or because tne conduct offends different federal statutes protecting different federal interests. The prime consideration is the protection of the accused from the harassment of successive prosecutions, and not the justification for or policy behind the statutes violated by the accused. If the same acts .violate different federal statutes protecting separate federal interests those interests-can be adequately protected at a single trial by the imposition of separate sentences for each statute violated. See, e. g., Bell v. United States, 349 U. S. 81, 82-83; Gore v. United States, 357 U. S. 386. The holding of the Court in In re Nielsen, 131 U. S. 176, establishes the governing principle. The defendant in that case, a Mormon with more than one wife, had been convicted of violating a congressional statute, applicable to the territory of Utah, which prohibited males from cohabiting with more than one woman. Subsequently he was prosecuted and convicted, of adultery in violation of another congressional statute, the second prosecution being based, on the same acts as the prior conviction. Despite the fact that it wag necessary to prove a fact in the second prosecution not necessary for the first conviction, i. e., that the defendant was married to another woman, and that a different federal interest was protected by each statute, the Court held that the second prosecution unconstitutionally put the defendant twice in jeopardy for the same offense. In short, though the Court in Gore has found no violence to the guarantee against double jeopardy when the sáme acts are made to do service for several convictions at one trial, I think not mere violence to, but virtual extinction of, the guarantee results if the Federal Government may try people over and over again for the same criminal conduct just because each trial is based on a different federal statute protecting a separate federal interest. 38 Smith-Hurd Ill. Stat. Ann. (1957 Supp.) §139 provides in pertinent part: “If any two or more persons conspire or agree together . . . with the fraudulent or malicious intent wrongfully and wickedly to injure the . . . property of another . . . they shall be deemed guilty of a conspiracy . . . The statute applies to conspiracies within Illinois to destroy property outside the State. See People v. Buckminster, 282 Il. 177, 118 N. E. 497. 18 U. S. C. §371 provides in pertinent part: “If two or more persons conspire ... to commit any offense against the United States ■. . . and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object Of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” The relevant part of 18 U. S. C. § 1362 is as follows: “Whoever willfully or maliciously, injures or destroys any. of the . . . property ... of' any . . . telephone, of cable; line, station, or system, or other means of communication, operated or controlled by the United States . . . .” is guilty of a crime. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: “nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . The circumstances of this case do not require us to consider the suggestion in the Government’s brief that “no state prosecution can preclude the federál government from enforcing federal law.” For example, there is nothing in this record to indicate any federal participation in the Illinois prosecution, Justice Johnson, in another case at the same Term, recognized the related problem of the scope to be given the plea of autrefois acquit when based on an acquittal by the courts of another country. United States v. Furlong, 5 Wheat. 184, 197. Compare, e. g., Mattison v. State, 3 Mo. *421, and Hendrick v. Commonwealth, 5 Leigh (Va.) 707, with e. g., State v. Randall, 2 Aikens (Vt.) 89, and Harlan v. People, 1 Douglass Rep. (Mich.) 207. See, e. g., Rios v. United States, 256 F. 2d 173 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1958); Smith v. United States, 243 F. 2d 877 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1957); Jolley v. United States, 232 F. 2d 83 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1956); United States v. Levine, 129 F. 2d 745 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1942). “It cannot be suggested that in cases where the. author is the mere instrument of die Court he must forego expression of his own convictions.” Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562, 576 (separate opinion). See also Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619, 639-640. Gavieres v. United States, 220 U. S. 338, upheld a prosecution for insulting a public officer despite a prior prosecution for indecent .behavior in public based on essentially the same acts. However, that decision was an interpretation of a congressional statute against double jeopardy applicable to the Philippine Islands, a territory “with long-established legal procedures that were alien to the common law.” Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 197. It has not been considered ah authoritative interpretation of the constitutional provision. Green v. United States, supra; see Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U. S. 464, 478, n. 3 (dissenting opinion). Flemister v. United States, 207 U. S. 372, decided under the same statute, involved two prosecutions of two different assaults on two police officers at two different times, although in “one continuing attempt to defy the law.” Burton v. United States, 202 U. S. 344, Was decided on a demurrer, the Court holding that the pleadings did not necessarily show that a count in a second indictment alleging the receipt of a bribe from a corporation charged the same offense as a count in a prior indictment, alleging the receipt ef a bribe from a named person who was an officer of the corporation. In United States v. Adams, 281 U. S. 202, the defendant had attempted to. conceal an embezzlement by making false entries in bank books and, at a later date, by falsifying a report. A federal statute prohibited both such falsifications. Although both falsifications were attempts to conceal the same embezzlement, the statute outlawed the falsifications themselves, and thus the Court held that since’they were made at different' times and in different circumstances each could be prosecuted separately. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies in the same manner to a prosecution following a prior conviction as it does to a prosecution following a prior acquittal. See Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 169, 172; United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662, 669. This is consistent with the fact that, although autrefois acquit and autrefois convict were separate pleas in bar in the English law, they have historically been given the same scope. See 4 Blackstone Commentaries *335-336; 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown (8th ed. 1824), pp. 515-529. The doctrine of collateral estoppel may not provide adequate protection. Of course, it will be of no help to an accused who has been previously convicted. But even if he has previously been acquitted, the doctrine may be of little help because in many cases it cannot be ascertained whether the controlling factual issues in the second prosecution were necessarily resolved in the prior trial. See Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U. S. 464, 471-472; United States v. Dockery, 49 F. Supp. 907; United States v. Holbrook, 36 F. Supp. 345. Furthermore, the protection of an essentially procedural concept such as collateral estoppel, see Hoag v. New Jersey, supra, at 471, is less substantial than the constitutional protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause. • For example, a second trial that placed the accused in double jeopardy could be collaterally attacked, whereas query whether the failure to apply collateral estoppel could be challenged by a post-conviction motion for relief. See Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 178-179.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the treatment the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed, that is, whether the court below the Supreme Court (typically a federal court of appeals or a state supreme court) affirmed, reversed, remanded, denied or dismissed the decision of the court it reviewed (typically a trial court). Adhere to the language used in the "holding" in the summary of the case on the title page or prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. Exceptions to the literal language are the following: where the Court overrules the lower court, treat this a petition or motion granted; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing refuses to enforce or enjoins the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as reversed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing enforces the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as affirmed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing sets aside the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as vacated; if the decision is set aside and remanded, treat it as vacated and remanded.
What treatment did the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed?
[ "stay, petition, or motion granted", "affirmed", "reversed", "reversed and remanded", "vacated and remanded", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part", "affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded", "vacated", "petition denied or appeal dismissed", "modify", "remand", "unusual disposition" ]
[ 1 ]
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WEEKS v. ANGELONE, DIRECTOR, VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS No. 99-5746. Argued December 6, 1999 Decided January 19, 2000 Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’Con-nor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsbueg and Beeyer, JJ., joined, and in which Souter, J., joined with respect to all but Part I, post, p. 237. Mark Evan Olive argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Glen A. Huff, Timothy M. Richardson, and Sterling H. Weaver. Robert H. Anderson III, Assistant Attorney General of Virginia, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Mark L. Earley, Attorney General Kent S. Scheidegger filed a brief for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether the Constitution is violated when a trial judge directs a capital jury’s attention to a specific paragraph of a constitutionally sufficient instruction in response to a question regarding the proper consideration of mitigating circumstances. We hold that it is not and that habeas relief is barred by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d) (1994 ed., Supp. III). Petitioner Lonnie Weeks, Jr., was riding from Washington, D. C., to Richmond, Virginia, as a passenger in a car driven by his uncle, Lewis Dukes. Petitioner had stolen the vehicle in a home burglary earlier in the month. The two sped past the marked car of Virginia State Trooper Jose Cavazos, who was monitoring traffic. Trooper Cavazos activated his emergency lights and took chase. After passing other vehicles on the highway shoulder, Dukes stopped on an exit ramp. Trooper Cavazos approached the driver’s side of the stolen vehicle on foot. Upon the trooper’s request, Dukes alighted and stood near the rear of the car. Trooper Cavazos, still standing near the driver’s side, asked petitioner to step out as well. As Weeks stepped out on the passenger’s side, he carried a 9-millimeter semiautomatic pistol loaded with hollow-point bullets. Petitioner proceeded to fire six bullets at the trooper, two of which entered his body near the right and left shoulder straps of his protective vest, and four of which entered his forearms and left wrist. Trooper Cavazos died within minutes. Petitioner was arrested the next morning. During routine questioning about his physical and mental state by elas-sification officers, petitioner confessed, indicating that he was considering suicide because he shot the trooper. Petitioner also voluntarily wrote a letter to a jail officer admitting the killing and expressing remorse. Petitioner was tried in the Circuit Court for Prince William County, Virginia, in October 1993. After the jury had found him guilty of capital murder, a 2-day penalty phase followed. In this proceeding the prosecution sought to prove two aggravating circumstances: that Weeks "would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society” and that his conduct was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved depravity of mind or aggravated battery.” App. 192. During the penalty phase, the defense presented 10 witnesses, including petitioner, in mitigation. The jury retired at 10:40 a.m. on the second day to begin deliberations. At around noon, the judge informed counsel that the jury had asked the following question: “Does the sentence of life imprisonment in the State of Virginia have the possibility of parole, and if so, under what conditions must be met to receive parole?” App. to Pet. for Cert. 90. The judge responded to the jury’s question as follows: “You should impose such punishment as you feel is just under the evidence, and within the instructions of the Court. You are not to concern yourselves with what may happen afterwards.” Ibid. The prosecution agreed with the judge’s response and defense counsel objected. At 12:40 p.m., court reconvened and the judge told the jurors that there would be a 1-hour luncheon recess and that they could go to lunch or continue deliberations, as a juror had apparently informed the bailiff that they might be interested in working through lunch. At 12:45 p.m., the jury retired from the courtroom. At 3:15 p.m., the judge informed counsel that he had received the following written question from the jury: “If we believe that Lonnie Weeks, Jr. is guilty of at least 1 of the alternatives, then is it our duty as a jury to issue the death penalty? Or must we decide (even though he is guilty of one of the alternatives) whether or not to issue the death penalty, or one of the life sentences? What is the Rule? Please clarify?” Id., at 91 (emphasis in original). The judge wrote the following response: “See second paragraph of Instruction #2 (Beginning with ‘If you find from .. .’).” Ibid. The judge explained to counsel his answer to the jury’s question: “In instruction number 2 that was given to them, in the second paragraph, it reads, ‘If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, either of the two alternatives, and as to that alternative, you are unanimous, then you may fix the punishment of the defendant at death, or if you believe from all the evidence that the death penalty is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment of the defendant at imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for life with a fine not to exceed $100,000.’ “I don’t believe I can answer the question any clearer than the instruction, so what I have done is referred them to the second paragraph of instruction number 2, and I told them beginning with, ‘if you find from,’ et cetera, et cetera, for them to reread that paragraph.” App. 222-223. The prosecution stated that the judge’s solution was appropriate. Defense counsel disagreed, and stated: “Your Honor, we would ask that Your Honor instruct the jury that even if they find one or both of the mitigating factors — I’m sorry, the factors that have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, that they still may impose a life sentence, or a life sentence plus a fine.” Id., at 223. Defense counsel asked that his objection be noted. More than two hours later, the jury returned. The clerk read its verdict: “[W]e the jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant Lonnie Weeks, Jr., guilty of capital murder, and having unanimously found that his conduct in committing the offense is outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhumane, in that it involved depravity of mind and or aggravated battery, and having considered the evidence in mitigation of the offense, unanimously fix his punishment at death . . . Id., at 225 (emphasis added). The jurors were polled and all responded affirmatively that the foregoing was their verdict in the ease. Petitioner presented 47 assignments of error in his direct appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, and the assignment of error respecting the judge’s answering the jury’s question about mitigating circumstances was number 44. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed petitioner’s conviction and sentence, holding that the claims petitioner advances here lack merit. Weeks v. Virginia, 248 Va. 460, 465-466, 476-477, 450 S. E. 2d 379, 383, 390 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U. S. 829 (1995). The Virginia Supreme Court dismissed petitioner’s state habeas petition as jurisdictionally barred on timeliness grounds. The District Court denied petitioner’s request for federal habeas relief, and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability and dismissed his petition. 176 F. 3d 249 (1999). We granted certiorari, 527 U. S. 1060 (1999), and now affirm. Petitioner relies heavily on our decisions in Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U. S. 607 (1946), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 (1982). Bollenbach involved a supplemental instruction by the trial court following an inquiry from the jury — in that respect it is like the present ease— but the instruction given by the trial court in Bollenbach was palpably erroneous. 326 U. S., at 611. In this respect it is quite unlike the present case. Eddings arose out of a bench trial in a capital ease, and this Court reversed a sentence of death because the trial judge had refused to consider mitigating evidence: “[I]t was as if the trial judge had instructed a jury to disregard the mitigating evidence Eddings proffered on his behalf.” 455 U. S., at 114. Here the trial judge gave no such instruction. On the contrary, he gave the instruction that we upheld in Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U. S. 269 (1998), as being sufficient to allow the jury to consider mitigating evidence. And in addition, he gave a specific instruction on mitigating evidence — an instruction that was not given in Buchanan — in which he told the jury that “[y]ou must consider a mitigating circumstance if you find there is evidence to support it.” Even the dissenters in Buchanan said that the ambiguity that they found in the instruction there given would have been cleared up by “some mention of mitigating evidence anywhere in the instructions.” Id., at 283. In Buchanan, we considered whether the Eighth Amendment required that a capital jury be instructed on particular mitigating factors. Buchanan’s jury was given precisely the same Virginia pattern capital instruction that was given to Weeks’ jury. See id., at 272, and n. 1. We noted that our eases have established that the senteneer may not be precluded from considering, and may not refuse to consider, any constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence, and that the State may structure the jury’s consideration of mitigation so long as it does not preclude the jury from giving effect to it. Id., at 276. We further noted that the “standard for determining whether jury instructions satisfy these principles was ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.’ ” Ibid, (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370, 380 (1990)). But we stated that we have never held that the State must structure in a particular way the manner in which juries consider mitigating evidence. 522 U. S., at 276. We concluded that the Virginia pattern jury instruction at issue there, and again at issue here, did not violate those principles: “The instruction did not foreclose the jury’s consideration of any mitigating evidence. By directing the jury to base its decision on ‘all the evidence,’ the instruction afforded jurors an opportunity to consider mitigating evidence. The instruction informed the jurors that if they found the aggravating factor proved beyond a reasonable doubt then they ‘may fix’ the penalty at death, but directed that if they believed that all the evidence justified a lesser sentence then they ‘shall’ impose a life sentence. The jury was thus allowed to impose a life sentence even if it found the aggravating factor proved.” Id., at 277. But, as noted above, the jury in this case also received an explicit direction to consider mitigating evidence — an instruction that was not given to the jury in Buchanan. Thus, so far as the adequacy of the jury instructions is concerned, their sufficiency here follows a fortiori from Buchanan. Given that petitioner’s jury was adequately instructed, and given that the trial judge responded to the jury’s question by directing its attention to the precise paragraph of the constitutionally adequate instruction that answers its inquiry, the question becomes whether the Constitution requires anything more. We hold that it does not. A jury is presumed to follow its instructions. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U. S. 200, 211 (1987). Similarly, a jury is presumed to understand a judge’s answer to its question. See, e. g., Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 258, 279 (1826) (opinion of Marshall, C. J.). Weeks’ jury did not inform the court that after reading the relevant paragraph of the instruction, it still did not understand its role. See ibid. (“Had the jury desired further information, they might, and probably would, have signified their desire to the court. The utmost willingness was manifested to gratify them, and it may fairly be presumed that they had nothing farther to ask”). To presume otherwise would require reversal every time a jury inquires about a matter of constitutional significance, regardless of the judge’s answer. Here the presumption gains additional support from several empirical factors. First and foremost, each of the jurors affirmed in open court the verdict which included a finding that they had “considered the evidence in mitigation of the offense.” App. 225. It is also significant, we think, that the jurors deliberated for more than two hours after receiving the judge’s answer to their question. Over áVz hours after the jury retired to begin deliberations, the jury asked the question at issue. Again, the question was: “If we believe that Lonnie Weeks, Jr. is guilty of at least 1 of the alternatives, then is it our duty as a jury to issue the death penalty? Or must we decide (even though he is guilty of one of the alternatives) whether or not to issue the death penalty, or one of the life sentences? What is the Rule? Please clarify?” App. to Pet. for Cert. 91 (emphasis in original). The question indicates that at the time it was asked, the jury had determined that the prosecution had proved one of the two aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. More than two hours passed between the judge directing the jury’s attention to the appropriate paragraph of the instruction that answered its question and the jury returning its verdict. We cannot, of course, know for certain what transpired during those two hours. But the most likely explanation is that the jury was doing exactly what it was instructed to do: that is, weighing the mitigating circumstances against the aggravating circumstance that it found to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. If, after the judge’s response to its question, the jury thought that it was required to give the death penalty upon finding of an aggravating circumstance, it is unlikely that the jury would have consumed two more hours in deliberation. This particular jury demonstrated that it was not too shy to ask questions, suggesting that it would have asked another if it felt the judge’s response unsatisfactory. Finally, defense counsel specifically explained to the jury during closing argument that it could find both aggravating factors proven and still not sentence Weeks to death. Thus, once the jury received the judge’s response to its question, it had not only the text of the instruction we approved in Buchanan, but also the additional instruction on mitigation, see n. 2, supra, and its own recollection of defense counsel’s closing argument for guidance. At best, petitioner has demonstrated only that there exists a slight possibility that the jury considered itself precluded from considering mitigating evidence. Such a demonstration is insufficient to prove a constitutional violation under Boyde, which requires the showing of a reasonable likelihood that the jury felt so restrained. See 494 U. S., at 380. It also appears that petitioner’s attorneys did not view the judge’s answer to the jury’s question as a serious flaw in the trial at that time. Petitioner’s attorney made an oral motion to set aside the sentence after the verdict of death was received, and did not even mention this incident in his motion. And the low priority and space which his counsel assigned to the point on his appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia suggests that the present emphasis has some of the earmarks of an afterthought. Because petitioner seeks a federal writ of habeas corpus from a state sentence, we must determine whether 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d) (1994 ed., Supp. III) precludes such relief. The Court of Appeals below held that it did. 176 F. 3d, at 261. We agree. Section 2254(d) prohibits federal habeas relief on any claim “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings/’ unless that adjudication resulted in a decision that was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. §§ 2254(d) and (1) (1994 ed., Supp. III). For the reasons stated above, it follows a fortiori that the adjudication of the Supreme Court of Virginia affirming petitioner’s conviction and sentence neither was “contrary to,” nor involved an “unreasonable application of,” any of our decisions. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Instruction No. 2, in its entirety, read: ,fYou have convicted the defendant of an offense which may be punished by death. You must decide whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death or to imprisonment for life or to imprisonment for life and a fine of a specific amount, but not more than $100,000.00. Before the penalty can be fixed at death, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the following two alternatives: “1. That, after consideration of his history and background, there is a probability that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society; or "2. That his conduct in committing the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim beyond the minimum necessary to accomplish the act of murder. “If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt either of the two alternatives, and as to that alternative you are unanimous, then you may fix the punishment of the defendant at death or if you believe from all the evidence that the. death penalty is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment of the defendant at life imprisonment or imprisonment for live [sic] and a fine of a specific amount, but not more than $100,000.00. “If the Commonwealth has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the alternatives, then you shall fix the punishment of the defendant at life imprisonment or imprisonment for live [sic] and a fine of a specific amount, but not more than $100,000.00.” App. 192-193. That instruction was titled “EVIDENCE IN MITIGATION” and stated in full: “Mitigation evidence is not evidence offered as an excuse for the crime of which you have found defendant guilty. Rather, it is any evidence which in fairness may serve as a basis for a sentence less than death. The law requires your consideration of more than the bare facts of the crime. “Mitigating circumstances may include, but not be limited to, any facts relating to defendant’s age, character, education, environment, life and background, or any aspect of the crime itself which might be considered extenuating or tend to reduce his moral culpability or make him less deserving of the extreme punishment of death. “You must consider a mitigating circumstance if you find there is evidence to support it. The weight which you accord a particular mitigating circumstance is a matter of your judgment.” Id., at 195. Justice Stevens attempts to distinguish the instruction given here from that given in Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U. S., at 272, n. 1, on the basis that the first paragraph of the “Weeks instructions contain[s] a longer description” of the aggravating circumstances. Post, at 239 (dissenting opinion). The first paragraph is longer here because the prosecution in Buchanan sought to prove only one aggravating circumstance. See 522 U. S., at 271. The mere addition of the description of another aggravating circumstance in the first paragraph, however, does not at all affect the second clause of the second paragraph of the instruction — the clause that Justice Stevens finds “ambiguous.” Post, at 241. More importantly, Justice Stevens, after stating that his "point is best made by quoting the instruction itself,” post, at 239, fails to quote the third paragraph of the instruction, post, at 239-240. That paragraph expressly applies when the jury finds that the prosecution failed to prove either aggravating circumstance. Specifically, it instructs that if the jury finds no aggravating circumstances, then it must impose a life sentence. See n. 1, supra. The third paragraph stands in contrast to the second paragraph, which expressly applies when the jury finds that the prosecution proved one or both of the aggravating circumstances. The second paragraph offers the jury the option of imposing whichever sentence— death or life imprisonment — it feels is justified in that situation. The existence of the third paragraph makes the function of the second paragraph even clearer. Justice Stevens’ arguments concerning the lack of a jury verdict form stating that the jury finds one or both aggravating circumstances and sentences the petitioner to life imprisonment miss the mark. The life sentence verdict forms do not suggest that a prerequisite for their use is that the jury found no aggravating circumstances. See post, at 246, n. 8. In any event, the claim here is that the trial judge’s response to the jury’s question was constitutionally insufficient, not that the jury verdict forms were unconstitutionally ambiguous. Justice Stevens states that the record establishes a “virtual certainty” that the jury did not understand that it could find an aggravating circumstance and still impose a life sentence. Post, at 238. In view of the different conclusion reached not only by this Court, but by the Virginia trial judge, seven justices of the Supreme Court of Virginia, a federal habeas District Judge, and three judges of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, this statement can only be described as extravagant hyperbole. The dissent also interprets the evidence of the jurors being in tears at the time of the verdict as resulting from having performed what they thought to be their “duty under the law*' despite their “strong desire” to impose the life sentence. Post, at 249. It is difficult enough to speculate with confidence about the deliberations of jurors in a case such as this, and still more difficult to speculate about their emotions at the time they render a verdict. But if we were to join in this speculation, it is every bit as plausible — if not more so — to think that the reason that jurors were in tears was because they had just been through an exhausting, soul-searching process that led to a conclusion that petitioner, despite the mitigating evidence he presented, still deserved the death sentence.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them. Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer. Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.
Who is the petitioner of the case?
[ "attorney general of the United States, or his office", "specified state board or department of education", "city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit", "state commission, board, committee, or authority", "county government or county governmental unit, except school district", "court or judicial district", "state department or agency", "governmental employee or job applicant", "female governmental employee or job applicant", "minority governmental employee or job applicant", "minority female governmental employee or job applicant", "not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable", "retired or former governmental employee", "U.S. House of Representatives", "interstate compact", "judge", "state legislature, house, or committee", "local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough", "governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact", "state or U.S. supreme court", "local school district or board of education", "U.S. Senate", "U.S. senator", "foreign nation or instrumentality", "state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of", "state college or university", "United States", "State", "person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime", "advertising business or agency", "agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor", "airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes", "airline", "distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages", "alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked", "American Medical Association", "National Railroad Passenger Corp.", "amusement establishment, or recreational facility", "arrested person, or pretrial detainee", "attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association", "author, copyright holder", "bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company", "bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization", "establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store", "water transportation, stevedore", "bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines", "brewery, distillery", "broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm", "construction industry", "bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle", "business, corporation", "buyer, purchaser", "cable TV", "car dealer", "person convicted of crime", "tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband", "chemical company", "child, children, including adopted or illegitimate", "religious organization, institution, or person", "private club or facility", "coal company or coal mine operator", "computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software", "consumer, consumer organization", "creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company", "person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial", "defendant", "debtor", "real estate developer", "disabled person or disability benefit claimant", "distributor", "person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector", "drug manufacturer", "druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy", "employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of", "employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan", "electric equipment manufacturer", "electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company", "eleemosynary institution or person", "environmental organization", "employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.", "farmer, farm worker, or farm organization", "father", "female employee or job applicant", "female", "movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of", "fisherman or fishing company", "food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard", "foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity", "franchiser", "franchisee", "lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization", "person who guarantees another's obligations", "handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to", "health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor", "heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be", "hospital, medical center", "husband, or ex-husband", "involuntarily committed mental patient", "Indian, including Indian tribe or nation", "insurance company, or surety", "inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder", "investor", "injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related", "juvenile", "government contractor", "holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor", "magazine", "male", "medical or Medicaid claimant", "medical supply or manufacturing co.", "racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant", "minority female employee or job applicant", "manufacturer", "management, executive officer, or director, of business entity", "military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist", "mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company", "mother", "auto manufacturer", "newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service", "radio and television network, except cable tv", "nonprofit organization or business", "nonresident", "nuclear power plant or facility", "owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels", "shareholders to whom a tender offer is made", "tender offer", "oil company, or natural gas producer", "elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly", "out of state noncriminal defendant", "political action committee", "parent or parents", "parking lot or service", "patient of a health professional", "telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company", "physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society", "public interest organization", "physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee", "pipe line company", "package, luggage, container", "political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official", "indigent, needy, welfare recipient", "indigent defendant", "private person", "prisoner, inmate of penal institution", "professional organization, business, or person", "probationer, or parolee", "protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer", "public utility", "publisher, publishing company", "radio station", "racial or ethnic minority", "person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination", "racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "realtor", "journalist, columnist, member of the news media", "resident", "restaurant, food vendor", "retarded person, or mental incompetent", "retired or former employee", "railroad", "private school, college, or university", "seller or vendor", "shipper, including importer and exporter", "shopping center, mall", "spouse, or former spouse", "stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder", "retail business or outlet", "student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only", "tenant or lessee", "theater, studio", "forest products, lumber, or logging company", "person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent", "trucking company, or motor carrier", "television station", "union member", "unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant", "union, labor organization, or official of", "veteran", "voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)", "wholesale trade", "wife, or ex-wife", "witness, or person under subpoena", "network", "slave", "slave-owner", "bank of the united states", "timber company", "u.s. job applicants or employees", "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "General Land Office of Commissioners", "Transportation Security Administration", "Surface Transportation Board", "U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.", "Reconstruction Finance Corp.", "Department or Secretary of Homeland Security", "Unidentifiable", "International Entity" ]
[ 54 ]
sc
BOURJAILY v. UNITED STATES No. 85-6725. Argued April 1, 1987 Decided June 23, 1987 Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Powell, Stevens, O’Connor, and Scalia, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 184. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 186. Stephen Allan Saltzburg argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were James R. Willis and James M. Shellow. Lawrence S. Robbins argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Weld, and Deputy Solicitor General Bryson. Judy Clarke and Mario G. Conte filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging reversal. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) provides: “A statement is not hearsay if. . . [t]he statement is offered against a party and is ... a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” We granted certiorari to answer three questions regarding the admission of statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E): (1) whether the court must determine by independent evidence that the conspiracy existed and that the defendant and the declarant were members of this conspiracy; (2) the quantum of proof on which such determinations must be based; and (3) whether a court must in each case examine the circumstances of such a statement to determine its reliability. 479 U. S. 881 (1986). In May 1984, Clarence Greathouse, an informant working for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), arranged to sell a kilogram of cocaine to Angelo Lonardo. Lonardo agreed that he would find individuals to distribute the drug. When the sale became imminent, Lonardo stated in a tape-recorded telephone conversation that he had a “gentleman friend” who had some questions to ask about the cocaine. In a subsequent telephone call, Greathouse spoke to the “friend” about the quality of the drug and the price. Greathouse then spoke again with Lonardo, and the two arranged the details of the purchase. They agreed that the sale would take place in a designated hotel parking lot, and Lonardo would transfer the drug from Greathouse’s car to the “friend,” who would be waiting in the parking lot in his own car. Greathouse proceeded with the transaction as planned, and FBI agents arrested Lonardo and petitioner immediately after Lonardo placed a kilogram of cocaine into petitioner’s car in the hotel parking lot. In petitioner’s car, the agents found over $20,000 in cash. Petitioner was charged with conspiring to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U. S. C. §846, and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, a violation of 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1). The Government introduced, over petitioner’s objection, Angelo Lonardo’s telephone statements regarding the participation of the “friend” in the transaction. The District Court found that, considering the events in the parking lot and Lonardo’s statements over the telephone, the Government had established by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy involving Lonardo and petitioner existed, and that Lonardo’s statements- over the -telephone had been made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. App. 66-75. Accordingly, the trial court held that Lonardo’s out-of-court statements satisfied Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and were not hearsay. Petitioner was convicted on both counts and sentenced to 15 years. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 781 F. 2d 539 (1986). The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court’s analysis and conclusion that Lonardo’s out-of-court statements were admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court also rejected petitioner’s contention that because he could not cross-examine Lonardo, the admission of these statements violated his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. We affirm. Before admitting a co-conspirator’s statement over an objection that it does not qualify under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), a court must be satisfied that the statement actually falls within the definition of the Rule. There must be evidence that there was a conspiracy involving the declarant and the nonoffering party, and that the statement was made “during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) provides: “Preliminary questions concerning . . . the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court.” Petitioner and the Government agree that the existence of a conspiracy and petitioner’s involvement in it are preliminary questions of fact that, under Rule 104, must be resolved by the court. The Federal Rules, however, nowhere define the standard of proof the court must observe in resolving these questions. We are therefore guided by our prior decisions regarding admissibility determinations that hinge on preliminary factual questions. We have traditionally required that these matters be established by a preponderance of proof. Evidence is placed before the jury when it satisfies the technical requirements of the evidentiary Rules, which embody certain legal and policy determinations. The inquiry made by a court concerned with these matters is not whether the proponent of the evidence wins or loses his case on the merits, but whether the evidentiary Rules have been satisfied. Thus, the evidentiary standard is unrelated to the burden of proof on the substantive issues, be it a criminal case, see In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970), or a civil case. See generally Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U. S. 157, 167-169 (1986). The preponderance standard ensures that before admitting evidence, the court will have found it more likely than not that the technical issues and policy concerns addressed by the Federal Rules of Evidence have been afforded due consideration. As in Lego v. Twomey, 404 U. S. 477, 488 (1972), we find “nothing to suggest that admissibility rulings have been unreliable or otherwise wanting in quality because not based on some higher standard.” We think that our previous decisions in this area resolve the matter. See, e. g., Colorado v. Connelly, supra (preliminary fact that custodial confessant waived rights must be proved by preponderance of the evidence); Nix v. Williams, 467 U. S. 431, 444, n. 5 (1984) (inevitable discovery of illegally seized evidence must be shown to have been more likely than not); United States v. Matlock, 415 U. S. 164 (1974) (voluntariness of consent to search must be shown by preponderance of the evidence); Lego v. Twomey, supra (voluntariness of confession must be demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence). Therefore, we hold that when the preliminary facts relevant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) are disputed, the offering party must prove them by a preponderance of the evidence. Even though petitioner agrees that the courts below applied the proper standard of proof with regard to the preliminary facts relevant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E), he nevertheless challenges the admission of Lonardo’s statements. Petitioner argues that in determining whether a conspiracy exists and whether the defendant was a member of it, the court must look only to independent evidence — that is, evidence other than the statements sought to be admitted. Petitioner relies on Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60 (1942), in which this Court first mentioned the so-called “bootstrapping rule.” The relevant issue in Glasser was whether Glasser’s counsel, who also represented another defendant, faced such a conflict of interest that Glasser received ineffective assistance. Glasser contended that conflicting loyalties led his lawyer not to object to statements made by one of Glasser’s co-conspirators. The Government argued that any objection would have been fruitless because the statements were admissible. The Court rejected this proposition: “[S]uch declarations are admissible over the objection of an alleged co-conspirator, who was not present when they were made, only if there is proof aliunde that he is connected with the conspiracy. . . . Otherwise, hearsay would lift itself by its own bootstraps to the level of competent evidence.” Id., at 74-75. The Court revisited the bootstrapping rule in United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974), where again, in passing, the Court stated: “Declarations by one defendant may also be admissible against other defendants upon a sufficient showing, by independent evidence, of a conspiracy among one or more other defendants and the declarant and if the declarations at issue were in furtherance of that conspiracy.” Id., at 701, and n. 14 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Read in the light most favorable to petitioner, Glasser could mean that a court should not consider hearsay statements at all in determining preliminary facts under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Petitioner, of course, adopts this view of the bootstrapping rule. Glasser, however, could also mean that a court must have some proof aliunde, but may look at the hearsay statements themselves in light of this independent evidence to determine whether a conspiracy has been shown by a preponderance of the evidence. The Courts of Appeals have widely adopted the former view and held that in determining the preliminary facts relevant to co-conspirators’ out-of-court statements, a court may not look at the hearsay statements themselves for their evidentiary value. Both Glasser and Nixon, however, were decided before Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. These Rules now govern the treatment of evidentiary questions in federal courts. Rule 104(a) provides: “Preliminary questions concerning . . . the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court.... In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.” Similarly, Rule 1101(d)(1) states that the Rules of Evidence (other than with respect to privileges) shall not apply to “[t]he determination of questions of fact preliminary to admissibility of evidence when the issue is to be determined by the court under rule 104.” The question thus presented is whether any aspect of Glasser’s bootstrapping rule remains viable after the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Petitioner concedes that Rule 104, on its face, appears to allow the court to make the preliminary factual determinations relevant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) by considering any evidence it wishes, unhindered by considerations of admissibility. Brief for Petitioner 27. That would seem to many to be the end of the matter. Congress has decided that courts may consider hearsay in making these factual determinations. Out-of-court statements made by anyone, including putative co-conspirators, are often hearsay. Even if they are, they may be considered, Glasser and the bootstrapping rule notwithstanding. But petitioner nevertheless argues that the bootstrapping rule, as most Courts of Appeals have construed it, survived this apparently unequivocal change in the law unscathed and that Rule 104, as applied to the admission of co-conspirator’s statements, does not mean what it says. We disagree. Petitioner claims that Congress evidenced no intent to disturb the bootstrapping rule, which was embedded in the previous approach, and we should not find that Congress altered the rule without affirmative evidence so indicating. It would be extraordinary to require legislative history to confirm the plain meaning of Rule 104. The Rule on its face allows the trial judge to consider any evidence whatsoever, bound only by the rules of privilege. We think that the Rule is sufficiently clear that to the extent that it is inconsistent with petitioner’s interpretation of Glasser and Nixon, the Rule prevails. Nor do we agree with petitioner that this construction of Rule 104(a) will allow courts to admit hearsay statements without any credible proof of the conspiracy, thus fundamentally changing the nature of the co-conspirator exception. Petitioner starts with the proposition that co-conspirators’ out-of-court statements are deemed unreliable and are inadmissible, at least until a conspiracy is shown. Since these statements are unreliable, petitioner contends that they should not form any part of the basis for establishing a conspiracy, the very antecedent that renders them admissible. Petitioner’s theory ignores two simple facts of evidentiary life. First, out-of-court statements are only presumed unreliable. The presumption may be rebutted by appropriate proof. See Fed. Rule Evid. 803(24) (otherwise inadmissible hearsay may be admitted if circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness demonstrated). Second, individual pieces of evidence, insufficient in themselves to prove a point, may in cumulation prove it. The sum of an evidentiary presentation may well be greater than its constituent parts. Taken together, these two propositions demonstrate that a piece of evidence, unreliable in isolation, may become quite probative when corroborated by other evidence. A per se rule barring consideration of these hearsay statements during preliminary factfinding is not therefore required. Even if out-of-court declarations by co-conspirators are presumptively unreliable, trial courts must be permitted to evaluate these statements for their evidentiary worth as revealed by the particular circumstances of the case. Courts often act as factfinders, and there is no reason to believe that courts are any less able to properly recognize the probative value of evidence in this particular area. The party opposing admission has an adequate incentive to point out the shortcomings in such evidence before the trial court finds the preliminary facts. If the opposing party is unsuccessful in keeping the evidence from the factfinder, he still has the opportunity to attack the probative value of the evidence as it relates to the substantive issue in the case. See, e. g., Fed. Rule Evid. 806 (allowing attack on credibility of out-of-court declarant). We think that there is little doubt that a co-conspirator’s statements could themselves be probative of the existence of a conspiracy and the participation of both the defendant and the declarant in the conspiracy. Petitioner’s case presents a paradigm. The out-of-court statements of Lonardo indicated that Lonardo was involved in a conspiracy with a “friend.” The statements indicated that the friend had agreed with Lonardo to buy a kilogram of cocaine and to distribute it. The statements also revealed that the friend would be at the hotel parking lot, in his car, and would accept the cocaine from Greathouse’s car after Greathouse gave Lonardo the keys. Each one of Lonardo’s statements may itself be unreliable, but taken as a whole, the entire conversation between Lonardo and Greathouse was corroborated by independent evidence. The friend, who turned out to be petitioner, showed up at the prearranged spot at the prearranged time. He picked up the cocaine, and a significant sum of money was found in his car. On these facts, the trial court concluded, in our view correctly, that the Government had established the existence of a conspiracy and petitioner’s participation in it. We need not decide in this case whether the courts below could have relied solely upon Lonardo’s hearsay statements to determine that a conspiracy had been established by a preponderance of the evidence. To the extent that Glasser meant that courts could not look to the hearsay statements themselves for any purpose, it has clearly been superseded by Rule 104(a). It is sufficient for today to hold that a court, in making a preliminary factual determination under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), may examine the hearsay statements sought to be admitted. As we have held in other cases concerning admissibility determinations, “the judge should receive the evidence and give it such weight as his judgment and experience counsel.” United States v. Matlock, 415 U. S., at 175. The courts below properly considered the statements of Lonardo and the subsequent events in finding that the Government had established by a preponderance of the evidence that Lonardo was involved in a conspiracy with petitioner. We have no reason to believe that the District Court’s factfinding of this point was clearly erroneous. We hold that Lonardo’s out-of-court statements were properly admitted against petitioner. We also reject any suggestion that admission of these statements against petitioner violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. That Clause provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” At petitioner’s trial, Lonardo exercised his right not to testify. Petitioner argued that Lonardo’s unavailability rendered the admission of his out-of-court statements unconstitutional since petitioner had no opportunity to confront Lonardo as to these statements. The Court of Appeals held that the requirements for admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) are identical to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause, and since the statements were admissible under the Rule, there was no constitutional problem. We agree. While a literal interpretation of the Confrontation Clause could bar the use of any out-of-court statements when the declarant is unavailable, this Court has rejected that view as “unintended and too extreme.” Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56, 63 (1980). Rather, we have attempted to harmonize the goal of the Clause — placing limits on the kind of evidence that may be received against a defendant — with a societal interest in accurate factfinding, which may require consideration of out-of-court statements. To accommodate these competing interests, the Court has, as a general matter only, required the prosecution to demonstrate both the unavailability of the declarant and the “indicia of reliability” surrounding the out-of-court declaration. Id., at 65-66. Last Term in United States v. Inadi, 475 U. S. 387 (1986), we held that the first of these two generalized inquiries, unavailability, was not required when the hearsay statement is the out-of-court declaration of a co-conspirator. Today, we conclude that the second inquiry, independent indicia of reliability, is also not mandated by the Constitution. The Court’s decision in Ohio v. Roberts laid down only “a general approach to the problem” of reconciling hearsay exceptions with the Confrontation Clause. See 448 U. S., at 65. In fact, Roberts itself limits the requirement that a court make a separate inquiry into the reliability of an out-of-court statement. Because “ ‘hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values,’ California v. Green, 399 U. S. [149, 155 (1970)], and ‘stem from the same roots,’ Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 86 (1970),” id., at 66, we concluded in Roberts that no independent inquiry into reliability is required when the evidence “falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.” Ibid. We think that the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is firmly enough rooted in our jurisprudence that, under this Court’s holding in Roberts, a court need not independently inquire into the reliability of such statements. Cf. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74 (1970) (reliability inquiry required where evidentiary rule deviates from common-law approach, admitting co-conspirators’ hearsay statements made after termination of conspiracy). The admissibility of co-conspirators’ statements was first established in this Court over a century and a half ago in United States v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 460 (1827) (interpreting statements of co-conspirator as res gestae and thus admissible against defendant), and the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the exception as accepted practice. In fact, two of the most prominent approvals of the rule came in cases that petitioner maintains are still vital today, Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60 (1942), and United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974). To the extent that these cases have not been superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence, they demonstrate that the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is steeped in our jurisprudence. In Delaney v. United States, 263 U. S. 586, 590 (1924), the Court rejected the very challenge petitioner brings today, holding that there can be no separate Confrontation Clause challenge to the admission of a co-conspirator’s out-of-court statement. In so ruling, the Court relied on established precedent holding such statements competent evidence. We think that these cases demonstrate that co-conspirators’ statements, when made in the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy, have a long tradition of being outside the compass of the general hearsay exclusion. Accordingly, we hold that the Confrontation Clause does not require a court to embark on an independent inquiry into the reliability of statements that satisfy the requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. We intimate no view on the proper standard of proof for questions falling under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b) (conditional relevancy). We also decline to address the circumstances in which the burden of coming forward to show that the proffered evidence is inadmissible is appropriately placed on the nonoffering party. See E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 53, p. 136, n. 8 (3d ed. 1984). Finally, we do not express an opinion on the proper order of proof that trial courts should follow in concluding that the preponderance standard has been satisfied in an ongoing trial. The Advisory Committee Notes show that the Rule was not adopted in a fit of absentmindedness. The Note to Rule 104 specifically addresses the process by which a federal court should make the factual determinations requisite to a finding of admissibility: “If the question is factual in nature, the judge will of necessity receive evidence pro and con on the issue. The rule provides that the rules of evidence in general do not apply to this process. McCormick § 53, p. 123, n. 8, points out that the authorities are ‘scattered and inconclusive,’ and observes: “ ‘Should the exclusionary law of evidence, “the child of the jury system” in Thayer’s phrase, be applied to this hearing before the judge? Sound sense backs the view that it should not, and that the judge should be empowered to hear any relevant evidence, such as affidavits or other reliable hearsay.’” 28 U. S. C. App., p. 681 (emphasis added). The Advisory Committee further noted: “An item, offered and objected to, may itself be considered in ruling on admissibility, though not yet admitted in evidence.” Ibid, (emphasis added). We think this language makes plain the drafters’ intent to abolish any kind of bootstrapping rule. Silence is at best ambiguous, and we decline the invitation to rely on speculation to import ambiguity into what is otherwise a clear rule. Given this disposition, we have no occasion to address the Government’s argument, Brief for United States 21-25, that Lonardo’s statements are admissible independent of Rule 801(d)(2)(E). We reject any suggestion that by abolishing the bootstrapping rule, the Federal Rules of Evidence have changed the co-conspirator hearsay exception such that it is no longer “firmly rooted” in our legal tradition. The bootstrapping rule relates only to the method of proof that the exception has been satisfied. It does not change any element of the co-conspirator exception, which has remained substantively unchanged since its adoption in this country.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them. Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer. Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.
Who is the respondent of the case?
[ "attorney general of the United States, or his office", "specified state board or department of education", "city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit", "state commission, board, committee, or authority", "county government or county governmental unit, except school district", "court or judicial district", "state department or agency", "governmental employee or job applicant", "female governmental employee or job applicant", "minority governmental employee or job applicant", "minority female governmental employee or job applicant", "not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable", "retired or former governmental employee", "U.S. House of Representatives", "interstate compact", "judge", "state legislature, house, or committee", "local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough", "governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact", "state or U.S. supreme court", "local school district or board of education", "U.S. Senate", "U.S. senator", "foreign nation or instrumentality", "state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of", "state college or university", "United States", "State", "person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime", "advertising business or agency", "agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor", "airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes", "airline", "distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages", "alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked", "American Medical Association", "National Railroad Passenger Corp.", "amusement establishment, or recreational facility", "arrested person, or pretrial detainee", "attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association", "author, copyright holder", "bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company", "bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization", "establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store", "water transportation, stevedore", "bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines", "brewery, distillery", "broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm", "construction industry", "bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle", "business, corporation", "buyer, purchaser", "cable TV", "car dealer", "person convicted of crime", "tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband", "chemical company", "child, children, including adopted or illegitimate", "religious organization, institution, or person", "private club or facility", "coal company or coal mine operator", "computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software", "consumer, consumer organization", "creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company", "person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial", "defendant", "debtor", "real estate developer", "disabled person or disability benefit claimant", "distributor", "person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector", "drug manufacturer", "druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy", "employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of", "employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan", "electric equipment manufacturer", "electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company", "eleemosynary institution or person", "environmental organization", "employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.", "farmer, farm worker, or farm organization", "father", "female employee or job applicant", "female", "movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of", "fisherman or fishing company", "food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard", "foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity", "franchiser", "franchisee", "lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization", "person who guarantees another's obligations", "handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to", "health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor", "heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be", "hospital, medical center", "husband, or ex-husband", "involuntarily committed mental patient", "Indian, including Indian tribe or nation", "insurance company, or surety", "inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder", "investor", "injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related", "juvenile", "government contractor", "holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor", "magazine", "male", "medical or Medicaid claimant", "medical supply or manufacturing co.", "racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant", "minority female employee or job applicant", "manufacturer", "management, executive officer, or director, of business entity", "military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist", "mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company", "mother", "auto manufacturer", "newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service", "radio and television network, except cable tv", "nonprofit organization or business", "nonresident", "nuclear power plant or facility", "owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels", "shareholders to whom a tender offer is made", "tender offer", "oil company, or natural gas producer", "elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly", "out of state noncriminal defendant", "political action committee", "parent or parents", "parking lot or service", "patient of a health professional", "telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company", "physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society", "public interest organization", "physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee", "pipe line company", "package, luggage, container", "political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official", "indigent, needy, welfare recipient", "indigent defendant", "private person", "prisoner, inmate of penal institution", "professional organization, business, or person", "probationer, or parolee", "protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer", "public utility", "publisher, publishing company", "radio station", "racial or ethnic minority", "person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination", "racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "realtor", "journalist, columnist, member of the news media", "resident", "restaurant, food vendor", "retarded person, or mental incompetent", "retired or former employee", "railroad", "private school, college, or university", "seller or vendor", "shipper, including importer and exporter", "shopping center, mall", "spouse, or former spouse", "stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder", "retail business or outlet", "student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution", "taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only", "tenant or lessee", "theater, studio", "forest products, lumber, or logging company", "person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent", "trucking company, or motor carrier", "television station", "union member", "unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant", "union, labor organization, or official of", "veteran", "voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)", "wholesale trade", "wife, or ex-wife", "witness, or person under subpoena", "network", "slave", "slave-owner", "bank of the united states", "timber company", "u.s. job applicants or employees", "Army and Air Force Exchange Service", "Atomic Energy Commission", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force", "Department or Secretary of Agriculture", "Alien Property Custodian", "Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army", "Board of Immigration Appeals", "Bureau of Indian Affairs", "Bonneville Power Administration", "Benefits Review Board", "Civil Aeronautics Board", "Bureau of the Census", "Central Intelligence Agency", "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "Department or Secretary of Commerce", "Comptroller of Currency", "Consumer Product Safety Commission", "Civil Rights Commission", "Civil Service Commission, U.S.", "Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs", "Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission", "Drug Enforcement Agency", "Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)", "Department or Secretary of Energy", "Department or Secretary of the Interior", "Department of Justice or Attorney General", "Department or Secretary of State", "Department or Secretary of Transportation", "Department or Secretary of Education", "U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner", "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator", "Federal Aviation Agency or Administration", "Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director", "Federal Bureau of Prisons", "Farm Credit Administration", "Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)", "Federal Credit Union Administration", "Food and Drug Administration", "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "Federal Energy Administration", "Federal Election Commission", "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "Federal Housing Administration", "Federal Home Loan Bank Board", "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "Federal Maritime Board", "Federal Maritime Commission", "Farmers Home Administration", "Federal Parole Board", "Federal Power Commission", "Federal Railroad Administration", "Federal Reserve Board of Governors", "Federal Reserve System", "Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation", "Federal Trade Commission", "Federal Works Administration, or Administrator", "General Accounting Office", "Comptroller General", "General Services Administration", "Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare", "Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services", "Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development", "Interstate Commerce Commission", "Indian Claims Commission", "Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement", "Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of", "Information Security Oversight Office", "Department or Secretary of Labor", "Loyalty Review Board", "Legal Services Corporation", "Merit Systems Protection Board", "Multistate Tax Commission", "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy", "National Credit Union Administration", "National Endowment for the Arts", "National Enforcement Commission", "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration", "National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer", "National Mediation Board", "National Railroad Adjustment Board", "Nuclear Regulatory Commission", "National Security Agency", "Office of Economic Opportunity", "Office of Management and Budget", "Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator", "Office of Personnel Management", "Occupational Safety and Health Administration", "Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission", "Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of", "Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)", "Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation", "U.S. Public Health Service", "Postal Rate Commission", "Provider Reimbursement Review Board", "Renegotiation Board", "Railroad Adjustment Board", "Railroad Retirement Board", "Subversive Activities Control Board", "Small Business Administration", "Securities and Exchange Commission", "Social Security Administration or Commissioner", "Selective Service System", "Department or Secretary of the Treasury", "Tennessee Valley Authority", "United States Forest Service", "United States Parole Commission", "Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster", "United States Sentencing Commission", "Veterans' Administration", "War Production Board", "Wage Stabilization Board", "General Land Office of Commissioners", "Transportation Security Administration", "Surface Transportation Board", "U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.", "Reconstruction Finance Corp.", "Department or Secretary of Homeland Security", "Unidentifiable", "International Entity" ]
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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al. v. TRI COUNTY INDUSTRIES, INC. No. 99-1953. Argued January 10, 2001 Decided January 17, 2001 Charles L. Reisckel, Deputy Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Robert R. Rigsby, Corporation Counsel, and Donna M. Mur ashy, Senior Assistant Corporation Counsel. Frank J. Emig argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Jeffrey Robert White and Frederick M. Baron filed a brief for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Per Curiam. The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently • granted.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
What is the issue area of the decision?
[ "Criminal Procedure", "Civil Rights", "First Amendment", "Due Process", "Privacy", "Attorneys", "Unions", "Economic Activity", "Judicial Power", "Federalism", "Interstate Relations", "Federal Taxation", "Miscellaneous", "Private Action" ]
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